

Codrington took up residence in the newly founded capital as Administrator. Fort Jameson, renamed Chipata in 1967, also became the provincial headquarters as well as commercial centre of East Luangwa. Thus Chipata has been a major administrative and commercial center from the genesis of colonial rule.

In 1911 North-Eastern Rhodesia and North-Western Rhodesia amalgamated to form Northern Rhodesia. The BSAC ruled Northern Rhodesia until 1924 when it came under the sovereignty of the British Government. Africans won self government from the British government in 1964.

Asian traders started immigrating into Chipata around 1904. In the next two decades the Indian Quarter took shape and Asians came to occupy a permanent niche in the economy of the district as traders.<sup>2</sup> By the 1930s Asian traders had spread to Lundazi and Petauke. Chipata has known the oldest settlement of Asian traders in Zambia.

## 1.2 THE DISPLACEMENT OF PRE-CAPITALIST TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Trade and industry existed in Eastern Province before the colonisation of the area.<sup>3</sup> Localised trade was conducted among ethnic groups occupying different ecological zones. The Chewa of the plateau, where iron-smelting was practised, exchanged items such as hoes, axes, spears and bracelets with fish caught by the Kunda of the Valley in nearby rivers. This kind of trade was essentially a subsidiary economic activity to

cultivation and hunting for the pot. Small scale manufacturing was undertaken in iron-smelting, cloth-weaving, crafts and pottery.

In the nineteenth century Eastern Province took part in long distance trade through the Bisa and Chikunda intermediaries. Ivory, slaves and some gold were exchanged with imported goods such as cloth, beads and some firearms. Even though this trade was specialised enough to give rise to a social stratum of African middlemen traders, it was not widespread enough to induce the transformation of the consumption patterns of the entire population in the region. Instead it specifically afforded the ruling class access to imported luxury goods through the barter system. The Ngoni participated in the trade in slaves and ivory, albeit on a small scale. Wiese, a German merchant, settled in Mpezeni's territory around 1892 for the purpose of conducting ivory trade for the overseas market. Mpezeni benefited from this trade like many African chiefs. Since the Ngoni thrived on pastoralism and raiding rather than on trading, they did not alter the indigenous system of trade and industry.<sup>5</sup> However, the Ngoni played a progressive role in the area in the sense that extension of Ngoni authority involved a process meant to unite heterogenous ethnic communities into one political hegemony.

Pre-capitalist trade and industry was gradually

displaced by the capitalist commercial system which entailed the marketing of factory produced goods amongst Africans. By 1919 it became evident that factory made hoes had succeeded in supplanting indigenous manufactured ones as the Administration was endeavouring to import 10,000 hoes for the district to avert an imminent 'famine' which was anticipated to result from the acute shortage of hoes.<sup>6</sup> Imported cloth was also supplanting the indigenous one. Africans were, in fact, increasingly becoming dependent on imported hoes, cloth and enamelware by the 1930s. To cater for the emerging African consumer as well as encourage African taste for imported trade goods, trading business penetrated Northern Rhodesia as a whole in the 1920s. In 1924 the Controller of Customs observed that

there is no doubt that in recent years the native indirectly, has been taxed through customs as his wants have increased. Cotton piece goods and Blankets account for the greater of his wants, while cheap European clothing especially hats, are gradually capturing tastes.<sup>7</sup>

Four years later Eastern Province imported goods for African trade valued at 37,494 pounds from which 4,719 pounds was raised as customs revenue.<sup>8</sup> The capitalist commercial system had greatly succeeded in displacing the pre-capitalist system in Northern Rhodesia as a whole by the 1930s as the Secretary for Native Affairs observed in 1931:

Many of the ancient arts and crafts of the indigenous population have been ousted by imported European manufactures and the few articles now obtainable are more suitable for preservation in a museum or sale as curios, than for present utilisation.. The hoe, axe and knife formerly manufactured by the native blacksmith are out of date, a cheaper and better article can be procured from overseas. The making of pottery has ceased as the enamel pail, basin, cup and jug can be bought very cheaply, are not liable to break, are lighter to carry and most suitable for drawing water.

Henceforth the African became dependent on the capitalist commercial system based on imports mainly from South Africa, Britain, India and Japan but crafts survived and emerged as one of the African's cash earners in Eastern Province.

### 1.3 ECONOMIC CHANGES IN EASTERN PROVINCE, 1900-1935

Economic changes which occurred in Eastern Province in the period 1900-1935 greatly influenced the rise of the Asian trading class in the district. Tobacco farming and migrant labour were the major economic activities on which trading hinged. Prior to 1912, European and Asian business grew very slowly owing to the fact that settler agriculture had not yet become a profitable business venture. Trading was undertaken by the generally under-capitalised settler as a source of capital to prop up farming. Moreover the pioneer settler maintained stores in order to enable himself to pay his labourers in kind since cash was then in limited supply. The African market was too small to stimulate large scale growth in trading since limited employment opportunities were available locally for Africans. The European market was



also small as the settler community was very small and the buying power of the average settler was still weak.

Between 1912 and 1915 there occurred the first tobacco boom which created more trading opportunities. In the absence of commercially exploitable mineral resources, the BSAC and Charterland had concentrated on promoting tobacco farming because tobacco had found a lucrative market in South Africa and Britain. The United Tobacco Company of South Africa established itself in Chipata around 1912 for the purpose of growing as well as marketing tobacco. Its system of paying farmers on the spot acted as a potent incentive to the settler farmer. The tobacco boom resulted in more local employment for Africans on the tobacco farms. In turn, enlarged African wage labour resulted in a relative growth in African trade.

The first World War created opportunities for traders to make windfall gains through overpricing African trade goods, even though it temporarily slowed down the development of tobacco farming as settlers enlisted in the war. War-time profiteering was created by the shortage of goods which accompanied the war as it was relatively difficult to procure goods from overseas owing to the fact that production and freight services were diverted to the sustenance of the war effort. In 1917 the magistrate of Chipata observed that

stores are making large profits and in addition to the usual bonus one firm at least was able to grant a special bonus to its employees. Prices are far higher than are justified even by the increased cost of freight on imported goods.<sup>11</sup>

Therefore, the war period was a trading boom for traders who could manage to procure goods.

This war also increased opportunities for Africans to earn cash. Prior to the war, Africans had begun to sell foodstuffs such as ufa (mealie-meal) to settlers on a limited scale. For example, by 1914 J.C. Innes was buying ufa and grain from Africans in Chipata and Petauke to supply the Native Labour Bureau and as ration for his farm labour.<sup>12</sup> Charterland had begun to employ Africans as tenga-tenga (porters). In 1913 as many as 700 could be employed in one month.<sup>13</sup> The war increased these opportunities. The high demand for food during the war as rations for the askari (soldiers) increased opportunities of earning cash by selling foodstuffs<sup>14</sup>. The war also created tenga-tenga employment opportunities in the army. Jokonya notes that the 'estimated number of the first line military porters in Northern Rhodesia between 1916 and 1918 was 41,000, most of whom came from North-Eastern Rhodesia'.<sup>15</sup> In fact the war played a role in encouraging the integration of the African into the money economy 'as many thousands of carriers employed in connection with the East-African campaign wished after its completion to earn wages which they had learned the value of as enabling them to meet

their wants'.<sup>16</sup> In the immediate post-war period Charterland offered more tenga-tenga employment owing to increased freight business. In 1920 '5093 native carriers were employed carrying bales of tobacco to Blantyre railroad'.<sup>17</sup> Tenga-tenga was also vital in freighting trade goods and government requisites from Broken Hill via Serenje before the introduction of motor transport. Employees earned five shillings and two shillings posho (ration allowance) per month'.<sup>18</sup> The level of tenga-tenga employment was dependent on the volume of tobacco exports and imports of trade goods and government requisites.

The rise of trading enterprises in the post-war period was encouraged by the increased tempo in the development of tobacco farming as a result of the soldier settlement scheme which succeeded in inducing seventy-one settlers to establish farms in Eastern Province between 1920 and 1922.<sup>19</sup> At this time tobacco farms were established by settlers selected on the basis of possession of sufficient capital considering that Europeans who had enlisted in the war earned substantial benefits in the form of salaries, pensions and compensation for damages during the war'.<sup>20</sup> The second tobacco boom, 1922-1928, led to a tremendous increase in tobacco production. In 1924 Chipata produced 1.1 million pounds of flue-cured tobacco worth £91,000. This was 60 percent of agricultural products that year'.<sup>21</sup> The whole

province produced two and three-quarter million pounds of tobacco in the 1926-27 season and there were about 161 farmers in the province.<sup>22</sup> Thus, the post-war tobacco boom gave rise to a prosperous settler community and expanded opportunities for Africans to earn cash as farm labour.

The second tobacco boom stimulated the growth of European and African trade in two major ways. Firstly, the average settler had increased his income considerably and was in a position to spend a lot more on purchasing heavy stock and his necessities from European stores than previously. Secondly, the prosperous settler was able to invest a little bit more in his farm store owing to the presence of a large labour force. Additionally, Africans were beginning to grow tobacco under the tenant system.<sup>23</sup> They were also selling eggs, chickens, tobacco baskets, rice and maize to Europeans and Asians. Maize was bought by settlers as posho for farm labour.<sup>24</sup> On the whole the second tobacco boom was accompanied by growth of the money economy in the province which, in turn, encouraged the rise in trading.

The second tobacco boom also effected a notable improvement in the transport system of the area. Around 1920 Charterland purchased ox-wagons with a view to phasing out tenga-tenga in response to the increasing tempo of economic changes at the end of the war.<sup>25</sup> Two years later Charterland purchased twenty motor lorries to

run daily between Limbe and Dedza in Nyasaland. At this time twenty-five ox-wagons were operating between Chipata and Dedza.<sup>26</sup> By 1924 Motor transport was an established feature in Chipata. For example, Nyasa Rhodesia Transport Company was undertaking freight services between Chipata and Nyasaland.<sup>27</sup> The construction of what became known as the Great East Road around 1926 and the Beit Bridge across the Luangwa in the early 1930s opened up regular motor transport communication between Chipata and Lusaka. As a result Eastern Province was linked up to Southern Africa and the Copperbelt. Motor transport worked to the advantage of trading enterprises as bulk trade goods could be freighted to Chipata by quicker and more effecient means than tenga-tenga and ox-wagons.

