

CRISES OF EXPECTATIONS: WORKERS' STRUGGLES IN ZAMBIA, 1964-2011

BY

FRIDAY ELIYA MULENGA

**A thesis submitted to the University of Zambia in fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History**

THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA

LUSAKA

2017

COPYRIGHT DECLARATION

All rights reserved. No part of this thesis may be reproduced or stored in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from the author or the University of Zambia.

DECLARATION

I, **FRIDAY ELIYA MULENGA** do hereby declare that this thesis represents my own work and that it has previously been submitted for a degree at this or any other University and does not incorporate any published work or material from another thesis.

Signed

.....

Date

.....

APPROVAL

This thesis by **Friday Eliya Mulenga** has been approved as fulfilling the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in History by the University of Zambia.

EXAMINERS

NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE
1.....
2.....
3.....

ABSTRACT

This study investigates aspects of the history of the trade union movement in Zambia from 1964 to 2011 by looking at some of the struggles the workers engaged in to obtain what they thought was due to them. The term ‘Crises of Expectations’ is used because what was expected and what was obtained did not always match. Workers, therefore, engaged in strikes to obtain benefits from their labour. The study investigated the economy and government labour policies. This subject was investigated because everywhere in the world workers occupy a strategic position in the economy and therefore need to have their history studied. In Zambia the trade union movement acted as the voice of the voiceless during the one party era.

The main objective of the study was to investigate the nature of the workers’ expectations and their struggles to obtain rewards from their labour. The specific objectives were to examine the impact of the performance of the economy on the workers’ expectations and trade unionism; and government’s labour policies on the workers’ expectations and trade unionism; to analyse the nature of the relationship between the trade union movement and the government; to analyse the impact of economic liberalisation on trade unionism; to examine the nature of the industrial relations and impact on the economy and to examine the workers’ expectations from 1991 to 2011.

Data was collected from primary sources in the Special Collections section of the UNZA library, the National Archives of Zambia and the UNIP Archives. This data was from monthly and annual labour reports, government reports, Parliamentary debates, Bank of Zambia annual reports and CSO reports. Secondary sources in the form of books, journal articles and newspapers were also consulted from both the UNZA library and NAZ. Oral sources were consulted, mainly those that have an idea of the history of the trade unionism. Data collected was analysed using mainly the qualitative method but also a little of the quantitative method through the use of tables.

Major findings of the investigation are that the crises of expectations among the workers still remains and their struggles to better their lives still continue. Strikes prevented implementation of a wages and prices policy. There is still no wages and prices policy. During the First and Second Republics, in spite of confrontations between the trade union movement and the government, labour laws to a large extent helped strengthen the trade union movement. On the other hand, labour laws during the Third Republic were used to strengthen the position of investors while weakening the trade union movement, especially through economic liberalisation. On the whole, in spite of the challenges and struggles the trade union movement has shown resilience and still remains relevant to the country’s social, economic and political development, with one of its former leaders heading the Ministry of Labour as Minister until 2016 and another currently heading it as Minister.

DEDICATION

To the memory of my father, Mulenga Eliya Nkalamu, and my mother, Estelle Mwanza Nkalamu.

And also to the memory of my elder sister Elisa (Deliya) and younger brother Benjamin.

But on the whole, this work is really for my wife of many years **Marjorie Kafula Kabela**. It has been long in coming, but finally it is here! Thanks for everything, my friend. God is always faithful.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As is the case with such work, many people have helped to make it possible, but there is room to mention only a few of them here.

I thank my friend and supervisor Professor Bizeck J. Phiri for working through this thesis with me, providing valuable advice and encouragement. Dr. Webby S. Kalikiti was the co-supervisor. I thank him as well for his input.

I wish to express sincere gratitude to the University of Zambia for awarding me the Staff Research Fellowship under which this study began and for the financial assistance granted.

I wish to express my gratitude to all my colleagues in the Department of History at the University of Zambia, Professor Francis B. Musonda, Dr. Euston K. Chiputa, Dr. Kamini Krishna, Miss Dorothy Mwansa, Dr. Clarence Chongo, and Miss Mailes Mbewe. They were there at the start of this work and in one way or the other helped to shape the work, although they may not be aware how! I also wish to remember the departed colleagues, namely, Dr. Bennett S. Siamwiza, Dr. Chewe M. Chabatama and Professor Mwelwa C. Musambachime. They were also there when this work started but were not around to see it concluded. Dr. Siamwiza and Dr. Chabatama in particular were familiar with this work and often offered encouragement. I also remember with gratitude, the late secretary in the Department of Historical and Archaeological Studies, Ms. Irene Banda. She constructed Table 7 on page 195.

This work faced many delays, for example, at the start of my research at the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), I found that files containing material on labour history were being re-classified. This took longer than expected and caused a delay of more a year and a half. And then there were the heavy teaching and marking loads, illnesses in the family, with my wife suffering an almost debilitating stroke, and then having to see her through a long healing process. I am grateful to God the Almighty for seeing us through all this.

It was only in the last two years that I freed myself from the heavy teaching and marking loads that I was able to see the work completed. In this regard, I would like to express very special gratitude to the following members of staff in the Department for graciously agreeing to help me out by taking some of the load off me: Mr. Santebe Mbozi, Miss Mailes Mbewe, Mrs Martha N. Kayuni-Sikazwe, and Dr. Clarence Chongo. I also express my special gratitude to Mr. Patrick Sikayomya, Mrs Nisbert M. Malama, and Miss Yvonne Kabombwe of the

Department of Language and Social Science Education (LSSE) in the School of Education at the University of Zambia (UNZA) for helping me out. To all these wonderful men and women, I say, May God bless you richly always and please continue to be good people and may you all become very wonderful academics.

I express my gratitude to the staff in the University of Zambia Library, but particularly all those that worked in the Special Collections Section during the entire period of this study. I also express gratitude to the staff at the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ). At the start of this work, there was a very long delay because the NAZ files on labour were being organised. When they were finally ready I was able to receive assistance from staff at NAZ.

I should also express my gratitude to all those men and women that allowed me to interview them for this work or just to discuss the work with me for all the valuable insights they provided on the challenges and struggles of the workers and the trade union movement in Zambia. In this regard, I particularly thank Mr. Fackson Shamenda, Mr. Leonard Hikaumba, Mrs Joyce Nonde-Simukoko, the late Mr. Alec Chirwa, and Dr. Sketchley Sacika. They gave me valuable information and were very knowledgeable. There are few surviving sources with knowledge of pre-1964 trade union issues, but Dr. Sacika did his best to fill in. There were also those that diplomatically declined to be interviewed or to discuss the subject with me. I also wish them well.

My students at the University of Zambia that studied Undergraduate history and took the courses I have offered from 1991, also deserve my gratitude. This is because in my lectures and discussions with them in tutorials, we often touched on the subject of workers and workers' organisations not only in Zambia, but also in other African countries and the world at large. These students may not be aware of this, but in an appreciable way, they helped shape this work as well. The same goes for the men and women that gave me the privilege of supervising their post-graduate (Master of History) work. Two of the ladies are lecturers in History, one at UNZA, and the other at Nkrumah University in Kabwe. The other, a gentleman, is late, but was also a lecturer in History at Nkrumah University in Kabwe. I was happy to work with them all.

Finally, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my wife, Marjorie Kafula Kabela who wanted to see this work come to fruition. I am sure the work will make her as happy as it has made me happy.

And God made all this possible. Thank you Lord.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page	
	Title Page
	Copyrighti
	Declaration ii
	Abstract iii
	Dedication iv
	Acknowledgementsv-vi
	Table of Contentsvii-viii
	List of Tablesix
	List of Abbreviationsx-xii
	Chapter One: Introduction and Historical Background 1
	Chapter Two: The Economy, Government Policies and the Trade Union Movement, 1964-1975 40
	Chapter Three: The Relationship between the Trade Union Movement and UNIP and its Government, 1965-1991 88
	Chapter Four: Challenges of Economic Liberalism on the Trade Union Movement, 1980-2011127
	Chapter Five: Industrial Relations and Strikes in Zambia, 1964-1991 159
	Chapter Six: The Trade Union Movement and the Workers’ Great Expectations in the Third Republic, 1992-2011199
	Chapter Seven: Conclusion 260
	Bibliography: 269

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1: Trade Unions and Associations as at 31st December 1964	18
Table 2: Trade Unions as at 31st December 1970	23
Table 3: Formal Employment and Labour Force Trends 1992-1999	147
Table 4: Formal Employment Trends 1997-2001	149
Table 5: Incidence of Poverty by Residence, Province and Poverty Status in Zambia, 2002/2003	150
Table 6: Industrial Disputes Involving Loss of Work, 1963-1992	179
Table 7: Strikes by Industry from January 1990-December 1993	195
Table 8: Trends in average earnings per month (Kwacha) 1997-2000	233
Table 9: Important Trade Unions in Zambia in 2002	251
Table 10: Trends in union membership 2004-2006 and 2010: Trade union membership Statistics:	255

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAC	Anglo-American Corporation
AEU	Amalgamated Engineering Union
AAWUZA	Airways and Allied Workers' Union of Zambia
AFL/CIO	American Federation of Labour/Congress of Industrial Organisation
ANC	African National Congress
AMU	African Mineworkers Union
ATUC	African Trade Union Congress
BSACo	British South Africa Company
CDEs	Classified Daily Employees
CSO	Central Statistical Office
CSUZ	Civil Servants Union of Zambia
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DG	District Governor
ECTU	Egyptian Confederation of Trade Unions
EASF I & II	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FFTUZ	Federation of Free Trade Unions (Initially Confederation of ...)
FNDP	First National Development Plan (also Fourth and Fifth NDP)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GUZ	Guards Union of Zambia
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
JCTR	Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection
ICFTU	International Confederation of Trade Unions
IFC	International Finance Corporation
ILO	International Labour Office
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDECO	Industrial Development Corporation
INDP	Interim National Development Plan
IPD	Industrial Participatory Democracy
IRA	Industrial Relations Act
IRC	Industrial Relations Court

IRLA	Industrial Relations and Labour Act
KCM	Konkola Copper Mines
KDMP	Konkola Deep Mining Project
KTZ	Kafue Textiles of Zambia
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LME	London Metal Exchange
LuSE	Lusaka Stock Exchange
MAPA	Mines African Police Association
MCC	Member of the Central Committee
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MLSA	Mines Local Staff Association
MLSS	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
MOSSA	Mines Officials and Salaries Staff Association
MP	Member of Parliament
MUZ	Mineworkers Union of Zambia
MWS	Mine Workers Society
NAC	National Airports Corporation
NAZ	National Archives of Zambia
NCZ	Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia
NEC	National Executive Committee
NEDC	National Economic Development Council
NOC	National Oil Corporation
NERP	New Economic Recovery Programme
NIEC	National Import and Export Corporation
NRAMWU	Northern Rhodesia African Mine Workers Union
NRG	Northern Rhodesia Government
NRGWTU	Northern Rhodesia General Workers Trade Union
NUBEGW	National Union of Building Engineering and General Workers
NUCIW	National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers
NUECGW	National Union of Engineering Construction and General Workers
NULAW	National Union of Local Authority Workers
NUPAW	National Union of Plantation and Agriculture Workers
NUPSW	National Union of Public Service Workers
NUPTW	National Union of Postal and Telecommunications Workers

NUTA	National Union of Tanganyika Workers
NUTAW	National Union of Transport and Allied Workers
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
PAYE	Pay As You Earn
PFP	Policy Framework Paper
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PSRP	Public Service Reform Programme
RAWU	Railway African Workers Union
RRP	Radical Reform Programme
RRWU	Rhodesia Railways Workers Union
RST	Rhodesian (later Roan) Selection Trust
RTU	Registrar of Trade Unions
RTUC	Reformed Trade Union Congress
RWUZ	Railway Workers Union of Zambia
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Development Programme
SATUCC	Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council
SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission
SNDP	Second National Development Plan
SOEs	State-Owned Enterprises
TAZAMA	Tanzania-Zambia Mafuta Pipeline
TAZARA	Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority
TNDP	Third National Development Plan
TCLC	Tripartite Consultative Labour Council
UBZ	United Bus Company of Zambia
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UFP	United Federal Party
ULM	United Labour Movement
UMHK	Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga
UMU	United Mineworkers Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNZA	University of Zambia
UNZALARU	University of Zambia Lecturers and Researchers Union

UNZAWU	University of Zambia Workers Union
UNZAAWU	University of Zambia and Allied Workers Union
UPP	United Progressive Party
UTUC	United Trade Union Congress
VAT	Value Added Tax
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
YTU	Young Trade Unionists
ZAMPOST	Zambia Postal Services
ZAMTEL	Zambia Telecommunications Corporation
ZANC	Zambia African National Congress
ZCBC	Zambia Consumer Buyers Corporation
ZCCM	Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZDC/ZADECO	Zambia Democratic Congress
ZEMA	Zambia Expatriates Miners' Association
ZENKO	All Japan Federation of Metal Workers Union
ZESCO	Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation
ZEWU	Zambia Electricity Workers' Union
ZFE	Zambia Federation of Employers
ZIMCO	Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation
ZMU	Zambia Mineworkers Union
ZNBS	Zambia National Building Society
ZNCB (ZANACO)	Zambia National Commercial Bank
ZNPF	Zambia National Provident Fund
ZNUT	Zambia National Union of Teachers
ZNWMC	Zambia National Wholesale and Marketing Corporation
ZPA	Zambia Privatisation Agency
ZRA	Zambia Revenue Authority
ZRAWU	Zambia Railways Amalgamated Workers Union
ZSIC	Zambia State Insurance Corporation
ZTUC	Zambia Trade Union Congress
ZUFIAW	Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers
ZUJ	Zambia Union of Journalists
ZULAWU	Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

The workers in Zambia, as is also the case elsewhere in Africa and the rest of the world, occupy a strategic position in the economy and therefore their history needs to be written and studied. Thus, the importance of a trade union movement cannot be ignored. In order to emphasise the importance of the trade union movement in one country, a scholar has stated that ‘to understand Tunisia, one must get to understand its labour movement. The labour movement in Tunisia is engrained in the political culture of the country and at all levels, a culture of trade unionism has become a structural component of Tunisian society.’¹

Sydney and Beatrice Webb defined a trade union movement as “a continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their working lives.” They added that trade unionism generally was concerned with the aspirations and the fears of ordinary people, with their endeavours and their struggles, with their modest successes and their setbacks. Importantly they also added that “by studying the history of trade unionism, we obtain an understanding of human problems in general, and in particular of those likely to exist in an emerging industrial society.”²

The importance of trade unions in most African countries was also emphasised in a similar way by many other scholars. In Nigeria, the trade union movement has been a force to reckon with. It took part in the anti-colonial struggle, and also contributed to the fight against military dictatorship and since the beginning of democracy in 1999, it acted as guardian of the

¹ “Trade unions and the construction of a specifically Tunisian protest configuration,” Mohamed – Salah 24 September 2013. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/mohamed-salah-omri/trade-unions-and-construction-of-specifically-tunisian-protest-configuration>. (Accessed on 02/03/16.)

² Sydney & Beatrice Webb, (eds.), *The History of Trade Unionism* (London: Longman, 1920), pp. xi, 10 & 12.

interests of the poor.³ In this regard, the history of a trade union movement is critical in the history of any country. It is even more important when, as was the case in Zambia, the trade union movement played an important role in the independence struggle of the country. This study has focused on the post-colonial history of the trade union movement in Zambia.

The trade union movement emerged during the colonial period based on the British model of trade unions. This meant that they had to be non-political and aim only at fighting to improve conditions of work as well as salaries and wages for members. However, evidence in this study has shown that in order for trade unions to fight to meet the expectations of members they had to be political to get the economic benefits.

The changes in the governance system and economic management always made workers expect better rewards for their labour. In 1964 and 1991 Zambia experienced changes in the governance and economic management systems which had an impact on the workers and which this study has discussed. When the rewards were not forthcoming the workers and the trade unions had to fight for them. Therefore, the main aim of this study was to analyse and place in a historical context the crisis of expectations the workers faced and the struggles they put up to get the economic benefits of independence. Over the years the fights and struggles of the workers involved not only strikes and other types of work stoppages, but also court battles with employers and the Government.

In writing this work, we were aware of the work that existed on trade unionism in post-1964 Zambia. This was work by Beatrice Liatto, Emmanuel Akwetey, Lise Rakner, and Miles Larmer.⁴ Larmer's thesis was on the mineworkers and their union, the Mineworkers' Union of

³ Bimbola Oyesola, Social Inclusion: Solidarity in diversity – Trade unions in Nigeria in pursuit of social justice, 10/03/2008. <http://www.dande.eu/en/article>. (Accessed on 22/04/2016.)

⁴ Beatrice B. Liatto, "Organised Labour and the State in Zambia," PhD Thesis, University of Leeds, 1989; Emmanuel Akwetey, *Trade Unions and Democratisation: A Comparative Study of Zambia and Ghana* (Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Politics 50, Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm, 1994; Lise Rakner, *Trade Unions in the Process of Democratisation: A Study of Party-Labour Relations in Zambia* (Bergen: Christian Michelson Institute, 1992; Miles Larmer, "A Class Apart: Mineworkers and Political Change in Zambia, 1964-1991", PhD Thesis, Sheffield University, 2004.

Zambia (MUZ) from 1940 to 1991. He placed the mineworkers at the centre of the change from one-party rule to multiparty rule. The mineworkers and the MUZ, were certainly important in the Zambian economy and politics. At one time the MUZ was the biggest in membership, the richest and most powerful union. However, when the fight for multiparty rule started, the individual leaders of the MUZ seemed hesitant and so did not come to play as prominent a role as Frederick Chiluba, Newstead Zimba and Chitalu Sampa from the mother-body, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).

Unlike Larmer and other scholars that chose to emphasise the role of the mineworkers and the MUZ, this study placed the whole trade union movement at the centre of the change to multiparty politics. After 1991, the MUZ even differed with the ZCTU and other unions opposed to privatisation. The MUZ supported the privatisation of the mines in the hope that its members would benefit. However, privatisation of the mines and the loss of jobs weakened the MUZ and there was even a splinter union formed from it, the National Union of Miners and Allied Workers (NUMAW). Some members of MUZ were unhappy with the way union affairs were being managed and decided to break away and form NUMAW to provide better service to members. Later there was another breakaway group from MUZ that called itself the United Mineworkers Union of Zambia (UMUZ), formed by a group of people that were dissatisfied with both MUZ and NUMAW.

Historical background

This study has explored the post-colonial history of the Zambian trade union movement. The background to it was provided by the context in which during the colonial period, Africans, including those in Zambia were employed in wage labour and began to be classified as workers. This classification as workers led to a consciousness among them which resulted in the formation of trade unions. Many writers on African labour have attempted to explain the circumstances in which Africans took up wage employment. Sandbrook and Cohen, for

example, have stated that white settlement and the establishment of European colonial administration led to the creation of a wage-labour force in Africa. During the early part of the colonial period, and although there were not many Europeans yet in most parts of Africa, African labour was not available in the numbers and with the qualities the Europeans desired.⁵

Although many Africans wanted jobs in the colonial civil service, some types of wage labour were less popular. Neither forced labour nor recruitment from Asia in the case of South Africa could meet the demand for labour in the long term. In view of this, in the early part of colonial rule, the Africans were compelled to sell their labour through the imposition of hut or poll taxes. Later the Africans accepted the new colonial economy as a fact of life and a new order they could not reverse and which in many cases they were prepared to welcome, and they did not need to be forced to work.⁶

According to Ananaba, the development of trade unions in Africa could be classified under three main periods, which were: the period before the end of the Second World War, the period from 1945 to 1960 and the period from 1961 to the 1970s.⁷ The Passfield Memorandum of 1930 from Lord Passfield, the British Secretary for Colonies, legalised unions for Africans in order to avoid riots as had happened in the West Indies in the 1920s in protest against lack of unions. Some colonial authorities and white settlers still wanted to sabotage the forming of trade unions by African workers but were forced to change that attitude.⁸

Wage labour and the workers' struggles in Zambia, with which this study was concerned, began during the colonial period. The first major organised strike by workers in the

⁵ Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen (eds.), *The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action* (London: Longman, 1975), pp. 13-14.

⁶ Sandbrook and Cohen (eds.), *The Development of an African Working Class*, p. 15.

⁷ Ananaba, *The Trade Union Movement in Africa*, pp. 1-2.

⁸ Ananaba, *The Trade Union Movement in Africa*, pp. 1-2.

pre-trade union era was in 1935 and the second was in 1940 when African miners staged strikes, and the third was in 1945 when African railway workers staged a strike.⁹

African trade unionism in colonial Zambia was born in 1946, with the help of William Comrie, a British Trade Union Labour Officer.¹⁰ The African Shop Assistants Trade Union formed in 1946 with 1,300 members was the first African trade union, followed in 1949 by the African Mineworkers Trade Union (AMU), which was an amalgamation of four unions formed in 1947 or 1948 at Nkana, Nchanga, Roan and Mufulira mines with 19,000 members with Lawrence Katilungu as its leader. The other African trade unions then in existence were the African Drivers' Trade Union with 1,700 members and the African General Workers' Trade Union with about 2,000 members.¹¹

There was strong opposition to the formation of African trade unions from the two copper-mining corporations, namely, the Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST) and the Anglo-American Corporation (AAC), both of which had large admixtures of American capital, and White settler interests. The Colonial Office under Creech-Jones and later under his successor Jim Griffiths backed the establishment of genuine trade unions for African workers. Local officials were at first inclined to ignore the fact that African workers were allowed to form trade unions and instead chose to rely on "tribal representatives" and "boss boys" committees. However, the African workers who were well advised by Comrie, went ahead and formed fully-fledged unions'.¹²

It was easy to see how important these African unions were. The White settlers for the most part, disliked them or wished they could be outlawed, though a minority among the white

⁹ Ian Henderson, "Wage earners and political protest in Colonial Africa," *African Affairs*, 72, No. 288 (1973), pp.288-289; Ian Henderson, "Early African Leadership: The Copperbelt Disturbances of 1935 and 1940," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 12, 1 (1974), pp. 57-67; Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism*, pp. 149-52.

¹⁰ Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism*, p. 161; & pp. 185-86.

¹¹ *Report to the Government of Zambia on Labour Administration*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1975, p. 5.

¹² NAZ, MLSS1/26/59 – Trade Unions General, 1951-1959: "North of the Zambezi," by Basil Davidson, Nkana Northern Rhodesia in *New Statesman and Nation*, September 29, 1951.

mineworkers appreciated the fact that African mineworkers also needed to have trade unions to represent them.¹³ Even Roy Welensky, prime minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1956 to 1963, acknowledged in 1946 that it was in the best interest of the European workers for African workers to be allowed to form trade unions as a way of protecting the Europeans' own high standard. Welensky argued that if African workers formed trade unions, they would use them to protect their own interests and in the process they would protect the interests of the Europeans whose standard of living they would be trying to achieve.¹⁴

The reason for the strong opposition to the formation of African trade unions by White settlers was easy to trace. Within a short space of time after the African unions were formed, especially the African mine workers' union, they showed that contrary to the belief by Europeans that Africans could not run their own affairs, they in fact could, thereby dismissing the "great White myth" that the Africans would not be fit to run their own affairs for years, and it was hoped maybe for generations. They learned about trade unionism from Comrie and by intelligently studying the methods which the white miners used to run their own union and their grasp of detail and of organisation was very impressive.¹⁵ A number of studies have examined the Proletarianization of Africans on the Copperbelt in the 1930s and 1940s, among them are those by Henderson and Perrings.¹⁶

The relationship that developed between trade unions and the nationalist movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was fluid. When the trade unions needed to co-operate with political parties they did so if co-

¹³ Davidson, "North of the Zambezi".

¹⁴ Roy Welensky, "Africans and Trade Unions in Northern Rhodesia," *African Affairs*, Vol. 45, No. 181, October 1946, p. 189.

¹⁵ Davidson, "North of the Zambezi".

¹⁶ Ian Henderson, "Wage-Earners and Political Protest in Colonial Africa: The Case of the Copperbelt," *African Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 288 (July 1973), pp. 288-299; Ian Henderson, "Early African Leadership: The Copperbelt Disturbances of 1935 and 1940," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (October 1975), pp. 83-97; & Charles Perrings, "Consciousness, Conflict and Proletarianization: An Assessment of the 1935 Mineworkers' Strike on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 Special Issue on Protest and Resistance, (October 1977), pp. 31-51.

operation served their interests. If co-operating with political parties or politicians did not serve their interests, the trade union movement withdrew. This was a position political parties, whether it was the ANC or UNIP, did not like. A number of studies have covered this relationship but not in detail as a full study had not yet been done.¹⁷

The presence of Katilungu in the trade union movement made the relationship even more difficult. He was both president of the AMU and the Northern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress (TUC) formed in 1951 by about seven African unions then in existence, but which split into two groups in 1959. He refused to join UNIP but joined ANC and opposed UNIP to the extent of agreeing to serve on the Monckton Commission in 1959 and in a speech reported in the *Northern News* he even questioned the benefits of African self-government!¹⁸ Mulford, Bates and Meebelo all show that Katilungu foiled the attempt to oust him from the leadership of TUC by expelling all the unions that were in arrears with their affiliation and annual fees. This left only the three mineworkers' organisations, the AMU, the Mines African Staff Association (MASA) and the Mine African Police Association (MAPA) in the TUC.¹⁹ However, as Mwendapole, Gupta, Bates, Meebelo and the Labour Commissioner show, the expelled unions then formed a rival congress, the Reformed Trade Union Congress (RTUC) in February 1960. RTUC assumed a militant posture and allied itself with UNIP and launched a vigorous campaign to remove Katilungu from the TUC. This objective was achieved in December 1960, when the doyen of African trade unionism was dismissed from the AMU

¹⁷ K. Quinn, "Industrial Relations in Zambia, 1935-69" in Charles Elliott (ed.), *Constraints on Economic Development in Zambia* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 57-90. See also D.C. Mulford, *Zambia, the Politics of Independence 1957-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Robert I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); Richard Hall, *Zambia* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965); and Richard Gray, *The Two Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) & Robert H. Bates, *Unions, parties and political development – a study of mineworkers in Zambia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

¹⁸ *Northern News*, 26/01/61 & 17/02/61.

¹⁹ Mulford, *Zambia, the Politics of Independence 1957-1964*, pp. 172-74; R.H. Bates, *Unions, parties, and political development*, p.144; Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism*, pp. 453-54.

presidency, the pedestal of his power.²⁰ The TUC and the RTUC merged in January 1961 to form the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC),²¹ with Jonathan Chivunga, a UNIP militant as its president. The formation of UTUC did not end the deep divisions that existed among the trade union leaders.²² The alliance between UNIP and UTUC did not give UNIP dominance of the trade union movement it wanted. This was shown by its quarrel with the African Mineworkers' Union (AMU) in mid-1962.²³ The relationship between AMU and UNIP involved quarrels and reconciliations as AMU continued to fight UNIP's attempts to control it.

A coalition government made up of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the African National Congress (ANC) took office in December 1962 after elections held on 30th October 1962. The formation of this coalition government gave people hope that the future constitutional path of Zambia would be clearer and more definite than it had been for some time in the past. Greater stability was expected to result in economic development which in turn would lead to increased employment opportunities which the country so badly needed. The trade union movement was split in December 1962 into two factions made up of the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) and the Zambia Trades Union Congress (ZTUC). In spite of the split African trade union activity was at this time greater than at any other time in the past. It was therefore imperative that trade unions became better organised and united to face the challenges ahead.²⁴ It was observed that the split in December 1962, which had led to the formation of the ZTUC, hindered the work of the trade union movement almost throughout the

²⁰ M.R. Mwendapole, *A History of the Trade Union Movement in Zambia up to 1968* (Lusaka: University of Zambia Institute for African Studies, Communication No. 13, 1977), pp. 48-49; Anirudha Gupta, "Trade Unionism and politics on the Copperbelt," in William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 295 & p. 297; Bates, *Unions, parties and political development*, p. 132, 144-153; Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism*, pp. 432-36 & p. 454; *Annual Labour Report 1963*, p. 20.

²¹ *Report to the Government of Zambia on Labour Administration*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1975, p. 5.

²² Elliot Berg and Jeffrey Butler, "Trade Unions", pp. 355-56; *Africa Digest*, VIII (April 1961), p. 135; *Africa Digest*, IX (August 1961), p.5. (Reference to *The Christian Science Monitor* is from Berg and Butler, p. 356.

²³ Berg and Butler, "Trade Unions" p. 356; *Central African Examiner*, VI (August 1962), p. 7.

²⁴ *Annual Labour Report 1962*, p. 22. (The Labour Commissioner expressed Government's hope.)

whole of 1963. There were frequent conflicts between rival unions operating in the same field and despite many attempts to resolve them, the differences of opinion between the two wings of the trade union movement persisted.²⁵

The break-up of the Katilungu-led NRTUC was well planned by his opponents who were strong UNIP supporters. They planned that if they could not outvote him in NRTUC, they would walk out and form their own grouping. Katilungu made sure they did not outvote him by not allowing unions behind in payments of their subscriptions not to vote or pay their subscriptions at the meeting. He claimed that there was a group of “evil political prostitutes and failures” trying to undermine his leadership. He warned this group that he knew its plans and would fight it. It was understood that his words were aimed at the newly formed UNIP that had criticised his leadership of AMU and the way he handled the issue of African advancement. He accused his critics of trying to spread “communist ideologies”.²⁶

The deposing of Katilungu and the formation of UTUC did not end the factionalism in the trade union movement. One faction favoured affiliation to ICFTU while another faction favoured affiliation to WFTU.²⁷ At this stage, UTUC was not independent and operated as an arm of UNIP in the liberation struggle. It was this that caused some trade unionists that included Mwendapole who wanted trade unions to be independent to differ with the Mubanga group.

In fact, according to Sacika, UTUC under Chivunga literally became a labour wing of UNIP for two important reasons. The first was that UNIP and Kaunda had espoused socialist

²⁵ *Annual Labour Report 1963*, p. 19. (This was what later led to formulation of policy of one union in one industry.)

²⁶ NAZ – MLSS1/26/144: Trade Unions (African) – General, 1957-1965 – Contains information recorded by L.C. Powell, the Co-operative and Marketing Officer (Trade Unions) given to him by a union leader, Patrick Mulenga of a plot by Mwendapole, Kalyati, Chivunga, Chikonkolo and Chirwa to break up Katilungu’s TUC if they could not outvote him; See also *Northern News*, 19th December 1959.

²⁷ UNIP Archives: UNIP12/1/4 – File No. DRB/50/2/2 – Trade Unions 1961-1962. (Contains letters written by Jonathan Mubanga based in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania in where he used UNIP offices manned by Robert Speedwell Makasa, the UNIP representative in Tanzania. Mubanga belonged to the pro-Chivunga faction opposed to Katilungu. The letters were to various trade union organisations in Africa and Eastern Europe soliciting support to the UTUC faction so that it could help UNIP in its fight for independence.)

ideals right from the beginning because most of the countries that supported UNIP's struggle for independence were socialist and by inclination UNIP adopted socialist policies. In European countries trade unions supported socialist parties, so UNIP thought that trade unions should naturally be closer to it. The second reason was that for the UTUC, their line of thinking was that without political independence there was very little that African trade unions could achieve, and that was true, except for the NRAMWTU (later the AMU), which benefitted from the strong personality of Katilungu. Sacika stated that he was not sure if without Katilungu the NRAMWTU would have been strong. The other African trade unions were in total disarray and so UTUC thought an alliance with UNIP was the best strategy. At the back of their minds they believed that if UNIP achieved independence, benefits of independence would rub off to the unions and workers and, according to Sacika that was a sensible stance because the association worked to the mutual benefit of both UNIP and the unions.²⁸

The external influences in the trade union movement at this time were as a result of the trade unionists themselves that introduced antagonisms and contradictions that made them vulnerable to manipulation by ICFTU and WFTU officials. There was also corruption and maladministration and financial indiscipline that made the trade union movement weak,²⁹ with some officials hiding and using money donated to the UTUC by the WFTU and Chivunga using £900 from the American Federation of Labour/Congress of Industrial Organisation (AFL/CIO) to buy for himself a brand new car costing over £900. Matthew Mwendapole was sure the money was meant for the UTUC and disapproved of Chivunga's behaviour.³⁰ These differences over monetary assistance from abroad caused divisions in the trade union movement and brought out succinctly the corruption and greed of some personalities involved.

²⁸ Interview with Dr. Sketchley Sacika, Chainama Golf Club, Lusaka, 27/04/15.

²⁹ Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism*, pp. 456-57.

³⁰ UNIP Archives: UNIP12/1/4 – File No. DRB/50/2/2 – Trade Unions 1961-1962: Mwendapole wrote, "A Sad chapter in Trade Union History-United Trade Union Congress – Northern Rhodesia," in which he replies to allegations against him made by Jonathan Mubanga.

This persuaded the Government to include a clause in the *Trades Union and Trade Disputes Act of 1964* barring the trade union movement from soliciting internal or external financial and material assistance without the permission of the Minister of Labour.

During the UTUC Special Congress, representatives of the AMU and other trade unions walked out of the conference in protest over the proposed new constitution. The divergence of views over questions of representation, administration and finance within the UTUC caused the split amongst the loyalties of some affiliated unions. The AMU and other trade unions that walked out of the Congress later broke away from the UTUC and formed their own congress, the Zambia Trade Union Congress (ZTUC) at a meeting at Mindolo in Kitwe.³¹

In February and April 1963, UNIP attempted to bring the two factions, ZTUC and UTUC together again into one Congress and a meeting was organised under the chairmanship of Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, the Party's National Treasurer and Minister of African Agriculture. In April 1963, elections were held at Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation in Kitwe again under the chairmanship of Kapwepwe, which saw the UTUC group score a landslide victory in the elections that led to the merger of UTUC and ZTUC being called the United Labour Movement (ULM). The formation of the ULM did not end the divisions in the trade union movement as suspicions still remained. For example, because the majority of the executive positions of the new ULM were scooped by adherents of the old UTUC it was seen by some adherents of the ZTUC as an indication that the merger had not been successful. There was also suspicion that the elections might have been rigged in favour of the old UTUC, since some of the unions the UTUC claimed were its affiliates did not in reality exist.³²

In this regard, the AMU, the richest and best organised union with at least twice as many members as any other union, and which achieved results on its own, and some adherents

³¹ *Annual Labour Report 1963*, p. 19. (The section on this page gives a short analysis of the trade union situation in the country in 1963.)

³² *Annual Labour Report 1964*, p. 19. (The Labour Commissioner reported on the attempts by UNIP to sort out the differences and divisions in the Trade Union movement.)

of ZTUC, shunned ULM/UTUC, and thereby sabotaging Kapwepwe's work in unifying the trade union movement. The disunity in the movement grew worse after the general elections of January 1964 which swept UNIP into power to give the country self-government with Kenneth Kaunda as Prime Minister. An atmosphere of suspicion descended upon the movement and personality clashes among leaders became the phenomenon of frequent occurrence. The *African Mail* reported: 'Nobody seems to trust anybody else at the top levels of the unions, and this is largely because the organisations are so bad that the left hand seldom knows what the right hand is doing.' And in its editorial it observed that the most important aspect of the squabbles was that they had never been based on principle, but on personalities. This had led observers to suggest that many leaders were in the trade union business just for what they could get out of it not to serve the interests of the workers. As long as that state of affairs existed, trade unions in Zambia would be laying themselves wide open to government control as had happened in Ghana and Tanganyika.³³

The government decided that the trade union federation needed surgical treatment to cure the malady it was suffering from. It enacted the *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes (Amendment) Bill of 1964*, which became the labour law as the *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (Amendment) Act of 1965*. The Minister of Labour and Social Development, Nalumino Mundia, announced that the Act of 1965 would come into operation on 1st April 1965.³⁴

In July 1964, Kapwepwe, the Treasurer of UNIP, tried again to reconcile the rival factions within the trade union movement and only succeeded in forming a new UTUC by persuading the main protagonists to leave the movement for government positions. Government ruled that Chivunga and Chisata the two major protagonists should choose

³³ *African Mail*, 29/05/64. (The paper gave a warning to trade union leaders to be well organised to avoid creating situations that politicians would use to interfere in trade union work.)

³⁴ *Government of Zambia, Statutory Instrument No. 131 of 1965*.

between serving the Government as junior ministers and leaving the trade union movement, or resigning their seats in Parliament to continue running the unions. The two chose to remain junior ministers. Wilson Chakulya, who was still an ordinary MP, was still free to run the unions, but Kaunda promised him a top post at a later stage if he did not stand for election for a UTUC position. Kaunda later made Chakulya Consul-General in Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi) in Congo.³⁵ In this way, Kapwepwe brought a united but weakened trade union movement into independent Zambia.³⁶ Veteran trade unionist Mwendapole, lamented:

And when President Kaunda and former Governor Evelyn Hone stood before the hoisting of the independence flag on 24th October 1964, the great and exciting history of the trade union movement lay prostrate and powerless to make a significant impact upon the life of independent Zambia.³⁷ Mwendapole was lamenting the fact that the trade union movement had entered the independence period “prostrate and powerless to make a significant impact upon the life of independent Zambia” because it had been ripped apart mainly by disunity, but also by other factors such as distrust and dishonesty among leaders and lack of good leaders at branch level, which had rendered it to be weak. This, therefore, was the state in which the Zambian trade union movement was at independence in 1964.

Mwendapole’s thesis of a “prostrate and powerless” trade union movement in Zambia at independence was correct. Zambia attained independence without a strong trade union movement because it was fractured and weak. The Government, which had differed with labour leaders from the time the UTUC protested at key men in the trade union movement being left out of nominations for the parliamentary seats, had given diplomatic jobs to veteran trade unionists possibly to silence them,³⁸ and this also weakened the movement.

Another angle to the differences between the UNIP Government and the trade union movement was that the quarrel between the Government and the trade union movement started early in October 1963, when the labour leaders demanded representation on the Central

³⁵ Ernest K.S. Chiwama, “Divide and Rule,” *Central African Examiner*, December 1964, p. 7. (NOTE: Chiwama used this article to explain why the trade union movement was weak going into independence. Henceforth we will use the name of the newspaper to refer to his views.); Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism*, p. 464 & pp. 470-85.

³⁶ *Annual Labour Report 1964*, p. 19; Bates, *Unions, Parties and Political Development*, p. 253, note no. 21; Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism*, pp. 466-85 & pp. 484-85.

³⁷ Mwendapole, *A History of the Trade Union Movement in Zambia up to 1968*, p. 54.

³⁸ *Central African Examiner*, December 1964, p. 7.

Committee of UNIP, but UNIP insisted that representation was by election as party members and not as representatives of other organisations because UNIP stood for the liberation of all the people in the country, including trade unionists. When Kaunda announced the names of Parliamentary candidates, Albert Kalyati, the General Secretary of UTUC, flew back from the United States where he was on a course, and protested that the trade union movement had been betrayed in that despite the campaign they carried on for UNIP during the liberation struggle, only four were nominated for Parliament. The movement had demanded twenty-five candidates, four of whom were to be Cabinet Ministers.³⁹

Government thought that offering government positions to some trade unionists would mark the end of the struggle for power in the trade union movement. However, trouble came in February 1964, when pro-Chivunga Young Trade Unionists (YTU), many of whom were trained in socialist countries, appeared on the scene. According to Meebelo, the YTU were led by a committee of ten with a membership which included Bryan Chirwa, who was the Chairman of the group, Jonathan Mubanga, Michael Sata, the general treasurer of the National Union of Engineering, Construction and General Workers (NUECGW), Christopher Chileshe, Alfred Chambeshi, Amos Ndyamba, Rennie Chikonkolo, Michael Bungoni, and H.W. Kabanga. The YTU was not a registered trade union. It was formed by the youth wings of the UTUC and UNIP on the Copperbelt as a pressure group to foster unity in the UTUC. However, the YTU brought more disunity and confusion in the trade union movement than unity. In the power struggle between Chivunga and Chakulya among UTUC factions it was anti-Chakulya whom it targeted and wanted to force him out of the trade union movement. Chakulya broke away and received the sympathies of eleven out of the thirteen registered unions.⁴⁰ It was at

³⁹*Central African Examiner*, December 1964, p. 7.

⁴⁰*Central African Examiner*, December 1964, p.7; For more detail on the YTU see Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism*, p. 464 & pp. 470-85.

this point that Government stepped in with Kapwepwe as the mediator and resolved the issue as we have seen above.⁴¹

A moderate group was elected to run the UTUC, with Amonson Mugala as President, Albert Kalyati as General Secretary, and Timothy Kankasa, President of the National Union of Local Authority Workers (NULAW) as a member of the UTUC Executive. The commotion and disunity in the trade union movement continued, this time between the Young Trade Unionists and the UTUC, while in the mining industry the United Mineworkers Union (UMU) led by Alfred Chambeshi organised strikes and demonstrations to get recognition from the Chamber of Mines and thus wipe out the mine-recognised AMU,⁴² but it failed. For several months UMU competed with AMU, but before the end of 1963, UMU was in serious difficulties and was dissolved. It was then re-organised as the Mines Local Staff Association (MLSA) to cover only supervisory and staff employees in the mines.⁴³ The UNIP Youth Brigade on the Copperbelt threatened to use violence against the Young Trade Unionists if they continued to make trouble. This compelled the Young Trade Unionists to give in, but the struggle between UMU and AMU continued to the embarrassment of the Government which wanted peace in the mining industry. At public meetings on the Copperbelt, cabinet ministers denounced the union leaders.⁴⁴ In 1993, Sata admitted in Parliament that there had been political interference in the running of trade unions when he explained that the UMU was created with the help of UNIP to wipe out the AMU. The Building, Metal and Industrial Workers Union was also interfered with and “broken up”. In its place the National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers (NUBEGW) was created.⁴⁵

⁴¹*Central African Examiner*, December 1964, p. 7.

⁴²*Central African Examiner*, December 1964, p. 7.

⁴³ Anirudha Gupta, “Trade unionism and politics on the Copperbelt”, p. 295.

⁴⁴*Central African Examiner*, December 1964, p. 7.

UNIP Archives: UNIP12/1/23: 6/00/28: United Trade Union Congress, Northern Rhodesia – Correspondence, 1964-65. Letter from UTUC Deputy President, A.M. Chambeshi to UNIP Regional Secretary, 24th June 1964.

⁴⁵ *Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session of the Seventh National Assembly*, 15th January – 18th March 1993, Columns 1881-1882.

Three veteran trade unionists were at the time of independence given diplomatic jobs. Chambeshi, who was a UTUC committee member and President of UMU, was sent to the Embassy in Washington. UMU described his appointment as a complete blow as he was irreplaceable. Gabriel Mushikwa, the publicity and organising secretary of the strong Nkana branch, was sent to Zambia's Cairo Embassy. Kankasa, President of NULAW and a veteran member of the UTUC executive was sent to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). Kalyati was appointed to work as a representative of the All-African Trade Union Federation, which had its headquarters in Accra, Ghana. With the Young Trade Unionists neutralised and the top men away from the trade union movement, Zambia remained without a strong trade union movement, going into the independence period.⁴⁶ Table 1 shows the number of registered trade unions for both European and African workers in existence in 1964. Some of the names changed, for example, Mine Workers' Society used to be Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union (for European miners), Northern Rhodesia Union of Teachers became Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT), and National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers used to be National Union of Building, Wood and Metal Workers.

This division continued into 1964 until reconciliation meetings were held chaired by Kapwepwe.⁴⁷ As this study attempts to show, the issue of conflict and cleavage has been very important and a recurrent theme in the history of the trade union movement in Zambia.

The Trade Union Movement after Independence 1964-1991

After independence in 1964, the Zambian workers suffered from a "crisis of expectations" as they thought that with the attainment of independence they would begin to earn more money and live better lives. However, the attainment of independence did not mean the end of their struggles, it merely took the struggle to another level, and if anything, they

⁴⁶*Central African Examiner*, December 1964, p. 7.

⁴⁷ *Annual Labour Report 1964*, p. 19.

sometimes found out that the struggles had become even more difficult because workers were expected to moderate their demands as a way of showing patriotism to their country. The new government on the other hand was grappling with the issue of labour laws and in 1965, enacted the *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance*, which replaced the 1949 *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance* enacted by the colonial government. The aim of the 1965 Ordinance was to ensure that the government was in control of labour issues in the country. Under this law, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was formed to replace the UTUC.

In a speech he made at a national rally in Kitwe on 23rd October 1965, Kaunda stated that he wanted to assure the leaders of the trade union movement in Zambia that the Government was interested in their movement which had an important role to play in building the future of the country. In this regard, he expected the leaders of the trade union movement and the workers whom they led to exercise a high sense of morality by being considerate to the thousands that were unemployed in the country. This was to be done by not asking for excessively high salaries as that would mean there would be a problem about creating new jobs. Table 1 shows that in a population of around three and a half million people in 1964, there were only 101,654 workers, both African and European, represented by unions. There were 556 in unregistered unions. Such small numbers in unions meant that a lot of people were unemployed, meaning that as the *Seers Report* had pointed out.⁴⁸ In view of what the Seers Report showed, Kaunda was correct to argue that even the unions should fight to help create employment for the larger group of people to take them out of poverty.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ *Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia: Report of the UN/ECA/FAO Mission* (The Seers Report), Ndola: Falcon Press, 1964), p. 7.

⁴⁹ Kenneth David Kaunda, *State of the Nation, Volume II: National Economy*. Compiled by United National Independence Party, Freedom House, Lusaka (Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, 1989), pp.101-103.

TABLE 1: Trade Unions and Associations as at 31st December 1964

Name of Trade Union	Year Registered	Members as at 31-12-64
Pilots Association of Central Africa (in Zambia)	1963	2
Northern Rhodesia Daily Marketing Board Staff Association	1963	50
Amalgamated Engineering Union (in Zambia)	1950	130
Northern Rhodesia Local Civil Servants' Association	1958	134
Northern Rhodesia Association of Local Government Officers	1952	525
Northern Rhodesia Mines African Police Association	1957	545
Zambia Typographical Union	1961	302
Northern Rhodesia Society of Bank Officials	1961	450
Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service Association of N. Rhodesia	1962	846
Northern Rhodesia Civil Servants' Union	1964	580
Shop and Factories Workers' Union	1963	500
Employees of United Trade Union Congress	1963	750
Rhodesia Railways Workers' Union (in Zambia)	1949	1,386
Railway African Workers' Union (in Zambia)	1960	4,876
Mine Workers' Society	1950	3,691
Northern Rhodesia Mine Officials and Salaried Staff Association	1950	3,038
United Mineworkers' Union (Northern Rhodesia)	1954	3,400
Central African Road Services Workers' Trade Union	1954	1,300
Northern Rhodesia Civil Servants' Association	1957	1,643
National Union of Hotel, Catering & Domestic Workers	1961	1,135
National Union of Transport and General Workers	1961	1,000
National Union of Postal & Telecommunications Workers	1964	1,058
Northern Rhodesia Union of Teachers	1962	2,401
National Union of Plantation & Agricultural Workers	1962	3,300
Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers' Trade Union	1957	32,000
National Union of Commercial & Industrial Workers	1960	15,300
National Union of Building, Engineering & General Workers	1960	10,000
National Union of Public Service Workers	1960	5,400
National Union of Local Authorities Workers	1961	5,912
Total membership of Registered Unions		101,654
Unregistered:		
United Trade Union Congress (UTUC)		17
Kabwe Mine Employees Association		167
Zambia Mines Staff Association		372
TOTAL		556

Source: Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Labour & Mines Annual Report of the Department of Labour for the Year 1964 (Lusaka: Government Printers, 1965, Table 9, p. 67).

What the Government expected of the trade union movement in independent Zambia was clearly expressed by Kaunda in speeches in the period immediately leading up to independence and the period following independence. He insisted that his government had the

best interests of the trade union movement and workers and wanted to see a strong trade union movement develop.⁵⁰ Kaunda's views on trade unions were what mainly guided the Government's labour policy that led to the enactment of the *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes (Amendment) Bill of 1964*, the creation of the ZCTU and later the enactment of the *Industrial Relations Act of 1971* and clashes over policy the trade union movement in this period.

When UTUC was dissolved, the government replaced the UTUC executive and appointed the first ZCTU executive. UNIP sought to control the trade union movement so that it did not disrupt its development agenda.⁵¹ The first president of ZCTU, Neziah Tembo emphasised that ZCTU was in a strong relationship with UNIP.⁵² Documents show that at first the relationship between UNIP and the trade union movement was good and that later problems began to emerge that ruined that relationship.⁵³ The government's decision to appoint the first executive of the ZCTU led to discontent within the trade union circles and in 1967 the trade union movement was allowed to elect its own leadership in ZCTU to replace the government-appointed leadership.⁵⁴

In spite allowing the movement to elect its own leadership, the Government was still concerned about the discipline in its leadership and was therefore determined to stamp its authority on the trade union movement. In this regard, in July 1970, four leaders of the Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT), were put in jail at Milima Prison in Kasama following a nationwide unofficial strike by teachers and were only released in January 1971. These leaders were the President of the union, Newstead Zimba, the General Secretary Muletambo Mubita, the Deputy General Secretary Bruno Peter Shiyenge Kapini, and the Treasurer Langford

⁵⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 25/10/65.

⁵¹ NAZ, MLSS1/26/292/2317: 1969-1969 – Notes on the Trade Unions & Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1965 & subsequent legislation.

⁵² NAZ, MLSS1/26/258/2307: 1965-1967: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, Presidential Address, July 1966.

⁵³ NAZ, MLSS1/26/292/2317: 1969-1969: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 100/15, Vol. III, Notes on the Trade Unions & Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1965 & subsequent legislation.

⁵⁴ *Annual Labour Report 1967*, pp.12-13; NAZ, MLSS1/26/279/2314: 1967-1969: ZCTU, 100/TU/15.

Musonda.⁵⁵ Table 2 shows the number of trade unions in existence as at 31st December 1970. It shows a slight increase in the number of unionised workers.

In 1971, the government enacted the *Industrial Relations Act*, which completely changed the way labour issues were to be handled in Zambia. All trade unions in the country were by law to affiliate to the ZCTU and the concept of one union in one industry was introduced.⁵⁶ Although that was not the intention of the Act, it ended up creating a very strong trade union movement in Zambia.⁵⁷ The leadership of the trade union movement, which was aligned to the nationalist leaders who led the fight for the independence of Zambia, was in 1974, replaced by a new leadership, led by Frederick Chiluba and Newstead Zimba, which was not aligned to the nationalist leadership. The Chiluba-led trade union movement committed itself to fighting for economic gains for the workers represented by trade unions. As if in response to the change in leadership in the trade union movement and its new strength, in 1976, UNIP tried to introduce the undemocratic system of vetting candidates contesting positions in ZCTU. The trade union movement strongly opposed the proposal and UNIP dropped it.

In 1980, the government introduced the Local Government Act which was to lead to a decentralised form of governance. The trade union movement, and especially the MUZ, strongly opposed the implementation of the Act. This led to a bitter clash between the movement and the government. In October 1980, government confiscated the passports of Chiluba, Zimba and Chitalu Sampa, Kaunda revealed that security forces had foiled a plot to overthrow the government. There were insinuations that the three leaders were involved in the plot.⁵⁸ Yoram Mumba, one of the coup plotters, seems to confirm these suspicions in his book

⁵⁵ *Government Gazette* No. 642 of Friday, 14th August 1970; *Annual Labour Report 1970*, p. 10; *Annual Labour Report 1971*, p. 10. (See also Ackson Kanduza, "Teachers' Strike, 1970: A Chapter in Zambia's Labour History," *Hs - SH*, Vol. XIV, No. 28 (November 1981), p. 487 & P. 489.

⁵⁶ Government of Zambia, the *Industrial Relations Act, No. 36 of 1971*.

⁵⁷ Interview with Sacika, Lusaka, 27/04/15; Rakner, *Trade Unions in the Processes of Democratisation*, pp. 82-88.

⁵⁸ *Annual Labour Report 1980*, pp. 16-17.

published in 2011, when he reveals that Chiluba and Sampa were consulted over the plot and were to be part of the Government to replace Kaunda.⁵⁹ A spate of strikes in 1981, led to the detention of Chiluba, Zimba, Chitalu Sampa and a businessman, Chama Chakomboka. They were again linked to the 1980 coup plot, but a *prima facie* case against them could not be established and they were, therefore released from detention on a *habeas corpus* ruling.⁶⁰

The economic situation had worsened considerably by 1985, but the trade unions still pressed hard for benefits for their members and even resorted to strikes. In order to deal with the many wildcat strikes in the country, the government banned legal strikes, and then the Minister of Labour and Social Services, Frederick Hapunda, in January 1985, through Statutory Instrument Number 6, revoked the Trade Union (Deduction of Subscriptions) Regulation of 1985 in terms of section 20 of the IRA. From then onwards all unions whose members went on strike would lose members' subscriptions. The ZCTU called Hapunda's action illegal and accused the government of subjecting workers to industrial dictatorship. The ZCTU took the matter to the High Court, but lost the case, leaving the trade union movement feeling unhappy with the government.⁶¹ The government also forbade labour leaders from addressing workers in future Labour Day celebrations on 1st May every year. The labour leaders would attend the celebrations, but they would not address the workers. This led to further acrimony between the government and the movement, which was only brought to an end when the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) came to power in 1991.

The 1986 food riots on the Copperbelt and Lusaka, and the 1990 food riots and coup attempt also had an effect on the history of the trade union movement. In 1989-1990, the movement led the calls for a return to multi-party democracy in Zambia. This culminated into

⁵⁹ Godwin Yoram Mumba, *The 1980 Coup: Tribulations of the One-Party State in Zambia* (Lusaka: UNZA Press, 2012), pp. 49-51.

⁶⁰ Mumba, *The 1980 Coup*, pp. 91-92.

⁶¹ *Government Gazette*, 20th January 1985; *Times of Zambia*, 21/01/85; *Annual Labour Report 1985*.

the amendment of Article 4 of the 1973 Republican Constitution that had allowed the existence of only one political party, UNIP. The country reverted to a multiparty system. Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held under this amended Act in October 1991. The MMD won both the Presidential and Parliamentary elections, toppling Kaunda and UNIP.⁶²

After the MMD came to power in 1991, Zambian workers and Zambians in general again suffered a further “crisis of expectations”. The MMD had promised to improve the wages and conditions of service of the workers and the standard of living of all the people of Zambia. However, from 1992, the MMD government introduced economic liberalisation policies, which led to stringent implementation of the structural adjustment programme and privatisation. Initially, the situation became even worse with the loss of employment and spreading poverty. In 1993, the government even declared a dispute against the trade unions when they threatened to go on strike. The MMD quickly became unpopular and Kaunda threatened to return to power. The MMD amended the constitution to bar Kaunda from contesting the 1996 Presidential elections. The MMD and Chiluba himself continued to become unpopular as Chiluba’s political trajectory quickly moved from that of a Messiah to a scapegoat for Zambia’s economic woes. Later Chiluba made a bid to change the constitution to allow him a third term in office by contesting the 2001 elections. However, the civil society organisations, joined by Church organisations and the trade union movement, and moulded into a group calling itself the Oasis Forum, opposed him and the bid failed.

⁶² Michael Bratton & Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 104; *The Weekly Post*, December 13-19, 1991; Parliament of Zambia, *Public Parliamentary Handbook of the Tenth National Assembly 2006-2011*, (Lusaka: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, March 2007), p. 6.

Table 2: Trade Unions as at 31st December 1970

	Year of Registration	Membership as at 31.12.70
Employers:		
Zambia Association of Civil Engineering Contractors (E)	1962	26
Employees:		
101 – 1, 000 Membership:		
University of Zambia Staff Association	1968	190
National Association of Local Government Officers (E)	1952	400
Zambia Airways Workers' Union	1968	428
Civil Servants Association of Zambia (E)	1969	800
Zambia Typographical Union	1961	975
Zambia Union of Bank Officials	1970	585
1, 000 – 5, 000 Membership		
Hotel, Catering Workers' Union of Zambia	1966	638
National Union of Postal and Telecommunication Workers	1964	2784
National Union of Transport and Allied Workers	1967	3801
5, 001 – 8, 000 Membership		
National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers	1962	6000
Zambia Railways Amalgamated Workers' Union	1967	6100
Zambia National Union of Teachers	1962	6107
Over 8, 000 Membership:		
National Union of Local Authorities Workers	1961	10 073
National Union of Public Service Workers	1960	10 512
National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers	1960	14 900
National Union of Building Engineering & General Workers	1960	15 500
Mineworkers' Union of Zambia	1967	45 207
TOTAL UNIONISED WORKERS		125 000

(E) = Estimated membership

Federation of Trade Unions:

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 1965 14 (1) (1) All trade unions except three Associations, namely, University of Zambia Staff Association, National Association of Local Government Officers and Civil Servants Association of Zambia were affiliated to ZCTU.

Source: *Republic of Zambia Ministry of Labour and Social Services Annual Report of the Department of Labour for the Year 1970*, (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1971), p. 51, Table 5 (a).

Between 1997 and 2011, wage freezes which were illegal as they infringed on trade union rights, continued to be applied as a way of controlling the wage bill and inflation, but the workers responded by staging strikes. The wage freezes became too much for the public service workers to bear. In February 2004, the trade union movement, supported by some civil society organisations, held a huge demonstration against the high pay as you earn (PAYE) tax and the wage freeze. These crises, which the workers in Zambia faced from 1964 to 2011, were subjected to careful historical analysis in this study.

This study intends to show that the fact that the trade union movement became the spearhead in the fight for the return to multiparty rule was not a surprise. While the trade union movement did not transform itself into an opposition party, from 1980 until 1991, tension was building up slowly until it reached the climax in 1991, leading to the fall of UNIP and its government. The conflicts witnessed between the government and the trade union movement from 1980 to 1991 were akin to a political power struggle. Kaunda seemed to have an idea of the struggle because he alluded to it in his radio address to the nation when he announced the detentions of trade union movement leaders in July 1981. In the end he was powerless to prevent the forces against him and his government from wresting power from him.

Objectives and significance of the study

In spite of the importance of the workers and the trade union movement in the political, economic and social life of Zambia since independence in 1964, there have been some historical studies on the trade union movement in the post 1964 period, but they have not been many, especially for the period from 1991 to 2011. There have been studies on individual trade unions, for example, Larmer's work on MUZ and Rakner's on various aspects of trade unionism and also Akwetey's, which compares the roles played by trade unions in Zambia and Ghana in the democratisation process.

The main objective of this study was to investigate the nature of the expectations of the workers in Zambia from 1964 and the struggles they waged in their quest to ensure that they received their just rewards from their labour. The specific objectives were to examine the impact of the performance of the economy on trade unionism; government labour and economic policies from 1964 to 2011 and their impact on trade unionism; to analyse the nature of the relationship between the government and the trade union movement from 1964 to 1991; to analyse the impact of the challenges of economic liberalisation on unionism and workers

after 1991; examine the industrial relations situation and strikes from 1964 to 2011; and finally to examine the workers' expectations after the achievement of democracy in 1991 to 2011.

Literature review

The literature reviewed in this section has drawn attention to the way African labour studies in general were conducted in colonial and post-colonial Africa in terms of what was studied, why it was studied, when it was studied and who studied it. The review then looked specifically at what was written on Zambia's labour history.

Thomas Hodgkin's work was pioneering,⁶³ in that it was one of the first to recognise African nationalist movements as being capable of challenging colonial control in the middle of the 1950s – especially after Gold Coast independence in 1957 set in motion a chain reaction that affected almost every African colonial territory. Hodgkin, however, treated trade unions as part of general political movements and depending on the author's methodological approach, was either given prominence or ignored.⁶⁴ Hodgkin, while correctly developing an understanding of African nationalism that transcended mere political organisation, unintentionally reinforced the idea that trade union movements and political movements were closely related,⁶⁵ especially because a considerable number of prominent political leaders had connections to trade unions. This correct recognition that the unions served as an important mobility channel to political power became confused with an incorrect assessment of the identity or closeness of the unions and parties.⁶⁶ What made Hodgkin's work relevant to this work was the fact that his assertions matched closely with the Zambian situation where labour leaders readily accepted political positions.

Epstein's work was also of interest to this work. Although it was sociological and concerned with the whole political environment of Africans on the Copperbelt, it assisted us to

⁶³ Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (London: Muller, 1956).

⁶⁴ Allen, "The Study of Trade Unionism", pp. 292-93; Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (1956).

⁶⁵ Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (1956), Chapter 4.

⁶⁶ Friedland, "African Trade Unions Studies", p. 579.

understand the causes and motivation of trade unionism in an African environment.⁶⁷ It was this aspect which made Epstein's book relevant to this work.

The chapter by Berg and Butler was of great influence in studies that followed on the African trade union movement.⁶⁸ This chapter in an edited book is so seminal that a lot of work on trade unions or trade union movements has been based on it. It was relevant to this work because it discussed many aspects of trade unionism, such as purpose of trade unions, their organisation, relations between trade unions and political parties and governments in Africa. It was this work that began the reaction against the argument that trade unions and political parties were close and the development of a realistic perception in 1964 when they showed that the view of unions being solely political instruments was erroneous.⁶⁹

Lynd's work, not only related African unionism to politics but also placed his entire analysis within a global framework of the Cold War with unions playing out their roles as allies of 'Democracy' or 'Communism'.⁷⁰ We found this argument relevant to this work because the Zambian trade unionism was also involved in this ideological struggle of democracy versus communism. The Zambian government from 1964 tried to use the law to prevent the trade union movement from falling under the influence of foreigners.

The Jack Woddis's pioneering study of the role of trade unions in the struggle for independence and the strategic position occupied by the workers in the colonial situation was important for this study because of the role the Zambian trade union movement played in the struggle for independence.⁷¹

⁶⁷ A.L. Epstein, *Politics in an Urban African Community* (Manchester University Press, 1958).

⁶⁸ Berg and Butler, "Trade Unions", pp. 340-81; Waterman, "Towards an Understanding of African Trade Unionism", p. 99.

⁶⁹ Berg and Butler, "Trade Unions", p. 340.

⁷⁰ Friedland, "African Trade Unions Studies", p. 579.

G.E. Lynd, *The Politics of African Trade Unionism* (New York: Praeger, 1968).

⁷¹ See Jack Woddis, *Africa, the Lion Awakes* (1961), Chapter 2.

The work of Bates was also important for this study because it focused on the mineworkers and the MUZ one of the strongest unions in the trade union movement in Zambia that is discussed in this work. The central theme of the work concerned the development of a labour policy by the Government that attempted to transform the MUZ that traditionally functioned as an instrument that specialised in the articulation of internal demands into an instrument to be used to emphasise increased production among the miners and to regulate and control the behaviour of its members by discouraging strikes. Other scholars argued that Bates was not correct when asserted that he thought that UNIP was a more appropriate body than the mine workers' union in the struggle for development and even in organising the Zambian people and standing up to the mining companies who were largely seen as "whites" rather than as "capital". However, the African mine workers and their unions showed that Bates was not correct and that they had the power to influence affairs on the mines. It was this that made their union one of the strongest and most important in Zambia,⁷² at least until 1991. This study also shows that the trade union movement wanted to be the master of its own destiny.

Friedland's book, which looked at the development of trade unions in Tanzania, was also useful in understanding some of the issues such as militancy, independence and conflict,⁷³ which were features associated with trade unionism in Zambia. Issa G. Shivji's book, which like Friedland's book is on Tanzania, was relevant to this work because it showed the contradiction in the policy of the government of Tanzania, which considered itself a progressive socialist state attempting to create a fairer society and yet one of its first achievements was to put in place authoritarian measures which shackled the trade union movement. In 1964, one single trade union was established by law, which both destroyed trade unions as effective independent organisations, and established organisational control by the

⁷² Bates, *Unions, Parties and Political Development*; Freund, "Labour and Labour History in Africa", p. 8; Burawoy, "Another Look at the Mineworker", pp. 239-87.

⁷³ William H. Friedland, *Vuta Kamba: The Development of Trade Unions in Tanganyika* (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), p. 1.

state over the working class. The first secretary of the new National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) was the Minister of Labour.⁷⁴ This Tanzanian situation was always on the minds of trade union leaders in Zambia whenever it appeared as if government wanted to shackle it.

Another book that looks at labour in East Africa is Richard Sandbrook's book on Kenya in which he examined the relationship between unionised workers and the state in Kenya. He argued that the privileged position of the workers in Kenya was more apparent than real and as a group they definitely did not regard their interests as congruent with those of the indigenous *nouveaux riches*, was valuable to this work.⁷⁵ The struggles of the Zambian workers covered in this study showed that they were not the *nouveaux riche*.

The two collections, one edited by Sandbrook and Cohen, and the other edited by Gutkind, Cohen and Copans, were also useful to this work because they showed how labour history could be studied and written. The works showed that workers in Africa were now primarily an object of study not of anthropology but of history and to a lesser extent sociology.⁷⁶ The two texts were important because of the way they helped sharpen our understanding of labour studies and labour issues in Africa.

Ananaba's two books were useful to this study by showing first, how the trade union movement in Nigeria developed and the secondly, how the trade union movement in Africa developed. The first book in particular, which dealt with the development of the trade union movement in Nigeria, was valuable in providing similarities and differences in the development of the trade union movement in Zambia.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Issa G. Shivji, *Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania* (London: James Currey/Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann/Dar es Salaam, 1986).

⁷⁵ Richard Sandbrook, *Proletarians and African Capitalism: The Kenyan Case* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

⁷⁶ Freund, "Labour and Labour History in Africa", p. 12. See also: Sandbrook & Cohen, *The Development of an African Working Class* (1975).
Gutkind, Cohen and Copans, *African Labour History* (1979).

⁷⁷ Wogu Ananaba, *The Trade Union Movement in Nigeria* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1969); Wogu Ananaba, *The Trade Union Movement in Africa* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1979).

In his book on the Nigerian trade union movement, Robin Cohen gave a detailed account of the movement in terms of its growth and development in a wider social and political framework, its fragmentation and disunity, especially at the national level of organisation, and the nature of collective bargaining, including the use of strikes as an expression of economic hardship and political discontent.⁷⁸ This was another one work that was of interest. The use of strike action as an expression of economic hardship and political discontent has parallels with the situation in Zambia. It was this type of analysis that made Cohen's work useful to this work.

The works by Charles Perrings⁷⁹ and John Higginson⁸⁰ on Belgian Congo and partly on Zambia were useful in understanding aspects of mine workers' history, not only in Belgian Congo, but also in Zambia. It was in this regard that the works had relevance to this study.

The book edited by Henk Thomas took over from those by Sandbrook and Cohen, and Gutkind, Cohen and Copans by pointing out new questions on labour studies.⁸¹ The book's six case studies focused explicitly on an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of trade unions in specific countries. The overwhelming odds against trade union movements, whether in the political, social or economic domains, formed the basis for the selection of Zambia and Zimbabwe in Africa, the first with a historically strong labour, the latter with one that was just emerging as an independent organisation.⁸² The issues raised in the book on unionism were different and relevant to this study. Earlier writings on trade union movements tended to assume that the trade unions would always exist and would always be relevant regardless of whatever social, political and economic changes took place in the world. This was the case

⁷⁸ Robin Cohen, *Labour and Politics in Nigeria, 1945-71* (London: Heinemann, 1974).

⁷⁹ Charles Perrings, *Black Mineworkers in Central Africa: Industrial strategies and the evolution of an African proletariat on the Copperbelt 1911-1941* (London: Heinemann, 1979).

⁸⁰ John Higginson, *A Working Class in the Making: Belgian Colonial Labour Policy, Private Enterprise and the African Mineworker, 1907-1951* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).

⁸¹ Henk Thomas (ed.), *Globalization and Third World Trade Unions: The Challenge of Rapid Economic Change* (London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995).

⁸² Thomas (ed.), *Globalization and Third World Trade Unions*, p. x.

with the major work by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and the one by Victor Feather.⁸³ The two works partly encouraged this study on the post-independence Zambian trade union movement.

The book, *Globalization and Its Discontents, Revisited*, was important to this study for highlighting new labour issues in the Third World, especially D. Narasimba Reddy's chapter,⁸⁴ which also pointed to new themes on labour that needed the attention of researchers,⁸⁵ such as globalisation with reference to employment and unemployment and labour relations.

