

**THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUSHALA
REBELLION IN NORTH WESTERN PROVINCE OF
ZAMBIA, 1976-1990**

By

THOKOZILE SHABA

**Dissertation Submitted to the University of Zambia in Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History**

THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA

LUSAKA

© 2019

DECLARATION

I, Thokozile Shaba, declare that this dissertation represents my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for a degree at this or any other University and that it does not incorporate any published work or material from another dissertation.

Signed.....

Date.....

COPYRIGHT

All rights reserved. No part of this dissertation may be reproduced or stored in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from the author or the University of Zambia.

APPROVAL

This dissertation of Thokozile Shaba is approved as fulfilling the partial requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Arts in History by the University of Zambia.

Examiner 1..... Signature..... Date.....

Examiner 2..... Signature..... Date.....

Examiner 3..... Signature..... Date.....

Chairperson

Board of Examiners..... Signature..... Date.....

Supervisor..... Signature..... Date.....

ABSTRACT

This study examines the socio-economic impact of the Mushala rebellion in North Western Province of Zambia from 1976 to 1990. The study argues that there were several reasons which compelled Adamson Mushala to take up arms against the United National Independence Party (UNIP) government. Mushala was dissatisfied with President Kaunda's one-party system which limited political opposition by force or coercion. His insurgency was also fuelled by Kaunda's refusal to accord Mushala the position of Director of Game and Fisheries. He was further dissatisfied with what he perceived as government's failure to fulfil the people's expectations of national and economic development. In particular, Mushala was infuriated with the marginalisation of the people of North Western Province, a situation he attributed to government's failure to develop the province. He also wanted political power. The study revealed that Mushala's rebellion had devastating socio-economic effects in the province. The insurgency led to the displacement of people from their homes. As a result of the kidnappings and abductions carried out by Mushala and his men, some family ties were broken as people lost children, husbands and wives. It also affected the educational activities and health facilities in the province. There was also destruction of life and property. The Mushala rebellion further disrupted the agricultural system. Consequently, hunger and starvation emerged in the province. The study further reveals that the government responded to the rebellion by initiating and implementing a number of measures in order to help the local people of North Western Province. On 28 January 1976, President Kenneth Kaunda invoked and extended the State of Emergency regulations to cover North Western Province in the wake of Mushala's rebellion. The government mobilised troops to the province in order to deal with security challenges engendered by Mushala's insurgency. The sort not only pledged to reward anybody that would provide the information regarding Mushala's whereabouts but also detained those who were suspected of collaborating with him. The government also provided food aid to victims of Mushala's insurgency. Mushala was finally killed in 1982, by Zambian security forces. However, the study noted that the remnants of Mushala's gang regrouped in Mwinilunga and continued with their acts of terror until they were pardoned by Kaunda in 1990.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation of work to my mother Doreen Chilembo and my father Laston Shaba.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I give thanks to the Almighty God for his love during my entire study. Special thanks go to my supervisor Dr. Clarence Chongo, for his supervision during my study. I also thank Professor B.J. Phiri, Dr. W. T. Kalusa and Dr. E.K. Chiputa for their commitment towards teaching during part one of my postgraduate studies. Many thanks go to all members of staff at the University of Zambia, Department of Historical and Archaeological Studies, for helping me shape my topic during the presentation of the research proposal for this dissertation and their encouragements when writing it. Furthermore, I thank my mother, Doreen Chilembo and father my Laston Shaba for their financial, moral and spiritual support.

I am thankful to staff at several institutions that facilitated the conduct of my research. I thank the staff of the Special Collections Section of the University of Zambia Main Library, the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ) and the United National Independence Party Archives in Lusaka. I also give thanks to the people of North Western Province for their help during my oral interviews with them. Lastly, I am very grateful to my friend Elijah Munga for his help during the entire study as a postgraduate at the University of Zambia.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration	i
Copyright	ii
Approval	iii
Abstract	iv
Dedication	v
Acknowledgements	vi
Abbreviations	ix
List of Figures	xi
List of Maps	xii
List of Tables	xiii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	1
1.1 Statement of the Problem.....	13
1.2 Objectives of the Study.....	13
1.3 Rationale.....	13
1.4 Literature Review.....	13
1.5 Research Methodology.....	20
1.6 Organisation of the study.....	21

CHAPTER 2: CAUSES OF THE MUSHALA REBELLION.....	22
2.1 Marginalisation of North Western Province.....	23
2.2 High Unemployment and Lack of Infrastructure.....	26
2.3 Mushala’s Dissatisfaction with the One Party State.....	28
2.4 Nepotism and Tribalism within UNIP.....	33
2.5 Mushala’s Heroic Quest.....	36
2.6 Mushala’s Betrayal.....	39
2.7 Mushala’s Quest for Power.....	41
2.8 South Africa’s Connection and Conflicion Interpretations.....	42
CHAPTER 3: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUSHALA REBELLION.....	51
3.1 Displacement of People.....	52
3.2 Breaking up of Families.....	55
3.3 disruption of Educational Activities.....	58
3.4 disruption of Healthy Services.....	59
3.5 Disruption of Agricultural Activities.....	61
3.6 Disruption of Hunting Activities.....	65
3.7 Hunger and Starvation.....	66
3.8 Disruption of Life and Property.....	68
CHAPTER 4: GOVERNMENTS RESPONSE TO THE REBELLION.....	74
4.1 1976 State of Emergency and Reward for Mushala’s Capture.....	75
4.2 Mobilisation of Troops to North Western Province.....	78

4.3 Detention and Treason Trial for the Suspects.....	82
4.4 Provision of Food Aid to the Victims.....	86
4.5 Why the Rebellion took long to be Quelled: Myth and Reality.....	87
4.6 The Killing of Mushala.....	93
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION	99
Bibliography.....	105

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
BOSS	South African Bureau of State Security
BOMA	British Overseas Military Administration
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
COZ	Credit Organisation of Zambia
DSC	Democratic Supreme Council
ETA	Basque Homeland and Liberty
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces
FRELIMO	The Mozambique Liberation Front
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
MPLA	The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MNR	Mozambican National Resistance
MP	Member of Parliament
NAMBORD	National Agricultural Marketing Board

PIDE	International and State Defence Police
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance Army
SADF	South African Defence Force
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
UDI	Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UP	United Party
UPP	United Progressive Party

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1:	Adamson Bratson Mushala.....	11
Figure 2:	Weapons found by the Zambian security officials in 1976.....	48
Figure 3:	A bridge burnt and wrecked by the Mushala rebels in 1976.....	71
Figure 4:	Photos of Mushala's right hand men.....	77
Figure 5:	The dead body of Adamson Mushala carried by prisoners in Solwezi.....	95
Figure 6:	Alexander Saimbwende.....	96

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1:	Location of North Western Province in Zambia.....	12
--------	---	----

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:	Crop Production of 1980/1981 season for North Western Province.....	63
----------	---	----

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

There have been many rebellions in the course of human history. In most cases these insurgences occurred when there was misunderstanding of political ideologies, poor governance, struggle to control natural resources, ethnic rivalry, declining economic conditions, and struggle for power and in some instances, religious differences.¹ Insurgences varied from one country to another. They differed in their internal structure, size, durational period and goals. Some rebel groups were well organised, better-equipped and attracted a large following while others did not. Some rebellions were long-lasting and difficult to overcome while others lasted for a short time and were easily crushed, and not all rebels achieved their goals.² A rebellion on the other hand is opposition to one in authority or dominance, open, armed, and usually unsuccessful defiance of or resistance to an established government.³

Almost all parts of the world have faced war in one way or another. In Europe, a violent conflict raged in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1998. This was a political, low intensity armed conflict which engulfed the six north-eastern counties of Ireland that formed part of the United Kingdom or Great Britain.⁴ This conflict was sectarian or communal in nature involving the majority unionists or loyalist Protestant population and the minority Catholic or Nationalists. The conflict claimed about 3,532 lives.⁵ Other communities in Western Europe have similarly attempted to secede in the past. Some were violent, while others appeared to be peaceful. Examples of these included the Basques conflict in Spain, which started in 1959 and lasted till

¹ Arthur T. Moe, "The Causes and Dynamics of Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa," MA, U.S Army War College 2009, p.2.

² Bertin K. Kouadio "From Stability to Insurgency: The Root and Proximate Causes of the September 2002 Civil War in Cote d'Ivoire" PhD dissertation, Florida International University, 2009, p.34.

³ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rebellion>, Accessed 09/09/2017.

⁴ David McKittrick and David McVea, *Making Sense of the Troubles: The story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland*, (Chicago: New Amsterdam books, 2002), p. x.

⁵ John Dorney, "The Northern Ireland Conflict 1968-1998," www.theirishhistory.com/2015/02/09/the-northern-Irelandconflict-1968-1998-an-overview/#, Accessed 9/06/2017.

2011. Here, the Basques Homeland and Freedom (ETA) movement, an armed nationalist and separatist organisation sought political independence from Spain. During this period, the Basques carried out a violent campaign of bombing, assassination and kidnapping throughout Spain resulting in more than 1,000 deaths.⁶

From the early 1960s when most African countries started getting independence, Africa has been facing more violent and deadlier conflicts than other continents or regions.⁷ Among the numerous destructive insurgences in Africa included the Biafra civil war in Nigeria which was fought between the government of Nigeria and the secessionist state of Biafra.⁸ The Igbo of Biafra had nationalist goals which they tirelessly pursued from 1967 to 1970 when the war ended. Claiming nearly a million lives, the conflict was a consequence of political, economic, cultural and religious tensions.⁹

The Jonas Savimbi led Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) guerrilla war against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government between 1975 and 2002 was yet another violent conflict in Africa. The war broke out immediately after independence and it was notable due to the combination of Angola's violent internal dynamics and massive foreign interventions.¹⁰ The civil war which was basically a power struggle between MPLA and Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and

⁶ Bertin K. Kouadio, "From Stability to Insurgency: The Root and Proximate Causes of the September 2002 Civil War in Cote d'Ivoire", p.36.

⁷ Stephen J. Stedman and Terrence Lyons, "Conflicts in Africa," in Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi (ed), *Democratic Reforms in Africa: The quality of Progress*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 141.

⁸ Nkem Den Chukwu, *Tribal Echoes: Restoring Hope*, (Bloomington: iUniverse, Inc, 2012), p. 22.

⁹ Chukwu, *Tribal Echoes: Restoring Hope*, p. 22.

¹⁰ Sarolta Takacs, *The Modern World: Civilization of Africa, European, Americas and Asia*, (London: Routledges, 2008), p. 27.

claimed about 500,000 lives.¹¹ It was not until 2002 when Savimbi was killed that the civil war in Angola ended.

The insurgency led by the Mozambican National Resistance Army (RENAMO), a militant organisation and political movement in Mozambique, was yet another violent political opposition which had devastating long-lasting effects on Mozambique's political stability. Like the Angolan civil war, the RENAMO rebellion was fuelled by external forces. Backed by South Africa, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) organised and sponsored the RENAMO insurgence in 1977 as a strategy of destabilising the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government in Mozambique.¹² After 1979, and following Zimbabwe's independence the following year, the South African government stepped in as the major financial backer of RENAMO and also as part of its grand strategy to defeat the African National Congress (ANC).¹³ By the time the RENAMO insurgency was defeated by the Mozambican government in 1992, the war had claimed at least 900,000 lives.¹⁴ However, in 2013, the RENAMO insurgence resurged and has continued to claim more lives.¹⁵

Like many African countries, Zambia has had its own share of violent political rebellions. The scale and intensity of rebellions in Zambia might not have been as in other countries such as the Angola and Mozambique where civil wars greatly compromised the two countries peace and political stability they, however, cost the country many lives. Immediately after independence the conflict between the governing United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the Lumpa

¹¹ Stedman and Lyons, "Conflicts in Africa," p. 141.

¹² Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellions: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 76.

¹³ Weinstein, *Inside Rebellions: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, p. 76.

¹⁴ Joseph Hamlon, *Mozambique: Who calls the shots*, (London: Currey, 1992), p. 42?

¹⁵ Bjorn E. Bertelsen, *Violent Becomings: State Formation, Sociality and Power in Mozambique*, (New York: Berghahn, 2016), p. 2.

Church escalated. The Lumpa Church, an African Independent Christian Church, was established in 1953 by Alice Mulenga Lenshina in the village of Kasomo in Chinsali district of Northern Province of Zambia.¹⁶ There were several reasons which accounted for the conflict between UNIP and the Lumpa Church. Among other reasons, the members of the Lumpa church refused to recognise political authority including the idea of paying taxes to the government. They only recognised Jesus Christ as their leader. They further did not want to belong to any political party. When these clashes worsened early in 1964, the government banned the church. The conflict mainly affected Chinsali district in Northern Province because it was the headquarters of the church and a UNIP stronghold.¹⁷ By the time the Zambian authorities quelled the rebellion, the uprising had cost about 1,500 lives and resulted in more than 19,000 Lumpa Church members fleeing to Congo Leopoldville for refuge.¹⁸

From the mid-1970s to 1990, Zambia experienced one of the most disruptive insurgencies in the history of the country. Adamson Bratson Mushala, the leader of 200 plus rebels, organised the only significant armed rebellion against the UNIP government.¹⁹ Mushala was born in 1935 among the Kaonde and Nkoya people in Kabompo district of North Western Province of Zambia.²⁰ He grew up at a time when most African countries were experiencing serious nationalist struggles and in Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) these struggles were getting tense. Having witnessed these struggles and the challenges of the freedom fighters, Mushala was

¹⁶ Hugo Hinfelaar, "Women Revolt: The Lumpa Church of Lenshina Mulenga in the 1950s," *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 21, No. 2, (1991), p. 99.

¹⁷ Elijah Munga, "The Lumpa Church: It's Socio-Economic Impact in Lundazi District in Eastern Province of Zambia, 1955 – 1995," Dissertation, University of Zambia, 2016. p. 6.

¹⁸ W.M.J. Van Binsbergen, "Religious Innovations and Political Conflicts in Zambia. A Contribution to the Interpretation of the Lumpa Rising,," in W.M.J. Van Binsbergen and R. Buitenhuis (ed) *African Perspectives: Religious Innovations in Modern African Society*, (Leiden: African studies centre, 1976) p. 101.

¹⁹ Miles Larmer and Giacomo Macola, "The Origins, Context, and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambia One Party State," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3, (2007), p. 471.

²⁰ Mwizenge S. Tembo, *Satisfying Zambian Hunger for Culture: Social Change in the Global World*, (Virginia: Xliris corporations, 2012), p.347.

inspired to participate in the nationalist struggle. As a young boy, he went to Chizela Mission School for his primary education, and as was typical of the colonial era, he entered school at the age of twelve in 1948 to pursue his primary education.²¹ Mushala attended Mukinge Mission School for his Standard II and six years later he went to Mutanda Mission School for his Standards VI, VII and VIII.²² Patrick Wele argued that Mushala was an above average student and was believed to be energetic and not a bully type, although at one point as a pupil, he was involved in a violent incident at school over poor diet. However, Wele notes that Mushala did not solely engineer the violence that broke out and led to the closure of the school for almost three weeks.²³

Mushala's three-year stay at Mutanda Mission School aroused his interest in nationalist politics. He finally got involved in nationalist politics and became an active member of UNIP in 1961. He later became a full-time UNIP branch official as Constituency Chairman in Chizela.²⁴ Some of the notable activities associated with him during the turbulent days were the burning of Mutanda Mission School and the assaulting of two policemen in a village near Solwezi in August, 1962.²⁵

During the early 1960s when the nationalist struggle was at its highest peak in Northern Rhodesia, UNIP decided to send approximately thirty-five youths including Mushala to Egypt and China to undergo military training in guerrilla warfare. UNIP took this decision following its scheme to dislodge the colonial government through an armed struggle in the event that the

²¹ Patrick Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, (Lusaka: Multimedia Publication, 1987), p. 2.

²² Tembo, *Satisfying Zambian Hunger for Culture: Social Change in the Global World*, p. 347.

²³ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 4.

²⁴ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 7.

²⁵ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 4

Lancaster negotiations failed.²⁶ While Mushala was away on military training, Zambia gained independence and the UNIP scheme to dislodge the colonialists through armed struggle was abandoned. When Mushala returned from military training, he hoped and expected to be treated like a hero, but this also did not happen. In recognition of his efforts towards the nationalist struggle, the Kaunda government instead gave Mushala the post of Deputy Secretary of the Education Committee at Freedom House, the UNIP headquarters in Lusaka. However, Mushala was not satisfied with this position. It is alleged that Mushala wanted to be Director of Game and Fisheries but this request was rejected by Kaunda.²⁷

Kaunda's refusal to appoint Mushala as Director of Game and Fisheries marked the turning point for Mushala. He embarked on an armed struggle against the UNIP government, a journey in which he would defy many laws against humanity. There were several reasons which compelled Mushala to take up arms against the UNIP government. Like UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique, Mushala was dissatisfied with Kaunda's one-party system which use force or coercion to limit political opposition.²⁸ His insurgency was also fuelled by Kaunda's refusal to accord him the position of Director of Game and Fisheries.²⁹ He was further dissatisfied with what he perceived as government's failure to fulfil the people's expectations of national and economic development.³⁰ In particular, Mushala was infuriated with the perceived marginalisation of the people of North Western Province, a situation he attributed to government's failure to develop the province.³¹ Therefore, Mushala sought to address these

²⁶ Patrick Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe*, (Solwezi: PMW, 1995), P. 6.

²⁷ Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe*, p. 15.

²⁸ John M. Mwanakatwe, *End of the Kaunda Era*, (Lusaka: Multimedia Publication, 1994), p. 88.

²⁹ Beatwell S. Chisala, *The Downfall of President Kaunda*, (BS, Chisala, 1994), p. 319.

³⁰ Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p.131.

³¹ Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia*, p.131.

challenges in the province. He also wanted political power and his main goal was to form a new government. Collectively, the above factors set the Mushala gang in motion on a mission to fight the UNIP government and in the process terrorised the people of North Western Province from 1976 until the 1990s.

After resigning from UNIP in 1966, Mushala first joined the opposition United Party (UP) under the leadership of Nalumino Mundia.³² However the UP was banned in August 1968 after the government blamed it for violence.³³ Thereafter, Mushala joined the African National Congress (ANC) led by Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula. His stay in ANC was short lived as Nkumbula announced that he was joining UNIP following the Choma Declaration of 1973 which marked the end of ANC. Mushala was therefore left without a party. Since he could not swallow his pride and re-join UNIP, and he was intensely determined to wage war against the UNIP government, he sought military training from the South African government and Portuguese authorities in Angola.³⁴

Mushala drew inspiration from UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi who campaigned relentlessly initially against Portuguese authorities and, after independence in 1975, continued with guerrilla warfare against the MPLA-led Angolan government. He was finally killed in 2002 by government troops.³⁵ Inspired by Savimbi, in 1974, Mushala and his supporters went to Angola for military training in guerrilla warfare in preparation for waging war against the UNIP government.³⁶ However, he did not stay in Angola for too long as his anticipated military expectations of undergoing guerrilla training did not materialise. From Angola Mushala turned

³² Tembo, *Satisfying Zambian Hunger for Culture: Social Change in the Global World*, p. 345.

³³ William Tordoff, *Politics in Zambia*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 22.

³⁴ Tembo, *Satisfying Zambian Hunger for Culture: Social Change in the Global World*, p. 347.

³⁵ Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), p. 67.

³⁶ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 60.

to South Africa in his continued quest to mobilise external support in guerrilla warfare. With the help of the Policia Interncional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) or the Portuguese International and State Defence Police, a secret but ruthless Portuguese intelligence agency, Mushala and his followers flew into Caprivi, a long, narrow strip of land administered by South Africa and stretching eastwards from Namibia's Okavango region bordering Botswana to the south and Angola and Zambia to the north. Here, Mushala hoped to get support for military training.³⁷ While there, Mushala and more than 200 rebels were trained by the South African Defence Force (SADF) under the command of Colonel Jannie Breytenbach.³⁸ Mushala's training was part of the South African broader strategy of destabilising neighbouring countries supporting liberation movements and allegedly to combat the spread of communism in Southern Africa.³⁹

However, Miles Larmer and Giacomo Macola have argued that Mushala's struggle within Zambia during the period under review was fought largely without external support.⁴⁰ They insist that the Mushala rebellion should not be depicted as a South African sponsored terrorist or bandit expedition, but it should rather be looked at as the consequence of the disturbances culminating from complex interaction between local, national and regional forces and structure.⁴¹ The Mushala rebellion should be understood as a distinctive and significant element of wider opposition to the one party state in post-colonial Zambia.⁴² Mushala's guerrilla

³⁷ Bennett Kangumu, *Contesting Caprivi: A History of Colonial Isolation and Regional Nationalism in Namibia*, (Windhoek: John Meinert Printing ltd, 2011), p. 155.

³⁸ Wim Van Binsbergen, "From Tribe to Ethnicity in Western Zambia: The Unity of Study as an Ideological Problem," in Wim Van Binsbergen and Peter Geschiere (ed), *Old Modes of Production and Capitalist Encroachment: Anthropological exploration in Africa*, (London: routledge, 2011), p. 222.

³⁹ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 72.

⁴⁰ Larmer and Macola, "The Origins, Context, and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambia One-Party State," p. 472.

⁴¹ Larmer and Macola, "The Origins, Context and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One-Party State," p. 472.

⁴² Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia*, p. 155.

campaign was nothing more than an expression of the political dissent during the 1970s and 1980s.

By 1976, Mushala had returned to Zambia and started his terror in North Western Province of Zambia. On his return to Zambia, he was armed with sophisticated weapons ready to wage war against the UNIP government.⁴³ During his insurgency Mushala and his group looted villages, abducted small girls and women, forced young men to join his movement and sabotaged some communities in North Western Province of Zambia.⁴⁴ From January 1976, Zambian authorities began to receive reports of armed robbery and shootouts with local police. In March of the same year, Mushala went in Senior Chief Kanongesha's area, where his forces burnt villages and⁴⁵ raided domestic animals and livestock.⁴⁶ The Mushala rebel group terrified villagers in the affected communities of North Western province of Zambia.⁴⁷ The name of Mushala instilled feelings of trauma among the people of that province. Mushala became a source of concern to the nation as his guerrilla activities compromised the freedom which came with independence in 1964.⁴⁸

Mushala is said to have used black magic and this enabled him to avoid detection by the Zambia security forces when sought for.⁴⁹ There were also reports that Mushala flirted with Kaunda at State House several times in his invisible states. However, Mushala was tracked and

⁴³ Chisala, *The Downfall of President Kaunda*, p. 130.

⁴⁴ Chisala, *The Downfall of President Kaunda*, p.320.

⁴⁵ Larmer and Macola, "The Origins, Context, and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One-Party State," p. 491.

⁴⁶ Chisala, *The Downfall of President Kaunda*, p.320.

⁴⁷ Chisala, *The Downfall of President Kaunda*, p.320.

⁴⁸ Larmer and Macola, "The Origins, Context, and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One-Party State," P. 491.

⁴⁹ Alan Cowell, *Killing the Wizards: Wars of Power and Freedom from Zaire to South Africa*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 93.

finally gunned down by the security forces after a tip off from one of his wives in 1982.⁵⁰ After his death his body was displayed at Solwezi General Hospital for the local people to see.⁵¹

After Mushala's death, Alexander Saimbwende who was second in command, took over the reign and refused to surrender partly because he feared to be jailed or sentenced to death. Thus, he continued the terror campaign until 25 September 1990, when he surrendered to the late Alexander Kamalondo, then a member of the Central Committee for North Western Province, and was flown to Lusaka where he was pardoned by President Kaunda.⁵² The rest of the members of the group opted to surrender when they realised that the terrorist activities were no longer effective following the demise of the vision carrier Mushala. By 1987, the group had only five committed members as the rest had deserted Saimbwende.⁵³ When news of the general amnesty reached Saimbwende, he felt it was the right time to surrender as the rebellion was doomed to fail in the absence of the foremost leader, Mushala.


⁵⁰ Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar your Neighbour: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, (London: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 244.

⁵¹ Chisala, *The Downfall of President Kaunda*, p. 321

⁵² James Anthony Pritchett, *Friends for life, Friends for Death: Cohorts and Consciousness among the Lunda-Ndembu*, (London: University of Virginia Press, 2007), p. 185.

⁵³ Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents*, p. 21.

Figure 1: Adamson Bratson Mushala.




