

# **THE IMPACT OF PLURALITY VOTING SYSTEM ON ZAMBIAN POLITICS**

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>A.N.C</b>	<b>= African National Congress</b>
<b>B.N.P</b>	<b>= Barotse National Party</b>
<b>D.P.</b>	<b>= Democratic Party</b>
<b>IND.</b>	<b>= Independent</b>
<b>L.D.A.</b>	<b>= Liberal Democratic Alliance</b>
<b>L.P.F.</b>	<b>= Liberal Progressive Front</b>
<b>L.P.</b>	<b>= Liberal Party</b>
<b>LIB/SDP.</b>	<b>=Liberal/Social Democratic Alliance</b>
<b>NA.D.A.</b>	<b>= National Democratic Alliance</b>
<b>N.D.P.</b>	<b>= National Democratic Party</b>
<b>N.P.</b>	<b>= National Party</b>
<b>N.L.P.</b>	<b>= National Lima Party</b>
<b>N.I.P.</b>	<b>= Northern Ireland Party</b>
<b>N.P.P</b>	<b>= National Progress Party</b>
<b>M.M.D.</b>	<b>= Movement For Multiparty Democracy</b>
<b>PLAID CYM.</b>	<b>= Plaid Cymru ( Welsh Nationalist Party)</b>
<b>R.R.P</b>	<b>= Rhodesia Republic Party</b>
<b>S.N.P.</b>	<b>= Scottish Nationalist Party</b>
<b>U.F.P</b>	<b>= United Federal Party</b>
<b>U.N.I.P.</b>	<b>= United National Independence Party</b>
<b>U.P.P.</b>	<b>= United Patriotic Party</b>
<b>Z.D.C.</b>	<b>= Zambia Democratic Party</b>

## CHAPTER 1

### Introduction

Zambia inherited the Plurality Voting System from Britain at Independence on 24 October 1964 and the system has been in use since then. This system, variously known as first-past-the post (FPTP) simple and relative majority, produced a condorcet winner in a two-candidate contest. But it was also capable of producing condorcet losers as winners in contests where there were more than two candidates. It was very simple to operate as an electoral system since the winning candidate was the one with the highest number of votes relative to each one of his opponents who together constituted the majority vote. If a political party won an election on this basis, it would end up forming a government on a minority electoral vote, but with a majority in parliament as would be shown from the British experience in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

*It was on this basis that the plurality Voting system had become the subject of controversy even in the country of its origin, Britain, between its supporters and its critics. The latter criticized the system for its lack of proportionality between the votes polled and the parliamentary seats secured by the competing political parties. They further pointed out that because of this lack of fairness in the system, there were normally incidences where majority parties nationally were under represented in parliament while those which were minorities vote-wise were at times grossly over-represented. As if this was not enough, the system virtually excluded minority groups from parliamentary representation (Bogdanor, 1984:1 - 6; Humphreys, 1911:20; Lakeman, 1955:32), as illustrated by Table 1 below:*

TABLE 1: 1983 British General Election Results

PARTY	VOTES	%	SEATS	%
Conserv.	13,012,315	42.4	397	61.1
Labour	8,456,934	27.6	209	32.2
Lib./SDP.	7,780,949	25.4	23	3.5
S.N.P.	331,975	1.1	2	0.3
Plaid Cym.	125,309	0.4	2	0.3
N.I.P.	764,925	2.4	17	2.6
Others	203,589	0.6	0	0.0
Total:	30,675,996	100.0	650	100.0

*Source: Adapted from (Bogdanor, 1984:3; Blackburn, 1995:15)*

So, the reformists usually wondered and asked: What type of a voting system was this? It allocated only 23 parliamentary seats to the Liberal/SDP Alliance for its 7,780,949 votes, while at the same time giving 209 seats to the Labour Party who had only 675,985 votes more than the Alliance. Could this difference in votes account for the difference of 186 seats in parliamentary representation (Bogdanor, 1984:4)! Because of these electoral discrepancies, not of anybody's deliberate action, the reformers had since the turn of the century been campaigning for the introduction of proportional representation in Britain (Humphreys, 1911; Lakeman, 1955; Lijphart and Grofman (eds), 1984.

But the supporters of the Plurality Voting System had also been arguing in its defence that the system benefitted all the parties concerned in the sense that it did not only favour one political party. The government alternated and most

importantly the present system ensured political stability as there was always one single party with a majority to form a stable and strong government after each and every general election. This enabled the country to avoid the political instability inherently present in coalition governments such as those formed in Italy, Israel and in most other countries where the PR systems operated. The reformists counter these arguments by pointing at the political stability enjoyed by Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands and also many states in other continents where PR was in use.

## STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

However, it was because of this debate especially in the United Kingdom, that I decided to look at Plurality Voting System in Zambia and see what effect it had for the past 32 years that it had been in use. This study became even more appropriate then, than ever before due to the fact that ever since Zambia re-introduced multi-party politics on 17 December 1990, over 30 political parties had so far been registered (EIU 3rd Quarter Report, 1996:2).<sup>1</sup> Hence the need to see if the present electoral system could continue in this volatile and constantly changing scenario without plunging the country into political turmoil.

But, the problem was that in Zambia the Plurality Voting System tended to promote a **de facto one-party** state political system whereas under Duverger's Law, the System was said to have the inclination towards promoting a 'two-party' political system in which there were many parties with at least two being dominant and one of which formed a single- party government. The other provided

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix 1 for the names of the political parties.

a strong and credible opposition. The following as quoted by (Lijphart and Grofman, 1984:35) was what Maurice Duverger had stated as the law:

(1) the plurality method tends to lead to a two-party system; (2)proportional representation tends to lead to a system of many mutually independent parties; (3)the two-ballot majority system tends to lead to multiparty moderated by alliance (Duverger, 1980,p.144)

So, Duverger's law under (1) explained the reasons for the existence of the two dominating parties in the British political system where we had the Conservatives polarized against Labour, with Liberal/SDP Alliance at the centre of the left -right issues dimension. But, as pointed out earlier, the puzzle in Zambia is that the 'method' tended to create a de facto one-party state political system since there had always been one major party forming the government and dominating the political scene with one, two or more very ineffective parties around. These small ineffective parties did not even have it easy as the dominating party kept on harassing them and their supporters were victimized in every possible way, such as eviction from council houses, losing jobs, etc. These inter-party quarrels even went to the extent of becoming full-scale bloody political violence.

