

**PEACE AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN
MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF THE UNITED
STATES AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM)**

INDIE KAYAMA

**PEACE AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN
AFRICA: THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
(AFRICOMINDIE KAYAMA**

(715809251)

SUPERVISOR: MR A.L.H MOONGA

**A Dissertation submitted to the University of Zambia and Zimbabwe Open University in
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Masters of Science in Peace,
Leadership and Conflict Resolution**

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DECLARATION

I, INDIE KAYAMA, declare that this research report presented for examination to the University of Zambia for the Master of Science in Peace, Leadership and Conflict Resolution is solely my own work. Wherever, citation of or reference to the work of others has been made, acknowledgement has been made accordingly. The work has not been submitted in part or in full assessment at any other college or university.

Name of Student

Signature

Date

INDIE KAYAMA

.....

October 2018

DEDICATION

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFRICOM	Africa Command
AGOA	Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
AU	African Union
CENTCOM	Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Command
DA	Defence Attaché
DOD	Department of Defence
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EUCOM	European Command
FOCAC	Forum on China Africa Cooperation
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Programme
NSS	National Security Strategy
PACOM	Pacific Command
PNAC	Project for New American Century
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
UNISOM	United Nations Mission in Somalia
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UZ	University of Zimbabwe
ZAF	Zambia Air Force

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ABSTRACT

This study analyses the peace and security implications of an American military presence in Africa with particular focus on the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). The problem was that AFRICOM was created by the USA without consulting any African state. This raised a lot of suspicion about the US motive since the relationship between the US and African states had previously been one where the US was associated with the assassination of African government leaders, the violent and illegal removal of African governments, the support of opposition parties at the expense of ruling parties and interference in African governance. The study sought to identify the rationale for AFRICOM's establishment, unpack the reasons and strategies used by America in penetrating the African continent, examine AFRICOM's effectiveness in enhancing regional peace and security in Africa and analyse the challenges and implications of US operations in Africa. The study utilised qualitative methodology coupled with documentary search and in-depth interviews with key informants. The study is based on the power theory with particular emphasis on smart power. Findings show that despite its military might, the US opted to use all its smart power tools at its disposal such as military, civilians and diplomacy to ensure its entry and acceptance in Africa. This resulted in a unified force called AFRICOM whose organogram include military, civilians and diplomats. Its primary occupation is to protect US interests in Africa such as the fight against terrorism, ensure safety of Americans in Africa, guarantee safe exploitation and repatriation of natural resources to the US, and to counter Chinese influence in Africa. Findings also showed that the US is making a positive impact in assisting African governments in form of humanitarian aid, drought relief, fight against diseases such as Ebola, HIV, military hardware, and training exercises. This positive impact is however, overshadowed by the negative peace and security implications of hosting AFRICOM that include an increase in terrorist activities, political interference, rise in insecurity of African workers following company closures and dependence by African militaries on US assistance. The study also highlights that despite AFRICOM making inroads in its being established in Africa, the African people and their governments would rather work with the US from a distance. Generally, the study indicates that the hosting of AFRICOM on African soil has negative implications on African peace and security. It is therefore recommended that African states should speak with one voice in their dealings with the international world; the US should try to understand issues from an African perspective before prescribing a solution to a problem and that African states should avoid hosting military component of AFRICOM.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This gives a background to the problem that stimulated the researcher's interest to undertake this study. It also gives a brief background to the US military presence and involvement in Africa in form of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the peace and security implications, which are the focus of this study. The statement of the problem, objectives and justification of the study, literature review and methodology are also presented.

1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The United States (US) military involvement in Africa was not very pronounced before the World Wars. According to Le Vine (2013), the US had some clashes with the present-day Libya dating back to the Barbary wars of 1801-1815. Africa's existence or importance to the US never seemed to be of any significance and it would appear that it was never included as having any of the US interests until after World War II. The US interests in Africa only started to rise during World War II and during the Cold War. The US interests in Africa then was just to use Africa as a battlefield between the East and Western blocs. Le vine (2013) concurs with the assertion by noting that, the US support for "corrupt and brutal dictators, military coups and governments, and insurgencies reflected the Sub-Saharan Africa's strategic importance as an East-West battleground.. (p. 13)." Development in African states therefore depended on a state's alliances and its policies. This study will therefore seek to analyse the peace and security implications of an increased American military presence in the form of AFRICOM in Africa.

The US's involvement in African issues also dates back to the era when African states were fighting colonialism and seeking independence. The US and the United Kingdom (UK) were fighting for what Wilson (2013) described as the neutralisation of socialist and communist influence in Africa. It can be opined that this was a polite way of explaining that they were fighting to protect their interests. The US approach and military presence in Africa was not very obvious then, it mainly comprised covert operations and training of African forces to perform their tasks. Most of the work was done diplomatically through their foreign missions. Wilson (2013) describes the US role then, as an overarching one. The US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, in Wilson (2013) buttressed this point by describing the US role as:

Leverages local and indigenous forces [for use] ... aggressively and surgically in Africa and the Arabian peninsula... in close coordination with, and in support of, geographic combatant commander and US embassy country team requirements (p. 1).

Wilson (2013) further notes that the US was disturbed by the hope of freedom in the African people, the possibility of both political and economic liberation and the growing Chinese influence in Africa and hence resorted to meddling and influencing the political discourse by whatever means available to ensure that their interests were protected. The unification of Tanzania and Zanzibar is one case that was prompted by the US uncertainty of future political and economic relations with an independent Zanzibar, this prompted the US to deploy a battleship to the shores of Zanzibar (Ibid). The US also encouraged the UK to invade in order to stop the locals from uprising against the government that was left by the British. The objective of uniting the two countries was later achieved not by military conquest, but through subterfuge, bribery and illegal means perpetrated by the US.

The US presence, interference and involvement in African countries though sometimes indirectly, has also been felt in many parts of Africa. Corera (2013) posits that the assassination of the first elected Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Patrice Lumumba was allegedly organised by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in collusion with the British M16. The reasons for his assassination being that he had turned to the Soviet Union for assistance when there was an army revolt in the country. At the same time secessionist groups in the mineral rich Katanga province were advocating for the secession of the province from the DRC. The US did not want Soviet influence in the region as had happened in Cuba.

In Ghana, the US intelligence also organised and to some extent participated in the coup d'etat that ousted the government of the then president Kwame Nkrumah because of his socialist orientation. Aidoo (2003) and Lee (2002) noted that a rebel general, General Katoka and other disgruntled military officers were identified and encouraged by bribery and the promise of political power to participate in the coup. On the diplomatic front, William P. Mahoney, the US ambassador to Ghana ensured that Nkrumah's popularity among the people would fall because of a failing economy. The economy was being affected to some extent by wrong decisions made by the government on the assumption that they would access aid from the US as promised by the US ambassador yet; the same ambassador requested the US government to stop all the aid to Ghana so that the economy would fail and guarantee the success of the coup. In Libya, Le Vine (2013) notes that the US had a very large military base as early as 1970 but her relations with the

African country began to deteriorate under the 40-year rule of Libya by Colonel Muammar Gadhafi.

According to Le Vine (2013), Somalia became a US strategic partner when it was dumped by the Soviet Union, which opted to support Ethiopia during the 1977-78 Somali-Ethiopian war. The Somalian government before then had been following a Marxist ideology. When the Cold War ended, the US lost interest and withdrew only to resurface under the guise of UN missions UNISOM I, UNITAF and UNISOM II from 1992-95. The Military Factory (2018) cites the reasons for the US's unceremonious withdrawal as the death of 18 US troops and injury of 70 of them. Kuzmarov (2013) concurs with the figures and adds that the US contributed to its demise in that, during the Cold War, they had supplied the Somalian warlords with weapons and training in a bid to destabilise the then Marxist government of Siad Barre. The US interests then in Somalia as advanced by General Norman Schwarzkopf in Kuzmarov (2013) were that "The Red Sea, with the Suez Canal in the North and the Bab-el-Madeb in the South formed an important communications link between the US Pacific and her European allies."

A point to note though was that Africa was not included in the initial US plan of being able to reach all parts of the world as shown by the fact that there was no Command that was dedicated to African issues only. African affairs then were handled by several commands with each region in Africa being the responsibility of a different Command. African issues that required US involvement were according to Ploch (2011) being taken care of or was divided amongst three commands namely the US European Command (EUCOM), US Central Command (CENTCOM), and US Pacific Command (PACOM). These commands were responsible for all African countries except Egypt. Ploch (2011) notes that in recent years, Africa's strategic importance to US interests grew and on 6 February 2007, the Bush administration announced the creation of a new unified combatant command, US Africa Command (AFRICOM), to promote US national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Accordingly, the Donald Trump National Security Strategy of December 2017 is anchored on four pillars, which glaringly prioritises the projection of American interests first in its foreign policy. First pillar is to protect the American people, homeland, and the American way of life while second is to promote American prosperity. The third pillar is to preserve peace through strength and lastly to advance American influence across the world (National Security Strategy of the USA, 2017).

In its conclusion, the National Security Strategy of the USA (2017) sets a positive strategic direction for the US that is meant to reassert America's advantages on the world stage and to

build upon its strengths. It summarises that the American people can be confident that their security and prosperity will always come first during the Trump Administration.

It further states that a secure, prosperous, and free America will be strong and ready to lead abroad to protect America's interests and way of life. To this end, Liautaud (2018) has noted that US military presence in Africa grew to about 7,500 over the past year citing Gen Thomas Waldhauser, the head of AFRICOM. Waldhauser said the majority of these US personnel were concentrated in Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia and in the west of the continent. Waldhauser said the US was focused on fighting violent extremist groups like ISIS affiliates in the Sahel, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaida. The US has since established a military Base on the African continent in Djibouti known as Camp Lemonneir deployed as Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) of the AFRICOM.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The US relationship with African states has been one where the US is associated with the assassination of government leaders, the violent and illegal removal of African governments sometimes without approval of the UN. The support of opposition parties at the expense of the ruling parties and interference in governance issues of the African governments that host their embassies. Barlow (2016) posits that a common thread that ran through all African conflicts and wars is that they are driven by political, economic, religious and social/tribal interests, but above all they are driven by encouragement, and foreign interests/support. He observes that Africa is currently the dumping ground for bad advice, old and sometimes obsolete weapons, experiments for new weapons and tactics all done in order to satisfy international organisations, NGOs and foreign governments (Ibid).

AFRICOM was established and operationalised without any prior consultation with African states and this has raised suspicions about its motive and agenda. Indeed former Zambian president Mwanawasa and SADC Chairman at the time stated that SADC countries and Zambia in particular would not accept the establishment of AFRICOM in the region (Phiri & Silwamba, 2007). Among the reasons advanced against the establishment of AFRICOM included compromised security and diluted sovereignty. The then South African defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota also concurred and added that the presence of AFRICOM would create uncertainty and insecurity in the region and in Africa as a whole (Ibid). Despite the overwhelming rejection of AFRICOM by the AU and its regional bodies, AFRICOM appears to be gaining ground in establishing bases and gaining a firm foothold on African soil through

bilateral agreements with individual states. AFRICOM has since established a military base called Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti.

While AFRICOM appears to be making inroads in both the humanitarian, diplomatic, and military relations with African countries, some African states have still experienced a rise in terrorist activities, in particular Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia. There has been a rise in political agitation in the Arab countries with governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya being removed from power with the involvement of the US. It appears as if the US interests in Africa are not limited to military security only but also include economic, political, human and environmental issues. Some African scholars, diplomats, and political commentators view an increased US military presence and her operations in Africa as an attempt to install her “puppets” into leadership positions in African states. This view is echoed by Kokulo (2008) when he states that, ‘Americans always back the so-called “big men” that will do what they say’. The same statement is shared by Femi (2008) who observes that most African conflicts have been because of US propping up dictators and warlords to further their vested interests.

In Africa, the US appears to be masking her intentions with the hybrid composition of AFRICOM. The re-emphasizing of humanitarian and developmental role for the US military in Africa, simply make the US foreign policy much shadier. The notion of a benevolent US combatant command is a paradox to those who understand the need for the US to secure access to Africa's natural resources; and to establish bases from which to destroy networks linked to terrorism. There is much sense in the argument for inter-agency cooperation; what does not make sense is linking this to a combatant command. When the US promotes a combatant military command in terms of development and humanitarianism, Africans will inevitably suspect that the true story is being kept from them.

