THE ROLES OF THE UNIVERSITY STUDENT IN THE ZAMBIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

A thesis submitted to the University

of Zambia for the degree of Master

of Arts

By

Michael Boris Burawoy.

August, 1972.

ABSTRACT.

Methodological shortcomings, a narrow focus on students as a group isolated from the wider society, the tendency to consider the student apart from the institution in which he operates - the university - and the difficulty of coming to terms with the transience of student status are some of the factors which have handicapped sociological inquiry in this area. Survey analysis may be supplemented by participant observation. Consideration of the student role may be supplemented by a consideration of the other members of his set of multiple roles. In the context of the Zambian social structure the student role is the focus of four sets of tensions. For historical reasons there exist two mutually exclusive avenues of recruitment to the ruling class, one passing through the educational system and the other through the party organisation. The result is competition between those with 'expertise' and those who exhibit 'loyalty and experience'. Tension between students and the party arises not only from competition but also from the arbitrary choice of criteria for upward ability in any particular instance. The exclusion of the student from the political arena and also from the central institutions and value system has given rise to a negative oppositionalism and the perception of the political élite as illegitimate rulers. This generates a second set of tensions between students and government. The third source of tension lies in a generalised resentment, an embryo class consciousness, of the mass of society towards those who have power and wealth and particularly those who consider they are entitled to such positions by virtue of their advanced formal education. Finally the structure of the university social system and the student community are antithetical to the political structure of the wider society. In the university directives flow upwards from below while in the wider society they flow in the opposite direction. This structural discontinuity, not only gives rise

to tension but also a segmentation of the student role into
two discontinuous components - a civic role and a university
role.

Apart from the student role, each student enacts other
roles derived from the wider social structure and linking him
to the society outside the university. Such role continuities
however do not mitigate the tensions surrounding the student
role. Within the university arena, extrinsically derived roles
are only enacted insofar as they are compatible with the stud-
ent role. Equilibrium between the university students and the
government is sustained through a set of norms and expectation
which sharply differentiate between the student's civic and
university roles. A violation of these role expectations
brings the students into conflict with the party or government
The absence of strong cross cutting ties and mediating forces
results in the escalation of conflict unless a 'scapegoat'
emerges to reunite the opposed groups in opposition to a third
'alien' element. It is characteristic of the Zambian social
structure that there are relatively few cross cutting ties
which can lock the social system into stable equilibrium.
Governments can handle tensions between themselves and trans-
planted institutions, in this case the university, in at least
three ways. First the university can be excluded from the
national arena, and awarded a measure of functional autonomy
on condition that its members accept a discontinuity between
their institutional role and their civic role. Second the
university may be incorporated into the party so that its
activities may be regulated. The third possibility is the
structural transformation of the university in such a way that
it becomes compatible with the wider social structure and
thereby reduces the tension.

PREFACE.

Any sociological inquiry arises from the interaction of the sociologist and the subject of study. Therefore, it is important for the writer to present some information about his orientation to the subject under investigation and the domain assumptions[1] he brings with him to his study. However difficult a task the social scientist must strive toward a heightened self awareness and become conscious of the assumptions implicit in his research.

My interest in students was first stimulated in 1965 by a visit to America, which was still digesting the implications of 'Berkeley' and experiencing the first large scale student sit-ins over Vietnam. The assumption of student status led to a heightened interest in the political role of students and to a four month visit to Africa in 1966. This served to introduce me to a few of the problems of education in South, Central and East Africa. In the following year I carried out a more systematic and better prepared study revolving around university education in India, in particular the 'problem' of medium of instruction in university education. The results and conclusions are written up elsewhere.

For those interested in student politics, 1968 turned out to be a challenging year and for those who were active in student politics it was a rare 'generational experience'. The turmoil in Europe and America led to a greater awareness of the capacity of the students to challenge the political order in the countries of Asia, Latin America and to a lesser extent Africa. As one who had observed the events of 1968 from

---

1. See Gouldner, A. W., <u>The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology</u> (London: Heinemann, 1971).

the vantage point of a British University, I became interested
in undertaking intensive comparative study of students as be-
tween the advanced capitalist nations and the 'new' nations of
Africa. After spending six months in South Africa, attempting
to familiarise myself with the nature of student politics on
the English speaking university campuses, I found myself in
Zambia employed on the Copperbelt by Anglo American Corporation.
In the following year entry to the University of Zambia as a
M.A. student in sociology enabled me to undertake a participant
observer study of Zambian students. The present thesis is the
result.

I brought with me to the University of Zambia a set of
prejudices which naturally arise from passing through the pro-
cesses of a bourgeois liberal education in England, and from
the security of middle class life in Britain. I understood
little of the insecurity and anxiety associated with upward
mobility, and of the tensions which pervade a small country
such as Zambia which has only recently emerged from colonial
rule and its attendant patterns of racial discrimination and
stratification. However one might resist the assumptions of
racial stereo-types inevitably one must adopt a set if, as had
been the case of the writer before he entered the university,
one has been living next to Zambians but interacting only in
the context of status inequality.

Inevitably many of the background assumptions and preju-
dices I brought with me to the University of Zambia were dras-
tically modified by the environment in which I interacted with
other students as a student, albeit a white one. In so far as
I became sensitized to the student culture and the assumptions
of the community, it was through involvement in its affairs as
a student. There is also the danger of falling into the other

extreme and adopting the student 'folk theory' as an explanation of student behaviour without analysing the underlying structural determinants and interests. Continual discussion with my teachers and my removal to Manchester to write up the thesis has hopefully made me conscious of the structural derivations of the beliefs and attitudes of the students.

Apart from the confluence of background and environmental influences the content and orientation of the thesis arises out of the nature of the sociological training I received at the University of Zambia. To Dr. Jayaraman I owe a great debt for guiding me through some of the mysteries of the Indian caste system, above all its relationship to class, and in so doing throwing light on the more general phenomenon of the manipulation of a cultural idiom in the pursuit of contextually derived interests. The concept of caste mobility and its cultural concomitants have illuminated many of the features associated with the upward mobility of the black 'caste' in Zambia. It was Professor Simons, my supervisor, who introduced me to political sociology and I had the great fortune to benefit from his outstanding analytical abilities and long standing experience and understanding of Southern Africa. His critique of an outline of this thesis proved to be particularly helpful in drawing my attention to the sensitivity of students to their different roles in the university and the wider society. Professor Van Velsen was always an inspiration during my three years in Zambia. Not only was I fortunate to have the benefit of his long experience of Central Africa, stretching back over two decades, but his unusually well developed critical faculties, his uninhibited enthusiasm for sociology and his continual interest in any research I undertook have been a spur to the completion of the dissertation. I am very grateful for

the opportunities I had of discussing my work with each of my teachers throughout my stay at the university. The theoretical framework to which I have been subjected emanated from their interpretation of Marxist writings which informed their analysis of society. The influence of the Manchester School of Social Anthropology and in particular 'situational' analysis, peioneered by Gluckman, Mitchell and Epstein, is unmistakeable. The reader will also note the influence of the writings of a number of American sociologists, most notably Merton, Gouldner, Lipset and Shils.

I am particularly grateful to the members of the University Sociological Association and in particular its executive committees, around which revolved so many of my activities at the University of Zambia, for the opportunity of active participation in student life. My two years at the university will remain one of the most exciting and enjoyable periods of my life. I would like to thank Anglo American Corporation for awarding me a scholarship to pursue my M.A. studies. I am indebted to the Office of the Registrar and the Computor Department of The University of Zambia for providing me with data concerning the student population. In Manchester, I profited immensely from discussions with Morris Szeftel of the University of Manchester. His knowledge of Zambia and concern with political development acted as an invaluable corrective to my more wild ideas. It was he who impressed upon me the importance of competition between élites. I should also like to thank Mrs. Elise Oldham for typing out the thesis so meticulously and for applying pressure now and again to ensure its completion.

ABBREVIATIONS.

ANC	African National Congress
K	Kwacha (Unit of currency, K1 = US $1.40 = UK £0.58)
NPP	National Progressive Party
NUZS	National Union of Zambia Students
SMOLISA	Student Movement for the Liberation of Southern Africa
UNZA	University of Zambia
UNZADRAM	University of Zambia Dramatic Society
UNZASA	University of Zambia Sociological Association
UNZASU	University of Zambia Students' Union
UP	United Party
UPP	United Progressive Party
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

———————

CONTENTS.

C H A P T E R   O N E

INTRODUCTION:

STUDENTS AND SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY.

The Stimuli behind Recent Inquiries into Student Behaviour.

Until recently students have been a neglected focus of
sociological inquiry. The transcience of student status,
their relative isolation and as students their relatively
insignificant impact on other sections of 'Western' society
may all have been contributing factors to this omission. In
addition, sociologists may be a little wary of making studies
so near to 'home'. With the expansion of university education
and the rising consciousness that education was not only for
the privileged few but was one of the keys to the equalitar-
ian society, the position of the student has altered accord-
ingly. Three factors are worthy of note. Increased numbers
of students have led to increased competition for jobs, the
devaluation of the degree, and the depersonalisation of educa-
tion. This in itself can but lead to enhanced dissatisfaction.
An increasing awareness and preoccupation of the student with
his role in society led to considerations of the nature of the
society in which he now existed and which he would confront
on graduating. Secondly students have become increasingly
self conscious possibly because they are now more conspicuous
by virtue of their numbers resulting in their definition as
a distinct group. The enhanced self consciousness alongside
an inflated view of their importance, engendered by the nature
of their education and their inexperience of wider society,
has contributed to the development of specific student
interests despite the transcience of the student status. These
interests have not always revolved around narrow trade union
concerns but have been extended to embrace other interests in
society both opposed to and in support of existing regimes.

The student consciousness and the development of the student
interest has spread with the assistance of mass media through-
out the Western world and inevitably has had an impact,
albeit very slight, on students of the 'new nations.'[1] The
third feature relates to the expansion in absolute, though not
necessarily in percentage, terms of the number of 'radical'
students who are prepared to make sacrifices in order to
undermine existing authority in society.[2]

The disturbances at Berkeley in 1964 first drew the
attention of a wide audience to the phenomena referred to
above. It put pay to the idea of stereotypes of the student
as a quiescent citizen of the American populus. Given the
absence of any strong tradition of dissent on American campuses,
the outburst and truculence of the students in opposing the
administration of the university was all the more unexpected
and clumsily handled.[3] However small a minority, there were
a number of students who had been in the Southern States work-
ing in the Civil Rights Movement during vacations. They had
returned to the university disillusioned with the obstacles to
racial harmony and the end of segregation and discrimination.
Many now saw their student life in new ways, subject to the
same mechanisms of 'oppression' and control as they had found
in the wider society. The Free Speech Movement, precipitated
by a relatively insignificant affair, became the focus of
student resentment and discontent vis-à-vis the university
administration. What had begun relatively innocuously devel-
oped into a radical critique of the American university as a
symptom and microcosm of the society in which it was embedded.
As protest gathered momentum, the universities' implication in
the Vietnam War became a focal point around which the 'left'

students rallied support in a number of established universities across the United States. Combined with issues of more immediate concern the bureaucratisation and depersonalisation of university education brought thousands out in protest against the 'capitalist' system which they held accountable for the American malaise. The section was small in percentage terms but in absolute numbers it was sufficient to create turmoil. Nonetheless as one eminent sociologist said, despite the militancy of a small section of the student population, the problem in American higher education is the prevailing unquestioning, uncritical and conformists ethos of the vast majority of students.[4]

The trouble on American campuses reached such dimensions as to cause widespread concern in political circles, particularly as it seemed to affect the better students in the more 'eminent' universities the most severely. As subsequent studies have tended to show, the militant students are the brighter students from professional backgrounds studying liberal arts subjects.[5] If trends in sociological investigation follow the paths their sponsors wish them to follow then it was inevitable that students would become the focus of sociological inquiry. In the eventuality no less eminent a sociologist than Professor Lipset of Harvard University took pioneering steps in the centralisation, organisation and synthesising of studies in student politics. But student protest from the 'radical left' had already begun to disrupt universities in Germany, and it would not be long before Italy, France and England would be similarly affected. Clearly there was something in common between the attitudes, situation and environment of the students in the large universities of Europe and

America. To ignore these might lead to a narrow focus on factors typical of the American campus where broader perspectives embracing features common to universities in the Western world would be more appropriate. Lipset's study began to take on an international dimension. It was not long before studies of students of the 'new nations' were incorporated not only as a possible contrast but because quite clearly they had had more success in affecting political behaviour in the national arena. Students had been instrumental in the fall of unstable governments in Venezuela (1958), Japan (1960), South Korea (1960), Turkey (1960), South Viet-Nam (1963), Bolivia (1964), Sudan (1964) and Indonesia (1966).[6] While in India student unrest had been a fact of life on almost every campus for many years already. This introduction is intended to provide a summary of these studies as a prelude and framework against which the remainder of the paper may be assessed.

Methodology.

It is clear from what has already been said that the recent glut of studies of students have assumed a comparative perspective. They have been less concerned with diachronic studies which examine changes over time than synchronic studies which highlight in comparative perspective structural features associated with different forms of behaviour. The resulting analysis is static rather than dynamic.

This emphasis is compounded by the tendency of the sociologists, possibly in their impatience to complete their investigations, to rely on the mechanistic techniques of survey through questionnaire and interview. Participant or non-participant observation has been precluded from their

methodological apparatus possibly because of the time factor but equally because those studying the students were not themselves students and would not have been accepted by the student body.[7] The survey technique used by itself introduces severe limitations as a means of collecting data. A survey of opinions, attitudes, aspirations etc., can produce misleading results when applied to a cynical or suspicious student body. In the case of the Zambian student, it would have been ridiculous to pose questions concerning the student's political affiliation and social origins, never mind his attitudes towards potentially divisive issues of national policy.[8] That students would be so sensitive to such questions and suspicious of the questioner is itself an important sociological observation worthy of deeper analysis. It reflects the status consciousness of the student, his feeling of powerlessness in the face of externally imposed authority, and the distrust that pervades the Zambian polity.[9]

Beyond that the survey is unable to cope with how people actually behave as distinct from how people believe they behave. Actual behaviour is best studied by direct observation. Because the crucial dependent variable in any sociological inquiry is human behaviour, the survey technique is an inadequate tool of investigation when used by itself. Nevertheless many surveys are conducted which remain unrelated to human behaviour: studies of African students are particularly prone to this defect. Thus Jahoda's study of the social background, attitudes and aspirations of Ghanaian students in 1953 can only justify itself by reference to the important role students are presumed to assume in the future.[10] But attitudes and background are not necessarily independent variables in the

determination of future behaviour. Indeed it could be equally argued that attitudes are situationally determined and those expressed by students while they are still at university will bear little resemblance to those of later life. Goldthorpe's study of students at Makerere suffers from the same drawback.[11] Though a great deal of data is collected concerning the student's social background, his attitudes, his educational experiences and a study is also made of graduates of Makerere, comparatively little attempt is made to interrelate any of these variables. Nor is any attempt made to relate such variables to student behaviour in any systematic manner. In this respect studies of student politics in America are more meaningful. These inquiries have deliberately isolated one section of the student community - the 'political activists' and have successfully sought to compare their backgrounds, attitudes, etc., with those of the student population as a whole.[12]

Too often the use of surveys invites research workers to view attitudes expressed as permanent and indicative of an underlying political culture. In this way majority opinions and attitudes are emphasised at the expense of divisions within the community belief system. Yet the divergent minority is often the significant group particularly in the consideration of political behaviour.[13] By omitting to consider behaviour in addition to attitudes and background the significance of departures from the norm will be lost in the generalisations which make up conclusions about student sub-cultures.

Beliefs and values must be considered at two levels; the fundamental level embodied in the 'sacred values' of the community and at a more superficial level where they are

situationally determined often summoned into existence for the rationalisation of a specific set of interests. Ambiguities and contradictions within the central value system permit the manipulation of values within its framework. Conflict is easily expressed by drawing on different elements and sub systems within the central value system.[14] Surveys tend to ignore the variations and contradictions with the value system which only appear when conflicting groups mobilise support and rationalise their interests.

This introduces the more fundamental dilemma posed by the existence of two types of sociological explanation, namely that which treats the structural determinants as paramount and that which accords priority to values. At one extreme one may regard values as manipulated in support of or opposition to structurally determined interests, while at the other extreme social structures are modified if not transformed in accordance with a fundamental value system. Since any sociological inquiry must begin with some 'givens' and derive the existence of other 'givens', normally research either begins with values and regards structure of secondary importance, or begins with structure and possibly derives values. A conglomerate of factors predispose a research worker to adopt one or other approach, such as sociological background and interests, nature of study, etc. This study of Zambian students begins with the social structure and derives values and beliefs from that structure as well as student behaviour. This is not to say however that values do not influence and modify the social structure and behaviour, but rather that this is to be examined at a secondary level.[15] The value system's significance as a constraint on human behaviour must be separated analytically

from its function as a rationalisation or justification of
human behaviour. The constraining, determining and rational-
ising functions of a value system will be encountered in the
study which follows, but in all cases that system will be
regarded as a derivative of the social structure.

It is suspected that the central value system typical of
the 'new nations' is more ambiguous and amorphous than the
core systems associated with the Western countries, which
appear to impose greater constraints on legitimate behaviour.
Thus in Zambia, for example, the absence of deeply held ideolo-
gies reflects the looseness of the central value system and
the tendency for disparate values to be drawn upon in the
prosecution and justification of specific interests rather than
as constraints on behaviour. Other writers have referred to
this same phenomenon in different terms emphasizing a conflict
between or transition from 'traditional' to 'modern' values.[16]
The present study will contrariwise stress the manipulation of
different elements of the value system as idioms through which
conflict is expressed. Thus it is quite common for politicians
to use 'traditional' values to justify one policy while using
'modern' values in the pursuit of another interest. Similarly
socialist and capitalist aims and beliefs will be expressed by
the same person in different contexts. In other words there
has been little attempt to order the disparate value sub-
systems which comprise the central value system into a coherent
and logical whole. But it must be immediately admitted that
social structures are also manipulated in the interests of
specific sections of society. The central institutional system
can be as ambiguous and contradictory as the central value
system. This is particularly apparent where the formal structure

and institutions, transplanted from a different society, are not rooted in and therefore not firmly integrated into that society. There is no consensus on the function and mode of operation of the new institutions, as there is in their country of origin. The following paper for example will illustrate just how the transplanted university is manipulated by those with political power for their own ends, and how despite the manipulation the university nevertheless moulds student behaviour and attitudes.

A Cultural Approach.

Springing from the surveys of attitudes, there has been a concomitant tendency to dwell on political culture as a dependent variable. Another set of studies concerned with the broader group of intellectuals have been pursued with a similar emphasis. It has been argued that the intellectual who is concerned with the absorption, development and transmission of ideas, does so in a relatively autonomous and structurally unconstrained manner. Therefore in the study of intellectuals ideas must be the primary variable rather than the social structure.[17] The confluence of these two approaches through idea systems and attitude surveys is to be found in the influential work of Shils,[18] who distinguishes six attributes of the political outlook of the intellectual in the 'new nations'; intense politicisation, nationalism, socialism, populism, oppositionalism and incivility. Insofar as these are not typical of the Western intellectual, Shils suggests they are the product of tension between province and metropolis in intellectual life, the desire to escape primordial attachments associated with their societies of origin, alienation

from authority and finally the coincidence of such attributes
with fundamental dispositions inherent in 'traditional'
society.[19]   Africa and Asia have remained primarily 'tradition-
al' societies where religion and kinship form the foci of
strongly held values. The development of the intellectual in
the new nations has passed through three stages; constitutional
liberalism, rejection of Western education and the embrace of
an independence movement and finally in the post colonial era
the schism between those intellectuals who cling to power and
those who are severely alienated from the political authority.[20]
What emerges very forcefully from this analysis is the exist-
ence of a 'special' kind of 'underdeveloped' intellectual who,
though he tries hard to emulate the intellectual of the
metropolis, falls short for a number of institutional and
cultural reasons.[21]   The province - metropolis relationship is
the generator urging the 'new nations' towards 'modernity'
while the characteristic features of the traditional society -
its institutions and its values - retard and obstruct such a
development. Indeed in concluding his analysis of Indian
students he writes

> The participation of the Indian student in the
> Civil Disobedience movement was a product of
> the disposition to refuse to be involved in
> the world of impersonal bureaucratic rule. It
> was a sort of truancy which manifested a deeper
> discomfiture. That discomfiture was the early
> product of India's movement from a primordial
> traditional condition into a modern large-scale
> civil order. It is against this that the
> Indian student is protesting; and the end of
> the protest is not in sight.[22]

Shils, concerned with the origin of ideas, sees their
emanation from a focal point and flowing outwards towards a
periphery where their absorption is impeded by uncongenial
institutions, belief systems and traditions. It is difficult

to regard the Zambian student as an intellectual as will be indicated in subsequent chapters and the concern for ideas becomes less relevant in this analysis. Rather than consider Zambian students in the light of Western 'culture', a reverse process will be pursued in which the Zambian student, his behaviour and his values, will be regarded as an outgrowth of his immediate environment. The emergent behaviour and beliefs will provide a focal point from which the behaviour and beliefs of students elsewhere in the world may be illuminated.

