

**RELEVANCE OF COMMUNITY RESOURCE BOARDS
TO A JUST DISTRIBUTION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCE
BENEFITS: A CASE STUDY OF MWAPE CHIEFDOM IN
EASTERN ZAMBIA**

BY

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REQUIREMENTS OF MASTERS OF ARTS DEGREE IN
APPLIED ETHICS**

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2009

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APPROVAL

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ABSTRACT

Community Resource Boards (CRBs) are important for the distribution of wildlife resources in Zambia. In 1998 under the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMAGE), and taking into consideration the Wildlife Act (No. 12 of 1998), CRBs were created to work with ZAWA. Digging into history, facts before us are that colonization brought a new dimension to the issues of conservation by creating National Parks (NPs), Game Management Areas (GMAs) and Open Areas (OAs). Zambian law bisected the land into reserves and Crown lands. Reserves were for the natives (indigenous inhabitants) and were governed under customary tenure, and crown land was governed under British law. The natives lost their customary land and user rights to wildlife as they gave way to NPs and did not get any compensation. For example, in Mwape Chiefdom, the creation of GMAs and game ranches resulted in many people inhabiting the fringes of Mvuvye River and Luangwa River posing an environmental problem of river siltation. This has resulted into tension between the local communities and the government. The demise of colonialism has brought a perpendicular turn in restoring the lost user rights to the natives, and CRBs have become a vehicle towards achieving a 50% share of wildlife sales. Wildlife currently belongs to the government as enshrined in the Zambia Wildlife Act.

The CRB in Mwape Chiefdom has a duty like any other CRB in the country to co-manage wildlife resources on behalf of its chiefdom. It is unfortunate that the local CRB is not working effectively and it needs to re-organize itself, to get safari operators to partner with them in the sale of wildlife, and to end its unsettled dispute over the boundary errors with Chisomo CRB. Nevertheless, the conclusion of this research study is that the current government policy on the distribution of wildlife resource benefits is found to be just in the sense that there is a 50-50 share between the concerned parties. However, the government could still empower more the CRBs and revise the Zambia Wildlife Act and ownership of wildlife.

The research is qualitative, descriptive and historical and uses interviews and observations; it is also philosophical in its analysis and applies some environmental ethical theories and John Rawls' theory of justice to the distribution of wildlife resource benefits. Much has been achieved in the area of conservation of wildlife and there are few cases of poaching.

DEDICATION

To my aunt, Mrs Stella Phiri for her love.

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LIST OF SYNONYMS

ADC	Area Development Committee
ADMADE	Administrative Management Design
BSA	British South African Company
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CRBs	Community Resource Boards
GMA's	Game Management Areas
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
LIRDp	Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project
N.E.R.	North Eastern Rhodesia
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Aid for Development
NP's	National Parks
NPWS	National Parks and Wildlife Services
N.W.R.	North Western Rhodesia
OAs	Open Areas
VAGs	Village Action Groups
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society
ZAWA	Zambia Wildlife Authority
ZK	Zambian Kwacha

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

This study is confined to the Nsenga people of Mwape chiefdom who occupy the land in the two administrative districts of Petauke and Nyimba in the Eastern province of Zambia. Geographically, the land which they occupy is in a Game Management Area (GMA). Zambia as a country has 19 National Parks (NPs) and 23 Game Management Areas (GMAs). Both are creations of colonialism. Before colonialism, these people used to share the same habitats with wildlife. However, they were later settled in confined villages. Today, the government of Zambia justifies this move on the grounds of conservation and commercial resource, that is, tourism, a way for the government to raise the mostly needed foreign currency. Conservation in Africa simply means the exclusion of rural people from national parks and forest reserves in the interest of the protection of large animal species and the preservation of habitats (Anderson and Grove, 1987). Colonizers in Southern Africa displaced large sections of the local people to create national parks. This displacement resulted in loss of livestock and homes and the alternative was barren plots in overcrowded reserves (Aylward and Lutz, 2003). At present, the local people feel that they have been separated from the wildlife resources to which they have little access. They cannot hunt as they used to do in the past. If they do so, the law criminalizes them for poaching which is an offence punishable to a jail sentence. This has resulted in the growth of poverty levels and lack of the needed nutrition from wildlife among local people. They are denied their traditional right to use wildlife resources. Wildlife is of instrumental value to the local

community and is a means to achieve their well-being and prosperity. This denial has furthermore diminished the morale of the local people towards conservation of wildlife.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The State created NPs and GMAs and Mwape Chiefdom is under Petauke West Bloc GMA. In 1904, the first game reserve, the present Luangwa area, was proclaimed by the British South African Company to protect the population of giraffes (Child, 2003:51). Most of the tribes in Zambia were involved in some subsistence hunting in the past. They depended largely on wildlife for survival. Today, it is illegal to continue with this practice of subsistence hunting. Wildlife is owned by the State. Ancestral lands have been taken for commercial game viewing and, as a result, hundreds of people have moved to the fringes of the rivers posing environmental problems. The State took control of wildlife with the aim of conserving nature and distributing appropriately the resource benefits. However, the local communities residing in the Open Areas and GMAs are receiving little or no benefit from the resource (Jachmann, 2000). These communities have found themselves deprived not only of a former supplement of their diet and income but of seasonal grazing lands and even of their arable plots (Anderson and Grove, 1987). This has brought conflict of interest between subjects of Mwape Chiefdom and the government.

The Zambia Wildlife Authority is the government agency created to foster the conservation and reaping of wildlife resource benefits. The government, however, has recently realized that it needs to involve the local people in conservation programs. According to Northcott (1996:277), "No conservation program which undermines human justice can ultimately hope to be successful". The Wildlife Authority accordingly has created CRBs as a means to channel the benefits from wildlife to the local communities. These local communities, however, perceive the Wildlife Authority as giving priority to wildlife over humans (Haster,

1996). This is clear when animals destroy the crops and victims are not compensated. It is even worse when the local people are arrested when they kill the animals destroying their crops. Furthermore, the resource benefits are not distributed justly to the local communities. Hence, the unjust distribution of the resource benefits has been one of the reasons that has led to the increase in environmental sabotage, illegal poaching, fishing and the cutting down unnecessarily of trees.

Zambia is now making efforts to give back to local rural people control over their own natural resources. This has been done through various projects of conservation spearheaded by the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). It has been realized that the success of conservation lies in the hands of local people who are supposed to be living more in harmony with nature. The Wildlife Authority has accordingly incorporated the local people in the management of wildlife resources. The government took possession of the customary land with a view to sharing the wildlife benefits more appropriately with the local people. The Wildlife Authority was then created so as to be the linchpin of initiating developmental programs and sharing justly the resource benefits. The purpose of my study, then, is to investigate the relevance of the Community Resource Boards (CRBs) established by the Wildlife Authority to assist in the just sharing of wildlife benefits between the government and the local people with specific reference to Mwape Chiefdom.

Literature is reviewed from different sources and the background of study area is mainly from these books, *Social and Ritual Life of the Ambo of Northern Rhodesia* by Stefaniszyn and *The Native Tribes of the East Luangwa Province of Northern Rhodesia* by Poole. More literature from other sources has been availed on the historical background to wildlife management and national parks.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

- i. to investigate the role of CRBs;
- ii. to investigate the manner in which CRB in Mwape Chiefdom is working;
- iii. to investigate whether wildlife resource benefits are justly distributed between the local community and the government in Mwape Chiefdom;
- iv. to propose a viable way of channelling resource benefits to local communities.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. What are Community Resource Boards and what is their role?
- ii. Is the Community Resource Board in Mwape Chiefdom working effectively?
- iii. Are the resource benefits distributed justly among the local people in the chiefdom?
- iv. Which are viable ways of resource distribution?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study aims at the alleviation of the conflict of interests between local communities living in close proximity with wildlife and the wildlife authorities. The government came up with an idea of community participation in wildlife management to resolve this conflict. Hence, it created ZAWA as an authority which would ensure a just distribution of the resource benefits. CRBs were in turn formed as a linchpin towards conservation and co-management of the wildlife resource benefits between the state and the local communities. It is important, therefore, to investigate the role played by CRBs so that the government can make a proper decision in formulating future policies towards a just distribution of resource benefits and wildlife conservation. The CRB in Mwape Chiefdom is considered as a case study.

1.6 Research Methods

The first part of my research is qualitative in the sense that I will use more of historical and descriptive research methods. This part will describe the values held by the people of Mwape Chiefdom and the value they attach to the environment and wildlife. The sources of my information are both primary, i.e., semi-structured interviews with appropriate subjects, and secondary sources, i.e., books, existing documents, internet, etc.

The second part of the research is philosophical. It consists of an ethical analysis based on the result of the empirical part. In considering the values involved in the relationship between the local inhabitants of Mwape Chiefdom and the natural environment, I have availed of some environmental ethical theories. I have then presented the arguments for and against the current procedure of distributing wildlife resources availing of John Rawls' theory of justice to determine how wildlife resource benefits can be distributed in a just and appropriate manner.

1.7 Research Implementation

In carrying out this research, I have conducted interviews with various participants and used an interview guide (cf. appendix 1) because the local community of Mwape Chiefdom has high levels of illiteracy and poverty. Those interviewed were Her Royal Highness, chieftainess Mwape, the ZAWA officers in Nyimba and Chipata bomas respectively, those working in the chiefdom, village elders known as village headmen, game scouts, senior citizens in the community, teaching staff at Mwape Kalongo School, the CRB members, the health workers at the clinic, and a focus group that consisted of six women and four men. This purposive sample was selected to represent the entire population of the chiefdom.

The local people of Mwape Chiefdom cooperated well and made themselves available in the evenings. The chieftainess also allowed her subjects to be interviewed. Problems were not

encountered interviewing the ZAWA officers because of prior arrangements before the interview day. My introductory letter from the University helped me to be accepted easily especially by the government officials who requested for identification and a permit to conduct interviews.

1.8 Research Limitations

A major limitation of the study was limited research funds which made it difficult to employ research assistants to assist me with the interviews. Some participants expected to be given a token of appreciation or some incentives in the form of money for sparing their time during the interviews. Another limitation was the restricted time-frame for the project. Rains had started and during the rainy season, roads are impassable in the area and public transport is scarce. The interview days were limited because it is a farming season and people were busy preparing and planting their fields and gardens. Nsenga language was used which they understand well. I directly translated the interview questions from English into Nsenga for easy communication with the local people.

It was not my first time to be in Mwape Chiefdom and I worked in the chiefdom for some years as an indigenous Catholic priest and Mwape Chiefdom was one of my prayer centres. Hence, the people in the area know me very well and I also know their religious, social, political and economical life very well. This helped me to understand the beliefs and ideas easily during the interviews. Some of the study areas were not new to me because formerly I conducted a workshop with the local people and discussed their life experience living with wildlife and the problems in the area.

1.9 Organizational Structure

The study is composed of Five Chapters. The introductory Chapter One discusses the background to the study and statement of the problem, objectives, research questions,

significance of the study, research methods, research implementation and limitations, and the overall organizational structure of the study. Chapter Two outlines the theoretical framework being availed of. Chapter Three discusses relevant literature for the historical background of Mwape Chiefdom and the historical background to wildlife management and national parks in Zambia. Chapter Four outlines the research findings and how the data collected has been arranged under three main themes. Chapter Five analyzes the data and makes an ethical evaluation of the arguments for and against the current procedure of wildlife resource distribution in Mwape Chiefdom. Finally, Chapter Six gives a conclusion of the study and makes some recommendations based on the findings.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the theoretical framework, Rawls' theory of justice will be availed of as one of the main ethical theory in traditional approaches to ethics. However, some environmental ethical theories will also be availed of in analyzing and evaluating the data. Hence, there is need for some discussion on the notion of different kinds of value in the natural environment, i.e., intrinsic, instrumental and inherent values. There is also need to discuss the relationship between humans and their environment as this is all related to the issue of conservation which has brought tension between ZAWA and people in Mwape Chiefdom.

2.1 Different Kinds of Values

This paper recognizes three kinds of value, namely, intrinsic value which is a value that is an end in itself, a value that need not be useful for any purpose beyond itself. It is often referred to as a good of its own kind in such a way that a plant or an animal is allowed to flourish. Instrumental value is a value ascribed to something or to some state of affairs because it is useful and an instrument to achieving another end, e.g., food, clothing and shelter are a means to achieve some other end. Inherent value is the aesthetic value ascribed by humans in their appreciation of the beauty of nature, e.g., game viewing.