Frederick Cooper's work on labour in French and English colonial Africa explored colonial conceptions of the African worker and showed how African trade union and political leaders used the new language of social change to claim equal wages, equal benefits, and a share of power.⁸⁶ Although Cooper's work covered mainly the colonial period, it was useful for the background to the labour question in post-colonial Zambia.⁸⁷

On Zambia there are a number of studies that cover the workers' struggles during the colonial period. These works concentrated on the struggles between capital and workers, which led to their participation in the struggle for independence, for example, Henderson, Mason, Mwendapole, Meebelo, Bates, Parpart, and Perrings.⁸⁸ This study examined issues that confronted the trade union movement and the workers from 1964 to 2011. These were issues of labour laws, the Zambian economy, wages and salaries, strikes, the relationship between the trade union movement and the Government, globalisation, liberalisation, unemployment and

⁸³ Sidney & Beatrice Webb, *The History of Trade Unionism*.

Victor Feather, *The Essence of Trade Unionism* (London: The Bodley Head, 1963).

⁸⁴ D. Narasimba Reddy, "Economic Globalization, Past and Present: The Challenges to Labour" in K.S. Jomo & Khoo Khay Jin (eds.), *Globalization and Its Discontents, Revisited* (New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2003), pp. 37-59.

⁸⁵ Reddy, "Economic Globalization, Past and Present", pp. 37 & xii-xiii.

⁸⁶ Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The labour question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁸⁷ Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, p. 19.

⁸⁸ Ian Henderson, "Wage-earners and political protest in Colonial Africa," *African Affairs*, 72, Issue 288 (1973), pp. 288-299; Philip Mason, *Year of Decision* (London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1960); Mwendapole, *A History of the Trade Union Movement in Zambia up to 1968*; Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism*; Bates, *Unions, Parties and Political Domination*; Parpart, *Labour and Capital on the African Copperbelt*; and Perrings, *Black Mineworkers in Central Africa*.

poverty. There was not much that had been written on these issues from 1964, making it look as if the relevance of labour in Zambia ceased with the attainment of independence.

Anirudha Gupta's chapter made a major contribution to the labour historiography of Zambia. He showed that the history of trade unionism on the Copperbelt could be described as the story of conflict that resulted from attempts by UNIP to control the mineworkers and the determination of the mineworkers to resist being controlled.⁸⁹ It was this kind of resistance by the mineworkers that made them such a significant group in trade unionism in Zambia.

The other books that covered in some detail the relationship between the mineworkers' union and nationalist politicians were those by Mulford, Gray, Mason, and Hall.⁹⁰ Although these works covered the period before 1964, they are important because some issues they covered were still relevant to the period of Zambian labour history which this study covered.

Anthony Martin's work⁹¹ was useful for its discussion of Zambia's economy from 1964 to the 1970s and its examination of the Zambian economy in its historic context from the British South Africa Company (BSAC) period in the late nineteenth century to the 1980s. Apart from the reports of the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Bank of Zambia, and Central Statistical Office (CSO), Martin's book (although dated now) had a good account of how the Zambian economy developed and the problems it faced.⁹²

⁸⁹ Gupta, "Trade Unionism and politics on the Copperbelt", pp. 288-319.

⁹⁰ Mulford, *Zambia: the politics of Independence, 1957-64*.

Gray, *The Two Nations: Aspects of the development of race relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland*.

Mason, *Year of Decision*.

Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*.

⁹¹ Anthony Martin, *Minding Their Own Business: Zambia's struggle against Western control* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), Chapter 6, pp. 121-152.

⁹² The other sources on the economy that have been consulted are: Robert E. Baldwin, *Economic Development and Export Growth: A study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966); Charles Elliott (ed.), *Constraints on the Economic Development of Zambia* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1971), especially Chapters 3 & 4; Mark Bostock & Charles Harvey (eds.), *Economic Independence and Zambian Copper: A Study of Foreign Investment* (New York/Washington/London: Praeger, 1972), especially Chapter 4; Jan Pettman, *Zambia: Security and Conflict* (Sussex: Julian Friedman, 1974) and Ben Turok, *Mixed Economy in Focus: Zambia* (London: Institute for African Alternatives, 1989).

Meebelo and Mwendapole made early attempts to put the history of Zambia's trade union movement in single volumes. Meebelo's work covered the period from the formation of the first African trade unions during the colonial period to 1964, while Mwendapole's smaller work covered the period from the formation of the first African trade unions to 1968.⁹³ The importance of Meebelo's work is that it laid the foundation for the study of the history of trade unionism in Zambia. Mwendapole was a trade unionist and his work was therefore unique because it was the only one by a trade union "insider". There have not been any major published works in Zambia from the trade union movement itself or from individual trade unionists, so Mwendapole's work is important in that respect. This is unlike in Zimbabwe where the trade union movement has collaborated with intellectuals to produce interesting works on it. These works were valuable to this study for the insights they provided, for example unionism and politics, unionism and labour laws and industrial relations, to mention a few subjects this study covered.⁹⁴

Munyonzwe Hamalengwa argued that 'the ruling class in Zambia had since 1964 tried to incorporate the trade union movement as a subordinate and subservient social entity by various methods, either peacefully or forcefully' and by decree the right to strike was forbidden.⁹⁵ The class analysis that he used is interesting.

The works examined in this section, together provided a base on which this work was carried out. The works clearly showed that the writing on labour issues had moved through phases from the time when African workers and their trade unions were considered insignificant to the time when through their actions they demanded attention and could not be

⁹³ Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism*; Mwendapole, *A History of the Trade Union Movement in Zambia up to 1968*.

⁹⁴ Brian Raftopoulos & Ian Phimister (eds.), *Keep on Knocking: History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe, 1900-1997* (Harare: Baobab Books, 1997) & Brian Raftopoulos & Lloyd Sachikonye (eds.), *Striking Back: The Labour Movement and the Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe, 1980-2000* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2001.)

⁹⁵ Munyonzwe Hamalengwa, *Class Struggles in Zambia 1889-1989 & The Fall of Kenneth Kaunda 1990-1991* (Lanham/New York/London: University Press of America, 1992), p.1; pp. 11-12...

ignored. Much of the literature needed for new issues on workers, their trade unions and the economies was gleaned from documents from organisations listed in the methodology. However, the literature available showed that there was not much literature from Zambian historians or non-Zambian historians based in Zambia on post-1964 labour issues in Zambia.

The literature reviewed raised issues for this research, such as the relationship between trade union movements and nationalist movements in Africa (Hodgkin, Epstein and Berg and Butler). This relationship pointed to what the relationship between Independence governments and trade union movements would be like. The literature also raised the issue of ideology, which concerned the UNIP government and led to be pre-occupied with centralisation. There was also the issue of how trade union movements should be studied and why (Sandbrook, Cohen and Ananaba). The work edited by Henk Thomas and the one by Narasimba Reddy introduced the concept of the changing economic environment that affected the work environment. This meant that unlike the situation considered by Feather, trade union movements were no longer automatically assured of survival.

This work is particularly different from the works mentioned here such as those of Bates, Parpart, Mtopa, Mwendapole, Aniruda Gupta, Lise Rakner, Beatrice Liatto, Larmer and others in that it veered away from studying the trade union movement through studying the mineworkers. This study attempts to develop a whole history of trade unionism in Zambia by covering the whole trade union sphere not just the mineworkers. It also takes the history of the trade union movement beyond 1991, the year the MMD came to power and beyond 2001, the year Chiluba stepped down from power. It looks at the whole period the MMD was in power.

Conceptual Framework

This study was conceptualised on the premise of two main arguments which contrasted. The first argument was from Victor Feather who argued that no matter what the circumstances were, trade unions would always exist in every society. The second argument was from Henk

Thomas who argued that it could no longer be taken for granted that trade unions would always exist. That was so because of the changing economic environment which affected labour market conditions. This study, therefore conceptualised that the trade union movement – that is, all the trade unions and the workers they represented as organised under the ZCTU and later under both the ZCTU and the Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ) as the mother bodies – moved from being relatively strong and autonomous during the First and Second Republics to being relatively weak and disorganised during the Third Republic as a result of the changed political and economic environment. Nevertheless, they showed resilience and survived throughout the period of this study.

The study dealt with several concepts used in labour studies, which were either defined or explained. These were concepts such as government ‘labour policy’, “the trade union movement”, labour or trade union leader or trade unionist. A trade union was defined to mean any group or organisation of employees registered as a trade union under the Zambian labour laws, whose main aims were to represent and promote the interests of employees and to regulate relations between employees and employers. The concept also included the federation of trade unions, which referred to an organisation whose membership consisted of trade unions affiliated to such a federation and whose main aims were the promotion and regulation of relations between the trade unions affiliated to the federation or between employees, trade unions, employers and employers’ organisations.

In the concept of a trade union were embedded concepts such as “employee” or “worker”, which referred to any person who entered into an agreement or contract with an employer to perform for him or her stipulated work. The concept of “employer” referred to any person or body of persons or firm, company or public authority, which entered into an agreement or contract with an employee or worker. The concept of a “lock-out” referred to a situation in which, as a result of a dispute, an employer closed or shut the place of employment

in order to force the employees to accept certain terms of employment. The other concepts such as “collective agreement”, “collective bargaining” and “collective dispute” were also used and explained in terms of conditions which led to the concept known as the “strike”, which referred to the stoppage of work or withdrawal of labour by employees as a result of a dispute at the place of work.

In the 1990s, everywhere in the world, there were economic changes as a result of the concept of globalization, which introduced new concepts into labour studies. The general concept of globalization was not new in labour studies even in the 1990s, but the entry of the concept of “economic globalization” brought with it concepts such as “liberalization”, “structural adjustment programmes”, and “privatization”, all of which affected the labour market situation and the concept of work. The trade union movement as a whole now faced challenges from the new concepts in labour organization such as ‘casualization’ of labour, “informalization” and “feminization” of work. As this study has shown, trade union movements all over the world were not initially prepared for these challenges brought about by new concepts in the labour markets and they had to adjust quickly to deal with new situations.

This study, therefore, used the concepts explained in this section to study aspects of the history of the trade union movement and the workers in Zambia from 1964. This involved examining the strategies the trade union movement used to survive even in a harsh political or economic environment.

Methodology and source materials

This study used mainly qualitative analysis, but also through the use of tables a little of the quantitative analysis. Data for this study was collected from a number of sources, among them the University of Zambia Library, the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), and the UNIP Archives on Sheki Sheki Road in Emmasdale. In the Special Collections Division of the University of Zambia Library monthly and annual labour reports from the Ministry of Labour

covering the period from around 1929 to 1983 were accessed. The annual labour reports were an extremely useful source of information, but being government reports, they lacked analysis and criticism. The University Library no longer collects the labour reports regularly and the old stock has not been looked after well. In the Special Collections there were also several government reports from several government departments, which were consulted. The Special Collections also had an erratic supply of copies of Parliamentary Debates, which were consulted. Bank of Zambia reports provided primary data. All the sources accessed in the Special Collections contributed to the understanding of many aspects of this study.

In the NAZ there were several files from the Ministry of Labour which were on several aspects labour matters and the Zambian economy, which were also consulted. The Ministry of Labour files in NAZ covered the period up to the mid-1970s only. The collection of Parliamentary Debates in the NAZ also helped to fill the gap left by the erratic collection in the Special Collections of the University Library.

Although some researchers are sceptical about newspapers as a source of history, they formed an important source for this work because some of the issues examined were so contemporary that newspapers were the only sources of information available. What was examined was what shaped the environment of the workers through what they said about themselves, what was said about them and what they did. Newspaper articles/stories contained direct quotations from these sources, for example, union officials and ordinary workers. In this regard, major newspapers in Zambia were consulted through a smart selection of the information required. Some of the information from the newspapers was counter-checked through interviews with some of the sources which were quoted in the news stories. This helped to make the information obtained from newspapers really valuable.

Oral sources also formed an important source of my study. Even here, there was a smart selection of the sources. The interviews conducted, lasting ninety minutes and sometimes even

longer, were with sources considered really valuable. These were past and present top leaders of the trade union movement in Zambia, former and serving top government officials such as a Secretary to the Cabinet and a Permanent Secretary. Discussions were held with ordinary members of trade unions. An interesting aspect we came across regarding trade union leaders was that most of them were younger and therefore had no idea of the history of trade union movement or even the history of their own trade unions. In addition, most of the trade unions across the country did not have good records about themselves.

Structure of the study

The study has been divided into seven chapters. This chapter is the Introduction and it introduced the main themes of the study. It also outlines the objectives and significance of the study, the historical background and discusses the literature review. It also explains the methodological approach adopted for the study and sources used for the study. Chapter Two examines the Zambian economy and government labour policies in relation to the trade union movement between 1964 and 1975. Chapter Three examines the relationship between the trade union movement and UNIP and its Government, 1965-1991. The quest for a productive and disciplined labour force and the trade union movement's fight for its autonomy were also examined. Chapter Four examines the challenges of economic liberalisation on the trade union movement from 1980 to 2011. Chapter Five reconstructs the history of industrial relations and workers strikes from 1964 to 1991 in order to gauge their impact on the economy and economic development. 1964 to 1991 covers the period Zambia became independent and the year the UNIP era ended. Chapter Six analyses the relationship between the trade union movement and the MMD government between 1992 and 2011 in view of the role the movement played in helping to bring the MMD to power. Chapter Seven concludes the study.

Conclusion

This is the introductory chapter to the whole of this study. Its aim was to show what this study was all about. In order to do this the chapter was divided into ten (10) sections, starting with an introduction and a historical background to the study. Then the relationship between the trade union movement and political parties prior to independence was covered. This section is important because relations between the trade union movement and political parties after independence, especially the ruling party, are still a topical issue. Reviewing the relationship before independence was meant to shed light on whether the issues that determined the relationship were still the same or were now different. The section that followed this one discussed divisions in the trade union movement before 1964. Like the section above, this section was also meant to throw light on the divisions in the trade union movement after 1964 by examining the earlier divisions, again with the intention of examining whether issues involved were still the same or were now different.

The objectives and significance of the study, literature review, conceptual framework, methodology and source materials were the next sections. The study had as its main objective, the examination of the challenges and struggles of the workers through the trade union movement from 1964. This was done by examining the economy, government policies in relation to the trade union movement and the workers between 1964 and 1975; the trade union movement and the struggles for autonomy between 1965 and 1991; the challenges of economic liberalisation on the trade union movement and the workers between 1980 and 2011; industrial relations and strikes in Zambia between 1964 and 1991, and the trade union movement and workers' great expectations in the Third Republic, 1992 to 2011.

The section on literature review explored the literature that was available and its usefulness to this study. While there has been a plethora of writing on labour in Zambia, it was mainly on the colonial period and mainly on the mines because of their importance in Zambia's

economy. This study veered away from the concentration on studying mineworkers and their unions to focus on the whole trade union movement and the challenges it faced between 1964 and 2011. The section on literature showed that there was not much that had been written on labour matters in the post-colonial period and this study, therefore, had as one of its aims, to fill in the gap of the lack of literature on the post-colonial period.

The conceptual framework explained how the study was conceptualised, while the sections on methodology and source materials explained the methodology and the type of sources used to do the study. Both primary sources in the form of archival material and secondary sources in the form of published material were used. Oral sources were also used by carefully selecting people who could add value to the study by bringing their personal experiences in the history of trade unions and talking about those experiences. The section on structure of the study explained how the study was structured in terms of the chapters and what was covered in each chapter. The final section is the conclusion to chapter one.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT, THE ECONOMY AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES 1964-1991

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine the Zambian economy and government labour policies in relation to the trade union movement between 1964, the year of independence and 1991, the year the UNIP era ended. The aspect of the economy was very important in determining the gains the workers were to make in the country. The government's labour policies also depended to a large extent on the state of the economy. Government's labour policies involved the enactment of the *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (Amendment) Bill* of 1964 and the creation of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). This was the first step by the post-colonial government to change the labour laws in order to control the trade union movement. The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance proved inadequate in addressing Zambia's development needs through participation by workers and the trade union movement. This was because it had been a "quick fix" meant quickly replace the colonial labour laws. The government then enacted the *Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of 1971* meant to comprehensively deal with issues of labour in the country. The finances of the trade unions were discussed because they determined the strength or weakness of the trade union movement and how autonomous it could be. The government was also interested in this aspect of finances of the trade union movement. It paid the debt the UTUC owed and carried into the independence period and gave ZCTU a loan to help it start on a sound financial note. Finally, the chapter discusses the trade union movement's support for the establishment of the one-party state in Zambia. This started with the movement supporting the banning of the United Progressive Party (UPP), formed in 1971 by Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe. The movement felt that the banning of UPP was a good thing for the country's quest for peace and stability and

that establishing a one-party state would lead to stable industrial relations and ensure that workers reaped full economic benefits of independence.

The Zambian Economy, 1964-1991

This section of the chapter discusses the Zambian economy from 1964 to 1991 with the aim of showing the economic environment in which the workers and the trade union movement operated. At the time of independence in 1964, that industrial development seemed certain to propel the new nation rapidly along the path of what was called “modernization”. In this respect, from being a purely rural agricultural territory at the time of its takeover by the British South Africa Company (BSACo) in the 1890s, Zambia had in 1969 acquired an urban population of over one million, which was nearly 30 percent of the population, with over 750,000 out of a population of just over four million in wage employment. In addition, Zambia had a vibrant industrial economy that made her one of the richest and most promising of the new African states.⁹⁶

The Zambian leaders who came to power in 1964, therefore, inherited a country with a very unbalanced economy. The first thing that stood out about it was the huge gap between the “modern” and the “traditional” sectors. A few months before independence, an international mission led by Dudley Seers visited Zambia for three months to make a comprehensive assessment of the country’s economy and prospects and to prepare guidelines for a long-term strategy of accelerated development. The international mission came up with the Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia: Report of the UN/ECA/FAO Mission (*The Seers Report*), which began by observing that:

⁹⁶ Martin, *Minding Their Own Business*, pp. 28-29; Turok, *Mixed Economy in Focus*, pp. 17-20; James Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 1. (See also *Republic of Zambia Census of Population and Housing 1969: Final Report* (Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, 1973), p. 1; and Turok, *Mixed Economy in Focus*, pp. 36-60; L.J. Butler, *Copper Empire: Mining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia, c. 1930-64* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 255-292; Ihonvbere, *Economic Crisis, Civil Society and Democratization*, pp. 58-62.

The great majority of the people of Zambia are poor, under-educated (if not illiterate) and unhealthy. This is certainly true of those living in the country (i.e. rural) districts scattered all over vast expanses of land, where there are almost no industries, few schools or hospitals, and agriculture itself is extremely backward... The “line of rail”, stretching from the Copperbelt through Broken Hill, Lusaka and the commercial farms to Livingstone, presents at first glance, a different picture – mines, industries, office blocks, shopping centres, fertile fields, solidly built houses and surfaced roads with street lighting. But here too, the more conspicuous because of the superficial prosperity, are to be found children undernourished and (the older ones) without a place at school. In each major town a large fraction of the men are unemployed, perhaps the biggest social and political problem of all are the youths who have no jobs, and may never have worked for wages, even though they left school years ago. Contrasts exist therefore, both between town and country (rural areas) and also within towns...⁹⁷

The Seers Report captures well the “Crises of Expectations” in the title of this thesis. The excerpt from the report shows that the majority of the Africans in Zambia in 1964 faced poverty in varying degrees, and this was the most fundamental and important fact of all as it explains why there was the “Crises of Expectations”. It also shows why labour policy and trade unionism were on difficult terrain in the 1960s shortly after attaining independence. Although the average cash income per head in 1963, at about £60 a year, was high by African standards, this said almost nothing about the actual living standards of the common man because the figure included the earnings of non-Africans, which were among the highest in the world. The majority of the African people depended mainly on subsistence farming with an average annual cash income estimated at no more than £10 a head. The chances of the rural person improving his position were not good if he stayed in the rural areas. This was because the preconditions for rural development, namely markets, transport facilities, extension services, credit, and so on, were almost totally absent, as was normally the case in the colonial countries of the Third World. In Zambia there was the added difficulty that the pull of the modern sector had stripped

⁹⁷ *Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia: Report of the UN/ECA/FAO Mission (The Seers Report)* (Ndola: Falcon Press, 1964), p. 7.

the rural areas of much of their energy and talent. Here again the disparity between the two sectors worked to the disadvantage of the people who remained in the rural areas.⁹⁸

Before and after the *Seers Report* was published, however, there were studies which showed that the gloomy picture of poverty presented for rural areas was not entirely correct as some forms of wealth had penetrated some rural areas. Watson⁹⁹ showed that while some scholars argued that labour migration destroyed rural economies and tribal life that was not the case for the Mambwe who found ways to benefit from both selling their labour through labour migration and using their labour in their village economies. Musambachime¹⁰⁰ showed that the fishing industry in Luapula enabled some people in rural Luapula to accumulate wealth. Vickery¹⁰¹ showed that because of the way the Plateau Tonga organised their local economy, labour migration did not have a negative impact on their cattle-keeping and agriculture economy. Chipungu¹⁰² also showed that the Tonga benefitted from the peasant schemes of the colonial government although its agriculture policies tended to favour European settler farmers. Chipungu¹⁰³ further showed that there emerged a “Boma” class, which had various petty bourgeois or wealth accumulating tendencies. This class was made up of paid Native Authority employees under a chief and was paid from the revenue collected by the Native Authority. Seleti,¹⁰⁴ focused on African business entrepreneurs in colonial Zambia to show that Africans had the initiative and rationality and therefore actively participated in the colonial economy

⁹⁸ Martin, *Minding Their Own Business*, 38-39; Richard Jolly, “The Seers Report in Retrospect,” *African Social Research*, No. 11, June 1971, pp. 1-26.

⁹⁹ W. Watson, *Tribal Cohesion in a money Economy: A study of the Mambwe people of Zambia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958).

¹⁰⁰ Mwelwa C. Musambachime, “Development and Growth of the Fishing Industry in Mweru-Luapula 1920-1964”, PhD Thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1981.

¹⁰¹ Kenneth P. Vickery, *Black and White in Southern Zambia: The Tonga Plateau Economy and British Imperialism, 1890-1939* (New York/Westport, Connecticut/London: Greenwood Press, 1986).

¹⁰² Samuel N. Chipungu, *The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation in Zambia: A Case Study of the Southern Province, 1930-1986* (Lusaka: Historical Association of Zambia, 1988).

¹⁰³ Chipungu, “Accumulation from within: the Boma class and the Native Treasury in colonial Zambia” in Samuel C. Chipungu, (editor), *Guardians in Their Time: Experiences of Zambians under Colonial Rule, 1890-1964* (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1992), Chapter 4, p. 75.

¹⁰⁴ Yona Seleti, “Entrepreneurship in Colonial Zambia” in Chipungu, (editor), *Guardians in Their Time*, Chapter 7, pp. 147-179.

and were not merely passive objects. In both his doctoral thesis and the book published from the thesis, Chondoka has argued that there was something positive in labour migration as returned labour migrants brought positive change in rural areas.¹⁰⁵

The works cited showed that there was progress in the rural areas during the colonial period, however, the great majority of the rural people were worse off than those in the urban areas. The statistics used in later chapters showed that poverty levels were higher in rural areas than in urban areas even after 1991, when the MMD took over Government. This was why there were the “Crises of Expectations”.

The contrast between the impoverished life of the rural areas, with its low standard of material comforts and limited freedom of choices, and the way the average expatriate lived, especially if he worked in the copper industry, could hardly have been greater. In 1963, for example, the 32,500 non-Africans in employment (who included some Indians and people of mixed blood) earned an average of almost £1,600 a year each. A European artisan on the mines earned about £150 a month in basic pay, together with generous leave entitlements and other benefits. In between these two extremes, of the poverty-stricken, illiterate and unhealthy subsistence farmer and the prosperous racist European mineworker, came the minority of Africans who managed to gain a precarious foothold in the modern sector by finding paid employment. In 1963, there were 225,000 of these, earning an average of £160 a year each.¹⁰⁶

Zambia entered Independence in 1964 in an unfavourable economic environment. Whereas the development of the country prior to Federation in 1953 had already taken the form of establishing areas of permanent European settlement, with African development as purely ancillary to these, these trends were greatly accelerated under the Federal rule. In this regard,

¹⁰⁵ Yizenge A. Chondoka, “Labour Migration and Rural Transformation on Chama District, North-Eastern Zambia,” PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1992; and Yizenge A. Chondoka, *Machona: returned labour migrants and rural transformation in Chama District, North-Eastern Zambia, 1890-1964* (Lusaka: Academic Press, 2007).

¹⁰⁶ Martin, *Minding Their Own Business*, 39-40.

between 1953 and 1964, there occurred a number of situations. There was a systematic draining of revenue and foreign exchange from the then Northern Rhodesia (NR) for the benefit principally of Southern Rhodesia (SR). The loss of revenue from Zambia in this manner over the life of the Federation was estimated at £60 to £70 million. Industrial development was concentrated in SR, with NR being reserved to be a market for goods produced in SR. There was a concentration on providing very good education for Europeans, while secondary education for Africans was neglected, while higher education for Africans was not even considered. In agriculture, Federal expenditure concentrated on providing extension services for European farmers, while extension services for African farmers depended entirely on local, non-federal funds. Strategic common services such as Central African Airways, Rhodesia Railways and Kariba power station were concentrated in SR.¹⁰⁷

At Independence, Zambia inherited a dual economy in which economic activity was in the hands of a small privileged minority, while the role of the majority Africans was limited to either engaging in semi-subsistence agriculture or to providing a reserve of unskilled manpower and a limited market for consumer goods.¹⁰⁸ It was in this regard that Arthur Wina, the MP for Barotseland East Constituency and also the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance in the UNIP/ANC coalition government, during a budget debate, discussed the question of the financial implication of the break-up of the Central African Federation. He pointed out the importance of creating a Northern Rhodesia currency, a Northern Rhodesia Central Bank and a separate financial situation altogether for Northern Rhodesia. This was not only because of the need for Zambians to take full control and direction of their economy, but also because in terms of the country's foreign reserves, balance of payments and the fact that all indications pointed to the fact that on its own Northern Rhodesia would enjoy a much

¹⁰⁷ Republic of Zambia, *First National Development Plan 1966-1970* (Lusaka: Office of National Development Planning, July 1966), Chapter I: Obstacles to Development, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ *First National Development Plan 1966-1970*, p. 2.

healthier state of affairs than perhaps if it were part of a general currency area including Southern Rhodesia. Wina agreed entirely with remarks by the Minister of Finance, T.C. Gardner who had stated in his Budget Speech that Northern Rhodesians had every right to expect a good future for the country and for the people after attaining Independence.¹⁰⁹

Wina argued that it was time people changed their attitudes. It was time the interests of Northern Rhodesia were considered paramount. It was time everyone began to realise that with the potential in the country, with the skills and enterprise in the country, the economy could be developed, employment could be created for the Zambian people, the general level of wages for the workers could be increased, and a healthier society could be created.¹¹⁰ There was agreement by both UNIP and its ANC coalition government partner that unemployment needed to be dealt with and that the discriminatory wage structure that favoured European workers needed to be abolished.¹¹¹

The Seers Report had, in addition noted that there was the lack of political progress for Africans in Zambia in the Federation period that needed to be taken into account when discussing the future development of the country. The political advancement of Africans was slower in the 1950s than in almost any other part of Africa, a situation that had two major economic implications. The first was that the political climate deteriorated with growing nationalist unrest. With the increase in unemployment, political opposition grew, including a mounting demand for the right to secede from the Federation. The second implication was that there was growing popular distrust of government, especially governments at the territorial level, because the proposals of officers working in rural areas, especially agricultural officers,

¹⁰⁹ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session (Resumed) of the Twelfth Legislative Council*, 18th June – 23rd August 1963 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1963).

¹¹⁰ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session (Resumed) of the Twelfth Legislative Council*, 18th June – 23rd August 1963.

¹¹¹ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session (Resumed) of the Twelfth Legislative Council*, 18th June – 23rd August 1963.

became suspect and therefore partially ineffective.¹¹² All this lack of progress by Africans added to the “Crises of Expectations” among them after the attainment of independence.

Although after the Second World War there were development plans in Northern Rhodesia, most of the development did not benefit Africans. In this regard, at independence the government instituted a programme of national development plans under the direction of the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) to benefit the Africans and address the “Crises of Expectations”. The Government set out with vigour to implement the policies and programmes enunciated in its manifestos of 1962 and 1963. In this regard, the Emergency Development Plan (EDP), which ran from 1st January 1964 to 31st December 1964, was formulated and implemented. This was followed by the Transitional Development Plan (TDP) for the eighteen months from 1st January 1965 to 30th June 1966. The TDP was a £35 million transitional capital development plan, which President Kaunda described in a New Year message as “designed to ensure a prosperous future.” It emphasised the strength of Zambia’s economy. During 1964, Zambia had a visible trade balance of more than £89 million and manufacturing output rose by 13.5 per cent. Mineral output was worth nearly £150 million. Plans were made for a £27.5 million government building programme, which was expected to give work to 40,000 more people and so cut urban unemployment by more than half.¹¹³ The plans attempted to address the “Crises of Expectations” through creation of employment and improvement of conditions of service for the Zambian workers.

The EDP and the TDP were devised firstly, to establish a viable administrative structure, secondly to provide a framework for a programme of economic and social infrastructure including transport, communications, health and education, which was crucial for the provision of required manpower in independent Zambia, and thirdly to lay down the

¹¹² *The Seers Report*, p. 10.

¹¹³ Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964: The Colonial Period*, p. 183.

foundation for a more comprehensive development programme.¹¹⁴ All these were aimed at addressing the “Crises of Expectations”. The Transitional Development Plan was followed by the First National Development Plan (FNDP) 1966-1970, which was launched in January 1966. The two plans provided for major investment in infrastructure and manufacturing. They were generally successful, though this was not true for subsequent plans.

The most immediate and perhaps the most serious handicap facing Zambian economy at Independence was the lack of skilled labour, due directly to the unprogressive and restricted educational policy of the Federation and the colonial administrations. As noted on page 43, the Seers Report recognised that the great majority “of Zambians were under-educated or illiterate”. The lack of skilled labour directly affected Zambia’s ability to transform her natural resources supplemented by foreign aid into social and economic growth. The training of Zambians to take managerial and technical responsibilities was, therefore, a major aim of the First National Development Plan.¹¹⁵ In 1966, Kaunda emphasised the need for trained manpower when he stated that:

Economically, Zambia is one of the most developed countries on the continent, but educationally, it is one of the least developed. It is a harsh fact of life that at the time of Independence, we had only about one hundred university graduates and, what is perhaps even more depressing, only fifteen hundred Zambians with School Certificate and six thousand with as much as two years of secondary school. The first Zambian graduate is the Minister of Education (John M. Mwanakatwe) and the Minister of Agriculture (Elijah Mudenda) was the first science graduate. Even today, we have only two graduates in Agriculture, one in engineering and five in medicine.¹¹⁶

Kaunda added that the facts above were ones that he recalled with distress, but he had to recall them as they clearly demonstrated how much Zambia had not only been a victim of a sad period

¹¹⁴ Republic of Zambia, *Manpower Report, A Report and Statistical Handbook on Manpower Education, Training and Zambianisation 1965-1966* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), p. 2; United National Independence Party: *National Policies for the next decade 1974-1984* (the UNIP Manifesto), Freedom House, Lusaka (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, the Government Printer, 1973.)

¹¹⁵ *First National Development Plan 1966-1970*, p. 2.

¹¹⁶ Republic of Zambia, *Installation Address by His Excellency the President, Dr. K.D. Kaunda as Chancellor of the University of Zambia* (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services & The Government Printer, 1966).

of colonialism, but also of a most sordid racial victimisation. He pointed out that Zambia had been Britain's sacrificial lamb on the altar of the whims of Central Africa's settlers and Zambians were then witnessing in the form of the UDI charade the culmination of such policies with the consequent ill-effects on Zambia.¹¹⁷ The ill-effects of UDI meant that it was difficult for the government to address the "Crises of Expectations" independence brought about.

The FNDP was based on the *Seers Report*, which proposed a major increase in government involvement in the economy to help expand infrastructure, promote agriculture, and direct more resources into regional development. Government involvement in the economy was also seen as a way of reducing the large inequalities in income between White workers and African workers, and therefore address some of the expectations of Zambian workers. The Zambian government sought to ameliorate the inequalities as quickly as possible. The fact that there were "surplus" resources from the wealth from copper seemed to provide a solution.¹¹⁸

Zambia inherited structures in which economic activity was in the hands of a small minority with the majority of the people not having a good share of economic benefits. Thus, many Zambians, employed and unemployed expected progressive labour policies after 1964. This determined the major orientation of the FNDP that was to redress the imbalance between the rural and urban sectors. It set the stage for rapid and sustained development in all areas of the economy.¹¹⁹ The FNDP had eight main objectives, among which were to diversify the economy so that the copper industry was not the only main employer in the economy and so that a greater proportion of domestic demand was satisfied by domestic production from a large industrial base; to increase employment by at least 100,000 jobs during the course of the Plan; to increase average monetary output per annum from £61 per annum in 1964 to about £100 per annum in 1970; to maintain reasonable price stability; and to minimise the inherited economic

¹¹⁷ Republic of Zambia, *Installation Address*, 1966.

¹¹⁸ McPherson, "The Sequencing of Economic Reforms: Lessons from Zambia", p. 8.

¹¹⁹ *First National Development Plan 1966-1970*, p.5.

imbalance between the urban and rural sectors with a view to raising the capacity of the latter sector for transforming resources into social and economic growth.¹²⁰The plan to create 100,000 jobs was meant to satisfy some of the expectations of unemployed Zambians after 1964.

The government embarked on a deliberate programme of industrialisation. Many new industries were set up. These included sugar refining and milling, beer brewing, cement manufacturing, tyre making, Kapiri Glass Factory, Kafue Textiles and Kabwe Industrial Fabrics, Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia in Kafue for fertiliser and explosives essential for mining and Indeni oil refinery at Ndola, which was commissioned in May 1973. The canning factory at Mwinilunga was established to process locally-grown pineapples. A copper fabrication factory was set up in Luanshya and bakeries were established in most rural districts. The sum total of all these and many other smaller industries was a phenomenal increase in manufacturing output from growth rate at a low rate at independence to over 15 per cent per annum between 1974 and 1984. The result of this tremendous pace of industrialisation was that a considerable measure of diversification of the economy was achieved through import-substitution industries which reduced Zambia's dependence on copper, and the share of mining declined as a proportion of GDP.¹²¹The achievement also met some of the expectations of the trade union movement for increased employment.

Although the share in GDP of the mining industry fell from 41 per cent in 1965 to 22.0 per cent in 1975, it was still the most important sector. In fact, the stagnation in output of the mining industry to a large extent explained the very modest growth in GDP that Zambia experienced since 1965. Copper production remained more or less static around 650,000 to 700,000 tonnes throughout the post-independence period. The Mufulira mine disaster of 1970,

¹²⁰ *First National Development Plan 1966-1970*, p. 5.

¹²¹ *A Profile of the Zambian Economy, 1976*, p. 10.

slumps in world demand for copper, rising costs of production, low profitability and problems with the route for exports all led to a squeeze in investment in new mines. The nationalisation of the mines by the government in 1970 and the very high turnover rates among the skilled expatriate staff on the mines, which both led to increased uncertainty in the industry, could have been the other factors contributing to the low level of investment.¹²²

As was explained above, Zambia's economy was, at independence, mainly dependent on copper mining, which accounted for 90 per cent of its export earnings. Some scholars argued that Kaunda's Government was committed to the promotion of economic development and restructuring the economy. This led to the undertaking of rapid nationalisation of the economy shortly after independence, paving the way for state-led development.¹²³ However, another scholar argued that that was not quite the way things were. UNIP, which formed government under Kaunda in 1964, was populist in character without a clearly specified ideology and only the vaguest of economic policies. On coming to power it was initially content to leave the economy intact while it sorted out the political-administrative structure which had to be created afresh after the breakup of the Federation.¹²⁴

The UDI in Rhodesia declared in November 1965 disrupted the efforts the Zambian government was making to come to terms with managing the economy. This was because apart from the political insecurity induced in Zambia by UDI there were serious economic consequences as the South was the source of Zambia's oil and coal, necessary for the copper mines as well as other essential goods the delivery of which was dependent on the jointly owned Rhodesia Railways. UDI made Zambia realise that it needed to break its dependence on the South because when it attempted to impose sanctions on Rhodesia, the retaliation from the

¹²² *A Profile of the Zambian Economy, 1976*, p. 10.

¹²³ "Zambia Shall Beat the Blockade: A Challenge to the Nation," by Dr. K.D. Kaunda, President of Zambia, Lusaka, March 1973, Zambia Information Services (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1973); Bertha Z. Osei-Hwede, "Development Policy and Economic Change in Zambia: A Re-Assessment", *DPMN Bulletin*, Vol. X, No. 2, April 2003 (No page numbers indicated in the document.)

¹²⁴ Turok, *Mixed Economy in Focus*, p. 38.

Smith government exposed Zambia's vulnerability. It was from the impact of UDI on the Zambian economy that decisions arose to create a separate Zambia Railways, a coal industry, the oil pipeline to Dar-es-Salaam, the Tanzania-Zambia Mafuta Pipeline (TAZAMA Pipeline) and the Chinese built railway, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA).¹²⁵

Kaunda stated that when UDI hit Zambia in 1965, it was designed to crush her economically and weaken the young nation which showed signs of moving fast forward to economic and political power which ultimately would spell ruin to the Rhodesian racialists. Fortunately, Zambia got her difficulties over one by one through determined action based on her internal strength, resources and foresight. Zambia had, in the period between 1965 and 1972 truly evolved into a new independence.¹²⁶ The scholars that argued that UNIP in 1964 was populist in character without a clearly specified ideology and only the vaguest of economic policies, as shown above, were not correct. Kaunda could state with confidence that:

We have come a long way since our independence in 1964. We have built up our industry, our agriculture, our communications, our social services and all those things which are essential to an independent people, during this period, thanks to the dedication of our people to our much-cherished goals of national independence and economic self-reliance under Humanism.¹²⁷

The government, which was dissatisfied with its colonial legacy and was inspired by the socialist political philosophy of Humanism, decided to undertake major economic reforms through the Mulungushi Reforms of April 1968 and the Matero Reforms of August 1969, which led to a major switch in the structure of the Zambian economy. A further step in the Reform process was announced by Kaunda on 10th November 1970, when he stressed that Zambia was determined to "remove foreign domination of our economic life by acquiring control of most major means of production and services while at the same time we establish a firm foundation

¹²⁵ Turok, *Mixed Economy in Focus*, p. 39; Andrew Roberts, *A History of Zambia* (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 225-29; Richard L. Sklar, "Zambia's response to the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence," in William Tordoff, (ed.), *Politics in Zambia*, pp. 320-362.

¹²⁶ "Zambia Shall Beat the Blockade."

¹²⁷ "Zambia Shall Beat the Blockade."

for the development of genuine Zambian business.”¹²⁸ The process of nationalisation was essentially completed by 1975 when President Kaunda delivered the “watershed speech”,¹²⁹ which brought in significant change in land tenure in Zambia.

The government, therefore, moved in and took control of most of the foreign owned businesses and industries, leaving some economic space for Zambian entrepreneurs in small and medium sized concerns. Through the 1968 Mulungushi Reforms the government acquired 51 per cent shares from private retail, transportation, and manufacturing firms to be controlled by INDECO, the state industrial holding company, which was to spearhead industrialisation. Subsequently, the Matero Economic Reforms of 1969 resulted in the government purchasing 51 per cent shares from the mining companies, Anglo-American Corporation and Rhodesia Selection Trust (RST), leading to partial nationalisation of the copper mining industry. The two mining corporations became the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM) respectively. Kaunda also created the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO), a new company wholly controlled by the government. Later, the 1970 reforms led to the creation of the Finance and Development Corporation (FINDECO), which allowed the government to gain control of insurance companies, building societies and various other large private companies. Foreign owned banks such as Barclays, Standard Chartered and Grindlays, however, successfully resisted takeover.¹³⁰

In 1971, INDECO, MINDECO and FINDECO were brought together under a government owned parastatal, the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). This

¹²⁸ United National Independence Party: National Policies for the next decade, 1974-1984 (the UNIP Manifesto), Freedom House, Lusaka (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, The Government Printer, 1973); Turok, *Mixed Economy in Focus*, pp. 41-43; K. Kaunda, *This Completes Economic Reforms* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1970), p. 2.

¹²⁹“The Watershed Speech” by Kenneth D. Kaunda, Zambia Information Service, 1975; McPherson, “The Sequencing of Economic Reforms: Lessons from Zambia”, p. 8.

¹³⁰ Martin, *Minding Their Own Business*, pp. 252-57; Turok, *Mixed Economy in Focus*, p. 44; Andrew Sardanis, *Africa Another Side of the Coin: Northern Rhodesia’s Final Years and Zambia’s Nationhood* (London & New York, I.B. Tauris, 2003), Part II, pp. 161-252; Sardanis, *Zambia: The First 50 Years* (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), Parts I & II, pp. 11-118; Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie, “The Development Policy and Economic Change in Zambia,” April 2003.

created one of the largest companies in sub-Saharan Africa, with Kaunda as chairman. The management contracts under which day-to-day operations of the mines had been carried out by Anglo-American and RST were ended in 1973. In 1982, NCCM and RCM were merged into the giant Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM). Nationalisation enabled the state to control 80 per cent of the economy through parastatals involved in mining, energy, transport, tourism, finance, agriculture, trade, manufacturing and construction. The effect of all these measures was to create a mixed economy in which the state became the engine of growth.¹³¹

The Second National Development Plan (SNDP) 1972-1976 was launched in January 1972, with similar objectives as the FNDP. In the FNDP, the government set out to create 100,000 jobs in four years. Despite the dislocation to the Zambian economy caused by the UDI in November 1965, nearly 90,000 jobs were created during the FNDP (1966-1970) and at the same time wages for Zambian workers more than doubled since 1964.¹³² The mid-term review of the SNDP, which assessed the overall and sectoral performance of the economy in the first three years of the Plan, showed that several of the assumptions underlying the formulation of the SNDP had not materialised and the course of the economy had been influenced profoundly by external factors such as fluctuations in the world price of copper, border closure with Zimbabwe, international monetary crisis and economic uncertainty facing the world community in the wake of the oil crisis. The SNDP recommended evolving an appropriate incomes, wages and prices policy for the maintenance of price stability although it did not spell out in any detail the ingredients of such a policy.¹³³

¹³¹ Martin, *Minding Their Own Business*, pp. 252-57; Turok, *Mixed Economy in Focus*, p. 44; Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie, "Development Policy and Economic Change in Zambia", April 2003; Sardanis, *Africa Another Side of the Coin*, pp. 161-252; Sardanis, *Zambia: The First 50 Years*, pp. 82-4, 116-7.

¹³² *National Policies for the next decade (the UNIP Manifesto)*.

¹³³ Republic of Zambia, *Mid-Term Review of the Second National Development Plan (Performance of the Zambian Economy, 1972-1974)*, (Lusaka: Ministry of Planning and Finance Development Planning Division, December 1974), p. 1 & p. 28.

Andrew Sardanis who was at the centre of re-organising Zambia's economy saw Mulungushi reforms as necessary economic nationalism. However, economic nationalism did not work as the country lacked adequate trained human resources and still relied on imported raw materials and foreign markets contrary to the desire to make Zambia self-reliant economically.¹³⁴ In the 1960s and 1970s, Zambia's economy was better than that of several other countries such as Brazil, Malaysia, South Korea, Turkey, Thailand, Philippines and Egypt. The picture presented by Turok, Ferguson and McPherson was that of a dynamic economy, which surely should have had a great impact on rural development than earlier suggested in this chapter. However, although this might seem to contradict the earlier picture painted of an economy which was not dynamic, the problem was that the development of the economy in the 1960s and 1970s was based on copper and was benefitting mainly the urban areas. In fact, the pattern of development followed the areas of development earlier set by European settlement and economic activity.¹³⁵

When taken at face value, the claim that at independence Zambia was one of the richest and most developed countries in Africa made it look as if what happened after independence was a case of gross negligence on the part of leaders who ruled the country after independence. However, that was not entirely the case because at independence, there was only the Copperbelt, which was developed and urbanised. The white miners were very well paid, but the African miners were not as well paid although on average they were better paid than the other African workers in the country. Apart from a few towns along the line of rail from Livingstone to Kitwe, the rest of the country, but especially the rural areas, were poor, with

¹³⁴Sardanis, *Africa: Another Side of the Coin*, pp. 212-13. (Note: Sardanis said he did not see a future president of Kaunda's calibre among the emerging MMD leaders, and since the MMD campaign was heavily funded by the apartheid regime of South Africa, he tried to lend a hand in a scheme to help keep Kaunda in power in a democratic Zambia led by Kaunda, pp. 303-307 of *Africa: Another Side of the Coin*.)

¹³⁵ Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity*, p. 6, quoting a *World Bank Development Report of 1979*, p. 126; Turok, *Mixed Economy in Focus*, p. 242; & Malcolm McPherson, "The Sequencing of Economic Reforms: Lessons from Zambia," (citeseers.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc. (Accessed on 08/04/12.)

some areas being very poor. The *Seers Report* confirmed the poverty of most of the Africans in Zambia at independence, in spite of the high earnings from the copper on the Copperbelt.¹³⁶ The fact that Zambia depended mainly on copper was a problem. Zambia was, until 1975, one of the most prosperous countries of sub-Saharan Africa. However, this wealth and the development of the infrastructure and public services which went with it, was founded on only copper. When the world copper price slumped, so did the rest of the economy.¹³⁷

The Mwanakatwe Salaries Commission of 1975 illustrated Zambia's unfavourable economic situation. The Commission, which was reluctant to recommend awarding workers a salary increase, noted that the economic situation was so bad that there was likely to be a substantial balance of payments deficit estimated at K96 million, as against a modest surplus of K18.6 million in 1974. If only the situation prevailing then was taken into consideration, the deficit would be close to K250 million and export receipts would also decline and that situation would have serious implications for the economy.¹³⁸

The depressing picture was compounded by the fact that domestic economic performance had been poor. Consumption had increased at the expense of investment, the growth of employment had not matched the expansion of the labour force, and agriculture had not made the hoped for contribution to self-reliance, and even the mining sector had been through a phase of relative stagnation. The GDP had hardly grown at all and was far behind the SNDP's target rate of 7.4 per cent. When computed at 1965 prices, the Per Capita GDP, the National Income and Per Capita Incomes were all in decline so that in real terms, Zambia was becoming poorer rather than richer all the time. The Commission concluded that salary

¹³⁶ *The Seers Report*, p. 7.

¹³⁷ *Country Profile: Zambia 1988-89* (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988), p. 11.

¹³⁸ Republic of Zambia, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Salaries, Salary Structures and Conditions of Service of the Zambia Public and Teaching Services, the Zambia Police Force and Prison Service, the Defence Forces and the Staffs of Local Authorities, Including Casual and Daily-Paid Employees and Personnel Employed by Statutory Boards and Corporations and by Companies in which the State has a Majority or Controlling Interest (the Mwanakatwe Salaries Commission), Volume One: The Public Service and Parastatal Sector, 1975.*

and wage increases, particularly if linked to the maintenance of prevailing subsidy levels for essential consumer products, could only add to the budgetary and balance of payments deficit unless appropriate adjustments were made elsewhere.¹³⁹

All in all, given the prevailing economic conditions in the world and in Zambia, the Commission would have preferred not to award any salary increases, but because of pressure from the unions it went ahead and awarded the workers a salary increase. The Commission brought out one poignant issue which was often ignored or simply glossed over when workers and their unions made salary and wage demands. This was that salary and wage increases could only be sustained if the economy of a country was doing well. Clearly, in 1975, the Zambian economy was not doing well, but the Commission went ahead and awarded salary and wage increases which were not sustainable in prevailing economic conditions. In absolute terms, the Zambian government received less revenue from copper between 1971 and 1976 than between 1965 and 1970. By 1975, copper contributed only K56 million to government revenue.¹⁴⁰

The Third National Development Plan was set to run from 1978-1983, (originally set for 1977-1981) but was launched in 1980 and had to be abandoned owing to problems in the economy. The Fourth National Development Plan launched in 1989 was later abandoned in 1991 in preference for a liberalised market system that brought numerous changes to the economy and the country.¹⁴¹

The economic policies pursued by the government, as well as events that were beyond its control combined to wreck the country's plans for national development. Zambia entered into a period of chronic balance of payments problems in the late 1970s and in the 1980s entered into a period of debt crisis.¹⁴² In 1973, the massive increase in the price of oil was

¹³⁹ *The Mwanakatwe Salaries Commission of 1975*, p. 7.

¹⁴⁰ Bank of Zambia and CSO Reports, 1971-1975; Scott, "Middle Class Politics in Zambia", p. 322.

¹⁴¹ Foreword to the Fifth National Development Plan, which was presented to Parliament by President Levy Mwanawasa in December 2006.

¹⁴² Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation", p. 8.

followed by a slump in copper prices in 1975 and a decrease in export earnings. In 1973, the export of copper accounted for 95 percent of all export earnings. This halved in value on the world market in 1975. By 1976, Zambia had a balance-of-payments crisis, and rapidly became indebted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Third National Development Plan (TNDP) 1978-1983 had to be abandoned as crisis management replaced long-term planning.¹⁴³

During the period October to December 1982, the performance of the economy continued to be unsatisfactory. Earnings of foreign exchange were not fluid, as the volume of all export of metals declined and prices of lead and cobalt fell. In addition to the problems of balance of payments, the Government accounts continued to register imbalance, showing a deficit of K248.2 million compared with a lower deficit of 108.3 million in the previous quarter. This was caused by sharp increase in total Government expenditure which outweighed the marginal rise in revenue collection. In an effort to cushion the economy from deterioration, the Government took a number of measures that included decontrol of prices for all commodities, except mealie meal, candles, flour and bread on 27th December 1982 and downward adjustment of the Kwacha by 20 percent. A general wage freeze of 10 percent and upward adjustment in the interest rate structure were also announced. In addition, the Government suspended repayments of principal on medium and long term foreign debt while seeking an immediate rescheduling from its creditors.¹⁴⁴ By the mid-1980s, Zambia was one of the most indebted nations in the world, in relation to its gross domestic product (GDP). In 1985 Zambia's total external debt was \$4.6 billion, in 1986 it was \$5.02 billion and in 1987 it was \$5.2 billion.¹⁴⁵

Zambia turned to the IMF, which recommended that the government should introduce a programme aimed at stabilising the economy and restructuring it to reduce dependence on

¹⁴³ Bank of Zambia, *Quarterly Financial and Statistical Review*, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1983; Addler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation," p. 8.

¹⁴⁴ Bank of Zambia, *Quarterly Financial and Statistical Review*, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1983, p. 3.

¹⁴⁵ Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation", p. 8; Bank of Zambia, *Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year ended December 31, 1987*.

copper. The proposed measures included the ending of price controls, devaluation of the Zambian currency, the kwacha, cut-backs in government spending, cancellation of subsidies on food and fertiliser and increased prices for agricultural products. Zambia obtained a series of loans from the IMF and the World Bank and in January 1983 agreed to a 20 percent devaluation of the Kwacha. This did not stop the economic slide and by the time the government began the Radical Reform Programme (RRP), in October 1985, which was supported by the World Bank and the IMF, Zambia had become the most indebted country in the world in relation to its GDP. The RRP was intended to achieve a thorough liberalisation of the economy and to stabilise the currency. In this regard, interest rates were liberalised and the Kwacha was allowed to float through a weekly auction of foreign exchange. The RRP also planned to reduce maize consumer subsidies and to liberalise maize marketing. The government stalled on maize marketing, while the removal of subsidies was quickly rescinded when following the sharp rise in the price of mealie meal there was mass rioting on the Copperbelt in December 1986.¹⁴⁶

The price of copper fell while the price of oil rose on the world market. This meant that Zambia had to borrow money to keep the economy running. This borrowing meant that between 1970 and 1980, Zambia's debt rose from \$800 million to \$3.2 billion and to \$6.4 billion in 1987 and \$7.19 billion in 1991. Following the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the government undertook economic policy reforms to rejuvenate the economy from 1973. Between 1973 and 1985 the government undertook to implement six structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) to stabilise the economy. The SAPs, however, worsened, rather than improved the economy. Agricultural and manufacturing outputs and exports failed to increase significantly. This was attributed to the

¹⁴⁶ Nicolas van de Walle & Dennis Chiwele, "Democratization and Economic Reform in Zambia", Zambia Democratic Governance Project, Monitoring and Evaluation Studies, November 4, 1994.

inadequate incentives for farmers due to uncompetitive exports of manufactures, high inflation, unemployment, and rising external debts.¹⁴⁷

In January 1983, Kaunda told the Zambian people that the “honeymoon” was over. He advised the Zambians who had for some time continued to live as if times were normal when the country was passing through one of the most turbulent periods economically had no choice but to lower their standard of living because the economic crunch had come. The Minister of Labour and Social Services, Frederick Hapunda, urged Zambians to make sacrifices for the economy to improve. Chiluba on the other hand urged trade unionists to be firm and fight for the workers’ benefits.¹⁴⁸ In 1983 the budget address to the National Assembly, the Minister of Finance called for self-sacrifice, self-reliance through increasing productivity and exercising financial discipline and prudence from all Zambians to assist the Government in its efforts to correct the deteriorating economic situation. For the year 1983, the overall position in the Government budget was estimated to record a deficit of K316.3 million or 37 percent from the 1982 estimated levels of K502.4 million.¹⁴⁹

In May 1984, Kaunda thanked Zambians for enduring the “belt-tightening” pain caused by the country’s battered economy and added that they had tightened their belts up to their bone marrow and had borne the pain very well. Zambians had suffered from 1973 when copper prices fell and later subsidies on essentials were withdrawn because government revenue could not support it any more. Then in July 1984, Kaunda attacked critics that said Zambia would not pull through the economic problems she was facing, describing them as agents of Satan and warned Zambians against paying attention to them.¹⁵⁰ However, the economy continued to

¹⁴⁷ “Zambia: Prospects for Sustainable and Equitable Growth”, (Washington DC, World Bank, 1993, p. 68); Jubilee Debt Campaign: Zambia (www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/Zambia3720.) Accessed on 29/06/13; Lishala C. Situmbeko & Jack Jones Zulu, “Zambia: Condemned to Debt,” World Development Movement, April 2004. (www.africafocus.org/docs04/zam0406.) Accessed on 29/06/13.

¹⁴⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 14/01/83; 31/01/83; 21/02/83; 07/04/83.

¹⁴⁹ Bank of Zambia, *Quarterly Financial and Statistical Review*, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1983, p. 20.

¹⁵⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 28/05/84; 10/07/84.

perform sluggishly and in 1987, registered a slight decline below the previous year and so the government announced major changes in economic management, contained in the New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP), aimed at arresting the decline in economic performance.¹⁵¹

By 1988, Zambia had fully implemented two national development plans and abandoned the third one. Each plan was less ambitious than the last in terms of target growth rates, and each was blown off course by a combination of lower than expected copper prices and transport difficulties. The major aim of the national development plans was to diversify the economy away from copper, encourage the development of agriculture and industry, improve social services and transport, and raise rural incomes. However, before the start of the IMF reform programme in 1983, the government tended to maintain the strong urban, import dependent, copper dependent bias that characterised the immediate post-independence period, with agriculture in particular, being neglected.¹⁵² This then was the challenge posed by the economy in which the Zambian workers and the trade union movement struggled to get benefits.

Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (Amendment) Bill, 1964

The legal basis of industrial relations in Zambia was first established in 1949, when the Northern Rhodesia Government (NRG) passed the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance that allowed the formation of African trade unions. It was also intended for the settlement of trade disputes and industrial conciliation.¹⁵³ The trade union law from 1949 to 1971 was based on the provisions of this Ordinance, which defined a trade union as ‘any combination, whether temporary or permanent, under the constitution of which the principal objects are the regulation of the relations between employees and employers, or between

¹⁵¹ Bank of Zambia, *Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year ended December 31, 1987*, p. 3.

¹⁵² *Country Profile: Zambia 1988-89*, pp. 11-12.

¹⁵³ *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1949* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1950); *Industrial Conciliation Ordinance, 1949* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1950);

employees and employees, or between employers and employers which objects are hereinafter referred to as the statutory objects whether such combinations would or would not, but for the provisions of this Ordinance, have been deemed to have been unlawful by reason of some or more of its objects being in restraint of trade.’¹⁵⁴

The importance of the Ordinance was that it gave legal status to trade unions. In this regard, the organizations of the workers had a legal status just short of incorporation. The trade union could therefore be sued or it could sue as a union and not by and in names of its members, but independently of its members.¹⁵⁵ In order to enable authorities to control the unions, the law required that every organization of workers or employers should within six months of its formation be registered with the Registrar of Trade Unions. If the Registrar refused to register the organization, it was expected to dissolve on the date of any notification by the Registrar that he had refused to register the union. No unregistered organization of either workers or employers was allowed to perform any acts in furtherance of its purpose and any such organisation or officer who contravened the provisions of the Act was punishable by law. Between 1948 and 1971, besides the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Ordinance, the other legislation dealing with trade unions was the Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Ordinance of 1948.¹⁵⁶

At the same time as the Ordinance was enacted in 1949, there was also enacted the Industrial Conciliation Ordinance to compliment it. The Industrial Conciliation Ordinance was concerned with the settlement of industrial disputes, which were described in the Ordinance as “any dispute between employers and employees or between employer and employer which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person”. The colonial government introduced a system for settling

¹⁵⁴ *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1949*; Mtopa, *Labour Laws of Zambia*, p. 206.

¹⁵⁵ Mtopa, *Labour Laws of Zambia*, p. 207.

¹⁵⁶ *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1949*, which was repealed in 1971); *Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Ordinance No. 23 of 1948*; and A.M. Mtopa, *Labour Laws of Zambia*, pp- 206-209.

of trade disputes which involved conciliation boards established for the purpose of settling disputes by arbitration or conciliation.¹⁵⁷

After independence in 1964, the Government was worried that the trade union movement might be controlled by outsiders who would, at any time the UNIP-controlled Parliament legislated anything against their interests in Zambia, use the unions to fight it. Parliamentary debates show that arising from such a position, some trade union leaders who went into politics were among the strongest advocates for the control of the trade union movement by the Government. This was a view expressed by Ditton Mwiinga, a former trade unionist, who was UNIP Member of Parliament for Kafironda constituency in Mufulira in 1964. It was also the argument he used to call on the Government to create a national trade union centre to control every trade union in the country. Mwiinga suggested that the trade union centre itself should be controlled by the Government.¹⁵⁸ UNIP supported Mwiinga's views.

Much to the chagrin of opposition MPs, Chakulya also supported Mwiinga's view that the movement should be controlled by the Government, as a way of curbing strikes so as not to frighten investment which the country very much wanted to attract. Chakulya argued that while they believed very strongly in the right to strike, which was the greatest weapon of a trade union, and they would like to have it maintained, they did not feel that the right to strike should necessarily be exercised every time as it was only the last weapon. He saw nothing wrong in government controlling trade unions. He advocated for unity in the movement, arguing that the movement could definitely be dangerous to the economy of the country, to the government, and to the ordinary man, if it was not properly administered or properly united.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ *Industrial Conciliation Ordinance, 1949*; Mtopa, *Labour Laws of Zambia*, p. 211.

¹⁵⁸ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First Legislative Assembly*, 10th March – 20th March 1964, p. 97.

¹⁵⁹ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First Legislative Assembly*, 10th March – 20th March 1964, p. 97.

It was probably the fear that foreign elements might use the trade union movement to fight the Government and also in agreement with Mwiinga and Chakulya and the other people who held similar views that when Minister of Labour Justin Chimba, himself a former trade unionist, presented the *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (Amendment) Bill of 1964* for the second reading on 15th December 1964, stated, among other things that:

The Bill will protect the trade union movement from disruptive outside influence by prohibiting affiliation with foreign agencies and the receipt of outside material assistance from any non-Zambian organisation without my approval.¹⁶⁰

Chimba also stated that the Bill was a direct departure from the old and out-of-date British trade unions tradition and had new features in it that were entirely Zambian. The government wanted to create trade unions that had that were answerable to the people they represented and to the Government as well to achieve stability in industry. The Bill could be used to achieve this cherished ideal. The Government assured the trade union movement that since it was a strong believer in freedom of association it would ensure that workers enjoyed that freedom. However, it did not believe in the kind of freedom of association that bred disunity in the trade union movement and rendered it incapable of negotiating for better conditions of service and higher wages for its members. In order to ensure that freedom of expression was not abused the Government included in the Bill some measures of control on individuals that tended to misuse the right to freedom of expression.¹⁶¹

Since in 1964 Zambia was a newly independent nation and was also suffering from unemployment, it could ill-afford the many industrial disturbances that might destroy the country's economic stability.¹⁶² Trade unionists, employers, Government and workers were

¹⁶⁰ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 14th December – 18th December 1964, p. 73.

¹⁶¹ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 14th December -18th December 1964.

¹⁶² *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 14th December – 18th December 1964, pp. 69-70.

therefore urged to unite in support of the policy of freedom and labour unity and understanding. The international labour confederations (ICFTU and WFTU) were blamed for the disunity in the trade union movement, so the Government decided to control, by law, the relationship between these confederations and the trade union movement.¹⁶³ Since the trade unions and the trade union movement as a whole were not to get financial help from the international labour organisations and other international financial institutions, employers were asked to co-operate to provide the check-off system to help trade unions raise money in that way.¹⁶⁴

The Bill was meant to achieve a number of things in the organisation of the trade union movement. First and foremost it was meant to strengthen responsible trade unions and lead to improvement in industrial relations. It was also meant to ensure that trade union leaders managed trade unions efficiently, failure to which under the law they would be suspended from office. It raised the minimum number of people who could form a trade union from 7 to 100 to discourage the formation of new trade unions to oppose those already in existence. Persons who were not employed in a particular industry or a trade union organised in that industry for at least three years were under the Bill banned from holding office in that union unless the Registrar of Trade Unions approved the appointment. It was through this Bill that the ZCTU was established, with the hope that all trade unions would eventually affiliate to it as membership to ZCTU would give affiliates many benefits. In order to protect the trade union movement from disruptive outside influence, the Bill prohibited affiliation of trade unions to foreign agencies and the receipt of outside material assistance from any non-Zambian organisation without the approval of the Minister of Labour. In order to ensure that trade union affairs were managed by members, the Bill required that all important issues should be decided

¹⁶³ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 14th December – 18th December 1964, pp. 69-70.

¹⁶⁴ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 1964, pp. 71-72.

by secret ballot supervised by the Registrar of Trade Unions or someone appointed by him. In addition, there was a clause in the Bill which barred essential workers from going on strike.¹⁶⁵

Opposition MPs, such as Harry M. Nkumbula (Monze), Mungoni Liso (Namwala), Mufaya Mumbuna (Mazabuka) and Maxwell S. Beyani (Gwembe), from the African National Congress (ANC) and those on Reserved roll seats from the National Progressive Party (NPP) formerly the United Federal Party (UFP), such John Roberts (Central), Cecil D. Burney(Ndola), Hugh Stanley (Copperbelt West) and Rodney Malcomson Copperbelt South), opposed some clauses in the Bill such as the ones which stipulated that money could be deducted even from salaries of non-members of a union. They also opposed the one which seemed to mark the end of free trade unionism as it gave the Minister of Labour a lot of powers to control the trade unions. They saw that as a bad law which the government might abuse as it was oppressive since sections of it even contravened the Bill of Rights. They argued that such clauses would weaken the movement and it would not grow. They also opposed the clause which favoured foreign capital over workers as foreign investors tended to stifle trade unions. The clause which barred persons who had not worked in a particular industry from holding office in a trade union in that industry was also opposed. The MPs pointed out that the colonial government tried to pass such a law but all trade unions opposed it. The opposition MPs found it surprising, therefore, that employers had achieved under a government led by former nationalists, what they failed to achieve under a colonial government.¹⁶⁶

Mungoni Liso argued: "...if any trade unionist like me listened to this debate what the hon. Minister was speaking he would have arrived at the same conclusion as I did that this is the end of free trade unionism in this country. It sounded as if the hon. Minister is attempting

¹⁶⁵ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 1964, pp. 72-73.

¹⁶⁶ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 1964, p. 106.

to make the trade union movement in this country a department of his Ministry of Labour and Mines.¹⁶⁷

The government was urged to let workers organise themselves in trade unions rather than arrogate power to itself to organise trade unions because workers were the ones who fought to improve their conditions and not the government. The opposition MPs pointed out that if the colonial government had placed the kind of obstacles in front of trade unions, which the independence government was placing in front of trade unions, the trade union movement would not have developed to the extent that it had. These were obstacles such as the banning of accepting assistance in the form of cash, gifts, loans, donations, property, travel vouchers or tickets from any foreign government without the approval of the Minister of Labour. Some former trade unionists who became cabinet ministers were reminded that not too long ago they were travelling all over the world to ask for grants. The colonial government, which was supposed to have been vicious, did not stop them from travelling. They also pointed out that if the colonial government had tried to introduce a law stating that money could be deducted as union contributions even from workers who did not belong to trade unions, there would have been uproar both from trade unionists and even the House of Commons as that would have been against the Bill of Rights.¹⁶⁸

The Government defended the Bill and denied that it might be *ultra vires* the Constitution.¹⁶⁹ It pointed out that the importance of the Bill was that it introduced non-alignment in the trade union movement. It also pointed out that it had included clauses which barred the movement from getting assistance from outside agencies and included clauses which allowed them to raise funds from local sources in order to make the movement absolutely independent financially and not have to go abroad to campaign for funds. In addition, the

¹⁶⁷ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 1964, p. 84.

¹⁶⁸ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 1964, p. 106.

¹⁶⁹ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 1964, pp. 100-101.

Government considered the Bill to be extremely important as the movement was in absolute confusion and sometimes it was difficult to know who the movement's leader was. The Bill was also meant to stop people from forming trade unions just so they could have a job.¹⁷⁰

The Government also pointed out that what caused disturbances, especially in newly independent countries was that outsiders who did not want to see stable conditions in the new countries tried to penetrate through the trade union movement and create chaos by funding factions in the movement. The only way to stop this was by making the movement dependent on funds from local sources and Government wanted to ensure that this happened through the amended Bill. It did not want the movement to be controlled either from the West or from the East. The leaders of the movement had to run their own affairs just as the Government would manage its own affairs without outside interference from either the West or the East.¹⁷¹

The government, therefore, ordered all trade unions and the trade union movement to disaffiliate from all international organisations. When the Minister of Labour Munukayumbwa Sipalo opened the ZCTU annual conference in Kitwe on 16th July 1967, he stated:

The Government has now decided that no union will be affiliated to an international organisation. This is in line with our policy of non-alignment, but our Trade Unions will be free to maintain international relations and attend international conferences or workers' gatherings of any sort as the present legislation provides.¹⁷²

The ZCTU immediately advised the unions to comply with the Minister's directive without delay to conform to Government's policy of non-alignment. The General Secretaries of all national unions were directed that in their own interest they should send copies of their letters of disaffiliation to the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Labour and a copy to ZCTU. They were to ensure that their headed paper did not bear the words 'affiliated to such

¹⁷⁰ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 1964, pp. 83-84.

¹⁷¹ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, 1964, p. 94.

¹⁷² MLSS1/26/269: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, 1966-1968: Speech by Minister of Labour Munukayumbwa Sipalo on opening of the ZCTU annual conference in Kitwe on 16th July 1967.

and such international bodies'. The unions ultimately complied with the directive to disaffiliate, but did so quite slowly. In the end the unions all disaffiliated. The office of the Registrar of Trade Unions ensured that they disaffiliated.¹⁷³

The Government emphasised that the Bill dealt with trade unions and the work of trade unions was not to get funds from outside and start working against the Government. The work of trade unions was to improve the conditions of the workers in the country. Further, the Government argued that there was nowhere in the world where there had been stability in industrial development when the trade unions were allowed to do whatever they wanted in whichever way they wanted to do it.¹⁷⁴ The Government also argued that it would not be immoral or illegal to force someone to subscribe to a trade union of which he was not a member because if that person who was employed received benefits from the trade union negotiations of improved housing on his behalf, higher wages obtained on his behalf and yet he did not subscribe a tuppence, (two pennies or two ngwee) he was a thief; he was stealing the strength of the trade unions. The Government also denied that the Bill on trade unions would contravene the Bill of Rights.¹⁷⁵

The Government pointed out that the employers' organisations that had been refusing to agree to a voluntary check-off system had to be forced by law to implement it because it was convinced that that was the right approach and did not see why some people should be nagging Government about it. It was also pointed out that the Bill would assist in the organisation of trade unions because instead of trade union leaders spending two-thirds of their time trying to collect union dues, now they would have time to carry out productive negotiations and improve conditions of their members. Finally, it was pointed out that the Bill did not state that affiliation

¹⁷³ MLSS1/26/269: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, 1966-1968 – see letter of 6th October 1967 from V.J. Malauni, Registrar of Trade Unions to trade unions. See also the various letters on the file from the Registrar of Trade Unions to General Secretaries of unions between July 1967 and December 1967.