Comparative Perspectives.

The study of students, particularly the recent crop whose pre-eminent concern has been student politics, has sprung from an interest in students per se. Such studies have not been undertaken with a view to understanding the society in which the students find themselves, rather society is one of the variables influencing student behaviour. The result has been a wide ranging and, too often, superficial examination of student behaviour in many different countries. Inevitably those features of the student community which mark it off from other sections of society have been highlighted at the expense of characteristics in common with other groups. Thus it is not surprising to find that Lipset's study of students in 'underdeveloped' countries bears little relation to his study of other groups in both American and underdeveloped societies.[23] Yet at the same time it should be noted that his analysis of American students though it differs markedly in concepts and approach from for example his seminal study of the International Typographical Union,[24] nevertheless fits in with his general conception of American society as being too

liberal for any radical movement to persist or noticeably
affect American society. Yet another look at Lipset's
Political Man[25] would reveal the differing conceptions he has
of the 'misunderstood' intellectual - in his behaviour the
epitomy of rationality and reason - and the American worker
whose political outlook is characterised as authoritarian.
(One wonders how a radical student might rewrite the chapters
of Lipset's book!)

The purpose of this paper is not merely to examine stud-
ents in the light of Zambian society but also to examine
Zambian society in the light of its students, who are sensitive
to many social currents. As will be indicated in Chapter Four
in some ways the student community may be regarded as a micro-
cosm of the wider society. Such a study must inevitably cast
light on the processes of integration and mobilisation as the
university is an institution responsible for absorbing people
from different sectional groups into a community and, four
years later, thrusting them back into the wider society in
entirely new roles and positions.

Because one of the concerns is to examine Zambian society,
so due care should be taken to avoid emphasizing specifically
student or university attributes in explaining behaviour when
more inclusive phenomena of broader significance have equal or
greater explanatory power. For this reason the writer's
inquiries into the Zambian mineworker, though not incorporated
into the body of this study, provide a broader canvas against
which student behaviour and values may be assessed.

One of the problems which beset international comparisons
of student behaviour is deciding on models and key variables.
Lipset's broad sweep of student politics in developing countries

turns out to be a careful categorisation of a number of significant variables, but fails to single out one or two of cardinal influence.[26] Any ambitious attempt to compare the nature of student politics in countries as different as England, America, India, Bolivia, Ghana and Japan suffers from a paucity of intensive qualitative studies of student politics in individual countries. Lipset's conclusions are based on data and studies conducted, perhaps a little too impatiently, through a technique that offers rapid results - the survey - but which is often barren of original hypotheses.

Isolation of the Student.

The specific concern with the student rather than the institution in which he operates - the university - or the society in which he lives, has led inquiries into student politics to consider the student as an isolate divorced from his environment. Indeed many writers have come to the conclusion that the student is severely alienated or cut off from the society in which he grew up. Such conclusions are yet a further, possibly inevitable, consequence of surveys portraying a set of attitudes and beliefs of students which tend to emphasize alienation from society. The research workers, being attached to the university, rarely get an opportunity to observe or question students outside the university environment in vacations or in the occasional term time sorties into the wider society. Yet students must be sensitive to any discrepancy between their role in the wider society and their role in the university, and the two must necessarily influence one another. Indeed it is the contrast between the student's civic and university roles that provides the point of departure for the

analysis which follows.

As Weinburg and Walker[27] have pointed out the linkages
between the student and society, in particular the political
system, have been largely ignored in the recent studies of
student politics. Their own analysis, important though it is,
only furnishes two such linkages based on recruitment to
political careers and government control over university
finances. The present paper will explore 'system linkages'
through the conceptual apparatus of role theory. Roles
derived from the wider social structure will be examined for
their significance in the interstices of the university social
structure. Participation in national and community politics
will be examined through the twin components of the student
role, namely the civic role and the university role. Inspira-
tion has been drawn from Epstein's seminal study of the Zambian
copper miners where he showed that within the industrial con-
text African townsmen behaved as workers in accordance with
the dictates of the industrial organisation.[28] Roles such as
tribesman assumed only secondary importance, and when they came
into conflict with roles derived from the industrial structure,
specifically the worker role, then it was the 'extrinsic' role
that was forsaken. What, however, has not been investigated,
and yet is of considerable theoretical interest, is the precise
nature of the influence of extrinsically derived roles. In
the context of the work situation what importance as determin-
ants of behaviour may be attached to roles of tribesman,
husband, lover, old timer, etc. One study by Kapferer at
Broken Hill mine does give some insight into the importance
of secondary roles.[29] A recent examination of absenteeism
as a form of role conflict offers clear-cut instances where

commitment to extrinsic roles can occasionally take precedence over commitment to intrinsic roles.[30] It will be a purpose of this study of Zambian students to examine as precisely as possible variations in the importance of extrinsically derived roles in the determination of behaviour.

In the process there arises the important, but usually neglected, distinction between politics internal to the community and politics in the wider society. It would be difficult to examine the one without the other, because of their intimate association and continual interaction. Changes in the political system outside the university have repercussions on student politics within the university. In the same way autonomous changes within the community political system, such as the assumption of office by a new executive can bring about a vivid response from outside, even if they do not bring about actual change.

Another group of studies, depending on the somewhat theoretically barren concept of élite, have tended to portray the student as detached from society.[31] The use of the élite concept has been particularly prevalent in studies of African students conceived of variously as an educated, presumptive, incipient, aspirant, élite. The theory of élites as it is most usually conceived in modern and older writings, sets a particular group - the élite - apart from the rest of society - the masses - but fails to introduce at a theoretical level any dynamic relation or interaction between the two. Thus the élite concept is particularly useful for those who have examined students as a community isolated and unconnected in any interactive sense with the remainder of society. In itself the concept encourages the view of students as an isolated

group preparing to take over positions of importance; it encourages the study of students in a social vacuum through surveys of background, attitudes and aspirations. When used in conjunction with analytic tools such as class then the élite concept can begin to pay dividends. In the following study the concept will be used to refer to a status group within the ruling class, and an examination of the ruling class must then necessarily also look at the recruitment patterns to and the relations between the various constituent élites.

The University and Society.

To consider the student without also considering his institutional environment, particularly the university is equivalent to divorcing the worker from his work place. The university system is crucial to the understanding of student behaviour. The universities of the Western world have evolved alongside and in consonance with society, often lagging behind changes outside.[32] In the process of evolution a concordat of 'sacred' conventions has developed to govern operations and interactions between universities and government. The universities of the ex colonial territories, taking the Western university as a model, have not been given the opportunity to evolve along with society. On the contrary the university in the 'new nations' is expected to spearhead rather than reflect change and development. The transplantation of a university congruent with modern British society into a society with a very different social structure is bound to lead to problems of 'mal-integration' and incongruence. Its position in society is inevitably thwart with tension, unless it undergoes an adaptive metamorphosis. Ashby has described the story of

unstable equilibrium and confrontation that has dominated

relations between universities and government in Africa.[33]

Collins and Ben-David, recognising the importance of

the university system as an influence on student politics,

have constructed an interesting two dimensional typology in

their study of academic freedom.[34] In one dimension they dis-

tinguish between 'élite' systems and 'expert systems', corres-

ponding to the ratio of students to population. The relatively

high ratio of 185 per 10,000 in the United States (1958 fig-

ures) places that system in the expert category, while the

lower figure of 19 per 10,000 places the British system into

the élite category. According to this classification Zambia

with a figure of approximately 3 per 10,000 is also an élite

system. In the second dimension the writers distinguish

between systems

> in which the university trains and educates for
> roles which are well known and accepted in the
> society, and systems which are created by a tradi-
> tional, or at any rate uneducated, élite for the
> purposes of eventually reforming themselves or
> increasing their efficiency through training new
> and better qualified people of a kind that do not
> yet exist in the country,[35]

Zambia falls clearly into the élite 'non model' category which

the writers argue is inherently unstable because the replace-

ment of an existing élite by a new one or the introduction of

a new stratum in society is bound to lead to conflict.

> No existing élite will put up gracefully with an
> open attempt to transform and replace it, and
> even less will young men reared as a future élite
> according to models of more advanced societies
> admit to the authority of a traditional ruling
> class.[36]

In the Zambian case, the existence of large numbers of expat-

riates in important positions requiring advanced forms of

modern education mitigates the conflict between the incumbent
Zambian ruling class and the emerging graduates. But as the
university expands and the number of graduates increases com-
petition and conflict will intensify, particularly if recruit-
ment to high posts continues to stress loyalty and experience
in preference to qualifications.

At present the Zambian system contrasts vividly with the
élite model of Britain where there is continuity between
activities within the university and outside, where there is
a relative consensus on the role and purpose of the university
between educationists and politicians and where those who
govern the country belong to the same 'class', speak the same
'language' and have passed through the same educational pro-
cesses and institutions as those who administer and teach in
the universities. Though the typology is useful, Ben-David
and Collins do not consider possible movements from one type
to another, in particular from the 'non-model' to the 'model'
systems except in the ambiguous case of Germany. Clearly
this is an area of paramount concern to Zambia and embraces
theories associated with 'institutionalisation.' Once trans-
planted into the Zambian environment is it then possible to
generate changes which assist rather than obstruct the integra-
tion of the university into the wider social system? Ashby
in his work on universities in England, Africa and India sug-
gests possible constitutional amendments, structural modifica-
tions, and changes in course content but these are slight
compared to what would be required to significantly reduce the
friction between university and government.[37]

Unanticipated Consequences.

Colonial governments, faced with the problem of legiti-
mising their rule, invoked education to rationalise discrim-
ination based on colour. Upward mobility, if it was at all
possible, was often determined by the level of formal educa-
tion acquired. The vast gulf which separated the opportuni-
ties for education for the colonised people from those for
the colonial rulers ensured that the former never posed a
serious threat to foreign rule. In the cash and urban sectors
of the economy literacy and numeracy seemed to be the passport
to 'success.' It was widely felt as it is today not only in
Zambia but also by many Africans in South Africa and Rhodesia
that the paper qualification, once achieved, would guarantee
promotion. The lengths to which colonised peoples would go
and the sacrifices they would make are witness to the wide-
spread belief in the mystical powers of education.[38] The in-
heritance from the pre-independence period was reinforced by
the views of such well meaning organisations as UNESCO that
education and particularly literacy was a key to the eradica-
tion of 'backwardness.'[39] All that was holding the African
nations back was the shortage of qualified manpower and wide-
spread illiteracy. Accordingly ambitious plans for education-
al expansion were prepared and at great cost schools and
universities were built and staffed by teachers imported from
abroad.

Yet the concomitants of educational expansion have not
all been beneficial. Alongside the growth of opportunities
for educational achievement the view has emerged that it is
not the educational content or its application that is

important, but the qualification which entitles the individual
to promotion and more pay, irrespective of whether the educa-
tion achieved leads to improved job performance. Education is
widely seen as means to upward mobility into better jobs,
rather than as a means to more productive, effective and
efficient performance of present jobs, hence the often cited
revolution of rising expectation.[40] In the words of one
commentator the Zambian is more status orientated than produc-
tion orientated.[41] The emphasis is more on individual en-
hancement than collective development, encouraged by the
laissez faire orientation to development as distinct from the
totalitarian mobilisational approach.

Writers have argued that the tension revolving around
such transplanted institutions as the university reflects the
more fundamental conflict between 'traditional' and 'modern'
norms and values; between ascription and achievement, particu-
larism and universalism.[42] Equally the tensions may be
attributed to the unanticipated consequences of transplanta-
tion ('modernisation'). In the eyes of those who ruled, the
University of Zambia was an essential pillar in national
development to provide the qualified indigenous manpower the
country so urgently required. It was only dimly appreciated
that the concomitants of the university apart from its narrow
function as training Zambian manpower, were likely to create
friction in society. The government was possibly unaware of
the inevitability that students alienated from the central
institutions of power would develop a set of political inter-
ests reflecting their own position in society which would be
oppositional in content. The leaders of the country were
possibly only dimly aware that the values inculcated by the

university might be at variance with those they considered
desirable. They expected to be able to contain student
political demands and the assumption of an 'intellectual
arrogance' which attached an importance to formal educational
qualifications out of all proportion to their 'worth' in the
pursuit of developmental objectives. These and many more
examples are to be found in the following pages which essen-
tially constitute an essay in unanticipated consequences.
Many of the consequences of the university and other 'borrowed'
institutions are unanticipated precisely because they are
borrowed. The manifest functions of a particular institution
may remain the same on transplantation but its latent functions[43]
concealed in the fabric of society, only become apparent when
its impact is observed in different social structures. Thus
the consequences which are here referred to as unanticipated,
are unanticipated because they do not appear in the country
where the institution originated.

Conventional Explanations of Student Rebelliousness.

Amongst certain circles, the most popular explanation
for expressions of student opposition revolves around the
universal phenomenon of 'generational conflict.' Student
'rebellions' are manifestations of the propensity for children
to question the authority of their parents, a perfectly healthy
activity (so long as it is kept within certain prescribed
limits). One writer views adolescent 'rebelliousness' as rites
de passage enacted when the student passes from adolescence
to adulthood, it is a feature of society related less to the
organisation of power and wealth and more to the social organi-
sation of age.[44] The leading exponent of the generational

argument suggests that the students 'search the social order for a strategic avenue' to express their opposition to 'gerontocracy.'[45] Though the opposition between generations is the basis of social progress, the 'student movement' reflects a breakdown in the generational equilibrium and as such represents a malady in society.[46] Feuer writes early on his book,

> The distinctive character of student movements arises from the union in them of motives of youthful love, on the one hand, and those springing from the conflict of generations on the other.[47]

Though an interesting exercise in social philosophy, the generational argument by itself has little explanatory power. It has to rely on 'special social circumstances' to explain variations in generational conflict both over time and from one country to another. A different set of circumstances must be drawn upon to explain why students, of all sections of youth, tend to be more prone to generational conflict, and indeed why certain sections of the student population tend to be more active than others. Nor does the theory of generational conflict have anything to say about the form the conflict will take. Furthermore the brunt of the attack seems to be absorbed by those who wield political, economic or military power. Why should this be so, if the fundamental element is the opposition between generations? Again the generational argument must be further modified to take into account the following student movements have amongst more than one generation. Once it has invoked a whole series of 'special social circumstances' the generational argument loses much of its significance and offers no new insights into the dynamics or mechanics of the 'student movement'. This is not to claim

that a generational gap does not exist but that a theory based
on the opposition between generations is not helpful in ex-
plaining the variations in student behaviour which ultimately
derive from the social, political and economic environment.

To dwell on the conflict or gap between generations is to
obscure a gamut of fundamental issues revolving around the
distribution of power and wealth in society. For those who
wish to direct attention away from such fundamental issues to
which the student is very sensitive, the generational argument
is very appealing.[48] Thus it is not surprising that those who
wield power should be the ones who most frequently cast stud-
ent oppositionalism or radicalism in the cloak of generational
conflict. In the following essay the generational argument
will be regarded as an idiom through which student 'radicalism'
opposition and criticism can be 'explained away.' It is norm-
ally adopted by those who wish to avoid considering the
specific issues the student raises, while at the same time
giving the impression that student rebelliousness is a healthy
phenomenon. Adolescent rebellion is an inevitable stage
through which 'we all go before we mature and enter the wider
world.'

The generational argument tends to regard student contribu-
tions to social change as imbued with irrational emotion.

> Emotions issuing from the students' unconscious,
> and deriving from the conflict of generations,
> impose or attach themselves to the underlying
> political carrier movement, and deflect it in
> irrational directions. Given a set of alterna-
> tive paths - rational or irrational - for realiz-
> ing a social goal - the influence of a student
> movement will be toward the use of the most
> irrational means to achieve the end. Student
> movements are thus what one would least expect -
> among the most irrationalist in history.[49]

(The assumption that extremism is irrational is characteristic of the liberal tradition in sociology.) Other writers convey the same impressions of student movements as 'irrational', 'self defeating' emotional outbursts. Shils, for example refers to the 'ethos of the expanding ego [in] a regime of plenitude'.[50] Others have been more charitable in referring to the contrast between the 'ethic of absolute ends' and the 'ethic of responsibility.'[51] After examining the issues, arguments, demands and protests raised by students another writer concluded that what he was witnessing was a world wide revolt against the 'modernist tradition' springing from a cult of irrationality.[52] It is not the purpose of this paper to deny the validity of these approaches but it will nevertheless be concerned to point out the 'rationality' of student behaviour in Zambia in the context of his perceptions and role status in Zambian society.

Objectives of the Study.

At the most simple level the following account is a description of the activities and attitudes of Zambian students. It is also an attempt to arrange the description and analysis in such a manner as to highlight the social pressures which mould their behaviour and beliefs. Apart from illuminating the behaviour of Zambian students it is intended that the analytical framework will also contribute to an understanding of the behaviour of students in other countries both where universities have been long established and where they have made a relatively recent appearance.

However the significance of this study would be severely

diminished if it did not make a contribution, however small, to the body of sociological theory. It is hoped therefore to enjoin the analysis of the roles of the student in Zambian society with an explorative study of group tensions. In this Gouldner's <u>Wild Cat Strike</u> will be used as a framework of comparison.[53] The essay has been arranged to suggest some hypotheses concerning societal tensions which incorporate role theory. Accordingly the first chapter will be concerned to outline the tensions in the social structure of Zambia, and in particular those revolving around the student role status. The second chapter will contrast the university social structure and the student role status in that structure with the wider social structure. The incompatible structures, it will be argued, lead to further stress between students and government. The fourth chapter explores factors which might mitigate the tensions outlined in the previous two chapters through sets of cross cutting ties binding the two opposed parties together. Having concluded that these forces tending towards tension reduction are weak and ineffectual, the fifth chapter seeks to delineate the conditions of equilibrium which allow peaceful coexistence between university and government. By implication a violation of these preconditions tends to plunge the two bodies into conflict and two such cases are considered. In the sixth chapter the mechanisms for the restoration of social order will be examined and alternative responses to the friction between the university and society considered. Finally, in the conclusion the behaviour of students in other countries is viewed in the light of the study of Zambian students and tentative hypotheses regarding a theory of group tensions will be presented.

N O T E S.

1. The diffusion of ideas from centre to periphery is a major
   theme in the work of Shils. See for example, Shils, E.,
   "Centre and Periphery," in Collected Essays by Edward Shils
   (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970). As regards student
   movements see Shils, E., "Plenitude and Scarcity,"
   Encounter Vol. 32, May 1969, pp.52-4.

2. See Lipset, S. M., and Altbach, P. G., "Student Politics
   and Higher Education in the United States," and Soares, G.,
   "The Active Few: Student Ideology and Participation in
   Developing Countries," both in Lipset, S. M. (ed.), Student
   Politics (New York and London: Basic Books, 1967), pp.199-
   252 and 124-147.