2.2 The Land Ethic

The Land Ethic of Aldo Leopold is an ethical theory that attempts to explain how an individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts which make up an ecosystem. Here, the land is not just merely soil but it enlarges the boundaries of community to include

water, plants and animals (Callicott, 1993:1). This is illustrated in the biotic pyramid which further explains the energy flow in the community. The biotic pyramid consists of different layers: soil at the bottom, plant layer resting on top, then animal layer, mammals and humans on the apex of the pyramid. The species in the layers are alike in what they eat (Leopold, 1993:103). This energy flow is a food chain and it conducts energy upwards from the soil. Death and decay channel the energy backwards to the soil. The flow of energy depends on complex structures of relations between living things. Unfortunately, the intervention of humans in the environment has often been violent and destructive and there is need to preserve good relations with the land. This theory gives a moral standing to the land community itself and not merely to individual members. From an ethical point of view, according to Leopold, "A thing is considered to be right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (Callicott, 1993:6).

2.3 Deep Ecology

Deep Ecology is a theory that emphasizes the interdependence of all living things throughout nature. It emphasizes that all living things possess a value that is independent of human interests and that the flourishing of non-human life as well as human life on earth has intrinsic value which needs to be acknowledged and respected. Some proponents of this theory emphasize how a closer identification of humans with non-human forms of life can lead to a concern for their welfare. This, according to Naess (1989:244), is possible through a form of Self-realization, a process by which humans come to recognize the manner and extent to which they are identified with the natural world on which they depend. This sense of identification with nature in humans is a transition from I-it to I-thou attitude which brings the sense of care for all of nature (Naess, 1989:246).

2.4 Social Ecology

Social ecology is a theory propounded by Murray Bookchin that attempts to explain how our present environmental problems are a result of the oppressive hierarchical organization of power structures in our society. Human history, therefore, is perceived as inseparable from the history of the natural environment. Hence, the hierarchical mentality and class relationships that permeate society result in the domination of the environment. This theory makes an appeal to the need for social reconstruction if environmental and ecological devastation is to be overcome. The environmental crisis is perceived to be as a result of hierarchical power and the authoritarian mentality and domination of humans by humans which is rooted in the structures of our society. There is, therefore, need to replace our mentality of domination with an ethics of complementarity, a recognition of unity-in-diversity by which individuals flourish within the good of the whole (Bookchin, 1993).

2.5 Tragedy of the Commons

The tragedy of the commons is a theory propounded by Garret Hardin that tries to explain the massive degradation of resources as a result of property that is not under any form of control from common exploitation. Hardin exemplifies this theory by depicting a pasture that is open to all. In this scenario, each herdsman as a rational being seeks to maximize gain by adding one or more animals to his herd. Each herdsman is inclined to increase his herd without considering the limit in a limited pasture. The end result in such a scenario is a tragedy, a ruin to the pasture. Whereas on the one hand, the positive aspect is an increment of the animals to an individual, on the other hand, the negative aspect is the additional overgrazing caused by the added animals to the herd. Hence, with reference to National Parks, Hardin proposes to sell them off as private

property in order to protect them, or to keep them as national public property while allowing for the right to enter them (Hardin, 1968: 1244).

2.6 Distributive Justice

Distributive justice is all about the distribution of social benefits and burdens. In environmental ethics, the focus of distribution of benefits has been on safe work places, clean water, clean air, fair compensation for exposure to environmental burdens and easy access to natural surroundings. The burdens are exposure to hazardous materials, wastes, pollution, health hazards, exploitation and depletion of local natural resources. The main issue in distributive justice concerns environmental equity, that is, the burdens and benefits need to be distributed fairly. It has been observed that poor people, people of colour, and under presented groups such as indigenous tribes and nations suffered from a disproportionate amount of environmental burdens. Hence, environmental injustice condones individual groups consistently receiving significant environmental burdens while others receive environmental benefits (Jameson, 2003:427).

2.7 Participatory Justice

Participatory justice raises the question of how distributive decisions are made and who participates in making them. Participants should have an adequate say in decisions directly proportional to the degree that particular decision affects them. It has been observed that there is a lack of adequate participation by the poor and by those discriminated against on the basis of colour, race, or class in environmental policy-making programs, laws and regulations on how environmental benefits and burdens are assigned. The location of environmental benefits and burdens are either intentionally or unintentionally exclusionary. Hence, the decision-making process is often biased, that is, it takes the top-down approach, and therefore, neglects

democratic rights. The principle of self-determination is very important, and it should act as a firm base for those more immediately affected by decisions made in order to determine whether burdens and remedies are acceptable to them (Jameson, 2003:428).

2.8 Rawls' Theory of Justice

Rawls' theory of justice is a theory that emphasizes what he considers to be correct standards of justice, standards to which we would all agree if we were free and impartial. This, according to Rawls, is achievable when we are in the *original position*, a hypothetical situation and not a historical one. We enter it through imagination only and, in this position, we decide under a *veil of ignorance*. Impartiality is guaranteed behind the veil of ignorance because individuals lack personal information of themselves and their circumstances which prevents them from making biased judgments and decisions. Hence, whatever moral duties and laws are unanimously agreed upon in this position are binding on everyone. Given this situation of uncertainty, it is rational to choose that option which maximizes the minimum, that is, the option which makes the worst outcome (the minimum) as good as possible (maximizes it). Rawls identifies two ethical principles: the first one is about equal liberty of citizenship, and the second one is about social and economic inequalities that need to be arranged so that they are attached to the offices and positions accessible to all under fair equality of opportunity. Under the second principle, Rawls also propounds a subsidiary principle, a difference principle which aims at regulating differences in the distribution of freedoms and economic resources. Inequalities are accordingly tolerated only when they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (cf. Rawls, 1971: 3-104 and Frey and Wellman, 2005: 284).

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY AREA

There has been awareness internationally and locally on the need to share the resource benefits with local communities living in close proximity with wildlife (Mc Neely and Miller, eds. 1984). Hence, both the international and local communities have held various conferences and workshops in trying to raise awareness of the subject matter. What follows is a review of the relevant literature which will be treated under the pre-colonial and colonial and post-colonial periods.

3.1 Historical Background to Mwape Chiefdom

In studying the attitudes and beliefs currently held by the people of Mwape Chiefdom in relation to wildlife and land resources, it is important to trace their origins and their social and political life. For example, chiefs like Luwembe, Nyalugwe and Chisomo share boundaries with Mwape Chiefdom. In all these chiefdoms, we have wildlife and CRBs. Chisomo, Luwembe and Mwape belong to one family tree. Chief Nyalugwe was given the present land by Luwembe. There are traditional boundaries to these chiefdoms. As we will see in the later sections, there was a boundary problem between Mwape and Chisomo chiefdoms in relation to hunting grounds for their respective CRBs.

The people of Mwape Chiefdom are today commonly known to belong to the Nsenga tribe. This is because they adopted the language and the customs of the Nsenga people. The local people in this chiefdom may be regarded as Nsenga simply because of their adoption of Nsenga customs and language. However, history and documentation has it that the people of Mwape Chiefdom belong to the Ambo tribe of Northern Zambia (see Figure 1.).

Luapula province. Currently, there are similarities of totems used by both tribes. For example, the totem of Nyendwa is common between the two tribes. This became the family name of the Ambo chiefs. The Ambo migrated from Luapula to East Luangwa and Mwape Chiefdom is the only kingdom among the Nsenga ruled by a female chief. This became a practice after their migration to East Luangwa where they are currently settled. They also have unusual features in their custom of succession. For instance, succession is transmitted from mother to daughter instead of from brother to brother or to maternal nephew as is the practice with all other matrilineal tribes. This custom is believed to have originated from the infanticide of male offspring during the reign of their chief, Chiwala Makumba. All male members were killed except for a few chosen for the purpose of procreation.

3.1.1 Migration

The people of Mwape Chieftaincy can be traced as far back as the 1800s. Their great, great ancestor was Chief Chiwala Makumba who dominated several tribes in Luapula, and the people of Mwape have close relations with the Lala people of Luapula. Chiwala Makumba was a powerful chief and the migration of the Ambos from Luapula was composed of three distinct family groups from three wives of chief Chiwala. Their aim was to conquer and establish their own new chiefdoms. The children from the first wife, known as the Tembo family, migrated under new chief Mukuni and they settled in the Lenje country. The second family tree of this group was under chief Nkana, known as the Nyangu family. The third group was the Nswi-Mphande family under new chief Lungo. This family tree is important because Mwape Chiefdom sprang from this family (Poole, 1934:64).

The Ambo arrived from the Luapula area and settled in the area that spreads from east of the middle and lower Lukusashi, the Mchinga mountains, and extended to the Luangwa valley

(see Fig. 2). It is under the chieftainship of Chilimba Nondo that they penetrated into the country east of Luangwa River. Chilimba Nondo founded two chiefdoms, i.e., Mboshya chieftaincy for his brother and Mwape chieftaincy for his sister. Mwape chieftaincy was located on the eastern banks of the Luangwa River. It was on chief Nondo's orders that Mwape chieftaincy came to be inherited by the female line of his family only. This has been observed up to this present time. The Ambo people under chief Nondo have become widely distributed in the Eastern Luangwa area (*The Sunday Post*, March 2, 2008, pp. vi - vii).

Luwembe, a nephew of Chilimba Nondo, was sent with a group of people on an exploration and founded his own chiefdom. He was known as Luwembe I, and he built his palace at Lisati village in the interior of the Nsenga land. Chilimba Nondo then colonized the Luangwa area and appointed chiefs. The reason for settling in this area was probably that the area was rich in game and fish. This would provide the people with enough food and nutrition.




Fig. 2 Map of Ambo Country.

Source: Stefaniszyn, B. 1964. *Social and Ritual Life of the Ambo of Northern Rhodesia*

3.1.2 Mwape Chieftaincy

As Chilimba Nondo had directed that the chieftaincy be inherited through the female line of his sister, the first Chieftainess was Mwape I, known as Namukwangu or Nachikwakulu. She occupied the eastern bank of Luangwa River between Mtikila stream and the banks of lower Mvuvye River. She belonged to the Nyedwa family.

Changwe, the daughter of Mwape I and the son of Katiula of the Njovu clan, inherited the chieftaincy from her mother after she died. She became Mwape II and lived until 1910.

During her chieftaincy, she assassinated the headman Mushalila at Katipa village. This was her first act of bloodshed. Milonga, the son of the murdered headman, took revenge and killed a lot of the Nsengas living near Mvuvye valley. This angered Mwape II and she contrived a plot to assassinate Milonga as well. Upon hearing this, Milonga took refuge in the Chikunda land. The leader of the Chikunda people, Jose d'aranjo Lobo, a Portuguese half-caste also known as Matekenya, protected him and offered him a job. The Chikundas were powerful in the area because they had firearms which they obtained from the Portuguese. Milonga acquired a lot of European wealth from Lobo. When Mwape II, heard about his affluence and fortune, she invited him back home and promised him protection. However, at a drinking spree, Mwape II killed him. This was her second bloodshed. Chitopa, the brother of the assassinated Milonga, asked the Chikundas to help him take revenge for his brother. They accepted and waged war against Mwape and she was overpowered. She escaped to the Bemba land at night and lived for some time with them. She later married in the Bemba country. The people of Mwape stayed for a period of time without their chief, but when the Ambo people heard the news that she was in Bemba land, they sent a group of men to bring her back home. This was done in order to help with the continuity of the chieftdom and its lineage (Poole, 1934:64).

When Mwape II came back, the most senior chief among the Nyendwa clan was Mboloma. He lived near Kapoko stream and later died. Mkwemba, a nephew of Luwembe, ascended to the throne. This did not please Mwape II as she was intolerant of any threat to her authority. So she arranged with Nsenga chief Ngambwa to assassinate Mkwemba in his nuptial hut while enjoying his bride's embraces. Mwape II then appointed her young son Chimkoko to the throne although he was still a minor. She was made regent in waiting for her son's coming of age. Chimkoko ruled as Luwembe III and later died in 1915.

Mwape II was the most remarkable in her epoch because of the wars she fought with the Chikundas. She extended her authority up to Msanzala, a kingdom twice as large as any Ambo chief had before her. Mwape II died in 1910 and was buried at the Chiwambila River (Poole, 1934: 64). The current chief is Mwape IV.

3.2 Historical Background to Wildlife Management and National Parks

3.2.1 Wildlife management in the pre-colonial era

Prior to colonialism, wildlife belonged to the local people of the designated area. In Mwape Chieftaindom, the land belonged to the chieftainess. Hence, the chief was saluted as *calo* in the Nsenga language meaning “the land”. Her subjects are referred to as her children. She distributed the land to her children, her subjects. The Ambo attitudes towards land were liberal and they practiced the rule of equity in distributing the land. There was also a common practice to give the land near the village to old people and widows (Stefaniszyn, 1964:66).