Despite the US emphasizing humanitarian and developmental role for the US military in Africa, African states suspect that the US military presence in Africa will result in a fragmentation of the relations of African states, greater instability and terrorist activities. African states also suspect that the US might want to impose its will on the African states without respecting the sovereignty of the African states. This study therefore, seeks to analyse the security implications of American military presence in Africa.

1.4 GENERAL RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The study was aimed at analysing the peace and security implications of an American military presence in Africa in the form of AFRICOM.

1.5 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the study were to:

- a. Establish the rationale for the creation of AFRICOM.
- b. Identify the strategies used by the US in penetrating Africa.
- c. Analyse the implications of US operations in Africa.
- d. Proffer recommendations to African states of the SADC region on how the negative effects can be mitigated.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- a. What is the rationale for the establishment of AFRICOM?
- b. What reasons and strategies are used by the US in penetrating Africa?
- c. What are the implications of US operations in Africa?
- d. How can African states of the SADC region mitigate the negative effects of AFRICOM?

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

So much has been written on AFRICOM but there seems to be very little research that has been conducted on the peace and security implications of its establishment in Africa. In fact, most of what is available is more of speculation and hearsay without established facts. This study therefore, aims to fill in the literature gap around this area. This study might benefit seurocrats, academics in the international relations field, military scholars, government leaders and the public that might be interested in international relations. The study may also act as an early warning mechanism to the peace and security environment currently prevailing in Zambia and the SADC region.

1.8 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study covered the period between 2007 and 2017. This period was chosen because it coincided with the shift in US interest to Africa and SADC in particular. It is the period when Zimbabwe had the worst relations with the Western world and AFRICOM was pursuing to establish a military base in the SADC region especially in Zambia.

In addition, the period marked the time the continent assumed greater economic importance and attracted investments from countries like China, India and the US among others. The study

limited itself to the geographical area of the SADC region. The study was restricted to military personnel from several African defence forces who are students and lecturers at the Zimbabwe Staff College. The study was also restricted to guest speakers to the College such as political leaders (including heads of state), diplomats, and international relations experts.

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This gives a broad perspective on how the establishment of AFRICOM in Africa is viewed and perceived by different scholars. Existing literature pertaining to the topic at hand was reviewed as analysed by different scholars. It shall outline the theoretical framework, give a critical review of the literature and highlight the relevance of this literature to the study. The review shall also identify the gaps in the reviewed literature and other related researches.

2.1.1 United States Interests

Feulner (2006) defines US vital interests as developments that could concretely affect the security or economic future of the US and its citizens. He lists the US vital interests as the safeguarding of the US national security, the prevention of a major power threat to Europe, East Asia or the Persian Gulf, the maintenance of access to foreign trade, the protection of US citizens against threats to their lives and wellbeing and the maintenance of access to resources. Allison and Blackwill (2000) divide the US interests into 4 groups that are, its vital interests, extremely important interests, important interests and less important or secondary interests. They describe vital national interests as conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance American's survival and well-being in a free and secure nation. They further described extremely important national interests as conditions that, if compromised, would severely prejudice but not strictly imperil the ability of the US government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

A point to note is that the US vital and extremely important national interests will change from time to time but some are always repeated in US National Security Strategy (NSS) documents and these are called enduring national interests. Lucas and McInnis (2015: 2) who notes that the 2015 NSS Report includes most of the important issues from the 2010 NSS Report buttress this. It also restates the list of the US "enduring national interests" from 2010 as;

"The security of the US, its citizens, and US allies and partners; a strong, innovative, and growing US economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; respect for universal values at home and around the world; a rules based international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges (p. 2)."

The importance of these interests to the US led to Condoleezza Rice (2008) to conclude that, there was need for the US to help weak and underperforming states to prevent them from failing and that

this required the transformation and better integration of both the US institutions of hard and soft power. This observation could have influenced the creation and structure of AFRICOM that is described by Ashton (2013) as a force multiplier that has friendly relations with NATO and is overwhelmed by self-interest. Another point to note is that the US is obsessed by the protection of her interests. This assertion is supported by Ashton (2013) when he states that even though the US is a champion of democracy, self-interests overrules all else. This implies that the US is preparing itself to project power, soft power or smart power as soon as she feels that her interests are being interfered with.

In pursuance of these interests, according to Condoleezza Rice (2008), the US president requested and Congress approved a nearly 54 percent increase in funding for US diplomacy and development institutions. In 2008, a request to Congress for the creation of 1,100 new positions for the State Department and 300 new positions for the US Agency for International Development (USAID) was made by Rice and the US President.

2.1.2 Peace and Security

Fast in Marquardt (2009) posits that the term Peace is generally used to imply harmony and or lack of conflict or violence. Despite this general understanding of the meaning of peace, Fast in Marquardt (2009), however, also indicated that this meaning can change depending on the context in which the word is used and the person using the term. Johan Galtung in Marquardt (2009) posits that peace can be described as positive or negative peace. He explains that negative peace is simply the absence of war or direct physical violence while positive peace as being the presence of conditions necessary for political equality, social and economic justice. To be understood well in his definition of peace, he further explained that violence is not only direct, physical and visible violence but also includes structural and cultural violence. Structural and cultural violence being conditions that cause inequality and injustice in a community, a society or a country.

On security, Fast and Marquardt (2009) argues that there is no generally accepted meaning since the meaning ranges from a secure condition or feeling of an individual to the safety of a state, a company or any other organisation against espionage, theft or other danger to economic issues.

The implication is that the term is so broad that it can be used in any context in justifying the absence of uncertainty or being untroubled by danger or fear. Fast also posits that the term can also be used to explain military, economic, political and food security among other forms of security.

He then concluded that there is no generally accepted meaning of the term “security” just like there is no generally accepted meaning of the term “peace”.

The definition of peace and security is also interpreted and applied differently by the UN. Article 39 of the UN Charter empowers the UNSC to “determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and make recommendations to decide measures to be taken.” Wood (2006) posits that the meaning of the terms, “threat to peace, breach of peace and act of aggression” have elusive interpretations and as a result debate has arisen as to whether the UNSC determinations under Article 39 are justiciable. Some of these inconsistencies are seen in the Tadic case, where the Yugoslav Tribunal said, “Whereas the act of aggression is more amenable to a legal determination, the threat to peace is more a political concept.” The various meanings of threats to international peace and security are reflected in the various UNSC resolutions. In the case of Libya in 1992, the UNSC Resolution 748 determined that “The failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism” constituted a threat to international peace and security. In the case of Haiti, Wood (2006) notes that the UNSC referred to the fact that “the legitimate government of President Jean-Bernard Aristide had not been reinstated as aggravating threats to international peace and security. Because of the inconsistencies, Matheson in Wood (2006) concluded that the meaning of peace and security has changed over the years to include:

Humanitarian agencies, overthrow of democratically elected leaders, extreme repression of civilian populations and cross border refugee flows threatening regional security and failure to hold perpetrators of major atrocities accountable. Matheson in Wood (p. 5).

One can therefore conclude that the meaning of peace and security has become so ubiquitous that the invasion of other countries for whatever purpose can always be justified using many reasons when the real reason is that of protection of national interests. Methods to be used in the maintenance of peace and security are no longer always conventional means since even covert operations are now used to counter perceived threats.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

According to Mbachu (2005), theoretical framework is the network of reasoning that embodies theories, concepts and assumptions as to how these events and phenomena are related to each other.

It is a collection of interrelated concepts. Theoretical framework is vital for the researcher no matter how little one thinks he/she knows about a topic, and how unbiased you think you are; it is impossible for a human being not to have preconceived notions, even if they are of a very general nature. The more research is guided by balanced theoretical framework, the more likely are the results to contribute directly to the development and subsequent organisation of knowledge (Ibid). The study will base the discussion on the Power theory and the Imperialism theory. The power theory will be discussed with particular reference to smart power. Imperialism is described by Ladenburg (2007) as a situation in which one country or state controls another. The controlling country or state is usually stronger and more developed than the controlled state.

The advances of the US on Africa through AFRICOM could be viewed as advances towards the control and manipulation of the states' by the US and this can therefore be described as imperialism. Ladenburg (2007) further notes that imperialism has three explanations which are humanitarian idealism, defence, and economic exploitation. The structure of AFRICOM satisfies the three explanations. It has a military component which satisfies the defence explanation, a business component that satisfies the economic exploitation and civilian component in the form of NGOs such as USAID to satisfy the humanitarian explanation. Imperialism is defined by Mangala (2010) as:

The process whereby the dominant politico-economic interest of one nation expropriate for their own enrichment the land, labour, raw materials and markets of another people, transforming and dominating their economies, cultures, and political life integrating their financial and productive structures into and international system of capital accumulation (p. 24).

Chomsky (1993) citing George Kennan who opined that the US views the third world resources as her raw materials supports this definition. The definition suggests the domination of other states and this is through the maintenance of perpetual dependence of the weaker state on the dominant state. It is achieved by ensuring that the weaker states' economic or political activities are determined by the dominant state. This kind of relationship is maintained through trade, aid and even coercion using diplomacy, political power, economic power, military power or a

combination of all these. In the protection of their interests therefore, the US had to create AFRICOM that was supposed to satisfy these requirements and this explains the reason why the AFRICOM structure includes the military, diplomats, civilians and business people. This fact is buttressed by Mathunhu (2011) who observed that from the mid fifteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, Africa was exporting labour (raw materials) in the form of slaves to work in European cotton and American sugar plantations in exchange to what he termed “rubbish” that included overpriced bottled alcohol and sugar.

The relationship has moved a “gear up” where in addition to the exportation of unprocessed mineral and agricultural products, Africa still exports human beings in the form of skilled labour (Ibid).

In explaining the aspect of economic exploitation, Onyx Coolie (2009) notes that, a statement by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), lamented the reduction of the US military spending after the end of the Cold War. The Project proposed an increase in defence spending and the use of military interventions to secure vital interests for her to remain a dominant force in the world. This explains why AFRICOM was created, partly to ensure the survival of the military industry in the US while justifying the spending on the military under the protection of the US interests and the global war against terror.

Ladenburg (2007) notes that imperialism is premised on the foundation of capitalism, exploitation of client states through an assortment of economic instruments that include aid, debt, private investment and trade, the implementation of an imperial policy that gives them control, imperialist penetration and stranglehold and the protection of their interests. To achieve this, the US therefore created AFRICOM and Magdoff in Landenburg (2007) who asserts that buttresses this fact:

American foreign policy is not designed to help improve the material conditions of ordinary citizens. Instead, it is driven by a desire to maintain as much of the globe as possible for private trade and enterprise based on the prevention of competitive empires from acquiring privileged trading and investment preserves to the advantage of US business interest, and wherever feasible, the attainment of a preferred trading and investment position for US business, and promotion of counter-revolution, which is hosted on the abortion of incipient social revolutions and the suppression of social revolutions in progress (p. 24).

The assertion by Madoff is supported by the US activities in some African states where under the guise of protecting their interests, they are involved in the overthrow of leaders, the enactment of AGOA and her interference in African politics and economic policies.

The power theory on the other hand is important in international relations, peace and conflict studies since it defines the types of relations between states in the international system. Weber (1947) in Pallaver (2011), defines power as the “probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.”

Arnold in Ayokhai and Ogbang (2013) echoed the same sentiments when he defines power as the ability to move others or to make them do what one desires, and not to do what one does not require them to do; and that power is the ability to move others by the threat or affliction of deprivation. These definitions fall in the sphere of hard power that Pallaver (2011) associates with power politics, force and violence using the military and at times economic means as tools of manipulation. Chossudovsky (2015) notes that when America declared the war on terror, it was a show of hard power were it indirectly declared war on any state that would harbour terrorists. This projection of hard power is also shown when the US threatened other states that if they did not support them in fighting terrorism, then they would be considered as terrorists also as indicated in Global Policy Forum Magazine (2012).

Nye (2003) in Pallaver (2011), argues that power is ‘the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get a desired outcome’, while Frankel in Ayokhai and Ogbang (2013) considers power as the ability to get one’s wish carried out despite opposition, and the ability to influence the action of others in accordance with one’s own ends. The power being defined in this case is soft power were one goes out of his way to convince or influence the other party to carry out his will. The tools for soft power according to Pallaver (Ibid) are persuasion, example, seduction, and myth. When African states showed signs of rejecting AFRICOM, the US opted to use soft power through entering into bilateral relationships with individual African states as opposed to multilateral engagements. This has paid dividends. Ashton (2013) noted, “Since its formation in 2007, AFRICOM took a soft stance approach that was characterised by diplomacy and public relations building attempts to offset negative perceptions and neo-colonial associations.”