3. See Lipset, S. M. and Wolin, S. S. (eds.), The Berkeley
   Student Revolt (New York: Anchor Books, 1965).

4. See Lipset and Altbach, op.cit., p.238.

5. Ibid., pp.213-224.

6. Emmerson, D. K., "Conclusion," in Emmerson, D. K. (ed.),
   Students and Politics in Developing Nations, p.390.

7. The problems would perhaps be not insuperable but certainly
   in the case of the Zambian students the existence of a
   participant observer who was obviously not a student would
   excite a great deal of suspicion. See Appendix I. A
   successful study of students through participant observa-
   tion is referred to in Becker, H. S., "Problems of
   Inference and Proof in Participant Observation," American
   Sociological Review, Vol. 23, No. 6, December 1958, p.652.

8. Responses to the questions posed by Hanna to students at
   Ibadan could only elicit unreliable data in the Zambian
   context. Hanna, W. J., "Students," in Coleman, J. S. and
   Rosberg, C. G. (eds.), Political Parties and National
   Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
   University of California Press, 1964), pp.413-443.

9. The political culture of Zambia in many ways resembles that
   of Burma described by Pye. See Pye, L. W., Politics,
   Personality and Nation Building (New Haven and London, Yale
   University Press, 1962).

10. Jahoda, G., "The Social Background of a West African
    Student Population," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 5,
    pp.355-65, Vol. 6, pp.71-9.

11. Goldthorpe, J. E., An African Elite (Nairobi: East African
    Institute of Social Research, Oxford University Press,
    1965).

12. Lipset and Altbach, op.cit.

13. Ibid.

14. Gouldner, A. W., The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology
    (London: Heinemann, 1971), pp.217-8. Gouldner develops
    this point in attacking Parsons, suggesting that a moral
    code rather than eliminating tensions becomes the language
    through which tensions are expressed.

15. The relations between the superstructure and structure as
    explicated by Marx and Engels follows a similar line: the
    economic base is ultimately the determining element in
    social change, though the superstructure impinges on and
    modifies that base. See Simons, J., Notes on Some Early
    Sociologists: Karl Marx (Unpublished MS, University of
    Zambia, 1970), pp.9-10.

16. See for example Lipset, S. M., "Values, Education and Entrepreneurship," in Lipset, S. M. and Solari, G., Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.3-60. Also Pye, op.cit.

17. See Nettl, J. P., "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent," in Rieff, P. (ed.), On Intellectuals (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), pp.57-134.

18. Shils' work is largely based on his study of Indian intellectuals, and this influences his more general article on intellectuals in the new nations. See Shils, E., "The Intellectuals in Political Development of the New States," in Kautsky, J. H. (ed.), Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York and London: John Wiley, 1967), pp.195-234.

19. Ibid., pp.205-220.

20. Ibid., pp.220-234.

21. For a detailed analysis of these themes see Shils' important work on the Indian Intellectual. Shils, E., "The Intellectual Between Modernity and Tradition: The Indian Situation," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Supplement I, 1961.

22. Shils, E., "Indian Students," Encounter, Vol. 17, No. 3, September, 1961, p.22.

23. Lipset, S. M., "University Students and Politics in Underdeveloped Countries," in Lipset, S. M. (ed., 1967), op.cit., pp.3-53.

24. Lipset, S. M., Trow, M., and Coleman, J. S., Union Democracy (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).

25. Lipset, S. M., Political Man (London: Mercury Books, 1963), particularly chapters four and ten.

26. Lipset, S. M., "University Students and Politics in Underdeveloped Countries," op.cit.

27. Weinburg, I. and Walker, N., "Student Politics and Political Systems: Towards a Typology," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 75, July 1969, pp.77-96.

28. Epstein, A. L., Politics in an Urban African Community (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1958).

29. Kapferer, B., "Norms and the Manipulation of Relationships in a Work Context," in Mitchell, J. C. (ed.), Social Networks in Urban Situations (Lusaka: Institute of Social Research, Manchester University Press, 1969), pp.181-244.

30. Burawoy, M., Pandawa, A., Simusokwe, A. and Tembo, N., "Absenteeism and Commitment to Work," University of Zambia Sociological Association, Paper No. 9, April, 1971.

31. See for example studies in Lloyd, P. C. (ed.), The New Elites of Tropical Africa (London: International African Institute, Oxford University, 1966).

32. For a history of the British University see, Ashby, E., Universities: British, Indian, African (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966).

33. Ibid., pp.290-343.

34. Ben-David, J. and Collins, R., "A Comparative Study of Academic Freedom and Student Politics," in Lipset (ed. 1967), op.cit., pp.148-195.

35. Ibid., p.162.

36. Ibid., p.167.

37. See Ashby, op.cit., pp.335-343.

38. This first came across forcefully to the writer when he was talking to students at Correspondence Colleges in South Africa and other parts of East, Central and Southern Africa in 1966.

39. A document which had some considerable influence in educational planning in Zambia is UNESCO, _Education in Northern Rhodesia_ (A Report and Recommendations prepared by the UNESCO planning mission, 1963, Lusaka: Government Printer, 1964).

40. See Burawoy, M., _A Study of the Expectations of Form V Students_ (Kitwe, Personnel Research Unit, Copper Industries Service Bureau, 1969).

41. This was the view of the visiting professor of sociology from Poland, Professor Matejko.

42. Lipset, S. M., "Values, Education and Entrepreneurship," _op.cit._

43. The use of latent and manifest functions follows the work of Merton. Merton, R. K., _Social Theory and Social Structure_ (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp.73-138.

44. Abrahams, P., "Rites de Passage: The Conflict of Generations in Industrial Society," _Journal of Contemporary History_, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1970, pp.175-190.

45. Feuer, L. S., _The Conflict of Generations_ (London: Heinemann, 1969), p.10.

46. _Ibid._, p.11.

47. _Ibid._, p.3.

48. Some view the generational argument as one of the manifestations of an ideological counter-attack against student opposition. See Wallerstein, I. and Starr, P. (eds.), _Confrontation and Counterattack_ (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), Chapters 15-17, pp.421-468.

49. Feuer, _op.cit._, p.8.

50. Shils, E., "Plenitude and Scarcity," _Encounter_, Vol. 32, May 1969, p.52.

51. Weber, M., "Politics as a Vocation," in Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. W., (ed.) _From Max Weber_ (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), pp.120-3.

52. See Wallerstein and Starr, _op.cit._, Chapter 16, particularly, Howe, I., "The Agony of the Campus," pp.437-8.

53. Gouldner, A. W., _Wildcat Strike_ (New York and London: Harper Torchbooks, 1965).

C H A P T E R   T W O

SOURCE OF TENSION:
THE ZAMBIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF ZAMBIA.

Since it is the intention of this work to illuminate student behaviour by reference to the structural features of Zambian society, so the latter's various elements will be examined first.

The Socio-Economic Structure.

A linguistically and 'tribally' diverse population distributed over an area of 290,000 square miles (larger than France, Belgium and Netherlands combined)[1] and concentrated at certain focal urban areas, combined with an uneven development both in historical and geographical terms has given rise to a social structure of contrasts. Of the four million inhabitants approximately one quarter (25.4%) live in towns having a population greater than four thousand, while 24% live in the main 'line of rail' towns.[2] The line of rail was constructed with the development of the copper industry to transport copper from the mines of Northern Rhodesia to Southern Rhodesia and from there out to the East Coast of Africa at Beira. It extends, therefore, from the Congo border in the North, to the capital of Zambia - Lusaka - and southwards to the border between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia at Livingstone. Economic development has been largely confined to the line of rail and has been particularly intensive in the small seventy by thirty five mile area known as the Copperbelt. There seven[3] mines operate to produce copper which provides 95% of the nation's export revenue and around 50% of the gross domestic product.[4] Though the population of the seven major towns on the Copperbelt amounts to 679,000,[5] the mines themselves employ only 43,500

African workers and 4,727 expatriates,[6] while subsidiary and service industries employ the bulk of the remainder.

Though nationalised in a 51% take-over in 1969 the mines are still managed, if not owned, by the two mining companies which began the commercial exploitation of Zambia's mineral resources in the late twenties of the present century. The mines which operate on a capital intensive basis[7] rely on expatriate expertise and will continue to do so for some time to come despite plans for Zambianisation. At present about 10% of the labour force is expatriate occupying mainly technical and managerial positions.[8]

Being so dependent on copper revenue and controlling only 12% of world copper production, the Zambian economy is very sensitive to changes in the prices on the London Metal Exchange over which it has virtually no control.[9] Confronted with a precarious dependence on copper for its livelihood the Zambian government has made vigorous attempts to diversify the national economy, not always with success commensurate with the declarations of intent. Not only has Zambia inherited a colonial one-primary-commodity economy but one that is closely linked to the nation's ideological enemy - South Africa. Despite determined efforts to reduce trade with South Africa and visible sacrifices made to this end such as the building of the oil pipe line from Dar Es Salaam and the on-going construction of the Tan-Zam Rail link, Zambia's economy is still largely dependent on trade with the white supremacist regimes to the South.[10] Table 1 makes apparent the extent of reliance, particularly with regard to imports.

TABLE 1 - ZAMBIAN TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA[11]

| Year | Imports | | | Exports | | |
| | Rhodesia | South Africa | Total (K'000) | Rhodesia | South Africa | Total (K'000) |
	(% of Total)			(% of Total)		
1964	39	21	156,438	4	8	335,518
1965	34	20	210,742	3	7	380,294
1966	19	24	246,116	1	6	493,009
1967	11	24	306,350	0	5	470,009
1968	7	23	325,184	0	2	544,415
1969	7	22	311,797	0	1	766,489

Apart from the continuing trade with South Africa, an equally serious association with South Africa is through the many companies which have their parent companies in South Africa.[12] The most outstanding example of this is the major copper mining company - Anglo American Corporation - which has not only investments in copper mining but also major holdings in other manufacturing industries and recently embarked on rural development through large scale farming enterprises.

All sectors of the national economy are still dependent on expatriate labour. The reliance on expatriates to run the mines has already been mentioned but the operations of central government also rely considerably on expatriates as indicated in Table 2. The table shows that in 1968 there were more expatriates employed in the top two divisions of the civil service than in 1966 and though the figures for 1963 are not complete they suggest that there were even fewer expatriates before Independence (1964). Nevertheless the number of Zambians in these two divisions has increased by 44.5% while the number of expatriates has only increased by 8.5% and this latter

increase may be attributed to increased demand for teachers to meet the expansion of the educational system.

TABLE 2 - CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT DIVISIONS I AND II[13]

Employment	1963		1966		1968	
	Zam.	Non-Zam.	Zam.	Non-Zam.	Zam.	Non-Zam.
Administrative and Executive	103	719	846	974	1,729	697
Professional	11	418	60	281	193	826
Technical and Works	531	891	720	866	1,375	956
Clerical, Medical, Police, Posts and Prisons	712	1,807	2,884	1,530	4,212	920
Teachers						
Primary			8,577	501	11,400	549
Secondary			118	1,044	145	1,636
Other			45	265	69	342
TOTAL			13,230	5,461	19,123	5,926

The distribution of wealth in Zambian society naturally follows the occupational distribution with 'non-Zambians' (expatriates) figuring at the top of the scale alongside a Zambian 'elite' with comparable or even greater incomes. An accurate assessment of income distribution amongst Zambians is not available but indications are that it is a very uneven distribution with a large proportion of the wealth concentrated in a small percentage of the population. The migration of able-bodied men to the towns has denuded the rural areas of those very people who could most assist their development. The migration into the towns has also meant that political power has flowed in the same direction and investment policies are

affected accordingly. The consequence is a widening gap
between rural and urban incomes and worsening terms of trade
for the rural areas vis-a-vis the towns.[14] The distribution
of the nation's wealth may be gauged from Table 3.

TABLE 3 - DISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES IN ZAMBIA[15]

Category of Worker	Approx. Total No. End 1968 (000's)	Approx. Annual Earnings End 1968 (Kwacha)	Increase in Real terms since 1964 (%)
Zambian Peasant Farmer	800	145	3
Zambian Wage Earner Outside Mines	270	640	52
Zambian Mineworker	50	1,300	35
Expatriate Employee Outside Mines	22	4,170	25
Expatriate Employee Copper Mines	6	7,600	16

There are four major economic groups. First a multi-racial
élite, with Zambians assuming the highest governmental and ad-
ministrative posts and some managerial positions while the
expatriate supplying the necessary skills for technical,
professional and in some cases managerial positions. Beneath
this élite there are the lower ranks of management, a white
collar group and a labour aristocracy composed mainly of miners.
Thirdly there is a mass of wage earners in non-mining indus-
tries, and semi-employed townsmen. Finally the remaining 70%
are still peasant farmers, comprising the poorest, and becom-
ing ever poorer, section of society.

Educational Structure.

The government views the educational system as the means

of making up the short fall of Zambian expertise and of re-
placing expatriates in both public and private sectors with
Zambians. With this in mind the educational facilities have
undergone rapid expansion including the establishment of the
University of Zambia.

Though Zambia has always been the source of great wealth
through its copper production, that wealth was largely
syphoned off into the pockets of the mining companies,
Southern Rhodesia and the British Government.[16] Relatively
little development took place in Northern Rhodesia itself
except in so far as it was necessary for efficient copper
mining, and African education was particularly undeveloped.

Most African countries were, in terms of education,
poorly prepared for Independence but in Zambia
education facilities for Africans were even more
deficient than elsewhere. During the colonial era
African education was not given high priority: in
spite of comparative wealth, during most years far
more was spent on education for the few Europeans
than on all forms of education for the African
population. From 1954 to 1963 European education
had been a Federal responsibility financed from
Federal taxation, which tapped the main sources of
revenue in Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia. In con-
trast African education was a territorial responsi-
bility relying entirely on local funds. The result
was that African education, to a large extent, was
cut off from the major source of Zambia's wealth,
revenue from copper. Secondly, in spite of Zambia's
comparatively advanced industrial structure,
opportunities for apprenticeship and on-the-job
training of Africans were hindered by racial dis-
crimination. Until 1959, no African was permitted
by law to be apprenticed in Zambia. Thirdly, the
discriminations of various sorts inside the Civil
Service, trade unions and in the private sector
limited the opportunities for Africans to gain
practical experience and responsibility in many
types of work. Of course, there were exceptions
and many individuals and institutions had laboured
for many years to right these injustices. Indeed,
without their tireless efforts, Zambia would have
remained an educational desert. But the lack of
priority, the general shortage of funds for educa-
tion and the limitations of training opportunities
meant that steps that were taken in other countries
during the crucial decade before Independence, were

not taken in Zambia. Zambia was less prepared
than most other African countries to the north,
east or west of Africa.

The result was that at Independence the scarcity
of educated Africans in Zambia was extreme. In
Zambia in 1964, there were in total just over
1,200 Africans who had obtained secondary school
certificates in the country - about the same
number as Kenya in 1957, Uganda in 1955,
Tanzania in 1960 and Ghana in 1943. The number
of Zambian graduates at the same time was
scarcely 100.[17]

It had been left largely to the missions to provide what little

African secondary and even primary education there was in the

country.

Without any doubt, the educational scene in Northern
Rhodesia was dominated by the Missions almost up
to the date of Independence in 1964. The vast
majority of primary schools and a proportionately
large number of secondary schools were under
Mission control in 1963. The voice of representa-
tives of voluntary agencies on the African Education
Advisory Board carried considerable weight, partly
because of their unique experience of African
educational problems and because of their appreciable
contribution in terms of finance and personnel to
the educational system.[18]

Faced with a chronic shortage of indigenous manpower the

new Zambian government put educational development and expan-

sion at the forefront of its priorities. This has since been

reflected in the ambitious education targets embodied in the

first Five Year Development Plan.[19] Amongst these was the

enrolment of students into the new University of Zambia. The

university was opened in 1966 when 310 students were enrolled,

in 1967 536 enrolled, in 1968 948, in 1969 1,298 and in 1970

1,469.[20] The university's tentative goal for total enrollment

is 5,000.[21] In 1968 99 awards were received by graduating

students including 27 degrees; in 1969 the number of awards

rose to 218 including 112 degrees; in 1970 the number of awards

increased to 243 including 113 degrees.[22] The distribution amongst the different subjects is shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4 - UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA AWARDS 1968 - 1970[23]

Award	1968	1969	1970
M.A.	-	-	1
B.A.	27	55	59
B.Sc.	-	3	13
B.Sc. (Human Biology)	-	6	20
B.Eng.	-	-	5
B.Law.	-	23	12
B.Social Work.	-	19	3
Dip. Social Work.	19	19	30
Post Graduate Certificate of Education .	53	72	54
Associateship Certificate of Education.	-	21	36
Certificate in Adult Education.	-	-	10
TOTAL	99	218	243

The government has tried to allocate graduates to jobs in accordance with its own priorities for Zambian manpower. Thus a large proportion of graduates have been directed into the teaching profession to offset the reliance on expatriates. To ensure the distribution of graduates in accordance with development objectives the government introduced a bonding system which bound, under a legally enforceable system, those students who accepted government bursaries (the vast majority) to enter the job decided for them by the Manpower Directorate. They also forfeited the right to choose their subject of study

while at university. Each discipline taught at the university received a quota restricting the number of students to that laid down in the development plan.[24] The highest quota was for students combining an arts or science degree with education. There had been considerable pressure from students and from some members of the academic staff to have the system removed or modified in view of the frustrations and hardship it generated.[25] Accordingly in 1971 the choice of students for the different disciplines was made less arbitrary by delaying the final decision until the second year and the Minister of Education announced that in 1972 the bonding to government would be lifted and students would be able to choose their own careers. The government had in any case had great difficulty in effectively directing students to pre-determined jobs, precisely because the acute shortage of educated manpower put the graduate at a premium. Table 5 shows just how short of educated manpower Zambia is, and how the expatriate dominates the top of the nation's educational pyramid.

TABLE 5 - ACTUAL EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONS
IN THE CIVILIAN LABOUR FORCE WITH OR IN JOBS
REQUIRING SECONDARY EDUCATION OR ABOVE,
1965 - 66[26]

Actual Educational Qualifications	Africans	Non-Africans	Total
Degree	150	3,499	3,649
Diploma or 'A' Level	517	5,944	6,461
'O' Level	1,516	11,965	13,481
Form II	7,282	11,409	18,691
Less than Form II but in jobs requiring secondary education or above	12,015	1,853	13,868
In jobs requiring primary education or less	249,666	91	249,757

A closer look at the educational structure as it appeared in 1969 shows how small a proportion has had so much as a lower secondary education.

TABLE 6 - EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF AFRICAN MALES FIVE YEARS AND OLDER[27]

Age	No Schooling (%)	Lower Primary (%)	Upper Primary (%)	Lower Secondary (%)	Upper Secondary (%)	Technical or Higher (%)
5-9	67	29	0	0	0	
10-19	19	40	33	6	2	0.3
20-29	24	25	32	11	6	0.2
30-39	36	32	25	4	1	0.2
40-49	49	30	16	2	1	
50-59	68	23	7	0	0	
60-69	79	15	4	0	0	
70+	83	11	3	0	0	
TOTAL	42	30	20	4	2	0.1

TABLE 7 - EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF AFRICAN FEMALES FIVE YEARS AND OLDER[28]

Age	No Schooling (%)	Lower Primary (%)	Upper Primary (%)	Lower Secondary (%)	Upper Secondary (%)	Technical or Higher (%)
5-9	67	29	0	0	0	
10-19	27	40	27	4	1	
20-29	56	27	12	2	1	0.09
30-39	74	19	4	0	0	
40-49	86	10	2	0	0	
50-59	91	6	1	0	0	
60-69	93	4	1	0	0	
70+	93	3	1	0	0	
TOTAL	60	25	10	1	0	

Thus the university student even before he enters the university is amongst the one per cent most highly educated members of the Zambian population. When he graduates he moves into the top 0.1%. This point cannot be over-emphasized and, as shall be shown later, has a significant bearing on the student's attitudes to education, to his role in society and to those less educated than himself. In the context of these statistics the students may be considered to form an 'educational élite' in a way that students in societies with long established universities could not be so called.

The Political Structure.