Source: *Zambia Daily Mail*, 13 May 1976.

Study Area

This study focuses on North Western Province of Zambia as map 1 indicates. The map shows districts in North Western Province and the Lunga National Park where Mushala had established his camp.

Map 1

North Western Province



Map drawn by the Department of Geography and Environment Studies, Cartographic Unit,
University of Zambia, 2018.

Statement of the Problem

Adamson Mushala led the most serious and disruptive insurgence against Zambia's post-colonial state. Yet, despite the huge disruptive effects engendered by this rebellion, very little has been written about its impact on local communities. This study attempts to investigate the socio-economic impact of the Mushala rebellion on North Western Province of Zambia from 1976 to 1990.

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study were three fold. The study:

- i. Traced the causes of Mushala's rebellion.
- ii. Investigated the socio-economic impact of the rebellion on North Western Province of Zambia; and
- iii. Examined government's response to the rebellion.

Rationale

The study will contribute to the existing literature on the impact of Mushala's rebellion. It is also hoped that the study will stimulate further research interest on the subject.

Literature Review

A survey of literature on the Mushala rebellion shows that a lot has been written on the rebellion but very little has been documented on its impact in North Western Province. The historiography of the Mushala rebellion is enriched by written records. The works include books and journal articles. Although the rebellion was significant, it is presented as a marginal aspect

of southern African history in general and Zambia in particular. Scholars have written about it only in passing. However, Patrick Wele is the only scholar so far who has attempted to write in detail about the Mushala rebellion in his two books titled *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion: The Untold Story* and *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe* published in 1987 and 1995, respectively. Although Wele placed very little emphasis on the social and economic effects of the Mushala rebellion, his works remain significant to this study as they provide very useful insights and form the basis on which to investigate the impact of the rebellion in North Western Province of Zambia.

In his earlier study (1987), Wele provides a detailed account of Mushala's life from his early days in primary school to his career as a politician.⁵⁴ Among other factors attributed to the outbreak of the rebellion, Wele emphasised Mushala's displeasure with the lack of economic development in North Western Province. Wele also argues that Mushala sought external support from South Africa and the Portuguese to prepare himself for the war he planned to wage against the UNIP government. He concludes that Mushala's terror was however short lived mainly because he was shot dead by the Zambia Army in 1982. Although Wele does not fully examine the socio-economic impact of the rebellion, his study is important as it provides detailed background information about the Mushala rebellion. This study builds on Wele's work.

In another study, *Zambia's most famous dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe*, Wele provides a brief account of Mushala's terrorist activities. He notes that although the Mushala rebellion was isolated, it took the Zambian government seven years to subdue it despite deployment of three battalions.⁵⁵ Wele further explained that after the death of Mushala,

⁵⁴ Patrick Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, (Lusaka: Multimedia Publication, 1987), p. 1.

⁵⁵ Patrick Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe*, (Solwezi: PMW, 1995), P. 6.

Alexander Saimbwende continued with the insurgency although at a lower level until 1990 when he was pardoned by President Kaunda.⁵⁶ Wele's work is significant as it provides useful insights about the circumstances that led to Mushala's death. This study builds on these insights.

James A Pritchett's study examines the daily life of the Lunda people and their culture. The central theme in his work is friendship groups who are not age groups but friends by choice within the Lunda-Ndembu society in North Western Zambia. In outlining the social history of the Lunda and Ndembu, Pritchett discusses the Mushala rebellion, although in brief. Like Wele, he also outlines Mushala's political career and some of the reasons that led Mushala to start the rebellion including Kaunda's refusal to give him the position of Director in the Department of Game and Fisheries.⁵⁷ Pritchett emphasises that it was Kaunda's refusal to give to Mushala the position of Director in the Department of Game and Fisheries that fuelled Mushala's insurgency in Zambia. Pritchett's work is vital to this study as it gives insights into the origins of the rebellion.

Mwizenge Tembo's study⁵⁸ is also relevant. Although the study mainly focuses on social change in post-colonial Zambia it discusses the Mushala rebellion in passing. Rather than attributing the cause of the Mushala rebellion to Kaunda's refusal to give Mushala the position of Director in the Department of Game and Fisheries, Tembo suggests that the rebellion in Zambia was a political dissent. He notes that following the introduction of one-party system, Zambians could not find legitimate ways of expressing disagreements, change the UNIP

⁵⁶ Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents*, p. 14.

⁵⁷ James Anthony Pritchett, *Friends for Life Friends for Death: Cohorts and Consciousness among the Lunda-Ndembu*, (Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2007), p. 181.

⁵⁸ Mwizenge S. Tembo, *Satisfying Zambian Hunger for Culture Social Change in the Global world*, (Virginia: Xlibris, 2012).

government peacefully or influence changes in the economic and political policies.⁵⁹ Some Zambians who opposed the one-party state never abandoned their belief in multi-party system and this gave rise to Mushala's armed political struggle against the Kaunda dominated one-party state. This study builds on these insights.

Like Tembo, Beatwell Chisala's study⁶⁰ on the early political history of post-colonial Zambia and the downfall of Kaunda shows that the Mushala rebellion was part of the wider opposition to the one-party state in Zambia. He notes that in North Western Province, Mushala waged a war against the Zambia Paramilitary Police and eventually the army in protest against the one-party rule.⁶¹ Although Chisala's work does not give a detailed account of the Mushala rebellion, his work still remain significant to this study as it provides insights on the political significance of the Mushala rebellion and also the responses and measures taken by the UNIP government to bring the insurgency to an end.

Joseph Hanlon's work, like Chisala's provides a brief account on the continuation of the rebels' activities after the demise of Mushala. He notes that Mushala's group remained active and continued to terrorise North Western Province of Zambia after the death of Mushala in 1982.⁶² He further contends that although the post-Mushala terror campaign was not as destructive as it was when he was still alive, it was nonetheless damaging enough to force an Italian mineral prospecting team to withdraw from their work and plans in the area.⁶³ Hanlon's

⁵⁹ Tembo, *Satisfying Zambian Hunger for Culture: Social Change in the Global World*, p. 347

⁶⁰ Beatwell S. Chisala, *The Downfall of President Kaunda*, (BS Chisala, 1994) and James Anthony Pritchett, *Friends for Life, Friends for Death: Cohorts and Consciousness among the Lunda-Ndembu*, (London: University of Virginia Press, 2007).

⁶¹ Chisala, *The Downfall of President Kaunda*, p. 319.

⁶² Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar your Neighbor: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, (London: Indiana University Press, 1986.), p. 244.

⁶³ Hanlon, *Beggar your neighbor: Apartheid power in Southern Africa*, p. 244.

study is important because it demonstrates how economic developments and activities were disrupted in the area even after Mushala's death. This study builds on these insights.

In his analysis of the post Second World War conflicts, B Klaus Jorgen Gantzel,⁶⁴ explains the possible factors that contributed to the armed conflicts in various parts of the world generally and in the developing world in particular. He points out that in the recent past the nature of war has shifted from large-scale interstate conflicts to internal civil wars and guerrilla wars. Gantzel attributes the instability in the developing world to economic modernisation and social integration which destroyed traditional relations. He too in passing points out that Mushala used the socio economic hardships of the province to recruit supporters in his struggle against the Kaunda regime. He argues that Mushala mainly targeted government institutions with the goal of destabilising the Kaunda regime and its one party system, and those that stood in his way suffered the same fate.⁶⁵ Although the study does not highlight the full account of the rebellion, it is vital as it provides useful insights on Mushala's activities in North Western Province of Zambia.

Although studies by D. Dreyer, B. Kangumu, T. Bell and B.D. Ntsebeza, and H. Lungu and N. Ngoma,⁶⁶ focus on different themes and aspects of southern African history, they seem to agree on one central theme that is the sources of sponsorship for the Mushala rebellion. That Mushala and his group received financial support and military training from the South African

⁶⁴ B Klaus Jorgen Gantzel, *Warfare since the Second World War*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2000).

⁶⁵ B Klaus Jorgen Gantzel, *Warfare since the Second World War*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2000.), p. 351.

⁶⁶ Donald Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics of Decolonization 1946-1990*, (New York: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1994); Bennett Kangumu, *Contesting Caprivi: A History of Colonial Isolation and Regional Nationalism in Namibia*, (Windhoek: John Meinert Printing Ltd, 2011); Tery Bell and Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, *Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth*, (London: Verso, 2003) and Hannaina Lungu, Naison Ngoma, "The Zambian Military trails tribulation and hope," in Martin Reval Rypia, (ed) *Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa*, (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2005).

government is a subject of consensus among the authors.⁶⁷ Although these studies do not give any details on the impact of the insurgency, they are vital to this study as they convincingly demonstrate that Mushala's source of military training and military equipment was South Africa.

Giacomo Macola and Miles Larmer's article on the origins, context and political significance of the Mushala Rebellion is also vital to this study.⁶⁸ The central theme in this work is the political significance of the Mushala rebellion. Macola and Larmer argue that Adamson Mushala led the only significant internal armed rebellion against the post-colonial Zambian state. They essentially dismiss the standard depiction of Mushala's foreign military support for his terrorist activities. They emphasise that his insurgency should be viewed as the precipitate of complex interaction between local, national and regional forces and structures.⁶⁹ Macola and Larmer's work is vital to this study as the study builds on their critical insights and analysis of the Mushala rebellion.

In the same vein, Miles Larmer's work, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia* rejects the view that Mushala received external support for his terrorist activities. Larmer insists that the rebellion was more than an expression of tribalism for it was also fuelled by the failure of the independent Zambian state to fulfil its people's expectation of national economic development.⁷⁰ Larmer's work shows that Mushala's band of fighters inspired simultaneously by anti-communism, and post-colonial economic discontent were heroes who resisted the one party state and in so doing, paved the way for the pro-democracy movement of

⁶⁷ Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics of Decolonization 1946-1990*, p. 140 and Tery Bell and Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, *Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth*, p. 61.

⁶⁸ Miles Larmer and Giacomo Macola, "The Origins, Context, and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One Party State," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 40, No.3, (2007), pp. 471-496.

⁶⁹ Miles Larmer and Giacomo Macola, "The Origins, Context, and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One Party State," p. 472.

⁷⁰ Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia*, (Franham: Ashgate, 2011), 132.

1990-1991. He further notes that the reason the rebellion was not able to spread to other parts of the country other than the North Western Province of Zambia was the lack of intense military equipment.

Works by Stephen J. Stedman and Terrence Lyons; and Michael Brown⁷¹ demonstrate how grim the conditions were in many African countries undergoing civil wars from the 1960s onwards. The scholars show that Africa has been the site of the world's deadliest wars as most of the countries were experiencing the most violent conflicts. They not only analysed the most violent conflicts that spanned the African continent such as the civil wars in Angola, Liberia and Uganda but also provided statistical evidence in terms of the number of casualties.⁷² For example, they noted that the Ugandan civil war of the early 1980s led to more than half a million deaths while between 1991 and 1993, 240,000 Somalians died in war induces famine. During the seven year civil war (1990-1997) in Liberia, about 150,000 people died. Similarly when the Angolan civil war resumed in 1992, the death toll reached 1,000 per day.⁷³ These works are critical as they inform this study about various civil rebellions in Africa which had similar repercussions to the Mushala rebellion in Zambia.

Research Methodology

This study was accomplished using both primary and secondary sources of data. This study consulted the University Of Zambia Main Library, especially the Special Collections section, for sources such as books, journal articles, newspapers, and parliamentary debates. The National

⁷¹ Stephen J. Stedman and Terrence Lyons, "conflicts in Africa," in Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi (ed), *Democratic Reforms in Africa: The Quality of Progress*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Brown, Michael E. *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

⁷² Brown, Michael E. *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p. 235.

⁷³ Stephen J. Stedman and Terrence Lyons Stedman, "conflicts in Africa," in Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi (ed), *Democratic Reforms in Africa: The Quality of Progress*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p.141.

Archives of Zambia and the UNIP Archives were also consulted for primary sources such as North Western provincial files, presidential speeches, newspapers such as the Times of Zambia and the Zambia Daily Mail. Oral interviews were conducted in the affected communities of North Western Province with the ordinary people who either witnessed or were affected by the Mushala rebellion; Chief Chizela was also interviewed, all efforts to interview Mushala's immediate family yielded no fruits. Furthermore, interviews were conducted with the former minister of Home Affairs, Aaron Milner and former Minister of Defence Grey Zulu. The study largely employed qualitative analysis of the data collected. Both archival and oral data was analysed in comparison to each other. Different themes were identified under which the data was analysed and presented.

Organisation of the Study

The study is organised chronologically. This dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction and historical background. Chapter two investigates the causes of the Mushala rebellion. Chapter three examines the socio-economic impact of the Mushala Rebellion in North Western Province of Zambia and Chapter four investigates the government's response to the Rebellion in an effort to help the affected communities of the province. Chapter five is the conclusion of the whole study.

CHAPTER 2: CAUSES OF MUSHALA’S REBELLION

Introduction

The Mushala rebellion was one of the significant armed internal rebellions in the history of Zambia. Evidence suggests that the rebellion started in 1975 but it was only identified in 1976 as the Mushala rebellion.¹ The rebels first unveiled themselves in Sesheke, in Western part of the country in the late 1975, where they left a mark of their act of terror among the people. From Western Province, the rebels moved to North Western Province in Chizela district (now Mufumbwe district), where they began terrorising the people of that area. From 1976 to the later 1980s, Adamson Bratson Mushala succeeded in destabilising North Western Province.

This chapter investigates the factors that led to the rise of the Mushala rebellion in North Western Province of Zambia. It argues that the conditions that led to the Mushala rebellion emerged from longstanding grievances against the post-colonial government. A combination of factors-local, national and regional factors contributed to the rise of the Mushala rebellion. The chapter is subdivided into three sections. The first part investigates the local factors which include, among others, the marginalisation of the people of North Western Province, high levels of unemployment and lack of infrastructure. The second section examines the national causes for the rebellion which includes dissatisfaction with the one-party rule, nepotism and tribalism within the UNIP government, Mushala’s heroic quest, his betrayal by those he had made a pact with and his quest for power. The last part explores the regional factors that contributed to the rise of the Mushala rebellion and attempt to analyse the conflicting interpretations regarding the perceived involvement of South Africa in stirring up the rebellion.

¹ Interview with Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba, Mufumbwe, 17 October, 2017.

Marginalisation of North-Western Province

Among the local factors that contributed to the rise of the Mushala rebellion was the perceived marginalisation of the people of North Western Province during the period under review. Although it was one of the largest provinces in Zambia, Mushala felt that North Western Province did not enjoy the fruits of development as other parts of the country did. The scholarly argument concerning the economic conditions of North Western Province was that although politically stable, the early days of Zambia's independence was difficult economically both for the country and especially North Western Province.²

The academic discourse concerning the underdevelopment of African countries including especially after independence is understood from among other issues the dependence syndrome in many African countries and also due to lack of economic diversification. Timothy Shaw argues that although Zambia had managed through mining to expand its manufacturing capacity and to reorient its transport routes, the country had neglected agriculture and rural development.³ Jaeger adds that despite economic potential of North Western Province in agriculture as shown by its excellent climate and rainfall pattern and its potential in tourism, the living conditions of the population remained poor as the economy of the province was predominantly subsistence farming.⁴ From 1963 onwards, relatively little was known about this province and this remained so for at least four decades thereafter. Due to these conditions in the

² Fred Mutesa, *Zambia Country Study*, (Lusaka, Diakonia, 2003), p. 19 and William Tordoff, *Politics in Zambia*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 94.

³ Timothy M. Shaw. "Zambia: Dependence and underdevelopment," *Journal of African studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, (1976), p. 7.

⁴ Jaeger, "Settlement Patterns and Rural Development: A Human Geographical Study of the Kaonde, Kasempa District, Zambia," p. 14.

province, scholars such as Achim Von Oppen called North Western Province, Zambia's Cinderella province.⁵

Contrary to scholarly examination of underdevelopment in North Western Province, Mushala's perception of the marginalisation of North Western Province was attributed to the UNIP government which he blamed for failing to develop the province.⁶ After independence, there was great expectation from many people across the country. As in many other parts of the country, in North Western Province, the promises and expectations of development during the formative years after independence were high. However, the people of North Western Province were disappointed when the national government failed to deliver the basic social services in the province as school infrastructure and access to education, health service delivery and clean water remained a huge challenge to local communities.⁷ Thus, Mushala organised the rebellion in protest against the perceived lack of development in the Province. It was the underdevelopment of the Province that made Mushala to take up arms against the UNIP government.⁸ Miles Larmer and Giacomo Macola argue that the Mushala rebellion:

was...fired by the increasingly manifest failure of the independent Zambian state to fulfil its people's expectations of national social and economic development. He and his supporters consistently acted and saw themselves as the spokesmen of the neglected peoples of the North Western Province.⁹

⁵ Achim von Oppen, "Cinderella Province: Discourses of Locality and Nation State in a Zambian Periphery 1950s to 1990s" *Sociologist*, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2002).

⁶ Interview with Rabson Samora, Mufumbwe, 13 October, 2017 and Interview with Senior Chief Chizela, Mufumbwe, 23 October, 2017.

⁷ Interview with Senior Chief Chizela.

⁸ Interview with Samora.

⁹ Miles Larmer and Giacomo Macola, "The Origins, Context, and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One-Party State," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3, (2007), p. 472.

Mushala saw the social and economic underdevelopment¹⁰ of the province as a deliberate neglect of the Zambian government under the leadership of President Kenneth Kaunda. Thus, he took it upon himself to fight on behalf of the people of North Western Province to ensure that the development that was taking place in other places such as the Copperbelt and Lusaka was the same in North Western Province.¹¹

The problem of underdevelopment in North Western Province can be traced back to the colonial period when Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) was governed by the British colonialists. During colonial rule, there was very little development in the province. Even after 1964, when Zambia gained independence, the province was still far from becoming an economic centre despite its economic potential.¹² At independence, the province had mining potential but the Zambian government failed to build on what the colonial government had left. Nothing much was done to improve the economic system of the province.¹³ For instance in Kasempa, Solwezi, and Mwinilunga districts, abundant mineral resources such as copper and iron were found but the province had one of the worst poverty levels in the country.¹⁴ During this period, Dirk Jaeger notes that:

...the government [had] however, begun copper ore exploitation at some places in the province which had been worked in the colonial period but had been

¹⁰ Underdevelopment is deficiency or deprivation in one or many aspects of human life, comprising the physical, economic, culture, social and political dimensions. It can also mean people's accesses to social and economic needs are relatively lower as compared to same reference groups of people or between regions. See Carmel Tabone, "The Concept of Relative Poverty and its Measures," in John Dixon and David Macarov, (ed), *Poverty: A Perspective Global Reality*, (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 119. See also Katar Singh, *Rural Development: Principles, Policies, and Management*, (California: Sage Publications, 2009), p. 50.

¹¹ Interview with Alexander Saimbwende, Ex-Rebel, Mwinilunga, 6 November, 2017.

¹² Interview with Chief Chizela.

¹³ *Times of Zambia*, 24 March 1966.

¹⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 24 March 1966.

found to be unprofitable after a few years. The best known of these is the Kansanshi mine near Solwezi,¹⁵

Jaeger further points out those other small mines such as Jifumpa mine in the southeast of the Kasempa district were only in operation from 1972 to 1974. Thereafter, the province had to rely on agriculture as the main economic practice.¹⁶ The abandonment of such projects by the post-colonial government meant economic stagnation for the province since there was no investment attracted in the area anymore. The development of the province lagged behind mainly because the mining industry which was the main driving force of the country's development agenda was not sufficiently developed despite evidence of minerals in the province.

High Unemployment and Lack of Infrastructure

In addition, due to lack of adequate economic development in rural areas, there were high levels of unemployment in the province. In 1969, the total population of North Western Province was about 231,733¹⁷ and only 8,790 were in employment.¹⁸ High unemployment levels resulted in resentment from the people of the province towards the government due to its failure to bring tangible benefits to the province.¹⁹ In fact, from the colonial period to the late 1980s, labour migrants from North Western Province went to search of employment in towns along the line of rail owing to the scarcity of jobs in the province since there were few economic activities during

¹⁵ Dirk. Jaeger, "Settlement Patterns and Rural Development: A Human Geographical Study of the Kaonde, Kasempa District, Zambia," PHD Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1981, p. 14.

¹⁶ Jaeger, "Settlement Patterns and Rural Development: A Human Geographical Study of the Kaonde, Kasempa District, Zambia," p. 14.

¹⁷ Central Statistical Office (hereafter) CSO, "Monthly Digest of Statistics," Vol.12, No. 1, (1976), p. 1.

¹⁸ CSO, "Monthly Digest of Statistics," Vol. 12 No. 1, (1976), p. 1.

¹⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 29 March 1966 and Interview with Saimbwende.

this period.²⁰ It was such kind of economic conditions that Mushala sought to address.

Furthermore, Patrick Wele points out that:

At independence, the province had one secondary school for boys in Solwezi... Three schools (Zambezi, Mwinilunga and Kabompo) were built and turned into duo schools which greatly enhanced education for girls. Before that, no secondary school for girls ever existed... [In] 1980 approximately 896 students were enrolled into Form I and 448 completed secondary school, a very meagre figure compared to other provinces except Luapula.²¹

Very little was done to increase the number of schools in the province. While that was the case in North Western Province, in places such as the Copperbelt during the Emergency Development Plan period 1965-1966, the government had built six secondary schools on the Copperbelt,²² further marginalising North Western Province.

Moreover, the province did not have adequate basic government services such as health centres.²³ In the entire province there was only one government hospital at Zambezi, another one at Chitokoloki, one at Kalene Hill in Mwinilunga and Mukinge mission Hospital. The distances between these hospitals were quite far and two of these hospitals were run by missionaries.²⁴

The roads in the province were equally poorly developed; from the 1950s onwards the roads which existed were only bush tracks. This resulted in only three-ton trucks being allowed in the province. This state of affairs continued after 1964 when Zambia attained its

²⁰ Patrick Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion: The Untold Story*, (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1987), p. 126.

²¹ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 124.

²² L. H Kaluba, "Education in Zambia: The Problem of Access to Schooling and the Paradox of Private School Solution," in Vijayan K Pillai, (ed), *Developing Areas: A Book of Readings and Research*, (Oxford: Berg, 1995), p. 267.

²³ *Official Verbatim Reports of the Parliamentary Debates of the Third National Assembly 16th January 1976*, (Lusaka: Government Printers 1976), p.3057.

²⁴ Interview with Gilbert Mwilitula Wisamba, Former Member of Parliament for Solwezi, Freedom House Lusaka, 13 November, 2017.

independence.²⁵ The road between Kabompo and Kasempa was almost impassable during the rainy season, as was the case with the Kasempa-Kaoma road. Due to poor road network, it was difficult to achieve economic development in North Western Province and for a considerable period of time, no works were done to improve the road system in the area.²⁶ Therefore, to Mushala, the government was very insensitive to the needs of the people of North Western Province of Zambia.²⁷

Mushala's dissatisfaction with One-Party State

Apart from lack of economic development in North Western Province, Mushala was dissatisfied with Kaunda's introduction of the one-party rule in Zambia in 1972. Mushala's series of violence and his dissatisfaction with the one-party rule can be traced to the early days of independence. Since 1959, Northern Rhodesia had a multi-party political system and at independence Zambia adopted the same British style of multi-party system of politics.²⁸ During this period the prominent political parties were UNIP and the African National Congress (ANC). Later other opposition political parties such the United Party (UP) emerged in 1966 and the United Progressive Party (UPP) in 1971.²⁹ Mushala was politically active held prestigious political positions. Mushala joined politics in 1961. Under UNIP he was the Deputy Secretary at

²⁵ *Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debate of the Third Session of the Third National Assembly*, 17 March 1976, (Lusaka: government printers, 1976), P. 3057.

²⁶ *Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debate of the Third Session of the Third National Assembly*, 17 March 1976, P. 3057 and Interview with Saimbwende.

²⁷ Interview with Saimbwende.

²⁸ United National Independency party archives (hereafter) UNIP 8/1/13, Reports: Historical Perspective on the One-Party Participatory Democracy, 1976.