It was then, in view of the puzzle explained above, that my research question in this Case Study Dissertation was to try and find out what the impact of plurality voting system was on Zambian politics. This question constituted my research objective which was operationalised in the hypothesis stated below:



## **HYPOTHESIS**

**That in Zambia, instead of leading to a 'two-party system' the Plurality Voting System invariably led to a de facto one-party state political system.**

## **PURPOSE**

In addition to what has been stated in the statement of the problem, the purpose of this Case Study Dissertation Topic was to test the universality of Duverger's law and to find out why Zambia's multiparty politics had not been able to produce a politically workable two-party system as predicted by the law. The other rationale for this dissertation essay topic was to avail myself of the opportunity to seriously study the other electoral systems so that alternatives, if necessary, could be found and proposed for adoption in Zambia.

## **METHODOLOGY**

### **Primary Data**

These were obtained from a few official government documents and Reports of the Inter-Governmental Organisations such as the Commonwealth and Inter-Parliamentary Union Secretariats. But, although there was no field work designed for this case study, I managed to have an unstructured interview with one senior official at the Namibian High Commission where I had gone to find out how Namibia was faring with its party-list PR. However, due to lack of proper documentation, I decided not to use the material in this dissertation, though I referred to it in passing.

## **Secondary Data**

This constituted the bulk of my desk research reading material comprising of books, periodicals, journals, newspapers and magazines of every description. Our Library at LSE provided all the necessary facilities in this regard. This was supplemented by the information relayed from Zambia via the Internet system incorporated into the School's Computer Network.

## **PREVIEW**

After this introductory chapter, there are three more chapters dealing with different aspects of the case study. The research findings, tabulating the results of four multiparty elections in both pre-and-post-independence periods, are presented in chapter 2. Chapter 3 is handling the analysis of the data and my main argument here is that a successful 'two-party system cannot be achieved in Zambia not because Duverger's law was wrong, but because the pre-conditions are not yet cultivated in the Zambian political system where political intolerance is the guiding principle and the 'winner-take-all spoils system' provided great incentives to victors who regard those defeated as vanquished people who 'had no right to exist' in the political arena of the country. Since plurality voting system panders to the self-interest of the victors, it is by far much better to look for a system that can drastically reduce, if not eliminate, the causes of political intolerance by having an electoral formula that can bring about a system of diffused power within Zambia's body politic. And this is where proportional representation system, introduced in chapter 4 comes in together with discussing the general theoretical and empirical issues affecting the various electoral systems

in representative democracies.

However, let me hasten to add that since this was a case study dissertation, my approach had been that of discussing issues in the context of the Zambian 'experience', thereby proving (Dunleavy, 1986:116) right when he states that:

The stimulus behind case study theses is usually empirical curiosity. For example, students who encountered particular explanations in their course work want to see how far these can be applied to the experience of their own area or country.

That was exactly what prompted me to conduct this case study dissertation so as to find out why plurality voting system had not produced the 'two-party' system predicted by Duverger's law.

## CHAPTER 2

### RESEARCH FINDINGS

#### SECTION 1

#### **Historical Background**

Zambia, then Northern Rhodesia, came under direct British Colonial Office Rule in 1924 when the British Government took over from the British South Africa Company (B.S.A) which had been running the country since 1890 after signing a mineral rights treaty ‘...with Lewanika, the King (Litunga) of the Barosteland’ (Tordoff, 1974:2).

But the Africans did not participate in the country's politics until 1948 when an Annual Conference held at Munali ‘...from 9-13 July 1948 ‘transformed’ ... the Federation of Welfare Societies ... into the Northern Rhodesia African (National).<sup>2</sup> Congress...’ (Mwangilwa, 1982: 28), and elected Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika as its first President. Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, an ex-LSE undergraduate joined the ANC in 1951 with the encouragement of Robinson Nabulyato, the current Speaker of National Assembly. A few months later in the same year Nkumbula defeated Lewanika and became the second president of the party within three years of its formation.

The ANC fought a losing battle against the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. But this loss turned into a blessing as the nationalists used the Federation as a focal point for asking all Africans to unite

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<sup>2</sup> The word and brackets are mine

and fight not only against colonialism, but also against Federation which was heading for Dominion Status within the British Empire and subsequently Independence for the Europeans. These Europeans would enslave the Africans more or less like in the apartheid South Africa since Northern Rhodesia Protectorate Status for the Africans would be lost once the British Government pulled out.

However, the nationalist movement split into two when Kaunda, Kapwepwe and Kamanga decided to form another party after differing with the party president Nkumbula over the Benson Constitution and (Mwangilwa, 1982:40) explains what took place:

Here was Nkumbula heroically burning the Benson constitution White Paper before his supporters. And this was the same man who declared that the Benson constitution ought to be given a chance and used an Ila proverb to justify his cooperation with the system he wanted overthrown. The proverb he was so keen to adopt as official party policy tantamounted to condoning cowardice. A cowardly hyena lives longer, he would say, and admit that his ordeal in prison had sapped all his energy.

So, Nkumbula participated in the 1959 elections and won a seat in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council. Meanwhile the new party, Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) boycotted the elections under a constitution that had according to (Mulford, 1964:14) provided for '...14 seats for the Europeans, eight (8) for Africans and six (6) for Officials ...' But this boycott led to violent campaigns resulting in only 6,846 persons registering as voters instead of the officially projected number of 24,648 persons (Mulford, 1964:15).

In answer to this ZANC success, (Mulford, 194:15) once more reports that: '... in March 1959 after a marked increase in violence and arson in the territory,

the Governor made the Safeguard of Elections and Public Safety Regulations, 1959, and Zambia (ZANC) was declared an illegal organisation.' So, the party was proscribed and its leaders were put under political detention. But those who remained outside the detention camps formed another political party known as the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the struggle continued.

## **SECTION 2**

### **Political Violence in Colonial Days**

From 1958 when ZANC was formed, **political violence** became associated with the new party as militancy was its major political characteristic and this militancy was passed on to its successor the United National Independence Party. These political violent campaigns were on two fronts, namely: violence against colonialism and violence against members of the other nationalist party, ANC, with whom UNIP was locked in bloody internecine fights for support from the people. Once again, the former Times of Zambia Chief Editor, (David Mulford, 1964:28) states that in July 1961, UNIP held its Annual Conference which:

granted Kaunda 'emerging powers' to implement the party's 'master plan' 'a non-violent, positive action campaign to destroy the new constitution. In early August serious disturbances broke out in Luapula and Northern provinces and on the Copperbelt. In Mid August, the Governor banned UNIP in both Provinces and its Youth League on the Copperbelt, but the disturbances continued to increase. By September 901 incidents and 1400 arrests had been reported. Thirty-eight schools had been burned, 34 of them in Northern province; 24 bridges seriously damaged or destroyed; more than 150 roads blocked; and 27 Africans killed. The Government reported that 650 persons had been convicted for various offences, of whom 550 were known UNIP supporters.

