

**CORRUPTION IN URBAN LAND ADMINISTRATION IN  
LUSAKA CITY: DRIVERS AND FORMS**

By

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A Dissertation submitted to the University of Zambia in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Science in  
Spatial Planning

THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA  
LUSAKA

2019

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## **DECLARATION**

I, **Banda Lizzy**, hereby declare that this dissertation is my original work. It has never being submitted at this University or any other University for the award of any academic qualification. All published work or material from other sources incorporated in this dissertation have been acknowledged and adequate reference thereby given.

Signature: .....

Date.....

## **APPROVAL**

This dissertation of Lizzy Banda has been approved as fulfilling the requirements for the award of Master of Science in Spatial Planning by The University of Zambia.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this dissertation to my beloved parents Francis Banda and Annie Vumu Banda, Mr D.J Mbewe, Pastor Oscar Mumba, my late grandparents, late mum Norah, family and friends.

## **ABSTRACT**

Scarcity of land in Lusaka is resulting into increased land prices and various sectors of the society are increasingly questioning the extent of transparency and fairness in land administration. This study examines public perceptions of corruption in urban land administration in terms of proneness of land administration processes to corruption; drivers of corruption; forms of corruption; and options for addressing the vice. Data was collected using a questionnaire administered on 265 conveniently sampled Lusaka residents. Additional data was also collected using five focus group discussions and five in-depth key informant interviews. Data was analysed using thematic and content analysis. Key informants included lawyers, land officers, urban planners, officials from Zambia Land Alliance, Civic forum official and individuals. This study identified 16 stages or processes in land administration from making layout maps through full council meetings to title deed issuance. All the processes of land administration were prone to corruption but at different levels. The processes that were perceived to be highly prone to corruption were; application process for plot stands; interviews; plans committee meeting deliberation; full council meeting deliberations; release of names of successful applicants in national media and recommendation of successful applicants to the Commissioner of Lands. The least prone to the vice were making of layout plans; numbering of the land; surveying of the land and advertising land in national media. These results showed that drivers of corruption included greed, poor enforcement of laws (over-regulation), use of discretionary powers, ignorance, land shortage, poverty, desperation, nepotism, competition, complex procedures and processes, over-bureaucratization and lack of defined timelines. The perceived two major drivers of corruption were greediness (15 percent) and political patronage (10 percent). The least driver was desperation (6 percent). Results further showed that corruption in land administration takes various forms including bribery, abuse of discretion, favouritism, nepotism and political patronage. Political patronage and bribery emerged as the most common forms at 87.2 percent and 66.4 percent respectively. The least form was institutional (4.2 percent). Options for addressing the vice includes corruption awareness campaigns for both residents and technocrats involved in land administration; implementation of policy that help prevent corruption such as the one plot to three applicant ratio in application for land; promotion of computerised system for land data storage using GIS software and finally advocating for mind-set change for both technocrats involved in land administration and Lusaka residents. This study concludes that the public perceive land administration process in Lusaka City is laden with corruption of various forms, driven by multiple drivers that require an integrated approach in addressing the problem. Thus the study recommends mainstreaming of anti – corruption in all development processes and policies, strengthening of legal systems and increased application of technology (ICT) to enhance transparency and improve efficiency in the land administration system.

**KEY WORDS:** Land Administration, Corruption, Urban, Perceptions. Lusaka

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to honourably acknowledge my appreciation to everyone that contributed to the preparation of this dissertation. I am particularly indebted to the following individuals and institutions:

To my supervisor Dr. Progress H. Nyanga for his guidance, technical input, advice, time and dedication, which helped shape this work. Words fail me because you have proven that there are indeed people in this world who care about others and put in their best to ensure you attain success in life. Thank you for challenging me to aim for the best input at all times. I am forever grateful and only Jehovah God will reward you. The co-supervisor Dr Gilbert Siame, thank you for your input.

My work place Mafinga Town Council, I sincerely want to thank the Council Secretaries Mrs J.M Shiliya, Mr B.R Khondowe and Mr P.R Nguluwe who accorded me the opportunity by approving my study leave. Am forever grateful for the support you all gave me. The Provincial Planner (Muchinga Province) Mrs L.M. Nsokolo who ensured I applied for this program which has changed my career life. God bless you Madam PPO. The Ministry of Local Government, for financial support rendered for my study I don't take it lightly the opportunity to study for this master's degree has been a life changing journey for my career.

Mr Ebenezer A. Odoi Jnr and Mr Reuben Lifuka thank you so much for your time and invaluable data you provided. Thank you to all institutions and respondents.

My heart felt appreciation goes to my beloved parents Francis Banda and Annie Vumu Banda 'Francianne' as we fondly call them. I thank Jehovah God for giving you as my dear parents. You will always be the best part of my life. I am who I am today because you sacrificed so much for me to be who I am today. Your true love, support and encouragements kept me and gave me so much hope to do more in life.

My family members Ades, Brown, Carlyn, Ellen, Jacob, Joseph, Luke, Maybin, Widon, mum Gertrude, mum Leah and my uncles Wilfred and Luckson and Dad Stanley thank you so much for the support and all my other family members who have always been a part of my academic life. Chibwe, Esther and Ipalo thank you!

The Spatial Planning Class of 2015-2017. I wish to extend my appreciation to all my course mates, each one of them was a source of encouragement. Thank you so much for making my postgraduate journey awesome and very memorable.

Indeed many people help contribute to who and what we end up becoming in life. Special thanks go to friends Abigail Hamiwe, Azad Patel, Chilufya M. Kapyra, Excella M. Simumba, Jane M. Mwale, Linda N Ohale, Rhaemie Salima, Ruth Kaela, Sharon George, Sulani Nyimbili, Vrunda Patel and Wiza Mutungwa.

My greatest appreciation and gratitude goes to the Almighty God for your grace and strength that has seen me through my studies. Jehovah God you are simply awesome!

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## ACRONYMS

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission
DFID	Department for International Development
EABI	East Africa Bribery Index
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FEACC	Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission of Ethiopia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-Operation
NRC	National Registration Card
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPHPZ	Poor People's Housing and Poverty in Zambia
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
TI	Transparency International
TIZ	Transparency International Zambia
UNODC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UN-Habitat	United Nations Habitat
US	United States
ZICTA	Zambia Information and Communications Technology Authority
ZILMIS	Zambia Integrated Land Management and Information Systems

# CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background

Land is a finite resource and competition for it is intensifying because of rapid urbanization, growing populations, economic development, persistent food insecurity, increasing insecurity in water and energy; and the adverse effects of conflicts and disasters (UN-Habitat 2010). Land is an asset vital for economic (Ding, 2011), social (UNECE, 2005) and environmental development (Williamson, 1993). Thus land as a resource and its administration are critical for sustainable development (Williamson *et al.*, 2010). Land administration is a very broad concept (FAO, 2007) that involves three core dimensions i.e. ownership, value and land use (UNECE, 1996). The benefits of good land administration include among others, guaranteed ownership and security of tenure; developed and monitored land markets; reduced land disputes; protection of state lands; improved urban planning and infrastructure development (UNECE, 2005; Del Saz Salazar and Menendez, 2007; Ding, 2007). Given that by the middle of this century 70 per cent of the world's people will live in urban areas, cities need to adapt to urban expansion (Angel *et al.*, 2011) and there is an urgent need to prepare for urban growth and its related land requirements. This calls for a realistic projection of urban land needs and innovative responses in urban planning.

On the global platform, the land question is critical to the achievement of a wide range of development outcomes, including the proposed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable by 2030 is SDG 11 and to achieve this, the land administration system must be revised to make it effective and easier to attain the goal. Land is also implied in several other proposed goals that relate to the sustainable use of natural resources and several depend on the use of additional land resources. The second SDG on food security, Goal 7 on energy supply, Goal 12 on production and consumption, and Goal 15 on the sustainable use of ecosystems all relate to land. Land is thus critical for all development and as such corruption can compromise development if not checked.

Corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain and the abuse of public power for private benefit. A well-known definition of corruption is the one by the

World Bank (2012) which considers it as the abuse of public office for personal gain. Transparency International (TI) (2012) also defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. The operational definition of corruption as it relates to this study is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain as defined by Transparency International. Corruption in urban land administration can limit the achievement of the above benefits of good land administration (Zakout *et al.*, 2006). Corruption, the abuse of power for personal gain, can result in land conflicts, social exclusion and erosion of ethics amongst others (Zakout *et al.*, 2006). Corruption is one of the main obstacles to sustainable environmental, political, economic and social development; it impedes urban growth, reduces government efficiency, increases inequality and perpetuates poverty (OECD 2014).

Estimates show that the cost of corruption equals more than 5 percent of global GDP (US\$ 2.6 trillion) with over US\$ 1 trillion paid in bribes each year (OECD 2014). The Transparency International's Global Corruption Report of 2009, shows that companies make annual payments of up to 40 billion US dollars to politicians and government officials in developing and transition countries alone (TI, 2009). Land administration is one specific area where the impact of corruption is a strong constraint on growth and development. Around the world, one in five people report that they have paid a bribe for land services recently (TI 2013). Particularly in African countries, land corruption is a huge problem and has a significantly negative impact on the whole population and most prominently on vulnerable groups such as elderly, women, religious and ethnic minorities (Chawla, 2016).

Corruption is collective rather than simply individual, going beyond private gain to encompass broader interests and benefits within political systems. Corruption is a symptom of wider governance dynamics and is likely to thrive in conditions where accountability is weak and people have too much discretion (Menocal *et al.*, 2015). It is this collective and systemic character of corruption that makes it so entrenched and difficult to address.

In most cities in developing countries, land administration is vulnerable to corruption (Farzana, 2013). Zambia has not been spared from the vice of corruption in land administration ([www.Lusakatimes.com](http://www.Lusakatimes.com) 2011). It is against this backdrop that this

study assessed the perceptions of the public on corruption in land administration (in terms of ownership) in Lusaka city.