In the area of wildlife, the chieftainess owned the wildlife on behalf of her subjects. She had monopoly over ivory which was clear when an elephant was killed. She always got the tusk lying on the ground. She is the *calo*, and the tusk is lying on her. The other tusk was given to the *ciwinda*, the hunter who killed the elephant. The *calo* had a share of the tusk on every elephant killed in her land. Furthermore, there was a hunting fee of three elands paid by every hunter in the chieftaindom for the hunting rights. All hunting sprees were permitted by the chieftainess, and part of the meat from these hunting sprees was given to her. The other specific benefits given to the chief from wildlife were the skins of the lion and leopard. These belonged to the chieftainess who was also considered to be the great lion of the chieftaindom (Stefaniszyn, 1964:65). The people of Mwape Chieftaindom had good conservation strategies, especially with regard to hunting.

Hunting was controlled by the chief and there were rules attached to hunting such as paying a hunting fee.

It would not be incorrect to say that the people of Mwape Chiefdom believed that all living things are interconnected and that there is a unity binding all living things. For example, as already mentioned, the chieftainess was referred to as the land. She and the people were connected to the land and all life springs from the land. She was also referred to as “the lion”. There is here a sense of being connected to other species. The land, as it is understood in Leopold’s land ethic simply enlarges boundaries of the community to include soil, water, plants and animals (Wenz, 2001). Mwape Chiefdom shares a similar thought pattern. The boundary of their community goes beyond their human species and they consider the land as part of their community. It is the land which is an important source of their livelihood. There is thus an essential ecological relationship between species and ecosystems, a relationship of eating and being eaten which is referred to as a food chain.

Mwape Chiefdom also shares also some of the views shared by Arne Naess in his Deep Ecology where he explains that all living things are interconnected and belong to the cosmic unity. Humans did not weave the web of life; they are merely a strand in it. Their traditional beliefs show us their maturity by widening their self-identification to include their ecosystem. An aspect of care can be seen when the hunting was restricted to the hunters with permission from the chief. They cared for their environment by not depleting wildlife. The hunting fee which was paid at the time was a way of trying not to harm the environment. These people practiced what is referred to as “ultimate maturity” (Wenz, 2001:223) by identifying themselves with the land, the entire universe. They knew intuitively that they had no right to disrespect elements of the natural world which are entitled to “moral consideration” (Leopold, 1968:204) and other life forms

which have “a-good-of-their-own”, and other life forms were not permitted to be reduced except for satisfying vital needs (Wenz, 2001:147). Hunting in the chieftdom was for the purpose of nutrition. Eating of animals was an event between humans and the animals. The rules of this game came from the ecosystems in which humans evolved. We eat in order to live and nature requires that. Poachers do not look at minimizing the suffering of animals but at the destruction of animals. In pre-colonial times, there were no such poachers. Hunting was for survival. Predation was acceptable for the health of a species, controlling wildlife populations and providing opportunities for other species. Predation eliminated the weak, sick, old and the young because they were easy to catch. This is in contrast to modern hunting which removes the largest and the best from the herd and which impairs the species’ evolutionary fitness as it affects breeding. In pre-colonial times, the conduct of the people was right because their intention was, as Leopold says, “to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community” (Leopold, 1968:224). They respected all life forms of which human life is a subset.

Generally, the land in Africa was considered to be sacred which meant that it could only belong to God. The Southern African region was occupied by hunter-gatherers involving nomadic and semi-nomadic communities. These hunter-gatherers were a small population and their daily needs were simple. Land was collectively owned by the community and there was no significant environmental damage caused by their simple way of life (Chenje and Johnson, eds. 1994:159).

Many tribes in Africa had tribal elders whom they called chiefs and headmen who were trustees of the land on behalf of God. They were entrusted with the responsibility to care for the precious gift of land given to humankind. These were trustees for the benefit of humanity to enjoy and harvest the fruits of the land. The pattern of land use was established on a clan system

in which the rights of cultivation and other land use practices rested in chiefs for the benefit of the people (Maim, 1967:5).

In many African societies, the chief had power to allocate a piece of land to any member of his or her tribe but had no right to sell it. Rights to land rested with the Creator. For example, among the Tonga tribes of Southern Zambia before colonialism, individuals were free to cultivate any tribal land that was free, and they were free to transfer their land to other persons on loan or as a gift. Among these tribes, inheritance of land acquired was common (Cotran and Rubin, 1970:255). Many Zambian tribes still have a chief as a central political authority who controls the tribal land. Hence, the people who seek land in tribal areas need to accept the chief as the political authority.

In Mwape Chiefdom, the land is vested in the chief who is the custodian of the people's cultural heritage and she is greatly respected. Studies show that in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, there is an essential cultural link between members of the community and the chief. This is based on the belief that the spirits of the chief's ancestors controlled the productivity of the land through rainfall, droughts, pests and plagues. Any problem in the productivity of the land was therefore interpreted as a form of punishment from the ancestors of the chief (Chenje and Johnson, eds. 1994:163).

Chiefs, then, were regarded as trustees of both land and wildlife. In their jurisdiction, chiefs had special hunting reserves and could grant hunting permission to their subjects and others. These hunting reserves were not there to satisfy their personal needs but were a way of controlling the traditional distribution of wildlife products, particularly during drought periods or communal rituals. Some clans were instituted as hunting clans in their chiefdoms and the mode of hunting was for the benefit of the community. These clans hunted on behalf of the chiefdom,

and they hunted mainly for their food. The chiefs were entrusted with power to enforce laws on conservation of the natural environment and poaching of wildlife. Since God was perceived as the owner of the land, this belief empowered the ancestral spirits and chiefs as custodians of the land who controlled both the land and wildlife. Hence, the chief was perceived as a spiritual leader as well. Local people easily obeyed, respected and believed in their chief because she or he represented their spiritual world (Cotran and Rubin, 1970).

3.2.2. Wildlife management in the colonial era

The advent of colonial rule brought new changes in the understanding of the land tenure system in Zambia, that is, with regard to rights and interests in land. The State encroached upon the customary land, resettled the local communities and put them into the Game Management Areas. The National Parks were set aside as reservoirs for wildlife. This was done because of the dwindling density of wildlife as a result of the rinderpest epidemic in the 1950s that swept the country. Hunting is strictly forbidden in National Parks and wildlife became the property of the State (Jachmann, 2000). Hence, the chiefs and their subjects could not hunt game freely as they used to do in the past. Slowly they were losing their authority over land and wildlife. The advent of colonial administrators brought to an end the use of spears, bows and traps and brought in muzzle-loading guns which were more destructive to the environment (Chenje and Johnson, eds. 1994:159).

In countries like Zambia, because of the British presence, land tenure was moulded to their interests. They established certain rights for themselves which brought conflicts between African interests and their own. Between 1899 and 1911, the land in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) was administered by the British South African Company (BSA). It was administered in two units, that is, Northern Eastern Rhodesia (N.E.R.) and North Western Rhodesia (N.W.R.).

This study is particularly concerned with one unit, North Eastern Rhodesia, as Mwape Chiefdom belongs to this unit. The British crown assumed direct control of the territory in the period between 1911 and 1924. During this period, a major legislation was enacted which became fundamental to colonial land policy in Northern Rhodesia.

The BSA Company interpreted this piece of new legislation to mean that they owned vacant and alienated land, the land which was not occupied by the Africans, and that they owned the wildlife in these lands. This piece of legislation thus gave the Company power to make regulations for peace, order and good governance. Consequently, the authority of local chiefs was diminished. Interestingly, this misunderstanding of the territory being vested in the Company was later debated in courts of law. It is now understood that the Company only secured from the chiefs mineral rights and not other rights like right to wildlife and forests which they claimed (Mvunga, 1980:5). Today, this has raised the question of the validity of the titles of land in N.E.R. given to the Company. BSA rule was terminated in 1924 and the Company was obligated to compensate Africans whom they illegally dispossessed of their land. The first reserves to be created by the first British governor were in East Luangwa area.

As the Company made treaties with natives, i.e., the chiefs, it assumed that the chiefs were owners of the tribal land whereas the truth is that the chiefs were only public trustees of the land. On the one hand, the Company mistakenly assumed that they were given exclusive rights over the land, i.e., forest, wildlife and mining rights. On the other hand, the chiefs assumed that they were just granting the Company user rights which they themselves enjoyed.

In 1931-32, Captain C.R.S. Pitman, who was at the time the game warden of Uganda, was sent to work in Zambia. In 1934, he recommended the creation of a Game Department as one of the greatest assets for the country. Wildlife was seen as a main economic asset as much as

soil and water, and his concept came to dominate in the 1960s. He ordered the creation of the National Parks so as to control the over population of elephants and buffaloes. In 1940, action was taken by the government and the Game and Tsetse control department was established. The first National Park at Kafue was established in 1950, although there was then no wildlife and law enforcement policy. Although wildlife was considered the property of the government, Zambians considered game meat as their only reasonable source of meat at the time. However, it should be noted that during this period, there was widespread tsetse disease affecting animals called *nagana* which also causes sleeping sickness in people preventing them from keeping cattle in the country (Johnson and Roder, 1979:78).

In Northern Rhodesia and elsewhere in Africa, there was separation of wildlife and human habitat. The Nairobi Conference on the Fauna of Eastern and Central Africa made a decision that Game Parks would be created in areas unfit for human settlement and production (Anon, 1948). The 1958 drastic fall of copper prices had resulted in many miners being retrenched and the government of the time eased the life of the retrenched by issuing a hunting licensing system which was in favour of the African hunter. In 1959, the government removed the tsetse control and created the veterinary department of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. The Game and Fisheries Department was fused into the Ministry of Native Affairs although things did not improve until the post-Independence era. In the early 1960s, private game areas were introduced to enable farmers to manage personal game estates. In 1962, GMAs were introduced to facilitate wildlife cropping schemes and the more traditional practice relating to a hunting license was reviewed with the result that the laws introduced automatically took away the African traditional right to hunt without a license. The collapse of the economy in 1970 resulted in a wave of illegal poaching mainly of rhino and elephants, and corrupt practices by

government officials and security forces provided opportunities for illegal commercial hunting and trading in wildlife products. Alleviation of this clash of interests between the general public and the conservation groups brought about the need to involve the local community in wildlife management (Jachmann, 2000:10). Poaching had become rampant, and even the local people themselves were involved in petty poaching. There was also commercial poaching which involved the large scale killing of game for sale of meat and trophies. Poaching had become easier because of the abundance of fire arms, the muzzle loaders. Another problem at the time was overshooting by license holders which reduced returns for the government. However, the local people also benefited from the meat distributed to them by safari hunters whose interest was in the trophies acquired (Johnson and Roder, 1979:90).

3.2.3 Wildlife Management in the post-colonial era

The Zambia tenure system is a legacy left behind by colonial masters. It is a blend between English law and that of indigenous inhabitants. Land in Zambia is vested absolutely in the President of the country. Such powers are stated in various legislations such as the following: The Zambia (State Land and Reserves) Orders, 1928-1964; The Zambia (Trust Land) Orders, 1947-1964; The Zambia (Gwembe District) Orders, 1952-1964; and The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act. 20 of 1975 as amended. The President delegates the administration of land to public officers who execute the duties of Commissioner of Lands. The district council participates in the administration of land and is empowered by the policy on decentralization. The President's powers, however, are limited with regard to trust lands and reserves, and he has to consult the local authorities, i.e., the council and the chiefs (Land Circular No. 1 of 1985). However, the chiefs have no ultimate authority over their land.

3.2.4. Bali Congress on National Parks (1982)

Between 11th and 22nd October 1982, an International Congress on National Parks was held in Bali (Indonesia). There was an overwhelming participation of different countries. The countries present at the Congress discussed the future direction of national parks and protected areas with regards to their management. They emphasized the expanding role of conservation land managers in the planning, development and management of the areas under their control. The Congress realized that the world must have protected areas which are designed, planned and managed to bring immediate and long term benefits to people. It is these parks and these reserves that protect the water supply of many towns and agricultural regions. They bring the mostly needed foreign exchange to third world countries and affect the livelihood of many people.

The concern of the Congress was also for the local communities living in close proximity with wildlife. Hence, it called for increased support for communities next to national parks through measures such as education, revenue sharing, participation in decision making and initiating appropriate developmental schemes. Consequently, there was a growing widespread recognition that the successful long term management of protected areas depended on the cooperation and support of local people (Mc Neely and Miller, eds. 1984).