As for direct violence against Europeans on this first front, only one incident is very well-known and is hereby evidenced by the United Federal Party (UFP) in their election campaign speech recorded by (Mulford, 1964: 118) as follows:

It was UNIP supporters who savagely murdered Mrs Lillian Burton at Ndola and set two of her four young children alight with petrol... It was UNIP who organized last year's campaign of violence in Northern, Luapula and Western (Copperbelt) Provinces and damaged or destroyed: 64 schools, 28 churches, 86 houses, 2 hospitals, 64 bridges, 13 railway lines, 69 motor vehicles. It was UNIP's Sipalo who urged a 1,500- strong crowd at Broken Hill to hate every thing white with two legs.

On the second front, UNIP's violent acts were aimed at members of other parties who were opposing them, especially the ANC from which it originated. These inter-party clashes became the order of the day during the struggle for independence and another former Managing Editor of Zambia Daily Mail and was also Editor of a church paper, National Mirror, (Goodwin Mwangilwa, 1982:53) states that:

As the drive for membership heated up in most provinces, there were violent clashes between supporters involving stoning, beatings, arson, petrol bombs and killings. The areas that bore the brunt of these man-eats brutality were mainly former congress strongly holds that the new party was determined to win over such as Eastern and Western 'Copperbelt' provinces where resistance was most fierce.

### **Political Violence in the post-Independence Days**

Unfortunately, this Political Violence, though abated, surfaced in the post-Independence years right up to-date whenever there were elections in the offing or elections being held. But at least one striking feature was that polling day was usually peaceful throughout the country compared to the inter-party clashes that took place when campaigns got hot and into their final states leading to the voting

day. Before the introduction of the one-party political system in 1972, these political acts of violence were aimed at 'wiping out' the ANC but the latter proved its resilience in all those attempts. Let us see what (Tordoff, 1974: 165,181) has got to say about political violence in Zambia:

While the Electoral Commission was independent, the legitimacy of multi-party electoral competition was not universally accepted in the ruling party. Indeed, the rhetoric of the party often implied that the ANC had no right to exist. Their work (that of UNIP activists) will be aimed at wiping out the ANC, while Mr. Daniel Mumkombwe, Political Assistant for the Southern Province, added more graphically that the opposition would be "bulldozed and crushed".

Violence was a persistent feature throughout the election campaign. Physical intimidation of opponents has long been a feature of Zambian political history. It dates back particularly to the late 1950s, when vicious struggle developed between ANC and the newly formed UNIP.

All the above acts of violence refer to the first post-independence multi-party elections held in 1968 through which UNIP expected to 'wipe out ' ANC through the ballot box. Having failed to 'wipe out 'ANC , UNIP through its leader, Kaunda launched what was known as the 'it pays to belong to UNIP'; a campaign of '... discrimination against ANC' (Tordoff, 1974:159) and this move started parting dividends as evidenced once more by (Wright, 1971:52) who tells us of incidences such as 'Five sacked as U.N.I.P. only policy starts' when at least five employees at Kafue Township Council have been sacked as a result of implementation of the 'it pays to belong to U.N.I.P. policy, U.N.I.P. constituency secretary for Kafue Mr. Matanda confirmed.'



This violence continued after the 1968 General Elections and became even more pronounced when a new party was formed in 1971 by former Vice-president of U.N.I.P and the Republic of Zambia, the late Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe (Tordoff, 1974:139, 140).

More and more violence as (Mwangilwa, 1986:150,153) tells us how the Leader of UPP was viciously attacked and beaten up severely in Lusaka:

...A mob of people emerged and they started punching me in the face. They kicked me all over the body but I was overpowered by, what I think was, a stick used by Mpande which hit me twice on my skull. I fell on my knees bleeding. While I lay on the ground, the mob started kicking me...

A twenty -year old witness to the incident said, 'I saw about 100 elderly and young men, punching him and kicking him. He was bleeding from cuts over his left eye, his nose and his head. His glasses had been smashed. Paramilitary policemen in a Land-rover just laughed at him as he walked away. He looked a terrible mess.'

The beating in Lusaka happened on 12 January 1972 and Kapwepwe had come from the National Assembly where he had just attended the ceremonial opening of parliament. Consequently UPP was banned on 4 February 1972 and about 123 of its leaders including Kapwepwe, this time, were arrested and put under indefinite political detention. This was in addition to the 116 UPP leaders who were detained within two to three weeks of the formation of the party, plus two UPP Executive Committee members Secretary-General and Treasurer, who were detained the very day the formation of the party was announced. On 25 February 1972, introduction of the One-Party State was announced and was legally implemented by December of the same year (Gertzel, Baylies and Szeftel, 1984: 17; Tordoff, 1974: 138, 141).

But 17 years of One-Party Rule eventually gave way to the return of Multi-party Politics in Zambia on 17 December 1990 and the first multi-party elections were held ten months later in 1991. These elections, though relatively more peaceful than the pre-One-party state elections, produced some sparks which pointed to the worse things to come in future elections when all the inter-party fighting fires that had been smouldering all these years were finally rekindled if no pre-emptive measures were taken in these first years of the re-introduced political pluralism. The following were the sparks as recorded by the (National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Carter Centre of Emory University in their October 1991 Elections in Zambia Report, 1992: 44-45):

Specific incidents exemplified the growing tension. Upon arriving at a soccer match in July, Kaunda and his entourage were pelted by fans throwing stones, bottles and fruit. At the home of Dipak Patel... running for Parliament on the MMD ticket, unknown assailants severely beat a security guard and destroyed two vehicles. In Eastern province, a UNIP stronghold, there were frequent reports that huts and granaries of MMD sympathizers were burned to the ground. Certain Chiefs in some parts of the country allegedly expelled villagers from their homes because of their political affiliations. Youths from both parties intimidated those attending rallies of their opponents.

There were so many incidents of political violence in Zambia that the few that I have listed above were just a minute fraction specifically for this essay's purpose. I have not even touched and mentioned names of people killed together with their whole families in incidents such as petrol bombing of ANC homes in Ndola and other towns.