²⁹ Miles Lamer, "Enemies Within? Opposition to the Zambian One-Party State, 1972–1980," in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar & Giacomo Macola (ed), *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia*, (Brill, 2008), p. 98; Clarence Chongo, "The Impact of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on Zambia's Economic and Socio-political Development 1965-1979," M.A Dissertation, The University of Zambia, 2009, p. 77

Freedom House from 1964 to 1966.³⁰ Between 1966 and 1968, Mushala was UP's Deputy Secretary and from 1969 to 1972 he was ANC North Western Provincial President.³¹ Mushala utilised his political positions in these parties to oppose the one-party rule in Zambia before and during his rebellion.³²

In 1972, Kaunda, abandoned the multi-party system of politics and adopted the one-party participatory democracy. Kaunda's justification for the introduction of the one-party rule in Zambia was to promote national unity in the country.³³ He argued that it would further stop the verbal and physical confrontations mostly based on ethnic and regional differences as the new mushrooming political parties were being organised along sectional and tribal lines which threatened national unity and national integration (one Zambia one nation).³⁴

Another advanced was that Zambia had a hostile relationship with the four neighbouring white minority regimes, the Portuguese regimes in Angola and Mozambique, the rebel regime in Southern Rhodesia and Apartheid government in South Africa which also controlled South West Africa now Namibia. This, coupled with internal disunity engineered by tribal and sectional sentiments, posed a serious threat to national integration.³⁵ Thus, to the UNIP government, the one-party state was a move that was meant to stop the white minority regimes from using the political opponents in the country to undermine Kaunda's leadership.

³⁰ UNIP 16/6/30, B.F. Kapula, to UNIP's Secretary General, Solwezi, 9 November, 1976.

³¹ Interview with Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba, Mufumbwe, 17 October 2017.

³² Interview, Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba.

³³ *Times of Zambia*, 30 April, 1971 and Chongo, "The Impact of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on Zambia's Economic and Socio-political Development 1965-1979," p. 81.

³⁴ UNIP 8/1/13, 1972 Reports: Historical Perspective on the One-Party Participatory Democracy, 1976; UNIP 8/1/12, Record of meeting held in Mulungushi Hall from 3rd to 6th March 1972 and *Times of Zambia*, 26 January 1971.

³⁵ UNIP 8/1/13, Reports: Historical Perspective on the One-Party Participatory Democracy, 1976.

However, this conventional doctrine that a one-party state was necessary to avoid the social tensions arising from the emergence of ethnic based political parties is challenged by scholars operating from a revisionist perspective. The central thesis of the revisionist scholars concerning the one-party rule is that the single party system of government that sprung up all over Africa in the 1970s was often the result of extreme doubt referenda conducted in the mist of violence against and individual opposition and critics. Scholars such as Patrick E. Ollawa, Bornwell C. Chikulo and C.M Chabatama among others argue that the introduction of the one party rule in Zambia was not to unify the country but rather to save Kaunda's own political and personal interests.³⁶ These scholars contend that tribalism was a flimsy ground on which UNIP based its arguments of introducing the one-party rule. William Tordoff noted that the root cause of political competition was not tribalism which to a greater extent led to violence in Zambia. He argues that the conflicts in politics can be traced from the divergent economic and political interests, and not in tribal differences.³⁷ Based on this argument, the UNIP's argument that Zambia needed to be a one party state due to tribalism and ensure unity was not convincing enough.

Whatever the claims and counter claims concerning the introduction of one party system, what is clear is that Mushala opposed the UNIP government on the basis that the introduction of the one-party state would infringe on democracy in the country. Mushala insisted that the country needed democracy and a political atmosphere which would give the Zambian people total

³⁶ Patrick E. Ollaw, *Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The political Economy of National Development*, (Devon: A.H. Stockell Ltd, 1979); Bornwell C. Chikulo, "Elections in a One Party Participatory Democracy," in Ben Turok (ed.), *Development in Zambia*, (London: ZED Press, 1985) and M.C Chabatama, "The Untold Story: The Experiences of Zambians in the one party state" in Y.A Chondoka and B.J Phiri, (ed), *Zambia: Forty Years after Independence, 1964-2004*, (Lusaka: Department of history, University of Zambia, 2007).

³⁷ William Tordoff, *Politics in Zambia*, (Berkeley: University of California press, 1974), p. 96.

political independence.³⁸ Alexander Saimbwende, ex-rebel and Mushala's lieutenant, contended that for Mushala, "it did not really make sense that just a few years after gaining independence from the colonial government; UNIP should introduce the one-party state in Zambia where political power would be vested in the hands of one man."³⁹ He reasoned that through the introduction of the one party rule, ultimate power would be given to Kaunda at the expense of the majority Zambians.

Furthermore, Mushala's argument against the introduction of one-party rule was that one-party rule in Zambia was against what the people of Zambia had been told and promised at independence. Political independence was very important as this was one of the things which had been fought for during Zambia's struggle for independence.⁴⁰ For Mushala the introduction of the one-party rule meant that Zambians' fight for independence would be in vain as the people would be under dictatorship. Thus:

Mushala was not going to allow the people of Zambia to continue suffering by imposing policies on them which were contrary to democracy. Therefore, he was going to use whatever means he could to stop Kaunda from subjecting the people of Zambia to dictatorship. Zambia needed total democracy and for Mushala, Kaunda had no place in government if he was going to introduce the one-party rule which was dictatorship under the veil of participatory democracy.⁴¹

Mushala's view was that fight against one-party rule was for the interest of all the people of Zambia. Mushala began opposing the idea of introducing the one-party rule in Zambia while still a member of UP and continued when he joined ANC. In 1966, Mushala together with others such as Dickson Mukwenje Chikulo, Linda Makelele and Willian Muzala Chipango broke away from

³⁸ Interview with Saimbwende.

³⁹ Interview with Saimbwende.

⁴⁰ Interview with Gilbert Wisamba; Interview with Samora and Interview, Saimbwende.

⁴¹ Interview with Saimbwende.

UNIP and joined UP.⁴² After joining UP, Mushala was appointed Deputy National Secretary of the party. He utilised this time and his position to express his opposition against the introduction of the one-party state in the country. Mushala's main argument was that in as much as Zambians fought for freedom and successfully attained independence, the truth was that the people were fed up with UNIP because of its oppression and dictatorship ways of ruling the country.⁴³ In 1968, the UP was banned by the government following clashes with UNIP⁴⁴ and its leaders were detained on the grounds that the party was violent.⁴⁵ The party was further accused of operating contrary to the interest of the nation.⁴⁶ Following the release of some of the UP members who included Mushala, they joined ANC.⁴⁷

In 1969, while in ANC, Mushala became the North Western Provincial President. The ANC did not only provide checks and balances to the UNIP government, but also became the voice of the marginalised and those who could not speak openly against UNIP. During this period, Mushala opposed the government when it was toying with the idea of introducing one party rule. He expressed concern that the one-party state would generate fear since the administrative machinery would be bulldozed by a political clique and that this would further create insecurity among citizens.⁴⁸ Although the system was meant to be a one-party participatory democracy, it would not be democracy in practice as people would not be given a wider choice

⁴² James Anthony Pritchett, *Friends for Life Friends for Death: Cohorts and Consciousness among the Lunda-Ndembu*, (Chaelottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007), p. 180; Patrick Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion: The Untold Story*, (Lusaka: Multimedia, 1987) and p. 31; Patrick Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents: from Mushala to Luchembe*, (Solwezi: PMW, 199005), p. 37.

⁴³ *Times of Zambia*, 9 June, 1966.

⁴⁴ UNIP 8/1/11, United National Independence Party Central Committee Annual Report, 1972.

⁴⁵ UNIP 8/1/12. Syndicate Four: One Party Participatory Democracy, 1972 and Interview with Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba.

⁴⁶ UNIP 8/1/12, Record of the Meeting Held in Mulungushi Hall held from 3rd to 6th March 1972.

⁴⁷ Interview with Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba and Chongo "The Impact of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on Zambia's Economic and Socio-political Developments, 1965-1979," p. 78.

⁴⁸ Interview with Saimbwende; Interview with Jonathan Liyato, Solwezi, 19 October, 2017 and *Times of Zambia*, 11 July 1972.

of political leadership. Mushala believed that the one-party system of governance would not give people a genuine sense of participation in the political process. In democracy the people have the power to throw out the government they no longer liked or trusted.⁴⁹ Therefore, his attitude towards UNIP government was hardened when it finally introduced one party rule in 1972 and a few years later started the rebellion. Thus, Mushala's insurgency was part of the wider element of opposition to the one-party state in post-colonial Zambia.⁵⁰

Nepotism and Tribalism within UNIP

Mushala further blamed the UNIP government for practicing nepotism, a problem which was coupled with tribalism and ethnic rivalries. Mushala claimed to have left UNIP due to its nepotistic activities.⁵¹ UNIP members had developed a slogan "it pays to be UNIP."⁵² In July 1966, the ANC Member of Parliament (MP) for Namwala Edward Mungoni Liso expressed concern that ever since UNIP came to power, nepotism had taken root in government. He further argued that the "government Ministers were going round all over the country, urging people to join UNIP, or lose their jobs...efficient people were being overlooked, by-passed in promotions, uneducated people were being promoted just because they possessed UNIP membership."⁵³ In 1968, President Kaunda gave a speech in which he promised to implement economic reforms to show that it paid to belong to UNIP. In his speech, he stated that:

I cannot see how I can continue to pay a police officer or a civil servant who works for Nkumbula...How dare they bite the hand that feeds them? They must

⁴⁹ John M. Mwanakatwe, *End of Kaunda Era*, (Lusaka: Multimedia Publication, 1994), p. 286.

⁵⁰ Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia*, p. 155.

⁵¹ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba;

⁵² Chongo, "The Impact of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on Zambia's Economic and Socio-political Developments, 1965-1979," p. 78.

⁵³ *Official verbatim Report of the Debates of the Third Session of the National Assembly, 30 July, 1966*, (Lusaka: Government Printers, 1966), p. 849.

know that it pays to belong to UNIP. Those who want to form a civil service of the opposition must cross the floor and get their pay from Harry Nkumbula.⁵⁴

This was Kaunda's way of dealing with the opposition. Although ANC MPs were elected into Parliament following the 1968 general elections, at the order of Kaunda neither of these opposition MPs were to be granted licences to run businesses; nor were their licences renewed.⁵⁵ Mushala was against the idea that such opportunities were mostly granted to UNIP cadres. He held that this was not the right way of doing things.⁵⁶

Therefore, when Dickson Mukwenji Chikulo, a UNIP back bencher and UNIP educational secretary resigned from the party after accusing UNIP of not being truthful to the motto "One Zambia One Nation,"⁵⁷ Mushala followed suit and decided to resign from UNIP claiming that the party practiced nepotism.⁵⁸ Upon resigning, he stated that UNIP was nepotistic, a scourge he feared would not easily be eliminated unless UNIP and Kaunda as President stepped down and another party took over government.

However, Mushala's claim of nepotism as the basis for leaving UNIP was not accepted by some members of UNIP, including Aaron Milner who was then UNIP's Deputy National Secretary. In his response to Mushala's claim about the party's nepotistic tendencies, Milner noted that Mushala was unfair in labelling the party as practicing nepotism. He insisted that Mushala failed to appreciate UNIP's effort in helping the people of Zambia by accusing the party of practicing nepotism. He further noted that Mushala was among those that benefited from

⁵⁴ As cited in B. J. Phiri, "The Capricorn African Society: A study of Liberal Politics in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia 1949-1972," PhD Thesis, Dalhousie University, (1991), p. 77.

⁵⁵ Phiri, "The Capricorn African Society: A study of Liberal Politics in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia 1949-1972," p. 77.

⁵⁶ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba

⁵⁷ Lamer, *Rethinking African Politics a history of Opposition in Zambia*, p. 139.

⁵⁸ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba; Goodwin B. Mwangilwa, *Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula: A Biography of the Old Lion*, (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1983), p. 99; Patrick Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion: the Untold story*, (Lusaka: Multimedia publications), p. 31 and Patrick Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents: from Mushala to Luchembe*, (Solwezi: PMW, 1995.), p. 37.

Credit Organisation of Zambia (COZ), an organisation which was designed specifically to lend money to former freedom fighters. Mushala had in fact received a loan of K1,400 from government.⁵⁹ Despite that being the case, in 1966, and as already pointed out, Mushala left UNIP and joined UP under the leadership of Nalumino Mundia insisting that there was too much nepotism in UNIP.⁶⁰

In addition to nepotism, Mushala accused the ruling party UNIP of practicing tribalism.⁶¹ Although Kaunda tried tribal and regional balancing in appointing cabinet ministers in his government, some opposition members still held the view that those regions where UNIP was strongest, areas such as the Bemba-speaking regions enjoyed the greatest influence and benefits.⁶² Mushala argued that it was such kind of manifestation of tribalism and favouritism coupled with nepotism that made him leave UNIP and join UP.⁶³

In response to President Kaunda's speech presented to the UNIP National Council in which he directed the Police Commissioner to sack any member of the Police Force who attended any meeting, campaigns or rally held by the UP party,⁶⁴ Mushala replied by stating that Kaunda's decisions and ways of ruling the nation were undemocratic and that such kind of leadership was not healthy for the country.⁶⁵ He contended that people should be free to attend whatsoever association or political party campaign they desired because Zambia was a democratic republic and not a dictatorship. Mushala "believed that one characteristic of a free

⁵⁹ Mwangilwa, *Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula: A Biography of the Old Lion*, p. 99; James Anthony Pritchett, *Friends for life, friends for death: cohorts and consciousness among the Lunda-Ndembu*, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007), p. 180.

⁶⁰ Interview with Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba.

⁶¹ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 42.

⁶² Tom Draisma and Ella Kruzinga, *Inside Zambia 1964-2004*, (Hague: Cordaid, 2004), p. 81

⁶³ Interview with Saimbwende and Interview with Samora.

⁶⁴ *Mail Magazine*, 12 March, 1968.

⁶⁵ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 42.

country is the freedom with which citizens get together and speak their mind in an environment that is tribal free.”⁶⁶ To Mushala, Kaunda’s rule was more of a dictatorship than democracy.⁶⁷

Mushala’s Heroic Quest

Mushala took up arms against the UNIP government partly because he felt unappreciated by the ruling party for his efforts during the nationalist struggle and his work in post-independence Zambia. After independence many expected government to reward them with jobs and political positions for participating in the nationalist struggle. However, not everyone was given jobs in government as a token of appreciation. As a result, some people became discontented and felt left out.⁶⁸ Mushala was one of those who became disillusioned with government for its failure to reward him.⁶⁹

During the Cha Cha Cha campaigns, Mushala is said to have been one of the active participants in the campaigns in North Western Province.⁷⁰ In the 1960s, the nationalist movements in Northern Rhodesia had become tense and UNIP orchestrated the Cha Cha Cha as a way of fighting for the nation’s independence. The campaign was meant to create discomfort for the Northern Rhodesian government.⁷¹ The plan of the Cha Cha Cha campaign was first to burn the *Chitupa* (identity cards) then blocking of roads, ditching bridges, cutting telephone cables and destroying cattle pens. The colonial government officials, the police and soldiers were to be harassed and given no rest, until the Africans took over the government.⁷² Nationalist leaders such as Lewis Changufu, first independence Minister of Finance, Arthur Wina and Mr Edmund

⁶⁶ Interview with Saimbwende and Interview with Jonathan Liyato.

⁶⁷ Interview with Saimbwende.

⁶⁸ Interview with Gilbert Wisamba and Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

⁶⁹ Interview with Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba.

⁷⁰ Interview with John Latamesha, Former Member of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), Mufumbwe, 17 November, 2017.

⁷¹ National Archives of Zambia (hereafter) NAZ HM 74, J.M, Sokonin, MS “The Causes of the Cha Cha Cha” n. d.

⁷² NAZ HM 74, J.M, Sokoni, MS “The Causes of the Cha Cha Cha” n. d.

an Irish party member, were members of the Cha Cha Cha committee given the responsibility of overseeing the whole operation.⁷³ The committee was to identify targets for attack and to do so, they engaged a group of youths to execute the scheme. Mushala was one of the few young men engaged in the Cha Cha Cha campaign in North Western Province.⁷⁴ The Cha Cha Cha campaigns were significant as they created serious discomfort for the British colonialists. Wele points out that:

Some of the activities associated with Mushala during those turbulent days were the burning of the Mutanda Mission School the very school he had received his Standard Six certificate [from] and assaulting two policemen in August 1962...in 1962 unsuccessful attempt was made to burn the Mutanda bridge.⁷⁵

Mushala was also associated with the cutting of telephone lines that connected North Western Province to the Copperbelt.⁷⁶

Anticipating that the next stage of the nationalist struggles would require more acts of violence, UNIP devised a scheme to dislodge the colonial government should the Lancaster negotiations fail. UNIP sent about thirty five youths to China and Egypt for training in guerrilla warfare and Mushala was among those that went to China to be trained in guerrilla warfare.⁷⁷ However, while still away, the political atmosphere in Zambia changed as the Europeans seemed to have finally acknowledged the viability of the African majority rule and in his absence in 1964, Zambia got its independence. Upon his return, Mushala was ready to wage war against the colonial government but the situation had changed. However, he still expected and hoped to be treated like a hero which did not happen. For his efforts in the nationalist struggle Mushala asked

⁷³ Kelvin Kachingwe, "Changufu: Death of Cha Cha Cha mastermind" <https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/changufu-death-of-cha-cha-cha-mastermind/>, Accessed 21 September, 2017.

⁷⁴ Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba.

⁷⁵ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 11.

⁷⁶ Pritchett, *Friends for life, Friends for Death: Cohorts and Consciousness among the Lunda-Ndembu*, p. 179.

⁷⁷ Interview with Benwa Kifwanakenu Kantumoya, ex-rebel, Mufumbwe, 18 October 2017.

to be Director of Game and Fisheries which did not happen.⁷⁸ However, he was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Education Committee of the party headquarters in Lusaka. Mushala accepted the position not because he liked it but because he had no other option. Thus Mushala started the rebellion partly because he felt unappreciated by the UNIP government and partly on account of Kaunda's refusal to give him his desired job position.⁷⁹

The 1973 Choma Declaration can be viewed as a unifying factor which brought to an end UNIP's dilemma of institutionalising the one-party rule in Zambia, but it was also one of the factors which compelled Mushala to refuse to re-join UNIP as other ANC members were expected to do. The Choma Declaration was a document signed on 27 June 1973 between President Kaunda and Harry Mwanga Nkumbula of ANC in Choma in Southern Province.⁸⁰ It heralded the registration of all ANC branches as UNIP branches and all ANC members were supposed to join UNIP but not everyone accepted.⁸¹ Some individuals such as Mushala refused to re-join UNIP.⁸² Since he could not swallow his pride and re-join UNIP following the dissolution of ANC that followed after the signing of the Choma Declaration, Mushala decided to seek military training outside the country.

The Choma Declaration confirmed and sealed the one party state system in Zambia.⁸³ Nkumbula who initially fought the introduction of the one-party rule finally gave up and joined UNIP.⁸⁴ The agreement endorsed the official establishment of the one-party state and the

⁷⁸ *The Post*, 23 October, 2004.

⁷⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 13 April, 1980 and *The Post*, 23 October, 2004.

⁸⁰ UNIP, ANC 9/21, The Choma Declaration 1972.

⁸¹ UNIP, ANC 9/21, The Choma Declaration 1972 and NAZ HM 70/11, Press Cutting, 1974.

⁸² Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

⁸³ UNIP, ANC 9/21, The Choma Declaration 1972.

⁸⁴ UNIP, ANC 9/21, The Choma Declaration 1972.

dissolution of the ANC.⁸⁵ The dissolution of the ANC came as a shock to Mushala who felt betrayed by those he trusted and believed they fought for the same cause, which was to fight UNIP against the one-party rule and the underdevelopment in most of the rural areas.⁸⁶ Mushala could not swallow his pride and re-join UNIP. He therefore was determined to continue opposing the one-party rule even by violent methods. He was willing to secure military support and training from South Africa and Angola in order to achieve his objective of overthrowing the UNIP government.⁸⁷ The signing of the Choma Declaration paved the way for Mushala and his men to leave Zambia and went first to Angola and later to South Africa in search of military support in preparation to fight the UNIP government.⁸⁸

Mushala's Betrayal

The reason why Mushala took up arms against the post-colonial Zambian state was betrayal and frustration.⁸⁹ The idea of Mushala leaving Zambia to seek military training so as to come and dislodge the UNIP government was not a one-man plan. Mushala did not mastermind the plan to take over government by military means alone but rather had joined hands with other politicians such as Nalumino Mundia and William Chipango⁹⁰ There is evidence that the idea to seek military training outside Zambia with the goal of dislodging the UNIP government was hatched in the mid-1960s, long before the introduction of the one-party rule in Zambia.⁹¹ On different occasions, Mushala and other ANC officials visited the exiled Kanongesha group in Angola. It was during these visits that at one point Mushala met Portuguese officials and learned something

⁸⁵ UNIP, ANC 9/21, The Choma Declaration 1972.

⁸⁶ Interview with Gilbert Wisamba.

⁸⁷ Tembo, *Satisfying Zambian Hunger for Culture: Social Change in the Global World*, p. 347.

⁸⁸ Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe*, p. 6.

⁸⁹ Interview with Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba.

⁹⁰ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba and Interview with Samora.

⁹¹ UNIP 16/3/15, Press Statement Issued at the UNIP Headquarters and Signed by the Election Strategy Committee, 4 December, 1968.

about the international support that could be made available to those willing to use military means to oppose their governments.⁹² According to Jeffrey Wisamba, the plan was that Mushala would go to South Africa for military training while such men as Kalimbwe Lupasa would seek military training in Rhodesia.⁹³ Wisamba further observed that while Mushala and others were receiving military training outside Zambia, others such as Mundia would remain in the country to assess the situation so that when the rebels returned, they would execute their plan and overthrow the UNIP government.⁹⁴ Wele points out that:

Kalimbwe Lupasa was sent to seek military support from Rhodesians. The Rhodesians agreed...a near tragedy occurred when their contact [informant]...telephoned Nalumino Mundia at parliament. Mundia was then Member of Parliament for Kalabo Constituency. The contact wanted confirmation from either Chipango or Mundia over their request. Unfortunately, Mundia was not there to receive the telephone but received the message. Mundia panicked because the security officers might have got wind of it.⁹⁵

The Zambian government later accused Nalumino Mundia of gun-running and sending people abroad with the view of destabilising the peace of the country.⁹⁶ President Kaunda accused Kapwepwe of joining hands with Mundia and seeking support from South Africa in wanting to dislodge his government.⁹⁷ When later confronted, Mundia denied his involvement in the plan to overthrow the government. He did this in an effort to save his own skin. Mundia seems to have sold out those that were already receiving military training outside the country, in this case, Mushala and Lupasa.⁹⁸ Mushala was infuriated by Mundia's betrayal. He viewed Mundia and others he had signed a pact with as Judas Iscariots who left him vulnerable and the only enemy of

⁹² UNIP 5/3/ 30, L. Kamwandi to Resident Minister, Mwinilunga, 28 December, 1966.

⁹³ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba and Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous: From Mushala to Luchembe*, p. 38.

⁹⁴ Interview with Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba.

⁹⁵ Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous: From Mushala to Luchembe*, p. 38.

⁹⁶ UNIP 8/1/11, United National Independence Party Central Committee Annual Reports 1972.

⁹⁷ *Times of Zambia*, 28 august, 1971.

⁹⁸ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

the Zambian government.⁹⁹ Thus, out of anger, Mushala viewed Mundia and other government officials as targets of the rebellion and all those that would stand in his way suffered the same fate.¹⁰⁰

Mushala's Quest for Power

Mushala's struggle against the UNIP government reflected his quest for power. His main goal was to overthrow the ruling government and wrest political power from UNIP through military means if possible. In 1976, Mushala established a political party called Democratic Supreme Council (DSC) and appointed Chimwana as General Secretary.¹⁰¹ Its members included Alexander Saimbwende, Smith Katenga Chikwiti, Yotam Chimwanga, Nyaulungu Kashimba, Friday Mushitala, Slaish Masumba, Shadereck Hachambu, Aaron Kashimba and Amos Gondwe.¹⁰² However, it was not legally recognised by the laws of Zambia. DSC was ready to fight the UNIP government and the one party rule at whatever cost.¹⁰³

In Mushala's quest for political power, Kaunda seemed to have been his main stumbling block and he was willing to use force in order to obtain that power.¹⁰⁴ The DSC main goal was to fight communism and the one party rule in Zambia. Mushala had developed dislike for communism when UNIP sent him for guerrilla training in China prior to independence.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba and Interview with Gilbert Wisamba.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Gilbert Wisamba and Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

¹⁰¹ Interview with Saimbwende.