Smart power is said to have been introduced by Professor Joseph Nye and is viewed as one that falls between hard and soft power and may go beyond the two. Nye in Pallaver (2011) defines this power as the capacity to influence others to produce the outcome one wants. He further

argues that smart power is “neither hard nor soft”, rather “the skilful combination of both. Implying the development of an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve desired objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power.” Nye further explains that, smart power “is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels to expand one’s influence and establish the legitimacy of one’s actions. One could therefore, argue that smart power is more that the projection of power to influence change but is results based were no matter how much power is projected, what matters would be the results obtained at the end of it all.

The US in its relationship with African countries adopted a soft power approach as observed by Ashton (2013) that the US, in its relationship with Africa pushes forward the humanitarian objective, were it says one thing but acts in a different way. He observed that even though the US is a champion of democracy, self-interests overrules all else as shown by the deployment of AFRICOM that according to Ashton (2013) is a force multiplier that has friendly relations with NATO and is overwhelmed by self-interest. The Global Security Magazine (2013) supports this approach when it observed that the designers of AFRICOM understood the relationship between security, development, diplomacy, and prosperity in Africa and as a result, the AFRICOM structure includes the military and civilians. This fact is buttressed by Ploch (2011) when he notes that the structure of AFRICOM comprises an integrated staff structure comprising management and staff representation by the department of State, USAID, and other US government agencies involved in Africa.

2.2.1 Relevance of the Theory

The relevance of the Power and Imperialism theory is, as in the Dependency theory, the benefits of domination are accrued by the dominator state at the expense of the dominated state. Power can be seen as influence, governing the kinds of settlements nations can achieve, or circumstances nations must endure, with or without fighting (Gartzke, 2009). Aside from being theoretically interesting, better understanding of the dynamics of power politics can be valuable from the applied standpoint. The theories view the processes of power and imperialism as critical mediators of unfavourable relationships between dominating and dominated states. Using the Power and Imperialism theoretical framework, this study will seek to examine the implications of an increased American military presence in Africa in the form of AFRICOM. It will cover the period from the time AFRICOM was established in 2007 to 2018.

2.3 AFRICOM STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

2.3.1 AFRICOM Background

Combatant Commands were according to Feickert (2013) a product of exploiting the lessons learnt in the Second World War. These combatant commands can be divided into geographic combatant commands and unified combatant commands. Combatant commands normally have a geographic or a functional responsibility and are defined as a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defence and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Ibid).

AFRICOM, according to Ploch (2011:24), is one of the geographic combatant commands that was created on 6 February 2007, when the then US President Bush's Administration announced the creation of a new unified combatant command in Africa. It is one of the six US geographic combatant commands and one of nine unified combatant commands.

Kindle (2010:1) notes that it became fully operational on 30 September 2008. Ploch (2011:2), also notes that prior to October 2008, the US Department of Defence's responsibility for Africa was divided between three commands namely, the European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM). EUCOM was based in Germany and was responsible for 42 African countries; CENTCOM was based in Florida and was responsible for eight countries in East Africa including the countries in the Horn of Africa; and PACOM based in Hawaii that was responsible for the Comoros Islands, Madagascar, and Mauritius.

AFRICOM is responsible for military relations with 54 African countries that include the islands of Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe, and the Indian Ocean islands of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles (Feickert 2013, Deen 2013). They also agree that Egypt's affairs are taken care of by both CENTCOM and AFRICOM. The reason for such an arrangement is given by Deen (2013), as Egypt's proximity to the Middle East while Feickert (2013) indicates that on issues relating to African security, Egypt relates with AFRICOM. Such a relationship shows that the creation of these combatant commands is not mainly about addressing African security concerns but about the protection of the US interests.

This interest is also pronounced in AFRICOM's mission that according to Feickert (2013) is to "protect and defend the national security interests of the US by strengthening the defence capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military

operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.” This shows that AFRICOM’s objective is to train African militaries so that they may form the first line of defence in the protection of US interests. This strengthening of the African defence forces would also ensure that the regions become militarily strong also. A point to note though is that AFRICOM will conduct military operations against any state when directed to do so. This would happen when the US feels that a state is a security threat or has challenges in governance and developmental issues.

2.3.2 AFRICOM Structure

General Thomas D. Waldhauser is the current commander of AFRICOM which is based in Stuttgart, Germany (<http://www.africom.mil/>). Both military and civilian members of staff conduct AFRICOM operations. This fact is buttressed by the US Africa Command Fact Sheet (2011), which indicated that in 2011, AFRICOM’s staff was 50% military and 50% civilian employees of the US Department of Defence. It had about 2100 personnel located in different bases in Germany and the UK.

A smaller percentage of this number are Africans employed by the US Offices of Security Cooperation (OSC) in African host nations. The structure of AFRICOM according to Café Pan-Afrika Magazine (2012), is such that the Military Commander reports to the Secretary of Defence who in turn reports to the US President while in countries that host AFRICOM, the Ambassadors are the US President’s personal representative of AFRICOM. According to the AFRICOM website, the civilian component in AFRICOM is drawn from more than 10 government departments and agencies.

According to <http://www.globalsecurity.org/>, AFRICOM is composed of both the military and civilians. It posits that, AFRICOM reflects an integrated staff structure that includes management and staff representation by the Department of State, USAID, and other government agencies involved in Africa. It goes further to state that the staff structure of AFRICOM reflects an understanding of the relationship between security, development, diplomacy and prosperity in Africa by AFRICOM’s designers. The AFRICOM’s first commander General Kip Ward in Plock (2006:6) also shared this deep understanding. Gen Plock noted that “the US military’s role in Africa is part of a three-pronged” US government approach, with DOD, through AFRICOM, taking the lead on security issues, but playing a supporting role to the Department of State, which

conducts diplomacy, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which implements development programs (Plock, 2006:6).

This view is also shared by the AFRICOM when it indicates that even though the civilian staff are embedded with the military staff and are spread throughout the command; their activities are coordinated through AFRICOM's J9 Office of Interagency Coordination and AFRICOM's Interagency Board (<http://www.africom.mil/>).

2.3.3 African Reaction to the Establishment of AFRICOM

The creation of AFRICOM was received with mixed African voices but on a regional perspective, it would appear that AFRICOM's coming into Africa was generally not acceptable. Tebele (2012:1) also noted this general feeling when he indicated that both the AU and SADC made official pronouncements that they did not want a permanent US military base on the continent.

Weinberg (2008:2) observes that SADC was the first regional block to state that it was not comfortable with the coming into Africa of foreign troops and in particular AFRICOM. This position was made through a SADC announcement on the 29 August 2007 (Ibid). The announcement stated that it would be desirable if the US dealt with Africa from a distance rather than be present on the continent. On 29 August 2007 (Ibid), the SADC Defence and Security ministers further buttressed this point by stating that "... sister countries of the region should not agree to host AFRICOM and in particular, armed forces, since this would have a negative effect ...".

According to Nathan (2009:3), some of the reasons for the poor reception of AFRICOM by African countries was because of the US failure to consult African countries about AFRICOM and poor communication about the AFRICOM aims and objectives. The reception that AFRICOM received in Africa could also have resulted from the mistrust and suspicion that African states, especially those states that got their independence through the liberation struggle have about foreign occupation and the risk of being colonised again (Ibid). The US is also to blame because it is only now that they appear to have an interest on the security of Africans yet during the same countries' fight against colonialism, the US was according to Nathan (2009) unsympathetic to the African cause but instead supported African dictators during the cold war. The suspicions of the US objectives in Africa also emanate from the failure by the US to respect some of its own cultural norms that it tries to force Africans to adopt. The AFRICOM objectives

include the promotion of Human Rights and the Rule of Law, however, Ashton (2013:2) notes that the US self-interest overrules everything else and Nathan (2009:3) supports this assertion by highlighting that the US supports Israel despite its illegal occupation of Palestine and its long history of unilateralism, aggression, and disdain for international law.

Some of the activities that reinforce this point would be the 2003 illegal invasion of Iraq and its continued presence and use of the Guantanamo Bay as a prison. An increased US military presence in Africa is viewed as problematic because it is felt that she will dictate and impose her will on African governance issues. Femi (2008:1) notes that AFRICOM is a case of the US forcing its policy upon an unwilling continent, De Freitas (2008:2) agrees with him when he also observed that the US uses force for everything to get its way. An attempt to impose her will on the African political system is seen when former US President Obama according to Baker (2015:1) raised his concerns about African leaders who changed their constitutions to allow them to extend their terms of office when he commented, “Nobody should be President for Life”.

While the US president was making these comments, Baker (2015) notes that most African leaders intended to extend their terms beyond those stipulated in their constitutions. Baker (Ibid) further notes that as Obama was delivering his speech, in Rwanda, lawmakers had just voted in support of a constitutional change allowing President Paul Kagame a third term and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), there were concerns that President Joseph Kabila might extend the two-term limit outlined in the Constitution by delaying the 2016 presidential election.

The other problem with US involvement in African issues is that the rise in terrorism and instability in some African regions is said to be a result of opposition to American involvement. Femi (2008:1) and De Freitas (2008:2) echoed similar sentiments when they observed that wherever the US forces go, they more or less become a “magnet for terrorists” and that they seem to create problems. The Libyan political environment has been unstable since the ouster and subsequent murder of Colonel Muamar Gadhafi, Campbell (2014:3) suggests that AFRICOM was involved in the campaign. On attracting terrorism, the US Department of State’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001” shows that the US was in 2001, the target of about two thirds of the world’s international terrorist attacks. It is pertinent to note that according to Eland (1998:2), the Pentagon's Defence Science Board, had earlier on linked terrorist attacks on the US and her interests to the US involvement in international situations. While it may be difficult for terrorists to carry out such attacks on US soil as was the case with the 11 September 2001 bombing of the US trade centre, terrorist may resort to attacking some US interests in Africa that

may be viewed as vulnerable. Such attacks on African soil took place on 7 August 1998 when according to Eland (1998); terrorists bombed the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. This therefore buttresses the point that an increased American presence in Africa is likely to attract terrorists and create instability in Africa.

An increase in the US activities in Africa is a problem in that it causes the fragmentation of the AU and other regional bodies. One way that the US used to achieve this was the enactment of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) by the US Congress on the 18 May 2000. Membership to AGOA is not automatic but determined by the US president. Froning (2013:15) observes that eligibility for membership into AGOA is dictated mostly by governance issues and the relationship between that country and the US and that the US President reviews on an annual basis the countries that should benefit from AGOA. Section 104 of AGOA, stipulates, “The US President is authorised to designate a sub-Saharan African country as an eligible sub-Saharan African country ...” A point to note is that not all African countries are beneficiaries of AGOA. Froning (2013) points out that the sub-Saharan African countries that were not AGOA beneficiaries for 2015 are the Central African Republic, the DRC, the Gambia, Republic of Equatorial Guinea, State of Eritrea, Somalia, Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Hogg (2015:3) advances that the USA was in 2015 contemplating removing the Republic of South Africa as a beneficiary of AGOA. This segregation by the US tends to impact negatively on the AU decisions that are likely to have an impact on the US.

This kind of fragmentation is also noticed when it comes to the AU’s position on AFRICOM. While African countries unanimously state that they are not for the idea of permanently hosting AFRICOM, as individual countries, they accept to host it and their relations appear to be growing stronger with every year that passes by. Turse (2013:1) supports this fact by indicating that there is evidence of the US military expansion right across Africa even though the US will only officially acknowledge their presence in Djibouti. Ashton (2013) also observed that even though the SADC region was the first to officially condemn AFRICOM and its presence, AFRICOM now enjoys cordial relations with South Africa and Botswana and even has military presence in Botswana and other countries, even though SADC’s 2007 official position still stands. Tebele (2012:2) also notes that in 2012, there were fears that the US 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division was going to be deployed in Africa at Thebepatswa Air Base in Gaborone, Botswana. This followed the announcement by Major Gen David Hogg of the US Army that the US was going to start the regular deployment of a brigade of about 3,000 or more

troops to Africa. This announcement according to Tebele (2012:2) was made after some joint military exercises namely Southern Accord 2 and Eastern Piper 12 had been conducted.