3.2.5. National conservation strategy (1985)

Zambia issued a National Conservation Strategic paper in 1985 whose objectives were to ensure the sustainable use of Zambia's renewable natural resources. Sustainable development is a difficult concept to understand because it has a wide range of meanings based on different disciplines and worldviews. It depends mainly on what is being sustained and for how long a period. It is, therefore, open to interpretation. The different objectives for the use of environmental resources lead to different expectations as to what is to be sustained and as to who

is to have claims on environmental services. Conservation has been dominated by the debate about the sustainable use of wildlife which has been pushed by developed countries in the North. Developing countries in the South began to question and fight for the right to exploit their own wildlife, a fight which is ultimately about justice and the rectification of past user rights (Child, 2003:175).

The aim of the Zambia National Conservation Strategy is to maintain the biological diversity of plants and wildlife species. One of the issues raised was that the poachers were robbing the national economy of millions of kwacha in wildlife products each year. Whereas locals were claiming rights for the use of wildlife resources for meat, safari companies were claiming rights for hunting, and tour companies were claiming rights for tourism. This brought about a rise in conflict due to self interest. It has been rightly observed that the problem arises from the absence of wildlife projects and policies to incorporate the local people, and which would in turn facilitate the equitable sharing and distribution of benefits. There is, therefore, need to address issues of underdevelopment in the vicinities of protected areas, and these prevailing problems need to be addressed in a balanced way. There are inadequacies in decision making and poor organizational structure to help the best allocation of resources. Current legislation needs to be reviewed to enable just and sustainable wildlife use by locals (IUCN, 1984).

3.2.6. Zambia Wildlife Policy (1993)

The Zambia Wildlife Policy of 1993 recognizes wildlife management as the most profitable use of land. The government is determined to exploit the wildlife market for the benefit of this resource and for all the people of Zambia, especially for those who live in close proximity to it. The policy aims to maintain the ecological and aesthetic integrity of national

parks. It promotes the sustainable use of wildlife and its habitats. It encourages people to conserve and use the resource correctly because it is to the advantage of themselves, the community and the nation at large. The policy recognizes the local people as the custodians of wildlife and other renewable resources on their land (National Parks and Wildlife Services, 1993).

3.2.7 African Wildlife Policy Consultation (1996)

The aim of the African Wildlife Policy Consultation of 1996 was to stimulate a process of dialogue and consensus on wildlife conservation and management in Africa. The countries present addressed issues on resource value, constraints and benefits of alternative land uses at local, national and international level. They also discussed the marketing potential of wildlife uses. Much emphasis was on the importance of community participation in the management and conservation of wildlife resources. They observed that for wildlife to survive well into the next century, it needs the cooperation and consent of the people living in the vicinity of the wildlife. An example was given of how conservation and survival of wildlife is linked with the lives and survival of surrounding rural communities in Zambia. These communities hold the key to the successful conservation of wildlife (African Wildlife Policy Consultation Final Report, July 1996:3).

The Report also noted that because of colonialism in all African countries, many communities were forcibly removed from their land to pave way for the creation of national parks. Many communities were thus denied access to resources such as grazing land for their cattle, hunting grounds, medicinal plants, firewood, thatching grass and their ancestral graves. The local communities living in peripheries of protected areas bore numerous conservation costs.

They not only lost their ancestral land but their fields were continuously ravaged by wildlife and even the loss of human life.

3.2.8. Zambia Wildlife Act (1998)

Absolute ownership of every wild animal within Zambia is vested in the President on behalf of the Republic. The Zambia Wildlife Act states that game animal can only be killed or captured with an appropriate license granted by the issuing authority. This also applies to the wild animals that are found outside GMAs, that is, in the near residential areas.

The Zambia Wildlife Authority was created as a government body in 1998 to help in the conservation and administration of wildlife. In GMAs and Open Areas, the jurisdiction of ZAWA is limited to wildlife. Human settlement, agriculture and other activities are permitted in these areas. The President, in consultation with the wildlife authority and the local community, can declare any land to be a GMA for the sustainable utilization of wildlife. However, the role of ZAWA has not been free from conflict with traditional chiefs. This is because other communities existed prior to the existence of GMAs. Indeed, the chiefs have resented ZAWA's conversion of their land into GMAs (Mudenda, 2007:48-50).

3.2.9. Community Resource Boards

Community Resource Boards (CRBs) were also created in 1998 under the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) for Game Management Areas taking into consideration the Zambia Wildlife Act (No. 12 of 1998). The purpose of the CRBs was to co-manage the resources with the local communities. This was in response to heavy poaching of rhino and elephants in the late 1970s and early 1980s during which there was a massive decline in their population. The CRBs spearheaded the granting of benefits to rural communities as an enticement for conservation (Fabricius and Magome, 2001:25). Conservationists developed programs that

aimed at more involvement of local people in wildlife conservation (Child, 2004). The ADMADE Project was established to direct a share of government revenue to local chiefs and their communities. They were to hire village scouts to work with the conservation authorities to stop poaching.

3.2.10 Property rights

In Zambia today, land is distinguished between customary and state land because of the history surrounding our land tenure system. In 1924, *reserves* and *crown* lands were created under the authority of Sir Herbert Stanley who was the first governor of Northern Rhodesia. This meant that the indigenous people could not enjoy customary rights over crown land. The natives were moved to the reserves and the white settlers inhabited the crown lands which were governed under British law whereas reserves were under customary tenure (Mudenda, 2007: 365). Customary land is defined as land which is held by communities identified on the basis of tribe, residence or community of interest and this also includes ancestral lands. Such land is not used without the approval of the chief or local authority. State land is that land which is held under leasehold tenure, the lawfully held and occupied land by any Government ministry, department and agency, and also includes the gazetted or declared national forests, GMAs, NPs and protected areas (Times of Zambia, June 2, 2009). Customary land covers 93% of Zambia's area and state land covers 7% (NPEZ, 2005). The government created GMAs in customary lands and wildlife management was placed under ZAWA. The role of ZAWA has not been free from conflicts with local people living with wildlife.

Feeny et al. (1990:4-8) discuss property rights under four categories of rights. The first category is open access rights. These rights are free for all, for everyone. The second category is private property rights. These are rights that exclude others from using the resources. The state

recognizes these rights and enforces them. The third category is communal property rights. These rights are held by an identifiable community of interdependent users who have rights of equal use and access. The fourth is state property rights. These rights are exclusively vested in the government who make decisions for access to the resources. Such property rights may be held in trust for the citizenry. The Zambia Wildlife Act of 1998 provides for two categories of property rights in the creation of CRBs, i.e., state property rights and communal property rights. These rights are vested in the government and in an identified community respectively.

Open areas have led to what Hardin referred to as “the tragedy of the commons”, the degradation of the commons because of the inability to regulate access to the wildlife resources which have no owner. This has led to the depletion of wildlife in certain areas. Lack of ownership and of property rights give rise to neglect and overuse of a resource (Pearce, 1995:3). Private property rights, on the other hand, provide private rights that exclude others accessing the resource. A price is charged to exclude others. It is a private good. Game Ranches (GRs) provide an example of private property rights where the property has the potential of being free from degradation. Communally held property is a perfectly viable and sustainable form of resource management. The common owners mutually agree to limit their use of the resource as opposed to open areas where there is no mutual agreement on limiting the resource. It is then a public good (Pearce, 1995:7) and has the potential to exclude other than members of a defined community. CRBs are specified for a particular area and come under common property rights. Benefits are intended for the members of that particular area. State property excludes those who do not belong to the governance of the state. Such exclusions protect the property.

Under Section 6 of the Zambia Wildlife Act of 1998, ZAWA is supposed to pay to the CRBs 50% of the revenue of the total earnings from the sale of wildlife, i.e., license fees,

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH FINDINGS

The responses from the interviews conducted from the people of Mwape Chiefdom, the chieftainess, institutions in the chiefdom, and ZAWA officers of Nyimba and Chipata respectively can be summarized under three major themes, i.e., wildlife ownership and management in the chiefdom, community participation in wildlife management and distribution of wildlife resource benefits.

4.1 Wildlife Ownership and Management in Mwape Chiefdom

The local community in Mwape chiefdom currently understands that wildlife belongs to ZAWA or to the government. They have their own reasons to support this for the local people have no right to hunt or kill the animals in their own chiefdom without a license issued by ZAWA. Failure to obtain a hunting license from ZAWA can lead to prosecution. However, they believe that before the creation of protected areas, wildlife belonged to their community under the leadership of their chief. ZAWA has acknowledged that the creation of NPs, GMAs and Open Areas has caused the local people to lose their ownership of wildlife. For example, in the past, National Parks and Wildlife Services (NPWS) had imposed game guards on local people to prevent them from poaching. The locals were deprived of game meat which was part of their diet prior to the creation of protected areas. The result was enmity between the local communities and the NPWS.

As poaching had become rampant in the 1970s-80s, to curb this scourge, the government saw the need for community participation in wildlife management. Norwegian donors (NORAD) funded the pilot project which started in the 1990s. The project is known as Luangwa Integrated

Resource Development Project and it is based in Mambwe district. The aim of the project is community participation in wildlife management. ZAWA is aware that the NORAD funded program comes to an end in 2012 so the government needs to start looking for more external funding.

The ZAWA officers believe that ownership of wildlife belongs to both the government and the local communities living in close proximity with wildlife. This is one of their main reasons for advocating wildlife projects that involve the participation of local peoples. The officers understand wildlife management as the management of human activities that affect wildlife and the human use of wildlife resources. These projects aim at moderating human activities and wildlife use so that there are no negative effects on wildlife and on the environment at large. Humans are at the centre of wildlife management and the local people are sharing the habitat with wildlife. Hence, local people are the key to a successful management of wildlife and its resources. Both parties, the government and the local communities, are interested parties with regard to wildlife for they consider themselves to be the owners and guardians of wildlife, and that they are entitled to share between them the benefits from the sale of wildlife products.

The Operations Ranger of ZAWA East Management Unit identified two important dimensions in the management of wildlife. There is what they call *passive management* which is also known as preventive, protective or custodial management whose aim is to minimize external influence on wildlife and its habitat. This form of management reduces human interference in the ecological process. The other dimension is *active or manipulative management* of wildlife. This is implemented directly or indirectly on the population or the habitat in, for example, harvesting, cropping, hunting, and clearing forests, and in the construction of dams for wildlife. Manipulative management is practised in all the protected areas in Zambia.

Both ZAWA and the local community have a duty towards wildlife. For example, ZAWA monitors wildlife populations, takes habitat censuses and manages habitat distribution. The local community and its scouts enforce the law through patrols, and they arrest, prosecute, control game, and control wildlife damage.

In Mwape Chiefdom, the local community is aware that there are a number of conservation managers, i.e., ZAWA, a local CRB, Nyakolwe and Nyamvu Game Ranches, and Nyimba Wildlife Conservation Society. These groups have doubled their efforts in conservation in the past few years. Game ranching is an extensive managed production of free living game on large fenced or unfenced private or communal lands, usually for hunting but also for game products, tourism, live trade of wildlife animals, and other non-consumable uses. These ranches are private properties where humans are prohibited to enter. Human interference in wildlife, mainly by local communities, has been limited in these ranches. Ecosystems have thus been protected including endangered species.

Although there has been improvement in conservation which is seen by the growing numbers of wildlife, the people of Mwape are aggrieved over the destruction of their fields and gardens by wildlife. The local people put the blame on other wildlife managers such as ZAWA for failing to control the animals entering their fields. Another criticism levelled at GRs is that they have failed to fence their private properties. This allows the animals to move freely into their fields and villages causing danger to the crops and their lives. In the past, the local people had little or no experience of crop destruction in view of the small wildlife population. Local communities had their traditional hunters who had a duty to scare away wildlife from entering their fields and villages using muzzle loader guns. These guns have since been confiscated by

ZAWA. Today, the local people look helplessly at the animals destroying their crops and they have no capacity to protect their gardens and fields.

Elephants have always been a nuisance in protected areas and they have caused mass destruction on the fields, gardens and barns. An effort, however, has been made to curb animal-human conflicts. A conservation group, Mfuwe's South Luangwa National Park Conservation Society, started a pilot project to curb human-animal conflict. They introduced a chili fencing program, a technique that protect crop fields from wild animals. This type of fencing mainly protects crops from animals like elephants, hippos and bush pigs. Chili is avoided by elephants and hippos for they cannot stand the smell of the plant. In Mfuwe, farming has improved and the local farmers can now afford a good harvest for consumption and sale (Kapala Chisunka, *Zambia Daily Mail*, October 21, 2008). This type of fencing requires dried pounded chili, used engine oil, engine grease, sisal, wooden poles and mutton cloth. A buffer zone of two metres wide is created, the sisal is tied along the wooden poles, and these poles are then put right between the buffer zone.