¹⁰² Interview with Saimbwende and Beatwell S. Chisala, *The Downfall of President Kaunda*, (Lusaka: Co-op Print, 1994), p. 320.

¹⁰³ Interview with Saimbwende.

¹⁰⁴ Chabatama, "The Untold Story: Experiences of Zambians in a One Party State," p. 44.

¹⁰⁵ Pritchett, *Friends for Life, Friends for Death: Cohorts and Consciousness among the Lunda-Ndembu*, p. 179.

Mushala aligned his ideas against communism with those of Savimbi in Angola. He believed that UNITA's policy against communism was similar to that of his DSC.¹⁰⁶

South Africa's Connection and Conflicting Interpretations

The Mushala rebellion can further be understood as originating from regional factors. The conspicuous argument has been that Mushala was sponsored by the South African government. However, the extent to which external factors played a role in the Mushala rebellion has been debated by different scholars. The assertion that the Mushala rebellion was sponsored by the South African government was initially propagated by the Zambian government. The government authorities insisted that the rebellion was inspired by apartheid South Africa to destabilise the peace of the country.¹⁰⁷

In the early 1970s, when Mushala was North Western Provincial president under ANC, President Kaunda accused South Africa of propping up the ANC and wanting to dislodge the UNIP government.¹⁰⁸ In the mid-1970s, when the Mushala rebellion started, the government again accused South Africa of supporting the Mushala rebellion.¹⁰⁹ The Zambian government believed that the opposition political parties had succeeded in sending people abroad with the intention of subverting the peace of the country. Among those that were sent to receive military training was Mushala who, with the financial support from South Africa was causing disturbances in the country aimed at overthrowing the UNIP government.¹¹⁰ In December 1976, Aaron Milner, then minister of Home Affairs stated that Mushala was trained by South Africa to

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Saimbwende.

¹⁰⁷ *The Post*, 23 October, 2004; *Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976 and UNIP 8/5/13, Press release, 20 May, 1976.

¹⁰⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 28 August, 1971.

¹⁰⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976 and UNIP 16/6/30, B.F. Kapulu, Reports to all District Governors and all Regional Secretaries, Solwezi, 27 August, 1976.

¹¹⁰ UNIP 8/1/11, United National Independence Party Central Committee Annual Reports, 1972; *Times of Zambia*, 14 September, 1976 and *The Post*, 23 October 2004.

returned and overthrow the UNIP government. He further noted that Mushala was given instruction to kill some leaders in Zambia and eventually annex it to South Africa so that it could be cut up into chiefdoms.¹¹¹ In June 1980, President Kaunda told newsmen that the documents seized by police in May 1976, bore signatures of South African Defence Chiefs. The papers showed that South Africa was involved in training Mushala in fighting techniques which he was applying to cause terror in North Western Province of Zambia.¹¹²

Scholars such as Donald Dreyer, Joseph Hanlon, Stephen Nangoh Esomba, and Bennett Kangumu have also supported the argument that Mushala was sponsored by the South African government. Dreyer in particular argue that:

The SADF [South African Defence Force] trained a Zambian dissident group led by Adamson Mushala a former official of Zambia's United National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1975. The group known as the Mushala gang was sent back to Zambia in December 1975...the gang skirmished with Zambian forces, blew up a bridge and kept South Africa informed about SWAPO movements.¹¹³

South Africa used the Mushala rebels as informants over South West African People's Organisation's (SWAPO) activities in Zambia. In addition, Diana Cammack argues that the South African government gave the Zambian dissident forces training, arms and logistical support to destabilise the peace in the country.¹¹⁴

Robert S. Jaster notes that in Angola and Mozambique, South Africa among others supported UNITA and RENAMO respectively. In Zimbabwe, South Africa supported *Super*

¹¹¹ *Times of Zambia*, 17 December, 1976 and Phone Interview with Aaron Milner, Former Minister of Home Affairs, 9 January, 2018.

¹¹² *Times of Zambia*, 13 April, 1981.

¹¹³ Donald Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics of Decolonisation 1946-1990*, (New York: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1994), 140.

¹¹⁴ Diana Cammack, "Refugees in Southern Africa: Destabilisation and Refuges in Southern Africa," *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees*, Vol.6, No. 4, (1987), p. 13.

*Zapu*¹¹⁵ while in Zambia it supported the Mushala rebels.¹¹⁶ Cammack adds that the “targets of these dissidents included political leaders, government facilities, and projects funded by international donors and staffed by expatriate workers.”¹¹⁷ Like Jaster and Cammack, Susanna Smith insisted that:

Clandestine South African support for rebel military and sabotage activities in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho were also being reported. In Zambia, South Africa was reported to have backed the Mushala Gang during the 1970s...a group of bandits active in North Western Province from 1976 to 1982.¹¹⁸

South Africa’s sponsorship and support for these dissidents caused great disturbances in their countries as the countries suffered militarily and economically.¹¹⁹ In Zambia, “its mission was to rate...Zambia the same way as the rebels in Mozambique [Mozambican National Resistance] (MNR) or UNITA in Angola.”¹²⁰ Stephen N. Esomba also contends that South Africa continued to support the Mushala rebellion until Mushala was killed in 1982.¹²¹ Moses Shapwaya further notes that “The Mushala insurgency was a South African sponsored operation; code named Operation Plathond and was commanded by Colonel Jannie Breytenbach of South Africa’s Special Forces unit.”¹²² Thus, to these scholars, the Mushala rebellion in Zambia was masterminded by South Africa and perpetuated by Mushala as an agent of apartheid South Africa.

¹¹⁵ Super Zimbabwe African people’s Union (Super ZAPU) was a military organisation, made up of former members of the Rhodesian security forces, which operated in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. They worked and fought on behalf of apartheid government of South Africa. See, Eliakim M. Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African people’s Union, 1961-1987: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia*, (Africa World Press, 2005), p.261. See also Joseph Honlon, *Beggar Your Neighbour: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, (Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 182.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Saimbwende; Robert S. Jaster, “Strengthening Regional Security in Southern Africa,” *International Peace Academy, Report No. 28*, (1988) p. 54.

¹¹⁷ Cammack, “Refugees in Southern Africa: Destabilisation and Refugees in Southern Africa,” p. 13.

¹¹⁸ Susanna Smith, *Front Line Africa: The Right to a Future*, (Oxford: Oxfam, 1990), p.332.

¹¹⁹ Jaster, “Strengthening Regional Security in Southern Africa” p. 53.

¹²⁰ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 4 January 1983.

¹²¹ Stephen Nangoh Esomba, *Zambia under Kaunda's Presidency: The Conditions, Experiment with Socialism, and the Final Lap to Democracy*, (Hamburg: Lit, 1996), p. 166.

¹²² Moses Shapwaya, “Implication of a Non Unified Command System and the need for a Unified Command System in Zambia.” M.A. Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2013, P. 5.

However, the argument that Mushala was sponsored by the South African government has recently been dismissed by scholars such as Miles Larmer and Giacomo Macola. They have asserted that the Mushala rebellion must be viewed as a consequence of a complex interaction between local, national, and regional forces.¹²³ South Africa's involvement in the Mushala rebellion was to divert Zambia's focus from the liberation movement and make Zambia pay more attention to its own home problems.

During the 1960s, Zambia was involved in the liberation struggles of countries such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and South Africa.¹²⁴ Godfrey Mwakikangile argues that during this period, Zambia was used as a base from which some southern African countries organised themselves and attacked their white regimes and Lusaka was used as the main operational base of the movements.¹²⁵ South Africa looked for ways in which it could discourage African countries in Southern Africa from helping the black South Africans from organising their guerrilla operations in their countries.

Lamer and Macola argue that as a way of stopping Southern African countries from helping black South Africans in their liberation struggle, South Africa employed the policy of hot pursuit against SWAPO guerrillas who operated from Zambia. Therefore, South Africa established relations with dissidents from Zambia, Angola and Mozambique. South Africa was afraid that white minority rule in Southern Africa was coming to an end following the intense nationalist struggles in Angola. It was believed that the only choice was to take the war to the

¹²³ Lamer and Macola, "The Origins, Context, and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One-Party State," p. 471.

¹²⁴ UNIP 8/1/13, Reports: Historical Perspective on the Party Participatory Democracy, 1972 and *The Post*, 23 October 2004.

¹²⁵ Godfrey Mwakikangile, *Zambia: Life in an African Country*, (Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press, 2010), p. 18

nationalists' bases, inevitably leading to open conflict with Zambia itself.¹²⁶ Thus, the main objective of South Africa was to force neighbouring countries to pay more attention to their own problems and less to apartheid South Africa.

Furthermore, it makes sense to argue that South Africa was not involved in the Mushala rebellion. The South African ambassador to the United Nations, Roelof Botha told the Security Council that although his country knew about Mushala, his country never assisted his plans against Zambia but merely granted him political asylum as a refugee.¹²⁷ In addition, the rebels were poorly armed which indicated poor funding or no funding at all. The rebels never had sufficient guns and ammunition which they could use carry out massive terrorist attacks in the country. This explains why the rebellion was only confined to North Western Province of the country.

While in Angola, where South African joined hands with other outside sources to sponsor the rebel Savimbi, at the time of Savimbi's death, the UNITA rebels handed over 26,000 small arms, 861 mortars and artillery pieces, as well as 8 anti-aircraft guns and about 290, 000 rounds of ammunition to Forças Armadas Angolanas or Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) after ceasefire and this was at the verge of extinction in terms of the rebel's ammunition.¹²⁸ Equally in Mozambique by 1992, the RENAMO rebel group had about 2.7 million rounds of ammunition, 19,047 mines and a large quantity of hand grenades and explosives.¹²⁹ While this was the case in Angola and Mozambique, in Zambia, at the time of Mushala's death, the amount of guns which

¹²⁶ Larmer and Macola, "The Origins, Context, and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One-Party State," p. 485.

¹²⁷ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 13 April, 1981.

¹²⁸ Michael Brzoska and George A. Lopez, *Putting Teeth in the Tiger: Improving the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes*, (Bingley: Emerald Group Pub, 2009), p. 157.

¹²⁹ Richard Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-1994*, (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), P. 111.

were found at the rebel camp where the rebel leader was killed were few and the rebels had only a handful of ammunition.¹³⁰

Furthermore, poor weaponry also showed that there was no outside funding by the number of weapons shown in Figure 2 seized by the Zambia security officials after attacking the Mushala rebel camp earlier in May 1976. This is a clear indication that the rebels were not receiving any ammunition from any outside sources.

Figure 2: Weapons found by the Zambian security officials at one of the rebels camps in 1976.



Source: *Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976.

In addition, the rebel group had few men, at its highest pick the group would amount to about 500 rebels.¹³¹

¹³⁰ Interview with Benwell Kwanuka, Former Game Warden, Matushi West, 20 October, 2018 and Interview with Benwa Kifwanakenu Kantumoya, Ex-rebel, Mufubwe, 13 October, 2017.

¹³¹ Interview with Saimbwende.

Conclusion

The chapter has examined the main causes of the Mushala rebellion in North Western Province of Zambia. Among the reasons which accounted for the Mushala rebellion was Mushala's dissatisfaction with the marginalisation of the people of North Western Province during the period under review. Despite the area being one of the largest of Zambia's nine provinces, it was one of the poorest and had high levels of unemployment. The province was further underdeveloped and for a considerable period of time, nothing was done by the post-colonial Zambian state to improve the situation. Thus, Mushala considered the underdevelopment of the area as deliberate neglect of the post-colonial Zambian state and he and his followers began seeing themselves as the representatives of all the people of North Western Province.

The Mushala rebellion was also as a result of Mushala's dissatisfaction with the introduction of the one-party rule in Zambia. Mushala saw the introduction of the one-party rule in Zambia as a form of dictatorship under the veil of one-party participatory democracy. His main argument was that the one-party rule would hinder the freedom of choice in choosing their leaders as power would be vested in the hands of one man. In addition, Mushala accused the ruling party, UNIP, of practising nepotism and tribalism, the main reason he claimed to have left UNIP. Mushala argued that tribalism and nepotism could not easily be eradicated unless Kaunda stepped down as president.

The chapter has also demonstrated that Mushala took up arms against the post-colonial Zambian state due to frustration after being betrayed by some of the politicians he had made a pact with in overthrowing the UNIP government. By the time Mushala returned from South Africa where he had gone to seek military support, he found that those he had made plans with to

dislodge the UNIP government had abandoned the cause and some of them had re-joined UNIP. Thus, due to frustration, Mushala could not turn back as he was already labelled as a rebel by the government. It was due to the betrayal by those he had trusted that made Mushala began to hurt all government officials and anybody that stood in his way suffered the same fate. Mushala further wanted political power thus, he resolved to fight the UNIP government and the one-party rule until he could take over power from UNIP.

The chapter has also examined the conflicting interpretations of South Africa's involvement in the Mushala rebellion. One side of the debate is that South Africa was responsible for sponsoring and supporting the Mushala rebellion in Zambia. However, this argument is dismissed by scholars such as Miles Larmer and Giacomo who argue that the Mushala rebellion was not only solely a South African sponsored terrorism, but rather, that it should be seen as a distinctive and significant element of wider opposition to the one-party rule in post-colonial Zambia.

CHAPTER 3: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUSHALA REBELLION IN NORTH WESTERN PROVINCE

Introduction

The Mushala rebellion brought extreme misery; pain and frustration to the people of North Western Province for the days of Mushala were brutal and painful.¹ Mushala's acts of terror left scars on the people, some of which would remain visible for a long time. The impact of his insurgency began to be felt immediately after the rebellion started. In an effort to fight the UNIP government, Mushala unleashed terror on the ordinary people of the province. The rebellion had far reaching consequences on the lives of the people in the affected communities.²

This chapter attempts to assess the socio-economic consequences of the Mushala rebellion in North Western Province. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first part investigates the social impact of the rebellion in the affected areas of the province. It argues that the rebellion had devastating consequences on the social welfare of some areas of the province. It should be noted here that the effect of the rebellion varied from one district to another and the most affected districts in North-Western Province included Chizela, Kasempa, and Manyinga districts, where the insurgency disrupted the provision of social services such as health and education, and dislocated families. The second part of the chapter examines the economic consequences of the Mushala rebellion in the province. The chapter argues that the Mushala rebellion resulted in disruption of economic activities such as farming and hunting, leading to hunger and starvation. The third section of the chapter shows that the rebellion had equally severe military consequences, including loss of life and property.

¹ United National Independence Party (hereafter) UNIP 8/9/36, Honourable Member of the Central Committee, Monthly Reports to the Committee North Western Province, March 1980.

² UNIP 16/6/30, B.F Kapula, to UNIP's Secretary General, Solwezi, 16 August, 1976.

Displacement of People

The Mushala rebellion caused many people to flee their homes.³ The rebellion dislodged the people in the affected communities and created logistical nightmares for the people of North Western Province. However, the displacement of the people was, in most cases, temporary as they often returned to their villages once Mushala and his group left their area.⁴ From the beginning of 1976, there was localised redistribution of population in the province. Temporary movements of people often took place between Ntambu and Chizela. This was evidenced by the abandoned and burnt-out villages.⁵

Even though Mushala's primary targets were government officials, ordinary people in certain communities were the major victims.⁶ Due to Mushala's activities, the victims were forced to seek refuge in areas where rebel activities were less intensive. At the peak of the rebellion, the Mushala victims in Chizela district now Mufumbwe district were forced to seek refuge at Chief Chizela's palace. It should be mentioned here that statistical evidence in regard to the number of displaced individuals due to the Mushala rebellion is difficult to come by. However, oral evidence reveals that following the burning of houses in Ntambu area in 1976, the people of Ntambu moved to Chief Chizela's palace for refuge.⁷ Similarly, in 1977, the people of Shinkula villages sought refuge at the Chief's Palace after Mushala and his group burnt their houses.⁸ They abandoned their property including domestic animals as they sought refuge at the Chief's palace. They stayed at the chief's residence until such a time when Mushala and his group

³ Francis Wiafe Amoaks, *Africa*, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), p. 297.

⁴ Interview with Senior Chief Chizela, Mufumbwe, 23 October, 2017.

⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976 and Interview with Senior Chief Chizela.

⁶ UNIPA, 16/6/30, Letter from F. Kapwanga to the Secretary General UNIP, Freedom House, 8th February 1977.

⁷ Interview with Samora.

⁸ Interview with Samora and interview with Senior Chief Chizela

stopped terrorising their area.⁹ The major reason local people took refuge at the Chiefs palace was because the palace was always guarded by the Zambian security forces during the entire period of the rebellion thus, the people felt secure there.¹⁰

The displaced people also sought refuge in schools.¹¹ For instance, in Matushi, the local people frequently took refuge at Matushi West Primary School whenever Mushala's rebels terrorised them.¹² Other schools where people found refuge included Matushi East, Kashima and Chizela Primary Schools.¹³ Schools were safe havens as security officials usually set up camps near the institutions. It was also easy for the security officials to offer protection to the people when they gathered together at one place such as a school.¹⁴ The victims spent most of their days and nights in these schools until Mushala left their area.¹⁵ Furthermore, following the burning of houses and granaries in Kamabuta area in the late 1977, the security officers established camp in the area so as to offer the local people protection against Mushala.¹⁶ Mushala inspired a great deal of fear such that people could not stay in their houses but opted to find refuge at the security camp until Mushala left their area.¹⁷

In places such as Kikonge which was far from Chief Chizela's palace, the people found refuge in the bush while others hid on top of the anthill especially during the night.¹⁸ Some people spent their nights on anthills as the insurgents usually launched their attacks on villagers during the

⁹Interview with Senior Chief Chizela.

¹⁰Interview with Senior Chief Chizela.

¹¹*Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976.

¹² Interview with Ephraim Kinausu Musobela, Senior Headman, Matushi West, Mufumbwe, 20 October, 2017.

¹³ Interview with Senior Chief Chizela

¹⁴*Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976.

¹⁵Interview with Musobela.

¹⁶ Interview with Chief Chizela.

¹⁷ Interview with John Latamesha, Former Member of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), Mufumbwe 17 November, 2017.

¹⁸ Interview with Moses Mangisha, Kikonge Village, Mufumbwe, 19 October, 2017.

night.¹⁹ Thus, Mushala succeeded in destabilising the people of North Western Province by subjecting them to hide-and-seek tactics during the entire period of his rebellion.

The Mushala insurgency in areas such as the West Lunga National Game Park changed people's way of life across the landscape.²⁰ Mushala had set camp in the dense part of the forest in Lunga Game Park which enabled him to hunt game which was crucial for sustaining his followers.²¹ He also traded in game with some of the local people whom he had good relations with.²² As a result of his presence in the Lunga Game Park, people in surrounding areas could no longer hunt in or carry out any other activities as they were afraid of being abducted or killed by the rebels.²³ Aaron Milner, then Minister of Home Affairs, announced in May 1976, that his ministry had asked Dr Sefelino Mulenga, the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources and Tourism, to declare the Lunga Game Park a prohibited area for hunting after receiving reports that the rebels were operating in the game park.²⁴ Mushala's presence and activities in the park coupled with government decision to close the park unintentionally resulted in conservation of wild life and prevented the park from being over-exploited.

Consequently, wild animals grew in number particularly elephants, warthogs and antelopes. Evidence reveals that during the days of Mushala the number of antelopes increased and they would be seen roaming into the villages or the nearby fields.²⁵ The increase in the number of

¹⁹ Interview with Allan Kananda, Catholic Catechist of Holy Trinity Parish, Mufumbwe, 21 October, 2017.

²⁰ James Pritchett, *Friends for Life Friends for Death: Cohorts and Consciousness among the Lunda-Ndembu*, (London: University of Virginia press, 2007), p. 186.

²¹ Interview with Benwa Kifwanakenu Kantumoya, Former Ex-rebel, Mufumbwe, 18/10/2017 and Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

²² Interview with Kantumoya and Interview with Wallace Kajimalwendo, Former Head-Teacher at Kawama primary school, Mufumbwe, 22 October 2017.

²³ Interview with Kantumoya.

²⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976 and Phone Interview with Aaron Milner, Former Minister of Home Affairs, 9 January, 2018.

²⁵ Interview with Chief Chizela and Interview with Matafwali.

wild life posed a threat to the safety of humans and disrupted the cultivation of food crops.²⁶ Therefore, the Lunda population moved northwards away from the threat posed by the increased animal population in the game park.²⁷ Furthermore, Mushala and his rebels made the work of the game guards in Lunga National Park almost unbearable due to their constant terror.²⁸ The game guards were frequently terrorised forcing them to abandon their camps.²⁹ For instance, in 1979, the rebels ambushed the Luswishi Game Camp and confiscated all the guns from the game wardens leaving them unarmed. The game wardens in response vacated most of the camps and relocated to the Lunga Main Camp fear of being killed by Mushala and his rebels.³⁰

Breaking up of Families

Due to the dislodging of people from their homes, social bonds of amity that had sustained families were broken by the Mushala rebellion. The rebellion had devastating effects on families especially the vulnerable such as women and children. The rebels were brutal and uncompromising individuals who without mercy used anyone they could capture including women as mercenaries to fight for their cause.³¹

Africa's track record on violent conflicts since the early 1960s shows that these conflicts, to a large extent contributed to large numbers of widowed women, female-headed households and orphans. These acts of terror led to breaking of family ties as the victims were often taken away from their families and integrated into the rebel armies where they served in various positions

²⁶Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

²⁷ James Pritchett, *Friends for Life Friends for Death: Cohorts and Consciousness among the Lunda-Ndembu*, p. 187 and Interview with Senior Chief Chizela.

²⁸*Times of Zambia*, 22 August, 1979 and Interview with Benwell Kwanuka, Former Game Warden, Matsishi West, 20 October, 2018.

²⁹*Times of Zambia*, 22 August, 1979.

³⁰*Times of Zambia*, 22 August, 1979 and Interview with Kwanuka.

³¹Interview with chief Chizela.

such as combatants, military instructors and spies, while women were used as wives, cooks and nurses.³²

The Mushala rebels also used the tactic of kidnapping and abducting victims, a method which further contributed in breaking up family ties. People lost children, husbands and wives.³³ It is important to note that family disintegration occurred to both the families of ordinary citizens whom Mushala's rebels attacked and members of the Mushala rebel movement. For instance, Benwa Kantumoya got separated from his wife and children following his abduction by Mushala in 1976. Like other abductees, Kantumoya was forced to join the rebel group. He was separated from his family for almost seven years until he deserted Mushala in 1979.³⁴ Similarly, Alexander Saimbwende was kidnapped in 1977. He recalls that Mushala forced him to be his rebel. He had a wife.³⁵ Since Saimbwende was viewed as one of Zambia's public enemy number one together with Mushala, he could not return to his family. Consequently, he abandoned his wife and children.³⁶ In 1981 Saimbwende was given a concubine named Jenness Mubamba as a wife from among the girls who were kidnapped.³⁷

Family disintegration occurred too in families of ordinary people in the affected communities. As earlier noted, Mushala kidnapped girls and women whom he forcibly made wives of his

³² Michael P. Scharf, "Forced Marriages as a Separate Crime against Humanity," In Charles Chernor Jalloh, (ed), *The Sierra Leone Special Court and its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.193; Linda A Mooney, David Knox and Caroline Schacht, *Understanding Social Problems*, (Belmont: WodsworthCengage Learning, 2013), p. 503 and Helen Liebling-Kalifani, "Women Survivors in Uganda: Resilience and Suffering as Consequence of War," in Hannah Brandy and Gilian Lewando Hundt (ed), *global perspective n war, Gender and Health: the Sociology and Anthropology of Suffreing* (New York: Ashgate, 2010) p.73

³³ UNIP 8/1/107, Highlights on the Right Honourable Prime Minister Tour to the North Western Province from 9 to 19 July 1977; *Times of Zambia*, 26 May, 1980 and Beatwell S. Chisala, *The Down Fall of President Kaunda*, (Lusaka: Co-op Print, 1994), p. 320.

³⁴ Interview with Kantumoya.

³⁵ Interview with Saimbwende.

³⁶ Interview with Saimbwende.

