

THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

BY
EUNICE MOONO

TOPIC:
REGIONAL AND ETHNIC POLITICS: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF PARTY
POLITICS IN ZAMBIA, 1948 TO 2011.

DECLARATION

I, EUNICE MOONO do hereby declare that this dissertation represents my own work and that it has not been previously submitted for a degree at this or any other University.

SIGNED.....

DATE.....

COPYRIGHT

All rights reserved. No part of this dissertation may be reproduced by any means without prior permission in writing from the author or the University of Zambia.

APPROVAL

This dissertation of Eunice Moono is approved as fulfilling part of the requirements for the award of the degree of Masters of Arts in History at the University of Zambia.

Signed Date

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

ABSTRACT

The post-independence political landscape of Zambia has been characterised by incidences of ethnicity and regionalism in party politics. However, ethnicity has not been the main defining factor in party preferences. Accordingly, there has been an important debate on whether some political parties were perpetuating ethnic politics. This study finds that, like elsewhere in a multiethnic country, the voting pattern in different provinces was not significantly different. Available evidence suggests that candidates usually performed better in the regions where they hailed from. While this was mainly the case in most elections, particularly at the presidential level, some political parties in general and politicians in particular applied the ethnic tag as a strategy of weakening their opponents' political base while at the same time mobilising support for their parties. Under such circumstances, the ethnic label was used as a political resource. This study sought to examine the operations of different political parties in a multiethnic country.

The study also finds that although all political parties may have ethnic elements, some parties were more prone than others. In addition, the study holds that, other than being used as a political resource, other external factors were at play. These included the portrayal of these parties by the media. The media tended to project the ruling parties as being national in character while prominent opposition parties were projected as being ethnic or regional in orientation.

This study concluded that there were other crucial factors in determining party preferences other than ethnicity or regionalism. There was no conclusive evidence that the failure by either the ANC or UPND to ascend to power had been due to their ethnic character but rather the perception and portrayal that they were ethnic parties.

DEDICATION

To my mother Margret Mweembe Moono, a wonderful woman who died before she could witness my achievements and, my father Dickson P. Moono who made me appreciate the value of education.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I owe a debt of gratitude to my husband Calvin Habasonda for his unwavering encouragement, tolerance and support during the period of my research and writing. Special thanks go to my daughters Nangoma and Moono for their encouragement and faith in me. I also wish to extend thanks especially to my course mates who were always available to share my stressful moments. I particularly thank Edina Lungu, Godfrey Kumwenda, Yvonne, Sakwiba Muyunda, Ivy Chimfwembe, Vincent Kayombo, and Nalumino Namwayi for their friendship and academic support. I will be failing in my duty if I do not acknowledge Lecturers in the Department of History for their patience whenever I went to consult. I particularly thank Dr. Wilima Kalusa for his input in my study, for helping me to access documents which were useful to my work.

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Prof. Bizeck J. Phiri for his constructive academic criticism without which my work would not have been achieved. Many thanks are also due to the workers at National Archives of Zambia and UNIP Archives for the assistance rendered to me during my research. My gratitude also goes to all those not specifically mentioned but, whose contributions enriched this study. Above all my thanks go to the Almighty God for giving me good health and the ability to comprehend this tedious work.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
ANIP	African National Independence Party
AZ	Agenda for Zambia
BCP	Basuto Congress Party
ECZ	Electoral Commission of Zambia
FAS	Federation of African Societies
INESOR	Institute of Economic and Social Research
KADU	Kenya African Development Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
LEGCO	Legislative Council
MCC	Member of the Central Committee
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MP	Member of Parliament
NAZ	National Archives of Zambia
NMC	National Management Committee
NP	National Party

NRAC	Northern Rhodesia African Congress
PDC	People's Democratic Party
PF	Patriotic Front
UFP	United Federal Party
ULP	United Liberal Party
UNFP	United National Freedom Party
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UP	United Party
UPND	United Party for National Development
UPP	United Progressive Party
WW1	World War One
WWII	World War Two
ZANC	Zambia Africa National Congress
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZNBC	Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation
ZRP	Zambia Republican Party

TABLE OF CONTENT

Declaration	i
Copyright	ii
Approval	iii
Abstract	iv
Dedication	v
Acknowledgement	vi
Abstract	vii
Abbreviations	viii
Table of Content	ix
CHAPTER ONE	1
Introduction and Historical Background.....	1
Statement of the Problem	4
Rationale	4
Objectives	5
Literature Review.....	5
Methodology.....	12
Dissertation Layout	14
CHAPTER TWO	16
Party Politics and the Nationalist Struggle, 1948-1963	16

Introduction	16
The Split of the African National Congress (ANC)	17
The ANC in the Coalition Government, 1962	27
Conclusion	34
CHAPTER THREE	36
Multiparty Politics in Zambia’s First Republic, 1964-1973	36
Introduction	36
The Political Environment after Independence	37
The Road to One-Party State	52
The Choma Declaration	57
Conclusion	61
CHAPTER FOUR.....	63
The Ethnic Factor in Zambia’s Party Politics and the Reintroduction of Multiparty Politics	63
Introduction	63
Ethnic Politics in the Second Republic.....	64
The Restoration of Multiparty in Zambia	66
Perpetration of Biased and Ethnic Perception of Political Parties by the Media.....	75

Ethnicity as a Political Resource	83
Conclusion	90
CHAPTER FIVE	91
Conclusion	91
Bibliography.....	94

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The political history of Zambia can be traced back to the years of the Welfare Societies. The initial struggle that emanated on the Zambian Copperbelt was directed at improving the working conditions and salaries for African mine workers. However, after world war two, educated Zambians realised that their grievances could be solved if they attained political independence. Instead of focusing on workers' needs in isolation, Africans started fighting for political freedom.

The first society, the Mwenzo Welfare Society was formed in 1923 with Donald Siwale and David Kaunda as the founder leaders. In the years between the two world wars, Africans in Northern Rhodesia like the world over had become politically enlightened and their demands began to evolve. They began to demand for political, economic and social independence.¹ The increased awareness and demand for better working conditions and political freedom led to the mushrooming of Welfare Societies across the country. By 1946, these Societies amalgamated into what came to be called the Federation of African Societies (FAS), which later evolved into a political organisation. The formation of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress (NRAC) in 1948 was the genesis of African party politics in Northern Rhodesia.

NRAC was formed under the leadership of Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika. However, his reign came to an end in 1951 when Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula was voted in as the new leader. According to Malimba Masheke, Mbikusita had lost favour among the NRAC members who saw him as a stumbling block to their political demands.² In 1951, NRAC changed its name to African National Congress (ANC). At this stage the struggle for political freedom had intensified, and Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula was seen as the best driver for the ANC.³ In the period between 1948 and 1958, the ANC was the only African political party in Northern

¹ Robert I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964* (London: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 115

² Interview with General Malimba Masheke, Kasupe, Lusaka. 22-02-2014. Masheke observes that Mbikusita was accused of being sympathetic to the European cause.

³ Interview with Vernon Mwaanga on the 24-10-2013, Kalundu, Lusaka

Rhodesia. As such its support cut across ethnicity or region. The party represented the aspirations of all Africans. The political theme before independence was the attainment of political freedom from the foreign oppressors. There was unity of purpose as people were fighting a common enemy. At that point political affiliation was mostly determined by race. Africans felt the political, social and economic problems they faced were a result of the white race dominating them.⁴ Ethnicity was not seen as a determining factor in political alignment. As a result the ANC under Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula enjoyed support from all citizens. However, in 1958 the ANC experienced the first split when Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) was formed. This marked the beginning of competitive politics between African political parties.

In 1959 when ZANC was outlawed by the colonial government, other small political parties like the African National Independence Party (ANIP) and United National Freedom Party (UNFP) emerged under the leadership of Paul Kalichini and Dixon Konkola respectively. Later the two parties came together to form the United National Independence Party (UNIP) which was led by Mainza Chona before Kenneth Kaunda took over after his jail term in 1960.⁵ After the formation of UNIP in 1959, ideological differences as well as political approach became the determining factors on which party one would support. This however, did not mean people were not conscious of their ethnicity, but attaining independence was everyone's ultimate goal.⁶

After independence, the people of Zambia realised that independence alone was not sufficient to bring about equitable distribution of national resources. Therefore, the political dynamics began to change as other themes developed ranging from political, social and economic benefits at local and regional levels. In pursuance of these benefits, ethnic cleavages became more apparent. However, the Zambian situation has been different in that, it has never been the main defining

⁴ Kenneth Kaunda, 'African Opinion' Melady (ed.), *Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: Selections from his Writings* (New York: Frederick A Paeger Publishers, 1964), p. 116

⁵ Giacomo Macola, 'Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP and the roots of authoritarianism in nationalist Zambia' in Jan-Bart Geward, Marja Hinfelaar, & Giacomo Makola (eds.) *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia* (Lusaka: The Lembani Trust, 2009), P.21

⁶ Interview with Malimba Masheke, 22nd February, 2014, Kasupe Farm, Lusaka.

factor for any political party.⁷ Unlike countries like Rwanda or Nigeria, the ethnic-divide has never reached a conflict stage in the Zambian political arena.

Jones defines ethnicity as “that aspect of a persons’ self conceptualisation which results from identification with a broader group in opposition to others on the basis of perceived cultural differentiation or common dissent.”⁸ According to Heewon Chang and Timothy Dodd, ethnicity is an embodiment of values, institutions and patterns of behaviour of people.⁹ This embodiment defines their membership to the group. Hutterstrom sees ethnicity as a linguistic identity based on language and customs.¹⁰ The underlying feature in the definitions above was the commonality of language or customs as well as locality (region). Most politicians in multiparty states therefore, used this identification as the starting point for their parties. It was in this vein that Rakner viewed ethnicity as a crucial element in the sustainability of political party regimes the world over.¹¹

Political parties rely heavily on support mobilisation, which requires favourable conditions in order for a party to attract good membership. This study argues that political parties in multiethnic countries have always used ethnicity as a mobilisation strategy. It argues that politicians in Zambia have used ethnic appeals to solicit support from their groups, as well as to discredit their opponents.¹² This however did not imply that these parties were summarily ethnic in orientation. Their ethnic groups were simply a starting point. An ethnic political party was one that wishes to foster the interests of one particular ethnic group while in government.

In the case of Zambia, apart from incorporating language, ethnicity was also viewed in terms of territorial demarcation. Each province was dominated by a particular ethnic group, with the exception of the Bembas who have dominated Luapula, Northern and to some extent Copperbelt

⁷ Interview with Peter Matoka, 26th November, 2013, Ibex Hill, Lusaka

⁸ S. Jones, *The Archaeology of Ethnicity, Constructing identities in the Past and Present* (London: Routledge, 1997), p.xiii

⁹ Heewon Chang & Timothy Dodd, *International Perspective on Race and Ethnicity: An Annotated Bibliography* (2001), p. 107

¹⁰ Karolina Hutterstrom, *In Pursuit of Ethnic Politics: Voters, Parties and Policies in Kenya and Zambia* (PHD Thesis) (Stockholm: UPPSALA University, 2003) p.26

¹¹ Lise Rakner, *Politics and Economic Liberation in Zambia, 1991-2001* (Stockholm: The Nordic African Institute, 2003), p. 95

¹² Seymours Lipset & Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Across national Perspectives* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p.2

Provinces. For the Bembas, a leader who hailed from these provinces was essentially considered as their own.¹³ The majority of the inhabitants of Southern Province were the Tongas, although other smaller groups like the Toka Leya, Ila, and the Lenje of Central Province were collectively called the Bantu Botatwe. The people of Southern Province are a closely knit people who have not experienced internal wrangles like the Lozis and the Nkoya where the latter feel suppressed by the former. As a result, solidarity in terms of social, economic and political alignment in Southern Province comes naturally.

Political historians in Zambia have adequately researched and written on the political trends of the country focusing mostly on the operations of the ruling parties. This approach however, has resulted in deficiency in the body of knowledge in as far as party politics was concerned particularly those that have not ascended to power. Those who have attempted to document the history of opposition parties have either underscored their importance or portrayed them as a negative aspect in political developments.¹⁴ Opposition parties headed by people from Southern Province have particularly been portrayed as ethnic parties only interested in the welfare of their regions not the country at large. If this assertion was unfounded as this study argues, what then were the factors behind this negative portrayal? It should however, be noted that in recent years, some scholars such as Macola, Larmer, Szeftel and others have tried to remedy this inadequacy by paying particular attention to the contributions of opposition parties to political developments in Zambia. While supplementing existing literature, this study takes a different dimension by focusing on party politics in Southern Province in the context of multiparty systems. The study further explores the tendency of manipulating ethnic identities or regionalism for political expediency.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Although Zambia has experienced peaceful co-existence among various regions and ethnic groups, there have been manifestations of ethnicity and regionalism in party politics as far back as the 1960s. This situation was briefly contained after the introduction of the one party state in 1972. However, with the upsurge of political competition after 1991, each political party tended

¹³ Interview with Mutale Nalumango, Rhodes Park, Lusaka. 01-10-2014

¹⁴ Solofo Randrianja, 'Nationalism, Ethnicity and Development' Stephen Ellis (ed.) *Africa Now: People, Policies and Institutions* (London: Villiers publications, 1996), p.26

to draw significant support from specific regions. In the process some political parties such as the United Party, United Progressive Party, African National Congress, and the United Party for National Development (UPND) have been portrayed as parties that perpetrated ethnic politics.

In view of the foregoing, this study seeks to investigate the operations of political parties particularly those in opposition. It intends to examine the factors that lead to the portrayal or perception of some political parties as ethnically oriented. The study further seeks to determine how political parties utilised ethnicity as a political strategy particularly in a multiparty regime.

THE RATIONALE

The motivation to undertake this study emanates from the fact that among the numerous works by many scholars, there was still a dire lack of literature on party politics particularly on opposition parties. This was despite some scholars suggesting that political parties like the ANC and UPND were perpetrating regional politics. This study therefore intends to bridge this gap in existing literature. The study was particularly significant given the divisive potential of ethnic politics in a unitary state like Zambia. Further, the study is expected to stimulate other scholars to conduct further research on the subject of party politics in other areas.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of this study are threefold.

1. Firstly, it attempted to examine party politics in Zambia in the context of multiparty politics.
2. Secondly, it intended to investigate the impact of the Choma Declaration on the politics of Southern Province and Zambia as a country.
3. Lastly the study sought to investigate the parallels between the ANC and the UPND in terms of support, operations and perception.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Most of the studies on political history focusing on the pre-independence period were more interested in nationalists' struggles. Their concentration was on the contribution made by freedom fighters. While the major theme for scholars who documented the post independence

political history were hinged on glorifying the ruling parties and their presidents with little interest on party affiliations and especially on opposition parties. Charles Mwewa's work discusses the evolutions in the politics of Zambia dating back to the colonial era.¹⁵ In his argument, Mwewa acknowledged the prominence of ethnic patronage in many political parties. However, just like other scholars, he specifically singled out the ANC as an ethnic party. Nonetheless, the study was useful in that it gave a brief background on the way the ANC and Southern Province in general were perceived politically.

One of the earliest studies on the political history of Zambia was done by David Mulford who contends that increased political activities brought ethnic tensions and fragmentations in Northern Rhodesia. He cites the United Party formed by Nalumino Mundia as one that resulted from discrimination and victimisation of the Lozi speaking people by UNIP. Mulford argues that by the time of independence, Nkumbula's ANC had shrunk and only restricted to Southern Province.¹⁶ He emphasises the ethnic factor in the ANC as the main deterrent to Nkumbula's ascendancy to national Presidency. This study appreciated Mulford's work which laid a foundation for examining party affiliation and their operations within the context of competitive politics.

Just like Mulford, George Bond sees the ANC as a party for Tongas of Southern Province which never enjoyed nationwide support during its existence. In his view, Bond observed that ANC was never a national party even when it was the only party.¹⁷ Bond's perspective was supported by Molteno who contends that the ANC's ethnic inclination contributed greatly to its decline. Robert Molteno's chapter in Tordoff categorically labeled the ANC as an ethnic political party which was bound to disband sooner or later. Molteno further gives a comprehensive analysis of ethnic cleavage and conflicts in Zambian politics.¹⁸ This study however holds that the ANC's decline in terms of support especially after independence was precipitated by a hostile political

¹⁵ Charles Mwewa, *Zambia: Struggles of My People and Western Contribution to Corruption and Underdevelopment in Africa* (Lusaka: Maiden Publishing House, 2011), p. 245.

¹⁶ David C. Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.25

¹⁷ George C. Bond, *Politics of Change in a Zambian Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 29

¹⁸ Robert Molteno, 'Cleavage and Conflict in Zambian Politics: a study in Sectionalism' William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia* (Bristol: Manchester University Press, 1974), p.69.

environment that existed during the First Republic. The study benefited from Molteno's chapter in examining UNIP's efforts to suppress the opposition through the introduction of a one party state.

Critical to this study was Daniel Posner's work. The central theme in this work is the origin of ethnic coalition in Zambia. In his argument, Posner points out that the major ethnic groups that have dominated the political stage in Zambia were the Bemba of Luapula and Northern Provinces and the Ngoni of the Eastern part of Zambia. Other groups were the Tonga of Southern Province and the Lozi of Western Province.¹⁹ Posner indicated that the politicians used their ethnic background to foster their political agenda. This work was useful in analysing the utilisation of ethnicity in political mobilisation.

Robert Alfred's chapter in Lipset and Rokkan discusses political parties in Anglo-American countries. He observed that social classes played a vital role in party formation.²⁰ Alfred's chapter examined the correlation between ethnic orientation and party functioning. This chapter offers a good understanding of the voting trends in different political parties. The study therefore, asserts that despite many political leaders and their parties denouncing ethnic loyalty, the vice was still being used by politicians for political expediency.

The ethnic influence has varied in prevalence at different stages of Zambia's political history. In the pre independence era, ethnic cleavage was not prominent in political parties due to the nature of politics that prevailed. The post independence period however, experienced increased incidences of ethnicity and regionalism in political operations. This study drew greatly from Sikota Wina's *Night Without a President*. Wina's work gives a vivid picture of what transpired during UNIP's general conference in 1967 at Mulungushi Rock of Authority. It shows how the formation of two blocks based on ethnic connection brought discontent within UNIP. While the Bembas and the Tongas agreed to support each other, the Lozis aligned themselves with the

¹⁹ Daniel Nolan Posner, *The Institutional Origins of Ethnic Politics in Zambia PhD Thesis*, (Chicago: Harvard University 1998), p. 183.

²⁰ Robert R. Alfred, 'Class Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems' Lipset, M. Seymour & Rokkan Stein (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 68.

Nyanja speaking people of Eastern Province.²¹ However, Wina's work takes an introspection of UNIP and the problems of ethnicity within the party and how Kaunda attempted to resolve the tension.

To a large extent, this study shares Andrew Sardanis, Macola, and Tordoff's views that the Choma Declaration was a historical event in the political history of Zambia. These scholars argue that the Choma Declaration ushered in a new political dispensation in Zambia, the One Party Participatory Democracy. In his work, Sardanis, discusses Nkumbula's unreserved rejection and attack on the introduction of a One Party State. This, he argued was evidenced by his refusal to serve on the Chona Commission.²² However, these arguments were in contrast with Robert Rotberg who believed that the Choma Declaration was simply a formality meant to implement what had already been decided. He observed that at that time Nkumbula had long ceased to provide effective leadership politically.²³ Apart from examining the importance of this work, this study explores the effects of the Choma Declaration on Southern Province and national politics after 1973.

Another study that was beneficial to this study was Langley Ayo's work. Ayo's work gives a general perspective of politics of ethnicity in West Africa particularly Ghana and Nigeria. In his argument, he observed a vehement opposition to the introduction of a lingua franca in Ghana fearing that it would lead to the domination of one tribal culture by another. Ayo further argued that while advocating for a unitary Government, the people of Ghana still wanted to maintain their tribal identities even in politics.²⁴ This was contrary to the Zambian situation where unity in diversity was greatly appreciated and encouraged as this study will reveal. The study drew heavily from West African experiences while investigating the factors that could lead political parties to be ethnically inclined.

²¹ Sikota Wina, *The Night Without a President* (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1985), p.9.

²² Andrew Sardanis, *Africa: Another Side of the Coin, Northern Rhodesia's Final Years as Zambia Nationhood* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p.264.

²³ Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 122

²⁴ Langley J. Ayo, *Ideologies of Liberalism in Black Africa, 1856-1970: Documents on Modern African Political Thought from Colonial Times to the Present* (London: Rex Collings Ltd, 1979), p.445.

This study argues that the media just like politicians played a critical role in creating party perception. It contends that the partiality and biasness of both the print and electronic media did affect certain parties in insofar as party perception was concerned. Avery Leiserson's work was significant to this study in analysing the role of the newspapers, radio and television in projecting political parties differently.²⁵ This study observed that sometimes the media had been used as instruments of propaganda by politicians and their parties. However, Leiserson does not divulge any reasons for media biasness, and why some parties are projected negatively. Our study therefore intends to fill in this void.

Related to Leiserson's work were Francis Kasoma and Robert Moore's works which separately discussed the role of the media in democratic Zambia. Kasoma tackled the period from 1906 to 1983. He argued that control and ownership of the media was not a post independence phenomenon, but that it existed even during colonial rule. This work was critical to our study as it aided in understanding the relationship between the media, the ANC, UNIP, and the colonial government, and how this relationship impacted on the popularity as well as perception of these parties.²⁶ Moore sees the state media in Zambia as being particularly sensational and biased against the anti government views. Insights drawn from this work were vital in understanding how the media aided in ascribing the ethnic tag on opposition parties.²⁷

Another critical work reviewed was Arend Lijphart. In his argument, Lijphart holds that political parties were principle institutional means for translating segmental cleavages into the political realm. He further points out that there was a close connection between party preference and ethnic cleavages.²⁸ This study benefited from Lijphart's work in justifying our argument that all political parties in multiethnic countries like Zambia first drew support from their groups before thrusting to other regions.

²⁵ Avery Leiserson, *Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), p.15

²⁶ Francis Kakoma, *The Press in Zambia: The Development, Role and Control of National Newspapers in Zambia, 1906-1983* (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1986), p. 4

²⁷ Robert C. Moore, *The Political Reality of Freedom of the Press in Zambia* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991), p.60

²⁸ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p.83.

In his insightful work on party organisation, Hartmut Hess observed that political parties are groups of people who have joined forces to pursue their common political and social goals. Hess observed that party solidarity was a two-way street where party members must see their own interests and political will being represented in their party.²⁹ This study drew greatly from Hess's work in examining party affiliation and voter alignment in Southern Province, in comparison to other areas.

This study acknowledges Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel's article which gives an in-depth analysis of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in terms of support, patronage as well as operations. They further explored the parallels that existed between MMD and UNIP. This work provided ideal insights in the operations of the two parties that led the country between 1964 and 2011. This work is relevant in examining the parallels between the ANC and UPND.³⁰

The work of Leroy Vail was significant to our study by providing the background information to ethnic formation in Southern Africa. Although the work deals with ethnic formation in general and not necessarily in party politics, it helped in understanding the historical genesis of ethnic patronage. Vail's work explores the way societies in Southern Africa have used the ethnic coalition to defend themselves against intruders as well as in fostering their demands.³¹

What clearly emerges from Jonathan Moyo's work is that ruling parties had a tendency of ascribing the ethnic tag to opposition parties. Moyo examined the operations of the ZANU-PF against the PF-ZAPU. With the latter being projected as an ethnic political party because it was an opposition party, and dominated by a minority ethnic group. Our study concurs with Moyo's view that opposition parties are usually victims of their opponents' propaganda. Moyo further discussed the 1987 Unity Agreement between Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkhomo that gave ZANU-PF authority to establish a One Party State. This helped in understanding the

²⁹ Hartmut Hess, *Party work in Social-Democratic Parties: A Practical Handbook* (Dusseldorf: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 1994), p.19

³⁰ Carolyn Baylies & Morris Szeftel, 'The Rise and Fall of Multi-party Politics in Zambia' *Review of African Political Economy*, 54. (1992), pp. 75-91.

³¹ Leroy Vail, 'Introduction: Ethnicity in Southern African History' in Leroy Vail (ed.), *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (London: James Currey Ltd, 1989), p. 2

circumstances behind the Choma Declaration of 1973, and how it impacted on the politics of the province.³²

This study benefited from Lise Rakner's work which among other things discussed the formation of the United Party for National Development (UPND) in 1998. She points to the effect that at its inception, UPND attracted national-wide support which enabled the party to come out second in the 2001 presidential elections. This work was critical in providing a starting point in trying to understand why UPND has since failed to score such successes in the elections that followed. Rakner's work however does not examine the operations of other political parties in the context of democracy.³³

In his analysis of party politics and ethnicity, Bizeck J. Phiri concluded that UPND failed to attract support from other provinces because of its failure to escape the ethnic trap. To him UPND has remained confined in one region because of its ethnic campaigns.³⁴ Phiri's work was among the major works that informed this study. The work gives a comprehensive discussion of political trends in Zambia dating back to colonial period. In his work, Phiri argued that "the most important feature of interparty competition was the allegiance of political parties' geographical base of support."³⁵ Though not directly related to Phiri's work, this study drew greatly from this work.

Among the most recent studies undertaken on Zambia's political history has been works by Giacomo Macola and Miles Larmer. While giving a biographical study of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, Macola took a comprehensive exploration of political developments in Zambia from colonial era to the recent past. Additionally, Macola gives the perception of different political parties that has existed since 1948.³⁶ This study drew insights from Macola's work in terms of party and national politics in Zambia. Macola was one of the scholars who have written on

³² Jonathan N. Moyo, *Voting for Democracy: A Study of Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1992), p.24.

³³ Lise Rakner, *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia, 1991-2001* (Uppsala: The Nordic African Institute, 2007), p.122.

³⁴ Bizeck Jube Phiri, *A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the Third Republic, 1890-2001* (Asmara: Africa World Press, Inc. 2006), p. 186

³⁵ Bizeck Jube Phiri, *A Political History of Zambia*, p. 184

³⁶ Giacomo Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula*, (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 6

Zambia's political history in recent years. He gives a clear picture of how many scholars have overlooked or indeed under played the role Nkumbula played both in the liberation struggle and the post independence era. The projection of UNIP as an all powerful party that worked for the good of every Zambian has to a large extent been exaggerated and overshadowed the contribution of opposition parties like ANC. Macola's work was very illuminating to this study as it gave a vivid discussion of Nkumbula's contribution to Zambian politics.

Larmer's work is basically on the operations of the United Progressive Party (UPP) under the leadership of Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe. However, he goes further to acknowledge the relevance of the ANC as an opposition party especially after independence even though it failed to ascend to power. Nonetheless, Larmer does not state the ANC's operations during the First Republic. By discussing the difficult conditions UPP operated in, our study was informed of some of the hurdles opposition parties in general faced in multiparty regimes. In his analysis of UPP, Larmer attributed the party's foundation to economic deprivation on the part of the Bemba speaking people of Northern Province. Who felt that their province was being sidelined in terms development.³⁷Larmer holds that the UNIP government used propaganda to portray the UPP as a party for the Bembas without any national agenda. His work was critical to this study in comprehending the operations of other political parties such as the ANC, UP, MMD, and UPND in the context of ethnicity and regionalism. Therefore, Larmer's work on UPP was used as a comparative study to other parties like the ANC and the UPND.

Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola's chapter in *One Zambia Many Histories* was very critical to this study. The chapter provided a vivid analysis of the operations of the ANC in the post independence era. The authors argue that Nkumbula contributed greatly to the political history of Zambia by providing checks and balances to UNIP which was becoming too powerful. Although the chapter does not specifically discuss political parties like

³⁷ Miles Larmer, 'A Little Bit Like a Volcano: The United Progressive Party and Resistance to One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1964-1980' *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 39. No. 1 (2006), PP. 49-83

the UPND, it helped in providing insights on the perception of political parties, especially those in the opposition.³⁸

METHODOLOGY

This dissertation is based on comprehensive research conducted between October 2013 and June 2015. Data was collected from various sources which included the University of Zambia main library where both published and unpublished information was gathered. Books, theses, dissertations and articles from journals were consulted. The African Annual Reports provided vital information on the relationship between the two major political parties (ANC and UNIP) and the Federal Government. From these reports, we also obtained information relating to the split of the ANC and the subsequent formation of ZANC in 1958, which later transformed into UNIP. Published materials provided an opportunity to interact with other scholars' and their different dimensions in their works. It also helped in understanding the relationship between ethnicity or regionalism and party politics in Zambia as well as in Africa as a whole.

Information was also collected from UNIP Archives (UNIPA) where correspondence between political leaders and their officers were consulted. Tour Reports from different provinces both by government officials and political parties were examined. Here, the ANC and UNIP correspondence on matters relating to their operations, differences and conflicts were consulted. In addition, Presidential Speeches, Ministerial Statements and Press Releases were accessed at UNIP Archives. This data helped illuminate the difficulties that faced the ANC from inception to its demise, as well as accusations and counter accusations of regional inclination by UNIP and the ANC respectively.

At the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ) monthly, annual and provincial Reports were consulted, this information was very vital in providing insights to party operations before and after independence. Among the files consulted were those that contained letters, official correspondence and minutes for party meetings. These revealed the political environment that

³⁸ Giacomo Macola, 'Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP and the roots of authoritarianism in nationalist Zambia' in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar & Giacomo Macola (eds.), *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post Colonial Zambia* (Lusaka: The Lembani Trust, 2008), pp. 18-44

prevailed especially after independence. It highlighted some of the complaints the ANC especially had against the UNIP government such as police harassment on party officials.

More information was obtained from the National Assembly Library where Hansards for Parliamentary Debates were consulted. The debates gave insights of real political concerns in as far as party politics was concerned. It the researcher to appreciate what different leaders stood for. Nkumbula for instance came out strongly against political suppression as perpetrated by the UNIP Government. The changing dynamics in political considerations and debates threw light on the perception of different political parties. Issues leading to the signing of the Choma Declaration which consequently led to the Introduction of the One Party State were also highlighted in these debates.

The Choma Museum was consulted specifically to have an understanding of the Choma Declaration which was very instrumental to this study. Unfortunately the actual document could not be traced although general information was obtained. This helped in understanding the significance of the Choma Declaration in the political history of Southern Province and the country as a whole.

The study also utilised oral evidence which was obtained by way of interviews. Oral evidence was vital in supplementing written sources. More so on opposition parties like UPND whose history is not yet adequately documented. Interviews provided first hand information on the dynamics of party politics in relation to ethnicity and regionalism. They were further insightful in providing people's perception of different political parties in Zambia. These interviews were conducted in English except for situations where the interviewee was not conversant with English. In such situations, an appropriate medium was used like Nyanja, Bemba and Tonga. Both veteran politicians and senior citizens were interviewed. However, attempts to interview certain politicians like Dr. Kenneth Kaunda and Patrick Chisanga proved futile despite making several appointments.

Among the people interviewed were Daniel Munkombwe, Grey Zulu, Vernon Mwaanga, Request Muntanga, Charles Kakoma, Dr Peter Matoka, Mama Chibesa Kankasa, Richard Kapita and many others. Finally data collected from interviews, primary and secondary sources were organized, analysed and interpreted using qualitative method.

DISSERTATION LAY OUT

This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one discusses the introduction and the historical background of the study. It sets a foundation base for the rest of the study. The chapter explores the genesis of political parties in Zambia. At the same time, relevant literature was reviewed in order to show the link with other scholars' works or the gap that the study intends to fill. The rationale and objectives of the study are also discussed in this chapter.

The second Chapter discusses the split of the ANC and subsequent formation of ZANC which was later reconstituted into UNIP. This Chapter holds that the split of ANC in 1958 had nothing to do with Nkumbula's ethnic politics as contended by some scholars. It further argues that while UNIP was strengthened and secured by the coalition government of 1962, the ANC's position was weakened. The Chapter covers the pre-independence period running from 1948 to 1963.

Chapter three argues that the ANC's continued existence during the First Republic was evidence of its strength considering the hostile political environment towards those with dissenting views. Having achieved political freedom, the relevance of opposition parties did not seem obvious to many people. A comprehensive analysis of how the UNIP government tried to suppress the operations of the opposition party by using state machinery will be made. It is argued in this chapter that, the period between 1964 and 1973 was characterised by government's suppressive tendencies on the opposition ANC making it difficult to freely recruit membership.

While admitting that the ANC just like UPND had their stronghold in Southern Province, Chapter four rejects the projection of these parties as ethnic. Instead it argues that these political parties did operate like any other party in a multiparty system. The focus of this Chapter is to demonstrate how different political parties in Zambia have utilised ethnic groups in mobilising support. The Chapter further indicates that the increased political competition in a multiparty dispensation precipitated the labeling of some political parties as ethnically inclined. In this chapter the media is considered among the factors that led to the portrayal of parties like the ANC and UPND as ethnic political parties. The last Chapter concludes the whole study.

CHAPTER TWO

PARTY POLITICS AND THE NATIONALIST STRUGGLE, 1948-1963

Introduction

This chapter focuses on party politics during the nationalist struggle and how the emergence of more African political parties altered political cleavages. It examines the political contest that emerged between the ANC and UNIP between 1958 and 1963. Political parties are the focal institutional instruments for national political interactions. They are alliances or organisation of people seeking to achieve common goals and with intentions of controlling government. Political parties therefore compete against one another for political power. For the purpose of this study, political cleavage is defined as the divisions that affect political allegiances and policies.¹

In other words, there are a number of potential cleavage lines ranging from racial, social status, religion, age, gender, ethnicity to socio-economic needs. To a large extent, these cleavages and others dictated which political party one would support. The starting point for this analysis is the understanding that Zambian politics just like other political systems elsewhere was based on popular support. Hence, every politician or indeed political party endeavoured to spread their political tentacles beyond their ethnic groups while, at the same time, using their ethnic groups as spring boards for their political ambitions.² This, however, was prominent in competitive politics where there are many political parties, as was the case in Northern Rhodesia after 1958. During the nationalist struggle, people tended to support any political party that drove them towards the attainment of political freedom. The importance people attached to political independence made it difficult for all other cleavages to override that of nationalism.

While most parties may originate in factional cleavages of either personal or group interests, they always sought to be accepted at national level. All political parties aim at controlling the formal structures of power. As such political parties the world over were characterised by the great need of attracting majority support. In the process of this ascendance, they did everything within their

¹ Gabriel A. Almond, *Comparative Politics Today: A World Review*. (New York: Pearson's, 2004), p.6

² Avery Leiserson, *Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), p.73.

means to trample on their opponents in order to attract popular support.³ It was within this context that the ANC and UNIP operated, especially from 1959 onwards. The chapter discusses pertinent issues that exacerbated the disintegration of the first African political party, the ANC. The ANC's preparedness for competitive politics will be examined in the last section of the Chapter. Further, the chapter explores the Coalition Government of 1962, focusing on the impact it had on the two political parties (ANC and UNIP).

The increased political activities experienced by Northern Rhodesia led to the formation of Northern Rhodesia National Congress in 1948 which later changed its name to African National Congress as discussed in the previous Chapter. The ANC enjoyed political monopoly in the period between 1948 and 1958 when ZANC, the forerunner of UNIP was formed as a break away party.⁴ Prior to the formation of ZANC, the only competition the ANC faced was from white dominated political parties like the United Federal Party (UFP). As such, it was obvious that the majority of Africans would support the ANC. However, with the coming of ZANC on the political stage, the political tempo begun to change, African parties started competing amongst themselves for support.

The Split of The African National Congress (ANC)

Scholars such as George Bond and David Mulford allude to the fact that the split between the ANC and ZANC was mainly caused by ethnic elements that had characterised the leadership of ANC. They argued that, in a bid to guarantee his continued stay at the helm of the party, Nkumbula deliberately started inviting more delegates from Southern Province than anywhere else. To such scholars, Nkumbula had lost the support of the executive due to his leadership deficiencies.⁵ Kapasa Makata alleged that in a bid to be re-elected during an emergence General

³ Daniel Nolan Posner, *The Institutional Origins of Ethnic Politics in Zambia* (PhD Thesis), 1998, p. 11.

⁴ David C. Mulford, *The Politics of Independence, 1957-1967* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.62

⁵ George C. Bond, *The Politics of Change in a Zambian Community* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p.86.

Meeting of 1958, Nkumbula brought a huge contingent of supporters from his homeland.⁶ This study discusses other major problems that precipitated the disintegration of the party which had enjoyed political monopoly since 1948. It argues that among salient factors were tactical differences in the struggle for independence, as well as the power struggle that had engulfed the party.

The above argument was consistent with the insights and perspectives of some of the eminent personalities of Zambian political history such as Vernon Mwaanga and Peter Matoka. Mwaanga observed that “the split between the ANC and ZANC had completely nothing to do with ethnicity, but everything to do with the political approach among top leadership.”⁷ The argument collaborates with the views of Daniel Munkombwe who saw the split as a matter of methodological differences within the ANC leadership which had become pronounced between 1955 and 1958. While the young nationalists such as Kapwepwe, Kaunda, Kamanga and others preferred an aggressive and confrontational approach, Nkumbula wanted a moderate approach towards the whites. In other words, while fighting for a common cause, the ANC leaders differed or quarreled over perceived delays and urgency. The attainment of independence was seen as a matter of urgency, and many nationalists within the ANC saw Nkumbula to be too slow and tolerant of the colonialist.⁸ The young radicals within the party wanted an injection of new energy in the struggle which according to them was getting dim.

Whereas the radical nationalists preferred an aggressive and fearless leadership, Nkumbula was not keen to engage in what he called hooliganism or extreme nationalism. He sought to achieve the liberation of Northern Rhodesia through legal and legitimate means which involved persuasion, lobbying and negotiations. Nkumbula’s preference for moderate politics made him unpopular among the radical politicians who believed that the soft approach was tantamount to admitting defeat. In their view, Nkumbula’s political approach was equated to clinging to

⁶ Kapasa Makasa, *Zambia’s March to Political Freedom*.(Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981), p. 94.

⁷ Interview with Vernon Mwaanga on 24.10.2013, Lusaka. This perspective was supported by Peter Matoka on 26-11-2013, Ibex Hill, Lusaka.

⁸ Interview with Daniel Munkombwe, 18-10-2013, Belvadere Lodge,, Lusaka, see also Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First National Assembly, 10thJanuary-2nd March,1973. P.3

conservative and rigid methods of nationalism which were incapable of yielding positive results.⁹ By pledging Congress to non-violence struggle, Nkumbula was seen to have failed to embrace the political dynamics which called for proactive leaders. Also Nkumbula's failure to embrace the socialist influence which had taken root among the radicals popularly called 'Young-Turks' negatively impacted on his image.¹⁰ By 1958, the emergence of militants was seen as the immediate path to quick independence which had become the pre-occupation of most Africans.

Nkumbula feared that extreme confrontation with the colonial government would lead to banishment of the party. Therefore, he opted for dignified and constitutional approach that included persuasion and lobbying. His intention was to avoid the struggle of bloody shed. To Nkumbula, politics of evolution was more preferable than revolutionary politics that was being advocated for by militants. However, many people were yearning for the immediate attainment of independence, as such any strategies considered slow were not supported by the majority. At the same time, the militants were ready to employ any method available regardless of the consequences. As tension increased between the radical nationalists and Nkumbula, murmurs of ethnicity which had not been pronounced before began to emerge. Nkumbula was alleged to be using his tribesmen, and that his leadership was based on ethnic support from the Bantu Botatwe of Central and Southern Provinces, who did not want another ethnic group to lead the ANC. Slowly the politics of the country was getting polarised on grounds of ethnicity.¹¹

With Ghana getting her independence in 1957, the political agitation accelerated, apparently most of the young leaders such as Wesley Nyirenda, Simon Kapwepwe and Nalumino Mundia had studied in India which had gotten her independence. Through their interaction with politicians there, they had appreciated the need for aggressive nationalism. By 1958 it had become apparent that the attainment of independence would be through aggressive nationalism hence calls to oust Nkumbula became louder.¹²

According to Malimba Masheke, another factor that contributed to the split of the ANC was power struggle that had engulfed the party. The desire by the radicals to take over the party

⁹ J.P Murray, African Affairs Report on Western Province, 1959, p. 29

¹⁰ Interview with Malimba Masheke, 21-02-2014.

¹¹ Interview with Peter Matoka, 26-11-2013

¹² Interview with Malimba Masheke, 25-02-2014

leadership added to the disintegration of ANC. In Masheke's view, Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe particularly had always exhibited interests to lead the party.¹³ Similarly, Grey Zulu observes that during Nkumbula's London trip, Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe was alleged to have tried to ascend to power through dubious means.¹⁴ Similar observations were made by Sikota Wina who noted that:

Immediately Nkumbula and Kaunda were arrested in 1955, Simon Kapwepwe occupied the office of the president and started calling and sending urgent telegrams to all congress branches where he proclaimed the beginning of political freedom From then on Nkumbula's hold on the presidency begun to be challenged.¹⁵

At this point, the radicals capitalised on Nkumbula's moderate approach by alleging that he had back-pedaled on his earlier commitment to fight colonialism. Nkumbula was accused of postponing the demand for immediate independence, by advocating for equal representation in Parliament. Chibesa Kankasa noted that after Nkumbula and Kaunda spent two months in jail in 1955, the former had lost his vibe to fight the whites. Instead he was now advocating for equal representation in the LEGCO.¹⁶ However, in his Parliamentary Debates, Nkumbula did not relent in his commitment to fight for African independence. He insisted that African independence was a prerequisite to African political, social and even economic freedom.¹⁷ Nkumbula challenged the colonial government by urging that, "I demand a constitution that will give immediate self-government in Northern Rhodesia. In fact, we want self government constitution in 1961, and subsequently independence in 1963."¹⁸

¹³ Interview with Masheke,

¹⁴ Interview with Grey Zulu, 23-03-2015. Makeni Farms, Lusaka. Grey Zulu's views were in tandem with Vernon Mwaanga who considered Kapwepwe as an ambitious politician

¹⁵ Sikota Wina, *The Night Without a President* (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1985), p. 6

¹⁶ Interview with Mama Chibesa Kankasa, 17-10-2013.

¹⁷ Northern Rhodesia Hansards No:106, Official Verbatim Report of First Session of 12th Legislative Council, 15th January-14th February 1963.(Lusaka: Government Printers, 1963), p.1026.

¹⁸Northern Rhodesia Hansards No: 106, Official Verbatim Report on the First Session of the 12th Legislative Council, 15th January-14th February, 1963, p. 1027

Using Hartmut Hess's argument that a party can only thrive if it continued to represent people's political will, Kapwepwe and other revolutionary nationalists like Kaunda claimed that Nkumbula was no longer representing people's aspirations adequately.¹⁹ He was said to have been inciting the ANC members to rise against Nkumbula capitalising on his extravagant life style which had cost the party a lot of money. In his autobiography, Kaunda blamed the press for portraying him as a contender to Nkumbula rather than a partner in the struggle. He acknowledged that there was mistrust between Nkumbula and himself.²⁰ Kaunda complained that the press projected him as a competitor to Nkumbula when in fact they were all fighting for a common cause. The worsening relationships within the ANC leadership circles vitiated the effectiveness of the party. In an attempt to contain the situation, Nkumbula became more and more authoritarian, and decided to purge out what he termed rebellious and destructive elements in the ANC, of which Munakayumbu Sipalo was the first casualty for failing to heed Nkumbula's calls to end the shop boycotts. This act infuriated the radicals and justified their stance that Nkumbula had become too authoritative and was no longer fighting for the cause of Africans.²¹

In the meantime, the boycott campaign of European shops launched by ANC in 1954 as a way of expressing their grievances with colonialists had scored successes. Vernon Mwaanga observed that these boycotts were very successful especially in Mufulira, Monze and even Lusaka's Kamwala area where business was almost coming to a standstill.²² Despite this breakthrough, Nkumbula ordered ceasefire, and demanded that congress branches should end the boycott by June 1956. This stance riled the radicals and some ANC supporters who felt Nkumbula was being more sympathetic to the cause of Europeans than that of Africans. However, Nkumbula's unpopular decision was premised on the danger that the boycotts were becoming violent, as such the colonial Government would have found reason to outlaw the party, a situation Nkumbula wanted to avoid at whatever cost.²³ In his address to the Party National Assembly, Nkumbula

¹⁹ Hartmut Hess, *Party Work in Social-Democratic Parties: A Practical Handbook* (Dusseldorf: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 1994), p.18

²⁰ Kenneth D. Kaunda, *Zambia Shall Be Free: An Autobiography* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1962), P.84

²¹ Interview with Daniel Munkombwe, 18-10-2013

²² UNIPA/ANC 7/81. 8th April, 1956

²³ Interview with Dr Peter Matoka, 26-11-2013.

stressed the need for peaceful agitation if the party had to avoid being outlawed. He complained that:

My leadership had been misconceived by many people, I always tried to be a statesman, fighting the federation, fighting for independence ... but people say my leadership is not desired because it is slow Have you any desire that we live peacefully in this country?²⁴

Already, a number of ANC supporters involved in these boycotts and picketing were arrested country-wide. This move added to Nkumbula's unpopularity within the party as observed by Macola.²⁵

Attempts by the proponents of radical nationalism to oust Nkumbula through the ballot box had proved futile. This failure as Mama Chibesa Kankasa observed suggested that the 'Old Lion' still commanded respect and support within the ANC circles despite the differences. The only option for the discontented was to fight from outside. Probably, ZANC would not have been formed had it been possible to replace Nkumbula with a militant leader.²⁶ The year 1958 marked a turning point in the nationalist movement. On the basis of the issues highlighted, the radical faction, which included Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, Kenneth Kaunda, Sikota Wina, Justin Chimba, W. Sikalumbi and many others, broke away from the ANC to form the Zambia National Congress (ZANC). These leaders immediately called for boycott of elections that were to take place in March 1959. It was obvious that this split severely fractured the ANC's support base. Writing to the National Secretary, Cuthbert Sinyangwe stated, that Northern Province was a vast constituency comprising a lot of districts, but ever since the days of Zambia split, the ANC had actually never recovered from the shock of animosity.²⁷ These sentiments were in tandem with R.S Foster who reported that when ZANC was founded, most of the adherents of the ANC in Northern Province turned to ZANC. At the same time, Foster confirmed that the ANC still

²⁴ UNIPA/ANC 7/27. 1960, Nkumbula's address to the Party National Assembly

²⁵ Giacomo Macola, 'Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula and the formation of ZANC/UNIP: A Reinterpretation,' Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar & Giacomo Macola (eds.), *Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in Late Colonial Zambia* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2011), p.43.

²⁶ Interview with Mama Kankasa, 17/10/2013

²⁷ UNIPA/ANC2/22, 21st January, 1962

remained resilient in other parts of Northern Rhodesia.²⁸ This was in agreement with Irving Kaplan's observation that although the new party became the rallying point for those more ardent nationalists on the Northern part of the country, the ANC still made strides in places like Mufulira and Chingola.²⁹

Having broken away from the ANC, the young militants led by Kenneth Kaunda embraced a radical and non compromising approach which they termed 'positive' nationalism, which according to Mwaanga, had elements of violence. Because of aggressiveness, intimidation and violent confrontations, ZANC won people's support within a short period of its existence especially among the youth who were getting desperate for independence.³⁰ Drawing from success stories in countries where propaganda, intimidation and violence were used to attain self-government, ZANC did not hesitate to use them. Ghana and the neighboring Malawi had to revolt in order to get independence. In South Africa, the young radicals like Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo had formed the (Umkhonto We Sizwe) an aggressive Youth Wing to revive the freedom struggle. In Kenya the Mau Mau Movement was also taking shape thus influencing other nationalists to embrace violence as a means to defeat colonial domination.³¹

Experiences in these countries gave impetus to ZANC to use aggressive means in the struggle against the imperialists, a strategy that was lacking in the ANC. Addressing a UNIP Committee, Kaunda acknowledged that although the violent struggle stories in India, Egypt, Ghana and other countries make sad reading, they saved one useful purpose and all point to the right direction which was independence. Justifying their aggressive approach, Kaunda observed that, "when the Indians revolted, burnt schools, houses, churches and some had to walk naked, the Britain declared their Independence. The same happened with our neighbour Nyasaland. Thus ZANC was on the right path by using 'positive' nationalism."³² At this point, the ANC was portrayed as a compromised party incapable of fostering African demands.

Apparently, the colonial Government felt threatened by ZANC's political activities, which were threatening to cause anarchy. Announcing the banning of ZANC, on 11th March, 1959, the

²⁸ R.S Foster, African Affairs Report on Northern Province, 1958, p.18

²⁹ Irving Kaplan, *Zambia: a Country Study: Foreign Area Studies*, n.p (1979), p. 34

³⁰ African Affairs' Report, (NRG/AFR/AF. 3), 1959.p. 2

³¹ UNIPA/UNIP 16/1/1. 5th May, 1961. Correspondences, 1961-1962,

³² UNIPA/UNIP 8/1/1. 7th January, 1961. Central Committee Minutes.

Governor, Sir Arthur Benson equated the party to a terrorist organisation. He alleged that at the Accra Meeting of All African People in Ghana, ZANC president Kenneth Kaunda and Hastings Banda were plotting violence as a means to achieve independence. However, the banning of ZANC did not kill the spirit of the radical nationalists, instead it militarised the politically-minded people more than before. Meanwhile, the ANC had difficulties in convincing the Africans that the party still stood for African independence. The party seemed to be in good books with the colonial government as Chibesa Kankasa puts it. At the same time, former ZANC members were alleging that the ANC had incited the banishment of the latter as such, it could not be relied upon.³³

As if to confirm ZANC's suspicions, the Northern Rhodesia Governor, Sir Benson alleged that Nkumbula had walked out of the Accra Meeting which was intended to find a way forward to African independence. The governor commented, "I want to thank Nkumbula for having walked out of the meeting in protest to these resolutions which were intended to bring anarchy and lawlessness to our peaceful country."³⁴ However, this was simply a political strategy used by the colonial government purposed to play the two political parties against each other, thus hindering co-operation. Although Nkumbula refuted these allegations, the exoneration came too late and the governor's sentiments had already infuriated many Africans who felt betrayed hence losing faith in the ANC and its president. For the Africans of Northern Rhodesia, political parties were formed with a core purpose of fighting for political independence hence any party that diverted from this principle was perceived irrelevant to the political dispensation of the time.³⁵

When ZANC was proscribed, its extremist leaders were arrested and moved from spheres of their operations to remote areas where the difficulties of language would inhibit their activities. However, instead of killing the party as the Federal Government had intended, it facilitated its spread to areas not reached before. This was evidenced by Sir Evelyn Hone's concerns that, the restricted ZANC leaders had managed to reach areas which were unaffected thus spreading the danger of subversive activities.³⁶ Hone observed that, "in these isolated places which were calm

³³ Interview with Mama Chibesa Kankasa, 17/10/2013.

³⁴ The Northern News, Jan-March, 1959

³⁵ The Northern News, 1959, 14th March, 1959.

³⁶ Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, First Session of the 11th Council, 1959-1960. p. 18

and peaceful before, we may be spreading a very dangerous and harmful atmosphere by taking the banished leaders there.”³⁷ For instance, in 1959 while restricted in Kabompo, Kenneth Kaunda continued sending messages of encouragement to his comrades urging them to fight on wherever they were.

At the same time, ZANC supporters who believed that the action taken against their leaders was simple vendetta had vowed to continue advancing the ZANC agenda in whatever form. This, they did through UNIP which was formed out of a merger of the African National Independence Party (ANIP) and the United National Freedom Party (UNFP) as alluded to in Chapter one. UNIP came in to fill in the void left by ZANC. While soliciting for support, UNIP leaders, launched a vicious propaganda campaign against the ANC, which had managed to avoid the attention of the colonial government because of the party’s moderate politics. To the contrary, UNIP was always at cross-roads with the colonial government due to its violent approach to the struggle. In his Press Release, Kaunda claimed that the victimisation was an indication that the party was more resolute than the ANC.³⁸

Nkumbula’s decision to participate in the territorial elections of 1959 affected him negatively. The Territorial elections scheduled for March, 1959, were to be based on the Benson Constitution. The Constitution failed to meet the Universal Adult Suffrage being advocated for by Africans. Its requirements only protected the federal franchise while being discriminative on the Africans who were only given eight seats. As such, UNIP had vowed to fight by boycotting all the elections held under this constitution. In protest, UNIP launched vigorous campaigns to discourage Africans from participating. Meanwhile Nkumbula had chosen to participate in these elections even though he was against the terms of the constitution. According to Vernon Mwaanga, Nkumbula felt boycotting these elections would be suicidal on the part of Africans because the whites would still have found stooges to occupy these seats.³⁹ Having participated in these elections, Nkumbula won the South West Constituency seat. However, his readiness to work within the framework of the Benson Constitution and in colonial dominated parliament

³⁷ Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, p. 7

³⁸ UNIPA/ UNIP 16/1/1. 26th September, 1962. Press Release

³⁹ Interview with Vernon Mwaanga, 24-10-2013

caused resentment among conservative Africans who concluded that Nkumbula had chosen to collaborate with the enemy.⁴⁰

In all his accounts of the struggle, Kaunda indicated that Nkumbula's move to participate in the 1959 elections and foster partnership with the enemy was the worst betrayal to the Africans.⁴¹ To the contrary, Nkumbula's parliamentary debates asserted the fact that he went to the Assembly to represent African opinion. He consistently reiterated that the only best government for the Africans was one fully manned and run by the black people. Nkumbula used his presence in the Legislative Council (LEGCO), to make passionate appeals for constitutional changes and un-delayed independence for Africans. In his maiden speech, Nkumbula acknowledged that he went to parliament with mixed feelings because the constitution used was defective. He complained that the European parties had encroached on the rights of Africans. Four out of eight seats reserved for Africans were filled by whites from European parties who were not familiar of African problems. This constitution had a lot of loopholes that needed amending.⁴²

Nkumbula declared that if independence was not given by 1960, the ANC would make Northern Rhodesia ungovernable. "We want [ubuntugwa nomba] independence now, and as president of the ANC I want to see a government that is entirely black."⁴³ Nkumbula further condemned the Federal government over its exploitative tendencies such as land alienation and other grievances of rural Africans like crop marketing. He further continued to call for an overhaul of the Benson Constitution which he considered to be incapable of ensuring free and fair elections. Such utterances did not reflect postponement of independence demands as portrayed by Nkumbula's opponents. Grey Zulu, a veteran politician who served in different portfolios under UNIP called Nkumbula as the father of modern and civilised politics in Northern Rhodesia, whose input could not be ignored both in the nationalist struggle and the post independence era.⁴⁴ In Munkombwe's view, Nkumbula's move to participate in a UFP dominated parliament was an act of bravery though misunderstood by many Africans.