Since trading thrived on tobacco farming, the tobacco slump resulting from the 1929-33 economic depression brought about a sharp decline in exports and imports for the province. The value of tobacco exports dropped from 70.058 pounds in 1929 to 46.663 pounds in 1930.<sup>28</sup> The economic depression ruined about ninety-five settlers and only about fifty-four managed to survive largely with government assistance.<sup>29</sup> In turn trade imports and customs revenue declined as follows.<sup>30</sup>

VALUE OF IMPORTS		VALUE OF CUSTOMS REVENUE
1928	94,779	11,058
1929	66,704	8,127
1930	46,729	6,646

Despite the decline in trade imports, African trade thrived fairly well owing to a substantial influx of Anabwela (returning migrants) bringing back home the little money they had managed to save which they readily spent on paying tax and satisfying the taste they had acquired for the factory produced consumer goods. Stores situated along the labour route especially benefited from the money emanating from Southern Rhodesia with the Anambwela.<sup>31</sup> In fact African business began its rise at this time. The Anabwela were also bringing back home capital which the most enterprising invested in small trading enterprises. The proliferation in hawkers and village stores indicates that the most enterprising Anabwela were venturing into African trade in order to earn a living during the lean times. Other business ventures initiated by the Anabwela were bakeries, butcheries, restaurants, carpentry and vegetable gardening.<sup>32</sup> Thus migrant labour is a major economic activity that influenced the development of trading in Eastern Province.

Migrant labour was a source of cash to Africans in Eastern Province from the earliest phase of colonial rule through the deferred pay system and remittances. Africans were migrating to Southern African to seek wage labour on the mines because mine employment was offering higher wages in comparison to locally available farm employment.<sup>33</sup> Those recruited by the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau received part of their remuneration on their return through the deferred pay system.<sup>34</sup> Those going by themselves could remit money through the Post Office as sending money to their families back home became an established practice among the migrant workers.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore renewed activity in tobacco farming at the end of the depression and the subsequent tobacco boom gave impetus to expanded trading in the 1930s.

It should be noted that underdevelopment analysts emphasise the role of migrant labour in the impoverishment of Eastern Province but overlook that money in the hands of Anabwela and the knowledge they came to possess about the industrial world was fundamental in paving the way for the emergence of African business in the province.<sup>36</sup>

#### 1.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN BUSINESS IN CHIPATA, 1900-1935

European business was predominant in African and European trade up to the economic depression of 1929-1933

when Asian business ascended to predominance in African trade. In this section, I will examine the development of European business in Chipata between 1900 and 1935 in order to provide the framework for the study of the rise of Asian business and the Asian trading class. I will demonstrate that European business dominated trading activities in Chipata until Asian business gained an upperhand in African trade in the 1930s.

There were three forms of trading enterprises in European business namely, the limited company, partnership and the sole enterprise. Trading firms originated from the metropolises but partnership enterprises were established by settlers within Chipata. Sole enterprises were founded by individual settlers who ran farm stores or/and undertook large-scale trading. All three forms of enterprises were involved in European and African trade.

Mandala was the pioneering trading firm in the district as it started trading there as early as 1900. Mandala also pioneered tenga-tenga freight services by transporting goods from Nkhota-kota in Nyasaland and Tete in Mozambique to North-Eastern Rhodesia and North-Western Rhodesia.<sup>37</sup> By 1912 Mandala had established stores in Petauke and Lundazi. It was also involved in wholesale trade and banking in addition to dealing in arms and ammunition.<sup>38</sup> Long before 1920, Mandala was trading in



the entire province.

In addition to Mandala, Charterland, Northern Rhodesia Trading Company, Kapata Syndicate and Kabula Stores established themselves in Chipata. In 1910 Charterland, which had been preoccupied with prospecting for minerals, diversified its commercial interests to farming and trading. By 1916 it was selling arms and ammunition. It was also involved in wholesale trade.<sup>39</sup> Four years later it was dealing in liquor for which a separate licence was required.<sup>40</sup> Kapata syndicate and Kubula Stores were engaged in general trading and the sale of liquor. Other trading companies were J.H. Highfield and Company and Ludwig Deuss and Company.<sup>41</sup> All these trading companies were part and parcel of the process of integrating the African into the money economy in the early phase of colonial rule.

Leading partnership in Chipata were Thom and Schinard as well as Food and Hayter. Both were general dealers. Additionally the former was an hotelier and auctioneer.<sup>42</sup> Partnerships participated in both European and African trade.

The sole enterprises was typically set up by a settler as a farm store. In fact trading was an integral aspect of commercial farming to the settler as labour was generally paid in trade goods prior to

the first tobacco boom. Johnston's observation as regards the importance of trading to the pioneer settler in Nyasaland was true for their counterparts in North-Eastern Rhodesia. Thus

originally when there was little or no cash in the country every planter had likewise to be a trader on a small scale as labourers were paid in trade goods, and all food he bought from the natives was purchased in the same manner.<sup>43</sup>

The under capitalised settler in particular undertook trading to raise income vital to his existence and development of his farm.<sup>44</sup> However, a few settlers in possession of sufficient capital were able to trade on a large scale by establishing a network of stores. Prominent entrepreneurs in Chipata were T.A. Paolucci, G. Campbell, H.G. Purchase, J.A. Seymour, F.M. Kennedy, R.M. Greer and J.C. Innes.

Innes succeeded in establishing a network of stores in the hinterlands of Chipata and Petauke by 1912.<sup>45</sup> He held an import licence to buy goods straight from suppliers to cater for his network of stores. He was also a broker and an auctioneer. However, around 1927 he sold his Indian Quarter Stores to McKay for reasons which are not clearly known.<sup>46</sup> It is likely that Asian competition was having its toll on the performance of his Indian Quarter Stores.

McKay, described as general merchant, auctioneer, clearing and forwarding agent and transport contractor in

1927,<sup>47</sup> fell into financial distress by 1930 as a result of the economic depression as well as Asian competition and he was cautioned by the District Commissioner to settle 54 pounds and 2 shillings in rental arrears.<sup>48</sup> The following year he sold off his Indian Quarter Stores since he was unable to outlive the depression as a trader. This act marked the collapse of European business in the Indian Quarter and the genesis of monopoly of the Indian Quarter by Asian business.

On the whole European business in African trade collapsed as a result of the economic depression. It became a common occurrence for European traders to fall into debt with the Asian trader. For example in 1929 Carr was sued by Mahamed Khamisa to recover 40 pounds 3 shillings and 2 pence; in 1932 G.R. Jeffrey was sued by O.H. Sundi over 10 pounds and 10 shillings and A.J.P. Knowles over 30 pounds and 10 shillings.<sup>49</sup> Debts as small as 10 pounds prove that Europeans had fallen into dire financial distress during the depression.<sup>50</sup> The European trading company was also adversely affected by the depression. In 1935 the DC, Chipata observed that 'Charterland which formerly had numberless stores throughout the province, has now closed nearly all'.<sup>51</sup> In the succeeding years the European trading company confined itself to European trade and the settler confined himself to farm stores. European business in African trade declined and Asian business gained an upperhand in African trade inspite of the depression. I

will examine why Asian business survived the depression below (pp. 46-49).

### 1.5 ORGANISATION OF EUROPEAN BUSINESS

The European trading firm was run on bureaucratic lines with its headquarters in London and sub-headquarters in either Blantyre or Chipata. For example, the head offices of Kubula and Mandala were in London and Glasgow respectively and their sub-headquarters in Blantyre. From Blantyre they established extensive trading networks in Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia.<sup>52</sup> A branch manager responsible for the management of stores in North-Eastern Rhodesia resided in Chipata. European supervisors regularly visited African stores manned by African shop-assistants known as Capitaos for stock-taking. European stores were manned exclusively by European capitaos.<sup>53</sup>

The partnership firm and the sole trader relied mainly on African capitaos. Innes employed African and Asian capitaos as well as a European supervisor. In fact the partnership enterprise and the sole enterprise concentrated on African trade which was more profitable than European trade as will be demonstrated below (pp. 18-20).

Due to high freight charges and the precarious mode of freighting goods from Tete to Chipata, wholesale trade

was essentially a domain of the trading firms since they commanded a large capital outlay to import goods in bulk and meet high freight charges. Until the introduction of motor transport in the 1920s, goods were freighted by tenga-tenga or ox-wagon over a one way trip distance of 225 miles.<sup>54</sup> However, wholesale trade was commercially viable owing to a proliferation of farm stores run by settlers who could ill-afford to import goods for their stores.

The European trading firm also undertook retailing in European and African trade. African trade was generally more profitable than European trade for two major reasons. Firstly, prior to the 1920s the European market was very limited owing to a small European population. For example, in 1914 there were only 143 Europeans in the district and around 1918 the population had grown to 158.<sup>55</sup> However, in the 1920s, the European market expanded considerably as the European population increased to 605 by 1927. But the depression caused a decline in the European population to 325 by 1930.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore extended credits to settlers particularly in the earliest period contributed to low turnover in European trade.<sup>57</sup> In African trade turnover was relatively high owing to the fact that popular line goods were sold on cash basis in a relatively bigger market.<sup>58</sup> Around 1910, for example, Mandala's store in Chipata, John Bull, was earning a monthly turnover of 50

pounds from a monthly stock of 150 pounds.<sup>59</sup>

Secondly, high turnover in African trade was realised by running a network of stores in centres of high concentration of population in the province. The trading firm enjoyed the advantage of economies of scale as it imported trade goods in bulk for its chain of stores. Furthermore, during the war and the immediate post-war period traders were co-operating in keeping prices of European and African goods uniformly high due to shortage of trade goods.<sup>60</sup>

Thirdly, overhead expenses and capital expenditure were lower in African trade than European trade largely because African capitaos were remunerated less than their European counterparts. In 1921 the Deputy Administrator observed that African capitaos are in many cases underpaid and consequently are apt to supplement their small pay by underhand means'.<sup>61</sup> The assistant Legal Adviser had made a similar observation in 1913.<sup>62</sup> The licence fee for a hinterland store was 2 pounds compared to 10 pounds for stores within the Township.<sup>63</sup> Hinterland stores were constructed of pole and dagga on half-acre plots leased at 10 shillings per month up to 1917 when the lease fee was raised to one pound per month.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, half-acre plots in the Indian Quarter were being sold at 35 pounds whereas half-acre plots in the European Quarter were being sold at 52 pounds. The

value of property erected on a single plot in the Indian Quarter fell below 500 pounds but had to be above 500 pounds in the European Quarter.<sup>65</sup> As a result of the foregoing factors European participation in African trade developed substantially between the first tobacco boom and the economic depression of 1929-1933. Having examined the features of European business I will now examine the development of Asian business and the Asian trading class in Chipata.

#### 1.6 BACKGROUND TO ASIAN SETTLEMENT IN CHIPATA, 1904-1905.

In this section I will demonstrate that settlers and Mandala strongly opposed the initial settlement of Asian traders in the district primarily because they feared that Asian competition in African trade would be harmful to the development of European business. I argue that racism became embedded in settler rationalisation of their opposition to Asian competition because the incoming rivals were ethnically and culturally distinct from European settlers.