¹⁷⁴ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, pp. 95-96.

¹⁷⁵ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, p. 110.

to outside organisations would be stopped or that obtaining aid from outside organisations would be stopped. The Bill stipulated that affiliation to outside organisations and aid from the outside organisations could only be obtained with the approval of the minister. Members of the Opposition were urged not to assume that Government would, through the Bill, muzzle trade unions, as that would not be the case.¹⁷⁶

The Bill was received with mixed feelings even by some trade unionists while others welcomed it wholeheartedly. The UTUC sent two representatives, namely, George B. Chima and A.N. Kalyati to meet the Minister of Labour and Mines to present its objections to some of the clauses in the Bill. The Minister disputed the objections of the UTUC and argued that in fact the Bill was quite progressive because it would give the Congress more executive powers over the affiliates and the Bill provided for a check-off system which was meant to ensure trade unions and the trade union movement had money. He stated that in this regard, the UTUC could not have it both ways. Since the trade unions would benefit from the Bill, the Government should, therefore, have some control over the movement.¹⁷⁷

At the time that the UTUC was negotiating with the Minister of Labour and Mines to have its suggested amendments included in the Bill, Bryan Chirwa, General Secretary of the National Union of Hotel and Catering and Domestic Workers and Remmy Chikonkolo, Acting President of the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers made a strong statement which was reported in the *Northern News* of 17th December 1964, endorsing the Bill in full. Kalyati, the General Secretary of the UTUC observed that this was a clear indication that the movement was not yet completely united. He further observed that the behaviour of Chirwa and Chikonkolo might have jeopardised any chance of the Minister considering the UTUC

¹⁷⁶ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, pp. 111-112.

¹⁷⁷ UNIP Archives – UNIP12/1/24: 6/00/73 – Railway Workers’ Union, 1964-65: The Secretariat Report Presented to the Executive Board (UTUC) meeting held on Sunday the 20th December 1964 in Buchi Welfare Committee Room commencing at 9am.

suggestions.¹⁷⁸ The Bill was, therefore, passed into law and trade unions in Zambia began to operate under this new law which the Government hoped would change the way industrial relations would be conducted in the country. Clearly, it was important for the government to both have control of the economy and the workers and the trade union movement.

In order to protect the employment of Zambian workers, the government passed Regulations prohibiting employers that employed five or more employees from terminating the services of any employee engaged on or before the commencement of the regulation without approval of a proper officer. A proper officer was a labour officer. The Regulations also provided for the establishment of an Employment Review Tribunal to consider written applications for the decision of a proper officer to be reviewed.¹⁷⁹ Sacika emphasised that these Regulations were a clear demonstration of the concern by the UNIP government for the well-being of the Zambian worker at independence.¹⁸⁰

Dzimhiri showed that in the immediate post-independence era control of indigenous voluntary organisations such as trade unions became a typical feature in countries such as Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya. Trade union rights such as freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike were heavily curtailed and unionism was restructured to fit the needs of independent states. Governments in almost all Southern African countries also showed a negative attitude towards trade unions in varying degrees. Like Kaunda in Zambia, Mugabe also intervened in trade union matters and introduced extensive legislative powers aimed at neutralising militant unions.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ UNIP Archives – UNIP12/1/24: 6/00/73 – Railway Workers’ Union, 1964-65: The Secretariat Report presented to the Executive Board (UTUC) meeting held on Sunday the 20th December 1964 in Buchi Welfare Committee Room commencing at 9am.

¹⁷⁹ Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 273 of 1966 (Act No. 29 of 1966), The Employment (Special Provisions) Regulations, 1966.*

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Sacika, Lusaka, 27/04/15.

¹⁸¹ Lewis B. Dzimhiri, “The State and Labour Control in Malawi: Continuities and Discontinuities Between One-Party and Multiparty Systems,” *Africa Development*, Vol. XXX, No. 4, 2005, pp. 57, 59 & 60.

The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 1965

The UTUC resolved “with great reluctance” to dissolve itself on 31st October 1965 at a meeting held in the main Welfare Hall in Kitwe attended by 55 delegates from, member unions. The motion to dissolve it was proposed by Basil Kabwe (ZNUT) and was seconded by Phiri (NUPSW). The motion was unanimously supported.¹⁸² The Minister of Labour and Social Development, Nalumino Mundia, announced through Statutory Instrument No. 364 of 1965 that the UTUC had been dissolved on 31st October 1965.¹⁸³ It was replaced by the ZCTU, which was established in accordance with the provisions of the *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (Amendment) Act No. 3 of 1965*. The Government, through Statutory Instrument No. 358 of 9th November 1965, determined the structure of the ZCTU. It was to comprise of a President, Deputy President, General Secretary, Financial Secretary, Assistant General Secretary, and not more than five other persons to represent the interests of other member trade unions. The first Executive Committee was appointed by the Minister of Labour and Social Development, under Statutory Instrument No. 363 of 1965 on the 12th November 1965. Nezia Tembo¹⁸⁴ was appointed to be President, Edward Mubanga was to be the Deputy President, Augustine Nkumbula was to be the General Secretary, Matthew B. Mwale was to be the Financial Secretary, and Jonas B. Ponde was to be the Assistant General Secretary. Peter G. Chibuye, Nathan J. Mbewe, Watson Y. Banda, Bishop L. Sinyangwe and Andrew J.B. Leslie were appointed to the Executive Committee to represent the interests of member trade unions.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² MLSS1/26/249/2305 – United Trade Union Congress 1964-1965, TU/3/9A Vol. II: Minutes of the Adjourned meeting of the last Executive Board of the United Trade Union Congress Meeting held on 31st October 1965 in the main Welfare Hall (Kitwe).

¹⁸³ Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 364 of 1965*, Dissolution of Federation of Trade Unions, 12th November 1965, p. 1583; *Annual Labour Report for 1965*, p. 18.

¹⁸⁴ Mr. Neziah Tembo passed away in Kalulushi on Sunday, 3rd May 2015. Few people interested in labour issues in Zambia were even aware that the first president of the ZCTU had still been alive and living in Kalulushi.

¹⁸⁵ Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 358 of 1965*, The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (Laws, Volume II, Cap. 25), The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (Amendment) Rules, 1965, 9th November 1965; Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 363 of 1965*, Appointment of Office Bearers

Mugala, President of the dissolved UTUC, opposed the system of the Government appointing ZCTU officials and called on it to call a conference at which leaders of the ZCTU could be elected. He insisted that if ZCTU officials were appointed by the Government, they would be seen as Government (sic) stoggers (stooges) because everyone appointed would automatically become a civil servant. He pointed out that while there was no need for the trade union movement to quarrel with its own government, the appointment of trade union officials might deflect the government from its intended principle as some people that were neither trained nor experienced in trade union work might be appointed. The Registrar of Trade Unions, Chalikulima, who was present at the meeting, defended the government position, stating that there was no clause that allowed elections and that UTUC was dissolved because of the debt it had incurred and that if any other step was taken many trade union leaders would be disqualified from holding positions in their national unions and in UTUC/ZCTU.¹⁸⁶ZCTU was officially registered as a Congress of trade unions on 10th January 1966.¹⁸⁷

Matthew B. Mwale declined the position of Financial Secretary, while Augustine Nkumbula expressed dissatisfaction with the conditions in the job as Secretary General of the ZCTU compared to the conditions he enjoyed in his job on the mines in Chililabombwe and resigned from the position in September 1966. Nkumbula's position could not immediately be filled because of the volatile industrial relations situation in the country, but within the Ministry of Labour it was felt that the resignation had created an opportune moment for the ZCTU to convene an extra-ordinary meeting to elect office bearers of the ZCTU.¹⁸⁸

of the Executive Committee of the Zambia Congress of Trade unions, 12th November 1965, page 1581; *Annual Labour Report 1965*, p. 18.

¹⁸⁶ MLSS1/26/249/2305: United Trade Union Congress, 1964-1965 TU/3/9A Vol. II: Minutes of the Adjourned meeting of the last Executive Board of the United Trade Union Congress meeting held on 31st October 1965 in the main Welfare Hall (Kitwe).

¹⁸⁷ NAZ, MLSS1/26/258/2307 – 1965-1967-Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 100/TU/15: Certificate of Registration No. 560.

¹⁸⁸ NAZ, MLSS 1/26/258: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, 1965-1967: File contains information on appointment of ZCTU Executive in 1965 by Minister of Labour, and other matters such as Mwale declining appointment and Nkumbula resigning his position.

It was suggested that to stop unwanted or irresponsible union officials from being elected to ZCTU positions, government could disqualify such officials from contesting elections in ZCTU. However, other government officials opposed this as it would put in place “Government stooges” and that would mean that the trade union movement would have little or no respect from the public and more especially from international organisations. As such a situation would bring the government into great disrepute, it was considered inappropriate at that moment to introduce such legislation. Munukayumbwa Sipalo, the Minister of Labour responded that he was also not keen to introduce such legislation, stating that the move would be very dangerous politically and would not restore confidence within the leaders themselves. In fact, despite Sipalo’s views on the issue, the government later decided to disqualify some trade union leaders from participating in trade union affairs in the country.¹⁸⁹

From the time it became clear that UNIP under Kaunda would form the independence government, Kaunda, in speeches he made around the country, but mainly on the Copperbelt, urged the trade union movement, its leaders, and the workers, especially the miners on the Copperbelt, to avoid making wage demands that could ruin the economy and to avoid strikes that could drive away investors.¹⁹⁰ He also appealed to the trade union movement to appreciate what the government was doing to improve the workers’ wages and conditions of service. However, he warned the trade union movement that while it would be allowed to operate freely, it would not be allowed to become irresponsible as that was what had led to its accumulating a huge debt which the government had undertaken to repay. He was very clear on the type of trade union movement he wanted to see. It was one that was well organised and responsible, disciplined with an equally disciplined leadership. A responsible trade union movement was

¹⁸⁹ NAZ, MLSS 1/26/269: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 1966-1968: Matters pertaining to the ZCTU Executive and managing the trade union movement in the immediate post-colonial period.

¹⁹⁰ *State of the Nation, Volume II: National Economy*; Kenneth David Kaunda, Compiled by United National Independence Party, Freedom House, Lusaka (Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, 1989), Chapter 4: Industrial Peace and the Trade union movement, pp. 100-01.

one that cared not only for the narrow interests of people in wage employment but also those who were not in employment. At a national rally in Nchanga in Chingola on 9th January 1966, he showed clearly that he would love to have UNIP take control and direct policy of the trade union movement but that the labour leaders were resisting this.¹⁹¹

The UTUC's finances were so mismanaged that in 1965 the Government gave it a grant of £5,614 to assist in winding up its business so that the ZCTU "could begin functioning with a new slate".¹⁹² Opposition MPs such Mungoni Liso and Harry Nkumbula wondered why the Government should subsidise the trade union movement using tax payers' money, when the poor leadership led to the mess. Some opposition MPs even suspected the subsidy was another Government move meant to help it control the movement. In the end, though, Parliament approved the grant to UTUC.¹⁹³

On the whole, Kaunda's views on the movement and its leadership, and also the views of the others in the political leadership insisting on a disciplined and responsible movement and leadership were crucial in determining the nature of the relationship which developed between the UNIP government after independence and the movement and its leadership. Those views all came out in the clauses included in the *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes (Amendment) Bill of 1964*. If a partnership was to be formed between the movement and the UNIP Government, the movement had to subordinate itself to the political leadership.

At the Annual Conference held in Kitwe on 16th July 1967, for the first time the ZCTU independently put into office elected members of its executive. These were Amonson Mugala as President, Abel Musonda as Deputy President, Wilson Chakulya as General Secretary, Jonas B. Ponde as Assistant General Secretary, and Safeli Mukuka as Financial Secretary. Bishop Sinyangwe, Neziah Tembo and J. Chulu were elected to the position of Trustees. The

¹⁹¹ *State of the Nation, Volume II: National Economy*, pp. 112-13

¹⁹² Parliamentary Debates – Supplementary Estimates, 14th December 1965; Gupta, "Trade unionism and politics on the Copperbelt", p. 296.

¹⁹³ *Parliamentary Debates* – Supplementary Estimates, 14th December 1965, pp. 133-145.

Committee members elected were J. Musonda, A. Lutangu, R.T. Mubanga, S. Mwale and D. Mwila.¹⁹⁴ The government noted that Chakulya's election as General Secretary of ZCTU had ended the long period of ineffective leadership.¹⁹⁵ In order to develop a capable trade union leadership, ZCTU embarked on training programmes for union leaders and in 1968 set up a Department of Education and training.¹⁹⁶

Kaunda gave guidelines on the type of labour law he wanted to see enacted in Zambia, first at the Second National Convention of UNIP in Kitwe in December 1969, and in Lusaka and Mufulira in March 1970. He instructed the Minister of Labour to initiate a complete revision of the existing labour legislation. He also pointed out that the reform of the industrial relations law had to be comprehensive to avoid having to continually revise the Trade Unions and Trade Dispute Ordinance and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance, which stemmed from a period which had nothing in common with Zambia's new approach to national affairs. In this regard, the new approach proposed was to take the form of recognition by law of the existence of various interest groups in industrial undertakings, the most important of these being the owners of capital or investors, the workers and the Government as the custodian of public interest and management. Since these were distinct groups and their interests were very often in conflict the purpose of labour legislation should be to provide the framework for the regulation of these conflicts.¹⁹⁷

The government wanted a trade union movement that would have characteristics of a truly Zambian movement and not one that would simply copy the British model of trade

¹⁹⁴ MLSS 1/26/269: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, 1966-1968: Election of the first ZCTU Executive independently elected by members of affiliate trade unions.

¹⁹⁵ *Annual Labour Report 1967*, pp. 11-13.

¹⁹⁶ *Annual Labour Report 1966*, p.14; *Annual Labour Report 1967*, p. 4 & p. 12; *Annual Labour Report 1968*, p. 7; *Workers' Voice*, June 1979, p. 7.

¹⁹⁷ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session (Resumed) of the National Assembly*, 23rd November – 3rd December 1971, pp. 228-259; See also President Kaunda's address to the ZCTU Management Seminar, Lusaka, 5th March 1970 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Service, 1970); Mtopa, *Labour Laws of Zambia*, p. 213.

unionism.¹⁹⁸ This came out clearly in Kaunda's continuous chiding of the movement's leadership. When he opened the 4th Annual Conference of the ZCTU held in Kitwe from 21st to 24th May 1970, he expressed strong disappointment over the failure by some unions affiliated to the ZCTU to pay their contributions regularly. He warned that the Government might consider taking steps against the defaulting unions if the situation did not improve. During the Conference, elections of the ZCTU officials were held. The following were elected: Abel T.K. Musonda, President, Newstead Zimba, Vice-President, Wilson M. Chakulya, General Secretary, Basil Kabwe, Assistant General Secretary, and Safeli M. Mukuka, Financial Secretary.¹⁹⁹

The finances of the Trade Union Movement

The finances of the trade union movement had always been in such a poor state that it entered the independence period with a huge debt. Individual unions such as ZNUT, ZULAWU, NUPSW and Guards Union of Zambia (GUZ) all faced financial problems. ZNUT was even evicted from its offices on Cairo Road for non-payment of rentals.²⁰⁰ The government feared that this position meant that the movement could easily be manipulated both by internal and external forces. It was hoped that the creation of the ZCTU would end most of the problems that the movement faced,²⁰¹ but not even ZCTU could solve the financial problems. In fact, it started off by facing financial problems, and in 1966 still depended on Government for its existence.²⁰² In his report, the ZCTU Secretary General indicated that the government undertook to pay off the debt left by the UTUC of a little more than £6,000 so that ZCTU could begin with a clean record and to allow the trade union movement to start afresh and clear the

¹⁹⁸ *Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session of the Second National Assembly*, 7th January-25th March 1970, p. 508.

¹⁹⁹ *Annual Labour Report 1970*, p. 26.

²⁰⁰ NAZ, MLSS1/26/168: Letter from Trade Union Officer, L.C. Powell to President of ZNUT, 27th March 1965.

²⁰¹ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly*, pp. 69-113.

²⁰² *Annual Labour Report 1967*, p. 12.

names of the then trade union leaders who would have been sued by debtors of the UTUC under the law in the event of bankruptcy. ZCTU only received £47. 13s 8d from UTUC and President Kaunda generously donated £1,500 and affiliation fees had amounted to £10.²⁰³

In order to help ZCTU improve its financial position the government issued Statutory Instrument No. 448 of 1967, which came into effect on 1st January 1968, which increased union subscriptions from 6d. in a pound to 20 per cent of total subscriptions from members. This immediately doubled the income of the ZCTU. The declaration of dues shop orders in various establishments compelling employers to make automatic deductions from pay of monthly subscriptions from all workers on behalf of trade unions also helped to improve ZCTU's finances. The following were the trade unions then affiliated to the ZCTU: ZRAWU, ZNUT, NUPAW, NULAW, NUTAW, NUPSW, NUBEGW, NUPTW, NUCIW, MUZ, National Union of Hotel Catering Workers (NUHCW), and Zambia Typographical Union (ZTU). All these were local trade unions, that is, they catered for Zambian workers. All expatriate trade unions remained unaffiliated.²⁰⁴ In 1968, when MUZ paid its subscription to the ZCTU, the Congress even repaid the Government loan of K10, 000 by July. Its financial position was still shaky, however, and in 1970, it experienced considerable financial problems caused by the failure of some of its affiliates to remit their contributions to it regularly.²⁰⁵

In January 1968, when Chakulya was elected as MP for Kantanshi in Mufulira, other trade union leaders wanted him to vacate his position as General Secretary of ZCTU. They argued that he should not be MP and General Secretary at the same time as he might be compromised, but he insisted on staying on. UNIP supported him and condemned ZCTU President, Amonson Mugala, as his squabbles with Chakulya were damaging the whole trade

²⁰³ MLSS1/26/258/2307: 1965-1967: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 100/TU/15 – Augustine Nkumbula, Secretary General's Report, 21st January 1966.

²⁰⁴ *Annual Labour Report 1967*, p. 12; *Annual Labour Report 1968*, p. 30.

²⁰⁵ *Annual Labour Report 1968*, p. 30; *Annual Labour Report 1970*, p. 25; & *Annual Labour Report, 1973*, p. 19.

union movement.²⁰⁶ In May 1968, Chakulya had indicated that he would resign, but changed his mind when unions such as MUZ and ZRAWU threatened to leave the ZCTU should he resign. One of the disagreements Mugala had with Chakulya was caused by Chakulya's tendency of meeting ministers (or politicians in UNIP) most of the times without the knowledge of the ZCTU. This was resented by other trade union movement leaders as they felt Chakulya was compromised.²⁰⁷ In February 1969, the General Council unanimously agreed that Chakulya would continue to be both General Secretary of ZCTU and MP. However, the conflict only really ended in November 1969, when the General Council relieved Mugala of his position.²⁰⁸

When Chakulya became Minister of Labour and Social Services he decided he wanted to change the financial outlook of the trade unions. He demanded to know from the civil servants in his ministry the trade unions in arrears with the ZCTU and the amounts of money they owed and how the unions proposed to redeem them.²⁰⁹ The information supplied showed that many unions were in arrears with their payments to ZCTU and the MUZ was the only up to date paid up union. The ZCTU noted that without financial contributions from the MUZ and a few other unions, it would not exist.²¹⁰

The financial situation of the unions did not satisfy the Minister. He decided to amend the constitution of the ZCTU to abolish the post of Financial Secretary to pave way for the appointment of a firm of accountants to maintain the books of the Congress and those of its affiliated National Unions on a full time basis.²¹¹ Messrs Shaw and Company of Chingola were

²⁰⁶ *Annual Labour Report 1968*, pp. 30-32; MLSS1/26/279 – ZCTU 100/TU/15: 1967-1969.

²⁰⁷ MLSS1/26/258: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, 1965-1967. (Note: Files covers 1968 as well.)

²⁰⁸ *Annual Labour Report 1969*, p. 31; MLSS1/26/292: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Minutes of the Third General Council Meeting, Buchi Community Centre, Kitwe, 22nd February 1969, at 11:00 a.m.

²⁰⁹ NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966.

²¹⁰ NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966.

²¹¹ NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966.

proposed to be the firm to do the accounts as they were already doing it for many unions.²¹² Sketchley Sacika, the Acting Labour Commissioner, informed him that he did not have the authority to initiate amendments to the rules of the ZCTU, but suggested that he could try to persuade the ZCTU to accept the idea of amendments. He also added: "I would prefer this to be done unofficially for fear that if the matter is dealt with officially we would be accused of gross interference in the internal affairs of the Congress."²¹³ He was then directed to prepare a detailed account of the proposed amendments for submission to the Attorney General.²¹⁴ This was done, but Sacika also sought legal advice from the Attorney General on whether the Minister could amend ZCTU rules. He stated:

It is feared that as long as the control of finances of trade unions is vested in elected persons, most if not all of whom have very little or no idea at all of the range of responsibilities attaching to their offices, no hope can be entertained for any improvement to occur in the financial management of the trade union movement in Zambia. This is the prospect the Minister is anxious to avoid.²¹⁵

The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Legal Affairs, Sebastian S. Zulu, who was also the Solicitor-General, replied as follows:

I wish to advise that your Minister does not appear to have any powers under Statutory Instrument No. 228 of 1965 or under the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, Cap. 25 to initiate amendments to Rules of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions. You will note that Rule 12 (f) of the Rules of the Congress confers the power to amend Rules on the Annual Conference, except that no amendments of the Rules may become effective until approved by your Minister. Therefore, any amendments to the Rules of the Congress should be proposed at the Annual Conference of the Congress.²¹⁶

²¹² NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966; Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 228 of 1965*.

²¹³ NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966.

²¹⁴ NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966.

²¹⁵ NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966.

²¹⁶ NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966.

On 25th June 1971, the Minister was informed that he had no powers to effect an amendment to ZCTU rules. This could only be done by the Annual Conference of the ZCTU in which the Minister's role would only be limited to approving such amendments. Vincent Malauni, the Acting Permanent Secretary, suggested that as that was the position, the Minister might have a fresh look at the matter and perhaps try to influence the ZCTU in an informal way to pass such amendments at their forthcoming Extraordinary Conference, scheduled for November 1971. He also added the following caution to the Minister: "I think there is need to proceed cautiously since I would not like the Honourable Minister to be accused of trying to dictate to the ZCTU and the trade union movement as a whole."²¹⁷

Further to the caution suggested by both Sacika and Malauni to Chakulya, on 30th June 1971, I.F. Nyirenda, the Principal Labour Officer (PLO), wrote to Malauni, referring to his instruction of 29th June 1971 that he should prepare a Cabinet Memorandum on the proposed amendment of the *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance* so as to make provision in the law for the Minister to be empowered to abolish the post of Financial Secretary in the ZCTU and to appoint a firm of accountants to look after the finances of the Congress. Nyirenda referred Malauni to the position taken by the Attorney General's Chambers and ended by writing: "I am quite sure that the proposed amendment will in a way require a policy statement which should be in line with Government policy and has the necessity for the approval of the Attorney General."²¹⁸

Chakulya was determined to deal with the issue of the finances of the Congress and its affiliates because he had personal experience about how bad financial affairs of the unions in the country had been. He went behind the back of the ZCTU to push through a law to control unions. He argued that only those that wanted to continue to mishandle trade union funds would

²¹⁷ NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966.

²¹⁸ NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966.

be critical of the move such as the one he intended to make.²¹⁹In July 1971, he successfully pushed through Parliament the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes (Amendment) Bill of 1971 in which he gave himself the powers he sought, to abolish the position of financial secretaries for trade unions and to have professional accountants used instead. He argued that the amendment was “meant to make unions self-reliant by facilitating the building up of funds to a healthy position through a proper accounting system.” While supporting the amendment, an opposition MP wondered why when Chakulya was Secretary General of ZCTU he did not suggest that his books were not in order.²²⁰Chakulya was obviously not impressed with some elements of the leadership of the trade union movement and was determined to stamp his authority on it. When he addressed the General Council of the ZCTU in Kitwe in July 1971, he accused some union leaders of wanting to “loosen” the relationship between UNIP and the unions. He also stated that other union leaders were claiming that the ZCTU was forced to support UNIP because it was the only viable party in the country.²²¹

Chakulya rejected the argument that it was as a result of this relationship between the trade union movement and UNIP that the unions were forced to accept policies that were against the interests of the workers. He argued that the claim was a complete lie put out by “tin-pot trade union messiahs” who pretended to be champions of the workers’ cause. He warned that the “messiahs” would be exposed and flushed out of the movement. He further claimed that UNIP did not coerce the ZCTU to affiliate to it as the move was decided upon freely and democratically by the movement. He pointed out that the support for UNIP by the movement was not unusual as similar situations existed in the United States of America (USA), and the

²¹⁹ NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966.

²²⁰ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session (Resumed) of the Second National Assembly*, 13th July – 22nd July 1971, pp. 221-226; MLSS1/26/257: Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966.

²²¹ MLSS1/26/257: Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions): Record of the General Council meeting of the ZCTU addressed by the Honourable W.M. Chakulya, M.P., Minister of Labour and Social Services held at the National Centre, Kitwe at 11:00 hours on Sunday, 11th July 1971.

United Kingdom (UK) where trade union movements supported political parties. He stated that the relationship between the Government and the movement would continue to be influenced by the behaviour of the unions, and if the leaders acted irresponsibly the Government would deal with them firmly by removing them from the movement. He urged trade union leaders to remember at all times that they were Zambians first and foremost and that their trade union positions were secondary. He warned against factionalism, lack of integrity among leaders and rumour-mongering that had contributed to weakening the movement and threatened its unity.²²²

The trade union leaders accused the Government of weakening the trade union movement by appointing its leaders to government positions. Chakulya's response to this was to brand the accusations as irresponsible and childish as the President had the right to appoint available manpower to public office for national development. In addition, the Government denied it could ever want to weaken the trade union movement, pointing out that its helping out to solve its financial problems was proof of its concern for the well-being of the movement.²²³

Trade union movement's support for introduction of the One-Party State

Some writers on the trade union movement in Zambia noted its support for the re-introduction of multiparty politics,²²⁴ but few noted its support for the introduction of the one-party state and all that it entailed. Larmer briefly referred to it in his doctoral work. He stated that the ZCTU under one-party rule would be legally answerable to the Government and UNIP for the implementation of its labour policies. The ZCTU, however, declared that it would not allow workers' rights to be eroded, meaning that it did not promise full support to UNIPO and

²²² NAZ – MLSS1/26/257 – Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions), 1965-1966; "Rebels will be rooted out: Chakulya lashes union 'messiahs'," *Times of Zambia*, 13th July 1971;

²²³ NAZ, MLSS1/26/257/2307, 1965-1966: The Minister of Labour and Social Services address to the General Council of the ZCTU, 11th July 1971.

²²⁴ See for example, Rakner, "Trade Unions in the Process of Democratisation", 1992; Akwetey, *Trade Unions and Democratisation* 1994; Paschal Mihyo, "Against Overwhelming Odds: The Zambian Trade Union Movement", 1995; Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation, 1997; and Rakner, "The Pluralistic Paradox: The Decline of Economic Interest Groups in Zambia in the 1990s", 2001.

its Government.²²⁵ Even before the one-party state was established some labour leaders, sounded so subservient to UNIP that they considered the movement a wing of the party, and even indulged in some witch-hunting, by accusing some labour leaders of supporting opposition parties such as the ANC or the UPP or the United Party.²²⁶

The language used in a ZCTU Press release of 3rd March 1972 showed that the movement really considered itself a wing of UNIP. It welcomed the banning of the UPP and saluted the Central Committee, the Cabinet and the Government for the timely action taken to bring about harmony and peace once more in the country in which UPP machinations would have brought about anarchy, discord and disunity had they been left to operate longer. Even some individual unions, such as the Zambia Railways Amalgamated Workers' Union (ZRAWU), supported the introduction of the one party state because they thought that trade unions would be strengthened and prosper under such a regime.²²⁷ ZCTU appealed to all the workers in Zambia to understand that unity and peace were the pre-requisite to development and prosperity and they therefore needed to keep away from divisive and discontented elements of Zambia's political society. It stated that it was aware that the One Party Democracy was soon to be a reality and, considering the fact that it had for a long time advocated for the introduction and establishment of the one party democracy, it was happy that Kaunda and the Central Committee of UNIP had speedily arrived at a decision to set up a Commission to work out the details of the one party democracy. ZCTU was also happy that it had been invited to participate on the Commission of Inquiry on the setting up of the one party democracy.²²⁸

²²⁵ Miles Larmer, "A Class Apart: Mineworkers and Political Change in Zambia, 1964-1991", PhD Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2004, pp. 98-99.

²²⁶ UNIP Archives – UNIP 12/1/38: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions Correspondence 1970-73.

²²⁷ UNIP Archives – UNIP 12/1/41: Zambia Railways Amalgamated Workers' Union (ZRAWU) – Correspondence and Minutes 1971-73: Minutes of the 15th national Executive Committee held at Kabwe on Saturday 16th December 1972.

²²⁸ UNIP Archives – UNIP 12/1/38: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions Correspondence 1970-73.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the Zambian economy from 1964 to around 1991 and tried to show how it impacted the workers and the trade union movement. The 1950s and early 1960s informed some of the debates in some of the sections of this chapter in the sense that to bring the story to 1964 and beyond the chapter delved into the 1950s and 1960s for explanations. Up to the end of 1960, the relationship between trade unions and political parties prior to independence was dominated by Lawrence Katilungu who was both President of the AMU and the NRTUC. He did not want trade unionism to mix with politics and therefore did not co-operate with the nationalist politicians. The lack of co-operation from the trade union movement and some labour leaders, for example, the AMU and Katilungu, in the 1950s and early 1960s, angered the nationalists. They decided to get rid of Katilungu from the trade union movement but getting rid of Katilungu was done at the expense of splitting the trade union movement when two national trade union centres emerged. As was shown from Kaunda's speeches in the period immediately before and after independence, by the time independence came, the trade union movement was seen by the nationalists to be unsuitable to participate in the development of the country unless it was reined in.

By 1964 Zambia had an urban population of over one million, which was nearly 30 percent of the population with over 750, 000 out of a population of just over 4 million in wage employment. The copper industry gave Zambia a vibrant industrial economy that made her one of the richest and most promising of the new African states. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Zambia's economy was doing well and was better than the economies of countries such as Kenya and Egypt and her GDP was higher than those of Brazil, Malaysia, South Korea and Turkey. The start was good, therefore, and up to about 1969, the Zambian workers benefitted from rising wages, but this was an economy dominated by copper production and controlled by foreigners. The Zambian government needed to take control of this economy and spread its

benefits to people in rural areas. Up until 1975, the economy was performing well, but after 1975, with copper prices falling and oil prices rising, the economy was adversely affected. As shown, a salaries commission in 1975 was even reluctant to award workers a salary increase because there was not enough money in the national coffers.

The chapter also discussed government's decision to amend the labour law to bring it in line with the development agenda it was pursuing. This led to the creation of the ZCTU to replace the trouble-ridden UTUC. The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act of 1965, was enacted and the ZCTU was created. This did not end the divisions in the trade union movement. Even when it came to making a stand on whether the country should be a one party state or not, the trade union movement was not very clear. In the end some leaders and some unions supported the introduction of the one party state, arguing it would create a better working environment for the workers, but this only exposed the movement's weakness in relation to UNIP.

The poor financial position of the trade unions and the trade union movement needed to be sorted out. It was believed that it was the poverty of trade unions which made them seek outside help from international labour confederations, a situation which left them open to manipulation and in turn was caused the disunity in the movement. The Government decided to step in and helped to create the ZCTU. UNIP and its government wanted to reorient the movement from one that had battled with colonial rulers and employers in a colonial economy on behalf of African workers to one that had to work with an African Government in an independent African country run by indigenous African people. Although the Government helped the ZCTU financially that did not end the poor financial position of the trade union movement. Kaunda and UNIP hoped to control the movement and through the ZCTU. In this regard there were attempts to remodel the trade union movement so that it could be subservient to the Party. This was a path filled with risks as it led to confrontation rather than co-operation.

The measures being put in place to ensure control of the economy as well as of the workforce were not enough to give the Government comfort, especially with opposition growing in the country. The trade union movement was itself flexing its muscle and demanding autonomy. The answer then became the introduction of the one-party state, which the movement, or at least some trade unions, wholeheartedly supported in the belief that while it would solve the country's political problems, it would also solve the problems of the movement. It is interesting that a movement that was in the field of fighting for social, political and economic justice for the workers and the masses at large could actually welcome the use of brutal methods of detention against political opponents the way it supported the methods used to deal with the UPP. It would appear that the trade union movement opted to support the creation of the one-party state in the hope that there would be benefits for the workers and the movement itself.

CHAPTER THREE

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT AND UNIP AND ITS GOVERNMENT 1971-1991

Introduction

This chapter examines the relationship between the trade union movement and UNIP and its government in the period 1971 to 1991. There were a number of issues that impacted that relationship. The labour policies the government implemented, was one. The attempts by UNIP to introduce the vetting of candidates for the elections to ZCTU executive positions and the enactment of the UNIP constitution of 1978 were the other issues. There was also the Local Government Act of 1980, the ban by the government for trade union leaders to address Labour Day rallies and the move to weaken the trade union movement by removing Chiluba from the leadership of the trade union movement by first removing him from the leadership of the National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers (NUBEGW). Finally, there was the breakdown of the relationship between UNIP and the trade union movement and the fight for the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in the country. These are the issues tackled in this chapter to show the trade union movement and workers' struggles in Zambia.

Labour Policy, 1971-1991: The Implementation and reactions

The year 1971 marks the start of this section because it marked the start of a very important phase in the history of trade unionism in the country. At an important tripartite Labour Conference held in Livingstone on 7th and 8th April 1967, representatives of the government, trade unions and employers discussed the problems of labour relations in the country, especially that many strikes took place shortly after independence. Many of the recommendations passed at this conference provided the basis for the IRA of 1971, whose Part VII introduced workers participation in industries where they worked in Zambia. This is in turn

called for the formation of Works Councils.²²⁹The Industrial Relations Act (IRA) was enacted in 1971 but came into operation on 1st April 1974 by Statutory Instrument No. 29 of 1974, with the exception of Part VII concerning the Works Councils. This latter part came into operation on 1st May 1976 by Statutory Instrument No. 76 of 1976, after massive resistance from managements of various work places.²³⁰

In the IRA of 1971, the administrative powers, which earlier were assigned to the Minister of Labour and Social Services to vet and approve collective agreements, were now transferred to the Industrial Relations Court (IRC). Under the provisions of the IRA, the IRC was empowered to vet, approve and affirm collective agreements in accordance with the country's wages and incomes policy, and also in accordance with the public interest. Meanwhile, the ZCTU continued to express concern over the absence of a more realistic wages and incomes policy and the erosion of the workers' real earnings by inflation and the rising cost of living. Both the ZCTU and Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE) called upon the Government to convene a national convention to study the deteriorating economic situation with a view to formulating a more realistic wages and incomes policy designed to stabilise the economy, give greater purchasing power to the workers and promote investment and employment.²³¹

Adler and Webster have pointed out that on the other hand, the Act brought about a dramatic strengthening of the movement. Three provisions – the principle of “one industry, one union”, the mandatory affiliation of all unions to the ZCTU as the sole legitimate federation, and automatic and compulsory dues check off – significantly increased the power of the

²²⁹ Government of Zambia, Ministry of Labour, *Livingstone Labour Conference*, 7th -8th April 1967 (Lusaka: Government Printers, 1967); *Industrial Relations Act, No. 36 of 1971*; Peter D. Machungwa & Tresford Mwaba, *Works Councils and other Committees: Aspects of Zambian Industrial Relations* (Lusaka: M&M Management and Labour Consultants Ltd., 1989), p. 4.

²³⁰ *Industrial Relations Act of 1971*; Mtopa, *Labour Laws in Zambia*, p. 215; Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 29 of 1974, The Industrial Relations Act (Commencement) Order, 1974*.

²³¹ *Annual Labour Report 1974*, 7-8.

federation and its affiliates. All these stipulations resonated well with the one-party system of rule. Furthermore, the expansion of the domestic industry and the growth in the parastatal sector – both consequences of the development strategy – boosted employment levels and union membership, further increasing the resources flowing into the federation and its affiliates. UNIP, in attempting to create a labour federation strong enough to discipline workers in pursuit of its developmental goals, unintentionally assisted the development of a movement which could act independently of the state. Rather than increasing state control over labour, the creation of the single party state and the expansion of nationalised industry with the state as the largest employer created new grounds for antagonism between UNIP and the workers. On the other hand changes in the labour law ironically created a more coherent and better resourced organisation that would in time come to vigorously champion workers' grievances.²³²

Sacika explained that the formulation of government's labour policy was influenced by the need to get the workers to produce wealth in the country that would be distributed evenly in the country. The trade unions were in disarray at independence and therefore needed to be reorganised. UNIP and its government, therefore, prioritised formulating labour laws that would help trade unions be better organised so that the workers they represented would work to produce wealth in the country.²³³

Burawoy noted that the bargaining power of the mineworkers came from their strategic importance in the mining industry, which was the backbone of the economy. It was this strategic importance that mineworkers in a particularly strong position. Throughout the post-independence period the Government feared the power of the mineworkers, and tried to weaken MUZ. In 1966, for example, UNIP tried to usurp the leadership of MUZ but failed. The Government attempted to turn the union from consumption orientation to production

²³² Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation", pp. 7-8; Interview with Sacika, Lusaka, 27/04/15.

²³³ Interview with Sacika, Lusaka, 27/04/15.

orientation – making it an agency to promote production and productivity rather than merely working to improve the wages and welfare of members.²³⁴ During the presentation of the Second Reading of the Industrial Relations Bill of 1993, Michael Sata strengthened the argument that indeed in the 1960s, UNIP wanted to weaken the MUZ. He stated that he and other people in the trade union movement had instructions from UNIP to break up the stronger unions. They started by breaking up the African Mineworkers' Union (AMU), which later became the MUZ and tried to destabilise other trade unions.²³⁵

MUZ leaders seemed to accept the Government campaign to promote high productivity at all places of work and therefore became hostile to strikes and acts of indiscipline from their members such as absenteeism. When the Union failed to control members, the Government moved in to remove any leaders agitating strike action. The Government succeeded in controlling the mineworkers from 1966 as evidenced by the lack of any major strikes on the mines to 1991. In 1967, Government showed its gratitude to MUZ leaders by assisting it by legislating for one union, one industry principle, which eliminated any competition from rival unions and by seeing to it that the more popular leaders did not successfully challenge the established leadership. The check-off system combined with a closed shop ensured the Union enjoyed financial security without actively campaigning and advancing the interests of the rank-and-file.²³⁶ However, there was not always agreement between what union leaders in MUZ wanted and what the rank-and-file members wanted, so strikes to press demands regardless of what union leaders said continued.²³⁷ The government was against strikes and argued that wage demands must be matched with high productivity.

²³⁴ Burawoy, *The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines*, p. 78.

²³⁵ *Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session of the Seventh National Assembly*, 15th January – 18th March 1993, Columns 1881-1882.

²³⁶ *Annual Labour Report 1967*, p. 14; Burawoy, *The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines*, p. 78.

²³⁷ *Annual Labour Report 1967*, p. 6.

The labour leaders, especially those in the ZCTU, such as Chiluba,imba and others, perceived the political role of trade unionism in Zambia as being that of championing the rights of the workers. Although the government acknowledged that the workers' rights had to be preserved, there was a difference in how to implement the laws affecting the rights. The government sought to use the organisational ability of the trade union movement to advance UNIP's agenda. In this regard it sought to turn the ZCTU into an organ for the mobilisation of workers for the production of a surplus to keep manufacturing buoyant, the mining industry earning foreign exchange and foreign investment flowing into the country. The government tried to use the philosophy of Humanism as a medium to communicate to the people what was in the national interest and to the benefit of peasants, workers, and the unemployed. Humanism, however, did not become an effective tool for driving the economic development effort in Zambia because it was not developed as a tool to drive economic development. A kind of ideological war between the Party and its Government and the trade union movement developed because of the differences in the way each side understood the political role of trade unions.²³⁸

The decision to introduce a one party regime on Zambia, emphasis on import-substitution and the push for economic independence, Zambia's geo-political position in which she had to deal with hostile neighbours and even depend on them were all factors that made the government to push to have unions that worked for high productivity and led to the enactment of the IRA of 1971 that the government believed would redefine the role of trade

²³⁸ Kenneth D. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its implementation, Part I* (Lusaka: Zambia Information Service, 1967), Kenneth D. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its implementation, Part II* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1974), This completes Economic Reforms: "Now Zambia is ours," Address by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. K.D. Kaunda, on the occasion of the closing of the United National Independence Party National Council, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, 10th November 1970 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1970), p. 2, Timothy K. Kandeke, *Fundamentals of Zambian Humanism* (Lusaka: Neczam, 1977), See especially Chapter 4: "The Ideological Concept of Zambian Humanist Economy," pp. 63-102; Liatto-Katundu, "The Role of the ZCTU in Zambian Politics", pp. 23-24.

unions but which introduced organs considered contradictory such as Works Councils and political committees at places of work that seemed to work against unions.²³⁹

Many questions were asked about whether works councils had performed well or not or in fact, whether they were even necessary. Although they were seen to be a good idea to promote and maintain participation of workers in management decisions and to improve industrial peace as well as increase productivity and efficiency, there had been more failures and problems with the Works Councils than achievements since their inception in 1976.²⁴⁰ Some trade unionists viewed Works Councils as threats to the work of trade unions as one section of it seemed to give the Works Councils duties which traditionally and statutorily belonged to the trade unions.²⁴¹ Sacika, who was part of the government system that promulgated the IRA of 1971 and the idea of Works Councils, insisted that Works Councils were a good idea as there was no inconsistency in their existence and that of trade unions. They were not intended to undermine or weaken the trade unions and there were no political instructions received when drafting the part on Works Councils. They were introduced to improve the organisation of trade unions. The trade unions were involved in the drafting of the IRA of 1971 and they did not contest the issue of Works Councils, and yet after the Act was implemented, they raised objections to the Works Councils. Sacika argued that the Works Councils did not work in Zambia only because Chiluba and Zimba and other trade union leaders did not want them.²⁴²

²³⁹ Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation", p. 7; Rakner, "Trade Unions in the process of Democratisation," p. 84; *Industrial Relations Act no. 36 of 1971*, Part VII – Works Councils; "Zambia Shall Beat the Blockade: A Challenge to the Nation, by Dr. K.D. Kaunda, President of Zambia, Lusaka, March 1973, Published by Zambia Information Services (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1973); United National Independence Party: *National Policies for the next decade, 1974-1984* (the UNIP Manifesto), Freedom House, Lusaka (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, Government Printer, 1973).

²⁴⁰ *Industrial Relations Act of 1971*, Part VII – Works Councils, Columns 54-78; Machungwa and Mwaba, *Works Councils and other Committees*, p. 11 & 42.

²⁴¹ *Industrial Relations Act of 1971*, Part VII – Works Councils, Columns 54-78; Hamalengwa, *Class Struggles in Zambia 1889-1989*, p. 79.

²⁴² *Industrial Relations Act of 1971*, Part VII – Works Councils; Interview with Sacika, Lusaka, 27/04/15.

The Industrial Relations Act, 1971

The need for a new labour law led to the enactment of the *Industrial Relations Act of 1971*. This was the first labour law enacted by the post-independence Government. It was, therefore, seen as an indigenous law. The main aim of the Act was to replace the colonial labour laws that according to the Government ‘had nothing in common with Zambia’s approach to national affairs’. Through this Act the workers would now participate in a new system of industrial relations.²⁴³ Ananaba called the Act ‘the most advanced piece of labour legislation existing in English-speaking Africa’.²⁴⁴ This was not surprising since it was so comprehensive that it covered just about every sphere of industrial relations on top of which there was the establishment of the Industrial Relations Court to settle industrial disputes.²⁴⁵ The idea for this Act could also have been copied from Ghana’s 1958 Industrial Relations Act through which the Nkrumah government attempted to take over the Ghana trade union movement.²⁴⁶

The Act was meant to match with the Government’s labour policy that was guided by two considerations. Firstly, there was the need to have a development labour policy in which the labour force disciplined itself by not staging strikes, for example, and instead participated in the development of the country for the benefit of both those in employment and those not in employment. Kaunda was very clear on this issue. Secondly, there was need to have social justice in the country. This meant narrowing the gap between those in wage employment and those not in wage employment-earners by restricting wage increases.²⁴⁷ This resonated with Kaunda calling on trade unions to also think about the unemployed and not only concentrate

²⁴³ *Annual Labour Report 1970*, p. 21; *Industrial Relations Act, 1971*.

²⁴⁴ Ananaba, *The Trade Union Movement in Africa*, p. 180.

²⁴⁵ *Industrial Relations Act, 1971*, p. 647; Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 104 of 1974, The Industrial Relations Act, 1971, The Settlement of Collective Disputes Regulation, 1974* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1974); Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 206 of 1974, Industrial Relations Act of 1971 (Act No. 36 of 1971), The Industrial Relations Court Rules, 1974* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1974).

²⁴⁶ Berg & Butler, “Trade Unions,” p. 369; Bill Freund, “Labour and Labour History in Africa,” p. 18.

²⁴⁷ Bates, *Unions, Parties and Political Development*, p. 27.

on asking for higher wages and staging strikes when they were dissatisfied with their conditions of work.

Sacika explained that in 1976, when he was Labour Commissioner, he was invited by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to attend a seminar in Dar es Salaam on human rights with emphasis on trade union rights. The other Zambian delegates to the seminar were Willa Mung'omba, Daniel Lisulo and Frederick Chomba, all of them lawyers. Sacika was invited largely because he was expected to explain why the IRA of 1971 contravened ILO Conventions, for example, stipulations that all unions should affiliate to ZCTU, the dues shop order, and the one industry, one union. Sacika agreed in the paper he presented that it was true the IRA of 1971 did not conform to some ILO Conventions, but pointed out that Zambia needed to take the measures put in the Act because it was dealing with an extra-ordinary situation, for example, one in which trade unions were weak, and there was fragmentation in the trade union movement. The measures were therefore intended to bring order to the industrial situation in the country. If the measures were not taken, the country's economic and political situation would have been at stake, for example, if the European Mineworkers Union had continued to operate it might have sabotaged the economy. It was hoped that when the situation completely stabilised due to the measures taken, Zambia would re-work the IRA of 1971 to conform to internationally accepted standards as constituted in ILO Conventions 87 and 98. As a member of ILO, Zambia wanted to design its labour and social policy in accordance with ILO Conventions.²⁴⁸

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and Labour Centralisation

In 1971 and 1972, the trade union movement led by the ZCTU became concerned with its own internal weaknesses that had begun to lead to the forming of splinter unions, for example, in the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers (NUCIW) and Zambia

²⁴⁸ Interview with Sacika, Lusaka, 27/04/15.

Railways Amalgamated Workers' Union (ZRAWU).²⁴⁹ Internal troubles in a number of unions continued in 1972, as a result of dissatisfaction with the poor quality of trade union leadership and the ineffectiveness of trade unions to meet the demands of their members. Unions such as the Guards Union of Zambia (GUZ), National Union of Postal and Telecommunications Workers (NUPTW), National Union of Building and General Workers (NUBEGW), Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ) and University of Zambia Workers' Union (UNZAWU) were badly affected by power struggles in the leadership.²⁵⁰ In 1975 the Government banned UNZAWU when it had a debt of K16, 000. In 1976 a new union to cater for workers in high institutions of learning was formed and was called the University of Zambia and Allied Workers' Union (UNZAAWU). The K16, 000 debt was to be paid by the ZCTU. Newton Mwenifumbo was elected chairman, with E.N. Tembo as vice chairman, W.P. Bowa as secretary and Mrs B.L. Ng'andu as vice secretary.²⁵¹

The ZCTU was concerned about these internal weaknesses. It was also concerned with the problems posed by the splinter unions. The power struggles within the leadership hierarchy of unions was another concern as it was likely to affect the good and healthy industrial relations. In August 1972, the General Council set up a "Working Party" to recommend reform to strengthen the trade union movement financially and administratively and how to prevent the formation of splinter trade unions. Mwendapole, the veteran trade unionist was appointed to head the 'Working Party' that also included Fanwell Sumbwe, Joseph Musonda, Emmanuel Mwansa, Edwin Thawe, Annaniah Simwanza and Mrs Ida Simukwai.²⁵² Mwendapole argued that ZCTU had let a great chance to improve trade unionism, its performance and image slip by. He also felt that given the changing times of the 1970s and post-1970s, centralisation of trade union organisation was the logical way to go, as smaller unions would benefit because

²⁴⁹ *Annual Labour Report 1971*, pp. 16-17.

²⁵⁰ *Annual Labour Report 1972*, p. 19.

²⁵¹ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 09/04/76.

²⁵² *Annual Labour Report 1972*, p. 20.

they were both materially and financially weak and were therefore unable to deliver goods to their members.²⁵³ Japhet Fulilwa, the president of the National Union of Transport and Allied Workers (NUTAW) hit back at Mwendapole's criticism of the ZCTU general council, saying he had "insulted" some unions by calling them "small". Fulilwa called the Mwendapole report "incomplete and not straightforward".²⁵⁴

Although many people agreed that the idea of a centralised trade union system was for the good of trade unionism in Zambia, the trade unions affiliated to the ZCTU, for reasons that bordered mainly on lack of trust for each other among trade union leaders, out rightly rejected the recommendations of the "Working Party". The *Times of Zambia* in its editorial of 14th July 1973, made a scathing attack on the trade unionists that had rejected the idea of centralisation, accusing them of selfishness because they feared that merging their small shoe-string unions would mark the end of their meal tickets.²⁵⁵ This opinion from the *Times of Zambia* was in line with the government campaign for a well-organised trade union that would work as an arm of government in its development agenda.

Amidst the wrangling in the movement, the ZCTU General Secretary, Basil Kabwe admitted that the ZCTU had failed to play a full role as a central organisation of the movement, blaming the failures on poor communication between the Congress and the national unions. He pointed out that national unions usually did not respect decisions they made at the general council meetings of the Congress. The Congress had no legal powers to enforce its own code of conduct by imposing punitive measures against offending members. The powers to punish erring members lay in the hands of the Labour Commissioner who rarely used them.²⁵⁶ Kabwe's admission was surprising because the Congress could, in fact, take punitive measures on the members that erred. For example, the ZCTU decided to ban officials whose unions were in

²⁵³ *Times of Zambia*, 24/07/73.

²⁵⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 25/07/73.

²⁵⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 23/07/73.

²⁵⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 31/08/73.

arrears with it from representing the country abroad. The measure was taken to correct the worsening situation in which some affiliates failed to pay their monthly subscriptions. A ZCTU official indicated that this measure was the most lenient as the ZCTU had powers to take other tough measures but those, if taken, could only spoil the relationship between the unions and the mother body.²⁵⁷

In 1973, Chakulya, the Minister of Labour and Social Services, and a former General Secretary of ZCTU, decided to institute far-reaching changes in the set-up of the mother body, without consulting the ZCTU executive.²⁵⁸ This led to disagreement and a row with the ZCTU President, Newsteadimba, in which the editors of the *Times of Zambia* and the *Zambia Daily Mail* were drawn.²⁵⁹ Chakulya accused the editors of the two papers, namely Vernon Mwaanga and Vincent Majoni and their newspapers of being tribal in their coverage of stories involving his ministry, all because they wanted to ruin the relationship between his ministry and the trade union movement.²⁶⁰ He labelled the *Times* a Tonga paper and the *Daily Mail* a Ngoni paper because both papers had never written anything negative against Tonga or Ngoni ministers and that there was *Tonga-ism* at the *Times of Zambia* and *Ngoni-ism* at the *Zambia Daily Mail*. He blamed the two papers for the row that had erupted between the Ministry of Labour and the trade union movement over the amendments affecting the Congress and affiliated unions. He said the papers lacked specialised reporters in industrial matters and as a result reporters misinterpreted labour affairs.²⁶¹

The issue reached the Central Committee of UNIP through the Secretary General. The Central Committee of UNIP found out that Chakulya's accusations were baseless and that apart from being irresponsible and mischievous, his statement constituted a serious offence and

²⁵⁷ *Times of Zambia*, 01/09/73.

²⁵⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 10/09/73.

²⁵⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 14/09/73 & 15/09/73.

²⁶⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 21/09/73.

²⁶¹ *Times of Zambia*, 21/09/73.

severely reprimanded him.²⁶² That marked the end of that particular incident, but not the personal feud between Chakulya and Zimba. In October 1973, Chakulya accused Zimba of insulting Mrs Chakulya on the telephone on the night of 11th October. Chakulya wrote to Basil Kabwe, the ZCTU general secretary, with copies to the President, the Secretary General of UNIP and the Prime Minister, and made disparaging remarks against Zimba.²⁶³ Investigations established that Zimba was innocent.²⁶⁴ Chakulya held the portfolio of Minister of Labour and Social Services from January 1973. He ceased to be a cabinet minister on 10th December 1973 when he was defeated in the parliamentary elections held that year, despite contesting in a constituency dominated by workers. He was succeeded by Hyden Dingiswayo Banda.²⁶⁵

Vetting of Candidates for Zambia Congress of Trade Unions Elections

UNIP had always wanted to turn the trade union movement into its wing to be like the Women's and the Youth Leagues of the Party as a way of taming and weakening it. In public UNIP always denied this but that was what it wanted. The evidence for such manoeuvres was provided by its intention in 1976 to introduce vetting in elections for positions in the ZCTU executive, which was an attempt by UNIP at complete domination of the trade union movement. UNIP archival sources showed that neither the trade union movement nor the Minister of Labour, Dingiswayo Banda, liked the idea of vetting candidates for ZCTU elections as it was bound to give rise to considerable speculation, suspicion, and resentment from ZCTU and censure from the ILO for denying workers their rights.²⁶⁶ While Grey Zulu, Secretary General of UNIP, argued that many trade union leaders were happy with the decision on vetting, UNIP's archival sources show that this was not the position. Zimba, the ZCTU General Secretary stated that the governing General Council of ZCTU had resolved to reject vetting,²⁶⁷

²⁶² *Times of Zambia*, 07/11/73.

²⁶³ UNIP Archives: UNIP 12/1/48: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions – SGP/7/2/1 – 1974-78.

²⁶⁴ UNIP Archives: UNIP 12/1/48: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions – SGP/7/2/1 – 1974-78.

²⁶⁵ *Annual Labour Report* 1973, p. 19.

²⁶⁶ UNIP Archives: UNIP 12/1/48: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions – SGP/7/2/1 – 1974-78.

²⁶⁷ UNIP Archives: UNIP 12/1/48: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions – SGP/7/2/1 – 1974-78.

as it would create suspicion between union leaders and the members of their unions to the extent that it would be virtually impossible for those leaders to control certain situations such as work stoppages.²⁶⁸ The matter ended without UNIP trying to impose vetting of candidates on the ZCTU.

Government sources were quick to point out that the government's cardinal objective since independence had been to help in the development of a strong trade union movement in the country. In this regard, every effort, including legislative action was framed to nurture the movement into a strong organisation that could effectively look after the interests of all the workers and take part in the development process of the country.²⁶⁹ This view was supported by Sacika, the former Labour Commissioner and former Secretary to the Cabinet.²⁷⁰ The trade union movement, however, always viewed this position of the government with suspicion.

The 1980 Local Government Act and the Trade union movement's Reaction

In 1980, the government replaced the Local Government Act of 1965, a carry-over from the British colonial laws, with the Local Administration Act of 1980 in the belief that this was more suitable for the one-party state and would transfer power to the people.²⁷¹ The new system which was to take effect on 1st January 1981, aimed at introducing an integrated system of local government. In the new system, City, Municipal and Township Councils were abolished. District Councils in both urban and rural areas were established and were to be headed by District Governors (DGs). The DGs would replace mayors and would become chairpersons of

²⁶⁸ UNIP Archives: UNIP 12/1/48: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions – SGP/7/2/1 – 1974-78; See also *Times of Zambia* and *Zambia Daily Mail* of November 1976.

²⁶⁹ *Annual Labour Report 1978*, p. 19.

²⁷⁰ Interview with Sacika, Lusaka, 27/04/15.

²⁷¹ *Republic of Zambia: The Local Administration Act 1980 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1980); Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session (Resumed) of the Fourth National Assembly, 29th July – 22nd August 1980, Columns 857-849. See also: Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session of (Resumed) of the Fourth National Assembly, 25th November – 5th December 1980; Government of Zambia, Statutory Instrument No. 171 of 1980, The Local Administration Act (Act No. 15 of 1980), The Local Administration Act (Commencement) Order, 1980 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1980; See also: Republic of Zambia Government Gazette Acts: Index to Supplements Containing Acts for the Year 1980 for Gazette Volume XVI, January – December 1980. Supplement to the Republic of Zambia Government Gazette dated 29th December 1980, pp. 95-132.*

the new District Councils. The UNIP Ward chairmen would constitute the councillors with representatives nominated by trade unions and other institutions.²⁷²

The 1980 Act, however, became a major source of conflict between the trade union movement and the government. The ZCTU opposed the 1980 Local Government Reform Bill. When it was passed in parliament and became the Local Administration Act of 1980, the ZCTU declared it would refuse to comply with the new local government structures. The resistance to UNIP's policy of decentralisation started with the Zambia United Local Authorities Workers' Union (ZULAWU), which felt that decentralisation would pose a danger to its future and its members. MUZ joined the resistance to the 1980 Act, arguing that integration of mine townships into the local councils would lower miners' standards in terms of their benefits derived from the mines, including low rents and regular refuse collection and other benefits.²⁷³ MUZ ordered its officials who had contested seats in the councils to withdraw or resign their posts in the union. In Chililabombwe, MUZ sacked six shop stewards who took part in the elections because it felt that the new system could not work.²⁷⁴

During the latter part of the year, the industrial relations scene was again overshadowed by differences of opinion between the government and the trade union movement on the efficacy of introducing a new system of local government. The movement petitioned the Party and its Government and indicated its total opposition to the new system and withdrew its support to the programme, but the petition did not succeed.²⁷⁵ The confrontation started in early October 1980, when MUZ at its bi-annual conference held in Livingstone decided to boycott

²⁷² *Annual Labour Report 1980*, p. 11.

²⁷³ *Local Administration Act, 1980*; For debates on the Local Government Bill involving miners on the Copperbelt and MUZ, see *Times of Zambia*, 19/01/76; *Times of Zambia*, 22/01/76; *Times of Zambia*, 24/01/76; *Times of Zambia*, 03/02/76; *Times of Zambia*, 04/02/76.

²⁷⁴ *Times of Zambia*, Independence Supplement, 24/10/84.

²⁷⁵ Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session of the Fourth National Assembly, 16th January-27th February 1981, pp. 1003-1004; *Annual Labour Report 1980*, p. p.11.

the new programme of decentralisation of local government administration and take punitive action against any of their members who would flout the union's decision.²⁷⁶

The opposition by MUZ stemmed from the understanding that the new system would mean the integration of the mine townships into the existing local authorities. Hitherto the mine townships were managed autonomously and superintended by the mining companies. This arrangement gave the miners fringe benefits. It was therefore believed that the integration of the mine townships would mean that the fringe benefits such as free or subsidised water supply would cease, forthwith. A number of union officials were subsequently dismissed from their union posts. Despite assurances that the miners would continue to enjoy existing facilities, the differences persisted.²⁷⁷ The Bill was also opposed because it was deemed to be undemocratic, costly and aimed at ensuring that UNIP had absolute political control of Zambia.²⁷⁸

The opposition to the Act did not please UNIP and its Government. Kaunda saw the opposition as the work of a minority group in the trade union movement trying to divide the workers and UNIP. He argued that UNIP and the trade union movement were one and so could not be divided. When ten shop stewards who took part in the Party elections were sacked from MUZ Nkana branch, the 15th UNIP National Council ordered MUZ to immediately reinstate the sacked officials. MUZ was unwilling to reinstate them and ZCTU supported this stance. Kaunda accused MUZ of behaving like an opposition party. He added that labour leaders were using the decentralisation issue as a pretext under which to cause confusion in the country. Although Kaunda met most of the demands that had led to the problems between the Party and

²⁷⁶ *Annual Labour Report 1980*, p. 11.

²⁷⁷ *Annual Labour Report 1980*, p. 11; *Annual Labour Report 1981*, pp. 8-9; p. 11; p. 16.

²⁷⁸ Chiluba, *Democracy: The Challenge of Change*, p. 41; Michael Burawoy, "The Hidden Abode of Underdevelopment: Labour Process and the State in Zambia" *Politics and Society*, 1982, pp. 123-124; Nsolo N.J. Mijere, "The Mineworkers' Resistance to Government Decentralisation in Zambia: Nation-Building and Labour Aristocracy in the Third World" PhD Thesis, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts, 1985, pp. 3-4; Mwanakatwe, *End of Kaunda Era*, p. 191; *Times of Zambia*, 21/08/80.

the ZCTU and assured the miners that they would continue to enjoy their privileges, MUZ only reinstated the sacked officials in May 1981.²⁷⁹

The opposition by the labour leaders to decentralisation of political power was taking place at a time when there were other serious national problems which confronted the Party and its Government and also the Zambian people as a whole. From January 1980, a man dubbed “the Lusaka Strangler” killed a total of twenty-nine women in Lusaka. In October 1980, a group of men who included a prominent lawyer, Edward Shamwana, and the former Governor of the Bank of Zambia, Valentine Musakanya, were arrested for plotting to overthrow the Government by unlawful means. Seven men were sentenced to death for this. It was also during this period that a series of wildcat strikes took place as the unions demanded higher salaries,²⁸⁰ in spite of the poor state of the economy.

Trouble between the Government and the trade unions had been brewing throughout 1980. Initially, the problems were confined to purely industrial questions – mainly dissatisfaction over wage and salary claims. However, after the President implicated the trade unions in his statement on the failed coup, their leaders repeatedly asked for clarification. The tension increased when union leaders were prevented from travelling to London in November 1980 to attend an ICFTU conference on Black trade unions in South Africa. Matters were brought to a head within the MUZ over the nature of its relationship with UNIP following its wrangles with the Party over the Local Government Bill.²⁸¹

Mainza Chona, who was then (1980) the Secretary General of UNIP, published a letter in the Press in which he stated:

²⁷⁹ *Times of Zambia*, Independence Supplement, 24th October 1984.

²⁸⁰ Godwin Yoram Mumba, *The 1980 Coup: Tribulations of the One-Party State in Zambia* (Lusaka: UNZA Press, 2012); *Times of Zambia*, 10/12/80; *Times of Zambia*, Independence Supplement, 24th October 1984.

²⁸¹ *African Contemporary Record*, 1980-81, Vol. 13, p. B899.

We may have stranglers, plotters, strikers and other professional destabilisers but they should not use the Local Government Administration Act as a scapegoat. Some people have been trying to create chaos and confusion since independence.²⁸²

From Chona's statement, it was obvious that UNIP interpreted the actions of the labour leaders as being politically motivated. Since the stance taken by the ZCTU over the decentralisation issue signalled its first act of disobedience towards UNIP, it also responded rapidly to this breach of faith by suspending and later expelling 17 ZCTU and MUZ leaders from UNIP in January 1981, including Chiluba, Zimba and Walamba.²⁸³ The leaders expelled were not eligible to hold office in the trade union movement or any other organisation. Zimba, who was the MP for Chifubu constituency, automatically lost his seat in the National Assembly, but the Party Secretary General, Humphrey Mulemba, in April announced the readmission of the labour leaders to the Party. He said the action by the Party to readmit the trade union leaders was "to usher in a new era of development in the country."²⁸⁴

These repressive responses provoked a wave of strikes on the Copperbelt, where 50,000 miners protested the victimisation of their union leaders. The strikes soon spread across the country as postal and bank workers showed solidarity with the miners.²⁸⁵ There were thirty strikes on the mines alone in 1981, the highest since 1966. Overall for the country there were 157 strikes in 1981, involving 76,783 workers and a loss of 555,998 man-days. In 1966, 307,167 workers were involved with a loss of 579,406 man-days.²⁸⁶

The Local Administration Act of 1980 stayed in place and came into effect in 1981. Eventually the unions backed down and the ZCTU agreed to comply with the new Local Government Act and its leaders were reinstated in UNIP. But a breach had opened in relations

²⁸² Chona's letter of 1980 reproduced in *Times of Zambia*, Independence Supplement, 24th October 1984.

²⁸³ *Times of Zambia*, 29/12/80; *Times of Zambia*, 10/01/81; *Times of Zambia*, 21/01/81 & 26/01/81.

²⁸⁴ See *Times of Zambia* of between 10/01/81 and 26/01/81; *Times of Zambia*, 07/02/81; *Times of Zambia*, Independence Supplement, 24th October 1984.

²⁸⁵ Addler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation", p. 8; *Times of Zambia*, 30/01/81; *Times of Zambia*, 19/02/81; *Times of Zambia*, 21/02/81; *Times of Zambia*, 28/04/81 & *Times of Zambia*, 04/05/81.

²⁸⁶ *Annual Report for Labour for 1981*, Table 13: Strikes, p. 44; *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 – January 1972, Table 6.

between the ZCTU and UNIP, and before this could heal a new conflict emerged which would make the break irreparable. Within months of the resolution of the local government crisis, a shortage of mealie meal and demands for equal pay with expatriate miners provoked a new round of wildcat strikes on the Copperbelt early in 1981. At one of these conflicts a minister's car was stoned, and police arrested seven (7) MUZ and ZCTU leaders, including Chiluba and Zimba. They were detained for four months.²⁸⁷ Some people saw in the conflict over the Local Government Act of 1980 the fact that the one party state could be challenged and that the ZCTU had become the centre of opposition to the one party state.²⁸⁸

Under the leadership of Chiluba and Zimba, the movement became the most potent force in Zambian politics and provided the ideal checks and balances to the system. Unionism was a counter-force to One-Partyism.²⁸⁹ Numerous statements by labour leaders about not giving in to the machinations of UNIP to take over the movement and its resolute stance on the need to re-introduce multi-party democracy attested to this. Chiluba, commenting on the trade union movement's resistance to being made a wing of UNIP stated:

We as workers must know not only our rights but we must also know our obligations to the Party and its Government and the latter should also know its obligations to us to give the necessities of life so that we can become party members without being forced out of buses in order to do so.²⁹⁰

Political Leadership of the Trade union movement

In 1967, Chakulya was elected General Secretary of the ZCTU and after a long period of ineffective leaders the ZCTU showed a marked improvement. He stated that he wanted a strong Congress with unquestionable authority over affiliated unions, but this did not receive a lot of support because of complications in the constitutions of various trade unions, some of which provided much higher salaries than the Congress could afford for its staff. This factor

²⁸⁷ *Annual Labour Report for 1981*, p. 9; Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation", p. 8; *Times of Zambia*, 17th July 1981 & 28th July 1981.

²⁸⁸ Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation", p. 8.

²⁸⁹ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 04/09/94.

²⁹⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 14/04/80.

lowered the prestige of the Congress, and it failed to make an impact on the affiliated unions.²⁹¹ There were certainly instances where rank-and-file members of some unions showed displeasure in the type of leadership they had.²⁹² From the end of 1974, the trade union movement had a new leadership led by Chiluba.