⁴⁰ S.J Sugg, Southern Province Commissioner, Northern Rhodesia African Affairs, 1959, p.65.

⁴¹ Kaunda, *Zambia Shall Be Free*, p. 105.

⁴² Official Verbatim Report of Debates of the First Session (Resumed) of the 11th Legislative Council, 23rd June-7th August 1959, pp. 67-68

⁴³ Northern News, Jan-April 1959, 17-04-1959.

⁴⁴ Interview with Grey Zulu, 23-03-2015, Makeni Farms Lusaka

However, such appeals were overshadowed by his continued association with the Europeans. His image was strained further in 1959 when he chose to ally with the Dominion Party which was white dominated. The ANC leaders on the Copperbelt ordered Africans to vote for white Dominion party candidates.⁴⁵ According to ANC officials, this was simply a strategy to reduce the UFP support and dominance on the Copperbelt. Justifying this move, Titus Mukupo who was ANC General Secretary explained that the move was aimed at weakening the UFP. He stated that, “we, as ANC do not like the Dominion Party and its policies, all we are interested in is expediency, and the marriage is only restricted to the Copperbelt.”⁴⁶ To many people, this was misconstrued as partnership with whites thus, cementing their arguments that Nkumbula was pro-European. Perhaps, Nkumbula had weighed the cons and pros of supporting a party that had less political following against leaving strong UFP unchallenged. Unfortunately, during the struggle, any political party or indeed individual who chose to associate with the whites was considered a collaborator and betrayer regardless of the intentions. The ANC /Dominion alliance was used to question Nkumbula’s commitment to the struggle. “How can a person claiming to fight for African nationalism get into an unholy alliance with people bent on impeding African freedom?” wondered Preston Mwenya.⁴⁷

Personalities play a crucial role in the formation and development of political parties. UNIP for instance, had come to bear Kaunda’s stamp, while the ANC’s image had become synonymous with Nkumbula. Thus, Nkumbula’s jail sentence on the offence of killing a black constable on 9th September 1960 and subsequent imprisonment for one year had a paralysing effect on the party. Suffice to say a number of theories were attributed to the accident with Nkumbula’s opponents arguing that, because of his reckless behaviour, he was driving while intoxicated, thus questioning his ability to rule a country.⁴⁸ This incident happened a year after UNIP came on the political scene, the time when the ANC needed to consolidate itself in order to face the competition ahead. Nkumbula’s unexpected absence came at a crucial moment when his services

⁴⁵ Northern News 1959, “Vote for sir, John Moffat for Eastern Rural and Harry Franklin for Western Rural”

⁴⁶ Northern News, 1959, 14th March, 1959.

⁴⁷ UNIPA/UNIP 8/I/1-11, 19th September, 1963. Preston Mwenya, UNIP Central Committee Annual Report, 1972

⁴⁸ David C. Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence 1957-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.49

were critically needed. Lawrence Katilungu, the acting president in Nkumbula's absence put it categorically when he noted that, "Harry had intended to conduct one of his most exhaustive tours of Northern Rhodesia during the next two months."⁴⁹ Subsequently, Nkumbula's seat was declared vacant by way of absenteeism. The jail sentence had a massive blow on the ANC whose supporters were in a dilemma and their future uncertain. People wanted independence urgently, thus had no patience to wait for a president who was incarcerated. As a result the ANC went into the 1962 elections on a weaker basis to UNIP which had launched massive campaigns before elections.

The ANC in The Coalition Government, 1962

The year 1962 was a critical year in the history of Zambia's nationalist struggle as it marked a landmark towards the attainment of independence. However, this development impacted negatively on the ANC and Nkumbula's popularity. Under the Federal Constitution, the winning party was supposed to get a clear majority. Apparently, this was not the case after the elections of 1962. At this stage, the political development in Zambia lay squarely on Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula's choice. This argument was put into proper perspective by Vernon Mwaanga and Peter Matoka, who separately argued that although UNIP won 14 seats, they were insufficient to form government. Similarly, the white dominated United Federal Party (UFP) and the ANC needed more seats if they were to form government; they had only secured 16 and 7 seats respectively.⁵⁰ With a view to maintain their dominance, the UFP had already started engaging Nkumbula with the possibility of forming a coalition government.

According to Matoka, Nkumbula would have expediently accepted the tempting offer from Welensky's government which had dangled attractive incentives for Nkumbula's friendship. He had been promised a senior ministerial position and half the cabinet if he agreed to the ANC/UFP alliance. He knew the consequences of preventing the formation of an African Government, a fight he had endeavoured to achieve since the formation of the ANC. Fearing that Nkumbula would conclude an alliance with the white dominated party, UNIP started sending emissaries which included prominent politicians like Elija Mudenda, Sikota Wina, Mainza Chona, Raphael

⁴⁹ The Northern News, 13-04-61.

⁵⁰ Interview with Vernon Mwaanga and Peter Matoka on 24-10 2013 and 26-11-2013 respectively

Kombe and others. These initiated negotiations for a possible coalition. In his analysis, Peter Matoka who was in agreement with Malimba Masheke observed that Nkumbula passed the litmus test of patriotism by agreeing to form a coalition Government with UNIP in 1962. The coalition was the first African Government which facilitated independence discussions with the British Government which would not have taken place without Nkumbula's positive decision.⁵¹ Based on this decision, Nkumbula later declared that,

If I were an ambitious man seeking for personal glory, we could not have attained independence because I could have put all my strength to crush UNIP with help from colonial government, and I should have co-operated with UFP to form coalition in 1962.⁵²

Together with Kaunda, they headed an African delegation to London in 1963 where they adequately represented the views of Africans. It was through these concerted efforts by Kaunda and Nkumbula, that the federation was dissolved in 1963. This co-operation demonstrated Nkumbula's commitment to fighting for the national cause that transcended ethnic or regional politics.⁵³

However, Nkumbula's decision to forge a partnership with UNIP was not without consequences. While the leaders generally appreciated the need for unity, and endeavoured to put up a united front against foreign domination, there was far less understanding at lower level. As a consequence, political confrontations and suspicions continued to prevail among supporters of the two parties. These disturbances were a product of mistrust and suspicions that characterised the partnership. According to some UNIP supporters, Nkumbula joined the coalition with a hidden agenda of spying for the whites. Siwale a staunch UNIP supporter claimed that, "Nkumbula joined UNIP in the coalition simply to save his face, he was not genuine, but was scared of African opinion if he joined UFP."⁵⁴ Such suspicions were also reflected among the top leadership where Kaunda and Nkumbula treated each other with contempt. Several times Kaunda dared Nkumbula to leave the coalition if he was not happy. Similarly, Nkumbula threatened to

⁵¹ Interview with Malimba Masheke,

⁵² UNIPA/ANC/7/27. 22nd May, 1963. Gen. Conference, 1955-1963

⁵³ African Affairs Annual Report, 1962. by F.M.N Heath, permanent secretary. P.3

⁵⁴ UNIPA/UNIP 2/16. 3rd March, 1963. Siwale a staunch UNIP supporter alleged that Nkumbula joined UNIP in the coalition simply to save his face, he was not genuine, but was scared of African opinion if he joined UFP.

abandon the coalition if his voice was not heard. This was, indeed, a marriage of convenience, no wonder politically perpetrated violent clashes continued to escalate particularly on the Copperbelt. To some extent, the coalition was seen to be an imposed relationship between the ANC and UNIP leadership without consulting the grassroots. A UNIP member once questioned the relationship between the two parties, “Does it mean that you are only working together there in Lusaka and not here in the village.”⁵⁵

The coalition was received with mixed feelings particularly among ANC supporters who felt cheated by their leader and feared that UNIP would manipulate the agreement to its advantage. In a letter to the ANC secretary, Bruno Kapini who was an ANC supporter wrote, “people here are demanding an explanation as to the real meaning of the coalition and what benefits are there for ANC?”⁵⁶ To many ANC members, the relationship between the two parties was viewed as a dangerous trap intended to destabilise their party. Although they were all fighting for independence, the two parties differed in terms of approach and technique, while the ANC agitated for moderate nationalism, UNIP had settled for an aggressive approach. UNIP’s activities were based on what they called positive aggression, through which houses were burnt, bridges and schools were destroyed and opponents were intimidated. Showing his reservations, J.D Lungu observed that:

While I do appreciate the need for Africans of this nation to unite for the sake of liberation of our beloved country, I still feel UNIP is not a party to trust UNIP members are unscrupulous savages ... it is very surprising how ANC could even think of joining such a party which is capable of deliberately distorting the truth for their own advantage. Unless they change their dealings to suit the Congress ... I see no need for coalition.⁵⁷

In addition, UNIP leaders were conducting vigorous campaigns that the coalition signified the disbanding of the ANC, and that Nkumbula had finally joined UNIP. Having failed to obtain a

⁵⁵ UNIPA/UNIP 16/1/3, 9th January, 1963. Government and UNIP Press Release and Newsletters

⁵⁶ UNIPA/ANC 2/5, 29th January, 1963. Correspondences and Circulars, letter from Bruno Kapini to the General Secretary.

⁵⁷ UNIPA/ANC 7/44, 11th December, 1962. Letter from D.J. Lungu to Party Secretary, Job Michello

clear win in the 1962 elections, the true purpose of coalition was deliberately misinterpreted by UNIP leaders and supporters who portrayed their party as the only party in existence. Through their manoeuvres, UNIP had caused havoc to a party that was once intact, meanwhile, the ANC failed to redeem itself from these allegations thus continued to lose membership as observed by John Makuya in Balovale.⁵⁸ More appeals were made for Nkumbula to pull out of the coalition before the ANC could be destroyed completely. Moses Chisela of Lusaka made a passionate appeal to Nkumbula, “our father, please help us, break away from the coalition before 20th next month so that K.K can’t get into power. If not we will go to ask for help from K.K.”⁵⁹

In certain instances, the ANC supporters instigated violence in order to be recognised as equal partners with UNIP despite having joined the coalition with a smaller number of seats as compared to UNIP. Regardless of the fact that UNIP and the ANC had equitably shared government portfolios, it was difficult for the uneducated rural dwellers to understand the meaning of a coalition government, especially that what came out prominently was the fact that the government was headed by UNIP. This problem was compounded by the ANC officials’ failure to visit rural areas in order to clear these misconceptions and misgivings held by supporters. This was illustrated by C Sinyangwe, Provincial General Secretary who observed that at all the meetings held in Kasama during the coalition period, there was no mention of the ANC, instead Kapwepwe and Mwanakatwe told the audience that UNIP was the only political party running government.⁶⁰ Through this propaganda, the ANC supporters were, therefore, forced to relinquish their allegiance to the ANC. These concerns were confirmed by Daniel Munkombwe who told a UNIP meeting at Singani on 28th December, 1963 that “people should not waste their votes on the ANC which was non-existent in other parts of the country except Southern Province.”⁶¹ Needless to say, the coalition which was well meaning and beneficial to all Africans did a great deal of disservice to Nkumbula and contributed to the crumbling of the ANC.

It should be noted that, while the ANC members like Bruno Kapini, Stephen Phiri, and many others were only concerned with their party’s prestige, some members saw the coalition as the

⁵⁸ UNIPA/ANC 2/5. 14th July, 1962. Report on Balovale Tour, 1962-1963

⁵⁹ UNIPA/ANC 7/41, 16th November, 1962. General Correspondence , 1962-1970

⁶⁰ UNIPA/ANC 2/22, 21st January, 1962. C. Sinyangwe, Provincial General Secretary, Kasama.

⁶¹ NAZ/SP 4/2/171, 7th January, 1964. Report of Meetings by Political Parties, UNIP Rally at Singani

only possible way to attaining independence. As such, they saw no need of having two political parties for Africans whose sole purpose was to achieve political freedom from the colonialists. There was a strong feeling that in the interest of the country, the two parties should merge. Already the two parties had demonstrated that they could co-operate in times of necessity, as such their separate existence was proving irrelevant. In his resignation letter, Chembe Lombe who had served the ANC in various portfolios questioned the need for two political parties when it was possible to fight collectively.⁶² Because of the number of seats that UNIP took to the coalition and its popularity at the time it automatically became a preferred party to many people.

Although the ANC faced a lot of frustrations emanating from external forces, some of the party's difficulties were a direct result of Nkumbula's failure to salvage the party from internal woes. From the time of the split, Nkumbula paid little attention to principles of motivating and binding the membership together. In 1963, the ANC lost a number of its political heavy weights. Job Michello who was the Party National treasurer resigned to form the People's Democratic Party (PDC). Michello was supported by other defectors such as John Kameya, A.M Banda and many others whose presence in the ANC was cardinal. Although the PDC did not last long before it was disbanded, the implications of this split were massive on the ANC. After this break away, Nkumbula and Michello were locked in fights of character assassination, thus weakening the party further. At this point some ANC supporters were tired of these defections and needed leaders to assure them of the party's strength. One member complained that, Michello's split had left the party divided. "People here are confused with Michello and Kalenga's split, they have lost confidence in the party because leaders at the headquarters have failed to stick together and assure us of continued struggle."⁶³ In the meantime, UNIP was growing from strength to strength by establishing sound structures.

According to Hartmut Hess, for a party to operate successfully, it must have well established structures to attract active and vibrant grass root support. The local branches were responsible for disseminating party ideals, and in their absence, an organisational vacuum was created. The ANC's foundation remained shaky and susceptible to collapsing. The structures also required vibrant party organisers at branch and grassroots levels. In Malimba Masheke's view, if the

⁶² UNIPA/ANC 7/47. 1st November, 1963. F.B. Chembe's resignation letter to Nkumbula.

⁶³ UNIPA/ANC 7/46. 9th September, 1963. Gen. Correspondences.

ANC's local structures were as powerful as those for UNIP, the former would have won more seats in 1962. This was the motivation behind UNIP's vigorous campaign especially in rural areas where the ANC still commanded good support.⁶⁴ Addressing the Party's National Assembly, Nkumbula acknowledged that the party was undergoing a difficult time in terms of organisation. He admitted that the party needed a great upsurge in its organisational machinery. On the other hand, UNIP had embarked on serious organisation of its local branches.⁶⁵ Viable local organisation was indeed a prerequisite to any well established institution or political party. It could, therefore, be argued that in the absence of strong local structures, the ANC could not resist the UNIP force. Similarly, William Kayoma noted, "many people have ignored the ANC because Mr Nkumbula is idle, he does not pay attention in areas of party organisation, as such our party lacks political emancipation and enthusiasm. We do not have local offices to take our problems."⁶⁶ After the formation of UNIP, the ANC leaders needed to take country wide tours to reposition the party as one that was still committed to the fight for African freedom. Effective political parties the world over were those that demonstrated internal stability and coherent. One supporter complained that:

Why was ANC an old party so weak, we do not even know our ministers UNIP organisers are found in rural and urban areas People in Luwingu are willing to support the ANC but the problem is there are no influential officers ... You only organise meetings in Mufulira neglecting other areas like Kitwe, Chingola, Bancroft and Kalulushi ... we demand your immediate visit."⁶⁷

In the midst of such complaints, the ANC found it difficult to compete effectively with UNIP which had good party structures some of which were former ANC offices.

Political leaders were supposed to be a source of inspiration for their supporters. In the absence of such inspiration, members were bound to lose track. From the 1960s, the ANC national leaders were seen to restrict their efforts to places along the line of rail. Reporting on Balovale and Mankoya ANC situation, Yawano Sandande observed that while Kaunda and his officials

⁶⁴ Interview with Malimba Masheke

⁶⁵ UNIPA/ANC 7/1, 18th February, 1964. Presidential Speech.

⁶⁶ UNIPA/ANC 2/10, File 22. 4th September, 1961. Party Correspondence, 1957-1963.

⁶⁷ UNIPA/ANC Lua 8/7/12, 3rd March, 1963.

had visited Chief Ndungu, none of the ANC senior officials had ever visited the same chief. It appeared as though UNIP had more respect for people in rural areas than the ANC, as a result many people in that area had joined UNIP.⁶⁸ These complaints were not only unique to Balovale, but also to other parts of the country. If the party was to attract members, Albert Lisulo noted:

Top leadership must visit chiefs to seek their support, appoint educated men of courageous characters, and establish regional stations Please Mr secretary send us our president or Mr Banda, people are asking us questions which we cannot answer, the absence of Headquarters officials has made it difficult for us to work effectively ... We are tired of having confidence in a president seen only on pictures and not his visits.⁶⁹

Stephen Phiri a party official for the ANC expressed concern that it had become difficult for the people of Kawambwa to continue supporting a party that was absent. He noted that, “even us who were supposed to answer queries we cannot because our president has forgotten that he was fighting for the whole country not only Southern Province where he was concentrating.”⁷⁰ At this stage therefore, the ethnic factor was not a serious issue on the ANC’s popularity though it was not completely absent. At most of its rallies, UNIP portrayed the ANC as an ethnic party whose leaders were not ready to accommodate people from other provinces. Addressing a UNIP meeting at Mochipapa in Choma, Mulenga and Situmbeko claimed that their resignations from the ANC were as a result of the party’s ethnic tendencies.⁷¹ Similar allegations were being labeled against UNIP, with the ANC leaders claiming that UNIP was an ethnic Party dominated by Bemba speaking people from Luapula and Northern Provinces. In his Press Release, John Kalenga, who was UNIP’s former Provincial Secretary observed that:

UNIP was a barbaric party. It is clear that North-Western Province played a major role in the United National Independence Party but has been considered as second class citizens to Northern Province ... Iam not being tribal but people of North-

⁶⁸ UNIPA/ANC 2/7-16, 14th July, 1962. Report on Mankoya District

⁶⁹ UNIPA/ANC 2/22, 27th July, 1963. Balovale Tour

⁷⁰ UNIPA/ANC 2/15, 4th March, 1964. Letter from Stephen Phiri to the party General Secretary

⁷¹ NAZ/SP 3/25/43. 28th December, 1963. Political Parties’ Correspondence, UNIP Minutes

Western have contributed financially to UNIP struggle, 75% of the funds being used for Bemba private affairs Since 1962 UNIP had sponsored three people from North Western, while hundreds had been sponsored from Northern Province.⁷²

Based on the above argument, it was evident that ethnic sentiments were used as a propaganda tool by different parties to woo support, while at the same time using it as a weapon to de-campaign their political opponents. UNIP leaders were claiming that their Copperbelt supporters were denied access to fish in Sinazongwe and Namwala. At the same time, some people from southern province were also claiming of not being allowed to sell their fowls freely on the Copperbelt by virtue of being Tonga. In Eastern Province the ANC supporters alleged that the party was failing to operate freely and even hold meetings because the Ngonis were all supporting UNIP.⁷³

Nkumbula's problems were further compounded by financial challenges which the party was facing. This was acknowledged by Mohamed Salih who observed that financial woes had been the fate of many political parties in Africa, where in some cases these leaders tended to use their personal resources to support their parties.⁷⁴ The ANC did not escape this tragedy. Apparently, political parties depended on people's good will, and in a situation where membership dwindles, even the inflow of such resources as finances begun to shrink. The ANC's weak financial capability seriously affected its capacity to mount and sustain an effective struggle against UNIP which was growing at a faster rate in terms of support and organisation. In 1968, Aaron Mukonda the ANC's District Chairperson complained that few days before elections, they were told that the ANC had no money to pay for each candidate.⁷⁵

The ANC leaders at local levels continued expressing their need to be funded by the Headquarters which unfortunately was slowly drifting into bankruptcy. Without finances it was

⁷² UNIPA/UNIP 7/1/12. 14th February, 1963. Presidential Affairs, Press Release by John Kalenga former Provincial Secretary for UNIP member.

⁷³ NAZ/SP 4/1/117. 1st September, 1963. District Reports, Choma.

⁷⁴ Mohamed Salih, M.A. (ed.) *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance* (London: Pluto Press, 2003) p.

⁷⁵ NAZ/SP 4/1/171, 21st August, 1968. Aaron Mukonda, wondered how the party was going to win if it could not afford to pay twenty-five pounds for each candidate.

very difficult for officials to mobilise people. Responding to S.E. Mumba of Eastern Province, the ANC national secretary Mungoni Liso acknowledged that lack of funds had worsened the ANC political situation. He however assured supporters not to lose hope since the party was doing everything possible to rectify the situation.⁷⁶ Some ANC members were complaining that while UNIP had fulltime paid officials to organise the party at all levels, the ANC was unable even to provide transport for these officers' mobility. Enock Mkandi reported that a house which should be turned into an office was available at 500 pounds, but the party was unable to purchase it due to lack of funds. This according to Mkandi made it impossible for the ANC leaders to penetrate remote areas like UNIP was doing.⁷⁷ With these problems the party was slowly being outwitted by UNIP which had received a lot of financial support from its well wishers.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that party affiliations and support were determined by the political environment that prevailed at a particular time. From 1948 to 1958, the ANC enjoyed political monopoly as the only party for Africans. During this period, issues of ethnicity or regionalism were not apparent. With the coming of another party for Africans, ZANC and later UNIP, party support was no longer automatic, people had to choose which party to render their support to. It has further been shown that the ANC's split in 1958 had nothing or little to do with ethnicity. At this point, ethnicity or political credentials had little relevance to the struggle since Africans were fighting a common enemy, nationalism. Because of its moderate approach to the struggle, the Congress was seen to be old-fashioned and not capable of attaining independence. Although Nkumbula remained resolute to the nationalist struggle, his soft stance towards the whites caused resentment especially from the young radicals within the party. It has also been established that some young leaders such as Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe and Kaunda developed leadership ambitions which they failed to access while in ANC. In the period under consideration, African party politics in Northern Rhodesia revolved around the ANC and UNIP which solicited for support from the people of the territory using different strategies.

The chapter also attempted to establish a link between the ANC's declining popularity and the coalition of 1962. UNIP manipulated the situation by misinterpreting the facts about the

⁷⁶ UNIPA/ANC 7/1/14. 11th June, 1964. Election Bulletins by ANC

⁷⁷ UNIPA/ANC 2/22. 23rd July, 1963. Gen. Correspondence

coalition. People were made to believe that the coalition was actually a merger signifying the ANC's demise. The chapter has demonstrated that by 1963, ANC's problems ranged from internal to external challenges. Apart from being hit with financial difficulties, the party's local structures were crumbling thus hampering smooth communication between the grass root supporters and the national leadership. However, despite all these hardships, the Chapter has illustrated that ANC continued to exist in different parts of the country which guaranteed its existence till 1973 when the One Party State was introduced. The discussion did not dispute the fact that the ANC's stronghold was in Southern and Central Provinces. Given this background, the next chapter attempts to assess the operations of the ANC in the post-independence era.

CHAPTER THREE

MULTIPARTY POLITICS IN ZAMBIA'S FIRST REPUBLIC, 1964-1973.

Introduction

This chapter interrogates the political environment that existed after the attainment of independence, and how political parties re-adjusted to new realities. It also seeks to answer pertinent questions such as how the ethnic factor featured in the First Republic whose operations were supposed to be based on multiparty principles. The introduction of the One-Party Participatory Democracy will also be examined in this chapter. Further, the chapter discusses the Choma Declaration in the context of its implication on the politics of Southern Province and the country as a whole.

Zambian politicians, intellectuals and Africans in general played a significant role in confronting the colonial government which was seen as a hindrance to their independence. However, the fight against colonial domination was specifically tailored to inspire the struggle for political independence, and had little concern on post independence relationships. According to Leroy Vail, African nationalism was to a large extent a negative force which only targeted colonialism with very little positive vision or rather consideration about the nature of the society to come after independence.¹ Although Vail's observation may not be a total reflection of the struggle, it gives a picture that nationalists believed that national unity would be an ultimate result of political freedom. In other words, politics was centered on fighting the common enemy in the name of colonial rule. As a result, the African nationalist movements did not reflect significant ethnic divisions.² However, the realities hidden behind the anti-imperialism struggle was soon to resurface, and the nationalist rhetoric about unity and nation building lost its primacy to the common man whose needs had shifted with time.

¹ Leroy Vail, 'Ethnicity in Southern Africa History' in Leroy Vail (ed.), *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (London: University of California Press, 1989), p. ix See also, UNIPA/ANC 5/15, Miscellaneous

² Robert Molteno, 'Cleavage and conflict in Zambian politics: a study in Sectionalism' in William Tordoff (ed), *Politics in Zambia* (Bristol: Manchester University Press, 1974), p.62

The Political Environment after Independence

The post independence political context was significantly different from that which prevailed during the struggle. Having attained independence, ruling parties tended to personalise the political stage. In the post independent Zambia, the opposition ANC operated under very difficult circumstances in that the party had to prove its relevance to the politics of the country. During this period, the UNIP government viewed opposition parties as channels of destruction aimed at perpetuating colonial influence. Perhaps this could answer why within the early years of independence, Zambia was already contemplating introducing a one party state.³ This in itself made it difficult for opposition parties to compete effectively with the ruling party. For instance, the ANC had to redefine its political direction after independence with a view of adapting to the new political dynamics. Apart from providing checks and balances on the party in government, the ANC also became the voice of the marginalised. For instance, in 1972, Nkumbula called for the removal of the president's excess powers which were capable of turning him into a dictator.⁴

After independence Zambia experienced a momentous change in the political realm. While the forces of independence had triumphed, those of national unity and peace were yet to be achieved. In a bid to take full control of government operations, and ensure national unity, UNIP was determined not to tolerate any destructive forces from any quarter. Therefore, although the First Republic was a multiparty government, minority political parties were viewed with contempt and suspicion. Any opposition to UNIP was tantamount to rejecting the government of the day. As such UNIP employed various tactics to hinder opposition activities.⁵ A similar situation prevailed in other African countries like Ghana, Kenya and Uganda where new leaders denounced the opposition by claiming that they hindered national unity. Ruling parties claimed that the opposition's pre independence acceptance was for expediency, and that they were no longer tolerable.⁶ In his parliamentary debate, Malama observed that, instead of fostering unity

³ Jonathan Moyo, *Voting for Democracy: A Study of Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1992), p.23

⁴ Times of Zambia, 11th July, 1972.