The initial settlement of Asian traders in Chipata was initiated by Codrington, the Administrator of North-Eastern Rhodesia, in 1905. Codrington was largely adopting Johnston's Nyasaland Asian policy of utilising Asian traders as intermediaries between the European

trading firm and the African consumer.<sup>66</sup> Johnston held the view that settlers should concentrate on farming rather than trading which would be the domain of the European trading firm and the Asian trader:

It appears to me that as time goes on the European trading community will be limited to employees of two or three trading companies commanding considerable capital, and to a number of British Indians who will not in any way conflict with the commerce of the European firms and agencies. The remainder of European settlers will be rather planters than traders, disposing likewise of their produce to the commercial companies in British Central Africa.<sup>67</sup>

Due to North-Eastern Rhodesia's administrative and economic attachment to Nyasaland before 1911 as well as geographical proximity, Codrington replicated the Nyasaland Asian policy in North-Eastern Rhodesia. Codrington himself had worked in the Nyasaland Administration before becoming Administrator of North-Eastern Rhodesia<sup>68</sup>. In fact Johnston and Codrington were operating within the existing framework of utilising human resources from India in the colonisation process of Africa.<sup>69</sup>

Settler opposition to settlement of Asian traders in Chipata emerged in 1904 against the first two Asian traders, Abdulah Ismail of Blantyre and Osman Gani of Nkota-Kota.<sup>70</sup> It appears that these two traders aroused settler hostility because they were offering European traders stiff competition owing to Asian business methods



of underselling competitors and giving mbasela to win the goodwill of their customers.<sup>71</sup> As a result of European hostility they folded up their business in Chipata and returned to Nyasaland the same year. Seeing that settlers were hindering the establishment of Asian business, the following year Codrington promulgated a policy designed to lure Asian traders from Nyasaland to settle in Chipata in order that they should play a role in integrating Africans into the money economy by extending African trade into the hinterlands of the territory. Therefore the Administration established a trading zone for African trade designated the Indian Quarter and Asian traders began to trickle into Chipata in response to Codrington's Asian policy.

Renewed settlement of Asian traders in Chipata in 1905 was strongly opposed by settlers and Mandala. It galvanised them into associating politically in order to exert pressure on the Administration so that it could rescind Codrington's Asian policy. In early June, Kisson, Assistant Manager of Mandala, Schinard and Paolucci both farmer traders, authored a petition to the Administrator as representatives of European business which contained three major grievances.<sup>72</sup> Firstly, they complained that settlement of Asian traders in the territory would deter the prospective settler who was vital to the economic development in the area as trading was a necessary aspect of farming to the pioneer settler.

Secondly, they feared that Asian competition would be harmful to European business in view of the prevailing economic depression. They asserted that 'it is well known that the Asian trader does nothing towards the development of a country, his code of commercial conduct is not of a very high type, and we are satisfied the result will be to drive out the European traders'.<sup>73</sup>

Thirdly, they complained that Asian competition would lead to the collapse of the European trading firm because European trade by itself was not an economically viable venture. To forestall Asian competition, they implored the Administration to proscribe Asian immigration into North-Eastern Rhodesia.<sup>74</sup> The farmers Association added that Asian competition was undesirable owing to the limited amount of money spent by the Administration and settlers in the area.<sup>75</sup> In reply the Acting Administrator, Justice Beaufort, argued that Asian competition in African trade was desirable because it would enhance the development of African trade whether European business would be undermined or not:

If it [Asian competition] should have the unfortunate effect of damaging European traders it is a circumstance which can only be deplored as irremediable so long as Europeans will not make more strenuous efforts to cultivate them [native wants].<sup>76</sup>

In view of the unfavourable response from the the Administration, the settlers appealed to the BSAC Board of Directors in London which upheld Codrington's Asian policy on the grounds that the European trading firm

would benefit from the presence of Asian traders as was already the case in Nyasaland as well as Portuguese East Africa.<sup>77</sup> To the Board its regional and territorial interests were paramount over the sectional interests of settlers in Chipata. The BSAC's overriding interests lay in the hastened development of African trade so as to induce Africans to earn money to pay tax and purchase consumer goods by selling their labour or indigenous products. Therefore, inspite of opposition from the settlers and a representative of European trading firms, the BSAC sanctioned Asian settlement in Chipata.

Three major conclusion can be drawn from the controversy over the settlement of Asian traders in North-East Rhodesia. Firstly, settlers feared Asian competition because they knew that Asian traders would succeed in underselling European business in African trade by operating at lower costs than the European because Asian traders were very capable of maintaining a relatively low standard of living. However, this fear was intertwined with racism since the incoming rivals were distinct by colour, ethnicity as well as occupation. Secondly, to the BSAC Administration Asian traders would contribute to economic and social change in the territory by enlarging demand as well as satisfying consumer needs

among the Africans which, in turn, would hasten integration of the African into the money economy. Thirdly, the fear of Asian competition influenced the rise of settler politics in the area to safeguard their sectional interests as opposed to those of Asian business. In view of this conflict of interests the BSAC acted as an agent of sectional reconciliation in its capacity as the overall political authority.

In the emergent political economy Africans were the people from whom labour could be obtained to work the farms and the mines in addition to being a market for imported consumer goods. Asians became a link for the African in the import trade and commercial farming remained the domain of settlers. In the final analysis, Codrington's Asian policy contributed to the shaping up of a racially stratified society in which the racial factor assumed an economic dimension.

#### 1.7 THE RISE OF THE ASIAN TRADING CLASS, 1905-1935

In this section I will examine the rise of the Asian trading class in Chipata. I will demonstrate that the Asian trading class in the district had emerged by 1930. I argue that the tobacco booms, the First World War, migrant labour and the unique ability of Asian business to survive the economic depression of 1929-1933 all gave impetus to the rise of the Asian trading class.

Asian traders began to settle in Chipata under the aegis of the administration in 1905. Among the pioneers of Asian business were the Khamisa brothers, Osman and Mahomed as well as Osman Adam.<sup>78</sup> Osman Adam established stores in Chipata as an extension of his Blantyre firm. Asian employees manned his trading enterprise in Chipata whereas the Khamisa brothers personally manned their enterprise as they were domiciled in Chipata. By 1908 Osman Adam had built three stores in the Indian Quarter and the following year his Asian employees numbered seven.<sup>79</sup> The Khamisas had employed one Asian and several Africans, designated 'storeboys.'<sup>80</sup> The practice of employing Africans to perform menial tasks as 'storeboys' and Asians as Shop-Assistants became established in the earliest times.

By 1912 Osman Adam had established five stores and the Khamisas three within the Indian Quarter. Three years later the Khamisas increased their stores to five.<sup>81</sup> Their Asian employees increased to four and Osman Adam's to eleven.<sup>82</sup> In fact Osman Adam's employees made up the larger portion of the tiny Asian population prior to 1920. For example the 1914 Asian population of twenty-one was composed of nineteen employees of whom eleven worked for Osman Adam, four for Hassam Khamisa, three for J.C. Innes and one for Charterland.<sup>83</sup> In addition to traders and shop-assistants, two barbers and

two tailors immigrated into Chipata between 1908 and 1911.<sup>84</sup>

Around 1912 Osman Adam and the Khamisas diversified into wholesale trade by catering for European traders and African traders as a result of a trading boom created by the first tobacco boom.<sup>85</sup> Between 1911 and 1916 the first African traders, the Mattaka brothers, of Nyasaland origin, were running three stores, two in the Indian Quarter and one in Kambwiri's village.<sup>86</sup> Asian wholesale trade was further boosted by the proliferation in village stores in the 1930s. European traders emerged as major customers of the Asian wholesaler during the first tobacco boom. In 1914 the Manager of Charterland observed that 'many of the Europeans are already trading with the Indian firm and are glad to do so'.<sup>87</sup> At this stage fierce economic rivalry had given way to the mutual co-existence the BSAC had envisaged considering that the European trading firm preferred to trade with the Asian who was a cash buyer rather than the undercapitalised European trader.<sup>88</sup> It must be emphasised that the pioneer Asian trader had sufficient capital at his disposal because he was an established merchant in Nyasaland expanding into Chipata and not a penniless immigrant. The European trader preferred the Asian wholesaler to the European trading firm mainly because the Asian offered him credit terms of trade whereas the European trading firm did not generally offer credit. Consequently, it was a common occurrence

for the ailing European traders to accrue debts with Asian traders. For example in 1913 Osman Khamisa sued E. Haselton to recover 10 pounds plus 12 percent interest and Osman Adam sued A. Taylor to recover 41 pounds 3 shillings and 8 pence.<sup>89</sup> The Asian trader was generally determined to recover every single penny due to the limited market inspite of the tobacco boom. The second tobacco boom gave rise to more stores which boosted Asian wholesale trade in the 1920s.

The First World War created a trading boom period which enhanced the growth of the Asian trading class. The Khamisas were able to increase their stores from five in 1915 to seven in 1919. Asian stores increased from eight in 1912 to eleven in 1919. At this time six European traders owned thirteen native stores, Mandala owned two and Charterland owned ten.<sup>90</sup> The Asian population in the district increased from seventeen in 1911 to 21 in 1914 and to 28 in 1921.<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, Asians were a tiny minority in comparison to the numerically and politically stronger European community. For example the 1922 European population of 139 men, 59 women and 57 children was far bigger than the exclusively male Asian population of about 28.<sup>92</sup> Even though Osman Adam closed his Chipata enterprise, a few more Asian traders immigrated into Chipata in the 1920s as a result of the post-war trading boom.<sup>93</sup> Incoming traders such as K.M.B. Kadri of Lilongwe were trading as H.A. Hussein and Company in

rented premises around 1920.<sup>94</sup> Later Walli Mohamed Adam, M. Hamir, O.H. Sundi and Hussemia Kadri came to settle in Chipata as traders.<sup>95</sup>

Inspite of the economic depression in the late 1920s Asian business experienced expansion in two major ways. Firstly, Asian traders penetrated Lundazi and Petauke. Between 1927 and 1935 H.M. Kadri, W.M. Adam., M. Hamir and O.H. Sundi established stores in Lundazi villages such as Mlindana, Kosakwanda, Kawinga and Mbuzi.<sup>96</sup> In fact Sundi emerged as the leading trader in the expansion of Asian business into the outlying areas of Lundazi. Osman Hassam Dodia and Hassam Ayub were the forerunners in the penetration of the Petauke area as they had two stores each in Petauke by 1928.<sup>97</sup> Dodia had established another store near Luangwa bridge by 1931<sup>98</sup>. Thus, Asian traders had established themselves in the province as a whole by the early 1930s.