The Labour Commissioner noted that in 1977, under the leadership of Chiluba the ZCTU had matured into a well organised institution successfully shepherding the movement into an effective tool as a champion of the workers that insisted on all its affiliates adopting reasonable administrative procedures. As a result, the ZCTU and the movement as a whole, gained a “new image” and a general recognition to the extent that Government consulted it on all matters in connection with and affecting the workers. The movement was also now fully represented on most of the major policy-making bodies in the country.²⁹³

One effect of the weak leadership in the movement had been that the rank-and-file members went on ‘unconstitutional’ strikes, especially after 1964. In Government circles there had been hope that as Zambian workers realised the value of trade unions and adopted the correct procedures for solving industrial disputes, strikes would decrease. Although in 1977 the Labour Commissioner noted that the ZCTU had matured into a well organised institution, some unions remained weak. In 1978, the Labour Commissioner reported that a disturbing feature of industrial relations was that workers were unwilling to use normal channels for solving grievances and therefore went on spontaneous work stoppages without the knowledge of their unions. The unions were handicapped by the lack of adequately qualified and experienced officials, especially at the branch and regional levels and by lack of regular contact with their members. There was no effective trade union leadership at grass roots level, which meant that workers were left alone to deal with issues as they saw fit.²⁹⁴

²⁹¹ *Annual Labour Report 1967*, pp. 12-13.

²⁹² *Annual Labour Report 1973*, p. 19.

²⁹³ *Annual Labour Report 1977*, p. 17.

²⁹⁴ *Annual Labour Report 1978*, p. 20.

At the 5th Quadrennial Conference of the ZCTU held in Livingstone in October 1978, the Minister of Labour, Dingiswayo Banda, urged the unions and the ZCTU to get better organised. ZCTU constitution was amended. The amendments were proposed and adopted at the conference. The amendments strengthened the position and influence of the Congress in respect of the activities of affiliates. In particular, Congress would now, in consultation with national unions, have the right to intervene in any industrial disputes to ensure amicable settlements of the disputes. In the past it could only sit on the side-lines even when issues developed into disputes leading to strikes.²⁹⁵

Although Banda implied that there was poor communication between the labour leaders and the members of unions whom they led, other sources suggest that might not have entirely been the case. This was because in 1980 and 1981, some rank-and-file members of MUZ showed that there was good communication between their leaders and themselves when they supported their leaders in the wrangles the Government and the trade union movement on the efficacy of introducing a new system of local government.²⁹⁶ The relationship between the trade union movement and UNIP was steadily deteriorating at the start of the 1980s. UNIP accused the movement of having become a political party in opposition to it when its Secretary General Chona stated: “The ZCTU has virtually ceased to be concerned with labour matters but has become a political organisation.”²⁹⁷ However, Chiluba had earlier emphasised the trade union movement’s democratic right to offer checks and balances to the government, when he stated that “all over the world trade unions play an indispensable role. They have to monitor the progress of government machinery and alert the people.”²⁹⁸

²⁹⁵ *Annual Labour Report 1979*, p. 18.

²⁹⁶ *Annual Labour Report 1980*, pp. 10-11.

²⁹⁷ *Times of Zambia*, 10/01/81.

²⁹⁸ *The Workers’ Voice*, Vol. 3, No. 3, October 1980: Speech to Seminar of the ZCTU General Council by the Chairman-General, 28th September 1980.

Banda, like Kaunda, also tried to show that there was poor leadership in the trade union movement as the labour leaders did not always act in the best interest of the workers they were supposed to represent. In July 1981, following persistent industrial unrest on the mines, the President ordered the detention of some top leaders of the ZCTU and the MUZ. The detentions, which were made under the powers contained in the Preservation of Public Security Act, were deemed to have been designed to safeguard the interests of national security.²⁹⁹ On 27th July 1981, Kaunda announced in an early morning broadcast the detention of the ZCTU leaders, namely Chiluba, held in Livingstone, Zimba, held in Solwezi, Sampa, held at Kamfinsa in Kitwe, and the MUZ leader, Timothy Walamba, held in Katete and a Ndola businessman, Chama Chakomboka, held at Lusaka Central Prison. He accused them of using workers to promote their political objectives of taking over the leadership of Zambia.³⁰⁰ Before the 1981 detentions, the Government had taken away the passports of the three ZCTU leaders, namely Chiluba, Zimba and Sampa in October 1980, after Kaunda had revealed that security forces had foiled a plot to overthrow the Government.³⁰¹

Much to the embarrassment of the Government since there were no reasonable grounds to justify their detention, Chiluba, Zimba, Walamba, Sampa and Chakomboka were later released from detention in October and November following a successful application to the High Court for the writ of habeas corpus.³⁰² The Party and its Government appealed to the Supreme Court against the habeas corpus ruling, but withdrew the appeal in 1983, citing the industrial tranquillity prevailing in the country as a result of efforts exerted by all concerned, including labour leaders.³⁰³

²⁹⁹ *Annual Labour Report 1981*, p. 8 & p. 11.

³⁰⁰ Press Release, Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, 28th July 1981, p. 1; *Times of Zambia*, 28/07/81; Republic of Zambia *Government Gazette*, No. 2385, Lusaka, Wednesday, 12th August 1981, Gazette Notice No. 1111 of 1981; *Times of Zambia*, Independence Supplement, 24th October 1984.

³⁰¹ *Annual Labour Report 1980*, pp. 16-17; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 15th February 1981.

³⁰² *Times of Zambia*, 27th July 1981; *Times of Zambia*, 10th & 14th & 29th October 1981.

³⁰³ *Times of Zambia*, 25/01/83.

Zambia was at this time in an economic crisis with high inflation resulting in high prices for goods and services, but as far as Kaunda was concerned, the trade union leaders were using that to gain political mileage. In Kaunda's one-party regime anyone that pursued "political objectives" outside UNIP was viewed with suspicion. If we can borrow the term 'rewards and punishments' from Berg and Butler, we could state that Kaunda was merely trying to use the system of 'rewards and punishments' to make his Party and Government establish supremacy over the trade union movement.³⁰⁴ In order to reinforce this system of 'rewards and punishments', sometimes in Kaunda's regime when workers went on strike to press their demands, the police arrested them or even shot at them causing injury.³⁰⁵

There had always been the challenge of weaknesses in the leadership of the trade union movement, which the political leadership tried to take advantage of. Even MUZ that had been perceived to be the strongest union in the country had not escaped from such a weakness. In fact, MUZ had not always used its strength to the benefit of the whole movement. Instead, it had sometimes used its strength to weaken the movement, for example, through its quarrels with ZCTU. There were wrangles between ZCTU and MUZ and Government over disputed elections held November 1970 won by David Mwila, but which Abel Musonda and others claimed were irregular. Some members led by Albert Supaile, the former Branch Secretary of the defunct Mines Local Staff Association (MLSA) threatened to form a splinter union if the leadership wrangle was not solved amicably. There were even moves to take the matter to court and the Supaile group emerged as a serious dissident group in MUZ. The government chose to side with MUZ executive.³⁰⁶ There was also the wrangle over Edwin Thawe in 1973, and the

³⁰⁴ Berg & Butler, "Trade Unions", pp. 366-368.

³⁰⁵ Zambia Railways (ZR) Archives: ZR/1/39/5 – "Staff Strike on Zambia Railways": Acting Commandant, ZR Police to General Manager, ZR, Kabwe, 22nd April 1970; *Annual Labour Report 1973*, p. 16.

³⁰⁶ MLSS1/26/302: Mineworkers' Union of Zambia, 1970-1971. See also *Zambia Daily Mail*, 05/01/71; *Times of Zambia*, 14/01/71 & 22/01/71.

serious one in 1974, when after losing elections to Chiluba, MUZ Chairman David Mwila threatened to pull MUZ out of ZCTU.³⁰⁷

The threat to pull MUZ out of ZCTU prompted Dingiswayo Banda, Minister of Labour, to rebuke Mwila.³⁰⁸ He said the threat was ‘unfortunate, uncalled for and divisive’. He found Mwila’s reasons for threatening to quit to be ‘folly’ and threatened that he could be prosecuted and that ‘Mwila should not be surprised if the course of events turn against him because this is intolerable.’ He also warned that any trade union attempting to pull out of the Congress would be struck from the register because under the IRA of 1971, affiliation to the ZCTU by registered trade unions was obligatory and not optional. Mwila complained that the attack was ‘personal and unfortunate’ because the view he expressed was that of the entire MUZ executive, and that although he lost as an individual, it was the entire MUZ that had lost.³⁰⁹

In 1976, MUZ faced another leadership wrangle, when a major row erupted, known as the “Walamba controversy”. It started when MUZ vice-chairman, Alexander Kamalondo, who was elected to the position in 1967, resigned to take up a new appointment as District Governor of Luanshya.³¹⁰ According to Rule 7 (J) of the MUZ constitution, Timothy Walamba who was Branch Chairman of the MUZ Konkola Branch in Chililabombwe should have filled the vacancy since he came second to Kamalondo in elections in 1967. MUZ Supreme Council did not want him in the position and decided to amend the constitution and hold elections. Government through the then Labour Commissioner Sacika, refused to allow the amendment just to block one individual. The controversy ended when the MUZ Supreme Council allowed

³⁰⁷ MLSS1/26/302: Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia, 1970-1971. See letter dated 30th November 1970 from the Assistant Labour Commissioner to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Labour and Social Services; Annual Labour Report 1973, p. 19; *Times of Zambia*, 1st May 1973. (See also issues of the *Times of Zambia* of May, June and July 1973); *Annual Labour Report* 1974, p. 19.

³⁰⁸ MLSS1/26/311: Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia, 1974-1977: MUZ Chairman David Mwila threatened to pull out of ZCTU after he lost elections for the post of Chairman of ZCTU.

³⁰⁹ *Annual Labour Report* 1974, p. 19; *Times of Zambia*, 03/12/74.

³¹⁰ MLSS1/26/311: Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia, 1974-1977. See also *Times of Zambia*, 30/12/75 & 09/01/76; *Zambia Daily Mail*, 09/01/76.

Walamba to take up the position,³¹¹ but this was another leadership wrangle that shook MUZ and highlighted the divisions that existed in the trade unions as well the trade union movement. It was after this wrangle that Mwila strongly accused the entire Ministry of Labour of being tribalistic and singled out the Minister, Banda, of spearheading tribal practises when dealing with MUZ.³¹²

When Chiluba was elected as President of the ZCTU in 1974, it became clear that he was a good choice for leader of ZCTU. In interviews with Shamenda and Alec Chirwa, both men attested to this and also Tentani Mwanza who wrote an article on this.³¹³ It was as “protector” of the underprivileged that Chiluba could state: “We must fight to the bitter end to preserve trade unionism in Zambia, because if we lose it that will be the end of us. We should not allow politicians to stay in office without delivering the goods to the workers.”³¹⁴ He further stated that he was happy to be in the trade union movement and that was why he had spurned all Government appointments, adding: “Although these have been offered, we have quietly said no, sir.”³¹⁵

Although at the start of his term of office as ZCTU president Chiluba in 1974 appealed to the government not to regard the ZCTU as a pressure group,³¹⁶ twelve years later in 1986 he not only regarded the ZCTU as a pressure group, but maintained that ZCTU participation in politics was crucial to maintain “checks and balances” to be essential to the democratic process.³¹⁷ The ZCTU General Secretary, Zimba, reinforced the argument that the movement ought to be a pressure group, when he appealed to the movement to fight for political autonomy

³¹¹ MLSS1/26/311: Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia, 1974-1977: Decision of Supreme Council of MUZ on Walamba; See also *Times of Zambia*, 25/03/76 & 26/03/76 & 31/03/76; *Zambia Daily Mail*, 26/03/76 & 31/03/76 & 02/04/76 & 03/04/76.

³¹² *Zambia Daily Mail*, 03/04/76.

³¹³ Interviews with Shamenda, 07/04/11 and Chirwa, 17/05/13; Tentani Mwanza, “Reminiscences of Chiluba,” <http://derricksinjelazambia2011.blogspot.com/2011/06/reminiscences-of-chiluba-by-tentani.html>. (Accessed on 18th December 2012.)

³¹⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 11/04/83.

³¹⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 11/04/83.

³¹⁶ See also *Times of Zambia*, 29/09/75.

³¹⁷ Liatto-Katundu, “The Role of the ZCTU in Zambian Politics”, p. 24.

and independence. He added that trade unions were aware of the consequences of selling their rights to become a transmission belt of UNIP policies. The movement in Zambia needed to maintain its true identity to operate with enough freedom under the pressure of the Party (UNIP). He stated: “The political leadership in Africa had now realised or was in the process of discovering that while trade unions and the ruling parties might be legs of the same body, they were not always marching in the same direction.” He further explained that the objectives of the trade union movement were to protect the job interests of its members and planning for development for improved living standards. The trade union movement had the duty to understand government policies, to influence them positively and to work within that framework to promote economic and political development.³¹⁸

Reuben Kamanga, the Chairman of the Political and Legal Sub-Committee of the UNIP Central Committee, reacted to Zimba’s statement by challenging ZCTU to come out in the open and state whether it was no longer loyal to the Party and its Government. He stated that since UNIP was the only party in the country he did not know what Zimba was talking about when he called for political autonomy and the independence of the trade union movement. He argued that it was wrong for the ZCTU leadership to claim to have the interests of the workers at heart more than the Party and its Government had. He pointed out that in case some people had forgotten, ZCTU was a UNIP initiative and therefore it made no sense to him when some people talked as though the Party was indifferent to the welfare of the workers.³¹⁹

In its editorial comment, the *Times of Zambia* of 15th August 1983 reinforced Kamanga’s stance that the ZCTU was UNIP’s “baby” and therefore should be loyal to its “parent”. It stated that the ZCTU should be told in plain parental language that it was a limb of UNIP to which it owed its existence. Had it not been for UNIP being a mass party concerned

³¹⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 15/08/83.

³¹⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 18/08/83.

with every Zambian's welfare ZCTU would not have been created. The trade union movement was born out of the Party and as a result of that UNIP was more concerned with the workers' welfare than those in ZCTU who professed to be champions of the workers. The ZCTU was accused of failing to come up with a constructive employment-creating plan and of instead being interested in fault-finding, collision and confrontation with the establishment no matter what good the latter did. By calling for "political autonomy and independence" it simply meant that the ZCTU wanted to break away from the Party. The paper advised that: "The ZCTU must not be seen to be a political pressure group, let alone an opposition movement using the subtle but bare cover of trade unionism."³²⁰

ZCTU denied being on a confrontation course with the Party and stated that it was fed up with people who twisted its stance on a number of issues. It attacked Kamanga for challenging its loyalty to the Party and its Government and added that it was absurd for people to suggest that ZCTU was a creation of UNIP as the history of trade unionism in Zambia preceded that of the Party. Zimba also accused the *Times of Zambia* of "hostile" reporting on ZCTU issues.³²¹ When we consider that ZCTU was not created from nothing, but came from what started as the African Trade Union Congress (TUC), and then the Reformed Trade Union Congress (RTUC) and the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC), Zimba's observation was correct. It was true that the trade union movement entered the independence period in a troubled state, but the fact was that it had existed before African political parties were formed. However, the role of the government using legislation to help strengthen the trade union movement cannot be ignored. The issue of whether or not UNIP intended to weaken the trade union movement by taking it over, took centre stage in early 1984, with UNIP denying it ever had such intentions. In spite of UNIP's denials, the ZCTU insisted the Party wanted to turn it into

³²⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 18/08/83.

³²¹ *Times of Zambia*, 19/08/83.

a mass organisation and vowed not to budge in its rejection of the move, as the idea was “dictatorship” and was “unwelcome”.³²²

Zimba continued the argument when he stated that trade unions in independent Africa were in danger of either being taken over or controlled by governments to make them responsive to pressures of the ruling political parties. The friction between trade union movements and governments was often over the pursuit of economic policies. After the change to one-party rule some leaders in Zambia had expressed fears that there was a danger in the formations of powerful economic classes by entrepreneurs on one hand and a highly organised working class on the other.³²³

Prime Minister Mundia reminded the movement that it was recognised as the strongest in Africa because of deliberate legislation formulated by the Party and its Government after independence. The labour leaders were therefore asked to appreciate the role the Government played in enabling the workers to have a strong voice. He stated that he was yet to hear of an African country that had passed a law to allow for a “check-off” system so that union membership dues were deducted from salaries and sent to the relevant trade unions directly. It was the “check-off” system which had enabled the unions in Zambia to be financially strong. He added: “We are still doing things which strengthen the movement. If we had not intended it to be strong, we would not have done unusual things which other African countries haven’t done.” He pointed out that he knew what he was talking about because at the time of the enactment of the legislation which helped to strengthen the movement, he was the Minister of Labour and Social Development and he played an active part in the enactment.³²⁴ As Minister

³²² *Times of Zambia*, 21/01/84 & 23/01/84; *Times of Zambia*, 13/02/84; *Times, of Zambia*, 14th February 1984; *Times of Zambia*, 25th February 1984.

³²³ *Times of Zambia*, 22nd August 1984.

³²⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 24th September 1984.

of Labour and Social Development, he appointed the first Executive Committee of the ZCTU in 1965,³²⁵ and he also dissolved the UTUC,³²⁶ which was replaced by the ZCTU.

There was a contradiction that while the trade union movement did not want to be subordinated to UNIP, it wanted its members to have influence within the Party by encouraging them to contest Party positions in elections. Chiluba urged workers to participate fully in Party elections of 1984 as that was the only way to influence changes of the political direction of the country. Clearly, he was interested in changing the political direction of the country, just as Kaunda had alleged in 1981. Chiluba, who stated that he was speaking “strictly as ZCTU chairman” pointed out that the Congress had a political role to play in the affairs of the country and because of that he urged workers to take a keen interest in UNIP affairs. UNIP membership was a privileged position from which to influence the planning and policies of the Party. In order to emphasise that workers should take his message seriously, Chiluba stated further:

I would like workers to participate fully in the forthcoming Party elections and not to leave anything to chance. Some people hold the view that there is nothing one can do to influence change in a one-party state like the ones we have in Africa, but we feel that ours in Zambia is peculiar in that it allows changes to be made by the people according to their wishes.³²⁷

From the views Chiluba’s it is clear that he was being less than subtle. He was calling for change in the governance of Zambia while trying to appear as if he was just being a trade union leader and not dabbling in politics. It was clear that in 1984, he was truly a member of UNIP and believed in its “goodness”, but the views also underscored the assertion that the trade union movement was serious about being autonomous and independent of UNIP so that it could play

³²⁵ Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 363 of 1965, The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (Laws, Volume II, Cap 25)*, 12th November 1965.

³²⁶ Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 364 of 1965, The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (Laws, Volume II, Cap 25)*, Dissolution of Federation of Trade Unions, 12th November 1965.

³²⁷ *Times of Zambia*, 03/03/88; *Times of Zambia*, 17/03/84.

a major role in politics in the country. On the other hand, Chiluba's position appeared contradictory, when it was "noted that trade union members opposed to government policies had for a long time turned to Chiluba, the outspoken critic of the government. However, his opposition became muted from the time of his detention in 1981 and he always denied having any political ambitions."³²⁸ His denial was not believed because it had earlier been stated of him that he "was seen by some Bemba-speaking people as the volatile ZCTU leader who had acquired the leadership mantle from Simon Kapwepwe – even though he disavowed any such role."³²⁹ A link was also seen between Chiluba and Kapwepwe, and it was claimed that his "style was modelled on that of Kapwepwe."³³⁰

In 1984 Chiluba encouraged the workers to participate in UNIP elections, but in 1985, he again complained and threatened to resign as ZCTU chairman if UNIP turned the trade union movement into a mass organisation like the Women's or the Youth Leagues because that would introduce "political absolutism" which could kill criticism.³³¹ In February 1988, some backbenchers in Parliament accused Government of stifling the trade union movement and called for an improvement in relations between the two parties for peace and stability in the country. Government was accused of victimising some labour leaders just because they had refused to take up political appointments and had even withdrawn passports from unionists. It was pointed out that Government treated the labour leaders well before the introduction of the One-Party State because it had wanted support from them, but after the One-Party system was introduced, the labour leaders were treated as anti-Government elements and the Government had been suppressing the movement then. It was considered unfortunate that Government was ignoring the movement's contribution to the independence struggle. The Government's response was that as far as it was concerned relations between it and the movement were good.

³²⁸ *African Contemporary Record*, 1985-86, Vol. 18, p. B887.

³²⁹ *African Contemporary Record*, 1980-81, Vol. 13, p. B900.

³³⁰ *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 31, No. 20 (12th October 1990), p. 7.

³³¹ *Times of Zambia*, 09/02/85.

It accused some backbenchers of building a false rift between it and the movement. However, the movement agreed with the backbenchers.³³² In May 1990, a labour leader accused the Government of prolonging hostilities between it and the movement by, for example, insisting on refusing to lift the ban on the labour leaders to address Labour Day celebrations.³³³

The Fight for Labour Day Celebrations

As a result of wrangles between leaders in the trade union movement and the government, in 1985, trade union leaders were banned from addressing workers during Labour Day rallies. In 1987, the ZCTU threatened to boycott Labour Day celebrations unless Government stopped interfering by stopping labour leaders from making speeches. The Congress said it would not be cowed into submission despite Government's decision to ban labour leaders from being featured on radio and television programmes, as was common in *Apartheid* South Africa.³³⁴ Since the labour leaders did not have political power the ban remained in force to the end of the Second Republic in 1991.

The NUBEGW affair and Chiluba's position in the trade union movement

In 1987, there developed what we have called "the NUBEGW affair" when an attempt was made to weaken Chiluba's position in ZCTU, or perhaps in fact, to remove him from the leadership of his union, NUBEGW and ZCTU.³³⁵ We have called it the "NUBEGW Affair" because it was a significant part of the history of the trade union movement. If the plan to unseat Chiluba through the "NUBEGW Affair" had succeeded, Zambia's history would have taken a different trajectory. He would have had no power base as the carpet would have been swept

³³² *Times of Zambia*, 24/02/88; *Times of Zambia*, 25/02/88.

³³³ *Times of Zambia*, 05/05/90.

³³⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 27/04/85; *Times of Zambia*, 14/02/87.

³³⁵ For a summarised version of the "NUBEGW affair", see Friday E. Mulenga, "Fighting for democracy of the pocket: The labour movement in the Third Republic" in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar & Giacomo Macola (eds.), *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008), p. 246.

from under his feet and he would not have become President of Zambia. However, the trade union movement was strong enough to stand by him and resist moves to unseat him.

This move to unseat Chiluba was welcomed in political circles because since 1974, when he became the leader of ZCTU, Chiluba had been a strong and consistent critic of the UNIP Government whose economic policies were blamed for bringing hardships on the workers and the Zambian people in general. ZCTU through Zimba claimed that there were external forces trying to disrupt the operations of the trade union movement by destabilising Chiluba. It accused the Government of having formed a secret unit within its security organisation whose task was to infiltrate trade unions and influence leadership changes. UNIP's aim was to replace the leaders who were considered to be too radical with those who could be manipulated. The Secretary of State for Defence and Security, Alex Shapi, vehemently denied these charges,³³⁶ but *Africa Confidential* showed that there was indeed such a conspiracy, with the police Special Branch infiltrating NUBEGW. The secret police persuaded the NUBEGW executive to suspend him, the idea being to disqualify him from standing for election as a ZCTU official, which was open only to those who held a post in an affiliated union. ZNUT and ZUFIAW then adopted him and gave him senior positions in their unions.³³⁷

Despite denial from UNIP, a number of sources saw a conspiracy in the removal of the “charismatic” Chiluba from the leadership of the NUBEGW. His supporters saw his expulsion as part of UNIP's political machination and accused the party of infiltrating the union's executive. Meanwhile, Kaunda accused Chiluba's ZCTU of being close to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and some unnamed Western countries. He particularly accused Friedrich Brunke, the head of the West German Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which was close

³³⁶ *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January 1988), p. 4.

³³⁷ *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 31, No. 20 (12th October 1990), p. 7.

to the German Social Democratic Party, of funding ZCTU's anti-government stance and ordered him to leave the country in 1988.³³⁸

In the "NUBEGW affair", of September 1987, Chiluba was accused of failing to discharge his duties and some branch officials accused him of abuse of office. Chiluba issued a statement reported in the *Times of Zambia*, in which he stated that "if the charges will be proved, I'm ready to step down from the chairmanship of this union and the ZCTU because my leadership has never been or will never be for personal glory ... The constitution would take its full course if the call for my removal proved baseless."³³⁹ Chiluba was suspended from the union for three months for abuse of office.³⁴⁰ In October, the ZCTU extra-ordinary general council nullified the suspension and charged some NUBEGW officials with conspiracy to remove Chiluba from office unconstitutionally, and suspended them. Then Chiluba decided to sue the suspended NUBEGW officials. He said they had defamed him when they published "malicious" accusations against him in the national Press during the announcement of his suspension as national chairman.³⁴¹ The ZCTU was probing the union's General Secretary, Patrick Nzima and Luciano Mutale, the vice national chairman. In addition, the ZCTU charged five full-time employees of the union with "conspiracy" to remove Chiluba from office unconstitutionally and threw them out of the union. The five were Kester Kaamba, Anastasia Zambwe, Rogers Goma, Ricky Nyirenda and Mulunda. The Government intervened and nullified the ZCTU action. The Labour Commissioner, Musa Chitangala, argued that the IRA of 1971 under which the ZCTU was established did not give it or any of its institutions the power to suspend, let alone dissolve an executive committee of an affiliate union. The ZCTU then accused the Government of "stifling it" and using NUBEGW officials to undermine

³³⁸ *African Contemporary Record*, 1987-88, Vol. 20, p. B823; *Africa Confidential*, 22 Jan 1988, Vol. 29, No.2, pp. 4-5

³³⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 11/09/87.

³⁴⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 14/09/87.

³⁴¹ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 12/10/87 & *Times of Zambia*, 12/10/87.

Chiluba's position in the movement. Zimba insisted that section 15 clause 2 of the IRA was specific on the ZCTU's constitutional powers over affiliated unions.³⁴²

The IRA of 1971 at Section 15 (1) states that from the date of the commencement of the Act (a) every trade union which was in possession of a valid certificate of registration issued under the provisions of the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (i) would be deemed to have been duly registered under the 1971 Act as if it were in fact registered under the 1971 Act; and (ii) would be deemed to be a trade union duly affiliated to the Congress under the 1971 Act; (b) every trade union which was in possession of a valid certificate of registration issued under the provisions of the Trade Unions and Trade Unions Ordinance would be deemed to be a trade union duly affiliated to the Congress under the 1971 Act. (2) Stated that the trade union mentioned in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of subsection (1) would, upon such affiliation, be entitled to the rights and privileges, and be subject to the obligations, specified in the constitution of the Congress.³⁴³ Later Zimba argued that labour legislation had been violated in Zambia because of alleged failure by the IRA to define the legal rights of trade unions in the country. He stated that while the Act was commendable and enhanced the strength of the trade union movement, it had flaws.³⁴⁴

In December 1987 Chiluba was expelled together with nine other members from the NUBEGW for defying the union's general council's instructions to withdraw a Press statement he made on 11th September when he stated that he would step down from his position if the allegations of abuse of office against him were proved true and then warned that the constitution would take its course if the reports were proved baseless. The other reasons for his expulsion were that he had involved himself in union activities while on suspension and had

³⁴² *Times of Zambia*, 11/09/87 & 14/09/87; *Times of Zambia*, 11/10/87 & 12/10/87 & 22/10/87; *Times of Zambia*, 23/10/87 & 24/10/87; *Times of Zambia*, 12/12/87; 14/12/87 & 25/12/87.

³⁴³ *Industrial Relations Act of 1971*, Part II: Registration of Trade Unions, Section 15.

³⁴⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 12/12/87.

ignored normal established procedures of resolving his issue. Chiluba was invited to the meeting at which the decision to expel him was made, but he chose not to attend it.³⁴⁵

Zimba announced that because Chiluba had been elected by affiliates, under ZCTU constitution and the IRA his position in ZCTU was intact.³⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the trade union movement pledged to work with the Party and its Government in response to the UNIP National Council's challenge for unions to participate in the revival of the country's economy. Zimba stated that for the first time ever, the trade union movement was convinced that the words of the Party's leadership at the 22nd National Council were genuine. However, a few days later, Chiluba stated that the trade union movement was in disarray due to outside pressures. "We have lost courage due to some political mumblings. Our timidity to live and enjoy our rights under the Republican Constitution is fast leading the trade union movement to fall flat on its face." He urged the trade unionists not to give up under the pressure but to remain strong and fight for their rights.³⁴⁷

The internal division in NUBEGW was so deep that in 1988, "the NUBEGW affair" ended up in the Kitwe High Court and later the Supreme Court, which sat in Ndola. The Kitwe High Court ruled in favour of ZCTU, but the Supreme Court overturned the ruling. Rodger Chongwe was the lawyer for NUBEGW and Levy Mwanawasa was the lawyer for the ZCTU. The Deputy Chief Justice Matthew Ngulube, who sat as Acting Chief Justice, led the Supreme Court bench that also comprised Brian Gardner, who sat as Acting Deputy Chief Justice, and Matthew Chaila.³⁴⁸ Chiluba sued NUBEGW for wrongful suspension,³⁴⁹ but did not get back his post in NUBEGW. When he was re-elected Chairman-General of ZCTU in October 1990,

³⁴⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 14/12/87.

³⁴⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 25/12/87.

³⁴⁷ *Times of Zambia*, 31/12/87.

³⁴⁸ Luciano Mutale and Jackson Chomba v Newstead Zimba (1988-1989) Z.R. 64 (S.C.) Supreme Court, 13th September, 6th December 1988 (S.C.Z. Judgement No. 12 of 1988); *Times of Zambia*, 27/10/87 & 31/10/87
Times of Zambia, 27/02/88, *Times of Zambia*, 07/12/88; 09/12/88 & 17/12/88.

³⁴⁹ Luciano Mutale and Jackson Chomba v Newstead Zimba (1988-1989) Z.R. 64 (S.C.) Supreme Court, 13th September, 6th December 1988 (S.C.Z. Judgement No. 12 of 1988); *Times of Zambia*, 26/09/89.

he delivered an emotional victory speech that was centred mainly on his expulsion from NUBEGW, which used to be his springboard to the ZCTU position. He told the crowd that included Luciano Mutale, who led the fight to remove him from NUBEGW that he had been saved only because God had sent angels to redeem him through Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW) that had co-opted him as a Trustee to enable him remain in the movement.³⁵⁰ Alec Chirwa argued that it was not correct to state that ZUFIAW saved Chiluba's career in the movement because as Chairman of ZCTU, he would have been a delegate to the General Conference and he would have been allowed to contest elections.³⁵¹

Zimba considered it unfortunate that an "ill wind" was attacking some trade union leaders. He did not make any direct reference to the expulsion from the NUBEGW of Chiluba but added that it was strange that "some people had abandoned their responsibilities and were dancing to the tune of their masters", but did not identify the "masters".³⁵² A Director at ZCTU stated that after the NUBEGW affair, the ZCTU did not fire Chiluba after losing the court case because the government would have taken advantage and put their man in as ZCTU president. The ZCTU stood by Chiluba to ensure the trade union movement remained strong.³⁵³

Apart from the "NUBEGW Affair" there were also wrangles between the ZCTU and RWUZ in 1985,³⁵⁴ and the National Union of Transport and Allied Workers (NUTAW) in June 1986,³⁵⁵ but these were not as serious as the "NUBEGW Affair" that had threatened to shift the power base in the trade union movement. In October 1987, the ZCTU warned that it would deal ruthlessly with affiliated unions contesting its decisions. This was in reaction to the flurry of criticism over the way the Congress handled wrangles with affiliated unions. The

³⁵⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 29/10/90.

³⁵¹ Interview with Chirwa, Lusaka, 17/05/13.

³⁵² See for example: *Times of Zambia*, 15/12/87.

³⁵³ Anonymous – A Director at ZCTU, in a discussion on 6th May 2014 at ZCTU Headquarters.

³⁵⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 20/03/85 & 22/04/85.

³⁵⁵ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 18/10/87.

Government advised the ZCTU to exercise its authority over affiliates through influence, and not by bullying them, which aroused resentment.³⁵⁶

The Trade union movement and Opposition to UNIP

There has been a flurry of writing on this theme because it has interested scholars.³⁵⁷ The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the political changes that followed that collapse in Eastern Europe encouraged many groups in Zambia to call for an end to one party rule. The trade union movement was the first group to take advantage of the change in Eastern Europe. Chiluba, was quoted stating that if the owners of one party regimes had abandoned the system why could Zambia not do the same.³⁵⁸ The ZCTU's General Council had resolved in December 1989 to work towards the immediate re-introduction of multi-party politics. This was a demand that ZCTU submitted to the special UNIP National Convention in March 1990 called to discuss democratisation.³⁵⁹ The UNIP leadership and Kaunda in particular, because he had failed to appreciate the shifting political currents developing around him, opposed these demands. But mounting internal and external pressure – and a renewed outbreak of rioting in June 1990, caused by an increase in mealie meal prices – forced the government to change its political direction. In July 1990, it lifted the ban on the right by opposition groups to form and organise political parties, and within days the MMD was launched, with Chiluba as Vice-Chairman.³⁶⁰

The MMD won the support of the trade union movement because Chiluba became the leader of both the MMD and the trade union movement. In interviews, some trade union leaders stated that the MMD was seen as the party that would protect and promote the interests of the

³⁵⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 19/10/87; 23/10/87 & 24/10/87.

³⁵⁷ See for example, Carolyn Baylies & Morris Szeftel, "The Fall and Rise of Multi-Party Politics in Zambia", *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 54, 1992; Michael Bratton, "Zambia Starts Over", *Journal of Democracy*, (April) 1992; Rakner, "Trade Unions in the Process of Democratisation"; Akwetey, *Trade Unions and Democratisation*; Mihyo, "Against Overwhelming Odds"; Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation"

³⁵⁸ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 1st January 1990.

³⁵⁹ Zambia Congress of Trade Unions – written submission to the Fifth National Convention on Political and Economic Reforms, 14-16 March 1990 held at Mulungushi International Conference Centre, Lusaka, p.2.

³⁶⁰ Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation", pp. 9-10; *African Contemporary Record*, 1989-90, Vol. 22, p. B673; *African Contemporary Record*, 1989-90, Vol. 22, p. B673.

workers better. The workers and the trade union movement had great expectations of seeing the wages and conditions of service improve.³⁶¹ The UNIP leadership was unhappy with the trade union movement's support of MMD. Secretary of State for Defence and Security in the UNIP Central Committee, Alex Shapi, and both UNIP Secretary General, Grey Zulu and Prime Minister, General Malimba Masheke, threatened that the Government would cancel the check-off system to punish the ZCTU for allegedly misusing workers' funds and time on the campaign for multi-party democracy. Zulu warned the ZCTU not "to bite the finger that feeds them."³⁶²

As the fight for the return to multi-party politics became heated up, wrangles between the trade union movement and the politicians in UNIP intensified. The CSUZ warned UNIP leaders against intimidating Government workers supporting the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in the country. The chairman of the legal sub-committee of the MMD, Levy Mwanawasa appealed to the Inspector-General of Police, Zunga Siakalima to arrest both Zulu and Masheke. He complained that the two UNIP leaders had contravened referendum regulations and had, thereby violated the rights of workers, their unions, and those of Members of Parliament and other citizens.³⁶³ A referendum was to be held in 1990 to decide the question of Zambia's return to multi-party democracy, but owing to pressure from pro-democracy advocates, Kaunda cancelled the referendum, allowed the amendment of the constitution to allow for the formation of other political parties and Zambia went to elections in October 1991, which the MMD won to usher in the Third Republic. As has been shown, the trade union movement warmly welcomed the MMD government led by Chiluba who was regarded as 'one of them', that is one of the workers.

³⁶¹ Interviews with Shamenda, Lusaka, 07/04/11; Joyce Nonde, Lusaka, 09/05/11; Chirwa, Lusaka, 17/05/13; & Hikaumba, Lusaka, 24/05/13.

³⁶² *Times of Zambia*, 21/08/90 & 23/08/90.

³⁶³ *Times of Zambia*, 01/09/90 & 04/09/90.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the relationship between the trade union movement and UNIP and its government in the period 1965 to 1991. There were a number of issues that impacted that relationship. The labour policies the government implemented, was one. The attempts by UNIP to introduce the vetting of candidates for the elections to ZCTU executive positions and the enactment of the UNIP constitution of 1978 were the other issues. There was also the Local Government Act of 1980, the ban by the government for trade union leaders to address Labour Day rallies and the move to weaken the trade union movement by removing Chiluba from the leadership of the trade union movement by first removing him from the leadership of the National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers (NUBEGW). Finally, there was the breakdown of the relationship between UNIP and the trade union movement and the fight for the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in the country. These are the issues tackled in this chapter to show the trade union movement and workers' struggles in Zambia. A number of conclusions were drawn from the discussion of the various issues in the chapter.

In 1965, 1971 and 1990, the government enacted labour laws which were meant to give it a say in the way trade unions in Zambia conducted their affairs. The 1965 Act was meant to change what the colonial government had put in place in terms of control of labour. However, that was not adequate and therefore, in 1971, a new Act was enacted which was meant to completely domesticate and control the trade union movement. Domestication meant making the trade union movement completely Zambian by making it relevant to Zambia's developmental needs. The movement did become Zambian in that it began to articulate issues on the politics and economy of the country. The attempt by UNIP to control the movement so that it could toe the party line, led to clashes between the Party and its Government and the movement.

The government of Zambia wanted to enact labour policies which would make the movement become part of the production ethic, which meant working towards increasing production of goods and services to produce wealth and alleviate poverty. This meant that the government should control the movement. The urban workers who were mainly members of trade unions were supposed to ensure that their demands for improved wages and conditions of service did not deter rural development. However, the workers, through their unions were prepared to fight to improve their own situations without referring to rural populations.

The 1971 IRA had the unintended result of making the Zambian trade union movement one of the best organised and one of the strongest in Africa. There were, of course, some internal problems which sometimes affected that running of the unions, for example, financial problems as a result of poor handling of money by unions or weak leadership in individual unions, and the wrangling between the mother body of unions and affiliate unionism for example, ZCTU had wrangles with MUZ, NUBEGW and NUTAW. However, with the ascendancy of Chiluba as president of ZCTU and Zimba as General Secretary in 1974, the movement had a strong leadership which managed to fight for autonomy and independence from control by UNIP. Attempts by the government to weaken the movement by destabilising Chiluba through having him removed as leader of the NUBEGW, did not succeed.

The movement was strong enough to resist UNIP's attempt to be vetting candidates for positions in ZCTU executive or to turn it into a wing of UNIP to be like the Youth League and Women's League. The movement did not succeed in stopping UNIP and its government from banning labour leaders from addressing Labour Day rallies, but this did not in any way weaken it. It also engaged UNIP and its Government in a debate over the 1980 Local Government Act. In the end Government gave in to some demands and the Act came into effect in January 1981.

In spite of the problems the movement faced in organisation and finances or with weak leadership in some individual unions, the movement managed to maintain a semblance of

autonomy and it was strong enough to be one of the major players in the fight for the re-introduction of multi-party politics or democracy in the country. The movement even provided the presidential candidate for the MMD.

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMIC CHALLENGES ON THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT 1980 TO 2011

Introduction

The previous chapter examined some of the issues which the trade union movement grappled with in order to remain autonomous so as to be in a position to fight for workers' social, political and economic rights. The focus of this chapter is to analyse the impact of privatisation on the trade union movement. In this regard it examined the challenges of economic liberalisation on the trade union movement from 1980 to take in the Kaunda era when such policies started up to 2011 to take in the Chiluba era when economic liberalisation was seriously carried out. The chapter then examined the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) starting with the SAPs attempted by the Kaunda regime to those attempted by the Chiluba regime, and continued by the Mwanawasa and Rupiah Banda regimes. The chapter shows that these economic liberalisation policies posed serious challenges on the trade union movement from 1980 to 2011. The challenges of economic liberalisation made the question of fighting for autonomy of the trade union movement almost irrelevant. This was because although it is axiomatic that trade union movements fight for social and economic well-being of their members, this time around, the trade union movement had to engage in a new fight. It had to ensure that the few jobs which remained after economic reforms were carried out were not lost and its members could still hang on to the few jobs remaining and that those retrenched were given good severance packages. This chapter has six sections including an introduction and a conclusion.

Structural Adjustment Programmes

From 1980, the IMF and the World Bank encouraged developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to undertake economic liberalisation to institute greater economic stability, growth and ultimately, poverty alleviation. The economic challenges which came to

affect the workers in Zambia could be historically traced to the economic problems which affected Zambia from 1975 but which worsened from around 1980.

Before 1975 the Government either ran budget surpluses or financed its modest deficits with medium to long-term loans from domestic and foreign sources. The collapse of copper prices in 1975 reduced the revenue from mineral taxes. With reduced mineral revenues in the years which followed, the government ran large deficits which it could only finance by short-term borrowing, largely from the Bank of Zambia, equivalent to 16.9 percent of GDP in 1975 and fell only to 11.8 percent in 1978. This trend of borrowing from the Bank of Zambia was stopped in 1978 and 1979 with the help of standby facility from the IMF. However, the relief proved short-lived as government expenditure continued to outstrip revenue as a result of subsidies on maize and fertiliser and on higher wages from August 1980.³⁶⁴

Over the period 1975 to 1980, the economy suffered massive contraction largely as a result of the world energy crisis and the vulnerability of the economy due to its heavy reliance on mineral receipts as demand for industrial inputs such as copper reduced. Falling export receipts and rising import prices resulted in high balance of payments deficits. In an effort to maintain import levels, the government borrowed from external sources resulting in huge foreign debt. Rising production and import costs led to high inflation rates and a reduction in formal sector employment. This led to disequilibrium in the economy which necessitated the adoption of the structural adjustment programme under the IMF and the World Bank. However, adjustment efforts in the 1980s were characterised by several policy shifts which saw the programme suspended very often.³⁶⁵ Many factors could be cited for this sudden collapse of a

³⁶⁴ Bank of Zambia – *Republic of Zambia: Financial Report, February 1983* (Ndola: Printpak, 1983), p. 10.

³⁶⁵ Government of the Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office, *Living Conditions in Zambia – 1998*; Zambia 1991 Child Labour Survey, Country Report (International Labour Organisation, *International Programme for Elimination of Child Labour/Republic of Zambia*, Central Statistical Office, 1999).

once promising African economy, but probably the most important and easiest to cite was the steady decline in the buying power of Zambia's copper on the world market.³⁶⁶

The performance of the Zambian economy during the period of the Third National Development Plan (TNDP), 1980-1984 as measured by the real GDP was unsatisfactory. The actual growth rate of 0.06 percent fell short of the projected growth rate of 4.8 percent per annum. The main factors which contributed to this poor performance included a decline in investment levels and volume of imports due mainly to problems of acquiring foreign exchange. An analysis of the sectors of the economy during the TNDP showed that the performance of the major sectors of the economy, namely, mining, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, transport and communications was disappointing. The actual growth rates in these sectors fell short of the planned targets. The performance of the mining industry as a whole fell below expectation despite the high proportionate level of investment which accounted for 31 percent of the total aggregate investment which took place in the economy during the TNDP. The TNDP had envisaged an average annual level of copper output of 690,000 tonnes as compared to the actual 550,000 tonnes produced.³⁶⁷

Between 1986 and 1989, the economy continued to decline with falling employment levels and major industries such as mining unable to employ extra labour as operational costs rose. Other companies even cut down on production for lack of raw materials and spare parts. The measures put in place by the government to improve the economy did not work.³⁶⁸

The problem of unemployment at this point was made worse by both the contraction in employment opportunities and the growth in the labour force. The fact that the problem of unemployment was very huge could be seen in the fact that formal sector employment would

³⁶⁶ Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity*, p. 7; Rakner, *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001*, pp. 53-62.

³⁶⁷ Government of the Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme, Interim National Development Plan, July 1987-December 1988* (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1988), p. 1.

³⁶⁸ *Annual Labour Report 1986*, p. 5; *Annual Labour Report 1989*, p. 9.

have had to grow at an annual rate of 15 to 17 percent to absorb new additions to the labour force. This task could not conceivably have been achieved in the short to medium term and it was in this respect that the role of the informal sector in employment creation became important. The formal sector had shown little capacity to create new jobs from around 1980. The 1986 CSO Labour Force Survey defined the informal sector broadly as consisting of all subsistence farmers, all own account workers, and all employers in unlicensed and unregistered business. The Labour Force Survey estimated that there were 1.83 million persons in the informal sector in 1986. The total employment comprised 2.36 million persons constituting 87 percent of the labour force. The total employment in turn consisted of 54.4 percent in the subsistence sector, 22 percent in non-subsistence informal activities and 23 percent in the formal sector.³⁶⁹

According to the categorisation of employed persons used in 1986 in the Labour Force Survey, there were about 0.35 million unemployed persons in the economy constituting 13 percent of the labour force which statistically implied that there was no significant unemployment problem. However, that was misleading and could result in undue emphasis being placed on the role of the informal sector as the solution to the problem of unemployment and economic stagnation. The informal sector was not to be seen as the solution to the problem of unemployment and economic stagnation because it was characterised by a high degree of underemployment, lengthy hours of work and generally low remuneration for work. The goals of economic growth and development implied increased productivity, higher incomes and greater structural coherence of the economy. It was therefore essential to focus on and promote those policies which would generate efficiency and growth in output, incomes and employment.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁹ *Country Profile: Zambia 1989/1990*, pp. 30-31.

³⁷⁰ *Country Profile: Zambia 1989/1990*, p. 31.

As a result of the prolonged economic decline Zambia faced from the mid-1980s the country embarked on structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) to correct the situation. The main thrust of these programmes was reduction in the budget deficits, tight fiscal measures such as cuts in spending and shifting resources to the economic sectors from consumption, reduction in the size of the civil service, tight monetary policies, liberalisation of both the interest and foreign exchange rates and liberalisation of the economy through emphasis on the growth of the private sector. Reform of the parastatals and privatisation were also some of the strategies. In an effort to cut government spending and shift resources to the more productive sector, spending on the social sectors, health and education, for example, suffered greatly.³⁷¹

Structural Adjustment Programmes in the Kaunda Era

The Kaunda government was said to have been reluctant to promote economic reform because the country benefitted from the buoyant world demand for copper together with the expanding mine production during the first decade of independence, 1964-1974. However, as the economic problems increased from 1975, those people who could take their resources out of Zambia did so. The result was capital flight from the mid-1970s onwards which resulted in Zambia losing an estimated \$12 billion. The government responded to the economic decline with several attempts at economic reform. Internationally-supported economic reform programmes were undertaken in 1978, 1980, 1981, 1984, 1985, 1989, and 1991,³⁷² with little success and this led to the fall of UNIP. An IMF supported austerity programme, the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), which included removing maize subsidies over a two-year period was implemented too quickly and the maize subsidy was removed at one go rather than gradually. This increased the price of breakfast mealie meal, from which *nshima*, the staple food is cooked, from K19.15 for a 25 kg bag to K38.35 and from K37.32 for a 50 kg bag to

³⁷¹ Zambia Human Development Report 1998, UNDP, Lusaka, December 1998.

³⁷² McPherson, "The Sequencing of Economic Reforms: Lessons from Zambia", p. 8-9.

K76.30.³⁷³ The result was fierce widespread rioting and looting on the Copperbelt between 6th and 8th December 1986. At least fifteen people were killed and many more injured. Property worth millions of Kwacha was destroyed. In Kaunda's own words, "There was acute public resistance," and the *National Mirror* opined that "December 1986 marked the beginning of the end of the Kaunda regime."³⁷⁴

Through Statutory Instrument No. 207 of 1986, the riots were repressed through imposing a curfew on the Copperbelt and using both the police and the army.³⁷⁵ The government reinstated the mealie meal subsidy. However, by Kaunda's own admission, although the price of mealie meal was subsidised, it was still out of reach of the population, particularly the urban poor. As he observed, "This makes mealie meal pricing such a sensitive matter in Zambia."³⁷⁶ There was no doubt that the mealie meal question contributed significantly to Dr. Kaunda's devastating loss in the presidential and general elections held on 31st October 1991.³⁷⁷ Kaunda stated in an interview that he hoped the IMF could devise an adjustment programme which would not require him to shoot Zambian citizens.³⁷⁸

The reinstatement of the mealie meal subsidy led to so much tension between the IMF and the Zambian government that Kaunda chose the annual Labour Day celebrations on 1st May 1987, to announce that Zambia had broken off relations with the IMF and the World Bank. Kaunda also announced government's intention to "go it alone" under the auspices of a New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP).³⁷⁹ When announcing the break with IMF policies and the launch of NERP, Kaunda stated that Zambia had discontinued the IMF programme of her

³⁷³ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session (Resumed) of the Fifth National Assembly*, 9th-19th December 1986 (Ministerial Statement by the Prime Minister Mr. Kebby Musokotwane, Wednesday, 10th December 1986); *Times of Zambia*, 12/12/86.

³⁷⁴ *National Mirror*, No. 413, 06/04/92.

³⁷⁵ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session (Resumed) of the Fifth National Assembly*, 9th-19th December 1986 (Ministerial Statement); *Times of Zambia*, 09/12/86; *Times of Zambia*, 10/12/86; *Times of Zambia*, 15/12/86; *Times of Zambia*, 16/12/86.

³⁷⁶ *National Mirror*, No. 413, 06/04/92.

³⁷⁷ *National Mirror*, No. 413, 06/04/92.

³⁷⁸ Baylies and Szeftel, "Democratization and the 1991 Elections in Zambia", p. 87.

³⁷⁹ Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation", p. 9; *The Post*, Friday, 02/05/95.

own free choice just as she had entered into the programme of her own free choice. The course taken was necessitated by the realities of the situation which the country faced and by considerations of national survival. Kaunda hoped the international community would judge Zambia fairly in the measures she had taken or at least allow the people of Zambia the freedom to shape their own destiny and also continue to support Zambia as before.³⁸⁰ In search of international support for the NERP, Prime Minister Kebby Musokotwane visited Britain, France, Iraq, Bulgaria and Japan to solicit for support. He returned and stated that his tour had been successful as most of the countries he visited were willing to help in the interim national development plan.³⁸¹ The theme of NERP was “Growth from Own Resources” and it represented the country’s commitment to self-reliance in all areas of human activity in line with the objectives of the philosophy of Humanism.³⁸² The failure to achieve the objective of stabilising the economy through NERP was not because the price control policy had failed; the failure was as a result of structural problems of the Zambian economy.³⁸³ While in Budapest, Hungary, Kaunda announced that his Government would reduce subsidies as soon as the country was able to pay its workers good salaries.³⁸⁴

Dr. Alassane Ouattara, Counsellor and Director of the African desk at the IMF stated that the organisation believed that Zambia’s interim economic restructuring programme (NERP) contained both weak and good points whose successful implementation were difficult

³⁸⁰ Government of the Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme, Fourth National Development Plan 1989-1993, Vol. I & Vol. II, Office of the President, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, January 1989*; Government of the Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme, Interim National Development Plan, July 1987-December 1988* (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1988.)

³⁸¹ *Times of Zambia*, 28/09/87.

³⁸² Government of the Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme, Interim National Development Plan, Progress Report No. 2, July 1987-March 1988* (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1988), pp. 54-59; Government of the Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme, Interim National Development Plan, July 1987-December 1988* (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1988).

³⁸³ *New Economic Recovery Programme, Interim National Development Plan, Progress Report No. 2, July 1987 – March 1988*, pp. 54-59; *New Economic Recovery Programme, Interim National Development Plan, July 1987-December 1988*.

³⁸⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 29/09/87.

to predict.³⁸⁵ NERP soon proved unworkable as the country faced growing inflation and a mounting budget deficit. The decision to “go it alone” and particularly the decision to limit debt servicing alarmed the foreign donors and they therefore mounted a propaganda campaign against Zambia. Most of the foreign donors refused to support NERP and they urged Zambia to return to the IMF/World Bank fold. The IMF and the World Bank in particular were in the forefront in campaigning against NERP. The country was isolated from the international donor community and that led to a sharp decline of foreign assistance from around US \$500 million a year to only US \$150 million.

Kaunda warned that the Government would revoke licences of traders convicted of overcharging and supporting the black market. He said “greedy” businessmen, marketeers and other traders had made Zambia’s difficult economic situation worse through overcharging. “We are sick and tired of these merciless exploiters. We must put a stop to it. This is the final warning and I want to warn them very seriously.” Any businessman who received essential goods produced by State enterprises and was convicted in a court of law for overcharging would have his licence revoked. He added that if he had no power to revoke a licence, he would ask Parliament to give him that power.³⁸⁶ Indeed some businessmen were arrested and charged for overcharging. Charles Kalaluka, a businessman in Senanga was fined K2,600 for overcharging on mealie meal for selling a 25kg bag of roller meal for K50 instead of K15.50. In Luanshya, the District Governor Boyd Kasenga announced that the District Council had compiled a list of businessmen who were convicted for overcharging on controlled goods. The list was to be forwarded to authorities responsible for granting trading licences.³⁸⁷

It was also at this time that Kaunda announced that the Government was considering introducing subsidised shops for the poor. He said that the “fair price shops” would be heavily

³⁸⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 30/09/87.

³⁸⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 16/09/87.

³⁸⁷ *Times of Zambia*, 24/09/87.

supported by the state, a method that was in use in Pakistan and India. The policy on shops for the poor would be a sharp departure from the previous practice where “everybody” was subsidised. Kaunda stated: “At the moment we are subsidising everybody from the rich, the poor to some neighbouring countries through smugglers. We only want the poor to be subsidised. Let the rich pay for themselves. Those who can afford should pay economic prices.”³⁸⁸The idea of the shops for the poor was never implemented.

From 1st January 1989, the Government implemented the mealie meal coupon system through which the poorest urban consumers were to receive mealie meal upon production of a coupon. The aim was of the coupon system was to cushion this group of urban people from the effects of structural adjustment and to reduce the large budget deficit. In spite of the good intentions of the system, from its beginning the Government was concerned about its own cost, efficiency and effectiveness, as well as the capacity of the programme to the worsening economic conditions of the poor urban dwellers.³⁸⁹ The coupon system enabled the people in the low income group buy mealie meal at a subsidised price and it was also aimed at fighting smuggling and black marketeering. A 25kg bag of breakfast mealie meal cost K56 and a 25kg bag of roller meal cost K41.00.³⁹⁰

The coupon system brought with it problems of cost, efficiency and effectiveness. The Government was concerned about this. It is not surprising that the programme was discontinued when the MMD came to power. Meanwhile, by 1989 the government was in trouble. It was forced back into the arms of the IMF and the World Bank. It was given serious conditions which had to be fulfilled between 1989 and 1993. The IMF and the World Bank formulated the Economic and Financial Policy Framework Paper (PFP) for 1989 to 1993. The PFP came

³⁸⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 21/09/87.

³⁸⁹ Gary L. Stampley, “Demographic and Expenditure Profiles of Zambian Households: Evidence from June 1991 Zambian Household Expenditure and Income Survey,” Staff Report 93-SR 63, September 1993.

(www.card.iastate.edu/publication<pdf – Accessed on 15/11/17); *National Mirror*, No. 413, 06/04/92.

³⁹⁰ “Coupons and the Poor,” *Workers’ Challenge*, March/April 1989.

about through the government launching the Fourth National Development Plan (FNDP) in January 1989. The FNDP was an attempt to arrest the decline of the economy and to restructure it.³⁹¹ In June 1989, the government abolished, in one stroke, all price controls except those on maize, maize-meal and fertiliser. The measures initially introduced shock to the system, but in the end resulted in the virtual elimination of the black market, encouraged private sector activity and eased supply constraints.³⁹² The implementation of some of the PFP measures had an adverse impact on living standards of large sections of the population, for example, the prices of maize and mealie meal went up and inflation also increased. Zambia's debt, which was US \$3.2 billion in 1980, also rose to US \$4.6 billion in 1985 to US \$6.6 billion in 1987 and to US \$7.2 billion in 1989.³⁹³

The government also embarked on a programme of mass retrenchment of workers from the parastatal companies and the government. In May 1991, Kaunda unsuccessfully tried to persuade the donors to allow the Government to postpone the implementation of maize subsidies for six months. This was because he felt that if mealie meal prices were to rise drastically with the elections scheduled for November 1991, there might be violence similar to that in December 1986. When the government tried again to phase out subsidies and increase the price of mealie meal by over a hundred percent, a nation-wide revolt broke out in June 1990 and included an attempted military coup organised by Mwamba Luchembe. The revolt took a political complexion through the MMD, which most labour leaders joined.³⁹⁴

³⁹¹ Government of the Republic of Zambia, *His Excellency the President's Address to Parliament on the Opening of the Second Session of the Fifth National Assembly, 11th January 1985* (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1985); Republic of Zambia, *Progress Report on the Implementation of Economic Measures, Consultative Group for Zambia, April 1990*, p. 2; van de Walle & Chiwele, "Democratic and Economic Reform in Zambia," November 4, 1994.

³⁹² Government of the Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme, Economic and Financial Policy Framework, 1991-1993*, Ministry of Finance and National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, April 1991.

³⁹³ Bank of Zambia, *Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year ended December 31, 1987*. Note: The Bank of Zambia figures for 1986 were \$5.02 billion and \$5.2 billion respectively.

³⁹⁴ *New Economic Recovery Programme, Interim National Development Plan, July 1987-December 1988*; Van de Walle & Chiwele, "Democratic and Economic Reform in Zambia"; *National Mirror*, No. 413, 06/04/92.

Structural Adjustment Programmes in the Chiluba Era

The aim of this section is to show that the MMD Government which the movement supported later implemented economic measures which hurt the workers very much. After 1991, with the coming to power of the MMD the labour market quickly changed. The workers found themselves under attack from new economic forces brought in by the SAP which the Government vigorously implemented from February 1992, and which entailed privatisation and liberalisation. This was because in spite of playing a central role in the successful transition to liberal democracy, the movement was ditched by the government, which changed labour laws hurriedly in 1993 with little consultation with the movement. Before this, there was a tripartite arrangement through which the Government, the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE) and the movement through ZCTU met and discussed economic policy. As a result of the change after 1991, the government, elected on a platform of committed free market reform, was relatively unconstrained by labour and embarked on “one of the most ambitious economic reform programmes on the African continent” with high social costs³⁹⁵ to the workers and the great mass of the people. Zambia became the only country in Eastern and Southern Africa whose economy was completely liberalised.

The justification for economic reform was that in order to compete in the global market economic reform in Zambia was unavoidable.³⁹⁶ A government document stated that:

The people of Zambia inaugurated a new economic and political era when they went to the polls on October 31, 1991. By an overwhelming majority, they voted into power a party – the MMD – committed to an open political system in which human rights would be protected and to an open-market economy in which private initiative would be encouraged and rewarded.³⁹⁷

Implied in the statement above is that by voting for MMD, the Zambians chose for themselves the implementation of harsh economic measures to improve the economy and their livelihoods.

³⁹⁵ Adler and Webster, “Bargained Liberalisation”, p. 2.

³⁹⁶ “Zambia: Deregulation and the denial of human rights”: Submission to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, March 2000. (Unpublished Paper).

³⁹⁷ *New Economic Recovery Programme, Economic and Financial Policy Framework, 1992-1994*, p. 1.

Chiluba's government adopted fully-fledged SAPs³⁹⁸ and implemented economic reforms more rapidly than the Kaunda government, or any other African government for that matter, earning the reputation of a model liberalising economy. Such a reputation allowed the government to borrow heavily from the donor community, to offset deficient export earnings and to finance development. When MMD took over Government in 1991, Zambia's debt was US \$6.7 billion. It dropped to US \$5.0 billion and US \$5.1 billion in 1992 and 1993, but by the end of Chiluba's first term in 1996, it had risen to US\$7.0 billion.³⁹⁹

In February 1992, the government formally embarked on an IMF/World Bank supported structural adjustment and economic reform programme. An agreement was reached with the IMF and the World Bank on a Policy Framework Paper for 1992-1994. The agreement outlined a comprehensive policy on reforms for stabilising and restructuring the economy and stimulating growth. SAP included privatisation of parastatal companies; liberalisation of domestic and international trade; liberalisation of the foreign exchange market; strong fiscal policy which included government operating on a cash budget to reduce inflation; health and education sector reforms, which included the re-introduction of user fees; transformation of the Civil Service; transformation of the agriculture and transport sectors; stringent revenue collection through Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) and introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT).⁴⁰⁰

The trade union movement saw SAP as the cause of the problems the people of Zambia were facing, and therefore, persistently called on the government to review its stand on it. Its argument was that the trend in which thousands of jobs were being lost was having serious adverse social effects on the people. It therefore, called on the government to U-turn on SAP

³⁹⁸ For a detailed discussion of economic reforms during the Chiluba era, see Rakner, *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001*, pp. 67-102.

³⁹⁹ Bank of Zambia *Annual Reports, 1993 & 1996*.

⁴⁰⁰ Central Statistical Office, *Living Conditions – 1998*; Zambia Human Development Report 1998, United Nations Development Programme, December 1998, p. 24;

in sympathy with the suffering people of Zambia. The SAP which the MMD Government began to implement in February 1992 was merely continuing the UNIP government's NERP. Key institutions and underlying laws were reformed at a fast pace in two broad and overlapping phases of liberalisation and privatisation. In a drive to liberalise the economy, subsidies and price controls were eliminated, controls on the quantity of imports allowed into the country were removed and customs duties and tariffs were reduced. Although it was introduced with the intention of reviving the economy, SAP became very unpopular. It was blamed for all that went wrong in the economy. Since one of the main features of SAP was the removal of subsidies on items such as mealie meal, fertiliser and fuel, it was seen as the cause of high prices which led to suffering and this became one of the major reasons why it was not liked.⁴⁰¹

When Chiluba reviewed the performance of the MMD Government towards the end of October 1992, he expressed satisfaction that its austerity programme was paying off. He cited the fact that the Budget deficit was cut from a staggering K18.1 billion in 1991 to K1.2 billion in 1992.⁴⁰² In spite of his trade union background, Chiluba strongly supported the SAP and in August 1994, underlined the inevitability of SAP when he stated that:

I don't like the Structural Adjustment Programme but I kiss it and will continue doing so. In this respect I can declare that I don't care losing the coming presidential elections if people hate me because of the programme. Even when I lose, I will go a happy man because I have so far managed to change people's minds from perpetual borrowing to fend for themselves.⁴⁰³

Some scholars expressed surprise that the leaders of the trade union movement supported the neo-liberal economic policies of the MMD government and yet earlier, when the UNIP government was forced by the IMF to attempt, rather unsuccessfully, several different stabilization and adjustment programmes between 1975 and 1986,⁴⁰⁴ the movement led by

⁴⁰¹ *Times of Zambia*, 21/11/92; *Times of Zambia*, 16/12/94.

⁴⁰² *Times of Zambia*, 29/10/92.

⁴⁰³ *Times of Zambia*, 31/08/94.

⁴⁰⁴ Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, "Democratization and the 1991 Elections in Zambia", in John Daniel, Roger Southhall and Morris Szeftel (eds.), *Voting for Democracy: Watershed Elections in Contemporary Anglophone Africa* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999), p. 87.

Chiluba resisted attempts by the government to implement the adjustment programmes. However, as Shamenda explained, the shift in the positions of the movement from opposing and later supporting the neo-liberal economic policies was because the movement was aware that when the MMD Government came to power the economy was in such a poor condition that it urgently needed to be resuscitated surgery. The trade union movement, therefore, decided to support the Government's liberal economic policies. However, after three years of SAP, its performance had not been impressive. This was in spite of stabilising some macro indicators such as inflation and interest rates.⁴⁰⁵

In addition, the argument by Adler and Webster that ZCTU did not know how to react to the neo-liberal policies instituted by the MMD government does not seem correct.⁴⁰⁶ The ZCTU knew what neo-liberalism meant for the workers in Zambia. In this regard, it predicted that the plight of the workers was definitely going to be worsened by the new economic measures taken under SAP. The high social costs in terms of increased costs of living and loss of jobs asserts ZCTU's negative view of SAP.⁴⁰⁷

When Ronald Penza, was the Minister of Finance (1993 to March 1998) he was the main driving force of the economic reform programme. He was asked in parliament in 1995 by MPs if SAP was still on course. He was further asked to give an assurance that living standards and the well-being of people of Zambia were improving and not getting worse. In his reply, he stated that it was on course. Since the question had come from Professor Patrick Mvunga, a UNIP MP, Penza stated that it was UNIP's legacy of failed SAPs that had brought Zambia where it was.⁴⁰⁸ He was passionate when it came to defending the MMD government's

⁴⁰⁵ ZCTU: A paper presented by the Chairman General Mr. F.U. Shamenda during the meeting with the Head of State, Mr. F.T.J. Chiluba on the current social and economic situation in the country, State House, Lusaka, 22nd December 1994.

⁴⁰⁶ Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation," p. 11; Interview with Chirwa, Lusaka, 17/05/13.

⁴⁰⁷ ZCTU: *Report of the Secretary General to the 9th Quadrennial Congress*, 26th – 29th October 1994, p. 3.

⁴⁰⁸ *Parliamentary Debates of the Fourth Session (Resumed) of the Seventh National Assembly*, 14th November-7th December 1995, pp. 29-39.

economic policies. In his budget speeches in parliament he insisted that the economy was doing well, even when the workers through the trade union movement and the rest of the people were suffering from the austerity measures.

When on 26th January 1996, Penza presented that year's budget to parliament, he stated that Zambia had made remarkable progress in most areas that the Economic Recovery Programme had set out to achieve. Zambia had scored success with IMF programmes and after just four years of MMD rule, Zambia was a success story. The whole structure of the economy had fundamentally changed. He added that SAP was making the economy run.⁴⁰⁹ In the 1997 budget presented to parliament on 31st January 1997, Penza did not offer the workers any tax relief. He stated that the measures he had proposed for raising revenue had been drawn against the background of the need to maximise mobilisation of domestic resources and in that context it had been difficult to offer substantial tax relief to workers. He called for hard work from everyone and stated that workers were asking for too much considering the low levels of productivity and inflation. He added that it was disturbing to note that the attitude of most of the workers towards work was not conducive to uplifting the economy. "There is a tendency among us to think that we can get benefits without having to work hard at all."⁴¹⁰ As shown on page 128 of this study, the trade union movement did not agree with Penza as it lamented about 1995 having been a bad year for workers and 1996 not offering any hope to them.

Privatisation and its effect on the trade union movement

The story of privatisation in Zambia starts in the late 1960s with the story of nationalisation of companies and the creation of parastatal companies. Initially the parastatals performed well, and employed many people, but by 1990, they were not performing well

⁴⁰⁹ *Parliamentary Debates of the Fifth Session of the Seventh National Assembly*, 19th January-29th February 1996, pp. 226-229 & p.326.

⁴¹⁰ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the Eighth National Assembly*, 6th December 1996-26th March 1997. (NOTE: Penza had political differences with Chiluba and was dismissed in March 1998. He was brutally murdered on 6th November 1998 at his home in Ibex Hill, Lusaka.)

because nearly all 300 SOEs were being subsidised by the Government in order to run their operations at the expense of the development of education, health and other economic sectors which could promote growth. The MMD Government had no alternative but to agree with the IMF and the World Bank to embark on an ambitious and aggressive programme aimed at liberalising, restructuring and reactivating the economy.⁴¹¹ The privatisation programme formally began in 1992 with the enactment of the Privatisation Act No. 21 and the creation of the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) that targeted 280 parastatals for privatisation.⁴¹²

After a slow start, the pace of the privatisation of parastatal companies accelerated in 1994 as large numbers of parastatals began to be privatised in 1995 and 1996. Under donor pressure, in 1994 the government liquidated the heavily indebted state-owned transport companies, Zambia Airways and the United Bus Company of Zambia (UBZ).⁴¹³ The Government also liquidated some trading companies such as Zambia Consumer Buyers Corporation (ZCBC), National Import and Export Company (NIEC) stores and Zambia National Wholesale and Marketing Corporation (ZNWMC). The Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), the parastatal holding company was closed. Chilanga Cement and Zambia Breweries were sold in 1994, while Zambia Sugar Company was sold in 1995. At the end of September 1995, twenty-six (26) companies had been sold or liquidated, agreements to sell 17 more had been reached and negotiations to sell 49 more were underway.⁴¹⁴

ZPA reported that a total number of 229 companies and units were privatised as at 31st May 1999. The gross sales proceeds realised as of June 1999, excluding ZCCM Limited sales, were US \$93,311,194.00 and K29, 138,912,900. The proceeds of the sale of the ZCCM Limited

⁴¹¹Country Presentation by the Government of Zambia at *Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries*, Brussels, 14-20 May 2001, p. 4; Sardanis, *Africa: Another Side of the Coin*, pp. 212-221; 238-39; Rakner, *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001*, pp.95-99.