## SECTION 3

### 1. THE 1962 GENERAL ELECTION

**TABLE 2: The 1962 General Election Results**

PARTY	VOTES	%	SEATS	%
U.F.P.	23,322	21.3	16	43.0
U.N.I.P.	64,584	58.9	14	38.0
A.N.C.	18,101	16.5	7	19.0
L.P.	1,624	1.5	0	0.0
R.R.P.	65	0.0	0	0.0
B.N.P.	134	0.1	0	0.0
IND.	1,852	1.7	0	0.0
Total:	109,682	100.0	37	100.0

*Source: Adapted from Mulford (1964:175-6) Appendix 1.*

The Coalition Government: This was also known as the **'Three-legged Government.'**

1. The British Government.
2. UNIP.
3. ANC.

## 2. THE 1964 GENERAL ELECTION

TABLE 3: The 1964 General Election Results

PARTY	SEATS WON	%	TOTAL SEATS	%
U.N.I.P.	55	84.6	55	73.4
A.N.C.	10	15.4	10	13.3
N.P.P.	-	-	10	13.3
Total:	65	100.0	75	100.0

*Source: Adapted from (Mulford, Article: AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 9, No. 2 (February 1964: 13-17).*

### Black Government Formed

The first black Government was formed after these elections in January. It lasted less than ten months as by 24 October 1964 the country became independent as the Republic of Zambia.

## 3. THE GENERAL ELECTION

TABLE 4: The 1968 General Election Results

PARTY	VOTES POLLED	%	SEATS WON	UNOPPO- SED	TOTAL	%
U.N.I.P.	657,764	73.2	51	30	81	77.1
A.N.C.	228,277	25.4	23	0	23	21.9
IND.	12,619	1.4	1	0	1	1.0
Total:	898,660	100.0	75	30	105	100.0

*Source: Adapted from Tordoff (1974:190), Table 5.8*

#### 4. THE GENERAL ELECTION

**TABLE 5: The 1991 Parliamentary Election Results**

PARTY	VOTES	%	SEATS	%
M.M.D.	951,606	74.4	125	83.3
U.N.I.P.	314,894	24.6	25	16.7
NA.D.A.	1,695	0.1	0	0.0
N.D.P.	803	0.1	0	0.0
D.P.	120	0.0	0	0.0
IND.	10,091	0.8	0	0.0
Total:	1,279,209	100.0	150	100.0

*Source: Adapted from the Provisional Official Election Results Report 1991.*

**TABLE 6: The 1991 Presidential Election Results**

CANDIDATE	VOTES POLLED	%
Chiluba, F.T.J.	981,453	76.0
Kaunda, K.D.	312,032	24.0
Total:	1,293,485	100.0

*Source: Adapted from the Provisional Official Election Results Report 1991.*

This brings us to the end of the Research Findings chapter and we should now prepare ourselves for the following chapter which is going to deal with the analysis of the data made available here.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **DATA ANALYSIS**

#### **The Universality of Deverger's Law**

It is clear, from the data presented in the previous chapter, that, given the necessary conducive conditions, Devergers's Law can successfully operate in Zambia. Its universality is hereby acknowledged in the sense that despite difficult conditions at least there has always been one small party opposing the big dominant one starting from the 1962 General Election. In that year, there were six political parties from which only three emerged as winners. In terms of the nationalist politics, the dominant party UNIP was opposed by the small ANC. From that time UNIP campaigned very hard to ensure that the ANC did not improve its fortunes by the time another election was held.

However, the ANC showed its resilience and successfully survived the violent UNIP attacks in the political arena right up to the 1968 General Election when it had even increased its parliamentary seats from 10 in 1964 to 23 in 1968. This ANC resilience was as a result of its having a political base deeply rooted in very strong ethnic cleavage (Molteno: Tordoff, 1974; Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor, 1970), which dated back to the time of the formation of the ZANC, and a splinter party initiated by the Bemba Nationalists who led the split from ANC which was led by Nkumbula, a Ila-Tonga Nationalist. So, the Ilas and Tongas did not see sense in abandoning a party led by person from their area and join one led by those who decided to fight their own tribesman! Their rational decision was to keep what virtually became their party. But UNIP in its under-estimation of the

intensity of ethnic cleavage continued to believe '... that the one-party state would be created only through the ballot box' (Tordoff, 1974). The more they (UNIP), vilified Nkumbula, the more resolute the Ila and Tonga became in their support of ANC.

Paradoxically, the ethnic cleavages which Kaunda and UNIP condemned as tribalism are to-day the same Zambian social and political traits which are responsible for his and UNIP's political survival. The 1991 General Elections resulted in the MMD literally over-running the entire country except Eastern Province as the Easterners felt that they were closer to Kaunda than to Chiluba. So, in a country with no traditional economic classes or ideologies on which to base political support, Zambians will have no alternative but to accept that ethnic groupings would always play a great part in the politics of the country, with those capable of coming together in alliances forming coalition governments.

But before leaving this issue, let me clarify one point which might have passed as a contradiction. I am quite aware that my hypothesis states that Plurality Voting System in Zambia does not lead to a 'two-party system' but to a de facto one-party state. My argument very briefly here is that the way Duverger's law works in Britain does not obtain in Zambia, for in Britain all political parties operate without any encumbrances from the party in power. This means that the plurality voting system flows smoothly within the British body politic and picks on two parties which seem to be occupying the left-right dimensions on issues, leaving those who are not on these two polarities, of the political arena, to pick a few votes here and there resulting in garnering a few parliamentary seats which, metaphorically was like picking fruits which were

dropping from the overflowing basketfuls of the two big parties, namely; Conservatives and Labour. The control of government machinery alternates between these two big parties. The rest, I hope, will be made clear in the analysis of my hypothesis in the subsequent paragraphs.

### **A de facto One-Party State**

I stated my hypothesis as follows:

**That in Zambia, instead of leading to a 'two-party system' the Plurality Voting System invariably led to a de facto one-party state political system.**

The election results of 1964, 1968 and 1991 gave us nothing but the de facto one-party state Government Machinery in the National Assembly. Whereas in the British or American 'two-party' systems the opposition parties are so strong that there is no way a party in power can consistently ignore their input in the passing of laws as is the case in Zambia. In Zambia's first multi-party Republic UNIP never paid any attention to whatever the ANC had to say. The main reason for this state of affairs was that there were only 10 ANC Members of Parliament compared to 55 elected and 5 nominated UNIP Members from 1964 to 1968. So, inclusive of the nominated Members of Parliament, 75 per cent of the membership was UNIP. In 1968, exclusive of the nominated members, 7 per cent membership of Parliament was UNIP! Therefore, ANC as an Opposition Party was so ineffective that the UNIP Government even expelled from parliament one of the most militant and articulate ANC leaders, Secretary-General by then, the late Mungoni Liso, without ANC raising any political dust at all. The behaviour by UNIP was nothing, but dictatorial and oppressive, to say the least. Consequently



ANC consigned itself to being perpetual underdogs with no chance of ever acceding to power.