Secondly, expansion occurred within the Indian Quarter in the township at three levels. Firstly, each of the leading traders set about acquiring new plots within the Indian Quarter. As a result there was a scramble for plots among Asians traders. Hussemia, Sundi and Walli Adam embarked on acquiring plots to enlarge their enterprises<sup>99</sup>. The aim was to acquire adjoining premises available as half-acre plots in order to set up bigger trading premises or a chain of stores. Secondly,



the scramble for plots was encouraged by the split up of the Khamisa enterprise into two separate entities around 1930. After this split up Ibrahim Khamisa, Hassam Khamisa's son, established an enterprise called Hassam brothers and embarked on acquiring new plots. Ibrahim and his two brothers had inherited their father's share in the Khamisa enterprise on his death in 1925.<sup>100</sup> Thirdly, other Asian traders resorted to operating from rented premises or buying trading premises from collapsing European traders. For example, Ibrahim Haji Kassam and Abba Mohamed were renting premises from McKay who was undergoing financial distress. Later they were able to buy these premises when McKay sold off his Indian quarter property. This expansion which took place at a time when European business in African trade was collapsing propelled Asians business into a position of dominance in African trade by the early 1930s. The Asian population had grown to 31, consisting 26 men, two women and three children.<sup>101</sup> Therefore, expansion of Asian business enhanced the establishment of the Asian trading class in Chipata and Eastern Province as a whole. I will demonstrate why Asian business was able to outlive the economic depression below(pp. 46-48 )

#### 1.8 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE RISE OF THE ASIAN TRADING CLASS: 1912-1935.

The rise of the Asian trading class to a position

of predominance in African trade by the 1930s was influenced by economic activities which occurred in the area between 1912 and 1935 notwithstanding the economic depression. As demonstrated above on (pp.5-11), tobacco booms greatly enhanced the rise of Asian business as well as the Asian trading class in Chipata because trading was heavily dependent on the viability of commercial farming. The first World War also influenced the rise of Asian business. Cash in the hands of Africans and the shortage of goods during the war created favorable conditions for profiteering which was especially rife among Asian traders. In 1918, the Magistrate, Chipata, observed that Asians were profiteering in native goods, particularly hoes which were in short supply but on very high demand by the Africans. They were selling hoes and blankets at 10 shillings and 6 pence and 4 shillings and 6 pence each respectively.<sup>102</sup> In fact the Magistrate threatened he would recommend that Asians should not be given any more licences 'unless they agree to charge reasonable prices'.<sup>103</sup> To try and curb marketeering in hoes, the Administration appointed Mandala and J.C. Innes as its agents to sell the hoes at 3 shillings and 3 pence each, 3 pence being commission on each hoe.<sup>104</sup> Nevertheless profiteering in hoes continued into the immediate post-war period. In 1920 the Native Commissioner, Lundazi observed that Africans themselves were profiteering in hoes inspite of the administrative

measures.<sup>105</sup> The Asian trader particularly took advantage of the shortage of goods to earn high profits on native goods he managed to procure. As a result the Khamisas managed to increase their stores from five in 1915 to six in 1919 and to eight in 1922.<sup>106</sup> Therefore the post-war tobacco boom found Asian business in a strong position as result of the war time trading boom.

Improved communication by motor transport between Chipata and Nyasaland as well as between Chipata and Lusaka gave further impetus to the rise of the Asian trading class as Asian traders began to rely on motor transport to freight bulky trade goods from Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. Around 1924 Asian traders were hiring Nyasa Rhodesia Transport Company to freight trade goods into Chipata.<sup>107</sup> Prominent traders such as Sundi who owned a lorry were utilising motor transport to supply their stores in the outlying areas with trade goods.<sup>108</sup> Furthermore small traders were also able to establish stores because they had a more ready supply of goods from prominent Asians than previously. On the whole small traders became an established feature of Asian business largely as a result of motor transport which made it relatively easier for the Asian wholesaler to freight trade goods into Chipata.

The rise of the Asian trading class was further enhanced by the growth of the cash economy in the

post-war period. In addition to growing Virginia tobacco and selling maize to tobacco farmers, Africans were increasingly embarking on growing rice for sale to Europeans and Asians. In the Lundazi villages of Kambwiri and Chitungura, for example, Africans were selling rice to Europeans and Asians at what the Native Commissioner considered to be fairly good prices.<sup>109</sup> In other areas of the province Africans were selling craft goods. In 1922 Luangwa Valley Africans were earning money by selling reed mats at 6 pence per square yard.<sup>110</sup> Growing vegetables also emerged in the 1920s most likely at the initiative of Anabwela who had worked as 'garden boys'. Vegetable gardening was being successfully undertaken in the Msandire and Rukuzie areas of Chipata around 1929.<sup>111</sup> An increase in money earning activities among Africans led to the growth of the cash economy which, in turn, stimulated the rise of the African trade and the Asian trading class.

Migrant labour also played a major role in the rise of the Asian trading class in two ways. Firstly, since consumer goods such as clothes, soap and parafin had become necessities to the Anabwela during their stay Kuwalale (urban areas), they were prone to spend cash they had managed to save on buying consumer goods. This meant that the influx of Anabwela, especially during the economic depression of 1929-1933, created some business in African trade.

Secondly, the Anabwela contributed to the rise of an African entrepreneur class in African trade which, in turn, stimulated expansion in Asian business since emerging African traders were almost entirely dependent on the Asian for their supplies. From the early 1920s the most enterprising Anabwela were keen to invest the little money they had saved in trading enterprises such as hawking, village stores and bakeries though BSAC Administration was hindering them from doing so.<sup>112</sup> As a result in 1924 Chief Mpezeni implored the Governor to make it possible for 'men who returned from work with plenty of money' to be allowed to go into trading.<sup>113</sup> In fact, savings by the Anabwela were a very important source of capital to the emerging African entrepreneur class in the district. In 1935, for example, 38 Anabwela from Lundazi opened up saving accounts with Barclays Bank, Chipata, some of which amounted to 30 pounds even though the average amount was 4 pounds.<sup>114</sup> Unlike the BSAC the British government encouraged the development of African entrepreneurship from 1924.<sup>115</sup> By 1930 the Fort Jameson Town Management Board had set aside a trading center for Africans in the Native Quarter and in 1931 the Provincial Commissioners Conference approved the establishing of trading centres for Africans in Northern Rhodesia as a whole.<sup>116</sup> In this favorable climate, the most enterprising Anabwela began taking up trading on an increasing scale. Zilole, for example, who

emerged the leading African businessman in the province during the colonial period. established a bakery around 1930 in the Native Quarter on his return from Southern Rhodesia.<sup>117</sup> Five years later he opened a butchery. By this date there were 26 African village stores and 44 hawkers in Chipata.<sup>118</sup> Bakers, hoteliers, tailors, and cobblers had become established in the Native Quarter.<sup>119</sup>

It is at this time that African hawkers emerged in Chipata largely owing to the practice among the Anabwela of bring back home goods which they wished to sell in order to raise cash.<sup>120</sup> Chipata recorded 87 African hawkers in 1933, fifty-nine in 1934 and forty-eight in 1935.<sup>121</sup> In Eastern Province as a whole there were 193 hawkers in 1932, one hundred and forty in 1933, one hundred in 1934 and eighty-eight in 1935<sup>122</sup>. The decline in hawkers by 1935 was possibly due to either stiff competition from Asian stores and village stores or a fall in the numbers of the Anabwela following the end of the depression. Emergent African traders contributed to the expansion of Asian business because they were essentially dependent on the Asian trader for their wholesale facilities.

African traders were basically dependent on the Asian trader for their supplies from the genesis of African business in Chipata. The Mattaka brothers relied on Osman Adam and around 1921 Mpezeni relied on Hassam

Khamisa for supplies of singlets, calico, shirts, soap, matches, knives, boots, razors, scissors, needles and beads for his store.<sup>123</sup> There were three major reasons for the African trader's dependence on the Asian. Firstly, due to trading segregation in the township the African had no choice but to purchase his stock from the Indian Quarter. Secondly, the generally under-capitalised African trader could purchase goods on credit terms from the Asian in spite of the Native Credit sales Ordinance.<sup>124</sup> Thus Moezeni was purchasing goods from Khamisa on credit terms.<sup>125</sup> In 1930 the Local Administration observed that:

Strict attention will have to be kept on the native owned stores to avoid any risk of the owner becoming involved with the Indian trader so that the latter practically becomes the controller of the store while the native owner would be relegated to the position of capitao.<sup>126</sup>

Thirdly, the Asian was particularly adept at stocking goods for the African market as well as satisfying the African consumer as I will demonstrate below. On the whole migrant labour and the emergence of African traders played a fundamental role in sustaining the rise of the Asian trading class in Chipata.

Another factor which played a major role in sustaining the rise of the Asian trading class was that the pioneers of Asian business possessed capital, managerial skills and business connections in Nyasaland, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia. The 1926 Memorandum of

Partnership between M.C. Khamisa and H.O. Khamisa gives some idea about the magnitude of capital and business experience commanded by the prominent Asian trader.<sup>127</sup>

They had been established traders in Mozambique and Nyasaland before immigrating into Chipata. In Mozambique they owned real estate investment since they were renting out their business premises to Asian traders. They also owned buildings in Dedza, Nyasaland. In Chipata they had acquired five plots within the Indian Quarter and had put up buildings of brick and iron sheet roofs by 1928. The computed value of their business assets was given as follows:—

Fixed property in Fort Jameson	800 pounds
Fixed property in Limbe	500 pounds
Fixed property in Beira	300 pounds
Stock and trade in Fort Jameson	3500 pounds
Capital account of approximately	7800 pounds

This amount of capital was considerable in contrast to what an average European trader to whom trading was a sideline business venture to farming must have had at his disposal. In general prominent Asian traders could afford to acquire an average of four plots at once. Around 1930 Hussemia and Sundi wanted to acquire a series of plots each within the Indian Quarter. Sundi was ready to spend between 500 pounds and 600 pounds to develop two plots. At this stage he owned a lorry and employed several Asian employees.<sup>128</sup> He also had a network of



stores in Lundazi. In fact the average Asian trader possessed substantial capital judging from the scramble for plots in the Indian Quarter. For example Walli Adam was able to purchase two plots at a cost of 61 pounds seven shillings and eight pence at once on which he would erect building of brick and iron sheet roofing.<sup>129</sup> Similarly, other traders intent on acquiring plot in the Indian Quarter could afford the necessary costs pertaining to property value. Therefore, in terms of capital and skills relating to organisation of African trade, the Asian trader was far more advanced than the average European sole trader and the novice African trader. This is one major reason why Asian traders rose to a position of dominance in African trade. A combination of economic factors and unique organisation of Asian business as discussed below (pp. 43 -48 ) was responsible for the rise of the Asian trading class in Chibata.

#### 1.9 TRADING POLICIES OF THE BSAC AND THE NORTHERN RHODESIAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS: 1905-1935.

The colonial authority was able to subject Asian traders to racial discrimination in trading through two major ways. It could enact racially restrictive trading regulations or apply trading regulations in a discriminatory manner even though they were not racially restrictive in wording. An examination of the trading policies and administrative practices will demonstrate that class and race were fused and mutually reinforcing

since racism influenced the commercial legal framework. I argue that even though the BSAC sanctioned the settlement of the pioneer Asian traders, its subsequent administrative practices were largely guided by the primary interests of settlers. I also argue that in the 1920s and the 1930s the colonial government did not apply trading regulations in a racially restrictive manner as it encouraged both Asians and Africans to trade in the Native reserves. But from 1939 the colonial government pursued a policy of Africanisation of trade in Native Reserves.