⁴¹² The Privatisation Act, Chapter 386 of the Laws of Zambia.

⁴¹³ *Policy Framework Paper 1995-98*, Prepared by the Zambian Government in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 29th November 1995.

⁴¹⁴ *Policy Framework Paper 1995-98*, Prepared by the Zambian Government in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 29th November 1995.

were directly used for the payment of ZCCM Limited liabilities. The proceeds had been externally audited up to 31st December 1997. There were 23 companies yet to be privatised and they included Kagem Mining Limited, ZAFFICO, Mpulungu Harbour, Zambia Education Publishing House (ZEPH), Kafue Textiles of Zambia (KTZ) Limited, Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ), Zambia State Insurance Corporation (ZSIC), Zambia Railways (ZR), Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZNCB), Zambia Telecommunications Limited (ZAMTEL) and Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO). The privatisation of ZCCM was a complex and difficult task. The completion of the privatisation of ZCCM was initially planned for 30th June 1997, but this timetable could not be achieved due to the failure of the Government and the Kafue Consortium to reach agreement on the commercial terms for the sale of Nchanga and Nkana Divisions, together with the Chambishi Acid/Cobalt Plants and the Chingola Refractory Ores.⁴¹⁵

By the end of 1999, the government had sold 208 out of the 280 state-owned companies earmarked for sale. At the end of 2001, 257 companies had been privatised out of ZPA's original portfolio of 280 parastatals.⁴¹⁶ The major state companies, such as ZSIC, ZNCB, ZAMTEL, ZESCO, NCZ, KTZ, TAZAMA pipelines, and National Oil Company (NOC), were not privatised during Chiluba's presidency. This was because some of those companies were milch cows for Chiluba's party, the MMD, paying for conferences, election campaigns and so on, as well as his government.⁴¹⁷

In a speech in Parliament in January 1998, Chiluba claimed that compared to the days of the Second Republic, the economy had thus far performed better, for example, in 1997 inflation dropped to 18 percent, nearly half of what it was in 1996 and the value of the Kwacha

⁴¹⁵ Government of Zambia, *Report of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour for the Third Session of the Eighth National Assembly Appointed on 3rd February 1999* (Lusaka: National Assembly of Zambia, 1999), pp. 38-43.

⁴¹⁶ *Policy Framework Paper, 1995-98; Africa Recovery*, Vol. 14 No.1 April 2000, p. 17.

⁴¹⁷ *Policy Framework Paper 1995-98; Zambia Privatisation Agency Status Report* as at 31st May 1999 & as at 31st July 2000.

had been relatively stable and GDP had increased. Privatisation was going well and by the end of 1998, government expected ZPA to complete the divestiture of about 120 companies remaining to be privatised. In addition, government had instructed the ZPA to begin preparatory work on the large parastatal companies which were not yet part of the ZPA portfolio, for example, ZAMTEL, ZESCO and the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company (LWSC), the transport sector, Njanji Commuter Company, the National Airports Corporation (NAC) and Zambia Postal Services (ZAMPOST).⁴¹⁸ As at 31st July 2000, 239 companies had been privatised out of a total working portfolio of 239.⁴¹⁹

From the beginning, the most publicly and organised opposition to privatisation in Africa came from the trade union movement. Sometimes trade union movements and workers succeeded in blocking or slowing down the privatisation of specific enterprises or influencing negotiations for a privatisation agreement. At other times, responding to external pressures, governments had simply brushed labour opposition aside, leaving a legacy of anger and political tension. Usually, workers reacted against threatened jobs or the possibility that benefits might be jeopardised under new management. Fears were heightened by the fact that some of the early privatisations resulted in job losses. In Zambia, after initially supporting the idea of economic reform, the ZCTU began to condemn the privatisation policy as “too narrow to be meaningful as a development tool”.⁴²⁰ It was for this reason that the Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ) vowed to fight the privatisation of ZCCM. The ZCTU also vowed to fight it by launching a national campaign to press for the nationalisation of strategic companies should government go ahead and privatise ZCCM and other companies such as ZESCO and ZAMTEL.⁴²¹ In the end, neither MUZ nor ZCTU could prevent the privatisation of the mines.

⁴¹⁸ Government of the Republic of Zambia, *Speech on the Official Opening of the Second Session of the Eighth National Assembly by the President, Mr. Frederick J.T. Chiluba on 16th January 1998, Lusaka* (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1998.)

⁴¹⁹ *Zambia Privatisation Agency Status Report as at 31st July 2000*.

⁴²⁰ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 10/5/92.

⁴²¹ *Africa Recovery*, Vol. 14 No. 1 April 2000, p. 11; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 20/09/92 & 22/09/92.

Privatisation had hit workers through hiring freezes, lay-offs or early retirements. While in some cases there had been some re-hiring by newly privatised firms, privatisation had often created a new set of problems for governments which struggled to pay termination benefits and to address the broader social consequences of job losses.⁴²² Unemployment, which increased was mainly as a result of redundancies induced by liquidation of the parastatal companies and the collapse of business with the highest job losses recorded in the manufacturing sector. This was mainly due to the local manufacturing firms facing competition from subsidised imported goods mainly from South Africa and Zimbabwe. The closure of UBZ in 1994 and three commercial banks in 1995 and a number of wholesale and retail outlets contributed significantly to the high redundancy figure of 6,905 workers in 1995.⁴²³ The liquidation of UBZ alone led to the loss of 1,500 jobs.⁴²⁴

There was a massive decline in the share contributed by the mining sector to GDP from 19.4 percent in the 1990s to a mere 6.6 percent in 1999, which was down from more than 40 percent in the early 1970s. In spite of the liquidation of UBZ and Zambia Airways, the contribution of the transport sector remained stable at 5.6 percent of GDP in 1990 to 6.0 percent in 1994 and 6.2 percent in 1999. This would suggest that the privatisation of the transport sector did not lead to massive job losses as was the case in other industries such as mining or construction.⁴²⁵

On the other hand, liberalisation of the road passenger transport sector, which had been the preserve of the State-owned UBZ before its demise led to tremendous positive changes compared to the pre-1991 era when passengers travelling long distances waited for many days to board buses travelling to various destinations. There was an unparalleled increase in the

⁴²² *Africa Recovery*, United Nations, Vol. 9 No. 2 August 1995, p. 18.

⁴²³ *Bank of Zambia Annual Reports 1994 – 1999*.

⁴²⁴ International Transport Workers' Federation: "The Bus business", Transport International Online, <http://www.itfglobal.org/transport-international>, accessed 07/02.12.

⁴²⁵ *Zambia Human Development Report 1999/2000: Employment and Sustainable Livelihoods*, United Nations Development Programme, Lusaka, 2001.

number of private bus operators and coach operators. There was also an increase in the number of buses as a result of Government's deliberate policy of 1993 to waive tax on imported buses with the view to improving the transport sector.⁴²⁶

On the whole, in the implementation of SAP and the privatisation between 1992 and 1999, employment levels were affected, but ZPA also argued that through privatisation, the enterprises had been placed on a sounder footing and in some cases had been able to expand operations and hire additional workers (or re-hire some of those who were initially retrenched).⁴²⁷ Generally, however, the impact of the SAP on the labour market and on unionisation was clearly visible. As a result of School leavers, University and College graduates joining the labour market every year, Zambia's labour force continued to record high growth against a backdrop of an economy that could not create employment, particularly in the formal sector. Zambia's formal sector employment continued to fall⁴²⁸ as the Table 3 shows.

Table 3: Formal employment and labour force trends 1992-1999

			1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Total Labour Force (Millions)			3.3	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.99	4.4	4.41	4.6
Formal Sector Employment (Thousands)			546	526	496	485	479	475	467	478
Formal Sector Employment as % of total Labour Force			17	16	15	13	12	11	10.5	10.4

Source: CSO Reports 1999.

The World Bank stated that Zambia's privatisation programme had been among the most successful in Africa. This was because by mid-1999, nearly 230 of the 280 state enterprises slated for privatisation had already been sold off. The ZPA was also convinced that privatisation had brought a substantial number of beneficial changes to the economy. These included a flow of fresh capital and technology which had important off-shoot benefits through

⁴²⁶ Country Presentation for Zambia, *Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries*, Brussels, 14-20 May 2001, p. 32; *Daily Parliamentary Debates for the First Session of the Tenth Assembly*, Wednesday, 21st March 2007, <http://www.parliament.gov>, accessed on 08/02/12.

⁴²⁷ *Africa Recovery*, Vol. 14 No. 1 April 2000, p. 11.

⁴²⁸ "Current Practices in Labour Market Information Systems in Zambia," www.academia.edu/1341790/Current-Practices-in-Labour-Market-Information-Systems-in-Zambia. (Accessed on 04/03/16)

the general upgrading of product quality and services; greater access to foreign bank credit; the development of Zambian capital markets, which provided opportunity for companies to raise long-term investment capital; increased turnover and profitability in real terms for privatised companies; earning Zambia more foreign exchange through pursuing aggressive export strategies; helping to preserve several thousands of jobs in companies which had been headed for liquidation but were successfully privatised; and privatisation became one of the major tools for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country and technology transfer.⁴²⁹

The perception of some sections of Zambian society, such as some MPs and some NGOs, however, was that the programme had many negative effects. For example, ZCTU noted that the closure of local industries led to increased unemployment.⁴³⁰ While the aim of SAP was to enhance the growth potential of the economy, it invariably resulted in several adverse factors in the short term. One of the effects was the loss of jobs in the formal sector. The shrinkage of formal employment through retrenchments and layoffs was one of the factors which led to the emergence of the “new poor” in Zambia.⁴³¹ James Matala, who served as the first director of ZPA between November 1992 and September 1994, when he was sacked, stated in December 2007 that Zambia’s privatisation programme ranked as the biggest fraud in economic history because the destruction of the public enterprises (SOEs) during the Chiluba regime that had accounted for over 80 percent of economic activity was an act of unprecedented vandalism. Zambia lost economic investments and assets accumulated over a period of 100 years. There were powerful business interests in government that treated enterprises and assets to be privatised as ‘goods fallen from the back of a delivery truck.’⁴³²

⁴²⁹ Government of Zambia, *Report of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour for the Third Session of the Eighth National Assembly, Appointed on 3rd February 1999* (Lusaka: National Assembly of Zambia, 1999.)

⁴³⁰ *Report of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour*, 1999.

⁴³¹ *Zambia Human Development Report 1999/2000: Employment and Sustainable Livelihoods, United Nations Development Programme*, Lusaka, 2001, pp. 32-35.

⁴³² “Matala explains Zambia’s privatization mess,” <http://maravi.blogspot.com/2007/12>. (Accessed on 30/07/16).

Privatisation had a negative effect on the workers and the trade union movement. The parastatal sector included all companies in which Government had a controlling share and all statutory bodies. It used to be the second largest employer of workers after the Central Government. However, starting from the end of June 1995, the sector became the third largest employer after the Central Government and the Local Government. The overall reduction in employment in the sector over the period September 1993 to June 1998 was due to liquidations and the privatisation programme which reduced the number of parastatal companies and employees in the remaining companies. Employment levels in this sector declined from 73,931 in June 1997 to 67,982 in June 1998.⁴³³ Table 4 shows formal employment trends between 1997 and 2001.

Table 4: Formal Employment Trends 1997-2001

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001*	% Increase
Formal Employment by Agency	475,100	467,444	477,508	487,340	494,457	1.5
Central Government (Civilian)	129,200	117,250	1189,377	123,128	124,000	0.7
Local Authorities	15,100	9,339	9,550	9,527	9,506	(0.2)
Parastatal Companies	73,390	70,039	71,626	71,452	71,297	(0.2)
Private Sector Companies	256,900	270,816	276,955	2383,233	289,654	2.3

Source: Quarterly Employment and Earnings Inquiry, Central Statistical Office.

*Estimates as at June 30.

As Table 4 shows, there was an increase of 1.5 percent in formal sector employment from 487,340 in 2000 to 494,457 in 2001. Employment in both the parastatal and the local authority sectors declined by 0.2 percent. Natural attrition, voluntary retirement and shedding off of casual workers contributed to the reduction of jobs in local authorities and parastatal

⁴³³ Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office, *Quarterly Employment and Earnings Survey Report* (Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, June 2000), pp. 1-2.

companies. In the private sector the increase was as a result of increased production, especially in manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade.⁴³⁴

CSO figures for 2002/2003 showed that for the whole Zambia, 46 percent of the people in Zambia were extremely poor and 21 percent were moderately poor giving 67 percent as the total of the population was poor. These results implied that 46 percent of the population was living in extreme poverty since their income could not meet the cost of the minimum food basket while 21 percent of the population was able to afford the food basket but fell short of acquiring other non-food needs of life. The results further showed that the non-poor constituted only about one-third of the total population in the country.⁴³⁵ The Table 5 also shows figures for poverty levels province by province.

Table 5: Incidence of Poverty by Residence, Province and Poverty Status, Zambia 2002/2003

	Poverty Status				Total	Total Population
	Extremely Poor	Moderately Poor	Total Poor	Non-Poor		
All Zambia	46	21	67	33	100	10,757,192
Rural/Urban						
Rural	52	22	74	26	100	7,002,932
Urban	32	20	52	48	100	3,754,260
Province						
Central	50	19	69	31	100	1,097,632
Copperbelt	38	20	58	42	100	1,707,843
Eastern	49	22	71	29	100	1,440,604
Luapula	47	23	70	30	100	852,351
Lusaka	36	21	57	43	100	1,496,428
Northern	63	18	81	19	100	1,371,234
N/Western	51	21	72	28	100	637,112
Southern	40	23	63	37	100	1,335,538
Western	38	27	65	35	100	818,450

Source: Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office, Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report, 2002-2003. (Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, November 2004), p. 115.

⁴³⁴ Republic of Zambia, *Economic Report 2001*, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Lusaka, February 2002, p. 51.

⁴³⁵ Central Statistical Office, *Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report 2002-2003*, p. 115.

After the privatisation started, the private sector became the largest employer. In both March and June 1998, for example, the sector accounted for 57.5 percent of all formal sector employees. The growth in the private sector was mainly due to the privatisation of the parastatal sector. Most of the small-scale enterprises were found in this sector. However, the increase in employment levels in the private sector did not correspond to the overall job losses in the formal sector. This showed that some of the people losing jobs in the formal sector were ending up in the informal sector of the economy or remained jobless for some time.⁴³⁶

In January 1995, the Government announced its decision to sell the ZCCM to private investors, but despite increasing pressures from the multilateral institutions and the donor countries, no progress was made on privatising the mines until Chiluba's second term.⁴³⁷ The government expected to earn \$500 million from the sale of the mines. ZCCM was finally sold in 1999 but the privatisation of the whole mining industry was completed in March 2000.⁴³⁸ The government was forced to accept a low price of \$90 million for three major mines from the Anglo-American Corporation, the British-South African conglomerate, which already had a 20% stake in the enterprise. The accepting of the Anglo-American Corporation bid surprised many people who thought that the bid by some of the best American and Canadian mining houses, Phelps Dodge and Noranda, which was rejected, was better and higher than Anglo's. In fact, a mining expert explained that in 1991 experts estimated the value of privatising the

⁴³⁶ Central Statistical Office, *Quarterly Employment and Earnings Survey Report, June 2000*, pp. 2-5.

⁴³⁷ *Policy Framework Paper 1995-98*; Lishala C. Situmbeko and Jack Jones Zulu, "Zambia: Condemned to Debt – How the IMF and World Bank have undermined development", *World Development Movement*, April 2004, p. 20.

⁴³⁸ *The Mopani copper mine, Zambia: How European development money has fed a mining scandal* (Unpublished), December 2010, pp. 7-8. See also the interesting account on the privatisation of the mines in the book entitled, *Selling the Family Silver: The Zambia Copper Mines Story* by Francis Kaunda (Natal: Kwazulu-Natal, 2002).

mines at \$3 billion, but when all the ZCCM assets were divided into seven units, they were sold to various private consortiums for a total of \$627 million.⁴³⁹

The mining and quarrying industry had over the years been experiencing job losses. In the quarter ending March 1997, the employment level was estimated at 43,498 and dropped to 42,607 by December 1997. In March 1998, employment levels stood at 39,490 and by June 1998 the levels declined to 39,160 employees. The industry experienced further drops in employment levels in 1999 to 38,521 and was expected to drop further to 36,780 in 2000, mainly due to the privatisation of ZCCM. Employment levels in the construction industry had been dwindling since 1994 mainly because of the poor performance of the economy. Most of the construction work, which used to be done for the parastatal companies, was stopped because of privatisation and liquidations.⁴⁴⁰

In spite of privatisation of the mines, production and world prices declined, and had worsened since the 1990s. These and other problems of increased mining costs forced the Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) to withdraw its investment from Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) in 2002, less than two years after purchasing a majority stake in KCM. The pull out of the AAC from KCM, which produced 67 per cent of copper and cobalt exports, was a big blow to the copper-dependent Zambian economy. The Mwanawasa government found a new equity partner to replace AAC, but few Zambians had confidence in this new partner in mining.⁴⁴¹

The mining industry showed tremendous signs of recovery after privatisation with massive amounts of funds invested in plant rehabilitations, refurbishments, erection and commencement of new smelters, new pits and shafts like Chibuluma South, the Konkola Deep Mining Project (KDMP) and the emergence of brand new mines like Albidon Nickel Mine in

⁴³⁹ Sardanis, *Africa: Another Side of the Coin*, p. 316; *The Mopani copper mine, Zambia: How European development money has fed a mining scandal*, pp. 7-8.

⁴⁴⁰ Central Statistical Office, *Quarterly Employment and Earnings Survey Report, June 2000*, pp. 2-5.

⁴⁴¹ Charles Bweendo Muchimba, *The Zambian Mining Industry: A Status Report Ten Years after Privatisation* (Lusaka, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010), pp. 6-7;

Mazabuka and Lumwana Mine in Solwezi in North Western Province. Metal production also increased from 250,000 tonnes at the close of privatisation of the mines in 2000 to 338,000 tonnes by 2000, 409,000 tonnes by 2004 and 515,618 tonnes by 2006, with the value of Zambia's exports doubling between 2005 and 2006 to reach \$2.78 billion.⁴⁴²

As a result of the privatisation of the ZCCM and the changes which occurred in the labour laws, MUZ and other trade unions in the country began to face unique, different and formidable challenges in recruitment of members, organisation of the union and service delivery. The unbundling of the ZCCM conglomerate into smaller mining companies posed a number of challenges to the union. The restructuring led to a steep fall in MUZ membership from the high levels of 56,582 in 1991 to around 25,000 at the close of the privatisation of ZCCM in 2000. In addition, the new mining companies withdrew from the historical role the mining companies had played of providing mealie meal and other essential commodities to members. In 2001 MUZ membership was 24,735; in 2002 the membership was 24,753; and in 2003 it was 24,910.⁴⁴³

President Mwanawasa and some Ministers all at various times expressed sentiments which showed that the government had lost faith in the privatisation programme.⁴⁴⁴ The sentiments of these politicians matched the feelings of most Zambians that privatisation was being used to enrich foreign investors at the expense of the ordinary people. However, the sentiments expressed by Mwanawasa and Ministers on privatisation were contrary to those expressed by those that were pro-privatisation and liberalisation of the economy even though many Zambians, workers and peasants, were being hurt by the measures. However, Mwanawasa, later told British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that if he had a way of not

⁴⁴² Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, "For Whom the windfalls? Winners and losers in the privatisation of Zambia's copper mines" (Lusaka: CSTNZ/CCJDP, 2007), pp. 19-21.

⁴⁴³ Muchimba, *The Zambian Mining Industry*, pp. 24-27; *The Mopani copper mine: How European development money has fed a mining scandal*, p. 9-10.

⁴⁴⁴ Situmbeko and Zulu, "Zambia: Condemned to Debt," pp. 21-22. See also *The Post*, 05/08/03; *The Post*, 26/08/03; *The Post*, 10/10/03.

depending on the IMF he would not care about the IMF but Zambians needed the IMF whether they liked it or not.⁴⁴⁵

Key figures in the trade union movement such as Joyce Nonde, president of the FFTUZ, expressed a sense of betrayal over the outcome of privatisation. She stated that while the movement had generally welcomed the principle of privatisation, it had done so with the understanding that the workers' interests would be protected by both the government and the new investors. What had taken place, however, was completely different from the initial expectations of the movement. Shamenda and the other labour leaders had earlier reached the same conclusion that privatisation was a betrayal of the workers. Nonde also now further stated that as a result of this, the movement no longer supported the privatisation programme as a panacea to Zambia's faltering economy.⁴⁴⁶

In July 2007, Sata accused the leadership of the trade union movement of letting down the workers for allowing privatisation that caused unemployment and suffering among workers to go unchecked. He was unhappy that a foreign bank had taken over the 'people's bank', the Zambia National Commercial Bank without the movement knowing the exact terms of the takeover. He was also unhappy about the privatisation of the mines and threatened that when he came to power he would revoke all the mining agreements that the MMD government had signed with the foreign investors and review the ownership of the parastatal companies that had been privatised. He singled out Joyce Nonde of ZUFIAW as the only trade union leader standing up for the workers. The rest of the leaders were compromised by foreign investors and had failed to live up to the qualities of early union leaders such as Justine Chimba, Katilungu, and Robinson Puta. ZCTU vice-president, Sam Phiri refuted Sata's claims and

⁴⁴⁵ Situmbeko and Zulu, "Zambia: Condemned to Debt", p. 33, quoting BBC News On-Line of 02/09/03; See also Friday E. Mulenga, "Fighting for democracy of the pocket" p. 254.

⁴⁴⁶ Interview with Joyce Nonde, Lusaka 2011; Situmbeko and Zulu, "Zambia: Condemned to Debt", p. 22. See also Mulenga, "Fighting for Democracy of the pocket" pp. 254-55.

advised him to concentrate on matters affecting his political constituency. Sata also blamed Mwanawasa over his government's handling of labour issues, as the government favoured foreign investors over the well-being of Zambian workers.⁴⁴⁷

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to examine the effects of economic liberalisation policies on the Zambian trade union movement. There were many challenges which the movement faced as a result of economic liberalisation.

Most of the effects of economic liberalisation could be seen by examining what happened in the economy. When Zambia began to face an economic crisis in which the country's wealth was dwindling, the government approached the IMF and the World Bank for help with keeping the economy afloat. The IMF and the World Bank recommended structural adjustment measures to which the Government agreed. However, the UNIP Government half-heartedly implemented the structural adjustment measures firstly because they hurt the workers and the rest of the Zambian people and made UNIP unpopular and secondly because the trade union movement led by ZCTU opposed the measures strongly. In this regard, as was shown, the Government would start implementing the measures and then abandon them when they hurt, only to return to the IMF and the World Bank for more relief and begin the measures all over again. In 1987, the Kaunda regime even attempted to implement "go it alone" structural adjustment measures, NERP, some kind of home-grown structural adjustment, which did not work.

In November 1991 MMD took over power with the blessings of the workers' movement and agreed with the IMF and the World Bank to implement the SAP more aggressively in order to resuscitate the ailing economy. While during the attempts by the UNIP Government to

⁴⁴⁷ (<http://maravi.blogspot.com>. Accessed on 15/02/11).

implement the SAPs the movement fought hard to save workers' jobs and sometimes succeeded as the Government would abandon the SAP, under the MMD Government the movement faced a more serious challenge of loss of jobs and poverty among former workers as a result of economic liberalisation and privatisation.

Structural adjustment changed the pattern of employee relations systems. In 1993, a new Industrial Relations Act was enacted in which the collective bargaining structures, which were put in place through the IRA of 1971, were changed. For example, when the labour laws were changed in favour of investors and employers in order to attract foreign investment, this led to the redefining of the relations between the private sector employers and trade unions in Zambia. Collective bargaining became meaningless and yet it had been an important tool in trade unionism. The employers began to sign individual work contracts with employees, a situation which led to the development of individual relationships between employers and employees. The trade unions were cut out of this new relationship, thereby rendering the unions weak.

There was a high loss of employment, through privatisation and liquidation, in the parastatal companies which previously employed many workers. The massive loss of jobs as a result of retrenchments and redundancies during the privatisation process was seen as a failure by trade unions to protect the jobs of their members. This led to the workers developing anti-trade union attitudes as they became reluctant to join trade unions for fear of losing their jobs. As a result of this unionisation rates dropped to about 50 percent in the 1990s from about 70-80 percent in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1997 out of the total labour force estimated at 4.194 million, only 11% were employed in the formal sector. The remaining 89% of the labour force were either unemployed or employed in the informal sector. It was estimated that formal employment had been declining at an annual average of 2%. The contribution of the formal sector to employment continued to decline mainly due to declining economic activity.

Among the major problems facing the workers were the soaring levels of poverty alongside persistent and pervasive unemployment in the midst of an increasing population. The reality was that economic reform had increased inequality. Formal sector employment as a ratio of the labour force was always small. In 1969 it was only 16.4 percent. While formal employment stagnated through in the 1970s through the 1990s, the labour force was expanding at a rapid rate. As a result of this the share of those with formal jobs in the labour force dropped to 12.1 percent in 1996 and 11 percent in 1999. As formal employment declined, more and more people went into the informal sector. However, the informal sector could not be the solution to unemployment and economic stagnation. This was because the informal sector was characterised by a high degree of underemployment, lengthy hours of work and generally low remuneration for work.

The trade union movement seemed to have undermined itself when it supported the MMD and failed to participate in the liberalisation process as did the South African trade union movement. However, the Zambian case was not comparable to the South African case because the Zambian economy was nationalised. The South African economy was private-sector driven. The workers' movement was participating in it fully before majority rule was achieved in 1994.

All in all it could be stated that the major economic changes implemented after the MMD came to power through the SAPs transformed the economy from state owned enterprises to private sector driven. The economic reforms eliminated price and market controls and transformed Zambia into one of the most liberalised economies in Africa. The reforms stabilised the macroeconomic environment and stimulated investment growth and enabled the economy to move towards a sustainable balance of payments position. However, the cost of the achievements was heavy as was evidenced by the deterioration in every social indicator. Between 1990 and 1999, Zambia suffered a drastic decline in living standards with per capita GDP of \$300 in 1999 compared to \$720 in 1981. In 1999 Zambia was considered one of the

least developed nations in the world. Key unfavourable factors such as failure to diversify into non-mining activities such as agriculture and tourism, unfavourable trading terms on the world market, declining earnings from metal mining and occasional natural disasters like drought made Zambia's economic performance difficult in the period 1991 to 2000. In addition, attempts to borrow externally to cushion effects of the declining socio-economic conditions without addressing the root cause of the problems left the country with a huge debt burden.⁴⁴⁸

After years of implementing the economic programmes, macroeconomic stability in Zambia was achieved. Inflation came down while shortages of commodities and foreign exchange disappeared. However, the general economic and social situation was below expectation. Economic growth over the decade was minimal. Macroeconomic indicators signified that there was progress in economic stabilisation and that inflation was brought under control. In 1992 inflation was 165 percent but was brought down to 20 percent in 1999. Interest rates fell from 150 percent in 1992 to 40 percent by 2000. The budget deficits were significantly reduced and reached surplus levels in 1996/97 and 1998/99. However, the increase in foreign debt from US \$6.4 billion to US \$7.1 billion in 1997 was a sign that there was deviation from the path of stability.⁴⁴⁹

Finally, in spite of all the challenges the trade union movement faced arising from economic liberalisation, it showed resilience by not entirely collapsing. The wage-earners had never been a majority in Zambia and so were never the "masses". They had always been a small percentage of the population, but they always had a big voice in national issues. This had remained the trend in Zambia. Economic liberalisation affected organisation of the workers'

⁴⁴⁸ Country Presentation by the Government of Zambia, *Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries*, Brussels, 14-20 May 2001, p.6.

⁴⁴⁹ *Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries*, p.7 & p. 9

trade unions so much that they were left hanging on, but they had survived and remained with the potential to re-organise and become as strong as they were in the 1970s and 1980s.

CHAPTER FIVE

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND STRIKES IN ZAMBIA, 1964-1991

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed how the changes made in the economy through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), liberalisation and privatisation affected employment levels and the workers' wellbeing through retrenchments and closures of companies. This chapter reconstructs the history of industrial relations and workers' strikes in Zambia from 1964 to 1991 in order to gauge their impact on the economy and economic development. The chapter was divided into three main sections in which industrial relations, the wages policy and strikes and the 1990 Industrial Relations Act were discussed.

Industrial conflict and strikes was a common feature of industrial relations in Zambia from the colonial times when Africans were drawn into wage labour when the general laws of capitalist development were set in motion by the colonial powers all over Africa.⁴⁵⁰ The main argument in this chapter is that economic problems were the major causes of strikes in Zambia as they led to incessant demands for higher wages to beat the rising cost of living.⁴⁵¹ The fact that the country went through economic problems for a long time meant that there were a large number of strikes up to 1991. The trade unions often used strike action by their members to show that they were independent and were in charge of their own destinies. This chapter covers the period from independence in 1964 to 1991, the end of the UNIP era, not because strikes ended after 1991, but because industrial relations are also covered in chapter six, which covers

⁴⁵⁰ Peter C.W. Gutkind, Robin Cohen & Jean Copans (eds.), *African Labour History*, (California & London: Sage Publications, 1978) 7-8; 13, 15-16.

⁴⁵¹ Matthew Mwendapole, *Report of the working party appointed by the General Council to enquire into the structure of trade unions in Zambia*. (Lusaka: Institute of African Studies, UNZA, 1972); *Annual Labour Report, 1972*.

the MMD era. Industrial relations after 1991 were affected by different issues from those in the earlier period.

Industrial Relations, 1964-1991

Industrial relations, which are also called labour relations, may be defined as the relationship between management or employers and workers, especially those groups of workers who were represented by a trade union. Governments usually set the framework for industrial relations through legislation and regulation, the way it has been in Zambia.

The Government report on Labour for 1964 noted that the advent of independence naturally had a considerable effect on industrial relations generally. This was evident amongst employees in all spheres of economic activity but was more marked in government service, local government service and the mining industry.⁴⁵² After 1964, with the great expectations which followed independence, workers became restless. The restlessness led to an increase in strikes to the extent that shortly after independence, Zambia experienced the “rolling strike” syndrome, which was characterised by industry-wide action mainly expressed through strikes. With independence, African workers expected economic redemption and therefore to be paid at the same level as European workers. The African workers felt that since the country was now run by their own government, they should enjoy the economic benefits of independence or self-rule.⁴⁵³

As was explained in Chapter Two, the legal basis of industrial relations in Zambia was first established in 1949, when the Northern Rhodesia Government (NRG) passed the *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance* for the settlement of trade disputes and industrial conciliation.⁴⁵⁴ The trade union law between 1949 and 1971 was based on the provisions of

⁴⁵² *Annual Labour Report 1964*, p. 11.

⁴⁵³ Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule*, Chapter 10; *Annual Labour Report, 1964*, p.11.

⁴⁵⁴ *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1949; Industrial Conciliation Ordinance, 1949*; Mtopa, *Labour Laws of Zambia*, p. 206.

that 1949 Ordinance.⁴⁵⁵ Between 1948 and 1971, besides the *Trade Union and Trade Disputes Ordinance*, the other legislation dealing with trade unions was the *Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Ordinance* of 1948.⁴⁵⁶

When the 1949 Ordinance was enacted there was also enacted the *Industrial Conciliation Ordinance* to compliment it. The Industrial Conciliation Ordinance was for settling of industrial disputes, which were described “any dispute between employers and employees or between employer and employer connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person”. The colonial government introduced a system for settling of trade disputes which involved conciliation under boards established for settling disputes by arbitration or conciliation.⁴⁵⁷

Between 1964 and 1974, the government allowed former colonial laws that it inherited to continue to be used in matters of trade unions and the settlement of trade disputes. However, the colonial labour law could not continue to be used given the type of the political, economic and social changes the government wanted to make.⁴⁵⁸ The colonial laws were in most cases discriminatory and favoured European workers over African workers. Although a few of these laws were repealed and some amended, most of them were retained. The main aim of the labour policy of the Zambian government was to domesticate the trade union movement by aligning it to policies in industry that would be derived from the philosophy of Humanism. The new labour law was also to take into account the changed economic situation in the country since independence. The government initiated a complete revision of the existing labour legislation, resulting in the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971.⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁵ *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1949*; Mtopa, *Labour Laws of Zambia*, p. 206.

⁴⁵⁶ *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1949* (which was repealed in 1971); *Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Ordinance* No. 23 of 1948; See also Mtopa, *Labour Laws of Zambia*, pp- 206-209.

⁴⁵⁷ *Industrial Conciliation Ordinance, 1949*; Mtopa, *Labour Laws of Zambia*, p. 211.

⁴⁵⁸ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session (Resumed) of the National Assembly*, 23rd November – 3rd December 1971, pp. 228-259; See also Kaunda’s address to the ZCTU Management Seminar, Lusaka, 5th March 1970; Mtopa, *Labour Laws of Zambia*, p. 213.

⁴⁵⁹ Kaunda’s address to the ZCTU Management Seminar, Lusaka, 5th March 1970; Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, *International Labour Organisation Core Conventions Ratified by*

The IRA of 1971 repealed the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (Amendment) of 1965, which had replaced the 1949 Ordinance. Sketchley Sacika stated that after the 1965 measures, the government decided to move a step further when the whole legislation regulating trade union organisation was changed. The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act were put in place by colonialists to serve their interests. It was decided to change the colonial legislation. The process started in 1969 and resulted in the passing of the IRA of 1971. Sacika who was Labour Commissioner at the time stated that the government wanted the new IRA to include the philosophical and ideological underpinnings of UNIP's socialist policy. He added that it was felt at the time that just having an Act to regulate trade unions without tying that legislation to an ideology would be a half measure.⁴⁶⁰

Kilby showed that in the 1960s in Nigeria, the Government through its behaviour as an employer, and quite independent of its policy objectives in the labour field, exerted a powerful influence on industrial relations throughout the economy.⁴⁶¹ In Zambia as well, the Government exerted a powerful influence on industrial relations throughout the economy because it was the largest employer.

In its conduct of industrial relations, the Government used a combination of “carrot” and “stick” to establish control over the trade union movement. The “carrot” was applied when the workers were awarded wage increases and improved conditions of service. The “stick” was applied when government used harsh methods to deal with the movement such as the removal of leaders from office, detentions of leaders of unions and the fielding of candidates sympathetic to government policy for positions of leadership in the movement. There was also

Zambia: An Assessment of their Implications on Poverty Reduction, Owen Mgemezulu & Caroline Moyo (Lusaka, October 2003); Mtopa, *Labour Laws of Zambia*, p. 214.

⁴⁶⁰ Interview with Sacika, 27th April 2015.

⁴⁶¹ Peter Kilby, “Industrial Relations and Wage Determination: Failure of the Anglo-Saxon Model”, *Journal of Developing Areas*, 1 (July 1967), pp. 489-90.

the use of “ideological engineering” such as when labour leaders from the grassroots were involved in seminars aimed at giving them political education. The aim of these mechanisms was for the government to create the type of trade union movement which it could control.⁴⁶² In interviews, some past and present trade union leaders agreed with the views expressed by Liatto. Hikaumba even elaborated that sometimes the Government would use arm-twisting tactics such as threatening a trade union it considered “troublesome” with using Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) or National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA) to squeeze the unions on unpaid dues.⁴⁶³ Although it was implied that workers were “given” material benefits such as wage increases, the history of workers in Zambia showed that wage increases did not just happen and workers’ wages were not just “given”, as carrots. They were fought for by the workers and often that involved strike actions to press demands.

In the years before independence industrial disputes per year did not reach 200, but after independence, especially in the years 1966, 1967 and 1968, the number of industrial disputes per year was over 200. In the years which followed, the number of industrial disputes dropped until it was as low as 39 in 1982. In 1984, however, mainly as a result of wage increase demands, there were 507 industrial disputes in the country. The picture which emerged from studying the statistics on strikes in Zambia showed that strikes occurred in waves.

Kraus has argued that after independence, the post-colonial regimes in virtually all African states legislated and implemented by political, administrative and often coercive means some variant of corporate nationalist model. The corporate nationalist model involved the ideological assertion that Africa did not possess classes and in this regard, unions should no longer perceive themselves as being involved in a militant struggle against employers or the government, which was the major employer. It also involved the adoption of various state

⁴⁶² Liatto, “Organised Labour and the State in Zambia”, p. 101.

⁴⁶³ Interviews, Shamenda, Lusaka, 07/04/11; Joyce Nonde, Lusaka, 09/04/11; Chirwa, Lusaka, 17/05/13; and Hikaumba, Lusaka, 24/05/13.

controls over trade unions and intervention in union leadership selection, with some corresponding carrots like check-off system or subsidies held out to unions to induce them to become control devices and anti-strike legislation or practices.⁴⁶⁴

In 1969, Kaunda had stated that the success of efforts to prevent income inequalities inherited from the colonial system from further developing between rural and urban society lay in the hands of the urban workers. He explained that the tensions created by Zambia's industrial development were not so much a result of conflict between workers and employers but the result of disparities between urban and rural life. It was in this context that after he announced the Mulungushi and the Matero Economic Reforms in 1968 and 1969 respectively, he felt that since the state had taken a majority holding in the country's biggest industries, including the mines, a system of industrial relations, with the unions on one side and employers on the other was absurd. He argued that the Government invested in industries not for its own good, or merely for the good of those directly employed in the state enterprises, but for the benefit of all Zambians. In such a situation, as far as Kaunda saw matters, for a union to push a claim against the State was to push a claim against the people.⁴⁶⁵

Kaunda announced three measures he hoped would encourage the correct spirit of national commitment among workers. First, the trade union movement was to employ economic and legal advisers to ensure a good working relationship between workers, management and the government and to prevent the misunderstandings which had arisen in the past between workers and the government. Secondly, Workers' Committees at places of work would be formed to encourage responsibility among all types of workers. Thirdly, workers in industry were to be represented on Boards of Directors to help them understand industrial problems and give them a wider perspective of their role.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁴ Kraus, "Strikes and Labour Power in Ghana", p. 260.

⁴⁶⁵ *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1969-1970, Vol. 2, p. B237-B238.

⁴⁶⁶ *African Contemporary Record*, 1969-1970, Vol. 2, p. B238.

From the discussion above, it is obvious that it is important in every country to have good industrial relations. The views of stake holders in Zambia in 1983 made this very clear. The Director of Industrial Participatory Democracy (IPD) in UNIP, Alexander Kwibisa, acknowledged that only a contented labour force produced the best results.⁴⁶⁷ The trade union movement was aware that wrong decisions made by employers could lead to industrial unrest in the country. In this regard it urged the Government and employers to solve workers' grievances to avoid a situation in which the country could face serious industrial problems. The Government even withdrew its appeals to the Supreme Court in the *habeas corpus* proceedings involving ZCTU leaders and one MUZ leader because of the industrial tranquillity prevailing in the country due to the efforts put in by all concerned including the labour leaders. This was in reference to the detentions in July 1981 of the ZCTU leaders, namely Chiluba, Zimba, Chitalu Sampa and the MUZ leader Walamba for allegedly plotting to overthrow the Government. The labour leaders were released after their applications for *habeas corpus* in the High Court were successful.⁴⁶⁸ The Zambian government acknowledged that in any given country it was necessary to maintain industrial peace in order to enhance increased production of goods and services in the economy.⁴⁶⁹ Industrial relations could, however, easily be marred by salary issues as was shown in 1983, when the Government set a ceiling of five percent on salary increases. The industrial relations scene was marred by threats of strikes by workers.⁴⁷⁰

The Wages Policy and Strikes in Zambia 1964-1991

This section of the chapter examines attempts by the government of the Republic of Zambia to establish a wages policy and how its failure to successfully do so led to many strikes. Although wage employment accounted for only a small proportion of the total labour force in

⁴⁶⁷ *Times of Zambia*, 01/01/83.

⁴⁶⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 12/01/83; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 23/01/83; *Times of Zambia*, 25/01/83.

⁴⁶⁹ *New Economic Recovery Programme, International Development Plan Progress Report No. 2, July 1987-March 1988*, p. 62.

⁴⁷⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 19/02/83; *Times of Zambia*, 23/02/83; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 27/03/83.

Zambia, there was a lot of interest on the issue of the determination of wage levels. This was because wage incomes accounted for as much as three-quarters of the total labour incomes in Zambia. There was also a disparity between wage and non-wage incomes which lay at the heart of the unequal distribution of personal incomes in Zambia.⁴⁷¹ There was an argument for fair distribution of wealth because income distribution was considerably biased in favour of the urban sector. The urban population which constituted one-third of the total population in 1997, for example, claimed over 60 percent of the total income while the rural population with two-thirds of the total population claimed only about a third of the total income.⁴⁷²

In his maiden speech as MP for Kafironda Constituency in Mufulira in 1964, Ditton C. Mwiinga, a trade unionist-turned politician called for the improvement of wages and conditions of service for Zambian workers so that there could be a fair distribution of wealth in the country to bring peace, progress and happiness. He argued that he firmly believed in the principle that the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people could be served best by moderate application of reasonable and fair distribution of income. He went on to state that:

Poverty among Africans, we black people in this country, has partly been caused by unfair distribution of the national wealth. We must not overlook the fact that the expectations of our people are very high indeed now that we are self-governing under the umbrella of the British Government. The common man in the street expects to see a national pay rise covering all industries, commerce and agriculture. Obviously this cannot be done easily but immediate practical steps must be taken to show the laymen that government is very much alive and keen to help wherever possible. Those who sleep in dark houses, particularly those in Kafironda Constituency, in Kwacha, Kamuchanga and Chibolya, who are situated in the midst of a place where other people enjoy high life, expect lights; they want to see electricity at work in their houses as soon as possible. At present they use candles and those who enjoy the wealth of this country do not use such things.⁴⁷³

⁴⁷¹International Labour Office, United Nations Development Programme Technical Assistance Sector, *Report to the Government of Zambia on Incomes, Wages and Prices in Zambia: Policy and Machinery*, ILO, Geneva, 1969 (*The Turner Report 1969*), p. 8; James Fry, *Employment and Income Distribution in the African Economy* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 97.

⁴⁷² *Narrowing the Gaps: Planning for Basic Needs and Productive Employment in Zambia: A Report to the Government of Zambia by a JASPA Employment Advisory Mission, International Labour Office – Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa*, Addis Ababa, January 1977.

⁴⁷³ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First Legislative Assembly*, 10th March – 20th March 1964, pp. 94-95.

Some scholars later expanded on Mwiinga's point about the workers' high expectations after independence.⁴⁷⁴

Fairhurst, an official in the Ministry of Labour and Mines of the Northern Rhodesia Government (NRG) observed in a paper he presented in December 1963 that there was evidence of conflict in the consciences of many governments throughout the world, a conflict inherent in the concept that governments ought to remove themselves from the field of wage-fixing whilst at the same time exercising much greater control over the formulation of an economic and therefore a general wages policy. More and more it was considered that a national wages policy was essential to raise the level of production on which the wealth of a country depended and to ensure a fair distribution of income at all levels. Indeed, in the report of the Director-General of ILO to the 1963 General Conference, it was suggested that the question of an incomes policy in relation to economic development was of such importance that the conference should consider the drafting of an international recommendation to define the broad principles involved. It was progressively appreciated that a wage policy was an essential element of every government's economic plan. It was equally widely appreciated that there was no easily applied blue-print for success.⁴⁷⁵

The first attempt to lay down lines for a wages policy to be followed in the territories in Africa was made by a committee of Experts on Social Policy, summoned by the ILO, which met in Dakar, Senegal in 1955. Governments, in the view of the ILO experts were urged to aim by their wages policy to raise the wages to the highest level permitted by the economic circumstances of the territory and as a result, to stabilise the working population on a family

⁴⁷⁴ Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule*, Chapter 10; Liatto, "Organised Labour and the State in Zambia", p. 107.

⁴⁷⁵ "A Comparative study of the factors which influence the state in formulating a national wages policy and a review of methods of wage fixing", a paper presented by J. Fairhurst, Ministry of Labour and Mines, Northern Rhodesia Government, December 1963, NAZ, MLSS1/14/021: Wages Policy General, 1968-1971.

basis. It was recommended that minimum earnings should reach a level sufficient to support settled family life without assistance from outside sources.⁴⁷⁶

The views of the Dakar Committee were widely circulated and in 1962 the Second Session of the African Labour Advisory Committee meeting in Tananarive (Antananarive) in Madagascar considered the practical implications of the problem of a wages policy in Africa.⁴⁷⁷

The Tananarive Committee recommended, among other issues that firstly, the natural aim of wage policy should be to improve both the prevailing and future remuneration of wage-earners as far as it was fair and possible in relation to the growth of the national income, of the capacity of industry to bear the cost and the just share of national income enjoyed by other working people. It was recommended that wages should be such as to permit workers and their families to live decently. Secondly, the aim of a wages policy was to protect the purchasing power of workers and all other members of the community. The relationship between wages and prices was to be closely studied so that one may be kept in line with the other, either through wage or price adjustment. Thirdly, a wage policy should aim to promote stabilization of the labour force.⁴⁷⁸

The explanations above were relevant to this study because an examination of Northern Rhodesia's wage-fixing machinery showed the same complex structure which was in evidence in many other countries of the world. It was accepted as axiomatic that where two sides in industry showed that they were capable of regulating their own affairs, they should be free to negotiate wages and conditions of service by voluntary agreement with no interference from government and with no obligation to seek statutory enforcement of the agreements reached. Such conditions prevailed in the mining industry, on the railways, in public transport and in

⁴⁷⁶ "A comparative study of the factors which influence the state in formulating a national wages policy and a review of methods of wage fixing", NAZ, MLLS1/14/021: Wage Policy General, 1968-1971.

⁴⁷⁷ "A comparative study of the factors which influence the state in formulating a national wages policy and a review of methods of wage fixing", NAZ, MLSS1/14/021: Wage Policy General, 1968-1971.

⁴⁷⁸ "A comparative study of the factors which influence the state in formulating a national wages policy and a review of methods of wage fixing", NAZ, MLSS1/14/021: Wages Policy General, 1968-1971.

local government and public service.⁴⁷⁹ That was the situation in Zambia when independence was attained in 1964. However, the advice given by the departing civil servants was that the system for determining wages and conditions of service needed to be overhauled to make it work better.⁴⁸⁰

The major test of any system of industrial relations was how effectively it dealt with the central issue of wage determination in the relationship between workers and employers. In Nigeria, in the 1960s, despite carefully constructed institutional framework and the avowed commitment of all parties concerned, voluntary collective bargaining failed to function as a significant mechanism of fixing wages.⁴⁸¹ The Government was also aware from 1964 about the importance of having a system for determining wages. Wina, therefore, stated that a wage policy must form part of any development plan, and that would necessitate the closest consultations with labour unions and would involve new and important functions for their leadership. He hoped that the trade union movement would participate fully in designing and implementing the development plan, which would include an acceptable wages policy.⁴⁸²

The determination of salaries or wages and other conditions of service for public service workers in Zambia and other countries in the British Commonwealth was for a long time done arbitrarily by the Government rather than through collective bargaining. In Zambia this was the practice during the colonial period and for many years after independence. The government would appoint an administrative committee or a commission of inquiry. It would go round the country to get submissions from government institutions, organisations, individual public service workers and even members of the public on how public service workers should be

⁴⁷⁹ “A comparative study of the factors which influence the state in formulating a national wages policy and a review of methods of wage fixing”, NAZ, MLSS1/14/021: Wages Policy General, 1968-1971.

⁴⁸⁰ “A Comparative study of the factors which influence the state in formulating a national wages policy and a review of methods of wage fixing”, NAZ, MLSS1/14/021: Wages Policy General, 1968-1971.

⁴⁸¹ Kilby, “Industrial Relations and Wage Determination”, p. 496.

⁴⁸² *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session (Resumed) of the First Legislative Assembly*, 9th July – 27th August 1964, pp. 16-17.

remunerated. The committee or commission would consider the submissions and write a report with its recommendations to the government. The government would issue a white paper in which it would show the recommendations that were accepted and those that were rejected. Although this method led to the raising of salaries and improvement of conditions of service, it was arbitrary and not satisfactory to the workers. The government had the last say and it also determined when to appoint a committee or commission to consider public service workers' grievances. It was only after the public service workers were allowed to register their unions and engage in collective bargaining that the system was ended.⁴⁸³

In 1963 a Commission headed by Sir Gordon Hadow was appointed to review salaries and conditions of service of the Northern Rhodesia Public and Teaching Service and of the army and air force. The Hadow Report was presented to Parliament on 4th June 1964 by the Prime Minister, Kenneth Kaunda. Opposition Members of Parliament had difficulty accepting some findings and recommendations of the Report, prompting Minister of Local Government, Nalumino Mundia to argue that opposition MPs had missed the principle involved in the whole exercise of the Hadow Commission. He argued:

We had in the past a wage structure which allowed very few people to get a lot of money on top, very few people to get other income in the middle, and millions and millions of people being underpaid or getting almost nothing in return for what they were contributing by their work. This was the state of the wage structure in this country. What the Hadow Report proposes is this: the very low income groups should be raised up; the higher income group levels should be reduced and they should meet somewhere in the middle so that this will enable the biggest number of people – the people who get average incomes – to form the biggest bulk of the people in the country. This is, indeed, very important, and the Government accepted this recommendation because as a socialist country, or one aiming to move towards that, it would have been very unrealistic for us to continue with the wage structure which allowed very few people to earn thousands and thousands while other people starved or got practically nothing. That is the main issue involved in the whole exercise.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸³ Chirwa, "A Brief History of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers' Union," pp. 1-2.

⁴⁸⁴ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session (Resumed) of the First Legislative Assembly*, 27th May – 5th June 1964, p. 310; pp. 304-342; and pp. 370-71.

From Mundia's statement in Parliament it could be discerned that the wage policy of the UNIP government was going to involve closing the wage gap among workers and UNIP was going to try to turn Zambia into a socialist country, an aspect which had an effect on wage structures and industrial relations in the country over the years UNIP was in power.

In the immediate period before independence in 1964, the NRG officials examined the issue of a wages policy in Northern Rhodesia. The Ministries of Labour and Mines and Finance did not agree on how to establish a wages policy. Some officials were of the opinion that in Northern Rhodesia where wages differed between those on the mines and those in government and other industries, it would be difficult to come up with a uniform type of wages policy. It was suggested that an expert on wages should be engaged. Professor Phelps-Brown of the London School of Economics (LSE) was suggested as the man to do the job.⁴⁸⁵ In 1964, the *Seers Report*, on which the First National Development Plan (FNDP) was based, stated:

The wages and salary question is perhaps the most serious problem facing the Government: its decisions on the wages and salaries it pays itself and the way it exercises its influence on wages and salaries in the private sector, may be decisive in determining whether Zambia will become during this century a modern developed country.⁴⁸⁶

Indeed, government's decisions on the wages of its employees and its influence on wages in the private sector have had a large bearing on the issue of wages in Zambia. Wina, in April 1964, when commenting on the economic situation left by the Federation Government, stated:

The past ten years of Federation are thankfully past. Their record is of time wasted; of money and other resources taken from Northern Rhodesia to subsidise and foster development of the other territories. That sad record cannot be looked back upon without arousing the strongest feelings. Such advantages as there were to Northern Rhodesia – and they are very difficult to find – were infinitesimally small in relation to the disadvantages which have left us with a load of debt which will impose burdens and limitations upon us in the future.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸⁵ NAZ, MLSS1/14/021: Wages Policy General, 1968-1971.

⁴⁸⁶ Report of the Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia (the Seers Report): Report of the UN/ECA/FAO Mission (Ndola: Falcon Press, 1964), Chapter 2 Section 53: Turner Report, p. 8.

⁴⁸⁷ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session (Resumed) of the First Legislative Assembly*, 9th July – 27th August 1964, p. 5.

Wina went on to explain to the Legislative Assembly how Northern Rhodesia lost money when it was part of the Federation through the federal public debt. He explained how the debt was incurred and stated that the result of that public debt was that whereas at the beginning of Federation in 1953 the public debt of Northern Rhodesia was £22,508,000, as at 1st January 1964, it was £103,197,000.⁴⁸⁸

Wina also stressed the effects of strikes on the national economy. He pointed out that if 1964 turned out to be a typical year for strikes in Zambia it would mean a loss of 20 days production, which in turn would mean a loss of about £8,000,000 in earnings to the mining companies and well over £2,000,000 to the government in revenue. The amount could pay for the construction of the new Zambia University, or would put 250 children through eight years of primary school and 40 children through secondary school. He pointed out that the strike which recently took place at Broken Hill mine cost the country in lost revenue an estimated £5,000 a day, an amount which was the exact cost of building one four-bed dispensary and staffing and running it for a year. The dispensaries treated up to a thousand out-patients a month and perhaps as many as 12,000 in a full year. He stated that it was not the intention of the government to introduce legislation as happened in Tanzania, Kenya and Ghana to stop strikes, but whether the government was forced to move in that direction or not would depend upon the employers and employees and trade unions.⁴⁸⁹

In 1965, Kaunda stated that it was necessary to give urgent and serious thought to the preparation of a wages policy for Zambia as that was a vital matter since without such a policy great damage could be done to the country's economy if wage demands were not kept within the framework of an agreed wages policy. He advised that before there was a general demand for wage increases, the government should announce its wages policy and should mobilise the

⁴⁸⁸ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session (Resumes) of the First Legislative Assembly*, 9th July – 27th August 1964, p. 5 & p. 21.

⁴⁸⁹ Press Release No. 559, April 22, 1964, NAZ, MLSS1/14/021: Wages Policy General, 1968-1971.

party and by other means should put over the government's policy to the country. It was essential, as Kaunda saw it, to prevent a new privileged class of workers from growing up in Zambia. It was agreed that there were many factors which would affect the wages policy for the country and those should all be carefully considered. They included the wage structure of the copper mining industry, the government's taxation policy and price control. It was also agreed that consideration should be given to establishing a wages policy for the country.⁴⁹⁰

In 1966, the Zambian Government acknowledged that there was a problem with the policies on wages and salaries. There was a very fast rate of increase in wages and salaries which would not have mattered if the productivity of employees and their labour efficiency had risen at least as fast, so that the actual costs and prices did not increase. However, the most serious feature of inflation in Zambia was quite clearly that labour efficiency was very low. Kaunda remarked in August 1969 that before independence bricklayers were laying more than 500 bricks a day on average, and that in 1969 the average was 200.⁴⁹¹

In spite of Wina's complaint, the Zambian government was fortunate in that the break-up of the Federation and the Independence settlement left it with adequate resources to fund the restructuring of wages in the country. In this regard, when the Brown Commission awarded miners a 22% wage increase in 1966, the Whelan Commission was able to award a similar increase to civil servants. In 1967, the Minister of Labour could boast that the government had been able to meet workers' demands for increased wages because the country was rich.⁴⁹² 1967 was the big year for Zambian wages. The salary increases awarded by the Brown and Whelan Commissions came into effect at the beginning of 1967. The wage increases for the miners and

⁴⁹⁰ NAZ, MLSS1/14/021: Wages Policy General, 1968-1971 – EC (65) 17th Meeting, 10th August 1965; Economic Committee, Extract from Unconfirmed Minutes, Secretary to the Cabinet, Item 4: Wages Policy for Zambia.

⁴⁹¹ The Turner Report 1969, p. 8, p. 12 & p. 14; *Times of Zambia*, 30/08/69; Republic of Zambia, Development Division, Office of the Vice President, *Zambian Manpower*, 1969 (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1969), p. 11; Republic of Zambia, *Report of the Second National Convention on Rural Development, Incomes, Wages and Prices in Zambia: Policy and Machinery*, Kitwe, 12th-16th December 1969 (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1969).

⁴⁹² *Zambian Manpower*, 1969, pp. 12-13; Liatto, "Organised Labour and the State in Zambia," p. 107.

Government employees stimulated higher wage contracts in other industries and provided the basis for the action of the Wages Board to raise the minimum wage for large numbers of unorganised workers. It was not surprising therefore, that the annual rate of increase in wages and salaries, which was 12 percent in 1965 and 1966, averaged 24 percent during the next 18 months. As a result of the wage increases between 1960 and 1968, the cost of labour also increased, meaning that it would be more difficult to achieve Zambia's economic objectives.⁴⁹³

The poor performance of the economy provided a reality check and led to a change of this perception and measures were instituted to slow down wage increases. The Brown Commission had sparked off a round of wage increases averaging over 20% which had continued for much of 1967. In August 1967 official concern was raised over the pace of the wage increases. The Ministry of Local Government and Housing refused to approve an award of more than K28.17 per month after a Commission to review local government wages had recommended a rise of between K27 and K32 per month.⁴⁹⁴

The Strike Wave in Zambia 1964 – 1992

In the Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act of 1997, a strike “means the cessation of work or withdrawal of labour contrary to the terms and conditions of a contract by a body of persons employed in any undertaking acting in combination; or a concerted refusal or a refusal under a common understanding of any number of persons who are so employed to continue to work or provide their labour.”⁴⁹⁵ Although some scholars argued that this definition was not adequate,⁴⁹⁶ we will use it in this study.

In examining the issue of strikes in Zambia, it should be noted that from 1965, when the government enacted the amended Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, which

⁴⁹³ *Zambian Manpower*, 1969, pp. 12-13.

⁴⁹⁴ Fry, *Employment and Income Distribution in the African Economy*, p. 109.

⁴⁹⁵ *Industrial Relations Act, 1971*, Section 3 (1); *Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1997* Section 3 (1); and *Industrial and Labour Relations Act, 1997*.

⁴⁹⁶ Richard Hyman, *Strikes* (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1972, 1975), p. 17 (Citing J.I. Griffin, *Strikes: a Study in Quantitative Economics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, pp. 20-22).

replaced the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance of 1949, it instituted measures aimed at orienting workers who belonged to trade unions from a system of conventional trade unionism to a system of industrial relations which would include other actors and other practices and in that way reduce the powers of trade unions. However, despite the measures aimed at effecting political incorporation of the trade union movement into the political party system, the workers and their trade unions continued to claim independence and pursue their interests in the ways which they felt suited them, which meant sometimes staging strikes.⁴⁹⁷

Extensive restrictions on strikes already existed within labour laws and the government provided alternative mechanisms both for worker participation in industry and resolution of conflict.⁴⁹⁸ Apart from this worker participation method being a way of government's response to strikes, there was also the geo-political situation in Southern Africa and the role Zambia played in the liberation struggles in the sub-region from the 1960s to the 1980s, which determined the way government responded to strikes.⁴⁹⁹

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) on 11th November 1965 and the liberation wars in neighbouring countries were not very important in the discussion of strikes in Zambia's First Republic. However, UDI and liberation wars are both mentioned here because sources show that they brought about so much tension in Zambia that UDI, for example, led to the first ban on strikes by Kaunda in August 1970.⁵⁰⁰ Some opposition MPs argued that the British government was using the Zambian government to destroy Zambia's economy and therefore Zambia suffered more from UDI than the people of Rhodesia because the Zambian government agreed to implement all the economic sanctions

⁴⁹⁷ *Annual Labour Reports 1964-1993*; Liatto, "Organised Labour and the State in Zambia", p. 154.

⁴⁹⁸ See Restrictions on strikes as specified in the IRA of 1971, Part 9, sections 89-95 and section 116.

⁴⁹⁹ Liatto, "Organised Labour and the State in Zambia", pp. 156-57; Speeches of President Kaunda.

⁵⁰⁰ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session (Resumed) of the First National Assembly, 20th July – 23rd September 1966*, Column 148.

imposed by the British government on Rhodesia,⁵⁰¹ with Zambia having to spend £31 million on various projects to make the country continue to survive.⁵⁰² Nkumbula, MP for Monze Constituency and leader of the opposition ANC, cautioned the government to be careful and ensure that while supporting the people of Rhodesia to achieve independence, they did not let Zambia commit suicide.⁵⁰³

Table 6 summarises information on the industrial disputes (strikes) that occurred in Zambia from 1964 to 1990. In the year of independence, 1964, the construction, agriculture and mining industries together recorded the highest number of industrial disputes with a total of 72 industrial disputes, 10,839 workers directly involved and 80,391 man-days lost. In terms of the man-days lost the mining industry recorded the highest at 69,234 of the 125,738 lost for the whole year.⁵⁰⁴

1966 stands out in terms of industrial disputes recorded. There were 241 industrial disputes involving stoppages of work and a total of 579,406 man-days lost. This figure was the highest ever recorded in the history of the Labour Department and was attributed mainly to strikes in the mining industry. There were thirty-two disputes involving stoppages of work and a total of 549,383 man-days lost in this sector alone, meaning that the mining industry was responsible for 95% of the lost working days in 1966, while the remaining 5% was distributed over forty-two other industries. 2,254 European miners and 284,490 African miners were involved. The disputes ranged from discharge of employees to wage demands.⁵⁰⁵ The 1966 industrial relations situation on the mines worried the government so much that both government officials and politicians became involved in trying to resolve industrial issues in

⁵⁰¹ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session (Resumed) of the First National Assembly, 20th July – 23rd September 1966*, Columns 195-96; 305.

⁵⁰² *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session (Resumed) of the First National Assembly, 20th July – 23rd September 1966*, Columns 484; 500-01; 546-48; 613.

⁵⁰³ *Debates of the Third Session (Resumed) of the First National Assembly, 20th July- 23rd September 1966*, Columns 599-600.

⁵⁰⁴ *Annual Labour Report 1964*, Table 10(a), p. 68.

⁵⁰⁵ *Annual Labour Report 1966*, p. 15

the industry. The political leadership even decided to use the Office of the President (Special Branch) to spy on workers and trade unions so as to get on top of the fluid situation.⁵⁰⁶

In September 1966, Augustine Nkumbula resigned as General Secretary of ZCTU. The issue of his replacement was affected by the volatile industrial relations situation in the country, especially on the Copperbelt. Replacing Nkumbula, therefore, had to wait. The industrial relations situation on the mines was also affecting the industrial relations contours in the country.⁵⁰⁷ Government officials were of the view that the prevailing climate of strikes in the country in 1966 was such that it did not favour the holding of elections in ZCTU immediately after Nkumbula's resignation. The elections, therefore, could only be held in 1967. Kasonde, the Permanent Secretary advised the civil servants under him to avoid tying themselves to particular dates since the primary reason why they refused to allow the Congress to hold elections was that they wished to establish a single union in the mining industry, at least for the local employees in the first instance, and that the combined unions should be well represented in the elected Congress Committee.⁵⁰⁸

On 3rd August 1966, Minister of Labour and Social Development, Sipalo, commented on the strike wave in the country as follows:

On the whole, Sir, turning to the question of the labour situation as a whole in the country, the picture has not been very bright at all. Since January this year up to June we have had 138 strikes as compared to fifty-four at the same period last year. And the number of workers involved was 152,354, and the number of man hours lost came to 358,814. Obviously, Sir, this is a very grim picture for a country whose economy is booming and with a Government so dynamic that we are placed at ransom by this idea of strike action. It is unfortunate in that our people have got into this unfortunate spirit of get rich quick and as a result there is *an explosion of expectations*.⁵⁰⁹

Sipalo went on to state that the numerous strikes were as a result of some union leaders not being honest. He further stated that the country should know that just as there had been sacrifice

⁵⁰⁶ NAZ, MLSS 1/26/36: Zambia Mineworkers' Union, 1949-1967.

⁵⁰⁷ NAZ, MLSS, 1/26/258: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, 1965-1967.

⁵⁰⁸ NAZ, MLSS 1/26/269: Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, 1966-1968.

⁵⁰⁹ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session (Resumed) of the First National Assembly*, 20th July – 23rd September 1966, p.325.

to obtain political independence, there should also be sacrifice to obtain economic independence. The situation where there had been so many strikes in six months could not be allowed to continue. Mainza Chona, the Minister of Home Affairs and also MP for Livingstone Constituency stated that racist Europeans caused the strikes, while C.D. Burney, MP for Ndola Constituency on the Reserved Roll, replied that the accusation was “nonsense”.⁵¹⁰ The expression *an explosion of expectations* that Sipalo used resonates with the title and theme of this thesis, *crises of expectations*.

The strikes on the Copperbelt in 1966 led to the realisation by the national political leadership that ZMU had low quality leadership. The state then decided to encourage a merger between ZMU and Mines Local Staff Association (MLSA) so that the latter could provide quality leadership in the trade union movement on the mines. It was also hoped that the Mine Workers’ Society (MWS) formerly the European Mineworkers’ Union and the Mines Officials and Salaried Staff Association (MOSSA) could also merge so that all those groups could be forced to belong to one union. Minister of Labour, Sipalo urged Minister for the Copperbelt, Mutemba and his assistants on the Copperbelt to work towards that endeavour.⁵¹¹ ZMU, however, did not respond favourably to the idea of a merger with MLSA whose members it accused of having been supporters of the UFP. The union even tried to suspend from office its vice president, David Mwila for showing too much enthusiasm for the merger.⁵¹²

⁵¹⁰ *Parliamentary the Debates of the Third Session*, p. 326.

⁵¹¹ NAZ, MLSS 1/26/36: Zambia Mineworkers’ Union, 1949-1967.

⁵¹² NAZ, MLSS 1/26/36: Zambia Mineworkers’ Union, 1949-1967: Letter from M. Sipalo, Minister of Labour to Andrew B. Mutemba, Resident Minister for the Western Province, 5th September 1966.

Table 6: Industrial Disputes Involving Loss of work 1963-1992

Year	Total Number of Disputes	Number of Workers Involved (000s)	Number of working days lost through disputes
1963	194	41,686	409,559
1964	157	30,839	123,317
1965	114	10,149	22,493
1966	241	307,167	579,280
1967	222	24,006	46,088
1968	206	30,770	65,898
1969	159	16,944	20,773
1970	128	17,040	122,951
1971	127	14,964	18,894
1972	74	10,453	20,874
1973	68	9,892	6,453
1974	60	7,725	38,334
1975	78	17,121	51,003
1976	59	5,619	6,527
1977	51	9,166	15,990
1978	50	42,067	29,733
1979	44	10,846	42,916
1980	121	28,434	79,896
1981	156	76,776	55,641
1982	39	4,066	7,702
1983	54	9,217	8,170
1984	507	27,750	31,382
1985	50	23,749	66,176
1986	35	5,344	8,932
1987	70	17,437	15,432
1988	39	9,437	51,009
1989	69	19,963	32,173
1990	103	51,606	71,938
1991	102	31,788	25,806
1992	91	25,658	110,710

SOURCE: *Compiled by the author from Northern Rhodesia/Republic of Zambia Ministry of Labour & Mines/Ministry of Labour & Social Development/Ministry of Labour & Social Services, Annual Reports of the Department of Labour for the Years 1963-1992; International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1963-1992.*

In the end, the three local mine unions, the ZMU, MLSA and the Mines African Police Association (MAPA) dissolved in early 1967. They merged to form the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ). In May 1967, elections for office bearers were held. All posts were taken by former officials of the ZMU.⁵¹³

In 1968, there were 206 industrial disputes involving stoppages of work resulting in a total loss of 65,898 man-days. The stoppages of work in the mining industry combined with

⁵¹³ *Annual Labour Report 1967*, p. 7.

those in the Railways accounted for the loss of 68% of the total man-days. The mining industry recorded the highest number of industrial disputes with 25. Of the 206 disputes, 41 disputes were over wage demands, while 66 were as a result of other causes, 58 were on conditions of service.⁵¹⁴ The Labour Commissioner was also of the view that the major causes of workers' indiscipline were undoubtedly chronic weakness and in some cases complete lack of leadership in trade unions.⁵¹⁵

The enforcement of the "wage component" of the Wages and Incomes Policy adopted by the Second UNIP National Convention in December 1969 was assigned to the Minister of Labour and Social Services. However, apart from stipulating that wage increases would be restricted to a minimum of 5 per cent in 1970, and that such increases would be permitted only if there was evidence of a corresponding increase in labour productivity, the Minister was not given statutory powers for him to enforce the policy effectively, and there was no supervisory machinery to ensure compliance. Consequently there were considerable evasions and infractions of the policy and, where there was evidence of infringements, only political pressure could be used to correct the situation.⁵¹⁶

The restriction of wage increases to 5 per cent in 1970 caused considerable resentment among workers in the lower income group because they earned less than workers in the higher income group. However, in some circumstances where workers in the lower income group demanded wage increases exceeding the stipulated maximum, the Minister gave permission for wage increases exceeding 5 per cent to be awarded if it was absolutely necessary to do so.⁵¹⁷

In 1970, industrial relations did not improve much. There were fewer strikes than in 1969, but the man-days lost through strikes nearly doubled because there were more men on

⁵¹⁴ *Annual Labour Report 1968*, p. 13 & Table 7, pp. 60-61.