³⁷ *Times of Zambia*, 16 October, 1979; Interview with Saimbwende and Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe*, p. 8.

demoralised soldiers.³⁸ Women and girls were usually kidnapped whenever Mushala carried out mass recruitment of soldiers. He abducted women and forced them to become wives of his soldiers so as to discourage them from deserting him thereby creating families within his military organization. This strategy had a grave impact on the social lives of the women as they lost, not only their homes, but they were also forced to live in the forest for years.³⁹ This tactic further highlights the constant vulnerability captured women faced in the Mushala rebel camp. The captured women were deprived of their liberty and literally became the property of their rebel husbands. According to Nepetelo Z. Matafwali:

Girls and women who were abducted could not go back to their villages again. Some women who were abducted were married; they were made to leave their husbands and children behind while being forced to stay with Mushala and his rebels in the forest for years. Some of the girls and women who were abducted began bearing children for the rebels.⁴⁰

The strategy of abductions and kidnappings had an adverse impact on those women as they were robbed of their lives. Most kidnapped women could not leave the Mushala rebels for fear of being killed.

As a result of forced marriages, physical abuse and prolonged separation from their families, some of the women that were later rescued found it difficult to reintegrate into the society. Although they were warmly welcomed by their counterparts in the local communities, some of these girls returned with children whose fathers were members of Mushala's rebel group. Some of the members of the local communities looked down on these women and their children. In some instances, it became difficult for these women to remarry as local people viewed them as

³⁸Interview with Nepetelo Zhane Matafwali, Mushala's Victim, Kisopeka village, Mufumbwe, 19 October, 2017.

³⁹Interview with Matafwali.

⁴⁰Interview with Matafwali.

former victims of Mushala and the fact that they had had children with the rebel soldiers.⁴¹ In order to avoid stigma, some rescued women decided to relocate to new environments and started new lives with their children whom they had had with the rebels.⁴²

Disruption of Educational Activities

Mushala's activities in North Western Province also affected the educational activities in the province. School-going children were too scared to go to school for fear of being kidnapped by Mushala and his men thus leading to learner absenteeism.⁴³ Learning activities were also disturbed from time to time because school buildings such as Matushi Primary school were sometimes used as refugee camps for the people running away from Mushala.⁴⁴ Because Mushala was never in one place, school activities at times would go on very well. However, as soon as news of Mushala reached a village, parents stopped their children from going to school in fear of losing their children through kidnappings by Mushala and his men.⁴⁵ Villagers especially those in far places from the schools kept their children at home until such a time when Mushala was not in their area. In an effort to ensure that their children attended lessons, some of the parents escorted their children to school and picked them up when lessons were over. In some instances, school-going children went to and from school in groups.⁴⁶

As earlier stated, schools were used as refugee camps for the Mushala victims thus, making it difficult for the pupils to start their classes in time.⁴⁷ It was difficult to reconcile between starting classes on time and keeping the people at the school who were running for their lives.

⁴¹Interview with Matafwali.

⁴²Interview with Matafwali.

⁴³*Times of Zambia*, 26 May, 1980

⁴⁴*Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976 and interview with Kajimalwendo.

⁴⁵*Times of Zambia*, 26 May, 1980.

⁴⁶Interview with Headman Chimbulo, Chimbulo Village, Kashima East, 06/11/2017 and Interview with Matafwali.

⁴⁷ Interview with Kajimalwendo.

The movement of people in schools and spending nights at these schools in as much as the schools provided shelter and refuge for them, usually disturbed the teaching and learning activities for the early morning classes. In such cases teaching and learning activities would be disturbed as the school environment would not be too conducive for learning.⁴⁸

Disruption of Health Services

The Mushala rebellion also affected the provision of health services. The Mushala rebellion disrupted the delivery of health care services and interrupted the health care system in local communities. During the rebellion medical personnel were targeted to serve the medical needs of the rebels. The rebels sometimes abducted health personnel and confiscated medicines from health institutions. This activity affected the local people in the affected areas. In early 1976, Mushala abducted medical personnel from Kayombo Health centre.⁴⁹ In May, Mushala was in Chief Chinyengele's capital after moving from Muluwa village where he instructed his men to pull down posters of Kaimana, his second in command.⁵⁰ At the same time, the security officials instituted a man hunt of Mushala and his men and clashed on 22 April 1976, in Muluwa village. During the clashes, one officer was killed while others were wounded including some of Mushala's men.⁵¹ After this shooting with the police, Mushala went into hiding. It took the security officials approximately 14 days to discover that Mushala was hiding in Chief Chinyengele's capital.

While in chief Chinyengele's area Mushala forcefully recruited more young men in order to increase the number of his rebels. This happened between 17th and 30th May 1976. Mushala

⁴⁸Interview with Kajimalwendo and Interview with Sazoza,

⁴⁹Interview with Kantumoya.

⁵⁰Interview with Kantumoya.

⁵¹ UNIP 16/6/30, M.D. Kalepa, Kabompo District Governors Report to N.C.C North Western Province on Mushala's Terrorist Movement, 1 June 1976.

managed to recruit 17 young men from chief Chiyengele's area into his group at gun point. Unfortunately among the abducted were two Kayombo Health Centre staff.⁵² The main aim of Mushala's abduction of these medical assistants was to provide medical services to his rebels who had been wounded during exchange of fire with the security officials a few weeks earlier in Muluwa village.⁵³ In addition, Mushala collected some medicine from the some health centre to use as first aid at his camp in Mulumbwanshika.⁵⁴

Furthermore, Benwa Kifwanakenu Kantumoya who had worked with Mushala as his soldier for close to seven year recalled how he and Mushala together with other members of the rebel group had attacked a medical clinic in Chovwe with the goal of confiscating medical facilities from the clinic. The rebels had attacked the clinic on their way from Mulumbwanshika, their main base, and they were heading into Chovwe area where they had gone to look for food and other commodities.⁵⁵ While in Chovwe, the rebels attacked Chovwe clinic and confiscated most of the medicine from the clinic.⁵⁶ Therefore, the health services for the local people were greatly affected. Moreover, medical assistants and suppliers were few. Thus, the absence of medical personnel and medicines at the health centres deprived the sick of medical services.

Disruption of Agricultural Activities

Mushala's insurgency also affected agricultural production for the people in the affected communities of North Western Province as they fled or could not spend enough time in their

⁵² UNIP, 16/6/30, M.D. Kalepa, District Governor Kabompo, "District Governors Report to the N.C.C North Western Province," 1 June, 1976.

⁵³ Interview with Kantumoya.

⁵⁴ UNIP, 16/6/30, M.D. Kalepa, District Governor Kabompo, "District Governors Report to the N.C.C North Western Province," 1 June, 1976.

⁵⁵ Interview with Kantumoya.

⁵⁶ Interview with Kantumoya.

fields.⁵⁷ The major agricultural activities in the province were centred on cultivation of maize, groundnuts, filed beans, rice, pineapples and sunflower,⁵⁸ rearing of cattle and pigs and also the collection of honey.⁵⁹ Cassava was also widely grown.⁶⁰ However, the Mushala rebellion slowed down most economic activities in the province.⁶¹ For example, in 1976, immediately after the rebellion started, it was reported that people were so terrified that they could not leave their homes. They also stopped their fishing excursions and working on their gardens for fear of Mushala who was terrorising their area.⁶² Moreover, following the death of Mushala's brother, Samson Mushala who was killed by the security officials in 1977, Mushala turned to more violent acts of terror such as beheading his victims.⁶³ Most of the Mushala victims were hacked to death using machetes thus, spreading fear among the people working in their fields.⁶⁴

It is imperative to understand that the effect of the insurgency on agriculture varied from one district to another. Shortly after the rebellion started, reports of terrorism in North Western Province become rife.⁶⁵ The Mushala rebels were forcefully recruiting men into their group. The fear of being beaten kidnapped or killed forced people to stay at home and this greatly affected the economic activities of the local people, especially agriculture. By 1979 there were reports of

⁵⁷ UNIP 8/5/13, Reports of the North Western Province Tour by the Right Honourable Prime Minister E.H.K Mudenda from 9 to 19 July, 1977.

⁵⁸ National Archives of Zambia (hereafter) NAZ MAG 2/17/116 North Western Province Provincial Agricultural Officer's Annual Report 1980-1981.

⁵⁹ NAZ MAG 2/17/116, The Provincial Agricultural Office, Crop Production Report, 1980 and GRZ, Agricultural and rural sector survey, volume 2. Annex 8. (Annexs 1-11).

⁶⁰ P. S. Hindmarsh, *Report on a Six Year Secondment to the Food Conservation and Storage Unit, Zambia, 1970-1976*, (London: tropical Products institute, 1978), p. 5.

⁶¹ UNIP 8/9/46, Speech by B. F Kapulu, MCC, On the Occasion of the Seminar to Discuss the Decentralised Proposal for Integrated Local Government Administration held in Solwezi, 17 March, 1978.

⁶² *Times of Zambia*, 23 January, 1976.

⁶³ Interview with Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba, Mufumbwe, 17 October, 2017; Interview with Kantumoya; Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 150 and Miles Larmer and Giacomo Macola, Lamer and Macola, "The origins and significance of the Mushala Rebellion," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 40. No. 3, (2007), p. 493.

⁶⁴ Interview with Chief Chizela.

⁶⁵ *Times of Zambia*, 22 January, 1976; *Times of Zambia*, 23 January, 1976; *Zambia Daily Mail*, 29 January 1976 and UNIP 8/5/13, Reports of the North Western Province Tour by the Right Honourable Prime Minister From 9 to 19 July, 1977.

localised famine in the province.⁶⁶ Evidence from agricultural reports show that crop production during the 1978/1979 season especially in Chizela district, where Mushala's activities were concentrated reduced compared to other districts in the province where his reign of terror was less severe.⁶⁷ During this farming season, Chizela district produced 1188 standard bags of maize and 48 standard bags of groundnuts while districts such as Solwezi where the Mushala insurgency was not too intensive, produced 12835 standard bags of maize and 170 standard bags of groundnuts.⁶⁸ During the same farming season, Zambezi where Mushala never terrorised the people, was able to produce 13200 standard bags of maize and 4050 bags of groundnuts.⁶⁹

Similarly, during the 1980/1981 farming season, crop production continued to decline in the affected communities of the province as shown in Table 1. Crop production declined because local people were too scared to go to their gardens and farms.⁷⁰ The table on the next page shows the production of crops in the affected communities of Chizela and Kasempa as compared to other districts of the province where the Mushala acts of terror were not as intense.

⁶⁶ Larmer and Macola, "The Origins, Context, and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One-Party State," p 493.

⁶⁷ NAZ MAG 2/17/116, The Provincial Agricultural Office, Crop Production Report, 1980.

⁶⁸ NAZ MAG 2/17/116, Provincial Agricultural Annual Report, 1978/1979 Season.

⁶⁹ NAZ MAG 2/17/116, Provincial Agricultural Annual Report, 1978/1979 Season.

⁷⁰ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba and Interview with Gilbert Wisamba.

Table 1: Crop Production of 1980/1981 season for North Western Province.

District	White Maize	Groundnuts	Beans	Rice
Chizela	1769 bags	140 bags	16 bags	120 bags
Kasempa	1232 bags	-	16 bags	-
Kabompo	6336 bags	1200 bags	136 bags	1060 bags
Solwezi	17652 bags	-	620 bags	-
Mwinilunga	12712 bags	540 bags	88 bags	1560 bags
Zambezi	36984 bags	440 bags	50 bags	2010 bags

Source: GRZ, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, Department of Agriculture, Provincial Agricultural officer's Annual Report 1980/1981 Season.

It is very clear from the table above that Chizela and Kesempa the epic-centre of the Mushala terror attacks recorded very low yields of crops compared to the areas not directly affected by the rebellion. At the peak of the Mushala rebellion, the period between 1976 and 1980, there was a localised negative effect on agricultural production in the affected communities where the rebellion was profound and more widespread.

Due to the fact that people were too scared to go into the fields and farm, cassava became the crop which they depended on.⁷¹ During this period cassava proved to be more advantageous than cereal crops. This was because cassava required little attention, it could be left in the ground for a long period of time and it could be harvested by one person at a time when it was safe. Furthermore, cassava could be harvested in large quantities and be stored for a long period of time. Cassava was also a versatile crop, it could be dried, roasted or prepared fresh. In addition, the people could make cassava flour and eat its leaves. In areas such as Matushi and Kashima in

⁷¹Interview with Jeffrey WangaWisamba.

Chizela district cassava became very important crop and was grown not for sale but consumption.⁷² Thus, people in the affected communities had sufficient food to sustain themselves until they had knowledge that Mushala was no longer terrorising their area.⁷³

The people in the affected communities suspended the rearing of animals such as cattle and pigs due to fear of meeting Mushala in the bush during grazing of their animals.⁷⁴ The rearing of pigs was suspended by most people in the affected communities of the province.⁷⁵ Evidence shows that by 1979 when the Mushala insurgency was at its peak, Chizela district had low production of pigs, compared to other districts in the province where the Mushala's terror activities were less widespread. For instance, while the population of pigs in 1979 was 48, in Chizela and 116 in Kasempa, districts such as Kabompo and Zambezi where the Mushala acts of terror were not common, the pig population was 4,000 and 650 respectively.⁷⁶

Similarly, cattle production significantly reduced in the province particularly in Kasempa and Chizela districts during the period under review.⁷⁷ This is evident in the agricultural annual report of 1980-1981 which shows that there was little cattle production in places such as Chizela and Kasempa districts.⁷⁸ These districts only managed to produce cattle at a very low level compared to other districts of the province such as Solwezi and Zambezi where Mushala's act of terror were not intense. While Zambezi district slaughtered 387 cattle and sold 150 and Solwezi

⁷² GRZ, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Supply, Provincial Agricultural Officer's Annual Report 1980-1981 Season and Interview with Chief Chizela.

⁷³ Interview with Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba.

⁷⁴ Interview with Musobela and Interview with Samora.

⁷⁵ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

⁷⁶ GRZ, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, Agricultural Department, Provincial Agricultural Officer's Annual Report 1980-1981 and NAZ MAG 2/17/116, Quarterly Report, Husbandry Section for July to September 1979.

⁷⁷ UNIP 16/6/30, B.F. Kapula Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

⁷⁸ GRZ, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, Agricultural Department, Provincial Agricultural Officer's Annual Report 1980-1981.

slaughtered 630 cattle and sold 675 in 1981, Chizela did not slaughter any cattle nor did it sell any while Kasempa only slaughtered 2 cattle and sold only 14 animals.⁷⁹ The cattle were sold to the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD).

Disruption of Hunting Activities

The rebellion disrupted hunting activities of the people of North Western Province. Literature on North Western Province reveals that hunting and honey collection has always been part of the economic life of the people of the Province since time immemorial.⁸⁰ The consensus among these scholars is that hunting has always been an important activity attached with great economic significance to the lives of the people. People hunted for food and hunting was part of their regular economic life in which they traded game meat with other commodities within their societies. They also collected honey from the same forests where they hunted game. Honey was an important aspect of the cultural and economic life of the people. Honey was used for brewing local traditional beer called *imbote* among the Kaonde.⁸¹ They hunted in the northern part of Kafue National Park and Lunga West National Park.⁸²

The presence of Mushala and his rebels in the West Lunga National Park brought fear among the local hunters in the province. The local people could not go into the park to hunt game, set traps or collect honey for fear of meeting Mushala along their way.⁸³ Poachers were also scared of poaching game in the Lunga National park following the accidental killing of six poachers in the area by the security officers who were believed to have been part of Mushala's men in the

⁷⁹ GRZ, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, Agricultural Department, Provincial Agricultural Officer's Annual Report 1980-1981.

⁸⁰ Chikosa Langson Kamwengo, "Hunting and Conservation in Kasempa District of North-Western Province of Zambia, 1934-1994, M.A Dissertation, The University of Zambia, 1999, p.39.

⁸¹ Langson Kamwengo, "Hunting and Conservation in Kasempa District of North-Western Province of Zambia, 1934-1994, p. 39.

⁸² Chris McIntyre, *Bradt Zambia*, (Chalfont: The Bradt Travel Guide, 2008), p. 491.

⁸³ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

early 1976.⁸⁴ In May 1976, the Lunga National park was closed due to security reasons as earlier mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.⁸⁵ Since people could not hunt, collect honey or parch, their economic lives were devastated.

Hunger and Starvation

Since people could neither cultivate enough crops both for consumption and for sale nor, could they hunt or collect honey, the consequence was hunger and starvation. Because people had challenges when it came to food production, they resorted to making gardens near their village houses to enable them to produce food for their families.⁸⁶ In an effort to prevent people from total starvation, the security officials resorted to escorting the villagers especially those that were camping at Chief Chizela's palace and in schools to their farm yards to collect food for home consumption.⁸⁷

Hunger and starvation emerged in some communities after Mushala and his rebels burnt granaries.⁸⁸ Granaries were facilities constructed by villagers to store various kinds of food crops such as maize, groundnuts and cassava among others for future use especially in times of hunger. The burning of granaries by Mushala's insurgents affected the food security of the people in the affected areas. For instance, in 1976, Mushala burnt granaries in Ntambu and Kashima. Similarly, in 1977, he burnt granaries in Shinkula village. Furthermore, in 1978, it was reported that Mushala was in Kashima area where he destroyed people's granaries by setting them ablaze and confiscated some foodstuffs including mealie meal and chickens and this subjected the people of

⁸⁴ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 13 May 1976.

⁸⁵ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 13 May 1976.

⁸⁶ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

⁸⁷ Interview with Senior Chief Chizela and Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

⁸⁸ Interview with Jeffrey WangaWisamba.

Kashima area to hunger and starvation.⁸⁹ By 1979, there was a proclamation of food scarcity in the province.⁹⁰ Towards the end of 1981, there were reports that Mushala and his groups had burnt people's granaries in Matushi West and East in Chizela district now Mufumbwe district.⁹¹ Mushala and his men burnt granaries for the people who were suspected of being informants and sending reports to the security officials. The insurgents also targeted those suspected of being UNIP supporters.⁹²

Mushala used the burning of granaries as an effective weapon to starve the people into submission.⁹³ The burning of the granaries by Mushala and his rebels was meant to confirm to Zambian authorities that Mushala was still in existence and fighting for his cause. It was also a strategy of inflicting punishment on the villagers who were sending information to security officials concerning his whereabouts. It was further one of his effective ways of spreading terror and demanding submission and respect among affected communities of North Western Province.⁹⁴ Consequently, the local people were subjected to hard economic conditions. The burning of granaries entailed hunger for the villagers until the next farming season. It further meant that cultivation for the subsequent farming season was also affected because the burning of granaries also entailed that seeds were also destroyed.

⁸⁹Interview with Sazozza, Senior Headman, Kashima West, 06 October, 2017.

⁹⁰Lamer and Macola, "The Origins and Significance of the Mushala rebellion," p. 493.

⁹¹ Interview with Sazozza.

⁹²Interview, Chief Chizera; interview, Kangula.

⁹³ Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Civil Wars in Rwanda and Burundi: Conflicts Resolution in Africa*, (Pretoria: New Africa Press, 2013), P. 152

⁹⁴Interview with Samora.

Destruction of Life and Property

Apart from disrupting economic activities, the Mushala rebellion led to a number of deaths of both security officials and ordinary people. However, it should be noted here that statistical evidence with regards to the exact number of killed people during the rebellion is difficult to come by. His rebellion also led to the destruction of property⁹⁵ especially in Kikonge, Matushi, and Kashima in Chizela district and Kashinakaji in Manyinga district.⁹⁶ Mushala destroyed lives including those of his own men especially those who deserted or attempted to desert him. He killed anyone he suspected of being a potential informant who might reveal information to the security officers regarding his whereabouts.⁹⁷ Mushala used these terror tactics as an instrument of coercion towards the Zambian government.

The first case of loss of life due to Mushala's act of terror was reported in December 1975, when he killed a Mechanical Service Branch driver (MSB) and stole the payroll in Sesheke.⁹⁸ In January 1976, headman Mutula in Chief Mwanamumunwa's area was shot dead together with two others namely Sekeleti Imboela and David Nangana.⁹⁹ It was later revealed that the people responsible for the crime were Mushala's rebels. In April 1976, police officials moved into the province and began a manhunt for Mushala. On 22 April, two policemen were killed during an encounter with Mushala's men. Mushala set an ambush for the security officers who were sent to kill or capture him. The incident happened between Manyinga and Chizela Districts. A few security officials left other officials in Kashinakaji and went to Chizela, unaware that Mushala

⁹⁵*Africa confidential*, 9 July, 1976 and *Africa News*, 29 July, 1976.

⁹⁶ UNIP 16/6/30, B.F. Kapulu, Report to all District Governors and All Regional Secretary, Solwezi, 27 August, 1976.

⁹⁷ Interview with Mayumbelo Handson Laishi, Ex-Rebel, Mufumbwe, 18 October, 2017.

⁹⁸*Times of Zambia*, 23 January 1976 and Interview, Jeffrey Wanga Wisamba.

⁹⁹*Official Verbatim Report of the Third Session of the Third National Assembly, 21 January 1976*, (Lusaka: Government Printers, 1976), p. 127.

and his men had set a trap for them. They drove straight into the trenches set by the insurgents. The rebels had dug trenches and covered them with branches of trees to trap the officials. One of the villagers who heard about Mushala's plan and wanted to alert the police about the incident was shot dead by the rebels.¹⁰⁰ When the paramilitary Land Rover reached the area, it dived straight into the trench and the rebels opened fire killing two officers and shattered the vehicle. One of the victims was identified as Constable Chisheta. During the clash, four policemen were injured and the rebels got away with rifles and ammunition from the police after the ambush.¹⁰¹

More life was destroyed through accidental means. In May 1976, inspector Kakoma of paramilitary police was accidentally shot dead by his fellow police officer when he went to the camp late at night and was suspected of being Mushala's rebel.¹⁰² During the same period, Milner, while in Kabompo, reported that from January 1976, when the Mushala rebellion started, twelve lives were lost.¹⁰³ Other reports in the media were that between January and May 1976, Mushala had led to the death of fourteen people through his terrorist activities and among them were security officials.¹⁰⁴ On 18 August 1976, security officials in Solwezi also accidentally shot dead a man called Kalenga Sambona when they mistook his identity for that of one of Mushala's rebels.¹⁰⁵

The concern of the local people was that the government should have called for a joint mobilisation of villagers from the four districts concerned and the members of security forces.¹⁰⁶ The people of Matushi West decided to reorganise themselves to fight Mushala. Armed with

¹⁰⁰*Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976.

¹⁰¹*Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976 and *Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976.

¹⁰²*Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976.

¹⁰³*Zambia Diary Mail*, 15 May, 1976.

¹⁰⁴*Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976.

¹⁰⁵ UNIP 16/6/30, D.G. Mpundu, Crime Notes, 16 August -31 August, 1976.

¹⁰⁶ UNIP 8/9/36, Honourable Members of the Central Committee, Monthly Reports to the Committee North Western Province, March 1980.

spears, they followed the insurgents into the bush. As they came closer, Mushala opened fire and killed one of the villagers. They were forced to withdraw and abandon the idea of pursuing him. The villagers demonstrated bravery when they followed Mushala and sought to fight him. However, they were unable to challenge him because they were poorly armed.¹⁰⁷

In December 1976, Mushala was reported to have travelled to the Copperbelt where he had an encounter with the security officials and killed two of them. The incident happened at Mimbula Fitula mine near Chingola.¹⁰⁸ When he returned to North Western Province, Mushala continued with his killings. For instance, on 29 February 1980, Mushala killed Jim Samupi in Nyakayolo village in Chizela district.¹⁰⁹ Jim Samupi was among those on the rebel's list who were believed to be sending information about the rebels in the area to the security officers. From the onset of the rebellion, the UNIP carders were given the responsibility of providing information about Mushala's rebel activities to the security officials in the province so as to help quell the rebellion.¹¹⁰ However, this move put the local people in grave danger as Mushala considered them traitors and enemies working for the Zambian government.

The Mushala rebellion further led to the destruction of property. Several houses were set on fire by Mushala and his insurgents at any given excuse. Individuals whose property was being burnt would be ordered out of their huts before setting them ablaze with property inside. During this period, property and domestic animals were destroyed by fire. In April 1976, Mushala and the rebels went on wanton destruction of villages in Mayau's area in Chief Sikufele's in

¹⁰⁷ UNIP 8/9/36, Honourable Members of the Central Committee, Monthly Reports to the Committee North Western Province, March 1980.

¹⁰⁸ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 17 December, 1976.

¹⁰⁹ UNIP 8/9/36, Honourable Members of the Central Committee, Monthly Reports to the Committee North Western Province, March 1980.