ZAWA has sold the idea of chili fencing in Mwape Chiefdom and a demonstration was carried out at one of the fields by ZAWA officers. Unfortunately, the fencing was not well done and the elephants pulled out the fence. Nyamvu GR has provided a 25 kg bag of maize flour as an incentive to the families that adopted chili fencing. However, despite the fact that the animals are destroying their crops, the local community is not ready to be resettled and to leave their ancestral land.

Legally, as wildlife is owned by the government, ZAWA is the managing agency on behalf of the government. In the past, local communities were hindered from participating in wildlife conservation and management. As a result, the scourge of poaching escalated. Today, an

olive branch is being extended to local communities to actively participate in wildlife resource management and distribution. Although there is improvement in wildlife conservation, the people in Mwape Chiefdom are still aggrieved over crop destruction by elephants and hippos. Mitigation measures are underway with the introduction of chili fencing.

4.2 Community Participation in Wildlife Management

The local community participates in many ways in wildlife management. Some of the ways are the following: networking together with ZAWA and with the NGOs that are promoting conservation in the area by creating their own CRB, accepting the establishment of Nyamvu and Nyakolwe GRs in the chiefdom, and providing manpower for these ranches.

A number of ZAWA officers are stationed in the chiefdom and others are at Nyimba boma. These officers have experienced a warm working relationship with the local communities who today have understood their role and accepted them. In the past, the NPWS officers had bad working relations with the local people because they had no regard for the local communities and for their role in the management of wildlife. The resource benefits realized by NPWS from these protected areas were never shared with the local communities. In such situations, local communities only benefitted negatively through poaching.

The participation of local communities in wildlife management is traced as far back as 1996 when two pilot projects were initiated in Mambwe district, i.e., in Mwanya and in Lundazi districts respectively. In Mwanya, there was an ADMADE for GMAs, and in Mambwe, there was the LIRD. These projects were introduced by Brian Child who borrowed the system from Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMFIRE)

Program (Child, 2003:232). This system is known to have yielded tremendous benefits to local communities living in close proximity with wildlife, and it has also brought poaching under control through law enforcements by the recruited local village scouts.

These pilot projects started by introducing Village Action Groups (VAGs). The duty of the VAG was to involve all people by holding general meetings. In these meetings, they prepared and agreed on all work-plans, budgets, and allocation of wildlife revenue to projects, and implemented and monitored VAG level projects and activities. They also maintained the bank accounts and financial records, and managed wildlife at local level. Each VAG was composed of 110 households.

VAGs chose the leaders to constitute the Area Development Committee (ADC), later known as CRBs (see Figure 4). The duties of the ADC were coordinating at the ADC level to maintain bank and financial records and coordinate development plans for the area. They monitored and oversaw the implementation of plans in VAG projects. They also monitored and oversaw wildlife management and safari hunting in the area. The chief was the chairperson and overall advisor of the ADC. He or she imparted traditional values and guided the community on broad land uses. The role of the ADC was non-executive and non-administrative.

The wildlife resource benefits were shared as follows: 60% was given to LIRDPA and 40% to ADC. The 40% was to help communities to dig wells, build community schools, employ community school teachers and build clinics. However, it was found that chiefs as chairpersons dominated and intimidated the ADCs. They even demanded vehicles and were accordingly each given a Toyota land cruiser model by LIRDPA. Some chiefs collected the 40% on behalf of the ADC and misused the funds. In this system, chiefs benefited more than the local communities. The benefits which they received resulted in them informing their subjects that wildlife belonged

to the government and that no one was allowed to harvest wildlife without a license. In 1995, the government and NORAD re-evaluated the system and concluded that it was a failure and that chiefs were a stumbling block as there were few checks and balances to control the behaviour of the chiefs who used the money ineffectively and inequitably (Child and Dalal-Clayton, 2003:183).

Relationship between CRBs and other Bodies




Fig. 4

In 1996, a new bottom up approach was followed. The chiefs were removed as chairpersons and were made patrons. The benefits were then shared as follows: 79% to VAGs, 4% to ADCs, 7% to chiefs and 10% to LIRD (as illustrated in Fig. 5). The 10% was used for workshops, logistics, marketing and maintaining accounts. This was the first time the community got the money directly. It was also the first time when the community realized that there are

economic benefits from wildlife. Furthermore, poaching was reduced and the community actively participated in curbing it. Local communities built dams for wildlife in areas where there was a severe shortage of water and they recruited village scouts, paid them and built their own offices.

The ZAWA Community Liaison Assistant who once worked in Mambwe but is currently working in Mwape, informed me that in 1996, Mambwe CRB got ZK320 million which was a great incentive to the local community. When the local communities are given the benefits, attitudes towards wildlife change for the better. Hence, a new policy was formulated which is currently in place. Under this new system, benefits are shared as follows: ZAWA gets 50% and the ADCs (renamed as CRBs) get the other 50% from the hunting quotas. The 50% given to CRBs is shared as follows: 45% to the community and 5% to the chiefs who are patrons/matrons of the CRBs.

Second Approach by LIRD in Sharing Resource Benefits




Fig. 5

4.2.1 Formation of Mwape CRB

Mwape CRB was established on the 8th of March, 2007. Its formation was a result of the success of other CRBs that were reaping wildlife benefits in neighbouring chiefdoms of Chisomo, Luwembe and Nyalugwe. Initially, the two chiefdoms of Mwape and Chisomo used to have one CRB known as Chisomo CRB. Chieftainess Mwape and Chief Chisomo used to share the 5% benefits awarded to them as patron/matron of the CRB. This was the arrangement followed by the late Mwape. However, it was only the community in Chisomo chiefdom which used to enjoy the 45% benefits. The Mwape community did not benefit from the funds. Consequently, the present Mwape and ZAWA officers in the chiefdom pushed for the creation of an independent Mwape CRB, which is now in place. It consists of three VAGs, i.e., Chifukuzi, Mwape and Chinsimbwe. Each VAG elected three members to be part of the CRB.

The Zambian law on the establishment of CRBs allows each to have 7-10 members. Mwape CRB has nine members and eight trained village scouts, currently they are not working. Unfortunately, it has been reported by Nyimba ZAWA officers that Mwape CRB is not getting any wildlife benefits and funds. The community is not getting the 45% from ZAWA. There are several reasons for this, one of them being the absence of safari operators. These are supposed to receive hunting quotas, sell the quotas abroad, and later forward the revenue to ZAWA. They fetch more money when quotas are sold abroad. It is, therefore, surprising that whereas district hunting quotas are sold locally and hunting is taking place in Mwape Chiefdom, the local CRB is not benefiting. Other reasons for the CRB not benefiting will be elaborated in the section below. It should also be noted that in Mwape Chiefdom, there are two private ranches, Nyamvu and Nyakolwe, and the owners of these ranches have pledged to provide various services to the local community. Some of the services have been fulfilled while others are yet to be fulfilled.

4.3 Distribution of Wildlife Benefits in Mwape Chiefdom

As mentioned earlier, the Zambia National Conservation Strategic paper provides for the incorporation of local people in the management of wildlife and allows for the benefits accrued to be equally distributed (IUCN, 1984). Equally, the Zambian Wildlife Policy of 1993 calls for equitable distribution of benefits from wildlife. It recognises that the local communities are the custodians of wildlife and other renewable resources in their land. The same point has also been emphasized in the Zambian Wildlife Act (No. 12 of 1998) which calls for the resource benefits from wildlife to be equally distributed to the local community through the CRBs.

4.3.1 Hunting quotas

In Mwape Chiefdom, the local community has benefited in various ways from the wildlife resources. However, the concern of the local people is not just about receiving benefits but rather about receiving a just or fair distribution of these wildlife resource benefits. The ordinary people feel that these benefits are not distributed fairly. The community is aware that the government has a moral duty to take care of its citizens and that it should help them to get better benefits. They base their argument on the Wildlife Act which was enacted in 1998 which requires the local community to form a CRB for them to receive the wildlife benefits. The local community responded accordingly to the act by forming their local CRB in March 2007. However, although the CRB is present in the chiefdom, and although they have participated in the required seminars, they are not benefiting from the wildlife in their chiefdom. The local community has observed that hunting quotas are issued by ZAWA to people who have been hunting in their chiefdom. They are surprised that they are not receiving benefits from these hunting quotas sold in their area. The community has also observed that these licensed hunters are over-harvesting wildlife because they are not supervised in most cases. Consequently, the

government is losing a lot of revenue from wildlife. The revenue from these residential quotas goes straight to government. ZAWA is distributing the 50% from the hunting quotas for Mwape chiefdom to the other neighbouring CRBs of Chisomo and Luwembe because Mwape chiefdom is not functioning at present. Hence, there is need for dialogue between ZAWA and the Mwape CRB so that wildlife resource benefits can be channelled fairly to the local community.

3.3.2 Boundary errors

The ZAWA officers have their own arguments as to why the Mwape CRB is not getting fair benefits. In the past, there were some misunderstandings and mistakes made on drawing the boundary map of the chiefdoms of Mwape and Chisomo. These two chiefdoms used to have one CRB and it was acceptable. Whereas the traditional boundary for Chisomo ended in the escarpments, the map prepared by ZAWA extended the boundary further to the Luangwa River which was part of the Mwape territory. As a result, Chisomo CRB used to harvest wildlife in what was customary land for Mwape chiefdom. The chiefdom places the blame for the boundary error on ZAWA who did not do proper research and did not consult the concerned authorities from both chiefdoms over the disputed traditional boundary. However, the misunderstanding is currently being looked at by the concerned parties and this will hopefully bring the wildlife benefits to the local people of Mwape chiefdom in the near future.

The Chisomo CRB benefited in getting its 50% share from ZAWA for the hunting quotas even though these hunting quotas also covered the disputed land in Mwape. Whereas the late chieftainess Mwape used to share with chief Chisomo the 5% benefits offered to patrons and matrons of the Chisomo CRB, Mwape local community did not receive any benefits.

4.3.3 Safari operators

Another reason forwarded by wildlife officials for the local community not receiving benefits is that the Mwape CRB does not have safari operators who are commercial hunters who hunt mainly for trophies. The prices for trophies are quite high (as illustrated in Figure 6) and the community can benefit reasonably from such favourable prices. The Mwape community will benefit from the hunting quotas when they find a safari operator to work in their chiefdom. Right now, as there are no safari operators in the area, this means a loss of revenue from the favourable sales of trophies. Usually, the safari operator gives the revenue obtained from the hunting quotas to ZAWA and the government gives the 45% share to the CRB and 5% to the chief later. Failure by the local people to get benefits has made them not to appreciate wildlife as a better way of using the land.

Zambia’s 2009 Trophy List and Pricing

Buffalo	\$2,600
Eland	\$3,600
Hartebeest	\$1,150
Hippo	\$2,500
Hyena	\$550
Lechwe	\$2,950
Leopard	\$6,500
Lion	\$9,500
Sable	\$4,850

Fig. 6: Source: *Safari Operators*

4.3.4 Nyamvu and Nyakolwe Game Ranches

The Mwape community is aware of wildlife benefits received from the Nyamvu and Nyakolwe GRs. Mwape chiefdom can be divided into two main zones, i.e., Chinsimbwe and Mwape. These two zones are separated by a range of hills and they are 10 kms apart. The two ranches are located in these two zones, Nyakolwe in the Chinsimbwe zone and Nyamvu in the Mwape zone, and they have pledged to help the people in their respective zones.

In 2004, the village headmen and the chief allowed Nyamvu ranch to start its operations, and Nyamvu pledged to provide some services to the community. One of these pledges was to fence the ranch so that animals would not move outside. This was to reduce animal-human conflict as the gardens and fields for the local people are near the boundary of the ranch. Fencing the ranch is important to protect people's fields and gardens and there are three cases reported of people trampled by elephants near the ranch. Some of the fulfilled pledges are the following: a light truck bought for the community to ease the transport problems in the area, a grinding mill for the community, a borehole, the building and renovation of teacher's houses and a 1 x 3 classroom block, ten bicycles for the headmen, a banana boat for water transport, and the renovation of the road from Mwape to Nyimba boma. Furthermore, they have given relief food to the aged and families whose fields were destroyed by game. Each household was given a 25 kg of maize flour. Unfulfilled pledges are the fencing of the ranch, and building a shop. The local people are enjoying the benefits of working at the ranch and about eighteen locals have been employed as game scouts. The ranch has been providing seeds for cash crops and has created a market to buy their cash crops.