So, even after 17 years of One-party State Rule, the country seems not to have learnt any lessons as to the danger of having a One-party state whether by law (de jure) or by the ballot box (de facto), for both routes lead ultimately to Dictatorship. The ballot-box route is the one that is produced when Kenneth Arrow's fourth law which is Condition D (non dictatorship) is violated whenever an election satisfies the other three laws, namely; Universal Domain (Condition U), Pareto Principle (Condition P) and Independence of irrelevant alternatives (Condition I). The best electoral system according to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is one which satisfies all the four conditions. Unfortunately, there has not been so far any known electoral system that has successfully fulfilled all these conditions. The situation has been that of an electoral system satisfying one or two conditions and then violate the others (Sen, 1970: 5; McClean, 1987:172; Stevens, 1993:143). So, having seen all the results of the elections giving overwhelming victories and parliamentary majorities to UNIP, the hypothesis as framed above is supported by the empirical evidence contained in Tables 2 to 7 and the only thing left now is to wonder and ask: **Why this trend?**

### **The Role of Political Violence**

I have tried in chapter 2 to document acts of political violence at some length in order to show the dominant role of political violence in the Zambian politics. Its role had so far been so negative, obviously as expected of violence, that it is, with other factors, responsible for the non-development of a successful multi-

party political system in the country as it has succeeded in promoting and consolidating a negative culture of **political intolerance**, which is the key operative principle of traditional politics where most of those who become chiefs find it hard to co-exist with other members of their royal families who contest them for the chieftainship. There is even a Bemba proverb to support them when it says that: **Ba ngoshe babili tabalala culu cimo**, literally meaning that no two cobras can stay in one anthill. This figuratively means exactly Shaka Zulu's war philosophy of 'never leave an enemy behind' for he will rise to avenge his defeat. So, the defeated cobra should not be allowed to stay in the same anthill with the victorious cobra. It should go and find another anthill for itself. But since in national politics, no defeated party in Zambia can go and practise its politics in another country, the only alternative for the victorious cobra (UNIP) was to 'bulldoze and crush' the vanquished cobra (ANC). This is exactly what MMD have been trying to do to UNIP since the former's landslide victory in the 1991 General Election.

To UNIP, ANC posed a threat to their continuity in power, for allowing it peaceful co-existence would have provided an alternative for nearly all disappointed UNIP supporters so that by the scheduled 1973 elections, ANC would have improved its standing in the Nation vote-wise and in parliament with increased number of seats. But, because of UNIP's unstated policy of the '...creation of the one party state through the ballot-box', Zambia became an anti-liberal democratic state just as recorded by (Tordoff, 1974:108) when he states that '...Zambia, in short, belonged to the world of snowballs, not pendulums - of dominance, not alternation'.

The incentives for this great appetite for political intolerance culminating in violence are found in the 'winner-take-all' syndrome of the 'spoils system' which is also heavily supported by tradition where winners in tribal warfare were taking everything they could carry. They killed men and old women and spared those they could marry. The 'once a chief, always a chief philosophy' is what has been the problem in creating a liberal democracy in Zambia and to remain a chief for life was Kaunda's main objective in politics as stated by (Jan Pettman, 1974:41) that 'Kaunda is unlikely to deny this. He has always acknowledged that survival, not principle, was the key to politics'. However some may argue that these things were everywhere and that Europe had gone through all these. Yes, the operative phrase is that 'Europe had gone through them', but we don't ask ourselves why it is proving difficult for us to adapt when we even have examples to learn from? Europe did not have so many lessons to learn from like us. It was all pioneering work that was always done with few lessons in history from here and there. Having come this far, let me now finally for this chapter look at the impact of plurality voting system on Zambia politics.

### **The Impact of Plurality Voting System on Zambian Politics**

Unlike in the British political system where the complaints against plurality voting system are lack of proportionality, under-representation of the majorities and over-representation of the party in power and the virtual exclusion of minorities from parliament, in Zambia the above complaints cannot be levelled against the voting system since the condition in which it operates are quite different from those obtaining in Britain. The plurality voting system in Zambia

cannot even be credited with the political stability which is ascribed to it in established liberal democracies where it is practised, for in Zambia the political stability and 'peace' were legally induced as Kaunda through UNIP ruled the country with a permanent state of emergency, which gave him powers to detain anybody at his pleasure. There were and still are other laws empowering police to detain anybody at their pleasure. In other words the state of emergency, the punitive and oppressive laws helped to develop and consolidate a 'carrot and stick' political system.

In a nutshell, **the impact of plurality voting system on Zambian politics is negative.** It panders to the whims and fancies of those in power since by nature plurality voting system's ultimate destination is the **creation of a one-party system** through the ballot box ; which mean't peaceful creation of dictatorship. It is my argument here that even the 'two-party system' predicted by **Duverger's law** is not the ultimate end of the voting system. It is a **compromise between Plurality's march to dictatorship and the Unanimity Constraint placed in its way** by rational voters whose utilities cannot be harmonised. Otherwise, 'would the Conservatives in Britain give some parliamentary seats to the Labour party so as to maintain multipartyism if they won all the 650 seats in an election?' asked Kaunda in reply to a question from a British Journalist who asked him on his declaration of Zambia as a one-party state at a State House press conference. In other words he was telling the Journalist and the World that any country, let alone Britain, using the Plurality Voting System could become a one-party state through the ballot box by having one single party win all the seats in Parliament. That was a reminder that if you

so much hate one-party system, why do you still maintain a voting system which can one day turn Britain or U.S.A. into a one-party state? The deep-rooted culture of political tolerance, the role of interest groups coupled with the well established norms of civil rights in established liberal democracies have provided a system of so effective countervailing measures that the Plurality Voting System does not threaten the continued existence of liberal democracy in these countries.

But in Zambia, mass poverty and suffering result in politics of Messianism which, in itself, is not bad if leaders serve the interests of the people who put them in power. This Messianism drastically reduces the effect of the Unanimity Constraint on the Plurality Voting System by having over 75 percent of the people voting for the Messiah and his party perceived to be capable of ending the suffering. Kaunda was called Moses for standing against colonialism and nearly everybody went for UNIP and the latter 's political ego became inflated to the point where there was no alternative but to become dictatorial. Chiluba was called Moses destined to liberate Zambians from the Kaunda-induced mass poverty and suffering, and nearly everybody who voted went for Chiluba and MMD. But unlike Kaunda who took years to be seen as a Dictator, Chiluba and his party, MMD, wasted no time in manifesting themselves as Dictators for in addition to liquidation of companies resulting in mass unemployment, they have reneged on their promises to repeal the oppressive laws as evidenced by (Peter Burnell, 'Report: Building on the past:..., GOVERNANCE, 1995: 401) that: 'The 1955 Public Order Act remains in force and imposes a requirement for police authorization for political demonstrations, but the procedures seem to have been waived in the case of some MMD events stage-managed by party officials.'