⁵ UNIPA/ANC 7/84, 1962-1966, Press Release

⁶ Naomi Chazan, Peter Lewis, Robert Mortiner, Donald Rothchild and Stephen Stedman, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (London: Lynn Rienner Publications, 1999), p.48

and development, the opposition ANC was operating on the basis of prejudice, rather than consolidating UNIP, the ANC was giving undue criticism to the ruling party.⁷

The young Zambian government through its propaganda continued to portray the opposition party as an enemy of peace, unity and development. Supporting this perspective, Reuben Kamanga in his parliamentary debate claimed that, “the African National Congress in certain tribal areas where they still exist, have tried to prevent the activities of government from spreading satisfactorily.”⁸ This stance however was refuted by the ANC leaders who felt the government was deliberately avoiding taking development to areas dominated by the opposition in order for their supporters to suffer. Development was used as a weapon to woo people to the ruling party.

During this period, the ANC was faced with challenges of not only securing support from people still engrossed in the fever of excitement with political freedom, but also to prove their non alignment with the colonial masters. At this stage, everyone wanted to be associated with the party in power. Similarly, some ANC supporters did not see the need to continue opposing the government they helped create. Tendering his resignation from the ANC in 1964, B.F. Chembe explained how the ANC and UNIP managed to defeat the UFP in 1962 by forming a coalition government. Together the two parties fought the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland until it was dissolved in 1963. He wondered why the two parties could continue to oppose each other instead of working together.⁹ In view of this, the ANC had to redefine its political objectives if it was to prove its relevance to the new political dispensation. The ANC leadership dedicated its operations to speak for the people and to counter certain laws that were deemed to favour the ruling elite. Rejecting the introduction of the one party state, Nkumbula argued that the one party state would generate fear and insecurity among citizens since the administrative machinery will be bulldozed by a political clique. He further called for the release of all political detainees.¹⁰ At

⁷ Parliamentary Debates of the Fourth Session of the Second National Assembly, 12th January-9th March, 1972. P.162

⁸ Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First Legislative Council, July 7th August 27th, (1964), p.515

⁹ UNIPA/ANC 7/46. 01st November, 1963. A letter of resignation from F.B Chembe to H.M. Nkumbula

¹⁰ UNIPA/ANC 7/71-74. 28th December, 1972. Minutes of the National Assembly Held at The Party's Headquarters from 28th-30th December, 1972

the same time, the party had to contain frustration and intimidation from the ruling party. For those in UNIP, the most honorable move the ANC should have taken after independence was to unite with the ruling party to foster national development rather than being irresponsible opponents of constructive development.¹¹ On the other hand, the ANC through its leaders was determined to remain a government in waiting.

Political conflicts were not uncommon during the First Republic, and when they occurred, they were always attributed to the presence of ethnic or regional appeals particularly in the opposition parties. Despite all the difficulties highlighted in chapter two faced by the ANC, the party still remained a force to reckon with. At independence, it was the main opposition party as well as the main threat that UNIP faced in establishing total political dominance. Addressing Regional Secretaries in 1967, the Vice President Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe acknowledged the presence of the ANC in Eastern, Central and Southern Provinces. He expressed the need to eliminate these ANC pockets by all means if UNIP was to remain the only dominant party.¹² Violence, intimidation as well as portraying the party as a nuisance which only appealed to parochial loyalties were among the methods employed to rid the government of opposition.¹³ The UNIP led government did not only perceive competing parties as inappropriate, but also potentially destabilising bases for ethnically based conflicts.

Given this scenario, how then did the ruling party react to what it considered an intrusion by an opposition party? The UNIP Government tried to discredit the ANC which was their main threat between 1964 and 1971 when the UPP was formed. This was a common trend in most African States that had just attained independence where opposition parties were perceived as remnants of colonial loyalists seeking to debilitate the young governments. In Kenya for instance, the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) discredited the opposition Kenya African Development Union (KADU) as an ethnic party bent on destabilising peace loving people of that

¹¹ Zambia Mail, 13th February, 1970, in an article under title, 'ANC warned of elimination,' Kaunda warned that if ANC continued to misbehave, then the party would face total elimination. If the party was interested in the wellbeing of Zambians, the party should have disbanded to help fight against Ian Smith's threats.

¹² UNIPA/UNIP 7/1/1, 1967. Vice President's Address to all Ministers and Regional Secretaries.

¹³ Thomas Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-party Dominance in Zambia' in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7,3 (Oct 1969), pp 407-424

country.¹⁴ Similarly, in Zambia, UNIP embarked on a crackdown of the ANC using government machinery. The police and economic benefits were among the useful instruments of suppression. The appreciation of the ANC as an alternative party in the post independence era can only be realised after taking a close survey of the political environment of that time.

The UNIP government sought the services of the police in suppressing the opposition parties. The police force, a government wing entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining law and order, to protect and defend the rights of all citizens was unfortunately working for the survival of UNIP as a ruling party.¹⁵ While calling on police officers to perform their duties in a non-partisan manner, government officials did not acknowledge that supporting UNIP against other political parties was being partisan. Trying to be loyal and obedient to the ruling UNIP, the police were discriminatory in the manner they enforced the law. Whereas, opposition offenders were severely punished, offences instigated by members of the ruling party were deliberately ignored or underplayed. On 22nd July 1968, an ANC supporter in Kanyama was murdered by UNIP cadres but no arrests were made. While in August, 1968 Timothy Mukuka a UNIP youth was killed during a confrontation in African Workers' Compound on the Copperbelt, and within two days eight people were arrested and charged with murder.¹⁶ The ANC officials on the Copperbelt claimed that the police were making mass arrests of the ANC supporters while real perpetrators of violence were deliberately left loose on the streets. During the political confrontations which erupted in Kafue between UNIP and the ANC supporters, seventy-eight people were arrested out of whom sixty-one were ANC members. Only seventeen were UNIP.¹⁷ The ratio of the people arrested was an indication of the biasness exhibited by the police in the manner they handled offenders from different parties.

The government openly used the police as a potent tool in fostering UNIP ideals. Used as a weapon for intimidating opposition, the police did everything within their means to ensure that

¹⁴ Mohamed M.A. Salih (ed), *African Political Parties: the Evolution, Institutionalization and Governance* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 57

¹⁵ UNIPA/UNIP 7/14/1, (1967-1975). Addressing the police officers at Lilayi on 3rd August, 1967, Fines Bulawayo told the officers that there should complete obedience and loyalty to the political party that constituted government.

¹⁶ Times of Zambia, 16-08-1968.

¹⁷ UNIPA/ANC 2/10, 1965. Report on the Political situation on the Copperbelt, see also Zambia Mail, 10-08-1970

UNIP demands were enforced. By sparing UNIP offenders, the police found themselves in a compromising position against the principles of fair play. For the ANC supporters, police protection was almost non-existent as such they resorted to taking the law into their own hands as a way of defending themselves. Sibabba Nsebeele, a staunch ANC supporter boasted of how he had made it difficult for UNIP supporters to organise their party in Simwatachela area. He claimed that the ANC was defending its stronghold because UNIP had made it impossible for them to hold meetings in Eastern Province and the police was not being helpful.¹⁸ With dictatorial powers at their disposal, the police were able to arrest and detained political offenders. In some instances, the police attended opposition meetings to note what was being said and use it to victimise the opposition. In his address to the National Assembly, Nkumbula observed that the police was failing to meet people's expectations because most of them were recruited from the UNIP wing of youths. He noted that officers were recruited from the Youth Service which was purely a UNIP wing.¹⁹ Consequently, the maintenance of law and order was segregatively used to intimidate members of the opposition. In 1970, after the ANC was outlawed in Livingstone, the area was infiltrated with a heavy presence of police purporting to instill law and order. Similarly, Enock Shooba, Mumbwa ANC MP accused the police of protecting UNIP Youths. He observed that "every time UNIP youths were arrested, the government ordered their immediate release."²⁰ Such systematic repression by the UNIP government prevented the opposition from becoming a powerful force.

The institution of chiefs was considered a suitable ally in the government's efforts to rid the UNIP of opposing forces. The utilisation of traditional leaders had proved useful to the British Colonial Government in administering their colonies. They governed through the Indirect Rule system which placed traditional leaders at the centre of enforcing government propaganda. The Kaunda government realised the relevance of this institution not only in terms of fostering development, but also as a tool for suppressing political opposition. In other words, chiefs and headmen were active political partners with government. In his presidential speech, Kaunda

¹⁸ UNIPA/ANC 7/4, 5th March, 1968. Letter to the National Secretary

¹⁹ Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First Legislative Assembly, 7th July – 27th August, 1964. p. 348

²⁰ Parliamentary Debates of the 4th Session of the 2nd National Assembly, p.109, and Daily Mail, 16-02-1970, See also Michael Wright, *Zambia: I Changed My Mind* (London: Johnson Publications LTD, 1972),P 45

stated that “any chief who fails to perform government functions by not entertaining opposition to unity and development.”²¹ In the process of aiding government to crush the opposition, the chiefs’ ability to function on neutral basis was eroded. Chiefs were expected to dismantle opposition elements in their territories by proclaiming the importance of unity which, according to the ruling party would only be attained if the opposition was outlawed. Traditional leaders were to ensure the permeation of government influence down to the people. This was to be achieved by not tolerating the opposition which according to Kaunda was detrimental to the wellbeing of the people of Zambia.²² Understandably, the traditional leaders had their positions and influence to protect, as such working with, and for the party in power was the only option. Under such a hostile environment, the sustenance and survival of opposition parties like the ANC became difficult.

Chiefs who were perceived to align themselves with the views of the opposition were either threatened or punished. In Luwingu, two Messengers and two Kapasos were allegedly replaced by UNIP supporters for being sympathetic with the ANC.²³ In his parliamentary debate, Nkumbula condemned government for making chiefs irrelevant. He called for reforms to protect chiefs, who were supposed to take care of everybody regardless of their political affiliation. This point was raised when chief Monze was allegedly removed from office for no apparent reason, except that the opposition ANC was strong there.²⁴

Threats on chiefs were made by senior officers of the ruling party, even by the President. During elections traditional leaders were warned of punitive measures if the ruling parties’ candidates lost. These threats included withdraw of economic development projects and government support in areas dominated by the opposition party. After losing parliamentary seats in Sinazongwe during the 1968 elections, area headmen were told that the intended clinics would not be built because people had voted for the opposition. In a letter to all headmen in Sinazongwe, Nzunga Siazela UNIP’s Regional Publicity Secretary warned the people not to expect government to prioritise their area in terms of development since they had continued to collaborate with the

²¹ UNIPA/UNIP 1/30, 5th November, 1971. 1964-1973. Presidential Circulars

²² UNIPA/UNIP 3/5/2/2, Ministerial statement of 1st February, 1969

²³ UNIPA/ANC 2/15, Stephen Phiri reporting on ANC operations in Luwingu

²⁴ Parliamentary Debates of the 4th Session of the 2nd National Assembly, 12th January to 9th March, 1970. UNIPA/ANC 2/15, Nkumbula called for the reinstating of Chief Monze.

opposition ANC.²⁵ Kaunda reiterated these threats when he warned village headmen and chiefs in Gwembe of serious consequences if the nineteen UNIP candidates lost during the local elections of 27th August 1970.²⁶ These threats were reiterated when UNIP lost these seats. Chiefs' participation in partisan politics inevitably placed themselves in an awkward position against subjects who may have different political alignments. Actually, chiefs played a major role in creating a non-level playing field for all political contestants in their jurisdiction.

To safeguard their positions, chiefs had little option but to de-campaign opposition candidates in their territories. The chairperson for The House of Chiefs, Chief Gawa Undi expressed the position of chiefs when he assured government of continued and unreserved support from this body. He stated that:

We as chiefs wish to make our stand clear that, all chiefs in Zambia were happy with the progress and developments achieved by Kenneth Kaunda since independence Power hungry preachers like the ANC and the UPP should not count on our co-operation, they should be stamped out in the interest of peace and harmony in Zambia.²⁷

This was evidence of how traditional leaders were able to wield their authority by imposing their political views and choices on their subjects. Under such conditions, the ANC or indeed any opposition party found it difficult to compete equitably with UNIP and to expand its membership.

During the First Republic, victimisation and intimidation was a common phenomenon. Chiefs resorted to threatening people with deportation if they continued giving the ANC a political base at the expense of UNIP. As early as 1965, chiefs Mzamani of Mpenzeni District, Nyanje and Mwanjabantu both of Petauke District had banned the holding of ANC meetings in their areas.²⁸ A similar situation prevailed in other provinces where chiefs claimed that they needed to accord

²⁵ UNIPA/ANC 7/81, 1963-1970, 10th November, 1968. Gen. Correspondence.

²⁶ Zambia Daily Mail, 10th August, 1970. Kaunda warned that development would only be implemented through UNIP Councillors.

²⁷ ZAMBIA: House of Chiefs Minutes of 14th July, 1971

²⁸ UNIPA/ANC 3/14. 1st September, 1965. Tour of Eastern Province, 1965, where Morris Chulu, ANC acting Provincial Secretary complained of the hostility the party faced from the chiefs in the province.

UNIP a chance to rule peacefully. Reporting on party activities in Kalomo of Southern Province, Artson Malambo stated that an unnamed chief in the district was threatening to deport all those not supporting UNIP. Similar sentiments were echoed in Rufunsa where chiefs were allegedly going round urging people to vote for UNIP candidates if they needed economic development in their respective districts. Mutinta who was ANC Councillor blamed chiefs for the ANC's poor performance in the area.²⁹ Chiefs' political influence was to be reflected in the way they fought to eliminate the opposition in their jurisdiction. Chiefs Mungaila and Macha of the Tonga people were cited among those who were hostile to the opposition ANC. Chief Macha was allegedly forcing people to join UNIP since one of his sons had a portfolio in the party, as such he tried to prevent the ANC from holding meetings in his chiefdom. Addressing a traditional gathering, chief Macha pointed out that, "God helps those who help themselves. UNIP is now in government, therefore, everyone who wants to benefit is expected to belong to government, which is UNIP."³⁰ It should however be stated that despite these hardships the ANC continued to exist and to give UNIP a credible challenge.

Despite chiefs being used as a tool of suppression, it should be noted that traditional leaders also played a critical role in reconciling politicians. When Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe resigned from UNIP and formed the UPP, realising the influential role chiefs played, Nkoloso had appealed to Kaunda to summon prominent chiefs from Northern Province to reconcile the two leaders.³¹ In this case, the chiefs were expected to play a mediating role, except they mostly got involved when UNIP was inflicted. But when opposition parties complained of state harassment, chiefs stayed aloof. Chiefs claimed that it was their duty to ensure the elimination of divisive and destructive forces. Apparently, the ANC as an opposition party fell into the category of divisive forces and was considered detrimental to the interests of the majority. It was within this hostile environment that Nkumbula and his ANC had to thrive and continue to render the needed checks and balances to an all powerful UNIP. Justifying the need to outlaw the ANC, Sikota Wina

²⁹ UNIPA/ANC 7/33, 1960-1972, Historical Extracts of the ANC. Reporting on party affairs in Lusaka Rural East Constituency, Councillor L. Mutinta complained that Chiefs in the area were intimidating ANC members while campaigning for UNIP.

³⁰ NAZ/SP 4/2/171, (Adm.18/1/2).6th August, 1964. Report of Meetings by Political Parties

³¹ UNIPA/UNIP, 31st August, 1971. Letter from Nkoloso to General Secretary to Government, A.M. Milner

observed that the most political problems were caused by the ANC. He indicated that “the ANC has been giving us problems for over five years, actually since independence the party has become a nuisance.”³²

The kind of democracy that existed during the First Republic was characterised by acts of violence, intimidation and suppression, thus disadvantaging the opposition. Excited for being the party in government, UNIP youths often conducted random Card inspection to ensure that every person had a UNIP card. These inspections targeted strategic places such as bus terminus, road blocks and work places. Travellers without UNIP cards were barred from boarding public buses. In certain instances people were forced to purchase UNIP cards regardless of whether they belonged to UNIP or the ANC. Consequently, freedom of political association was not tolerated by the ruling party. By and large, the tenets of democracy were violated in the First Republic. It was reported in the Times of Zambia that Jockery Kapulu a nineteen year old student and his friend were approached by a gang of UNIP youth armed with sticks and planks who demanded for UNIP cards, when they failed to produce them they were severely beaten.³³ In Chingola UNIP Youths stationed themselves at bus stops and people without UNIP cards were not allowed to board buses. In Chiwempala, Chingola Governor Joseph Mulilo was sent home to get his card before he could be allowed to pass.³⁴ All these barbaric acts were done under the guise of card checking.

Consequently, the ANC supporters were scared to come out in the open to express their political inclination for fear of victimisation. While the ruling party continued priding itself that Zambia and Botswana were the only African countries that had democratic governments for a long period after independence, the tenets of democracy were not adhered to. Fines Bulawayo, Minister of State complained that the political disunity in the country was caused by the opposition. Supporting the debate for the need to introduce a one party state, he argued that, “in the entire Africa, we are the only country with Botswana still tolerating the opposition. Countries

³² Parliamentary Debates of the Fourth Session of the Second National Assembly, 12th January-9th March, 1972

³³ Times of Zambia, 18-12-1971.

³⁴ Times of Zambia, 22-11-1971, Under the title ‘UNIP Youths run Amok ‘

like Tanzania, Malawi and Zaire were One Party States and were experiencing peace.”³⁵ With such intolerance to political freedom, was difficult for the ANC or indeed any other political party to expand its support base and function effectively.

Incidents of violence instigated by UNIP youths were prominent in areas where the ANC still had sound support such as Mufulira, and parts of Eastern Province. In Eastern Province the death of Macdonald Lushinga a staunch ANC supporter was followed by vicious confrontations between the two parties. If the ANC was as inconsequential as portrayed by Mulford who contends that by independence, the ANC had become a loosely ethnically organised party, one cannot help imagine why UNIP had to take all these measures to suppress it. The attempts to eliminate the ANC, was evidence enough that the party was still a viable entity on the political arena as Mulford indicated.³⁶

For UNIP youths, democracy was perceived as nothing more than a forum through which they could protect the ideals of their party. They exerted pressure by trying to stifle opposing voices. The ANC supporters who failed to produce UNIP cards on demand attracted severe punishment from these youths. In Chingola, UNIP youths would burn houses belonging to the ANC supporters in what the latter called campaign of terror. Julius Namakando an ANC organiser on the Copperbelt whose house was set ablaze appealed to UNIP to discipline their youths otherwise the situation on the Copperbelt would be chaotic.³⁷ Unsurprisingly, the ANC supporters did not possess these cards, thus landing them into conflict with the UNIP Youths who apparently had a way of avoiding police nets. Given this scenario, it would be appropriate to contend that opposition parties that existed after independence were very resilient.

In 1964 the ANC had only managed to win ten seats in parliament. The small number of seats for the opposition convinced UNIP officials that the party was too weak to last long. However, after the 1968 elections, the scenario changed, the ANC secured twenty-three seats. The ANC's position in Western Province had strengthened especially after the UP was proscribed in 1967. When UP was banned, the people of Western Province switched their support to the ANC, and in

³⁵ Parliamentary Debates of the 4th Session of the 2nd National Assembly, 12th January-9th March, 1972, p.184

³⁶ Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence*, p. 344

³⁷ Daily Mail, 17th February, 1970.

the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1968, the ANC won eight out of eleven seats in the province.³⁸ At this point, UNIP leadership realised that the ANC was not going to die naturally without stringent measures being employed as earlier thought.

It was evident that after the 1968 elections, the UNIP government took on a new political drive of using the civil service to frustrate the opposition. Being a civil servant became a privilege for UNIP supporters. Kaunda was quoted as having declared that:

From now on if I appoint a senior civil servant, it is because he is a loyal party man If those who do not support UNIP want to be workers, they must wait until doomsday when Mr Nkumbula comes in ... all appointments I will make will be political ... any disloyalty to appointing authority would warrant dismissal and such a one would find it difficult to find employment in the country.³⁹

Moreover civil servants who aligned or were perceived to be sympathetic of the ANC cause faced disciplinary actions. In Choma, Governor Jonathan Ntambo gave civil servants and the police a three weeks ultimatum to bow to UNIP or face dismissals from their employment. In its endeavour to implement the policy of 'it pays to be UNIP' it was reported that five people lost their jobs at Kafue City Council for being ANC sympathisers.⁴⁰ Addressing a seminar in Livingstone, the Minister of Labour and Social Services Wilson Chakulya called on all employers to adopt a 'No card no job' policy, as this was the only way to pull everybody to UNIP.⁴¹ Bright Sikota claimed that he was dismissed from ZBC by virtue of being a strong supporter of the ANC. Similar sentiments were echoed by Bornwell Kaliyangile who claimed to have been charged with disobedience after being found with an ANC card.⁴² In his parliamentary debate, Nkumbula complained that teaching staff in Southern Province were being intimidated as

³⁸ Robert Molteno, 'Independent Zambia: Achievements and Prospects' in William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia* (Bristol: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 137

³⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 31st December, 1968. See also Michael Wright, *Zambia: I Changed My Mind* (London: Johnston Publications LTD, 1972), p.52. Where the Governor warned the police and other civil servants in Choma, were given three weeks to bow to UNIP or get out, and that ANC members were to be evicted from government houses.

⁴⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 20th January, 1969. UNIP is said to have embarked on a policy of 'it pays to be UNIP' which saw five people losing their jobs at Kafue City Council for being ANC sympathisers.

⁴¹ *Times of Zambia*, 10th August, 1972.

⁴² UNIPA/ANC 8/11 Miscellaneous

they were perceived to be ANC supporters.⁴³ Mungoni Liso wondered whether “it was possible to reconcile humanism which was based on a man centered society with the slogan ‘it pays to belong ... if the slogan holds then it means anyone who is not a member of UNIP is not a man.’”⁴⁴ The UNIP government was contradicting itself by advocating unity and respect for man while at the same time refusing to accept dissent views.

Under such repressive tendencies, opposition political parties could not thrive and compete equitably with the party in government. Nkumbula further noted that the mines in Mufulira were dismissing people on the basis of their political affiliation. These concerns were confirmed by Copperbelt Provincial Minister, Shapi. Addressing women protesters, Shapi was quoted as having ordered government senior officers to remove people believed to be associated with the UPP.⁴⁵ In 1971, Chambishi’s Bottle Store in Ndola was closed because the businessman was believed to be associated with the UPP operations in the area. Commenting on Kapwepwe’s resignation from UNIP, A.M. Milner who was UNIP’s Secretary General warned that the mighty party UNIP would not hesitate to crush Kapwepwe together with his supporters.⁴⁶ Chibesa Kankasa a leader of the women brigade organised mass protests against the UPP. The protesting women called on government to remove all the officers and senior civil servants from the mines who were associated with the UPP. The UPP as an opposition party did not escape the firm and suppressive arm of the ruling party. Similarly, police officers who gave permits for the ANC gatherings were reprimanded either by being fired or transferred to rural areas. District Governor S.A. Sikufweba demanded for the transfer of Ottireno who was Monze Officer in Charge for allowing ANC to hold a public meeting on 7th December, 1969 even after being advised otherwise.⁴⁷

Another weapon used by UNIP to stifle the opposition was the use of development. There was a deliberate move of sidelining areas under the opposition in terms of developmental projects. In

⁴³ Parliamentary Debates First Session of First Legislative Assembly, July 7th –August 27th, 1964, p.199, see also UNIPA/ANC 7/2. 23rd March, 1970

⁴⁴ Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the Second National Assembly, 13th February- 6th April 1968, p. 215

⁴⁵ UNIPA/ANC 101/28/3, 27th August, 1971. Political Parties

⁴⁶ NAZ/SP/101/28/1. 24th August, 1971

⁴⁷ NAZ/ SP1/5/34. POL 2/Conf. 30th December, 1969. Mr Sikufweba complained that the Officer in Charge allowed ANC meeting to proceed, and he deployed plain clothed officers to deal with UNIP supporters who tried to disturb the meeting.

1972, Edward Nyanga who was ANC Member of Parliament for Mbabala, observed that the provisions of social amenities were done in a discriminative manner. He argued, “I can substantiate that in my constituency, water projects like sinking of boreholes were only taken to areas where UNIP had support. I have made several attempts to have boreholes in my constituency but to no avail.”⁴⁸ Opposition Members of Parliament (MPs) were lured into joining the ruling party, resulting in defections to UNIP. This was due to benefits that accrued to UNIP supporters. By 1972, three of the ANC’s twenty-three MPs had crossed over to UNIP. No wonder the slogan ‘it pays belonging to UNIP’ became prominent. Justin Kabwe, political Assistant in the Copperbelt declared in parliament that:

Supporters of the ANC or any non UNIP members will not be allowed to form Cooperatives in the Western Province under the Government’s eighteen months development plan ... this is the true meaning of ‘it pays to belong to UNIP’ ... am one of those who consider applications and I recently turned down applications from Luanshya residents whom I knew to be supporters of the ANC Later the applicants concerned joined UNIP and their applications were approved.⁴⁹

Indeed political independence without economic stability was meaningless. As such, every citizen looked forward to economic benefits from the government and for the ANC supporters, this would entail abandoning their party.⁵⁰ For the UNIP government, the opposition was nothing but a hindrance to national development, and those who supported it were enemies of development.

In areas deemed to be the ANC strongholds, the UNIP government did not hesitate to outlaw the party on the pretext of preventing anarchy in the country. In 1970, for instance, the government imposed a total ban on the ANC in Livingstone District. Among the arrested ANC officials were Choma MP, Peter N.K Munga, and Sesheke MP Sefulo Kakoma.⁵¹ In fact, no UNIP supporter was arrested because the Government was certain that UNIP members were victims and not

⁴⁸ Parliamentary Debates on the 4th Session of the 2nd National Assembly, 12th January-9th March, (1972), p.1066.

⁴⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 19th July, 1969

⁵⁰ UNIPA/ANC 7/81, 1951-1970. Nkumbulas’ Speech at the 16th Annual Conference at Kabwata Hall on the 6th November, 1965

⁵¹ UNIPA/ANC 7/91, 1970, President Kaunda bans ANC in Livingstone

perpetrators of violence.⁵² Livingstone police commanding officer Luke Mwanakombo confirmed arresting thirteen ANC supporters for carrying out political activities after the party was banned.⁵³ Similar measures were taken in Mumbwa District where the ANC officials were served with restriction orders prohibiting them from entering these areas. According to government, these measures were prompted by political tensions that had engulfed these areas. Surprisingly, during the political confrontations, the ANC claimed that no UNIP members were either questioned or arrested despite numerous complaints from the ANC.⁵⁴ Similarly, Stephen Mwamba of Kawambwa complained of how the police started victimising him after he reported UNIP thugs who were causing anarchy in the area.⁵⁵ The action by police was indicative of how vindictive and selective law enforcers were. With restricted access to these areas, the ANC officials could not organise or mobilise their members in the said territories effectively.