¹¹⁰ UNIP 8/9/36, Honourable Members of the Central Committee, Monthly Reports to the Committee North Western Province, March 1980.

Kabompo district.¹¹¹ In this area, Mushala burnt people's houses and all their personal belongings in those houses, leaving the people destitutes.

At about the same time Mushala and his men burnt and destroyed a wooden bridge on the West Lunga River on the road to Mwinilunga as shown in Figure 3.¹¹² The burning of the bridge was meant to create a barrier and stop the security officers from following him further into the park. This happened after Mushala's hunt by the security offices under the leadership of Lieutenant General Francis Sibamba who were tipped off of the presence of the rebels in Chizela.¹¹³

Figure 3: A bridge burnt and wrecked by the Mushala rebels in 1976.



Source: *Times of Zambia*, 12th May, 1976.

In 1981, Mushala decided to launch a mass recruitment of rebels as he had lost most of his men through exchange of fire with the security forces while some of his men just deserted him.¹¹⁴ He

¹¹¹*Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976.

¹¹² Interview with Morgan Sazoza and *Zambia Daily Mail*, 13 May, 1976.

¹¹³ Francis Gershom Sibamba, *The Zambia Army and I: Autobiography of a former Army Commander*, (Ndola: Mission Press, 2010), p. 152.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Kantumoya

went from village to village conscripting young able-bodied men as his rebel members. Mushala lunched his attacks mostly in the night. He sometimes came at the village and asked all the men out of their huts and carefully selected those that he thought were able to fight in his group. For the villagers who tried to resist, their huts were set ablaze with all their property inside. This method of recruitment led to loss of property. In 1982, prior his death, Mushala and his rebels caused chaos in Mwinilunga. This time, the rebels burnt down a camp belonging to the veterinary and tsetse control at Chiwoma in Mwinilunga, thus, disrupting the working environment of the people in that area.¹¹⁵

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the socio-economic impact of the Mushala rebellion in the affected communities of North Western Province of Zambia. The chapter has argued that socially the Mushala rebellion caused many people to flee their homes, thus creating logistical problems for the people. People often moved to the Chiefs palace and schools for refuge whenever Mushala was in their area. The chapter has argued that the dislodging of people was in most cases temporally as people often returned to their villages once Mushala and his group left their area. It has also argued that during the rebellion family ties were broken as people lost husbands, wives and children through kidnapping and abductions carried out by Mushala and his men. The chapter has further shown that there was disruption of educational activities in areas such as Matushi west in Chizela district now Mufumbwe district. Since schools were sometimes used as refugee camps, it becomes difficulties to have school lessons in times like this. For the people who stay in places which were far from the school, people in such areas stopped their children from going to school in fear of having their children kidnapped by Mushala. The consequence for

¹¹⁵*Times of Zambia*, 29 November, 1982

this was school absenteeism. The Mushala rebellion further affected the provision of the health services in the affected communities.

The chapter has also demonstrated that the Mushala rebellion had negative consequence on the agricultural activities in affected communities of the province. People fled or could not spend enough time in their gardens for fear of meeting Mushala while working in their fields. They also could not go into the fields to hunt, set traps or collect honey. Consequently, there was hunger and starvation. The chapter has further shown that there were negative military consequences due to the Mushala rebellion. The chapter has argued that the rebellion led to the disruption of life and destruction of property. Mushala destroyed lives including those of his own men, especially those who deserted or attempted to desert him. He further burnt people's houses and granaries.

CHAPTER 4: GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO MUSHALA'S REBELLION

Introduction

Following the outbreak of the Mushala rebellion, the Zambian government spared no effort to capture Mushala and his insurgents. It looked for means and ways of dealing with the rebellion which was greatly compromising the security system of the country. From the beginning, the rebellion in North-Western Province was characterised by widespread abuse of human rights. The rebels committed atrocities against innocent people in an effort to fight the UNIP government. Immediately the rebellion started, the defence and security committee of the UNIP central committee came together and constituted itself into a regular fighting force by deploying security officers into North-Western Province as a way of counter acting the insurgency. This was aimed at protecting the affected people and ensuring security in the province.

This chapter is divided into three sections, the first part investigates government measures in response to the rebellion. Among others, the government extended the State of emergency in 1976, mobilised troops, offered a reward for Mushala's capture and detained, charged the suspects with treason. The second part examines the myths which attempt to explain why it took long for Mushala to be killed. It is argued that the rebellion took almost a decade to be quelled, and it was believed by many that this was due to Mushala's use of magic. Mushala was believed to be a shape shifter and omnipresent at the same time. However, the chapter refutes these arguments and insists that the Mushala rebellion can be understood in the social context in which the rebellion unfolded. It argues that there were a number of factors that enabled Mushala to avoid capture by the security offices, and among the main reasons was his skill in guerrilla warfare coupled with his knowledge of the terrain where he operated. The chapter further

examines the killing of Mushala and dismisses the conspicuous argument that the soldiers stripped naked at the time of killing Mushala. The third section of the chapter examines the activities of the remnants of Mushala after his death. This chapter attempts to examine government's response to the rebellion.

1976 State of Emergency and Reward for Mushala's Capture

Immediately the rebellion started, the Zambian government's security officials commenced investigations with the view of establishing the people responsible for the suspected terrorist activities in that part of the country. This followed the rebels' killing and kidnapping of people and the destruction of property thereby causing a great deal of fear among the local communities of North Western Province. Therefore, President Kaunda on 28th January 1976, invoked a state of emergency.¹ "The state of emergency was first imposed on 27 July 1964, initially to deal with the Lumpa Crisis. In the wake of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11th November, 1965, the regulation was extended to cover the whole country."² During the UDI, the state of emergency was extended to allow the government deal effectively with the security problems which were created.³ However, on 28th January, 1976, President Kaunda declared the full application of the state of emergency in response to the grave security situation which was developing in North-Western Province so as to defend the national constitution and the nation.⁴ President Kaunda noted that it was in the interest of the government to protect the people of Zambia and ensure peace and stability in the country. He stated that:

¹ GRZ, *Invocation of the Full Powers of the State of Emergency by his Excellency the President Dr K. D. Kaunda*, (Lusaka: government printers, 1976), p. 1

² Clarence Chongo, "The Impact of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on Zambia's Economic and Socio-political Development, 1965-1979," M.A Dissertation, The University of Zambia, 2009, p. 76.

³ Chongo, "The Impact of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on Zambia's Economic and Socio-political Development, 1965-1979," p. 76.

⁴ GRZ, *Invocation of the Full Powers of the State of Emergency by His Excellency The President Dr K. D. Kaunda*, (Lusaka: government printers, 1976), p. 1 and High Court of Zambia(hereafter) HCZ HN 351, Judgment No. 20, Yona Mutanda V Attorney General, 20 September, 1980.

There is foreign interference...in Zambia. A number of people financed by foreigners have infiltrated our country...unidentified armed gang was detected in North Western Province terrorising villagers and travellers. A total of four innocent Zambians were murdered. The murderers are still at large...With the application of the full power of the state of emergency we will deal without mercy with the people who commit crime against the state.⁵

Thus, Kaunda's declaration of the state of emergency was aimed at giving government more power to effectively deal with security challenges caused by the rebellion in North Western Province and reduce the crime levels in the area. It was also hoped that by imposing emergency regulations, the security forces would track the people responsible for the crimes in different parts of the country more generally and especially Mushala who had become Zambia's public enemy number one.⁶ Kaunda noted that the rebellion which had started in North Western Province of Zambia was being led by Mushala and he was responsible for the terror in that area.⁷

For the government, it was necessary to take such steps and ensure the security of all the people and ensure that the nation continued to enjoy peace and stability. The government appealed to the public and the villagers in the affected communities of North Western Province to help the government by alerting the security officers on the whereabouts of Mushala and his insurgents.⁸ It also offered a reward to anybody who would provide information leading to the whereabouts of Mushala and his insurgents. An amount of one hundred kwacha was promised to anybody that came forth with information leading to Mushala's arrest.⁹ The reward was meant to stimulate the effort of the ordinary people in bringing Mushala and his men down. This appeal

⁵ *Zambia Dairy Mail*, 29th January, 1976 and GRZ, *Invocation of the Full Powers of the State of Emergency by his Excellency the President Dr K. D. Kaunda*, p. 3.

⁶ GRZ, *Invocation of the Full Powers of the State of Emergency by his Excellency the President Dr K. D. Kaunda*, p. 3 and *Times of Zambia*, 25th January, 1976.

⁷ GRZ, *Invocation of the Full Powers of the State of Emergency by his Excellency the President Dr K. D. Kaunda*, p. 3.

⁸ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 23 October, 1976.

⁹ Interview with Samora Rabson, Former Member of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), Mufumbwe, 13 October, 2017.

was published in the *Zambia Daily Mail* together with photos of some of Mushala's trusted men as shown in Figure 4 for the public to see and know who the rebels were.¹⁰

Figure 4: Photos of Mushala's right hand men.



Source: *Zambia Daily Mail* 13 May, 1976.

However, time went by and there were no reports about the whereabouts of Mushala and his rebels. Perhaps nobody knew the exact hiding place of Mushala as he was considered to be a very tactful man in his operation and that was attributed to his guerrilla skills. Furthermore, Grey

¹⁰ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 20 May, 1976.

Zulu, then Secretary of State for Defence and security, stated that Mushala and his followers had planned to extend their operation from North Western Province into the Copperbelt.¹¹ However, this time, it seemed the police were one step ahead of him. They blocked Mushala and he could not go further into the Copperbelt.

Mobilisation of Troops to North Western Province

During the same period, the Zambian government responded to the Mushala Rebellion with military force as soon as reports of Mushala and his terrorist activities began.¹² Initially, the Mushala rebellion was considered as nothing more than banditry by the government. However, when Mushala started his terrorist campaign, he meant war with the government and he was determined to achieve his military objectives by all means. Fire would be exchanged with the paramilitary and in most cases both the police officers and the insurgents would be killed.¹³ The Zambian authorities had initially under-estimated the threat posed by the Mushala group, but after it became clear that the rebels were killing and abducting people and destroying property, they deployed the paramilitary police to intercept the rebels and protect the local people in the area.¹⁴

After a number of unsuccessful engagements by the paramilitary police, it was realised that the paramilitary alone could not be equal to the task.¹⁵ This was because Mushala employed guerrilla tactics against the paramilitary police. He avoided confrontation with them but would systematically set traps and ambush them with the aim of gradually depleting them while

¹¹ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 1 June, 1976 and Interview with Grey Zulu, Former Minister of Defence, Lusaka, 16 February 2018.

¹² *Times of Zambia*, 13 May, 1976.

¹³ UNIP, 16/6/30, B.F. Kapula Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

¹⁴ Francis Gershom Sibamba, *The Zambia Army and I: Autobiography of a Former Army Commander*, (Ndola: Mission Press, 2010), p. 148.

¹⁵ Sibamba, *The Zambia Army and I: Autobiography of a Former Army Commander*, p. 148.

lessening his own losses. Coupled with his knowledge of the terrain where he operated, Mushala became invisible as he knew where to enter from and where to hide while in the forest. However, Bautis F. Kapulu, then Member of the Central Committee for North Western Province attributed Mushala's successes in launching military attacks to the fact that he had informants among the paramilitary police.¹⁶

Therefore, the government engaged the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) to work together with the paramilitary officers in the area in an effort to capture the rebels as well as to give the government an outlook of the crime situation in the province.¹⁷ In doing so, the police were able to arrest three men who were believed to be members of the Mushala gang and began interrogating them on the whereabouts of Mushala.¹⁸

In February 1976, Mushala was reported in Kashinakazhi area in Kabompo District.¹⁹ There, he continued to terrorise the area. The police forces also set camp in Kashinakazhi and regularly conducted search operations for him and his men in order to protect the people. During this time, the police officers had received information from James Maliki together with the Councillor of the area that Mushala's group was in Kashinakazhi and was seen around by the roadside unconcerned of who might see them. This information was later confirmed by a group of unknown women who had seen the rebels from a distance. The police then moved into action with the view of apprehending the rebels.²⁰

¹⁶ UNIP 16/6/30, Bautis F. Kapulu Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

¹⁷ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 22nd January, 1976 and Patrick Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion: The Untold Story*, (Lusaka: Multimedia, 1987), p. 72.

¹⁸ Interview with Rabson Samora, Mufumbwe, 13 October, 2017.

¹⁹ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 72.

²⁰ UNIP 16/6/30, B.F. Kapulu Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

However, the rebel's appearance on the roadside was Mushala's way of holding out his baits to entice the security officers; he used deceit to send the police officers into his trap. As earlier stated, before they came closer, Mushala had dug a trench across the road and smoothly covered it with lighter poles and soil so as to make it look normal. The land rover which was carrying the paramilitary police nosedived into the trench and immediately Mushala opened fire on the security men.²¹ In this incident, only one man from the security forces identified as constable Fimbo was killed while others were injured.²²

To further humiliate the police, Mushala stripped off the uniform of the dead constable Fimbo.²³ Among the injured was the commander of Kashinakazhi camp, inspector Moonga.²⁴ While the police abandoned the trapped vehicle in search of cover, Mushala and his men ransacked the police vehicle and took with them an unknown number of G3 rifles and an unknown quantity of ammunition which was left by constable Mutale and Sergeant Linumgo.²⁵ This was the manner in which Mushala was able to acquire guns and ammunition as stated in the previous chapter.

During this time, the police did not know the exact number of men who belonged to Mushala's group and the amount of ammunition they possessed. However, they were ready to do anything in order to capture or kill Mushala.²⁶ Therefore, the government ordered the deployment of three battalions under the command of Colonel Christon Tembo to North Western

²¹ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 13th May, 1976.

²² UNIP 16/6/30, Bautis F. Kapulu Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

²³ UNIP 16/6/30, Bautis F. Kapulu Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

²⁴ UNIP 16/6/30, Bautis F. Kapulu Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

²⁵ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 73 and UNIP 16/6/30, B.F. Kapula Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

²⁶ Interview with Gilbert Wisamba, Former Member of Parliament (hereafter) MP Solwezi, Freedom House Lusaka, 13/10/2017.

Province to track down Mushala and his rebels.²⁷ Later on in July 1976, the battalion which was sent to track down Mushala soon fell into his trap. Like in the previous incident, Mushala dug a trench which was not noticed by the government soldiers when they were operating in the area. When the vehicle fell into the trench, Mushala's men instantly opened fire on the security forces killing two soldiers namely Staff Sergeant Nyirenda and Corporal Andrew Mbewe.²⁸ Following this incident, Mushala became the most wanted man, dead or alive.²⁹

In October 1976, it was reported that five members of Mushala's rebel group were killed and that the security forces were doing everything possible to wipe out the entire Mushala group.³⁰ By August 1979, it was reported that eighteen members of the Mushala rebel group had been wiped out by Zambian Security Forces.³¹ Again in October 1979, three Mushala rebels died while in detention. Among the detained were two women who had become involved with Mushala as a result of being kidnaped and could therefore not desert him for fear of being killed. The dead detainees were identified as Swana Karinga, Julius Saulo and Patson Mwape Lisala.³² In April 1981, the Zambian security forces overran the rebel camp and killed two Mushala rebels namely Friday Kananda Mushala, the younger brother of Adamson Mushala and the leader's right hand man, Landwell Kasempa. During the same period, two other rebel members were captured while some of the women who had been kidnapped by the rebels were released.³³ Among the items that were retrieved during this operation was a G3 rifle, one shot gun, one muzzle loader, over 200 rounds of ammunition and other documents including those of the

²⁷ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 74.

²⁸ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 78 and UNIP 16/6/30 B.F. Kapula Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976

²⁹ UNIP 16/6/30 B.F. Kapula Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

³⁰ *Times of Zambia*, 23 October, 1976.

³¹ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 22 August 1979.

³² *Zambia Daily Mail*, 16 October 1979.

³³ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 11 April, 1981.

defunct African National Congress (ANC) bearing the photos of Mr Harry Nkumbula. Other items retrieved were the UNIP youth league cards.³⁴

Detention and Treason Trial for Suspects

The Zambian government was determined to make treason infamous in the country. The government gave the harshest punishment to all those that were involved in the rebellion and this was done through long term jail time. Just at the beginning of the rebellion all suspected rebels were detained while they awaited trial.³⁵ Any association with Mushala including not being able to report Mushala to the security officials led to detention. However, some of the people who were suspected to have played a major role in masterminding the rebellion went to High Court for treason trial. Suspected individuals were tried on charges including their military training in South Africa with a view of coming to overthrow the established government upon their return³⁶ and also their involvement with Mushala and his terrorist activities.³⁷

A close relation can be drawn between the Mushala rebellion and the treason trial of William Chipango of 1976. Literature on the political history of Zambia shows that William Chipango was arrested on counts of treason. The conspicuous argument among scholars is that from the late 1960s, Chipango had been recruiting people to undergo military training in Caprivi with the view of coming to overthrow the UNIP government using military force.³⁸

³⁴ *Zambia Daily Mail*, 11 April, 1981.

³⁵ Wele, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, p. 72.

³⁶ *Times of Zambia*, 17 June, 1976.

³⁷ High Court of Zambia (hereafter) HCZ HN 351, Judgment No. 20, Yona Mutanda V Attorney General, 20 September, 1980.

³⁸ Chiponde Mushingeh, "Unrepresentative Democracy: One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1973-1990," *Trans African Journal of History*, Vol. 23 (1994), p. 123; Chiponde Mushingeh, "The Evolution Of One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1964-1972," *Trans African Journal of History*, Vol. 22 (1993), p. 112; Beatwell Sekeleti Chisala, *The Downfall of President Kaunda*, (Lusaka: Co-op Print, 1994), p. 319 and Godwin B. Mwangilwa, *Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula: A Biography of the old lion in Zambia*, (Lusaka: Multimedia Publication, 1983), p. 59.

As earlier stated in chapter two, Mushala did not mastermind the plan alone to overthrow the Zambian government, but rather had joined hands with other politicians such as Nalumino Mundia and William Chipango.³⁹ While Mushala and others were receiving military training outside Zambia, others such as Mundia were to remain in the country to assess the situation so that when the rebels returned, they would execute their plan and overthrow the UNIP government.⁴⁰

In the late 1960s, Chipango and Kalimbwe Lupasa succeed in making contacts with the South Africans in Caprivi for financial aid although this request was rejected.⁴¹ By the early 1970s, Mushala was seeking military training and support in Angola and later South Africa, while Kalimbwe Lupasa was sent to seek military support from Rhodesia.⁴² However, these plans soon came to a dead end as the UNIP government began apprehending all those suspected to be involved in such acts.

From the beginning of 1973, there were police reports about the arrest of individuals who were planning to overthrow the UNIP government. Among the many reports there were those from Kaoma District, about the arrest of “Bernard Muluti who had been recruiting people in [Kaoma] District with Adamson Mushala and William Chipango”.⁴³ In 1974, William Chipango was arrested and placed under detention.⁴⁴ During the arrest of Chipango, Mushala was nowhere to be seen as he had already gone to Angola to seek military training and later Caprivi.⁴⁵ Chipango was accused of recruiting people for military training in South West Africa, now

³⁹ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba; Interview with Samora and “African Studies Centre, Zambia News Online - (2), 9/27/96,” <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/zno2.html>, Accessed 24 July, 2018.

⁴⁰ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba; Interview with Samora and interview with Wanga Wisamba.

⁴¹ Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p.141.

⁴² Wele, *Zambia's Most Famous: From Mushala to Luchembe*, p. 38.

⁴³ Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia*, p.141.

⁴⁴ Beatwell Sekeleti Chisala, *The Downfall of President Kaunda*, p. 319.

⁴⁵ Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia*, p. 142.

Namibia, with the objective of overthrowing the Zambian government.⁴⁶ Godwin B. Mwangilwa notes that Chipango was alleged to have recruited about 100 men for training in South-West Africa under South African soldiers.⁴⁷

On 16 June 1976, therefore, William Chipango, who was a former Mayor of Livingstone together with Sefulo Kakoma, former Sesheke Member of Parliament (MP), Crispin Mwendabai, former Bank official and Albert Shishwashwa, who was unemployed, were tried and were found guilty of all 13 counts of treason and sentenced to death.⁴⁸ It was revealed in the Zambian High Court that between 1st December 1972 and January 1973, the quartet recruited 100 Zambians for military training in Namibia so that on their return, they would topple the Zambian government by means of force.⁴⁹

The other individuals who were considered to have been part of the Mushala rebel group included Vincent Munalula together with other six unnamed. Munalula was representing the other six men during the 1972 trial. The seven individuals were detained on grounds that between November 1972 and January 1973, they did undergo military training by the Portuguese in Angola and South African soldiers in Caprivi with the intention of coming back to overthrow the government.⁵⁰ They were further accused of working under the leadership of Adamson Mushala a wanted person who had been terrorising members of the public in North Western Province of Zambia. Therefore, it was convenient that they be put under control through detention.⁵¹ The seven accused men had appealed to the Supreme Court, on grounds that the charge of associating

⁴⁶ Chiponde Mushingeh, "The Evolution of One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1964-1972," p. 112.

⁴⁷ Godwin B. Mwangilwa, *Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula: A Biography of the Old Lion in Zambia*, p. 59.

⁴⁸ *Times of Zambia*, 17 June, 1976.

⁴⁹ *Times of Zambia*, 17 June, 1976.

⁵⁰ Supreme Court of Zambia (hereafter) SCZ ZR 154, Judgment No. 2, Vincent Munalula and 6 Others V Attorney General, 3 January, 1979.

⁵¹ SCZ ZR 154, Judgment No. 2, Vincent Munalula and 6 Others V Attorney General, 3 January, 1979.

with Mushala was vague because there were no details or instances of the said association given. As a result none of the appellants was able to make a meaningful representation to the detaining authority.⁵²

It should be noted here that during the Mushala rebellion, any association with Mushala including failure to report any encounter with Mushala to the security officials was regarded as a compromise to the peace and security of the country. It was believed even without evidence that there were higher chances of continued meeting with Mushala in the future which would jeopardise the security of the country. For instance:

On 30th December, 1976, an order was made by His Excellency the president of the republic of Zambia to detain...Yona Mutanda under the provisions of reg. 33 (1) of the preservation of public security Registrations.⁵³

The reason for detaining Mutanda was that on a date unknown but in October, 1976, in the forest in the Copperbelt area, he met Adamson Mushala but failed to report this encounter to the security forces. This act was considered to be prejudicial to public security and for its preservation.⁵⁴ It was further believed that there were high chances of a future meeting between Mutanda and Mushala thus, the detention of Mutanda.

Furthermore, in February 1977, Mungabangaba was detained on grounds that on the date and month unknown but in 1976, in Kasempa District of North Western Province, Mungabangaba together with Fanwell Munena was recruited by Adamson Mushala to become his agents. The accused were said to have actively taken part in assisting the Mushala insurgents by delivering letters of propaganda for the purpose of gaining support from members of the public.⁵⁵ It was

⁵² SCZ ZR 154, Judgment No. 2, Vincent Munalula and 6 Others V Attorney General, 3 January, 1979.

⁵³ HCZ HN 351, Judgment No. 20, Yona Mutanda V Attorney General, 20 September, 1980.

⁵⁴ HCZ HN 351, Judgment No. 20, Yona Mutanda V Attorney General, 20 September, 1980.

⁵⁵ HCZ HN 40, Judgment No. 10, Mungabangaba V Attorney General, 26 August, 1981.

further believed that Mungabangaba and Munena acted as Mushala informants about the reactions of villagers to Mushala's activities in the area. The above acts were considered prejudicial to public security and its perseverance. Therefore, it was found necessary to detain Mungabangaba and Munena on the presidential detention order signed on 9th February, 1977 and their appeal was refused.⁵⁶

Provision of Food Aid to the Victims

The Zambian government also responded to the rebellion by providing food aid to the people who were affected by Mushala's insurgency in North Western Province. Like the Lumpa Church victims who had been provided with bags of maize and meal to sustain them during the Lumpa crisis in the 1960s,⁵⁷ the Mushala victims whose houses and granaries were burnt were also given bags of maize every month until they recovered the following farming season.⁵⁸ This was done in order to save the people from starvation and ensure food security in the area. The government continued to provide relief until the affected people were able to recover and cultivate food in the next season.⁵⁹ In few instances, the government provided clothes to the affected families whose properties were burnt. For instance, following the burning of property by Mushala in Ntambu and Kashima area in 1976 and also in 1977 when he burnt people's property in Shinkula village, the government provided cloths for the affected people in the area.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ HCZ HN 40, Judgment No. 10, Mungabangaba V Attorney General, 26 August, 1981.