But as Zambians, instead of spending time on blaming Kaunda and Chiluba, it is worthwhile now to take a critical look at the electoral system, for the key to the success of any country's politics is the electoral system through which **politics per se**, in the words of Harold Lasswell as quoted by (Reeve and Ware 1992:17), **decides 'who gets what, when, and how.** When a country keeps on blaming the leaders one after the other without critically examining the reasons for their behaviour, it would in the end deprive itself of good leaders as once the negative systems get entrenched they would be capable of rendering good men and women with good leadership qualities ineffective and unworthy of high public office.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEMS**

'Proportional representation' refers not to a specific electoral system but to an ideal or principle to which different electoral systems seek to conform . ... They are used by every European democracy except for Britain and France, and the majority of the World's stable democracies use one or other of the various systems of proportional representation (Bogdanor, 1984:46).

Zambia should adopt the Single Transferable Vote PR System (STV) for electing Members of the National Assembly and the Second Ballot System for electing a president if the present presidential system was not abolished in favour of a Parliamentary System. My argument for wanting Zambia to adopt a PR-STV system is based on the fact that the country can be able to develop a culture of political tolerance very much needed for a non-dictatorial democracy by ensuring that no single party would initially emerge from an election with an overbearing majority as to enable it impose the 'tyranny of the majority' upon the Zambian people. And at times the overbearing majority is derived from the minority who turn up to vote as is the case with the present Chiluba administration which was ushered into office by only 45 percent of Zambia's registered voters (NDI et al. Report, 1992).

Under this system even proportionality would be there just like the British election results in Table 1 of chapter 1 would have produced the following figures if the elections had been held under the STV or Party-list PR System:

Conservatives	276 seats
Labour	179 "
Alliance	165 "
SNP	7 "
Plaid Cymru	3 "
Northern Ireland Party	16 "
Others	4 "

*Source: Bogdanor (1984:7)*

The 1991 Zambian election results, not as spectacular as the British ones would have been as follows if they had been held under the same PR systems referred to above:

Movement for Multiparty Democracy	(MMD)	113 seats
United National Independence Party	(UNIP)	37
National Democratic Alliance	(NADA)	0
National Democratic Party	(NDP)	0
Independent (IND.)		

*Source: Adapted from the Provisional Official Election Results Report (1991)*

Proportionally, the above figures both in the British and the Zambian contexts would have indicated the actual political standing of the parties in their respective countries.



But, using the same 1991 election results would give us the following projected results needed for the propagation of the ideals of pluralist politics;which, in common parlance, means multi-partism:

TABLE 7: Projected Party-List PR Election Results Using the 1991 valid Votes cast

PARTY	VOTES	%	SEATS	%
M.M.D.	377,760	29.5	45	30.0
U.N.I.P.	280,426	21.9	33	21.9
Z.D.C.	195,288	15.3	23	15.3
N.P.	156,503	12.2	18	12.0
N.L.P.	127,921	10.0	15	10.0
L.P.F.	62,640	4.9	7	4.7
L.D.A.	15,586	1.2	2	1.3
NA.D.A.	14,655	1.2	2	1.3
N.D.P.	12,438	1.0	1	0.7
U.P.P.	10,744	0.8	1	0.7
IND.	25,248	2.1	3	2.1
Total:	1,279,209	100.0	150	100.0

*Source: Adopted from the Provisional Official Election Results Report (1991).*

As the above projection is purely for the academic exercise, the arbitrary distribution of the votes have nothing to do with what the actual party ratings are in the country. I simply decided to reduce the figures for the major parties so as to accommodate at least 10 political parties out of the more than 30 political parties registered in the country (E.I.U Country Report: Zambia, 3rd quarter 1996:2) and as per Appendix 1. I have used the Hare and the largest remainder

formulae, also known as the Droop formula as indicated below:

$$\text{Votes/Seats} + 1 = +1 \text{ (i.e next integer).}$$

For easy of computation in order to show how the proportionality principle is achieved, I have in the above examples used both Britain and Zambia as single districts respectively. So, these single national constituencies have respectively got 650 and 150 district magnitudes. The above formula has given me 47,122 votes as the Quota for Britain and 8,472 for Zambia. These denominations are then used to divide the total votes polled by each party and this yields the number of parliamentary seats given to each party at the first allocation. The surplus votes are listed as remainders for use in the allocation of the surplus seats. The formula normally used here is known as the 'highest remainder', meaning that the smaller parties are accommodated since their votes which may be less than the 'threshold' (quota) eventually become the highest remainders and as a result become eligible for seats in parliament.

There is another formula known as 'highest average'. This formula favours the big parties as it is a procedure whereby the Assembly Size or the District Magnitude (Lijphart, 1995:12; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989:19) become the denominators dividing each party's total votes and the highest averages are obviously secured by the big parties who usually poll the highest number of votes. This formula cannot be accepted under normal circumstances, for it negates the very reason why proportional representation gets introduced as an electoral system for any country which wants to accommodate many shades of opinion and views in parliament so that full representation is achieved.

It is for this reason of trying to accommodate the national political diversity

that even the figure one (1) is added to the Assembly size or constituency magnitude so that the denominator can be big enough to produce a lower quotient. In a district or nation (as a single constituency) where thresholds become prohibitive for the representation of small parties, this one (1) can be transformed into two, three, four, five....., even up to 10. The big parties cannot object to the increase in the denominator since they can end up getting more seats than even the small parties in whose name the increase in the denominator would be executed.

### **Party-List Proportional Representation (PR) System**

In the above example, I have used the Party-list PR electoral system for illustrative purposes only. It cannot be recommended for adoption in Zambia, for apart from the innovations involving multi-member districts or constituencies and the use of proportionally equated Hare or Droop formula and the highest remainder formula, everything else remains just like in the Plurality Voting System which, in this case study dissertation, is already rejected. Hostilities and intolerance remain intact and can even be accentuated as competing political parties move in big groups campaigning for the maximization of the votes from which each individual parties alone would benefit and nobody else. So, the incentives for violence, under the party-list system, are still there just like in the first -past- the- post voting system.

Alliances cannot be made if and only if the advanced form of PR-party-list system is in place where voters are asked to vote ordinally and not categorically. But even this system (Rae,1967:16) would not do away with political violence. If

anything, Alliances would start pitting themselves against each other or one another if several of them are formed.

My argument here is that Zambia would still experience political violence under party-list PR since Plurality's ultimate destination of creating a one-party state through the ballot box would be looming high on the political party organisation and elections campaign landscape. So, the best PR system for Zambia would be the Single Transferable Vote (STV) even though Namibia seems to be doing well with the categorically- party-centred Party-list electoral formula (David Simon: Article: AFRICAN AFFAIRS, vol.95, (Jan.1996:55)

### **Single Transferable Vote (STV)**

Since the aim is to virtually end political violence at the organized political level in Zambia, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) is the best for the country for it has got a built-in mechanism that I sincerely believe would in the long run prove to be so effective that political violence would eventually disappear from the Zambian political scene and just remain in the annals of history only.