To a large extent, this was the tragedy suffered by African opposition political parties in the face of their ruling counterparts. Similar actions had been taken in Lesotho where the opposition party's imminent rise to power was thwarted by the Chief Justice's move to declare a state of emergence just before announcing election results which had tilted in favour of the opposition.⁵⁶ In January 1970, Jonathan Leabua called for the arrest of prominent members of the opposition, Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), before seizing power. Apparently, similar intimidation and victimisation of the ANC and its supporters were being carried out by the UNIP government, perhaps the difference lay in the degree. In 1972 UPP was banned and its leaders arrested on what was said to be security reasons. In his parliamentary speech, Nkumbula wondered why people should only protest against white domination when African dictators were getting away with their tyrannical governance.⁵⁷

⁵² UNIPA/ANC 7/91, 1966-1973, Press Release. No: 18/70.

⁵³ *Times of Zambia*, 10th July, 1971

⁵⁴ UNIPA/UNIP 5/24, 1970, Presidential Speeches and Press Releases. Announcing the banning of ANC operations in Livingstone, Kaunda stated that UNIP supporters were could not be arrested or questioned because it was obvious that they were simply victims of ANC's barbaric acts.

⁵⁵ UNIPA/ANC 2/15, 1960-1966, A Letter from Stephen Mwamba to the ANC President H.M Nkumbula

⁵⁶ *Daily Mail*, 30-01-1970, 'Agony of the opposition in Lesotho's Africa.'

⁵⁷ Parliamentary Debates of the 4th Session of the National Assembly, 5th December-14th December 1970, Nkumbula told parliament that he was surprised that African Countries failed to

Consequently, the suppression on the ANC and its supporters had devastating effects on the party and Nkumbula as a leader. The ANC sympathisers were scared to openly support their party as this would warrant them unbearable consequences. Although the First Republic was considered to operate under democratic system, opposition political players did not function freely since they were deliberately marginalised. Charles Madubansi observed that the democracy that existed after independence was to a large extent a mockery, characterised by intimidation which generated fear and insecurity among people. He noted that “while the pre independence era was dominated by Whites who inflicted unbearable pain on Africans by suppressing them, the post independence black government suppressed the opposition and those who supported its cause.”⁵⁸

However, Kenneth Kaunda holds that the ethnic polarisation that characterised the country after independence was caused by political tension perpetrated by the opposition party. Available evidence however, suggests that this was caused by the government’s failure to fulfill people’s pre-independence dreams. This was consistent with Solofo Randrianja’s observation that after independence, there was a multiplication of ethno-nationalists as it dawned that their independence expectations were not forthcoming.⁵⁹ In essence, people’s interests were slowly drifting from the principles of national building to territorial or regional appeals. Regions that felt sidelined in the sharing of national resources easily grouped together to air their displeasure. As early as 1964, D. Kalota the ANC publicity secretary then condemned government for its educational programmes and bursaries which were only being offered to UNIP members. “We are sick and tired of the Government’s expenses on one political party only, as taxpayers, we do not see the justification for the slogan One Zambia One Nation when only one section of our community is enjoying all the privileges.”⁶⁰ In 1971, Simon Kapwepwe who had served as vice

condemn the barbaric action taken by Lesotho’s Justice Minister. He claimed that their silence was indicative of how compromised they were.

⁵⁸ UNIPA/ANC 7/71-74, Madubansi, observed that the post-independence era was as bad as the pre-independence era in terms of being suppressive.

⁵⁹ Solofo Randrianja, ‘Nationalism Ethnicity and Democracy’ in Stephen Ellis (ed.), *Africa Now: People, Policies and Institutions* (London: Villiers Publications, 1996), p.21

⁶⁰ UNIPA/ANC 7/62. 3rd November, 1964. Press Statement

president of the country resigned from UNIP citing sidelining of Northern Province in terms of economic development and political appointments.⁶¹

In the absence of viable economic development, people started advocating for the fulfillment of regional needs rather than national demands. Prior to independence, nationalists had successfully preached a message of economic empowerment, but when this was not realised, there developed a sense of dissatisfaction among the citizens. As such, the new dimension of economic, social and political requirements began to fracture the pre-independence political alliances. What people envisaged as an independent and united Zambia was actually not forthcoming. At this stage, political affiliations began to be structured either along regions or indeed ethnic identities. Before independence, political parties were viewed as vehicles for national unity, but in the post independence era, they were seen as a means through which different people would participate and benefit from national resources.⁶²

The Road to One-Party State

The UNIP's position of dominance after independence could have helped in reducing inter-party competition as well as conflicts. This was difficult because of intra-party conflicts that were simmering within the party. At UNIP's General Conference in August 1967, aimed at electing members of the Central Committee, the political rivalries within the ranks of UNIP showed that the party was not immune to issues of ethnicity. There were serious confrontations which degenerated into two ethnically based coalitions. The Bemba teamed with the Tongas, while the Lozis and the Easterners grouped together, each group wanting to outdo the other. The climax was reached when Nalumino Mundia was fired from UNIP and subsequently formed the United Party which was basically Lozi dominated both in leadership and support.⁶³ According to Munkombwe, Kaunda was further accused of appointing more Bemba governors at the expense of other tribes. Refusing to be drawn into ethnic debates, Kaunda tendered in his resignation until he was persuaded by church leaders and other senior citizens to rescind his decision. The crack

⁶¹ Solofo Randrianja, *Nationalism Ethnicity and Democracy*, p.21

⁶² UNIPA/SP 4/2/171, 11th December, 1964. At a UNIP rally at Batoka Siding, A.H Munkombwe appealed to the people of region to support the party in government if they had to benefit economically.

⁶³ Irving Kaplan (ed.), *Zambia: a country study, Foreign Area Studies* n.p (1979), p.38

caused by these differences was never to be mended. For UNIP, the only possible solution to such fragmentation of the party was the establishment of a one-party state.⁶⁴

The factionalism within UNIP became a catalyst for the ANC's unexpected resurrection in 1968, a development that threatened the ruling party thus justifying its demands for a One Party State. During the general elections of 1968, the ANC made inroads in some areas previously dominated by UNIP. With the development programs that the government had embarked on after independence, UNIP leaders were certain that ANC's representation in parliament would drastically reduce. To the contrary, out of fifty-one contested seats, the ANC won twenty-three seats, while UNIP scooped twenty-eight.⁶⁵ Although UNIP won these elections with a huge margin of eighty-one seats against the ANC's twenty-three, the latter had gained control of Western Province where UNIP lost all the seats except two seats for Grey Zulu and Arthur Wina who went unopposed.⁶⁶ In the elections of 1964, the ANC had only secured ten seats against UNIP's fifty-five, and UNIP had hoped that ANC would eventually disband. The formation of United Party by Nalumino Mundia in 1967 which saw most of the Lozi speaking people ditching UNIP was seen as a potential recipe for further fragmentation. The UNIP was slowly splitting on ethnic lines. Perhaps the swaying of the political tempo to the ANC in Western Province in 1968 was enough to make UNIP realise that only a One-Party state would deter those contemplating leaving the party.

Most of the documented evidence has emphasised the need for national unity as being the driving force for the introduction of the One-Party State. Scholars supporting this perspective suggested that the multiparty system was divisive and a source of political tension which resulted into disunity. However, a critical examination of political operations in Zambia from 1964 to 1973 when the One-Party state was introduced indicates that the move was actually precipitated by a combination of factors. The ruling UNIP was not ready for political competition which was typical of a multi-party dispensation. UNIP leaders observed that the presence of opposition parties provided a fertile breeding ground for regionalism and ethnicity. According to Mama Chibesa Kankasa, the idea of having a one party state was as old as independence itself. The

⁶⁴ Interview with Munkombwe, 18-10-2013

⁶⁵ Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, Summary of Election Results 1968. Elections Office, Lusaka

⁶⁶ Interview with Malimba Masheke, 21-02-2014

party needed time to improve the social, economic and political wellbeing of the people.⁶⁷ Even before putting multipartism to test, the UNIP government was already considering introducing a one-party state. The road to a one party state had its genesis in the period just before independence when UNIP began to consider the type of government to adopt after independence. The government needed the cooperation of all citizens to achieve economic development. Preston Mwenya a UNIP supporter condemned the existence of several political parties because they hindered the much desired united front against poverty, disease and ignorance.⁶⁸

The above perspective was affirmed in Kaunda's 1973 speech, when he stated that, the one-party constitution brought to reality the dream of a peaceful and united Zambia which started during the struggle for independence. It crowned the process which was started in 1962, but temporarily abandoned when the country was still in search of a new route to unity.⁶⁹ Drawing from what prevailed in countries already independent, the UNIP government concluded that democracy or indeed multiparty democracy came at a cost. African countries like Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania had introduced one party state within a few years of their independence. They claimed that multipartism was divisive and promoted regionalism.⁷⁰ As early as 1963, Preston Mwenya, a staunch UNIP supporter had already started agitating for a one-party state. He observed that:

Those who wanted separate parties did so for their personal prestige and satisfaction, after all, the achievement of independence does not remove the need for collective action ... just like they united against the oppressor, so is it that they unite against poverty, disease and ignorance.⁷¹

Rather than seeing the opposition in the context of being a partner in development by providing checks and balance, the opposition was viewed as a destructor. Drawing from the Kenyan

⁶⁷ Interview with Mama Kankasa, 17th October, 2013, she alluded that UNIP did not want to waste time attending to opposition confrontations, instead of attending to developmental issues

⁶⁸ UNIPA/UNIP 16/1/3, 19th September, 1963. Press Release by Preston Mwenya, who observed that tribalism finds fertile breeding ground under competitive politics.

⁶⁹ Parliamentary Debates, First Session of the First National Assembly, 20th January-2nd March, 1973, p.28

⁷⁰ Salih (ed.), *African Political Parties*, p.53

⁷¹ UNIPA/UNIP 16/1/3, 19th September, 1963. Press Release by Preston Mwenya, a staunch UNIP supporter studying abroad entitled: Zambia: Another One-Party State

situation where politics reflected a deep ethnic divide due to the presence of opposition parties. The UNIP government did not appreciate the opposition ANC. In 1971, the *Times of Zambia* quoted Kaunda as having argued that, “history provides clues and answers to today’s problems, and Zambia has learnt from the problems caused by multiparty in independent African countries”⁷²

According to Kaunda, the people of Zambia had been constantly demanding for the establishment of a One-Party State since independence. He claimed that people had always called for the end of multiparty politics, except UNIP was reluctant to implement these demands.⁷³ However, there is no available evidence indicating that the majority of Zambians were demanding for a one-party state. What was evident however was that these demands were coming from those in government or party leadership circles. From such understanding, it can be argued that the demand for a one party system came from people who wanted to safeguard their interests by ending political competition. At the same time, those who wanted to ensure that decisions by the ruling party were unchallenged, unlike what prevailed under a multiparty system. The introduction of one party state should therefore, be understood as another strategy that was meant to consolidate UNIP while at the same time suppressing the opposition. On the basis of such insights, Nkumbula complained that the One Party system was imposed on the people Zambia.

The final threat to UNIP came in 1971 when its former vice president, Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe resigned and formed the United Progressive Party (UPP). The coming of UPP on the political scene threatened to sweep UNIP’s support from the Bemba dominated Luapula, Northern, and Copperbelt Provinces. The impending power shift would have created further political tension in UNIP thus weakening the party further. With the ANC in full control of Southern and Western Provinces, the formation of UPP meant UNIP was losing its national flavour. By late 1971, UPP had caused havoc in Luapula and Northern Provinces, and coincidentally, negotiations about a possible merger with the ANC had reached an advanced

⁷² *Times of Zambia*, 19th July, 1971,

⁷³ UNIPA/UNIP 9/1. 4th February, 1972. Report of National Commission.

stage.⁷⁴ The possibility of the ANC and the UPP working together made UNIP's chances of survival very bleak. Efforts to revamp UNIP were getting frustrated by the ANC/UPP manoeuvres.

Initially, UNIP had hoped that with passage of time, the ANC would be wiped out of the political scene naturally, but this was not the case. As late as 1972, Nkumbula was still popular and pressing for the removal of excess powers vested in the president by the constitution. He continued fighting for the marginalised minority. In this case, the notion that Nkumbula was finished by the time the One-party state was introduced was unfounded. By 1972, he was still able to address mammoth rallies on the Copperbelt. In Chamboli, armed police had to use tear gas to disperse a big crowd being addressed by Nkumbula. These rallies were getting more and more inclusive, especially with many people against the introduction of a one party state, thus increasing UNIP's fears of being voted out.⁷⁵

It was evident that since independence, UNIP had exhibited insecurity due to the persistent presence of the ANC in certain parts of the country like Mufulira, Southern, Western and parts of Eastern province. By 1972, UNIP had come to a realisation that the opposition would not be silenced. For those in the opposition, the exacerbation of politically motivated violence was simply a scapegoat to introducing a one-party state which UNIP had always advocated for.⁷⁶

Perhaps UNIP and its leaders understood the complexities of seeking people's opinion on such an unpopular subject. Kaunda had made it clear that no referendum was to be conducted to assess people's views, instead the Commission appointed was intended to find ways of how the One-Party State was to be implemented.⁷⁷ The Chona Commission was headed by Mainza Chona and comprised of people drawn from different sections of society. Because of his stance on the one party, Nkumbula declined Kaunda's offer to be on the Commission. In short, the terms of

⁷⁴ UNIPA/ANC 7/14. PM/AG/GT. 11th September, 1971. Annual Conference Resolutions. At this Annual Conference, Nkumbula had indicated that negotiations for a possible ANC/UPP merger had reached an advanced stage.

⁷⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 14-08-1972. It was reported that tear gas breaks up riot at a well attended ANC rally in Mufulira.

⁷⁶ Interview with Peter Matoka, 26th November, 2013

⁷⁷ UNIPA/UNIP LUA 1/30, 4th February, 1972. Presidential Circulars, 1964-1973. Press Conference at State House Announcing the Appointment of the National Commission on the Establishment of a One Party Democracy in Zambia.

reference for the Chona Commission had no provision for people's opinion whether or not they wanted a one party state. It was simply a formality of what the UNIP had already concluded. The ANC through its leader Nkumbula put up a vicious attack on the introduction of the one party, he called it retrogressive and dictatorial.

The Choma Declaration and its Political Implications

The UNIP government continued using the accelerating political tensions in the country to justify the establishment of the One-Party State. The Minister of Education and Culture, Wesley Nyirenda argued that the One-Party State would rid the country of politicians who thrived on ethnic loyalties, thus reducing political conflicts.⁷⁸ From the opposition's perspective, the One-Party State was seen as a way of sustaining perpetuity by the party in power, which had lost people's mandate. Nkumbula for instance, held that, the One-Party State would breed dictatorial elements in the president who was to be an all powerful figure.⁷⁹ It is true that the actual causes of political violence were deliberately being overlooked by the ruling party, otherwise it would have employed other means of resolving them rather than curtailing people's political freedom.

Signed at Choma Secondary School on 27th June, 1973, the Choma Declaration marked a turning point in the political history of Zambia. It signified the demise of the First political party in the country, and consequently the end of multiparty politics in Zambia. For the people of Southern Province and Nkumbula as the ANC leader, the Choma Declaration yet again demonstrated their ability to forfeit individualistic and regional interest for the sake of national unity.⁸⁰ The introduction of a One-Party State was not welcomed by many people. Even some UNIP members were not in support, although they could not voice out for fear of the party's retribution.⁸¹ Though underplayed by many scholars, the political tensions that had engulfed the country were slowly degenerating into a chaotic situation. The ANC supporters were being killed

⁷⁸ Parliamentary Debates of the Fourth Session of the National Assembly, (5th-14th December, 1972), p. 61

⁷⁹ Parliamentary Debates for Fourth Session of the National Assembly, 1972, p. 63

⁸⁰ Interview with Request Muntanga, Lusaka, 10-11-2013

⁸¹ Interview with Malimba Masheke and Vernon Mwaanga, who separately contend that people in UNIP were scared of opposing the party because that would attract severe punishment from the party leadership.

in UNIP dominated areas like the Copperbelt where their houses were burnt. Similarly, deadly clashes occurred in ANC strongholds.

Other than ushering in the Second Republic, the Choma Declaration can be understood from a different dimension. At the time of independence, most of Zambia's neighbours: Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, and Namibia were still under colonial domination. The Zambian government had decided to be at the centre of the liberation struggle in support of its majority neighbours. This stance endangered its relationship with white minority governments. Zambia became a good refuge for freedom fighters in these countries, which exposed the country to frequent confrontation with neighbouring countries. According to UNIP, the existence of opposition political parties was not ideal for a united and peaceful Zambia.⁸²

In his report on the refugee situation in Nyimba particularly at Ziwanwana village, Commissioner S Chipwaya complained of constant attacks from Portuguese borders. Ziwanwana housed more than six thousand refugees, a situation that endangered the lives of the local people.⁸³ Already, people of Western Province were under numerous attacks from Angolan soldiers. Malimba Masheke contends that a combination of Angolan and Portuguese soldiers from Mozambique were captured in Chavuma area between 1969 and 1972. However, these soldiers were not charged. Mr Skinner who was the Chief Justice ordered their release to the annoyance of the Zambian people. Protesting against Skinner's move, the Zambia National Service from Kafue marched to State House demanding for his removal. The situation was similar in other areas bordering these countries.⁸⁴ Therefore, Nkumbula's decision to sign the Choma Declaration helped the UNIP government to direct its resources and energy towards external enemies rather than towards the internal political wrangles.

The government managed to contain the situation but the security of the country remained volatile. Compounded by internal political tension that prevailed amongst political party members, Zambia was on the verge of experiencing serious conflicts. The Choma Declaration, therefore, helped the country to unite and face the challenges of the colonial and racist regimes

⁸² Bizeck J. Phiri, *A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the Third Republic, 1890-2001* (Asmara: Africa World Press, 2006), p. 156

⁸³ UNIPA/ANC 7/84, 1956-1973. Press Release on Mozambique Refugees in Eastern Province, 1969.

⁸⁴ Interview with Malimba Masheke, 22-02-2014

that threatened Zambia's security. South Africa in particular was ready to finance any organisation or political party to destabilise independent African Countries to divert their attention from the liberation struggle. The importance of the Choma Declaration cannot only be seen in terms of national unity, but it goes beyond Zambia's borders.⁸⁵

Besides, the Choma declaration could be viewed as a unifying factor which brought to an end UNIP's dilemma of institutionalising the one party state, which the party had always wanted to introduce. After the formalities of establishing a one party system ended in 1972, the system could not be implemented until 1973. The UNIP government was thus faced with the difficult reality of convincing people that the one party state will be democratic. The fight against the introduction of a one-party system earned Nkumbula support from the masses that could not air their views openly. This was evidenced by the huge rallies he addressed both in Lusaka and the Copperbelt.⁸⁶ At the Lusaka meeting, he managed to secure \$100 contributions from people to fight against the establishment of the one-party state. The rally held at Kabwata Hall, responded positively to Nkumbula's call to fight against the introduction of the one party system.⁸⁷

Similarly, UNIP's fears were compounded by William Chipango's activities. Chipango who was an organising secretary for UP before crossing over to the ANC had organised a group of people to launch an armed attack on the UNIP government to prevent it from implementing the one party state. Chipango's men though not well coordinated showed the danger that the UNIP government was to face if opposing views were not silenced at once.⁸⁸ Further another related group in North Western Province

Apparently, this group was comprised of many people from Southern, Western and North Western provinces. They went for military training in South Africa, however, these dissidents were captured on their return to Zambia because they had been infiltrated by intelligence personnel. Although, these attempts to sabotage the UNIP government were suppressed before

⁸⁵ Interview with Malimba Masheke, 22-02-2014. Masheke believed that without the Choma Declaration, Zambia would not have managed to contribute positively to the liberation struggle of the neighbouring countries.

⁸⁶ UNIPA/ANC 4/4, 4th March, 1972, Nkumbula addresses a mammoth rally in Mufulira

⁸⁷ UNIPA/ANC 8/11, 1962-1972, Correspondence on the one-party state and with UPP

⁸⁸ Patrick Wele, *Kaunda and Mushala Rebellion: The Untold Story* (Ndola: Mission Press, 1987), p.35

they became pandemic, an imprint of fear was created.⁸⁹ At the same time, Nkumbula had vowed to fight the establishment of the one party through what he termed non violence activities. Even after Kaunda had signed the statutory instrument which ushered in the Chona Commission, Nkumbula continued to oppose the concept of one party by filing in high court petitions although they were thrown out.⁹⁰ Perhaps Kaunda and his government understood the consequences of imposing the one party without Nkumbula's consent. Otherwise Kaunda would have easily summoned Nkumbula to Lusaka to sign the declaration, but by going to Nkumbula's home area, Choma, it was a sign that Kaunda was basically pleading with Nkumbula in order to avoid revolts. As a result of this action, the people of Southern Province expected to get special political favours in the one party government.⁹¹

With the signing of the Choma Declaration, the ANC was officially dissolved and UNIP became the only legitimate party in Zambia. Initially, the ANC had proposed that the two parties (UNIP and ANC) should be disbanded and a new name coined to show neutrality of the one party government. The proposal was not accepted instead UNIP promised to embrace ANC members as equals. In the first one-party elections that took place in 1973, some former ANC senior officials contested under UNIP. Mungoni Liso who was the ANC vice president rose to the position of Member of the Central Committee (MCC), the highest organ in UNIP. According to Peter Matoka, the terms of the Choma Declaration provided that, Nkumbula assumes the position of vice president. However, the 'Old Lion' could not stomach the idea of deputising Kaunda, so he chose to stay out of government. The refusal by Nkumbula to take up a top position in the UNIP government created resentment in the people of Southern Province who felt cheated.⁹² Nkumbula's supporters, felt that his had been stripped off. A move they considered retrogressive considering that the ANC had been in existence since 1948. But Nkumbula's decision to stay clear of the UNIP government demonstrated his lack of faith in the ideals of a one party state which he considered dictatorial and unsuitable in a democracy. Stating his stance, Nkumbula noted that:

⁸⁹ Interview with Malimba Masheke, 17-05.2014

⁹⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 5-08-1972. As late as August 1972, Nkumbula continued fighting the establishment of the one party through courts of law.

⁹¹ Interview with Peter Palija, 8th February, 2014, Choma

⁹² Interview with Peter Matoka, these sentiments were echoed by Malimba Masheke who noted that the people of Southern Province continued treating UNIP with suspicion thereafter.

Kenneth Kaunda offered me secretary generalship of the party, but I turned it down on principle because I didn't believe in the Chona Constitution of participatory democracy. I want to serve a government that I believe in ... I criticised the system and openly declared that I did not like it, I don't think it was right to accept the post.⁹³

Nkumbula's refusal to join UNIP when his political future looked bleak showed that he was a principled man who put his country above ethnicity or personal interests.

Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the political competition in the First Republic revolved around the struggle for power between the two major political parties, UNIP and the ANC. Later in the 1970s, the UPP joined this struggle though for a short period of time. It has also been demonstrated that the post independence political environment was characterised by numerous forms of injustices making the operations of opposition parties difficult. The discussion refutes the widely held notion that after independence, the ANC was a finished political party. Instead, the chapter has shown that the ANC's success story was only anchored on its persistence existence despite the frustrations and undemocratic tendencies that prevailed during this period. Its presence could not be ignored by the ruling party which employed government apparatus to silence the voice of the opposition. The institution of chiefs played a critical role in trying to dislodge the opposition in their chiefdoms. All these conditions impinged on the ANC's popularity.

The desire by the ruling UNIP to counter the expansion and growth of the opposition parties to a large extent precipitated the introduction of the One Party State which Nkumbula fought to the very end. Like Michael Wright put it, attacks on tribalism were actually attacks on any form of opposition or criticism to UNIP government. Thus demand for national unity was equivalent to unconditional submission to the power of UNIP.⁹⁴ Initially, the governing party had relied heavily on persuasion and positive inducement to eliminate the opposition ANC. But after the

⁹³ Robert Molteno, 'Independent Zambia: Achievements and Prospects' in William Tordoff [ed.], *Politics in Zambia* (Bristol: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 374

⁹⁴ Michael Wright, *Zambia: I Changed my Mind*, (London: Johnson Publications LTD, 1972), p. 24

1968 elections, it became evident that these tactics had failed to yield desired results, hence the call for the introduction of the one party state became pronounced. The issue of national unity though exaggerated in most discourse indeed did add to the other factors that prompted UNIP to impose a One-Party State. The discussion has further demonstrated that the opposition ANC continued to exist despite the hostile political environment that existed. In a bid for political dominance, the ruling political party used government machinery to discredit and weaken the opposition parties. Apparently, these tactics aided in creating a negative perception about certain political parties as the next chapter will show.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ETHNIC FACTOR IN ZAMBIA'S PARTY POLITICS AND THE REINTRODUCTION OF MULTIPARTY POLITICS

Introduction

This chapter explores the role of the ethnic factor in Zambia's party politics under different political systems. It argues that unlike in the First Republic when elements of ethnic inclination were obvious, the Second Republic managed to suppress the vice through the one party system. The 1990s saw Zambia embarking on a period of democratic transition and consolidation of multiparty politics. However, important questions such as the challenges that come with democracy are really issues of concern for many scholars. In view of these challenges, this chapter seeks to examine the operations of political parties in the context of multiparty systems. It will discuss among others some salient issues that influence party alignment or affiliation under such a political environment. There was a general perception that opposition parties were more prone to ethnic influences than ruling parties. In 1972, the vice president Mainza Chona complained that the biggest challenge Zambia was facing was ethnicity and regionalism which was perpetrated by opposition parties. He noted that "a precedent existed in Africa where opposition parties were behaving like enemies of progress and unity."¹ On the contrary, this chapter attempts to show that ethnic elements were never totally absent in political parties formed in multidimensional ethnic countries. It also attempts to explore factors that facilitate the portrayal of certain political parties as more ethnically inclined than others.

Among the basic tenets of multi-party democracy was the presence of many political parties hence the existence of political competition. This chapter further argues that the exacerbated political activities among different parties did translate into increased ethnic manifestations in the 1990s. Naomi Chazan et al cite one Ghanaian political observer who once commented: "of all the highly significant cleavages in a multiparty regime, none was more salient than ethnicity."²

¹ Parliamentary Debates of the Fourth Session of the Second National Assembly of the 12th January – 9th March, 1972, p. 16

² Naomi Chazan, Peter Lewis, Robert Mortiner, Donald Rothchild and Stephen J. Stedman, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (London: Lynn Reinner Publications, 1999), p. 167

Contrary to the Ghanaian situation where the people or grassroot were the ones advocating for ethnic recognition, in Zambia, to a large extent, the vice was being perpetrated by politicians and not the grass root. The chapter draws heavily on interviews and newspaper publications due to the scarcity of archival data.

