INSTITUTIONALISATION OF LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ZAMBIA, 1964-2011

By

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DECLARATION

I, NDAMBWA BIGGIE JOE, do hereby declare that this dissertation represents my own original work and that it has not been previously submitted for a degree, or any other qualification at this or any other university.

Signature…………………………………… Date……………………………..

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

This dissertation, titled "Institutionalisation of Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia, 1964-2011" has been approved as partial fulfillment of the requirement of the award of the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science by the University of Zambia.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation focuses on analysing the extent to which leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia has become institutionalised during the period 1964 to 2011, with specific attention on political differentiation, political adaptation and structural growth of the committee system.

The National Assembly of Zambia is one of the longest continuously functioning legislatures in Southern Africa. The background to this study stems from institutionalisation model first proposed by Samuel P. Huntington, and as applied in other legislatures in Europe, United States and Latin America which show that leadership in those legislatures has acquired value and stability. Although institutionalisation model has proved to be useful in analysing political processes, no significant study has been conducted to analyse the value and stability of leadership in the Zambian legislature.

The specific objectives of the study were as follows: to assess the extent to which leadership has become differentiated from the political environment; to determine the extent to which leadership has adapted to changes in the political environment; and to evaluate the growth in internal complexity. In order to achieve these objectives, the study employed a descriptive and explanatory research design. Data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to analyse both primary and secondary data.

The major findings of the study were that leadership has become considerably institutionalised, although greater political differentiation, adaptation and strength of the committee system are required for it to acquire more value and stability. The speakership has shown signs of boundedness with 60% of speakers having had legislative experience before elected. However, the boundaries are very weak as evidenced from a high number of uncontested elections (82%). The influence of main political parties on who becomes the speaker also shows how significant they are in the National Assembly. The study also shows that it is hard for religious and ethnic minorities to gain access to the position of speaker.

The study shows that leadership has been quite stable, as evidenced by the lower turnover rate (16%) per Parliament since 1964. Also, Speakers' tenure has also tended to be much longer than expected. However, the study shows leadership lacks flexibility to change generation age of leaders, as evidenced by the generation gap between successive speakers. Leadership just experienced one inter-generation succession in 2011. Finally, the study suggests leadership has grown in structure, as evidenced by the increase in the committee leadership and overall gross expenditure of the National Assembly over the years.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For My Mother

Molly Shimuchele Ndambwa

(1952-2008)

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANC..African National Congress
API...African Parliamentary Index
CBOs...Community-Based Organisations
CDF...Constituency Development Fund
CE...Committee on Estimates
CEAL...Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour
CNSF..................................Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
CPA..Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
CPASS.........................Committee on Privileges Absences and Support Services
CSO..Central Statistical Office
CSOs...Civil Society Organisations
ECZ..Electoral Commission of Zambia
EEAB...Excess Expenditure Appropriation Bill
GPC..General Purposes Committee
GRZ..Government of the Republic of Zambia
INDECO...Industrial Development Cooperation
IPU...Inter-Parliamentary Union
MCC...Member of Central Committee
MMD...Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MoF...Ministry of Finance
MoFED..Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoFNP..Ministry of Finance and National Planning
MoH...Ministry of Health
MP...Member of Parliament
NGOs...Non-Governmental Organisations
PAC...Public Accounts Committee
PF...Patriotic Front
PRMC...Parliamentary Reforms and Modernisation
SOC..Standing Orders Committee
UN...United Nations
UNIP...United Nation Independence Party
UPND...United Party for National Development

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1.   Background

This dissertation seeks to analyse the stability and value of leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia by using the institutionalisation model. It must be noted that the use of the institutionalisation model to analyse legislative value and stability of leadership is highly essential but a rarely attempted undertaking. A significant inquiry in this genre rests on the classic work by Huntington (1965). Other studies have used the model to analyse the stability and value of leadership in state legislatures, such as the British House of Commons (Hibbing 1988) and the United States' Congress (Canon 1989). Still others have used the model to analyse the stability and value of leadership in supranational assemblies, such as the United Nations General Assembly (Keohane 1969) and the European Parliament (Gungor 2009).

However, despite the centrality of the institutionalisation model, there has been no significant application of the model in order to analyse the stability and value of leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia. This is highly essential for legislative autonomy because it insulates leaders from influences exerted by other competitive organisations in the political environment (Hibbing 1988). In order to maintain its stability and value in the political system, the National Assembly of Zambia must nourish the perception of having leadership with a distinct political identity. It must constantly seek to maintain the boundaries of its leadership within its environment. This helps in insulating leaders from influences from other competitive organs of the government and social forces.

Apart from acquiring a distinct identity, leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia must be adaptable enough to respond to changes in the political environment. Adaptation implies the ability by leaders to create, modify and eliminate the functional units and the resilience of key functional units of leadership (Ragsdale and Theis 1997). This is, in effect, the safety valve to

stability and value of leadership in the House, because it allows leaders to react to shifts in the political environment. In this way, leadership can continue to develop overtime, adjusting to environmental changes, as new functional committees become part of the enduring composition of leadership.

Further, there should be increased division of labour and specialisation for the leadership to acquire value and stability (Polsby 1968). This can be an indicator of growth in value and stability of leadership. The growth in internal complexity also adds to the cumulative value of the legislature by developing an intricate committee system, as many committee leaders do compartmentalised tasks. This internal specialisation and professionalisation makes leadership valuable, thus improving its stability. In this way, the value of the leadership of the organisation would also capture the level of human capital expressed in terms of financial resources devoted to running the organisation (Squire 1992).

Therefore, the institutionalisation model is very useful in analysing the stability and value of leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia over the years. Acquiring a distinct political identity relative to other members of the political environment lessens interference in the management of the National Assembly of Zambia by other competitive organisations (Rosenthal 1996). Flexibility of the leadership could imply that the policies adopted by the National Assembly of Zambia are adequately conceived in technical terms because the leadership of the legislature may be adjusted to the real needs of society (Hibbing 1988). Further, increased division of labour and resources could imply that the leaders have the internal capacity to manage legislative responsibility (Gungor 2009). It is against this background that this study focused on analysing the extent to which legislative leadership has become institutionalised.

1.2.   Statement of the Problem

A major failing in studies among political science literature in Zambia has been lack of a general theoretical model for studying legislative stability and value of leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia. Although the theory of

institutionalisation probably offers the most promise to analysing stability and value of the leadership in a legislature, no significant academic inquiry has taken up that model.

1.3. Objectives

1.3.1. General Objective

The general objective of this study was to assess the degree to which legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia has become institutionalised from 1964 to 2011.

1.3.2. Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were:

    (a) To determine the extent to which leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia has become differentiated from the political environment;

    (b) To assess the level to which leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia has adapted to changes in the political environment; and

    (c) To determine the growth of internal complexity of the National Assembly of Zambia.

1.4. Research Questions

    (a) To what extent has the speakership of the National Assembly of Zambia become differentiated from the political environment between 1964 and 2011?

    (b) To what extent has the leadership of the National Assembly of Zambia been able to adapt to changes in the political environment between 1964 and 2011?

    (c) To what extent has the leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia increased in its internal complexity from 1964 to 2011?

1.5. Significance of the Study

This study is significant in two main ways. First, analysing the extent to which leadership has become institutionalised may be critical for determining the

effective functioning and management of the legislature in specific periods when the National Assembly is in session. Second, the stability and value of leadership in the National Assembly is critical for determining the effectiveness of the policymaking process. Having uninstitutionalised leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia would mean that legislative decisions, are to a large extent lacking consensus and, therefore, unreliable, inefficiently or unfairly implemented. Uninstitutionalised leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia would in the long-run make it difficult for a country to achieve national development.

1.6.   Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework is based on the revised model used by several scholars that have attempted to use it to analyse value and stability of leadership in legislatures. This revised model contains three different but related concepts that can be used to analyse the stability and value of leadership. Figure 1.1 shows the diagrammatic representation of the interaction of the various indicators of institutionalisation.

FIGURE 1.1
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.6.1. Institutionalisation

Institutionalisation refers to the process by which leadership "acquires value and stability" as an end in itself (Huntington 1968: 12). Selznick (1957: 17) states that "to institutionalise is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand." Stability also denotes that leadership in the legislature is no longer a mechanistic entity, easily altered or eliminated (Hibbing 1988). Instead, as the leadership of the legislature institutionalises, it survives various internal and environmental challenges. Value denotes "the prizing of the leadership for its own sake" (Selznick 1957: 17). As leadership institutionalises, it acquires a distinctive identity, a way of acting, and tasks it acts upon. For leadership, its value is also a matter of political power, exhibited when leaders in a legislature have authoritative control over policy outcomes, acceded to by those in other organisations (Ragsdale and Theis 1997).

As a conceptual construct, institutionalisation can be examined more concretely by indicators first proposed by Huntington (1965): autonomy, adaptability, complexity, and coherence. Building on Huntington's model of indices for measuring institutionalisation, the external dimension specifies the stability and value of leadership, encompassing differentiation from the political environment and the ability to adapt to changing environment. The internal dimension specifies the value of leadership, encompassing internal complexity of its units. It this study, the model for measuring internal and external institutionalisation used three distinct but related indicators: *political differentiation*, *political adaptation* and *structural growth*.

1.6.1.1. Political Differentiation

Political differentiation refers to the establishment of boundaries which makes the leadership in a legislature to be distinctive from the external political environment of the legislature (Camino 2013). It is the valuation of legislative experience of leaders before being elected into leadership positions used to determine the level of autonomy from the environment (Canon 1989). Higher level of differentiation

are associated with more experienced legislators chosen to leadership positions as opposed to legislators that are known for their linkages to the executive or to partisan interests more broadly, but that lack experience inside a Legislative Body (Squire 1992). The percentage of leaders chosen from within the legislature depicts the established boundaries of legislative leadership, which differentiates it from other members of the political environment.

Apart from boundedness, differentiation can be reinforced by having more *contested elections* for positions so that the leadership hardens its boundaries (Bullock, 1972). One indicator of the value of leadership is how much difficult it is for entry into leadership positions. This is determined by analysing the number of *uncontested elections* for leadership positions at the beginning of each new Session of Parliament. It is important to also note that some legislative scholars have used the *contested elections* to refer to elections in which the announced outcome is disputed in a reasonably formal manner by one of the participants (Polsby 1968; Squire 1992). However, in this study the term is used to refer to elections in which only one candidate is vying for legislative position. This is consistent with parliamentary procedure and practice which require candidates for legislative positions to be elective, either by secret ballot or by acclamation (Hibbing 1988).

1.6.1.2.   *Political Adaptation*

Political adaptation refers to the flexibility of the leadership with regard to changes in its political environment (Rosenthal 1996). There are three main indicators of stability of leadership in a legislature. The first measure is durability which has to do with the building of legislative authority associated with the longevity of service (Polsby 1968). The more leadership turnovers a legislature experiences per Session of Parliament, the more unstable it is. The more durable the leadership is, the more stable and, therefore the more institutionalised it becomes. In this way, stability can be determined by analysing leadership turnover per life of parliament.

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The second measure of political adaptation is generational change of leaders (Huntington 1965). In this study, generational change refers to the flexibility of the National Assembly to replace one generation of leaders with another (Polsby 1968). If the same generations of leaders continue to perform legislative functions across generations, then adaptation of leadership from one generation to another is in doubt (Huntington 1965; Hibbing 1988). This may be measured by evaluating the percentage of inter-generation changes, as opposed to intra-generation changes whenever there has been leadership change in the House. Higher percentages of inter-generation changes indicate higher levels of adaptation from the political environment.

The last measure of political adaptation is *functional adaptation* (Huntington 1965). It refers to the ability of leadership to acquire new functions in addition to those performed when it was first established. Therefore, when the leadership in a legislature acquires value and stability, the leaders are able to create new functional units of leadership without subtracting from the substantive functional units (Polsby 1968; Hibbing 1988). If legislative leadership has been able to adapt to changes in the political environment, it must have been able to exercise flexibility in order to enable it successfully cope with the change in its environment (Huntington 1965).

1.6.1.3. *Structural Growth*

Structural growth refers to the increase in the number of chairpersons of committees. This is because the increase in the number of committee chairpersons reflects complexity of leadership for their diverse needs (Canon 1989; Squire 1992). The growth in the number of committee chairpersons in a legislature implies higher levels of internal complexity. An increase in the number committee chairpersons in real terms is a clear indicator of the increase in personnel available to assist the leadership in the legislature (Squire 1992).

While internal complexity may translate into increase in sub-units of leadership, it also pertains to the workload and methods used to handle it. The workload refers

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to an increase in budgetary allocation to the legislature (Obando 2013). Many legislative scholars have overlooked this aspect of legislative institutionalisation and have opted to use committees and departments. As an indicator of institutionalisation, an increase or decrease in the number of financial resources is rarely used to determine the growth and complexity of units of leadership. Nonetheless, the tentative evidence of the growth or decrease in structural complexity of units in real terms would indeed suggest structural growth of units.

1.7. Literature Review

This study was informed by a number of legislative inquiries in Zambia, Europe and the American continents. In Zambia a number of legislative studies (African Parliamentary Index 2012; Phiri 2005; Kupalelwa 2004; Haantobolo *et al* 2004; Warren 2008; Corderec 2009; Chibesakunda 2001) were adequate enough in informing the study on the need for fresh and diverse enquiry of institutionalisation of leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia. In Europe a number of studies (Hibbing 1988; Rosenthal 1996) provided reference to the significance of studying Legislative Bodies in an institutional framework. Other studies (Polsby 1968; Squire 1992; Canon 1989; Obando 2009) were informative about the process of institutionalization in other countries' legislatures.

1.7.1. Legislative Studies in Zambia

The most recent writing on the legislature in Zambia is a *Country Report on the National Assembly of Zambia* (2012) by the African Parliamentary Index (API). This report shows the variations with the area of Budget Act and Budget Office in the National Assembly having the highest computed weight at 388, while the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) area weighed the least at 116. The study indicates that the former needs more attention, especially that there is no such Act or office in place while the later in view of the existence of the PAC means that less attention is needed in that area, except for enhancing its capacity. Further, the National Assembly was assessed as having good capacity in the areas of the work of the PAC, the provisioning of financial and material resources, the levels of

transparency and providing budgetary oversight to the executive. It was assessed as moderate in the areas of the audit function, human resources capacity and accessibility of the institution. The areas of legal mandate and budget review and hearing were scored as low moderates requiring significant attention.