### **1.2 Statement of the problem**

This study is centred on the problem of corruption in urban land administration. There has been an increase in media reports concerning corruption in urban land administration in Zambia (Times of Zambia Newspaper, 2015). Lusaka City Council was in 2014 suspended by the Minister of Local Government due to corruption allegations related to land administration ([www.Lusakatimes.com](http://www.Lusakatimes.com) 2011). Similar incidences were recorded in Livingstone, Kitwe and Ndola (Times of Zambia Newspaper, 2015). Corruption in its various forms in land administration can result into loss of confidence by the public in the formal systems; increased inefficiency; perpetuate marginalization of the poor; and lead to poor urban planning (Zakout *et al.*, 2006). Thus the problem of corruption in land administration can compromise social, economic and environmental development. Previous studies on corruption in urban land administration focused on Tenure, Gender and Corruption from customary land perspective. Thus, this study aims at clearly showing the common forms, major drivers and land administration stages prone to corruption in Lusaka City

### **1.3 Aim of the study**

To examine the public perceptions of corruption in urban land administration in the City of Lusaka

### **1.4 Objectives of the study**

- i. To identify stages of urban land administration prone to corruption.
- ii. To identify the common forms of corruption in urban land administration in Lusaka.
- iii. To determine the major drivers of corruption in urban land administration in Lusaka.

### **1.5 Research questions**

- i. How are the stages of urban land administration prone to corruption?
- ii. What are the common forms of corruption in urban land administration?
- iii. What are the major drivers of corruption in urban land administration?

### **1.6 Significance of the study**

This study will highlight the common forms of corruption, their causes and possible ways of reducing corruption in the urban land administration in Lusaka city region. The findings will be of use to Ministry of Lands and Ministry of Local Government in addressing corruption in land administration. The study will also provide vital information to organizations such as the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), Transparency International Zambia (TIZ), Zambia Land Alliance, and People's Process on Housing and Poverty in Zambia (PPHPZ) for their use in the effort of improving transparency and fighting of corruption in land administration. This study is important because recent research by Isbell (2017) shows that 60 percent of Zambians do not report corruption for various reasons. Thus without scientific research being done, we cannot know important facts concerning corruption in urban land administration which could be used to help to improve policy that can ensure we build inclusive cities for all. The study will also contribute to academic literature on land administration and corruption causes, forms and possible remedies to curb the vice.

### **1.7 Organisation of dissertation**

The dissertation consists six major chapters. The first chapter outlines the introduction part, which comprised background of the study, problem statement, research objectives, significance and definition of key terms. Chapter two reviews the relevant literature under the headings theoretical literature and empirical and best practices and gives a theoretical framework of this study. The third chapter deals with the description of the study area in terms of location and size, administration, infrastructure, population and economic activities. Research methodology which is chapter four has the methodological approach, research design, selection of respondents, data collection methods, sample size, sampling method, data presentation and analysis, limitations as well as profile of respondents. Chapter five, deals with the results and discussion. The final chapter six, deals with the conclusion and recommendation.



## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This section reviews literature within the following thematic areas i.e. types, forms and drivers of corruption in urban land administration; concept corruption and land administration, implications of corruption and best practices against corruption in land administration.

### **2.2 Types of corruption**

Corruption is the abuse of power for private gain (Transparency International 2015) and comes in different types. The magnitude and impact of corruption varies depending on its type. There are various types of corruption (Vargas-Hernández, 2013) but this research focuses on two types namely petty and grand corruption.

#### **2.2.1 Petty corruption**

Petty corruption involves individual public officials, who abuse their offices by demanding bribes and kickbacks, diverting public funds or doling out favours in return for personal gratification as observed by Shah (2007). Mutondoro *et al.*, (2012) explain further that petty corruption takes the form of small bribes that need to be paid to register property, change or forge titles, acquire land information, process cadastral surveys and generate favourable land use plans. Bribery such as this can also extend to favours and be facilitated by close personal connections between elites, politicians and investors. Such vested interests mean that officials can personally benefit from corruption in the land administration system by taking advantage of favouritism, impunity and nepotism to enhance themselves and their families (MacInnes 2012).

#### **2.2.2 Grand corruption**

Grand corruption refers to the theft or misuse of vast amounts of resources by state officials, including politicians and government bureaucrats (Shah 2007). Amundsen (1999) defines grand corruption as the manipulation of political institutions in order to facilitate resource allocation that sustains the power and wealth of political decision makers. MacInnes (2012) says that in grand corruption senior government officials and politicians might be able to acquire lease rights to large areas for companies that are owned by the same politicians or their families.

Brankov and Tanjević (2013) argue that grand corruption in the land sector is usually extremely hard to document as it usually involves the interface between the holders of political and economic power. The two authors further state that grand corruption opens the way for the widespread abuse of public functions on the one hand and the smooth, fast and enormously enriching individuals close to the government, on the other hand.

The next part of the review looks at the common forms of corruption in land administration.

### **2.3 Forms of corruption**

Some examples of forms of corruption are bribery, collusion, embezzlement of public funds and theft, fraud, extortion, abuse of discretion, favouritism, clientelism, nepotism, the sale of government property by public officials and patronage. One of the most common forms of corruption is bribery of land officials to facilitate access to information and services (Owen *et al.*, 2015; TI and FAO, 2011). Al-Jurf (1999) observes that bribery is the most widespread form of corruption driven by lucrative profits and the giving of some form of benefit to unduly influence some action or decision on the part of the recipient or beneficiary. Van der Molen (2007) state that abuse of office, nepotism, fraud and bribery are also forms of corruption that is prevalent in land administration. Palmer *et al.*, (2009) noted that in the land sector those in power may illegally transfer land to themselves or their allies. Land distribution policies and laws may be implemented in their favour (Palmer *et al.*, 2009). Political patronage, nepotism, and bribery are the common forms found in literature as seen in Palmer *et al.* (2009).

### **2.4 Drivers of corruption**

In terms of drivers of corruption, land plays a critical role as a means of patronage (Kakai, 2012; Onoma 2008; Boone 2012). Bureaucratic processes create incentives for people to pay for faster service or to simply circumvent the established procedures entirely (Deininger *et al.*, 2010). Thus bureaucracy and inefficient processes have also motivated abuse. Over-centralisation can cause delays and inefficiencies. Overly centralised agencies can also suffer from poor training, resourcing and support, thereby making them less effective and allowing greater opportunity for corruption to take root (Dixon-Gough and Bloch, 2006). Zakout *et al.*, (2007) show that slow and bureaucratic procedure and the high cost of land

administration services give rise to corruption. According to Tanzi (1998), the officials in many developing countries use their formal mandates such as authorization or inspection of numerous public activities to fuel corruption. These officials may abuse their bestowed power by refusing services to the citizens until bribes are offered (Tanzi, 1998).

The level of public sector wages has also been identified as a driver of corruption. (Tanzi, 1998) noted that the wages paid to civil servants are important in determining the degree of corruption. When government officials feel that they are underpaid, they may rationalize corrupt behaviour as a means to obtain what they consider to be their just compensation. Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) show a statistically significant inverse relationship between wage levels and corruption and argue that an increase in wage level would reduce corruption. For example, high-level administrators in Sweden earned 12-15 times the salary of an average industrial worker in the country; this yields to low levels of corruption in Sweden (Tanzi, 1998). Higher wages raise the opportunity cost of losing a job and help eliminate greed. In many developing countries, low salaries for public servants often result in corruption (Vo, 2015).

The increasing political and economic value of land has become one of the drivers of corruption and political patronage over the past decade (Legend, 2016). German *et al.* (2013) confirm that leaders have tended to make decisions based on their personal gain, rather than communal interests. In Uganda corruption is the outcome of self-aggrandizement, of unrealistically low remuneration for public servants and a closed political system (Ouma, 1991).

## **2.5 Land Administration and Corruption**

Koechlin *et al.*, 2016 observe that, while recognised in recent land literature, problems of corruption in urban land delivery and development have received little attention in the established literature on urbanisation, urban planning and land use management.

First-hand informed studies on good practice in land administration are available, but very little analysis is available on the nature, scale, drivers and effects of corrupt land administration practice (Enemark *et al.*, 2014; Williamson *et al.*, 2010). According to Owen *et al.*, (2015) land administration in Zambia shows a clear mismatch between *de facto* and *de jure* systems. *De facto* is the legal way of doing things whilst *De jure*

is how things are actually done and as such, illegitimate acquisitions and bribery are rife. German *et al.* (2013) confirm that leaders, both state and communal have tended to make decisions based on their personal gain, rather than communal interests. A lack of accountability at each stage of the process aggravates this mismatch.

Corruption in the planning field is largely tied to the opportunities that land-use planning generates by allocating development rights and land uses (following a discretionary and differentiated logic) (Chiodelli and Moroni, 2015). Studies from West Africa (Durand Lasserre *et al.*, 2015) show that corrupt practice is increasingly frequent in processes of urban land development, owing to scarcity of land, rising demand and land values and the range of different actors and authorities engaged in land development and delivery processes. In the land sector those in power may illegally transfer land to themselves or their allies (Palmer *et al.*, 2009). Or they may implement land distribution policies and laws in their favour (Palmer *et al.*, 2009).

Corruption in land administration is widespread especially among developing countries (Asfaw *et al.*, 2014; UNOD, 2011). Powerful groups can instrumentalise institutions intended to strengthen property rights and economic development, ultimately leading to disempowerment of ordinary people, the undermining of markets and heightened political tensions (Kimeu *et al.*, 2015; Manji, 2015; Onoma, 2011; Southall, 2005).

## **2.6 Implications of Corruption**

Land corruption can reduce the desire among elites to implement effective land governance reforms. If elites are able to abuse land ownership and administration to monopolise their position as land owners, governance reforms that may make this harder or impossible are less likely to be implemented (Wren-Lewis 2013).

Secure and equitable rights to land have been identified as being central to the success of the recently established Sustainable Development Goals. Effectively and transparently administered land rights empower people by enhancing food security, incentivising eco-friendly and sustainable protection and use of land and promoting inclusive societies (Action Aid International 2015).

According to TI (2016), corruption in land administration reduces access to land, harms the livelihoods of small-scale producers, agricultural labourers, indigenous communities and landless rural and urban poor. Women, young people and ethnic minorities are the groups who suffer most by having their access to land hindered by

corruption. Land corruption can also have a negative effect on the development and prosperity of national economies, and can cause food insecurity.

Given the scale and importance of land administration and the processes that it involves, excellent management and transparency are needed to ensure that abuse and corruption do not take over. However, land administration is technically complex, and this is part of the reason why so little progress has been made in land administration reform (Deininger *et al.*, 2011).