⁵⁷ Elijah Munga, "The Lumpa Church: It's Socio-Economic Impact in Lundazi District in Eastern Province of Zambia 1955-1995," M.A Dissertation, The University of Zambia, 2016, p. 98.

⁵⁸ Interview with Samora

⁵⁹ Interview with Morgan Sazoya, Senior Headman Kashima West, 06 October, 2017.

⁶⁰ Interview with Sazoya,

Why the Rebellion took long to be quelled: Myth and Reality

It is alleged that Mushala used magic which enabled him to avoid detection by the security officials when sought for, thus the long man hunt for Mushala.⁶¹ According to oral evidence, it was the use of magic that enabled him to survive that long and not being caught by the police.⁶² During the time of the rebellion, reports that Mushala was using black magic in his operations were spreading like wild fire. There were reports that Mushala could disappear at any time without a trace and that he could transform himself in all sorts of forms such as a bird, a tree or a stone, in simple terms he was a shape shifter.⁶³

Mushala was believed to have survived through a complexity of witchcraft and supernatural powers.⁶⁴ He incorporated war magic into war and different people interpreted his success as being dependent on black magic.⁶⁵ One did not have to invite Mushala as he was considered to be omnipresent, he would appear at any time, any place he so wished. There are stories that more than once Mushala flirted with Kaunda in State House in his invisible state. It is alleged that using magic, Mushala would go to State House in his invisible state and dine with President Kaunda without the knowledge of the President.⁶⁶ It was believed that Mushala had charms which worked as bullet proof during the exchange of fire with the security officials. The people in North Western Province believed that Mushala's powers enabled him to know if someone is

⁶¹ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

⁶² Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba

⁶³ Interview with Samora.

⁶⁴ Alan Cowell, "Robin Hood of Zambia: End of the Myth," <http://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/02/world/robin-hood-of-zambians-end-of-a-myth.html>, Accessed, 05 October, 2017.

⁶⁵ Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia*, (Farnham: Ashagate, 2011), p. 132.

⁶⁶ Alan Cowell, "Robin Hood of Zambia: End of the Myth," <http://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/02/world/robin-hood-of-zambians-end-of-a-myth.html>, Accessed, 05 October, 2017.

talking about him, and that his powers were so great that he was able to know if the police and security officers were following him.⁶⁷

However, in reality, people used local paradigms to make sense of the failure of the Kaunda regime to capture Mushala. Literature on African traditional religion point out that where science does not work; calamities and disasters are explained through traditional means and beliefs.⁶⁸ In the case of Mushala, the common assumption that Mushala flirted with Kaunda at State House was the consequence of the persistent beliefs in supernatural powers. The idea that Mushala flirted with Kaunda was one of the ways the people could comprehend the prolonged manhunt for Mushala in Zambia.⁶⁹

It took the government almost a decade to quell Mushala's rebellion. Unlike the use of magic, the long manhunt for Mushala can be attributed to a number of factors. To start with, even though:

The battalions were well equipped and well trained in counter insurgency operations...the unit lacked experience...the men were well drilled in such stereotyped procedures like crowd dispersal, mounting road blocks, cordon and search and patrols...tracking and fighting an elusive guerrilla like Mushala was to prove quite challenging.⁷⁰

The Zambian security officers lack of experience in such warfare contributed to the long manhunt for Mushala. The nature of Mushala's insurgency required that the government deployed a significant number of troops and established lines of strongholds to restrict the

⁶⁷ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

⁶⁸ John S. Mbiti, *An Introduction to African Religion* (2nd Edition), (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1992), p. 179; John S. Mbiti, *African Religions & Philosophy*, (Oxford: Heinemann, 2006), p. 36; Edward Anaegboka Udoe, *Resolving the Prevailing Conflicts Between Christianity and African (Igbo) traditional Religion through Enculturation*, (Wien : Lit, 2011), p. 100 and Maduabuchi F. Dukor, *Theistic Humanism: Philosophy of Scientific Africanism*, (Lagos: Noble Communications Network, 1994), p. 88.

⁶⁹ Interview with Allan Kananda, Catholic Catechist for Holy Trinity Parish, Mufumbwe, 21 October, 2017 and Interview with Mulondwe Muzungu, Hellen Kaunda, Lusaka, 08 June, 2018.

⁷⁰ Sibamba, *The Zambia Army and I: Autobiography of a Former Army Commander*, p. 150.

insurgents' movement. But as earlier noted, the Zambian authorities had initially underestimated the threat posed by the Mushala rebel group as they had considered the Mushala rebellion as nothing more than banditry. Therefore, tracking and fighting Mushala proved quite challenging.⁷¹

Furthermore, some of the officials who were given the responsibility of tracking Mushala in the province were sometimes irresponsible as they would report on duty drunk.⁷² Due to this misconduct, the Mushala man hunt was delayed as some of the officials were not able to work effectively under the influence of alcohol.⁷³ In addition, the fact that Mushala worked as a game warden in the very forest he had established his camp as earlier pointed out in chapter three, it was easy for him to hide and avoid capture by the security officials as he knew the terrain well. He knew the paths of entry and escape; he further knew the good places to hide while in the forest.⁷⁴ Because Mushala knew the terrain very well and the people around, it was very easy for him to organise himself and source support from the local people.⁷⁵

In most cases, the security officials constantly harassed the villagers who seemed to possess information about Mushala. Whenever someone gave reports to the security officials about Mushala, they were treated as Mushala's accomplices. As earlier mentioned, such reports even led to detentions. Those that took such reports would be beaten and threatened with arrest if they did not show the security officials where Mushala was hiding, even if they did not know his whereabouts.⁷⁶ Due to such treatment by security officials, the villagers felt mistreated by both

⁷¹ Sibamba, *The Zambia Army and I: Autobiography of a Former Army Commander*, p. 150.

⁷² UNIP 16/6/30, Bautis F. Kapulu, to UNIP's Secretary General, Solwezi, 9 November, 1976.

⁷³ UNIP 16/6/30, Bengt Ageros, Report on Incident on Kabompo-Solwezi Road, 31 July, 1976 and UNIP 16/6/30, B.F. Kapula, to UNIP's Secretary General, Solwezi, 9 November, 1976.

⁷⁴ UNIP 16/6/30, Bautis F. Kapulu, to UNIP's Secretary General, Solwezi, 9 November, 1976.

⁷⁵ UNIP 16/6/30, Bautis F. Kapulu, to UNIP's Secretary General, Solwezi, 9 November, 1976.

⁷⁶ Interview with Enoch Manamute, Mufembwe, 18 October, 2017 and Interview with John Latemesha, Mufumbwe, 17 October, 2017.

Mushala and the soldiers.⁷⁷ Consequently, they began to withhold some important information about Mushala's whereabouts in fear of being harassed thereby leading to delay in tracking him down.⁷⁸

The local people were further intimidated by security officials in the course of tracking Mushala and his men. For instance, on 31 July 1976, one of the government vehicles belonging to the ministry of agriculture was flagged down by the soldiers near Kasempa turn-off.⁷⁹ The soldiers then asked all the people who were in that vehicle to come out and line up. The soldiers went on to ask where Mushala was while using abusive language and insults on them. In response, the leader of the agricultural workers replied that he did not know Mushala other than what was written in the newspapers about him.⁸⁰ The questioning went on for about 30 minutes, after which they were allowed to go and ordered to keep their mouths shut. During the whole questioning period, very foul, rude and unpleasant language was used. One of the soldiers was identified as Mr Nyirenda and he did not wear any sign indicating his rank.⁸¹

During the same incident, there were four farmers among the travellers. The soldiers went on to accuse the farmers of being Mushala's men who were using farming to conceal their terror activities. They further slapped and kicked the four farmers. The entire luggage that belonged to the four farmers was thrown out of the vehicle.⁸² The farmers were further insulted and humiliated by the soldiers. The farmers were later told that the only way they could be allowed

⁷⁷ Interview with Amos Lungunge, Mufumbwe, 19 October, 2017; Interview with Donald Shakwamba, Mufumbwe, 19 October, 2017 and Interview with Felix Kanyane Laimo, Mufumbwe, 20 October, 2017.

⁷⁸ Interview with Samora; Interview with Benwa Kifwanakenu Kantumoya, Former Ex-rebel, Mufumbwe, 18/10/2017 and Sibamba, *The Zambia Army and I: Autobiography of a former Army Commander*, 154

⁷⁹ UNIP 16/6/30, Bengt Ageros, Report on Incident on Kabompo-Solwezi Road, 31 July, 1976.

⁸⁰ UNIP 16/6/30, Bengt Ageros, Report on Incident on Kabompo-Solwezi Road, 31 July, 1976.

⁸¹ UNIP 16/6/30, Bengt Ageros, Report on Incident on Kabompo-Solwezi Road, 31 July, 1976.

⁸² UNIP 16/6/30, Bengt Ageros, Report on Incident on Kabompo-Solwezi Road, 31 July, 1976.

to continue with their journey was if they provided the soldiers with two kwacha each.⁸³ Such attitude and behaviour by security officials annoyed the local people and greatly contributed to the prolonged the manhunt for Mushala in the province.

The local people suffered at the hands of both Mushala and the soldiers. Villagers were in a dilemma of having been coerced by Mushala on one hand and the security officers on the other. It became extremely risky for any villager to courageously report Mushala's activities to security officers without being subjected to undue harassment.⁸⁴ For instance, during the shootout with the police which led to the death of constable Fimbo, villagers who had helped the wounded officers were accused of causing the death of constable Fimbo. This happened after the wounded officers found refuge in the village. The wounded officers had asked the villagers to help them take the body of the dead Fimbo to the police camp. When the villagers obliged, they were badly beaten by the security officials at the camp and were accused of causing the death of a police officer.⁸⁵ The harassment by the police made people afraid of alerting them of Mushala's whereabouts in the area for fear of being accused of collaborating with him and his men. Thus, humiliation, harassment and terror for the villagers did not just come from Mushala and his rebels but also the police. The harassment of the local people by the security personnel contributed to making the manhunt for Mushala longer. The rebellion took long to be quelled as people were afraid of giving vital information about Mushala in fear of being accused of working with him.

Furthermore, there were reports that Mushala had informants who constantly alerted him on almost all the moves that were being made by the security forces in trying to apprehend him and

⁸³ UNIP 16/6/30, Bengt Ageros, Report on Incident on Kabompo-Solwezi Road, 31 July, 1976.

⁸⁴ Wele Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion, p. 81.

⁸⁵ UNIP 16/6/30, B.F. Kapula Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

that to a large extent enabled him avoid detection by the security officials.⁸⁶ Through his informants within the police, Mushala knew very well the movements of the security forces including number plates of the trucks that would be following him.⁸⁷ Thus, disloyalty and treachery to the government of the time by some of the police officials led to the prolonged hunt for Mushala and his men.⁸⁸ Mushala was seen several times in the Copperbelt with senior police officers. One of the letters sent to the UNIP Secretary General by F. Kapwanga revealed that “on 19th December 1976, Mushala visited Rokana and Mindolo mine with senior police officers of Rokana...these were Chisaka, Kafyama, and Sitima.”⁸⁹ It was such kind of relations and meeting between Mushala and some senior police officers that enabled Mushala know the government’s intention about him.

In addition, by the end of December 1976, there were reports that Mushala was either hiding in the Copperbelt or was on his way to North Western Province after his meeting with the people who were disloyal to the government. In addition to the information he got from some police officers and other government officials, Mushala was further assisted, backed, hidden and provided with food by some local community members on the Copperbelt.⁹⁰ This also contributed to the prolonged man hunt for Mushala as some people were not ready to hand him over to the security officers.

⁸⁶ HCZ HN 351, Judgment No. 20, Yona Mutanda V Attorney General, 20 September, 1980.

⁸⁷ UNIP 16/6/30, Bautis F. Kapulu Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

⁸⁸ UNIP 16/6/30, Bautis F. Kapulu Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

⁸⁹ UNIPA, 16/6/30, Letter from F. Kapwanga to the secretary general UNIP, Freedom House, 8th February 1977.

⁹⁰ UNIP 16/6/30, F. N. Bulawayo, Copperbelt to Bautis F. Kapulu, Solwezi, 16th December, 1976.

The Killing of Mushala

Mushala was killed in 1982,⁹¹ by the security officials in the Lunga Game Park where he had established his camp, thereby, ending the longest manhunt in Zambia's history.⁹² It is argued that the death of Mushala was a result of betrayal by a woman known as Lesy Mukwemba who had once been his wife.⁹³ Mushala and his men frequently changed wives when they were tired of them.⁹⁴ It is believed that by the end of 1981, Mushala had found himself another wife by the name of Edesi Mumbelonga who was younger than Lesy. The attention which was given to Edesi was too much for Lesy to handle, thus, tensions became the order of the day between the two women.

Lesy was an insecure woman, who was not only upset by the fact that Mushala took another wife, but feared losing her place as the older wife of Mushala.⁹⁵ The coming in of Edesi as a new wife to Mushala posed a threat to all that Lesy enjoyed. Anger and jealousy overtook Lesy.⁹⁶ Soon, Edesi became pregnant and envy grew within Lesy and fights between the two women were uncontrollable. This prompted Mushala to divorce his older wife, Lesy. Instead of killing her, Mushala decided to spare Lesy's life but banished her from his camp after which she went back to her village in Kasempa district.⁹⁷

News of Lesy's return quickly spread to the security officials in Kasempa and arrangement to go and hunt for Mushala with the aid of Lesy were made. Thus, the Zambian soldiers accompanied by some game wardens, with the help of Lesy went into the Lunga Game Park in

⁹¹ *Times of Zambia*, 10 November, 2018.

⁹² *Times of Zambia*, 29 November, 1982.

⁹³ Interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

⁹⁴ Interview with Kantumoya.

⁹⁵ Interview with Matafwali.

⁹⁶ Interview with Matafwali.

⁹⁷ Interview with Siambwende.

search of Mushala.⁹⁸ As earlier mentioned, on 9 November 1982, Mushala had left the camp for honey collection and other rebel members had gone hunting leaving the camp with few men and women.⁹⁹ None of the rebel members at the camp knew that they were surrounded. As soon as Mushala returned to the camp, soldiers opened fire on him, a shot in the eye and in the chest, instantly killed him.¹⁰⁰

The general argument among scholars such as Robert M. Emerson, Rachel I. Fretz and Linda L. Shaw is that the soldiers who had gone to kill Mushala had to strip naked for them to be able to see Mushala with their physical eyes without which they would not have seen him as he was believed to have magic which made him invisible.¹⁰¹ This was also the belief among local people and still is today.¹⁰² However, this argument is refuted by Benwell Kwanuka, one of the game wardens who had accompanied the soldiers in and out of the forest. According to Kwanuka, the soldiers never stripped off their uniforms when killing Mushala. He notes that they were all fully dressed. At the time, Mushala was away in the field collecting honey. Unknown to Mushala that the soldiers were nearby, hiding and waiting to attack, he walked straight into their trap and the soldiers shot at him instantly killing him.¹⁰³ His body was then sent to Solwezi¹⁰⁴ as shown in Figure 5 in the picture on the next page. People gathered in large numbers to witness the news about the death of Mushala knowing that their suffering had come to an end.

⁹⁸ Interview with Benwell Kwanuka, Former Game Warden, Matushi West, 20 October, 2018.

⁹⁹ Interview with Saimbwende.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Kwanuka.

¹⁰¹ Robert M. Emerson, Rachel I. Fretz and Linda L. Shaw, *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago press, 2011), p 189.

¹⁰² Interview with Saimbwende; Interview with Chief Chizela and interview with Jeffrey Wisamba.

¹⁰³ Interview with Kwanuka.

¹⁰⁴ *Times of Zambia*, 10 November 2018.

Figure 5: The Dead Body of Mushala



Source: *Times of Zambia*, 29 November, 1982.

After the death of Mushala, the remnants of the Mushala group regrouped in Mwinilunga under the leadership of Mushala's second in command, Alexander Saimbwende. As earlier noted in chapter one, after Mushala was killed, the rebels continued their terrorist campaign, although with less intensity. Their activities continued till 1990 when they were pardoned by President

Kaunda.¹⁰⁵ After Mushala was killed, Saimbwende shown in Figure 6 on the next page took over as the new leader of the group. The decision to surrender was out of question as the rebels feared the consequences of surrendering. However, not all rebel members remained with Saimbwende. Out of fear, some members of the rebel group deserted him. By the early 1983, the group had only 9 members. In 1986, the group managed to recruit about ten members bringing the number of the rebels to nineteen. However, by the mid-1987, due to misunderstandings within the rebel group, some of the rebels deserted Saimbwende and he was left with only 5 men and a handful of ammunition. In 1990, news of the general amnesty reached Siambwende and it was necessary for him to surrender as the rebellion was destined to fail in the absence of the vision carrier Mushala. The rebels were finally pardoned by President Kaunda in September 1990.¹⁰⁶

Figure 6: Alexander Saimbwende.



Source: *Times of Zambia*, 11 November, 2018.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Saimbwende.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Saimbwende.

Conclusion

This chapter has established that there were several measures that the government of Zambia took in order to quell the rebellion and help the affected people in the province. One of the measures introduced was the provision of increased security in North Western Province of Zambia. Shortly after the rebellion started the chapter has shown that the government of Zambia imposed the state of emergency in the country. This was done in order for the government to have maximum power to deal with the security challenges brought about by the activities of Mushala and his men. The chapter has further demonstrated that just about the same time, the Zambian government mobilised troops in the province. A number of soldiers were sent to the province to apprehend Mushala and his men and also provide security for the local people. The government further offered a reward to anybody who would come forth with vital information which could lead to the whereabouts of Mushala and his rebel members. The government also provided food and clothes to those whose houses and granaries were burnt.

The chapter has dismissed the common argument that Mushala used magic which enabled him to avoid detection by the security officials when sought for. It has been argued that the people used local paradigms to make sense of the failure of the Kaunda regime, that where science does not work, the local people explained calamities and disaster through traditional means and beliefs. However, the chapter has argued that the Mushala rebellion can be understood through the social context in which the rebellion unfolded.

The chapter has further dismissed the argument that the soldiers who had gone to kill Mushala took off their clothes. Based on oral evidence, the chapter has argued that nobody stripped naked the time the soldiers killed Mushala. The study has shown that Mushala was

betrayed by his ex-wife and killed by the security officials in 1982. It has also been noted that after the death of Mushala, his second in command Alexander Saimbwende took although his activities did not match those of Mushala over until 1990 when the rebels were pardoned by President Kaunda.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The Mushala Rebellion started in the late 1975 but was only identified as the Mushala rebellion at the beginning of 1976. Mushala, a leader of 200 plus rebels led the rebellion against the UNIP government. Mushala managed to lead the only significant armed internal rebellion in the history of Zambia. He also succeeded in subjecting the people in some parts of North Western Province to terror and torment while trying to achieve his goals.

The study has shown that there were a number of factors that led to the rise of the Mushala Rebellion in North-Western Province. Among them was Mushala's dissatisfaction with Kaunda's one party system which limited political opposition by force or coercion. From the beginning of 1964, the study has demonstrated that Mushala was evidently in UNIP as Deputy Secretary at Freedom House from 1964 to 1966. Between 1966 and 1968, Mushala was UP's Deputy Secretary and from 1969 to 1972 he was ANC North Western Provincial President. The study further reveals that Mushala utilised his political positions in these parties to oppose the one party rule in Zambia before and during his rebellion. The main argument was that the one-party rule was dictatorship under the veil one party participatory democracy. It was noted that by adopting the one party rule, ultimate power would be vested in the hands of one man at the expense of all Zambians.

The study has further shown that Mushala accused the ruling party, UNIP, of practising nepotism and tribalism, the main reason he claimed to have caused him to leave the party. Mushala argued that tribalism and nepotism could not easily be eradicated unless Kaunda stepped down as president. He also wanted political power and his main goal was to form a new government.

It has also been deduced from the study that Mushala's insurgence was also fuelled by Kaunda's refusal to accord him the position of Director of Game and Fisheries. For Mushala, the request for this position was seen as a token of appreciation for his effort during Zambia's nationalist struggle. However, his desire never materialised. Thus, he was frustrated and consequently he organised an insurgency against the government. There was also the marginalisation of the people of North Western Province, a situation he attributed to government's failure to develop the province.

The study has demonstrated that although it was one of the largest, Mushala felt that North Western Province did not enjoy the fruits of development as other parts of the country. His arguments were that the government failed to deliver basic social services in the province such as school infrastructure, health service delivery and clean water also remained a huge challenge to local communities. Mushala saw the social and economic underdevelopment of the province as a deliberate neglect of the Zambian government under the leadership of President Kenneth Kaunda. In addition there were high unemployment levels in the province because there were not sufficient investments in the province which could have created jobs for the local people. Mushala blamed the UNIP government for all these challenges. Therefore, he saw himself not just as a spokesperson for the people of North Western Province but also a redeemer charged with the responsibility of restoring the benefits of the people in the Province.

The main focus of this study was to investigate the socio-economic impact of the Mushala rebellion in North Western Province of Zambia from 1976 to 1990. The study has concluded that the impact of the insurgency started being felt immediately the rebellion started. The study has shown that the rebellion led to the displacement of people thus creating logistical problems for the people in the affected communities. However, the study has demonstrated that the

displacement of people was in most cases temporary as people would often go back to their villages once they knew that Mushala was no longer operating in their area.

It has also been deduced from the study that the rebellion led to the break-up of families. This was through the kidnappings and abductions carried out by Mushala and his rebels. Consequently, social bonds of amity were broken as people lost children, husbands and wives. The study has argued that the kidnapped men were usually forced to join the rebel group as soldiers while girls and women were forced to become wives to the rebel members. As a result of forced marriages, physical abuse and prolonged separation from their families, some of the women that were later rescued found it difficult to integrate into the society they once belonged.

It has also been argued in the study that the Mushala rebellion affected the educational activities in the affected communities of North Western Province by causing absenteeism among school going children who were too scared to leave their homes and go to school in fear of meeting Mushala on their way to school. Learning activities were also disturbed from time to time because school buildings were sometimes used as refugee camps for the people running away from Mushala. In addition, the study has shown that there was an effect on the healthy services in some parts of the province as the rebel groups attacked these health facilities and making away with the medicine which they needed for treating their wounded soldiers.

The study has further demonstrated that the Mushala rebellion had devastating economic consequences. It has been argued that the Mushala rebellion led to the disruption of agricultural activities. Due to fear, people were so scared of going to their fields and cultivate crops. Consequently, crop production in the affected communities become low. The people were so terrified that they suspended their fishing excavations and working in their gardens for fear of

being kidnapped or killed by Mushala while working in their gardens. It has further been demonstrated that as a result of the insurgence, there was hunger and starvation in the affected communities of the province. From the beginning of the insurgence, the rebels were destroying people's granaries with fire. This had a grave impact on the economic life of the people as they were left without food for both consumption and sale. Due to the rebellion, local people in the affected communities could not go into the park to hunt game, set traps or collect honey. By the year 1979, there was a proclamation of localised famine in the affected communities of the province.

The study has shown that in response to the socio-economic impact of the rebellion in the affected communities of the province, the government of Zambia put up measures which they believed would help quell the rebellion. The first step which the government took was to evoke and extend state of emergency. It has been demonstrated that the state of emergency was first imposed on 27 July 1964 initially to deal with the Lumpa Crisis. In the wake of UDI on 11 November 1965, the regulations were extended to cover the whole country. Under UDI, the state of emergency was to allow the UNIP government deal with the security problems which were created. However, on 28 January 1976, President Kaunda evoked and extended the state of emergency in response to the grave security situation which was developing. It was also done so as to defend the nation and help subdue the rebellion which had started in north western part of the country. The study has also shown that about the same period when the state of emergency was declared, the government was also willing to give a reward to anybody that was willing to come forth with the information leading to the whereabouts of Mushala and his rebel members. This was done in an effort to help quell the rebellion in the province.

It has also been deduced from the study that in order for the government to maintain peace and order in the country, the government mobilised troops into North Western Province immediately the rebellion started. It has been argued that the government further engaged the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to work together with the paramilitary officers in the area in an effort of intercepting the rebels as well as giving the government an outlook of the crime situation in the province. Consequently, several arrests and a number of detentions were made. It has further been noted that the other way in which government responded to the rebellion was to give harsh punishment to all those that were involved in the rebellion and this was done through long term jail time. A number of detentions were made and a lot of detained suspects were put in jail for a long period of time.