In the report titled: *The Autonomy of the National Assembly of Zambia,* Corderec (2009) provides some information regarding the internal institutional structure of the National Assembly of Zambia. The study stresses that parliamentary autonomy is a question which one might describe as "cross-disciplinary" since it touches on all aspects of the organisation and functioning of parliaments. This study stresses, that even when limited to its administrative and financial dimensions, the question might seem too broad and as a result to elicit responses which are too general to be relevant. In fact the reverse is the case. Further, autonomy is not regarded as an "empty shell" but a concrete reality which expresses in some way and to various degrees depending on the country, the shared specificity of the parliamentary phenomenon throughout the world. The study concludes that autonomy is defined in effect on one hand by non dependence and non-subordination of the Legislature in relation to the Executive, and, on the other, by the possibility of the House freeing itself at least partially from the rules of ordinary law so as to follow instead its own regulations.

Writing in a report titled: *African Legislatures Project: Zambia,* Warren (2008) observes that that many challenges remain if the National Assembly of Zambia is to become independent, representative, open, and able to contribute meaningfully to policy development and implementation. Most reform efforts have focused on capacity building within the National Assembly, particularly in terms of staff development and committee structure. While the supply of support services and resources has been substantially addressed, incentive structures within the political system that reward the engagement of Members of Parliament with legislation, policy implementation, and constituents are still lacking. In addition, the study found out that it will take time for new skills and structures to become part of the culture of the National Assembly. Finally, the study reveals that the

Zambian experiment in the National Assembly management of non-partisan constituency offices should be closely monitored and evaluated to determine the extent to which these offices succeed in linking constituents to their Members of Parliament and the wider policy process in the National Assembly.

Bizeck Jube Phiri (2005) in a study titled: *Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in SADC Countries* observes that several issues affect the integrity of the institution of National Assembly of Zambia. The research highlights the need to consolidate the parliamentary reforms and their dissemination throughout the country. The research also demonstrates that Zambians from different walks of life have different perceptions of the National Assembly. The study contends that there is need to intensify the dissemination of information regarding parliamentary reforms, as well as the crucial role of the National Assembly in a democracy so that the electorate can have a better understanding of the institution. Over and above, the study reveals that the traditional role of legislating and its oversight role are less well known.

Henry Kupalelwa (2004) in a study titled: *The role of the Zambian Parliament in Controlling Administrative Actions,* focussed on the role of the National Assembly in controlling administrative actions. This study was largely influenced by the desire to recast academic inquiry on what other public functions the National Assembly performs apart from legislative functions. The study reveals that only the National Assembly has the legal authority to sanction public expenditure and revenue in Zambia. The study also shows that it is the ultimate responsibility of the National Assembly to ensure that any expenditure which has been sanctioned is both properly and efficiently spent. This study also shows that the National Assembly controls this administrative action through the Committee of Supply.

Writing in a study "*Protecting the Reputation and Standing of the Institution of Parliament and Parliamentarians* which appeared in the Commonwealth Parliamentary (CPA) in 2004, Haantobolo et al, reveal very important indicators. This study reveals some factors that have contributed to the declining status of the

National Assembly of Zambia. The study shows that the people expect a lot from the National Assembly. The study also shows that the people's understanding of the National Assembly and its functions is very significant as far as the survival and respect of the Zambian legislature is concerned.

Coming closer to this study, is the book published in 2001 by Ng'ona Mwelwa Chibesakunda, former Clerk of the National Assembly. Chibesakunda's The *Parliament of Zambia* was published in order to give readers and Members of Parliament a document that would facilitate a mature construction and assessment of the deliberations of the House. The book explains what the National Assembly of Zambia was, how it came into being and how it had functioned and continues to function. It shows the functions of the various legislative offices and how they have grown overtime. Specifically, it shows how the various legislative units, such as the committee system and the leadership of the speaker, have developed overtime.

It is evident from the foregoing that there has been no previous systematic analysis of extent of institutionalisation of Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia. The African Parliamentary Index (API) for 2012 only shows the performance by targeting the Committees of the National Assembly. Corderec (2009) only shows the structure of the National Assembly and how it has evolved. Warren (2008) shows that the National Assembly of Zambia has becoming independent. Kupalelwa (2004) reveals some information regarding the role of the National Assembly in holding the Executive accountable. Haantobolo et al (2004) shows the perceptions people have on the National Assembly. Phiri (2005) reviews some of the challenges affecting the integrity of the National Assembly of Zambia. Chibesakunda (2001), attempts to describe the institution of the National Assembly and how it has evolved. All of the above works presents some shortcomings, as far as institutionalisation is concerned. This work, therefore, is pioneering one in that respect by targeting at legislative leadership and how it has acquired legislative value and stability.

1.7.2. Legislative Studies in North America

In *State Legislative Development: Observations from Three Perspectives* which appeared in Legislative Studies Quarterly, Alan Rosenthal (1996) compiled a series of comparative studies for legislatures in the United States. Data on tenure and turnover suggests that state legislatures in the United States of America generally had been increasing in boundedness in the 1970s and 1980s. In this regard, they were becoming more institutionalised bodies than they had been in earlier years. Since the 1930s legislative turnover had been declining. This study shows that in some states, such Michigan, New York, and Ohio, leadership turnover in state legislatures had dropped to 10% or less. Overall, the study shows that turnover in lower houses fell from 45% in the 1950s to 32% in the 1970s to 28% in 1981-85. The study concludes that most legislatures are not differentiated from the political environment.

Squire (1992) *The Theory of Legislative Institutionalisation and the California Assembly* which appeared in the *Journal of Politics* is a very important contribution to legislative studies. This study paid substantial attention to professionalisation of the legislature, as well as to the relationship between legislative evolution and membership turnover. The findings indicate that the process of legislative institutionalisation is driven by the membership's career goals. The study also shows that members of the California Assembly have different career ambitions than members of Federal House of Representatives. The study shows that the Californian Assembly has increased internal complexity, and, on many but not all measures, it has established well-defined boundaries. Another finding is that seniority does not matter because more discretionary and particularistic methods better serve the career needs of the Assembly membership.

Nelson Polsby (1968) study titled: *The Institutionalisation of the United States' House of Representatives* which appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, is quite revealing. This study shows that an institutionalised organisation has three major characteristics: it is well bounded, it is complex, and the organisation tends to use universalistic as opposed to particularistic criteria in

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running its affairs. In addition this study generated important literature, especially within the American political field, looking across United States' state legislatures. The study shows that early emphasis on the implications of the internal organisation of Congress was taken several steps forward by the later literature that sought to shed light on the motivations underlying congress' observed organisation. This study shows that the House of Representatives has become institutionalised by becoming well-bounded, increased in internal complexity and the use of universalistic rather than particularistic norms in its management.

The above works are very useful in understanding the process of institutionalisation of leadership in a legislature. Rosenthal (1996) shows how leadership in state legislatures in the United States have become institutionalised. Squire (1992) provides great insight with regard to the process of institutionalisation of the leadership in the Californian Assembly. Polsby (1968) analysis of the process of institutionalisation of leadership in the United States' House of Representatives is very useful to this study. However, other than just providing a basis of analysis, the evidence from the foregoing works indicates the significance of studying the process of institutionalisation in the Zambian context. Therefore, this work is endeavouring to fill that void by studying the process of institutionalisation of legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia.

1.7.3. Legislative Studies in Europe

Gungor (2009) in a study titled: *Institutionalization of the European Parliament* analyses the extent to which the 'world's only elected supranational assembly' has become institutionalized. The study shows that, like the House of Representatives in the United States, the European Parliament is also a transformative legislature that possesses the independent capacity to mould and transform proposals from whatever source into Laws. Unlike the Legislatures in the United States, the European Parliament is a relatively young legislature with only 50 years of legislative history. Evidence from this study reveals that the changes observed in the European Parliament have been consistent with the

pattern of change that might be expected based on the notion of institutionalisation. The study shows that the European Parliament has become more autonomous, more internally complex and universalistic.

Hibbing (1988) study titled: *Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons* which appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, shows that the House of Commons in Britain has become highly institutionalised. However, regarding differentiation and adaptability, the pattern in the House of Commons is not nearly as clear as it is in the House of Representatives in the United States. For example, between the general elections of 1734 and 1741, 98 new members entered as a result of by-elections; another 156 new members entered as a result of the general election of 1741. Thus, 254 new members entered the Commons over this seven-year period. Since there were 558 seats at the time, the average turnover per year works out to about 6.5 percent of the total membership. These findings indicate a movement toward internal differentiation by the use of committees, albeit a late and abrupt one, but nevertheless a movement consistent with one of the fundamental aspects of institutionalisation.

The above works are also very useful in understanding institutionalisation of leadership. Gungor (2009) analysis of the process of institutionalisation in the European Parliament shows how that supranational legislature has become institutionalised. Hibbing (1988) provides great insight with regard to the process of institutionalisation in the British House of Commons is very useful to this study. However, other just providing a basis of analysis, the evidence from the foregoing works in the European Parliament and the British House of Commons indicates the significance of studying the process of institutionalisation in the Zambian context. Therefore, this work is endeavouring to fill that void by studying the process of institutionalisation of legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia.

1.7.4. *Legislative Studies in Latin America*

Palanza *et al* (2012) findings on the *institutionalisation of Congresses in Latin America and beyond* are another interesting study with regard to institutionalisation of legislatures in Latin American countries. This study examined the determinants of and the processes by which strong policymaking institutions emerge, with emphasis on the most central democratic institution. The findings of this study indicate that investments and beliefs are the driving force of congressional institutionalisation in most Latin American countries. In addition by making use of several other indicators of institutionalisation, this study provides evidence suggesting that congressional institutionalisation has an impact on the qualities of public policies and on economic and social development outcomes. The study also reveals that some constitutional factors that may promote congressional institutionalisation (Ibid 2012).

Camino (2011) in a study entitled: *Legislative Institutionalization in Chile, 1834-1924* is a significant to the study of institutionalisation in Latin American countries. This study showed that the Chilean legislature developed a congressional committee system that took stock of previous experiences and remained untouched until the late nineteenth century. In a sense, the study reveals that both houses of the Chilean legislature locked-in into the institutional design agreed upon early, so committee reforms built upon the institutional framework passed in the 1840s. Interestingly enough, both committee systems in the two houses of the legislature reflected bureaucratic goals at first and newly emergent policy issues by the turn of the century. The study also shows that the evolving institutional design of the Chilean legislature had an impact on this outcome, as the Chilean legislature gradually became an intermediate case between the Congress in the United States and House of Commons in Britain by the 1890s, a phenomenon that pushed it further above in the path of institutionalisation.

The foregoing literatures are very useful in understanding the institutionalisation in other Legislative Bodies. Palanza et al (2012) shows how legislatures in some

Latin American countries have become institutionalised. Camino (2011) provides great insight with regard to the process of institutionalisation in the Chilean Legislature. However, other just providing a basis of analysis, the evidence from the foregoing works indicates the significance of studying the process of institutionalisation in the Zambian context. Therefore, this work is a pioneering one as far as institutionalisation of leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia is concerned.

1.8. Methodology

This section outlines the scientific methods and the data that was needed. It also shows how the information was collected and the best analytical procedure that was used to examine the degree of differentiation, adaptability and structural growth of legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia.

1.8.1. Study Design

The study was both descriptive and explanatory in terms of its design. It was descriptive in that it provided an account of leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia regarding its differentiation, adaptability and the growth of internal complexity. It was explanatory in that it examined some potential changes in the political environment and structure of institution which could have a direct impact on stability and value of leadership.

1.8.2. Sources and Methods of Data Collection

Primary sources of data were interviews in which both qualitative and quantitative data were used. Structured interviews were employed so that respondents were asked questions phrased in the same manner. Interview guides contained open-ended questions (see Appendix I for more information on the interview guide used during the interviews). The inclusion of open-ended questions was intended to dig into as much insight as possible since the study was an in-depth analysis. The research instrument facilitated the collection of primary data. Secondary sources of data included libraries, government documents and the running record in the Parliamentary Hansard and other electronic materials from the National

Assembly Library and the National Archives. Other sources of secondary data included newspapers, and Memoirs.

1.8.3. Sampling

Purposive sampling was used to select individuals who hold key positions and knowledge regarding the operations of leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia. Snow-bow sampling was used as a procedure for selecting the informants. A total of 20 respondents were interviewed. These included ten (10) Members of the National Assembly, five (5) Former Members of the National Assembly and five (5) National Assembly Staff. Although the sample was small, the nature of the study did not require a large sample, as long as the research questions were answered.

1.8.4. Data Processing and Analysis

Data were analysed using both Excel (quantitative data) and the Manual or Narrative Method (qualitative data). Descriptive statistics were summarised in the text and reported in tabular form. Frequency analyses were conducted to identify valid per centum for responses to all questions in the instruments. Qualitative data in the form of text and audio obtained through interviews, documents and other materials was analysed for themes. The steps in qualitative data analysis included (a) preliminary exploration of the data by reading through the transcripts and writing summaries; (b) coding the data by segmenting, labelling the text and aggregating similar codes together (c) connecting interrelated themes and (d) constructing a narrative. Data analysis involved a detailed description of each case of the independent variables (see Appendix II). Based on this analysis, a detailed narration of each variable was provided, using either an elaborate perspective about some incidents, chronology, or major events followed by an up-close description.

1.8.5. Scope and Limitations of the Study

The scope of the study was limited to the position of Speaker and Committee Chairpersons. Since this study is a pioneering one, as far as studying

institutionalisation in Zambia is concerned, it was vital to limit the scope to those variables and applying the units of analysis. The scope, therefore, did not include other types of leaders in the National Assembly, such as Deputy Speakers, Clerks of the National Assembly and Whips. Perhaps it would be important to conduct more research on leadership involving a significant number of leaders in order to analyse legislative stability and value.