Nyakolwe game ranch is owned by Sable Transport Company. Most of the people in Chinsimbwe zone lost their fields and gardens when the ranch was created and they were not

given any compensation. This has forced the local people to start farming at the fringe of the river which is causing an environmental problem that will lead to silting of the river. This unfenced ranch has also brought continuous hunger to the people as the harvest today is very low compared to previous years. Elephants and wild pigs are the main animals troubling the community as they have destroyed crops in the area. Poverty and hunger have thus become part of the living condition of the local community. On the other hand, Nyakolwe ranch has made some contributions to the Chinsimbwe community. They are currently building a classroom block and teacher's houses, and the local people have been employed as game scouts. In August 2008, the ranch bought 22 bicycles for the local village headmen. The ranch, however, is benefiting more than the local people. As the ranch is not fenced, the animals that enter the ranch automatically became part of the game for the ranch. This is also robbing wildlife revenue from the government for there is neither any ongoing counting of the animals in the ranch nor close monitoring of the activities in the ranch by government wildlife officers.

Despite the benefits received, the local community is very disappointed by Nyamvu failing to fence the ranch which has caused animal-human conflict and the destruction of crops. The community has been seeking audience with the management of the ranch to review the pledges given but not implemented to date.

4.3.5 Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS)

The Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) is an NGO which is working in the Mwape Chieftdom with the local communities. The WCS is running its programs mainly in the GMAs. The aim of the WCS is to reduce deforestation and promote conservation of all wildlife so as to boost tourism in the area. They have targeted the charcoal burners and poachers. Their target groups have been given loans for seeds like groundnuts, rice and soya beans. Those given the

loans are those identified to have the potential to pay back the loans. Their programs help the local communities to contribute positively towards wildlife conservation. The response from the community has been overwhelming and local communities have found in the WCS another source of income. The target groups have been trained to start a bee-keeping project and they have supplied bee hives to the local community. The WCS also provides a market for the honey harvested. A few poachers have been given skills like carpentry, farming and fishing, and fencing materials have also been provided, especially for the rice fields. These are some of the benefits Mwape community is currently enjoying from the WCS which is mainly aimed at reforming the poachers and curbing poaching and deforestation in the area. Benefits to the community are a motivating factor as the community changes in a positive sense when it receives benefits. Community members have thus become active participants in wildlife conservation programs.

An evaluation on the economic desirability of wildlife ranching was carried out in our neighbouring country, Zimbabwe, and the outcome was that small wildlife operations with tourism and hunting generated much greater revenue per hectare of land than cattle, even at high stocking rate (Waterhouse, 1994). For this reason, local people should start thinking of ways other than farming as a way of generating income. Their participation in game ranching and making their CRB active and workable can be considered as alternatives.

4.3.6 The Problem of elephants

The Mwape community, however, is also sharing the burdens. Their fields have not been spared from destruction by wildlife, especially elephants, as there has been an increase in the elephant population because of the reduced scourge of poaching. The international ban on the trade of ivory has also contributed to the population increase of elephants. The enforcement of

the law against poaching by the ranches has further contributed to the increase of wildlife. Hence, these ranches and wildlife officers need to build enough camps to control the movement of game and reduce destruction of the fields.

The lives of the people are also at risk from the elephants and the death toll has risen to five in 2008 in Mwape chiefdom. Another problem is that pupils from far away villages are finding it difficult to go to school. For example, Makoleka village is about 5 kms from the nearest school Mwape-Kalongo. Kanga and Fulu villages are also 3 kms from the school and there is a forest in which there are herds of elephants that these pupils have to cross to get to the school. The only way to avoid these elephants is to cross these forests mid-morning and afternoons. As a result, some pupils have left school in these areas while others are arriving at school late. A solution would be to build a school in their respective areas. Teachers also find it difficult and are at risk, especially when they travel to collect their salaries in Petauke. They mostly use bicycles because of scarce motorized transport and they have to cross long forests which are inhabited by elephants.

4.3.7 Hunting licenses

The local people have little access to the needed nutrition from game. Last year in September, no person from Mwape chiefdom was able to buy a hunting license due to the escalation of the price for district licenses (as shown in Figure 7). In theory, licenses are justified as providing hunting rights for local residents. In practice, however, only relatively rich people, often outside the area, get such licenses. Consequently, only a few benefits flow to local people because the meat is sold in urban areas. For example, the local or district license fee for buffalo was going at 2.5 million Zambian Kwacha which is an enormous increase in price compared to the previous year which was about 270 thousand Zambian Kwacha. The ordinary person cannot

afford such an amount for a hunting fee. This is a burden to the local people who are being deprived of the needed nutrition from wildlife.

Price List for District Residential Hunting

PRICE	YEAR 2008-2009
BUFFALO	ZK 2,500,020
BUSHBUCK	ZK 200,160
ELAND	ZK 3,000,060
HARTEBEEST	ZK 800, 100
KUDU	ZK 2,500,O20
WATERBUCK	ZK 900,000
ZEBRA	ZK1, 500,120
HIPPOPOTAMUS	ZK 3,500,100
ELEPHANT	ZK 42,000,120
LION	ZK 7,000,000

Fig. 7: Source: *Chipata ZAWA Offices*

In conclusion, ZAWA has ultimate authority over wildlife, although both the government and local communities are said to be equal partners in the management of wildlife. Both partners practice manipulative management which is having an external influence on wildlife. Although they have a duty to conserve wildlife and protect fields and gardens from wildlife destruction, this has been difficult even to the extent of losing human life because of the increase in the elephant population. Chili fencing has been recommended for crop protection but this project has

not yet yielded desirable results in Mwape chiefdom. The local people feel that they have been deprived of a fair distribution of benefits because hunting quotas are sold by ZAWA for the wildlife in their chiefdom. It has been observed that license holders are taking advantage of them in the sense that they are over-harvesting wildlife in their chiefdom, and neighbouring CRBs are benefiting from the wildlife sales in their land. Mwape CRB needs to start working effectively and involve safari operators who can partner with them to reap maximum benefits from their wildlife resources. Although some benefits have been received from the surrounding game ranches in their land, the growing population of elephants is posing a serious threat to the lives of the people.

CHAPTER 5

DATA ANALYSIS AND ETHICAL EVALUATION

From the research findings, it can be seen that conflicts could escalate between the community in Mwape chiefdom and ZAWA officers if issues of equity and transparency of revenue sharing of wildlife resource benefits are not amicably settled. Hence, the government needs to find ways of ending the human-animal conflict that has also resulted into tension and mistrust among the concerned parties. This is not a problem only affecting the community in Mwape chiefdom but it also affects other communities in the country. Indeed, it has been noted on a more universal basis that “equity and transparency of revenue sharing from natural resources are often highly contested, and conflicts between communities, private sector and state over access to resources are escalating” (Ahmed et al., 2008:96). According to the interviews conducted from concerned parties, Mwape CRB and the community are not benefiting adequately or fairly from their wildlife resources unlike the other neighbouring CRBs of Chisomo, Lwembe and Nyalugwe which are all under Petauke West GMA Bloc (Nyimba Wildlife Office). Conflicts are normally a result of poor management of natural resources, weak environmental protection and lack of voice from the most affected. Hence, in this chapter, different ethical theories as discussed in chapter 2 will be applied in an attempt to evaluate whether or not the current procedure in Mwape Chiefdom results in a just distribution of wildlife resource benefits to the local community.

5.1 Arguments for the Current Distribution of Wildlife Resource

Benefits

5.1.1 Participatory justice

Participatory justice raises the question as to how and by whom distributive decisions are made. In other words, do those directly involved actively and adequately participate in the decision making process? Clearly there is need for participants to have an adequate say in decisions on issues that directly or indirectly affect them. As far back as 1996, the government has been involved in finding suitable ways of enabling community participation in natural resources and environmental management, and in revenue collection and distribution. Projects involving community participation in wildlife management have been implemented in other countries and have succeeded in countries like Zimbabwe (Child, 2004:175). In 1996, similar projects commonly known as LIRDP and ADMADE were begun in Zambia where guidelines were formulated for Community Based Wildlife Management (CBWM). As a result of these meetings, a process was begun to move towards a fair distribution of wildlife resource benefits (Child and Dalal-Clayton, 2003:183). Guiding principles of NPEZ are fair distribution of wildlife benefits and revenue between central government and the local government and the local communities and reduction of human-animal conflict (NPEZ, 2005). To date, consultative meetings and workshops are still taking place which is a way of involving local people to a greater extent in decision making on issues of wildlife that affect them. This has helped in reducing tension between the government and local communities.

Later on, there was the enactment of Wildlife Act No.12 of 1998. This act is in use to date for the management and distribution of wildlife resource benefits between the government and the local communities sharing the same habitat with wildlife. For transparency, good

governance and an enabling environment, the current procedure allows local inhabitants to start participating in natural resource management, policy making and its implementation. Their participation has contributed to the management of wildlife resources as a result of which the CRBs are currently getting 50% of the wildlife sales. The Act has also resulted in an improvement in wildlife conservation and in a reduction of cases of poaching.

5.1.2 Distributive justice



The people living in GMAs are the most vulnerable and are affected by human-animal conflicts. The current procedure which provides for a 50% share given to local communities mitigates their sufferings. At present, the vulnerable have a voice in the policy decisions through their respective CRBs and the 50% share is a way forward towards a fair and equitable distribution of wildlife resource benefits. In becoming thus empowered, local inhabitants have not only become more active as citizens but also less vulnerable. This procedure has the effect of making the government more accountable to its citizens and, as a result, people are better informed about government commitments. Furthermore, the government has developed a warmer relationship with CRBs and the entire community living with wildlife. On the part of local citizens, there is a growing recognition that they have an important role to play in enhancing the accountability of public officials as well as in reducing corruption and leakages of funds from wildlife sales. Today, CRBs are in a better position to understand and be more actively involved in issues of wildlife management, ownership and the implementation of related policies.

5.2 Arguments against the Current Distribution of Wildlife Resource

Benefits

5.2.1 Paternalism

Despite the arguments in favour of the current distribution of wildlife resource benefits, there are some arguments that militate against this procedure. In the past, the National Parks and Wildlife Services (NPWS) had a different approach to resource distribution in that they never shared the benefits with the local communities. Poaching was rampant and local communities harvested wildlife at will to the extent of near extinction of animal species like the black rhino. The NPWS made decisions and implemented policies for local communities without their participation in decision making. This procedure was justified on the basis of the principle of paternalism (Beauchamp, 1982: 290) because the local communities were perceived to be irresponsible at the time and to have neglected the conservation of their wildlife. As the wildlife population had dwindled in their respective areas, the NPWS took it upon themselves as a responsible agency to manage the wildlife resources without involving the local people.

Although the current procedure is not a paternalistic one, it has been opposed by some who feel that the right of local communities to self-determination has been violated. They believe that local communities should have complete control over the management of their own wildlife resources independent from ZAWA. As it is, the CRBs have no right to sell wildlife as the sales are done by ZAWA. The following example is given by Child (2003:201). If government allowed cotton growers or livestock producers to receive 50% of the sale of their produce but only to access this money by applying for a school or clinic, then it would be unlikely that producers would continue to produce and they would switch to other businesses. Applying this line of thought to CRBs and the local communities, the objection is that unless

local communities get the 100% of sales from wildlife, they will not have adequate incentive to manage their wildlife resources responsibly, nor will they feel free to decide themselves on how to use the money obtained.

Another argument against the current procedure is one that seeks legal justice of redress. According to this principle, the law looks at the nature of the injury and treats parties as equal if one has inflicted damage and the other sustained damage (Beauchamp, 1982:225). Some opponents of the current procedure feel that ZAWA has harmed local communities by robbing them of the ownership of wildlife in their areas. This argument is based on the past use rights of land and wildlife as both were traditionally in the hands of the local communities. This principle, then, calls for the need to legally redress the injustice by government giving back the rights of property ownership of wildlife to local communities.

A further argument is with respect to the current 50-50 percentage distribution of shares between the government and local communities. While communities in principle are given 50%, 5% is given to chiefs as individuals so that communities only get 45% of the total shares. This kind of sharing is not considered to be on an equal basis. In sum, the argument is that ZAWA has too much control over the funds and wildlife so that both parties are not really equal partners in the management of the resources.

5.2.2 Misappropriation of funds by CRBs

In addition to the above, the office of the Zambia Wildlife Authority auditor general has discovered financial irregularities among the CRBs. For example, between July-December 2005, Jumbe CRB paid the chief an extra 16 million Kwacha which is more than the 5% to which he is entitled. This is contrary to the guidelines provided by the Wildlife Act mentioned above by which the chief gets his 5% directly from ZAWA.