⁵¹⁵ *Annual Labour Report 1968*, p. 7.

⁵¹⁶ *Annual Labour Report 1969*, p. 4.

⁵¹⁷ *Annual Labour Report*, 1970, 6.

strike than in 1969. Three major strikes occurred in Local Government, the Teaching Service, and Zambia Railways, which between them accounted for about 69 percent of the total man-days lost. A significant number of minor stoppages took place in other sectors, notably manufacturing and construction industries.⁵¹⁸

Regulations were promulgated in 1970 under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance extending the prohibition of strikes and lockouts to all essential services including the mining industry, transport, communication and the teaching service. No prosecutions were made under the Regulations, although a number of strikes occurred, involving workers in establishments where strikes and lockouts were prohibited.⁵¹⁹ As a result of the prolonged strike by teachers, the Ministry of Education terminated the Recognition Agreement it had with ZNUT. In July 1970, four leaders of the ZNUT, namely, the president, Newstead Zimba, general secretary, Muletambo Mubita, deputy general secretary, Shiyenge Kapini, and treasurer, Langson Musonda were detained. Minister of Labour Fwanyanga Mulikita set up a Board of Inquiry, with Hosea J. Soko as chairman, and Fanwell C. Sumbwe, Reverend Father M.J. Maloney as members, and L.M. Imasiku as secretary, to look into the causes and circumstances leading to the existence of a trade dispute between the ZNUT and the Ministry of Education. Mainly as a result of the findings of the Board of Inquiry, the detained officials were released in January 1971 and reinstated as union officials.⁵²⁰

In 1978, the Government asked for help from the International Labour Office (ILO) in formulating and putting in place prices and incomes policy as a way of improving industrial relations in the country. Professor H.A. Turner, who had done a similar job in 1969, was

⁵¹⁸ *Annual Labour Report 1970*, p. 9.

⁵¹⁹ *Annual Labour Report 1970*, p. 10.

⁵²⁰ Government Gazette No. 635 of Tuesday, 28th July 1970; Report of the Board of Inquiry appointed to look into the causes and circumstances leading to the existence of a trade dispute between the Zambia National Union of Teachers and the Ministry of Education, 1970; *Annual Labour Report 1970*, pp. 11-12; *Annual Labour Report 1971*, 10; MLSS1/25/146 – Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) versus Ministry of Education, 1970-1871.

appointed to carry out the task again.⁵²¹The recommendations of the Turner Commission did not help to reduce the tensions that caused strikes and other work stoppage. As Table 6 shows, there were several strikes and work stoppages between 1978 and 1983, mainly caused by issues of wages and conditions of service. In 1981 on the mines there were serious strikes caused by protests over the expulsion of union leaders from UNIP caused by disagreements over the 1980 Local Government Act.⁵²²

Towards the end of 1982 and in January 1983 respectively, the government announced measures pertaining to the decontrol of prices of essential goods, the devaluation of the Kwacha by twenty percent, and the introduction of a wage policy, which limited the rise in wages to not more than ten percent. These measures caused anger among trade union leaders and they vehemently opposed them because they felt that they would weaken the real purchasing power of wages and salaries and also drastically lower the standard of living. While the trade union movement acknowledged the bad state of the country's economy and appreciated the efforts the Party and its Government was making to improve the situation, it still felt that the wage ceilings and incomes policies had not been durable instruments for securing steady growth with price stability. In this regard, the movement felt that the Party and its Government should either control both prices and wages or decontrol both prices and wages for the sake of avoiding long term industrial relations problems. In January 1983, Chiluba indicated that the trade union movement wanted a wages policy which would lead to bridging the gap between the "have-not" and those in the high income bracket. He stated: "We want to ensure that those who eat breakfast without having any appetite do not get richer over those who eat with appetite."⁵²³ In the end the Party and its Government agreed with the movement that the control of wage

⁵²¹ *Annual Labour Report*, 1978, 8-9.

⁵²² *Annual Labour Report 1982*, p. 9.

⁵²³ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 23/01/83.

movement would be temporary up to the end of April 1984 and thereafter the situation would revert to free collective bargaining.⁵²⁴

Zimba, the General Secretary of ZCTU described the 1984 budget as “one for a sick nation which will take the masses from abject poverty to septic poverty.”⁵²⁵ When the ZCTU General Council met in Kitwe on 5th February 1984 to critically analyse that same budget it was scathing in its analysis of it. It observed that the budget was more consumer-oriented than job-creation oriented. It further observed that “it encouraged the already rich and clever to become richer and the poor to become poorer. It lacks the rudiments of national self-reliance, propensity to serve and the much-talked about self-sacrifice.” It was in this regard that the ZCTU urged the Government to take a bold policy decision to remove free services provided to national leaders and parastatal executives because of the worsening economy. ZCTU felt that Government would save a substantial amount of money if it stopped providing free services to the rich who constituted only 10 percent of national salary earners. It warned that the prevailing trend in which the rich were being subsidised by the poor through the provision of free housing, electricity, water, transport, fuel and security guards was bound to divide the country into two.⁵²⁶

The conflicts over salaries and conditions of service continued into 1985, when workers in the public service and represented by the Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ), the Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT), the National Union of Public Service Workers (NUPSW) and the Zambia United Local Authorities Workers’ Union (ZULAWU) went on strike.⁵²⁷ Frederick Hapunda, the Minister of Labour and Social Services called for a “stop to the rot of strikes” because they were worsening the already bad state of the economy,

⁵²⁴ *Annual Labour Report 1983*, p. 10 & p. 12.

⁵²⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 30/01/84: Newstead Zimba: “From abject poverty to septic poverty.”

⁵²⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 06/02/84.

⁵²⁷ *Annual Labour Report 1985*, p. 9.

and decided to apply the “stick”⁵²⁸ by cancelling the check-off system,⁵²⁹ stating that the country experienced serious industrial unrest in 1985.⁵³⁰ He issued, under section 20 (12) of the IRA of 1971, Cap 517 of the Laws of Zambia, Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 1985, called the Trade Unions (Deduction of Subscriptions) Regulations of 1985, to punish trade unions whenever their members went on strike, whether the strike was legal or illegal. This legislation introduced more conflict between the trade union movement and the government.⁵³¹ ZCTU petitioned the Kitwe High Court for an order to revoke Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 1985, which in essence banned strikes, but the petition was not successful.⁵³² While several MPs saw a problem with Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 1985, and argued that it had caused disharmony between government and the movement, government insisted that all was well and its relationship with the trade union movement was good.⁵³³ Hapunda argued that although the trade union movement believed at the time of implementing Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 1985 that the Party and its Government intended to proscribe the independence of the trade union movement or ban it altogether that was not the intention of the Party and its Government but rather to curtail the incidence of illegal strikes.⁵³⁴

In addition to Statutory Instrument (S.I.) No. 6 of 1985, President Kaunda made two orders under the Preservation of Public Security Regulations, but specifically Regulation 37, which banned workers employed in what was deemed to be a “necessary service” from going on strike or participating in any stoppage of work. Under this order, contained in Gazette Notice No. 273 of 1985 and Statutory Instrument No. 35 of 1985, all financial institutions were

⁵²⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 05/01/85; 16/01/85; 19/01/85; 21/01/85.

⁵²⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 22/01/85; 05/03/85; 08/03/85; 19/04/85; 23/04/85; & 15/05/85.

⁵³⁰ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session of the Fifth National Assembly*, 17th January – 27th March 1986, Column 2445.

⁵³¹ *Annual Labour Report 1985*, pp. 18-19.

⁵³² *Annual Labour Report 1985*, p. 16.

⁵³³ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session of the Fifth National Assembly*, 17th January – 27th March 1986, Columns 2395-96.

⁵³⁴ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session of the Fifth National Assembly*, 17th January – 27th March 1986, Columns 2444-45.

classified as “necessary service,” and it brought nearly all services in the country under the category of “necessary service”. These regulations introduced a modicum of industrial harmony at places of work and instilled a sense of responsibility into the trade union movement’s hierarchy and indeed in workers as a whole. This was what the government wanted in order not to disrupt economic development.⁵³⁵

As a result of the S.I. No. 6 of 1985, the check-off system of eight (8) trade unions was discontinued as a result of their members going on strike. These unions included the Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW), ZNUT, the National Union of Postal and Telecommunications Workers (NUPTW), the Zambia Electricity Workers’ Union (ZEWU), the Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ), the National Union of Plantation and Agriculture Workers (NUPAW), the National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers (NUBEGW), and the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers (NUCIW).⁵³⁶ In an effort to assist the trade unions which lost their statutory dues the ZCTU provided support in cash and in kind to the affected trade unions to enable them carry out recruitment of members. A remarkable response was recorded in most industries and workers willingly signed check-off to enable the employers to deduct trade union subscriptions.⁵³⁷

Some MPs commended Hapunda for doing a good job under difficult circumstances, but also advised him to handle labour leaders carefully, especially at that time when the country’s economy was going through a severe economic crisis. They argued that it was not necessary, for example, to issue S.I.s all the time when matters could be discussed at a round

⁵³⁵ Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 1985*, The Industrial Relations Act (Laws, Volume X, Cap. 517), The Trade Unions (Deductions of Subscriptions) Regulation, 1985 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1985); Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 35 of 1985*, The Preservation of Public Security Regulation, The Preservation of Public Security (Necessary Service) (Declaration) Order, 1985 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1985); Republic of Zambia, *Gazette Notice No. 273 of 1985*, The Preservation of Public Security Act (Laws, Volume III, Cap. 106). The Preservation of Public Security Regulations (Page 30), Order under Regulation 37 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1985); *Annual Labour Report 1985*, p. 19.

⁵³⁶ *Annual Labour Report 1985*, p. 19.

⁵³⁷ *Annual Labour Report 1985*, p. 16.

table between the government and the labour leaders. The continuous issuing of Statutory Instruments would not solve the problem; it would just aggravate the situation.⁵³⁸

The year 1985, therefore, saw a marked deterioration in the relationship between the trade union movement and the Party and its Government as a result of Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 1985, the introduction of the foreign exchange auctioning system and the unabated high cost of living. The movement was of the view that the government had deliberately introduced all these measures to weaken it or if not to weaken it, it was to completely finish off the movement in the country.⁵³⁹ In addition to all the problems the movement faced in fighting for its members, the outlook for the future when viewed against the decline in national economic performance was not bright. In addition, Zambia's labour force, that is the number of people entering the labour market and seeking employment, was expanding, even at the time of stagnation or continued decline in economic activities. This led to a sharp rise in unemployment particularly among the youth.⁵⁴⁰

Even with S.I. No. 6 of 1985 in force, there was a serious one week strike by miners on the Copperbelt in June 1985, sparked by MUZ over miners contributing to the ZNPF when they already had their own pension scheme, the Mukuba pension scheme. The miners, however, felt that the ZNPF scheme was better than the Mukuba scheme which they demanded should be scrapped.⁵⁴¹ In Parliament the government was asked to explain the strike. Minister of State for Labour and Social Services R.K. Banda explained that the illegal strike by the miners had certain peculiar characteristics compared to previous strikes First and foremost the strike did not arise from a dispute between the union and mine management, nor was it directed against the Government. Secondly, during the course of the strike, there was looting, arson (miners in

⁵³⁸ *Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session of the Fifth National Assembly*, 11th January – 29th March 1985, Columns 4000-10.

⁵³⁹ *Annual Labour Report 1985*, p. 16.

⁵⁴⁰ *Annual Labour Report 1985*, p. 14.

⁵⁴¹ See the *Times of Zambia* and *Zambia Daily Mail* of between 03/06/85 and 17/06/85.

Mufulira looted a mine farm and burned down MUZ offices) and general violence (a man was shot and wounded in Chingola when police clashed with miners, which resulted in damage to property. Last but not least, miners at the Chambeshi Mine commandeered buses to go to other divisions to force other miners to join the strike.⁵⁴²This was the explanation offered to Parliament by the Ministry of Labour and Social Services.

The ZCCM reported that it had lost K16 million when it lost 4,000 tonnes in copper and cobalt production as a result of the strike.⁵⁴³ Initially, a total of 5,680 mine workers were dismissed from employment as a result of their participation in the illegal strike. The number, however, was reduced upon appeal to 2,250, meaning that 3,430 miners successfully appealed against dismissal. Mufulira Division had the highest number of dismissals followed by Nchanga Division which included Chambeshi Mine, where the strike began on 1st June 1985.⁵⁴⁴

Kaunda pointed out that in the period 1964-1984, workers had resorted to illegal strikes because they ignored procedures and constitutions of their organisations. Hapunda vowed to crush any malcontents destroying good worker/employer relations at places of work in Zambia,⁵⁴⁵ but the workers were feeling the effects of the increased cost of living and there was notable disenchantment among the workers, particularly in the low and middle income bracket emanating from a sharp rise in prices of basic commodities.⁵⁴⁶ Chiluba, declared that unions did not take joy in wildcat strikes, while Hapunda informed Parliament that the country had lost 4, 570, 782 man-hours in 233 illegal strikes throughout the country from 1981 to 1983. He attributed the strikes to an atmosphere of mistrust between the Party and its Government on the one hand and the ZCTU on the other. He added that the period 1981 to 1985 was the worst.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴² See *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session of the Fifth National Assembly*, 17th January – 27th March 1986, Columns 2395-96; *Times of Zambia*, 04/06/85; 05/06/85.

⁵⁴³ *Times of Zambia*, 11/06/85.

⁵⁴⁴ *Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session of the Fifth National Assembly*, 17th January – 27th March 1986, Columns 2395-96; *Times of Zambia*, 07/06/85; 08/06/85; 10/06/85 & 11/06/85.

⁵⁴⁵ *Annual Labour Report 1985*; *Times of Zambia*, 13/03/85; 01/05/85 & 01/06/85.

⁵⁴⁶ *Annual Labour Report 1986*, p. 10.

⁵⁴⁷ *Annual Labour Report 1985*; *Times of Zambia*, 31/08/85.

There were thirty-five stoppages of work involving 5,344 workers and resulting into 8,932 man-days being lost in 1986. In 1986 Kaunda reprieved those trade unions whose statutory orders (check-off system) for collection of monthly subscriptions had been revoked in 1985. Between 1980 and 1986, the Zambian economy sunk deeper and deeper into crisis caused mainly by continued high prices of oil. The crisis was characterised by a worsening in the terms of Zambia's terms of trade. Domestic inflation was higher than was recorded in previous years, reaching a peak of 67 percent in April 1987. It was against that worsening economic crisis that the NERP was introduced.⁵⁴⁸ It was also against that background that workers were demanding higher wages.

In March 1987, teachers on the Copperbelt went on strike. The Times of Zambia reported that the political leadership on the Copperbelt blamed the strike on "some disgruntled elements bent on destabilising the nation," and there was even fear that some "political malcontents" may take advantage of the situation.⁵⁴⁹ The strike was actually caused by anomalies in the wage package offered to them. They only returned to work after two weeks when authorities assured them that their complaint would be attended to.⁵⁵⁰ Prime Minister Kebby Musokotwane, a former teacher, in a statement in Parliament accused the teachers of triggering off a wave of strikes by various groups in the public sector, including nurses and junior doctors. He argued that the illegal strikers should be punished by law by withdrawing their salaries because workers were paid in exchange for their labour and so when that labour was voluntarily withdrawn it was only logical that their salaries be withdrawn as well.⁵⁵¹

The trade union movement accused Musokotwane of threatening striking teachers and doctors with the loss of their salaries and also of arrest. As leader of business in Parliament

⁵⁴⁸ *New Economic Recovery Programme, Fourth National Development Plan 1989-1993, Vol. I and Vol. II*, Lusaka, January 1989.

⁵⁴⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 13/03/87.

⁵⁵⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 13/03/87.

⁵⁵¹ *Parliamentary Debates of the Fourth Session of the Fifth National Assembly*, 16th January – 2nd April 1987, Columns 3817-3822; *Times of Zambia*, 27/03/87.

Musokotwane issued a Ministerial statement on strikes in which he appealed to the nation to side with the government against the striking workers whom he claimed had used a lie to go on strike. The ZCTU came out strongly in defence of the striking workers by asking the government to stop threatening the workers, as threats to punish the workers on strike were ill-calculated and could only serve to worsen the situation by pushing the workers beyond the brink of tolerance. The government was advised to first announce measures it had put in place to satisfy the workers before it could issue threats.⁵⁵²

The Government expressed optimism on industrial relations in 1987 but that did not match the facts on the ground as the year experienced 70 industrial disputes with 17,437 workers involved with a loss of 15,432 working days. On 13th March 1987, workers at Nakambala Sugar Estate went on strike and it affected all field staff. Several workers were sacked. The MP for Mazabuka, Patterson Haamane asked in Parliament if the Government was in order to allow so many workers to be sacked. Minister of Labour, Unia G. Mwila explained that the 307 workers sacked were those that failed to beat the ultimatum to return to work by 24th March, while 4,198 workers returned before the ultimatum.⁵⁵³

In March 1988 teachers on the Copperbelt went on strike. The Government was so upset with them that there was an attempt to prosecute them. Minister of General Education and Culture, Basil Kabwe, a former teacher and trade unionist, lashed out at ZNUT for allegedly being the most disorganised union.⁵⁵⁴ ZNUT and ZCTU were not happy about this and urged the Government not to prosecute the teachers but to find a solution to their problems.⁵⁵⁵ On 28th July 1988, following persistent strikes on the mines, Kaunda ordered the detention of Chiluba,imba, Chitalu Sampa, the MUZ leader Timothy Walamba, and Ndola businessman Chama

⁵⁵² *Times of Zambia*, 28/03/87.

⁵⁵³ *Parliamentary Debates of the Fourth Session of the Fifth National Assembly*, 16th January-2nd April 1987, Columns 4310-13.

⁵⁵⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 17/03/88; 18/03/88; 31/08/88; 01/04/88; 04/04/88; 13/04/88; 07/05/88; 09/05/88; 19/05/88; 07/06/88; 08/06/88; & 22/06/88.

⁵⁵⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 14/04/88.

Chakomboka, under the Preservation of Public Security Act to safeguard the interests of national security. When he announced the detention of the ZCTU leaders, he accused them of using their positions to achieve political objectives.⁵⁵⁶

The free collective bargaining wage policy introduced early in 1989 provided a general guide to trade unions and employers in industries and other employing organisations.⁵⁵⁷ Unlike the wage policy introduced in 1984, which was weighed towards bridging the gap between the high income and low income groups, which in turn created countless problems for managements and particularly resulted in professional and technically qualified personnel leaving for other countries, the 1989 policy appreciated that reasonable differentials should be maintained between earnings and according to professional and technical qualifications. In order to address the problems of unequal income distribution between the non-unionised and unionised employees, which was largely due to the extensive fringe benefits enjoyed by the former, there was increasing demand from trade unions that the Prices and Incomes Commission should have authority over such incomes as it had over those of unionised employees.⁵⁵⁸

The economy witnessed some very significant changes in wage levels in 1989. The most notable change occurred in the public service following the acceptance by government to award in addition to the usual increments fifty percent increase for the low income group and thirty percent for the high income group, with effect from 1st July. Many employers in the parastatal and private organisations also followed suit and granted similar increases to their employees' wages and salaries with effect from 1st July. In spite of these salary awards, as can be seen from the table, 1989 witnessed 69 strikes involving 19,963 workers with a loss of

⁵⁵⁶ *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 29, No. 22, January 1988, 4; & Press Release (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, 1988.

⁵⁵⁷ *Annual Labour Report 1989*, p. 13.

⁵⁵⁸ *Annual Labour Report 1989*, pp. 13-14.

32,173 man-days.⁵⁵⁹ In January 1989, the Minister of Labour, Social Development and Culture, General Kingsley Chinkuli, warned that trade unions whose members staged wildcat strikes would in future be proscribed and their leaders banned to curb industrial unrest. The striking workers would also lose their salaries or wages. His warning came as Barclays Bank workers were trooping back to work after a three-day sit-in protest.⁵⁶⁰

In August 1989, however, junior doctors in Lusaka, Kitwe and Ndola, went on a go-slow and refused to call it off despite appeals from authorities, thereby defying a 1985 Presidential ban on such action by workers deemed essential. They were sacked, but when the situation in the hospitals deteriorated, with the number of deaths among patients increasing, they were quickly re-hired.⁵⁶¹ Kaunda threatened to close any hospital where medical staff staged illegal strikes to press demands for better conditions of service.⁵⁶²

As Table 7 shows, the early 1990s also witnessed a wave of strikes. In October 1990, the Minister of Labour and Social Development, Lavu Mulimba, admitted that the law had not succeeded in ending strikes as the countrywide protest by lecturers and teachers persisted. He also charged that the wave of strikes was politically motivated and blamed unnamed people with political ambitions of fanning unrest in order to create anarchy and usurp political power.⁵⁶³ He did not offer any concrete evidence to show that the strikes were politically motivated and only surmised that it was politics involved because proper channels were not followed by workers when they went on strike and also because this was at the height of the campaign to return Zambia to multi-party politics. The *Times of Zambia* reported that the ZCTU was “dismayed” at Mulimba’s charge because the reasons for the strikes were “very well known” to Government and “solutions should have been found a long time ago”. Among

⁵⁵⁹ *Annual Labour Report 1989*, p. 27.

⁵⁶⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 21/01/89.

⁵⁶¹ *Times of Zambia*, 15/08/89 - 30/08/89.

⁵⁶² *Times of Zambia*, 31/08/89.

⁵⁶³ *Times of Zambia*, 05/10/90 & 06/10/90.

these reasons was the fact that the economy was performing poorly and the cost of living was always going up making it difficult for a worker to survive. 1990 experienced 103 industrial disputes involving 51,606 workers with a loss of 71,938 working days.⁵⁶⁴

The 1990 Industrial Relations Act

Towards the end of Kaunda's rule, there was general agreement that the industrial relations system needed to be changed to suit the changing labour market situation. In that regard, in 1990, government repealed the IRA of 1971 and replaced it with the IRA of 1990, which aimed at liberalising the trade union structure to remove the one union in one industry principle. Kaunda argued that democratisation of the Party and the call for political pluralism entailed political and social liberalisation. In this regard it was decided that the right to choose a party to belong to or the type of Government which should rule should also be extended to the right to form and belong to a trade union and the right of that trade union to be or not to be affiliated to the ZCTU. In the new political environment, affiliation by a trade union to the ZCTU could not be mandatory and supported by a statute. Legal experts had deduced that the mandatory nature of the affiliation clause in the IRA of 1971 had made the ZCTU to become a powerful force at the negotiating tables. The proposals being made to amend the mandatory clause were likely to cut the trade union movement to size. The changes would mean that the ZCTU would have to win over to its side any trade union it wanted to affiliate to it. It was also felt that the mandatory clause had introduced an attitude of taking membership for granted. The ZCTU argued that there was nothing new to the proposal as the trade union movement had always advocated autonomy. Britain and the US had a similar system. The ZCTU would not disintegrate, but would even become stronger.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 08/10/90.

⁵⁶⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 25/09/90; *Industrial Relations Act of 1990*.

The trade union movement opposed the IRA of 1990, because the government ignored the inputs from the ZFE and the ZCTU. In this regard, the movement saw the IRA of 1990 as a bad law, which was enacted in bad faith to eliminate some “undesirable” personalities such as Chiluba, Sampa and Zimba, who were said to be inimical to the interests of the nation. ZCTU teamed up with ZFE to oppose the IRA of 1990.⁵⁶⁶ The ZCTU resented the IRA of 1990 as it viewed it as being punitive. The ZCTU noted that the immediate effect of the 1990 Act was that the trade unions were weakened and that confusion in commerce and industry was rife. When the MMD came to power in October 1991, the three social partners, namely, the government, employers and the trade union movement agreed to revert to the one union in one industry policy. Accordingly, the IRA of 1990 was repealed and replaced by the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993.⁵⁶⁷

Sacika insisted that the 1990 Act was a very genuine and courageous attempt by the UNIP government to liberalise the labour relations system in order to bring it in line with the liberalised political system. The problem of the effort, however, was that it fell far short of the criteria and benchmarks established by the ILO in the conventions dealing with the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. In this way, a golden opportunity was missed to truly liberalise and democratise the labour relations system to suit the aspiration of political pluralism.⁵⁶⁸ He added that the opportunity in 1990 to go back to multiparty politics should have been used to revise the IRA of 1971 in full instead of doing it piecemeal. There were problems in the trade union movement that the government wanted to correct through the Acts of 1965 and 1971, but they were not done according to ILO Conventions. Although in 1990 there was a chance to use the ILO Conventions, this was not done. Further changes had been made to the

⁵⁶⁶ *Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session of the Seventh National Assembly*, 15th January – 18th March 1993, pp. 1873-1875.

⁵⁶⁷ ZCTU: Report of the Secretary General to the 9th Quadrennial Congress, 26th to 29th October 1994, Livingstone, pp. 13-14.

⁵⁶⁸ *The Post*, Friday, January 13, 1995.

Act of 1971 in 1993, 1997 and 2008, and the changes have had the effect of weakening the trade union movement quite considerably.⁵⁶⁹

Sacika emphasised that it was never the intention of Kaunda's government to consider provisions of the IRAs of 1965, 1971 or 1990 as permanent. The stance taken through the provisions in the 1965 and 1971 Acts was not only a political or philosophical aspect, but it was also a practical aspect. It was not intellectual, but practical. He added hypothetically that if Kaunda had continued in government beyond 1991 he would have made far-reaching changes to the labour law to conform to international requirements and in favour of the trade unions and workers.⁵⁷⁰

Conclusion

The main aim in this chapter was to examine the issues of industrial relations (or labour relations) by looking at the wages policy and workers strikes in Zambia in the period 1964 to 1991, the period during which Zambia was ruled by Kaunda and UNIP. The aim was to show the nature of the strikes and the impact they had on the country.

The government wanted to quickly establish its hegemony over the trade union movement and the workers they represented immediately after independence so that it could be the leader in economic development. That was done by legislation, for example, the enacting of the IRA of 1971 and the IRA of 1990, or by using force, for example declaring some services as "essential services" and banning strikes in those industries. Sometimes labour leaders were detained or police arrested striking workers as a way of intimidating the workers.

⁵⁶⁹ Interview with Sacika, Lusaka, 27/04/15.

⁵⁷⁰ Interview with Sacika, Lusaka, 27/04/15.

Table 7: Strikes by Industry from January 1990 – December 1993

STRIKES BY INDUSTRY FROM JANUARY 1990 – DECEMBER 1993									
Sector	No. of strikes	No. of Workers Involved	No. of Man Days Lost	NUMBER OF STRIKES					
				Wages	Man Days	CBA's	Man Days	Other	Man Days
						Number			
Agricultural , Animal Husbandry Forestry and Fishing	39	16,276	71,253	28	52,793	01	00	09	19,340
Mining and Quarrying	07	7,130	24,712	04	5,037	03	19,675	00	00
Manufacturing	113	23,506	64,751	78	47,058	15	4,028	20	14,031
Electricity, Gas and Water	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Construction	22	4,778	10,999	11	10,799	00	00	04	600
Wholesale and Retail Trade Restaurants and Hotels	20	2,621	3,210	10	2,536	04	440	10	2,128
Transport, Storage and Communication	23	12,495	69,035	17	12,452	00	01	05	115
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate And Business Services	29	190,504	34,305	16	10,662	04	2,998	12	19,273
Non-Government Service	38	3,337	13,948	13	10,196	05	3,096	03	256
Government Service	53	24,372	888,459	29	23,339	11	23,339	13	7,251
TOTALs	344	132,410	1,173,056	222	1,068,408	44	53,576	78	81,787

Source: ZCTU Report of the Secretary General to the Quadrennial Congress in 1994

The IRA of 1971 was enacted to replace the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance of 1965 which was found to be inadequate. The IRA of 1971 was considered to be good legislation and it was hoped that through it, the trade union movement in the country would be domesticated, but it was actually the instrument meant to be used to suppress the movement. However, it had some unexpected results. The “one union in one industry” principle introduced by the Act led to compulsory affiliations by the unions to the ZCTU and the compulsory paying of union dues to the mother body. These two aspects helped to strengthen the ZCTU and trade unionism in the country. In fact, the Zambian trade union movement became one of the strongest in Africa.

The government also tried to relate the issue of wages to the issue of levels of skills without perpetuating a racial wage structure. The wages policies the Kaunda government tried to adopt, therefore, were meant to relate wage levels to productivity and efficiency, to attain a unified wage structure and to reduce incidences of strikes and work stoppages to a minimum. In order to achieve those aims, the government used several commissions of inquiry to examine salary structures in the country in various undertakings. In spite of all this, no clear wages policy was introduced in the country. The frequent occurrence of strikes made it difficult to implement a prices and wages policy. The relationship between the cost of living, wage demands and strikes was crucial in understanding industrial relations in Zambia. From year to year these were the issues which determined the relationship between the trade union movement and the Government and other employers. At least during the First and Second Republics negotiations for wages and conditions of service were conducted through the guidance of the labour laws, for example, the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 and the amendments to it, which followed later. Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) would be signed between trade unions and employers and the two groups would be bound by these agreements.

The major test of any system of industrial relations was in how effectively it dealt with the important issue of wage determination in the relationship between workers and employers. Between 1964 and 1991 the non-implementation of CBAs caused problems leading to strikes. Wages and conditions of service had to be bargained for every year owing to the cost of living which rose every year as the economy performed poorly. Strikes were costly to the economy. Although no figures are readily available to show what was lost in terms of money, everyone, employers and employees and trade unions, agreed they were expensive. It was in that regard that government's reaction to the strikes was sometimes marked by strong disapproval and included detaining trade union leaders and confiscating their passports to prevent international travel, or declaring some categories of workers as "essential workers" who were prevented by law from going on strike. That did not stop strikes, leading government leaders to conclude that most strikes were instigated by political enemies to bring down the government. Laws were passed to deliberately make it difficult for workers to go on legal strikes.

During the time there were calls for the return to multiparty democracy in the country, the Kaunda regime changed the labour laws by enacting the IRA of 1990, which it argued was meant to democratise the trade union movement. The 1990 Act removed the principle of "one union in one industry" that had resonated well with the one-party system of government, and also the compulsory payment of subscriptions to the ZCTU, aspects which had strengthened the trade union movement. The trade unions could now choose whether to affiliate to the ZCTU or not. While many people agreed that the trade union movement needed to be democratised, the trade union leaders saw danger in the 1990 Act and claimed it was intended to kill or weaken the trade union movement in the country.

CHAPTER SIX

THE STRAINED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT AND THE MMD GOVERNMENT, 1992-2011

Introduction

This chapter analyses the relationship between the trade union movement and the government between 1992 and 2011. The chapter specifically examines Chiluba's position as a former trade union movement leader and his relationship with the trade union movement in a democratic country. During the Second Republic, especially under the leadership of Chiluba, the trade union movement was so strong that it was considered to be one of the strongest workers' movements in Africa.⁵⁷¹ It was so strong that even President Kaunda, with all the powers he wielded as a one-party state leader, could not ignore it. When it spoke out on any issue in the country, the government listened.⁵⁷² However, when Chiluba became President, he ignored the same movement he had led so effectively. He was even accused of contributing to the split in the ZCTU, and this led to its being weakened.

The chapter also examines the implications of the changes to the labour laws under the MMD Government from 1993. It then examines the split in the ZCTU in 1994 resulting from the changed labour laws. The chapter then examines industrial relations and strike in the Third Republic. Finally, the chapter discusses the issue of the decline of trade unionism under the MMD Government. All these issues had a bearing on the relationship between the trade union movement and the MMD Government. Most scholarly writing on the relationship indicated that it was poor because it was affected by many factors, the most important of which were the economic policies of liberalisation the government pursued. As was the case in other African countries in which SAPs were implemented, such as Democratic Republic of the Congo,

⁵⁷¹ John M. Mwanakatwe, *End of Kaunda Era* (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1994), p. 184.

⁵⁷² *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 04/09/94; Piet Konings, "Trade Unions and Democratisation in Africa," <http://openess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887.../ASC-1246231-027.pdf> (Accessed on 16/11/17).

Zimbabwe, Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique and Malawi, to name a few, the major effects of these economic policies in Zambia were the reduction in employment levels as a result of retrenchments from downsizing in industry or closure of companies, the weakening of the trade union movement as trade unions lost members and also the drop in the rate of unionisation. Therefore, while the size of the labour force in the country was increasing, employment was shrinking. The trade unions were in danger of going into extinction unless they changed their strategy to enable them to operate in the new environment in the labour markets.

If in 1964 Zambian workers had great expectations that the African government under UNIP would give them improved wages and a good standard of living, the workers' expectations that the MMD government would give them even better rewards were even greater. However, an analysis of the relationship which developed between the trade union movement and the government from 1992 to 2011 reveals that the workers' great expectations were not fulfilled. Even though the workers celebrated a "false dawn" their wages and conditions did not improve and taxation on income kept increasing. The wage freezes which began to be implemented during the Kaunda regime became a constant feature in the wages policy of the government. In some cases conditions for the workers became worse than before, but even more difficult for the workers was that the economic policies of the government led in most cases to reduction in jobs available and a rise in informal sector employment.

Babeiya noted that trade unions in Tanzania had a very minimal role to play in democratisation mainly due to factors such as a missing bond between trade unions and opposition parties due to the continued control of the political sphere by the ruling party, the fragility of the opposition, the failure of the opposition parties to introduce alternative policies,

absence of a clear political stance by the trade unions.⁵⁷³ This study will show that in the post-1991 era in Zambia the situation was slightly better than that in Tanzania.

Chiluba, Democracy and the Workers

On Thursday, 31st October 1991, Zambia went to the polls. Out of 1,283,234 valid presidential votes cast, Chiluba, obtained 972,212 votes, which was 76 percent of the vote, while Kaunda, obtained 311,022 votes, giving him slightly over 24 percent of the total presidential vote. The MMD won 977,138 votes cast in parliamentary elections, giving it 72 percent of the vote, and 125 out of 150 seats in the National Assembly. UNIP won 310,723 votes, giving it 23 percent of the votes and 25 seats in an electoral turnout of about 45 percent.⁵⁷⁴

When Chiluba was sworn in as President, he swore to uphold the Constitution of Zambia and promised that the MMD would be committed to the basic principles of good governance, democracy and its tenets of transparency and accountability, but this was not to be.⁵⁷⁵ However, Roger Chongwe, a former cabinet minister in Chiluba's cabinet, argued in a letter to the *Post* newspaper that despite having been promoted as a new-style African leader and the "Moses of Zambia", Chiluba soon began to show some clear old-fashioned leadership traits. Chongwe accused him of sacking independent-minded colleagues (such as himself) from his cabinet by 1994 and surrounding himself with "yes" men and women.⁵⁷⁶ Mbita Chitala, who served as a Deputy Minister in Chiluba's Government also accused him of throwing out of his cabinet all ministers who seemed to want to see a truly democratic Zambia emerge. After

⁵⁷³ Edwin Babeiya, "Trade Unions and Democratisation in Tanzania: End of an Era?" *Journal of Politics and Law*, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2011, p.130.

⁵⁷⁴ Electoral Commission of Zambia, 1991.

⁵⁷⁵ Chitala, *Not Yet Democracy*, p. 23; Denis Venter, "Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa: Recent Elections in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho", *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, January 2003, pp. 4-25; Jan Kees van Donge, "Zambia: Kaunda and Chiluba – Enduring patterns of political culture" in John A. Wiseman (ed.), *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 208-214.

⁵⁷⁶ Rodger Chongwe, "Open letter to the voters", *The Post*, 25/12/01.

this all institutions which had faithfully served the one-party state were enhanced to serve Chiluba whose presidential powers were increased by the enactment of not only the fourth constitution of the Republic, but also through a series of acts and statutory instruments.⁵⁷⁷

After Chiluba's and the MMD's victories, one of the first actions the trade union movement engaged in was to show public support for Chiluba and his Government by holding 'victory marches' in Lusaka and other parts of the country to show solidarity and support for Chiluba because he was one of them and the government because they had put it in power. Shamenda called for discipline among workers and moral integrity in Government.⁵⁷⁸ The trade union movement, therefore, wholly welcomed the MMD victory,⁵⁷⁹ because it was convinced that it was the workers that had put the MMD in power and therefore they looked to its Government with great expectations of good remuneration for their labour and respect for professionalism. However the trade union movement warned that the workers' patience would not last forever.⁵⁸⁰

The good number of former trade unionists that went into government raised great expectations among workers of good things to come because they expected the MMD government to be a government of workers. The trade union leaders that went into government were as follows: Chiluba became Republican President,imba, became Minister of Labour and Social Security, Sampa, the former ZCTU Assistant Secretary General, became Minister of Home Affairs, Henry Kabika, the former National Chairman of CSUZ, became Deputy Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Koshita Shengamo, the former General Secretary of MUZ, became Deputy Minister of Finance, Godden Mandandi, the former General Secretary of CSUZ became Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Security, Nelson Simatendele, the

⁵⁷⁷ Chitala, *Not Yet Democracy*, p. 215; Ihonvbere, *Economic Crisis, Civil Society and Democratization: The Case of Zambia*, pp. 200-02; Chongwe, "Open letter to the voters", *The Post*, 25/12/01.

⁵⁷⁸ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 24/11/91.

⁵⁷⁹ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 24/11/91.

⁵⁸⁰ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 24/11/91.

former Trustee in ZCTU went into the foreign service, Peter Chilindi, the former General Treasurer of MUZ went into the foreign service and Reverend Peter Mulenga, the former National Chairman of ZUFIAW, went into the foreign service.⁵⁸¹ With regard to trade union leaders accepting positions in government, Hodgkin and Friedland observed from the 1950s that trade unions were a channel into political jobs.⁵⁸² Henderson observed that since Zambia had the most powerful trade union movement in East and Central Africa in the 1950s, UNIP adopted the strategy of persuading trade unionists to accept the view that the fight for independence was being sabotaged by those trade unionists that insisted on keeping the trade union movement independent of government or political parties. He further observed that some trade union leaders had been neutralised by being brought into the cabinet, as was the case with Tom Mboya in Kenya and Wilson Chakulya in Zambia.⁵⁸³

When Chiluba addressed the ZCTU on 11th January 1992, on democracy in Zambia, he acknowledged that his having been ZCTU leader had helped to make him the second President of Zambia by giving him the courage, the experience to lead and to make decisions.⁵⁸⁴ He accused the people who had managed the one party regime of selfishness and appropriating to themselves the nation's wealth. Chiluba further stated that the workers led by the ZCTU, the peasant farmers and the intellectuals rose together to fight the UNIP system to stop the mismanagement of national resources. He added that the change of government was to bring about justice, to restore political and human rights and to re-establish people's liberties and

⁵⁸¹ ZCTU: Report of the Secretary General to the 9th Quadrennial Congress, 26th to 29th October 1994, Livingstone.

⁵⁸² Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, Chapter 4; Friedland, "African Trade Unions Studies," p. 579.

⁵⁸³ Henderson, "Wage-Earners and Political Protest in Colonial Africa," p. 290 & p.291.

⁵⁸⁴ Speech delivered by the President of the Republic of Zambia, Mr Frederick Chiluba, to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), 11th January 1992, in Donald Chanda (ed.), *Democracy in Zambia: Key Speeches of President Chiluba 1991/92* (Lusaka/Kitwe: Africa Press Trust, 1993), p. 24

freedoms. It was about bringing honesty in the production and utilization of the country's natural resources and a fair distribution of the national product among all Zambians.⁵⁸⁵

Chiluba promised a tough immediate future in which not only the workers, but also the intellectuals, the peasants and everyone else in the country would face deprivation as subsidies were reduced and then withdrawn. Since the rebuilding of the economy was a national task, he said he did not expect anyone, whether as individuals or as groups to carry pocket agendas. He especially told ZCTU that since it was one of the organisations in the forefront in the birth of MMD, it had, together with the MMD government established one common public agenda for the development of the country. On the whole, he indicated that he did not expect the ZCTU to abandon the MMD government no matter how hard things became.⁵⁸⁶

In retrospect, Chiluba's promises in 1992 were populist because over the ten year period he was president most of the promises were not fulfilled. From 1992, the Government economic reforms began to take effect and the workers began to bear the brunt of the reforms. In February 1992, for example, the Government began to implement its SAP which badly affected employment levels in the country. In 1993, the Government announced it was going to run the economy on a cash budget system and also in 1993, the Government even declared an industrial dispute against the Public Service unions whose members had gone on strike to demand higher wages.⁵⁸⁷

The "honeymoon" between the trade union movement and MMD and its Government was over. At the end of 1995, Shamenda conceded that the movement was entering 1996 with a broken heart because 1995 did nothing to reduce the decline of the workers' purchasing power. There was nothing to celebrate about 1995 as workers did not fare as well as expected.

⁵⁸⁵ Chiluba's speech to ZCTU on 11th January 1992, p. 24.

⁵⁸⁶ Chiluba's speech to ZCTU on 11th January 1992 in Chanda, *Democracy in Zambia*, pp. 25-26.

⁵⁸⁷ ZCTU: Report of the Secretary General to the 9th Quadrennial Congress, 26th to 29th October 1994, Livingstone, p. 14.

Instead there had been more suspicion between ZCTU and Government. The workers were leaving 1995 with sorrow and regrets. The movement had lost many members through retrenchments and many had died because of depression.⁵⁸⁸ The trade union movement seemed to have claimed a “false victory”. If political democracy had been achieved, the workers still had to fight for economic democracy, or “democracy of the pocket”.⁵⁸⁹ Worse still it appeared that the workers became the most vulnerable species of the multi-party era,⁵⁹⁰ trade unionism faced another crisis and the Third Republic might be remembered for the fall of the strongest supporter of the MMD and the Third Republic.⁵⁹¹

It looked as if Zambia might achieve the dubious distinction of being the one country in Africa in which the trade union movement was “killed” after getting a President who had been its leader and one who was strongly supported by the same movement. It was especially so when viewed in the light of what Victor Feather stated about the importance of trade unions in the world and how they were everywhere and had come to stay regardless of the climate or weather.⁵⁹²

The confidence about the invincibility of trade unions in the 1950s and 1960s was not shared by scholars researching and writing on trade unions in the 1980s and the 1990s. Henk Thomas noted that although trade unionism continued to have a strong appeal as an instrument and symbol in the search for industrial and economic democracy, there was ample reason to ask whether trade unions would survive into the twenty-first century. In many parts of the world, particularly in Asia and Africa, but also in South and Central America, this question no longer led to an unequivocally affirmative answer because trade union movements in these

⁵⁸⁸ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 31/12/95; See also Report of the ZCTU Secretary General of 1994.

⁵⁸⁹ *Africa South & East*, March 1993, p. 28.

⁵⁹⁰ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 04/09/94.

⁵⁹¹ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 02/10/94.

⁵⁹² Feather, *The Essence of Trade Unionism*, p. 10.

regions faced totally new challenges, which they were hardly equipped to face. These new challenges were SAPs, the exclusion of labour from national politics, the informalization and feminisation of industry, flexibility in labour relations and the casualization of work. While for more than a century the trade union movement was an important actor in defending the interests of workers and in the struggles for independence and democracy, it now faced in large parts of the world almost total elimination as a significant social institution.⁵⁹³

In fact, even in Zambia, at the time Shamenda spoke excitedly on behalf of the movement on the MMD's victory, there were already some trade union leaders who did not really share in the euphoria of the other workers over such a victory. Brian Chipoya, the General Secretary of the Airways and Allied Workers' Union (AAWU) stated that the movement would continue to champion the workers' cause and would oppose any policies by the new government, which would not serve the interests of the workers.⁵⁹⁴

Shamenda, while still affirming the movement's support for the government, was soon warning politicians in the government not to interfere with industrial relations but to work to retain and maintain true principles of democracy and to work hard to find answers to the prevailing economic ills the nation was facing. He stressed that it would not hesitate to differ or to criticise the government on issues not in the interest of workers.⁵⁹⁵ Shamenda's views clearly suggested that from the beginning of the MMD rule, the movement was aware of the possible areas of conflict with the new Government. This chapter showed instances and areas where the trade union movement did not agree with the Government.

⁵⁹³ Thomas (ed.), *Globalization and Third World Trade Unions*, p. ix & p. 3. NOTE: There is literature available on the debate about the challenges facing trade union movements in the Third World. Scholars writing before the late 1980s insisted that trade union movements would always exist. However, scholars writing from the late 1980s and in the 1990s counter-argued that because of the changes in the labour markets as a result of globalization, the existence of trade union movements as relevant institutions was no longer assured. The book edited by Thomas, which we used in this work carried works which had these debates.

⁵⁹⁴ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 24/11/91.

⁵⁹⁵ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 22/12/91.

In fact it was not long after October 1991 that the workers and the trade union movement began to show displeasure with the MMD government through strikes. On its part the government began to threaten the workers with sackings or even arrest. It was as a result of the threats that striking teachers decided to continue with their strike in June 1992. The trade union movement also issued its own threats by threatening to expose ministers it perceived to be corrupt and that were not serving the interests of the nation. The public service trade unions were angered by the government's delay in opening negotiations for salaries and conditions of service. They were also unhappy that the government was not fulfilling promises on housing when it decided to repeal the section of the labour law that compelled employers to provide housing allowance or accommodation for its employees.⁵⁹⁶ This led the trade union movement to accuse the government of having a hypocritical approach to industrial relations.⁵⁹⁷ As far as the movement was concerned the honeymoon the government was over. It stressed that the honeymoon was over because it would not compromise the principles of trade unionism just to make a few leaders happy. This position forced the ZCTU leadership to state that while it supported the MMD in the run-up to the 1991 elections, it was no longer under any obligation to support its government if its policies created hardships for workers.⁵⁹⁸

In December 1991, the ZCTU General Council confirmed Fackson Shamenda as president of the ZCTU with full authority to speak for the Congress. The vacant posts of secretary general and assistant secretary general, previously held byimba and Sampa, were also filled. The ZCTU Executive comprised the following: Fackson U. Shamenda – President; Francis Kunda – Deputy President; Alec J. Chirwa - Secretary General; Geoffrey P. Alikipo – Assistant General Secretary (O&A); Ignatius M. Kasumbu – Assistant General Secretary

⁵⁹⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 06/03/92; 28/05/92; 18/06/92; 13/08/92; 23/01/93.

⁵⁹⁷ *The Weekly Post*, October 30 – November 5, 1992.

⁵⁹⁸ *Sunday Mail*, 22/11/92.

(F&BA); L. Ikowa – Trustee; P.S. Kumbuyo – Trustee; and N.L. Simatendele – Trustee (he later left to serve in Foreign Service).⁵⁹⁹

There was also disappointment and unhappiness in the trade union movement with the way Government handled labour matters and accused it of being inconsistent and insincere. It accused the government of side-lining it because it did not consult it on major issues affecting Zambia except when it wanted to remove subsidies on essential commodities or to increase producer prices on maize, thereby adversely affecting the livelihoods of workers and other ordinary Zambians.⁶⁰⁰ The Kaunda regime had set up a consultative mechanism through the tripartite meetings involving the government, the employers through the ZFE and the trade union movement through the ZCTU, but the MMD government was ignoring this.

The movement had expected to be treated as an equal partner of the MMD in the governance of the country because of the presence of trade unionists in the government, but found out that it was not regarded as such. The movement pointed out that it only supported the MMD because it was the best placed to bring about change in the country but that did not mean it would support its policies blindly.⁶⁰¹ The fact these attacks on the MMD government by labour leaders started barely a year after the MMD came to power points to the fact that the trade union movement was quickly disappointed with the MMD economic policies which were hurting the workers. The pain of the workers was too visible to be hidden even by the ZCTU which was mandated to speak for them. The ZCTU refused to be used in any way, and pointed out that it had fought for change in order to be consulted on major issues taken by Government.⁶⁰²

⁵⁹⁹ ZCTU: *Report of the Secretary General to the 9th Quadrennial Congress*, 26th – 29th October 1994; Interview with Shamenda, Lusaka, 07/04/11; *Times of Zambia*, 23/12/91.

⁶⁰⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 19/10/92; Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, A Paper presented by the Chairman General Mr. F.U. Shamenda, during the meeting with the Head of State, Mr. F.T.J. Chiluba on the current social and economic situation in the country, State House, Lusaka, 22nd December 1994.

⁶⁰¹ *Sunday Mail*, 22/11/92.

⁶⁰² *Times of Zambia*, 19/10/92.

The movement also complained about its failure to meet the President over national issues. It stated that there was “a socio-economic crisis” in Zambia which needed urgent solutions but the movement had failed to meet Chiluba due to bureaucracy. It condemned the red tape in fixing an appointment with the President as unnecessary, stating that the movement felt that there were “explosive” national issues which needed the input of the unions when handling them. It was particularly unhappy with the manner Government was laying off workers or allowing companies to go into liquidation before putting safety measures in place for retrenched workers who were entitled to K200 as terminal benefits.⁶⁰³

The movement also blamed the ministers whom it considered to be “arrogant” for the plight of the workers. It deplored the “extreme arrogance and indiscipline” among some ministers and called on them to consult interest groups on all political and economic plans. It reiterated its belief that some ministers were in Government only for personal gain and pointed out that the people of Zambia voted the MMD into power because they had no alternative even though they had a terrible manifesto. All that the people wanted was to remove UNIP from power. Shamenda was particularly emphatic in blaming some of the men that became ministers, claiming that the landslide October 1991 elections victory made some ministers “drunk with power” while paradoxically MMD branches were dead and could not function.⁶⁰⁴

The complaints by the trade union movement against the performance of the Government should also be seen against the background of the unsatisfactory performance of the Zambian economy in 1992. Economic growth in 1992 was particularly limited by the severe drought which affected the whole of Southern Africa. Overall the employment situation in the country deteriorated and yet the number of new entrants in the labour market was increasing every year. The prospects for employment in 1993 were not very promising due to the expected

⁶⁰³ *Times of Zambia*, 19/12/92.

⁶⁰⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 30/09/92.

loss of jobs because of factors such as privatisation, retrenchment in the public sector, continued credit squeeze which restricted investments.⁶⁰⁵ While the employment situation in 1993 continued to be poor with many redundancies, the overall financial position of the Government in the period January to June 1993 was also quite unsatisfactory.⁶⁰⁶

When the MMD Government started implementing the SAP in February 1992 the movement accepted the programme in principle as a way to revamp the ailing economy. However, while the intent and design of the programme was welcome to many Zambians with knowledge of the country's past economic problems, the implementation of the programme ran into difficulties, which led to a rift between the government and the movement. For example, the widespread closure of companies and downsizing with the resulting loss of jobs when there were inadequate safeguards for the workers losing jobs through retrenchments and retirements did not please the trade union movement. It argued that the Government had not given enough support to the industrial and agricultural sectors and had opened up the market too quickly leading to reduced productivity and loss of jobs in those key sectors. The rate of investment was also insufficient to offset the losses.⁶⁰⁷

In March 1992, Chiluba told a meeting of the Southern African Labour Commission that only 350,000 workers were employed in the formal sector out of a population of eight million people. The majority of workers were engaged in the informal sector. In his budget speech in 1993, the Minister of Finance also pointed out that since 1970, only 100,000 jobs had been created, while the population had increased by four million. In fact, from 1995 to 2005, the number of formal employment rose only by 10,000.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁵ Republic of Zambia, *Economic Report 1992*, Office of the President, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, January 1993 (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1993), p. 15, p. 19.

⁶⁰⁶ Republic of Zambia, *Economic Review January – June 1993*, Office of the President, Planning and Development Co-operation, Lusaka, September 1993 (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1993), p. 5 & p. 11.

⁶⁰⁷ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 10/05/92; Interview with Shamenda, Lusaka, 07/04/11; Interview with Joyce Nonde, Lusaka, 09/05/11.

⁶⁰⁸ *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1992-94, Volume 24, p. B721; Various CSO *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, 1995-2005; ZCTU sources and Ministry of Labour and Social Security sources.

The movement was also displeased with Government's interference in the labour market through imposing the wage freeze. The imposition of a wage freeze was seen as a contradiction in policy in view of the liberalised environment introduced in the labour market. Wages were supposed to be negotiated for between social partners. The difficulties in the implementation of the economic reforms were creating difficulties in industrial relations. The movement further argued that in the wider context the difficulties in the implementation of economic reforms created social dislocations in the wider society with social vices of crime, prostitution, street children, and drunkenness becoming common features. It was in view of those problems that it called on the Government to review the SAP, which it described as "too narrow to be meaningful as a development tool" and warned of serious ramifications if Government continued to force through the programme.⁶⁰⁹

The Government's response to the complaints by the movement came through the then Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Ronald Penza. He insisted that the implementation of the SAP was the way to go for Zambia's economic salvation. He advised the workers to brace for lay-offs because the new industrial and labour relations policy introduced in the country would not entertain a bloated work force. The Government would not dictate to employers or the movement but would allow the law to take its course. The Government further pointed out that the socialist policies of the UNIP Government, which had tolerated over-employment were partly to blame for the low productivity in industry and mismanagement of state-owned firms. In this regard, Penza vowed that the Government would not budge on the SAP and stated categorically that privatisation would not be halted.⁶¹⁰

When Shamenda complained and accused some cabinet ministers of wanting monetary gains from the strategic industries which they were in a hurry to sell, Penza labelled him "a

⁶⁰⁹ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 10/05/92; Interviews, Shamenda, Lusaka, 07/04/11; Joyce Nonde, Lusaka, 09/05/11.

⁶¹⁰ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 20/09/92.

terribly irresponsible unionist who did not understand Government policy and therefore should not make alarming statements”.⁶¹¹ Shamenda denied being irresponsible since he was advocating the security of workers’ jobs and argued that it was Penza who was irresponsible since he was advocating redundancies through the sale of public companies at dinners while drinking champagne. He pointed out that the majority of Zambians were against the sale of strategic companies such as ZCCM, ZAMTEL and ZESCO and advised Penza to consult the movement on important issues so that Government could be given a proper picture of how the people felt on certain issues.⁶¹²

As it turned out Shamenda’s views were attested to by James Matale, director of the ZPA from November 1992 to September 1994, when he was sacked. He may have spoken out of bitterness, but he pointed out that Zambia’s privatisation programme ranked as the biggest fraud in economic history because the destruction of the public enterprises during the Chiluba regime that accounted for over 80 per cent of economic activity was an act of unprecedented vandalism. Powerful business interests in the government treated enterprises and assets lined up for privatisation as goods fallen from the back of a delivery truck.⁶¹³

The complaints of the ZCTU against the Government’s economic policies received sympathy from some MPs from both the ruling MMD and the opposition UNIP. In July 1993, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, MMD MP for Mongu in Western Province, sponsored a Private Members Motion in Parliament, which was seconded by Levison A. Mumba, UNIP MP for Msanzala in Eastern Province. The motion was entitled “Review of Economic Policies especially with regard to food prices and distribution.” At this point Mbikusita-Lewanika had resigned his cabinet position in the Government, citing failure to deal with corruption in the government as the reason for resigning, but was still chairperson of the Economic and Finance

⁶¹¹ *Times of Zambia*, 21/09/92.

⁶¹² *Times of Zambia*, 22/09/92; Shamenda confirmed this exchange in the in an interview, Lusaka, 07/04/11.

⁶¹³ <http://maravi.blogspot.com/2007/12/matale-explains-zambia's-privatisation-mess>. (Accessed on 30/07/16).

Committee in the party's National Executive Committee (NEC). It was that aspect which disturbed MMD MPs, especially those in the cabinet and in NEC. They tried to curtail the debate, but the Speaker of the House, Robinson Nabulyato, refused to implement such a measure, pointing out that the MMD MPs should have stopped Mbikusita-Lewanika from outside the House in a caucus meeting. In his motion, Mbikusita-Lewanika suggested that the Government should review its economic policies, especially the SAP, because they were hurting the people. The UNIP MPs supported the suggestion overwhelmingly. Mumba who seconded the motion stated that while it was clear that in September 1990, the Zambian economy was generally said to be sick, two years later it was in an intensive care unit. The falling standards of living, inadequate social services to the people, galloping inflation and bankrupt incomes and a poor prices policy had all compounded the problem which the nation faced. All those problems had in some way showed that Zambia had become the IMF's newest Bantustan.⁶¹⁴ MMD MPs strongly opposed the motion and defended Government position. In the end, Mbikusita-Lewanika was satisfied that Government had been made to listen to the cry of the poor and he withdrew the motion.⁶¹⁵

The price of mealie meal had been raised in 1993. Brenda Mwananshiku, a teacher of Ndola Rural on the Copperbelt and a mother of four children wondered why it was that from the Second Republic to the Third Republic what ruined people's happiness in the country was the issue of mealie meal only. She further wondered whether perpetually increasing the prices of mealie meal was what would improve the country's economy.⁶¹⁶

Two teachers from Kitwe who signed themselves "Two Poor Teachers", wrote an open letter to President Chiluba, which was published in *Icengelo* and is worth quoting in part:

⁶¹⁴ *Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session (Resumed) of the Seventh National Assembly*, 13th- 29th July 1993, p. 435.

⁶¹⁵ *Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session (Resumed) of the Seventh National Assembly*, 13th – 29th July 1993, pp. 419-475.

⁶¹⁶ *Icengelo*, A Bemba Christian Magazine, May 1993, Vol. 23, No. 5, p. 4.

We write to protest at the way your Government has treated teachers. All teachers have been pushed down well below the poverty line. Even where husband and wife are teachers, they cannot make ends meet. The morale of the teaching profession has been undermined. When you were a trade unionist, many times you spoke of solidarity with the workers. Today we are afraid you have lost contact, Mr. President, not only with the workers but with reality itself. Recently our fellow teacher broke his spectacles. The cost of new lens and frame was K80,000; that is more than four months' salary for something that is essential. Do you know the cost of essentials, Mr. President?⁶¹⁷

The "Two Poor Teachers" complained over the high cost of everything and suggested that the President should establish a poverty (datum) line in Zambia. They also suggested that all salaries negotiated by trade unions should be linked to this poverty (datum) line and were to be updated every three months and salaries were to be adjusted automatically. This was seen as the only way wasteful strikes would be avoided. They also suggested the establishment of a leadership code to stop politicians living like those of the Second Republic who lost contact with the reality of what life was like at the grassroots level. Another suggestion was that Government ministers must not receive more than five times what a trained teacher received, taking all perks and extras into account.⁶¹⁸The teachers suggested the establishment of a poverty datum line, which Chiluba as a trade unionist had been insisting Kaunda's Government should establish. It was never established. They also suggested the establishment of a leadership code, which the Kaunda Government had established to prevent politicians from enriching themselves from the Government treasury. It did not work. The letter from the two teachers shows how much the teachers, like many other workers felt that their expectations were not being met by a Government they had thought would give them good rewards for their labour, especially because it was headed by a former trade unionist.

In August 1993, Shamenda stated that his movement had a "soft spot" for the MMD and the Party, which was formed after 1991, using the name "Labour Party" to refer to itself as there was "no labour party in Zambia". Chibeza Mfuni, the man who formed the party observed

⁶¹⁷ *Icengelo*, September 1993, Vol. 23, No. 9, p. 7.

⁶¹⁸ *Icengelo*, September 1993, Vol. 23, No. 9, p. 7.

that the trade union movement had only itself to blame for the hardships it had started going through under the MMD government, and many other observers agreed with him.⁶¹⁹

This study agrees with view that the MMD was not a labour party, set up mainly to look after the interests of the workers, but was a broad alliance of businessmen, professionals, and workers that came together to oppose Kaunda's socialism and were strong advocates of economic liberalisation and co-operation with the IMF. The ZCTU eventually also came to a position where it opposed the command economy, but it was staunchly opposed to economic liberalisation in general and structural adjustment in particular. But these positions were swept aside by the MMD, and the ZCTU was persuaded to reverse its long-held policy of opposition to economic liberalisation and structural adjustment and begin to support the MMD's stand.⁶²⁰

The ZCTU justified this about-turn in the hope that a democratically elected government would at least implement structural adjustment fairly, but this was not the case, as within a year of taking power, the MMD government enacted many of the liberalisation policies Kaunda had attempted and failed to implement after the 1989 rapprochement with the IMF. By 1994, it moved to a 'cash budget' to stabilise government expenditure, and began to undertake broader structural reforms, including the dismantling of marketing boards, privatisation, and the downsizing of the public service.⁶²¹ The ZCTU also admitted that although the U-turn was unsatisfactory it came about as a result of its being out-smarted by the politicians who took advantage of its internal weaknesses. Despite helping the MMD to defeat UNIP, the trade union movement's voice within the MMD was very weak even though former labour leaders were in the Government.⁶²²

⁶¹⁹ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 22/08/93. See also *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 15/08/93.

⁶²⁰ Baylies & Szeftel, "The fall and rise of multi-party politics in Zambia", *Review of African Political Economy*, 19 (54), 1992, pp. 75-91.

⁶²¹ Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation", p. 10; Van de Walle & Chiwele, 1994, pp. 27-41.

⁶²² Interview with Shamenda, Lusaka, 07/04/11 & Chirwa, Lusaka, 17/05/13; ZCTU, Paper Presented by the Chairman General Mr. F.U. Shamenda during the meeting with the Head of State, Mr. F.T.J. Chiluba on the current social and economic situation in the country, State House, Lusaka, 22nd December 1994.

As a result of lacking influence within the government, the Zambian media was reporting that the trade union movement was in such a shambles that between October 1991 and October 1994 it performed very poorly and as a result of that poor performance the movement was at crossroads. It was noted that from its emergence in the 1940s, it only came to be considered to be at its weakest during the reign of the MMD because it “sold out” to the MMD when it compromised itself by supporting it. As a result, it could do nothing about the retrenchment of workers and liquidation of the companies that had led to the numbers of workers in formal employment to decline.⁶²³ Shamenda denied that the ZCTU was in a shambles and pointed out that it was still vibrant and relevant.⁶²⁴

Privatisation resulted in job losses especially in the mines. From a peak of 66,000 in 1976, privatisation reduced job levels drastically to 51,000 in 1986, to 31,033 in 1997. In 2004 there was a marginal increase when the figure rose to 31,440 but dropped to as low as 19,000 in 2005.⁶²⁵ Although job losses started earlier than 1992 when privatisation began, there were more job losses in a short period as a result of the programme. The MMD had promised the miners that it would improve their conditions of service. However, the conditions of service for the miners did not improve and instead they faced heavy job losses as a result of privatisation. Many people wondered why the trade union movement did not hold the MMD Government accountable when the miners did not receive better conditions of service or when miners lost many jobs during privatisation when the MMD was in power.

In statements which underlined the deepening rift between the government and the movement, Shamenda pointed out that a small clique of “criminals” recycled from the previous

⁶²³ See for example: *Times of Zambia*, 05/03/92; 13/03/92; & 05/12/92; *The Weekly Post*, No. 76, December 18-23, 1992; *Zambia Daily Mail*, 14/10/93; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 22/08/93; *The Weekly Post*, No. 137, 24/12/93; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 04/09/94 & 02/10/94; *The Post*, 25/10/94; 27/12/94; 13/04/95; 13/01/95 & 02/05/95.

⁶²⁴ Interview with Shamenda, Lusaka, 07/04/11.

⁶²⁵ Various issues of *CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics, 1976-2005*; *Building a Better Zambia: Perspectives and Demands of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions on the next government ahead of the 2006 tripartite elections* (Kitwe: ZCTU, 2006), p. 15; Also from various *CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics 1980s to 2005*.

regime, which wanted power for itself, had taken over government, abused their positions and alienated the workers. The group of “bloody crooks” used Zambia’s political transition to make themselves “very rich” at the expense of the masses. Some of those crooks were walking the streets before 1991 but after 1991, were driving cars.⁶²⁶ Shamenda stated in an interview that he stood by these views.⁶²⁷ The angry words criticising Chiluba’s cabinet, underscored the irony to the situation, which was that while in 1991 the movement happily welcomed Chiluba’s and the MMD’s victory over Kaunda and UNIP, at the end of 1995, “the trade union movement was entering 1996 with a broken heart” because that year did nothing to reduce the decline of the workers’ purchasing power.⁶²⁸ Interestingly, neither the small clique of ‘criminals’ nor the ‘bloody crooks’ openly challenged Shamenda to defend their positions. In 1993, Stanford Hlazo who was the MMD M.P. for Mumbwa resigned from the party. He gave as his reason for resigning, rampant corruption in the MMD government. In a statement that agreed with Shamenda’s sentiments, he said: “Men who were with nothing before the 31st October 1991 elections have become overnight billionaires.”⁶²⁹ In July 1992, Baldwin Nkumbula resigned as Minister of Youth, Sport and Child Development. He became the first minister to leave Chiluba’s cabinet.⁶³⁰ In the same month of July 1992, Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika also resigned as Minister of Education, Science and Technology. Both cited corruption as the reason for resigning. Later, Mwanawasa resigned as Vice President in 1994, citing Chiluba’s failure to deal with corruption as the reason for resigning.⁶³¹

Although it was clear that after the attainment of multiparty democracy the workers were still far away from achieving the kind of victory which would improve their economic

⁶²⁶ *The Weekly Post*, No. 137, 24/12/93.

⁶²⁷ Interview with Shamenda, Lusaka, 07/04/11.

⁶²⁸ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 31/12/95.

⁶²⁹ *Weekly Post*, 12/11/93.

⁶³⁰ *Weekly Post*, August 13-19, 1993.

⁶³¹ See also: Jotham C. Momba & Clever Madimutsa, “The Evolution and Development of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in Zambia,” SAIIA Occasional Paper No. 17, Political Party Systems in Africa Project, April 2009, p. 9.

position,⁶³² and they were the victims of democratisation,⁶³³ Shamenda's position towards the MMD was ambivalent. In 2000, the trade unions were so disappointed with the performance of the MMD government that they wanted to urge their members to vote against the party in the elections of 2001. He opposed that stance, arguing that while leaders of individual trade unions might speak on behalf of their unions, ZCTU could not become politically involved. He further argued that in 1991 ZCTU became involved in politics only to help restore democracy and not because it was partisan.⁶³⁴ Shamenda's stance agreed with the position taken earlier in 1988 by the then deputy ZCTU general secretary, Samuel Lungu, who disputed statements by scholars⁶³⁵ and observers that the trade union movement had become an unofficial opposition to UNIP. He argued that all the movement wanted was to reserve the right of voicing opposition to policies that were not in the interest of the workers.⁶³⁶

Shamenda stated that in spite of the differences he used to have with Chiluba, he was the only active trade union leader whom Chiluba offered a cabinet position, that of Minister of Youth, Sport and Child Development. He stated that he turned it down because he felt he could not work with some of the "crooks" who had got into the cabinet. He preferred to remain a trade unionist so that he could continue to speak for the workers. He added that the only request he made to Chiluba was that he should not appoint a former trade unionist as Minister of Labour and in this regard was happy when Sondashi was appointed Minister of Labour as he came from outside the trade union movement.⁶³⁷ In later cabinet reshuffles, however, Chiluba appointed former General Secretary of the ZCTU, Newstead Zimba as Minister of Labour.

⁶³² *Africa South & East*, March 1993, p. 28.

⁶³³ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 04/09/94; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 02/10/94.

⁶³⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 09/09/00 & 11/09/00.

⁶³⁵ Examples of some scholars who saw the trade union movement as an unofficial opposition to UNIP's one-party rule are Mihyo, "Against Overwhelming Odds", p. 201 & p. 209; and Larmer, "A Class Apart: Mineworkers and Political Change in Zambia", PhD Thesis, 2004, p. 214, citing K. Woldring, "Survey of Recent Inquiries and their Results", in *Beyond Political Independence: Zambia's Development Predicament in the 1980s*, ed., K. Woldring, Mouton Publishers (Berlin, 1984), p. 205.

⁶³⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 15/04/88.

⁶³⁷ Discussion with Shamenda, Lusaka, 08/02/11.

Changes to the Labour Laws under the MMD Government from 1993

Despite the fact that the trade union movement helped the MMD to bring about the first change of government in Zambia since 1964, it did not gain either a formal or informal hold on the process of decision-making in government. One of the reasons for this were the changes made to the labour laws by the MMD Government. The labour laws underwent changes from the time the MMD came to power in order for the government to assume hegemony over the political space. The result of this was not only the weakening of the trade union movement but also the weakening of the MMD itself as it lost one of its most vital sources of strength.