There were other limitations related to data. For instance lack of prior research studies on the topic. For this reason, the study required using a combination both and explanatory, rather than exploratory research design. This limitation can also serve as an important opportunity for further research. Another limitation was the measure used to collect the data. This was particularly true with self-reported data. Self-reported data was limited by the fact that it rarely can be independently verified. It relied heavily on what respondents said during interviews at face value. This is a limitation because self-reported data could contain several potential sources of bias such as selective memory by some respondents who remembered or not remember experiences or events that occurred at some point in the past. Some respondents employed telescoping, that is recalling events that occurred at one time as if they occurred at another time. Others used the act of attributing positive events and outcomes to their own agency but attributing negative events and outcomes to external forces.

1.9.   Chapter Outline

Each of the chapters which follow concentrate on the specific subject areas, among which have been broadly outlined in the conceptual framework in section 1.6 above. This dissertation has six chapters with the hitherto **Chapter One** followed by the subsequent chapters.

Chapter Two gives a historical account of legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia. It analyses the relationship between the legislative leadership and various informal and formal distributions of power obtaining under the various historical epochs. The chapter unveils the foundations of legislative

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leadership in Zambia and the factors which undermined it in the period 1890 to 2014.

Chapter Three deals with the differentiation of legislative leadership in the National Assembly. In particular it deals with the establishment of the boundaries of legislative leadership. It uses the legislative experiences of speakers of the National Assembly, expressed in years served in the legislature before their first or second appointment as speaker of the National Assembly. The chapter also discusses the question of consolidation of the boundaries by analysing the number of contested elections for the position of Speaker of the National Assembly from 1964-2011.

Chapter Four discusses the question of adaptability of legislative leadership in the National Assembly. It deals with the leadership turnover per life of parliament. It also discusses the generational gap of leaders between 1964 and 2011. Finally, the chapter discusses the functional changes to the leadership. The chapter deals with environmental challenges and how they impacted on the functions of the committee system more broadly.

Chapter Five evaluates the growth of internal complexity. It focuses on the increase in the number of committee chairpersons in the National Assembly of Zambia in the period 1964-2011. The chapter also assesses the increase in the financial resources used in running the National Assembly as determinants of institutionalisation.

Chapter Six is the conclusion, which summarises the contents of the substantive chapters.

CHAPTER TWO
EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

2.1.   Introduction

Leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia is one of the oldest in a continuously functioning legislature in Southern Africa (National Assembly of Zambia 2014a). It operates in a unicameral legislature modelled along the British Westminster style of parliamentary system. The leadership of the National Assembly presides over 150 members elected in single-member electoral districts and eight (8) members nominated by the President. The legislative power of the Republic of Zambia is vested in the Parliament, which is made up of the President of the Republic of Zambia and the National Assembly (Article 62, Constitution of the Republic of Zambia 1996).

The President of the Republic of Zambia, through the powers conferred by Article 62 of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia (Cap 1 of the Laws of Zambia 1996), calls Parliament to meet and gives final approval to laws. However, the President of the Republic of Zambia does not otherwise play an active role in legislative work. It is the Speaker of the National Assembly, who presides over the legislature and carries out a wide range of important legislative responsibilities. This chapter traces the historical background of the speakership in the National Assembly of Zambia from 1889 to 2011.

2.2.   Legislative Leadership and the Queen-in-Council (1889-1911)

The historical evolution of legislative authority in the territory known as Zambia today can be traced back to the late 19th century. On October 29, 1889, the British government granted a Royal Charter of incorporation to the British South Africa Company (BSACo) granting the company mining rights in the territory (Ndulo 1989; Mumba 2004). The Charter gave the BSACo mandate to rule Northern Rhodesia on behalf of the British government (Kupalelwa 2004). However, the territory proved to be too vast for the Company to administer. As a result, by the Orders-in-Council of 1889 and 1890, Northern Rhodesia was divided into two

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territories, North-Western Rhodesia and North-Eastern Rhodesia. Nonetheless, the Order-in-Council for North-Western Rhodesia and the Order-in-Council for North-Eastern Rhodesia did not create any central legislative institution. In North-Eastern Rhodesia, legislative sources were the Queen-in-Council through Orders-in-Council in exercise of powers to the company under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 passed by the British Parliament (Mumba 2004).

Further, the Administrator, who was head of the territory, and his Council were empowered by the Royal Charter of 1899 and the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order-in-Council to make, alter and repeal regulations for the administration of justice, raising revenue and for peace and good governance in the territory (Section 11 of Royal Charter 1899). However, to be valid such regulations were to be approved by the British High Commissioner to South Africa who was the supervisor of the two territories (Section 16 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890). In addition, the High Commissioner could also legislate for the territory and such legislation was known as the Queen's Regulations as outlined under Section 17 of the Foreign Jurisdictions Act of 1890 (Haantobolo 2008).

The British High Commissioner for South Africa had legislative powers and leadership for the people of North-Western Rhodesia (Barotseland under Section 2 of the Foreign Jurisdictions Act of 1890). The High Commissioner could make proclamations which provided for the administration of justice, revenue collection and generally for the peace, order and good government, as well as the prohibition and punishment of acts tending to disturb the peace (Phiri *et al* 2008). The British imperial government, however, retained its checking power of disallowance of any undesirable legislation through the Colonial Secretary (Section 17 (1) Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890).

2.3.   Legislative Leadership in the Advisory Council (1911-1924)

In 1911 North-Western Rhodesia and North-Eastern Rhodesia amalgamated into a single territory which came to be called Northern Rhodesia (Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council, 1911). Further, Article 13 of the Order-in-Council of 1911

provided for the enactment of an Advisory Council to assist the Administrator of the territory. The Advisory Council comprised of five (5) elected unofficial members. The Advisory Council did not have any legislative powers as all legislations in the territory were approved through the proclamations by the British High Commissioner to South Africa who acted as the *de facto* legislative leader of the Council (Phiri *et al* 2008). The *de facto* leadership of Advisory Council and the entire Council for that matter was not institutionalised as the Administrator could make decisions without consent of the elected representatives of the Advisory Council (Kupalelwa 2004).

However, despite the Advisory Council having no legislative powers, it provided the settlers of Northern Rhodesia with a platform where they could voice their grievances and opinions against the administration (Haantobolo 2008). Although the Advisory Council was not a legislature in the true sense of the term, it nonetheless, proved to be a useful body both to the administration and the settlers in Northern Rhodesia (Chibesakunda 2001). Through the Advisory Council, the administration was able to use the information obtained from demands by settlers to make policies for the territory. Even though legislation or regulations in the territory were made through proclamations by the High Commissioner to South Africa, Advisory Council and the High Commissioner as the *de facto* leader stood as the foundation of today's leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia (Kupalelwa 2004).

2.4.   Legislative Leadership in the Legislative Council (1924-1964)

In 1924, Northern Rhodesia became a British Protectorate and the BSACo ceded administrative responsibilities of the territory to the British Crown (Haantobolo 2008). In 1924, the Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council set up a Legislative Council (Chibesakunda 2001). The Legislative Council had provisions to "establish such ordinances as may be necessary for the administration of justice, the raising of revenue, and generally for the peace, order and good government of Northern Rhodesia (Article 20, Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council 1924). The Legislative Council comprised of the Governor as President, nine officials (that is

five Ex-official Members and four official Members) and five elected unofficial Members. The unofficial Members of the Legislative Council were elected from ordinary citizens (Chibesakunda 2001).

Nevertheless, the Legislative Council was not a legislature in the generally accepted sense of a legislature (Kupalelwa 2004. This is because the full authority to legislate for Northern Rhodesia was retained by the British government. This view was confirmed by Governor Sir Herbert Stanley in his inaugural speech to the Legislative Council when he emphasised that the Council was not a Parliament in the generally accepted sense of that term. According to him, the Council stood as a basis through which views of people from various parts of the territory were to be brought before the government for consideration, which otherwise could have escaped the notice of government (Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates – Hansard 23rd May, 1924 Column 3). Although this was the case, the elected official members of the Legislative Council saw themselves in a different light. According to Leopold Moore (Ibid Hansard, May 20th 1925, Columns 102-3), "the difference between Parliament and the Council were small and…should not be emphasised."

The sessions in the Legislative Council were presided over by the Governor until 1948 when the first speaker was appointed by the Governor General himself (Chibesakunda 2001). The Governor's dominance over the Legislative Council was assured by provisions which empowered him with powers to appoint the majority of its members, to suspend erring members, to dissolve or prorogue the Council, to have the casting vote, and to assent Bills (Order-in-Council 1925). Moreover, the governor was the only one authorised to propose Bill to the Legislative Council. The object or effect of most of the Bills proposed by the Governor was to impose tax or dispose of or charge any part of the public revenue in Northern Rhodesia (Kupalelwa 2004). This only shows the extent to which the Legislative Council was influenced by the authority of the Governor.

In 1953, there were significant changes in the political and administrative structure in Northern Rhodesia (Haantobolo *et al* 2004). The Federation of

Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established out of the desire by the British government to foster closer association between the two Rhodesia (Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia) and Nyasaland (Kupalelwa 2004). The executive powers of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were vested in Her Majesty the Queen of England, but were exercised by the Governor-General as her viceroy. The Governor-General was assisted by the Executive Council which comprised of the Prime Minister and other Ministers, all appointed by the Governor-General (Chibesakunda 2001).

The legislative powers of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were vested in the Federal Assembly although Her Majesty reserved the right to legislate for the Federation (Article 8, Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1953). The Federal Assembly consisted of the Speaker and 59 members, 44 of whom were elected. Of the 44 elected members, 24 were from Southern Rhodesia, 14 from Northern Rhodesia and 6 from Nyasaland. At its inception, the Federal Assembly only comprised of 35 members but this was raised to 59 in 1957. Northern Rhodesia however, retained its Legislative Council (Kupalelwa 2004). The arrangement during the period of the Federation as regards the relationship between the legislature of a territory and the Federal Assembly was that if any person was elected a member of the former, he was not to take his seat in the latter until he ceased to be a member of the former. Likewise if an elected member of the Federal Assembly became a member of the Legislative Council, he was thereupon to vacate his seat in the Federal Assembly (Article 10 (3) and (4) of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1953).

Therefore, the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia still retained the power to legislate on all matters except constitutional ones which fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly (Kupalelwa 2004). In 1959 a new Constitution was adopted which the British government hoped would have encouraged the development of party politics as opposed to racial politics as the case was before (Chibesakunda 2001). Under the 1959 Constitution, the Legislative Council was made up of a total of 30 members, six (6) official

members (excluding the Speaker of the Legislative Council), two (2) unofficial members, and twenty-two (22) elected members (Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia, Order-in-Council 7(6) 1959).

Although the 1959 Constitution was meant to encourage the development of non-racial politics in Northern Rhodesia, it was certain that the racial composition of the Legislative Council's elected members would be fourteen (14) Europeans and eight (8) Africans (Kupalelwa 2004). As a result of the dissatisfaction by both Africans and Europeans with the 1959 Constitution of Northern Rhodesia, a Commission of Inquiry was appointed to review the Constitution which resulted in the 1962 Constitution (Chibesakunda 2001). Under the 1959 Constitution of Northern Rhodesia, the Legislative Council comprised of Ex-officio members of the Executive Council plus the elected members (The Constitution of Northern Rhodesia 1959).

In 1963 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved after campaigns by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the Africa National Congress (ANC) and a new Constititution was enacted (Kupalelwa 2004). Under the new Constitution the Legislative Council was renamed the Legislative Assembly (Article 32, Northern Rhodesia Constitution, Order-in-Council 1963). The Legislative Assembly created under the 1963 Constitution of Northern Rhodesia increased membership of the Legislative Council to 75 from 45 in 1962 (Chibesakunda 2001). Out of the 75 members of the Legislative Assembly, 65 were elected by African voters and 10 by European voters (Kupalelwa 2004). The Executive Council was collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly and the Governor was neither a member of the Legislative Assembly nor the presiding officer of its legislative business (Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council 1963).

2.5. Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly (1964-2011)

On October 24, 1964, Northern Rhodesia became an independent sovereign Republic of Zambia under the 1964 Independence Constititution which named Kenneth David Kaunda as the first President (Chibesakunda 2001). Under the

1964 Constitution of the Republic of Zambia, the Legislative Assembly was renamed National Assembly of Zambia. Accordingly, the legislative power of the Republic of Zambia was vested in the Parliament, which was made up of the National Assembly and the President of the Republic of Zambia (Section 57 of the Constitution of Zambia, 1964). This was an important turning point in the legislative history of the National Assembly in general and leadership in particular. The National Assembly became an institution forming part of the three wings of government, the Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature. For the first time, on December 14, 1964 the National Assembly of Zambia elected its own speaker (Kupalelwa 2004).

On December 13, 1972, the Republic of Zambia became a One-party State after an amendment to the Constitution which provided that UNIP was to be the sole legal political party in the country (Constitution Amendment Act No 5 of 1972). Under the One-party Constitution, the legislative power of the Republic of Zambia was vested in the Parliament which was a composite of the President and the National Assembly. The National Assembly was composed of 125 members including 10 nominated members (Article 64 and 66 of the Constitution of Zambia 1973). The National Assembly was vested with the power to legislate although the President retained the power to assent to all Bills.

However, the National Assembly in the Second Republic was subordinate to the Party. This was affirmed by the Constitution of UNIP which state that the Party had supreme authority over all state organs. Although Parliament was the National Assembly was the highest legislative organ in the country, it derived its authority from the Party. Like any other institution, there could be no doubt about the supremacy of the Party over the National Assembly (Kaunda 1975). Despite uproar and continuous warnings from the Party the National Assembly continued to exercise its legislative authority and oversight responsibilities against the executive in the Second Republic (Kupalelwa 2004). On November 30, 1990, the National Assembly of Zambia passed the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill which allowed the formation of opposition political parties and signaled an

end to the One-party system and also the Second Republic after President assented to the Bill which paved way for the amendment of Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia (Chibesakunda 2001).

Following the passing of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill in 1990 by the National Assembly, a new Constitution was enacted which allowed the formation of opposition political parties (Simutanyi 2002; Phiri 2005). Under the 1991 Constitution (and amended in 1996), the legislative power of the Republic of Zambia was vested in the Parliament, which comprised of the National Assembly and the President of the Republic of Zambia (Article 62 of the Constitution of Zambia, 1991). The National Assembly was composed of 150 elected members and not more than eight (8) members nominated by the President of the Republic of Zambia and the Speaker of the National Assembly. This arrangement in the National Assembly of Zambia has persisted even today, although a number of reforms have been proposed with a view to improving its legislative capacity and oversight vis-à-vis other parts of the political environment (Phiri 2005; Chisha 2012; National Assembly of Zambia 2014b).