Another discrepancy in the finances is the failure to honour the agreement which was reached between the safari operator in the same chiefdom and the wildlife authority. The Wildlife Authority made a hunting concession agreement with the safari operator to sink boreholes for the community. However, the safari operator bought grinding mills which he placed at the chief's palace instead of sinking boreholes as per agreement. Consequently, the local communities who were the intended beneficiaries could not benefit as they did not have access to the boreholes.

A further dishonesty in the distribution of funds was discovered when the Mwanya CRB members diverted public funds and paid themselves advances of ZK300,000 each. These are some of the financial irregularities discovered by the Auditor General's office of ZAWA (<http://zambiaconservation.blot.com>). Hence, the current procedure has not prevented the misappropriation of funds by CRBs with the result that the intended purpose of the funds to develop the chiefdoms has been diverted into personal pockets.

5.2.3 Animal superiority

Today, some communities living in the same environment with wildlife are experiencing many cases of human-animal conflicts. For example, in Mwape Chiefdom, and as earlier discussed in research findings, the human death toll had risen to five because of human-animal conflicts. Human life is at risk because of the population increase of the elephants. Local people have been complaining that the ZAWA has prioritized the welfare of wildlife over humans in the name of conservation, and wildlife seems to have more rights than humans. When elephants kill people and destroy crops, the response of ZAWA is half-hearted; but when an animal is killed, they respond immediately and at times harass the local villagers. Hence, some people are against the current Wildlife Act because it has escalated conflicts between ZAWA and the chiefs (local

people). Local community members have a right to be protected and ZAWA violates their human rights when it fails to save victims from wildlife.

5.3 Overall Ethical Evaluation

The distribution of wildlife resource benefits needs to take into account the wider framework of values that are involved in the relationship that exists between humans, wildlife and the natural environment.

5.3.1 Conservation

Conservation of the natural environment including wildlife in its totality by both ZAWA and local CRBs highlights the more traditional relationship of humans to the wider natural environment. It strengthens the awareness of individuals as members of interdependent parts, i.e., soil, water, plants and animals upon which the food chain depends as well as the importance of the human-animal relationship. One of the objectives of the Zambia Wildlife Policy of 1993 is to encourage local people to conserve wildlife and to use the resource correctly, not just because of its economic utilitarian benefits to humans but also on account of the intrinsic and inherent values which the natural environment and animals embody. This is a way forward towards living in harmony with, and preserving good relations with the land. Such a development supports the ethical dictum of Leopold's *Land Ethic* that, "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (Leopold, 1968: 224).

In the past, when wildlife management was in the hands of NPWS, the local communities had no opportunities of participating in wildlife conservation programmes. The current procedure allows local communities to participate in the management of wildlife. It is a way forward in helping them to understand and appreciate the range of different kinds of values

held by wildlife in particular. As a result, local communities have strengthened their awareness of their interconnectedness and interrelatedness with nature. This in turn has brought a greater sense of identification with nature in humans as propounded by Arne Naess in *Deep Ecology*, that is, a transition from an I-it to I-thou attitude which brings in a sense of care for all of nature (Naess, 1989: 244).

In his understanding of *Social Ecology*, Bookchin (1993) emphasises how environmental degradation is so closely related to, and a result of oppressive hierarchical relations in human society. In colonial times, poaching was rampant to the near extinction of species like the black rhino. The colonial/colonized or oppressor/oppressed mentality of unequal relationships expressed itself in the manner in which the natural environment was treated. The colonizers did not have that sense of identity with the natural world that was part and parcel of the traditional African mentality with the result that the natural world was perceived as resources to be used for the benefit of humans alone. The emphasis on the generation of foreign currency through the killing and sale of animal parts such as ivory tusks paid little attention to the value of the natural environment in itself except for tourist purposes. The exploitation of mineral and other natural resources for export abroad was a dominant feature of the colonial presence. Development did not refer to the development of Zambia but rather to the extent that the occupying country was benefiting. Conservation as such was not a priority nor was any program for environmental protection. It was dominated rather by the debate about the sustainable use of wildlife which was pushed by the North.

Developing countries in the South such as Zambia began to question and fight for their rights to be guardians of their own wildlife. This fight was about justice and the rectification of past user rights of wildlife resources (Child and Dalal-Clayton, 2003:175). This has expressed

itself in developments such as ZAWA and the CRBs and the need for massive education of local people on the value of wildlife and the benefits of conservation.

5.3.2 Regulating common property

In the 1960-70s, Hardin's article on what he called the *Tragedy of the Commons* exercised a powerful influence on the need for resource management policies (Feeny et al., 1990:4). The theory predicted that overpopulation would result in the degradation of the resources used in common. These resources could include fisheries, forests, wildlife, ground water and air. The uncontrolled human desire to maximize personal profit leads to the degradation of resources such as grazing land, and the unrestrained exercise of such freedom by individuals leads to ruin for all if the commons are not regulated.

Resource degradation is inevitable unless common property is converted into private property or government introduces regulations on the use of the commons (Feeny et al., 1990:5). Consequently, many governments began to regulate common properties like wildlife, forests and fisheries. The Zambia Wildlife Act has converted some common properties into National Parks and GMAs. This was done to avoid massive degradation and extinction of wildlife species. Rules and regulations were put in place for using these commons, for example, by introducing the payment of hunting licenses, a fee for game viewing, and the creation of CRBs. Today, however, there is also a greater emphasis on the need for local management and decentralization. Commonly managed resources have the potential of success.

Today, the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDp) and the Administrative Management Design (ADMADe) Zambia are wildlife projects of commonly managed properties. The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe is also a commonly managed project that has succeeded (Child,

2003:232). A rapidly expanding body of scientific evidence indicates that sustaining environmental resources is not dependent on the particular structure of a property regime but on a well specified property rights regime and a regime congruent with ecological and social context (Hanna and Munansighe eds., 1995:4).

The people living in GMAs are part of the total sum of the *citizens* of Zambia and should not be regarded as *subjects* (Child and Dalal-Clayton, 2003:176). In colonial times, communities had no opportunity to participate in wildlife resource management. The National Parks and Wildlife Services never involved the local communities in policy formulation, management and the allocation of wildlife resource benefits. Such communities were considered to be *subjects* and not *citizens*. Most of the government programmes were not successful because they faced resistance from local communities. Escalation of the scourge of poaching in the 1970s and 1980s was attributed to this factor. Whereas a responsible government has a duty to protect and care for its citizens, these local communities felt neglected by the government on account of not being part of the managing agencies of their wildlife. The people in Mwape Chiefdom are citizens of Zambia and the government has a duty to protect and care for them not just as a community but as individuals as well. Kant enunciates his categorical ethical principle that “persons should be treated as ends in themselves and never solely as means to the ends of others” (Beauchamp, 1982:118). Treating persons as means is to ignore their personhood by exploiting and using them without regard to their interests and needs. Today, the Wildlife Policy of 1993 advocates for local communities to be integrated and accepted as custodians of wildlife and of other renewable resources in their land.

5.3.3 Restoration of user rights

Justice is linked to desert, what one merits or deserves, what is due or owed to him/her. The principle of desert can be applied to the issue of distribution of wildlife resource benefits to the communities living in close proximity with wildlife. These people deserve what is due to them for two reasons. The first is that, in the past, many communities lost their ancestral lands when National Parks were created. Hence, these local communities were harmed by the government's action in creating these parks. The current procedure which provides a 50% share of the resources and co-management of their own resources is justified; they are just getting what is due to them or what they deserve. Secondly, local communities deserve some form of compensation for their lost ancestral lands and wildlife which now belong to the State as stipulated by the law of Ownership of Wildlife (Mudenda, 2007: 48). Furthermore, these communities are productive in the sense that they produce crops in their fields and gardens in spite of the problem posed by elephants, wild pigs and hippos.

The benefits from wildlife should be returned to *producer communities*. These communities surrendered their land for wildlife production, and they are now participating in the management and conservation programmes that enhance wildlife production. Based on the principle, "economic progress is driven by the premise that benefit is directly related to input" (Child, 2004:78), these people have sacrificed their land which is an input enhancing the protection and conservation of wildlife. Hence, there should be a positive correlation between the quality of management demonstrated by these communities and the benefits received. These communities should be considered as shareholders of the resource and they are consequently entitled to the dividends from the proper management of the wildlife resources. The government

has taken a bold step of allocating the rights of benefit from wildlife to local communities living near wildlife in the GMAs.

The ethical principle of effort also has relevance to the current procedure which restores user rights. The Wildlife Act advocates that benefits from wildlife resources can be accessed by simply making an effort to establish a vibrant CRB. These CRBs co-manage wildlife with the government. Communities that have established vibrant CRBs are currently reaping the resource benefits. It is unfortunate, however, that the Mwape CRB is not currently vibrant.

The current procedure helps to restore the lost property rights which were taken by the State when they created the National Parks. Prior to colonialism, both the land and wildlife belonged to the local communities and their chiefs. The current procedure honours the rights of communities living with wildlife. Although their property rights have only been partially restored, the local communities are reaping wildlife benefits. They are co-managers of the property (land and wildlife) together with the government. This co-management has been of benefit to both parties as well as to the animals that are protected and have been saved from extinction by aggressive poachers. Both the government and the local community are involved in law enforcement which has lessened the scourge of poaching, and the government is getting substantial revenue from tourism. The local communities, therefore, have contributed much in different areas such as the tourism industry, wildlife conservation and the management of natural resources. There are also farming activities taking place in GMAs which are contributing much to the agricultural industry.

Historically, there is no doubt about the link that existed between the landholders and wildlife, but it was disconnected when National Parks were nationalized and their control was dominated by government officials and politicians. Landholders questioned such government

moves and fought for their user rights to exploit their wildlife resources. Today, the current procedure of resource distribution has been hailed both in Zambia and internationally. This is a way to decentralize the management of wildlife to ensure maximum benefits to landholders.

However, although these landholders now have access to their wildlife resources, only ZAWA has the right to sell their wildlife. Nevertheless, the current procedure is a way forward for the country towards the democratization process and a way of empowering the local communities to have a sense of ownership of wildlife. Consequently, economic gain has been achieved by local communities from the sale of wildlife. The most important incentive is the recognition of people's rights to use wildlife resources. Once rights are assured, local people will participate in the formal and informal institutional structures necessary for the proper management and protection of wildlife resources. Hence, their use rights need to be defined and appropriately recognized. Priority should always be given to the local people.

5.3.4 Sustainability of natural resources

Conservation values, the use of the earth's resources and wildlife such that they are able to support and sustain all life forms for future generations, are being promoted by the current procedure of wildlife resource distribution. The system allows wildlife to continue existing in a natural state. The local CRBs and ZAWA law enforcement agents have continued with foot patrols, arrests and prosecution of poachers. Locals are now reluctant to engage themselves in illegal dealings of wildlife. Both landholders and the government are empowered to promote conservation and economic values, and this has been possible through the willingness to pay by clients. These conservation programmes help the clients to recreate and refresh their body and mind through trophy hunting and game viewing.

The Zambia Wildlife Policy of 1993 and the Wildlife Act of 1998 both advocate for sustainable use of wildlife resources. Zambia is also a signatory to the 7th Millennium Development Goal with a view to achieving environmental sustainability by 2015. Nature has to be preserved for future generations. In the 50% share of wildlife funds, part of it is allocated for the sustainability of wildlife conservation. Unsustainable exploitation of natural resources damages the earth's environmental ecosystems, and this is likely to be much worse for people who will live in the distant future. Such actions are considered to be a form of environmental injustice (Frey et al. 2005: 281). Hence, we have an obligation to avoid what will be seriously disadvantageous to future persons.

There is, therefore, need to establish institutions that enhance the rate to which resources are conserved for the benefit of future generations. ZAWA and CRBs were instituted to increase the rate of wildlife conservation and they aim at the sustainable use of this resource.

5.3.5 Rawls' maximin principle

The government has tried different procedures in its quest for a just distribution of wildlife resource benefits and three approaches have been tried. The first approach was under LIRDP and funds were shared as follows: 60% for the local community and 40% for LIRDP. The second approach shared proceeds as follows: 90% for the local community and 10% for LIRDP (Child, 2003:183). The third approach divided shares as follows: 50% for ZAWA and 50% for the local community (Wildlife Act of 1998, No.12). The third approach is the current procedure for wildlife resource distribution shared between the government and the community. The three approaches are illustrated in Figure 8 below where X represents the Local Community and Y the LIRDP/Government.