Asian traders did not establish stores in the hinterlands during BASC's rule largely because there existed a trading regulation which excluded Asians from trading away from the Indian Quarter. This meant that Asian business was confined to the Indian Quarter throughout the rule of the BASC by means of a discriminatory trading regulation. Europeans stood to gain from this regulation by being cushioned from direct Asian competition in the outlying areas where they ran farm stores. Since commercial farming was the mainstay of economic progress in the area, settlers could exert pressure on the Administration through their farmers association which emerged as a potent forum of settler politics.

However, the racially restrictive trading regulation was not supported by all the European trading firms. The North Charterland Company in

particular was opposed to the exclusion of Asian traders from the hinterlands. In 1914 McKerrow, Manager of Charterland, expressed the view that this restriction was unduly unfair to Asian business because more trading was taking place in the hinterland than in the Indian Quarter.<sup>130</sup> Even though Asian traders were excluded from trading in th hinterlands, business prospects within the township were not as poor as McKerrow implied. To the contrary, Asian business was doing fairly well considering that Asian traders were conducting a great deal of wholesale business with European at this time. In essence, McKerrow desired Asian participation in the retail trade of the hinterlands largely because this meant that Asian business would concentrate on retailing rather than wholesaling. Such a development would create more wholesale business for his firm. Asian competition in wholesaling was less desirable to charterland than retailing because the European trading firm was generally finding it increasingly troublesome to effeciently supervise stores situated all over the province.<sup>131</sup> The following year McKerrow impressed it upon the Administrator to allow Asians to trade in specified centres outside the township 'as the Indian was much less objectionable than the Jew Boy'.<sup>132</sup> Being whites Jews were objectionable as they would offer Europeans competition in European trade from which Asians were excluded. But the Administrator was not amenable to allowing Asian trading away from the Indian Quarter. In

fact he preferred African traders to Asian traders in the outlying areas. In 1923 he asserted that 'it will be better for stores in Native reserves to be run by natives, certainly not by Indians.' In areas earmarked for Native reserves only Mandala would be allowed to trade<sup>133</sup>. Administrative officials in general considered Asian trading in the hinterlands as detrimental not only to European interests but also to African interests for reasons of both economic and racial dimensions. Settlers found Asian competition undesirable as farm stores were an important source of ready cash in the 1920s. It should be emphasised that there were no administrative impediments to Asian expansion within the Indian Quarter throughout BSAC rule.

The Northern Rhodesian government abandoned the racially restrictive trading regulation pertaining to exclusion of Asian business from the hinterlands between 1929 and 1939. It appears that in keeping with the British policy of not subjecting British subjects to legislation conceived purely on racial grounds, the colonial officers did not restrict Asian trading away from the township in the early phase of its rule and, thus, paved way for Asian expansion into the outlying areas. The 1929 Provincial Commissioners' Conference resolved that Asians should be allowed to trade in Native Reserves which had been established the previous year.<sup>134</sup>

It was practicable to allow Asian traders in the Native reserves as the administrative circles shared the view that African business was not yet capable of catering for the African consumer. As a result of a favourable trading regulation as well as a favourable disposition within the administration circles, Asian traders penetrated the hinterlands as far afield as Lundazi and Petauke.

It is also likely that Asian opposition to racially restrictive regulations played a role in influencing the colonial officers to abandon racial trading practices as regards Asian expansion away from the township. Generally Asians in Northern Rhodesia had begun to oppose racially restrictive trading regulations in the early phase of the colonial government. For example, the British Indian Association sent a petition to the Governor in 1927 whose major complaint was that the local administrators along the line of rail were subjecting Asian business to racially discriminatory practices in trading. As they were 'pure British subjects, law-abiding and faithful to His Majesty's Government,' they implored the Governor to redress the situation.<sup>135</sup> Asian complaints to the Central government tended to have the effect of restraining the local administrators from applying trading regulations in an outrightly racially discriminatory manner. In Chipata Asians were represented on the Town Management Board from 1925 and

were, therefore, part and parcel of the local administration.<sup>136</sup>

Expansion of Asian business into the European Quarter was, however, subjected to a racially restrictive regulation meant to retain this trading zone exclusively for European trade by both the BSAC and the colonial government. Throughout colonial rule Asian business was excluded from the European Quarter by applying trading regulations in a discriminatory manner in keeping with the dictates of a racially stratified society.

#### 1.10 THE NATURE OF ASIAN BUSINESS

There were two forms of Asian business, namely the sole enterprise and the partnership firm. Osman Adam's firm was of the former type while the Khamisa firm was a latter type. Osman Adams's firm was run on bureaucratic lines more or less as the European trading firm. An Asian Manager responsible for the management of the firm was stationed in Blantyre and an Asian Branch Manager was stationed in Blantyre and an Asian Branch Manager resident in Chipata supervised the management of the Chipata enterprise. It appears that the Head Office of Adam's firm was in India where Adam himself resided. Unlike the European trading firm which relied on African capitaes, Adam relied on Asians employed under the traditional contract system which will be examined subsequently. Partnership was of two kinds. The first

kind, like that of the Khamisas, was contracted among brothers or cousins. The second, like that of Walli Adam and H. Hamir, was contracted among friends. The sole enterprise and the joint firm of brothers were basically family businesses.

The general pattern of establishing Asian firms in Chipata was that an enterprising trader who had acquired initial capital either in Nyasaland or Mozambique came to settle in Chipata and personally managed his stores. He engaged shop-assistants and in some cases African capitaos as the number of his stores increased.<sup>137</sup> Typically Africans were employed as 'store boys' and Asians as capitaos. In general Asian stores were managed in a personalised way considering that the trader himself was available to make quick decisions based on the exigencies of the moment. His personal judgement, initiative and intuition, unlike the African capitao who had to abide by the etiquettes of a formalised communication structure, was vital in winning the patronage of Africans and satisfying their wants. Even Asian employees had a leeway in operating their stores in a personalised way. Africans employed by Europeans could not compete with the Asian as regards 'negotiable' prices, mbasela and entertainment gimmicks because it was not the policy of European business to employ such business methods.<sup>138</sup> Therefore, unlike the African capitao the Asian trader utilised the most effective

methods of winning patronage and goodwill of the Africans because of personalised management.

The Asian trader was also able to operate with minimal overhead costs in comparison to the European for the following reasons. An established trader relied on imported Asian labour from Nyasaland, Mozambique and India under the contract system.<sup>139</sup> This contract labour proved relatively cheap and extremely efficient in two ways. Firstly, employees were paid very low wages because they were largely teenagers with no families of their own to look after. Furthermore, boarding and lodging expenses were incurred by the sponsor throughout the tenure of the contract period under an extended family budget.<sup>140</sup> Clothing and incidental expenses were debited from the employee's salary normally paid at the end of the contract in a lump sum. The actual salary was very low partly because the employee was looked after by the employer called sponsor. Moreover, this cheap labour was very efficient since the employee who lived under the same roof as his sponsor worked honestly for long hours because his incentive and motivation emanated from the on-the-job training as well as the assistance his sponsor would extend to him when establishing a store of his own at the end of the contract, rather than the actual pay packet. Later it will be demonstrated that beginning in the 1930s it became an established pattern for employees to progress into traders. Thefts by Asian employees were



unusual because it was impracticable for an employee to steal goods when he lived under the same roof as his employer. Stealing cash was equally impracticable since it would not be possible for him to spend the money in other Asian stores without raising suspicions. In fact in Asian business ethics it is considered anathema to steal cash because the trader needs cash to settle his debts with his suppliers.<sup>141</sup> The fear of dismissal also made the Asian employee to be devoted to his sponsor. In a study of Asian traders in Sierra Leone, Merani and Van der Laan reached a similar conclusion: 'in certain cases the employer has the right to dismiss and repatriate an employee before his term has been completed. Such a measure may ruin a man, so that employees have always been afraid of dismissal'.<sup>142</sup>

Frugality was particularly important in enabling Asian business to survive the economic depression. During the depression there occurred a general constriction in turnover and some Asian traders were compelled to sell 'under the cost price in order to meet pressing liabilities'.<sup>143</sup> Sundi's average monthly turnover for his Lundazi stores, for example, dropped from 12 pounds in 1930 to 2 pounds in 1932.<sup>144</sup> As a result it was not uncommon for the Asian wholesaler to sue fellow Asians for outstanding debts which could be as small as 4 pounds.<sup>145</sup> For example, in 1932 Kasam Ayub sued Husseinmia Kadri to recover 60 pounds.<sup>146</sup> The

following year Omar Haji Adam owed Hassam Khamisa 33 pounds 15 shillings and six pence.<sup>147</sup> Omar himself was owed 73 pounds 10 shillings by Dhaya Rama.<sup>148</sup> In fact Omar's business collapsed. Sundi was compelled to close his store at Kambombo and to sell his Tembwe Store to Muhono, his store capitao, in order to concentrate on stores where good business was possible due to an influx of the Anambwela.<sup>149</sup> Nevertheless, the majority of Asian traders survived the depression by struggling against the odds of constricted turnover and intra-trade competition. In fact inspite of the depression Asian business expanded into the outlying areas largely because the ability of the Asian trader to maintain a low standard of living, in contrast to settlers, enabled him to cut down on his domestic expenses rather than consume his capital. This was possible because the mainstay of Asian diet was cheap locally available rice. Furthermore his home contained the barest adornments and he wore simple pyjama-like attire. As a moslem he was not supposed to take alcohol. The pioneer Asian trader led an ascetic life and practised frugality almost to the extreme as the case of Sundi indicates. Sundi, 'one of the richest Indians' is reputed to have been 'the chief miser' because he dressed poorly and could not easily part with a penny even though his office could be full of boxes of matches and cigarettes in which he kept his money.<sup>150</sup> But settlers employed two or three house servants and frequently held parties at which whisky was

consumed in excess.<sup>151</sup> It was also largely because of the frugal mode of life that the pioneer Asian trader was able to explore untapped markets in the outlying areas of relatively backward Lundazi. Therefore, frugality was a fundamental feature of Asian business which played a major role in the ascendency of Asian traders into a position of dominance in African trade.

The fact that Pioneer Asian traders left their families behind also helped in the reduction of domestic expenses to some extent. Families left behind in India by the strata of married traders and employees lived mainly on the land until the immigrant was able to earn enough to sustain a family. Up to around 1927 the Asian population was exclusively male. By 1930 there were only two Asian females and three children in comparison to 95 women and 63 children in the European population.<sup>152</sup> Furthermore, being away from home, the Asian trader could use his discretion in remitting money to meet extended family obligations rather than compulsion from the clansmen depending on the level of his earnings.<sup>153</sup>

It must also be emphasised that Asian traders were engaged in cut throat competition whose intensity took on the character of family feuds as internecine quarrels between the Khamisa and Osman Adam's employees demonstrated. For example in January 1911, Ahmed, Bin Ali, Ali Hassam and Omar Sali sued Khamisa's employee.