Leadership of the Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia is established under Article 69(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia (1996) which states that: "There shall be a Speaker of the National Assembly who shall be elected by the Members of the Assembly from among persons who are qualified to be elected as Members of the Assembly but are not Members of the Assembly." As a constitutional office, it is one of the most important offices not only in the National Assembly but also in the political system and the political environment (Chibesakunda 2001).

According to National Assembly of Zambia Standing Orders (SO (5), 2005), the Speaker is the Presiding Officer of the National Assembly of Zambia and the Principal Presiding Officer of Parliament (when the President of the Republic attends), and his authority is recognised and respected. The Speaker is the guardian of the privileges of the National Assembly (National Assembly of Zambia Parliamentary Procedure Code (8) 2010). The Speaker shapes the

proceedings in the House, maintains its dignity and gives it proper direction. The Speaker is invested with authority to ensure order and that the privileges of the National Assembly are not abused or misused. The function of the Speaker is to regulate debate and enforce the observance of the rules which govern its conduct (SO (5) 2005). The Speaker calls upon Members who wish to speak and uses his/her own discretion in selecting them (National Assembly of Zambia Parliamentary Procedure Code (8) 2010). The Speaker is also the representative of the National Assembly in its external relations with other wings of the state or authorities and other persons as well as in international parliamentary relations (Ibid 2010).

The Speaker is assisted by the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, whose office is established under Article 70 (1) of the Constitution of Zambia (1996) which provides that: "There shall be a Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly who shall be elected by the Members of the Assembly from among Members of the Assembly." The Deputy Speaker is assisted by the Deputy Chairman of Committees of the Whole House as provided for in National Assembly Standing Order No. 5(14). The Deputy Chairman of Committees of the Whole House is also elected by secret ballot. When the House is in Committee, any Member, other than the Vice President, Minister, and Deputy Minister or any Member holding or acting in any office prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament, may, at the request of the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of Committees, take the Chair for a short time. Chairpersons of various committees also provide legislative leadership when committees are in session (National Assembly of Zambia 2014).

The Speaker of the National Assembly is elected from outside a constituency to avoid tying the Speaker to any specific local interests, because his/her interests should be the interests of the House and the State (National Assembly of Zambia 2005). The Speaker's election to the House places him/her in a convenient position to claim the ancient rights and privileges of Members of Parliament in his/her address to the Head of State when presenting himself/herself for presidential approbation (Kupalelwa 2004). The Speaker is usually elected at the

beginning of every new Parliament or when the previous Speaker of the National Assembly dies or retires (Article 69 Constitution of the Republic of Zambia 1996). In addition, according to National Assembly of Zambia Standing Order No 5(2) of 2005, election of the Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia is by secret ballot.

The Deputy Speaker is elected to the House when the Assembly first sits after any dissolution of Parliament or when the Office becomes vacant due to death, resignation or removal of the incumbent. This is provided for under Article 70 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia. Like the Speaker, the election of the Deputy Speaker under National Assembly Standing Order 5 (14) is also by secret ballot. Because of the important role the Deputy Speaker and Speaker have in the House, the election of the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly of the is the second business that a new Assembly transacts at its first meeting in accordance with Article 69(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia (1996). The Deputy Speaker is almost instantaneously together with the Deputy Chairman of Committees (SO 5(14) of the National Assembly of Zambia). The various chairpersons of committees are appointed by the Speaker of the National Assembly, while others are allowed to elect their own leaders as per Standing Orders or as prescribed under an Act of Parliament.

2.6.   Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the legislative leadership has passed through different phases of legislative development. It is important to state that the whole period from 1911, when the Advisory Council was established, to 1964 when a responsible National Assembly of Zambia was established, what existed was more of an advisory institution in Northern Rhodesia administration than a legislature in the true sense of the term. During those days, leadership of the Advisory Council was constituted in such ways that it lacked adequate levels of differentiation, could not adapt to changes in the political environment and the body was internally simplistic to say the least. After 1964 National Assembly elected its own Speaker and with an obligation to steer the legislative process and

perform oversight functions. Although this has been heralded by some scholars as the beginning of institution-building, the current political developments in the National Assembly of Zambia no doubt requires recasting attention to analyse the extent to which leadership has become institutionalised. The following chapters address these issues.

CHAPTER THREE
POLITICAL DIFFERENTIATION

3.1   Introduction

This chapter seeks to analyse the extent to which leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia has become differentiated from the political environment. In a highly institutionalised legislature, the speakership is usually insulated from both political and non-political groups and procedures (Huntington 1965). Differentiation, therefore, refers to the boundaries which distinguish the speakership from members of others parts in the political environment. It is the tendency to choose Speakers from among the veterans who have served in various legislative responsibilities. This is in order for the speakership to clearly define its boundaries, differentiating it from influence of other parts of the political environment. As such, when the boundaries are clearly defined, entry into leadership positions requires longer service in the legislature such that it becomes hard for candidates who have little or no legislative experience.

The growth in boundedness should also be associated with greater competition positions of the Speaker of the National Assembly (Polsby 1968). If boundaries of leadership are clearly defined, they can make entry into leadership positions very difficult for novices or persons who have no experience in the legislature to ascend to the position of Speaker of the National Assembly. This implies that the number of positions contested by more than one candidate would normally increase as the leadership acquires legislative value. However, undifferentiated leadership is associated with leaders emerging rapidly and lateral entry in uncontested elections by people from outside its political environment is quite common (Rosenthal 1996). Therefore, as leadership becomes more differentiated, it acquires value by hardening its boundaries and channels career opportunities to experienced legislators.

Lastly, politically differentiated leadership should be insulated from other social forces in the environment (Polsby 1968). These social forces are groupings of

people in the country meant for social and economic activities. They include legislative parties, ethnic and religious groupings (Huntington 1965). Accordingly, differentiation implies that the leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia is not just the expression of, and subordinate to these particular social forces. This also serves as a shield against partisan or other considerations that may intervene in the legislative process.

3.2. The Political Boundaries of Leadership

The most common indicator used to demarcate the political boundaries of leadership is the legislative experience of Speakers of the National Assembly. This is calculated from the number of years served in the National Assembly before assuming leadership positions. Regarding the boundaries of leadership in the National Assembly, the pattern is not nearly as clear as it is in advanced legislatures but the trend shows many of the Speakers of the National Assembly before 2011 have had adequate legislative experience before appointment. The numbers contained in the Table 3.1 below represent the pre-service years for Speakers in the National Assembly of Zambia (including their time and positions of service in the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia).

TABLE 3.1
LEGISLATIVE EXPERIENCE FOR SPEAKERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Name	Pre Service Years	Legislative Experience
Wesley P. Nyirenda	1962-1964	Member of Parliament and Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia
Robinson M Nabulyato	1954-1959	Member of the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia
Robinson M Nabulyato	1969-1988	Speaker of the National Assembly
Fwanyanga M. Mulikita	-	No Legislative Experience
Amusaa K Mwanamwambwa	1991-1998	Member of Parliament, Liuwa Constituency
Patrick Matibini	-	No Legislative Experience
Percentage of Insiders	**60%**	

**Source**: National Assembly of Zambia (2014), Various

The information shown in Table 3.1 above indicates that 60 per cent of Speakers that served in the National Assembly of Zambia from 1964 to 2011 have had legislative experience before being elected. For example, Wesley Pillsbury

Nyirenda served as Member of the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia (African Representative-East Luangwa) and Deputy Speaker between 1962 and 1964 before he became its Speaker in 1964 (Mulenga 2004a). Similarly, Robinson Nabulyato also served as African Representative (Southern and Barotseland Provinces) in the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia between 1954 and 1959 before becoming Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia in 1969 (Nabulyato 2004). Amusaa Mwanamwambwa served as Member of Parliament (MMD - Liuwa Constituency) in the National Assembly of Zambia from 1991 to 1998 before being elected its Speaker in 1998 (National Assembly of Zambia 2014a).

Only Fwanyanga Mulikita did not serve in any legislative responsibility in the Zambian legislature before his first appointment as Speaker of the National Assembly in 1988 (Chibesakunda 2001). Recent trends also indicate that the boundaries of leadership in the National Assembly are admittedly relatively unstable. This is true, especially with the recent election of former High Court Judge, Justice Patrick Matibini, as Speaker of the National Assembly after the 2011 general elections, albeit his experience on the bench. Although that has been the case, the trend suggests that the boundaries of leadership in the National Assembly are considerably bounded. For instance, the aggregated percentages of Speakers who have been legislators before the beginning of the 11th National Assembly in 2011 is astonishingly high, with ¾ (75%) of them having served as legislators before being elected as Speakers of the National Assembly.

This study also suggests some differences in the level of boundaries of leadership in the National Assembly and the nature of the party system. For instance, aggregating the years served by Speakers of the National Assembly shows that legislative leadership in the first multiparty and second multiparty National Assemblies were more bounded than in the one-party National Assembly. Figure 3.1 shows the cumulative years of service for leaders under the multi-party and one-party National Assemblies from 1964 to 2011.

FIGURE 3.1

CUMULATIVE EXPERIENCE OF SPEAKERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

As shown in Figure 3.1 above, legislative leadership in the National Assembly is admittedly becoming more differentiated from its environment by establishing the boundaries of its leadership. The results of the graph in Figure 2 above show that leadership in the National Assembly in first multi-party system was highly differentiated from the external political environment. All the first two (2) speakers who served during this period had prior knowledge of the National Assembly (the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia) with cumulative years of service amounting to seven (7) years before their election as Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia.

However, during the one-party National Assembly, the boundaries of leadership were not quite defined as in the first multi-party National Assembly. Only ½ (50%) of the leaders who served during that period had experience in the National Assembly, with an aggregate of five (5) years served in the National Assembly before. After the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1991, leadership in the National Assembly retained its boundaries as in the first multi-party National Assembly. The cumulative experience of leaders in the period 1991 to 2011 was 24 years. Among the Speakers who served in this period, Robinson Nabulyato had served as member of the Legislative Council for seven (7) years and also as Speaker of the National Assembly for nine (9) years before his appointment in

1991. Amusaa Mwanamwambwa served as legislator for eight (8) years before he became Speaker in 1998 (National Assembly of 2014b). This suggests establishing of the boundaries of leadership after the re-introduction of multiparty National Assembly.

The recent case of Justice Patrick Matibini is an exception having served as High Court Judge before his election as Speaker at the beginning of the eleventh National Assembly in 2011. However, like in other organs of the state, careers of leaders in careers in the National Assembly of Zambia change in other ways, too. The case of Patrick Matibini is a notable one but his case is explainable, given his desire to start an essentially new career after President Michael Sata nominated him to serve as Speaker of the National Assembly (Silwamba and Chilemba 2011). This institutional shift from a willingness and desire to appoint people with experience in the National Assembly towards people in executive and judicial capacities constitutes a pristine encapsulation the porous boundaries of leadership.

In addition, during the one-party National Assembly, it was not uncommon for someone to have bed executive experience before becoming Speaker. Fwanyanga Mulikta was Zambia's first Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) before he was elected Speaker of the National Assembly (Mulenga 2004). He also served as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Education before between 1969 and 1973. President Kaunda elevated him to UNIP Member of the Central Committee (MCC). In 1988, he was elected as Speaker of the Zambian National Assembly, where he steered Parliament during the transition from one party to plural politics in 1991.

Debates on the merits and demerits of speakers having executive, judicial or legislative experience continue among legislative scholars (Polsby 1968; Hibbing 1988; Obando 2013). However, this study shows that former ministers rarely become Speakers of the National Assembly of Zambia. Ministerial experience may even be a handicap, although recently there is a virtual requisite that Speakers of National Assembly have previous experience on "the bench". In the early post-colonial National Assembly, experience and training as a lawyer were

not nearly as important as they have become in recent years, but it is much more likely for future Speakers of the National Assembly to serve in the capacity of chairman of Ways and Means, often called the Chairman of Committees, Deputy Speaker or Member of Parliament as the boundaries of the leadership become more defined.

If legislative experience is a measure of the how bounded the leadership is, then at least in some way, the position of Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia can be seen as becoming more and more differentiated from other spheres. There seem to have been some institutional shift from a willingness and desire to appoint leaders with experience in the National Assembly towards people in executive and judicial connections, (which could ruin the established boundaries of legislative leadership in the National Assembly). However, there is enough evidence suggesting growing boundedness, differentiating the speakership from members and methods of behaviour in other parts of the political environment.

3.3.   Uncontested Elections

It is clear from the previous analysis that between 1964 and 2011, the boundaries of legislative leadership were clearly defined despite, partisan and executive control which weakened the value of leadership. In order for the leadership to acquire more value, its boundaries must be hardened such that entry into positions of leadership becomes more difficult (Polsby 1968; Squire 1992). This is important for the leadership of the National Assembly to maintain its distinct political and social identity. This can be determined by the percentage of uncontested elections for the position of Speaker of the National Assembly at the beginning of each session of parliament.

The concept of uncontested elections is often used to measure the level of competition in the National Assembly. To avoid confusion, it is important to explain that legislative scholars, such as Polsby (1968) have used the concept of uncontested elections in a different context. The term is used to refer to elections in which the announced outcome is disputed in a reasonably formal manner by

one of the participants. In this study the term is used to refer to elections in which only one candidate was competing for the position of Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia at each general election or whenever a transition occurred (Rosenthal 1996).

The number of contested elections offers more insight regarding the consolidation of those boundaries resulting in more internal differentiation (Hibbing 1988). To show the trend towards the consolidation of boundaries of Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia, over-time decrease in the number of uncontested elections for the position of the Speaker of the National Assembly from 1964 to 2011 are presented in Table 3.2 below.