Three Approaches to Distribution of Resource Benefits

1 st Approach	2 nd Approach	3 rd Approach	
60%	90%	50%	X
40%	10%	50%	Y

Fig. 8

Given the choice between these three approaches, which one would it seem reasonable to choose? If you are X, you would definitely choose the 2nd approach. This is to X’s advantage. We tend to tailor our decisions to our own advantage. According to Rawls, correct standards of justice are those that are impartial and rational. An impartial choice is made when one is in the *veil of ignorance*, without knowledge of one’s situation, deprived of information that enables us to tailor things to our own advantage (Beauchamp, 1982: 246). In this position of uncertainty, we are able to make rational choices and the rational principle is what Rawls calls the *maximin principle*. This means that we would rationally maximize the minimum, or the worst possible scenario that may result for us. In other words, the best rational choice would be the one which would not leave us badly off no matter what the outcome. Hence, according to this principle, the impartial and rational choice is the 3rd approach. Each concerned party will play it safe by agreeing on an equal share for each because they do not know whether they are X or Y.

With reference to the current Wildlife Act that permits a 50-50 share of benefits between ZAWA and the local community, equality is demonstrated between the concerned partners in this policy. The government has realized that the local communities are equal partners in the management and conservation of wildlife. Today, the local communities have an equal share of

the sale of wildlife resources. The lost property rights have been restored by the current procedure of distribution. As co-managers of the property, local communities can freely decide what to do with their share.

Distribution of wealth and income and hierarchies of authority must be consistent with both the liberties of equal citizenship and equal opportunity. The starting point is that primary goods should be equal so that everyone has an equal share. Inequalities are tolerated and desirable if they make everyone better off and are in line with equal liberty and opportunity. They are more desirable if they work to enhance the position of the most disadvantaged persons. Injustice in this sense is the inequality that is not to the benefit of all and compensation is permitted for the loss of some by the gains of others. The difference principle calls for redress of undeserved inequalities and compensation. Treating all equally and with equal opportunity, society needs to give more attention to those with fewer assets and those born in less favourable positions.

Conservation of wildlife was initially dominated by countries from the North and they dictated this to the countries in the South who implement their conservation agenda by creating national parks. The State annexed customary land under the British South African Company as discussed earlier in Chapter 3 and wildlife became the property of the state. Colonial masters created social inequalities and some original inhabitants were settled in unproductive lands. Authority and power was vested in the white district administrators of the time and, as a result, positions of authority were not accessible to all but were placed in the hands of a small minority of whites.

After the attainment of political Independence in 1964, Zambia began the process to redress the inequalities in the direction of equality. With respect to wildlife resources, the Wildlife Act

addressed these inequalities by empowering the local communities and restoring their lost rights. The jurisdiction of government was restricted to wildlife and the customary land was left in the hands of the local communities. Consequently, local communities are on an equal footing with regard to participating in wildlife conservation as co-managers with the government and in receiving an equal percentage of benefits from wildlife sales.

As in the case with Mwape Chiefdom, the community is less advantaged in the sense that, geographically, it cannot be easily accessed and it is relatively underdeveloped in the province. There are few schools, no secondary schools, colleges, electricity, hospital and adequate clean water. Although GRs in the chiefdom have contributed to upgrading schools and roads, sources of employment are only available for a few. These ranches are benefiting more than the community itself and it seems that the local community has accepted the inequalities between them as they consented to their establishment in their customary land. Nevertheless, in terms of Rawls' difference principle, Mwape community is in a position to benefit from the 50-50 percent distribution if it moves towards resolving its internal problems.

5.4 Final Assessment

The current procedure of wildlife resource benefits distribution has yielded many desirable opportunities for both the government and local communities. The most important factor is empowerment of the mostly affected people through community participation programmes and the acquisition of funds from wildlife sales. Historically, prior to colonization, local communities managed their own wildlife resources and the advent of colonialism robbed them of their user rights of wildlife resources which were later restored in 1996 through projects such as ADMADE and LIRDP. Furthermore, the Wildlife Act of 1998 empowered local communities through the establishment of CRBs thereby giving them greater participation in

decision making, a 50% share of wildlife sales, and in bringing about a reduction of the scourge of poaching.

Taking into account the arguments against the distribution of wildlife resource benefits cannot override the arguments for the current distribution of wildlife resource benefits. For example, Mwape chiefdom is part and parcel of the national conservation agenda. Therefore, the government has a right to implement fully its conservation programmes in all concerned chiefdoms. It is also justifiable to take away some community rights because common property might end up being no one's property especially if there are no regulations set and the end result is lack of responsibility and degradation of the common property. The 5% entitlement to the chief is also justified in the sense that, she is the recognised authority of the customary land. Funds are sometimes misappropriated by CRBs and this does not make a 50-50 distribution unjust. Finally, opponents to the current distribution of wildlife benefits have observed that ZAWA has given priority to wildlife than human life and, this is not the case, there is balanced protection of wildlife and the community.

Despite the arguments given above against the current distribution of wildlife resource benefits, my overall ethical assessment is that the procedure is just in view of the consideration given to various environmental theories as well as to Rawls' theory of justice. Rawls says that all the citizens who live in a just society have the same basic rights and therefore the distribution of a 50-50% share of wildlife sales to both the government and local chiefdoms is a demonstration of acknowledging equal rights. The local CRBs have been accepted as equal partners in the management and conservation of wildlife. Various CRBs have benefited from this current procedure and tangible results have been produced especially in infrastructure development as

discussed in subsection 4.3.4. The Zambia Wildlife Act gives a fair opportunity to chiefdoms through the establishment of CRBs that are used to channel wildlife benefits to the communities.

Although there is equality in the distribution of wildlife resource benefits, some chiefdoms are disadvantaged because of their geographical positions which make them difficult to access. The benefits received are a form of compensation for their lost customary land and wildlife. However, there is need to consider vulnerable and disadvantaged chiefdoms like that of Mwape, so that they can benefit more from their wildlife resources. Although some communities in Mwape Chiefdom may not consider the current procedure to be just because their CRBs are not harvesting the intended benefits, the reasons given are largely due to the fact that the CRBs in question are not executing their duties properly or they are just not functioning at the moment. In particular, there is need for CRBs to find safari operators to market their wildlife abroad so that they can maximize the sales of their wildlife. Correcting traditional boundary errors can also help the chiefdom to redefine its land so that safari investors might come in. If such issues surrounding the Mwape CRB are resolved, then they will surely succeed in obtaining greater benefits, and they will discover that the current procedure is actually fair.

CHAPTER 6

GENERAL SUMMARY

The people of Mwape Chiefdom trace their origins from the Ambo tribe who migrated from Luapula to the Luangwa valley where they settled and inherited Nsenga customs. These people are important because of their association with wildlife and their sharing of the same habitat. Their traditional leader is a woman locally known as *mambo* or *calo*, and the chieftainess was considered to be a trustee of the land and wildlife on behalf of the people. The advent of the colonial era brought new changes to the traditional land tenure system and the colonials created Game Reserves and National Parks. The State subsequently encroached upon the customary land and local communities were resettled in areas known as Game Management Areas. The forests, minerals and wildlife belonged to the State. The collapse of the economy in 1970 resulted in local people taking up illegal activities such as the poaching of rhino and elephants for economic gains.

Conferences were held, policies were formed and laws were enacted to restore the user rights of wildlife to local communities. Today, the most important outcome attributed to these conferences is the involvement of local communities as co-managers of wildlife resources. Programmes of community participation have been successful in countries like Botswana and Namibia where the sales of wildlife go directly to local communities living with wildlife. In Zambia, local communities only started participating in the management of their wildlife resources in 1996. The Wildlife Act of 1998 was later enacted to provide a 50-50 share of wildlife sales between the locals and ZAWA, and this is an incentive that has reduced poaching

among the locals. Their entitlement to such incentives and benefits is based on the premise that they are shareholders of the property which they inherited from their forefathers.

6.1 Conclusion

Today, wildlife belongs to both the local community living in close proximity with wildlife and ZAWA. CRBs were established to co-manage with ZAWA on behalf of the local communities. Under the current procedure of wildlife resource benefits distribution, there are advantages such as an equal share of resources between co-operating partners, empowerment of local chiefdoms, conservation of wildlife and forests, and restoration of user rights towards their wildlife. Some of the disadvantages are that irresponsible behaviour by locals towards wildlife conservation, mismanagement of common funds by CRBs, and the priority that is sometimes given to animals over humans in the name of conservation.

Mwape Chiefdom has been disadvantaged by the current procedure in the sense that its people are not benefiting from the 50-50% share from wildlife sales. The reason is that its CRB is not vibrant unlike its neighbouring CRBs of Luwembe, Chisomo and Nyalugwe that are currently working and benefiting. The CRBs in Mwape Chiefdom lack powerful investors like safari operators to market their wildlife abroad. Furthermore, they are currently having boundary problems with their neighbouring chiefdom of Chisomo. The increase in the population of elephants has also brought hunger in the chiefdom as fields and gardens are perpetually destroyed by wildlife and people have even been killed by elephants. This undesirable situation can be prevented if the CRB starts working effectively so that it dialogues with ZAWA on behalf of the chiefdom.

There is need to conserve wildlife for its own sake as well as for the benefit of the people. In other words, there is need to acknowledge and protect the different values that belong to

wildlife and the natural environment. This calls for sustainable exploitation of the natural resources and wildlife in order to avoid extensive damage to the harmony of the ecosystem involved.

The current procedure needs to be re-evaluated so that disadvantaged chiefdoms like Mwape can have wildlife benefits. In future, there is need for a review of the Wildlife Act so that local communities may perhaps be allowed to get a 100% share from wildlife sales as is the case in countries like Botswana and Namibia. The government may also need to find other ways of raising revenue from wildlife sales such as taxing CRBs from their sales of wildlife and introducing trophy handling fees.

The current relationship between ZAWA and local communities is considered to be just, future comparative research should be carried out with respect to countries like Botswana and Namibia to evaluate the extent to which their procedure of giving their local communities 100% share of their wildlife resources may turn out to be an even more desirable way forward.

6.2 Recommendations

- i) There is need for both ZAWA and CRBs to be equal partners and also empowering CRBs to have a greater bargaining power in wildlife sales and management.
- ii) CRBs should be given the mandate to hire and fire partners in conservation such as safari operators and game ranchers.
- iii) Revision and amendment the Zambia Wildlife Act and the land tenure system so that ownership of wildlife and the customary land which was lost during the creation of National Parks and Game Management Areas.
- iv) Full and active participation of all stakeholders including the local communities in decision and policy making on wildlife sales and distribution.

- v) Tighten and increase the number of law enforcers, patrols and monitoring of GMAs and Open Areas so that license holders are monitored and prevented from over harvesting wildlife as not prescribed by their licenses.
- vi) Both the government and CRBs to search for more donor funds to help them conserve wildlife because NORAD funding is ending in 2012.
- vii) Increase annual budget allocation to the Ministry of Environment and Tourism so that there is enough money to be channelled towards wildlife management and conservation.
- viii) CRBs and their chiefs should be allowed to define themselves geographically in order to ease boundary tensions.
- ix) Transparency, checks and balances, and the monitoring of the funds distributed to CRBs so that they can reach the intended beneficiaries.

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APPENDIX: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

A. Introduction

- Introduce myself.
- Ask participants to introduce themselves.
- Explain purpose of session.
- Assure them that all responses are confidential.
- Assure them that there is no right or wrong answer and encourage them to share freely.
- Thank them in advance for participating.

B. Question Guide

1. Tell me something about wildlife management in your community, in your neighbourhood?
2. What are the three top issues of wildlife management in your community? And in your chiefdom? Why do you consider them to be top issues?
3. Who owns wildlife in your chiefdom? Why?
4. What is your understanding of conservation? What is the role of the community, chief and government in wildlife and conservation and management?
5. Are you happy and satisfied with the role played by the community, chief, government in conservation? If yes, explain and if no, explain?
6. Do you have conflicts among yourselves (community, chief and government) in the management and conservation of wildlife resources? If there are any conflicts what is the reason?
7. Do you have conflicts with wildlife in your community?

8. What type of meat do you eat in your homes? Do you eat meat every week?
9. Is poaching a problem in your area? If a problem, how can it be reduced?
10. How is your community participating in the management of wildlife?
11. What are the benefits to the community in the management of wildlife?
12. What are the benefits to the chief? To the government?
13. Does the community participate in decision making of wildlife conservation programmes?
14. What would you suggest as the best program for wildlife management?
15. What is the role of women in the management and conservation of wildlife? Is their role significant?
16. What is the role of children in conservation programs?
17. How can we improve the conservation of wildlife in our community?
18. What two or three challenges do you consider to be most important ones facing your community today in conservation?
19. What are some of the ways to overcome such challenges?
20. What would you suggest as the best conservation program in your area?

C. Closing

- Ask them if they have any final comments or thoughts to be shared.
- Thank them for participating.