The formal political system of Zambia is modelled on the Westminster system, with formally 'independent' legislature, executive and judiciary. In practice the legislature and executive act as a single body controlled by the dominant party - the United National Independence Party. The judiciary too has had to give up some of its independence when its decisions were not welcomed by the party.[29] The position of the President as Head of State, Chief Executive, and Secretary General of the ruling party has no counterpart in the Westminster system.

The separation of the powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary, to the extent that it ever exists, is promoted by the operation of an effective two party system in which the sanctity of these institutions are accepted by those who may be in a position to subvert them. Where one party has a virtual monopoly of power through its control of wealth, the mass media and the coercive apparatus of the state, the appearance of a legitimate opposition party as a contender for

power is a practical impossibility. In such circumstances
the legislature is effectively an instrument of an executive
composed in this case of members of the central committee of
UNIP.[30] Following the 1964 General Elections the state of
the parties in the National Assembly was: UNIP - 55 seats
(plus five M.P.'s nominated by the President); African
National Congress - 10, and the National Progressive Party
(the successor to the United Federal Party) making a clean
sweep of the ten seats reserved for the white minority and
those Indians who opted for it.[31] In the second parliament
the number of seats increased from 80 to 110 - five of which
were nominated by the President, and following the General
Election of 1968 the representation of the parties was: UNIP -
81 seats (plus the five nominated members); ANC - 23 seats;
Independents - 1 seat.[32] Though still less than a quarter of
the National Assembly, the opposition had gained more seats
than expected.

Voting patterns followed regional allegiances, as indi-
cated in Table 8.

TABLE 8 - DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
BY PROVINCE[33]

Province	1964 Election		1968 Election	
	No. UNIP Seats	No. ANC Seats	No. UNIP Seats	No. ANC Seats
Eastern	10	0	14	0
Northern	9	0	16	0
Central	7	2	13	3
Luapula	6	0	10	0
Western	7	0	3	8
North Western	4	1	6	0
Southern	1	7	1	13*
Copperbelt	11	0	18	0
	55	10	81	24

Reserved Roll Seats: * One of these was an inde-
N.P.P. - 10.   pendent elected through

ANC support has been mainly confined to two provinces: Southern Province where they held 12 seats, Western Province with 8 seats and Central Province 3 seats. Southern Province has consistently been the heart of ANC support ever since Africans were allowed onto the electoral roll. Western Province traditionally a thorn in the flesh of national unity, had shown its disaffection with the government before the 1968 election by supporting the newly formed United Party.[34] This party, led by the Lozi from Western Province, Nalumino Mundia previously a Cabinet Minister in the UNIP government, had support both in Western Province and the Copperbelt but was banned just before the 1968 elections. The United Party votes were transferred to the African National Congress in Western Province.

The only other party to make an appearance since 1968 has been the United Progressive Party led by the former Vice-President and at the time of his defection from government, Minister for Provincial and Local Government and Culture - Simon Kapwepwe. He announced his resignation from government and his Presidentship of the new United Progressive Party in August 1971. The UPP was seen as a 'tribal' party since its leadership and support was predominantly from the Bemba speaking people from the Northern, Luapula and Copperbelt provinces. After a month of its existence over a hundred of its known leaders were put in detention, but Kapwepwe himself escaped this fate. These included a former Cabinet Minister, a former minister of state, three other members of parliament, four ex-district governors, 6 ex-regional secretaries and two ex-mayors.[35] As Molteno points out many of the top officials had been removed from their posts in government or party for various offences. Following the detentions nine students from

the university abandoned their studies to take up the now
vacant posts in the UPP organisation. The bye-elections
which took place as a result of MP's changing their party gave
the UPP only one seat and that was Mufulira West which was
held by Kapwepwe. In a second round of detentions in February
1972 123 leading members including Kapwepwe himself were
rounded up and the Party banned.[36]

Intra-party competition has played at least as signifi-
cant role in the political system as inter-party competition;
indeed they may be seen as closely related to one another.[37]
The formation of UP and UPP may be looked upon as the result
of intra-party strife. Evidence of such factional strife is
to be found in the analysis of the 1967 Mulungushi Conference
of UNIP when the fifteen member central committee was elected.
The manner of selecting delegates to the Mulungushi elections
of 1967 favoured the Bemba speaking peoples. This sectional
group then struck an alliance with the Tonga-Ila speaking
group (from Southern Province) and together they campaigned
to enthrone their own leaders. As a result the Bembas achieved
a dominant position in the central committee of UNIP at the
expense of leaders from Eastern and Western Provinces. Re-
cruitment to positions of leadership within UNIP have been
widely interpreted in terms of sectional politics and similar
interpretations have been made with regard to factionalism
within the national leadership.[38]

Developments since the 1967 Mulungushi Conference may be
seen as a struggle to reduce representation of the Bemba speak-
ing people in central government and party structures. This
is how many supporters of the UPP viewed the events. Following
the 1968 elections there were changes in the cabinet which

gave greater representation to the Eastern and North Western
Provinces at the expense of the Bemba speaking group. Later
in 1969 the Bemba dominated central executive of UNIP was dis-
solved together with the party constitution. A new constitu-
tion which was finally adopted in May 1971 made it very much
more difficult for the central committee of UNIP to come under
the domination of a single sectional group. Molteno in fact
suggests that the adoption of the new constitution, which put
pay to the Bemba dominance won at the Mulungushi Conference
of 1967, precipitated the formation of UPP as a separate
political party.[39]

January 1969 also saw the expansion of the party appar-
atus with the creation of new structures at the provincial
and district levels. A Minister of State of Cabinet rank was
assigned to each Province. Under the Minister of State the
new post of District Governor was created for each district.
The District Governor combined both the political and admin-
istrative functions with the assistance of a District Secretary
and Regional Secretary.[40] Though the President has suggested
that there should be an exchange of personnel between the
party and the civil service, nevertheless this has rarely
occurred and the district governors were nearly all recruited
from the ranks of the party rather than the civil service.[41]

The civil service, following its British counterpart,
is expected to be non-political in its execution of duties.
Competition exists between the civil servant and party offic-
ials for a number of reasons. First the civil servant earns
considerably more than the equivalent party official and
second the party official regards his contribution to the
Independence struggle as slight, which, to the extent that

this is true, maybe, in part, attributed to the restrictions
imposed by the colonial government on the political activit-
ies of its civil servants.[42] At present the party and civil
service structures parallel one another from the cabinet rank
to the district level.

Support for the United National Independence Party is
concentrated in the poorer sections of the Zambian society.
Intellectuals, professional classes, the mineworkers and the
students have little to no representation in the party. The
resistance of the mineworkers to incorporation into the party
has been documented by Bates.[43] The case of student estrange-
ment from the party is more complex as will be shown in
succeeding sections.

THE STUDENT ROLE IN THE ZAMBIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

Parsons draws a basic distinction between the two con-
cepts role and status.

> This participation in turn has two principal
> aspects. On the one hand there is the positional
> aspect - that of where the actor in question is
> "located" in the social system relative to other
> actors. This is what we call his status, which
> is his place in the relationship system considered
> as a structure, that is a patterned system of
> parts. On the other hand there is the processual
> aspect, that of what the actor does in his rela-
> tions with others seen in the context of its
> functional significance for the social system. It
> is this which we shall call his role.
>
> The distinction between status and role is at the
> root very closely related to that between the two
> reciprocal perspectives inherent in interaction.
> On the one hand each actor is an object of
> orientation for other actors (and for himself).
> In so far as this object-significance derives
> from his position in the social relationship

> system, it is a status significance. On the
> other hand each actor is orientated <u>to</u> other
> actors. In this capacity he is acting, not
> serving as an object - this is what we mean
> by his playing a role.[44]

It is usually assumed that the status accorded to a particular
role is uniquely defined. For the student role, as will be
shown, this is by no means the case, and the concept of status
set is therefore introduced. Regarding status in more specif-
ic terms as a position in the social structure distinguished
by a set of rights and obligations enforceable through social
sanctions, then the ambiguity arises from the disparate sets
of rights and obligations of 'ego' towards different 'alters.'
Within the Zambian social system, for example, those with
university education define the student status in different
terms from those without higher education. The status set
is a system of disparate rights and obligations integrated to
a lesser or greater extent through various social mechanisms
associated with a single social structure. The role, on the
other hand, expressing the behavioural counterpart of status,
is here defined to be unique in that it embraces all aspects
of the behaviour of the role incumbent. Thus, to each social
structure there are roles and associated status sets. Just
as the actor is the basic unit of the social system so,
transposing, the role status is the basic unit of the social
structure. In the following essay the role status will
frequently be abbreviated to role, but implicit in any use of
the term role is the existence of a status corresponding to
each social structure.

The role set refers to the set of multiple roles which

each actor must inevitably act out during the course of his
life. In the following account the 'roles of the student'
refers to such a set of multiple roles, whereas the 'student
role' refers specifically to his role as a student. Each
role may be subdivided into 'role segments' corresponding to
the different social structures from which the role is
derived. Thus, the student role may be divided into a univers-
ity role derived from the university social structure and a
civic role derived from the wider social structure. To each
role segment there also corresponds an 'arena' of action
where 'role segment behaviour' is uniquely defined. However,
arenas need not be isolated but may intersect to a lesser or
greater extent. The intersection of two arenas represents
the area of 'common' role behaviour compatible with both the
corresponding social structures, or more simply the area where
behaviour corresponding to role segments overlaps.

Between two different arenas there will be a discontin-
uity in role behaviour. This constitutes what will be
referred to as a role discontinuity - a discontinuity between
two role segments and the associated status sets. The role
discontinuity need not only refer to 'situational discontin-
uity' but also 'processual discontinuity' over time, as bet-
ween the student role in the past and in the future. Roles
may also 'continue' from one structure into another, when
enacted in one arena but derived from a social structure
corresponding to a different arena. The activation of
'extrinsic' roles in the interstices of a social structure
will be referred to as 'role continuities.' The twin concepts

of role continuities and role discontinuities provide the
analytic framework of subsequent chapters.

Role Discontinuities Over Time.

One of the peculiarities of the student role is its
transience, and consequently both future and past roles take
on central importance as influences on present role behaviour.
Secondly in the following sections considerable stress will
be given to the political elements of the student role. This
is justified in view of the all-pervasive character and
dominance in all spheres of life of the political system - a
feature typical of regimes where a new political elite has
rapidly supplanted an old one.

Secondary school students and African teachers played a
significant role in the Independence movement as active sym-
pathisers with the United National Independence Party and
according to one source as messengers between the two rival
organisations ANC and UNIP.[45] They were responsible for
fermenting disturbances at schools again in collaboration
with the African political parties. Students, teachers,
clerks, workers, villagers collaborated in fighting the common
enemy - the colonial government. Many of the first recruits
to the University were indeed just such students who had been
politically active before Independence. They naturally saw
no reason why their political activities should cease now
that Independence had been won and the 'fruits' were avail-
able for distribution.

The government's view, however, was somewhat different.

It viewed the students solely in terms of their future role
as specialists, technologists, civil servants in short as an
incipient professional 'class'. The government did not wish
to consider the students as a pressure group in their own
right, and pursued a policy designed to depoliticise the
student body.[46] Yet the government recognised from the begin-
ning the dilemma it was faced with, not only as regards
students but many other sections of society which had been
politically active before Independence and whose demands for
power and influence were in their view antithetic to effective
government. Once the students were acknowledged, albeit un-
officially, as an interest group with its own goals to pursue,
there were primarily two approaches. Either the students'
political interests and leanings could be incorporated into
and thereby controlled by the ruling party or they could be
deliberately excluded from and given no access to the formal
political system. Both alternatives had their drawbacks.
Bringing students within the party would have incurred opposi-
tion from those whose positions in the party rested not on
expertise but on loyalty and their contribution to the Independ-
ence struggle. Indeed these latter officials may have felt
threatened by the students who may have been accorded influence
based on their superior education. Feelings of 'anti-
intellectualism' aroused by students expecting influence
appropriate to their supposedly superior 'enlightenment' would
have been unleashed, precipitating a destructive conflict
within the party. Yet to exclude them from the national
political processes would encourage opposition and resentment
from outside, from a vocal, radical and articulate body. To
isolate the student from national problems would leave him

less prepared to cope with such problems when he graduates
and perhaps also the party would benefit from the presence of
student representatives. In the event the government has
been unequivocal in its intent to exclude students from the
political system. As early as 1964 at the first National
Congress of the National Union of Zambia Students the Minister
of Education, John Manakatwe, made the government's view clear.

> ....Now that we have won political Independence, we
> cannot and will not tolerate the continued exist-
> ence of backward economic systems. A rapid change
> in the situation has become imperative. The
> philosophy which should guide Zambian students
> to-day is quite simple. They must develop those skills
> and acquire that knowledge which their less fortun-
> ate brothers who left school too early do not
> possess. A large number of Zambian students should
> take advanced courses in science and mathematics,
> both at secondary and graduate level which will be
> of the greatest importance in the development of
> this country and the advancement of the fortunes of
> the students themselves. This is vital if our
> nation is to develop and survive in the modern
> world.

> Mr. President, I must now seriously sound a word
> of warning to all the delegates who are here
> assembled. In my preliminary remarks I said that
> Zambia's progress in the next few years will
> depend upon the unity of its people. To perform
> with success the tremendous task before us in
> Zambia, our people must not only be united, - they
> must also be disciplined. An undisciplined nation
> is confused, impotent and worthless. In any
> orderly community there should be those who lead
> and those willing and prepared to be led. Natur-
> ally, wherever there are intelligent self-conscious
> men and women, there will be always differences of
> opinion between them - this is good in itself and
> essential for progress. But criticism of one
> another must not lead to intolerance or hatred.
> We must learn to instruct and to be instructed, to
> lead and also to be led; we must learn to com-
> promise for the sake of harmony and the orderly
> progress of our country.

> Mr. President, I have been concerned as Minister
> of Education, at the large number of students in
> Zambia who have become indifferent to the observ-
> ance of school regulations, far too many smoke or
> drink alchohol despite the strict school regula-
> tions on these matters. I concede that there have
> been some heads of schools who have been too
> hasty in the expulsion of offending students. But

there has been in recent years a tendency on the
part of pupils to flout authority with impunity.
Next year I intend to mobilise all the forces at
my command to ensure that misconduct of any kind
is severely dealt with. We would be failing in
our duty if we cannot impress upon the young
generation the importance of self control and
discipline. If a student is provoked or unjustly
treated there are always many ways in which a
constitutional protest can be made. The task of
your members is mainly to study well and utilise
fully the opportunities before them, so that
they can be fully prepared for the responsibili-
ties they must inevitably assume after leaving
school. Ill-considered criticisms of the
government by students will not be tolerated.
It would please me greatly if you would give a
new year instruction to your members to the
effect; "Leave politics to the politicians". If
you adopt this motto, I am sure your members
would be doing this country a very great serv-
ice indeed. Thus, such time and surplus energy
of your members as they may have can then be
used in more constructive efforts such as mass
literacy campaigns, participation in self-help
schemes, voluntary teaching in evening classes
and so forth....[47]

Such a forthright denial of student participation in the

political system is unusual in the light, for example, of

experience in other African countries.[48] Perhaps one reason

is the extreme shortage of educated Zambians and in particular

the paucity of university educated personnel in the party

organisation. Ian Scott has documented the recruitment to

'central political positions' in the UNIP organisation, show-

ing how and why the party is "unquestionably the dominant

group represented at the national level" and examines "the

relationship of the organisation to the 'intellectuals' as

one group which one might expect to see represented in

central political positions".[49]

The party's slate for the 1968 election shows
the same emphasis on local officials as that of
1964. With the increase in the number of parlia-
mentary seats from 75 to 105 it would perhaps
have been expected that other groups in the
society would start to make inroads on the

privileged position of the party organisers. In
fact, the only group of any size represented,
apart from the men of the organisation, were the
civil servants and their representation was
about one-fifth that of the organisation's.
Among the party officials there were some who
had risen very quickly within the ranks. Four
of the five successful candidates under the age
of thirty were regional secretaries at the time
of their selection and ten candidates were serv-
ing regional secretaries. Yet none of these had
reached that rank three years previously (in
August 1965) and only a few of them had attained
more junior rank of youth regional secretary at
that time. The selection of these officials is
clearly more a reflection of the importance of
the party organisation in current Zambian poli-
tics than of any role played by these officials
in the pre-independence movement.

Not only has the organisation been represented
in parliament, it has also succeeded in obtain-
ing representation in the Cabinet and at the
Minister of State level. By January, 1970, four
former regional secretaries, in a Cabinet of
twenty three, had attained the rank of Cabinet
Minister. Of the twenty-seven Ministers of
State, ten had been former regional secretaries
and two more had local level organisational ex-
perience in the party. The same pattern of
local level party representation has applied in
the selection of district governors. When the
administrative changes were announced in
November 1968, it was thought that the post of
district governor "might be interchangeable,
that is, between politicians and civil serv-
ants." In fact, the selection of district
governors appears to have been dictated by much
the same considerations which applied to the
selection of Members of Parliament. Of the
fifty-three district governors selected in
December 1968, for example, twenty-eight had
organisational links with the party at the
local level and two more had been national
level organisers. Only eight of those appointed
were former civil servants and six of them were
given positions in the Barotse and Southern
Provinces. Since Independence then, recruitment
to these central political positions has been
primarily from the local party organisation or,
perhaps more accurately, of the success of a
number of local organisations in gaining rep-
resentation at the centre.[50]

Not only is recruitment through the party from the local

levels, but the formal educational attainment of the 1968

UNIP election candidates is relatively low.

Of the forty-four local level organisers chosen,
only two had completed secondary school and only
one had attended university.* Of those with
university degrees, eleven of the fifteen had no
organisational experience at the local level.

> *Even these were out of character. Two were
> Eurafricans educated in South Africa and
> the third went to university after he had
> served as a regional secretary. To my
> knowledge, only one regional secretary has
> ever obtained a university degree.[51]

Dominated by relatively poorly educated officials the anti-
intellectual sentiments have been more influential than in
other African countries where university graduates were to
be found in greater numbers in the party organisations. Scott
also comments that there is opposition to the intellectual in
the party.

> ....there is some evidence to suggest that the
> party organisation receives the intellectuals,
> in the wider context of the society as a whole,
> to be a long term threat to their privileged
> access to central political positions. As
> President Kaunda has put it, "The freedom
> fighter may be jealous of the ease with which
> the intellectual wins high positions without
> personal sacrifice...." The President goes on
> to say that, although the possibility of
> friction between the two groups is always
> present, "in Zambia...these two groups within
> the party have achieved a remarkable degree of
> unanimity". Nonetheless the term 'intellect-
> ual' was one of abuse during the 1967 Central
> Committee elections and some regional officials
> believe that the intellectuals, who were un-
> successful except where they were running
> against one another, lost because they were
> reputed to have a somewhat high-handed and
> neglectful attitude towards the party organis-
> ation. If the party has a general attitude
> towards 'intellectuals', it is perhaps
> expressed most succintly in a resolution passed
> by a Lusaka regional seminar in March 1969;
> "The Government should give political jobs to
> the politicians with no regard to higher
> educational qualifications".[52]

Graduates or students wishing to enter party politics must
begin at the lowest ranks and make their way up. Replying to

a question concerning the prospects of the student in the party raised at a meeting between students of the university and President Kaunda in October 1971, he said that UNIP was a democratic organisation and at every level selection for posts in the party is conducted through elections. Positions can only be gained by contesting elections and this applied to the student as to anyone else: the student was no different and had no advantages. As a further disincentive, the lowest full time official in the party hierarchy - the regional secretary - receives a monthly official income of K60, approximately one third of what the graduate would receive on leaving university. As Scott points out the local party organisation is a workers' and peasants' organisation and "tends to produce leaders, slightly better educated than the general population who are then recruited to the national level".[53] In such circumstances a graduate's university education may be a positive disadvantage to him when contesting for support amongst the electorate.

The government therefore views the function of the university in terms of its contribution to the creation of a professional and technocrat 'class' to replace the expatriates and to foster the expansion and development of the national economy. In the view of the government it is wasteful for Zambian graduates to compete with other Zambians for jobs which in their estimation do not require a university qualification, such as positions in the party bureaucracy. Students who graduate with a B.A. are expected, in the main, to deploy their training not in an administrative post in government or party bureaucracies where there are already Zambians, but in the teaching profession where expatriates predominate.