Staff Sergeant Carlin Leslie (2014:1) buttresses the fact that African states enjoy cordial relations with the US and are prepared to work with AFRICOM despite their official positions as shown by the fact that in 2014, AFRICOM funded the completion of the Tanzania Defence Intelligence College. Commenting on the relations between Tanzania and the US, Marissa Maurer, the US Embassy Tanzania public affairs officer, indicated in 2014 “building and solidifying a partnership between Tanzania and the US is vital to the successes of both nations. These successes will allow a regional security to Tanzania ...”

2.3.4 AFRICOM’s Approach to Opposition

The creation of AFRICOM appeared to have been met with rejection from the African countries but on the ground,

it would appear that it has been accepted and has made inroads into several individual African countries where in some instances, they now have military presence including military bases. This has been achieved through bypassing multilateral negotiations and instead entering into bilateral relationships with individual countries. Ashton (2013:11) notes that since its formation in 2007, AFRICOM took a soft stance approach that was characterised by diplomacy and public relations building attempts to offset negative perceptions and neo-colonial associations.

One approach that is used by AFRICOM to increase its acceptability and penetration in Africa is through working with other local humanitarian agencies and cooperation with the local population. The Global Security website (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/>), buttresses this fact by stating that the command will incorporate partner nations and humanitarian organizations, from Africa and elsewhere, to work alongside the US Staff on common approaches to shared interests. This cooperation is sometimes used as a tool to remove uncooperative governments. Some evidence of attempts to remove governments using humanitarian agencies is shown by Murwira (2015) when he observed that USAID distributed about \$850 million to Zimbabwean NGOs on a regime change agenda between 2011 and 2014.

2.3.5 US Power Projection

Nye in Ilgen (2006) defines hard power as the ability to coerce and this ability grows out of a country’s military and economic might. This kind of power is important to states that are trying to guard their independence and to non-state actors such as terrorists who need recognition and

are willing to turn to violence. The US projection of hard power is viewed with suspicion even among its allies. Nye in Ilgen (2006) notes that the attractiveness of the US and its foreign policy in Europe has diminished over the years because of the US unilateralist approach. He further notes that the US is feared but is less loved because of its hard power approach. The US approach being an aggressive and assertive approach towards the promotion of the US values. The US approach is premised on US unilateralists who believe that the US should take advantage of their dominant position. They also believe that nations should only understand that “American intentions are good, American hegemony is benevolent” and should not ask or enquire further.

Nye (2006) notes that majorities in Britain, Germany, and France want some independence from the US in their approach to diplomatic and security affairs and that in Fall (2003), a majority of Europeans ranked the US as a threat to world peace as compared to North Korea or Iran.

They also noted that after the Cold War, majorities in Europe see US unilateralism as an important international threat to Europe. While the projection of hard power may produce the desired results, it however has its own problems and one of these problems being the creation of enemies. A Department of Defence study in 1997 concurred that the US projection of hard power created enemies for the US when they stated that historical data showed a strong correlation between US involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States.

Nye in Ilgen (2006) also noted that Spaniards also believed that the US policy of hard power projection attracted enemies to the US and the states that supported the US policy. He posits that more than 90% of Spaniards were opposed to the Spanish participation in the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. To show their dislike, Spanish voters in the 2004 elections, voted against the party of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, who had been a staunch US supporter and ally in the Iraqi war, in favour of a candidate who advocated for the removal of Spanish troops from Iraq and a more rational relationship with the US. The Spaniards also believed that the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings by terrorists in Spain were some form of retribution for their participation in Iraq in support of the US.

Makinda (2007:2) notes that before the creation of AFRICOM, the US had complete military coverage of Africa, even though the whole continent was covered by three different commands. The US requirement to have a military presence in Africa in the form of AFRICOM was initiated through a presidential announcement. Ayokhai and Ogbang (2013:210) note that the

announcement was made without any prior consultation with any African state. This was an example of hard power projection by the US where it knew that it could go ahead in planning and eventually implement or establish AFRICOM without expecting any physical resistance from African states. That kind of approach and lack of respect for other sovereign states and lack of transparency on the part of the US as to AFRICOM's aims and objectives could have been the reason why according to Makinda (2007) AFRICOM was not received with open hands in Africa.

The structure of AFRICOM was however, designed to take into consideration the negative effects or the results of the projection of hard power. The US on realising that the projection of hard power alone was to some extent a threat to the safety of US citizens, took the advice of former president Jimmy Carter and resorted to the projection of both soft and smart power in the form of AFRICOM. Nye in Ilgen (2006) defines soft power as that power that arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies.

He goes further to infer that soft power is the ability to seduce the people of a different state to the extent that they emulate or wish they could be part of your own state. He posits that some of the seductive tools used in soft power are values such as democracy, human rights and individual opportunities that are projected according to Trunkos (2013) through public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and financial aid. When a state's policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, its soft power is enhanced. Similar effects are also felt across Africa because of the US soft power projection. Soft power, according to Nye in Ilgen (2006) is quite important sometimes, in preventing terrorists from recruiting supporters, and for dealing with transnational issues that require multilateral cooperation. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive (Ibid).

The Bush administration was mostly known for its projection of hard power as evidenced by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Glenn (2011) notes that even though the US was known as fighters, the hard power stance started softening during Bush's second term and the same administration is credited for its creation of AFRICOM. It was not possible for the US to kill or capture its way to victory in the war against terrorism (Ibid). Some military generals also advocated for a policy shift from one that countered terrorism through pursuing, capturing and killing terrorists to one of counter-insurgency that would provide security for the local population and the facilitation of economic development, good governance and the creation of partnerships.

Glenn (2011:11) posits that the Obama administration adopted this principle of smart power projection when they came into office as shown in Obama's inaugural speech that he repeated in Cairo where he was aware that the majority of his audience were from the Muslim world. He stated that military power alone would not solve the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the same speech, Obama promised to invest \$1.5 billion annually for five years to collaborate the Pakistanis to build schools and hospitals, roads and businesses, and about \$2.8 billion to help Afghans to develop their economy and to deliver services that people depended upon.

The Obama administration adopted a smart power approach in its interacting with the world and this meant that they had to make a balance between hard power military tools and soft power tools of diplomacy and development (Ibid). Hillary Rodham Clinton gave the official pronouncement of this stance in her confirmation hearing in 2009. According to Hunt (2009), Clinton highlighted the importance and necessity of smart power projection in contemporary times by stating that:

“We must use what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at our disposal - diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural - picking the right tool or combination of tools for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of our foreign policy” (p.19).

She went further to indicate that the US approach would be led by diplomacy but in so doing, it will never be forgotten that military force will be necessary at times for the protection of the US people and her interests. She however also stated that in the US soft power approach, the use of the military would always be the last resort. In the fight against terrorism, she stated that there was need to root out their networks and dry up their support with a combination of intelligence, diplomacy and military assets.

Hillary Clinton in 2009 also highlighted that smart power in the US case translated into specific policy approaches in five areas that according to her, were the updating and creation of vehicles for cooperation with US partners, the pursuance of principled engagement with those that disagreed with US policies, the elevation of development as a core pillar of American power. She further noted the integration of civilian and military action in conflict areas and the leveraging of key sources of American power that include the US economic strength and the power of the US example.

2.3.6 AFRICOM's Presence in Africa

Despite AFRICOM being overwhelmingly rejected by regional groupings in Africa, its civilian component in the form of USAID has generally been accepted by individual African governments. It can be credited for having achieved the highest penetration as opposed to its military component whose presence is only felt during military exercises. The USAID website (<https://www.usaid.gov/>) lists one of its objectives in Africa as supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance. The website further expands this objective by stating that it helps governments fight corruption, expand space for civil society, help citizens choose their leadership and strengthen the trend toward democratization in Africa. It however is not clear as to how much space is required by civil society and the extent of assistance to be rendered to citizens in the selection of their leaders. Such vague statements are probably what led the political editor of the Herald Newspaper Zindoga (2015), to conclude that, “the USAID does overtly what the CIA does covertly”. USAID appears to be more active in those countries whose policies are not acceptable to the US. This is shown by the amount of funding that that USAID is availed, for use in the particular countries. The USAID in 2015, requested US\$21.8 million to fund political activities only in Zimbabwe in 2016 (Ibid).

Some African countries that were also to get funding besides Zimbabwe were South Sudan, the DRC, Sudan, Liberia and Somalia. One common feature that the listed countries had is that their relations with the US were not at their best. As an example, Zimbabwe has been imposed with sanctions through the Zimbabwe Democratic and Recovery Act (ZIDERA) and the then Mugabe government was viewed to be undemocratic and did not observe the rule of law.

Some of the major exercises that have been carried out by AFRICOM in the humanitarian area according to AFRICOM (2014) website at <http://www.africom.mil/>; include Ebola assistance in West Africa and HIV Testing and Counselling Programs in a majority of African countries. They are also involved in draught relief programs, the building of schools and hospital. The official US position on the presence of AFRICOM on African soil is that AFRICOM only has one military base in Djibouti, Africa. It is however, believed that, as of 2013, and in addition to its traditional base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, AFRICOM now has a drone base in Niger. Turse (2013:1) supports this fact by indicating that there is evidence of the US military expansion right across Africa even though the US will only officially acknowledge their presence in Djibouti. He highlights the fact that military presence through base construction, security cooperation engagements, training exercises, advisory deployments, special operations

missions, and a growing logistics network is undeniable evidence of an American expansion program.

The first full scale AFRICOM military operation in Africa according to Azikiwe (2013:2) was Operation Odyssey Dawn that was conducted in Libya in 2011. The operation was meant to impose a no-fly zone on Libyan territory but it ended up including a regime change agenda that resulted in the overthrow and subsequent execution of the then Libyan president Colonel Muammar Gadhafi. Coincidentally, Azikiwe (Ibid) notes that Libya has the largest known oil reserves in Africa and the living standards of the Libyan people under the Jamahiriya were the highest in the continent. Hari (2011:1) concurs with Azikiwe when he notes that Libya is among the world's top ten producers of oil. On the other hand, Gadhafi was also opposed to the establishment of AFRICOM on African soil. Pan-Afrika (2012) posits that Gadhafi was so opposed to the AFRICOM establishment to such an extent that he paid African leaders twice the amount of money that the US had paid them just to resist AFRICOM in Africa. It can therefore be concluded that the Libyan intervention by the US through AFRICOM and some US allies was not meant to benefit the Libyan people but was meant to serve US interests.

The military arm of AFRICOM is also busy conducting military exercises and training programs with some African countries and regional blocks even though their operations are shrouded in secrecy. Turse (2015) posits that the US stance of having only one military base in Africa is a lie. He argues that the number of US military installations, training missions, military exercises and deployments had increased under the Obama administration, and the Pentagon has taken measures to conceal the depth and breadth of its African activities to such an extent that very few people would notice. Turse (2013) in *Libya 360* indicates that AFRICOM military activities are carrying on across Africa. He states that they are involved in Algeria and Angola, Benin and Botswana, Burkina Faso and Burundi, Cameroon and the Cape Verde Islands. Skip to the end of the alphabet and the story remains the same: Senegal and the Seychelles, Togo and Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia. From north to south, east to west, the Horn of Africa to the Sahel, the heart of the continent to the islands off its coasts, the US military is at work.

Turse (2015) further buttressed that the US shows a persistent, enduring, and growing need for presence on the African continent. He states that US staging areas, cooperative security locations, forward operating locations (FOLs), and other outposts - many of them involved in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities and Special Operations missions have been built in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia,

Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Senegal, the Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda. A 2011 report by Lauren Ploch, an analyst in African affairs with the Congressional Research

Service, also mentioned US military access to locations in Algeria, Botswana, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and Zambia.

According to Turse (2015) in 2014, AFRICOM carried out 674 missions in Africa but not many people know that. Some of the major military exercises carried out by AFRICOM include Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya in 2011, the Pan Sahel Initiative, the Flintlock Exercise in Ndjamena, MEDLITE 10, 11 and 12 in South Africa, the DRC and Botswana, Southern Accord exercises held in Malawi and Botswana (<http://www.africom.mil/>). Turse (2015) notes that during these joint exercises, the AFRICOM troops normally serve as trainers and examples of military professionalism and US core national values. A point to note though is that most if not all AFRICOM military exercises exclude those countries that are viewed as rogue states by the US. According to one senior Zimbabwe Staff College Officer, one such country being Zimbabwe where military records show that before the fallout of relations between the country and the US, Zimbabwe was a favourite venue for joint military exercises and joint military training. The US also sponsored some military exchange programs that saw several Zimbabwean officers and men trained in the US. The Zimbabwe Staff College used to enrol US military students during the College's third term where lectures are mainly on Counter Insurgency (COIN) techniques. The US also used to send military officers to teach Zimbabwean officers on the law of armed conflict.