Koechlin *et al.*, 2016 show that corruption affects other government bodies involved in decision-making over land at central, municipal and local levels, not just land administration services per se. These include those responsible for spatial planning, surveying, revenue collection, the judiciary and allied sectors such as housing, agriculture, forests and mining, as well as land professionals, traders, investors, housing developers, banks, the legal profession and customary authorities (Durand Lasserre, 2015; Manji, 2012; Owen *et al.*, 2015).

Corruption in urban land administration takes on different forms in different countries and contexts ranging from petty and grand corruption (Koechlin *et al.*, 2016). Petty corruption in urban land administration is notably practiced by low ranking civil servants demanding bribes in small sums of money for basic administrative procedure (Transparency International, 2012; Nuhu, 2013). Grand land corruption is mainly practiced by politicians or higher ranking public officials and involves a large sum of money. In this kind of corruption, laws, regulation or policies are bent or changed to suit their demands or to create conducive environment for corruption. Regardless its form, corruption has a devastating impact on access to land which includes reduction of land investment, increased cost and exclusion of the poor people in the process of accessing land (Otusanya, 2011). On the whole, land corruptions degrade land governance system and threaten the hope of the people for a better quality of life and a more promising future (Wolforwitz, 2007). The problem of urban land administration, being exacerbated by incidence of corruption, is severally in urban areas. A number of reasons have been aired for the continued existing corruption in land issues (see for example, De Sardan, 1999; Catula, *et al.*, 2004; Ngware and Hoseah, 2010). It is understood that land is a fixed resource, while population growth is continuously and rapidly escalating especially in the urban

areas. In turn, demand for land for investment has been on the increase, leading to the commercialisation of land.

## **2.7 Best practices against corruption in land administration**

A review of literature shows that corruption is a common phenomenon in many sectors around the world, and that corruption exists throughout the world in both the developed and developing countries and as pointed by literature it has existed since time immemorial.

Cases of corruption around the world were captured in Europe, UNODC (2011) cites Bosnia and Herzegovina where corruption in urban land administration is prevalent. Crewett and Korf (2008) show evidence of corruption in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Kenya and many other countries in Africa as cited by World Bank (2012) and Transparency International (2011) reports. Anderson and Tran (2013) also cited cases in Asia with Vietnam being the example where corruption in urban land administration is prevalent. Land administration in Vietnam is said to be the second most corrupt sector (Vo, 2015).

There is however, hope in this fight against corruption in the land administration sector as seen from the many best practices that are being used in order to effectively help curb corruption. Below are some best practices that are effective in reducing corruption in land administration from around the world as captured from literature.

### **2.7.1 One day standard time for land registration in Thailand**

The Thai government established a one-day service standard to register property transactions. The office staff is instructed not to leave the office before completing the processing of all documents submitted by the customers on the given day. The number of staff of each office is determined by the average number of transactions, and therefore prevents work overflow. In addition, each land office is limited to 100,000 titles (Zakout, *et al.*, 2006).

### **2.7.2 Web based land information system in El Salvador**

In El Salvador, the National Registry Centre, created in 1995 by legislative decree, has become a modern decentralized institution which consolidates into one single agency, the function of property registration, cadastre and mapping; thereby

facilitating simultaneous access to juridical and cadastral information for each parcel and increasing security by avoiding overlaps (Zakout, *et al.*, 2006)

### **2.7.3 Front office function in Moscow**

In Moscow, the cadastre office, customer interface and better customer service have been recognized as a key element to improve the agency's image and to reduce corruption. The workflow has been recognized and state-of-the art technology installed. As a client comes in, clear information about registering property rights, such as procedures and forms needed, is displayed on computer panels. Customers get a ticket and wait for their turn. The entire workflow is monitored by the head of the office to ensure that customers do not wait longer than the specified time. Because access to the service is provided equal to all customers, incentives for informal payments are reduced significantly (Zakout, *et al.*, 2006).

### **2.7.4 Customer's surveys in Albania**

The government of Albania has embarked on a major program to improve the services of the immovable property registration office through streamlining of procedures, automation, improving quality of registered data and completing the first registration of all property in the country (Zakout, *et al.*, 2006).

### **2.7.5 Computerize Land Administration Systems in Sub Sahara Africa**

African countries led by Rwanda and Mauritius have also embarked on programs to computerize land administration systems that enhance land market transactions. Following completion of its national land certification program, Rwanda has computerized her land administration systems to improve efficiency in land transactions including land transfers and mortgages. Mauritius also did the same. As a result, in 2015 it took 32 days to transfer land in Rwanda and 14 days in Mauritius compared to 57 days for Sub-Saharan Africa and 22 days for OECD high income countries (World Bank 2015b). At least 25 more African countries have joined Rwanda and Mauritius to initiate computerization of their land administration institutions as of 2015 (Byamugisha, 2016).

## **2.8 Theoretical Framework**

### **2.8.1 Democratic Governance Theory (DGT)**

Nuhu, S. and Mpambije, C.J. (2017) state that the Democratic Governance Theory (DGT) expounds the importance governance in all issues of public services delivery and accessibility to resources such as land. The DGT has been championed by the World Bank which stresses the importance of minimal governance control by allowing other actors to have an equal play in the public service delivery. Democratic Governance Theory (DGT) is capable of bringing together different actors together for one common goal since DGT is concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action. As such, the theory calls for accountability, fairness, rules of law, participation, equity, equality etc. Since its inception, the theory has however bred two contending views among scholars. Some scholars, such as Pierre (2000); Meagher (2009); Alamgir *et al.*, (2006) and Kombe (2010) are in favour of the DGT arguing that it can simplify provision and delivery of public service, as well as accessibility to resources such as land. Other scholars including Tanzi (1998), Mbuh (2006) and Court et al., (2002) have strongly criticised the theory underscoring several weakness that in their view cannot lead to smooth provision of service and delivery of public services including accessibility of land when applied mostly in African context.

Scholars who argue in favour of DGT stress that the theory is capable of bringing together different actors together for one common goal since DGT is concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action (Stoker, 1998; Peter and Pierre, 1998; Milward and Provan, 2000). Pierre (2000) notes that important actors in the DGT include the state, political actors, institutions, interest groups, civil society, NGOs and transitional organisations. All these actors are dependent upon each other for achievement of collective action, and thus, must exchange resources and negotiate shared understanding of ultimate programme goal (Legaspi, 2005). Thus, when these actors combine their efforts together can lead into effective and efficient elimination of evils like corruption in public service delivery and accessibility to land in particular. According to Meagher (2009), DGT also improves the state capacity through the delivery of public services to the people. The theory, therefore, advocates for participation as a key to fighting corruption. Furthermore, Ngware and Hoseah (2010), argues that corruption is a governance problem, because it exists where there



is no economic freedom and prevalence of overregulation by governmental structures which creates motivation for corruption. Transparency International and UNFAO (2011) assert that where there is poor applicability of DGT, in urban land administration, the process is likely to be characterised by high levels of corruption. Kombe (2010) notes that inapplicability of DGT leads to the increase of land conflicts inter alia to dysfunctional of government institutions. Nuhu, S. and Mpambije, C.J. (2017) also states that failure of abiding to DGT also leads to nepotism in urban land administration and the unregulated urban development and increase of informal land administration.

Literature shows that effective and efficient systems to detect bribery and other forms of corruption within land administration processes are largely inexistent in most developing countries (Van der Molen and Tuladhar, 2007). There is overwhelming literature on corruption in land administration in a number of countries such as Ethiopia, Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, Vietnam, Italy, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Asfaw *et al.*, 2014; Vo 2015; Kakai and Sèdagban 2012; UNODC 2011; Ouma 1991). However, in the case of Zambia, most literature is on gender and land issues as well as studies that looked at corruption but with a bias towards donors and customary land (NORAD 2011, Menocal and Taxell 2015; FAO 2012; Brown 2005). This study thus sought to fill the knowledge gap by studying public perceptions of corruption in urban land administration in Lusaka City. This study aimed to establish the most common forms of corruption in urban land administration in Lusaka city, the most prone stages to corruption in land administration, and identify major drivers of corruption and used Democratic Governance Theory (DGT) as a theoretical lens.

## **CHAPTER THREE: DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This section presents the description of Lusaka City in terms of the location and size, administration, infrastructure, population and economic activities. Lusaka City Council was chosen because it is the oldest, well-structured and fully functional local authority in Zambia.

### **3.2 Location and Size**

The City of Lusaka covers an area of 375 square kilometres (UN-Habitat, 2007).

The study area boundary (Lusaka City) and surrounding districts is shown in Figure 3.1 (on page 16).

### **3.3 Administration**

All central government activities at national level are conducted in Lusaka and all ministerial headquarters are located in Lusaka City. All diplomatic missions are also in the city. The highest Learning Institution the University of Zambia, parliament, Supreme Court and key national institutions such as Zambia Information and Communications Technology Authority (ZICTA), many media houses are also in Lusaka City. The presence of the mentioned institutions makes land in Lusaka more valuable than any other place in Zambia. And as such open spaces of land in locations where there embassies for instance would fetch for a very high price and would be wanted by many influential government officials.

### **3.4 Infrastructure**

Lusaka is the most developed City in Zambia in terms of both institutional and physical infrastructure in the country. The City has a good number of modern infrastructures such as hotel facilities, event venues, sports/recreational centres. Hospitals, road networks, schools, universities and communication facilities, shopping malls and public markets are well developed in the City of Lusaka.

### **3.5 Population**

According to the 2010 Census of Population and Housing report Lusaka City has a total population of 1, 747, 152. The total male population is 860 424 giving 49.2 percent whilst the female population stands at 886 728 giving 50.8 percent. The population density is 4 853.2 persons per square kilometre (CSO, 2010). It is


important to note that Lusaka City was planned for 500 000 residents (ECZ, 2008). The population of Lusaka as of 2010 was at 71.38 percent larger than initially planned.

### **3.6. Economic activities**

Lusaka being the capital city of Zambia is the main hub of economic activities i.e. manufacturing, transport, construction sectors, shopping malls, education, health, urban agriculture and street vending. The City is centrally located and connects to neighbouring countries. For instance the major road Great East Road, connects to Malawi. The Great North Road connects to Congo D.R and Angola via Copperbelt and North-Western provinces respectively. The Great North Road also connects to Tanzania via Nakonde and its said to be the gate way to East Africa. In the south direction via Kafue road it connects to Zimbabwe, and Botswana. Most residents of Lusaka are in informal employment (traders, small scale entrepreneurs). Most farming areas such as Makeni, Lilayi and Lusaka West are now residential areas thus there are fewer farmers in the city.