TABLE 3.2
CONTEST FOR LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Assembly Session	Year	Contestants and Number of Votes
1st National Assembly	1964	W. P Nyirenda
2nd National Assembly	1968	R. M. Nabulyato
3rd National Assembly	1973	R. M. Nabulyato
4th National Assembly	1978	R. M. Nabulyato
5th National Assembly	1983	R. M. Nabulyato
6th National Assembly	1988	F. M. Mulikita
7th National Assembly	1991	R. M. Nabulyato
8th National Assembly	1996	R. M. Nabulyato
9th National Assembly	2002	A. Mwanamwambwa (80) F. Hapunda (77)
10th National Assembly	2006	Amusaa Mwanamwambwa
11th National Assembly	2011	Patrick Matibini (78) Richard Kapita (77)
Percentage of Uncontested Elections		82%

The information shown in Table 3.2 above indicate that the boundaries of leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia have been very weak, although recent trends show signs towards greater competition with a decrease in the number of uncontested elections for the position of Speaker. The percentage of uncontested elections per general election was very high (about 82% of elections for the position of Speaker have been uncontested). For instance, during the First Republic all elections to the position of Speaker were uncontested. Wesley Nyirenda was elected as Speaker of the National Assembly at the beginning of the

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First National Assembly in 1964 (National Assembly of Zambia 1964). In 1968, Robison Nabulyato was also elected as Speaker in another uncontested election at the beginning of the Second National Assembly (National Assembly of Zambia 1968). This suggests that the boundaries of legislative leadership in the multi-party National Assembly were highly permeable as all elections for the position of Speaker of the National Assembly were uncontested.

During the Second Republic (1973-1991) all elections for the position of Speaker of the National Assembly were also uncontested. For instance, at the beginning of the Third National Assembly in 1973, Robinson Nabulyato was re-elected as Speaker of the House in another uncontested election (National Assembly of Zambia 1973). Robison Nabulyato was again re-elected as Speaker of the National Assembly in an uncontested election at the beginning of the Fourth National Assembly in 1978 and also at beginning of the Fifth National Assembly in 1983. At the beginning of the Sixth National Assembly in 1985, Fwanyanga Mulikita was elected as speaker of the National Assembly in an unopposed election. This study suggests that the boundaries of Legislative Leadership in the one-party National Assembly were highly permeable as virtually all elections to the position of the Speaker of the National Assembly were unopposed.

However, the period 1991 to 2011, there was a reduction in the number of uncontested elections for the speaker of the National Assembly. During this period, the National Assembly had only witnessed two (2) contested elections for the position of Speaker and three (3) have been uncontested. Among the uncontested ones was the election of Speaker at the beginning of the Eighth National Assembly in 1991 when Robinson Nabulyato was elected as Speaker in an uncontested election. At the beginning of the Ninth National Assembly in 1996 he was re-elected as Speaker again in another uncontested election (National Assembly of Zambia 1991). At the beginning of the Tenth National Assembly in 2006 Mwanamwambwa was re-elected Speaker of the National Assembly in an uncontested election (National Assembly of Zambia 2006).

The 2011 election of the Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia was highly contested with Patrick Matibini polling 78 votes against Richard Kapita's 77 votes (National Assembly of Zambia 2011). In 2002, Amusaa Mwanamwambwa was re-elected as speaker of the National Assembly with 80 votes, beating Frederick Hapunda, who got 77 votes (Ngoma and Lukumba 2002). Admittedly, the number of uncontested elections in the period 1964 to 2011 has been very high. Since the re-introduction plural politics in 1991, there has been an unmistakable decrease in the number of uncontested elections for the position of the Speaker of the National Assembly. The decrease was rather staggering because of changes in the party system, but the general drift in the number of uncontested seats was down ward shortly after 2001, when virtually all seats were and have subsequently been contested, except in 2006.

However, the general trend is consistent with what is expected (Rosenthal 1996; Obando 2013). A decrease in the number of uncontested elections to enter the leadership positions would be consistent with the notion that the value of leadership in a legislature entails the "channeling" of careers and a need to "pay dues" or perform homage before entry is granted and advancements are made (Polsby 1968; Ragsdale and Theis 1997). All this relates to the idea that a part of differentiation is the presence of competitive contestation for political power that must be cleared in order for the leadership to be differentiating from its political environment (Hibbing 1988 makes a similar argument).

3.4. Differentiation from Social Forces

From the previous analysis, it is clear that entry to leadership positions has been easier, with only a sizable proportion of elections having been contested. But the value of leadership also depends on its differentiation from other social forces. These social forces may include groupings of men and women for social and economic activities such as families, clans, churches, ethnic and linguistic groups (Huntington 1965). Accordingly, legislative institutionalisation should evolve a leadership that is not just the expression of particular social groups. Legislative leadership that is an instrument of one ethnic group, political party or class lacks

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value in the political system, as it is subordinate to those particular social forces (ibid 1965).

3.4.1. *Political Parties and Speakers*

The study suggests that the most probable social forces have been legislative parties who have tended to wield an enormous influence on who becomes speaker of the National Assembly. During the one-party National Assembly, UNIP played a crucial role in controlling the conduct of leaders in the National Assembly. It is not only expected that speakers ruled according to the instructions of the party, but also that those who do not do so may risk severe sanctions. These may include not being adopted as a candidate for the position of speaker at the next session of parliament, suspension or even expulsion from the party. The strategy adopted by UNIP to influence speakers in this way was the vetting system. Aspiring candidates were subjected to vetting by the UNIP Central Committee and it was through this system all critical aspiring candidates were eliminated.

The fear of being vetted at the next session of the National Assembly and the expectation of political appointments caused some speakers and Members of Parliament to support government motions and bills (Gertzel 1984). However, serious tensions developed between speakers and the party as to the rights and obligations of Members of Parliament to their voters on the one hand, and their responsibilities to their party on the other hand. This was later to fuel the debate on the efficacy of the government system and provoked demands for the re-introduction of a multiparty system in mid-1990. The power and influence of UNIP on speakers was so pervasive that it had serious implications on the consolidation of the political boundaries of leadership in the National Assembly. The study also shows that the organisation of legislative business through caucuses though very poor during the UNIP era, often caused the party to play an influential role in parliamentary affairs, especially regarding voting for the position of the speaker.

In 1991, Zambia reverted to a multiparty system which presupposes a plurality of political parties to ensure political competition for power (EISA 2005). This affords legislative parties an opportunity to choose from different sets of political leaders. However, there was an incident in which Dingiswayo Banda accused Speaker Robinson Nabulyato of favouring the ruling party. He was suspended from Parliament and stripped of his position as Leader of the Opposition when UNIP demanded that he be replaced by a high-ranking party official. The MMD era turned out to be similar to the UNIP days. For instance, the demands of 65 Members of Parliament to petition the Speaker of the National Assembly, Amusaa Mwanamwambwa to convene Parliament in order to debate an impeachment motion were not granted. Parliament was not convened for eight months in 2001 and only met for two weeks in November (Phiri *et al* 2004).

In 2011 Patrick Matibini was elected Speaker of the National Assembly and was sponsored by the ruling Patriotic Front (PF). The authority of Speaker Matibini was also questioned especially by opposition Members of Parliament. For instance, Speaker Matibini was criticised as presiding over the legislature as if it is a court (*The Daily Nation Newspaper*, April 12, 2013). Even All Peoples' Congress Party (APC) president Nason Msoni once charged that "Zambians should ignore Speaker of the National Assembly, Patrick Matibini's threats as they are merely aimed at stopping them from checking his alleged biased conduct in managing Parliament" (*The Daily Nation* Newspaper, June 23, 2014). The Speaker's attitude may not be surprising given the fact that he is sponsored by the ruling party.

3.4.2. *Ethnic and Religious Minorities*

Ethnic and religious groups are significant social groups (Hibbing 1988). This study suggests that struggles by religious minorities to gain representation in Parliament have parallels with minority ethnic groups' efforts to increase their representation at the level of legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia. The study shows that Christian Speakers and Members of Parliament traditionally considered themselves a religious group rather than an ethnic one.

The study further reveals that its neither ethnicity nor religion that stood in the way of ethnic and religious minority candidates wishing to enter the position of speaker. On the contrary, it is much to do with the strength of the political party which sponsors them.

The study further suggests that religious influence exerted by Christianity on legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia, is nonetheless evident, considering their traditional Christian oath of allegiance. An estimated 53 per cent of the Zambian population considers themselves Catholic (CSO Census Report 2010). The country's official religion has been Christianity since 1993 when President Chiluba officially declared it so. Of course there are other religions, including a large Muslim population primarily in Eastern Province. There are Hindus and Jews, who, combined, comprise only 1 percent of the population.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter reveals that legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia has acquired legislative value, especially its boundaries. The study suggests that National Assembly has established the boundaries of its leadership with 80 per cent of its leaders who have served in the National Assembly between 1964 and 2011 having had prior experience in the legislature before their first or second appointment as Speaker. Wesley Nyirenda and Robisison Nabulyato served as members of the Legislative Council of Rhodesia, while Fwanyanga Mulikita and Amusa Mwanamwambwa served as members of the National Assembly before being elected as Speakers. However, recent trends shows signs of subordination of the speakership to other members of the political environment, especially with the election of former High Court Judge, Patrick Matibini, who has had no legislative experience in the National Assembly of Zambia. Fwanyanga Mulikita also did not have legislative experience when he was elected Speaker of the National Assembly in 1988.

The study also suggests that the entry into leadership positions at the level of the speaker has been easier as evidenced by a huge amount of uncontested elections.

However, there is a trend towards consolidation of the boundaries of legislative leadership with a decrease in the number of uncontested elections for the position of Speaker of the National Assembly. All the previous elections of the speaker have been contested except in 2006 when Amusaa Mwanamwambwa went unopposed and in 1991 when Robison Nabulyato became speaker in an uncontested election. The trend is admittedly weaker when the legislative value of speaker is viewed from the perspective of uncontested elections with only 40% of elections for the speaker have been contested between 1964 and 2011. Although the percentage of uncontested elections is higher, (suggesting weaker boundaries), the recent highly contested election between Patrick Matibini and Richard Kapita clearly suggests a trend towards hardening of the boundaries of legislative leadership.

Lastly, the study also shows that challenges still remain with regard to the influence of legislative parties. Main parties have exerted influence on who becomes Speaker of the National Assembly. This in itself means that Speakers autonomy and independence when ruling on the floor of the House is affected. This is true especially for those leaders who wish to recontest the position of Speaker because, by and large, their nomination depends on the President, who is normally the leader of a political party. Although, the majority of Speakers of the National Assembly have been from the Christian religion, which may suggest trend towards subordination of legislative authority to one religion, the situation is understandable in a society dominated by the Christian religion.

CHAPTER FOUR
POLITICAL ADAPTATION

4.1.   Introduction

This chapter examines the critical aspect of political adaptation by the leadership to respond to changes in the political environment. The ability to adapt is critical to the stability of leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia. As such, adaptability refers to the ability of the Speakers of the National Assembly to become accustomed to changes in the political environment. The more flexible the leadership is when responding to environmental challenges, the more stable it is and therefore the more institutionalised it becomes. One of the common determinants of adaptability is leadership turnover per life of parliament. The lower leadership turnover, the higher the level of stability. This also implies that the more stability the speakership acquires, the more likely the leadership would respond to any new environmental challenges, such as change of political party or party system.

Political adaptation may also be examined by evaluating the generational gap between Speakers of the National Assembly of Zambia from 1964 to 2011. The assumption is that as long as the National Assembly has its first set of leaders, and as long as the procedures are still performed by those who first performed them, then the adaptability of leadership is in uncertainty (Huntington 1965). Furthermore, the more often the leadership in the National Assembly has been able to surmount the problem of peaceful succession and replaced one Speaker from a previous generation with another Speaker from the current generation, the more stability it acquires (Huntington 1965). The Age difference between successive speakers is a probable measure of generational gap as an indicator of institutional adaptability (Rosenthal 1996).

Another determinant of adaptation identified by Huntington (1965) is functional adaptation. As leaders anticipate changes in the political environment, they exercise flexibility by introducing new functional units. Leadership that has adapted to changes in its political environment and has survived one or more

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changes in its principle functions is said to be highly institutionalised than one that is not. Therefore, when leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia adapts to changes in the political environment, the Speakers come to value the position for its own sake and would not relinquish it for anything else (Polsby 1968; Hibbing 1988). As a measure of adaptability, one will need to find out what other new functional units been added as a response to changes in the political environment.

4.2. Leadership Turnover

Leadership turnover is associated with chronological age of respective Speakers (Polsby 1968). It refers to the valuation of the number of years served as Speakers in the National Assembly (Rosenthal 1996). It has to do with the building of legislative authority associated with the longevity of service. The lower the leadership turnover per life of parliament is the more it adapts to change in its environment. The argument is that the length of leaders' tenure affects the ways in which leaders organise legislative business internally. Leaders who anticipate that their days in the legislature will quickly end might care less to strengthen legislative authority of the organisation (Polsby 1968; Judge 2009).

The general assumption is that a general election (change in the environment) is likely to trigger some changes in the legislature. The lower the turnover rate the more adapted the leadership becomes (Polsby 1968; Judge 2009). This also implies that institutionalised leadership will tend to have lower turnover rates. The longer the tenure of office, the lower the turnover rate, therefore the higher the degree of adaptability. Lower turnover rates are therefore fundamental elements of stability of the leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia. Table 4.1 below shows the Sessional Turnover between 1964 and 2011. The average turnover per session of parliament in this period was 16% or at least one (1) meaning that more and more speakers can outlive a session of parliament.

TABLE 4.1

SESSIONAL LEADERSHIP TURNOVER IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ZAMBIA

| Session	Period	New Speakers	Turnover Rate (%)
First National Assembly	1964-1968	1	20.00%
Second National Assembly	1968-1972	1	20.00%
Third National Assembly	1972-1977	0	00.00%
Fourth National Assembly	1977-1982	0	00.00%
Fifth National Assembly	1982-1986	0	00.00%
Sixth National Assembly	1986-1991	1	20.00%
Seventh National Assembly	1991-1996	0	00.00%
Eighth National Assembly	1996-2001	0	00.00%
Ninth National Assembly	2001-2006	1	20.00%
Tenth National Assembly	2006-2011	0	00.00%
Average Turnover Rate (%) Per Parliament			**16%**

The 16% per cent turnover rate shows that leadership has gained the value and stability required for it to respond to changes in the political environment. However, there were two period that show significant signs of instability. The first one is the period 1986 to 1991, which is the period leading into the transition from one-party to multiparty democracy which had 20 per cent turnover for each of the first two sessions of the post-colonial legislature. During the transition from one-party to multiparty political system, the turnover was very high at 20 per cent. The period after the eighth National Assembly in 1991 has been very stable as far as turnover is concerned.