In contrast to the government's beliefs about the future
role of the student, the student himself sees his future much
less clearly and regards his reception in the wider society
as being much cooler than the government would have him
believe. The student perceives a generalised resentment
towards him which he attributes to an assumed threat he poses
to Zambians holding senior positions without advanced qualif-
fications in formal education. Thus in a survey conducted in
1969, it was found that only 7% of Zambia's top three hundred
Zambian civil servants had university degrees.[54]

The student's expectations as regards his future derive
from the rapidity with which a number of Zambians were pro-
pelled into high positions at the time of Independence, for
which, the student feels, they were not qualified. With their
'superior' qualifications i.e. university degrees the students
expect equally rapid promotion despite their lack of exper-
ience. The Zambians who hold the senior positions frequently
attack the students who "think they know everything just be-
cause they have a degree" and who lack experience and maturity
to perform responsible jobs effectively. The following is a
fictional commentary on the conflict between a student and
one such senior Zambian - a junior minister one time the
student's schoolmate.

> "But look here chum, don't think by virtue of your
> being at University you will straight away be
> general managers, justices, medical officers etc.
> You'll need to acquire the necessary experience
> before you move a notch further. You know it has
> taken us a long time to climb the ladder, alright?"
> "I agree, but, but, but...I hesitate to say it
> aloud, but if it takes a standard four bloke ten
> years to become a General Manager, does it follow
> that my apprenticeship has also to take all that
> long? I see no reason why within one year I
> can't grab that "expatriate's only job"."...He
> protested. "But what's the point in Zambianizing

and at the same time creating artificial posts for the expatriate? I know a Zambian in a para-statal body who Zambianised an expatriate post, and the expatriate became General Manager extra-ordinaire."[55]

Graduates entering the mines have complained bitterly of the practices which discriminate against them in favour of the expatriate with similar qualifications. On the one hand he finds himself in a small minority amongst fellow Zambians who have won their high positions in the mines by virtue of their experience and loyalty, and who are likely to resent the rapid promotion of the graduate. On the other hand the graduate faces further resistance from the expatriate who wishes to protect his job against critical juniors and who prefers the Zambian whose poor qualifications ensure a subservient and dependent subordinate.[56] For, the poorly qualified Zambian, who has risen through the industry on the basis of loyalty, experience and job performance, will find it very difficult to find alternative employment according the same income and is therefore in a much weaker position than the graduate who is so much more favourably placed in the labour market. It is for these sorts of reasons that the student perceives his future in bleaker terms than the government. It is, however, true to say that his assessment of his future derive from what are often exaggerated expectations originating from the exigencies of the immediate post independence period when personnel were promoted on the basis of their contribution to the Independence movement rather than their expertise. His feeling of deprivation stems also from an exaggerated conception of the worth of his qualification, which again stems from the shortage of educated personnel and the importance government has attached to education. One student,

who felt that the government was deliberately trying to frustrate him and his colleagues by insisting that all public administration students attend a further year at the National Institute of Public Administration after graduating before being allowed to enter the civil service, commented, "It doesn't pay to be a student". Though perhaps a somewhat exaggerated view, nevertheless it echoes the sentiments of many students.

One can delineate two basic criteria of recruitment to and mobility within any organisation, namely that based on loyalty and experience and that based on expertise and formal qualifications.[57] In those societies where the educational system has been well established, and where substantial numbers of graduates are to be found in the high positions in each organisation it is possible for candidates in the recruitment and mobility processes to be both "experts" and "loyal". The distinction between the two is less significant than it is in those countries whose educational systems for the indigenous population have lagged behind the development of their organisations. Here it is difficult to find personnel who are both "experts" and also "loyal" and "experienced" and those responsible for recruitment and promotion must decide in each instance which criterion to select. Inevitably in such circumstances the competition between the personnel represented by each criterion becomes acute and since jobs normally require a combination of attributes the decision to opt for any one is often arbitrary. This makes the resolution of competition and conflict very difficult and since there are no rules in the competing pressures unrelated to the choice play an important role in resolving the conflict. Thus the future of

a Zambian graduate will possibly depend as much on the power
he can summon in his support as on the effectiveness with
which he would perform the job.

Present Role.

The government would like to see the students in terms
of their future roles as members of a professional 'class'
and their sojourn at the university a period of preparation
for their future. Though students do accept their university
career as a training for the future, it is nevertheless as
far as they are concerned only a partial definition of their
situation. Any continuously existing community composed of
a homogeneous membership occupying identical positions in the
social system must develop a characteristic set of interests
and values which will be passed onto and possibly modified by
succeeding enrolments. These values and interests will be a
product of their anticipated future roles and their view of
their present student role in the context of the Zambian
social structure. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
political sphere where the values and interests nurtured in
the university have come into direct conflict with both the
party and the government.

It will be recalled that in his speech to the first
National Congress of the National Union of Zambia Students,
the Minister of Education suggested that students "leave
politics to the politicians". Attitudes of students to this
conception of the student role are made clear in the first
and fourth opinion polls conducted by the University of Zambia
Sociological Association. Students were asked to express
their attitudes to the following statements.

The student body should make public its views on national issues.

87% agreed, 7% were uncertain, 6% disagreed[58]

The student body should make public its views on international issues.

73% agreed, 16% were uncertain, 11% disagreed[59]

Students should get on with their studies and leave politics to the politicians.

11% agreed, 8% were uncertain, 81% disagreed[60]

Further evidence that student leaders, and as shall be shown later the structure of the university community does not allow the student leaders to deviate far from general student opinion, have not been prepared to "leave politics to the politicians" is apparent in the confrontations that have occurred between students and the party. As early as 1966, when the university had barely opened its doors, the Third Annual Congress of NUZS passed the following resolution.

The National Union of Zambia Students condemns all those who have and still make dangerous statements which result in furthering violence and intimidation through Youth activities.

That there have been recent massacres of many souls by the Youth of a certain political party.

That a citizen is deprived of his right to fundamental human rights through intimidation and violence.

That some members of the government in very responsible positions have produced dangerous statements in order to protect and safeguard their political and governmental positions.

It urges all those responsible for inciting Youth to act ruthlessly to stop this most inhuman and satanic behaviour. Our Youth should be told that our enemies are those whites who would like to see Zambia suffer instability by perpetuating colour prejudices.

Condemns all those responsible for law and order for their failure to maintain the protection of every citizen and hence facilitating violence and

fear of political parties.

Condemns the main political parties concerned
for this use of oppression to undermine indiv-
idual liberties and suppress the opposition.

Urges that the government takes a firm action
against any breach of the law by the Youth.[61]

The first public confrontation came at the beginning of
1967 when school students returning to school in Eastern
Province by bus were asked by UNIP youths to produce their
UNIP cards.

UNIP youths are forcing passengers at Lusaka's
bus station to buy party cards. The youths
tell people boarding buses for the Eastern
Province that if they do not bring cards they
cannot board the bus.[62]

The following day Solomon Kalulu - National Chairman of UNIP -
was reported in the press to have said that "carrying of party
cards was a matter of UNIP policy. The students should under-
stand that and they must carry membership cards wherever they
went".[63] The President of NUZS - an UNZA student -
retaliated by arguing that it was government policy that
students should not be involved in party politics and that
Mr. Kalulu's statement therefore contradicted his own govern-
ment's stated policy. The President of NUZS warned that if
the practice of demanding cards continued then it might result
in violent resistance by other youths.[64] The following day
the press reported that the Kitwe National Convention on
Development had recommended a reorganisation of Zambia's Youth
movement and that,

....the plenary session also threw out a recommend-
ation by the committee [which dealt with "the role
of youth in the nation" and under the chairmanship
of Dingiswayo Banda] to "ban and scrap" the
National Union of Zambia Students. The committee
had alleged that the union had become a "vehicle
for undesirable influences and activities and in
some cases foreign influences".[65]

As front page news, NUZS had little option but to reply and President Kasuka Matukwa did so in the idiom of the national interest.

> NUZS strongly refutes the allegation that we are
> under foreign influence...This is bareless,
> irresponsible and unfounded. The students of
> this country are so patriotic and dedicated to
> the advancement of Zambia that they can't be
> suspected of being under foreign influence. To
> ban and scrap NUZS is tantamount to stabbing Zambia in
> the back.[66]

The UNIP youths had ample ammunition with which to retaliate; first their card checking campaign had been attacked and now their own Minister of Youth (Dingiswayo Banda) had been rudely rebuked in the press for his comments about NUZS. The Lusaka UNIP Constituency Secretary threatened 'Red Guard' activities and that the youth would march on the university if the student leaders did not explain their recent remarks in the press. "If it means a clash we will clash...nobody has ever before complained...about the selling of cards at the bus station. The Government has given them bursaries but they continue criticising the Government - why?"[67] Acrimonious exchanges between students and UNIP officials continued for another two days, until the proposed march on the campus was referred to 'higher authorities' and the Minister of Education arranged a meeting with NUZS leaders. The upshot was a conciliatory press communiqué from NUZS - "We are looking forward to co-operation and understanding with our brothers."[68] The matter ended peacefully enough but bitterness towards students who asserted themselves in national politics remained as Ndola's regional secretary is reported to have said, "Students should stick to their studies. They are politically immature."[69]

Two months later the Minister of Education made his

Munali Declaration on the political role of students. This
was an inevitable amendment of his earlier statement made in
1964 which had become obsolete in the face of the policies
of NUZS. Declaring the interests of NUZS to be identical
with those of government, he said,

> But as the Government's source of power is the
> Party, it follows that the translation of
> students' interests and efforts must be
> channelled through the Party Machine.[70]

In his carefully worded statement he was not calling upon
students to become party activists but to cease from pursuing
an independent oppositional role. He was advocating reconcil-
iation with the party, relinquishing the independence of NUZS
to the supremacy of the party. A more precise definition of
the relation between UNIP and NUZS was conveniently omitted,
and the only conclusion to be drawn from the declaration was
that Mwanakatwe was asking the students to desist from making
statements against the party.

Between the confrontation with UNIP in January 1967 and
the Munali Declaration of April 1967, the President of NUZS
had applied for financial assistance from the International
Union of Students (the communist dominated international stud-
ent organisation) and had accepted an invitation to attend the
Ninth Congress of the IUS in Mongolia. There he delivered a
speech endorsing his government's stand on various political
issues in particular the situation in Southern Africa. NUZS
was affiliated at that time to both the IUS and the ICS (the
non-communist dominated international student organisation)
and it was to these affiliations that Dingiswayo Banda was
presumably referring when he spoke of foreign influence in
NUZS. In his Munali speech Mwanakatwe made his views about

the affiliations very clear.

> ....over the past year or so the reaction of
> students to some of our national activities have
> been inspired by outside influences...This is
> the way foreign governments have contrived to
> penetrate enlightened leadership in African
> Independent States for their own selfish ends...
> Last night Mr. Mwanakatwe confirmed that his
> Munali speech had been a straight directive to
> quit...Its affiliation to the two international
> bodies was contrary to the principle of non-
> alignment...Neither could it be allowed to
> become a member of other world organisations.
> This is in accordance with the policy the
> government has applied to trade unions. The
> students' union must be treated in the same way.[71]

However NUZS did not disaffiliate from either international

organisation until the following year at the Fifth Annual

Congress (September 1968) when it was decided to leave the

ISC because of its supposed association with the CIA but to

remain affiliated to the IUS.[72] At the seventh Congress in

1970 the President reported that NUZS had dropped all dealings

with both international organisations.[73] Nevertheless it is

clear that both the government and the party were at pains to

depoliticise the student body and it is equally clear that the

students have been unwilling to totally withdraw from present-

ing their views on national and international issues. This

persistent refusal, tolerated as long as public announcements

were not outspokenly opposed to the party or government, ulti-

mately and inevitably led students to a confrontation with the

party and government. The details of the 'university crisis'

of 1971 will be related in a later chapter.

Studies of students have paid relatively little attention

to the student role outside the university environs during the

vacations. At such times their activities are more difficult

to record, and their student role is possibly of less

importance in determining their behaviour. Yet their role in
the wider society during vacations and the attitudes of others
towards him at such times must be a contributing factor to
their political behaviour during the times their activities
are directly affected by involvement in the all-embracing
student community.

Vacational employment does not follow any particular pat-
tern and students apply to government and private enterprise
either through the Dean of Students or through their own
initiative. The jobs they accept tend to be white collar
occupations in the towns, where their relatively advanced
levels of formal education would supposedly be of some assist-
ance to their employers. They are paid at student rates which
vary from about K70 to K120 per month. Students rarely under-
take jobs that involve manual labour or even enter into semi-
voluntary schemes, though a tiny minority have been involved
in such projects as smallpox vaccination campaigns, the con-
struction of a clinic and a measles immunisation programme.
Students have not been encouraged to undertake any co-ordinated
programme of 'national service' to promote the developmental
interests of the nation as has been the case in other countries
such as Tanzania.[74] However student leaders have on many
occasions expressed a desire to participate in such a national
service. Thus at the Fourth Annual National Congress of NUZS
in 1967, there was a discussion over a National Service, and
towards the end of 1970 following a meeting between student
leaders and the President the former declared the necessity
for a National Service and again there have been similar calls
in early 1972. However, in this matter the leadership does
not necessarily reflect the sentiments of the bulk of the

students, as indicated in the second opinion poll.

> Students should be forced to participate in a
> National Service of one year before receiving
> their first degree.
>
> Agree 36%, Uncertain 9%, Disagree 55%[75]

Though many students are eager to participate in schemes
of national development and leaders have expressed this desire
on many occasions, no one in government has been prepared to
openly encourage the student to take an active part in nat-
ional development. Even so much as participating in the life
of the workers in the areas neighbouring the university, and
undertaking surveys there has been regarded by students with
fear and has encountered a barrier of non-co-operation from
the municipal officials both in government and the party. So
conscious of the mistrust accorded to them by Zambians and
expatriates in senior positions, those students who have other
qualifications to commend them for a job may avoid revealing
their student status when seeking vacation employment. Others
who have no other qualifications to offer a prospective em-
ployer have been known to over-play the 'superior' qualifica-
tions they possess and in so doing incurred the resentment of
employers.

Though students have made their voices heard on a variety
of public issues through their two organisations the National
Union of Zambian Students and the University of Zambia Students
Union (UNZASU), in general the government has been successful
in restricting the student role within narrow limits closely
related to their future roles as members of a professional
'class'. Yet apart from 'leaving politics to the politicians',
Mwanakatwe has added to and elaborated his conception of the

student role.

Although the University is very closely linked
with the problem of manpower requirements of
Zambia, it should not be regarded merely as a
factory to turn out the men and women required
to man the services of the society. It should
be the centre for the highest intellectual
development of those Zambian scholars who will
gain admission to it, helping them to under-
stand the aspirations of the less educated men
and women in the land, to break tribal and
racial barriers within which they have grown
and to foster in them a national consciousness.

Every effort should be made to discourage the
University from turning out graduates who will
form a privileged élite in Zambia, an exclus-
ive class of intellectuals who will be ashamed
to return to their villages to live and work
among their kinsmen for the general good of
the country. The role of the University must
be to bridge the gap between the 'haves' and
the 'have-nots' so that gradually the evils of
a class-conscious society are completely
eliminated. In the furtherance of this ideal,
the University's staff and students should
restrain their demands for better living con-
ditions, bearing in mind that the University
was not intended to be a prestige institution
which would create new and unrealistic stand-
ards of living. Lest we forget - the
University of Zambia was established with
immense good will from the public. Old women
sold their eggs to raise funds for the new
University, old men gave some money from sel-
ling their catch of fish, townsmen signed stop
orders to contribute regularly from their bank
accounts the funds sorely needed by the
Government for the University project. The
sacrifice of the old people and the young men
and women, as well as the countless hundreds
of teachers and their pupils who organised
raffles and concerts to raise funds for the
University, was an act of faith - faith that
the University would produce the élite which
the nation wants, 'one which is more concerned
with its responsibilities than with its rights,
an élite dedicated to the noble task of nation-
building, however hard and humble the demands'.
Indeed, in the years ahead the University will
become inevitably the most expensive educa-
tional project in Zambia. Yet it would con-
tinue to win the hearts of men and women in the
country on the basis of the University's
students' contribution to nation-building
efforts.[76]

But active student participation in nation-building, bridging
the gap between the poor and the rich, etc., cannot be
achieved so long as the government pursues a policy of depoli-
ticisation of the student body which is designed to sever
links between the students and the party and to stress the
student's future role at the expense of his present role. The
student role which Mwanakatwe and many others advocate is in-
compatible with the constraints generated by the wider social
structure. The emphasis on the student's future role as a
member of a professional 'class' or an 'élite' contradicts the
emphasis on students forging links between the poor and the
rich and the cultivation of a feeling of close kinship with
their uneducated brethren who work in the fields.

STUDENT STATUS IN THE ZAMBIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

Though the government would like to look upon the student
in terms of his future role alone, it has had to accommodate
the fact that setting up a university with a concomitant
student community leads to series of consequences which were
unintended and possibly unforeseen. How then has the govern-
ment come to regard the students qua students? How have other
sections perceived the student? To what extent is the status
of the university student in the Zambian social structure
uniquely determined? In the previous section perceptions of
student status in society entered into the discussion of the
student role. However, it is difficult to assess with any
accuracy what the student status is without conducting de-
tailed surveys of the Zambian population. For this reason
most studies of students omit to pay much attention to the way
in which sections of the society regard the student.[77] But

this is a factor which inevitably affects student behaviour
and will therefore be given some attention in this section.
The attitudes and perceptions of the student status in society
is likely to be markedly influenced by the background,
interests and the extent to which students present a threat
to those interests. For this reason two relatively well
defined groups will be considered, those who hold dominant
positions in the society and those who don't.

Perceptions towards Students within the Political Elite.

For the purposes of this discussion, the political élite
will be defined as that section of the ruling class whose
members are to be found at the apexes of government and party
organisations. The non-availability of information makes it
impossible to analyse the attitudes prevalent within the
other élites - administrative, military and economic - towards
the university student.

There are three general strains in the perception of
students amongst members of the political élite. First the
favourable view of students as a set of intellectuals with much
to contribute to the development of the country. Second the
view that they represent the young generation destined to
replace the older generation now in power - an incipient pol-
itical élite. Third an unfavourable view, that they represent
a 'parasitical' group ungrateful for the sacrifices society
is making on their behalf. The prevailing view will depend on
who is espousing it and in what context. Observations of these
perceptions may be gauged in crisis situations when the con-
text becomes overridingly influential must be avoided and
therefore the following will dwell on two relatively informal

but nevertheless public occasions when students came up for discussion in the context of their position in society.

The following debate in the National Assembly concerned the Vote of thirty six million kwacha to the Ministry of Education. It took place on February 28th, 1969 soon after the 1968 elections which had followed the banning of the United Party. The protagonists of the different views were the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Moto Nkama and the Minister of Education, Wesley Nyirenda. Nkama had been an active UNIP member coming up through the ranks of the party via the posts of Regional Youth Secretary and the Regional Secretary on the Copperbelt. He attended Roma University College 1960-1961 and Oxford University in 1964 but without having received a degree. He had served as Deputy Head of the Zambian Mission at the United Nations and is in his early thirties.[78] Wesley Nyirenda, on the other hand, has a very different background. Ten years older than Nkama, Nyirenda has moved up to his present position by virtue of his educational background. One of the very few who managed to attain a measure of education during the colonial period, he attended Munali Training Centre and Chalimbana Training College for teachers between 1940 and 1944. He has also attended the Pholela Institution in Natal after which he went to the London Institute of Education, where he received a degree and post graduate diploma in education. He became Deputy Speaker of the Northern Rhodesian National Assembly and then Speaker of the Zambian National Assembly and finally Minister of Education.[79] These two politicians represent two distinct types of recruitment to central political positions, and are therefore likely to perceive the students in correspondingly different terms.

It is very important, Mr. Chairman, for the Government to realise that unless schools are brought into the general line of the UNIP Government, schools, colleges and indeed the University of Zambia here in Lusaka, could become centres of subversion and sabotage. We have seen these examples elsewhere in Africa.