When the MMD came to power in 1991, the existing labour law was the Industrial Relations Act of 1990⁶³⁸ passed by the UNIP Parliament. It was in many ways a radical departure from the IRA of 1971, which had been the main guiding law of industrial relations before 1990. The UNIP government argued that the 1990 Act was passed in the spirit of political pluralism. It revoked the mandatory affiliation to ZCTU and opened up space for the free formation of trade unions limited to 100 people. In this way, the two principles of mandatory affiliation and one-union-one-industry which ensured a strong and centralised trade union movement were done away with. The 1990 Act also stipulated that a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the union was required in order to affiliate to the ZCTU. In addition, that majority was also needed if a union wished to use trade union funds for political campaigns or wanted to support a political party. The 1990 Act was introduced after the ZCTU and its affiliates broke its alliance with UNIP and became one of the most important supporters of the MMD and the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Zambia. When viewed in this context it becomes easy to see why the movement saw it as just another attempt by UNIP to weaken it.⁶³⁹

⁶³⁸ *Industrial Relations Act No. 36 of 1990.*

⁶³⁹ *Industrial Relations Act of 1990; Rakner, Trade Unions in Process of Democratisation*, pp. 121-22.

The *Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993*⁶⁴⁰ was the first real labour law of the MMD government through which it attempted to put its own mark on industrial relations in the country. Since the trade union movement had helped to put the MMD in power, the 1993 Act did not introduce any radical change in labour law. The real effect of labour laws on the trade union movement began with the *Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act No. 30 of 1997*⁶⁴¹ and was completed by the *Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act No. 8 of 2008*.⁶⁴² The major amendment introduced by the Act of 1997 was that it liberalised the trade union space in the country. The Act abolished the one-union-one-industry stipulation, which meant that more than one trade union could exist in one industry. The Act also allowed the existence of rival trade union federations, which meant that the ZCTU would no longer be the only trade union mother-body to which all unions were by law to affiliate. The immediate effect of these amendments was to cause the emergence of many splinter unions in many industries, sharing the few remaining unionised workers. The amendments to the 1993 and 1997 labour law were also significant because they were meant to support the economic liberalisation policy of the government.

The amendments introduced by the *Act No. 8 of 2008* were more thorough and were more detrimental to the organisation and management of trade unions. Section 18, which deals with disqualification for election or appointment as an officer of a trade union, was used by the government to deal with trade union leaders it did not want in the trade union movement. Two examples of such leaders were Rayford Mbulu, who was forced to vacate his position as president of the MUZ, and Joyce Nonde-Simukoko, president of the FFTUZ who had to go to court to stop government from having her removed from her position.⁶⁴³ Section 21 gave the Labour Commissioner the right to have an input in the work of trade unions. On the whole the

⁶⁴⁰ *Industrial and Labour Relations Act, 1993.*

⁶⁴¹ *Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1997.*

⁶⁴² *Industrial and Labour Relations Act, No. 8 of 2008.*

⁶⁴³ Interview with Joyce Nonde, Lusaka, 09/05/11.

Act No. 8 of 2008 took the control of trade unions and the trade union movement away from the unions and their leaders and placed it in the hands of the government. Joyce Nonde-Simukoko observed that the 2008 Act was the most embarrassing labour law in Zambia as it was passed without the knowledge of the trade union movement as if it was in a country that did not have a trade union movement.⁶⁴⁴

Although at this point the MMD as a party was divided and facing break-away groups, the opposition political parties and the trade union movement could not take advantage of the divisions in the MMD or the growing disenchantment with the government's radical economic reform programme, which won the country some relief on its US \$7 billion foreign debt. The reforms were so severe that they provoked sharp criticism from almost all quarters including some donors and the World Bank representative in Zambia who in January 1993, pointed out that the government was moving too quickly on reform and was neglecting the social dimensions of adjustment. He also criticised the level of military spending, which was double that of education and health together. The criticism provoked the then Minister of Defence, Ben Mwila to threaten to deport him. In spite of the threat, the government addressed the criticism in the 1993 budget by increasing spending on health, education and social services.⁶⁴⁵

By 1993 many external and internal factors had influenced prices, wages and the value of the Kwacha over a period of two decades. However, the major problem in that period, as Minister of Finance Emmanuel Kasonde stated, was the Budget deficit, which caused high inflation, exchange rate pressures and the deterioration which the economy experienced. Zambia had sustained a Budget deficit of monumental proportions which had to be financed. During the initial stages that was managed by borrowing abroad. When the supply of external

⁶⁴⁴ She was reacting to the paper entitled "Crises and Successes of the Labour Movement in Zambia: A Historical Perspective," presented by this researcher at the Colloquium for Labour Movement Experts at Mulungushi University, Kabwe, Zambia, 16-17 March 2011.

⁶⁴⁵ *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (5 February 1993, pp. 6 - 7. See also *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 32, No. 22, 8 November 1991.

credit diminished, the deficit was financed by domestic bank borrowing, primarily from the Bank of Zambia. That pattern of financing led to high and accelerating rates of money growth. With total income stagnating, Zambia experienced the classic situation of an increasing volume of money competing for a limited supply of goods and services. There was constrained industrial production as well as industry operated below capacity. The result was persistent upward pressure on the prices of goods, services and foreign exchange.⁶⁴⁶

Kasonde also stated that although attention had often been focused on the relationship between wage demands and price increases and between inflation and devaluation of the kwacha, the main cause of the problem was government borrowing to finance budget deficits.⁶⁴⁷ The biggest problem, therefore, was inflation and to deal with it the government decided to reduce the growth of money supply in the economy by introducing what came to be known as a “cash budget”. The strategy of a cash budget meant putting financing first and expenditure second. In this way it was hoped that by the end of 1993 inflation would be reduced to an average annual rate of 10 per cent.⁶⁴⁸ In its 1996 election manifesto, the MMD boasted that it had done well on the question of labour, pointing out that it had put in place new labour policies which had included, among other issues, the introduction of equal pay for equal work.⁶⁴⁹

Simon Zukas, a former Cabinet Minister in Chiluba’s government confirmed that Chiluba was indeed more favourably inclined towards workers and wanted to reward the workers more, but his Minister of Finance, did not approve of it. He mentioned that there were government papers that showed that from the start of the MMD government there was a

⁶⁴⁶ *Parliamentary Debates*, 15th January – 18th March 1993, Column 456.

⁶⁴⁷ *Parliamentary Debates*, 15th January – 18th March 1993, Columns 457-58.

⁶⁴⁸ *Parliamentary Debates*, 15th January – 18th March 1993, Columns 462-63.

⁶⁴⁹ *MMD Manifesto '96: Changing Zambia for Good!* p. 15.

struggle between Chiluba and Kasonde over wages: Chiluba wanted workers to be awarded higher wages, Kasonde did not want,⁶⁵⁰ and Kasonde's arguments here show why.

The government was not afraid to push through harsh economic measures even if they hurt the workers and the ordinary people because the MMD used every opportunity to remind those that complained that it had the approval of all the Zambians to pursue its policies as Ronald Penza, the Minister of Finance stated in Parliament on 31st January 1997. He argued that the results of the 1996 elections reflected not only a massive validation of its policies over the past five years, but also a resounding vote of confidence in the leadership of Chiluba. Penza further argued that since the Zambians had given the government a fresh mandate, it had rededicated itself to the task of improving their lives. The mandate gave the government the resolve to pursue its economic agenda with renewed vigour to steer the country into the next millennium.⁶⁵¹ After presenting the 1997 budget in Parliament, Penza was heavily criticised for failing to adequately explain why K4.1 billion was allocated as Presidential Fund when there were more pressing needs that could have used that money.⁶⁵²

Zimba, the former General Secretary of the ZCTU, rejected the argument that the ZCTU faced problems because Chiluba used his position as President to weaken it. He pointed to the lack of self-confidence by the leadership which replaced Chiluba's group as the reason why the movement became weak. He further pointed out that it was not necessary for any government to be involved in choosing leaders for the workers. The former labour leaders serving in Chiluba's Government knew that during the UNIP days some labour leaders were planted to spy on others but that was not the case in the Chiluba government. The former labour

⁶⁵⁰ Zukas was reacting to a paper entitled "The Labour Movement in the Third Republic in Zambia: Fighting for Democracy of the Pocket, 1991-2006," presented by this researcher at a three-day conference organized by the Network for Historical Research in Zambia held in Lusaka, Zambia, in August 2005.

⁶⁵¹ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the Eighth National Assembly*, 6th December 1996 – 26th March 1997, Column 536.

⁶⁵² *Profit: Zambia's Business Magazine*, Vol. 5, No. 10, March 1997, p. 12.

leaders in Government were happy because they left behind well trained labour leaders.⁶⁵³ If indeed Chiluba worked to weaken the trade union movement, he simply used the law, as in the amendments to the 1993 and 1997 labour laws. The law that allowed the FFTUZ to exist dealt a huge blow to trade union unity.

The complaints against the government by the labour leaders showed that the movement and the workers felt a deep sense of loss after the MMD came to power. In the period between April 1994 to March 1996, the MMD government entrenched itself in power. However, it seemed to be losing popularity because those were difficulty years beset by persistent drought, lack of economic growth and political issues. CSO statistics released in 1995 showed clearly the poor state of the country's economy. The number of jobless people was 4.4 million in 1995. Formal employment declined from 17 per cent of the labour force in 1991 to 14 per cent in 1994. Between 1991 and 1995 about 1,244 companies had created over 40,000 redundancies.⁶⁵⁴

The results of the *Living Conditions Monitoring Survey* of 2002/2003 showed that 60 percent of all employed persons were self-employed, while 20 percent were unpaid family workers. The private sector employed only 10 percent of all employed persons, while the Central Government employed 5 percent. Sex differentials indicated that a large proportion of both males and females were predominantly working as self-employed persons, accounting for 63 and 57 percent respectively. Of all employed persons in rural areas, 67 percent were working as self-employed persons, while 26 percent were family workers.⁶⁵⁵

The figures for the persons in wage-paid employment picked up from 1999 after a fall from a high of 496,000 in 1994 to 467,000 in 1998. In 1999 the figure was 478,000 and it rose

⁶⁵³ "Shamenda timid, says Zimba", *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 21/08/94.

⁶⁵⁴ Various CSO *Monthly Digest of Statistics* for 1995; *African Contemporary Record*, 1994-96, Volume 25, p. B697; p. B703.

⁶⁵⁵ CSO *The Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Vol. 22, January 2005, pp. 4-5.

to 487,340 in 2000 and to 494,457 in 2001, an increase of 1.5 percent. In 2004 the figure rose to 495,784. Although no explanation was available for the other years, for 2001 labour market activity was characterised by increased formal sector employment and increases in nominal earnings. The private sector recorded the highest increase in employment from 206,771 jobs in 2000 to 227,841 jobs in 2001, representing an increase of 2.3 percent. Employment in the Central Government increased from 123,128 jobs in 2000 to 124,000 jobs in 2001, representing an increase of 0.7 percent. In both the parastatal sector and the local authority, employment declined by 0.2 percent during the same period. Parastatal sector jobs declined from 71,452 in 2000 to 71,297 jobs in 2001 while local authority jobs declined from 9,527 in 2000 to 9,506 in 2001. The decline was as a result of natural attrition, voluntary retirement and shading of casual workers, all of which contributed to the reduction in jobs in local authorities and parastatal companies. In the private sector, the increase was as a result of increased production especially in manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade.⁶⁵⁶ Counting the cost in this section refers to the deep sense of loss felt by the workers after the MMD came to power. They had great expectations of good things to come to them but instead suffered from loss of employment that sent some of them into poverty. The labour laws were amended to support investors and economic liberalisation, leaving the trade union movement weakened and unable to effectively represent the workers.

The Split in the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions

Between 1965 and 1994, the ZCTU was the only trade union mother body and before 1994 there was only one union in each industry. In 1994, Zambia ratified ILO conventions 87 and 98 to allow for the creation of a multiplicity of trade unions. Many new unions were formed with the largest number being in the teaching service which ended up with four different unions.

⁶⁵⁶ Republic of Zambia, *Economic Report 2001*, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Lusaka, February 2002, p. 51; Government of Zambia, *Report of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour for the Third Session of the Eighth National Assembly Appointed on 3rd February 1999* (Lusaka: National Assembly of Zambia, 1999.)

However, the most troubling impact of liberalisation was the major split which occurred in the ZCTU in 1994 when five of its largest affiliates broke away in the first major split in the Zambian trade union movement since 1959. The breakaway unions included the MUZ, ZNUT, and NUBEGW, Chiluba's old union. The others were ZUFIAW and NUCIW. These defections altogether meant the loss of nearly fifty percent of the ZCTU's remaining membership, and also deprived it of its leverage in crucial sectors of the economy.⁶⁵⁷

The split in the trade union movement occurred during the time Shamenda was still the leader. His explanation for the split emphasised the struggle for power by some leaders, mainly from MUZ were unhappy they lost elections for ZCTU positions at the 1994 convention.⁶⁵⁸ On the other hand, Joyce Nonde-Simukoko stated that ZUFIAW left the ZCTU because its leadership felt disappointed with its refusal to consider reforms to the Congress to bring it in line with the new political and economic changes in the country.⁶⁵⁹ Earlier at a Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) sponsored seminar, she pointed out that when 500 bankers were sacked for going on what was deemed an illegal strike, ZUFIAW went to the Industrial Relations Court, but lost the case. It then appealed to the Supreme Court and again lost the case. The union spent a lot of money on legal fees, but there was no help from the ZCTU. This was a strong reason that made ZUFIAW disaffiliate from ZCTU to form FFTUZ.⁶⁶⁰

The issue of splinter unions, which the ZCTU suspected was being encouraged by the MMD government, troubled the Congress very much. In this regard, it advised the government to be extremely careful when considering the registration of splinter unions as they could be

⁶⁵⁷ Adler & Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation", p. 14.

⁶⁵⁸ Interview with Shamenda, Lusaka, 07/04/11; Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tjens, Melanie Hughie-Williams & Nuria Ramos Martin, "An Overview of Women's Work and Employment in Zambia", Decisions for Life MDG3 Project Country Report No. 4, University of Amsterdam/Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), (Amsterdam, Netherlands, September 2009.) WageIndicator.org.

⁶⁵⁹ Interview with Joyce Nonde, Lusaka, 09/05/11.

⁶⁶⁰ She was making a contribution to a discussion at the FES/ZAPS seminar with political parties on the "Party/Trade Unions Relationship" held on 18th October, 2007, at Protea Hotel, Lusaka. She reiterated these views in the interview on 09/05/11.

counter-productive by undermining industrial democracy. The Congress argued that the proliferation of unions in one industry would weaken the trade union movement because employers would play the unions against each other. Shamenda pointed out that the fact that Chiluba rose from the ZCTU did not mean that every ZCTU president should seek the presidency of the country at one time or the other.⁶⁶¹

The ZCTU was suspicious of government's motives for registering the FFTUZ, seeing it as one meant to divide and weaken the trade union movement. Nevertheless, it actively pursued reconciliation and four of the breakaway unions re-affiliated with the ZCTU, leaving ZUFIAW alone outside the ZCTU ambit.⁶⁶²In 1992 the FFTUZ had more than 10,000 members but in 2001 the membership had declined to 6,300. In 2001, ZUFIAW was joined in FFTUZ by four other unions, including two splinter unions in the teaching profession to bring its membership to about 32,000.⁶⁶³Although no figures to show the amount of money lost, the split was seen to be costly for the trade union movement as a whole. This was because the loss of MUZ, NUBEGW, NUCIW, ZNUT and ZUFIAW meant the loss of 142,484 members. Added to that figure was the loss to the ZCTU of 38,346 members due to retrenchment.⁶⁶⁴It was because the split in the ZCTU was very costly financially for trade unionism in the country that the ZCTU leadership fought hard to persuade the members who had disaffiliated to return to it. Nonde-Simukoko accused the ZCTU of conniving with government to take action on ZUFIAW and the FFTUZ when they made mistakes, a situation which made reconciliation difficult. In an earlier interview, Shamenda disagreed with this view, and stated that the ZCTU always wanted unity in the trade union movement.⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶¹ *Times of Zambia*, 29/02/92; 13/03/92 & 01/06/92.

⁶⁶² ZCTU, Report of the Secretary General to the 10th Quadrennial Congress, 30th to 31st October 1998, Livingstone, p.13 & pp.16-17.

⁶⁶³ E.J. Nyirenda & Adrian Shikwe, "Trade Union Country Report – Zambia" (Lusaka: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2003), p. 20; Fashoyin, "The Contribution of Social Dialogue to Economic and Social Development in Zambia", p. 12.

⁶⁶⁴ Figures compiled by the author from various ZCTU sources and CSO sources.

⁶⁶⁵ Interview with Joyce Nonde-Simukoko, Lusaka, 09/05/11; and also interview with Shamenda, 07/04/11.

Even before the split the ZCTU and its affiliates were not in a position to prevent retrenchments or develop alternative policy to retrenchments. As a result of job losses, the MUZ, which was the largest ZCTU affiliate lost membership from 38,000 in 1998 to 24,735 in 2001 and as Table 10 shows it was 24,245 in 2003 and 2004 and 25,000 in 2005, when there was a slight improvement. However, in 2006 the figure dropped to 13,358 and rose again in 2010 to 18,313. The ZCTU squarely blamed the government for the splinter unions. As was pointed out Chiluba was blamed for the formation of FFTUZ because it was his strategy for weakening the trade union movement, but Joyce Nonde denied the assertion. She pointed out that the fact that it took so long to have the FFTUZ registered in 1998, after being turned down in 1995, and then only to be registered by court order showed that Chiluba had nothing to do with the organisation. In addition, most of the affiliates to the FFTUZ were affiliated by court order.⁶⁶⁶The editor of an independent Zambian newspaper insisted that the formation of the FFTUZ was Chiluba's strategy to weaken the trade union movement and that Joyce Nonde-Simukoko would not admit this was the case as it would expose her secret dealings with Chiluba.⁶⁶⁷In Malawi as well, 'the democratic government was accused of sponsoring splinter unions to create chaos in the trade union movement while appearing to be promoting unionism.'⁶⁶⁸

While it is easy to dismiss splinter unions as the work of greedy or power hungry union leaders, they are at the same time a good indicator of the poor relations that existed between union leaders and some of their members. The idea of "one union in one industry" was suitable in the politics of a one-party state. Just as the one-party state enforced political unity in Zambia, the one union in one industry regulation plus the enforced affiliation to one union mother body

⁶⁶⁶*The Zambian Mining Industry: A status report ten years after privatisation*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, n.d., but probably around 2009; ZCTU Country Report, 2003; Joyce Nonde in a conversation with the author, at the FES/ZAPS Trade Unions – Political Parties Workshop, Protea Hotel, Lusaka, 18th October 2007; Interview with Nonde-Simukoko, Lusaka, 09/05/11.

⁶⁶⁷ Discussion with the editor was held in Lusaka on 06/01/17. On request his name has been withheld.

⁶⁶⁸ Dzimbiri, "The State and Labour Control in Malawi," p. 72.

also enforced unity in trade unions and the trade union movement. Up until 1990, trade union unity was enforced by law. As soon as the law was amended and plurality and freedom of association were allowed as the ILO Conventions required, the disunity that had been papered over by law appeared again. Disgruntled members of some unions jumped at the chance to leave unions whose leadership had let them down.

Nonde, the most high profile female labour leader in Zambia's labour history, was increasingly seen as being too vocal and anti-government and so attempts were made in 2005 to remove her from the leadership of the movement. In November 2005, ZUFIAW members filed an injunction in the Industrial Relations Court against her to restrain her from discharging any union duties. They argued that since she had retired from Zambia National Building Society (ZNBS) in 2002, she no longer qualified to hold any position in ZUFIAW or FFTUZ. In December 2005, it was alleged that the government had assembled a team, which included the Labour Commissioner to ensure that she and her vice-president in FFTUZ, Teza Nchinga, were removed from their positions before the 2006 elections. The government feared that she could cause the MMD to lose the elections if she remained active in the movement. The Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) called on the Public Service Commission to discipline the Labour Commissioner for engaging in political conspiracy to hound Nonde out of the movement's leadership.⁶⁶⁹

Later, Nonde complained that she was a victim of psychological and mental abuse. Some people even used her being single to view her as a pitiless and heartless woman bent on destroying anything that crossed her path. She confirmed in the interview with her that it had initially not been easy to convince the men that she could lead them, so she had to work hard to convince them. She said that she had suffered betrayal within the trade union movement and

⁶⁶⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 26/11/05; *The Post*, 09/12/05; 10/12/05; 11/12/05; 13/12/05; Interview with Joyce Nonde-Simukoko, Lusaka, 9th May 2011.

had been receiving anonymous telephone calls, insults, threats and letters in a bid to break her. She added that she had not been spared from rumour mongering, character assassination and discrimination on the basis of gender.⁶⁷⁰ When Nchinga, whom she described as a gallant fighter for social justice, died in a road traffic accident, she thought that he might have been assassinated and that her own life could also be in danger.⁶⁷¹

The international trade union movement agreed with the view that the government was involved in a conspiracy to remove Nonde from the leadership of ZUFIAW. At the end of December 2006, ZUFIAW re-elected her as General Secretary unopposed, but the Labour Commissioner, Noah Siasimuna, refused to declare her the winner because he claimed there was a court case pending against her. However, when Robert Simeza, the lawyer for ZUFIAW firmly denied that there was a court case which barred her from standing for any position, the Labour Commissioner left the Congress without conducting elections for the remaining positions.⁶⁷² Although the Labour Commissioner was not interviewed for his side of the story, his clash with Nonde and ZUFIAW was well documented in the print media in which he was accused of acting like a politician instead of a civil servant.⁶⁷³ In 2011 he contested the Siavonga parliamentary seat on the MMD ticket and lost the election. On the whole, while relations between the ZCTU and the government were warm, those with the FFTUZ and with Joyce Nonde-Simukoko in particular, were not.

The then Minister of Defence George Mpombo, speaking in Parliament, accused trade union leaders of being ‘political rubble-rousers’ and having ‘corrosive hatred’ for the government. Nonde and the then ZCTU secretary general, Sylvester Tembo,⁶⁷⁴ responded to his accusations, stating that they were not true and a sign that the government was guilty of not

⁶⁷⁰ *Sunday Post*, 12/02/06; Interview with Joyce Nonde-Simukoko, Lusaka, 09/05/11.

⁶⁷¹ *The Post*, 17/03/06; Interview with Joyce Nonde-Simukoko, Lusaka, 09/05/11.

⁶⁷² 2007 Annual Survey of violations of trade union rights, <http://survey07.ituc-csi.org>. (Accessed on 14/08/10.)

⁶⁷³ In the interview with her on 9th May 2011, Joyce Nonde explained and elaborated on her altercation with the Labour Commissioner.

⁶⁷⁴ *Sunday Post*, 18/03/07.

looking after workers well. Both Nonde and Tembo here agree with the projection of the trade union movement as the ‘mother’ of the workers in Zambia that should ensure they were well looked after. This was what was earlier portrayed in the song, “Common Man” by celebrated Zambian folk singer, Peter Kalumba Chishala, popularly known as “Professor P.K.Chishala.”⁶⁷⁵

Chishala used traditional idioms to show that the trade union movement was the “mother” that interceded with the “father,” on behalf of her children. The children in this context are the workers that are the “Common Man”. The mother is the trade union movement. The father is the Government. The “Common Man” is the one suffering from hunger while others in the country are better off. It is for this reason that the workers (children) plead through the mother (the trade union movement) with the father (the Government) to alleviate the suffering, for example by keeping prices of mealie meal low. Prices of other commodities could be increased, but not of mealie meal, because when hunger ravaged a home, it was humiliating. Wearing good clothes or having a good time drinking beer or smoking cigarettes was not important, eating and living well was.⁶⁷⁶ The song was produced in 1992, at a time the MMD Government began to implement its economic policies of structural adjustment programmes that led to economic liberalisation, privatisation and loss of jobs from retrenchments. The song uses images of hunger and suffering of the workers and humiliation from hunger. In the context of the title of this thesis, therefore, the song is appropriate.

Industrial Relations and Strikes in the Third Republic, 1992-2011: The Mark of Disappointment

Industrial relations came to consist of a number of legislative instruments among which were the Employment Act Cap 268 of the laws of Zambia, which regulated the employment contract and its enforcement, the Industrial and Labour Relations Act Cap 269, which regulated

⁶⁷⁵ The popular song by P.K. Chishala was performed and produced around 1990.

⁶⁷⁶ Explanation of lyrics in the song “Common Man”.

the formation of trade unions and employers' organisations and governed their operations, and the Minimum Wage and Conditions of Employment Act Cap 276, which regulated the Minimum Wage and Conditions of Employment for workers not covered by collective agreements. The Ministry of Labour and Social Security was given the mandate to administer the national labour policy and its labour department had the sole responsibility of advising the Government on all matters pertaining to labour, including the promotion and maintenance of good industrial relations. The Ministry, in collaboration with social partners played an active role in ensuring that labour laws conformed to prevailing economic policy and international labour standards. The Industrial Relations Court, established in 1974, was also a key player in industrial relations. The Tripartite Consultative Labour Council was established under the ILRA of 1993 to serve as the major forum for consultation and participation of the social partners, that is, the government, employers and workers, on major issues related to ratification of ILO conventions, review of labour laws and other important labour market issues.⁶⁷⁷

Most blue collar workers in Zambia were not well paid. A Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council (SATUCC) June 1993 report stated that Zambians workers were the lowest paid in Southern and East Africa, with 70 per cent living below the poverty line.⁶⁷⁸ The burden of taxation made the workers' position worse as, according to Catholic priest, Father Davoli Umberto, they earned "subsistence salaries", which the government needed to urgently review to improve their status. He suggested that Government should end the workers' misery by urgently looking seriously at the taxation system because the minimum monthly wages of between K12, 000 and K15, 000 were too low to be taxed.⁶⁷⁹ MUZ,⁶⁸⁰ and ZCTU

⁶⁷⁷ Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, *International Labour Organisation Core Conventions Ratified by Zambia: An Assessment of their Implications on Poverty Reduction*, Owen Mgemezulu & Caroline Moyo (Lusaka, October 2003).

⁶⁷⁸ *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1992-94, Volume 24, p. B721.

⁶⁷⁹ See *Ichengelo* issues of 1990/91, the Bemba language Catholic Church publication for which Umberto was the editor; *Times of Zambia*, 03/07/92; 27/07/92; & 21/11/92.

⁶⁸⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 05/03/92.

agreed that the workers were indeed poorly paid and yet were highly taxed to subsidise the rich.⁶⁸¹

A GRZ/UNDP 1996 Report, *Prospects of Sustainable Human Development in Zambia*, showed that the monthly salary of a middle-level civil servant was between K30,000 and K50,000 (US\$45 to US\$70). Their Botswana counterparts earned approximately Pula 998 (US\$333) per month in 1995. There existed wide wage differentials between and within sectors, industry and enterprises. Wage differentials of up to 50 percent to 70 percent were common. The personal income tax was also high and regressive for the average worker. It had become common for employers to default in paying the wages and salaries of their workers even in the public sector. It had also become difficult for unions to negotiate, especially in the public sector because the government was imposing wage freezes, a process that made collective bargaining difficult.⁶⁸² Table 8 shows the range of pay for workers in Zambia between 1997 and 2000.

Table 8: Trends in average earnings per month (Kwacha) 1997-2000*

	1997	1998	1999	2000	% Change 1999-2000. 1999 as base year
Average Nominal Earnings by sector**	150,230	184,281	233,687	245,265	5.0
Central Government (Civilian)	134,154	154,850	194,377	205,265	5.6
Local Authorities	152,328	124,536	189,792	197,681	4.2
Parastatal companies	291,176	341,564	467,001	501,612	7.4
Private sector companies	103,264	141,780	187,661	206,771	10.2
Real Average Earnings by Sector	625.4	616.5	616.7	513.4	-16.4
Central Government (Civilian)	566.5	524.0	515.9	429.7	-16.7
Local Authorities	643.3	421.4	503.7	413.8	-17.8
Parastatal companies	1,229.6	1,155.9	1,239.4	1,050.1	115.3
Private sector companies	436.1	479.8	498.0	432.8	-13.1

*Estimates as at June 2000. ** Totals do not add up as a result of weighted averaging.

Source: Central Statistical Office & Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2000.

⁶⁸¹ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 29/11/92.

⁶⁸² "Current Practices in Labour Market Information Systems in Zambia," www.academia.edu/1341790. Accessed on 04/03/16.

What compounded the situation and partly led to the strikes in the country within the first year of the MMD reign, were the rapid price increases of food and commodities in a situation where there was also severe drought.⁶⁸³ Between January and May 1992, there were strikes over wage demands by workers at Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ) in Kafue,⁶⁸⁴ the four public service unions, namely the CSUZ, the NUPSW, the ZNUT and the ZULAWU,⁶⁸⁵ Zambia Railways workers, hotel workers, and health workers.⁶⁸⁶ In May, teachers in Lusaka, Kitwe and Livingstone went on strike over salary and conditions of service. In the same month, customs and tax workers also went on strike, thereby affecting revenue collection at entry points in the country.⁶⁸⁷

Although the government argued that the salary demands by the public service trade unions were ‘outrageous’ as they outstripped the national budget by K43 billion, the ZCTU considered the salary demands genuine because the new tax regime meant all allowances which had been tax free would be taxed and subsidies were removed and prices liberalized.⁶⁸⁸ The strikes over wage demands in June 1992 by between 1,500 to 2,000 Kafue Textiles of Zambia (KTZ) workers in Kafue and bank workers in Lusaka and the Copperbelt had debilitating results for the workers involved. The KTZ strike, which was Zambia’s first ever legal strike, led to the closure of KTZ, a factor that affected the workers and their families financially.⁶⁸⁹

The strike by bank workers in Lusaka and the Copperbelt in June 1992 led to the sacking of the 500 bank workers for going on an illegal strike. The Zambia Bank Employers’ Association (ZBEA) also resolved to withdraw the recognition agreement with ZUFIAW,

⁶⁸³ *Times of Zambia*, 5th March 1992.

⁶⁸⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 25th February 1992.

⁶⁸⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 6th March 1992.

⁶⁸⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 3rd April, 30th April & 24th September 1992.

⁶⁸⁷ *Times of Zambia*, 18th June & 24th June 1992.

⁶⁸⁸ *The Weekly Post*, April 24-30, 1992.

⁶⁸⁹ *Africa South & East*, December 1992, p. 18; *The Weekly Post*, No. 66, October 9-15, 1992, and also other sources compiled by the author.

which it accused of supporting the illegal strike. The government supported the sacking of the bank workers,⁶⁹⁰ but ZCTU condemned it for the support and demanded immediate reinstatement of the bank workers. The ZCTU also saw the sackings as Government's attempt to intimidate and weaken the trade union movement so that the capitalists could be free to exploit workers. ZUFIAW argued in the Industrial Relations Court that rules of natural justice were not followed as it was not consulted when the bank workers were sacked and when the recognition agreement with the ZBEA was revoked.⁶⁹¹ A few of the bank workers who had "good cases of appeal" were reinstated,⁶⁹² but the majority remained sacked. As shown earlier this case led to acrimony between the ZUFIAW and ZCTU.

The ZCTU stated that its biggest disappointment in the first year of MMD governance was the government's hypocritical approach to industrial relations. It could not understand how Chiluba and Zimba who only in 1991 were championing the repealing of the controversial IRA of 1990, arguing that it was repressive and aimed at killing the unions in the country, would suddenly change and go ahead to implement it. The Congress pointed out that when Zimba was ZCTU general secretary he was the first applicant to challenge the IRA of 1990 in the High Court and Roger Chongwe, the first Minister of Justice in the first MMD government was the Congress's lawyer.⁶⁹³

Sacika stated that Chiluba came onto the political scene with a coterie of people such as Ronald Penza, Dean Mun'gomba and others who believed in total liberalisation. As a result of their economic policies, many parastatal companies disappeared and with them the trade unions in, for example, the transport sector when companies such as Zambia Airways, Contract Haulage and UBZ were closed. The transport sector was broken up and small operators, whose

⁶⁹⁰ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 28th June 1992; *Times of Zambia*, 30th June 1992; *The Weekly Post*, No. 60, August 28-September 3, 1992; & *The Weekly Post*, No. 61, September 4-10, 1992.

⁶⁹¹ *Times of Zambia*, 1st July 1992; *Times of Zambia*, 2nd October 1992; *Times of Zambia*, 22nd January 1993.

⁶⁹² *Sunday Mail*, 26/07/92.

⁶⁹³ *The Weekly Post*, No. 69, October 30-November 5, 1992.

workers saw no need to join national trade unions, took over. This weakened the trade unions in the transport sector. Sacika explained that be that as it may, it did not explain why trade unions in the public and parastatal sectors were weak. Trade unions were systematically weakened and collective bargaining between employees and employers, which was important in industrial relations, was disregarded as the new investors preferred to give workers contracts and discouraged them from joining trade unions.⁶⁹⁴

The *Times of Zambia* explained that the wave of industrial disputes which rocked the country in 1992 was caused by economic measures put in place by the Government.⁶⁹⁵ The government was also seen to be contributing to strikes by delaying in starting negotiations with public service unions for improved salaries and conditions of service. Some categories of workers, for example, University of Zambia (UNZA) lecturers in 1992, were also blamed for exacerbating industrial unrest by making excessive demands of improved salaries.⁶⁹⁶ Scholarship shows that ‘there was also an increase in strikes in Malawi after the change to democratic rule in 1994.’⁶⁹⁷ As a result of there being too many strikes early in 1992, Sondashi, the Minister for Labour and Social Security and Michael Sata for Local Government and Housing threatened to have workers arrested or sacked. However, this provoked anger from the trade union movement, which explained that the strikes were caused by the high expectations from workers after the change of Government in October 1991 for better salaries and conditions of service. The other factors causing strikes were the high cost of living, the austerity measures Government had put in place to revamp the economy and delays in reaching agreement during collective bargaining.⁶⁹⁸ The *Times of Zambia* argued that the strike wave in

⁶⁹⁴ Interview with Sacika, Lusaka, 27/04/15 & Hikaumba, Lusaka, 24/05/13.

⁶⁹⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 04/04/92.

⁶⁹⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 04/04/92.

⁶⁹⁷ Dzimbiri, “The State and Labour Control in Malawi,” p. 68.

⁶⁹⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 10/04/92; 23/05/92; & 28/05/92. (Both Sata and Sondashi later left the MMD to form opposition political parties, the Patriotic Front in 2001 and the Forum for Democratic Alternatives in 2009, respectively.

1992, was caused by poor representation of workers by unions, government's failure to act firmly to end strikes, the refusal by workers and their unions to accept government's measures aimed at reducing inflation,⁶⁹⁹ and by some unions, for example, ZUFIAW that lacked discipline and allowed members to make outrageous salary demands and to go on illegal strikes such as the one by bank workers that led to 500 of them being sacked.⁷⁰⁰

The power of the donors to influence workers' wages became a new feature in industrial relations as they came to have a say in them. They supplied money to the government to help it resuscitate the economy and therefore did not want strikes as they could drive away investors.⁷⁰¹ Hikaumba added that even collective bargaining, the corner-stone of trade unionism, was affected by the demands of the new investors.⁷⁰² The industrial relations scene throughout 1993, as in previous years, was characterised by persistent demands and spontaneous and unconstitutional strikes to press for increased wages and improved terms and conditions of employment.⁷⁰³ In addition, existing legislation made it practically impossible for workers to go on strike. The power was tilted in favour of employers rather than the workers.⁷⁰⁴ The trade unions were under constant pressure from their members to open up negotiations for increased wages and improved conditions of employment.⁷⁰⁵

In the public service, industrial relations were marred by endless conflicts, which arose from complaints over wages. In order to forestall further industrial conflicts resulting from wage demands, the government appointed a Commission of Inquiry on 23rd July 1993, to review the salaries, salary structures and conditions of service of public service workers and to make recommendations for whatever necessary changes that needed to be made. The

⁶⁹⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 27/06/92.

⁷⁰⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 26/09/89 & *Times of Zambia*, 29/10/90.

⁷⁰¹ *Times of Zambia*, 24/06/92.

⁷⁰² Interview with Hikaumba, 24/05/13.

⁷⁰³ *Annual Labour Report 1993*, p. 12.

⁷⁰⁴ *Annual Labour Report 1993*, pp. 12-13.

⁷⁰⁵ *Annual Labour Report 1993*, p. 13.

Commission was headed by High Court judge, Mrs Justice Florence Ndepele Mumba, as chairman and Professor Muyunda Mwanalushi as vice chairman. The other members were Langston Kawesha, Francis Zaza Simenda, Reverend Joe Imakando, Darlington Banda, with Vukani Nyirenda as the secretary. All the Commissioners were sworn in on 26th August 1993 before Chief Justice Matthew Ngulube. Towards the end of September 1993, Commissioner Darlington Banda was replaced by Commissioner Fabian Xavier Chikuma.⁷⁰⁶ The Commission completed its inquiry towards the end of November and handed its recommendations to the government. The Commission found that the condition of service and salaries of public service workers needed to be improved and their salaries adjusted upwards. However, by the end of 1993, the Commission's recommendations had not yet been published as the Government stated that it was still considering them.⁷⁰⁷

The ZCTU and its affiliates condemned the government over the setting up the Commission and refused to serve on it because it was superfluous and compromised free collective bargaining enshrined in the law of 1993. In spite of this opposition the government went ahead with the Commission.⁷⁰⁸ In spite of Chiluba having led the trade union movement for seventeen years, his Government deemed the wage demands by unions as unacceptable as they were disruptive of its economic programme. In an unprecedented move, the Government declared a dispute with the three public service unions (CSUZ, NUPSW, and ZNUT) after they indicated in their letter of 23rd July 1993 their rejection of the offer from the government of a 50 percent salary increment. Government's action surprised and disappointed the ZCTU. However, under section 75 (c) of the ILRA of 1993,⁷⁰⁹ the government as an employer and in

⁷⁰⁶ Republic of Zambia *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Salaries, Salary Structures and Conditions of Service in the Public Service* (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1993), p. 3. (No explanation was given about why Darlington Banda was replaced, but it could have been that he travelled out of the country to pursue doctoral studies.)

⁷⁰⁷ *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Salaries, Salary Structures and Conditions of Service in the Public Service; Annual Labour Report 1993*, pp. 13-14.

⁷⁰⁸ *Annual Labour Report 1993*, p. 20.

⁷⁰⁹ *Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993*.

its own right as a party to the negotiations with the unions, had acted within the law. ZCTU could only appeal to it ‘not to play with people’s lives’ and urged it to rescind its decision to give the unions a chance to negotiate because they were still consulting their members. Government’s action was termed an irregularity never experienced in industrial relations before.⁷¹⁰ The following year the ZCTU noted that the government both as an employer and referee made a historic and surprise decision to declare a collective dispute against the public service unions in the negotiations for improved conditions of service in 1993. The ZCTU intervened to break the deadlock.⁷¹¹ The government was ignoring the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council (TCLC) established under Section 79 of the ILRA of 1993 for dialogue between government, employers (ZFE) and the trade union movement.⁷¹²

Apart from the fact that Government’s decision to declare a dispute with the unions was unprecedented, there is another way in which the action could be viewed. There was a time when the trade union movement determined its own narrative. This had changed with the coming to power of the MMD and foreign investors. Through its economic policies the movement had to follow the narrative of the government and investors and the results were not always what the movement or the workers wanted. This new narrative was emphasised by Ronald Penza, the Minister of Finance who gave the unions a “take-it-or-leave-it-situation” when he insisted that government would not budge from the 50 per cent wage increase offered to civil servants because it was determined to curb hyperinflation, which had plagued the economy for too long.⁷¹³

The University of Zambia Lecturers and Researchers Union (UNZALARU) was for the last half of 1993 locked in a dispute over equal pay for equal work with the University

⁷¹⁰ *Industrial and Labour Relations Act No. 27 of 1993; Times of Zambia, 07/08/93 & Sunday Times of Zambia, 08/08/93.*

⁷¹¹ ZCTU: *Report of the Secretary General to the 9th Quadrennial Congress, 26th to 29th October 1994*, Livingstone, p. 14.

⁷¹² See *Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993*, Section 79.

⁷¹³ *Sunday Times of Zambia, 08/08/93.*

Council.⁷¹⁴ In April 1994, the lecturers and researchers went on strike. The administration, which took a dim view of the strike action, sacked all the members of UNZALARU, including those on vacation and study leave, and those who were abroad attending workshops and conferences.⁷¹⁵ They were denied two month's pay or in some cases three month's pay. The move clearly showed the University administration's irritation with UNZALARU and its members over the unlawful strike and it chose to punish the union and its members. However, by going so far as to humiliate them by denying them salaries, the administration might also have showed that it did not care much about the welfare of the academic staff and their families. Later, because of the difficulty in recruiting qualified academic staff UNZA swallowed its pride and reinstated all the lecturers and researchers and paid them the salaries that were withheld. Only the union executive members had to fight their case in court and they were successful. This left the unionised lecturers furious and a year later forced senior management officers to leave office and UNZA altogether.⁷¹⁶

The relationship between the government and the trade union movement was obviously not good. In December 1994, ZCTU general secretary Alec Chirwa charged that Chiluba had failed Zambian workers more than Kaunda ever did and added that the honeymoon between him and the movement was over. He warned him to read the people's mood correctly because discontent in the country could lead to 'the inevitable'. ZCTU was infuriated by adverse government policies which had made the trade union movement lose a large portion of its membership and worsened the livelihood of the workers.⁷¹⁷ However, in an interview, Chirwa

⁷¹⁴ *Annual Labour Report 1993*, p. 21.

⁷¹⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 29/05/94: Advertisement placed in the *Times of Zambia* of 29/05/94 by the University Registrar, Jean M.F. Calder, entitled, "The state of the University of Zambia following the Illegal Strike by the University of Zambia Lecturers and Researchers Union (UNZALARU)." See also: Bizeck J. Phiri, *The Crisis of an African University: A Historical Appraisal of the University of Zambia* (Denver: iAcademic Books, 2001), pp. 95-96; 97-104.

⁷¹⁶ The information here is from the experiences of the researcher and some colleague that were sacked with him.

⁷¹⁷ *The Post*, 27/12/94.

confirmed his admiration of Chiluba as a trade union leader,⁷¹⁸ and later served as Permanent Secretary in his administration.

As a result of disappointment with the way things had gone in 1995,⁷¹⁹ in March 1996 thousands of civil servants went on an illegal strike demanding a 45 per cent pay increase on their monthly wages. They returned to work after a week, when they agreed to settle the dispute through negotiation.⁷²⁰ In May 1996, the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE) painted a gloomy picture of the economy when it stated that employers were walking a tightrope and could not afford to offer huge wage increments to workers unless the economy improved.⁷²¹ Since the economy was not improving, the Government decided to impose a wage freeze on public service workers, a move, which the ZCTU and CSUZ did not accept because its members were still living below the poverty datum line.⁷²²

The strike wave which hit the country and calls for increased salaries by teachers and council workers raised concern among opposition groups and civic groups that the 1996 elections might be disrupted because both teachers and council workers were crucial to the conduct of elections in Zambia.⁷²³ The government, however, tried to play down the spectre of strikes in the country, by stating that strikes had reduced in the country, especially between 1994 and 1996.⁷²⁴ The 1996 elections were conducted smoothly. The ZCTU dubbed 1997 as a bleak year for workers and threatened that it would mount an international campaign to expose the injustices committed by various employers in Zambia.⁷²⁵ A strike by CSUZ and NUPSW

⁷¹⁸ Interview with Alec Chirwa, 17th May 2013, Lusaka.

⁷¹⁹ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 31/12/95.

⁷²⁰ *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1994-96, Volume 25, p. B703.

⁷²¹ *Times of Zambia*, 04/05/96.

⁷²² *Times of Zambia*, 03/06/96; & 12/06/96.

⁷²³ *The Monitor*, No. 18, October 18-24, 1996.

⁷²⁴ *Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the Eighth National Assembly*, 6th December 1996 – 26th March 1997, column 1438.

⁷²⁵ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 26/01/97.

members in September 1997 was only stopped when the government obtained an injunction in the Industrial Relations Court.⁷²⁶

The year 1998 began with workers led planning to go on strike nationwide to protest against the wage freeze imposed by Government on salaries of public service workers after rejecting the Government's justification for the wage freeze. The unions resorted to call for a general strike on Monday, 9th March 1998, to force Government's hand. Zimba, the Minister of Labour and Social Security, accused the trade union movement of mass incitement and provocative statements using the media and noted that it had crossed the Rubicon by demanding the overthrow of the government.⁷²⁷ He warned that unions that if they participated in the general strike they would be de-registered, but the unions stated that no amount of threats and intimidation would cow them as long as Government did not compromise over the issue. They argued that the wage freeze was a contradiction in the liberalised economy. It made sense in the Second Republic commandist economy. The general one-day strike went ahead but many workers did not observe it and reported to work. The movement blamed the failure of the general strike on a Government circular that threatened workers with severe disciplinary action if they participated. Some workers blamed the unionists for the failure for not clarifying the reasons for the strike call.⁷²⁸

In May and June 2001, civil servants and public service workers went on strike beginning on 28th May, demanding a 100 per cent salary increase. The five public sector unions rejected the government's offer of a 35 per cent salary increase as insufficient to keep pace with inflation, which had been running at over 25 per cent in the past six years.⁷²⁹ A 2002 annual

⁷²⁶ "Public Service Workers' Hope for better conditions of service dashed", Zambia News Online – (28), 10/15/97 – <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletter/zno28.html>. (Accessed on 06/12/12).

⁷²⁷ *Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session of the Eighth National Assembly*, 16th January – 3rd April 1998: "Ministerial Statement on 'Threatened National Strike by the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) on Monday 9th March 1998 made by Minister of Labour and Social Security, Newstead Zimba, on 6th March 1998, columns 1854-1862.

⁷²⁸ *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 01/03/98; & *Times of Zambia*, 10/03/98; *Parliamentary Debates*, 16th January – 3rd April 1998 – Ministerial Statement, Columns 1854-1862.

⁷²⁹ "Strike wave rocks Zambia", <http://www.wsws.org> – accessed on 02/07/06.

survey of violations of trade union rights by the ICFTU showed that although legislation allowed workers to unionise, anti-union discrimination was prevalent, both in the public and in the private sectors. There were several high profile disputes in Zambia, which dragged on for many months, with constant allegations of bad faith in the bargaining process being levelled against authorities. As a result of delaying negotiations workers went on protracted strikes, which were deemed illegal because the complicated procedures for going on a legal strike were not followed.⁷³⁰

Shamenda stepped down as president of the ZCTU in 2002 and was replaced by Hikaumba who was elected president at the ZCTU convention. Hikaumba and Nonde were seen as representing a new type of labour leaders who could propel the trade union movement to new heights in the era of multiparty democracy.

Between March and August 2003, public service workers again went on strike, one trade union after another, costing the government over K50 billion a week in revenue collection because revenue collection departments such as the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) and the Road Traffic Commission were not collecting enough revenue. The civil servants demanded payment of wage increments and housing allowances as agreed and budgeted for in the 2003 conditions of service. However, the IMF persuaded the Government not to fulfil the agreements with the unions. The IMF demanded that the Government should tackle the projected budget overrun of about \$124 million (about K620 billion) and withdrew over \$100 million (over K500 billion) in aid.⁷³¹ The exchange rate of the Kwacha to the US dollar in 2003 fluctuated between K4,500 and K4,800 to a dollar.⁷³²

⁷³⁰ “Zambian trade unions increasingly met with violence”, Afrol News, 2nd July 2006 (<http://www.afrol.com/articles/12846>). (Accessed on 06/12/12).

⁷³¹ “Zambia public workers’ strike shrinks revenue base”, by Zarina Geloo (<http://www.agrnews.org> – accessed on --- 13/06/12).

⁷³² Bank of Zambia *Annual Report 2003*, p. 18.

Hikaumba complained that the trade unions were constrained in their bargaining ability because of their inability to address the concerns of the IMF.⁷³³ That became the new narrative where negotiations for improved salaries and conditions of service were concerned in the new economic environment. The IMF and the World Bank became involved. Nevertheless, many Zambian public sector workers found it hard to make ends meet as the cost of living kept rising. The Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR), which collected monthly cost-of-living data, showed that as of August 2003, an average family of six needed at least K1 million (US \$200) a month. However, police officers took home a paltry K200, 000 a month, which was then about US \$40.⁷³⁴

In his budget presentation to Parliament on Friday, 6th February 2004, Minister of Finance, in the Mwanawasa government, Ng'andu Magande, stated that there would be no wage awards for public service workers in 2004. Only the police, immigration and prison service personnel who did not receive any pay award in 2003, would receive a salary increase.⁷³⁵ Although Mwanawasa said the non-awarding of salary increments in 2004 was not meant to punish public service workers but a necessary measure to get the country's economy back on track, the trade union movement did not accept this. Before the budget was presented, the ZCTU had expressed the hope that it would provide the basis to widen the tax base to ensure relief to the average Zambian worker who was already paying high Pay As You Earn (PAYE). A meeting between President Mwanawasa and the leaders of the public service unions at State House failed to persuade the union leaders not to reject government's decision not to award salary increments to their members. The unions officially declared a dispute in accordance with the provisions of section 75 (b) of IRLA of 1993, arguing that they were totally opposed to

⁷³³ Lishala C. Situmbeko & Jack Jones Zulu, "Zambia: Condemned to Debt – How the IMF and World Bank have undermined development," World Development Movement, April 2004, p.37.

⁷³⁴ The exchange rate of the Zambian Kwacha to the US dollar was between K4, 500 and K4, 800.

⁷³⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 07/02/04; & *The Post*, 07/02/04.

wage restraint as it was their responsibility and fundamental concept to uphold and improve workers' living conditions.⁷³⁶

Magande insisted that government had no money and awarding workers wage increases would only worsen economic problems. On 6th February, he went ahead and presented to Parliament the 2004 budget. After it was presented, ZCTU and FFTUZ made submissions to the government in which they suggested adjustments to be made.⁷³⁷ Since their suggestions were ignored, the trade union movement decided to hold demonstrations to show displeasure. A week before the demonstrations were held, Nonde, the leader of the FFTUZ, vowed that the workers would hold mass demonstrations to force Parliament to reduce the PAYE and to withdraw the unlawful wage freeze which had been imposed.⁷³⁸ She also harshly criticised the donors for influencing the government on the budget. Since her views received international coverage, this angered Mwanawasa and he lambasted her, warning that donors should not be attacked scornfully and recklessly because they were helping to develop the country. He then apologised to the donors.⁷³⁹

The relationship between the trade union movement and the Mwanawasa Government worsened because of its threat to punish the workers that would participate in the protest. On Wednesday, 18th February 2004, the ZCTU in collaboration with the FFTUZ organised the first one day nation-wide general strike against the wage freeze for workers in the public service and the rising income tax, the PAYE. The movement accused the government of contravening ILO convention 98 by an arbitrary imposition of a wage freeze for the bulk of the public service workers except for the police and security forces.⁷⁴⁰ At Parliament grounds, Hikaumba and

⁷³⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 05/02/2004; 09/02/2004; 10/02/2004; 11/02/2004; 12/02/2004.

⁷³⁷ Zambia Congress of Trade Unions – Recommendations by ZCTU/FFTUZ on the 2004 National Budget Adjustments.

⁷³⁸ UNI: Zambia: “Nonde warns of mass demonstrations over PAYE”, <http://www.union-network.org>. (Accessed on 07/02/06).

⁷³⁹ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 06/02/2004.

⁷⁴⁰ ZCTU Secretary General's Report to the General Council, 11th March 2004, Kitwe; *Times of Zambia*, 09/02/04; *The Post*, 10/02/04; *The Post*, 11/02/04; *The Post*, 13/02/04; *Saturday Post*, 14/02/04; *Sunday Post*,

Nonde addressed the workers and both warned that if Parliament approved the 2004 budget without any amendments, the workers would stage an indefinite work stoppage. Nonde further stated that the workers would stage a revolution like the one in Georgia in Eastern Europe to remove the stubborn government.⁷⁴¹

The union leaders considered the first general strike in Zambia in sixteen years very successful because many workers turned up for the demonstration, but the wage freeze was not lifted and the PAYE was not reduced, a clear testimony that the government could ignore the trade union movement and suffer no adverse consequences. As a result of this, the workers endured a bad year.⁷⁴² Although the general strike did not achieve the intended results, it was a broad-based social movement in which for the first time in the history of workers, they acted in collaboration with other social actors such as civil society organisations (CSOs) to challenge government policy and the very nature of state power.⁷⁴³ Hikaumba stated that the Government would find it very rough to handle workers if it continued to call for sacrifice in 2005 and catalogued the sacrifices workers had made under the MMD government to allow it to pursue its economic policies since 1992 when the MMD government came into power.⁷⁴⁴

While it looked as if Chiluba's Government tolerated trade unions in spite of passing anti-labour legislation, for example, not allowing legal strikes, allowing casualisation of labour and allowing feminisation of labour, Mwanawasa's Government appeared to be openly hostile to trade unions and workers in general. Since Chiluba was a trade unionist and Mwanawasa a lawyer, people referred to the Governments they led as "Government of trade unionists" and "Government of lawyers" respectively. This explained why Mwanawasa openly declared in

15/02/04; *The Post*, 16/02/04; *The Post*, 18/02/04; *The Post*, 19/02/04; *Times of Zambia*, 13/02/04 – 19/02/04. See also: "Leonard and the wailing workers", <http://uk.oneworld.net/article>. (Accessed on 07/02/06).

⁷⁴¹ "Workers defy IMF demands", SocialistWorkeronline, <http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article> (Accessed on 07/02/06).

⁷⁴² *The Post*, 05/01/05; <http://www.afrol.com/articles> (accessed on 14/08/10).

⁷⁴³ "Workers Struggles: Europe, the Middle East and Africa", <http://www.wsws.org/articles>. (Accessed on 02/07/06.)

⁷⁴⁴ *The Post*, 04/01/05.

Solwezi in 2004 that he could do without the trade union movement and later engaged in a public verbal exchange of words with Hikaumba. This also explained why the Minister of Finance implemented the 2004 wage freeze with little regret. This hostility to labour from the Government explained why, in the liberalised economic environment the trade union movement won fewer and fewer battles for the workers.

In July 2005, Sata, leader of the Patriotic Front, was arrested on the orders of Mwanawasa on accusations that he had incited a strike by miners at Nchanga Open Pit mine after the local media quoted him as having admitted that he incited the miners. A day before, seven mine union leaders had been arrested and charged with publishing false information. Mwanawasa argued that the strikes were meant to make the country ungovernable, but since it was his duty to protect the country, he would not allow lawlessness. Mwanawasa's audience was a group of diplomats he was meeting at State House to assure them and investors that Zambia was safe for investment.⁷⁴⁵

The trade union movement observed that during the period 2002-2006, there were moves to deregister the ZCTU and some affiliates. The matter was resolved after a meeting between the ZCTU executive and President Mwanawasa. There was also strong support from MPs for the ZCTU against the perceived undemocratic approach by the government on the matter.⁷⁴⁶

Magande's 2006 budget also led to antagonism between the trade union movement and the government. This was because he refused to reduce tax as he argued that the best way to increase employment was by broadening the tax base rather than reducing PAYE. He called his budget a "budget for everyone". However, the trade union movement, the opposition FDD leader Edith Nawakwi and the JCTR, all condemned the budget. It was seen as a betrayal of

⁷⁴⁵ (<http://query.nytimes.com>. Accessed on 15/02/11)

⁷⁴⁶ ZCTU: Report of the Secretary General to the 12th Quadrennial Congress, 31st October to 3rd November 2006, Livingstone.

the workers who had sacrificed a lot for Zambia to reach the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) completion point only for them to receive nothing tangible from the government in the budget. The budget was also condemned for not being a development-oriented as it favoured only the rich and the employers.⁷⁴⁷ Although these views were carried by a newspaper many people perceived to be one that portrayed opposition views to the government, it still gave a good picture of the nature of relations between the government and the trade union movement. Just as Chiluba's government sided with capital and even passed laws to help capital against the workers, so did Mwanawasa's government.

According to the trade union movement, during the period 2002-2006, Zambia continued to experience high levels of poverty, unemployment and HIV/AIDS despite implementing the Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (PRSP), 2002-2004, the Transition National Development Plan (TNDP) and attaining the HIPC completion point around mid-2005.⁷⁴⁸ Despite the complaints from the trade union movement that the workers faced hardships, to Mwanawasa the economy was doing well and he could see a bright light at the end of the tunnel.⁷⁴⁹ The tax on workers' wages remained high throughout the period of the MMD Government, which refused to make tax cuts on wages for fear of distorting economic structural adjustment measures.⁷⁵⁰ During the privatisation of the mines the government gave the new investors in the mines a lot of concessions that meant losing a lot of revenue from the mines.⁷⁵¹ The loss of tax revenue from the mines meant heavy taxation for the workers.⁷⁵²

⁷⁴⁷ *The Post*, 03/02/06; 05/02/06; 07/02/06; *Sunday Post*, 10/02/06; & *The Post*, 14/02/06.

⁷⁴⁸ ZCTU: Report of the Secretary General to the 12th Quadrennial Congress, 31st October to 3rd November 2006, Livingstone, p. 35.

⁷⁴⁹ *The Post*, 07/02/06.

⁷⁵⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 21/12/92; *The Weekly Post*, No. 53, July 10-16, 1992; *Parliamentary Debates*, 15th January – 18th March 1993; *Parliamentary Debates*, 6th December 1996 – 26th March 1997.

⁷⁵¹ DiJohn, "The Political Economy of Taxation and State Resilience in Zambia since 1990", pp.13-18; Fraser & Lungu, "For Whom the Windfalls"; Neo Simutanyi, "Copper mining in Zambia: The developmental legacy of privatisation", *ISS Paper* 165 (July 2008), pp. 4-5; Elva Bova, "The implications of mine ownership for the management of the boom: a comparative analysis of Zambia and Chile", NCCR Trade Working Paper No. 2009/13 (April 2009), p. 9.

⁷⁵² Bova, "The implications of mine ownership for the management of the boom: a comparative analysis of Zambia and Chile", p. 14. See also Fraser and Lungu, "For Whom the Windfalls",

Many analysts asked for the restoration of the windfall tax. The Government had introduced a 25 percent windfall tax on copper mines in April 2008 when global copper prices were very high. The windfall tax stipulated that the mines would contribute a certain percentage of their profits on copper prices related to the ups and downs on the international metal markets. However, after the copper prices fell to a four-year low of less than \$3,000 a ton in 2009, the then Minister of Finance Situmbeko Musokotwane, abolished the windfall tax. This move symbolised the government's bowing down to the powerful lobbyists of the private sector who argued that the windfall tax raised production costs and discouraged investment,⁷⁵³ and also the growth of employment.

The Decline of Trade Unionism under the MMD Government

It was shown above that while more than half a century ago Victor Feather and other trade unionists were very confident that trade unionism would always survive in any environment, Henk Thomas and other scholars writing on labour matters later were not so confident that trade unions would always survive because there were new challenges to be faced. This study tried to show that as a result of the economic policies the MMD government pursued from 1992, the trade union movement faced several challenges, some of which were examined in this section in answer to the question of whether trade unions would survive in the new environment or not. In 2001 there were twenty-nine registered trade unions out of which twenty-five were affiliated with the ZCTU, while the remaining four were affiliated with the FFTUZ. On the whole, trade union membership declined since the start of privatisation in 1992. In 1995 the total trade union membership was 289,322 against a total of 485,000 workers in

(<http://www.minewatchzambia.com>) – accessed on 14/02/11); *Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session of the Seventh National Assembly*, 15th January – 18th march 1993, Cols. 463-465.

⁷⁵³ *The Zambian Mining Industry: A Status Report Ten Year After Privatization*, p. 10; “Zambia won’t bring back mining windfall tax”, <http://www.businesslive.co.za/africa/2012/03/22>. Accessed on 27/07/12.

formal employment. In 1999 the total trade union membership was 234,522 against a total of 478,000 workers in formal employment.⁷⁵⁴

The major factor for the decline in trade union membership was ascribed to the decline in economic activity and formal employment resulting from the IMF and World Bank-inspired structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Tables 9 and 10 show trade union membership in major unions in 2002 and unionisation trends between 2003 and 2006. As a result of the SAPs, the Zambian economy experienced massive layoffs of workers in almost all sectors of the economy. Although overall unemployment rates declined from 15 percent in 1990 to 13 percent in 2000, unemployment drastically increased overall in urban areas from 16 percent in 1990 to 26 percent in 2000. The 2000 Census showed that urban unemployment had been on the increase since 1990, increasing from 16 percent to 26 percent in 2000, with Lusaka, Central, and Copperbelt Provinces experiencing increases in urban unemployment. The largest growth in unemployment occurred in Lusaka Province where it rose from 14 percent in 1990 to 30 percent in 2000. On the Copperbelt, where the main employer, the mines were privatised, urban unemployment increased from 17 percent in 1990 to 25 percent in 2000.⁷⁵⁵

⁷⁵⁴ CSO and ZCTU Survey on Trade Union Membership and Profile, 1999.

⁷⁵⁵ Global Policy Network: Zambia: Socio-economic issues and unionization submitted by ZCTU SAP Project – Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, April 2001; CSO Economic report for 2000; CSO, *The Monthly*, Vol. 4., July 2003, p. 6.

Table 9: Important Trade Unions in Zambia in 2002

Name of Union	Sectors Organised	Membership	National Affiliation or Independent
Civil Servants and Allied Workers' Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ)	Public Service	34,973	ZCTU
Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ)	Mining	24,245	ZCTU
Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT)	Teaching	33,380	ZCTU
National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers (NUPAW)	Agriculture	17,000	ZCTU
National Union of Public Service Workers (NUPSW)	Public Service	11,711	ZCTU
National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers (NUCIW)	Commerce and Industry	16,270	ZCTU
National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers (NUBEGW)	Industry and Construction	15,463	ZCTU
Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union (ZULAWU)	Local Authorities	15,000	ZCTU
Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW)	Financial	5,000	FFTUZ
National Union of Communication Workers (NUCW)	Communication	3,980	ZCTU
National Energy Sector and Allied Workers Union (NESAWU)	Energy	3,980	ZCTU

Source: ZCTU Country Report 2003.

The fact that the unions seemed to lack capacity to organise in the new and increasingly hostile environment, particularly in the private sector also led to a decline in trade union membership. The private sector was more anti-union and some private employers even refused to recognise trade unions. Workers who were interested in joining unions were intimidated and threatened with dismissals. The new investors encouraged part-time, temporary, and casual employment in an attempt to lower the costs of production and to avoid having trade unions in their industries. To a lesser extent, death, voluntary retirement, and the increased use of machinery, which reduced the number of people doing a particular job, also contributed to the decline in trade union membership.⁷⁵⁶ Nonde and Hikaumba both also mentioned government tactics that supported investors but were totally against unions and unionisation.⁷⁵⁷

⁷⁵⁶ Global Policy Network: Zambia: Socio-economic issues and unionization submitted by ZCTU SAP Project – Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, April 2001.

⁷⁵⁷ Interview with Joyce Nonde, Lusaka, 09/05/11 & Hikaumba, Lusaka, 24/05/13.

The argument that the private sector was anti-trade unions was supported by the fact that unionisation levels were low in the sectors which were predominantly in private hands such as transport and communications (28.1%), agriculture (26.7%), manufacturing, trade, distribution and hotels (27.8%), and finance (22.6%). The only exception was the mining sector in which, despite privatisation, unionisation rates were still high at 88.3%, most likely because of the presence of a strong national union, the MUZ, which enjoyed both local and international support. Later, even in the mines unionisation declined and MUZ was no longer the strong national union it was before privatisation of the mines. On the other hand unionisation was still high in public dominated entities such as electricity and water (79.2%) and construction (88.3%). Unionisation in the public sector was moderate at 63.7% and this could be attributed to the public sector reform programme (PSRP) which placed many workers on contract employment as well the casualization of the bulk of the Classified Daily Employees (CDEs).⁷⁵⁸

An interesting trend which emerged in the privatisation era was the increase in the number of trade unions registered over the years despite the decline in general trade union membership. In 1995 there were only 20 registered trade unions. 18 were affiliated to ZCTU with a combined membership of 289,322. In 1999 there were 29 registered unions. 25 were affiliated to ZCTU with a combined membership of 230,037. The increase in the number of affiliates did not result in any significant increase in actual trade union membership because most of the new unions were splinter unions from already existing unions and they merely shared the already declining membership among them. Only a few unions were established in new areas which were previously not organised, such as UNZALARU and the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ). In 2002, ZCTU membership was down to 212,375.⁷⁵⁹

⁷⁵⁸ Global Policy Network: Zambia: Socio-economic issues and unionization – submitted by ZCTU SAP Project – Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, April 2001.

⁷⁵⁹ Global Policy Network – Zambia: Socio-economic issues and unionization submitted by ZCTU SAP Project – Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, April 2001; ZCTU Country Report 2003, p. 8.

There was also a decline in unionisation rates, which made the decline in trade union membership worse. Unionisation rates in the 1970s and 1980s were around 70 to 80 per cent, but the rate dropped to around 50 per cent by 2001. However, trade unionism still had a future in Zambia mainly because trade unions were resilient. For as long as there would be workers in Zambia, there would be trade unions. When it was suggested to Shamenda that UNZALARU was ineffective at UNZA, he disagreed and gave the example of a uniformed policeman whose mere presence at a scene could prevent a crime from being committed. He argued, therefore that while UNZALARU might appear to be weak and useless in the eyes of its members and perhaps the public, its mere presence at UNZA helped to make certain things move. The same was true for unions throughout the country.⁷⁶⁰

At the “Future of the Zambia Labour Movement Colloquium” held at Mulungushi University in Kabwe in March 2011, Shamenda admitted that the trade union movement was weak and its weakness came from three sources. The first were economic liberalisation policies that had entailed that instead of unions negotiating for improved conditions for their members, they were negotiating to keep the little that their members had left because governments were trying to take even the little away. The second was the political arrogance of the politicians who used their might to weaken trade unions. The third was the compromised trade union leadership that meant that trade union leaders betrayed their members and yet the politicians they tried to please did not even respect them. He stated that in the past trade unionists had supported each other, for example, in 1971, when Newstead Zimba was sacked, ZNUT amended its constitution to make the position of its union president full time to accommodate him. In a similar manner, in 1987, when Chiluba was in trouble in NUBEGW, it was ZUFIAW that saved him. In 2010, however, the trade union movement was so intimidated that

⁷⁶⁰ Discussion with Shamenda, at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Offices, Lusaka, 23/02/11.

government was asking for proof of payslips from anyone trying to contest ZCTU positions as happened at the Congress in Livingstone.⁷⁶¹

At the same Colloquium, a Mr. C. Chibesakunda, a former ZUFIAW Secretary General agreed with Shamenda that trade union leaders had abandoned their members. He cited the example of how at the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council, government could decide on its own what to do and how to change the labour law, and unions remained quiet, instead of consulting their members so that they could protest.⁷⁶²

Roy Mwaba, the then Secretary General of ZCTU noted that there was potential for the trade union movement to grow, but the weak finances of the trade unions undermined that potential to grow. Some unions were poor and to survive had obtained loans from the line ministries to which they belonged and that affected ZCTU because the unions could not bite the finger that fed them. He concluded his remarks by stating strongly that ZCTU was not compromised, it was its president, Hikaumba that was compromised.⁷⁶³ Although this was a very serious allegation him, Hikaumba diplomatically chose to remain quiet. He later told this researcher that he did so to maintain peace.⁷⁶⁴

⁷⁶¹Shamenda was reacting to the paper entitled “Crises and Successes” presented by this researcher at the Colloquium.

⁷⁶² Mr. C. Chibesakunda was also reacting to the paper presented by this researcher at the Colloquium.

⁷⁶³ Roy Mwaba was making a contribution at the Colloquium.

⁷⁶⁴ Discussion with Hikaumba during recess at the Colloquium.