The ordinal balloting where a voter is asked to rank the candidates according to his or her preference regardless of the candidates' party affiliation constitutes the built-in mechanism which would promote political harmony amongst political contestants of different political groupings. The reason for this is that the same Droop formula we saw under the analysis of actual British and Zambian elections, would be the same formula to be used under STV with the same results of proportionality, but with different procedures that make political rivals become friendly to one another. The peace-maker mechanism in detail is

located in the manner in which votes are distributed. The Droop formula would give the quota and any candidate with this number of votes, say 8472 in case of Zambia is automatically declared elected. If he or she has more votes, say 28472 for easy of computation, the surplus 20,000 votes would be distributed to other candidates according to the ranking order indicated by the voters. Those who qualify at the second count have their excess votes passed on to the other candidates ranked as third, fourth, etc. until all the seats in the constituency are filled.

This mechanism makes it very essential for candidates to be friendly to one another because the system has no incentives for any one to adopt hostile attitudes towards others of the opposite parties, because even if he or she goes flat out to campaign very hard and spends his or her resources lavishly on the campaign, the benefits would not accrue to him or her alone. The efforts would benefit nearly all the candidates and may even pay more dividends in the opponents' camps. For this reason campaigns would be low-keyed and friendly. The popular candidates would attract more candidates from within the same parties and from the competing ones, for being seen together in public would earn some of them higher slots by being placed second, third or fourth where chances of being elected are greater than when placed at the bottom of the voters' preference ordering. So, the cost of hostilities would be too high and at the same time the incentives for spending lavishly are virtually nil.

Another advantage is that party leaders would be relieved of the trouble of organizing primaries, for the party headquarters can allow as many of their party members who want to stand in one constituency which also gives the voters wider

choice among candidates of the same party in addition to voting across party lines. So, the system has even no incentives for voters to vote strategically and votes are not wasted since nearly every voter feels satisfied for having contributed to the election of nearly every Member of Parliament in the constituency. For those who lose the elections, the voters don't feel frustrated since it is their collective action of placing the losers right at the lower levels of their preference rankings which resulted in rejection of those candidates.

### **Coalition Government**

Because no single party may secure a parliamentary majority to enable it to form a single-party government, the country is bound to be governed through coalition governments which should be formed amongst the several parties represented in Parliament. Ideally, most parties would prefer to make the coalition larger by including in as many parties as possible by coming up with what (Lijphart, 1977:25) calls as 'Grand Coalition', stating that: 'The primary characteristics of constitutional democracy is that the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society cooperate in a <sup>d</sup>grand coalition to govern the country,' He goes on to talk about the 'minimum winning coalition' which are made by political parties that are normally either ideologically or socially opposed such as capitalists, socialists and communists coming together.

But in Zambia where communists may not be found, capitalists and socialists may be the ones to form this type of coalition,

But the 'minimum-connected-winning coalition' may be the easiest to form

in Zambia where MMD, for example, may use Christianity to secure the support of all those parties known to be nearer God than to 'man-centred Humanism' which is UNIP's philosophy even though UNIP members are also Christians and God-fearing. I definitely agree with (Lijphart, 1977:27) when, in commenting on Riker's "size principle" in coalition formations, he states that:

In other words, the size principle applies when the participants in the political process perceive politics either as a good game or as all-out war...Because the political stakes are often high in plural societies, it is advisable not to conduct politics as if it were a game: a grand coalition is therefore more appropriate than the government-versus-opposition pattern.

But with the goodwill built amongst the parties during the election campaigns under STV, formation of a 'minimum-connected -winning coalition' cannot be very much of a problem since most of the party leaders would have had at one time or another worked together, and most of them share the same ideals but might differ only in the approach. After all, for the past three decades or so, Zambian leaders have been preaching the virtues found in African traditions where decisions were always made by consensus. Here is the chance now to put into practice what they have been theorizing for the past 30 years. They have been preaching African consensus in theory while in practice dictating and imposing their will on the collective will of the people. They never even bothered to change the institutional structures so as to accommodate the African methodology of arriving at consensus in decision making. In short, they were never serious and all the preaching was nothing but politicking for it felt good and nostalgic to know that we Africans had something better and yet deep down we knew that the complexities of modern African societies could not be managed through such rhetoric.

However, someone is bound to wonder how coalition government can exist now in Zambia when the three-legged government formed in 1962 did not succeed. Yes, it is true that it failed in stopping violence. In fact its existence was one reason for the continued violence as UNIP wanted to press its demands for 'Independence Now' by pointing to the escalating political violence as necessitating for a strong government to deal with the violence once and for all. Political instability has been cited by several scholars as being one of the major weaknesses of the PR system due to the frequent collapse of coalition governments. The critics have deliberately ignored the political stability in countries such as Austria, Switzerland and Ireland to mention, but a few. These are liberal democracies with long-established proportional representation systems. In his book, F.A Hermens (1972) gives very detailed accounts of how Germany and Italy produced Hitler and Mussolin respectively due to political instability brought about by PR as if there had been no incidences of dictatorship in the histories of some of the countries now using other electoral systems such as plurality and other majoritarian electoral formulas.

Nevertheless, it is also true that in Zambia quarrels could initially be there. But, the fact that there would be no need to call for election so as to have one of the political parties in power to secure a parliamentary majority, since the subsequent election may even produce worse than the earlier results for the members of the coalition government; hence political stability is bound to follow as the members learn to accept one another and use the 'minority veto' sparingly.



## **Resistance to Electoral Change**

In their book, Reeve and Ware (1972:10-14) list at least six reasons for the continued stability of electoral systems everywhere not only in Britain. One very interesting reason listed is 'ignorance' on the part of the players in the political arena. I agree entirely with this view for my six years as a parliamentarian and three years as a Junior Minister I never really took the electoral laws, let alone the electoral system seriously. I think this might have been the same in Kenya where the opposition accused foreign powers of supporting Moi. But the election results as tabulated by Joe D. Barkan (Article: Journal of Democracy, (July-1993:96) shows that the opposition themselves squandered their victory by all of them standing for the presidency. Moi had 36 per cent, Matiba 26, Kibaki 19 and Odinga 17 per cent. Having failed to agree on having one opposition candidate to oppose Moi, they should at least have insisted on having a 'two-ballot' voting system under the majoritarian electoral system. That way Matiba could have defeated Moi in the second ballot depending on whether Odinga's 76 per cent Luo vote would have been given to him and not to Moi who had 14 per cent of the Luo vote as opposed to two (2) and nine(9) per cent given to Matiba and Kibati respectively. May be they opposed the plurality system of the presidency, hence their accusation of the foreign powers for not helping in stopping Moi from changing the electoral system.