Now, Mr. Chairman, it is an open secret that a few months ago, our University here in Lusaka, was in fact acting as a centre of sabotage. I may even add that the University of Zambia was in fact a stronghold of the now banned party called U.P.

Now, Mr. Chairman, secondly I would like to get from the hon. Minister of Education his comments on the following: The students at the University of Zambia, are somewhat out of touch with what the Government is doing. This may be so because the students at the University of Zambia, unlike the students of Universities in other countries, not only in Africa, but in Europe, have less work to do. I am sure that many hon. Members will agree with me when I say that it is a sad sight when we see many students from our university roaming the streets, doing nothing but drinking and drinking like fish.

I feel, Mr. Chairman, that is a very serious matter. Time has come for these students to realise that the University of Zambia was, as a matter of fact, built out of the sacrifice, the sweat and toil of the common man. We must realise that even our people, in the remote villages contributed in order to make this University the success that it is today.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, it is a great shame to see many of the students from our University concentrating on things other than their studies. I would like, therefore, to hear from the hon. Minister of Education as to what disciplinary measures he contemplates in order to bring students such as these to order.[80]

As Minister of Education, Nyirenda was obliged to defend the students against such attacks and the replies he made were more favourable than perhaps he would have made in other circumstances. Nevertheless when visiting the University he has made similar comments, but added some remarks critical of the students which were played down in his speech in parliament.[81]

To the accusation that the university is a centre of subversion, he not only denied that this was true but went on to

explain how such misconceptions have arisen.

> If I may be allowed to speak my mind, I do not know
> how many hon. Members who are this morning contribut-
> ing to the debate on the University of Zambia and on
> my Ministry, have taken the trouble to visit the
> University campus. There is a feeling amongst those
> of us who have been entrusted with education that
> the young men and women at the University have
> started badly because they have not been given a
> chance by us politicians in particular. Here are
> young men and women whom we have tried to run away
> from. Time and again some of us in leading posi-
> tions in politics have been invited to go and talk
> to these young men and women.

> Time and again we have been asked to mix with these
> young men and women who have been thrown into an
> institution, that is enjoying academic freedom, we
> have been asked to mix with them so that we can
> guide them and discuss their problems with them.
> But what has been our response? The University of
> Zambia is a place, we have asserted, that is harbour-
> ing saboteurs. It is a place where all subversive
> activities and sabotage are hatched. It is a place
> you know where the lecturers and professors are sus-
> pect. It is a place where young men and women who
> think that they know more than we do are kept. It
> is a place where you keep young men and women who
> think that they know better than Cabinet Ministers
> and they know better than Parliamentary Secretaries,
> District Governors and backbenchers. 'What institu-
> tion is this that you are putting up, of young men
> and women who are very political and who will think
> we do not know our job. It is a place where they
> think that it is only academic education that
> matters and that we are all useless in politics'.
> This is a common argument.

> I think we have misunderstood these young men and
> women. I think we have not taken the trouble to go
> and argue out issues with them. They are as anxious
> as hon. Members are this morning in this House, to
> be understood. They have sent me letters to find
> out why it is that leading politicians, people who
> are in key positions and who ought to influence
> policy at the University, do not even take the
> trouble to go and find out what University work is
> all about. I think the start has been bad through
> no fault of these students.[82]

Alienating students from the political processes and personnel

will inevitably lead to misconceptions about their behaviour

and the nature of the university, and shortcomings within the

student community may be attributed in part to shortcomings

in the leadership. He continues to argue that the isolation

of the university students has led to the interpretation of

criticism as opposition.

> Let it be observed that a University by its very
> nature, is an institution where freedom in
> academic thought is pursued. It is not a centre
> where some sort of indoctrination must take place,
> otherwise we might as well write off this nation
> ...We want them, while they are there, to develop
> a critical mind. That is a professional place it
> has nothing to do with whether you are Congress
> or you are UNIP or you are a member of the now
> banned United Party. That is a place where
> people pursue academic freedom, they must be free
> to argue even with me as their Minister of
> Education, they must be free to argue with their
> lecturers and so on...In other words here are
> young men and women who will want to approach a
> problem purely from the academic angle....[83]

Academic freedom has been considered by academics as essential

to the pursuit of learning, scholarship and research in

universities, as in the following definition.

> that freedom of members of the academic community,
> assembled in colleges and universities, which
> underlies the effective performance of their
> functions of teaching learning, practice of the
> arts and research. The right to academic free-
> dom is recognised in order to enable faculty
> members and students to carry on their roles.[84]

However, in the eyes of those who have not attended university,

and indeed to many who have academic freedom is at best an

ideology to protect the comfortable and secluded life of

academics and at worst an ill-conceived subterfuge under

whose cloak all forms of subversive activity are allowed to

take place unhindered. This latter view of the university

usually accompanies that view which regards students as a

'privileged élite' which should be grateful for the sacrifices

being made on its behalf; criticism of the government or party

is tantamount to 'biting the hands that feed them'. Interest-

ingly Nyirenda does not counter Nkama's perception of univer-

sity students as parasitical and ungrateful by arguing that

university education is less a privilege and more a right
earned on the basis of merit.   Rather he reminds the House
that students are adults and must be treated as such.

> Now I want to make it clear here that the University
> students drink if they want to drink...But, any
> student who is found so drunk that he becomes irres-
> ponsible, is disciplined like any other student.
> But, let us remember that they are men and women who
> are enjoying academic freedom and that freedom is
> necessary because if they have to do research and
> make contribution to the knowledge that we find in
> the books today, they must be given that freedom.
> If we discipline them like kids, then we will get
> nothing out of the University in so far as contribu-
> tion towards research is concerned.[85]

But over and above the defense of academic freedom and
critical spirit, Nyirenda employs another common argument to
counter accusations of irresponsibility and oppositionalism -
the 'generation argument'.

> That attitude which has prevailed at that University
> for a long time that these young men and women are
> proud, they think they are Cabinet Ministers, they
> think they can run this country better. We must
> change that attitude, because they are not like that.
> I have seen them. They are simple innocent men and
> women who are busy doing some research. They do not
> know more than we do. They are confused boys who
> will sort themselves out eventually.

> When I left the University, I thought I had wonderful
> ideas and I thought I was a very clever man until I
> began teaching, when I was cut down to size. While
> I was at work, I knew that I did not know and I
> became humble. Leave them to be mischievous during
> this period because they have reached that stage.
> We all pass through it, when they think they know
> and they splash there and ask for this and so on,
> life will teach them a lesson and once they know
> what the truth is, they will be solid men and women.[86]

This is the view of a graduate who looking back on his career
sees the 'folly of his youth' and recognises the same tenden-
cies in the new generation of students. However, it is much
more difficult for the politician without experience of
university life to sympathise with these sentiments, and

tolerate student excesses in such a benevolent fashion. It becomes even more difficult if these same politicians are in the long term threatened by students who, with educational qualifications, are supposedly better fitted to rule and administer the nation's affairs. The more firmly entrenched in the political leadership, the more one can afford to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the students.

The higher the leader is in the structure of political decision-making the more he plays the role of conciliator, settling differences between warring and competing interests. For such leaders the interpretation of conflict between students and the government or between students and the party as a manifestation of a generational gap is particularly convenient. For in talking of a generational gap one accords conflict an air of inevitability and even legitimacy and in so doing avoids censuring either side. It is not surprising, therefore, that the President himself, in his role as chief conciliator between rival, competing or conflicting groups, finds the generational argument particularly congenial.

> Yet the dangers of a wider generation gap in developing countries are potentially greater than in many developed countries in which student unrest is almost part of national life. Often, the cause of the generation gap lies in the phenomenon associated with the older generation. For most of the youth the older generation is not associated with wisdom, experience, level-headedness and mature consideration. For them it is associated more with negativism, sloppiness, hard-headedness and irresponsiveness towards change. On the other hand, for most of the old generation the youth are not associated with dynamism, consideration, level-headedness and so forth. They are associated more with irresponsibility, riotous behaviour, cynicism, over-adventure, arrogance, intellectual snobbery and downright exclusive possessiveness.

> These conditions do not promote a climate for the narrowing of the gap between generations.

> They, indeed, breed conflicts which can only be
> resolved through sides re-examining critically
> their premises.
>
> The responsibilities of the old and young
> generations in Zambia are even greater for, due
> to the misfortune of our historical past, the
> old generation like in any other developing
> country is associated not only with the epi-
> thets I referred to earlier on but with
> illiteracy and ignorance. They will continue
> to be associated with dependence on those
> whose earning capacity in terms of income is
> greater than theirs. The youth for their part
> will, in the circumstances, be associated with,
> inter alia, pride, élite consciousness and
> selfishness. [87]

Though in some ways a balanced view of the perceptions one

generation has for another, it fails to analyse the source

of those perceptions and the basis of the conflict between

students and other sections of society; the generational gap

is more an idiom in which the conflict has been expressed.

But the generational idiom has also been used to attack

the students, as Sikota Wina[88] makes very clear.

> All over Africa today a new generation is groom-
> ing itself for taking over the political control
> of Independent African States hitherto fought
> for and liberated by an older generation now in
> its afternoon...With all the responsibilities
> [laid upon] the only university in a [young
> African country like Zambia it would be a]
> tragic day when society as a whole begins to
> regard the University student as a dirty, shift-
> less, no-patriot, existing solely for himself,
> under the guise of campus radicalism. [89]

Wina's address followed a widely publicised demand by the

student union for increased government bursaries, which

aroused considerable resentment from governmental circles

with one junior minister reported in the press as saying that

'students want to compete with ministers'. Wina made refer-

ence to the student demands reminding them of the mass poverty

which still persists amongst the majority of the population.

> But even granting that there is a case to answer
> here, the procedure followed by the student
> organisation perhaps even raises more resentment
> than the amount of money involved - I am talking
> about the weapon of protest marches and demon-
> strations from a community which is supposed to
> set examples to society, particularly in an
> African society...the attitude adopted so far
> has been unfortunate, for a public display of
> indignation on your part for increased allow-
> ances amidst a population whose per capita
> income is a mere K186 and in which 21,820 people
> share one doctor degrades you in the eyes of the
> very public which looks up to you with a venera-
> tion which is sometimes uncalled for.[90]

The students must set an example of selflessness and sacrifice,

particularly as they will be the leaders of tomorrow, upon

whom the nation's future will depend. The view expressed here

represents a more sophisticated version of Nkama regarding

students as an 'incipient élite' 'leaders of tomorrow'. Many

in the party, of course, do not accept that students are

tomorrow's leaders asserting that their own claim to leader-

ship is of a higher order of legitimacy than that of the

'élitist', 'unpatriotic', 'subversive' student. Only an est-

ablished leader in the political élite can afford to suggest

that students are the leaders of the future. As Wina himself

said at question time.

> The student organisation here regards itself as
> an encircled enemy, and you are not breaking
> through that shell. Other people - the ones
> they are referring to - and I know this feeling
> exists in government circles, they are people
> you are referring to, think that the university
> student is something that is completely out of
> Zambia. So this coolness has been existing and
> I think it is important for both the progres-
> sive students at this university and the pro-
> gressive people in government circles to be
> able to bridge the gap.[91]

The more established the leader the more he can afford

and therefore the more likely he is to tolerate what might

appear to jeopardise the positions of those lower in the

political hierarchy. Those who themselves have been re-
cruited through the educational system, rather than the party,
to the central political system - a small minority which
tends to dominate the ministerial ranks - are inclined to be
more sympathetic to the student's demands, interests and
political pursuits. However those on other rungs in the party
hierarchy, who have had to leave school at an early age, may
regard students as a potential long-term threat to their
future. To them any political involvement by students is
interpreted as a direct challenge to the supremacy of the
party in political affairs. They wish to resist any attempts
by the students to gain access to the party apparatus, fearing
that students may be permitted to enter at higher levels and
thus put pay to their own opportunities for upward mobility.
Local UNIP officials may be expected to be the most virulent
in their attacks on students insisting that they 'stick to
their studies and keep their noses out of politics', while
Kaunda, Kapwepwe, Wina and a few other leaders with
'intellectual' backgrounds would like to see students more in-
volved in national development under the aegis of the party.[92]

The Perceptions towards Students within the 'Subject' Classes.

The antipathy of party officials towards students can be
a powerful influence in the formation and articulation of an
anti-student public opinion, particularly in the towns.
Sikota Wina was very frank on this point.

> Give us the facts and say this is why we are
> protesting, and we will find a solution. But
> my main fear is that if this controversy over
> university bursaries is going to continue, I
> think you might gradually find other groups
> of people mobilising other people who might
> think that K40 is too much. K40 is not much

> money. But if you keep shouting [that] you want
> even K10, you might find other people organising
> people to say, 'You see, you are having nothing
> to eat. These people at the University, they
> are now demanding K10 - the University has
> become a trade union'.[93]

And again later in the evening,

> I think you must find yourselves, the political
> party which is in the majority, and which some
> of you don't support but which is in the major-
> ity, is very easily in a position where they can
> mobilise...public opinion, to say that students
> (noise) - I'm not threatening, I'm saying to you
> a fact because these are the things (much noise
> and boos) which I hear as I travel around the
> countryside and I hear what people talk about...
> When I came here some friends of mine told me:
> "Look. Those chaps are not important at all and
> the earlier it is made clear to them the better
> ...."[94]

Officials have been known to threaten to organise UNIP Youth
to march on to the campus,[95] and earlier in this chapter it
was noted that a similar threat was voiced by the Lusaka UNIP
officials. Following the publication in the press of an open
letter to the President from the student union executive -
widely interpreted as arrogant and insulting - criticising him
for the manner in which he was conducting his foreign policy,
nation-wide demonstrations in nearly all the towns were staged
in opposition to the students, suggesting that there is an
underlying hostility towards the students from many quarters
of society, not only from those in the party.

These feelings may be interpreted as a form of embryo
class antagonism of the masses towards those who are reaping
and will reap the advantages of a 'superior' education. The
colonial heritage has made it very clear how necessary formal
education and articulateness in English were in moving into
the higher strata and the continuing emphasis on education as
a criterion of recruitment to better paid jobs has only

accentuated its importance. In clashes with students, police
have been seen to go out of their way to 'beat up' defence-
less students.[96] However, such actions of individual
constables in the 'riots' of 1970 and 1971 were often stimu-
lated by the contempt in which they were held by students mak-
ing derogatory remarks about their 'illiteracy' and 'ignorance'.[97]
Nyirenda, in the passage already quoted, spoke of the general
view of students as 'people who think they know better because
of their academic education', and it is certainly nearer the
truth than Nyirenda was prepared to admit in the National
Assembly. Such beliefs in the superior judgment, opinions and
actions of the 'educated' man have given rise to widespread
resentment, amongst those who have not had the opportunities
of education. Lipset has made the following perceptive remarks.

> ....It is clearly necessary for men in politics to
> try to demolish the strength of opposition views,
> and the very fact that the intellectuals have
> always claimed that their superior education and
> intelligence make their views important has
> tempted those who have disagreed with them, in
> both Europe and America, to resort to anti-
> intellectualism. The masses nowhere have real
> understanding of or sympathy for the problems of
> intellectual life, and they can be roused against
> intellectuals as part of their general resentment
> against the advantages of the more privileged and
> powerful. Engels noted how, in the early days of
> the European Socialist movement, it was possible
> for anarchist and other left-wing opponents of
> Marx to foster among Communist workers "ineradic-
> able suspicion against any schoolmaster, journa-
> list, and any man generally who was not a manual
> worker as being an 'erudite' who was out to
> exploit them." And David Riesman has correctly
> observed that political anti-intellectualism may
> be regarded as a form of the "class struggle"
> reflecting the fact that various groups "feel
> threatened by...the growth of intellectualism,"
> and the powerful enemy is "no longer only bankers,
> lawyers, drummers...[but also] professors,
> teachers, writers, and artists."[98]

Public hostility towards student involvement in politics in
the United States of America has been recorded in an opinion

poll conducted amongst Californians towards student protests in that State during 1964 and early 1965.

> The California Poll has recently completed a survey of public opinion throughout the state and finds that 92 per cent of the adult public has heard or read something about the demonstrations, and 74 per cent of the public takes a disapproving attitude towards them.[99]

Even though the public may be easily aroused to express hostility towards students in some contexts, in other contexts the worker or villager will express deference towards the student. For example, students were usually accorded the greatest respect when they were working with or interviewing mineworkers.[100] Interestingly, miners were frequently unwilling to be interviewed in the second half of the month when they would have no money to 'entertain' the student at the taverns. Again miners were often reluctant to have their interviews conducted at their home because they were embarrassed about their overcrowded concrete shacks which the mines provided as homes. It appeared that the students coming from the University of Zambia were identified with government, and miners would inform the students to tell President Kaunda what misery they were living in. 'It is good you are doing these studies, because now the government will know what conditions we are living in'. The university itself appeared to the workers as an extra-special school closely linked to government. When it was decided to build the University just after Independence local UNIP officials were asked to collect funds from the people as a contribution towards the costs. The nation-wide appeal for funds was publicised as being for the construction of a 'people's university' from which the future leaders of the country would be recruited, and where

they would study.

Political leaders still refer to the sacrifices of the
people of Zambia which made possible the construction of the
university.[101] The students therefore must be grateful for
the sacrifices that have been made and are being made by the
taxpayer to enable them to study and enter a 'privileged'
élite. Political involvement and criticism is not seen as
the inevitable consequence of establishing a university commun-
ity, or as student commitment to national development, but
rather as a sign of arrogance and 'élitism' stemming from an
inflated view of their importance. In the eyes of the public,
learning and political activity are two totally independent
and separate activities, the one is not the logical product
of the other.[102] These views are little different from the
views of the British public or the American public when, for
example, they have been confronted with student political
activity in recent years, the difference being that they are
not held so tenaciously by the political élites in these
countries.[103]

The difference devolves on the very low proportion of
graduates in the Zambian political élite, and the pressure
from the party to ensure that graduates are not favoured in
the recruitment to the political élite by virtue of their
education. In those societies where the vast majority of
members of the ruling class have attended university, and
where university education is an accepted and even preferred
qualification for entry to the party organisation, students
do not pose any long term threat and their political activ-
ities are therefore more easy to tolerate.[104] Such a univer-
sity educated leadership would also be more sympathetic to

student involvement in public issues and would perhaps regard
such involvement as a healthy rather than pathological sign.

In a society where the leadership has passed through
university themselves it is more difficult for them to argue
that students should be grateful to society for their educa-
tion and should express that gratitude by supporting the in-
cumbent leadership. Rather in such societies university
education is regarded in the same light as primary education
is in Zambia - namely a right to which all those who fulfil
the necessary qualifications are entitled. Where the view of
university education as a right rather than a privilege pre-
vails amongst the rulers, so the anti-intellectual, anti-
student sentiments to be found amongst the lower classes are
less likely to be exploited as a weapon to contain student
oppositionalism and politicisation.

In a society such as Zambia where the leadership is faced
with problems of maintaining national unity, where dissonant
forces are continually threatening to dismember the nation and
where there is a prevailing insecurity within the political
élite arising partly out of the nature in which it took over
the reins of power so the threshold level of criticism is much
lower than in the more self confident and established nations
of the West. The idea of academic freedom and the critical
function of the university is more widely accepted in European
societies, but even there, there are definite limits upon the
extent of opposition that will be tolerated. The different
stresses under which a nation must function particularly as
they affect the political élite and the legitimacy accorded to
opposition in the political system[105] are important determin-
ants of the upper tolerance limits of student oppositional
politics.

Ashby has emphasized the importance of convention in
safeguarding the academic freedom and by implication the
right of free criticism.

> What is sometimes overlooked in Africa is that in
> Europe - even in Britain - and in America it is
> the conventions, not the constitutions, of univ-
> ersity government which provide the real safe-
> guards for academic freedom...When universities
> are exported, these conventions are unlikely to
> be exported with them; and this has been the
> cause of some difficulties in the universities of
> tropical Africa.[106]

All these factors - the level of education prevalent in
the political élite, stresses within the society itself and
the degree of institutionalisation of a code of behaviour
mutually acceptable to the government and the university -
determine the probability that public opinion will be aroused
against the student.