Khassam, for assault. A native had bought a piece of cloth from Ali at one shilling and six pence but he later took it back because Khassam told him it was worth one shilling. This ignited a fight between the Khamisas and Osman Adam's employees.<sup>154</sup> The same year assault cases numbers twenty-one to thirty-five were of this nature. One such fight resulted in damage to windows and the door to one of Adam's stores.<sup>155</sup> Assault cases and 'causing a breach to the peace' arising out of a struggle for customers were an integral aspect of Asian business between 1905 and the early 1920s.<sup>156</sup>

To try to curb violent business competition, the local administration outlawed the wooing of customers in 1918.<sup>157</sup> Prior to this Asians were employing 'store boys' for the specific purpose of wooing customers. Violent competition must have been a consequence of a relatively small market owing to the low level of the cash economy. Traders were desperate for customers and for every single penny. Moreover Asian traders were confined to the Indian quarter to protect European business in the outlying areas from direct Asian competition. As a result intra-trade competition became very fierce. Violent competition declined in the 1920s, particularly around 1924, largely because Asian business was given room to explore untapped markets in the outlying areas.<sup>158</sup> By 1930 some measure of unity among Asians had been achieved

as the D.C. reported that Asian traders 'were a very law abiding type and give little trouble'.<sup>159</sup> Consequently, violent intra-trade competition was superseded by sober competition.

In this Chapter I have demonstrated that settlers and Mandala were opposed to settlement of Asian traders in Chipata primarily because of fear of Asian competition in African trade and racist arguments were used to justify this fear because the incoming rivals were racially distinct. The BSAC sanctioned Asian settlement in spite of settler opposition in order to enhance development of African trade which, in turn, entailed the integration of the African into the money economy. Even though the administration initiated the settlement of Asians in the area, it took care to cushion European business from direct Asian competition in the hinterlands through a racially restrictive trading regulation. Therefore, the racial factor assumed economic dimensions in settler politics.

The major factors that influenced the eventual establishment of the Asian trading class were unique organisation of Asian business, possession of capital and colonial government trading regulations favourable to Asian expansion in the hinterlands. The pioneers of Asian business, whose springboard was Nyasaland, were professional traders employing business methods suitable

to African trade within the context of a racially stratified social setting. Furthermore, they practised frugality particularly during lean trading times. As a result Asian traders managed to survive the depression which succeeded in ruining European business in African trade and ascended to a position of predominance in African trade in the early 1930s.

## NOTES

1. In 1900 the magisterial Districts of North-Eastern Rhodesia were defined as North Luangwa, West Luangwa and East Luangwa - East Luangwa comprised Chipata, Petauke and Lundazi. In 1934 East Luangwa was renamed Eastern Province. See, Stone, J.C., A Guide to the Administration of Boundaries of Northern Rhodesia. O'dele Memorial Monography No. 7. Department of Geography, University of Aberdeen, 1979.
2. The trading area set aside exclusively for African trade in the township was designated Indian Quarter.
3. For detailed examination of pre-capitalist trade in Eastern Zambia see, for example, J.P. Mtisi, 'The Economic Impact of Colonial Rule in Eastern Zambia, 1900-1953: The Experiences of Chipata and Petauke.' Ph.D Thesis (University of Ibadan, 1984), Chapter One.
4. Wiese acquired for himself a concession of 10,000 square miles from Mpezeni in 1885. He later sold this land to the Mozambique Gold concession which, in turn, sold it to the North Charterland Exploration Company Limited.
5. Barnes, Politics in a Changing Society, p. 72.
6. National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ), KDG 1/11/12, Native Affairs, 1919-1922. Magistrate, Fort Jameson, to Secretary of Native Affairs, Livingstone, 8 April, 1919.
7. NAZ, BS 3/185, East African Commission Visit 1924-1925. Controller Customs to Treasurer, Livingstone, 30 August, 1924.
8. NAZ, KSJ 4/1, Annual Reports, 1930. Provincial Commissioner's Report, 31 December, 1930.
9. For a detailed examination of tobacco farming in the province see Mtisi, 'The Economic Impact of Colonial Rule,' L.H. Zgambo, 'Farm Labour in the Eastern Province of Zambia, 1898-1964,' M.A. (University of Zambia, 1983).
11. NAZ, KSJ 4/1, Reports, Annual, Half Yearly, Quarterly, Tour, 1917-1919. Magistrate, Fort Jameson, to Secretary for Native Affairs, Livingstone, 31 March, 1917.

12. NAZ. KDG 8/1/2. Annual Reports, 1913-14. Petauke Annual Reports, 1914.
13. NAZ. KDG 1/15/1. North Charterland Exploration Company Equiry , 1912-1913. Memorandum by NCEC.
14. I.J.B. Jokonya. 'East Luangwa, 1895-1947: A Study in the Colonial Land Policy in the Eastern Province of Zambia.' Ph.D. Thesis (University of Sussex, 1973), 142.
15. Jokonya. 'East Luangwa, 1895-1947,' 131.
16. Report of the Commission on the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia (London: H.M.S.O., 1938), p. 25.
17. NAZ. KDG 8/1/3. Annual Reports, 1918-1923. Annual Report for Fort Jameson, 31 March, 1920.
18. W. Tapson. The Old Timer (Cape Town: Howard Timmis, 1957), p. 71.
19. Jokonya. 'East Luangwa, 1895-1947,' 148.
20. Jokonya. 'East Luangwa, 1895-1947,' 142.
21. R.E. Baldwin. Economic Development and Export Growth: A Study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 14.
22. Report of the Commission on the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia, p. 14.
23. Mtisi. 'The Economic Impact of Colonial Rule,' 330.
24. J. Pletcher. 'Agricultural change in Eastern Province, Zambia,' Unpublished History Staff Seminar Paper, History Department, University of Zambia (1979), 5. Posho is a corruption of the word ration. It was an established practice for farmers to provide food ration or ration allowance to farm labour.
25. A.G.E. Tapson 'Transport in the Early Days at Fort Jameson,' Northern Rhodesia Journal, 6.1 (1952), 54.
26. NAZ. KDG 8/1/3. Annual Reports, 1918-1923. Annual Reports, Fort Jameson, 31 March, 1920.
27. For example. Hassam Khamisa hired the Nyasa Rhodesia Transport Company in 1924 from



Nyasaland to Chipata at a cost of about 63 pounds NAZ. KDG 7/1/1, Registers: Civil and Criminal. 1904-1937. Case Number 19. 17 December, 1924.

28. NAZ. RSJ 4/1. Annual Reports, 1930. Provincial Commissioner's Report, 31 December, 1930.
29. Report of the Commission on the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia, p. 25.
30. NAZ. RSJ 4/1. Annual Reports, 1930. Provincial Commissioner's Report, 31 December, 1930.
31. NAZ. RSJ 4/1. Annual Reports 1930 Annual Report, Petauke District, 1930; NAZ, KDG 8/4/3. Tour Reports, 1928-1932. Report on Tour made by R. Crawford, Cadet Officer, Lundazi, October, 1932.
32. NAZ, KSJ 4/1. Annual Reports, 1930. Annual Report Fort Jameson, 1930; NAZ KDG 8/4/3.
33. L.H. Zgambo, 'Farm Labour in the Eastern Province,' 3.
34. Mtisi, 'The Economic Impact of Colonial Rule,' 266
35. By 1930 remitting money through the Post Office had taken root: NAZ, KSJ 4/1. Annual Reports, 1930. Provincial Commissioner's Report, 31 December, 1930.
36. For example Mtisi underplays the role of migrant labour in the emergence of African entrepreneurship: Mtisi, 'The Economic Impact of Colonial Rule,' 366-7.
37. H. MacMillan 'The Origin and Development of the African Lakes Company, 1878-1908', Ph.D Thesis (University of Edinburgh, 1970), 432.
38. NAZ, KDG 5/1. Chipata District Notebooks, Volume I.
39. NAZ, KDG 5/1. Chipata District Notebooks, Volume II.
40. NAZ, KDG 5/1. Chipata District Notebooks, Volume III.
41. North-Eastern Rhodesia Government Gazette Volume I, 1903; Volume 2, 1904, Volume 3, 1905, Volume 4, 1906
42. NAZ, KDG 5/1, Chipata District Notebooks, Volume 1.

43. H.H. Johnston . British Central Africa (London: Methuen and Co., 1897) p. 178.
44. NAZ. BS 1/32, Issuing, Introducing and Granting of Trading Rights to Indian Traders, 1905. Panlocci, Fort Jameson, to Secretary, BASAC Board, London, 24 November, 1905.
45. NAZ, KDG 5/1, Chipata District Notebook, Volume II.
46. NAZ. KDG 1/8/4, East Luangwa Correspondence, Lands, 1917-1931. McKay to District Commissioner, Fort Jameson, 16 December, 1928.
47. NAZ. KDG 1/8/4, East Luangwa Correspondence. Th information is carried in his headed letters, for example McKay to District Commissioner, Fort Jameson, 14 October, 1929.
48. NAZ. KDG 7/1/1, East Luangwa Correspondence. Secretary, Livingstone, to District Commissioner, Fort Jameson, 6 May, 1930.
49. NAZ. KDG 7/1/1, Registers, Civil and Criminal, 1904-1937. Case Number 5, 7 February, 1929; Case Number 8, 26, July, 1932; Case Number 7, 26 July, 1932.
50. NAZ. KDG 1/8/3, East Luangwa Correspondence. Agent, Kubula Stores to Magistrate, Fort Jameson, 21 November, 1921.
51. NAZ. Sec 2/85, Eastern Province, Fort Jameson District Annual Reports, 1935-1938. Annual Report. For Jameson, 1935
52. NAZ. KDG 1/8/2, East Luangwa Correspondence. Magistrate Fort Jameson, to Secretary, Livingstone, 16 August, 1917; Secretary Livingstone, to Magistrate, Fort Jameson, 6 September 1917.
53. NAZ. KDG 1/8/2, East Luangwa Correspondence. Magistrate Fort Jameson, to Secretary, Livingstone, 16 August, 1917; Secretary Livingstone, to Magistrate, Fort Jameson, 6 September 1917.
54. NAZ. KDG 1/15/2, North Charterland Exploration Company Enquiry, 1912-13. Memorandum by NCEC: Tapson, The Old Timer, p. 69.
55. There were infact 89 men, 27 women and 27 children in 1914 and 63 men, 41 women and 54 children in 1918: NAZ. KDG 8/1/2, Annual Reports, 1913-14. Annual Report. Fort Jameson, 31 March, 1915; NAZ

KDG 4/1. Reports: Annual, Half-Yearly, Quarterly, Tour. 1916-1933. Annual Report, East Luangwa District. 31 March, 1918.