However, the study shows that less attention has been devoted to the reforms that may prove equally necessary in the internal organization, procedures, and resources available to leaders if the process of institutionalisation is to create effective, stable, and lasting tenures. The core concern from which this analysis proceeds is the control of legislative power, and its premise is that such flexible leadership which responds to changes in the political environment, or at least

leadership which benefits greatly from congruence between environmental challenges and institutional capacity.

To buttress the significance of this analysis, one can argue that leadership has tended to last longer. Lower turnover rates also show that the leadership has become durable. Durability is associated with the longevity and resilience of leaders against several environmental challenges. Figure 4.1. shows the chronology and durability of leaders in the period 1964 and 2011. Their collective service covers the 47 years of the legislative history of the post-independence National Assembly.

FIGURE 4.1

CHRONOLOGY AND DURABILLITY OF LEADERSHIP

Source: Computed from figures in the National Assembly of National of Zambia (Parliamentary Procedure Code 2012)

The average duration of service for Speakers of the National Assembly between 1964 and 2011 was approximately ten (10) years. The basic concern is whether or not Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia evolved into a distinct and relatively permanent entity. In the National Assembly, the trend towards institutionalisation does materialise. The study suggests that the Speakers of the National Assembly are more likely to stay in the House for approximately ten (10) years as leadership becomes more and more institutionalised. The longest

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serving speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia has been Robinson Nabulyato (1969-1988, and 1991 to 1998).

The study shows that longevity is very significant for building legislative authority and stability. For instance, Speaker Robinson Nabulyato is credited for the extraordinary contribution he made towards elevating the position of Speaker of the National Assembly than any other leader that has served in the legislature in that time period. In many ways this is appropriate, since he is often credited with doing more than anyone else to elevate the position of Speaker to one of highest honour and respect (Mulenga 2004). The study also suggests that due to his extraordinary long service in the National Assembly, Nabulyato is remembered for allowing free debate in the National Assembly at a time when Kaunda had turned Zambia into an autocratic state.

The study also shows that Nabulyato is remembered for promoting the independence and autonomy of Parliament. He believed in the National Assembly resolving all issues that at one time refused to accept summons from the High Court and locked up the Sherriff who had come to serve him and he defended strongly the prerogatives and independence of Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia (Chibesakunda 2001). In the closing days of the second republic and the imminent collapse of the One-party State, Nabulyato allowed such a free hand in debates that the vocal and outspoken UNIP Members of Parliament literally occupied the place of the Opposition (Nabulyato 2004).

The impact of longer-serving leaders on the stability of leadership can also be seen in other Speakers who served in that capacity. For instance, the second long-serving Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia was Amusaa Mwanamwambwa (1998-2011). Like Nabulyato, Mwanamwambwa was also credited for working hard to elevate the position of Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia. As one of the long serving Speakers of the National Assembly of Zambia have worked is also partially an indication of the degree to which legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia has adapted to changes in the environment. As Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia,

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Mwanamwambwa worked hard to elevate the position of Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia through a series of parliamentary reforms during his tenure.

The least serving Speakers of the National Assembly have been Wesley Pillsbury Nyirenda (1964-1968) and Fwanyanga Matale Mulikita (1988-1991). The short tenure of these two Speakers of the National Assembly, more especially, Fwanyanga Mulikita, is remincent of the inability of leadership to adapt to changes in the political environment. For instance, Mulikita's tenure proved to be unstable, as the political environment was changing from one-party system to multi-party. President Chiluba had to recall Robinson Nabulyato from retirement to lead the National Assembly after the 1991 general elections (Mulenga 2004).

It can be argued that longer-serving leaders are more likely to work towards the establishment of legislative authority of a legislature that is resilient to changes in the political environment (Canon 1989; Hibbing 1994; Rosenthal 1996). This can be seen in the manner Nabulyato worked hard to institutionalise the authority of the Speaker during his long service as Speaker of the National Assembly of Zambia (Nabulyato 2004). Therefore, if durability is an indicator of adaptability of Legislative Leadership, then the trend towards institutionalisation does materialise in the National Assembly of Zambia. For instance, 3/5 Speakers who served between 1964 and 2011 have outlived at least one session of the National Assembly. Only Fwanyanga Matale Mulikita and Wesley Nyirenda failed to outlive at least one general election serving only four (4) years and three (3) years, respectively.

4.3. Generational Gap between Successive Speakers

Generational change refers to the ability of the National Assembly to change Legislative Leadership from one generation to another (Huntington 1965; Polsby 1968; Hibbing 1988). Generation adaptability may be measured by evaluating the percentage of inter-generation changes as opposed to inter-generation changes. Higher percentages of inter-generation changes in Legislative Leadership indicate higher levels of adaptability from the external political environment. With regard

to the percentage of inter-generation succession, the pattern of leadership succession in the National Assembly of Zambia is not as clear as it is in advanced Legislative Assemblies, such as the British House of Commons and the United States' House of Representatives. Nonetheless, the trends point towards the ability to adapt as shown in Table 4.2 below.

TABLE 4.2:
GENERATION CHANGE FOR SPEAKERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Name of Speaker	Year Became Speaker	Age on appointment	Year of Birth
Wesley P Nyirenda	1964	40	1924
Robinson M Nabulyato	1968	48	1916
Fwanyanga M Mulikita	1988	60	1928
Robinson M Nabulyato	1991	75	1916
Amusaa Mwanamwambwa	1998	58	1940
Patrick Matibini	2011	52	1959

Source: National Assembly of Zambia, Various

The results in Table 4 above show that Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia has less ability to adapt to generational changes. The National Assembly has experienced only one (1) inter-generation succession in the past 50 years. For instance, the change of leadership from Wesley Nyirenda, born on January 24, 1924, to Robinson Nabulyato born on October 28, 1916 was by and large an intra-generation succession. The difference between Nyirenda and Nabulyato was only eight (8) years. Therefore, there was no generation gap between the first two successive Speakers of the National Assembly of Zambia.

Also succession of leadership from Nabulyato (born 1916) to Mulikita born in 1928 was to a large extent an intra-generation leadership succession. Intra-generation succession continued after the reintroduction of plural politics in 1991 when Fwanyanga Matale Mulikita was replaced by Nabulyato as Speaker of the National Assembly. For insance, Gracomo Maciola (2004:45) writes in Memoirs of Robinson Nabulyato that "after serving parliament for almost 25 years, decisions increasingly became lacklustre and attracted severe criticism. He appeared as a man who was struggling to adapt to the new democratic

environment and his preoccupation with discipline and order even outside the House brought rulings that stained his earlier distinguished career."

In 1998, Amusaa Mwanamwambwa, born on May 15, 1940 another old generation leader succeeded Robinson Nabulyato as Speaker of the National Assembly. The age difference between Nabulyato and Mwanamwambwa was only 24 years. Like Nabulyato, Mwanamwambwa was also criticised for biased rulings in the National Assembly. For instance, "Vice President Enoch Kavindele accused Speaker of the National Assembly, Amusaa Mwanamwambwa of being biased over the ruling he made against him on Livingstone Member of Parliament, Sakwiba Sikota (UPND). In a note sent to the Press after rising on a Point of Order in Parliament to question whether Sikota was in order to boast after his name was cleared by Parliament over being shareholder of Ulterior Motives Limited, Vice President Kavindele said the Speaker was biased in his ruling"(*The Post Newspaper,* June 8, 2003).

Arguably however, leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia experienced an inter-generation succession in 2011 when Patrick Matibini born July 20, 1959 replaced Mwanamwambwa who was 19 years earlier. Although the trend has been remarkably week in the later years, current developments show some signs towards more adaptability, especially when Patrick Matibini succeeded Amusa Mwanamwambwa as Speaker of the National Assembly after the 2011 general election. Markedly, Amusaa Mwanamwambwa and Patrick Matibini come from the same generation. The two, therefore, may represent a true shift in generational change of Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly. Admittedly, the trend towards generational shift has been weak. Writing in the *Daily Nation Newspaper* (June 23, 2014) All Peoples' Congress Party (APC) president Nason Msoni stated that "...the fact that wrong decisions were upheld by the Speaker, questions the integrity of that office." Therefore, even Speaker Matibini was criticised as having failed to adapt to democratic environment in the house.

4.4. Functional Adaptation

Functional adaptation refers to the flexibility of leadership to create new units of leadership as a response of changes in the political environment (Ragsdale and Theis 1997). When leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia adapts to changes in the political environment, the leaders add more functional committees without subtracting from the substantive committees of the National Assembly (Polsby 1968; Hibbing 1988). As a measure of adaptability, one will need to find out what other committees chairpersons have been added to the position of the Speaker of the National Assembly over the years.

The most important function of the National Assembly of Zambia is to scrutinise the performance of the executive (Chibesakunda 2001). In order to do this Speakers of the National Assembly are mandated by the Standing Orders of Parliament (made under Article 86(1) of the Constitution of Zambia) to create parliamentary committees as the situation may allow (Haantobolo 2014). Committees are therefore mini legislatures, with the same legislative authority, immunities, privileges and immunities as the entire National Assembly.

4.4.1. Functional Adaptation by the Leadership (1964-1972)

After independence in 1964, several changes took place in the political environment (Chibesakunda 2001). At independence in 1964, Zambia inherited a multiparty National Assembly. Accordingly, the functions of all committee leadership only reflected party representation in the National Assembly (Chibesakunda 2001). The following were the original functional committees inherited by Speaker Wesley Nyirenda at independence in 1964;

i)   The Standing Orders Committee, which was chaired by the Speaker of the Legislative Council. The main function of the Standing Orders Committee was to deal with amendments to the Standing Orders and Staff matters (Legislative Council-Order-in Council 1958);

ii)   The House Committee, which was chaired by the Speaker of the Legislative Council. Its foremost function was to look into the comfort

of members, especially library and secretarial matters (Legislative Council-Order-in Council 1954);

iii) The Printing Committee, whose function was to decide what papers to print and in what form

iv) The Public Accounts Committee, whose function was to examine all public accounts (Chibesakunda 2001)

v) The Finance Committee, whose function was to examine all estimates of revenue and expenditure appropriation by the government (Legislative Council Order-in-Council 1956)

After the attainment of political independence, several committees were abolished and new ones were created (Chibesakunda 2001). To adapt to new changes in its political environment, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Wesley P Nyirenda authorised the formation of the new Sessional committee to deal with matters relating to the Library of the National Assembly. This committee took over the functions of the Printing Committee (Legislative Council Hansard 1964). Between 1964 and 1968, Standing Orders of the National Assembly were amended, but these changes did not affect the functions of Sessional or Select Committees of the National Assembly (Chibesakunda 2001).

4.4.2. Functional Adaptation by the Leadership (1972-1991)

By the end of the First National Assembly, there were still four (4) Sessional Committees in the House:

i) The Standing Orders Committee, which was a committee on privileges of the House as stipulated under National Assembly Standing Order 17 of 1974 read together with Article 86(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia, (Cap 1 of the Laws of Zambia, 1973);

ii) The Public Accounts Committee, which was appointed to examine the accounts showing the appropriation of sums granted by the National Assembly to meet with public expenditure as outlined in National Assembly Standing Order 145(1) of 1974 as read with Article 36(2)

and (3) of the Constitution of the United National Independence Party, and Article 123(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia (Cap 1 of the Laws of Zambia 1973);

iii)   The House Committee, which considered all matters connected with the comfort and convenience of Members, the running of amenities provided by the National Assembly, the availability of office accommodation for Members and staff (National Assembly Standing Order 139 of 1974);

iv)   The Library Committee, which assisted the Speaker of the National Assembly with appropriate advice on matters relating to the administration of the Library (National Assembly Standing Order 138 of 1974)

In 1972, there were other changes in the political environment which the leadership in the National Assembly needed to adapt to (Haantobolo 2014). The most significant one was the enactment of Act Number 29 of 1972 which gave legislative effect to the establishment of a one-party system of government (Chibesakunda 2001). With the increased responsibilities under the one-party system of government, the number of Members of Parliament increased from 80 members in 1965 to 110 in 1968. In 1973, the total number of members was increased to 136, including the Speaker of the House (Chibesakunda 2001). In order to adapt to these changes in its political environment, it became necessary for Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly to create more functional committees. In February, 1974, Speaker of the National Assembly Robinson Nabulyato announced the establishment of three extra committees. These were as follows:

i)   The Committee on Parliamentary Procedure, Customs and Traditions, which assisted the Speaker of the National Assembly with matters relating to the amendment of Standing Orders, variations to parliamentary procedure, customs and traditions. Before 1974, these

functions were performed by the Standing Orders Committee (Chibesakunda 2001);

ii)   The Committee on Absence of Members from Sittings of the House. The functions of this committee were to consider all applications from Members for leave of absence from the Sitting of the National Assembly (National Assembly of Zambia Standing Order 141A (2) of 1974);

iii)   The Committee on Delegated Legislation. The major function of this committee was to scrutinise and report to the House, through the Speaker, whether or not the authority to make orders, regulations, rules, sub-rules, and by-laws delegated by the National Assembly were being properly applied by any person or authority with such delegation (National Assembly Standing Order 141B (2) of 1974).