STUDENTS AND ELITES IN AFRICA.

There is a tradition in the studies of African societies
to refer to the upper strata as constituting an élite.[107]
Thus, African students have been variously referred to as an
'incipient élite',[108] a 'presumptive élite',[109] an 'educated
élite',[110] an 'aspirant élite',[111] etc. There has been some
considerable debate and confusion over the meaning to be
attached to the concept of élite and little consistency in
its use. It is proposed therefore to first consider the con-
cept and then to examine its place in studies of students in
African nations.

The Concept of an Elite.

In its traditional usage, originating in the work of Pareto and Mosca, the dimension of power was invoked as an integral element in the definition of the élite concept. Its extension to the upper strata of African society before their succession to political rule was, therefore, discontinuous with its traditional connotations in political sociology. This prompted social scientists to redefine the concept so that it more closely approximated to the 'situation' of the high status groups in the African societies, namely those who possessed an advanced Western education or who were rulers in traditional African societies. Nadel, who was one of the first to adapt the concept to the African context, defined a social élite as,

> a body of persons enjoying a position of pre-
> eminence over all others...[having] some degree
> of corporateness, group character, and
> exclusiveness. There must be barriers to
> admission...Above all, the pre-eminent position
> must be regarded, by the members of the élite
> as well as the rest of society, as belonging to
> the former not fortuitously, because of some
> possession, experience or interest they happen
> to share, but by right - by a corporate right
> which is not within the reach of everyone...As
> I see it, a high status group functions as an
> élite only if two further conditions are satis-
> fied: its superiority must be of a very general
> kind, and it must be imitable.[112]

Lloyd[113] has added one further dimension, namely that the élite should be an innovating body of persons. In the African context he considers an élite as denoting those who are Western educated and wealthy.[114] It is as "purveyors of modernity"[115] that in Lloyd's view they are innovating. Whether in fact African students may be regarded as a social élite rests on their pre-eminent position in the field of

education being regarded as a "corporate right" and their
superiority being of a general kind i.e. "the various inter-
ests, achievements, characteristic manners, and the moral
outlook of the [students being] regarded...as qualities
valued and judged desirable."[116] Though such a description
may fit Ghanaian students in 1955, in view of what has already
been said in respect of the status of the Zambian student and
his relations with other sections of the population it would
be difficult to categorise him as a member of a social élite.

　　With Independence and the emergence of an African
political 'élite', the concept of social élite is no longer so
commonly invoked and the traditional usage of the élite con-
cept, embracing a strong component of power, has been restored.
Following Mills' definition of the power élite as

> composed of men whose positions enable them to
> transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary
> men and women; they are in position to make
> decisions having major consequences,[117]

Barkan considers the feature distinguishing élites from the
rest of African society is their involvement in 'high level
decision making'.[118] In many of the political studies of
African students, Lasswell's definition of élite is implicitly
if not explicitly used,

> The power élite, in common with all élites, is
> influential; it differs in having severe
> sanctions at its disposal.[119]

　　Sociologists however have been reluctant to totally
abandon the concept of social élite. Thus Goldthorpe in his
study of Makerere students speaks of an educated élite. He
however introduces an interesting distinction between class
and élite.

> However one defines the term, African families
> are certainly not small, and the family is not
> the unit of social class in the same way as it
> is in the West, so that it is sometimes better
> to speak of an élite (of individuals) rather
> than a class (of families).[120]

By defining the family as the basic unit of class, the concept

becomes inapplicable in the African context because of the

extremes of poverty and wealth which coexist within the single

African family. The élite concept, on the other hand, which

takes the individual as its basic unit, is equally applicable

to Africa as it is to any other society referring, as

Bottomly defined it, to

> functional, mainly occupational, groups which
> have high status (for whatever reason) in a
> society.[121]

In focusing on the family as the distinctive basic element in

the notion of class, its universality and much of its ana-

lytical significance, as contained for example in Marxist

theory, evaporates without offering any theoretical framework

to take its place.

Henceforth, this paper will adopt a Marxist concept of

ruling class whose

> dominant position...is to be explained by its
> possession of the major instruments of
> economic production but its political domin-
> ance is consolidated by the hold which it
> establishes over military force and over the
> production of ideas.[122]

The relation between family and ruling class becomes an

empirical question which introduces such problems as surround

social mobility, recruitment to the ruling class, etc. While

still retaining the notion of class, the élite concept can be

introduced to enrich the analysis of the ruling class itself.

In such a conceptual scheme the élite is defined as a status

group within the ruling class, which can then be looked upon
as comprising a set of parallel élites including the military,
the government administrators, political leaders, and the
economic directors.[123] The segmentation of the ruling class
will be apparent to the extent that there are few linkages
between élites, little overlapping membership, differential
patterns of recruitment, competing élite interests rather
than common class interests, etc. One would speak of ruling
'élites' rather than a ruling 'class' to the extent that the
ruling class is divided into competing, non-interacting,
sharply differentiated élites. But both concepts are valid
tools of analysis in any society except the 'stateless' or in
which there is an equitable distribution of economic resources.
Which is the more appropriate depends on the problem at issue.
Thus an examination of the relationship between the rulers and
the ruled might see class as being of primary significance,
whereas an examination of the ruling class itself might make
use of the élite concept.

Amongst the élites which comprise the ruling class, there
are usually one or more dominant members with a decisive in-
fluence on the behaviour of the ruling class as a whole.[124]
In the Zambian context this core of the ruling class would be
the political élite representing the highest levels in the
party organisation and the few recruited to the cabinet from
other élites. It is the political élite which takes the
initiative in decision-making, and is able to enforce its
decisions through the coercive machinery of the state. It is
on the political élite that pressure is exerted by other
élites and sub-élites, waiting in the wings to take their
places in the ruling class, and it is the political élite

which serves as the pre-eminent reference group, both of comparative and normative types,[125] for all sections of Zambian society.

Studies of Students which Invoke the Elite Concept.

In the actual studies of African students relatively little attention has been directed to a precise and 'operational' definition of élite. The question of definition was easily avoided because such studies often concerned themselves with the attitudes and social origins of students considered as an isolated section of society. Little serious attempt was made to place them in their present and future roles in the social structure or examine their relations to other groups in society. Were this to be accomplished possibly many of the assumptions implicit in these studies would be modified and concepts such as élite, as it refers to students, would be refined.

Prior to Independence, the study of students was likely to focus on their status as a 'new' or 'Western' élite, usually confining their attention to a study of attitudes and social origins. Writers even then justified their studies by reference to the important role students were destined to play in the future of their countries. Jahoda introduces his social background study of Ghanaian students with these words.

> These students form the subject of the present study; many of them are likely to attain key positions in the country; they form the nucleus of a new élite, and the question of their origins therefore appears important.[126]

One of the most impressive studies in this area, that conducted by Goldthorpe,[127] considers all the students who passed through Makerere between 1922 and 1960 in terms of their

social origins. He also conducted an attitude survey amongst
those who were attending the College in 1954, 1958 and 1959,
together with a follow-up survey amongst students who had
left college in the thirties. Referring to the prominent
place of Makerere students in public life, he writes:

> It [Makerere] embodied African hopes for the
> future in a manner which has endowed it with a
> unique prestige; and while it would be too
> much to suggest that former students of the
> College made up the whole of the African
> élite, they constituted so substantial a
> part of it that a study of the social back-
> ground, careers, and adjustment is of some
> importance in understanding the general pro-
> cesses of social change in the three East
> African countries.[128]

In the field of political science and political develop-
ment, studies of African students have similarly accepted the
assumption that some students at least are destined to be the
future leaders of their nations and therefore any examination
of their aspirations and political attitudes is of consider-
able importance. Marvick, for example, introduces his
analysis of the social and political attitudes amongst stu-
dents at Fourah Bay College, Sierra Leone, as follows:

> For the next generation, however, the calibre
> of African leaders will depend on the young
> people who are today busy acquiring their
> certificates of higher education, either
> overseas or in African universities. Tomorrow,
> they will be the professional men, the govern-
> mental and community leaders - whether
> politicized or philistine - of still "new
> states".
>
> To be sure, their apprenticeships in public
> life will come only after they leave college.
> But something can be guessed of the contribu-
> tion they will make or fail to make by exam-
> ining their perspectives and interests while
> still students: by studying their attitudes
> towards traditional society, toward their
> careers and their academic preparation for
> careers, toward the student community and the
> communities to which they will soon return,
> toward the nation's symbolic political strug-
> gles and toward the substantive problems of
> modernization that await solution.[129]

Finlay opens his paper on Ghanaian student politics with the
following words:

> University students in Ghana, like those in other
> developing nations, are an incipient élite des-
> tined to hold political power in the future....[130]

and Hanna begins another paper with the assumption that stu-
dents

> constitute _the_ reservoir from which future
> national political leaders will be drawn.[131]
> (Italics are mine)

Such assumptions were not always compatible with the as-
pirations and attitudes expressed in the analyses which
followed. Thus Jahoda's study of Ghanaian students revealed
that none wished to enter politics immediately after graduat-
ing, while 8% aimed to enter politics within twenty years of
leaving university.[132] Both Finlay's studies of Ghanaian
students and Goldthorpe's of East African students revealed
similar patterns. Somewhat at variance with the latter
studies, Hanna found nearly half of the students at the
University of Ibadan expecting to be active in politics after
leaving university, but that, of course, is very different
from becoming a 'national political leader'.[133] Marvick dis-
covered similar degrees of student interest in local politics
after graduation.

> Only about one in every four or five would say
> that he expected to be simply a "good citizen",
> giving moral or financial support to "worthy
> causes." There was a middle ground, especially
> at the level of community affairs; one could be
> a "civic leader" without being a "politician."
> It was this role that appealed to two out of
> three Creole and Ibo students; among Yoruba,
> however, such a distinction was less meaningful.
> More than a third intended to be local poli-
> ticians; only an additional third planned to be
> civic leaders.[134]

If the political scientists attach so much significance to the attitudes and aspirations of students as affecting their future role and role performance then the expression of antipathy towards 'politics' noted in all the studies but statistically significant in the studies of Ghanaian and East African students puts in doubt the assumptions upon which the studies are based. Only Marvick's study is free from such a fallacy since his definition of a leader refers not specifically to a career or occupation but the general role in the community, as an 'influential'[135] or opinion leader, whereas the other studies interpret political leadership as decision-making at the national level.

Barkan's study of East African students takes expressed attitudes and aspirations as his starting point.

> To determine the type of role students will
> probably play following their graduation from
> college, the members of the sample were asked
> to respond to questions which focused on their
> conceptions of success, their career plans -
> both for the immediate future and the long run,
> their conceptions of authority and legitimacy,
> and their stereotypes of several groups which
> are usually regarded as élite.[136]

Not surprisingly he comes to conclusions that contradict the assumptions of earlier studies.

> Rather than wanting to exercise power by mak-
> ing decisions which will affect the lives of
> many of their countrymen, most East African
> university students prefer to implement the
> decisions of others. Rather than wanting to
> innovate new policies to deal with the myriad
> of problems confronting their countries most
> students want merely security for themselves
> and their families. Though they realise that
> courage to accept risks is a distinguishing
> characteristic of leadership, they themselves
> want to avoid taking any risks.[137]

But he concludes in an apparently contradictory fashion:

> It might be more appropriate, therefore, to
> describe students as an emergent upper-middle
> class instead of accepting the well worn
> cliché that they will be the leaders of
> tomorrow. Though many members of the future
> social, administrative and political élites
> will have been university students, most
> students do not think and behave as if they
> are anticipating such status.[138]

The difference between Barkan and the other analysts is not

so great as at first appears since he does assume that many

members of the 'power élite' will be university graduates.

He is suggesting, perhaps, that there is a difference between

members of an élite who all engage in high level decision-

making and the leaders. In that case the distinguishing fea-

ture is perceptions of roles and of role performance rather

than merely the role itself. Students in East Africa are un-

likely to be the 'leaders of tomorrow' not because they will

not occupy the appropriate roles but because they don't

express those attitudes characteristic of leaders. Yet at

the end of his article he writes, paradoxically;

> To conclude, it would seem that East African
> students should not be regarded as a presump-
> tive élite so much as an emergent upper-
> middle class. They will achieve this status
> because entrance into most of East Africa's
> high status and high salaried occupation is
> virtually dependent on high educational
> qualifications alone. _Entrance into East
> Africa's various élites, however, requires
> additional qualifications, the most basic of
> which is an interest in participating in the
> making of high level decisions. At the
> present time, students do not possess this
> interest, and it is not likely that they
> will develop one in the immediate future un-
> less events change dramatically in their
> countries._[139]

        (Italics are mine)

The confusion, typical of studies that limit their area

of inquiry to student attitudes, may be partly attributed to

the failure to refer attitudes and aspirations to forces in the social structure. Present attitudes cannot be extrapolated into the future with a view to gauging future attitudes, future roles and future role performances without reference to the social forces which mould them. To suggest, as Barkan seems to, that entrance of students into the East African élites, is dependent on their exhibiting an interest in participating in high level decision-making ignores the very much more important factor of recruitment patterns. What opportunities has the student, attitudes apart, for choosing his career? Even if he were inclined to high level decision-making would he be admitted to the appropriate élites? In Zambia, as has been shown earlier in the chapter, positions involving high level decision making, are unlikely to be filled by students if the determination of present incumbents to remain in 'power' persists or if recruitment policies continue to place students at a disadvantage, vis-à-vis the party loyalists. Thus the lack of interest in major decision making may be regarded as a realistic assessment of the opportunities available to the student and may be viewed as a mode of anticipatory socialisation.[140]

Apart from Goldthorpe's study, the above papers fail to examine the patterns of recruitment to the various élites - however defined.[141] But even Goldthorpe's analysis of graduate occupations is not entirely satisfactory since his interest is in the progression and diffusion of graduates throughout society. He does not assess the relative importance of Makerere as one of a number of 'reservoirs' from which members of the élites are recruited. For example, what proportion of the members of parliament, cabinet etc. are

graduates of Makerere. Lloyd has made some general comments
concerning recruitment patterns.

> Those attaining ministerial rank in governments
> tend to be among the better educated. The
> politicians have usually attained their educa-
> tional qualifications, and hence élite member-
> ship, before becoming politically active, and
> certainly these qualifications are not rewards
> for political service. Yet, as political
> parties develop their organisation down to the
> village level, as the central party secretariat
> takes over some of the functions of the civil
> service, and as promotion to this secretariat
> from the lower ranks in the party hierarchy is
> made on the basis of political loyalty, so
> does the party become an avenue of mobility
> into the élite. It is an avenue most likely to
> be utilised by those who have been frustrated,
> by lack of ability or finance, in educational
> advancement. Such development of party organ-
> isation seems to be found in two contrasting
> situations. In Ghana, for instance, the
> original appeal of the C.P.P. was mainly to the
> 'verandah boys', the less-well educated clerks
> and teachers; the better educated élite was, in
> the 1960's, apathetic towards the party, and
> thus seen by the political leaders to be an
> opposed group. In Tanzania and Guinea the ab-
> sence of a cadre of trained African administra-
> tive officers has prompted the development of
> party organs to fill the gap at the village and
> district levels.[142]

Earlier in this chapter the recruitment patterns to the
United National Independence Party showed only nine members
of parliament as having degrees, that is approximately 10%,
and, not surprisingly, not one of these were graduates of the
University of Zambia. To the extent that such recruitment
patterns persist, students will not be the 'political leaders
of tomorrow' and their apparent withdrawal from the ambition
to high level decision-making is consistent with their pre-
determined future as a 'professional class'. Starting from
the firmer terrain of the social structure and recruitment
patterns to élites, one can then explore the significance of
the attitudes expressed by the students.

The Aspirations of Zambian Students.

The aspirations of Zambian students closely resemble the aspirations of students in other African countries as revealed in the studies of Goldthorpe, Jahoda et al. Though such a conclusion is based more on participant observation of the students at the University of Zambia it is nevertheless confirmed in a study, conducted during 1969, of the Expectations of Form V Students.[143] Kitwe students in the last year of secondary school were asked to write an essay of two to four pages on the topic "Myself in Ten Years Time". They were asked to include references to their style of life, occupation, family, interests, etc. as they imagined they would be in ten years time. Students were not told that the essays would be used to gauge their expectations of their future. The essays were received and 'content analysed' under a number of items, including anticipated occupation, leisure time activities, relations with kinsmen, possession of material goods, place of living, etc. The conclusions were summarised as follows,

1. The student's desired style of living is essentially European but human relations are still governed to some extent by traditional values.

2. The expectations of the students as described in the essays are unrealistic in a sense that they would not be in a Western, achievement oriented, society. This could lead to unfortunate consequences.

3. Status and wealth were seen to be derived essentially from educational qualifications.

4. The students, uninterested in power, were concerned firstly for their security and welfare of themselves and their family. There was noticeably little idealism or nationalism.

5. Those who were more "rurally oriented"
   seemed to display a higher degree of
   "national consciousness".

6. Amongst the essays there was a marked
   conformity - suggesting that the pro-
   fessional class into which they will
   move will be lacking in original,
   innovatory thought and governed by a
   common set of material values.[144]

A subsequent set of essays received from schools in the rural
areas were not materially different in content. As in the
Kitwe essays, students were oriented to towns and the assoc-
iated style of life. In a personal communication, one
teacher in a rural secondary school pointed to the negligible
appeal of the Young Farmers' Club, vividly contrasting the
popularity of the 'Ball Room Dancing' Club. A similar outlook
characterises the students at the University.

In their dress, life style and desire for material pos-
sessions the students resemble the Western oriented élites.
Whether by reference to the "European" or by reference to the
Zambian élites the student undergoes a process of anticipatory
socialisation in which he adopts the life style and values of
the professional class into which he expects to move. Inter-
esting confirmation of the students' taste in clothing, for
example, comes in their reaction to the European students who
are to be found in 'beat' apparel of long hair, torn vests,
shorts and basket ball boots.

> We know only too well that we are Africans.
> But we are not a synonym to dirt. Thus, those
> of you who come to Africa after orientation
> think that you must look unkempt to measure to
> the national standards are also unwanted.
> Those too who knew us before Independence
> should not be trying to set what they regard
> as African standards since whatever conditions
> we underwent were oppressive and you cannot
> deny you were the oppressors' sympathisers.[145]

A similar view is expressed in the news column of UZ.

> The outside world is set on degrading the Univ-
> ersity. Some people are criticising students
> for dressing like 'Hippies' or Thugs. They say
> students go down Town in dirty Jeans and Minis,
> displaying uncombed and unwashed hair. This
> issue was also discussed on TVZ. [Television
> Zambia]

> Student reaction has been to scoff at these
> allegations, 'because UNZA students are some of
> the cleanest students in the World'. Here
> suits are still 'in' and washing is not con-
> sidered 'square'. The students asked the
> accusers to look at the modern American or
> British university students to see what being a
> Hippie is like.[146]

In the examination of the relations between workers and stud-
ents, evidence will be adduced to indicate that the student
already looks upon them from the standpoint of a dominant
class. The students adopt, to the extent that their income
permits, a style of life which is in accord with their antici-
pated status as a member of a professional class at present
dominated by expatriates.

The Myth of Students as 'Leaders of Tomorrow'.

If, indeed, students are not destined to hold positions
in the political élite in the near future, if the recruitment
patterns are designed to exclude students, and if in any case
only a tiny minority could conceivably occupy such positions
as high level decision-makers, then why do national political
leaders (not to mention political scientists) continue to
refer to students as the 'leaders of tomorrow', a presumptive
élite, an incipient élite, etc.? Any ruling class perpe-
trates a set of myths which justifies the subjection of the
ruled to the rulers. Thus the workers are exhorted to work
harder for the spurious goal of the 'national good'. To

justify the continual censorship of the worker and his sub-
jection to the dictates of management, government has promoted
the myth of worker indolence, and worker indiscipline. Simi-
lar views have been promulgated about the student, that he too
makes insufficient contributions to the national goals, des-
pite the sacrifices made on his behalf by the common man.