Ethnic Politics in the Second Republic

The UNIP government emphasised the need to curtail ethnic cleavages which were becoming eminent in the politics of the First Republic as the main reason for the introduction of the One Party System. Accordingly, political competition was curtailed through the operations of a one party system as loyalty was restricted to the only party, UNIP. Since political competition became in-house, ethnic advantage became meaningless because every citizen belonged to the same political party.³ However, Maboshe Silumesi sees the one party system as a recipe for the president's ethnic group to become more dominant than others hence breeding disenchantment among other ethnic groups. Without opposition parties, UNIP's position was fortified, hence its leaders became untouchables. Even during the one party system, Ministers and Members of Parliament exercised ethnic politics by taking developmental projects to their home districts at the expense of those without representation.⁴

Failure by governments to adequately address or ensure balanced economic development has also been a determinant in party choices among the electorates. According to Aquiline Tarimo, such a situation fermented anger and resentment among the aggrieved groups, which if not properly tackled could lead to ethno-politics.⁵ When forming the UPP, Kapwepwe had complained of Northern Province or the Bembas in general being sidelined by the UNIP government. He claimed that the Bembas were not getting economic development equivalent to what other places in the country were receiving. Similar reasons were given to justify the formation of the United Party under Nalumino Mundia. He noted that Barotseland was being sidelined both in terms of economic development and political appointments. Under such

³ Interview with Peter Matoka, 26-10-2013

⁴ Parliamentary Debates of the Second Session of the National Assembly, 17th January-21st March, 1975. p.52

⁵ Aquiline Tarimo, Politicisation of Ethnic Identities and Common Good in Kenya Parties and Politics' *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 61. No: 2 (2002), p.3

circumstances, sidelined groups reverted to ethnic solidarity in order to advance their demand for economic and political benefits.⁶

However, UNIP under Kaunda tried to avoid or indeed subdue ethnic discontentment in the Second Republic through what was called tribal balancing. Under this policy, Kaunda made sure that at least each province had a representation in government regardless of how popular the party was in that area.⁷ By increasing provincial representation in government and in senior party positions, Kaunda managed to secure support from these provinces. For instance, fearing to lose support from the Lozi of Western Province especially after the formation of UP, Kaunda made it a policy that at every given time the Province provided either a Prime Minister or a senior party official. From 1978 to 1981, Daniel Lisulo was the country's Prime Minister, while Nalumino Mundia served as Zambia's Prime Minister between 1981 and 1985. The position was held by Kebby Musokotwane between 1985 and 1989 when Malimba Masheke took over the leadership until 1991 when the position was abolished with the reintroduction of multiparty system.⁸

Southern Province which was home of the only opposition at independence was not ignored in terms of appointments especially during the Second Republic. Prominent politicians like Mainza Chona, Elijah Mudenda, Vernon Mwaanga, and many others served in various important government and party portfolios. Elija Mudenda was the Prime Minister of Zambia from 1977 to 1978. Mainza Chona for instance served as Zambia's vice president from 1970 to 1973, and he was UNIP's secretary general between 1973 and 1981. He further rose to the position of Prime Minister from 1973 to 1978.⁹ Although the UNIP government was accused of leaning more on Eastern Province more than any other Province, to a large extent Kaunda's government was ethnically balanced as it was inclusive of people from various provinces of Zambia. This was crucial in managing the fragmentation of the young country along ethnic lines. By and large, Kaunda's ethnic balancing technique helped in averting ethnic fragmentation, thus securing national unity even though people still held divergent political views.

⁶ UNIPA/UNIP 16/1/3. 1964-1968, Government and UNIP Press Release

⁷ Interview with Daniel Munkombwe and Malimba Masheke, 18-10-2013 and 21-02-2014 respectively.

⁸ Interview Malimba Masheka, 21-02-2014

⁹ Interview with Vernon Mwaanga, 24-10-2013

Similarly, Kaunda also incorporated traditional leaders in a bid to win the loyalty of their subjects. The Chitimukulu of the Bembas and the Litunga of the Lozis were part of Kaunda's governing body

In the case of Kaunda, despite having a Malawian origin, his inclination was towards the Eastern Province especially after losing Kapwepwes' support and his Bemba speaking areas.¹⁰ The realisation and fear of ethnic politics forced Kaunda to emphasise the One Zambia, One Nation slogan. This was aimed at inculcating the feeling of oneness or indeed unity in diversity. Although ethnicity was contained through Kaunda's ethnic balancing technique, the vice was not totally eradicated. It was still simmering among discontented groups awaiting an ideal environment such as a multiparty system to explode.

The Restoration of Multiparty in Zambia

By 1990, it had become apparent that the struggle for multiparty democracy could no longer be ignored. After a series of debates and consultations, Kaunda's UNIP government reluctantly came to a realisation that circumstances had changed and agreed to a referendum. In 1990, Article Four of the constitution was repealed to allow for the reintroduction of multiparty politics in Zambia. With this development, people were optimistic that the emerging multiparty politics would reinforce the freedom of choice in terms of political parties. The One Party system that existed since 1973 had confined people's political choice to UNIP. However, these hopes soon vanished as the new leaders began to tread the same route as that of the non democratic one party. It was soon realised that the 1990s politics were a reminiscent of past politics. Apart from legalising political parties, the 1990 political environment still remained hostile and intolerable to opposition parties.¹¹

The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) which formed government in 1991 started as a mass movement advocating for the end of a dictatorial one party state. The Movement reconstituted itself into a political party on 4th January, 1991 after Article Four of the

¹⁰ Interview with Daniel Munkombwe, 18-10-2013, who argued that from the time of its formation UNIP, had drawn heavily from Luapula, Northern and Copperbelt. The tide however changed in the late 1960s when UNIP began to lean heavily on the Eastern Province.

¹¹ *The Post Newspaper*, 6th January, 1998, Goodson Machona attests to the fact that the Third Republic was characterised by animosity to opposition parties.

Constitution was repealed. The party received overwhelming support from all corners of the country ushering in the Third Republic. The MMD's support in 1991 was multi-ethnic in scope. Perhaps this was because the Third Republic was born out of the promise of open democracy and good governance in general. People were fed up with the problems that plunged the country ranging from economic hardships to political suppression. They looked forward to full participation in all spheres of their country's development. But, not long after taking office, the MMD experienced severe strains among its membership and its popularity began to dwindle. Authoritative tendencies of the Second Republic became eminent in the party, thus frustrating some members.¹²

Allegations of biasness and favouritism towards certain individuals and regions at the expense of the whole country began to emerge.¹³ The MMD regime had for some reason failed to divorce itself from the repressive tendencies of the one party system. The new leaders for instance, could not stomach the presence of a healthy opposition both within and outside the party. Therefore, everything possible was done to frustrate such prominent opposition. As early as 1993, cracks in the MMD were becoming eminent. Some founding members who felt discontented with the party's disregard for political tolerance came together to form the National Party (NP) in 1993 with Humphrey Mulemba a North Westerner as its interim president. The NP became the first major challenge to the ruling MMD. The formation of the NP was followed by a series of resignations from the MMD leading to about eleven by-elections. Out of the eight contested seats, the NP secured four.¹⁴ Although the party had Emmanuel Kasonde as its vice president, and many other leaders from various ethnic groups, the MMD did not hesitate to exploit the ethnic card by labeling the NP as a party for the Lozis, Tongas and North Westerners in order to discourage other ethnic groups from supporting it.¹⁵ Among its ranks the party had notable politicians like Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika, Arthur Wina, Baldwin Nkumbula and others.

¹² Interview with Mutale Nalumango, 01-10-2014

¹³ Alfred Chanda, 'Governance and Democracy' in *The Challenge Magazine* 1999, p.8

¹⁴ Lise Rakner, *Politics and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia, 1991-2001* (Stockholm: The Nordic African Institute, 2007), p.106

¹⁵ Interview with Malimba Masheke, Kasupe, Lusaka. 22-02-2014

It was also political intolerance within the ruling party which led to the formation of the United Party for National Development (UPND) in 1998. Anderson Mazoka was the first president of the party. Mazoka had been a member of the MMD where he won an election as treasurer for Bauleni Branch. However, his election became controversial and was not accepted by some party leaders. Consequently, the MMD party leadership through its secretary general Michael Sata nullified the results. The nullification was premised on the fact that Mazoka wanted to use this position to aspire for a higher portfolio in the MMD. Mazoka tried to challenge the decision but to no avail.¹⁶ He was blocked by the senior leadership of the MMD. In his letter to President Chiluba, the party Secretary General Michael Sata indicated that Mazoka had a large following within the party which would easily enable him ascend to presidency if not stopped. His political ambitions needed to be curtailed before they mature.¹⁷ Disenchanted with the happenings in the MMD, Mazoka and others who were disillusioned came together to form the UPND.

It is imperative to note that not all political parties have an impact on the political stage. Some of them are merely on paper, and therefore their existence did not pose a major challenge to the ruling party. Such insignificant parties did not suffer prejudice from their opponents. According to Mutale Nalumango, the UPND suffered great prejudice and attacks because it came on the political scene with a bang and immediately became a threat to the ruling MMD.¹⁸ Two years in its life span, the party's electoral performance sent shock waves in the ruling MMD. In the 2001 presidential and general elections, the UPND lost with a minimal margin. The MMD's Mwanawasa won the presidency by twenty-nine percent while the UPND's Anderson Mazoka got twenty-seven percent.¹⁹ This performance reflected a national appeal, contrary to Mwewa's observation that Anderson Mazoka a brilliant native of Southern Province failed to assume national leadership due to his ethnic inclination.²⁰ Competitive politics is dependent on strategising. The MMD and indeed other parties had to find ways of curtailing the party's

¹⁶ *The Post Newspaper*, 13th August, 1998

¹⁷ *The Post Newspaper*, 8th May, 1998, According to Mazoka, the MMD had strayed from its democratic principle and had become dominated by a few undemocratic individuals who never wanted to accommodate people's views.

¹⁸ Interview with Mutale Nalumango, 01-10-2014

¹⁹ Kaela, LCW 2002 *Zambia in Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa*. (2002) pp. 377-378

²⁰ Charles Mwewa, *Zambia: The Struggles of my People and Western Contribution to Corruption and Underdevelopment in Africa* (Lusaka: Maiden Publishing House, 2011), p. 291

popularity, and labeling it an ethnic party was one of them. The labeling of an opposition party was not a new phenomena, Michael Wright observed that by 1970, the UNIP government used the ethnic threat to fight the opposition ANC and the UPP. He argued that “the demand for unconditional submission to the central government in the name of national unity was actually intended to bolster UNIP’s dominance.”²¹

However, after an excellent performance during the 2001 general elections, the UPND sunk into leadership wrangles. The party president Anderson Mazoka died in May 2006 leaving a leadership gap. Sakwiba Sikota who was the vice president saw himself as the obvious successor. Some members proposed Mazoka’s widow Mutinta Mazoka who declined the offer. Others in the presidential race were Bob Sichinga who withdrew his candidature before the convention, Hakainde Hichilema and Boldwin Nchite. The number later reduced to Hakainde Hichilema, Sakwiba Sikota and Boldwin Nchite. Following the leadership struggle that arose after Mazoka’s death, some political enthusiasts made remarks that UPND would only be led by a Tonga and not any one from another ethnic group.²²

Siacheye Madyenkuku, Ackson Sejani and Alex Nataala were quoted as having stated that only a Tonga could succeed Mazoka. However, these utterances were refuted by Patrick Chisanga the party spokesperson who indicated that these sentiments were individual opinions which did not reflect the stance of the UPND as a party. Chisanga asserted that the UPND operated under the Quota System which implied that no single province could hold two top positions in the Executive. The system was aimed at securing a balanced ethnic as well as provincial representation, not that presidents could only come from a particular province.²³ Although Muntanga notes that these politicians were not senior UPND officials, and their loyalty to the party was questionable, the damage could not be retracted as it became a reference point for political competitors.²⁴ He observed that the UPND National Management Committee (NMC) had always tried to have a representation from all the nine provinces of Zambia thus ensuring

²¹ Michael Wright, *Zambia: I Changed my Mind* (London: Johnson Publications Ltd, 1972). p. 23

²² *Times of Zambia*, 16th June, 2006

²³ *The Times of Zambia*, 16-06-2006

²⁴ Interview with Request Muntanga, Lusaka, 12-11-2013

ethnic balancing. Apparently, the UPND logo had nine faces which represented the nine provinces of Zambia.

At this time, Hakainde Hichilema was not in the NMC of the UPND but he was one of the financiers of the party. Based on his dedication to the party, some members felt he was suitable to lead the party. Ironically, Hichilema was nominated by Luapula Province and seconded by North Western and Central Provinces and not Southern Province.²⁵ At the General Convention, Northern and Eastern Provinces had more delegates by virtue of having more districts. “How could one ethnic group or province manipulate Hakainde Hichilema’s election when the elections were conducted under the auspices of the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) and other independent observers?”²⁶ Chibwe wondered.

Hichilema was elected as UPND president by an overwhelming majority of 512 votes. Sakwiba Sikota secured 233 votes while the South African based politician Baldwin Nchite only got seven votes.²⁷ Since each province was only allowed to send a specific number of delegates, dependent on the number of districts, it was impossible for one province to elect a president without an input from other provinces.²⁸ Sakwiba Sikota who did not take his loss kindly blamed it on the party being ethnically inclined to Southern Province. After resigning from UPND, Sakwiba continued to project his former political party as ethnic. Western Province which was a stronghold for UPND during Mazoka’s reign experienced a political shift to Sakwiba’s United Liberal Party (ULP) which was formed in July 2006 and the MMD in terms of support.²⁹ This compounded the ethnic perception of the UPND especially by its political competitors. The ULP however, failed to spread beyond Western Province where its president hailed from. But because the party did not pose a major threat on either the ruling party or the opposition, ULP was not publicised as a party that only thrived on ethnic support.

Although ethnicity played a central role in party organisation, it was often precipitated by various variables which included economic conditions, party perception, and control of state power. Campaign messages disseminated by politicians played a role in influencing people in

²⁵ Interview with Winstone Chibwe UPND Secretary General, Lusaka, 01-10-2014.

²⁶ Interview with Winstone Chibwe, 01-10-2014

²⁷ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 15th July, 2006.

²⁸ Interview with Request Muntanga, 12-11-2013

²⁹ Interview with Richard Kapita, 01-10-2014

party choices. Request Muntanga asserts that people take interest into political affairs of their country hoping to gain not only economically but also politically. When these expectations are not fulfilled, people usually opted for alternatives, among which was to put trust in those leaders who hail from their region or indeed their ethnic groups.³⁰ Under such circumstances, one cannot expect common or national interest to mutually develop. The disparities between communities can easily precipitate great solidarity among the neglected groups. In other words, those that assume government were expected to treat all regions and ethnic groups on equal basis. This could be done through economic development as well as political appointments.

The Chiluba government for instance was criticised for being biased towards his Bemba kinsmen. The *Weekly Post* reported that people of Eastern Province were crying foul, that most Easterners who held top positions in parastatals during the Second Republic were being replaced by Bembas in the Chiluba government.³¹ Justifying their dissatisfaction in the MMD, Southern Province MMD chairperson Fredrick Hapunda observed that the MMD government had failed to uphold the national unity by neglecting some provinces in terms of development. He complained that:

In contrast with people from Bemba speaking areas of this country People from the Southern Province have been sidelined in appointments to government and parastatals ... does it mean people from Southern Province had no right to lead others since most of the government departments are headed by the President's tribesmen?³²

To a large extent, tribal or indeed ethnic balancing helped in ensuring national unity since every province was represented either in the party's supreme organ the Central Committee or in government. However, this was not the case with the MMD government which had more senior officers from a few provinces.

The Chiluba government was said to have ignored the Luvalas in as far as political appointments were concerned. Elias Nyakutemba observed that the government helped in fueling the Luvale-

³⁰ Interview with Request Muntanga, 12-11-2013

³¹ *Weekly Post*, 2nd-8th July, 1993

³² *Weekly Post*, 5-15th July, 1993, see also *Weekly Post*, 21-27th May, 1993

Lunda ethnic hatred by appointing Lunda MPs instead of balancing the appointments.³³ Nyakutemba observed that the negative attitude the government showed towards the Luvala helped to fuel the long standing differences between the two groups. Similar sentiments of displeasure were echoed in Eastern Province in 1993, the MMD executive committee from Eastern Province vowed never to allow their province to be relegated to the background by the government's tendency of sidelining them in appointments.³⁴ Apparently, these politicians from Eastern Province felt that MMD as a political party was not sympathetic to their needs. As a way of protesting, they threatened to withdraw their support from the party. In other words, support to a particular political party has always been dependent on how supportive the party was to people of that region.

In 1991 the MMD scoped all the nineteen parliamentary seats in Southern Province, but by 2000 some politicians began expressing their dissatisfaction in the manner appointments were made. Peter Palija a senior citizen noted that, in spite of the overwhelming support the MMD got, "it was disheartening that national leaders opted to treat the province with disregard and neglect."³⁵ Based on such sentiments, one discerns that after voting, electorates were expectant of what the government would do for them. This could be through appointments to high offices and other economic incentives. In his parliamentary debate, Hachipuka urged the New Deal Government to ensure equitable distribution of national wealth as opposed to where certain provinces benefited more than others. Hachipuka observed that the people of Southern Province were agriculturalists who needed government involvement if the province was to develop.³⁶ Meanwhile, when such expectations of both economic development and appointments to higher offices were not fulfilled, and the feeling of deprivation grew, people tended to withdraw their support from that political party, and consequently sought solidarity from those in similar situation.

Whatever the structure of the polity, political parties have used ethnicity as instruments of mobilisation. Firstly, the president's place of origin or indeed ethnic group was the first source of support for any given political party. When UNIP was formed, its initial support came from

³³ *The Weekly Post*, 2nd -8th July 1993.

³⁴ A Letter to the MMD National Secretary, 30-06-1993, from the Provincial Executive MMD Eastern Province.

³⁵ Interview with Peter Palija, Choma, 8th February, 2014

³⁶ Parliamentary Debates of the First Session (Resumed) of the Ninth National Assembly, No: 121, 25th January-3rd April, 2002. P. 105

Bemba speaking provinces because of Kaunda's Chinsali connection.³⁷ The ANC's support base even when the party was at its peak was the Southern Province where Nkumbula hailed from. Although the MMD won overwhelmingly in all parts of the country in 1991, its stronghold was Luapula Province which was Chiluba's home area. Similarly, the UPND had Southern Province as its heartland. However, the above scenario alone could not qualify a party to be ethnic in nature, unless other factors are at play. According to Kanchan Chandra, an ethnic political party was one that aimed at representing and protecting the interests of an ethnic group in a political system.³⁸ Based on the above definition, political parties in Zambia could not be classified as ethnic except they all have their home area advantage in terms of support.

A critical analysis of the voter pattern in Zambia revealed that the trend was similar in all the provinces for all the parties. For instance, in 1991 when UNIP lost parliamentary seats elsewhere, the party managed to scope all the thirteen seats in Eastern Province. And in 2011 general elections, the UPND under Hakainde Hichilema won all the parliamentary seats in Southern Province except for Livingstone which went to the MMD, this was despite not having performed very well in other provinces. The scenario was similar in Luapula Province where during the same period, the PF under Michael Sata scooped thirteen seats apart from Chembe which went to the MMD. The pattern was not different in other national elections.³⁹

The table below indicates that each presidential candidate had a specific stronghold where they draw great support. It was interesting to note that in 2001 when the MMD was led by Mwanawasa a non Easterner, the party only got sixteen percent of votes from Eastern Province, while in 2011 when the same party was led by Rupiah Banda, the party scooped more than Seventy-two percent of votes. The table further shows that, in 2011, Luapula voted overwhelmingly for PF giving the party seventy-three percent of votes, while UPND only secured less than one percent of votes. The MMD got twenty-two percent of votes from Luapula. Southern Province gave seventy-one percent of their votes to UPND which was led by a Tonga. Only nineteen and six percent was given to the MMD and PF respectively. The voting trend was not very different in other general elections not discussed here.

³⁷ Interview with Peter Matoka, 26-11-2013

³⁸ Kanchan Chandra, *What is an Ethnic Party?* (New York: New York University, 2006), p.13

³⁹ The Electoral Commission of Zambia, Presidential Election 2001

The period considered was the general elections of 2001 and 2011. The table shows the total votes each candidate got in each province.

Table 1. Presidential Results per Province for 2001 and 2011

PROVINCE/REGION	Year	PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE					
		MWANAWASA, RUIPIAH BANDA (MMD)		HICHILEMA, HAKAINDE (UPND)		SATA, MICHAEL (PF)	
		No. of Votes	%	No. of Votes	%	No. of Votes	%
Central	2001	43,117	31.26	39,039	28.31	1,930	1.40
	2011	108,912	48.21	47,037	9.76	63,890	28.28
Copperbelt	2001	125,064	38.01	39,329	11.95	23,619	7.18
	2011	131,897	26.22	17,948	3.57	341,505	67.88
Eastern	2001	35,889	16.97	9,341	4.21	1,623	0.73
	2011	233,528	72.60	10,704	3.33	59,391	18.46
Luapula	2001	71,506	53.37	5,674	4.23	4,832	3.61
	2011	47,289	22.90	1,758	0.85	151,822	73.54
Lusaka	2001	40,225	15.56	79,419	30.72	9,484	3.67
	2011	123,653	30.76	45,397	11.27	224,925	55.94
North Western	2001	82,867	42.01	8,888	4.51	275	0.24
	2011	86,994	50.21	61,054	35.24	8,790	10.85
Northern	2001	37,336	32.25	55,816	48.22	15,781	8.00
	2011	121,482	32.16	2,935	0.78	242,455	64.18
Southern	2001	36,068	14.85	172,253	70.93	790	0.33
	2011	71,519	19.15	266,754	71.41	24,609	6.59
Western	2001	34,619	27.26	62,938	58.42	384	0.26
	2011	62,592	33.20	53,176	28.21	43,579	23.13

Source: The Electoral Commission of Zambia

From the table above, it was evident that all political parties were inherently ethnic, the question would be who was perpetrated the ethnic tag and why were they doing it? To understand party operations in Zambia, one should have a clear understanding of the driving force to their formation. Unlike the nationalist parties such as the ANC and UNIP which were formed to pursue a common cause of liberating the people of Zambia from colonial domination, the

political parties of the 1990s emerged due to an assortment of reasons. The MMD was formed to bring about regime change, from the dictatorial one party to multiparty. Because of the many problems that Zambians experienced during the one party state, there was a unanimous feeling that the regime needed to be changed. On the other hand, the NP and UPND formed as break away parties in 1993 and 1998 respectively had different agendas. These were formed by leaders who felt there was need to remedy negative elements of political intolerance within the MMD. This, to a large extent explains the varying support given to these parties. On one hand the MMD could easily appeal to the masses that were fighting a common enemy. On the contrary, the NP, UPND, ZRP and other parties needed a lot of work for people to accept the parties as well-meaning because not everyone had lost hope in the MMD.⁴⁰

Perpetration of Bias and Ethnic Perception by the Media

The characterisation of political parties may not always represent the correct or accurate picture of their positions. This was dependent on who was doing the characterisation and the purpose there of.⁴¹ In other words, the manner different political parties are portrayed by the media determined how the parties may be viewed by the electorates. Henry Kyambalesa contends that the Zambian media has always played a role in creating party perception. Suffice to say the functions of the media be it print or electronic in a democratic society like Zambia should among other things include impartial disseminating of information.⁴² Unfortunately, the media usually falls short of this task. In most instances, biased coverage was rampant, though mostly associated with state-owned media, the private media also suffered from biased projection of political parties.

The cause for the media biasness emanates from a number of factors. Firstly, the public media are government funded organisations whose survival and operations are dependent on their commitment to the funder. Secondly, most of the senior officers in such institutions are government appointees. Under such circumstances, it was not likely for such institutions to give fair coverage to perceived enemies of the government, and their undeniable devotion to their

⁴⁰ Interview with Charles Kakoma, 16-05-2014, Lusaka

⁴¹ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p.54

⁴² Henry Kyambalesa, 'The Role of the Press in a Democracy in Fighting Against Corruption' in *The Challenge Magazine*, 2009, p.34

sponsor was obvious. Any media that chose to report negative stories about the government were threatened with deregistration.⁴³

At the rebirth of multiparty democracy in 1991, people of Zambia were optimistic that the state media would become a viable forum for objective discussions of public affairs regardless of political affiliations. The optimism was backed by the pronouncements made by the MMD government. The new government pledged to institute a viable media which would promote national unity among other things.⁴⁴ But instead of speaking for the masses, state media only spoke for the party in power, a move which was detrimental to democratic principles. Any attempt by media houses to practice fair reporting was thwarted by continued state controls. The offensive against the media by African governments could perhaps be summed by Julius Nyerere's move to nationalise Tanzania's largest daily newspaper, the Standard. Justifying his move, Nyerere argued that the paper could only support the party and government ideals if it was in the hands of government. Under the private ownership of the Consolidated Holdings, Nyerere claimed that the paper was seen to be serving the interest of the foreign owners.⁴⁵ The trend was no different in Zambia where any newspaper that constantly attacked the opposition, while glorifying the party in power was deemed to be serving the interest of the people.

In his opening speech at a Journalist Seminar in 1972, Kenneth Kaunda was quoted as having castigated the media for being an agent of divisive forces. These attacks came in the wake of anti-one party stories propagated by the ANC which were being published in the press. Kaunda told the journalists that:

Too many of you are caught in the cobweb of ethnic journalism ... a number of you lack objectivity because you are instruments of our enemies bent on the destruction of Zambia It is disgusting to see that negative stories about the one party still made front page headlines ... some of you have always wanted to project an image

⁴³ *Sunday Mail*, 8th April, 2001, Susan Sikaneta, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, warned the owners of Radio Maria that the station risks closure if it continued airing anti-government views.

⁴⁴ William Phiri, *Democracy During the Reign of Dr. Fredrick Jacob Titus Chiluba: A Critical Analysis*, MA Dissertation (2003). P.7

⁴⁵ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 30th January, 1970

of disunity in UNIP no wonder you have failed to report the positive stories about the Chona Commission.⁴⁶

According to the above observation, while acknowledging the need for good journalism, Kaunda showed that giving coverage to divergent views such as the anti-one party debate was not honest reporting. This kind of hostility towards media criticism, in a way encouraged negative projection of opposition political parties.