By 1978, many changes happened in the political environment to which leadership in the National Assembly was required to respond to. President Kenneth Kaunda had announced the formation of public enterprises such as the Industrial Development Cooperation (INDECO) in 1975 and the Financial and Development Cooperation (FINDECO) in 1978 (Momba 2002). The state also embarked on an ambitious foreign policy of helping liberation movements in Southern Africa (Momba 2002). To respond to these changes in the political environment, Speaker of the National Assembly, Robinson Nabulyato authorised the formation of other committees at the beginning of, and during the Sessions of the Third National Assembly (Chibesakunda 2001). The following were the committee created:

i)   The Committee on Parastatal Bodies. This committee was established in 1978 to examine reports and general performance of all Parastatal Companies created by the UNIP government under President Kenneth David Kaunda (Ibid 2001). It ensured that the Parastatal Companies adhered to prudent commercial practices (Kupalelwa 2004);

ii)   The Committee on Local Administration which was created to deal with matters relating to administration of local councils. It considered the audited accounts of the councils tabled in the National Assembly by the Minister of Local Government and Housing (Chibesakunda 2001);

iii)   The Committee on Government Assurances, which scrutinised all assurances, promises and undertakings made by Ministers and Deputy Ministers on the Floor of the House. Its major function was to ensure that all assurances were executed (Kupalelwa 2004);

iv)   The Committee on Foreign Affairs. This committee was deliberately created to scrutinise Zambia's foreign policy, more especially with the active involvement of the Zambian Government in the liberation struggle (Chibesakunda 2001). The National Assembly and its leadership certainly had to adapt to these changes in the political environment.

v)   The Committee on Agriculture, Lands and Co-operatives. This committee monitored the implementation of policies on agriculture, fisheries, land use, marketing and the administration of Parastatal Companies (Mumba 2004; Chisha 2012)

vi)   The Committee on Social Services. The function of this committee was to scrutinise government policies on the provision of social services (Chibesakunda 2001)

vii)   The Committee on Women, Youth and Child Development. The main functions of this committee were to scrutinise government policy on women, youth and child development. It also looked into such matters which concerned the rights of women, youths and children.

In addition to the above functional changes, Speakers of the National Assembly of Zambia also created a number of Select Committees between 1977 and 1990. These included the following:

i)   The Select Committee to examine the Presidential Address (1977);

ii)   The Select Committee on the takeover of Milling Companies by the Government (1988);

iii)   The Select Committee on Land Acquisition (1988); and

iv)   The Select Committee on Democratisation of UNIP (1990)

However, the advent in 1972-1973 of formalised one-party rule did not bring about any fundamental change in the institutional power and practical importance of leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia (Bach 1994). Instead, it largely institutionalised a condition of weakness that had been evident almost from the beginning of the First Republic in 1964 (Ibid 1994). For example, Tordoff and Molteno (1975) characterised the National Assembly under the First Republic with Roberts (1985) later description of the parliament under the regime of One-Party Participatory Democracy as a residual legislature. While making due allowance for the indications since 1969 of the second National Assembly increasing flexibility, it must still be argued that neither the National Assembly as an institution nor its Speakers in their individual capacities have played a crucial role in adapting to changes in the political environment (Bach 1994).

During the one-party rule from 1973 to 1991, Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly was subservient to the party leadership, UNIP. This was clearly manifested in President Kenneth David Kaunda's speech to the UNIP National Council on December 12, 1974 when he stated: "Parliament is not an opposition device to the party itself or other party institutions. Under our system I regard Parliament as a Committee of the National Council charged with the responsibility of enacting laws of this country" (Chanda 1998: 442). The functions of the Speaker and the National Assembly were further constrained by the changed political environment. This was affirmed in President Kenneth David Kaunda's watershed speech when he stated that "…from now on the party and government will not stomach indiscipline among Members of Parliament masquerading under parliamentary privilege" (Kaunda 1975).

This change in the political environment was significant as far as the Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly was concerned. As argued by Huntington

(1965) for the National Assembly and its Leaders to survive the change in the political environment, it had to weaken its commitment to its original functions. For instance, the principle of collective responsibility precluded Legislative Leaders from making rulings that were critical to the party (citation in interview). This situation reduced Legislative Leadership and the entire National Assembly to mere rubber stamp (Mumba 2004). In other words, the party triumphed over the legislative functions (Huntington 1965).

4.4.3. Functional Adaptation by the Leadership (1991-2011)

In view of the inability of the committees to adapt to changes in the political environment, or to effectively perform their mandated functions, it became of high significance for the Leadership in the National Assembly to make farther changes to these units. In 1991, there were major changes in the political environment when the country reverted back to plural politics. Robinson Nabulyato was recalled to lead the legislature as Speaker after the 1991 general election. The changes were based on the premise that the previous committee system failed to adapt in order to hold the executive fully accountable to the National Assembly as required by the rules and principles of democratic political system (Chibesakunda 2001). To adapt to this change in the political environment, portfolio committee were created.

i)   The Committee on Agriculture and Lands;

ii)   The Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour;

iii)   The Committee on Communications, Transport, Works and Supply;

iv)   The Committee on Energy, Environment and Tourism;

v)   The Committee on Health, Community Development and Social Services;

vi)   The Committee on Information and Broadcasting Services;

vii)   The Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs;

viii)   The Committee on Education, Science and Technology;

ix)   The Committee on Local Government, Housing and Chief Affairs;

x)   Committee on Legal Affairs, Governance, Human Rights and Gender;

xi)   Committee on Sport, Youth and Child Affairs

In addition to the portfolio committee, the new committee system maintained the Housekeeping Committees which deal with matters pertaining to the internal affairs of the institution.

i)   The Standing Orders Committee. The duty of the Committee is to consider all proposals for the amendments of Standing Orders and any petition or recommendations received regarding benefits for the members (API 2012).

ii)   The Committee of Privileges, Absences and Support Services. Its functions include examining and enforcing the code of conduct that guides the behaviour and actions of Members and also considers all matters connected with the comfort and convenience of members around and within the precincts of Parliament (Chisha 2012).

iii)   The Parliamentary Reforms and Modernisation Committee constituted to examine and propose reforms to the powers, procedures, practices, organisation, and facilities of the members, constituted to examine and propose reforms to the powers, procedures, practices, organisation, and facilities of the National Assembly.

As noted by Ragsdale and Theis (1997) functional adaptability has to do with the flexibility to have to create more functional units to the already existing one. Consequently, and as a way of enhancing democratic governance, the National Assembly of Zambia found it prudent to realign the functions Legislative Leadership and the National Assembly with the demands of plural politics (National Assembly of Zambia 2014). This called for the introduction of parliamentary reforms with a view to addressing some of the limitations which existed in the institution (Ibid 2014). The Reform Programme was, therefore, conceived in order to enhance parliamentary oversight of the activities of the Executive and also to allow for increased participation of the citizens in the affairs of the country (Mumba 2004; Phiri 2005).

In addition, the reforms in the National Assembly have been designed to enable Legislative Leadership and the National Assembly to bring about accountability, transparency and good governance in the government system (National Assembly of Zambia 2014; Haantobolo 2014). Furthermore, the need to realign the handling of the business of the House arose out of the current trend that exists in most legislatures where most parliamentary business is dealt with in Committees. In addition to relieving pressure on the House, the reforms were also intended to deal with specialized matters in the most efficient manner.

It seems there is a concerted effort to realign the functions of the National Assembly and its various components of leadership to perform other functions in response to the changing political environment. However, despite all this effort most recent trends point to the inability of legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia to adapt to changes in the political environment.

4.5.   Conclusion

Leadership in the National Assembly shows signs of adaptation when responding to changes in the political environment. For instance, in terms of leadership turnover, the evidence is overwhelming, with only 16% turnover rate between 1964 and 2011. For instance, Nabulyato served for nineteen (19) years as Speaker of the National Assembly during the first multi-party and one-party National Assemblies. Nabulyato also served for eight (8) years after the reintroduction of a multiparty National Assembly in Zambia. Also Mwanamwambwa served for 13 years as Speaker of the National Assembly, among the two longest serving Speakers in post-independence legislative history of the National Assembly of Zambia. However, only two out of five past Speakers (between 1964 and 2011) have served relatively shorter tenures in the National Assembly.

The study also shows that the leadership has shown signs of adaptation when responding functional changes in the political environment. For instance, the National Assembly in general, and leadership in particular, have shown signs of adaptation to changes in the political environment. Although, in terms of

functional adaptation, leadership of the National Assembly as a whole has acquired new capabilities as a result of parliamentary reforms aimed at adapting to new challenges in the political environment. For instance, several parliamentary reforms in the 1990s and 2000s show leaders' quest to realign its legislative capabilities as a response towards the change in the political environment. Nonetheless, the situation is unstable as the legislative leadership has failed to move away from the legacy of the one party system and adapt to the new political environment.

However, in terms of generational gap between successive leaders in the National Assembly, the study suggests all the past Speakers of the National Assembly were from the same generation. Changes from Nyirenda to Nabulyato and from Nabulyato to Mulikita were all intra-generational changes of leadership in the National Assembly. Even the change from Nabulyato to Mwanamwambwa was an intra-generation change of leadership in the National Assembly. This is unbelievable for a Legislative Assembly which has evolved for a period close to a century as shown in Chapter Two of this Dissertation, an encapsulation of the inability to adapt to changes in the political environment. However, recent developments show otherwise with the election of Patrick Matibini, as Speaker of the National, albeit the lack of differentiation from the political environment as shown in Chapter Three of this Dissertation. While recent trends show signs of adaptability, the development is problematic when viewed from the perspective of political differentiation.

CHAPTER FIVE
STRUCTURAL GROWTH

5.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses the extent to which leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia has grown in its internal complexity. The growth of internal complexity refers to the structural growth of the units of leadership and the National Assembly as whole. As Polsby (1968: 153) notes, when compared to differentiation and adaptability, "simple operational indices of institutional complexity as indicators of institutionalisation are less easy to produce in neat and comparable time series." Some scholars (Hibbing 1988) argue that the obvious measure of internal complexity, the number of committee leaders in the National Assembly, could be misleading in that the raw number of committees may not reflect the true level of internal differentiation of committees. Some chairpersons could be presiding over powerless committees, while others could be presiding over very powerful committees in the House. Further, some of the chairpersons could have set jurisdiction or variable jurisdiction or they could have substantial or inconsequential oversight capabilities. In short, committee leadership in the National Assembly vary widely, and merely counting them may not be meaningful (Ragsdale and Theis 1997).

This situation convinced other scholars (Hibbing 1988; Canon 1989; Squire 1992) to look for other indicators of internal complexity. They chose the growth in the importance of committees, the growth of specialized agencies of party leadership, and the general increase in the provision of various emoluments and auxiliary aids to members in the form of office space, salaries, allowances, staff, and committee staffs. As leadership in the legislature becomes of value, its structural growth increases, new departments are created and ultimately resources increase (Hibbing 1988; Squire 1996). The growth in internal complexity reflected in increased expenditure by the National Assembly could serve as a reliable indicator the growth of leadership in handling legislative responsibilities which are usually delegated to committee chairs (Hibbing 1988). It is against this backdrop that this

chapter discusses the structural growth and internal complexity of each legislative office in the National Assembly of Zambia.

5.2. Growth of Committee Leadership

The growth in internal complexity of the leadership of the National Assembly may be assessed by analysing the increase in the number of Committee Chairpersons and the total membership of the Committee of the Whole House (CWH). The Graph in Figure 5.1 shows the increase in the number of Committee chairpersons and the increase in the membership of the CWH from 1964 to 2014.

FIGURE 5.2
INCREASE IN CHAIRPERONS COMMITTEE
AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE HOUSE

Prior to independence, there were only five (5) committee chairpersons in the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia. The total membership of the Committee of the Whole House in the Legislative Council was eighty (80).

5.2.1. Structure of Committee Leadership 1964-1972

After independence in 1964, the Legislative Leaders presided over multi-party National Assembly, though a number of constitutional changes took place (Chibesakunda 2001). This implied that Committee Leadership in the National

Assembly reflected party representation in the House. The committee leaders included; the chairperson of the Standing Orders Committee; the chairperson of the Printing and Library Committee; the chairperson of the House Committee; and the chairperson of the Public Accounts Committee (National Assembly of Zambia Hansard, June to August 1964). This means that the number of committee leaders in the National Assembly between 1964 and 1968 was four. The total membership of the Committee of the Whole House was increased from 80 in 1965 to 110 in 1968. This structure of the committee leadership in the National Assembly continued until 1972.

5.2.2. Structure of Committee Leadership 1972-1991

In 1972, the National Assembly of Zambia passed Act Number 29 which gave legislative effect to the formation of a one-party legislature. The Act also increased the membership of the Committee of the Whole House. In December 1973, the total membership of the Committee of the Whole House was increased from 110 to 136 inclusive of the Speaker of the National Assembly (Chibesakunda 2001). As noted in Chapter Two (Section 4.4.2), the Standing Orders Committee of the National Assembly felt that, in a one-party legislature, increase in the number of committee chairpersons had a vital role in the House. On February 19ᵗ 1974, Robinson Nabulyato, the Speaker of the National Assembly announced to the House the establishment of three additional committee chairpersons to head the Committee on Parliamentary Procedure, Customs and Traditions, the Committee on Absence of Members from Sittings of the House and the Committee on Delegated Legislation. This decision increased the structure of committee leadership in the National Assembly to seven (7).

In 1978, the structure of committee leadership in the National Assembly was increased to eight (8) with the creation of the Committee on Parastal Bodies. During the period from 1972 to 1991, six (6) other committee leaders were created to head the six (6) departmental committees. These were the chairperson of the Committee on Local Administration, chairperson of the Committee on Government Assurances, the chairperson of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

the chairperson of the Committee on Agriculture, Lands and Co-operatives, the chairperson of the Committee on Social Services and the chairperson of the Committee on Women, Youth and Child Development (Chibesakunda 2001). The total number of Sessional Committee chairpersons in this period was thirteen while the total membership of the National Assembly also remained at 110. The structure and number of Sessional Committee chairpersons remained like this until 1991 when a new multiparty National Assembly was elected.

5.2.3. Structure of Committee Leadership 1991-2011

In 1991, a number of changes to the structure of the committee leadership were embarked. A number of portfolio committee chairpersons were introduced to head the departmentally-related committees which came into operation in 1999. These included the Chairperson of the Committee on Agriculture and Lands; the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour, the Chairperson of the Committee on Communications, Transport Works and Supply, the Chairperson of the Committee on Energy Environment and Tourism, the Chairperson of the Committee on Health, Community Development and Social Welfare, the Chairperson of the Committee on Information and Broadcasting Services and the Chairperson of the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs (Chibesakunda 2001).

Others were the Chairperson of the Committee on Education, Science and Technology, the Chairperson of the Committee on Local Governance, Housing and Chiefs' Affairs, The Chairperson of the Committee on Legal Affairs, Governance, Human Rights and Gender Matters, the Chairperson of the Committee on Sport, Youth and Child Affairs. This increased the number of portfolio committee chairpersons from six (6) to eleven (11). The number of Sessional Committees remained like this from 1991 to 2012, although changes have been made with composition of the portfolio committees.