> But, I would be less than honest if I pretended
> that you, the students, have all done as much as
> was possible to you to involve yourselves in the
> betterment of the welfare of your fellow men...
> This university is the result of an enthusiastic
> response of all sections of our community, rich
> and poor, to the appeal for financial support...
> That enthusiasm for the national good is not
> being matched now in the university by an equal
> determination among all the students to leave
> not just the university, but the country as a
> whole, better than they found it when they
> entered the university... It is not too much for
> society to expect the student body to be fired
> by a missionary zeal; it is not too much for
> society to expect and hope that students, who
> owe it so much, will see fit to take an interest
> in the social and educational problems of their
> fellow men....[147]

This is the most frequent moral assault on the students, but
there is, too, another less self-righteous but more benevolent
approach, associated with the inevitable process of genera-
tional mobility. The students, so the myth informs us, will
be the leaders of tomorrow. Therefore they should set an
example to the rest of society in the way they behave, that is
they should behave responsibly pursuing the 'national good'.
There are also implications in this argument that the student
has no need to question the system or the leaders of today
since they, the students, will be soon taking over. Their
interests are identical with the incumbent leadership, namely
the preservation of the status quo. These assertions by those
who control the avenues to power inevitably evoke counter-
assertions and counter-myths concerning the nature and

characteristics of the incumbents within the ruling class in particular the political élite.

Whatever the myths and the idiom in which conflict is expressed, the underlying structural features which represent the source of the tension between students and those who control or hope to enter the avenues to political power remain the same, namely competition for those positions which entitle their incumbents to a share of the wealth of the country. Ultimately the tension between students and the remainder of society results either from the fact that they will inevitably enter the higher income brackets or from the potential challenge they present to those who have either managed to enter the ruling class, or are hoping to do so in the near future.

N O T E S.

1. Hall, R., _Zambia_ (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p.1.
2. Computed from, Republic of Zambia, _Statistical Year Book 1970_ (Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, 1971), Table 1.2(b), p.4.
3. There are two major operating companies: Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines is responsible for Rokana Division (Kitwe), Nchanga Division (Chingola), and Konkola Division (Chililabombwe), Roan Consolidated Mines is responsible for Mufulira Division (Mufulira), Luanshya Division (Luanshya) Chambishi and Chibuluma Divisions (Kalalushi). In addition NCCM runs the lead and zinc mine at Kabwe and RCM runs the Ndola Copper Refineries. NCCM was previously owned by Anglo American Corporation and RCM by Roan Selection Trust. With nationalisation Zambian AAC has a 49% share holding in NCCM and RST a 49% holding in RCM.
4. In 1967, for example, copper contributed 52% of Net Domestic Product and 97% of export revenue. RST and AAC, _Mining Year Book of Zambia 1969_ (Kitwe: Copper Industry Service Bureau, 1970), Table 2, p.28.
5. _Statistical Year Book 1970_, op.cit., Table 1.2(b), p.4.
6. _Mining Year Book of Zambia 1969_, op.cit., Table 14, p.42.
7. For an economic analysis of the copper industry see, Baldwin, R. E., _Economic Development and Export Growth: A study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960_ (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966).
8. The distribution of expatriates employed at one mine, NCCM, Rokana Division is shown in Bates, R. H., _Unions, Parties, and Political Development_ (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), Chart 3, p.24.
9. The price fluctuations on the London Metal Exchange and the production of Zambian copper as a proportion of world production is shown in _Mining Year Book of Zambia 1969_, op.cit., Graph II, p.37 and Table 1, p.27.
10. One of the most interesting and revealing books in this connection is Hall, R., _The High Price of Principles_ (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969).
11. Figures are computed from _Statistical Year Book of Zambia 1970_, op.cit., Table 14.1, p.165 and Table 14.8, p.172.
12. See Hall (1969), op.cit., Chapter 6.
13. _Statistical Year Book of Zambia 1970_, op.cit., Table 4.4, p.44.
14. See Young, C. E., "Rural-Urban Terms of Trade," and Maimbo, F. J. M. and Fry, J., "An Investigation into the Change in the Terms of Trade between the Rural and Urban Sectors of Zambia." Both in _African Social Research_, No. 12, December 1971, pp.91-110.
15. International Labour Office, _Report to the Government of Zambia on Incomes, Wages and Prices in Zambia: Policy and Machinery_ (Lusaka: Cabinet Office, 1969), p.9. The report was written by Professor H. A. Turner, Montague Burton Professor of Industrial Relations at the University of Cambridge, United Kingdom.
16. Hall writes,
     The Copperbelt was the milch cow and Northern Rhodesia suffered a net loss in the years 1953-63 of nearly

£100,000,000 - the bulk of which was used to develop Southern Rhodesia and the rest to prop Nyasaland. As though this were not enough, when the £280,000,000 Federal debt was divided up at the end of 1963, Northern Rhodesia was saddled with £96,000,000 - for which it had relatively little to show in the way of assets; it was more than five times the territory's national debt in 1953.

Hall, 1969, op.cit., p.61.

17. Republic of Zambia, Manpower Report (Lusaka: Cabinet Office, 1966), p.1.

18. Mwanakatwe, J. M., The Growth of Education in Zambia since Independence (Lusaka: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.35.

19. The targets may be summarised in projected enrolment figures included in the First National Development Plan.

Enrolments (Number of children).

	Actual, 1963	Actual, 1966	Planned, 1970
Primary	342,125	455,000	699,000
Secondary	6,525	16,910	51,000
University	Nil	312	1,665

These figures are taken from Statistical Year Book of Zambia 1970, op.cit., Table I, p.158. For further details of the plan and the difficulties it was confronting in the first two years see Mwanakatwe, op.cit.

20. Statistical Year Book of Zambia 1970, op.cit., Table 3.8(a), 3.8(b) and 3.8(c), pp.32-4.

21. Manpower Report, op.cit., p.35.

22. Figures are taken from the addresses by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zambia at the first, second and third graduation ceremonies.

23. Ibid.

24. In 1970, 79% of the students were on Zambian Government Bursaries. In 1971, the corresponding figure was 76%. (Figures supplied by the Computor Centre and Registrar's Office.) For an outline of the quotas for the different fields of study see Mwanakatwe, op.cit., pp.193-4.

25. In August, 1969 considerable publicity was given in the Zambia Mail to mental disturbances amongst students who had been forced to do courses they were not interested in. Dr. Nunn the government psychiatrist at Chainama Hills Hospital said that in 1969 alone 'he was treating 10 to 15 students, some of whom got upset as a result of their courses.' Zambia Mail, 22 August, 1969. There was also an editorial on the matter in the Zambia Mail, 29 August, 1969.

26. Manpower Report, op.cit., Table II.3, p.14.

27. Computed from Republic of Zambia, Census of Population and Housing 1969, First Report (Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, 1970), Table 27, p.B43.

28. Ibid.

29. For a reversal of a judicial decision, see Skinner Affair. Times of Zambia and Zambia Mail for period 16-19 July, 1969 and Zambia Mail, 24 September 1969. Also Economist, 19 July 1969.

30. For an analysis of the relations between the legislature and the executive see Tordoff, W. and Molteno, R., Parliament (To be published in a forthcoming book on Zambian politics.)

31. Scott, I. and Molteno, R., "The Zambian General Election," _Africa Report_ 14, No. 1, 1969, pp.42-6, and Young, R. A., "The 1968 General Elections," in Davies, D. H. (ed.), _Zambia in Maps_ (London: University of London Press, 1971) pp.52-55.

32. Young, _op.cit._, p.52.

33. Scott and Molteno, _op.cit._, p.44. Also data kindly provided by Ralph Young of Manchester University.

34. Caplan, G. L., "Barotseland: the Secessionist Challenge to Zambia," _Journal of Modern African Studies_, Vol. 6, No. 3, October 1968, pp.342-60.

35. Molteno, R., _Zambia and the One Party State_ (MS for university course PA210-Public Administration PA210/71/176, 1971), p.2.

36. See _Daily Mail_ and _Times of Zambia_, 5 February 1972.

37. See Rasmussen, T., "Political Competition and One Party Dominance in Zambia," _Journal of Modern African Studies_, October, 1969.

38. Rotberg, R. I., "Tribalism & Politics in Zambia," _Africa Report_, December 1967, pp.29-34. Also Mulford, D. C., _Zambia: The Politics of Independence 1957-1964_ (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), especially pp.329-330 and _passim_.

39. This analysis follows Molteno (1971), _op.cit._, p.6.

40. Scott, I., _Party Bureaucratic Relations and the Process of Development in Zambia_ (Unpublished MS, 1971), pp.9-10.

41. _Ibid._, p.11.

42. _Ibid._, pp.2-7.

43. Bates, _op.cit._, particularly Chapter seven, pp.126-65.

44. Parsons, T., _The Social System_ (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), p.25.

45. Conversations with Kasuka Matukwa.

46. Such a policy of depoliticisation has been noted by other commentators in reference to other countries. See for example Weiner, M., _The Politics of Scarcity_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), Chapter VII.

47. Mwanakatwe, J., Opening speech at the First National Congress of the National Union of Zambia Students, Oppenheimer College, 12 December 1964.

48. In other African countries the appearance of party branches supported from outside suggests either a greater willingness on the part of government to tolerate student participation in the national political arena, or the desire to regulate student political activity.

49. Scott, I., _The UNIP Organisation and Recruitment to Central Political Positions_ (Unpublished MS, 1970), p.1.

50. _Ibid._, pp.3-4.

51. _Ibid._, p.5.

52. _Ibid._, pp.6-7.

53. _Ibid._, p.8.

54. Subramaniam, V., _The Social Background of Zambia's Higher Civil Servants and Undergraduates_ (Unpublished paper delivered at the University Social Science Conference, Nairobi, December, 1969), Table 4.

55. _UZ_, 20 September 1971.

56. For a detailed analysis of the problems of Zambianisation on the mines see Burawoy, M., _Zambianisation: A Study of the Localisation of a Labour Force_ (Unpublished MS, Lusaka, 1971), particularly Chapter IV.

57. See Gouldner, A. W., "Organisational Analysis," in
Merton, R. K., Broom, L. and Cottrell, L. S. (eds.),
Sociology Today - Problems and Prospects (New York:
Basic Books, 1959), pp.400-428.
58. Opinion Poll One, Question 12.
59. Opinion Poll One, Question 13.
60. Opinion Poll Four, Question 11.
61. Press Release by the Publicity Secretary, NUZS concerning
the Third Congress of the National Union of Zambia
Students held at the University of Zambia from 2nd to 3rd
September.
62. Times of Zambia, 17 January 1967.
63. Times of Zambia, 18 January 1967.
64. Times of Zambia, 19 January 1967.
65. Zambia Mail, 21 January 1967.
66. Times of Zambia, 21 January, 1967.
67. Times of Zambia, 24 January 1967.
68. Times of Zambia, 3 February, 1967.
69. Times of Zambia, 25 January, 1967.
70. Mwanakatwe, J., Speech at Munali Secondary School, 1
April 1967.
71. Times of Zambia, 4 April 1967.
72. National Union of Zambia Students, Resolutions of the
Fifth Annual Congress of the National Union of Zambia
Students, 23 September 1968, paragraph 6.
73. Matakala, M., Address to the Seventh Annual Congress of
the National Union of Zambia Students, 22 August 1970.
74. In Tanzania the national service met with severe opposi-
tion from the students, leading to the closure of the
university and the suspension of 300 students in 1966.
Minerva, Volume V Number 3, Spring 1967, pp.451-2.
75. Opinion Poll Two, Question 15.
76. Mwanakatwe, 1968, op.cit., pp.194-5.
77. See Goldthorpe, J. E., An African Elite (East African
Studies 17, East African Institute of Social Research,
Oxford University Press, 1965). Goldthorpe makes the
same point in his conclusion.
    Although we have an idea of how educated men regard
    their kinsfolk, we do not know what their kinsfolk
    think of them; nor do we know enough about how other
    sections of the community view them. (p.85).
78. Mlenga, K. G. (ed.), Who is Who in Zambia (Lusaka:
Zambia Publishing Company, 1968), p.80.
79. Ibid., p.83.
80. Hansard, No. 17, 28 February 1969, Cols. 1365-6.
81. This was at an address Nyirenda gave in October 1971
when he asked the students to try to understand and
tolerate the views prevalent in many circles of the
party towards themselves.
82. Hansard, No. 17, 28 February 1969, cols. 1367-8.
83. Hansard, No. 17, 28 February 1969, col. 1369.
84. Quoted in Ashby, E., Universities: British, Indian, African
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p.291.
85. Hansard, No. 17, 28 February 1969, col. 1373.
86. Hansard, No. 17, 28 February 1969, cols. 1373-4.
87. Kaunda, K., The Challenge of the Generation Gap (Speech
by His Excellency Dr. K. D. Kaunda, Chancellor of the
University of Zambia on the occasion of the graduation
of its second students, on Saturday 6th June, 1970), p.2.

88. Sikota Wina has been one of the most prominent politic-
    ians in the country. At present he is the Minister for
    Information, Broadcasting and Tourism. Though he went
    to Fort Hare University in South Africa he never com-
    pleted his degree, being expelled for political activities.
89. Wina, S., The University and Our National Interests (An
    Address to University of Zambia students on Wednesday
    6 May, 1970) (Zambia Information Service, Background No.
    41/70), p.1 and p.6.
90. Wina, op.cit., p.7.
91. Wina, op.cit. Answer to questions from students. Tape
    Recording.
92. President Kaunda, for example, explicitly complained in
    1969 that
        enthusiasm for the national good is not being matched
        now in the university by an equal determination among
        all the students to leave not just the university,
        but the country as a whole, better than they found it
        when they entered the university...I would be less
        than honest if I pretended that you, the students,
        have all done as much as was possible to you to in-
        volve yourselves in the betterment of the welfare of
        your fellow men.
    (Address by Dr. K. D. Kaunda at the First Graduation
    Ceremony of the University of Zambia, 17 May 1969.)
    Kapwepwe has been the leading politician to come out
    openly in favour of student participation in national
    politics as is witnessed by his call for a branch of UNIP
    on the university campus and the incorporation of nine
    students into important positions in his new party, UPP.
    Mr. Arthur Wina, at that time Minister of Education, ex-
    pressed the following sentiments in Parliament,
        Finally I am hoping that the discussions which are now
        under way with the appropriate authorities of the
        University of Zambia should be able to produce some
        form of national service, that should again enable the
        students of our University to redirect themselves to
        the service of the country and the service of the
        common man.
    Hansard, No. 13, 8 March 1968, col. 848.
93. Wina, op.cit. Answer to questions from students. Tape
    Recording.
94. Ibid.
95. There are at least two occasions. The first was over
    the dispute between Dingiswayo Banda and the NUZS leader-
    ship already referred to. A second instance was over the
    statement made by NUZS President in October 1970 which
    was interpreted as a refusal on the part of students to
    take up their allotted places in the UNIP National Council.
    On this occasion the district governor in Lusaka
    threatened the President of UNZASU with UNIP youth if the
    latter did not conform to UNIP demands.
96. This will be considered in a later section. Suffice it
    to say that police the world over seem to relish the idea
    of butchering students and, if their behaviour at the
    annual demonstrations outside foreign embassies is any-
    thing to go by, then the Zambian police are no exception
    to the rule.

97. During their spell in a prison cell after the demonstration of 1971, students not only launched into a tirade of abuse at the police but scrawled derogatory remarks on the walls to the effect that the police were 'uneducated and illiterate' and needed to be educated in government policy and that Zambia was no longer a colonial regime. The students were delighted when the newspapers of the following day echoed their sentiments.

98. Lipset, S. M., Political Man (London: Mercury Books, 1963), pp.339-40.

99. Field, M. D., "The UC Student Protests: California Poll," in Lipset, S. M. and Wolin, S. S., (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt, (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1965), p.199.

100. During the vacations the writer worked with students on sociological projects on the mines. From conversations with the students and from their field notes the deference they were accorded is apparent.

101. Indeed they do so repeatedly and exaggerate the contribution of the population at large out of proportion as a political tactic to impress upon the students their responsibility to the Zambian population and the importance of placing the interest of the country (which in practice means support of the status quo) above their own narrow interests (which are usually at odds with the status quo).

102. There appears to be a widespread view that the university is a glorified school where students absorb information imparted to them by their teachers. This is the colonial-missionary concept of the school and even amongst students has a considerable influence. The idea that a university is a place of independent and creative thought where information is analysed and interpreted rather than merely absorbed continues to elude those who have never attended a university, which is the vast majority, not only amongst the subject classes but also within the élite. In its public relations the university has been very weak and has failed to present any image of its function and role in society.

103. The difference is well illustrated by Collins and Ben-David who distinguish between those university systems which embrace a well defined and accepted role for students in society and those which don't. In the British system there is close rapport between government and university because those who control both the institutions and the relations between them have been 'socialised' through the same universities and educational processes. In Zambia there is no congruity of educational experience between those who run the university and the leaders of the party and government. See Ben-David, J. and Collins, R., "A Comparative Study of Academic Freedom and Student Politics," in Lipset, S. M., (ed.), Student Politics (New York and London: Basic Books, 1967), pp.199-252.

104. The existence of thriving student wings of political parties in the universities of Western Europe and America suggest that the university rather than being a threat to the party leaders is seen to be an important reservoir for recruitment. Thus for example in 1959 over half of the Members of Parliament in the British House of Commons had degrees. See Sampson, A., Anatomy of Britain Today (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), p.44.

105. See Lipset (1963), _op.cit._, Chapter III, "Social Conflict, Legitimacy, and Democracy," pp.77-96. Also Almond, G. A. and Verba, S., _The Civic Culture_ (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), Chapter IV, "Patterns of Partisanship," pp.85-116.

106. Ashby, E., _African Universities and Western Tradition_ (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p.71.

107. When the word is used in this thesis it is as a 'status group' within the ruling class.

108. See Finlay, D. J., "Students and Politics in Ghana," _Daedalus_, Winter, 1968, p.51.

109. See Marvick, D., "African University Students: A Presumptive Elite" in Coleman, J. S. (ed.), _Education and Political Development_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), Chapter 14, pp.463-97.

110. See Goldthorpe, _op.cit._, Chapter One, pp.1-23.

111. This term owes its origin to my colleague Morris Szeftel and expresses the students desire to enter the élites.

112. Nadel, S. F., "The Concept of Social Elites," _International Social Science Bulletin_, Vol. 8, 1956, pp.415-6.

113. Lloyd, P. C., "Introduction," in Lloyd, P. C. (ed.), _The New Elites of Tropical Africa_ (London: International African Institute, Oxford University Press, 1966), p.50.

114. _Ibid._, p.4.

115. This is the definition which Shils has tended to use in defining intellectuals of the 'new states'. See, for example, Shils, E., "The Intellectuals in Political Development of the New States," in Kautsky, J. H., (ed.), _Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries_ (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), Chapter Four, pp.195-234.

116. Nadel, _op.cit._, p.417.

117. Mills, C. W., _The Power Elite_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p.1.

118. Barkan, J. D., "What makes the East African student run?" _Transition_, Vol. 7, No. 37, 1968, p.26.

119. Lasswell, H. D., "The Study of Political Elites," in Lasswell, H. D. and Lerner, D. (eds.), _World Revolutionary Elites_ (Cambridge, Mass. and London: M.I.T. Press, 1966), p.11.

120. Goldthorpe, _op.cit._, p.48. See also Goldthorpe, J. E., "Educated Africans: some Conceptual and Terminological Problems," in Southall, A., (ed.), _Social Change in Modern Africa_ (London and New York: International African Institute, Oxford University Press, 1961), pp.145-158.

121. Bottomore, T. B., _Elites and Society_ (London: Penguin, 1964), p.14.

122. _Ibid._, p.24.

123. Aron, R., "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," in Coser, L. A. (ed.), _Political Sociology_ (New York and London: Harper Torchbooks 1967), p.61.

124. Shils, E., "The Centre and the Periphery" in Shils, E., _Collected Essays by Edward Shils_ (Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1970), pp.1-14.

125. The analytic distinction between comparative and normative reference groups corresponds to the two functions