56. NAZ. KSJ 4/1. Annual Reports, 1930. Provincial Commissioner's Report. 31 December, 1930.
57. NAZ. BS 1/32. Issuing Introducing and Granting Trading Rights to Indian Traders, 1905. Assistant Manager, Mandala, Fort Jameson, to Secretary, BSAC Board, London, 27 November, 1905.
58. NAZ. KDG 8/1/2. Annual Reports, 1913-1914. Lundazi Annual Report, 1914 .
59. NAZ. KDG 6/1.. Records: Civil and Criminal, 1908-1912. Case Number 4, 1910 - ALC Vs Solomon. Native Storekeeper charged with larceny.
60. NAZ. KDG 8/1/3. Annual Reports, 1918-1923. Annual Report, Fort Jameson, 31 March, 1921.
61. NAZ. BS 3/350. Subsidiary Stores General Ruling, East Luangwa Native Reserves, 1921-1924. Deputy Administrator to Administrator, Livingstone, 24 October, 1922.
62. NAZ. KDG 1/9/2. Legal, 1913-14. Extracts from Assistant Legal Advisor's Minute to Magistrate, Kasama, 3 October, 1913.
63. NAZ. BS 3/350. Subsidiary Stores General Ruling, 1921-1924. Acting Treasurer to the Secretary, Livingstone, 25 July, 1922.
64. NAZ. KDG 1/8/2. East Luangwa Correspondence, Secretary, Land Board, Livingstone, to District Commissioner, 3 November, 1917.
65. NAZ. KDG 1/8. East Luangwa Correspondence, 1913-1917. Secretary, Livingstone, to Magistrate, Fort Jameson, 23 December 1927. Secretary, Livingstone, to District Commissioner, 17 May 1920; Magistrate, Fort Jameson, to Major Gorle, Fort Jameson, 14 August, 1920.
66. Johnston held the view that Asians could ably assist the European in the colonisation process. As a result he had imported Asians to man the lower

echelons of the Administration in Nyasaland: A.J. Hanna. The Beginning of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, 1889-1895 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969) pp. 226-227; Johnston, British Central Africa, p. 152.

67. Johnston, British Central Africa, p. 178.
68. Gann, A History, p. 95.
69. E. P. Makambe, 'The Asian Labour Question', 112.
70. Mfuwe Sports Club formed by the Asian trading class in Chipata used to publish a newsletter called Mfuwe Magazine. The 1982 publication carries a local Asian version of Asian settlement in Chipata.
71. Mbasela is a vernacular term defining a 'bonus' or 'gift' given to the customer by the trader after a good business transaction.
72. NAZ. BS 1/32, Issuing, Introducing and Granting Trading Licences to Indians, 1905. Mandala, Manager, Thom and Schinard, A. Paulocci to June, 1905.
73. NAZ. BS 1/31, Manager, Thom Schinard, Paulocci to Acting Administrator, Fort Jameson, 2 June, 1905.
74. NAZ. BS. Manager, Thom and Schinard, Paulocci to Acting Administrator, Fort Jameson, 2 June, 1905.
75. NAZ. BS 1/32, Farmers' Association, Fort Jameson to Acting Administrator Fort Jameson, 7 June, 1905.
76. NAZ. BS 1/32, Acting Administrator to Secretary of Farmers' Association, Fort Jameson, 6 June, 1905.
77. NAZ. BS 1/32, H.B.M., Kisson, Schinard, Paulocci to Secretary, BSA: London, 7 June, 1905; NAZ BS 1/32, Assistant Secretary, London, Co Acting Administrator, Fort Jameson, 2 August 1905.
78. 'The coming of Indians,' Mfuwe Magazine, p. 31; The North-Eastern Rhodesia Government Gazette, Volume 4, 1906.
79. NAZ. KDG 2/2/1, Criminal Cases: Magistrates Court, 1904-1912. See List of Witnesses at the

Magistrates Sitting on 11th April, 1908.

80. NAZ. KDG 6/1. Record Books: Civil and Criminal, 1908-1912. Case Number 9, 1909.
81. NAZ. KDG 5/1. Chipata District Notebooks, Volume II. Trade and Commerce, 31 March, 1915.
82. NAZ. KDG 8/1/2. Annual Reports, 1913-14. Census of Indians in Fort Jameson, 18 May, 1914.
83. NAZ. KDG 8/1/2. Census of Indians in Fort Jameson, 18 May, 1914.
84. NAZ. KDG 6/1. Record Books: Civil and Criminal Cases Number 9, 1908 and Number 1, 1911 contain this information.
85. NAZ. KDG 5/1. District Notebooks, Volume II. Trade and Commerce, 31 March, 1915.
86. NAZ. KDG 5/1. Chipata District Notebooks, Volume I Trade and Commerce, 1912-1916.
87. NAZ. KDG 1/13/1. Native Reserves, 1912-1918. Manager, NCEC, Fort Jameson, to Administrator, Livingstone, 1 May, 1914.
88. NAZ. KDG 1/13/1. Native Reserves. Manager, NCEC, Fort Jameson, to Administrator, Livingstone, 2 May, 1914.
89. NAZ. KDG 2/1/2. Civil Cases: Magistrates Court. Case Number 6, 15 September, 1913.
90. NAZ. KDG 8/1/3. Annual Reports, 1918-1913. Annual Report, East Luangwa District, 31 March, 1919.
91. The population of Asians in Northern Rhodesia was then 39. NAZ. BS 3/64. Magistrate Proclamations, Court Cases, Census of Population 1913. Northern Rhodesia Census, 1911.
92. NAZ. KDG 8/1/3. Annual Reports, 1918-1924. Annual Reports, Fort Jameson, 31 March, 1922;
93. The reasons that prompted Osman Adam to close his shops are not clear. What is certain is that he did not go bankrupt because he had benefited from the war time trading boom like the Khamisas. His property was being rented by Asians thereafter.
94. NAZ. KDG 1/8/3. East Luangwa Correspondence, 1917-1931. J.S. Cott, Blantyre, to District Commissioner, 15 April, 1921.

95. The Information is contained in the applications for trading plots in the Indian Quarter and the hinterlands: NAZ. KDG 1/8, East Luangwa Correspondence, 1917-1931.
96. NAZ. KDG 1/8/3, East Luangwa Correspondence. See forms of Monthly Tenancy of Store Plots, 17 June, 1929; 24 July, 1929; 1 October, 1929; 1 January, 1930; 15 May, 1930.
97. NAZ. KSJ 4/1, Reports: Annual, Half-Yearly, Quarterly, Tour, 1916-33., List of Store sites, 1930. District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, Fort Jameson, 4 July, 1930.
98. NAZ. KDG 1/8/5, East Luangwa Correspondence. District Commissioner, Petauke, to Provincial Commissioner, Fort Jameson, 26 May, 1931.
99. For Example NAZ. KDG 1/8/5, East Luangwa Correspondence. O.H. Sundi to Provincial Commissioner, 19 September, 1931.
100. NAZ. KDG 1/8/3, East Luangwa Correspondence. Secretary, Livingstone, to District Commissioner, Fort Jameson, 4 January 1929; District Commissioner to Director of Surveys, Livingstone, 20 December, 1928; Provincial Commissioner to Secretary 12 June, 1931.
101. NAZ. KSJ 4/1, Reports: Annual, Half-Yearly, Quarterly, Tours. Annual Report, Fort Jameson, 1930; According to Osman W. Adam, Born in Chipata in 1932. The First Asian women came to Chipata in 1927, namely his mother, Amina W. Adam and H. Hamir's wife: Interview, O.W. Adam, Trader, Chipata, 17 January, 1989.
102. NAZ. KDG 1/11/1, Native Affairs, 1914-1918. Magistrate, Fort Jameson, to Secretary, Livingstone, 2 November, 1918.
103. NAZ. KDG 1/11/1, Magistrate, Fort Jameson, to Secretary Livingstone, 2 November, 1918.
104. NAZ. KDG 1/11/2, Native Affairs, 1919-1922. Assistant Magistrate, Petauke, to Magistrate, Fort Jameson, 4 April, 1920; Magistrate, Fort Jameson, to Assistant Magistrate, Petauke, 5 May, 1920.
105. NAZ. KDG 1/11/2. Native Commissioner, Lundazi, to Magistrate Fort Jameson, 23 January, 1920.
106. NAZ. KDG 8/1/3, Annual Reports, 1918-1923. East Luangwa District, 31 March, 1919.

107. NAZ. KDG 7/1/1. Registers: Civil and Criminal Cases. 1904-1937. Case Number 19. 17 December. 1924.
108. NAZ. KDG 1/11/2. East Luangwa Correspondence. O.H. Sundi to Provincial Commissioner. 19 September. 1931.
109. NAZ. KDG 1/11/2. Native Affairs. 1919-1922. Native Commissioner, Lundazi, to Magistrate, Fort Jameson. 22 July. 1922.
110. NAZ. KDG 1/11/2. Magistrate, Fort Jameson, to Native Commissioner, Lundazi, 27 July. 1922.
111. NAZ. KDG 8/3/3. Quarterly Reports 1928-1929. Report of J.W. Wallace, Cadet Officer, Fort Jameson. 1929.
112. NAZ. KDG 1/11/2. Native Affairs. 1913-1922. Report of a meeting at Fort Jameson of Secretary for Native Affairs with Boma Officials and Native Chiefs of Fort Jameson District. 27 September. 1921.
113. NAZ. KDG 5/1. Chipata District Notebook, Volume II. Minutes of Indaba held at Fort Jameson. 12 July 1924.
114. NAZ. KDG SEC 2/85. Eastern Province. Fort Jameson Annual Reports. 1935-1938; Lundazi Annual Report. 1935.
115. NAZ. KDG 5/1. Chipata District Notebooks. Volume II. Minutes of Indaba held at Fort Jameson. 12 July. 1924.
116. NAZ. KDG 3/1/1. Memorandum Submitted to Provincial Commissioners' Conference. 1931. Extension of Indirect Rule.
117. Interview. J.T. Mawere. Farmer. Chipata. 8 February. 1989.
118. 'Meet Interesting People: Zilole Mawere,' Nshila. 13. 1958. 6-8.
119. NAZ. KSJ 4/1. Reports: Annual. Half-Yearly. Quarterly. Tours. Fort Jameson. 1916-1933.
120. NAZ. SEC. 2/85. Annual Reports. Fort Jameson. 1935.
121. NAZ. SEC. 2/85. Annual Reports. Fort Jameson. 1935.
122. NAZ. SEC. 2/84. Annual Reports on Native Affairs. Eastern Province. 1935. 1935 Annual Report on

Native Affairs. Provincial Commissioner.