### **3.7 Land Administration**

In terms of land administration at Lusaka City Council, data on how many title deeds have been issued out in the last 5years could not be gotten due to the sensitivity of the data and one required clearance from higher offices to access that data. The research however showed that most residents in unplanned but legalised areas had acquired occupancy licences. However, over 50 percent respondents said they were still in the process of getting the land documents citing long procedures as the reason for their delayment. Residents in planned areas have title deeds and those that buy subdivided land readily get their titles once full payment is made as observed from the research



**Figure 3.1: Map of Lusaka City**

Source: Adapted from Master Plan for Lusaka (Drawn by Z. Malanda 20

## **CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY**

This section outlines the methods which were used to collect and analyse the data. The methodological approach, target population, sample size, sampling techniques, data collection methods and data analysis methods as well as the study limitations are presented.

### **4.1 Methodological approach**

This study adopts a case study approach, using Lusaka City as the case (Yin, 1984). A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1981). The essence of a case study is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions; why they were taken; how there were implemented; and with what results (Schramm, 1971). Thus it was appropriate to use this approach in studying corruption an elusive phenomenon with the context of land administration. This research is largely a qualitative research. Qualitative research aims to explore and to discover issues about the problem at hand, because very little is known about the problem (Domegan and Fleming, 2007). According to Myers (2009), qualitative research is designed to help researchers understand people, and the social and cultural contexts within which they live. Such studies allow the complexities and differences of worlds-under-study to be explored and represented (Philip, 1998). In qualitative research, different knowledge claims, enquiry strategies, and data collection methods and analysis are employed (Creswell, 2003).

### **4.2 Data collection method**

The primary data was gathered through in-depth interviews, surveys while secondary data was collected through documentary review.

#### **4.2.1 In-depth interviews**

In-depth interviews were conducted with five key informants and the instrument used was the interview guide. Purposive sampling was used to select key informants. This method was used in order to enable selection of officers from the organisations that have knowledge which were relevant for this study. This is because purposive sampling allows one to hand-pick certain groups or individuals to include in the sample on the basis of their relevance to the problem under study (Tichapondwa, 2013). These were people who provided important information on land

administration. According to Patton (1990) the logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information rich cases for in-depth study. Key informants (planners, surveyors, civic leaders, lawyers and senior land officers) were drawn from Lusaka City Council, Zambia Land Alliance, Civic Forum, Lands Tribunal and Ministry of Lands. These organisations were chosen because of their involvement with land administration issues. The key informants were from both government and non-governmental organisations. The main advantage of using this method was that there was direct contact with respondents during data collection and this is good because it gives room for additional questions depending on the responses obtained. This led to specific constructive suggestions and detailed information being obtained. Few participants were needed to get richer and detailed data.

#### **4.2.2 Surveys**

The study employed a survey method and used questionnaires as the main instrument for data collection. Snowball sampling was achieved by asking survey participants to suggest someone else who might be willing or appropriate for the study. Snowball sampling was particularly useful in hard-to-track populations, especially that the issue of corruption is so sensitive. Convenience sampling was also utilised when spatial planning students were used in administering questionnaires around Lusaka City and University of Zambia spatial planning class of 2015. The spatial planning class has a good number of planners but respondents for the research were only those from Lusaka City Council. And during the Integrated Rural Development Strategy (IRDS), provincial consultation meeting held in Ndola the researcher took advantage of the presence of planners from Lusaka and interviewed them. Participants were those that were willing to talk about their work experiences in as far as corruption is concerned. Residents from planned (Makeni, Matero, Obama and Libala) and unplanned (Chipata compound, Mtendere East, Mandevu, Kabanana, Chazanga, and John Howard) residential areas of the city participated by answering the questionnaire. This was done by training research assistants and deploying them in the field to administer the questionnaires. The number of questionnaires administered was not uniform because it was convenience sampling and we used snowball sampling to identify respondents. Table 4.1 shows the number of questionnaires administered in each residential area.

**Table 4.1 Number of questionnaires administered in each residential area**

S/N	Residential Area	Total number of questionnaires administered
1	Makeni	33
2	Matero	18
3	Obama	10
4	Libala	23
5	Chipata compound	24
6	Mtendere East	30
7	Mandevu	45
8	Kabanana	30
9	Chazanga	22
10	John Howard	30
TOTAL		265

(Source; Field data 2017)

#### **4.2.3 Focus group discussion**


The five focus groups engaged for discussions looked at definition, causes, drivers and possible remedies of corruption in land administration. The focus group consisted of community leaders from Chipata compound, Mtendere East, Mandevu, Kabanana, Chazanga and John Howard. These people have first-hand information on land administration as they deal with land matters in their communities. The members were a homogenous team similar in age, education level, and profession. The focus groups had both men and women. Each focus group had either four or five members and total number of members was 23. The focus groups looked at the questions that defined corruption, forms, drivers and ways of curbing the vice (Appendix A).

#### **4.3 Sample Size**

In order to cover a wide array of information on corruption in land administration the study mainly focused on providers and beneficiaries of land services and goods. The sample consisted of 265 questionnaire respondents conveniently selected from selected planned and unplanned residential areas of the city (see Appendix B); five key officials from government and non- governmental organisations as well as five focus groups each group consisting of either four or five community leaders. Appendices C is an interview guide whilst appendix D is the summary of responses for key informants.

#### 4.4 Data presentation and analysis

Data was analysed using thematic and content analyses (Kothari, 2004). Content analysis was used to analyse texts of various types including writings, documents, and recordings and field observations. Qualitative data was analysed through thematic code frame, where issues emerging from data elicited by various themes related to objectives and research questions of the study were structured. Quantitative data was entered and analysed. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) is the software that was used to analyse this data. Results were presented using graphs and tables. A diagrammatic summary of the methodology is provided in Figure 4.1 below.



**Figure 4.1 : Summary of the research methodology**  
(Source: Author 2017)

The red bubbles represent the major action points for methodology whilst the yellow bubbles represent the processes done to achieve each major action point.



#### **4.5 Limitations of the study**

The research is limited primarily due to its sensitive nature. First the Data or information is very difficult to obtain. Apart from this, the African culture (hospitality) in a way makes one think receiving/giving gifts for quick response towards work is actually acceptable. Thus, one is left wondering as to what corruption really is. The researcher had to make it very clear from the onset that the study was not trying to pin point corrupt individuals but to simply identify the forms, drivers and the land administration processes most prone to corruption in order to find suitable remedies to curb the vice. Initially people refused to talk about this because they feared for their jobs until it was made clear that the objective was to find what was in the system that made it prone to corruption and not fault finding in people. The subject of corruption is not openly talked about and hence getting people to open up was really challenging but once they opened up, a lot of valuable information was obtained. According to Isbel (2017), 60 percent of Zambians will not report corruption for various reasons.

## CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents results and discussion of the findings. The presentation is done based on the objectives. Thus the process of land administration is first presented, followed by common forms and then the drivers of corruption in urban land administration.

### 5.2 Profile of respondents

This section provides a summary of the respondents involved in the study. Overall, the findings and discussion presented in this chapter were based on primary information collected from 265 respondents. The primary data obtained from key informants and focus groups did not get personal details of the respondents as it was not needed.

#### 5.2.1 Key characteristics of the sample

This section provides additional details on respondents with respect to marital status, age, sex, education, and monthly income.

##### 5.2.1.1 Age

Table 5.1 shows the age groups of all the respondents that took part in the survey.

**Table 5.1 Age groups of respondents.**

Age group	Frequency	%
16-25	70	26.4
26-35	99	37.4
36-45	59	22.3
46-55	21	7.9
56-65	12	4.5
66-75	3	1.1
76-85	1	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>265</b>	<b>100.0</b>


(Source: Field data 2017)

##### 5.2.1.3 Gender

Generally there are more women than men in Lusaka and this is reflected in the sample where 52.5 percent were women whilst 47.5 percent were men.

#### 5.2.1.4 Level of education

Figure 5.1 gives the information on the levels of education for respondents.



**Figure 5.1 Summary of respondents' education level**

(Source: Field data 2017)

#### 5.2.1.5 Monthly Income Level

The majority 52.5 percent earn a monthly income of less than K1000, 32.5 percent earn a monthly income of between K1000 and K4000 and only 6.4 percent earn above K4000 and the rest 8.7 percent does not have anything defined completely dependent on others for survival. Critically speaking all these respondents cannot afford to obtain land through bribes and so they lose out on land acquisition. From this sample the majority people earn less than K1000 meaning only a few elites are able to acquire land through bribes.

The above figures show that the income levels are low for most people (52.5 percent) as compared to land prices in Lusaka City. Literature shows that the average bribe paid for land services was found by East Africa Bribery Index (EABI) to be more than US\$100 in Kenya (Kivoi and Mbae, 2013). Citizens may pay bribes to land administration officials to register their purchases of land, or to shorten waiting times in receiving ownership documents. This thus means that majority Lusaka residents who are poor cannot afford to access land.

Before presentation and discussion of the above, the definition of corruption as perceived by respondents is given as shown in Table 5.2 below.

**Table 5.2 Definition of corruption by Focus Group Discussants**

	Focus Group 1	Focus Group2	Focus Group 3	Focus Group 4	Focus Group 5
Definition of corruption	the exchange of favours or rendering services to someone in return for a favour	Giving of a bribe to someone to obtain a favour in return.	Bribing of someone in power to do a favour. The third group further added that it can be in form of money or material things  the misuse of office for private gain	a form of dishonest or unethical conduct by a person entrusted with authority	dishonest or illegal way of obtaining a favour

(Source: Field data 2017)

The operational definition used for this study is adopted from Transparency International and is defined as the abuse of power for self-gain (TI, 2011). This is because all the above definitions relate to this definition in one way or the other.

### 5.3 Stages and process of land administration

In terms of land administration processes results show that there are 16 main stages of land administration process (Table 5.3).