In a multiparty democracy, people's decision making was dependent on the availability of adequate and accurate information for them to choose their course of action. Basically, the media was meant to bridge the information gap that existed between the government, the public and other political players. Failure to uphold this requirement rendered a mockery of freedom of the press, a requisite in a democratic dispensation. The dilemma the media faced was how to please the ruling party while at the same time reporting the truth.⁴⁷ Any media which accommodated the views of the opposition party was seen to be indulging in unnecessary antagonism with the state. Suffice to say such threats were an affront to democracy. Opposition parties whose ideals and policies were not accurately reported were likely victims of wrong perception, thus undermining their popularity. Consequently, such negative perception became a permanent stereotype. One can only choose responsibly if there was adequate information about alternative options, without which electorates ended up choosing what they were given.⁴⁸

During the colonial period, the media portrayed African political parties as groupings of disgruntled individuals seeking to cause anarchy in Northern Rhodesia. Kapasa Makasa attests to the fact that during the colonial era, *the Northern News* and *the Central African Post* served as the official mouthpieces of government propaganda. They distorted the image of African parties

⁴⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 3rd August, 1972

⁴⁷ *National Mirror*, 8th-14th March, 2003. Information and Broadcasting Minister Webster Chipili warned Icengelo in Ndola that if they continued being used as a mouthpiece for the opposition PF Leader Michael Sata, the government will have no choice but to revoke the license.

⁴⁸ Interviews with Mulikelela Nyambe, 17th June, 2014. A freedom fighter who observed that in a multiparty system, people tend to vote for political parties that are highly advertised, either through the media or public rallies.

in a bid to sabotage the struggle.⁴⁹ In 1952, Nkumbula complained that the *Central African Post* was portraying Africans as willing partners in the federation. Biased reporting was intended to swing African opinion towards the Federation. He observed that: “the Paper was publishing irresponsible statements of anti-Africanism by assuring the world that Africans of Northern Rhodesia were content with colonial administration.”⁵⁰ The media outrage on opposition parties was clearly exhibited during the UNIP/ANC Coalition Government. The media exaggerated the frictions and misunderstandings between Kaunda and Nkumbula. In their publications, the media indicated that the coalition would collapse before independence. These reports forced Kaunda and Nkumbula to hold a joint press conference where they assured the people of the coalition’s commitment to see Zambia independent.⁵¹

Equally, the post-independence governments continued using the media to perpetuate their political dominance at the expense of opposition parties. In February 2001, for instance, Minister of Information and Broadcasting David Mpamba informed parliament that the government could not privatise state-owned media because they were government mouthpieces. By viewing state-controlled media as government mouthpieces to be used as propaganda tools, free and fair reporting was hindered.⁵² Ruling parties in Zambia had a tendency of not only abusing state-owned media, but also monopolising it to only propagate their views. During UNIP’s twenty-seven years rule, the media was extremely controlled, thus disadvantaging those who had divergent views. The scenario was not different in the MMD era despite the leaders’s continued promises to have a free and fair press. In the process, opposition parties like the ANC, UPND or indeed any other party which had no free access to the media were marginalised.

Ruling parties tended to have an upper hand in deciding what the media should publish in terms of politics. Radio Icengelo was threatened of having its license revoked if it continued reporting against the government. Reacting to Chipili’s threats, Sata regretted having antagonised and

⁴⁹ Kapasa Makasa, *Zambia’s March to Political Freedom* (Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981), p.89

⁵⁰*The Central African*, 24th May, 1952. See also *Central African Post* 30th where Africans complained that the Government was giving misleading figures that 140,000 Africans in Jameson area were in favour of the federation.

⁵¹ *Central African Mail*, 22nd January, 1963. See also the same paper for 5th July, 1963, 13th July, 1963 with headlines like: Strains against coalition leaders revealed and ANC may give up respectively.

⁵² *The Post Newspaper*, 23rd February, 2001

monopolised the media when he was in government under the MMD. He observed; “Now that am in opposition I have learnt a bitter lesson. I didn’t see how serious and dangerous it was to monopolise the media to the exclusion of the others. When we come into government we will change the approach.”⁵³

In other words, the MMD used its control and access to the state-owned media for partisan advantage. Political interference in the operations of the media greatly contributed to the exclusion of the opposition parties. Sikota Wina alluded to the fact that: “the mass media has unashamedly been manipulated to the exclusive monopoly of a small clique of leaders, and views of the ordinary citizen wishing to constructively criticise their policies are blacked out.”⁵⁴ With biased coverage by the state-owned media, the opposition parties tended to depend on the private media for dissemination of reliable information. Nonetheless, the presence of privately owned media has not really helped in providing alternative information, since they also tended to have political favourites.

A critical examination of the privately owned Post Newspaper justifies Richard Kapita’s view that private media was as guilty as the public media of biased reporting.⁵⁵ An analysis of the media coverage of the 2011 general elections campaign period revealed obvious disparities in the allocation of space among the political players. While the state owned media unreservedly supported and campaigned for the ruling MMD, the only viable privately owned Post Newspaper had its own favourites. The Paper carried more stories about the opposition PF than any other political party, a clear indication of its inclination to the former. It was evident therefore, that the media always fell short of impartial portrayal of different political players. The table below is a summary of the political stories carried by the state owned Times of Zambia, Zambia Daily Mail and the privately owned Post newspaper in the run up to 2011 general elections. The stories cover the three main political parties, the MMD, PF and UPND from January to April 2011.

⁵³ *The Post Newspaper*, 26th February, 2003.

⁵⁴ Derrick Chitala and Akashambatwa Lewanika (eds.), *The Hour has Come: Proceedings of the National Conference on the Multi-Party Option held at Garden House*, (Lusaka Zambia, 20-21st July, 1990)

⁵⁵ Interview with Richard Kapita, 01-10-2014

Table 2. Comparative Media Coverage for Three Political Parties

		The Post		Times of Zambia		Zambia Daily Mail
	Date	Headline	Date	Headline	Date	Headline
Political Party						
PF						
	31/01/11	Sata Charms the Westerners	07/01/11	Let Lubinda challenge Sata	5/01/11	PF to fake defections
	8/02/11	Sata wins Eastern Province	17/01/11	Sata to blame for Mongu killings	10/01/11	Sata's forked-tongue exposed
	9/02/11	PF must sweep Luapula	21/01/11	PF MPs named in Lusaka land scam	17/01/11	Ungrateful Sata baffles Rupiah
	18/02/11	Sata leads, HH vice, in the Pact	01/02/11	Sata could divide Zambians	4/02/11	Don't vote for Sata Youths
	17/03/11	Sata explains stance on homosexuality	17/02/11	Sata has no respect for Chiefs	15/02/11	Luapula chiefs reject Sata
	23/03/11	Sata Warns Rupiah over gratuity	18/02/11	Sata is frustrated, A traditional leader observed	18/02/11	Stop the rot, Rupiah tells Sata
	11/04/11	Sata preferred choice, Western province	10/03/11	Sata has riotous character	01/03/11	New shadow cabinet rocks PF boat
	13/04/11	Sata seeks peaceful election environment	22/03/11	Sata's popularity declines in Lusaka urban	9/03/11	Sata unsuitable for plot one, NGO
	26/04/11	PF best alternative for Zambia, Chitala	23/03/11	Sata's gay support is shameful	15/03/11	I don't trust Sata, Kabimba senior
	26/04/11	Economic Expert predicts PF victory	13/04/11	PF Manifesto hollow, MUZ	28/3/11	Sata to lose poll, career to end
	29/04/11	Its Sata's year-Sondashi	27/04/11	Sata's CB popularity wanes	21/3/11	Opposition parties reject Sata
					12/04/11	Sata no match for RB
						Church to de-campaign sinful Sata
MMD						
	02/01/11	RB not fit for president, Chongwe	01/01/11	RB among Africa's top 12 leaders	01/01/11	RB preaches love and unity
	5/01/11	MMD won't get away with corruption	15/01/11	Give RB chance to build his successes	4/01/11	MMD hails RB's records
	7/01/11	Rupiah goes tribal in Eastern Province	24/01/11	Uphold Peace, RB tells Zambians	7/01/11	RB, MMD set for landslide victory
	8/02/11	Lozi blood will defeat Rupiah	05/02/11	RB Unveils plan to reduce poverty	22/02/11	North, Lenje chiefs for RB
	14/02/11	RB will cry like KK in 1991-	22/02/11	MMD still intact in		

		Sata		W/Province		
	2/02/11	RB not fit for president, Chongwe	10/03/11	Economist predicts Rupiah's victory	11/03/11	MMD victory certain
	3/03/11	Rupiah is a reckless leader	11/03/11	Creating wealth, jobs our focus, Banda	15/3/11	RB, humble and selfless
	25/03/11	Banda's regime anchored on tribalism	14/04/11	Vote to safeguard economic gains- Banda	5/04/11	South traditional leaders commend RB
	04/04/11	Rupiah refuses to waste money in West	22/04/11	I want to give Zambians better future, RB	11/04/11	I will defeat Sata, RB
	29/04/11	Banda must go, he's a killer	23/04/11	South Chiefs resolve to back Banda	12/04/11	West, MMD stronghold
			01/04/11	RB among Africa's top 12 leaders	14/04/11	12 Luvale chiefs back Banda
UPND						
	18/02/11	HH is committing political suicide	24/01/11	UPND picks candidates for Copperbelt seats	7/02/11	UPND campaign for HH
	24/03/11	UPND western province leader joins PF	09/02/11	UPND vows not to back Sata in Mporokoso	14/02/11	Bleak Pact leave HH isolated
	29/03/11	HH is a liar, immature and arrogant	15/02/11	UPND intensifies campaigns for HH	22/02/11	HH has auctioned UPND, Chifire
	31/03/11	We are fed up of UPND's regional politics	19/02/11	HH and Sata clash over Kabimba	24/02/11	UPND brand Sata dictator
	22/03/11	HH campaigning for Rupiah	21/02/11	UPND blames PF for pact failure	26/02/11	HH told to apologise to Zambians over pact
	01/04/11	HH hypocrisy has been unmasked	09/03/11	The pact eroded HH's credibility	28/02/11	I refused to join UPND due to tribalism, Kabimba
	25/03/11	Nalikwanda UPND officials joins PF citing tribalism in the party	22/04/11	UPND hails Government housing empowerment gesture	7/03/11	UPND dumps Pact
	04/04/11	Tribal politics still vivid in UPND	30/04/11	Don't vote for HH, Chituwo	8/03/11	UPND win kudos for ditching Pact
	05/04/11	HH's desperation for leadership can easily mortgage the country			11/03/11	UPND, MMD best Pact, Chiefs
	13/04/11	Top UPND officials in Kalabo joins PF				
	18/02/11	HH is committing political suicide				

SOURCE: Articles from the Post Newspaper, the Times of Zambia and Zambia Daily Mail between January and April, 2011

The above table gives a clear picture of the disparities in the manner the said media portrayed the three political parties. While the state owned Times of Zambia campaigned for the MMD, by portraying it as the only genuine and popular party, the paper ensured that all the headlines about

the opposition PF were negative. At the same time, the Post did not report anything positive about the MMD and its president Rupiah Banda. All the headlines about the MMD were those aimed at portraying the negative side of the party. The Post instead glorified the opposition PF and its leader Michael Sata.⁵⁶

Similarly, the UPND featured eight times in the Times of Zambia, and of these times, only two were positive headlines while the rest had nothing to do with its campaigns or policies. This scenario correlated with Chibwe's observation that the Government owned media were only interested when the UPND was criticising another opposition party.⁵⁷ The pattern in the Zambia Daily Mail was not different. In the case of the Post, all the headlines concerning the UPND were negative and destructive to the party.⁵⁸ According to Charles Kakoma, the Post Newspapers never published progressive policies or ideals of the UPND. He claimed that the paper had instead specialised in propagating ethnic propaganda which played in the hands of unsuspecting audience.⁵⁹ Such publicity could easily sway people's views about the UPND, especially those from other ethnic groups who may want to counter such a negative trend.

Perhaps this was history in perpetuity. In 1963 Nkumbula wondered whether newspaper editors lacked the ability to judge their source of information. He complained of misinterpreted facts concerning the ANC and its popularity. Some articles in the press were very divisive, inaccurate, and usually exaggerated on the issue of ethnic politics in Southern Province. The press according to Nkumbula was deliberately misinforming the public about the coalition by publishing unsubstantiated rumours.⁶⁰ Negative headlines about the ANC were a common feature in the newspapers between 1964 and the time when the one party system was introduced.⁶¹

⁵⁶ See the chart above for negative headlines about the MMD from the *Post newspaper*

⁵⁷ Chibwe noted that the state owned media would always feature UPND if the story was against another political party, not when it carried positive messages about the party itself.

⁵⁸ *The Post Newspaper*, 4th March, 2011, UPND is a Tribal Party, see also, *the Post Newspaper* for 21st, 24th 25th and 31st March, 2011, where all the stories carried on these dates portrayed UPND as an ethnic and regional party.

⁵⁹ Interview with Charles Kakoma

⁶⁰ Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, First Session of the Eleventh Council, 6th - 23rd March, 1963

⁶¹ Headlines such as 'ANC split Ahead' *Daily Mail*, 10th December, 1970. 'The ANC leader Nkumbula Rejected,' *Daily Mail*, 9th December, 1970. 'Nkumbula should Resign,' 16th

Apparently media bias was not a new phenomenon. In the early 1970s, the ANC leaders complained of how UNIP campaign tours in their constituencies were reported as developmental inspection by the media. During that period, the ANC was barred from campaigning on the pretext that the Electoral Commission had not yet sanctioned campaigns.⁶² By disguising UNIP's campaigns the media aided in blacking out the opposition. Similarly, by failing to cover campaign rallies for the opposition, the electorates were denied the opportunity to accurately judge the popularity of different political parties. Such maneuvers by the press limited the opposition's ability to attract substantial support nation-wide. Consequently, lack of adequate or accurate information about a particular political party could easily lead to stereotyping or wrong perception of such parties.

The UPND and indeed other smaller political parties were deliberately blacked out by the media. The party's progressive ideals and policies were rarely given a platform. On 28th August, 2001, Reuben Phiri reported of how ZNBC cancelled a programme aimed at giving an open debate by representatives from the opposition UPND and Agenda for Zambia (AZ). The reason for the cancellation was because the ruling MMD was not represented.⁶³

Ethnicity as a Political Resource

Subsequently, politicians have also not helped in undoing the picture created by the media. In trying to undermine the ruling party's popularity, opposition leaders also applied the ethnic tag by accusing the ruling party of sidelining their regions and channeling development to regions where they come from. In 2002, Benjamin Mwila the leader for the opposition Zambia Republican Party (ZRP) cited the Mwanawasa government for being vindictive against the Bembas. Mwila claimed that the Bembas were totally neglected in the Mwanawasa government. He further complained that "most countries where minority tribes rule would want to subdue the majority groups."⁶⁴ Apparently Mwanawasa was Lenje through his paternity. An ethnic group considered minority in relation to other groups like the Bembas, Ngonis, Tongas and Lozis. In 2003, Michael Sata leader of the opposition PF added his displeasure by claiming that

September, 1970. 'We Killed the Lion, says UNIP,' More Swing to UNIP', ANC'S End Nearing,' and many more stories indicating that ANC was indeed nearing its end.

⁶² UNIPA/ANC 2/31. 1970, Local Government Elections Circular No: 1

⁶³ *The Post Newspaper*, 29th August, 2001.

⁶⁴ *The Monitor*, 27-30th December, 2002.

Mwanawasa's leadership was heavily nepotistic and was anti-Bemba.⁶⁵ He was believed to have more relations in various portfolios than any other ethnic group. Such allegations were compounded by what the Challenge Magazine called the Family Tree in government.⁶⁶ However, considering the small size of the Lenje group, one discerns that these allegations were purely political meant to discredit Mwanawasa. Similar observations were made against Fredrick Chiluba who was seen to favour the Bembas while neglecting other smaller groups. Such interpretations therefore reinforced the understanding that most political parties in a multiethnic nation cannot totally escape the ethnic influence.⁶⁷

In a bid to consolidate their political power base, there was a deliberate tendency by politicians of weakening the political support of alternative parties. Most political leaders played the ethnic card in their bid to build their political base. This perspective was in agreement with Immanuel Wallerstein's observation that sometimes politicians tended to advance their personal interests and those of their supporters by engaging in separatist politics.⁶⁸ In this case they tarnished the image of other parties to win people's sympathy and votes. While calling other parties as ethnic they claimed to be national in orientation. Mugabe for instance, continued depicting the PF-ZAPU as an ethnic party which was predominantly Ndebele and had nothing to offer the people of Zimbabwe. Apparently the Ndebele was a minority ethnic group. However, the only difference between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU was that the former was dominated by the Shona speaking people which were a majority group.⁶⁹ In this case, the ethnic tag was used to discredit Joshua Nkhomo's opposition party while portraying the ZANU PF as a national party. Similarly, UNIP portrayed ANC as an ethnic political party since its stronghold was in Southern Province even though the party had support in other parts of the country. Writing to the 'Voice of UNIP,'

⁶⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 21/07/2003

⁶⁶ Fr Miha Drevensek (ed.), 'Family Tree' in *The Challenge Magazine*, vol.6 No 2 (2004), p.7

⁶⁷ Interview with Peter Matoka, 19-11-2013

⁶⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Elites in French-Speaking West Africa,' in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 111, 1, (May,1965), (Cambridge), pp.1-33

⁶⁹ Jonathan N. Moyo, *Voting for Democracy: A Study of Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1992), p.35

K. Shitumba a UNIP supporter indicated that ANC could not rule Zambia because of its tribal elements.⁷⁰

The practice of attaching the ethnic label to opponents was a common political strategy. During his campaign in 2011, Rupiah Banda advised the people of Chipata in Eastern Province not to vote for UPND because it was an ethnic political party which did not care for the interests of other ethnic groups apart from the Tongas.⁷¹ Such sentiments played in the hands of some electorates who believed that UPND was indeed ethnic. While discrediting their opponents, political players employ the ethnic card to advance their cause. By so doing, the voters from other ethnic groups shun such political parties thus limiting their support base, and at the same time, reinforcing the ethnic perspective.

Perhaps Kapita's observation that a political party was only national when in power can suffice. When UNIP was in government, it possessed a national flavour.⁷² However, after leaving government in 1991, the only place the party managed to secure seats during elections was Eastern Province. Similarly, the MMD was viewed as a national party despite having a lot of officials who hailed from Bembaland during Fredrick Chiluba's leadership. But from the time Rupiah Banda an Easterner took over the presidency, there was a shift of allegiance to Eastern Province. Since the president of the UPND was a Southerner, it became apparent that Southern Province would be the party's stronghold.⁷³

From 1991, UNIP has been getting the majority of its votes from Eastern Province despite having been in government for twenty-seven years. Similarly, the MMD which received overwhelming support across the country in 1991 had retreated to a few provinces as evidenced by election results after 2011.⁷⁴ If an ethnic party was understood as one that received the bulk of its votes from a single ethnic group, then all political parties in Zambia could be categorised as such. However, Kanchan Chandra defines an ethnic political party as one that championed the

⁷⁰ UNIPA/UNIP 7/1/12. Presidential Affairs. Writing to the 'Voice of UNIP' in 1963, K. Shitumba observed that ANC was not fit to rule Zambia because of its tribal elements

⁷¹ Interview with Daniel Munkombwe, 18-10-2013

⁷² Interview with Mutale Nalumango, 01-10-2014

⁷³ Interview with Mutale Nalumango, 01-10-2014

⁷⁴ Interview with Richard Kapita, 01-10-2014

needs and interests of a particular ethnic group or category.⁷⁵ An examination of voter patterns in Zambia indicated that every political party had its heartland. Even parties that were deemed to possess a nation-wide presence still had their strongholds in particular regions. This scenario was not only unique to opposition parties like the ANC and UPND.⁷⁶

Opposition parties are more prone to labels of ethnic loyalties because they did not have incentives for their followers. Ruling parties on the other hand control the government purse or resources in general. Every citizen longed to benefit from government resources and supporting the party in power became a sure way of accessing the benefits. It would be naïve to conclude that the UNIP or MMD became regional or ethnic after leaving office since their support base was more restricted to the presidents regions.

In their campaign messages, politicians always attach development to their being voted in power. Voters were thus made to believe that for them or indeed their region to develop, they must have someone to represent them in parliament. Robert Alfred sees the critical contest for power among different politicians, the ruling party and the opposition as the main source of ethnic influence.⁷⁷ Issue based campaign was mostly for cosmopolitan places like Lusaka, Livingstone and Copperbelt where there was a mixture of ethnic groups. Elsewhere, politicians only denounced the vice when it was not in their favour. The ethnic card therefore had been used as a campaign strategy by different political parties and indeed different politicians.

Politicians use ethnic appeals for varying reasons. Apart from labeling their opponents as ethnic parties, ruling parties may use their ethnic groups to ensure their continued stay in power. When Fredrick Chiluba's stay in power was threatened by the NP, when Emmanuel Kasonde a Bemba became the party's vice president, Chiluba chose to appeal to Bemba's ethnic feelings. Fearing to lose his foothold among Bemba speaking territories, Chiluba summoned Members of Parliament (MPs) from Northern Province to State House. In this case, Chiluba used his ethnic affiliation to

⁷⁵ Kanchan Chandra. *What is an Ethnic Party?* (New York: New York University, 2006), p. 18

⁷⁶ Miha Drevensek and Clive Dillon Malone (eds.), 'Family Tree' *The Challenge Magazine*, vol. 6, No 2 (Ndola: Mission Press, 2004), p.7

⁷⁷ Robert R. Alfred, 'Class Voting in the Anglo-American Political System,' Seymour M. Lipset & Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignment: Cross National Perspectives* (New York: Collier Macmillan Ltd, 1967), p.69

solicit for their solidarity. From this perspective, it can be argued that political parties used ethnic appeals at different levels for varying reasons. Moreover, political parties constitute competing bodies of men and women seeking political power to be attained and sustained at whatever cost.⁷⁸ As a political resource, ethnicity was used as a mobilising tool for different politicians. Its usefulness was bound in its ability to de-campaign their political competitors while energizing their supporters.

It is evident that, while politicians publicly condemned ethnic politics, in the privacy of their campaigns, they applied it as an instrument for mobilisation and advancing their political mileage. In 1970, Simon Kapwepwe had lashed out at top UNIP officials whom he said were mobilising their ethnic groups to solicit for elections, and even promotion. According to Kapwepwe these leaders were promoting artificial ethnicity.⁷⁹ Kapwepwe's observation was in line with Nkumbula's concerns that rather than promoting national unity and solidarity, politicians continued to mislead people through political hypocrisy. Some government leaders deliberately shunned opposition strongholds in terms of development in order to force the electorates to vote for their party. Such leaders use prejudice against their opponents as a way of wooing support from people.⁸⁰

The perceived on-going strength of ethnic solidarity in Southern Province was therefore primarily the product of political propaganda. Fearing that the opposition may gain ground, ruling parties and other political stakeholders continued projecting the ANC and UPND as parties built on ethnic support. Zambia has about seventy-three ethnic groups, and as such, the element of ethnicity or regionalism may not be strange. Tom Mboya of the founding members of KANU once observed that in an African setting, people's first loyalty was to the ethnic group, then to the region before it translated to a political party and lastly to the nation.⁸¹ Under such circumstances, it is obvious that loyalty to the state becomes dependent on how the state strives to satisfy the needs and demands of the people. More often than not, these political parties are

⁷⁸ *The Weekly Post*, 6-12th August, 1993. Chiluba was quoted as having reminded the people of Northern Province of their historical links with Luapula. He stressed the importance of family ties between the people of Luapula and the Northerners.

⁷⁹ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 16th February, 1970

⁸⁰ Parliamentary Debates of the 4th Session of the 2nd National Assembly, 12th January-9th March 1973, P.162

⁸¹ Tom Mboya Biography at www.tommboyo.org (Accessed on 24th October, 2014)

centered on ethnic groupings. Hence regionalism finds fertile breeding ground under such conditions.⁸² To a large extent, therefore, every political party in a multiethnic country like Zambia has some ethnic inclination, what differs is probably the degree of this inclination. This reality prompted Kaunda to embrace the ‘One Zambia One Nation’ slogan to try and create a sense of unity while overcoming ethnic conflicts.

Kaunda instituted the One Zambia One Nation policy to manage ethnic diversity within the framework of political unity. This policy helped in providing a sense of oneness. In addition, the policy was supplemented by encouraging political candidates not only to contest among their regions of birth. Vernon Mwaanga affirmed that he was elected twice in Luanshya, thus concretising the one Zambia one nation policy.⁸³ Therefore, it can be argued that the one Zambia one nation policy brought about national unity in Zambian politics. It helped to inculcate a sense of oneness despite the existence of various ethnic groups, thus promoting national unity.

The desire of every politician is to first secure support from their people before thrusting to other areas. This was the reason why politicians’ preferred contesting for positions from their homelands. Unless in cosmopolitan towns that was where anyone could comfortably stand and win an election.⁸⁴ Politicians are therefore, more popular in their home areas than elsewhere. Campaigning for Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe in 1971, a staunch UPP supporter indicated that:

One cannot prove to be a national leader without ethnic backing. You must start from the village where you were born, go to the district, province and national level Kapwepwe’s career started from his village in Chinsali just like Kenneth Kaunda, Nkumbula also started in Namwala, not to omit Nalumino Mundia ... this is how politics begin even if you are well known in Lusaka, without your village you would certainly stand to lose.⁸⁵

In their desperate effort to be in government, politicians tended to issue destructive sentiments that have not helped in averting the ethnic tag. In soliciting for support, the leaders of the ANC

⁸² UNIPA/UNIP 16/1/3 1963. Press Release by Preston Mwenya

⁸³ Interview with Vernon. Mwaanga, 24-10-2013

⁸⁴ Interview with Malimba Masheke, 21-02-2014. Masheke observes that places which have mixed ethnic groups like Livingstone and the Copperbelt are the only places where people from other provinces can win an election without the backing of ethnic connection.

⁸⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 7th November, 1970

were telling the people of Southern Province to vote for their own son Nkumbula not a stranger, as Vernon Mwaanga observed.⁸⁶ Apparently such sentiments were not unique to ANC alone. Earlier in 1962, writing to UNIP members, in Chifubu, a UNIP supporter, indicated that big ethnic groups in Zambia should never be led by a small ethnic group even if it had a brilliant leader.⁸⁷ Rupiah Banda used similar sentiments in 2011 during his campaigns in Eastern Province where he told the electorates to vote for him because he hailed from there. Such messages are likely to aggravate ethnic solidarity while at the same time creating ethnic mistrust. Consequently people are made to believe that they were mandated to vote for their people regardless of their capabilities. Therefore, politicians can be seen as architects of ethnic feeling on the political stage.

The ethnic rational in party politics can be seen in the manner those who collaborated with political parties headed by people from other ethnic groups were characterised as traitors or sell outs. Vernon Mwaanga a veteran politician who held different portfolios in the UNIP government, and later joined the MMD was branded as a Northerner in reference to his continued association with people of that area. "I have been teased and called names for working with Chiluba a Bemba, people from my ethnic group called me Vernon Mwansa."⁸⁸ When the NP was formed and Emmanuel Kasonde served as vice president, his fellow Bembas who were supporting Fredrick Chiluba labeled him a traitor. Posner attests to the fact that Kasonde was called Liswaniso implying that he was now Lozi.⁸⁹ With such prejudices, individuals find themselves in a dilemma of choosing between political parties of their choice and pleasing their ethnic groups.