2.3.7 America's Relationship with African Countries

The problem of acceptability that AFRICOM faces in AFRICA emanate from the way the US relates with African states. The US in its relationship with Africa pushes forward the humanitarian objective, however as Ashton (2013:2) observed, the US will say one thing but acts in a different way. He observed that even though the US is a champion of democracy, self-interests overrules all else as shown by the deployment of AFRICOM. As stated earlier, the US motives are not clear and they have since adopted a method of dividing African states by getting into bilateral negotiations with individual states as opposed to dealing with the AU or regional blocks. Kamati kaTate (2011:1) agrees with this observation when he states that AFRICOM operations undermine the unity and collective decision-making process by the AU. He further argues that AFRICOM undermines the AU and its Peace and Security Council, an organ that

deals with peace and security issues on the continent. One such divisive method by the US is shown in the AGOA where according to Froning (2013:15), not all African countries are beneficiaries.

AFRICOM has no respect for African governments and their leaders and is prepared to undermine state sovereignty in order to protect US interests. They also do not like governments by former liberation movements that are described by Kennan in Chomsky (1993:43) as "radical and nationalistic regimes" that are responsive to popular pressures for "immediate improvement in the low living standards of the masses" and development for domestic needs. One such government was the Robert Mugabe government in Zimbabwe. According to Chitsike (2003:1-9), in response to the needs of the masses, the regime embarked on the land reform program and enacted laws that legalised the redistribution of the land. That land at one time had belonged to the indigenous people but was now "legally" owned by a few white landowners who had been empowered by the Land apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969. These were legal instruments that had been passed by the UK government during colonisation and the Acts ensured that the Zimbabwean indigenous people were alienated from most of the land.

The Zimbabwean government in response to the masses' demands also embarked on an indigenisation program that according to Dube (2013) attempted to nationalise industries by ensuring that local previously disadvantaged indigenous people could own at least 51% shareholding in any company in Zimbabwe. In response, the US imposed sanctions on the country through ZIDERA and embarked on regime change programs since, according to the Zimeye online newspaper (<http://www.zimeye.net/>), Mugabe's government continued to represent "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the US". Chomsky (1993:45-46) seems to justify the US reaction to the measures taken by the Zimbabwean government to empower the masses by stating that "radical and nationalistic regimes" are not wanted at all and that they are viewed as "viruses" that would "infect" others or as "rotten apples" that would "spoil the barrel". This would be especially true if the policies appeared to be succeeding. The fear was that the nationalistic ideas might have spread to all other states on the continent and this might have had a negative effect on the US interests. Kamati kaTate (2011:1) in support of the above observations posits that the position and presence of AFRICOM in Africa is meant to facilitate the overthrow of African governments and to attack countries that are viewed as anti US.

2.4 REASONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AFRICOM

2.4.1 Maintenance of Peace and Security

Lieutenant Colonel Rozier (2010:1) states that AFRICOM was created as a way of acknowledging the emerging strategic importance of Africa to the US. He further posits that the realisation that a disturbance in the peace and stability in the African continent does not only

have a negative impact on the African people alone but also on US interests and the international world. It is his view that the creation of AFRICOM enabled the US Department of Defence (DOD) to focus its resources on the support and enhancement of US initiatives that help African nations and to address security related issues of African nations in addition to providing regional groups with an integrated DOD coordination point. The Global Security magazine (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/>) concurs with Lieutenant Colonel Rozier's observation but also adds that there was also need to deal with Africa as a whole, as opposed to dealing with single states within Africa.

The US opted to place the responsibility of leading the world in the promotion of peace and security to meet global challenges upon herself. This view was arrived at by Lucas and McInnis (2015:2) in their analysis of the contents of the US 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) report.

The report advocates for a "rule based international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation as one of her enduring national interests". This statement is however disputed by Ashton (2013:2) when he observes that while the US needs to be taken seriously, she is on the other hand dumping subsidised US grown crops and US aid and in the process destroying local and regional markets thereby creating unemployment, instability and radicalism.

Africa is a continent of strategic importance to the US and that explains why AFRICOM had to be deployed in Africa. This assertion is revealed through former US President Obama's policy documents and public statements. In his administration's first NSS report, issued in 2010, he stressed the need to "embrace effective partnerships" in Africa, and highlighted priorities that included among others conflict prevention, global peacekeeping, counterterrorism. An example of one of Obama's public statements was, when he addressed the Ghanaian Parliament in July 2009. Ploch (2011) quotes Obama stating that:

"When there is genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African problems, they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response.... And let me be clear: our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold on the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa, and the world" (p.14).

The above statement seeks to globalise African issues and challenges so that it leaves room for the Americans to move in whenever they think that there is a challenge or a problem anywhere in Africa that may affect their national interests.

There are however, some inconsistencies from the statements from the US with regard to why AFRICOM was created; former US President Bush while delivering a speech in Ghana put more emphasis on the social role of AFRICOM and not the military role. According to Weinberg (2008), President Bush stated that AFRICOM's aim was "to enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and to promote the development of health, education, democracy and economic growth." He however was not clear on the methods to be used by the military to promote the development of health, education, democracy and economic growth.

2.4.2 Protection of American Interests

It is prudent for one to note that no government in the world commits its financial resources in the protection of another state if there are no benefits to be realised in the endeavour. The US military presence cover most parts of the world either as part of the NATO force or as an independent US force. The reasons given for their presence will always vary depending on the situation on the ground and these range from promotion of democracy, the maintenance of peace and security and most recently, the global war against terrorism. The real reason for the US military presence throughout the world and in Africa is the need to protect American interests as portrayed by Chomsky (1993:43) when he indicates that American interests can only be understood from a global perspective. He further explains that the role of the US is to protect the interests of what he calls the "satisfied nations" and the "rich men dwelling at peace within their habitations". Latin America and Africa are regarded as the providers of resources, cheap labour, markets, investment opportunities and of late, export markets of pollution and industrial waste. The only threat to these US interests were identified as the "radical and nationalistic regimes" that are responsive to popular pressures for "immediate improvement in the low living standards of the masses" and development for domestic needs (Ibid).

The US is obsessed by the protection of her interests. Ashton (2013:2) supports this assertion when he observed that even though the US is a champion of democracy, self-interests overrules all else and his observation is buttressed by the deployment of AFRICOM. AFRICOM is described as a force multiplier that has friendly relations with NATO and is overwhelmed by

self-interest (Ibid). This implies that the US is preparing itself to project military power as soon as she feels that her interests are being interfered with. The US interests in Africa are not on military security aspects only but also includes economic, political, human and environmental security. Lucas and McInnis (2015:2) who notes that the 2015 NSS report includes most of the important issues from the 2010 NSS report buttresses this. It also restates the list of the US “enduring national interests” from 2010, as:

The security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners; a strong, innovative, and growing US economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; respect for universal values at home and around the world; a rules based international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges (p.2).

This report shows there is a likelihood that the US government will resort to any means possible including the removal of governments in Africa if the enduring national interests are affected.

This assertion is proven by the 2017 NSS report by Donald Trump that stands on four pillars. Firstly, to protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life. Secondly, to promote American prosperity and then to preserve peace through strength and lastly, to advance American influence across the world.

2.4.3 Countering China’s Influence in Africa

Trade between China and Africa has gradually increased to a point where it has almost doubled the trade between Africa and the US. According to McGreal (2014:11) China’s trade with Africa in 2013 rose to \$200 billion yet the trade between China and Africa 20 years earlier had been only \$6 billion. In 2017, the figures further grew by 19.5% (Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe, 2018). The 2013 trade figure is said to have more than doubled the American trade with Africa.

The trade mainly comprised of Chinese imports of oil and minerals and exports of electronics and textiles. While the volume of trade between China and Africa is rising, Hunt (2010) strongly believes that the creation of AFRICOM was in addition to other reasons, also meant to counter the Chinese influence on Africa as supported by the fourth pillar of the 2017 Donald Trump NSS report. According to Trump (NSS, 2017) the US must advance its American influence by encouraging aspiring partners, achieving better outcomes in multilateral forums, and championing American values on the globe.

While both China and the US appear to be concerned with the development of Africa, it is interesting to note that the two states do not appear to cooperate when it comes to African issues.

They however appear to be in competition as shown by the fact that each country has its own trade agreements with Africa. The Chinese have the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) while the US has AGOA. This led Yun Sun (2015:2) to conclude that the lack of US-China cooperation in Africa is an underlying sense of a no win competition between the two powers in Africa. The former US President Obama also buttressed this fact while addressing

African presidents on cooperation with the US indirectly referred to China's cooperation with Africa by stating that the US approach was different from those that "look to Africa simply for its natural resources and simply want to extract minerals from the ground..." (Ibid). This kind of competition between the two powers might have contributed to the need for the deployment of AFRICOM. The structure of AFRICOM and its responsibilities of protecting US interests would ensure that the US has an edge over China when need arises. The US soft power approach using AFRICOM would also ensure that African states might feel compelled to deal with the US.

2.4.4 Exploitation of African Resources

Africa is a continent that is rich in both natural and human resources. Fellows (2015:60) noted that Africa is a young continent with a majority population that is generally below the age of 35 years. He also notes that Africa has 10% of all the oil in the world, about 40% of the world's gold, 50% of all the diamonds in the world, 80-90% of the world's chromium and platinum, and about 70% of the world's tantalum. Tantalum is used in the manufacture of cell phones and Africa provides a huge market for the finished product. Africa has 60% of the world's uncultivated arable lands, which is a tremendous potential for agriculture to feed the rest of the world (Ibid).

One can therefore conclude that AFRICOM was deployed in Africa to guarantee the peaceful exploitation of African resources without interference from anyone including African governments. The humanitarian agenda that the US purports to be spearheading in Africa where she portrays concern for the African people may not be true (<http://www.voltairenet.org/>). The magazine highlights the fact that the US involvement in Africa is more to do with the protection of American interests. The magazine highlights the fact that AFRICOM was created on the recommendations of a US-Israeli think tank, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS) after realising that by 2013, one quarter of the oil and raw materials consumed by the United States would be coming from Africa. The former US President Obama in his administration's 2010 NSS report, supports this statement, he stresses the need to "embrace effective partnerships" in Africa, and highlighted priorities that include "access to open markets, and the protection of vital carbon sinks." The fact that AFRICOM was created to facilitate the

exploitation of African resources is buttressed by Chomsky (1993:43) citing George Kennan who opined that the US views the third world resources as her raw materials.

The US is not only interested in Africa's natural resources but is also interested in Africa's human resources since Africa also has a large labour force who can be employed to work in the

US. Matunhu (2011:68-70) buttresses this assertion by stating that about 25% of South African graduates migrated to the USA alone between 1994 and 2011. This figure is alarming when statistics from all African countries are considered yet the African continent continues to be underdeveloped and dependent on the developed world. Fellows (2015:60-61) defends this fact by noting that Africa has a rapidly growing population and it will have the world's largest workforce by the year 2040, surpassing both India and China. This also explains why the US needs to have influence in Africa to facilitate the human resource that is projected to be in abundance in the near future.

The US is also interested in creating a market for its industries and their finished products in Africa. Fellows (2015) posits that Africa is home to the world's top ten fastest growing economies and that Africa will be a market of 300-500 million consumers in the coming years. He further noted that Africa is also the world's fastest growing market for mobile phones.

2.4.5 Creation of Dependency

Dos Santos (1971:226) defines dependency as:

“A historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economics. A situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected”(p.226).

This definition is supported by Chomsky (1993:43) citing George Kennan who opined that the US views the third world resources as her raw materials. The definition suggests the domination of other states and this can only be done through the maintenance of perpetual dependence of the weaker state on the dominant state. This is also achieved by ensuring that the weaker states 'economic or political activities are determined by the dominant state. This kind of relationship is maintained through trade, aid and even coercion using diplomacy, political power, economic power, military power or a combination of all these.