**Table 5.3: Processes and stages of land administration**

SN	Stages	Processes	Proneness to Corruption
1	Layout plans made	Submission of layout plans to Surveyor General's office by Local Authority	<b>Least prone</b>
2	Numbering of land parcels	Numbering of stands including open spaces	
3	Surveying of land	Beacons are put on each land parcel	
4	Advertising	Land is advertised in national newspapers	

5	Application for plot stands	Application for land to the Town Clerk or Council Secretary	<b>Highly prone</b>
6	Interview period	Interviews and selection of candidates by the Plans Subcommittee of the Local Authority	
7	Plans committee meeting	Approval of selected names	
8	Full council meeting	Approved applicants are presented to the full council or Ordinary Council Meeting for adoption.	
9	Names of successful applicants are released in national media	After full Council meeting, the names of successful applicants are released.	
10	Selected applicants are recommended to the Commissioner of Lands	Recommendation to the Commissioner of Lands with minutes of Land Committee and the Ordinary Council meetings and Annexure A. (Land application form for stands).	
11	Commissioner of Lands accepts or reject names	The application is processed through hierarchical internal submissions to the Commissioner of Lands who approves or rejects the application.	<b>Highly/ moderately prone</b>
12	Offer letters are sent to all selected	Upon approval an 'invitation to treat' is issued to the applicant.	
13	Selected Applicants pay service charges	Upon payment of prescribed fees (invitation to treat), applicant is issued letter of offer.	<b>moderately prone</b>
14	Application for issuance of land title certificate	The offeree is required to submit survey diagrams/sketch plans to the Commissioner's office so that a lease can be prepared and eventually certificate of title issued.	
15	Publication of title deeds	Names printed in national newspaper	
16	Title deed collection	Collection of Title deeds by the land owner	

(Source: Adapted from Ministry of lands and Field data 2017)

These results suggest that the land administration process is ambiguous. One key informant explained that:

*“...this bureaucracy and tedious land acquisition processes means that people with the money can simply pay other people who know the system and are connected to land officers, planners, councillors as well as surveyors and in certain cases just even office clerks and committee clerks to have the processes shortened”*(Personal communication, 2017).

### **5.3.1 Vulnerability contexts of land administration to corruption**

Most key informants (60 percent) identified the stages most prone to corruption as stages from stage number five (application for plot stands) to number nine (release of successful applicants in national media); stages ten (selected applicant names are recommended to commissioner of lands) to sixteen (Title deed is released) are perceived to be moderately prone to corruption and the first four stages were said to be the least prone. These variations in the extent of corruption among these stages are due to vulnerabilities associated with respective processes at each stage (Table 5.4).

**Table 5.4: Stages of Land Administration Vulnerable to Corruption**

SN	STAGES	VULNERABILITIES TO CORRUPTION
1	Layout plans made	Top officials have details whilst the ordinary citizens are not aware at all and so at the stage plans of allocating land to themselves begins
2	Land is numbered	The officers here also have an interest and simply agree with the local authority to be given some parcels of land
3	Land is surveyed	This stage is critical and important for corruption reduction if vital information is provided i.e. the Geo-coordinates on the top left of the survey diagram. Instead only the Survey General file number is provided
4	Land is advertised in national media	This is done but most people have no access to newspapers because the illiteracy level is high and also most people cannot afford to buy newspapers
5	Application for plot stands	The interest here is to simply raise money from the sale of plots through the non-refundable application and interview fees. Plot-applicant ratio of 1:3 is not followed (for every one land parcel, there must be three land applicants competing for the land parcel)
6	Interview period	Usually this process in most cases is done just for formality  In most cases applicants have already been selected.
7	Plans Committee meeting	This a highly political process where each civic leader of the committee pushes his/her own agenda and out of greed acquire more

		than one parcel of land each only for them to sale
8	Full Council meeting	Usually names go through here unopposed unless the civic leaders are not in agreement.
9	Names of successful applicants are released in national media	This is a critical stage because those that may not have access to the paper may miss out because in most cases the local authority does not call successful applicants and payment period is less than the required 90 days stipulated in legislature
10	Selected applicants names are recommended to the Commissioner of Lands	This process takes longer than necessary and it's the reason most people do not have offer letters from the Ministry of Lands.
11	Commissioner of Lands accepts or reject names	Most recommendations are approved but usually feedback is not given
12	Offer letters are sent to all selected	Invitation to Treaty from Ministry of Lands is not sent to the applicants.  The local authority is the one that writes, another anomaly.
13	Selected Applicants pay for service charges	The list of selected applicants is in most cases distorted by even the junior officer who may simply change names and put names of applicants who did not even apply
14	Application for issuance of land title certificate	Most land is often not surveyed and so others may not submit a land survey diagram and most people are not aware of this process and as such may wait in vain for the local authority to apply on their behalf
15	Publication of all title deeds given	This is usually not done and most respondents admitted to have never seen this in the national media because it takes years to obtain a Land Title Deed
16	Title deed	This research has shown that very few residents of Lusaka have land title and for most it takes years to obtain this title

(Source: Field data 2017)

### 5.3.2 Reasons for perceived levels of corruption in land administration

Several reasons were given to account for these results. These were bureaucratic procedures, overdependence on the manual system, unclear procedures and lack of defined timelines for each stage, inconsistency in the land administration procedures, political interests and excessive discretionary powers.

Firstly, corruption in the land sector had been fuelled mainly by bureaucratic procedures. This is partially due to centralisation of the land administration system. Further, lack of knowledge among land seekers on the actual procedures involved when acquiring land have led to a lot of individuals succumbing (GRZ 2013). These results tally with Deininger *et al.*, (2010) who identified that there is a lot of inefficiency and unnecessary bureaucracy which create incentives for people to pay for faster service or to simply circumvent the established procedures entirely.

*The processes of land administration do not allow for cross validation of land data in the City and as such makes the processes prone to corruption. The land distribution process is quite ambiguous and the Land Cabinet Circular number 1 of 1985 (this is a document that gives guidelines on land administration to both the Local Authorities and Ministry of Lands in Zambia) needs to be revised to suit today's situation especially that the Town and Country Planning Act of 1962 was repealed by Urban and Regional Planning Act of 2015. Technocrats dealing with land administration and alienation together with all members of the general public must be familiarised to this important circular so that both parties move together and understand the processes in the same way (Personal communication, 2017)*

This research has shown that 3 out of 5 key informants are not familiar with the Cabinet Circular number 1 of 1985. This confirms what literature shows that regulations are poorly designed or implemented (Seth *et al.*, 2004).

Secondly, the current manual system of data (land file-land offer letters, survey diagrams, and title deeds) storage at both Council and Ministry offices has proved to be inefficient. Files are often “lost” deliberately. Key informants disclosed that files are in actual sense misplaced to create loopholes for corruption. This is done because all files are kept in one place and so one can easily be told that his or her file is lost and to avoid starting the process all over again, one is forced to bribe the officer so that he/she creates a file for them or finds the lost file. This phenomenon was further supported by another insider key informant that certain files are simply pulled out or hidden by officers in order to lure clients to pay unofficial fees for their files to be retrieved. Generally, key informants elaborated that the manual system has failed. A key informant further explained that:



*Despite millions of kwachas being spent on the Zambia Integrated Land Management and Information Systems (ZILMIS) about three years ago, nothing has been implemented for the simple reason that people have not been incentivized and as such you cannot caution a cat without cautioning a mouse. Apart from the land administration processes being prone to corruption, the poor working conditions have created a loophole for corruption (Personal communication, 2017).*

Thirdly, the land administration processes are not very clear and the stages do not have defined time lines and this makes the process prone to corruption. The lack of defined timelines creates loopholes for corruption as many officers work without being time conscious. Thus a person who may need to obtain title for purposes of obtaining a loan from a bank may be left with no option but to simply bribe an officer to quicken the process. This tallies with literature which shows that many applicants resort to bribing land allocation officers to ‘push their papers’ so that they can be processed faster (Mulolwa, 2002). One key informant who owns a land consulting firm disclosed that it can take more than 3 years to obtain title deed if one is not forceful. This is supported by Ng’ombe (2005) who states that it takes not less than 3 years to process land title. The key informant further said that there are others who have been able to obtain title within 24 hours. The question is how? Well money speaks in such cases as well as the connections that one has. Seth *et al.*, (2004) state that there is a lack of adequate information on the land application processes by most people. The focus group discussants also brought this point out strongly and revealed that many applicants opt to use third parties to help them acquire land occupancy licences, for instance.

State or urban land in Zambia is administered in sixteen stages ranging from stage one (making of layout plans) to stage sixteen (issuance of title deed). These stages do not have defined timelines and this is problematic because it makes it difficult for an applicant to follow up the issue of obtaining land title deed if the time of obtaining it is not given. So from stage fourteen (14) when one applies for issuance of land title to the point where one actually obtains the title deed there is no defined time that one is supposed to wait thus it can take as long as four years as it was discovered during this study. It is all dependent on who you know because some respondents said they were able to obtain the same title deed that takes more than three years for others to

get in just under 24 hours, three hours to be specific. All this is possible provided one has strong connections. One respondent bet for that ZMW1000 he could simply call the Lands Department and ask for a topographic sheet, saying he had connections that could enable him get the sheets within three hours. Corruption is quite complex because there are serious connections of people who have created consultancy firms. This shows the complex networks of cartels that exist in the system which is not easily known. This is very interesting in that it is similar to the way things were in La Paz in Bolivia in the Dieter's 1985 article entitled Corruption in La Paz: A Mayor Fights City Hall. This is a case where the mayor explained that every time he walked to the office, he found a lot of people, some former council workers standing around the civic centre doing various activities but most were there to simply ask potential clients and convince them to get the needed services quicker at a small fee in order to avoid long queues. In most cases queues are created by the officers who simply worked in a laissez faire manner to create desperation amongst public members seeking services from their offices. This is quite interesting because such sights are common in Lusaka City, not only at Ministry of Land offices but also at passport and driving licence offices where the level of corrupt activities is high, disclosed a key informant. He further added that in most cases from his own experience, most officers do not give adequate information pertaining to land allocation and suggestively convince you cannot do it. He said that at one point he told himself he would pursue title issuance without bribing anyone. However, after trying for over three and half years he gave in and he asked his friend to connect him to someone who could process his title. After paying an undisclosed amount of money, he obtained his land titles within eight hours after having failed to do so for over three years.

Clearly the sixteen stages need to be shortened and simplified as 87 percent of the respondents said the processes are complex. These sentiments match with literature where Njoh (2013) as well as Ansneeuw *et al.* (2012) describe the land administrative procedures as inappropriate. Both publications further state that the land administration processes are complex with often huge backlogs.