In Zambia, Chiluba had been changing the rules of the game with all the opposition parties sleeping. By the time they woke up Chiluba's decision had reached a point of no return as the time for negotiation had already gone. Recently, apparently learning from Moi, he had changed the electoral formula

from majoritarian to the first-past-the post formula with no protest from the opposition. Instead, the Law Association of Zambia is the one which protested and it does not even field players when the political game, if at all it is a game, is being played on the political pitch which has got the ruling party's goal -posts right up the hill and the opposition goal-post on the slopes of the hill and consequently the game would not be played on a level ground.

As for the other reasons for the stability of the electoral systems it is quite true that people in power can find it very difficult to change an electoral system that had just ushered them into office. Apart from fear of incurring hostilities and losing support, the newly elected party would like to consolidate its gains so as to be elected again. This leaves us with one alternative only.

And that is that such changes are never carried out by incumbents unless the latter were elected on a manifesto very much based on the issues of changing the electoral system and electoral laws to suit themselves. This means that in a country like Zambia, changing the electoral system should be not only a very serious campaign issue but a serious political issue which should be propounded to the electorate long before the elections were in, so that the people could be made aware of the merits and demerits and decide in favour if the former outweighed the latter. Surely in a country with more than 30 political parties, the STV merits, if properly documented, explained and set against plurality arguments, can easily be endorsed. Once in office, the implementation would pose no problem if attended to right-away for waiting until near the election time would create problems as the mood of the electorate might not be the same, depending on the performance since the last general election. If the performance in office is

negative, then changing the electoral system at such late period vis-a-vis new elections, would become a problem for the very reason Reeve and Ware are talking about; which is that the voters might think that the electoral system was being changed so as for the incumbents to continue in office and cling to power.

### **Representative Government:**

According to Lijphard (1984:1):

Democracy may be defined not only as government of the people but also, president Abraham Lincoln's famous formulation, as government for the people - that is government in accordance with the people's preferences.

The definition by Lincoln to the effect that government should pay attention to the preferences of the people who put them into power ties up nicely for me with the second view of representative government (Mueller, D.C., 1989) to which I fully subscribe. When a country prides itself with 'responsible government' then development is inhibited, for to those in power, public office becomes chieftainship and the country becomes chiefdom. It is for this reason that Zambia should change the electoral system so that it gets away from the "Leviathan" which is served by a 'responsible government' that, in a country with no traditional culture of alternating governments, does not take kindly to political competition. Without competition in politics the country gets retarded for the latter's development is embedded in the competition which makes politicians to maximize the votes by doing things that the people want. Because politicians want to be re-elected and they know that they can only be re-elected if they have been doing a good job. Hence, the need for political competition so that politicians can subordinate their self-interest to public interest for the good of the country.

It is for this reason that the Members of the international community are these days insisting on good Governance before they can think of listening to any third World's pleas for material, technical and financial aid. They know that without political competition the help they give end up personally benefitting those, in political leadership, who are supposed to use it for the uplifting of the standards of living for their poor country men and women.

## **Conclusion**

Having come this far, let me conclude by saying that in this case study dissertation essay, my main purpose was to find out what the impact of plurality voting system had been on Zambian politics since its inheritance at Independence on 24 October 1964. I was very much prompted by the controversy surrounding it in its country of origin especially and by the theories advanced by scholars about the characteristics of the system. Here, I have Duverger's law in mind, Riker's analysis of the law and what he calls as Duverger's hypothesis. I must point out that there is quite a lot of literature on the subject.

I have found that it is true that plurality voting system 'tends' to stabilise the party system by allocating more votes to the two polarized parties, since all the voters definitely cannot vote for the same party for all the seats even though in public choice that is recognized as being possible, hence the technical phrases such as condorcet winner or loser, universal domain, pareto principle, etc. But, in Zambia, the impact of plurality voting system has been quite negative due to the fact that the country lacks the necessary ingredients that mitigate its dictatorial tendencies in other countries such the United kingdom, the United States of

America and other countries with well-established liberal democracies. The absence of liberal democracy, let alone democracy itself beyond voting stages, makes the first-past-the-post system very instrumental in achieving the usually oppressive de facto one-party state political system, for in my view this is the ultimate end of plurality voting system since it is capable of giving all the parliamentary seats to one party and there is nothing that the political system in the polity can do apart from waiting for the next general elections. If the absolute 'winner-take-all' results persist, then it is likely for such a country to slide into dictatorship.

Because of its ultimate destination, simple and relative majority system contributed very much to the promotion of political violence as a result of political intolerance exhibited by UNIP which was bent on remaining in power for ever and its leaders for life, though publicly denied. Even after 17 years of one-party state, political intolerance has surfaced and if nothing is done to correct the situation, it seems to have surfaced with a vengeance.

Finally, it is my strong conviction that for the country to be on the road to Robert Dahl's polyarchy and economic progress as product of political competition, Zambia should adopt (STV)-PR electoral system for its parliamentary elections and a majoritarian two-ballot electoral system for the presidential elections. With these in place, Zambian politics would become progressively dynamic, peaceful and would finally lead to the attainment of a culture of political tolerance, so much needed for establishing and entrenching Liberal Democracy in Zambia.

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## **APPENDIX I**

### **Names of Registered Political Parties**

Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	-	Ruling Party
United National Independence Party (UNIP)	-	Opposition
National Party (NP)		
Zambia Democratic Congress (ZADECO)		
Liberal Progressive Front (LPF)		
National Lima Party (NLP)		
National Democratic Alliance (NADA)		
Movement for Democratic Process (MDP)		
National Party for Democracy (NPD)		
Christian Allia for Kingdom of Africa (CHAKA)		
Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)		
National Conservative Party (NCP)		
Liberal Democratic Alliance (LDA)		
United Democratic Party (UDP)		
United Patriotic Party (UPP)		
Independent Freedom Party (IFP)		
Grassroots Welfare Party (GWP)		
Social Democratic Party (SDP)		
United Front Party (UFP)		
Labour Party (LP)		
Party Democratic Socialism (PDS)		
Democratic Debating Party (JADEPA)		
Zambia Nat. People's Salvation Party (ZNPSP)		
Party For Total Ind. And Democracy (PTID)		
Caucas for National Unity (CNU)		
Congress for National Unity- (CNU-M)		
Forum for Practical Democracy (FPD)		
People's Redemption Organization (PRO)		
Theoretical Spiritual Political Party (TSPP)		
Multi Racial Party (MAP)		
Democratic Party (DP)		
United Democratic Congress (UDC)		