The study has also shown that the government provided food aid to the Mushala victims in the affected communities of the province. It has been argued that those whose houses and granaries were burnt were given bags of maize until they recovered the following season from the season when their granaries were burnt. This was done in order to save the people from starvation. In a few incidences, the government would provide clothes to the affected families whose houses were burnt down.

The study has further demonstrated that there are allegations that Mushala used black magic which enabled him to avoid detection whenever he was sought for, that he was a shape shifter and omnipresent at the same time. It is alleged that using magic Mushala would go to State House in his invisible state and dine with President Kaunda without President Kaunda knowing. Because of such strong beliefs, different people interpreted Mushala's success as being dependant on black magic.

However, the study has dismissed these arguments and noted that the people used local paradigms to make sense of the failure of the Kaunda regime, that where science could not work, the local people explained calamities and disaster through traditional means and beliefs. The study has argued that the Mushala rebellion can be understood through the social context in which the rebellion unfolded.

The study has revealed that there were a number of factors which allowed the Mushala rebellion to survive for almost a decade. To start with, the battalions employed to intercept the rebellion at the time lacked experience, some of the officials would report on duty drunk and that affected their performance while on duty. Also Mushala knew the terrain and the people very well and this allowed him to organise himself properly. In most cases, the security officials harassed the villagers whom they suspected to have information about Mushala, accusing them of working with Mushala. As a result people began to withhold important information about Mushala for fear of being accused of being Mushala's accomplices. The study has also shown that there were reports that Mushala had informants within the police who informed him of the government intentions on him.

The study has further shown that Mushala was killed in 1982 by the security officials in Lunga Game Park where he had established his camp. After his death his remnants regrouped in Mwinilunga under the leadership of Alexander Saimbwende Mushala's second in command. The study noted that the rebels continued to terrorise the people of North Western Province although the terrorist activities were not as extensive and intensive as they had been during the time when Mushala was still alive. It has also been argued that the insurgents finally surrendered in 1990 following the general amnesty from President Kaunda.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

i. Archival

- **United National Independency Party (UNIP)**

UNIP 8/1/107, Highlights on the Right Honourable Prime Minister Tour to the North Western Province from 9 to 19 July, 1977.

UNIP 5/3/ 30, Kamwandi L, to Resident Minister, Mwinilunga, 28 December, 1966.

UNIP 16/6/30, Kapulu B.F, to UNIP's Secretary General, Solwezi, 16 August, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Kapulu B.F, to UNIP's Secretary General, Solwezi, 9 November, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Kapulu B.F, Reports to all District Governors and all Regional Secretary, Solwezi, 27 August, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Lungu S.N, Letter to the President, "State of Emergency," 8 March, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Kapulu B.F, Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Kalepa M.D, Kabompo District Governors, Report to N.C.C North Western Province on Mushala's Terrorist Movement, 1 June 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Kapulu B.F, Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, security report 11 June, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Kapulu, B.F, Report to All District Governors and All Regional Secretary, Solwezi, 27 August, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Kapulu B.F, Member of the Central Committee North Western Province, Security Report 11 June, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Bengt Ageros, Report on Incident on Kabompo-Solwezi Road, 31 July, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Kapulu B.F, to UNIP's Secretary General, Solwezi, 9 November, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Letter from Kapwanga F. to the Secretary General UNIP, Freedom House, 8 February, 1977.

UNIP 16/6/30, Bulawayo F. N, Copperbelt to Kapula B.F, Solwezi, 16 December, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Kapulu, B.F, to UNIP's Secretary General, Solwezi, 16 August, 1976.

UNIP 8/9/36, Honourable Member of the Central Committee, Monthly Reports to the Committee North Western Province, March 1980.

UNIP 8/9/46, Speech by Kapulu B. F, MCC, On the Occasion of the Seminar to Discuss the Decentralised Proposal for Integrated Local Government Administration held in Solwezi, 17 March, 1978.

UNIP 8/5/13, Press Release, 20 May, 1976.

UNIP 16/6/30, Mpundu, D.G, Crime Notes, 16 August 31 August, 1976.

UNIP 8/1/11, United National Independence Party Central Committee Annual Reports, 1972.

UNIP 8/1/12, Record of Meeting held in Mulungushi Hall from 3rd to 6th March, 1972.

UNIP 8/1/12, Syndicate Four: One Party Participatory Democracy, 1972.

UNIP 8/1/13, Reports: Historical Perspective on the One-Party Participatory Democracy, 1976.

UNIP 8/5/13, Reports of the North Western Province Tour by the Right Honourable Prime Minister from 9 to 19 July, 1977.

UNIP 16/3/15, Press Statement issued at the UNIP Headquarters and Signed by the Election Strategy Committee, 4 December, 1968.

- **United National Independency Party/African National Congress (UNIP/ANC)**

UNIP, ANC 9/21, The Choma Declaration 1972.

- **National Archives of Zambia (NAZ)**

NAZ HM 70/11, Press Cutting, 1974.

NAZ HM 74, J.M, Sokonin, MS “The Causes of the Cha Cha Cha” n. d.

NAZ MAG 2/17/116, Provincial Agricultural Annual Report, 1978/1979 season.

NAZ MAG 2/17/116, Quarterly Report, Husbandry Section for July to September 1979.

NAZ MAG 2/17/116, The Provincial Agricultural Office, Crop Production Report, 1980.

ii. Government Documents

Central Statics Office (CSO), “Monthly Digest of Statistics,” Vol.12, No. 1, 1976.

Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) Agricultural and Rural Sector Survey, volume 2. Annex 8. (Annexs 1-11).

Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) Invocation of the Full Powers of the State of Emergency by his Excellency the President Dr K. D. Kaunda, Lusaka: Government Printers, 1976.

Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, Department of Agriculture, North Western Province Provincial Agricultural Officer's Annual Report 1980-1981.

Zambia Hansard no.7d Daily Hansard Friday 29 July, 1966, Official verbatim Report of the Debates of the Third Session of the first National Assembly, Lusaka: Government Printers, 1966.

Zambia Hansard no.5f Daily Hansard 16 January, 1976, Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Third Session of the National Assembly, Lusaka: government Printers, 1976.

Zambia Hansard no. 6 Daily Hansard 17 March, 1976, Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debate of the Third Session of the Third National Assembly, Lusaka: government printers, 1976.

Zambia Hansard no. 5c Daily Hansard 21 January 1976, Official Verbatim Report of the Third Session of the Third National Assembly, Lusaka: Government Printers, 1976.

Zambia Hansard no. 5c Daily Hansard 16th January 1976, Official Verbatim Reports of the Parliamentary Debates of the Third National Assembly, Lusaka: Government Printers 1976.

iii. Court cases

- **High Court of Zambia (HCZ)**

HCZ HN 351, Judgment No. 20, Yona Mutanda V Attorney General, 20 September, 1980.

HCZ HN 40, Judgment No. 10, Mungabangaba V Attorney General, 26 August, 1981.

- **Supreme Court of Zambia (SCZ)**

SCZ ZR 154, Judgment No. 2, Vincent Munalula and 6 Others V Attorney General, 3 January, 1979.

iv. Oral Interview s

Interview with Chimbulo, Senior Headman, Kashima East, Mufumbwe, 06 November, 2017.

Interview with Chingumbe Felix, Manyinga, 6 November, 2017.

Interview with Felix Kanyane Laimo, Mufumbwe, and 20 October, 2017.

Interview with Kajimalwendo Wallace, Former Head-teacher at Kawama Primary School, Mufumbwe, 22 October 2017.

Interview with Kananda Allan, Catholic Catechist of Holy Trinity Parish, Mufumbwe, 21 October, 2017.

Interview with Kantumoya Kifwanakenu Benwa, Ex-Rebel, Mufumbwe, 18 October, 2017.

Interview with Kwanuka Benwell, Former Game Warden, Matsishi East, Mufumbwe, 20 October, 2018.

Interview with Laishi Handson Wayumbelo, Ex-Rebel, Mufumbwe, 18 October, 2017.

Interview with Latamesha John, Former Member of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), Mufumbwe, 17 November, 2017.

Interview with Liyato Jonathan, Solwezi, 19 October, 2017.

Interview with Lungunge Amos, Mufumbwe, 19 October, 2017.

Interview with Makonto Benwa, Kashima East, Mufumbwe, 13 October, 2017.

Interview with Mangisha Moses, Kikonge, Mufumbwe, 19 October, 2017.

Interview with Matafwali Zhane Nepetelo, Kisopeka village, Mufumbwe, 19 October, 2017.

Interview with Morgan Sazoza, Senior Headman, Kashima West, 26 November, 2017.

Interview with Musobela Kinausu Ephraim, Senior Headman, Matushi West, Mufumbwe, 20 October, 2017.

Interview with Saimbwende Alexander, Ex-Rebel, Mwinilunga, 6 November, 2017.

Interview with Samora Rabson, Former Member of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), Mufumbwe, 13 October, 2017.

Interview with Senior Chief Chizela, Mufumbwe, 23 October, 2017.

Interview with Shakwamba Donald, Mufumbwe, 19 October, 2017.

Interview with Suze Rachael, Kikonge village, Mufumbwe, 19 October, 2017.

Interview with Wisamba Mwilitula Gilbert, Former Member of Parliament for Solwezi, Freedom House, Lusaka, 13 October, 2017.

Interview with Wisamba Wanga Jeffrey, Former Member of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) Mufumbwe, 17 October, 2017.

Interview with Zulu Grey, Former Minister of Defence, Lusaka, 16 February 2018.

Phone Interview with Milner Aaron, Former Minister of Home Affairs, 9 January, 2018.

B. Secondary Sources

i. Books

Afaoku George Osita and Ukaga Okechuku, *Sustainable Development in Africa: A Multifaceted Challenge*, Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005.

Amoaks Wiafe Francis, *Africa*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016.

Arnold Guy, *The A to Z of Civil Wars in Africa*, Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2009.

Bassey Oyom Celestine and Dokubo Quarker Charles, *Defence Policy of Nigeria: Capability and Context: A Reader*, Bloomington: Authorhouse, 2011.

Bell Terry and Ntsebeza Buhle Dumisa, *Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth*, London: Verso, 2003.

Bertelsen E. Bjorn, *Violent Becomings: State Formation, Sociality and Power in Mozambique*, New York: Berghahn, 2016.

Boxter Peter, *Biafra: the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970*, Solihull: Helion & Company Limited, 2014.

Brzoska Michael and Lopez A. George, *Putting Teeth in the Tiger: Improving the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes*, Bingley: Emerald Group Pub, 2009.

Buseh G. Aaron, *Empowering Resilience: Improving Health Care Delivery in War-Impacted African Countries: A Case Study of Liberia*, Lanham: University Press of America, 2008.

Chisala S. Beatwell, *The Down Fall of President Kaunda*, Lusaka: Co-op Print, 1994.

Chukwu Den Nkem, *Tribal Echoes: Restoring Hope*, Bloomington: iUniverse, Inc, 2012.

Collier Paul, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, Washington DC: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Connable Ben and Libicki C.Martin, *How Insurgencies End*, Santa Monica: RAND, 2010.

Cowell Alan, *Killing the Wizards: Wars of Power and Freedom from Zaire to South Africa*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

Draisma Tom and Kruzinga Ella, *Inside Zambia 1964-2004*, Hague: Cordaid, 2004.

Dreyer Donald, *Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics of Decolonization 1946-1990*, New York: Kegan Paul International ltd, 1994.

Dukor F. Maduabuchi, *Theistic Humanism: Philosophy of Scientific Africanism*, Lagos: Noble Communications Network, 1994.

Ebbe Ignatius Obi N, *Broken Back Axle: Unspeakable Events in Biafra*, New York: Xlibris Corporation, 2010.

EmersonM. Robert, Fretz I Rachel and Shaw L Linda L, *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes*, Chicago: The University of Chicago press, 2011.

Esomba Nangoh Stephen, *Zambia Under Kaunda's Presidency: The Conditions, Experiment with Socialism, and the Final Lap to Democracy*, Hamburg: Lit, 1996.

Falola Toyin, *Contemporary Africa*, Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2000.

Gantzel Jargen B Klaus, *Warfare Since the Second World War*, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2000.

Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Civil Wars in Rwanda and Burundi: Conflicts Resolution in Africa*, Pretoria: New Africa Press, 2013.

Hamlon Joseph, *Mozambique: Who calls the shorts*, London: Currey, 1992.

Hanlon Joseph, *Beggar your Neighbour: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, London: Indiana University Press, 1986.

Hindmarsh P. S. *Report on a Six Year Secondment to the Food Conservation and Storage Unit, Zambia, 1970-1976*, London: Tropical Products Institute, 1978.

Hodges Tony, *Angola: from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism*, Oxford: James Currey, 2001.

Holland Tracy and Martin J. Paul, *Human Rights Education and Peace building*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014.

Honwana Manuel Alcinda and Muse Project, *Child Soldiers in Africa*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.

Kangumu Bennett, *Contesting Caprivi: A History of Colonial Isolation and Regional Nationalism in Namibia*, Windhoek: John Meinert Printing Ltd, 2011.

Kew John and Stredwick John, *Business Environment: Managing in a Strategic Context*, London: Chartered institute of Personnel and Development, 2005.

King C. David, *Mozambique*, New York: Marshall Cavendish Benchmark, 2007.

Larmer Miles, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2011.

Mbiti S. John, *African Religions & Philosophy*, Oxford: Heinemann, 2006.

Mbiti S. John, *An Introduction to African Religion* (2nd Edition), Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1992.

McKittrick David and McVea David, *Making Sense of the Troubles: The story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland*, Chicago: New Amsterdam books, 2002.

Michael E Brown, *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.

Mwakikangile Godfrey, *Zambia: Life in an African Country*, Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press, 2010.

Mwanakatwe M John, *End of the Kaunda Era*, Lusaka: Multimedia Publication, 1994.

Mwangilwa B. Goodwin, *Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula: A Biography of the Old Lion*, Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1983.

Ollaw E Patrick, *Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The political Economy of National Development*, Devon: A.H. Stockell Ltd, 1979.

Pritchett Anthony James, *Friends for Life Friends for Death: Cohorts and Consciousness among the Lunda-Ndembu*, Chaelottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007.

Saxena Chandra Suresha, *Africa: Economic and Strategic Issues*, Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 2001.

Sibamba Gershom Francis, *The Zambia Army and I: Autobiography of a former Army Commander*, Ndola: Mission Press, 2010.

Singh Katar, *Rural Development: Principles, Policies, and Management*, California: Sage Publications, 2009.

Smith Susanna, *Front Line Africa: The Right to a Future*, Oxford: Oxfam, 1990.

Synge Richard, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-1994*, Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997.

Takacs Sarolta, *The Modern World: Civilization of Africa, Europe, Americas and Asia*, London: Routledges, 2008.

Tembo S. Mwizenge, *Satisfying Zambian Hunger for Culture: Social Change in the Global World*, Virginia: Xliris corporations, 2012.

Tordoff William, *Politics in Zambia*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974.

Udoye Anaegboka Edward, *Resolving the Prevailing Conflicts between Christianity and African (Igbo) Traditional Religion through Enculturation*, Wien: Lit, 2011.

Weinstein M. Jeremy, *Inside Rebellions: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Wele Patrick, *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion*, Lusaka: Multimedia Publication, 1987.

Wele Patrick, *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe*, Solwezi: PMW, 1995.

ii. Chapters in Books

Binsbergen Van W.M.J, "From Tribe to Ethnicity in Western Zambia: The Unity of Study as an Ideological Problem," in Binsbergen Van Wim and Geschiere Peter (ed), *Old Modes of Production and Capitalist Encroachment: Anthropological exploration in Africa*, (London: routledge, 2011), pp. 181-205.

Binsbergen Van W.M.J, "Religious Innovations and Political Conflicts in Zambia: A Contribution to the Interpretation of the Lumpa Uprising.," in Binsbergen Van W.M.J and Buitenhuis R. (ed), *African Perspectives: Religious Innovations in Modern African Society*, (Leiden: African studies centre, 1976) pp. 101-135.

Chabatama M. C, "The Untold Story: The Experiences of Zambians in the one party state" in Chondoka Y.A and Phiri B.J, (ed), *Zambia: Forty Years after Independence, 1964-2004*, (Lusaka: Department of history, University of Zambia, 2007), pp. 41-51.

Chikulo C. Bornwell, "Elections in a One Party Participatory Democracy," in Turok Ben (ed), *Development in Zambia*, (London: ZED Press, 1985), pp. 201-213

Kaluba H. L, "Education in Zambia: The Problem of Access to Schooling and the Paradox of Private School Solution," in Pillai K. Vijayan, (ed), *Developing areas: A Book of Readings and Research*, (Oxford: Berg, 1995), pp. 267-273.

Laband John, "African Civilians in War Time," in Laband John (ed), *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Africa: From Slavery Days to the Rwandan Genocide*, (London: Greenwood Press, 2007), pp. 1-16.

Lamer Miles, "Enemies Within? Opposition to the Zambian One-Party State, 1972–1980," in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar & Giacomo Macola (ed), *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia*, (Brill, 2008), pp.98-126.

Liebling-Kalifani Helen, "Women Survivors in Uganda: Resilience and Suffering as Consequence of War," in Hannah Brandy and Gilian Lewando Hundt (ed), *Global Perspective in War, Gender and Health: The Sociology and Anthropology of Suffering*, (New York: Ashgate, 2010) pp. 69-91.

Ozerdem Alphaslan and Roberts Rebecca, "The impact of conflicts on agriculture and post conflict reconstruction challenges," in Ozerdem Alphaslan and Roberts Rebecca (ed), *Challenging post-conflict Environments: Sustainable Agriculture*, (New York: Ashgate, 2016), pp. 19-34.

Scharf P. Michael, "Forced Marriages as a Separate Crime against Humanity," In Jalloh Chornor Charles, (ed), *The Sierra Leone Special Court and its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.193-214.

Stedman J Stephen and Lyons Terrence, "Conflicts in Africa," in Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi (ed), *Democratic Reforms in Africa: The Quality of Progress*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004) pp.141-158.

Stedman J. Stephen and Lyons Terrence, “conflicts in Africa,” in Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi (ed), *Democratic Reforms in Africa: The Quality of Progress*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 141-158.

Tabone Carmel, “The Concept of Relative Poverty and its Measures,” in Dixon John and Macarov David, (ed), *Poverty: A Perspective Global Reality*, (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 166-133.

Takarafira Masarira, “Poverty, Conflicts and Vulnerability in Africa,” in Munyaradzi Mawere (ed), *Jostling Between Mere Talk & Blame Game: Beyond Africa's Poverty and Underdevelopment Game Talk*, (Oxford: oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 83-138.

Turshen Meredith, “The Political Economy of Rape: An analysis of systematic Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women During Armed Conflicts in Africa,” in (ed) Moser O.N Caroline and Clark C.Fiona, *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors: Gender, Armed Conflict, and Political Violence*, (London : Zed Books, 2001), pp. 55-68.

iii. Articles

Hugo Hinfelaar, “Women Revolt: The Lumpa Church of Lenshina Mulenga in the 1950s,” *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 21, No. 2, (1991), pp. 99-129.

Larmer Miles and Macola Giacomo, “The Origins, Context, and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambia One Party State,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3, (2007), pp. 471-496.

Mushingeh Chiponde, "The Evolution of One Party Rule in Zambia, 1964-1972," *Trans African Journal of History*, Vol. 22, (1993), pp. 100-121.

Mushingeh Chiponde, "The Evolution Of One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1964-1972," *Trans African Journal of History*, Vol. 22 (1993), pp. 100-121.

Mushingeh Chiponde, "Unrepresentative Democracy: One-Party Rule In Zambia, 1973-1990," *Trans African Journal of History*, Vol. 23 (1994), pp. 117-141.

Mushingeh Chiponde, "Unrepresentative Democracy: One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1973-1990," *Trans African Journal of History*, Vol. 23, (1994), pp117-141.

Oppen Von Achime, "Cinderella Province: Discourses of locality and Nation State in Zambian periphery, 1950-1990," *Sociologus*, Vol. 52, No. 1, (2002), pp.11-45.

Reviewed Work by Tembo S. Mwizenge, "Kaunda and Mushala Rebellion: The Untold Story by Wele Patrick," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1989), pp. 712-713.

iv. Periodicals

Africa Confidential, 9 July, 1976.

Africa News, 29 July, 1976.

Mail Magazine, 12 March, 1968.

v. Newspapers

• Times of Zambia

Times of Zambia, Friday 23, 1976.

Times of Zambia, 24 March, 1966.

Times of Zambia, 29 March, 1966.

Times of Zambia, 9 June, 1966.

Times of Zambia, 26 January, 1971.

Times of Zambia, 30 April, 1971.

Times of Zambia, 28 August, 1971.

Times of Zambia, 11 July, 1972.

Times of Zambia, 11 July, 1972.

Times of Zambia, 23 January, 1976.

Times of Zambia, 25 January, 1976.

Times of Zambia, 13 May, 1976.

Times of Zambia, 17 June, 1976.

Times of Zambia, 14 September, 1976.

Times of Zambia, 23 October, 1976.

Times of Zambia, 17 December, 1976.

Times of Zambia, 22 August, 1979.

Times of Zambia, 16 October, 1979.

Times of Zambia, 13 April, 1980.

Times of Zambia, 26 May, 1980.

Times of Zambia, 29 November, 1982.

Times of Zambia, 10 November 2018.

Times of Zambia, 11 November, 2018.

Times of Zambia, 12 November, 2018.

Times of Zambia, 13 November, 2018.

- **Zambia Daily Mail**

Zambia Daily Mail, 22 January, 1976.

Zambia Dairy Mail, 29 January, 1976.

Zambia Daily Mail, 30 January, 1976.

Zambia Daily Mail, 13 May, 1976.

Zambia Diary Mail, 15 May, 1976.

Zambia Daily Mail, 20 May, 1976.

Zambia Daily Mail, 1 June, 1976.

Zambia Daily Mail, 23 October, 1976.

Zambia Daily Mail, 17 December, 1976.

Zambia Daily Mail, 13 June, 1978.

Zambia Daily Mail, 22 August, 1979.

Zambia Daily Mail, 16 October, 1979.

Zambia Daily Mail, 11 April, 1981.

Zambia Daily Mail, 13 April, 1981.

- **The Post**

The Post, 23 October, 2004.

vi. Theses and Dissertations

Chongo Clarence, “The Impact of Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on Zambia’s Economic and Socio-political Development 1965-1979,” M.A Dissertation, The University of Zambia, 2009.

Jaeger Dirk, “Settlement Patterns and Rural Development: A Human Geographical Study of the Kaonde, Kasempa District, Zambia,” PHD Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1981.

Kamwengo Langson Chikosa, “Hunting and Conservation in Kasempa District of North-Western Province of Zambia, 1934-1994,” M.A Dissertation, The University of Zambia, 1999.

Kouadio K. Bertin, "From Stability to Insurgency: The Root and Proximate Causes of the September 2002 Civil War in Cote d'Ivoire" PhD Dissertation, Florida International University, 2009.

Moe T. Arthur, "The Causes and Dynamics of Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa," MA, U.S Army War College 2009.

Munga Elijah, "The Lumpa Church: It's Socio-Economic Impact in Lundazi District in Eastern Province of Zambia, 1955 – 1995," Dissertation, University of Zambia, 2016.

Phiri Bizeck Jube "The Capricorn African Society: A study of Liberal Politics in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia 1949-1972," PhD Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1991.

Shapwaya Moses, "Implication of a Non Unified Command System and the need for a Unified Command System in Zambia." M.A. Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2013.

vii. Internet sources

Alan Cowell, "Robin Hood of Zambia: End of the Myth,"
<http://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/02/world/robin-hood-of-zambians-end-of-a-myth.html>,
Accessed, 05 October, 2017.

Dorney John, "The Northern Ireland Conflict 1968-1998,"
<http://www.theirishhistory.com/2015/02/09/the-northern-Irelandconflict-1968-1998-an-overview/#>, Accessed 9 June, 2017.

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rebellion>, Accessed 09 September, 2017.

Kelvin Kachingwe, “Changufu: Death of Cha Cha Cha mastermind” <https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/changufu-death-of-cha-cha-cha-mastermind/>, Accessed 21 September, 2017.