The majority of the key informants (4 out of 5) emphasised on the need to work out the legal frameworks of land administration so that every member of society is catered for regardless of social status. They further called for the simplification of the land

administrative processes and cutting down of unnecessary stages. For example Stages 10 (Selected applicants names are recommended to the Commissioner of Lands) and 11 (Commissioner of Lands accepts or reject names) can be merged into one to simply have a reduced number of stages instead of the existing 16 stages. They disclosed that the complexity and unpredictability of administrative procedures creates confusion and its one major factor that contributes to corruption. Computerisation of land administration record keeping could help reduce corruption.

Fourthly, there are a lot of inconsistencies in land administration such that there is a visible gap between the *de jure* and *de facto*. For instance, it was interesting to learn that there are competing ratios which must be ideally used in determining the number of application letters that can be received when land is opened up for lease to the general public. There is need to ensure that ratios are adhered to so that when you have 500 parcels of land, applications must be limited to 1500 applicants so that each parcel of land is competed for by three persons. However, the situation on the ground is that the public is allowed to apply simply because the Local authority is interested in generating income from the application fees. As a result, competing ratios increase, thus creating pressure on the selection process. Thus resulting in removal of names of many ordinary members, MacInnes (2012) observes that there is growing pressure on land for investment and patronage purposes in many African countries Zambia inclusive. It thus means that plots are given to individuals who have connections and thus favouritism and nepotism are what take the day.

Corruption has persisted despite having external organisations such as the ACC and Zambia Police sit on the interview panels for land allocations. The transparency of the allocation system is vital if corruption is to be curbed. Most (4 out of 5) of the key informants said that land is advertised for formality's sake most times. A respondent lamented that on several occasions, she was not able to obtain land. It was later disclosed by an insider that each panellist was actually an interested party. Thus interviews were only conducted for formality's sake. From the reviewed data, less than 10 percent of land owners obtained land in a transparent manner.

Another inconsistency is the fact that land that has survey diagrams in Lusaka City is not fully detailed. Survey diagrams do not have geo-coordinates and this is what makes double allocations of one parcel of land common. A case is Foxdale area of

Lusaka where about 300 plots (30x40) were created by lands department priced at ZMW 75 000 and Ministry of Land even issued offer letters to land buyers, but it was later realised that the land was already owned when the owner of the land sued the Ministry. This happened because records are not available at the Ministry of Land offices and the survey diagrams do not have the geo-coordinates as a result creating a loophole for double allocations. If these (geo-coordinates) were available the land would not have been subdivided because records would have shown that the land is owned by so and so and given all details. However, this is not the case, meaning land in Lusaka City does not have readily available documented transactional history data for land leaving the land market ambiguous.

Bare land is highly expensive in Lusaka City and in most cases this land is not affordable to most citizens including civil servants. e.g. Research showed that land that was recently opened up in woodlands residential area by Lusaka City Council was going for ZMW175 000 for a 40x50 m plot which is actually more than a senior management officer's annual salary at Lusaka City Council. The question then is who is this land targeted at? So even though a senior officer cannot afford, the easy way out is to simply obtain the land and sell it for a much higher price of say ZMW 250 000. This is how loopholes are created in the land administration processes.

Key informant 3 further said that;

*The 1995 land Act put land on premium and brought in the commodification of land. Land policies are not adequate in that they are not inclusive of Zambians regardless of their social status in society. The 1995 land Act is biased towards the elite and as such a few elite individuals have amassed huge chunks of land. Land acquisition today favours investors who have money thus depriving peasants of land thereby taking away their source of livelihood (Personal communication, 2017).*

The key informant however said it was difficult to prove if this was deliberate.

*"It is difficult to prove whether ruling authorities tailored the law to their interest with the adoption of the 1995 Land Act, but it is certainly evident that the 1995 Land Act has been used to serve the interests of elites and investors rather than of the general public" (Personal communication, 2017).*

The above statements tally with literature as seen in Palmer *et al.*, 2009 where the implementation of land distribution policies and laws are in favour of a certain group of society.

Fifthly, there is a lot of interest from civic leaders to sit in the planning subcommittee of the Council so they have access to first-hand information on the areas to be opened up and the associated value. The fact that civic leaders have powers to make decisions during the subcommittee deliberations on who gets land and why, gives them an opportunity to influence decisions and recommend certain names for approval.

There is a very thin line between politics and technical works so much that the level of political interference is overwhelming for many technocrats and in most cases because of inadequate laws/legislature/policy, political leaders carry out the day to day technical work, which in most cases does not favour the majority of citizens and this leads to political patronage. The majority of the Councillors want to actually be part of the plans subcommittee of the Council subcommittee responsible for looking at land issues simply because they will have more access to land than any other subcommittee members. Brown 2005, reports that Councillors have allocated land to themselves or investors.

It was further disclosed in focus group discussion that some Civic leaders work in cartels and collect National Registration Cards (NRC) of family members, friends, political supporters, and colleagues to use in obtaining parcels of land which they later sell and share the money with the National Registration Card owners.

When land is subdivided into different land uses and roads are made, a layout map is created, printed and submitted to the Surveyor General's office for numbering. Once the parcels of land are numbered, their use cannot change. But of late this has not been the case in Lusaka City where residents have witnessed a number of numbered open spaces being opened up for plot allocation in a number of high cost residential areas such as Roma and Woodlands. In certain cases these open spaces have been play parks or green areas and today the City has very few green spaces left because many of them have been turned into residential plots. A key informant had this to say during the interview:

*Most of these open spaces were opened and facilitated by civic leaders, who work in cartels and collect NRCs of family members, friends and colleagues use them to obtain parcels of land which they later sell and share the money with NRC owners. So the councillors simply obtain documentation for these parcels with survey diagrams and title deeds to justify their illegal actions (Personal communication, 2017).*

Officers in land administration related positions and departments have a high level of discretionary power such that they tend to have undue influence on the process of land administration in favour of their private interests and their network of social capital. Some respondents in focus group discussions explained that the officers often simply told them to wait and when they got tired they were told to pay an unofficial express fee to have their documents processed faster than usual. In other cases they were told to either pay for fuel or provide a vehicle for officers to use so that they can be shown their allocated land as transport is a challenge in most government institutions.

Literature shows that an administrative manual for decreasing and standardizing procedures and a computerized data system using software such Geographical Information Systems (GIS) for storing administrative data, including tax registers and estimates can simplify the problem. This is because both tools assist in improving coordination among offices, avoids duplication of duties and eliminates the use of unjustified administrative discretion, thus speeding the permit process (Gonzales de Asis, 2000).

Interviews with key informants showed that from the sixteen stages of land administration the most prone stages in as far as corruption is concerned are five to nine and this is mostly because of the nature of activities involved. Stages ten to sixteen are moderately prone to corruption because most issues are dealt with in the five stages mentioned. The first four stages were said to be the least prone but it must be stressed here that the fact that the system is centralised these stages could also create room for corruption.

The first four stages are mostly administrative work that is done by the main actors: the local authority and the Surveyor General's office.

Key informants and survey participants (4 out of 5 and 92 percent, respectively) disclosed that they were not familiar with the sixteen stages of land administration. They also disclosed that they did not know where to get information on land acquisition and that in the past they used people who were familiar with the sector to help them acquire land. These results tally with literature which shows that there is lack of information on the land application processes by most people (Seth *et al.*, 2004).

Key informants were shown land administration stages and asked to rate the prevalence of corruption at each stage of the land administration process. Table 5.5 below, shows key informant responses in relation to how vulnerable each stage of land administration is to corruption. So each informant marked each stage in terms highly prone, moderately prone and least prone.

**Table 5.5: Rating corruption by stages**

Stage most prone to corruption	Stage least prone to corruption
Application process for plot stands ( stage 5)	Making of layout plans ( stage 1)
Interviews ( stage 6)	Numbering of the land ( stage 2)
Plans committee meeting deliberation (stage 7)	Surveying of the land ( stage 3)
Full council meeting deliberation ( stage 8)	Advertising land in national media ( stage 4)
Release of names of successful applicants in national media ( stage 9)	
Recommendation of successful applicants to commissioner of lands ( stage10)	

(Source: Field data, 2017)

Key informants (4 out of 5) said that stages five, six and eleven were most prone to corruption and very critical. Opportunities of corruption are at each stage of the land administration process. This is because of a number of reasons such as the centralised system of land administration, the lack of defined timelines for each process, non-automated system of data and lack of computerised system for land data storage as well as the lack of servers for land data. Thus officers can make opportunities for people to become desperate by creating blind spots such that people have no choice but to make informal payments or bribes just so they can access the needed services or land title deeds especially when someone wants to obtain a loan

from a commercial bank for the development of their property and need a land title deed to use as collateral.


Finally, FGD participants were asked to give their perception of corruption in the next 10 years in land administration. The perception of 76 percent of participants in the FGD is that the levels of corruption in land administration will increase because the size of land available is decreasing whilst demand is increasing. So as far as the allocation process is concerned it will diminish (no plot allocations) as there will be less or no land at all to allocate. Corruption is likely to increase in land registration, record keeping and issuing of land title sections of land administration. The discussants expressed concern over the amount of discretionary power held by government officers dealing with land matters. Most discussants (80 percent) believe that tangible results will be achieved if and only if land legislature is revised. This is because land legislature has not been revised in a long time. Most respondents (92 percent) said that the land Act of 1995 does not favour the majority of Zambians in that land is seen as a commodity and so can be sold to whoever has money, when majority of Zambians are poor. They further added that there is a need to have an all-inclusive land Act. Apparently it was pointed out from the study that the land policy has been in draft form since 2006. The discussants (60 percent) said creating a land policy which is people oriented and all-inclusive will reduce the divide existing between the poor and rich. This is vital if corruption is to be reduced. Land administration is a component of urban planning and as such it must as well promote community participation. This is vital because lack of public participation in the land administration process is a driver for corruption (TI, 2015).

The next sections show results of the common forms of corruption followed by land administration stages that are prone to corruption, the major drivers and possible ways to reduce corruption as suggested by the study participants.

#### **5.4 Common forms of corruption**

In terms of forms of corruption, the research results show that there are several forms (Figure 5.2.)





**Figure 5.2: Perceptions on forms of corruption and their prevalence**  
(Source: Field data, 2017)

The top three common forms of corruption were political patronage, nepotism, and bribery.