In the protection of their interests therefore, the US had to create AFRICOM that was supposed to satisfy these requirements and this explains the reason why the AFRICOM structure includes the military, diplomats, civilians and business people. Matunhu (2011:68-70) observed that from the mid fifteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, Africa was exporting labour (raw materials) in the form of slaves to work in European cotton and American sugar plantations in exchange for what he termed “rubbish” that included overpriced bottled alcohol and sugar. The relationship according to Matunhu (Ibid), has moved a “gear up” where in addition to the exportation of unprocessed mineral and agricultural products, Africa still exports human beings in the form of skilled manpower. It would appear that in a bid to ensure that African economies should always be dependent on the US economy, investments between the US and African countries had to be made.

To facilitate investment and the exploitation of African resources through trade, the US legislators passed the AGOA into law.

The Act according to Williams (2015:2) is a nonreciprocal trade preference program that provides duty-free treatment to US imports of certain products from eligible sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. The Act advocates or encourages some selected African countries to open their economies and trade or sell their products to the US duty-free. The Act was passed in 2000 but the growing need and importance of African resources to the US and the need to protect these interests necessitated the creation of AFRICOM (<http://www.voltairenet.org/>). It is however observed by Chomsky (1993:44) that the real beneficiaries of free trade would be the more industrialised state at the expense of the lesser industrialised state.

Matunhu (2011:68-70) notes that the dependency of African states on the developed countries is strengthened by statutory and legal provisions such as AGOA and trade agreement provisions such as those of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) agreement and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) between the EU and African states. This arrangement led him to conclude, “The end of colonialism has not deterred the imperialists from dominating Africa”. The US and AFRICOM also create some dependences within African militaries in that they donate military hardware, fund African defence forces operations and also train the African forces. This results in African militaries not being able to fulfil their constitutional mandates on their own without any support from the US. At times, the US may even impose some restrictions on the use of their hardware or their money.

During training, according to Turse (2015), AFRICOM troops normally serve as trainers and examples of military professionalism and US core national values. This tends to in some way

brainwash the African troops into believing that without the US assistance, they can never win any war. Examples of US military funding are seen when the US donated about 9 billion Shillings to the Kenyan army for training soldiers, the purchase of drones and for the support of the Kenyan military in Somalia. The Egyptian military also gets an annual donation of about US\$1 billion for the purchase of American military hardware (Zadock 2015, Rayman 2014). Nigeria also received a donation of 24 used mine-resistant vehicles while the US also deployed a

300 strong force in Cameroon to conduct airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations (Ezeamalu 2016, Olandipo 2015). While all this was happening, according to Aljazeera News (<http://www.aljazeera.com/>), the then Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan was calling for the deployment of US troops to assist in the fight against Boko Haram.

On the other hand, Olandipo (2015), this request was made despite the fact that there was an AU-backed Multinational Joint Task Force that had been mandated to spearhead the counter-insurgency mission. This shows that some African militaries are now dependant on US assistance.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This research endeavoured to capture a more holistic view and assessment of the implications of an increased American military presence in Africa in form of AFRICOM, hence demanded a good research methodology. To understand the world around international politics better, the case study design was used with emphasis on the examination of the perspectives of the people or groups, such as their ideas, attitudes, motives and intentions. According to Neena (2011) its characteristics include; use of standardised approaches to collect data, explain causal relationship between variables, testing hypotheses or given theory, a high degree of pre-conceptualisation and adopting theory then research approach.

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND PHILOSOPHY

According to Kothari (2009) a good research design minimises bias, maximises reliability of data collected and analysed, yields maximum information and provides a window to consider various components of the problem. It acts as the glue that cements the research together; hence, it can be the framework (Debashis, 2012). The case study design is ideal because what is under study is the US AFRICOM that needs to be analysed. Bryman (2008) argues that, “the case study design often favours qualitative methods such as documentary search and unstructured interviewing because they generate an intensive, detailed examination of the issue”. This view is supported by Yin (2004) who argues that “compared to other methods, the strength of the case study design method is that it can apply a deep examination of a case within its real life setting”. Case study design also benefit from having multiple sources of evidence, as they are not limited to a single source of data. Yin (Ibid) further notes that evidence from multiple sources helps the researcher triangulate or establish converging lines in evidence to make findings as robust as possible.

3.3 DATA COLLECTION METHODS

The study was based on qualitative methods. The research was conducted mainly in Harare, Lusaka and Kampala. The researcher conducted documentary search while the literature already reviewed highlighted information on the aims, objectives, structure and the activities of AFRICOM in Africa. Data was be collected from both secondary and primary sources of data that include textbooks, electronic journals, newspaper articles, magazines and other journals. These sources were obtained from the National Defence College of Zimbabwe Library, University of Zimbabwe Library, Zimbabwe Staff College Library, Zimbabwe Open University Library, and the Internet.

The research also relied on in-depth unstructured interviews with key informants. The key informants were composed of two serving presidents, senior military officers, scholars, and embassy staff from the various embassies based in Harare such as ambassadors and Defence Attachés. The researcher relied on the interview guide during the conduct of interviews. The respondents' confidentiality and anonymity was guaranteed through the use of pseudonyms and the use of consent letters that guaranteed the respondents that the study was only for academic purposes. It was pertinent to guarantee the respondents' anonymity because the subject under study was perceived to be sensitive by some circles.

The structured questionnaires with open-ended questions were used because questionnaires guarantee confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents since one does not fill in his/her name. A questionnaire was used because it is easy to administer and because respondents will have time to think about their responses thereby enhancing validity of the data collected. The reliability of the questionnaire was enhanced through pre-testing the questionnaire before it was applied and the use of the interview guide during interviews.

3.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The data required for the research was publicly available and easily accessible electronically and from libraries. No form of unethical practice was required to gain access to the data required for analysis. Furthermore, all data is objectively presented and analysed and all literature used is properly acknowledged. During the course of developing data collection techniques, it was considered whether the research procedures were likely to cause any physical or emotional harm to research subjects. According to Resnik (2010), harm may be due to many factors, for instance violation of informants' rights to privacy by posing sensitive questions or gaining access to records, which may contain highly sensitive personal data. Other factors include observing the behaviour of informants without their being aware and allowing personal information to be made

public which informants would want to be kept private, and failing to observe/respect certain cultural values, traditions or taboos valued by informants. Consequentially, the following ethical aspects were adhered to during the course of the research:

3.4.1 Confidentiality

Confidentiality is the restriction of the right of access to the data provided by the participants.

The researcher instituted the following measures to assure confidentiality of the researchers:

- a. Use of serial numbers on data documents instead of actual respondents names.
- b. The researcher properly disposed of, destroyed, or deleted study documents should need arise.
- c. Limiting of access to information by securely storing documents within locked locations and assigning security codes to computerised records.

3.4.2 Anonymity

Making data anonymous means removing the contributor's name. However, one would often need more than this basic step to protect the participant's identity. Other information can help to identify people for instance job title, age, gender, length of service, membership of clubs and strongly expressed opinions.

3.4.3 Informed consent

Obtaining informed consent before the study or the interview begins. For this purpose, the researcher sought permission and/ or an agreement with the organization and other stakeholders through the human resources department prior to the commencement of the study.

3.5 SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

A sampling technique that was used in this study was the purposive sampling technique. Williamson (1997) highlights the fact that purposive sampling is a technique in sampling where the researcher purposely selects certain groups or individuals for their relevance to the area under study. The study employed the purposive sampling technique to select some scholars in the field of international relations in general and strategic studies in particular, some military officers and some embassy officials of various missions. The snowball technique was considered to ensure

that the researcher was referred to certain individuals who might be experts in the field under study to save time that might be wasted while dealing with irrelevant people. Atkinson and Flint (2001) highlighted the fact that the snowballing sampling technique can be looked at as a technique that overcomes the problems associated with sampling concealed populations such as the criminal and the isolated and that it takes advantage of the social networks of identified respondents to provide a researcher with an ever expanding set of potential contacts.

3.6 DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

The study used content analysis to analyse data from secondary sources such as government reports, books, journals, the internet and any other documents. The researcher examined relationships of different views in the data collected in order to establish a realistic explanation and understanding of the peace and security implications of AFRICOM in Africa. The data collected through questionnaires and in-depth interviews with senior officers, scholars and some embassy staff was analysed through thematic analysis.

3.7 LIMITATIONS

Though defence and security are public goods, the dispensation of such services require delicate handling, hence the demand for much secrecy. This constrained respondents from freely expressing themselves, however, the impact of this was minimised by use of a questionnaire which guaranteed confidentiality to the respondents. The study may also have been affected by the fact that access to some documents on AFRICOM and its operations in Africa was difficult due to their sensitivity and security classifications, however, this was minimised by e-research.

3.8 DELIMITATION

The study was confined to areas of peace and security in the African SADC region specifically in Zambia in relation to the presence of the US AFRICOM only for the period 2007 to date.

PEACE AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AFRICOM

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This section of the report is a representation and a discussion of the research findings. It is structured in procession with the specific objectives of the research.

4.2 Positive Impact

4.2.1 Humanitarian Assistance

Some respondents that were interviewed indicated that the US was at the forefront in humanitarian assistance initiatives. They indicated that sometimes the US does more than their African governments. Non-governmental organisations such as USAID that according to <http://www.globalsecurity.org/> is part of AFRICOM, is found in almost all African states and most of the respondents indicated that they had either heard about the organisation or had

actually encountered its employees at work in the distribution of drought relief materials. The US involvement and assistance in medical issues is buttressed by <http://www.africom.mil/> where AFRICOM is said to have assisted in the treatment of Ebola and the alleviation of HIV and AIDS patients through its Medical Civil Action Program (MEDCAP).

4.2.2 Security Co-operation

Some respondents from the military indicated that they valued and appreciated the assistance they got from the US through training, equipment donations, funding and military exercises that are sponsored by the US through AFRICOM. One officer from a SADC country indicated that most of their senior officers had done most if not all their training in the US. The officer indicated that he had no problems whatsoever with AFRICOM being hosted in any SADC country since according to him, the presence of AFRICOM would enhance the peace and security in the region. Some of the respondents also indicated that the presence of AFRICOM in Africa would ensure proper governance of their countries and would reduce the number of dictators in Africa. AFRICOM on its website <http://www.africom.mil/> buttresses the fact that it conducts military exercises and training with some African militaries in counter terrorism exercises. An example of US military equipment donation is given by Ezeamalu (2016:1) where he posits that in January 2016, the US donated 24 used mine-resistant vehicles in Nigeria for use in Counter Terrorism. AFRICOM also assisted in the construction of a military intelligence school in Tanzania.

The school is viewed to be the biggest military intelligence school in the SADC region if not in the whole of Africa (Staff Sergeant Carlin Leslie 2014).

4.3 Negative Impact

4.3.1 Regional Instability and Suspicions

Some of the respondents felt that the presence of AFRICOM on African soil would compromise the sovereignty of states and create mistrust among African countries. They indicated that the increased presence of the US on African soil will result in the US doing as it pleases without due consideration of the opinions of the African governments or the African people. They also indicated that the mistrust that would arise could compromise security in that African regional states might not then cooperate in peace and security issue but only consider their own. This assertion is buttressed by Ganetsang (2013:2) when he indicates that the Botswana government did not care about the feelings of other African states when it came to her hosting AFRICOM if she felt that it was in her interest to do so. Laurie (2009:3) also made a similar observation and

indicated that in undermining state sovereignty, AFRICOM, will alter the regional balance of power, and be divisive and destabilising.

4.3.2 Increase in Terrorist Activities

The general response of six respondents was that AFRICOM could compromise peace and security in the African region through increased terrorist activities. They believe that most of the areas where Americans have established, have at one time or another been attacked by terrorists. Chothia (2015:1) observes that Boko Haram, an Islamic terrorist group based in Nigeria is opposed to the American values and culture. She further states that the group forbids Muslims to take part in any political or social activity that has a western orientation. This observation was also made by the American Foreign Policy Council in a document titled Boko Haram in 2014. The name it is alleged means “Western education is sinful,” which in Hausa language translates to Boko Haram (Bokomeans “Book” or, more broadly, “Western education,” and Haram means “sinful”). This group is led by Abu Shekau. This group’s terrorist attacks have spread to areas outside the Nigerian borders to include Cameroon and Chad.

Buchanan (2015:1) notes that in 2014, Boko Haram doubled its attacks and expanded into Chad and Cameroon, and staged 46 attacks that claimed 520 lives. Blum (2004:2) posits that terrorists hate the US foreign policy and that terrorist attacks are only in retaliation to atrocities committed by the US mainly on Muslims.