⁸⁶ Interview with Vernon Mwaanga, 24-10-2013

⁸⁷ UNIPA/ANC 2/5 [Icalenga separation in September, 1958. Ibantu balefwaya chakuti umu Bemba nangu mu Ngoni ewaletungulula pantu emitundu ikalamba yaishibikwa muno chalo. Tabalefwaya umunthu uwafyalwa kukamutundu akanono ukuteka chalo cesu] what caused the separation in 1958 was because people did not want a person from a small tribe to lead them. They want either a Bemba or Ngoni because these are the big tribes in our country.

⁸⁸ Interview with Vernon Mwaanga, 24-10-2013, see also interview with Daniel Munkombwe, 18-10-2013 who complained that some of the people he worked with treated him with suspicion because he did hail from their regions.

⁸⁹ Daniel Nolan Posner, *The Institutional Origins of Ethnic Politics in Zambia* (PhD Thesis), Havard University, 1998. P.43

Conclusion

Though highly condemned by political players as being a divisive element, ethnicity in a multiethnic country like Zambia, has been utilised by the same people for their political expediency. It has been used either to discredit political competitors from their own ethnic group or to reinforce support from the politician's ethnic group. This study therefore concurs with Bizeck J Phiri's argument that "it would be wrong to expect ethnicity to disappear from the political arena since it is a useful mobilisation strategy."⁹⁰ While acknowledging the detrimental effects of ethnic politics, politicians continued using it as a weapon to discredit their competitors. However, to label a political party on the basis of its stronghold in one region maybe a misjudgment of political strategies in an African political environment.

Therefore, it was evident that ethnic politics was a creation of politicians. While some scholars argue that ethnicity or regionalism results in political rivalry, this chapter has shown that the latter precipitated the former. In the course of political competition, there has been a strong tendency among political players to label other political parties as ethnic. This study concluded that the labeling was purely for political expediency as there was no comprehensive difference in the manner different political parties solicited for support. More importantly we find that there were a lot of other factors affecting party choice, ranging from economic and political benefits to party projection by the media.

⁹⁰ Bizeck Jube Phiri, *A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the 3rd Republic*, 1890-2001 (Asmara: Africa World Press, Inc. 2006), p.48

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The study has attempted to investigate ethnic or regional elements in Zambia's party politics during the period 1948 to 2011. The study noted that the struggle for political independence involved many Zambians regardless of their background or ethnicity. Further, it was observed that Freedom fighters made deliberate attempts towards unifying people in the fight for a common cause. Despite these efforts, available evidence points to isolated incidences of ethnic inclination particularly after the formation of UNIP. However, it was hoped that skirmishes of ethnic loyalties that existed during the nationalist struggle would vanish in the wake of political, economic and social changes that were to accompany independence. Instead, the reversal was the case where some people especially politicians became more conscious of their ethnic identity than their national responsibility. Political parties and politicians in particular adopted the use of ethnic tag as a means of limiting the threats posed by their opponents. In other words, political parties and politicians in particular attempted to boost their electoral prospects by ascribing the ethnic tag to their rivals. This strategy was particularly employed by ruling parties which had a privilege of controlling government resources.

The First and Second Republics tried to defuse the problem of ethnically motivated politics through the implementation of the One Zambia One Nation motto. As a multiethnic country, Zambia needed policies or measures that would ensure peace and unity. Under this policy, the UNIP Government created a Zambia with at least equal opportunities regardless of one's ethnicity. In the context of Wiseman, "politics is about who gets what, when and how."¹ As such, politics gives rise to dissatisfaction in either the sharing of national resources or indeed political appointments. Through ethnic or indeed tribal balancing, Kaunda managed to subdue the ethnic threat. Notably, the emergency of a one party state significantly curtailed political competition which according to UNIP was the main genesis of ethnic inclination. However, the introduction of the one party state should also be understood as a response to the mounting divisions within UNIP as well as the pressure from opposition parties such as the ANC and UPP. These parties

¹ Victor Wiseman, *Politics in Everyday Life* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), p. 8

were threatening UNIP's hold on power. The strategy of using one party state to dismantle multiparty systems had already worked in many African Countries like Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania and many others countries. In Kenya Jomo Kenyanta accused the opposition of fueling regionalism and separatist tendencies.²

Although Zambia was a multi-ethnic country, different societies have harmoniously co-existed. But ethnic manipulation was an element that was ever present. For instance, it was evident that politicians intensified the usage of ethnic propaganda in soliciting for support as well as discrediting their opponents during different episodes of the political dispensation. In other cases, politicians used the ethnic card for their political expediency. More importantly, ruling parties appeared to have contributed greatly to fueling resentment and fermenting hostile competition by failing to take balanced development to all provinces. The UNIP government tried to suppress ethnic politics by ensuring that all provinces were represented in terms of appointments. However, the subsequent government tended to ignore this important aspect of One Zambia, One Nation.

Ruling parties were often seen to possess a national appeal not because they were free of ethnic or regional inclination, but because their support had benefits attached. While supporting an opposition party was a matter of sacrifice, supporting a party in power was rewarding in terms of contracts, job opportunities as well as developmental projects. During the First Republic, people affiliated to UNIP were able to access jobs and other social-economic services unlike those who supported ANC. For Nkumbula to remain in the opposition even when it paid to belong to the ruling party was a matter of personal sacrifice. A party in power always enjoyed national support because of what it had to offer. This explained why immediately after leaving government, these parties tended to reduce to particular regions associated with a particular ethnic group. The demographic reality of ethnic diversity in Zambia makes it susceptible to ethnic abuse by politicians. Kaunda's condemnation of ethnic politics in 1963 was not misplaced. He argued that: "we believe that the tribe of a man does not, and should not matter. The fact that one was born a mulozi, a mungoni, English or any of the seventy-odd tribes of Northern Rhodesia is nothing to

² Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Class Tribe and Party in West African Politics' in Seymour M Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) *Party Systems and Voter Alignment: Cross National Perspectives*, (New York: Collier Macmillan Ltd, 1967), p.331

either commend or condemn them.”³ The study demonstrated that the UNIP government managed to diffuse the problem of ethnicity through the practical implementation of the One Zambia One Nation motto.

Despite being perceived as ethnic political parties, the ANC and UPND operated within the framework of national politics. They were not any different from other parties like the UNIP, UPP, UP, MMD and PF. Their portrayal as regional parties was largely based on negative public opinion that emanated from a combination of factors such as the biased media as well as political competition.⁴ Probably the only difference lay in these parties having failed to ascend to power. The ANC under Nkumbula cooperated with UNIP leaders on issues of national interest. The ANC relentlessly fought the Federation. In 1962, the ANC agreed to form a coalition government with UNIP despite the latter having broken away from the ANC in 1958. In 1964 Nkumbula accepted defeat and vowed to defend democracy as opposition leader. It should be realised that Nkumbula could have easily convinced Kaunda to include him in his government, but opted to serve the nation in opposition despite the harsh political environment that existed in the First Republic. More importantly, Nkumbula agreed to sign the Choma Declaration which ushered in the one party state. For Nkumbula, the Choma Declaration was a declaration of peace and unity, thus putting national interest above personal or ethnic interest. For the people of Southern Province, the signing of the Choma Declaration was hope deferred. They believed that Nkumbula’s decision to accept the disbandment of the ANC would position the province at the centre of national politics.

The study has clearly shown that every political party desired to acquire a national character. However, in the case of the opposition, their efforts were continually stifled by utterances from politicians who found ethnicity to be a useful strategy in either recruiting their supporters or de-campaigning their opponents. The media’s biased coverage of political parties has largely contributed to projecting them either negatively or positively.

³ Kaunda, ‘African Opinion,’ p.119

⁴Hess, *Party Work in Social-Democratic Parties*, p.61.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Government Documents

African Affairs Gov. Zam. Annual Report 1956

African Affairs Annual Report, 1957

African Affairs Annual Report, NRG/AFR/AF 3. 1962

Northern Rhodesia African Affairs Annual Report. Gov-Zam N75 (058) 1959

Northern Rhodesia African Native Affairs. Gov. Zam. N79, 1950-1963

Irving, Kaplan. *Zambia: a country study in foreign Area studies*, (n. p), 1979

A.A Dubb (ed.), *The Multi-Tribal Society: Proceedings of the Sixteenth Conference of the Rhodes Livingstone Institute*, 1962

Zambia: House of Chiefs Minutes, Minutes of the tenth Meeting of the House of Chiefs, 14th July, 1978

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

National Archives of Zambia (NAZ)

NAZ/SP 1/3/61, District Tour Reports

NAZ/SP 1/5/34, June 1972 POL 2/ CONF Monze District Monthly Report,

NAZ/SP 4/1/116, 1971, Dev. 4/1 Southern Province Development Committee Minutes

NAZ/SP 4/2/171, 1964-1970, adm.18/1/2 Reports of Meetings by Political Parties

NAZ/SP 3/25/43, 1964, Choma Township Council Minutes

NAZ/SP 4/1/116, March 1971. Dev 4/1. Special Development Committee and Reports

United Nation Independence Party Archives (UNIPA)

UNIPA/ANC 2/10, 1957-1963. Tour of Northern Province

UNIPA/ANC 2/15, ANC Circulars

UNIPA/ANC 2/25, 1962-1967. Miscellaneous (Speeches)

UNIPA/ANC 4/4, 1971 Annual Conference Resolutions

UNIPA/ANC 7/1, Election Bulletins by ANC

UNIPA/ANC 7/5, 1972. ANC Publications

UNIPA/ANC 7/14 Press Release

UNIPA/ANC 7/81, 1951-1970. General Conference

UNIPA/ANC 8/9. A Letter from Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula to Fox Pitt, 27th July, 1956.

UNIPA/ANC 7/71-74, Presidential Speech, 28th December 1970

UNIPA/ANC 7/27, 1968-1972, Minutes of the National Assembly

UNIPA/ANC 7/33, 1960-1972, Historical Extracts of the ANC

UNIPA/UNIP 7/1/12, 1963, Presidential Affairs

UNIPA/UNIP 7/14, 11-09-1972, PM/AG/GT Annual Conference Resolutions

UNIPA/UNIP 7/14, 1970-1973. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and Telecommunication Services

UNIPA/UNIP 7/14/1, 1965-1967. General Information

UNIPA/UNIP 9/1, 25-02-1972, Report of the National Commission.

UNIPA/UNIP 9/20, 1961-1972, Circulars, Correspondence and Government Release

UNIPA/UNIP 15/1/16, 1970, Seminars

UNIPA/UNIP 16/1/3, 1963, Zambia: Another One Party State

UNIPA/UNIP 16/1/13, 1960-1963. Correspondences

Parliamentary Debates

Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, 2nd Session of the 10th Council, 6th-23rd March, 1956

Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, 1st of the Eleventh Council, 1959-1960

Northern Rhodesia Hansard No. 108, 1st August, 1963, Official Verbatim Report

Official Verbatim Report of the Debts of the First Session (Resumed) of the Eleventh Legislative Council, 23rd June-7th August, 1959

Parliamentary Debates of the First Session of the First Legislative Assembly, 7th Juli-27th August, 1964

Parliamentary Debates of the Fourth Session (Resumed) of the Second National Assembly, 25th July-3rd August, 1972

Parliamentary Debates of the 4th Session of the 2nd National Assembly, 12th January-9th March, 1972

Parliamentary Debates of the First national assembly, 10th January-2nd March, 1973, vol. xxxll

Parliamentary Debates, 2nd Session of the Eighth National Assembly, 16th January-3rd April, 1998, No 109

Parliamentary Debates of the First Session (Resumed) of the Ninth National Assembly, 25th January-3rd April, 2002

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Almond, A. Gabriel. *Comparative Politics: A World Review*. New York: Pearson, 2004.

Ayo, Langley J. *Ideologies of Liberalism in Black Africa, 1856-1970: Documents on Modern African Political Thought from Colonial times to the Present*. London: Rex Collings Ltd, 1979.

Bond, George C. *Politics of Change in a Zambian Community*. Chicago: The University Press of Chicago, 1976.

Chandra, Kanchan. *What is an Ethnic Party?* New York: New York University, 2006

Chazan, Naomi. Lewis, Peter. Mortimer, Robert. Rothchild, Donald & Stedman, Stephen (eds.), *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*. Cambridge: Lynne Rienner Boulder Co. 2000

Chitalu, Derrick and Lewanika, Akashambatwa (eds.) *The Hour Has Come: Proceedings of the National Conference on the Multiparty Option*. Lusaka; 20-21st July, 1990

Elischer, Sebastian. *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013

Ellis, Stephen (ed.) *Africa Now: People, Policies and Institutions*. London: Villiers Publications, 1996

Erdmann, Gero. *Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation, an African Case: Zambia*. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2007

Galant, Raashled, Minnie, Jeanette & Wales Jack (eds.), *So This is Democracy: State of the Media in southern*. Windhoeck: The MISA, 1999

Gertzel, e.tal (eds.). *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. London: Manchester University Press, 1984

- Gewald, Jan-Bart. Hinfelaar, Marja & Macola, Giacomo (eds.) *Living the End of the Empire: Politics and Society in Late Colonial Zambia*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2011
- Gewald, Jan-Bart. Hinfelaar, Marja & Macola, Giacomo (eds.) *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post Colonial Zambia*. Lusaka: The Lembani Trust, 2008
- Herbst, Jeffery. *State Politics in Zimbabwe*. Oxford: University of California Press, 1990
- Hess, Hartmut. *Party Work in Social Democratic Parties: A Practical Handbook*. Dusseldorf: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 1994.
- Hutterstrom, Karolina. *In Pursuit of Ethnic Politics, Voters, Parties and Policies in Kenya and Zambia* (PhD Thesis), 2004
- Jones, S. *The Archaeology of Ethnicity: Constructing Identities in the Past and Present*. London: Routledge, 1997
- Kakoma, Francis. *The Press in Zambia: The Development Role and Control of the National Newspapers in Zambia, 1906-1983*. Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1986.
- Kaunda, Kenneth D. *Zambia Shall Be Free: An Autobiography*. London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1962
- Kenneth, Ingram. *Politics in Modern Africa: The Uneven tribal dimension*. London: Routledge, 1990
- Leiserson, Avery. *Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958
- Lijphart, Arend. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977
- Lipset, Seymour M and Rokkan, Stein (eds.). *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives*. New York: The Free Press, 1967
- Macola, Giacomo. *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010

- Makasa, Kapasa. *Zambia's March to Political Freedom*. Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981
- Melady, Patrick T. (ed.) *Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: Selections from his writings*. New York: Frederick A. Paeger Publishers, 1964
- Minnie, Jeanette, Galant, Raashled & Wales, Zack. (eds.). *So This is Democracy: State of the Media in Southern Africa*. Windhoek: The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA). 1999
- Mmuya, Max and Chiligha, Amos. *Towards Multiparty Politics in Tanzania*. Dar-es salaam: University Press, 1992
- Molteno, Robert. 'Independent Zambia: Achievements and Prospects' in William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia*. Bristol: Manchester University Press, 1974
- Moore, Robert C. *The Political Reality of Freedom of the Press in Zambia*. Lantiana: University Press of America, 1991
- Moyo, Jonathan N. *Voting for Democracy: A Study of Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1992
- Mulford, David C. *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967
- Mulford, David C. *The Northern Rhodesia General Elections of 1962*. California: Oxford University Press, 1964
- Mwangilwa, Goodwin B. *Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula: A Biography of the Old Lion of Zambia*. Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1982
- Mwewa, Charles. *Zambia: Struggles of My People and Western Contribution to Corruption and Underdevelopment in Africa*. Lusaka: Maiden Publishing House, 2011
- Ollawa, Patrick E. *Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economics of National Development*. London: Arthur H. Stockwell LTD, 1979

- Pakner, Lise. *Politics and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia, 1991-2001*. Stockholm: The Nordic African Institute, 2007
- Phiri, Bizeck J. *A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the Third Republic, 1890-2001*. Asmara: Africa World Press, 2006
- Posner, Daniel N. *The Institutional Origins of Ethnic Politics in Zambia*. (Phd Thesis), Chicago: Havard University, 1998
- Rotberg, Robert I. *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966
- Salih, Mohamed M.A. (ed.). *African Political Parties: Evolution Institutionalisation and Governance*. London: Pluto Press, 2003
- Sardanis, Andrew. *Africa: Another Side of the Coin, Northern Rhodesia's Final Years as Zambia Nationhood*. London: Pluto Press, 2003
- Sithole, Masipula. *The One Party Tendency in African Politics: a Comparative Study*. Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati, 1977
- Tordoff, William (ed.) *Politics in Zambia*. Bristol: Manchester University Press, 1974
- Vail, Leroy (ed.) *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*. London: University of California Press, 1989
- Wele, Patrick. *Kaunda and Mushala Rebellion: The Untold Story*. Ndola: Mission Press, 1987
- Wina, Sikota. *The Night Without a President* Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1985
- Wiseman, John A. (ed.) *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. New York: Routledge, 1995
- Wiseman, Victor H. *Politics in Everyday Life*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966
- Wright, Michael. *Zambia: I Changed my Mind*. London: Johnson Publications Ltd, 1972

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Burnell, Peter. 'The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia: Continuities Past, Present and Future' *African Affairs*.vol. 100. No. 399 (April, 2001), pp. 239-263

Cross, Sholto. 'Politics and Criticism in Zambia: A Review Article' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 1. (1994), pp.74-75

Hwedie-Osei, Bertha.'The Role of Ethnicity in Multi-Party Politics in Malawi and Zambia' *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol.16.No. 2. (1998), pp. 227-247

Larmer, Miles. 'A Little Bit Like a Volcano: The United Progressive Party and Resistance to One-Party in Zambia, 1964-1980' *The International Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2006), pp.49-83

Musonda, Francis.'Ethnicity and Ethical Issues in Archaeological Interpretation: A Case of Chakeluka Iron Age Site' *South African Archaeological Bulletin*, Vol. 68. 197 (June 2013), pp. 52-62

Phiri, Bizeck J. 'Colonial Legacy and the Role of the Society in the Creation and Demise of Autocracy in Zambia, 1964-1991' *Nordic Journal of African Studies* Vol. 10. No: 2 (2001), PP. 224-244

Rasmussen, Thomas. 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7. 3 (October, 1969), pp. 407-424

Tarimo, Aquiline. 'Politicisation of Ethnic Identities and Common Good in Kenya' in *Journal of Asian and African Studies* Vol. 45. No. 3 (June, 2010), pp. 297-308

Walker, Conner. 'The Politics of Ethnonationalism' *Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 27. No. 1 (1973), pp. 1-24

Internet

Pdf Zambia 2010 Census of Population and Housing.www.webcrawler.com 21st January, 2015

www.ecz.com election Results

www.tommboya.org (Accessed on 24th October, 2014)

NEWSPAPERS

Central African News, 22nd January, 1963, ‘Speculations that the ANC-UNIP Coalition might Collapse’

Central African Mail, 5th July, 1963, ‘Ken/Harry Clash over date’

Central African Post, 1st June, 1949, ‘Africans were Politically Young and unsure of themselves’

Central African Post, 30th May, 1952

Daily Mail, 13th February, 1970, ‘ANC Banned, Opposition MPs arrested and detained’

Daily Mail, 16th February, 1970, ‘Artificial Tribalism lashed by Kapwepwe’

Daily Mail, 10th August, 1970, ‘Kaunda warned that development would only be implemented through UNIP Councilors’

Daily Mail, 16th September, 1970, ‘Mr Nkumbula must resign’

Daily Mail, 1st January, 2011, ‘RB Preaches Peace and Unity’

Daily Mail, 4th January, 2011, ‘MMD Hails RB’s Records’

Daily Mail, 7th January, 2011, ‘MMD Set for Landslide Victory’

Daily Mail, 18th January, 2011, ‘Over 200 Pf Members defect to MMD’

Daily Mail, 14th February, 2011, ‘Bleak Pact leaves HH isolated’

Daily Mail, 22ND February, 2011 ‘North, Lenje Chiefs for RB’

Daily Mail, 25th February, 2011, ‘Lamba chiefs Loud Rupiah’

Daily Mail, 8th March, 2011, ‘UPND Wins Kudos for ditching PF’

Daily Mail, 12th March, 2011, ‘West MMD Stronghold’

Daily Mail, 13th April, 2011, ‘Sata Imposes son for Parliamentary seat’

Daily Mail, 14th April, 2011, ‘Sata/PF not Popular in Western Province’

Daily Mail, 23rd April, 2011, ‘South Chiefs Endorse RB’

Monitor Newspaper, 27-30th December, 2002,

National Mirror, 7th July, 1990, ‘Chipata, Radio Maria Warned’

National Mirror, 23rd February, 2001, ‘Good Journalism requires Honest’

National Mirror, 8th March, 2003, ‘Newstead Zimba versus Monitor Newspaper’

Northern News, 13th March, 1959, ‘ZANC Banned and all leaders arrested’

Northern News, 3rd April, 1961, ‘Politics takes Second place to economic interest in Eastern’

Northern News, 13th April, 1961, ‘Nkumbula still top man’

Northern News, 11th January, 1965, ‘Nkumbula wonders why his ANC was refused Rally in Chingola’

The Post Newspaper, 8th July, 1998, Mazoka Challenges MMD over nullification of Bauleni Polls’

The Post Newspaper, 9th July, 1998, Tribal Seeds by Kawimbe’

The Post Newspaper, 22nd July, 1998, ‘Sata’s anti Mazoka ploy backfires’

The Post Newspaper, 13th August, 1998, ‘Mazoka quits MMD’

The Post Newspaper, 24th August, 1998, ‘MMD Southern Coordinator Resigns’

The Post Newspaper, 18th November, 2002, ‘Opposition is Tribal’

The Post Newspaper, 26th February, 2003, ‘Sata Regrets his Monopolisation of the Media’

The Post Newspaper, 3rd January, 2011, ‘Scrutinise Rupiah Ahead of poll’

The Post Newspaper, 7th January, 2011, ‘Rupiah Goes Tribal on MMD Leadership’

The Post Newspaper, 9th February, 2011, ‘PF must sweep Luapula’

The Post Newspaper, 9th March, 2011, ‘Rupiah must be tried for Mongu killings’

The Post Newspaper, 14th March, 2011, ‘Rupiah is scared that he will lose’

The Post Newspaper, 18th March, 2011, ‘With or without Pact we are going to win’

The Post Newspaper, 23rd March, 2011, ‘Sata warns Rupiah over gratuity’

The Post Newspaper, 25th March, 2011, ‘Nalikwanda UPND officials join PF’

The Post Newspaper, 31st March, 2011, ‘We are fed up f Regional Politics in UPND’

The Post Newspaper, 4th April, 2011, ‘HH is destroying himself,’ Chongwe

The Post Newspaper, 5th April, 2011, ‘Rupiah being misled like KK in 1991’

The Post Newspaper, 11th April, 2011, ‘Sata preferred candidate for Western Province’

The Post Newspaper, 13th April, 2011, ‘Sata seeks peaceful elections’

The Post Newspaper, 18th April, 2011, ‘Top UPND officials in Kalabo join PF’

The Post Newspaper, 26th April, 2011, ‘Chitala opts for Sata as alternative for Zambia’

The Post Newspaper, 28th April, 2011, ‘Its Sata’s Year, says Sondashi’

The Post Newspaper, 23rd May, 2011, ‘Sata’s Messages goes well with Western Province’

The Post Newspaper, 19th July, 2011, ‘Sata says Rupiah is disgrace’

The Post Newspaper, 20th July, 2011, ‘Rupiah must go, says Sebastian’

The Post Newspaper, 22nd July 2011, ‘Sata says Rupiah is disgrace’

The Post Newspaper, 16th August, 2011, ‘PF Wins Western Province’

The Post Newspaper, 31st August, 2011, ‘Rupiah is a liar, says Masebo’

Times of Zambia, 16th August, 1968, ‘UNIP Youth Killed during Workers’ confrontations’

Times of Zambia, 21st December, 1968, ‘Man Killed as rival Parties Clash in Mufulira’

Times of Zambia, 20th November, 1969, ‘Governor Expels ANC men’

Times of Zambia, 14th May, 1970, ‘Deputy Head teacher of a primary school suspended for allegedly being ANC’

Times of Zambia, 16th July, 1971, ‘Nkumbula Plans Fight against MP Suspension’

Times of Zambia, 22nd July, 1971, ‘ANC Claims causes Uproar’

Times of Zambia, 12th July, 1972, ‘ANC running illicit One-Party Probe’

Times of Zambia, 2nd August, 1972, ‘KK hits out ‘Disgusting Press’

Times of Zambia, 10th August, 1972, ‘No Card no Job’-it’s the only way, Chakulya tells seminar’

Times of Zambia, 14th August, 1972, ‘One Party is by consent, KK’

Times of Zambia, 22ND November, 1971, ‘Violence Flares at UNIP Rally’

Times of Zambia, 18th December, 1971, ‘Nkumbula Warns UNIP’

The Times of Zambia, 21st January, 2011, ‘PF MPs named in Lusaka land scam’

The Times of Zambia, 3rd February, 2011, ‘PF Sweating over Luapula, says MMD’

Times of Zambia, 24th February, 2011, ‘UPND Dares PF in Mutaba polls’

Times of Zambia, 28th February, 2011, Banda to win big in polls, says UNZA don’

Times of Zambia, 4th March, 2011, RB Scorns PF violent habits’

Times of Zambia, 10th March, 2011, Sata has riotous behaviour’

Times of Zambia, 11th March, 2011, MMD will win easily-RB’

Times of Zambia, 15th March, 2011, MMD has made inroads’

Times of Zambia, 17th March, 2011, West backs RB for president’

Times of Zambia, 29th March, 2011, Banda’s leadership has brought positive changes’

Weekly Post, 2nd-8th July, 1993

Interviews

Interview with Chibwe, Winstone. 1st October, 2014, Rhodes Park, Lusaka

Interview with General Masheke, Malimba. 21st February, 2014, Kasupe Farm, Lusaka

Interview with Kakoma, Charles. 16th May, 2014, Lusaka

Interview with Mama Kankasa, Chibesa. 17th October, 2013, Lusaka West, Lusaka

Interview with Kapita, Richard. 1st October, 2014, Rhodes Park, Lusaka

Interview with Matoka, Peter. 26th November, 2013, Ibex Hill, Lusaka

Interview with Munkombwe, Daniel. 18th October, 2013, Belvedere Rodge, Lusaka

Interview with Muntanga, Request. 10th November, 2013, Parliament Motel, Lusaka

Interview with Mwaanga, Vernon. 24th October, 2013, Kalundu, Lusaka

Interview with Nalumango, Mutale. 1st October, 2014, Rhodes Park, Lusaka

Interview with Nyambe Milikelela. 17th June, 2014, Munali, Lusaka

Interview with Palija, Peter. 8th February, 2014, Choma

Interview with Zulu, Grey. 23rd March, 2015, Makeni Farms, Lusaka