Majority (87.2 percent) of the respondents said political patronage is the most common form because land is now handled by political party cadres who in some cases may even have strong connections (complex cartel ranging from junior to senior officers at both Ministry of Land and Lusaka City Council in all departments dealing with land administration issues). As a result, due to political patronage, some people easily get land and title deeds. Key informants cited a number of areas where political patronage was evident and one such area is Garden House residential area. Political party leaders in this area have allocated land to the community members and have built houses within a short period of time without following all the legal procedures. The case of Garden House residential area of Lusaka shows a clear example of patronage.

And the area is illegally occupied and this can be clearly seen by the absence of government institutions such as a clinic, school and police. This example of Garden

House tallies with literature in Kakai (2012) on the role of land as a means of patronage

The second most common form of corruption is bribery 66.4 percent followed by nepotism 44.2 percent. The high perception in the prevalence of bribery is simply due to the lack of systems to detect bribery and corruption with the land administration systems as cited by Van der Molen and Tuladhar (2007). Due to inefficiencies and lack of transparency in land administration system, the use of social capital in form of social networks of friendship and acquaintances is increasingly a viable option to circumvent the ills of formal systems. This accounts for the high prevalence (third most common) of some form of nepotism in land administration. Nepotism is a form of favouritism based on acquaintances and familiar relationships whereby someone in an official position exploits his or her power and authority to provide a job or favour to a family member or friend, even though he or she may not be qualified or deserving. Some key informants pointed out that directives from superiors were also a very common practice and junior land officers are obliged to carry out the directive despite violating the legal processes. This is done so as to protect one's job and remain in harmony with the superiors. It was pointed out that some of these directives are associated with some rewards either in monetary form or non-monetary or both. A key informant further explained that:


*“In the past the only form of exchange was money but nowadays rewards are many including cars and other in-kind rewards (Personal communication, 2017)”.*

Key informants (3 out of 5) said that vehicles (medium of exchange) have become the most common form of exchange after money. This means that if a person has a vehicle and no money to buy land, the vehicle can be used to acquire land. These results show that corruption in land administration carries many forms and these forms are also often related.

### **5.5 Drivers of corruption**

Respondents were asked to identify the most common drivers of corruption in land administration. Of the total responses, the top three drivers of corruption were greed followed by political patronage and thirdly poverty and desperation (Figure 5.3). The results suggest that the level of greediness amongst civic leaders in issues of land administration is very high. The case of Tanzanian Presidential Commission of

Inquiry against Corruption shows similar results that there is excessive rent-seeking behaviour for wealth accumulation amongst civic leaders (URT, 2006).



**Figure 5.3: Drivers of Corruption in land administration**  
(Source: Field data 2017)

Secondary data sources also support this finding. According to the [www.Lusaka times.com](http://www.Lusaka times.com), dated January 22, 2011, Local Government Minister then Brian Chituwo on January 22, 2011 suspended Lusaka City Council to pave way for an audit. This was after Lusaka City Council was in some corruption allegations. The Council was accused of illegally allocating land to its Councillors without following the law governing the allocation of land. Out of 102 plots, the Councillors got 45 plots, 10 plots were given to the Mayor while the deputy Mayor got five plots and members of the public were only allocated 11 plots, the allocation of the remaining 51 plots is not known according to this news item.

The second top driver of corruption in urban land administration is political patronage. Literature has shown that land plays a critical role as a means of patronage (Kakai, 2012; Onoma 2008; Boone 2012). The use of land as a means for securing votes contributes towards corruption in land administration. Civic forum for housing cited in Bouju (2009) and Kakai (2012) contend that since the commodification of land in 1995, land has become a means of political patronage. Political patronage has also been cited as a cause of illegal land allocation in the City of Lusaka (Chilombo 2016). Often the illegal trade of votes for land appeals to the poor segment of the city that is often desperate for land and accommodation. Civic

forum for housing further stressed on the need for civic leaders to formulate land policies that are pro-poor (cited in Bouju, 2009); Kakai, 2012). Participation in politics is increasingly becoming the fastest way to get rich disclosed both key informants and focus group discussants. It was pointed out in focus group discussions that political positions provide opportunities for civic leaders and their networks to acquire large portions of land which they later sale. A discussant elaborated that *“Most of these civic leaders keep obtaining land and in some cases exchange that land with cars.”* Nepotism and desperation as well as ignorance also drive the corruption mileage higher and all this is exacerbated by the weak land administration law and weak enforcement (Transparency International 2013).

The research results show that the major drivers of corruption in Lusaka City are political patronage and greediness amongst those in leadership position in charge of this resource called land.

Greediness ranked highest in terms of being a major driver of corruption (Figure 5.3). This is very evident in media reports where councillors allocated themselves more than one parcel of land. The level of greed for this resource if not checked can result into serious national problems.

Sunday Times of Zambia newspaper article dated 24<sup>th</sup> September, 2017 confirms the fact that there is a lot of greediness in land administration (Figure 5.4).



**Figure 5.4 Newspaper article**  
(Source: Sunday Times of Zambia)

Key informants (2 out of 5) cited the baobab land in Lilayi area of Lusaka City. The key informants reported that the baobab land in Lilayi was corruptly obtained by the rich. According to [www.zambiawatchdog.com](http://www.zambiawatchdog.com) dated 12 June 2015, the brief background of Baobab land controversy is that, in 2006, the Lusaka city Council, which was dominated by PF councillors, earmarked the 190 hectares land for allocation to more than 1,000 private people and other commercial developers. But the councillors shared the land amongst them and gave the rest to cadres and relatives with a few genuine buyers. Mwanawasa grabbed the land from the corrupt city council and sold it to Legacy holdings to develop infrastructure. People who bought plots were refunded. In 2009, after Mwanawasa's death, Rupiah Banda decided to grab the land and gave Legacy Holdings a 3-month ultimatum to construct shopping malls, golf course and housing complex. No one can do that within three months. But, since that was his aim, Banda grabbed the land by forcing Legacy Holdings to 'sale' it and gave it to Sakwiba Sikota and Salama, with him as shadow owner. After the current government assumed office in 2011, a former mayor of Lusaka Daniel Chisenga advised the then new Government to terminate and reverse the corrupt transaction on Baobab land.

*"As a council who are the planning authority, we are still in the dark about what these Egyptians are putting up there. All this is happening because the previous government decided to ignore us and it is appropriate that the Government reverses this transaction,"* Chisenga said.

Chisenga further said

*"apart from servicing the area, the local authority could have been earning revenue through rates and service charges".*


On Jan 27, 2012, the ACC placed a restriction order on the land to prohibit any activity on it by its owners. This restriction was removed by the High Court, but the ACC appealed to Supreme Court. The owners of Bantu Corporation claim that they paid ZMK14 Billion (Kr14 Million) for 475 acres / 192 hectares Farm 4300/B Baobab Land. Bantu furthers says it plans to transform Baobab land into a modern residential area accommodating more than 2,000 housing units, a shopping mall, police station etc... But information of the ground is that this is highly unlikely due to a multiplicity of issues including the ones just numerated above. It is difficulty to develop a piece of prime land acquired corruptly. There are too many people with

interest in Baobab land. It is possible that the Egyptian investors were duped and whatever money they pumped in there has been lost. The truth is that with so many interested parties in that land, it will take decades to really settle the ownership of Baobab land. Rupiah Banda can use his influence on Edgar Lungu right now, but he must also ensure that government does not change otherwise such corrupt deals will be reversed and perpetrators arrested (www.zambiawatchdog.com 2015)

## 5.6 How to reduce corruption in urban land administration

The top most option for reducing corruption in land administration in Lusaka was improving the conditions of service for the public workers followed by elimination of political interference and sensitization of the public on the correct procedures and ills of corruption (Figure 5.5).

Improvement of the poor conditions of service for civil servants has also been reported in other studies as one of the viable options for addressing corruption (Svensson, 2005). Other literature has reported similar results as in Figure 5.5 (Dixon-Gough and Bloch, 2006). This result is disputed in some literature such as Mutabihirwa (1995) but other literature also shows that some European countries recorded positive results when working conditions of civil servants were improved so much that the levels of corruption drastically reduced (Svensson, 2005).



**Figure 5.5: Perceptions on remedies for corruption in land administration**

(Source: Field data 2017)

However, from key informants, the most prominent option reported was creation of robust rules and laws and enforcing them without any form of interference. Other scholars have argued for increased transparency and decentralisation of land administration services as being very critical in curbing corruption (Deininger *et al.*, 2011; Oxfam 2011). Most key informants also pointed out that the reduction of bureaucracy should be accompanied by the use of information communication technologies rather than the manual system. The new technologies should enhance transparency and efficiency.

Some key informants explained that there was need to put legal systems that prevent political patronage and use of discretionary powers by some civic leadership and public servants. Against this thought was a suggestion to revise the Land Act of 1995 to ensure that the weak members in society are guaranteed access to ownership of land by ensuring that all residents are entitled to land despite their socio-economic status in society. The need to have a land policy in the country cannot be overemphasised.

## **CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This study aimed at examining public perceptions of corruption in urban land administration in Lusaka City. The research concludes that all stages of land administration in Lusaka are prone to corruption to varying extents. Stages 5 to 10 (Application for plot stands, Interview period, Plans committee meeting, Full council meeting, Names of successful applicants are released in national media and Selected applicants names are recommended to commissioner of lands) are the most prone to corruption whilst stages 1 to 4 (Layout plans made, Land is numbered, Land is surveyed and Advertising) are least prone to corruption. The most dominant forms of corruption in the land administration process are political patronage, bribery, nepotism, administrative corruption. Greediness, political influence and poverty are top three drivers of corruption. Overall the study concludes that the public perceive the land administration process in Lusaka City to be laden with corruption of various forms, driven by multiple drivers that require an integrated approach in addressing the problem.

Based on the above conclusions, the following recommendations are proposed to help curb corruption in land administration:

- i. The stakeholders (Anti-Corruption Commission, Zambia Land Alliance, Transparency International and all other Non-governmental organisations dealing in land administration) should mainstream anti –corruption in all development processes and policies. This is because various stakeholders are involved in land administration process and the nature of the vice involves and affects several stakeholders. Concerted efforts may yield better results than leaving everything to the anti-corruption commission. Lusaka City Council and Ministry of Lands must implement this together with Ministry of Local Government.
- ii. The level of discretionary power held by officers administering land must be reduced so that one does not abuse his/her powers. For instance, technocrats (urban planners) mandated to alienate land should do so without political interference and planning of all land left to the planners according to the Urban and Regional Planning Act of 2015. This must be enforced by Lusaka City Council.
- iii. The land policy has been in draft form since 2006. There is need to ensure this policy is formulated as soon as possible. There are too many players in land administration



and in certain cases land is used as a commodity of appeasement by higher offices. The land policy has been in draft form for the last 10 years. Political will is vital in this sector if tangible results are to be achieved. The land policy will help solve the challenge of equitable land distribution for all and ensure land is available for all regardless of socio-economic status. And so there is need to ensure that adequate law is put in place to prevent unfair allocation of this very important resource which every human being has right to and need for sustainable development of an individual and country at large. This must be implemented by Ministry of Lands.