Apart from the 11 departmentally-related committees, the National Assembly maintained three chairpersons of Housekeeping Committees. These included the

chairperson of the Standing Orders Committee, the chairperson on Privileges, Absences and Support Services and the chairperson of the Reform and Modernisation Committee. The National Assembly has also maintained the four (4) chairpersons of the General Purposes Committees. These include the chairperson of the Public Accounts Committee, the chairperson of the Committee on Delegated Legislation and the chairperson of the committee on Estimates (Chibesakunda 2001). This increased the number of committee chairpersons from thirteen (13) in the period between 1972 and 1991, to nineteen (19) in the period between 1992 and 2011.

The numbers seem to indicate a movement toward increased internal complexity by the use of committees, albeit abrupt one, but nevertheless a movement consistent with one of the fundamental aspects of institutionalisation (Hibbing 1988). However, caution must be exercised in interpreting increase in the number of Select Committees Leaders as a measure of internal complexity. Given the abovementioned reservations about counting committees, it is not surprising that some scholars (Polsby 1968; Hibbing 1988) rely upon an impressionistic account of the development of the committee system to develop arguments that complexity increased over time as the number of committees in a Legislative Assembly increase. The increased usage of these standing committees suggests a path toward internal complexity, but we need to exercise caution. In many respects these standing committees are not equivalent with the specialised and elaborate subunits which the term might imply to some Legislative Offices in the National Assembly of Zambia.

5.3. Financial Resources

The other indicator of internal complexity of leadership of the National Assembly is "the growth of resources assigned to internal . . . management, measured in terms of personnel, facilities, and money" (Polsby 1968: 158). Staff assistance to the various legislative leaders of the National Assembly of Zambia constitutes an important part of these internal resources. This section presents no data on the growth of staff although it is impossible to say precisely by how much, legislative

staffs have grown in the National Assembly of Zambia. However, internal complexity means much more than just the number of staff. The physical attributes of legislative leadership in the National Assembly matter, and most importantly the trend in yearly expenditures required running legislative business of the House.

FIGURE 5.1
PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ALLOCATED TO THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ZAMBIA (SELECTED YEARS)

Source: Computed National Assembly of Zambia Supply Estimates (various years)

The figures shown Figure 5.1 above do indicate a clear increase in expenditure devoted to running of the National Assembly. In the Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the year ending 1973, the percentage of money allocated to the National Assembly of Zambia was approximately 0.179 of the total national budget (GRZ 1973). The percentage of expenditure by the National Assembly was increased 0.222 per cent in 1976 and 1979 respectively. Between the fiscal years 1982 and 1984, the percentage of expenditure was approximately 0.3 per cent. A modest growth in this type of complexity in the National Assembly of Zambia is evident in the First and Second Republic. Extended time series on staff is unavailable in this period, but by and large the situation in the National Assembly of the First and Second Republic allowed every Legislative Leaders who required secretarial help to receive it (Chibesakunda 2001).

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Increase in the internal complexity of Legislative Leadership continued even in the after the re-introduction of multiparty National Assembly of Zambia in 1991. Between 1991 and 2001, the increase in the expenditure for the National Assembly of Zambia was approximately 0.784 per cent of total national expenditure (GRZ 1996). In the period between 2002 and 2011, the percentage of expenditure by the National Assembly increased to one per cent of national expenditure. In the fiscal year ending 2002, the percentage remained the same range (about 0.605 per cent expenditure by the National Assembly). In 2006 the percentage of expenditure by the National Assembly increased to 0.852 per cent of the total national expenditure (GRZ 2006). In the 2011 estimates of revenue and expenditure, the percentage of expenditure by the National Assembly of Zambia increased to 1.307 per cent of the total national expenditure.

Certainly, a modest growth in this type of complexity in the National Assembly of Zambia is evident. Although no extended time series on staff is available in this period also, the data suggests that the current situation allows every leader in National Assembly who wants secretarial help to receive it. The Speaker, Deputy Speaker and Deputy Chairman of Committees, including Members of Parliament all receive secretarial help. This certainly was not the case years ago (Tordoff 1974). A comparison of figures for 1973 (GRZ 1973) and Rush and figures for 1979 and 1984 indicates that even in those years a clear movement toward a greater use of secretarial assistance took place, although this was not common.

Beyond this, research services in the National Assembly of Zambia have also been improved. Many Committee Leaders in the National Assembly employ their own personal research assistants; the National Assembly Library continues to expand and to modernize; members seem to be making greater use of quasi-legislative bodies like the comptroller and auditor general and the accompanying staff of several hundred. and, as has been mentioned, "special advisors" are attached to most of the select committees. While new National Assembly buildings have not been sprouting all over, constituency offices in recent years have spilled over the country. All this, not surprisingly, means that more money

must be allocated for the operation of the National Assembly than was the late 1970s, and 1980s.

TABLE 10
AUTHORISED EXPENDITURE FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ZAMBIA
(SELECTED YEARS, 1973-2012)

Year	Expenditure to the National Assembly (Year Kwacha)	Real Expenditure Increase (Percentage of National Expenditure)
1973	634,400	0.179
1983	4,450,452	0.329
1996	3,080,974,003	0.319
2002	32,838,494,164	0.605
2006	87,214,674,938	0.852
2012	267,576,976,493	1.307

Source: National Assembly of Zambia Supply Estimates, GRZ 1973, 83, 96, 2002, 2006 and 2012

Table 10 bears out this statement, at least for the selected years. The data show that legislative leadership and the National Assembly in general has become more complex (or at least more expensive) in the last 50 years. In actual Kwacha terms, the increase in expenditures is massive, but of course this means little unless the inflation rate is used to adjust the expenditure figures. In order to compensate for the impact inflation could have had on the figures, this adjustment is made in the in the second column where calculations for the percentage of National Expenditure clearly show a percentage increase in expenditure by the National Assembly in relation to the total National Expenditure in the past 50 years.

Even in real Kwacha, substantial increase in the cost of operating the National Assembly, an increase of over 100 per cent in only 20 years between 1973 and 1996. This is an even sharper increase than has taken place in the other legislatures such as the British House of Commons (Hibbing 1988) or the U.S. House of Representatives once inflation is controlled (Squire 1992). If the cost of operating a legislature is an appropriate measure of internal complexity, the National Assembly of Zambia has become more complex in recent decades.

5.4.   Conclusion

This chapter shows that leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia has become institutionalised by evidence of its budding in internal complexity. With

regard to growth of committee leadership in the House, the number of oversight committees has increased from 8 in 1964 to 15 in 2011. Despite some committee chairs presiding over highly differentiated standing committees such as the leaders of the Public Accounts Committees, the growth of committee chairs indicates the increased budding in its internal complexity. Also the amount of resources allocated to the National Assembly has increased over the years. As argued by Huntington (1965), the growth of committee leadership suggests that the Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia is becoming more institutionalised as time goes by. If the growth in the number of committees is a true measure of the complexity, legislative leadership in the National Assembly is becoming more institutionalised.

In terms of financial resources allocated to running the National Assembly, the study shows a clear growth in the expenditure over the years. In actual Kwacha terms, the increase in expenditures is massive, but of course this means little unless the inflation rate is used to adjust the expenditure figures. The percentage of national expenditure clearly shows an increase in expenditure by the National Assembly in relation to the total national expenditure in the past 50 years. Even in real Kwacha, substantial increase in the cost of operating the National Assembly, an increase of over 100 per cent in only 20 years between 1973 and 1996. This is an even sharper increase than has taken place in the other advanced legislatures. If the cost of operating a legislature is an appropriate measure of internal complexity, the National Assembly of Zambia has become more complex in recent decades.

CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

This evidence produced in this dissertation suggests that legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia is becoming institutionalised in two main indices, differentiation and complexity. In terms of differentiation, the study reveals that the legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia has evolved to become more differentiated from the environment. The study shows that the legislative experience in the National Assembly is one of the major considerations for one to be elected as Speaker. For example, over ¾ (75 per cent) of leaders who have served in the National Assembly between 1964 and 2011 have had prior experience in the legislature. Wesley Nyirenda and Robisison Nabulyato served as members of the Legislative Council of Rhodesia, while Amusa Mwanamwambwa served as member of the National Assembly before being elected its Speaker. However, recent trends shows signs of instability, especially with the election of former High Court Judge Patrick who has no legislative experience the National Assembly of Zambia.

The study also shows that the boundaries of the speakership in the National Assembly are not so much consolidated as indicated by the high number of uncontested elections for the position of speaker decreasing. The study shows that all the previous elections of the speaker of the National Assembly have been uncontested except in 2006 when Amusaa Mwanamwambwa went unopposed and in 1991 when Robison Nabulyato became speaker in an uncontested election. The trend is admittedly weaker when differentiation is viewed from the perspective of uncontested elections for the speaker of the National Assembly with only 4/10 (40%) of elections for the speaker have been uncontested between 1964 and 2011.

But when viewed from the perspective of social differentiation, the study shows that legislative leadership is not so differentiation from social forces. For instance the main parties have continued to influence not only the legislative process, but also on who becomes the Speaker of the National Assembly. In terms of ethnicity, leadership in the National Assembly has been switching across the four (4) major

ethnic groupings in Zambia. The study suggests that ethnic, minorities just like religious minorities, still find it difficult to get their way into the positions of speakership. It is very hard for people of Asian or Indian origin for instance to gain access to those positions of leadership, despite the National Assembly having had several Members of Parliament from those social groups at one time or another.

In terms of adaptability, the study shows that leadership in the National Assembly has been unable to adapt to changes in the political environment. In terms of chronological age, the leadership has nonetheless shown signs of durableness with an average duration of 10 years per speaker. But only 2 out of 4 past Speakers have been able to outlive at least one general election. The trend is admittedly stronger when viewed from the perspective of leadership turnover. In terms of generational change, the National Assembly also shows high levels of inability to adapt to the internal political environment with only one true generational change among the five (5) speakers of the National Assembly. Arguably, the transition from Nabulyato to Mwanamwambwa in 1998 could also be considered an inter-generational change of leadership. Despite all these problems of flexibility, the study suggests that legislative leadership in the National Assembly has gained in terms of functional adaptability.

Finally, this study shows that leadership in the National Assembly has become institutionalised by evidence of its budding in internal complexity. With regard to growth of committee leadership in the National Assembly, the number of oversight committees has increased from 8 in 1964 to 15 in 2011. Despite some committee chairs presiding over highly differentiated standing committees such as the leaders of the Public Accounts Committees, the growth of committee chairs indicates the increased budding in its internal complexity. Also the amount of resources allocated to the National Assembly has increased over the years. As argued by Huntington (1965), the growth of committee leadership suggests that the legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia is becoming more institutionalised as time goes by. If the growth in the number of committees is a

true measure of the complexity, legislative leadership in the National Assembly is becoming more institutionalised.

In terms of financial resources allocated to running the National Assembly, the study shows a clear growth in the expenditure over the years. In actual Kwacha terms, the increase in expenditures is massive, but of course this means little unless the inflation rate is used to adjust the expenditure figures. The percentage of national expenditure clearly shows an increase in expenditure by the National Assembly in relation to the total national expenditure in the past 50 years. Even in real Kwacha, substantial increase in the cost of operating the National Assembly, an increase of over 100 per cent in only 20 years between 1973 and 1996. This is an even sharper increase than has taken place in the other advanced legislatures. If the cost of operating a legislature is an appropriate measure of internal complexity, the National Assembly of Zambia has become more complex in recent decades.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I Interview Guide
The following was the interview guide that was used when collecting information regarding the various aspects of institutionalisation of legislative leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia. Section A contains questions relating to the political adaptation; Section B contains questions relating to the political differentiation; and Section C contains questions relating to structural growth.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES

Institutionalisation of Legislative Leadership
in the National Assembly of Zambia

2014 INTERVIEW GUIDE

Dear Respondent,

You have been selected to participate in this study, and I would be most grateful if you spared a few minutes to answer a few questions. This is a study on *Institutionalisation of Legislative Leadership in the National Assembly of Zambia*.

All the information you will offer will be handled confidentially. It will be exclusively for the use of the Masters Dissertation.

Instructions:

Fill in the blank space.

Department or Rank at National Assembly…………………………………………...

Signature………………………………………………………………………………..

Date of Interview……………………………………………………………………

SECTION A: ADAPTABILITY OF LEADERSHIP

1. What was the average number of years served by each leader in the Office of the Speaker of the National Assembly?

2. Who has been the longest serving Speaker of the National Assembly?

3. What could have been the reasons for serving that long?

4. What are some of the reforms introduced during the tenure of the longest serving Speaker of the National Assembly

5. Who has been the shortest serving Speaker of the National Assembly?

6. What could have been the reasons for a shorter tenure of office?

7. What were the key functions of the Speaker of the National Assembly in the First Republic?

8. What changes were made to the Standing Orders or the Constitution of Zambia in 1973 in relation to the functions of the Speaker?

9. What have been some of the significant changes to the functions of the Speaker as a result of the parliamentary reforms in the Third Republic (1991 to date?

SECTION B: DIFFERENTIATION OF LEADERSHIP

10. Does experience matter for one to be chosen or elected as Speaker of the National Assembly?
    (a) Yes   [   ]
    (b) No   [   ]
    (c) Sometimes   [   ]

11. How many Speakers have had prior experience in the House before being appointed to leadership positions?
    Please indicate the number---

12. Apart from experience in the House, what are some of the requirements for one to be elected as Speaker of the National Assembly?

13. Do political parties influence the election of the Speaker of the National Assembly? Illustrate

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14. Are there some years when the position of Speaker of the National Assembly has not been uncontested since 1964? Please indicate the years when such happened

SECTION C: STRUCTURAL GROWTH

15. How many committees were there in the National Assembly during the First Republic?
Please indicate the names of the committees in the space below (use a separate sheet of paper if space is not enough)

16. How many committees were there in the National Assembly during the Second Republic?

17. How many committees are there in the National Assembly?

18. How much in terms of financial resources does the Office of the Speaker of the National Assembly receive in a financial year i

End of Interview

Thank you so much for your participation