Other examples where the US was a target of terrorist activities are the US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya on 7 August 1998, the US twin Towers attack on 11 September 2001 (<http://www.history.com/>, Burke 2015).

Some respondents felt that the security of African countries and its people is generally compromised as people live in perpetual fear of terrorist attacks since they do not know when and where an attack will take place. Baldauf (2009:1) also made the same observation when he noted that the US embassy in Pretoria and US consulates in Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg were closed on the 22 and 23 September 2009 when information of an imminent terrorist attack against US government targets in South Africa had been received. The said attacks did not however take place.

Four political analysts responded to interview questions by indicating that while the threat to terrorism existed in Africa because of the weak security structures in African countries, it was pertinent to note that most of the attacks are in a way related to US involvement and interference in African issues. Two of the four respondents indicated that most of the terrorist organisations were products of a US military project whose objective had been to counter the

Soviet Union and China's socialist and communist ideologies respectively. Azikiwe (2015:1) also made observations when he indicated that, even though AFRICOM states its purpose as that of working with African countries in the fight against terrorism, some terrorist organisations were created and strengthened by the US through activities such as the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq and the destruction of Colonel Muamar Gadhafi's government in Libya. He states that:

...the "war on terrorism" is a by-product of successive failed imperialist interventions from Afghanistan to Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The so-called "Islamist extremist" organizations were nurtured, funded and coordinated since the early 1980s when the administration of President Jimmy Carter worked vigorously to overthrow the socialist government in Afghanistan which was supported by the former Soviet Union.

Azikiwe (2015:1) also posits that, the instability in Northern Mali is a result of the after effects of the destruction of the Libyan Jamahiriya system of Gadhafi's government through a CIA engineered regime change agenda. The Libyan war resulted in some members of the Tuarag nationality that had been living in Libya being forced back to Northern Mali where some unresolved inter-ethnic conflicts that had started in the 1960s still existed. One can therefore conclude that peace and security in the region has been compromised by the involvement of the US in their so called war against terrorism.

4.3.2 Political Interference

More than half of the respondents felt that the tendency by the US to interfere in African political, social and economic issues tends to compromise the African nations' sovereignty and

may cause instability and insecurity to the African people. A majority of these respondents indicated that while Africa might have its own governance problems, a bigger portion of some of the African problems are attributable to US interference. While it can be argued that the interference is not necessarily tied to AFRICOM, Tichaona Zindoga's (2015:1), conclusion that, USAID, which according to <http://www.globalsecurity.org/> is part of the civilian component of AFRICOM "does overtly what the CIA does covertly" implies that AFRICOM at times is used to interfere in African governance issues. As discussed earlier, USAID appears to be more active in those countries whose policies are not acceptable to the US and this is proved by the US\$21.8 million request by USAID in 2015 to fund political activities in some African countries in 2016 (Ibid). According to Azikiwe (2013:2), AFRICOM was also used for regime change in Libya. Turse (2013) in Libya 360 indicated that AFRICOM activities are carrying on across Africa, if this assertion is true then it concurs with the respondents' view that some African problems are attributable to US interference through AFRICOM.

The respondents highlighted that the US sometimes goes so low that it sometimes even dictates who should be president in some African countries and the insistence by the US for African leaders to have fixed terms. The US sentiments for fixed terms were according to Baker (2015:1) echoed by the US President Obama in his speech to the African Union (AU) when he advised that "Nobody should be President for Life". President Obama echoed these sentiments despite the fact that some African Leaders intended to extend their terms beyond those stipulated in their constitutions or to amend the constitution for the purposes of extending the presidential term. Baker (2015:1) notes that as Obama was delivering his speech, in Rwanda, lawmakers had just voted in support of a constitutional change allowing President Paul Kagame a third term. A number of African countries in the AU have presidents, prime ministers or monarchs who have been in power for long and some of the examples are Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo who had ruled Equatorial Guinea since 1979, Robert Mugabe who had ruled Zimbabwe since 1980, Paul Biya who had governed Cameroon since 1982, Yoweri Museveni who has governed Uganda since 1986 and Omar Hassan al-Bashir who has governed Sudan since 1989 (*Ibid*).

Similar sentiments were also made by Hilary Clinton in Corey (2008:1) when she told a US Senate Committee that one of Obama's foreign policy objectives was to end autocracy in Zimbabwe.

This kind of stance is one that led Kamati kaTate (2011:1) to conclude that AFRICOM's position in Africa is meant to facilitate the overthrow of some African governments (as it did in Libya) and to attack countries that are viewed as anti US. This shows that the US can also cause

instability and insecurity through agitating the African people to revolt against the legitimate African governments.

Some of the respondents' views were that the US tends to impose or select leaders for some African states. The respondents were of the opinion that despite the legitimacy of a leader or the elections that brought him/her to power, the US would not recognise him/her as long as he does not tow the US line or if he/she is not a US puppet. General Rodriguez in Azikiwe (2015:2) buttressed the respondents' views by stating that the most important issue for African militaries is to grow leaders and the selection of the right people and the building of the systems that sustain the leaders' efforts. Azikiwe (2015:2) concluded that this selection of leaders resulted in a coup in Mali on 23 March 2012 when the elected Malian leader Amadou Toumani Toure, was overthrown by a military Captain Amadou Sanogo. Sanogo had been a US military student as a participant in the International Military Education and Training program in Georgia and at the Marine Corps base in Quantico, which specialises in counter-terrorism education.

One senior diplomat at the Kenyan embassy in Harare indicated that they respect America very much as a nation and that when president Obama visits Kenya, they view him as a son who would have visited home. The diplomat could however not be drawn to give an answer about AFRICOM and their operations in Kenya save for the fact that the US does a lot in humanitarian relief and the training of the Kenyan military in some specialist areas like counter terrorism. Most of the respondents did acknowledge the good work done by the US in drought relief, medical assistance in areas such as HIV and AIDS and the treatment of Ebola but a majority of the respondents who are not in the military did not know the link between the US military and their civilian component. Some respondents however believed that the US activities through humanitarian agencies does compromise security in the African states in that these activities in particular food aid distributions are meant to create dependencies so that the population would lose faith in their own governments and view the US as the saviour.

4.3.3 Insecurity through Culture Imposition

Some respondents stated that the US deliberately imposes its culture and products on the African people. The US products that are sold in Africa tends to affect the security of the African people in that they compete with the African industries. The competition is unfair because the US commodities are subsidised and cheap.

This kind of competition negatively affects the African industries and their production with the end result being their closure that translates into unemployment and instability in the African states. Ashton (2013:2) also made a similar observation when he stated that while the US needs to be taken seriously on its humanitarian agenda, she was on the other hand dumping subsidised US grown crops and US Aid and in the process destroying local and regional markets thereby creating unemployment, instability and radicalism. The respondents' observations are strengthened by looking at some of AFRICOM's objectives that include the protection of the US interests, facilitation of the exploitation of Africa's natural and human resources and the creation of a market for US products (<http://www.voltairenet.org/>, Chomsky 1993, Matunhu 2011 and Fellows 2015).

One of the US enduring interests according to Lucas and McInnis (2015:2) is the growing of the US economy in an open international economic system. The same respondents also stated that some institutions that used to provide social and at times economic security to the African people have been eroded. They even went further to apportion blame on the US for the breakdown of the African family unit that included even the extended family. The political analysts among the

respondents also blamed the US for the rise in political activism that challenges sitting and legitimate governments. They argued that this compromises the peace and security of states and gave the Arab springs and the instability that followed as examples. This was also raised by Laurie (2009:3) when he argued that AFRICOM undermines state sovereignty.

4.4 Analysis

The respondent's professional disposition are as shown in Fig. 1 below. Fig. 1 shows that 70% of the respondents were military officers, 20% were scholars in International Relations and the remaining 10% comprised diplomats. The reason for such a distribution could be that a military officer who is also a student in International relations/Peace and Conflict studies undertook the study. The low response from the diplomats could be attributed to their busy schedules.




Fig. 1 Number of Respondents

Source: Author

Fig. 2 shows the country of origin of the respondents. The large number of respondents from Zimbabwe is attributed to the fact that the research was mainly done in Zimbabwe where the researcher is currently based and only questionnaires were sent to the respondents outside Zimbabwe. The fact that the respondents are spread across the SADC and East African regions implies that the findings do to some extent reflect the views of SADC and East Africa and can to some extent be generalised as the regions' views about AFRICOM.




Fig. 2

Source: Author

On the hosting of AFRICOM on African soil, 12% of the respondents were not sure on whether AFRICOM should be hosted on African soil or not while 18% of the respondents wanted AFRICOM to be hosted on African soil. The remaining 70% were of the opinion that AFRICOM should not have any permanent base in Africa. Those that advocated for the hosting of AFRICOM on African soil justified their decision by stating that this would expose Africa to the efficient way of doing things just as the Americans do. The reasons given by those that did not want AFRICOM to be hosted in Africa included reasons like, Americans do not understand Africa's complex environment but they pretend to be experts on African affairs while some indicated that Americans are irritating and patronising and are committed to the American cause and not Africa. Some also argued that Africa has the capacity to run her own affairs without foreign interference. This shows that a majority of Africans do not want AFRICOM to be hosted on African soil. Fig 3 below shows the percentages of those that did not want AFRICOM to be hosted on African soil against those that did not mind.




Fig. 3 Hosting of AFRICOM in Africa

Source: Author

Fig. 4 below shows the general response by the respondents on whether they thought the presence or the hosting of AFRICOM in Africa has a positive or a negative impact on peace and security. 59% of the respondents believed that AFRICOM had negative effects on Peace and Security.

Their belief was premised on the fact that if Africans are left alone to solve their own problems, then there would be peace in Africa. They also indicated that, political interference and the definition of terrorism and democracy by the US or AFRICOM tends to cause instability and security threats in the Africans countries. 29% of the respondents indicated that AFRICOM and US presence in Africa had a positive impact on peace and security. They indicated that the US has always been seen to be at the forefront when crisis occur in Africa. 12% of the respondents were of the opinion that the US presence or AFRICOM presence had no impact on African peace and security. These respondents believed that most of Africa's problems are self-made and can only be solved if African leaders had the courage to nip corruption in the bud.




Fig. 4 Hosting of AFRICOM in Africa

Source: Author

The findings in this study show that AFRICOM is a unified force that is composed of all the components that constitute the American people. It is composed of the military, diplomats and civilians in both the US and the host countries. AFRICOM's primary objective is to protect the US interests. The US interests can be broken down into security interests and these include, military training to capacitate African forces to counter terrorism, humanitarian assistance that includes disaster relief and medical assistance and political security that involves the curbing of the spread of political ideology that have a negative impact on the US interests.

These interests other than genuine humanitarian assistance tends to have a negative impact on African peace and security. The fight against terrorism has also resulted in an increase in terrorist

attacks on African countries. The US interests also include business interests where AFRICOM is facilitates the growth of US businesses in Africa. US businesses in Africa include the exploitation of both human and natural resources. The study has shown that Africa is rich in both human and natural resources such as oil and some precious minerals such as gold, diamonds, cobalt and uranium to mention just a few. Africa also provides a big and untapped market for US processed products and subsidised commodities. AFRICOM is also meant to facilitate the smooth repatriation of the business proceeds and ensure that the African governments do not interfere in these endeavours at all. This also has a negative impact on peace and security in that the African businesses cannot compete with US businesses resulting in insecurity and unemployment that causes instability. The exploitation of resources also has a negative impact in that they create economic insecurity that also ends up destabilising the African states. AFRICOM

is also meant to ensure that the US gains a foothold in Africa and counter China. This will guarantee business to its business people and at the same time allow the US to exert its will even in UN meetings based on the support of the African states.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter presented the major findings obtained from this study. It basically revealed that while the presence of AFRICOM in Africa has some positive contribution towards the improvement of peace and security in Africa, the negative impacts however, outweigh the positive impacts. The general view appears to be that the presence or hosting of AFRICOM in Africa would cause instability and will negatively influence African peace and security. The next chapter focuses on the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This includes conclusions on the study that was conducted to determine the peace and security implications of an increased American presence in Africa. The study that was delimited to a case of AFRICOM. The research's problem statement, research objectives, the theoretical framework and the major findings guide the conclusions. In particular, it summarises what came out of documentary search, structured and in-depth interviews, and key informant interviews in an attempt to find how AFRICOM affects the peace and security of African states. It also proffers some recommendations before concluding.