- iv. There is need for increased application of technology (ICT) such as use of Geographic Information System (GIS software) to enhance transparency and improve efficiency in the land administration system. This is because the current manual system has a lot of loopholes for corruption. ICT will help create an effective Land Information Management System which is more reliable and transparent. Thus the Zambia Integrated Land Management and Information System (ZILMIS) must be fully implemented by both the Ministry of Lands and Lusaka City Council.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A: Guide for Focus Group Discussion

#### A. Understanding of corruption

- 1 Define corruption.....
- 2 How common are the following forms of corruption?

A. Forms of corruption	How common is the form of corruption <b>in urban land administration in Lusaka City?</b>  1= very common 2=common 3= occasional 4=rare 5= very rare
1. Political patronage	
2. Nepotism/ tribalism	
3. Gender	
4. Bureaucracy (delays)	
5. Directives from friends	
6. Bribery	
7. Favours to friends	
8. Others specify	
B. Forms of corruption	What form of exchange is involved? 1= money 2=Non-monetary (specify)
1. Political patronage	
2. Nepotism/ tribalism	
3. Gender	
4. Bureaucracy (delays)	
5. Directives from friends	
6. Bribery	
7. Favours to friends	
8. Others specify	

#### B Drivers of corruption in land administration )

1. Kindly tick and rate the following factors that you perceive as drivers of corruption in urban land administration.

S/N	Driver	Tick	How common is the driver of corruption? 1= very common 2=common 3= occasional 4=rare 5= very rare
1	Poverty		
2	Nepotism/tribalism		
3	Political interferences(patronage)		
4	Greediness		
5	Seeking favours		
6	Ignorance of procedures		
7	Land shortage		
8	Desperation		
9	Competition		
10	Excessive regulations		

11	Poor land administration		
12	Gender		
13	Selfishness		
14	Low salaries		
15	Poverty		
16	Gender biasness		

**c. Options for reducing corruption**

9. Suggest ways of how to reduce corruption in land administration in urban areas

Thank you so much for your time

## Appendix B: Questionnaire for Residents

Questionnaire survey for assessment of views of residents on corruption in urban land administration 2015. This is part of the short course being undertaken at the University of Zambia.

### A. Basic household information

1. Residential area.....
2. Age.....
3. Sex .....
4. Level of education ..... (1=primary 2=secondary 3=tertiary)
5. Monthly income level.....( 1=below 1000ZMW 2=1000 to 4000ZMW 3=Above 4000ZMW)

### B Understanding of corruption

6. What is corruption in your view?.....
7. How common are the following forms of corruption?

Forms of corruption	How common is the form of corruption in urban land administration in Lusaka City? 1= very common 2=common 3= occasional 4=rare 5= very rare
9. Political patronage	
10. Nepotism/ tribalism	
11. Gender	
12. Bureaucracy (delays)	
13. Directives from friends	
14. Bribery	
15. Favours to friends	
16. Others specify	
Forms of corruption	What form of exchange is involved? 1= money 2=Non-monetary (specify)
9. Political patronage	
10. Nepotism/ tribalism	
11. Gender	
12. Bureaucracy (delays)	
13. Directives from friends	
14. Bribery	
15. Favours to friends	

16. Others specify	
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**C Drivers of corruption in land administration (tick drivers and rate their prevalence)**

2. Kindly tick and rate the following factors that you perceive as drivers of corruption in urban land administration.

S/N	Driver	Tick	How common is the driver of corruption? 1= very common 2=common 3= occasional 4=rare 5= very rare
1	Poverty		
2	Nepotism/tribalism		
3	Political interferences(patronage)		
4	Greediness		
5	Seeking favours		
6	Ignorance of procedures		
7	Land shortage		
8	Desperation		
9	Competition		
10	Excessive regulations		
11	Poor land administration		
12	Gender		
13	Selfishness		
14	Low salaries		
15	Poverty		
16	Gender biasness		

**D. Options for reducing corruption**

9. Suggest ways of how to reduce corruption in land administration in urban areas

10. How do you perceive levels of corruption in land administration in Lusaka in the next 10 years? (Circle your response) 1= increase 2 =remain the same 3=reduce

11. Explain/give reasons for your answer above

12. Who is mostly involved in corruption in land administration in urban areas with respect to wealth status? 1=High wealth status people 2=Medium wealth status 3=Low wealth status people.
13. Explain/ give reasons for your answer above

Thank you so much for your time

## Appendix C: Interview Guide for Key Informants

Code Number: .....

Interview Guide for Key Informants: Abuse of Power in Urban Land Administration in Lusaka City Region: Drivers and Forms.

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a student at the University of Zambia, pursuing a Master of Science Degree in Spatial Planning. As part of my studies, I am conducting a research on the **Corruption in Urban Land Administration in Lusaka City: Drivers and Forms**.

You have been selected to be interviewed and I would greatly appreciate your assistance. This is purely an academic exercise and therefore all the information that will be availed to me will remain strictly confidential and for academic purposes only. Your timely and sincere responses will be highly appreciated. The results from the data I am collecting will be used for the production of a Dissertation in partial fulfilment for the award of the Master of Science Degree in Spatial Planning.

### A: COMMON FORMS OF ABUSE IN LAND ADMINISTRATION

1. What is corruption in your view?
2. How common are the following forms of corruption?

Form of abuse	1(very common)	2(common )	3(occasional)	4 (rare)	5 (very rare)	Form of exchange
Bureaucracy (delays)						
nepotism						
Directives from superiors						
Favours to friends						
Bribes						
political						
Others specify						

3. What form of exchange is involved? Insert in table above ( 1=money) , (2= Non-monetary specify)
4. Do you have comments of the forms of abuse?

### B: MAJOR DRIVERS OF ABUSE OF POWER

1. What in your opinion are the major drivers of corruption in urban land administration?
2. Why are these drivers of abuse of power in land administration?

3. Which ones in your opinion are most common and why?
4. How can these drivers be dealt with in order to reduce on abuse of powers in urban land administration?

**C: PROCESSES OF LAND ADMINISTRATION PRONE TO ABUSE**

1. What processes of land administration are you most familiar with?
2. How effective and efficient are these processes? If you had powers, what would you change?
3. Cabinet Circular Number 1 of 1985 gives guidelines on Land administration. Do you think this document is still relevant?
4. Zambia Integrated Land Management Information Systems was recently introduced to help improve land administration. Do you think it's a system that is able to reduce corruption in urban land administration?

End of Questions  
Thank you for your participation



## Appendix D: Summary of key Informant Results

Parameter	Key informant 1	Key informant 2	Key informant 3	Key informant 4	Key informant 5
Definition of corruption in their view	Not following the law and guidelines on land allocation and alienation	Using the powers vested in you for both monetary and non-monetary gains	The use of statutory or assigned power for private gain. This takes the form of an office holder-whether in public or private, taking advantage of their positions and authority to gain undue advantage or indeed pecuniary advantage	Taking advantage of the weak system in an institution	Use of power for own advantage
Common Forms	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Bureaucracy and Political patronage (<i>very common</i>)</li> <li>2. Directives from superiors, bribes and favours to friends (<i>common</i>)</li> <li>3. Nepotism (<i>occasional</i>)</li> </ol> <p>The forms of exchange can be both monetary and non-monetary depends on the situation at hand.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Bureaucracy and Political patronage (<i>very common</i>)</li> <li>2. Directives from superiors, bribes and Nepotism (<i>common</i>)</li> <li>3. favours to friends (<i>occasional</i>)</li> </ol> <p>The forms of exchange can be both monetary and non-monetary depends on the situation at hand</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Bureaucracy, Directives from superiors, bribes, and favours to friends (<i>very common</i>)</li> <li>2. State capture and political patronage (<i>common</i>)</li> <li>3. Nepotism (<i>occasional</i>)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Bureaucracy and bribes (<i>very common</i>)</li> <li>2. Directives from superiors and political patronage (<i>common</i>)</li> <li>3. Nepotism (<i>very rare</i>)</li> <li>4. Favours to friends (<i>rare</i>)</li> </ol> <p>Monetary- bureaucracy and bribes</p> <p>The rest is non-monetary</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Nepotism, Directives from superiors, political patronage and bribes (<i>very common</i>)</li> <li>2. Favour to friends (<i>common</i>)</li> </ol>
Major Drivers	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Political interference (Very common)</li> <li>2. Lack of a transparent land administration process (<i>very common</i>)</li> <li>3. Ignorance of procedures (<i>very common</i>)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Bureaucracy (<i>very common</i>)</li> <li>2. Greediness (<i>very common</i>)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Abuse of discretionary power</li> <li>2. Unclear administrative procedure</li> <li>3. Public ignorance</li> <li>4. Lack of supervision</li> </ol> <p>The most common abuse is the abuse of discretionary power, the lack of checks and balances due to poor supervision leads to this.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Low salaries and poor conditions of service (<i>most common</i>)</li> <li>2. Political interference (<i>most common</i>)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Policy the current legislature is biased towards the elite the 1995 land Act</li> <li>2. Too many players in LA</li> <li>3. Political interference</li> </ol>
Processes of LA prone to corruption	<p>Refer to the table of the processes of LA.</p> <p>Most prone stages are stages 5,6, 11, 14, 16</p>	<p>Refer to the table of the processes of LA.</p> <p>Most prone stages are stages 5,6, 11, 14, 16</p>	<p>Refer to the table of the processes of LA.</p> <p>Most prone stages are stages 5,6, 11, 14, 16</p>	<p>Stages 5,6,7,8, and 9 (<i>highly prone</i>)</p> <p>Stages 1,2,3,4 (<i>least prone</i>)</p> <p>10,11,12,13,14,15,16 (<i>moderately prone</i>)</p>	<p>Stages 5,6,7,8,10,11, (<i>highly prone</i>)</p> <p>12 (<i>moderate</i>)</p> <p>1,2,3 (<i>least prone</i>)</p>

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