Table 10: Trends in union membership 2004-2006 & 2010: Trade union membership statistics

#	Name of Union	2003	2004	2005	2006	2010
1.	Airway & Allied Workers' Union of Zambia	703	1200	800	696	700
2.	Bankers Union of Zambia	135	160	160	160	Nil
3.	Copperbelt University Workers' Union	366	321	380	284	326
4.	Zambia Union of Security Officers & Allied Workers	8000	12450	15000	20978	25726
5.	Civil Servants & Allied Workers' Union of Zambia	34973	34973	46100	80000	37000
6.	Hotel Catering Workers' Union of Zambia	9918	12350	12350	16500	10000
7.	Mineworkers' Union of Zambia	24245	24245	25000	13358	18313
8.	National of Building Engineering & General Workers	12105	15463	15940	15243	10560
9.	National Union of Commercial & Industrial Workers	16270	17000	17500	20250	7930
10.	National Union of Plantation & Allied Workers	17000	16000	18000	12250	23222
11.	National Union of Communication Workers	5100	4500	2840	5140	3650
12.	National Union of Public Service Workers	11711	12115	12115	11500	13000
13.	Railway Workers' Union of Zambia	13395	800	800	1003	464
14.	National Union of Transport & Allied Workers	3028	3000	1430	1374	975
15.	University of Zambia & Allied Workers' Union	2105	2105	2200	1151	1037
16.	Zambia National Union of Health & Allied Workers	3484	2843	3000	5000	2500
17.	National Energy Sector & Allied Workers' Union	3326	4280	4300	3000	2600
18.	Zambia National Union of Teachers	35000	33380	37000	30399	38674
19.	Zambia Graphical & Allied Workers' Union	1401	1401	1430	3200	1120
20.	Zambia Union of Journalists	363	363	370	370	378
21.	Zambia Revenue Authority Workers' Union	1330	1394	1544	1000	767
22.	United House & Domestic Workers' Union of Zambia	400	400	400	889	Nil
23.	University of Zambia Lecturers & Researchers Union	200	212	220	242	300
24.	Workers' Union of TAZARA (WUTAZ)	1283	1283	1285	1421	1279
25.	Zambia United Local Authority Workers' Union	16500	13780	14300	14000	15580
26.	National Union of Technical Education Lecturers	---	---	3000*	3000	474
27.	Copperbelt University Academic Union	---	---	100*	120	117
28.	Zambia Bus & Taxi Workers' Union	---	---	10000*	10000	Nil
29.	Basic Education Teachers' Union of Zambia	10000	10000	12000	8756	15500
30.	Grain & Meat Workers' Union	---	---	---	---	820
31.	Gemstone & Allied Workers' Union	---	---	---	---	1022
32.	Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation	---	---	---	---	2150
TOTAL		232341	226018	259564	281554	233388

- Unions not subscribing to ZCTU then.
- **Source:** ZCTU Report of the Secretary General to the 12th Quadrennial Congress, 31st October to 3rd November 2006 & Compilation by the researcher.

Although it could be argued that trade unionism still has a future in Zambia, Table 10 shows that in 2005 total number of unionised workers belonging to ZCTU was 259,564 and in 2006, it was 281,554 these numbers had declined in 2010 to 233,388, less than half the unionisation figures for the 1970s and 1980s.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to analyse the relationship between the trade union movement and the Third Republic Government of the MMD to 2011. It also sought to find out whether it was true that as a result of the economic policies pursued by the MMD government, the trade union movement was weakened and also whether or not the trade union movement had declined. In doing that the chapter showed why the MMD government pursued the economic policies it did and where that left the trade union movement and the workers it represented. A number of observations, reflections and conclusions were made.

The first observation was that the MMD election manifesto of 1991 promised the workers improved conditions of work and salaries. This led the workers to have great expectations of better things to come. However, an analysis of the manifesto and the performance of the MMD government from 1992 showed that many of the promises the MMD made were not fulfilled. The MMD government, for example, changed the labour laws which led to the strengthening of the position of the investors and employers at the expense of the workers. The workers, who were promised the rights to negotiate, participate and influence events which affected them were left unable to act as partners with employers, almost in the master and servant scenario of the colonial days.

While the workers welcomed the coming into power of the MMD because they saw it as “their” government, which would give them a better deal than they had had before, things did not turn out that way. The trade union movement expected that the MMD government would regard it to be an equal partner. As an equal partner, the trade union movement expected

that it would be consulted on developmental issues. However, it was disappointed when it became clear that the MMD government did not regard it as an equal partner. This led to the breakdown of the relationship between the trade union movement and the MMD government. In addition, when the latter began to implement the IMF and World Bank policies of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), a further rift opened up between the government and the ZCTU which feared that SAP would lead, as it did, to loss of jobs.

Differences in interpreting the laws that affect workers, led to disputes between the government and the trade union movement. In 1993, for example, there was a difference between the government and the movement over government's proposal to repeal the Employment Act of 1971 to remove an employer's obligation to provide workers with accommodation or pay them a housing allowance. Government argued that repealing the Act would encourage workers to own houses and remove their dependency on employers. The trade union movement argued that because of the poor salaries many workers earned, few would afford to own houses or pay for decent accommodation. In addition, in labour circles, the move to repeal the Act was seen as another way of allowing employers to reduce the costs of labour by running away from fulfilling a major obligation. Government was forced to drop the issue.

The perception of the trade union movement was that the workers not received what they had been promised they would receive from the Government because, as Shamenda stated, a small, 'selfish clique of criminals', which was recycled from the previous regime and took over power and used it to serve its selfish interests. It could be concluded that the criticism of the government by the trade union movement which wholeheartedly welcomed the MMD government showed that the workers should not have claimed a victory when they welcomed the government which they claimed was theirs.

There is a tendency by some scholars to see the MMD's victory as the victory of the workers. This was erroneous, but it made the labour leaders who took over from Chiluba and

others who went into government believe they were part of the government. As a result of that position, when they were excluded from governance, they expressed shock and disappointment and attacked the government accusing it of betrayal. This chapter also concluded that although other authors even stated that the trade union movement formed a political party or transformed itself into a political party, which led the fight for democracy, this position was not correct. Although they argued that the ZCTU had huge financial resources and nation-wide branches, which it put at the disposal of the MMD to help it campaign and win the 1991 elections, the correct position was that the ZCTU did not have huge financial resources. Its financial position was not as good as some foreign observers believed it was. The trade union movement had always faced financial problems, which according to ZCTU Secretary General Mwaba still dogged it even in 2011. However, it was true that trade union movement's nation-wide branches were of help to the MMD which was new and did not grassroots structures.

In this regard, therefore, the ZCTU was not so rich as to make a significant financial contribution to the MMD to enable it unseat UNIP, as some of the authors made it appear. It was for this reason that MUZ, which always made the biggest financial contribution to it, always threatened to strangle it financially whenever there were differences between the two organisations. The ZCTU was most of the time financially weaker than some of its affiliates, such as the MUZ. What the trade union movement had in abundance was the human resource, which was regarded as more important than financial resources. This was because even if the MMD had a lot of financial resources but did not have the human resource, it would have found it difficult to successfully organise an election campaign, let alone win the elections.

The group that took over government under the MMD was made up of a collection of men from different occupations and was not necessarily pro-workers, despite receiving strong support from the trade union movement and the workers.

As the MMD government began to implement its economic policies to improve the economy, it had to quickly come to grips with the reality of structure of the Zambian economy. Government's economic policies were affected by the severe 1992 drought that affected food security, agricultural output and even electricity generation. In the end it also affected the way the government perceived the problems posed by the workers. In addition, the government had to deal with the budget deficit high inflation and this led to wage freezes and implementation of harsh economic policies that hurt the workers.

The change in labour laws was crucial as it led to the split in the trade union movement in 1994. The split saw some affiliates breaking away from the ZCTU to set up a rival trade union centre, the FFTUZ in 1998. Some sources blamed Chiluba for the split, as they saw it as his attempt to weaken the trade union movement to prevent it from being used by his political opponents to remove him from power the way he used it against Kaunda. However, the major point was that it was the change in labour laws in 1993, 1997 and 2008 that dealt a huge blow on the trade union movement. The trade union movement had, by 2011, not recovered from the crisis brought about by the splinter unions in its ranks.

The strikes by KTZ and bank workers, as well as by UNZA lecturers ended up with KTZ closing, the bank workers and UNZA lecturers sacked, showing that even under the MMD government, strikes would not be tolerated and that even professionals and highly qualified workers could be sacked. Even if some sacked workers would be reinstated, the point would have been made about where real power in the labour market lay.

In the 1990s and the 2000s, the strikes were mainly by public service workers because unionisation in the private sector, including the mines, had contracted. The MUZ, which before 1991 was one of the biggest unions and the most financially strong, had become smaller and less influential, and in 2003, suffered divisions when the National Union of Mineworkers and Allied Workers (NUMAW) was formed as a rival union to MUZ in the mines. The threat of

splinter unions had always existed on the mines from the 1970s, just as MUZ was threatening to split from ZCTU. The public service workers' unions, on the other hand, had almost maintained unionisation figures at high levels in spite of civil service and public service reforms government was carrying out.

On the whole workers' strikes under the MMD governments did not achieve much for the workers because investors and employers were well protected by the changed labour laws. In this regard, the trade union movement needed to adopt new strategies to use to effectively represent the workers.

This chapter showed that taxation on workers' wages was very high and the unions did not succeed in convincing the government to reduce it. This was as a result of the agreements and concessions given to these companies during privatisation. The loss of revenue from these privatised companies meant that the workers would face a high tax burden.

Finally, the chapter concluded that although the number of trade unions increased with the liberalisation of labour laws in the country, which led to splinter unions being formed, membership of trade unions declined from the start of privatisation in 1992. Nevertheless, trade unions still had a future in Zambia's social, economic and political life. As Victor Feather put it, trade unions would survive, no matter what the climate was. Henk Thomas and others warned the trade unions to change tactics to suit the changed environments in which they operated. The trade unions have learned to use new tactics of survival.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This chapter summarises major arguments and findings advanced in this research. As a background to the study, the thesis examined the post-independence history of the trade union movement in Zambia. This was done firstly, by examining the relationship between the trade union movement and political parties prior to independence. In this regard, the 1950s and early 1960s informed some of the debates in some of the sections of the early parts of the thesis because in order to bring the story to 1964 and beyond it was necessary to delve into the 1950s and 1960s for explanations. Meebelo's work was very useful for this period of labour history. It was shown that sometimes the trade union movement did not co-operate with the politicians. This lack of co-operation from the trade union movement and some labour leaders, for example, the AMU and Katilungu, in the 1950s and early 1960s, strained relations with the nationalists. The political leadership used some trade union leaders that co-operated with it to remove Katilungu from the trade union movement. However, removing Katilungu was done at the expense of splitting the trade union movement when two national trade union centres emerged. As was shown from Kaunda's speeches in the period immediately before and after independence on the trade union movement and labour, the movement and its leadership at independence was then seen by the nationalists to be unsuitable to participate in the development of the country unless it was reined in. However, the splits in the trade union movement became a recurring theme of the history of trade unionism in Zambia.

The main objective of this work was to investigate the nature of the workers' expectations and their struggles to obtain rewards from their labour from 1964, the year of the country's independence to 2011, the year the MMD rule came to an end. There were six specific objectives for this work. The first was to examine the impact of the performance of the economy on the workers' expectations and trade unionism. The second was to examine the

impact of Government's labour policies on the workers' expectations and trade unionism. The third was to analyse the nature of the relationship between the trade union movement and the Government from 1964 to 2011. The fourth was to analyse the impact of economic liberalisation on trade unionism. The fifth was to examine the nature of industrial relations and impact on the economy. The final specific objective was to examine the workers' expectations from 1964 to 2011.

The nature of the workers' expectations and struggles to obtain rewards for their labour, 1964-2011

This work has shown that at independence in 1964, Zambia inherited a system in which the nature of work and salaries and conditions of service were decided on the basis of race. In this regard, European workers performed skilled work and were paid better salaries and had better conditions of service than African workers. At independence, therefore, the Zambian Government ensured that this was changed. The crises of expectations that the Zambian workers faced at independence was caused by their expecting substantial increases in wages and salaries under their own African Government. This study has shown that the Kaunda Government was aware of the workers' expectations and tried to meet those expectations. The awareness came from the fact that salary scales before independence were racially determined, with the European workers on super salary scales and the African workers on lower salary scales. It was for this reason, therefore, that the need to improve remuneration for African workers was accepted as fact. An attempt was made to establish a wages and prices policy, but it proved difficult to implement. Between 1964 and 1969, an attempt was made to improve remuneration for African workers but it was found out that increasing salaries and conditions of service for workers without improving production was not tenable. The salaries and conditions of service improved, but the workers were not always patient and tended to go on strike whenever they felt that their expectations were not being met quickly enough. On the

whole, this study has shown that there were times when workers' expectations were met and times when they were not depending on the performance of the economy.

The impact of the performance of the economy on the workers' expectations and trade unionism

It was important to emphasise the fact that the performance of the trade union movement would be affected by the way the economy was performing. In this regard, this work examined the nature of the Zambian economy from 1964 to 2011. It was shown that Zambia's economy in 1964 was performing very satisfactorily up to around 1975, when the world prices of oil went up and the world prices of copper, Zambia's main export commodity went down. This affected growth of employment as well as what workers could earn from their work. This also affected the relationship between the Government, as the major employer and the trade union movement. Strikes became the norm and the Government had to put measures in place to ensure there was stability in work places. The Statutory Instrument number six of 1985, could be explained in this way, even if it led to a straining of relations between the trade union movement and the Government.

The impact of the Government's labour policies on the workers' expectations and trade unionism, 1964 - 2011

The issue of the labour policies was important for this study. This was because for any trade union movement to operate freely in any country, labour laws must be clear and allow workers and their movements to enjoy their freedoms. This study has shown that at independence two main issues about the trade union movement needed sorting out. The first issue was that the movement had to be re-oriented from one that had done battles with colonial rulers and colonial capital and employers in a colonial capitalist economy to one which had to work with an African Government in an independent African country run by indigenous

people. This study showed that Kaunda was anxious to have a trade union movement which his Party and Government could control. In this regard, UNIP and its Government tried to remodel the movement so that it could be subservient to UNIP. This path was filled with risks as it led to confrontation rather than co-operation. The first issue about the movement that needed sorting out was the disunity in the trade union movement from which it had suffered almost from the moment it emerged. A disunited movement would be of no use in an independent country in a hurry to develop for the sake of a poor majority of the population the colonial regime had neglected. The second issue that needed sorting out was one of the poor financial position of the trade unions that made them vulnerable and open to external influence. The Government wanted to put a stop to this. The answer to all these problems lay in enacting a new labour law. In 1965, 1971 and 1990 the UNIP Government enacted labour laws which were meant to give it a say in the way trade unions conducted their affairs. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was enacted. It was meant to completely domesticate the trade union movement and make it easy for UNIP and the Government to control it. It came into effect in 1974, the year Chiluba became leader of the trade union movement in Zambia. This law came to be regarded as one of the best in independent Africa. It had elements in it that allowed the trade union movement to grow and become one of the strongest in Africa. It was from this position of strength that the Zambian trade union movement became the voice of the people, not just workers in the one-party state introduced in 1972. It was also from this position that the trade union movement was able to play a leading role in the move to return the country to multiparty democracy in 1991. It even provided the man that became the second President of the country. However, having helped the MMD come to power, it then watched as the labour laws were changed in 1993 and amended in 1997 and 2008 to the disadvantage of the trade union movement and the workers it represented. Even the Kaunda Government had wanted investors to invest in the country's economy, but while welcoming these investors it did not

change the labour laws to favour them. This study has shown that this changed under the MMD Government as the labour laws were changed or amended to favour the investors. Even collective bargaining, one of the pillars of trade unionism, was affected. Employers began to prefer workers that did not belong to trade unions as they encouraged individual contracts. On the whole, this study has showed that while the labour laws remained favourable to the trade union movement from 1965 to 1990, this changed after 1991. Chiluba, the former trade union leader was even personally accused of using his knowledge of the movement to weaken it. This study has not agreed with this view. Instead this study has argued that the Chiluba Government used the law to deal with the trade union movement. The amendments to the labour laws, especially the 1993 and 1997 amendments led to the emergence of splinter unions from 1994. This led to some affiliates breaking away from the ZCTU and the setting up of a rival trade union centre, the FFTUZ. Chiluba was blamed for the creation of the FFTUZ, though sources within FFTUZ denied this. This study concluded that while some trade union leaders saw splinter unions as weakening the trade union movement on the contrary they became the best way in which in a democracy disgruntled trade union members challenged their leaders and express their independence from the leaders they did not like. This study, therefore, sees the economic policies and labour laws enacted after 1991 as having had the same effect of weakening the strength of the trade union movement.

The nature of the relationship between the trade union movement and the Government, 1964-2011

This study has examined the relationship between the trade union movement and the Government in two phases. There was the relationship between the trade union movement and the Kaunda Government from 1964 to 1991 and the relationship between the trade union movement and the MMD Government from 1992 to 2011, under three Presidents. The study has showed that at independence, the Government was willing to help the trade union

movement to grow and passed labour laws that helped it grow. However, the relationship between the trade union movement and the Government from around 1980 began to change. One of the issues that caused conflict between the UNIP Government and the trade union movement were the attempts by UNIP to turn the movement into a wing of UNIP. UNIP attempted to put in place measures such as vetting of candidates for positions in the ZCTU executive so that only those acceptable to the UNIP leadership could become leaders in ZCTU. This was resisted and as this study has showed, relations between UNIP and its Government and the trade union movement became more conflictual, leading to trade union leaders being banned from addressing Labour Day rallies. Relations between the UNIP Government and the trade union movement were also affected by the fact that by 1980, the performance of the economy began to decline because of both internal and external factors. The second phase of this relationship was from 1992 to 2011 with the MMD Government. The trade union movement helped the MMD to come to power. This meant that a warm relationship was expected to develop between the movement and the Government. However, as this study has shown, this was not the case. After celebrating the MMD victory, the trade union movement quickly realised that things were changing fast. Soon, trade union leaders began to say that the “honeymoon” between them was over. Economic policies and change of the labour laws led to strained relations.

The impact of economic liberalisation on the trade union movement

This study has showed that the Kaunda Government inherited an economy that was lopsided, an aspect that has been the subject of many studies on Zambia’s economy. It was an economy based on the production of copper and very little else. It was also an economy in which the majority of the people did not benefit. The Kaunda Government, therefore, went about trying to correct this. While the Government wanted the workers to benefit from independence, it wanted those not in employment to benefit as well. This meant telling the workers not to ask

for too much from the treasury. The Kaunda Government was aware in 1980 that the economy was not performing well and tried to put in place measures to correct the situation. The Government tried to reform the economy, but could not put in place measures that would negatively affect the people. This half-hearted approach, as some studies have shown prevented the economy from improving. This study has showed that when the MMD came to power it put in place economic liberalisation policies. The study then examined the challenges of economic liberalisation policies on the trade union movement. The study showed that the trade union movement faced many challenges as a result of economic liberalisation that impacted negatively on the trade union movement and the expectations of the workers. The study showed that in the end the most serious failure of both the UNIP and MMD Governments from 1964 to 2011 and which led to the weakening of the economy was the failure to handle the mines properly. During the colonial period and in the period after independence to 1975, the mines produced enough wealth for the country that enabled the Government to carry out development projects. However, after 1975, there was not any major re-investment in the mines and when they were privatised and sold off during the MMD era, they were sold off very cheaply to the detriment of the economy.

The nature of industrial relations and the impact on the economy, 1964-1991

This study devoted a chapter on discussing industrial relations from 1964, the year of independence to 1991, the year there was change on government. The chapter discussed mainly the issue of strikes and showed that because of the “crises of expectations” there were many strikes, coming in waves in some years. These strikes had an impact on the economy in that production was always affected by strikes. The study has showed that while some strikes led to the workers gaining benefits, they also led to the straining of relations between the trade union movement and the Government.

The workers' expectations under the MMD Government, 1992-2011

The final specific objective of this study was to examine the workers' expectations under the MMD Government. The study has showed that because the trade union movement helped the MMD to come to power, it expected more from it than the trade union movement did from the UNIP Government in 1964. This was especially so because Chiluba, who became President on 2nd November 1991, had been for a long time the leader of the trade union movement in Zambia. In addition, a number of trade union leaders were also given top Government jobs. However, the MMD Government stated that it had inherited an economy that was not performing well. In order to correct that it had to put in place economic liberalisation policies, many of which impacted negatively on the workers and the trade union movement. As the MMD Government began to implement its economic policies, it was faced with one of the worst natural calamities the country had ever faced. This was drought of 1992, which affected food security, agricultural output and even electricity generation. However, Kasonde, the first MMD Government Minister of Finance, identified the budget deficit under which the economy had operated from 1973 to 1993 as the biggest challenge the country and the people of Zambia faced. It was a problem which affected industrial relations in the country and relations between the Government and the workers. The quest to solve this problem led to the implementation of the economic liberalisation policies which had an impact on the trade union movement and brought into focus the "crises of expectations". The "honeymoon" between the trade union movement and the MMD was soon over. The economic liberalisation policies of the MMD Government were soon affecting the workers negatively. Some trade union leaders complained that Chiluba was letting down the workers more than Kaunda did. As a result of the economic liberalisation policies there was a reduction in employment as many workers lost jobs and the trade unions lost members and this led to weakening them. This chapter looked at the issue of strikes during the MMD rule and found that there was a reduction

in strikes. This was not because the workers were contented, but because the investors and new employers did not encourage strikes. In some cases, trade unions could not help members that were sacked as a result of going on strike. This meant that trade unions were not seen to offer protection to members, some of whom preferred not to belong to trade unions. The MMD Government also passed laws that allowed splinter unions to emerge. Although the aspect of splinter unions could be seen as something that promoted democratisation in the trade union movement, they were also one aspect that led to straining the relationship between the trade union movement and the MMD Government.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES

National Archives of Zambia

NAZ Reference	Title	Dates Covered
MLSS1/14/021	Wages Policy General	1968-1971
MLSS1/25/138	Labour Problems arising out of UDI	1965-1968
MLSS1/25/146	Zambia National Union of Teachers versus Ministry of Education	1970-1971
MLSS1/26/36	Zambia Mineworkers' Union (ZMU)	1949-1967
MLSS1/26/59	Trades Unions – General	1951-1959
MLSS1/26/144	Trade Unions (African) General	1957-1965
LSS1/26/154	Trade Unions: African Trade Union Congress	1958-1960
MLSS1/26/180	Trade Unions – General	1960-1963
MLSS1/26/207	All African Trade Union Federation	1961-1968
MLSS1/26/239	Registrar of Trade Unions – General	1963-1969
MLSS1/26/249	United Trade Union Congress TU/3/9A Vol. II	1964-1965
MLSS1/26/257	Trade Unions: United Trade Union Congress (Now to be Zambia Congress of Trade Unions).	1965-1966
MLSS1/26/258	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1965-1967
MLSS1/26/264	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions Accounts	1965-1970
MLSS1/26/269	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1966-1968
MLSS1/26/273	Zambia Congress of Trade Union 100/TU/15/Vol. 1	1967-1968
MLSS1/26/279	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1967-1969
MLSS1/26/292	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	1969-1969
LSS1/26/302	Mineworkers' Union of Zambia	1970-1971
MLSS1/26/307	Mineworkers' Union of Zambia	1971-1971
MLSS1/26/311	Mineworkers' Union of Zambia	1974-1977

UNIP Political Archives

UNIP reference	Title	Dates covered
UNIP 7/7/4	Ministry of Labour and Social Services Circulars	1967-1968
UNIP 7/7/6	UNIP5/161: Ministry of Labour General Correspondence	1969-1973
UNIP 7/7/7	Department (Later Ministry) of Labour – General	1953-1968
UNIP 7/1/13	MCC/KAP/1 – State House Presidential Circulars	1971-1976
UNIP 7/1/10	Trade Union – Minister of State	1970
UNIP 12/1/23	6/00/28 – United Trade Union Congress Northern Rhodesia – Correspondence	1964-1965
UNIP 12/1/24	6/00/73 – Railway Workers’ Union	1964-1965
UNIP 12/1/38	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions Correspondence	1970-1973
UNIP 12/1/41	Zambia Railways Amalgamated Workers’ Union (ZRAWU)	1971-1973
UNIP 12/1/43	Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ) Correspondence	1972-1973
UNIP 12/1/48	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions – SGP/7/2/1	1974-1978
UNIP 12/1/58	Zambia National Union of Teachers, Reports	1972-1973
UNIP 12/4/8	SGP/8/19/1: Zambia Railways – Correspondence	1975-1984

Zambia Railways Archives

Reference No.	Title	Dates covered
BS/5/4	Unions, Labour and Industrial Relations	1968
ZRB/5/5	Unions, Labour and Industrial Relations	1968–1970
ZRB/5/6	Zambia Railways Amalgamated Workers' Union	1967-1971
ZRB/5/6	Railway African Workers' Union	1960-1963
ZRB5/6	Union matters, Zambia Railways Amalgamated Workers' Union (ZRAWU)	1970-1973

ZCTU papers/records

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, Report of the Secretary General to the 9th Quadrennial Congress, 26th to 29th October 1994, Livingstone.

P.A. Mulenga, "ILO/FTF/ICFTU-AFRO/ZCTU Project on Trade Union capacity Building Through Education: Zambia Action Plan," January 2001-December 2004.

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, Country Report Submitted at the ILO-ITC Course on Training on ILS and the ILO Declaration on fundamental principles and Rights at work and its follow-up, Turin/Geneva, 12 May – 6 June 2003.

E.J. Nyirenda and Adrian Shikwe, Trade Union Country Report – Zambia, Lusaka: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2003.

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, Recommendations by ZCTU/FFTUZ on the 2004 National Budget Adjustments.

Zambia Congress of Trade Union, Secretary General's Report to the General Council, 11th March 2004, Kitwe.

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, Building a Better Zambia: Perspectives and Demands of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions on the next government ahead of the 2006 tripartite elections, Lusaka, 2006.

Oral Interviews

Mr. Fackson Shamenda, former ZCTU President, Lusaka, Thursday, 7th April 2011.

Mrs Joyce Nonde-Simukoko, ZUFIAW General Secretary and also FFTUZ President, Lusaka, 9th May 2011.

Mr. Alec Chirwa, former ZCTU Secretary General and also former Permanent Secretary, Lusaka, Friday, 17th May 2013.

Mr. Leonard Hikaumba, ZCTU President, Lusaka, Friday, 24th May 2013.

Dr. Sketchley Sacika, Labour Commissioner, 1973-1976 and Secretary to the Cabinet, 1990-1992, interviewed Lusaka, 27th April 2015.

PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES

Government Publications

Northern Rhodesia Government, *Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Ordinance, 1948*. Lusaka. Government Printer, 1949.

Northern Rhodesia Government, *Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance 1949*. Lusaka. Government Printer, 1950.

Northern Rhodesia Government, *Industrial Conciliation Ordinance 1949*. Lusaka. Government Printer, 1950.

Northern Rhodesia Government *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Unrest on the Copperbelt, July – August 1963*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1963.

Northern Rhodesia Hansard No. 108, *Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the First Session (Resumed) of the Twelfth Legislative Council, 18th June – 23rd August 1963*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1963.

Northern Rhodesia Labour and Mines Department Annual Reports of the Department of Labour, 1942-1963. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1943-1964.

Northern Rhodesia Labour and Mines Department Labour Monthly Reports of the Department of Labour, 1950-1963. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1951-1964.

Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Labour and Mines (Later Ministry of Labour and Social Services, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and Ministry of Labour and Social Security) *Annual Reports of the Department of Labour, 1964-1993*.

Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Labour and Mines *Monthly Labour Reports of the Department of Labour, 1964-1972*.

Republic of Zambia, *Official Verbatim Reports of the Parliamentary Debates (National Assembly), 1964-2004*.

Government of Zambia, Statutory Instrument No. 358 of 1965, *The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (Laws, Volume II, Cap 25), The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (Amendment) Rules, 1965*, 9th November 1965.

Government of Zambia, Statutory Instrument No. 363 of 1965, *Appointment of Office Bearers of the Executive Committee of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions*, 12th November 1965.

Government of Zambia, Statutory Instrument No. 364 of 1965, *Dissolution of Federation of Trade Unions*, 12th November 1965.

Republic of Zambia, *Manpower Report, A Report and Statistical Handbook on Manpower, Education, Training and Zambianisation 1965-6*. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966.

Republic of Zambia, *Addresses at the Installation of His Excellency the President as First Chancellor of the University of Zambia, 12th & 13th July 1966*. Lusaka: Zambia Information Service & The Government Printer, 1966. (Installation Address by His Excellency the President, Dr. K.D. Kaunda as Chancellor of the University of Zambia.)

Republic of Zambia, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Mining Industry 1966, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Roland Brown (The Brown Report 1966)*. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966.

Government Paper No. 1 of 1966, Republic of Zambia *Ministry of Labour and Social Development, Government Paper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Mining Industry (The Brown Report 1966)*. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966.

Republic of Zambia, *Report of the Commission Appointed to Review the Grading Structure of the Civil Service, the Salary Scales of the Civil Service, the Teaching Service, the Zambia Police and the Prisons Service, the Salary Scales and Wages of Non-Civil Service (Industrial) Employees of the Government and the Pay Scales and Conditions of Service of the Zambia Defence Forces*. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966.

Republic of Zambia, *First National Development Plan 1966-1970*. Lusaka: Office of National Development and Planning, July 1966.

Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 273 of 1966 (Act No. 29 of 1966), Employment (Special Provisions) Regulations, 1966*.

Republic of Zambia, *National Convention on the Four-Year Development Plan*, Kitwe, 11th to 15th January 1967. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1967.

Government of Zambia, *Livingstone Labour Conference: "A Survey of Industrial Relations in Zambia"*, Ministry of Labour, Zambia. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1967.

Republic of Zambia, *Zambia's Economic Revolution: Address by His Excellency The President Dr. K.D. Kaunda at Mulungushi, 19th April 1968*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1968.

Republic of Zambia, *Zambia's Guideline for the Next Decade, His Excellency The President, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, Addressing the National Council of the United National Independence Party at Mulungushi, 9th November 1968*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1968.

Republic of Zambia, Development Division, Office of the Vice-President, *Zambia Manpower 1969*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1969.

Government Gazette No. 635 of Tuesday, 28th July 1970, giving notice of appointment of the Board of Inquiry chaired by Hosea Soko to inquire into causes of the teachers' strike.

Government Gazette No. 642 of Friday, 14th August 1970. Gazette Notice No. 1531 of 1970. The Preservation of Public Security Regulations (Laws, Volume IX, Cap 265). *Notification of Detention Orders*. Lusaka, 12 the August 1970.

Government of Zambia, *Employment Act, 1968* (Chapter 268 of the Laws of Zambia).

Government of Zambia, *Industrial Relations Act No. 36 of 1971*.

Republic of Zambia, *Budget Address by the Minister of Finance, The Honourable J.M. Mwanakatwe, M.P. Minister of Finance, delivered to the National Assembly on the 26th January 1973*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1973.

Republic of Zambia, *Mid-Term Review of the Second National Development Plan (Performance of the Zambian Economy 1972-1974)*. Lusaka: Ministry of Planning and Finance, Development Planning Division, December 1974.

Republic of Zambia, *Budget Address by the Minister of Planning and Finance, the Honourable A.B. Chikwanda, M.P., delivered to the National Assembly on the 25th January 1974*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1974.

Republic of Zambia, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Salaries, Salary Structures and Conditions of Service of the Zambia Public and Teaching Services, the Zambia Police Force and Prisons Service, the Defence Forces and the Staffs of Local Authorities, Including Casual and Daily-Paid Employees and of Personnel Employed by Statutory Boards and Corporations and by Companies in which the State has a Majority or Controlling Interest (the Mwanakatwe Salaries Commission), Volume One: The Public Service and the Parastatal Sector*, 1975.

Government Paper No. 1 of 1975, Republic of Zambia, *Summary of the main recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into the Salaries, Salary Structures and Conditions of Service, together with the Party and Government Reactions to the Recommendations, Volume One, The Public Services and the Parastatal Sector*, 1975. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1975.

Republic of Zambia, Office of the Prime Minister, Department of Industrial and Participatory Democracy, *Report and Recommendations of the Symposium on Industrial Participatory Democracy in Zambia* held at the President's Citizenship College, Mulungushi, Kabwe, 12th to 22nd July 1976. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1977.

Republic of Zambia, *Third National Development Plan 1979-1983*. Lusaka: Office of the President, National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP), October 1979.

Republic of Zambia, *The Local Administration Act of 1980*. Lusaka. Government Printer, 1980.

Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session (Resumed) of the Fourth National Assembly, 29th July – 22nd August 1980.

Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session (Resumed) of the Fourth National Assembly, 25th – 5th December 1980.

Republic of Zambia, *Government Gazette Acts: Index to Supplements Containing Acts for the Year 1980 for Gazette Volume XVI January – December 1980*. Supplement to the Republic of Zambia Government Gazette, 29th December 1980, pp. 95-132.

Republic of Zambia, *Third National Development Plan, Annual Plan 1982*, Office of the President, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka. Lusaka: The Government: Printer, 1982.

Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates of the First Session (Resumed) of the Fifth National Assembly, 24th January – 23rd March 1984.

Republic of Zambia, *Report of the Third National Convention on the State of the Economy, Lusaka, 23rd – 25th July 1984*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1984.

Republic of Zambia, *Economic Report 1984*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1984.

Republic of Zambia, *Country Profile, Zambia 1984*, Central Statistical Office, Lusaka, 1984.

Republic of Zambia, *His Excellency The President's Address to Parliament on the Opening of the Second Session of the Fifth National Assembly, 11th January 1985*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1985.

Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session of the Fifth National Assembly, 11th January – 29th March 1985.

Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 1985*, The Industrial Relations Act (Laws, Volume X, Cap. 517). The Trade Unions (Deductions of Subscriptions) Regulations, 1985. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1985.

Government of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 35 of 1985*, The Preservation of Public Security Regulations. The Preservation of Public Security (Necessary Services) (Declaration) Order, 1985. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1985.

Republic of Zambia, *Gazette Notice No. 273 of 1985*. The Preservation of Public Security Act (Laws, Volume III, Cap. 106).The Preservation of Public Security Regulations (Page 30), Order under Regulation 37. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1985.

Republic of Zambia, Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, *Report on the Provincial Workshop on Workers' Participation in Decision-Making in Zambia*, held from 15th to 17th May 1985 at Chipata Teachers' Training College, Chipata. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1985.

Republic of Zambia, *Report on the Seminar on Workers' Participation at Board Level held at Zambia Motel, Livingstone, from 18th to 20th August 1986*. Lusaka: Ministry of Labour and Social Services, Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, Lusaka, 1986.

Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates of the Third Session of the Fifth National Assembly, 17th January – 27th March 1986.

Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates of the Fourth Session of the Fifth National Assembly, 16th January – 2nd April 1987.

Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme (Progress Report No. 1 on the Implementation of the Interim National Development Plan)*, October 1987. Lusaka: National Commission for Development Planning, 1987.

Republic of Zambia, Office of the President, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, *Economic Report 1987*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1988.

Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme, Interim National Development Plan, July 1987 - December 1988*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1988.

Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme, Interim National Development Plan, Progress Report No. 2, July 1987- March 1988* Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1988.

Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme, Fourth National Development Plan 1989-1993, Volume I and Volume II*, Office of the President, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, January 1989.

Government of Zambia, *Industrial Relations Act of 1990*.

Republic of Zambia, *Progress Report on the Implementation of Economic Measures*, Consultative Group for Zambia, April 1990.

Republic of Zambia, Office of the President, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, *Economic Report 1990*.

Republic of Zambia, *Country Profile: Zambia 1989/1990*, Central Statistical Office, Lusaka, December 1990.

Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme, Economic and Financial Policy Framework, 1991-1993*, Ministry of Finance and National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, April 1991.

Republic of Zambia, *New Economic Recovery Programme, Economic and Financial Policy Framework, 1992-1994*, Ministry of Finance, March 1992. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1992.

Republic of Zambia, *Public Investment Programme 1992-95*. Office of the President, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, March 1992. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1992.

Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session of the Seventh National Assembly, 15th January – 18th March 1993.

Republic of Zambia, *Economic Report 1992*, Office of the President, National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP), Lusaka, January 1993. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1993.

Republic of Zambia, *Economic Review January – June 1993*, Office of the President, Planning & Development Co-operation, Lusaka, September 1993. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1993.

Republic of Zambia, *Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993* (Chapter 269 of the Laws of Zambia).

Republic of Zambia, *Statutory Instrument No. 110 of 1993, Appointment of a Commission of Inquiry to Inquire into and report on matters relating to Salaries, Salary Structures and Conditions of Service of the Zambian Public and Teaching Services*, 10th August 1993. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1993.

Republic of Zambia, *Social Dimension Adjustment, Priority Survey I, 1991, Report*. Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, 1993.

Republic of Zambia, *Economic Report 1992*, Office of the President, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, January 1993. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1993.

Republic of Zambia, *Economic Review January – June 1993*, Office of the President, Planning and Development Co-operation, Lusaka, September 1993. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1993.

Republic of Zambia, *Zambia: Implementation of Economic Recovery Programme; Efforts and Policies of the Government of Zambia – Report presented to the meeting of the Consultative Group for Zambia, Convened for 6th-7th April 1993*, Office of the President, Government of Zambia, Lusaka, 5th March 1993. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1993.

Republic of Zambia, *The Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP), Volume I – Main Report, Volume II – Detailed Review of the Public Service Reform Programme Launch Meeting held on 2nd – 4th November 1993 at the Inter-Continental Hotel in Lusaka, Zambia, Cabinet Office, November 1993*.

Republic of Zambia, *Policy Framework Paper, 1995-98*, Prepared by the Zambian Government in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 29th November 1995.

Government of Zambia, *Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1997*.

Republic of Zambia, *Speech on the Official Opening of the Second Session of the Eighth National Assembly by the President Mr. Frederick J.T. Chiluba on 16th January 1998, Lusaka*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1998.

Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office, *Living Conditions in Zambia – 1998*. Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1998.

Republic of Zambia, *Report of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour for the Third Session of the Eighth National Assembly*, appointed on 3rd February 1999. Lusaka: National Assembly of Zambia, 1999.

Republic of Zambia, *Economic Report 1999*, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Lusaka, January 2000.

Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office, *Quarterly Employment and Earnings Survey Report*. Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, June 2000.

Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office, *Selected Socio-Economic Indicators 2000*. Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, June 2001.

Republic of Zambia, *Public Investment Programme, 2001-2003, Volume I: Sector Summaries and Investment Strategies*, Ministry of Finance and National Planning and Economic Management Department, Lusaka. Lusaka: Mipal Printers, 2002.

Republic of Zambia, *Economic Report 2001*, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Lusaka, February 2002.

Republic of Zambia, *Zambia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002-2004*, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Planning and Economic Management Department, Lusaka, May 2002.

Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, International Labour Organisation, *Core Conventions Ratified by Zambia: An Assessment of their Implications on Poverty Reduction*, Own Mgemezulu and Caroline Moyo. Lusaka, October 2003.

Economic Policies for growth, employment and poverty reduction: Case Study of Zambia, Centre for Development Policy Research, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Ndola: Mission Press, 2007.

Government of Zambia, *Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 2008*.

Bank of Zambia Reports

Bank of Zambia, *Report and statement of accounts for the year ended 31st December 1976*.

Bank of Zambia, *Report and statement of accounts for the year ended December 31st 1978*. Lusaka: Associated Press Ltd., 1979.

Bank of Zambia: *Financial Report*, February 1983. Ndola: Printpak, 1983.

Bank of Zambia, *Quarterly Financial and Statistical Review*, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1983.

Bank of Zambia, *Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year ended December 31, 1987*.

Bank of Zambia, *Report and statement of accounts for the year ended December 31st 1987*.

Bank of Zambia *Annual Report for 2000*.

Bank of Zambia *Annual Report for 2001*.

Bank of Zambia *Annual Report for 2010*.

Bank of Zambia *Annual Report for 2012*.

International Labour Office – United Nations Development Programme Technical Assistance Sector, *Report to the Government of Zambia on Incomes, Wages and Prices in Zambia: Policy and Machinery*, International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 1969. Cabinet Office, Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1969.

World Bank – *ZAMBIA: Industrial Policy and Performance, August 1984*, Document of the World Bank.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Northern News

Times of Zambia

Sunday Times of Zambia

Central African Mail

Zambia Daily Mail

Sunday Mail

Africa Confidential

Daily Express

The Evening Standard

Africa South & East

Weekly Post/The Post

National Mirror

Africa Contemporary Record

Monographs

Fraser, Alastair & John Lungu, *For Whom the Windfalls? Winners and losers in the privatisation of Zambia's copper mines*. N.D but around 2006.

Simson, Howard, *Zambia: a country study*. Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1985.

Van der Heijden, Hendrik, *The Ineffectiveness of Economic Policy Reform, Foreign Aid and External Debt Relief in Zambia, June 2000*.

Other

A Profile of the Zambian Economy, United Nations Development Programme, 1976.

Country Profile: Zambia 1988-89. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988.

The Zambia Independent Monitoring Team: *A Fair Play for a better tomorrow – Election Report 1991* (ZIMT, January 1992.)

Zambia: Human Development Report 1998. Lusaka: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), December 1998.

Zambia: Human Development Report 1999/2000: Employment and Sustainable Livelihoods, United Nations Development Programme, Lusaka, 2001.

Zambia: 1991 Child Labour Survey, Country Report. International Labour Organisation, International Programme for Elimination of Child Labour/Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office, 1999.

United National Independence Party – *UNIP President Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda, Speech to the United National Independence Party Extra-ordinary Congress held on May 9th and May 13th 2000 at the Zambia International Trade fair Grounds, Ndola*.

PUBLISHED SECONDARY SOURCES: BOOKS AND ARTICLES

BOOKS

Akwetey, Emmanuel, *Trade Unions and Democratisation: A Comparative Study of Zambia and Ghana*. Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Politics 50, Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm, 1994.

Ananaba, Wogu, *The Trade Union Movement in Nigeria*. New York: African Publishing Corporation, 1969.

-----, *The Trade Union Movement in Africa*. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1979.

Arrighi, G. & J. Saul (eds.), *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.

Baldwin, R.E., *Economic Development and Export Growth: A study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960*. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966.

Barber, W.J., *The Economy of British Central Africa: A case study of economic development in a dualistic society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.

Bates, R.H., *Unions, Parties and Political Development: a case of mineworkers in Zambia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

Berger, E.L., *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule: the Copperbelt from 1924 to Independence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Bowen, Walter, *Colonial Trade Unions*. London: Fabian Publications Ltd., 1954.

Bratton, Michael & Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Butler, L.J., *Copper Empire: Mining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia, c. 1930-64*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Burawoy, Michael, *The Colour of Class in the Copper Mines: From African Advancement to Zambianization*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972.

Chabal, Patrick (ed.), *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Chipungu, Samuel N., (ed.), *Guardians in Their Time: Experiences of Zambians under colonial rule, 1890-1964*. London & Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1992.

Chondoka, Yizenge A., *Machona: returned labour migrants and rural transformation in Chama District, North-Eastern Zambia, 1890-1964*. Lusaka: Academic Press, 2007.

Christie, Sarah & Lovemore Madhuku (eds.), *Labour dispute resolution in Southern Africa*. Cape Town: Creda Press, 1996.

Cooper, Frederick, *Decolonization and African Society: The labour question in French and British Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Daniel, P., *Africanisation, Nationalisation and Inequality: Mining Labour and the Copperbelt in Zambian Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Davies, I., *African Trade Unions*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966.

Epstein, A.L., *Politics in an urban African Community*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958, reprinted 1973.

Ferguson, James, *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt*. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1999.

Fisher William F. & Thomas Ponniah (eds.), *Another World is Possible: Popular Alternatives to Globalization at the World Social Forum*. London & New York: Zed Books, 2004.

Freund, Bill, *The African Worker*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Friedland, W.H., *Vuta Kamba: The Development of Trade Unions in Tanganyika*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969.

Gann, L.H., *A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1964.

-----, *A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1965.

Gould, Jeremy, *Luapula: Dependence or Development?* Lusaka/Uppsala: Zambia Geographical Association & Finnish Society for Development Studies, 1989.

Grillo, Ralph, *Race, Class and Militancy: An African Trade Union, 1939-45*. 1974.

Gutkind, P.C.W., R. Cohen and J. Copans (eds.), *African Labour History*. Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1978.

Hall, Richard, *Zambia 1890-1964: The Colonial Period*. London: Longman, 1976.

Hobsbawm, E.J., *Labouring Men: Studies in the history of Labour*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964.

Hodgkin, T., *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*. London: Muller, 1956.

Horton, Susan, Ravi Kanbur & Dipak Mazumdar (eds.), *Labour Markets in an Era of Adjustment. Volume 1: Issue Papers. Volume 2: Case Studies*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994.

Hyman, Richard, *Strikes*. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1972, 1975.

Ihonvbere, Julius O., *Economic Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization: The case of Zambia*. Trenton, NJ & Asmara: Africa World Press, 1996.

Kamwambe, Ngobola, *Frederick Chiluba: Is he riding a tide of fortune?* Lusaka: Shelley's Printers, 1991.

Karsh, Bernard, *Diary of a Strike*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958.

Khor, Martin, *Rethinking Globalization: Critical Issues and Policy Choices*. London & New York, 2004.

Larmer, Miles, *Mineworkers in Zambia: Labour and Political Change in Post-Colonial Africa*. London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2007.

Lynd, G.E., *The Politics of African Trade Unionism*. New York: Praeger, 1968.

MacGillivray, Alex, *A Brief History of Globalization: The Untold Story of our incredible shrinking planet*. London: Robinson, 2006.

Macmillan, Hugh, *An African Trading Empire: The Story of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, 1901-2005*. London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005.

Mandaza, Ibbo (ed.), *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986*. Dakar: Codesria, 1986.

Meebelo, Henry S., *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism: The Origins, Growth and Struggles of the Zambian Labour Movement to 1964*. Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, 1986.

Merle-Davis, J., *Modern Industry and the African*. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1967.

Meynaud, J. and A. Salah-Bey (eds.), *Trade Unionism in Africa*. London: Methuen, 1967.

Mtopa, Arnold M., *Labour Laws of Zambia*. Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, 1989.

Mulford, David C., *Zambia: The Politics of Independence 1957-1964*. London: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Mwendapole, M.R., *A History of the Trade Union Movement in Zambia up to 1968*. Lusaka: University of Zambia, Institute of African Studies, Communication No. 13, 1972.

Ollawa, Patrick E., *Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy of National Development*. Devon: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1979.

Parpart, Jane L., *Labour and Capital on the African Copperbelt*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983.

Peet, Richard, *Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO*. London & New York: Zed Books, 2003 & 2005.

Perrings, C., *Black Mineworkers in Central Africa*. London: Heinemann, 1979.

Phelps Brown, E.H., *The Growth of British Industrial Relations: A Study from the standpoint of 1906-14*. London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1965.

Phimister, Ian & Charles van Onselen (eds.), *Studies in the History of Mine Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe*. Salisbury: Mambo Press, 1978.

Raftopoulos, Brian & Ian Phimister (eds.), *Keep on Knocking: History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe 1900-1997*. Harare: Baobab Books, 1997.

Raftopoulos, Brian & Lloyd Sachikonye, *Striking back: The labour Movement and the Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe 1980-2000*. Harare: Weaver Press, 2001.

Rakner, Lise, *Trade Unions in the Process of Democratization: A Study of Party-Labour Relations in Zambia*. Bergen: Christian Michelson Institute, 1992.

Rakner, Lise, *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001*. Stockholm: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2003.

Roberts, Andrew D., *A History of Zambia*. London: Heinemann, 1976.

Roberts, B.C., *Labour in the Tropical Territories of the Commonwealth*. London, 1964.

Rotberg, Robert I., *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*. Cambridge: Massachusetts, 1966.

Sachikonye, Lloyd, (ed.), *Democracy, Civil Society and the State: Social Movements in Southern Africa*. Harare: Sapes Books, 1995.

Sandbrook, Richard, *Proletarians and African Capitalism: The Kenyan Case 1960-1972*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Sandbrook, R. and R. Cohen (eds.), *The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action*. London: Longman, 1975.

Simpson, Bill, *Labour: The Unions and the Party: A Study of the Trade Unions and the British Labour Movement*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973.

Singh, M., *History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement to 1952*. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969.

Smock, D.R., *Conflict and Control in an African Trade Union*. Palo Alto, 1969.

Stichter, Sharon, *Migrant Labour in Kenya: Capitalism and African Response*. Harlow, 1982.

Thomas, Henk, (ed.), *Globalization and Third World Trade Unions: The Challenge of Rapid Economic Change*. London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995.

Thompson, E.P., *The Making of the English Working Class*. London: Victor Gollancz, 1965.

Tordoff, William, *Government and Politics in Africa*, Third Edition. London: Macmillan, 1997.

Turok, Ben (ed.), *Development in Zambia*. London: Zed Press, 1979.

Turok, Ben (ed.), *Mixed Economy in Focus: Zambia*. London: Institute for African Alternatives, 1989.

Van Onselen, C., *Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933*. London: Pluto Press, 1976.

-----, *Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914*.
Vol. 1: *New Babylon*. Vol. 2: *New Nineveh*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1982.

Vickery, Kenneth P., *Black and White in Southern Zambia: The Tonga Plateau Economy and British Imperialism, 1890-1939*. New York/Westport, Connecticut/London: Greenwood Press, 1986.

Watson, W., *Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958.

Webb, S. and B. (eds.), *The History of Trade Unionism*. London: Longman, 1920.

Wilson, Godfrey, *An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia*. 1941.

Wilson, Godfrey & Monica Wilson, *The Analysis of Social Change*. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1945.

Woddis, J., *Africa: The Roots of Revolt*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1960.

-----, *Africa: The Lion Awakes*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1961.

SECONDARY SOURCES: ARTICLES

Allen, V.L., "The Study of Trade Unionism", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1969), pp. 289-307.

Babeiya, Edwin, "Trade Unions and Democratisation in Tanzania: End of an Era?" *Journal of Politics and Law*, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2011, pp. 123-131.

Baldwin, R.E., "Wage Policy in a Dual Economy – The Case of Northern Rhodesia," *RACE*, Vol. IV (November 1962), No. 1, pp. 73-87.

Baylies, Carolyn & Morris Szeftel, "The Rise of a Zambian Capitalist Class in the 1970s", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 8 (2), 1982, pp. 187-213.

-----, "The 1996 Zambian Elections: Still Awaiting Democratic Consolidation", *Review of African Political Economy*, 24 (71), 1997, pp. 113-28.

Bigsten, Arne & Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa, "The Political Economy of Policy Failures in Zambia," Working Papers in Economics No. 23, May 2000, Department of Economics, Goteborg University. (Swopec.hhs.se/gunwpe/papers/gunwpe0023.pdf. Accessed on 21/10/12).

Bjornlund, Eric Michael Bratton & Clark Gibson, "Observing Multiparty Elections in Africa: Lessons from Zambia", *African Affairs*, 1992, pp. 405-431.

Burawoy, Michael, "The Colour of Class Revisited: Four Decades of Postcolonialism in Zambia," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 40, No. 5, (2014), pp. 961-979

Burdette, Marcia, "Democracy vs. economic liberalization: The Zambian dilemma", *Southern African Report*, Vol. 8, No. 1, July 1992, pp. 1-7. (<http://www.africafiles.org>). (Accessed on 09/02/2011).

-----, "Nationalisation in Zambia: A Critique of Bargaining Theory," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1977), pp. 471-496.

-----, "The Mines, Class Power, and Foreign Policy in Zambia," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1984), pp. 198-218.

Cartwright, John, "Some Constraints upon African Political Leadership," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1977), pp. 435-453.

Cohen, Robin, "Resistance and Hidden Forms of Resistance Amongst African Workers," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 19 (September-December 1980), pp. 8-22.

Dzimhiri, Lewis B., "The State and Labour Control in Malawi: Continuities and Discontinuities Between One-Party and Multiparty Systems," *Africa Development*, Vol. XXX, No. 4, 2005, pp.53-85.

Eriksen, Karen & Kren Eriksen, "Zambia: Class Formation and Detente," *Review of Political Economy*, No. 9, Southern Africa (May-August 1977), pp. 4-26.

Freund, Bill, "Labour and Labour History in Africa: A Review of the Literature", *African Studies Review*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 1-58.

Friedland, W.H., "African Trade Unions Studies: Analysis of Two Decades", *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, 55, Vol. XIV – 3, MCMLXXIV (1974), pp. 575-593.

Goldsmith, Arthur A., "Donors, Dictators and Democrats in Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (September 2001), pp. 411-436.

Goodman, Stephen H., "Trade Unions and Political Parties: The Case of East Africa", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 17, No. 3, April 1969, pp. 338-345.

Henderson, Ian, "Wage-earners and political protest in Colonial Africa," *African Affairs*, 72, Issue 288 (1973), pp. 288-299.

-----, "Early African Leadership: The Copperbelt Disturbances of 1935 and 1940," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2, 1 (October 1975), pp. 83-97.

Hinchliffe, K., "Labour Aristocracy – Northern Nigeria Case Study," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 12, 1 (1974), pp. 57-67.

Hinton, J., "The Labour Aristocracy: a review," *New Left Review*, 32 (1965), pp. 72-77.

Hawkins, Jeffrey, "Understanding the Failure of IMF Reform: The Zambian case", *World Development*, 19 (7), 1991, pp. 839-49.

Hobsbawm, E.J., "Lenin and the 'Aristocracy of Labour'," *Marxism Today*, (July 1970), pp. 207-210.

-----, "Artisans or Labour Aristocracy?" *Economic History Review*, 37, 3 (August 1984), pp. 355-372.

Hodges, Geoffrey, "Zambia: Opening the gates and Tightening the Belts," *Review of African Political Economy*, Mining (May-August 1978), pp. 87-98.

Hyman, Richard, "Third World Strikes in International Perspective", *Development and Change*, Vol. 10 (1979), pp. 321-37.

Ihonvbere, Julius O., "From Movement to Government: The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1995), pp. 1-25.

Ingle, Mark, "Unbalanced growth and dependency theory in Zambia: A post-independence survey," *African Journal of Business Management*, Vol. 6 (16), 25th April 2012, pp. 5467-5471. (<http://www.academicjournals.org/AJBM>. Accessed on 21/10/12).

Jeffries, R., "The Labour Aristocracy? Ghana Case Study," *Review of African Political Economy*, 3 (1975), pp. 59-70.

Jolly, Richard, "The Seers Report in Retrospect", *African Social Research*, No. 11 (June 1971), pp. 1-26.

Joseph, Richard, "Zambia: A Model for Democratic Change", *Current History*, 91 (565), 1992, pp. 199-201.

Kanduza, Ackson M., "Teachers' Strike, 1970: A Chapter in Zambia's Labour History", *Hs – SH*, Vol. XIV, No. 28 (November 1981), pp. 485-506.

Kaniki, M.H.Y., "Wage Labour and the Political Economy of Colonial Violence," *African Social Research*, No. 31, (June 1981), pp. 1-26.

Kraus, Jon, "Strikes and Labour Power in Ghana", *Development and Change*, Vol. 10 (1979), pp. 259-86.

Larmer, Miles, "Reaction & Resistance to Neo-Liberalism in Zambia", *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 32, No. 103, (March 2005), pp. 29-45.

Lee, Ching Kwan, "Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa's Chinese Enclaves," *The China Quarterly*, 199, September 2009, pp. 647-666.

Lomas, P.K., "African Trade Unionism on the Copperbelt", *South African Journal of Economics*, XXVI, 2 (June 1958).

Maree, Johann, "The Role of Trade Unions in Sub-Saharan Africa in Defending and Promoting Democracy," Unpublished paper, University of Cape Town, July 2012. (Accessed on 21/10/12).

Momba, Jotham & Clever Madimutsa, "The Evolution and Development of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in Zambia," SAIIA Occasional Paper No. 17, Political Party Systems in Africa Project, April 2009, pp. 1-23.

Money, Duncan, "The World of European Labour on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, 1940-1945," *IRSH* 60 (2015), pp. 225-255.

-----, "Trouble in paradise: The 1958 white mineworkers' strike on the Zambian Copperbelt, *Extr. Ind. Soc.* (2017), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.07.005>. (Accessed on 10/11/17).

Moorsom, R., "Underdevelopment, Contract Labour and Worker Consciousness in Namibia," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 4, 1 October 1977), pp. 52-87.

Orr, Charles A., "Trade Unionism in Colonial Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. IV, 1 (1966).

Parpart, Jane L., "The Labour Aristocracy Debate in Africa: The Copperbelt case, 1924-1967," *African Economic History*, 13 (1984), pp. 171-191.

-----, "The Household and the Mine Shaft: Gender and Class Struggles on the Zambian Copperbelt, 1926-64," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Oct., 1986), pp. 36-56.

Perrings, Charles, "Consciousness, Conflict and Proletarianization: An Assessment of the 1935 Mineworkers' Strike on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Special Issue on Protest and Resistance (Oct., 1977), pp. 31-51.

-----, "A moment in the 'Proletarianization' of the new middle class: race, value and division of labour in the Copperbelt, 1946-1966," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 6, 2 (April 1980), pp. 183-213.

-----, "Premise and Inference in Labour Studies: A Zambian Example," *African Affairs*, 81, 322 (1982), pp. 94-96.

Phimister, Ian R., "The Shamva Mine Strike of 1927: An Emerging African Proletariat," *Rhodesian History*, Vol. 2 (1971), pp. 65-88.

-----, "Corporate Profit and Race in Central African Copper Mining, 1946-1958," *Business History Review*, Vol. 85 (Winter 2011), pp. 749-774.

Rakner, Lise, "The Pluralistic Paradox: The Decline of Economic Interest Groups in Zambia in the 1990s", *Development and Change*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (June 2001), pp. 521-543.

Rakner, Lise & Lars Svasand, "Multiparty elections in Africa's new democracies," Report R 2002: 7, Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights, 2002, pp. 1-34.

Read, Margaret, "Migrant Labour in Africa and Its Effects on Tribal Life", *International Labour Review*, 14, 1942, pp. 605-31.

Sandbrook, Richard, "The Political Potential of African Urban Workers," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1977), pp. 411-433.

Scott, Ian, "Middle Class Politics in Zambia", *African Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 308, July 1978, pp. 321-334.

Shivji, Issa G., "Working Class Struggles and Organisation in Tanzania 1939-1975," *Mawazo*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (December 1983).

Simutanyi, Neo, "Copper mining in Zambia: The developmental legacy of privatisation", *ISS Paper* 165, July 2008, pp. 1-12.

Southall, Tony, "Zambia: Class Formation and Government Policy in the 1970s," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 Special Issue on Contemporary Politics (October 1980), pp. 91-108.

-----, "Zambia: Class Formation and Detente: A Comment," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 12, Mining (May-August 1978), pp. 114-119.

Sutcliffe, Joe, "Abjection and Resistance on the Zambian Copperbelt," www.e-ir.info/2012/03/29/abjection-and-resistance-on-the-zambian-copperbelt. (Accessed on 09/11/17).

Taft, Philip, "A Rereading of Selig Perlman's 'A Theory of the Labor Movement'," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Oct., 1950), pp. 70-77.

Van Donge, Jan Kees, "The Plundering of Zambian Resources by Frederick Chiluba and his friends: A Case Study of the Interaction between national politics and the international drive towards good governance", *African Affairs*, 108/430, (2008), pp. 69-90.

Van Onselen, C., "Black Workers in Central African Industry: Critical Essay on the Historiography and Sociology of Rhodesia," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1, 2 (April 1975), pp. 228-246.

Vickery, Kenneth P., "The Rhodesia Railways African Strike of 1945, Part I: A Narrative Account," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 545-560.

-----, "The Rhodesia Railways African Strike of 1945, Part II: Cause, Consequence, Significance," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1999), pp. 49-71.

Waterman, P., "Towards an Understanding of African Trade Unionism," *Presence Africaine*, 76 (1970), pp. 96-112.

Welensky, R., "Africans and Trade Unions in Northern Rhodesia," *African Affairs*, 45, 181 (October 1946), pp. 185-191.

Zeitlin, Jonathan, "From labour history to the history of industrial relations," *Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May 1987), pp. 159-184.

CHAPTERS IN EDITED BOOKS

Arrighi, Giovanni, "Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia" in Arrighi & John Saul (eds.), *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York, 1973).

Berg, Elliot & Jeffrey Butler, "Trade Unions" in James S. Coleman & Carl G. Rosberg, Jr, *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley & California: University of California Press, 1970, pp. 340-81.

Chipungu, Samuel N., "Accumulation from within: the Boma class and the Native Treasury in colonial Zambia" in Samuel N. Chipungu, (ed.), *Guardians in Their Time: Experiences of Zambians under colonial rule, 1890-1964* (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1992), pp. 74-96.

Drake, St. Clair & Leslie Alexander Lacy, "Government versus the Unions: The Sekondi-Takoradi Strike, 1961" in Gwendolyn M. Carter (ed.), *Politics in Africa* (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1966), pp. 67-118.

Gupta, Anirudha, "Trade Unionism and Politics on the Copperbelt" in William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974, pp. 288-319.

Iiffe, John, "Wage Labour and Urbanisation" in M.H.Y. Kaniki (ed.), *Tanzania under colonial Rule*. Harlow, 1980.

Mihyo, Pascal, "Against Overwhelming Odds: The Zambian Trade Union Movement" in Henk Thomas, (ed.), *Globalisation and Third World Trade Unions: The Challenge of Rapid Economic Change*. London: Zed Books, 1995, pp. 3-27.

Peace, A., "The Lagos Proletariat: Labour Aristocrats or Populist Militants?" in Sandbrook & Cohen (eds.), *The Development of an African Working Class*, pp. 282-302.

Phimister, I. & Charles van Onselen, "African Worker Consciousness: Origins and Aspects to 1953" in Phimister, I.R. & C. van Onselen (eds.), *Studies in the History of African Mine Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe*, pp. 23-40.

Raftopoulos, Brian, "Human Resource Development and the Problem of Labour Utilisation" in Mandaza, (ed.), *Zimbabwe*, pp. 275-317.

Reddy, D. Narasimba, "Economic Globalization, Past and Present: The Challenges to Labour" in K.S. Jomo & Khoo Khay Jin (eds.), *Globalization and its Discontents, Revisited*. (New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2003. Pp. 37-59.

Sachikonye, Lloyd M., "State, Capital and Trade Unions" in Mandaza, (ed.), *Zimbabwe*, pp. 243-73.

Saul, J.S., "The Labour Aristocracy Thesis Reconsidered" in Sandbrook & Cohen (eds.), *The Development of an African Working Class*, pp. 303-310.

Schiphorst, Freek, "The Emergence of Civil Society: The New Place of Unions in Zimbabwe" in Henk Thomas, (ed.), *Globalization and Third World Trade Unions*, pp. 215-232.

Seleti, Yona Ngalaba, "Entrepreneurship in colonial Zambia" in Chipungu (ed.), *Guardians in Their Time*, pp. 147-179.

Stichter, Sharon, "Trade Unionism in Kenya, 1947-1952: The Militant Phase" in Gutkind, P.C.W., et al, *African Labour History*, pp. 155-174.

Thomas, Henk, "The Erosion of Trade Unions" in Henk Thomas, (ed.), *Globalization and Third World Trade Unions*, pp. 201-14.

Turner, A.A., "The Growth of Railway Unionism in the Rhodesias, 1944-1955" in Sandbrook and Cohen (eds.), *The Development of an African Working Class*, pp. 73-98.

Van Donge, Jan Kees, "Zambia: Kaunda and Chiluba: Enduring patterns of political culture", in John A. Wiseman (ed.), *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London & New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 193-219.

Van Onselen C., "The 'Labour Aristocracy' in Africa: Introduction to an Unfinished Controversy" in Cohen, D.L. and J. Daniel (eds.), *Political Economy of Africa: Selected Readings*. Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1981.

Van Onselen C., "Worker Consciousness in Black Miners: Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1920" in Phimister and van Onselen (eds.), *Studies in the History of African Mine Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe*, pp. 1-22.

UNPUBLISHED THESES AND OTHER PAPERS

Adler, G. & E. Webster, "Bargained Liberalisation: The Labour Movement, Policy-Making and Transition in Zambia and South Africa," Unpublished Seminar paper, University of the Witwatersrand, Institute for Advanced Social Research, August 1997.

Beele, Ernest Muketoi, "State, Trade Unions and Labour Policies: Theoretical issues and the evidence from Zambia", Master of Arts in Industrial Relations dissertation, University of Warwick, 1987.

Bova, Elva, "The implications of mine ownership for the management of the boom: a comparative analysis of Zambia and Chile", *NCCR Trade Working Paper* No. 2009/13, April 2009, pp. 1-23.

Chondoka, Yizenge A., "Labour Migration and Rural Transformation in Chama District, North-Eastern Zambia," PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1992.

Chirwa, Alec J., *A Brief History of the Civil Servants and Allied Workers' Union of Zambia*, 2013, Unpublished, pp. 1-34.

DiJohn, Jonathan, "The Political Economy of Taxation and State Resilience in Zambia since 1990", Crisis States Research Centre, Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, Working Paper No. 78, August 2010, pp. 1-25.

Henderson, I., "Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia: A study in the limits of Colonial power", PhD Thesis, Edinburgh, 1972.

Larmer, Miles, "A Class Apart: Mineworkers and Political Change in Zambia, 1964-1991," PhD Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2004.

Liatto, Beatrice B., "Organised Labour and the State in Zambia", PhD Thesis, University of Leeds, 1989.

Lindemann, Stefan, "Inclusive Elite Bargains and Civil War Avoidance: The Case of Zambia", Crisis States Research Centre, Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, Working Paper No. 77, pp. 1-62.

Mijere, Nsolo N.J., "The Mineworkers' Resistance to Governmental Decentralisation in Zambia: National-Building and Labour Aristocracy in the Third World", PhD Thesis, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts, 1985.

Mulenga, Friday E., "The Development of Worker Consciousness Among the African Railway Workers in Zambia 1953-1972," M.A. Dissertation, Lusaka, University of Zambia, 1987.

Musambachime, Mwelwa C., "Development and Growth of the Fishing Industry in Mweru-Luapula 1920-1964", PhD Thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1981.

Phimister, I.R., “History of Mining in Southern Rhodesia to 1953”, PhD Thesis, University of Rhodesia, 1975.

Turner, A.A., “A Socio-Economic History of Kabwe, 1902-1966”, PhD Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1979.

Van Klaveren, Maarten, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams & Nuria Ramos Martin, “An Overview of Women’s Work and Employment in Zambia”, Decisions for Life MDG3 Project Country Report No. 4, University of Amsterdam/Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), September 2009, pp. 1-51.

Zelniker, S., “Changing Patterns of Trade Unionism: The Zambian Case, 1948-1964”, PhD Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970.

INTERNET SOURCES

- <http://uk.oneworld.net/article> - accessed on 07/02/06.
- <http://news.bbc.co.uk> - accessed on 02/07/06
- <http://www.wsws.org> - accessed on 02/07/06
- <http://www.nimd.org> - accessed on 02/07/06
- <http://www.union-network.org> - accessed on 07/02/06
- <http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article> - accessed on 07/02/06
- <http://survey07.ituc-csi.org> - accessed on 14/08/10
- <http://www.minewatchzambia.com> - accessed on 14/02/11
- <http://www.itfglobal.org/transport-international> - accessed on 07/02/12
- <http://www.businesslive.co.za/africa/2012/03/22> - accessed on 27/07/12
- <http://www.parliament.gov> - accessed on 08/02/12

- <http://www.agrnews.org> - accessed on 13/06/12
- <http://www.globalpolicy.org> - accessed on 16/06/12
- <http://www.luse.co.zm> - accessed on 10/08/12
- <http://www.sec.gov.zm> - accessed on 10/08/12
- <http://www.eisa.org.za> - accessed on 01/11/12
- <http://www.washingtonpost.com> - accessed on 23/11/12
- <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletter/zno28html> - accessed on 06/12/12
- <http://www.afrol.com/articles> - accessed on 06/12/12
- <http://derricksinjelazambia2011.blogspot.com/2011/06/reminiscences-of-chiluba-by-tentani.html> - accessed on 18/12/12
- <http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/Zambia3720> - accessed on 29/06/13
- <http://www.afrifocus.org/docs04/zam0406> - accessed on 29/06/13