5.2 Conclusions

The study sought to establish the structure and the operations of AFRICOM, reasons for its establishment and its peace and security implications and to proffer recommendations on how the negative effects can be mitigated. The study revealed that AFRICOM is a unified force that is composed of the military, diplomats and civilians in both the US and the host countries. The commander of AFRICOM is a military general and the current and fourth commander is US Marine Corps General *Thomas Waldhauser*. Its official headquarters is in Stuttgart, Germany and it has one official base on African soil, which is Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. It however, has several secret staging points and bases in many African countries. AFRICOM has been involved in many military training exercises with many African forces and in many African countries such as Botswana, South Africa and Tanzania to mention a few. Some of these military exercises include Southern Accord, African Endeavour, African Lion, Atlas Accord and Flintlock to mention a few.

AFRICOM has also been involved in most African countries in the fight against the spread of HIV and AIDS through the Department of Defence HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) and was also involved in the fight against Ebola in West Africa mainly in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. AFRICOM's hard power projection was shown in Operation Odyssey Dawn where it was used initially in the enforcement of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 in Libya and later in the demise of Muamar Gadhafi. AFRICOM is a US soft power tool that is used to advance US interests in Africa. On realising that African states were to some extent opposed to its hosting on African soil, the US entered into bilateral negotiations with individual states.

This approach paid some dividends and to date, AFRICOM in one form or another is found in almost every state in Africa.

AFRICOM's primary objective is to protect the US interests in Africa. These interests include training African troops to be competent in the global war against terrorism, exploitation of African human and natural resources that include precious minerals and the promotion of American businesses. The US also has political interests and uses AFRICOM to ensure that rogue states are either removed or taken to book without the direct projection of hard power except where it becomes absolutely necessary. The US stance on Africa and the establishment of AFRICOM is also meant to ensure that China does not have more influence in Africa. The peace and security implications of hosting AFRICOM on African soil is generally that it has negative implications. While AFRICOM does assist African governments in disaster relief and medical issues such as the fight against Ebola, HIV and AIDS, it is generally felt that it causes more

insecurity. AFRICOM serves mostly its interests and therefore will not be restrained by any African government when it comes to protecting US interests.

The fight against terrorism has resulted in more terrorist attacks on African states while US business ventures tend to force African companies to close resulting in unemployment and instability. AFRICOM's political interference has resulted in political agitation and the removal of some African governments. AFRICOM also has a negative peace and security implication in that the training exercises they have with African troops exposes the African militaries as ill equipped, not well looked after, and unprofessional. The US through AFRICOM also pampers African militaries by donating military hardware and at times funding African military operations. US sponsorship and training of African militaries creates a sense of dependency where African militaries gradually find it difficult to engage in any war without the assistance of AFRICOM troops. AFRICOM also compromises the peace and security of African by creating an environment where African states tend to mistrust each other even though they may be

neighbours. The US deals bilaterally with individual states and some of its economic programmes such AGOA are selective and exclude other African states. This makes the African states not to trust each other and may not come to each other's aid when need arises.

5.3 Recommendations

The US assistance to African countries goes a long way in alleviating suffering among the African people and at times guarantees security to the African people where African states would have failed. The US efforts in such endeavours must be commended. However, some African countries are not comfortable with AFRICOM having some form of permanency through the hosting of AFRICOM military bases and their operations on the continent.

Since the US is viewed as a champion of democracy by most of the African people, it is therefore, recommended that the US should not be directly involved in African politics and AFRICOM should not be used as a tool to remove African governments as what happened in Libya. The civilian arm of AFRICOM should not also be used in the in political issues such as sponsoring or catching political parties that are opposed to African sitting governments or being direct commentators about the wrongs that would have been carried out by African governments. USAID activities should be confined to the projects that assist the African people as opposed to being a distributor of humanitarian aid and a political activists at the same time.

It is also recommended that the US or AFRICOM through their political education and activities should avoid pushing and imposing their will and or candidates for consideration to become

leaders in African states. African states and leaders are in some cases their own enemies when they deal with outsiders. They allow aid to cloud their judgements when negotiating and accept to be divided on the pretext that they would be given some aid or special favours by those countries that have. It is therefore recommended that African states and governments speak with one voice or agree to take a position and be able to stand by that decision be at regional, SADC or UN forums. This is to avoid situations where, African states unanimously agree not to host AFRICOM while in individual negotiations with the US they accept to host it.

To enhance her credibility, the US should not only confine or concentrate the bulk of their activities to areas that are rich in natural resources. It is therefore recommended that if the US or AFRICOM wants to be accepted by the African people and governments, they should try to ensure that they develop all African states equally. To avoid creating suspicion and mistrust among African states, they should avoid entering into bilateral trade agreements that are meant to benefit Africans yet they discriminate other African states. One example of such a trade

agreement being AGOA. This tends to at times benefit other states more at the expense of those left out. This may also have a negative impact on African peace and security.

On the social front, it would appear as if the US does not bother to study and understand the various African cultures to enable them to interact with the Africans without violating some of their beliefs and or norms. They, at times impose or even threaten sanctions for those that do not accept to adopt certain cultural issues that may not be acceptable among Africans. This tends to negatively impact on peace and security as shown by the Boko Haram terrorist activities. The group claims to be against western education and culture that is being imposed on them. It is therefore, recommended that the US should learn to respect the African culture when dealing with Africans. It is also recommended that African countries should approach and try to solve their problems as one rather than invite outsiders who may come and prescribe a wrong solution. Outsiders should only be used when operating under the guidance of Africans.

The experience gained by African militaries during training exercises with AFRICOM troops is very beneficial and the assistance given to African forces in terms of military hardware and funding goes a long way in ensuring their efficiency. It is recommended that there be military cooperation with all African forces as opposed to some being left out. It is also recommended that the training exercises be under the umbrella of African regional blocks or under the AU. It is also recommended that the hosting of any AFRICOM military bases by any African country be

discouraged. AFRICOM should be allowed to relate with African states from a distance as opposed to having some form of permanency. Where possible, it is recommended that African countries avoid US sponsorship in military hardware or funding of their operations, as this tends to have a negative impact on peace and security.

5.4 Areas for Further Study

The researcher feels that one area for further study that could be considered would be the recolonisation of Africa by the US and/or China.

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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MILITARY OFFICERS

This questionnaire is aimed at obtaining information on AFRICOM and its operations in Africa.

INSTRUCTIONS

Please answer all questions by placing an X in the box adjacent to one appropriate answer only. Please note that this information shall be treated as confidential and shall only be used for academic purposes. You are not obliged to write your name on the questionnaire, however, if for whatever reason your name does appear, you are however guaranteed that it will never be referred to or included in the study document that will be submitted to the university.

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Q1. What is your sex?

- a. Male
- b. Female

- Q2. What is your age?
- a. Below 25 years
 - b. 25 - 35 years
 - c. 36 – 45 years
 - d. Above 45 years
- Q3. What is your level of education?
- a. Secondary/High School
 - b. College/University
 - c. College/University (Post Grad)
- Q4. What is your rank?
- a. Major/Squadron Leader and Below
 - b. Lt Col/ Wg Cdr to Col/Gp Cpt
 - c. General

SECTION B: MILITARY EXPERIENCE

Q5. How long have you served in the Defence Forces?

- a. Below 15 years
- b. 15 - 24 years
- c. 25 – 30 years
- d. Above 30 years

Q6. Did you receive any form of Training from the US Military?

- a. Yes
- b. No

Q7. If your answer to question 6 above was Yes, what type of training did you receive?

- a. Officer Cadet Course
- b. Staff College
- c. Specialist Training

Q8. If your answer to question 7 above was Specialist Training, Please state the Course

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Q9. What was the role played by the US troops in this training?

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Q10. How do you rate this course(s) when compared to a similar Course(s) in your country

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Q11. Have you ever been involved in any military exercise(s) that involved US troops?

- a. Yes
- b. No

Q12. If your answer to question 11 above was Yes, Please state the Exercise(s)

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Q13. Have you ever been deployed to any UN mission where you operated together with US troops?

a. Yes

b. No

Q14. If your answer to question 13 above was Yes, Please state the mission(s)

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Q15. In your own view, what is your comment about the American troops conduct and performance in the mission(s)

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SECTION C: AFRICOM STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS

Q16. Have you ever heard anything about AFRICOM ?

a. Yes

b. No

Q17. If your answer to the above question is 'Yes', is AFRICOM a military or a civilian Institution?

a. Military

b. Civilian

c. Both

Q18. Does AFRICOM have any military bases in any African country(s)?

a. Yes

b. No

Q19. If your answer to question 18 above was Yes, Please name the country(s)

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Q20. Has AFRICOM conducted any military exercises in your country?

a. Yes

b. No

Q21. If your answer to the question above is 'Yes' what was the name of the exercise?

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Q22. Has AFRICOM or the US conducted any humanitarian assistance in your country?

a. Yes

b. No

Q23. If your answer to the question above is 'Yes' what were the circumstances that led to this?

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Q24. Has AFRICOM or the US assisted your Defence Forces in either material or financial donations?

a. Yes

b. No

Q25. If your answer to the question above is 'Yes' what are your feelings about the donation?

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Q26. Would you prefer that AFRICOM has a permanent military base in your country?

a. Yes

b. No

Q27. What are your reasons for the answer you gave in question 25 above

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SECTION D: REASONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AFRICOM

Q27. Do you think AFRICOM was created to protect US interests in AFRICA?

a. Yes

b. No

Q28. Do you think AFRICOM was created to assist African countries in the fight against terrorism?

a. Yes

b. No

Q29. Do you think AFRICOM was created to promote democracy in Africa?

a. Yes

b. No

Q30. Do you think AFRICOM was created to facilitate the exploitation of both human and natural resources in Africa?

a. Yes

b. No

Q31. Do you think AFRICOM was created to protect US industries in Africa and to ensure a smooth repatriation of profits without interference from African governments?

a. Yes

b. No

Q32. Do you think AFRICOM was created to facilitate the opening up of a market for US goods such as agricultural products, military hardware and technology?

a. Yes

b. No

Q32. Do you think AFRICOM was created to counter Chinese influence in Africa?

a. Yes

b. No

Q33. What other reasons do you think AFRICOM was created for?

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SECTION E: PEACE AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Q34. Do you think Africa would be more peaceful if AFRICOM would spread to all African states?

a. Yes

b. No

Q35. Do you think Africa would be more peaceful if the US does not involve itself in the governance issues of African states?

a. Yes

b. No

Q36. Do you think the US is responsible for the political agitation and activism by opposition political parties and some individuals in African states?

a. Yes

b. No

Q37. Do you think social insecurity in Africa is caused by the adoption of US culture?

a. Yes

b. No

Q38. Do you think financial insecurity in Africa is caused by trade imbalances between the US and African countries?

a. Yes

b. No

Q39. Do you think terrorist activities in Africa are more pronounced in countries that have friendly relations with the US?

a. Yes

b. No

Q40. Does the imposition of sanctions by the US on some African countries affect regional peace and security?

a. Yes

b. No

Q41. What do you think are the peace and security implication of an increased American presence in Africa with particular reference to AFRICOM?

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APPENDIX 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MILITARY OFFICERS

1. What motivates the US to conduct military training exercises with African defence forces?

2. What do you think are the reasons for the creation of AFRICOM?

3. Would you recommend that AFRICOM be hosted in your country and what would be your reasons?

4. Does the hosting of AFRICOM create a peaceful environment in African states?

5. What do you think are the peace and security implications of hosting AFRICOM to African states?

APPENDIX 3: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR DIPLOMATS

1. What are your country's views about the hosting of AFRICOM?
2. What are your views about military hardware and cash donations from the US to fund your own military operations?
3. What are your views about the US political interference in African states?
4. What are your views about the imposition of sanctions on some African states as a way of punishing the states for not behaving in a way that is acceptable to the US?
5. What do you think are the peace and security implications for an increased American presence in Africa?

APPENDIX 4: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SCHOLARS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL ANALYSTS

1. How has the penetration of Chinese goods on the African market affected US-Africa relations?
2. How has the Global War against terrorism impacted on the creation of AFRICOM?
3. Does the hosting of AFRICOM on African soil have a positive or a negative impact on peace and security in Africa?
4. Why do you think AFRICOM was created?