123. NAZ. KDG 1/9/1. Legal, 1915. Magistrate, Fort Jameson, to Zambezi Industrial Mission, Blantyre, 23 December, 1915; NAZ, KDG 2/2/2, Criminal Cases; Magistrates Court, 1921-1922. Case Number 35. July, 1921.
124. NAZ BS 3/192. Native Credit Sales Proclamation, 1911. Acting Commissioner, Zomba, to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, 4 June, 1963; The Native Credit Sales Ordinance was a racially restrictive regulation which excluded Africans from freely entering into a credit transaction with non-Africans the rationale being that 'their primitive character renders it inadvisable they should be placed on the same level as the European or Asian as regards contracts.'
125. NAZ. KDG 2/2/2, Criminal Cases; Magistrates Court, 1921-1922. Case Number 35. July 1921.
126. NAZ. KDG 3/1/1. Memorandum submitted to the Provincial Commissioners' Conference, 1931. Extension of Indirect Rule.
127. NAZ. KDG 1/8/3. East Luangwa Correspondence. See copy of Memorandum of Partnership Agreement dated 15 July, 1926.
128. NAZ. KDG 1/8/5. East Luangwa Correspondence. O.H. Sundi to Provincial Commissioner, 19 September, 1931.
129. NAZ. KDG 1/8/1. East Luangwa Correspondence. Secretary, Livingstone, to Provincial Commissioner, 30 March, 1931.
130. NAZ. KDG 1/13/2. Native Reserves, 1912-1918. Manager, NCEC, to Administrator, Livingstone, 2 May, 1914.
131. NAZ. KDG 1/9/2. Legal, 1913-14. Extract from Assistant Legal Adviser's Minutes to Magistrate, Kasama, 3 October, 1931.
132. NAZ. BS 3/2/78. Fort Jameson Township Land Grant. McKerrow Transport Report. Township Survey, 1913-1916. H.B. McKerrow, NCEC Manager, Fort Jameson, to the Secretary, Livingstone, 31 July, 1915.



133. NAZ. BS 350. Subsidiary Stores General Ruling, East Luangwa Native Reserve Stores, 1921-1924. Acting Secretary, Livingstone, to District Commissioner, Fort Jameson, 10 January, 1923.
134. NAZ. SEC 1/1576. General Dealer Asians Trading in Barotseland. 1937-1939. Chief Secretary to Attorney General, Lusaka, 22 October, 1937.
135. NAZ. RC/240. British Indian Association at Livingstone: Petition for Grant of Trading Licences and Plots for Indians. British Indian Association to Governor, 22 November, 1927.
136. NAZ. KDG 1/6/1. Governor's visit, 1933. Memorandum for his Excellency, May 1933.
137. For example Sundi had engaged Muhono to man one of his Lundazi stores: NAZ. KSJ 4/1. District Touring Reports, 1933. Lundazi Tour Report Number 6. R.P. Bush District Commissioner, August, 1933.
138. Entertainment here refers to cakes (Chikondamoyo) sweets, cigarettes, lumps of sugar or salt given to customers after or before purchase to build the image of a benevolent trader and thus win the goodwill of the customers.
139. As a general rule the established trade imported his poor relations.
140. Sponsor is a term used by Asians themselves to refer to Asian employers they worked for under the contract system: interview, Adam.
141. Interview, Mawere.
142. M.V. Merani and H.L. Van Der Laan. 'The Indian Traders in Sierra Leone, African Affairs, 78, (1979), 247.
143. NAZ. KSJ 4/1. Annual Reports, 1930. Provincial Commissioner's Report, 1930. 1930-31. December, 1930.
144. NAZ. KDG 8/4/3. Tour Reports, 1928-1929. Report on Tour by R.P. Bush, District Officer, April, 1932.
145. NAZ. KDG 7/1/1. Registers: Civil and Criminal, 1904-1937. Case Number 11, 16 September, 1933.

146. NAZ. KDG 7/1/1. Case Number 2. 1932.
147. NAZ. KDG 7/1/1. Case Number 9. 16 September. 1933; Case Number 11. 16 September. 1933; Case Number 10. 16 September. 1933.
148. NAZ. KDG 7/1/1. Case Number 4. 23 January. 1934.
149. NAZ. KDG 8/4/3. Tour Reports. 1928-19. Report on Tour made by R.P. Bush. District Officer. June. 1932: NAZ. KSJ 4/1. District Tour Reports. 1933. Lundazi Tour Report Number 6. August. 1933.
150. Interview. Mawere.
151. Tapson. The Old Timer. Chapter VI.
152. NAZ. KSJ 4/1. Annual Reports. 1930. Fort Jameson Annual Report for 1930.
153. Interview. I. Suleiman. trader. Chipata. 10 January. 1989.
154. NAZ. KDG 6/1. Record Books: Civil and Criminal. 1908-1912. Case Number 1. 9 January. 1911.
155. NAZ. KDG 6/1. Case Number 21. 28 August. 1911.
156. NAZ. KDG 6/1. Case Number 7,8 February. 1909; Case Number 24. 11 October 1909; NAZ. KDG 7/1/1. Case Number Registers: Civil and Criminal. 1904-1937. Case Number 2. 25 January. 1912. The registers show a noticeable decline of assault cases arising from trade rivalry towards the middle of the 1920s.
157. NAZ. BS 3/82. Fort Jameson Township Meeting of Chiefs and Headman Held at Chilanga. Proclamation of Village Management Board. 1918.
158. NAZ. KDG 7/1/1. Registers: Civil and Criminal. 1904-1937.
159. NAZ. KSJ 4/1. Annual Reports. 1930. Annual Report. Fort Jameson. 1930.

## CHAPTER TWO

### GROWTH OF THE ASIAN TRADING CLASS. 1935-1964

By the middle of the 1930s the economic depression had come to an end. The period between 1935 and 1964 experienced growth of the cash economy in the area as well as the Asian trading class. The growth of the Asian trading class was accompanied by expansion of Asian business into the trading centres on the Great East Road, Lundazi Road and Chadiza area. Furthermore, there occurred a big increase in the Asian population between 1935 and 1953 as a result of the influx of immigrants from India coming to work as shop assistants in the new branches that established Asian traders were opening up. This influx was checked by the Federation Immigration Act of 1954.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, a natural increase was already underway owing to the presence of a few female immigrants.

In the post-depression period trade rivalry between Asians and Europeans declined drastically because Europeans and Asians were no longer rivals in African trade. This was due to the fact that settlers confined themselves to farm stores and the European trading firms concentrated on European trade. In fact European trading firms' business declined during the war. For example, in 1943 the value of stocks of Mandala fell from 20,000 pounds to 3,000 pounds.<sup>2</sup> Business rivalry between Europeans and Asians was superseded by that between

Asians and Africans since African traders had emerged as direct business rivals with Asians by the 1940s. This business rivalry and Asian acquisition of land became the source of African racist attitudes towards the Asian minority in Chipata. In this Chapter I will explain why the Asian trading class was able to grow substantially between 1935 and 1964. Firstly, I will demonstrate that the economic changes that took place encouraged this growth. This explanation will relate the growth of the Asian trading class to the trading regulations and administrative framework. I argue that the Asian trading class grew as a result of the expansion in Asian business stimulated by the relatively increased buying power among Africans following the growth of the cash economy in the province. Secondly, I will demonstrate that Africans trying their hand at village stores failed to contend with competition from the Asian traders who were proficient in African trade. I argue that Asian competition in African trade was the source of racist attitudes on the part of African traders and the clerical class.<sup>3</sup> Thirdly, I will demonstrate that in the 1940s Asians diversified into tobacco farming and explain why they eventually failed as tobacco farmers. I argue that Asian landownership played a fundamental role in exacerbating African hostility towards the Asian presence in Chipata.

## 2.1 GROWTH OF THE CASH ECONOMY 1935-1964

The growth of the Asian trading class was

encouraged by increased African trade owing to economic growth in the province as a whole between 1935 and 1964. This growth resulted in relatively expanded sources of employment within the province and encouraged the rise of the African entrepreneur class in agriculture and African trade. Migrant labour to Southern Africa and the line of rail was another important factor in the growth of African trade throughout this period. For example, in 1937 the DC. Chipata, observed that 'a number of small stores for native produce have been opened and they do a fair trade with men passing on their return from work in Southern Rhodesia'.<sup>4</sup> Migrant labour was a main feature of the economic activities among Africans as the tour reports persistently pointed out. In 1943 the DC. Chipata observed that:

Practically every adult male has been to Southern Rhodesia or South Africa so his horizon is not bounded up by the neighboring village. The province has lost many thousands of its more progressive sons to the Southern territories, but in general the people love their homes and return to them. They are not blind to the defects of their present<sub>5</sub> state, and the will to change it is marked.

The 1957 statistics from the Labour Office in Chipata shown in Table 2.1 demonstrate that there were almost as many men going kuwalale as there were men returning home.<sup>6</sup>

TABLE 2.1

MONTH	IN	OUT
March	1284	1269
April	1089	1120
May	1112	1059
June	1042	1024
July	1199	1131

Unattractive working conditions on the local farms were largely responsible for the labour exodus from 'Fort Jameson and Petauke to other labour markets with comparatively better conditions and higher wages'.<sup>7</sup>

Migrant labourers encouraged the growth of African trade in the sense that they remitted money to their families or brought back home money which was eventually spent on buying consumer goods. According to Deane, on average the Anabwela brought back around 15 pounds in the form of cash or goods and remitted about 2 pounds and 7 shillings in cash or in kind. She further demonstrated that the total income from migrant labour to Eastern Province in 1945 amounted to about 146,000 pounds.<sup>8</sup> Migrants who prolonged their stay could manage to bring back home money as well as valuable goods such as bicycles and sewing machines important in African trade. In fact migrant labour was important to the economic growth of Northern Rhodesia as a whole. In this regard the Pim Report observed that 'the financial benefit to the territory from deferred pay varied between ~~£~~50,000 to

~~£~~70,000'.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to Southern Africa , the Copperbelt emerged as a labour market within Northern Rhodesia following the rapid development of the Copper industry between 1930 and 1954.<sup>10</sup> In 1957, for example, Rhokana employed 569 men from Eastern Province.<sup>11</sup> Additionally, the railways had emerged as an important labour market by the 1940s.<sup>12</sup> The absence of primary industries in Eastern Province meant that men began to head for the Copperbelt which was also experiencing the development of small scale manufacturing industries. By 1959 there were 254 concerns employing over 16,000 Africans some of whom were from the Eastern Province.<sup>13</sup>

Tobacco farming also played a major role in encouraging the development of African trade since it experienced boom conditions between the late 1930s and the early 1950s. The impact of the post depression tobacco boom on African trade had began to be felt by 1939. In this year the PC. Eastern Province, observed that more money was being paid to farm labour than previously and that this was encouraging better trade in the province. He further observed that trade imports through the Chipata Customs Post recorded a remarkable increase between 1937 and 1939. Thus 'clearances through the Customs Post of Chipata increased from ~~£~~84,865 in 1938 to ~~£~~90,229 in 1939. This figure is the more remarkable because it follows an increase of ~~£~~20,188 in the 1938 figure compared with the

1937 figure'.<sup>14</sup> In 1939 there were 99 native stores owned by Europeans and Asians and 143 village stores.<sup>15</sup> Poor working conditions notwithstanding, tobacco farming provided local employment opportunities for Africans to earn money to purchase consumer goods which had become necessities. Most tobacco estates in the area employed between 50 to 600 workers. On one of its farms, for example, Nyasa Rhodesia Estates Limited maintained a labour force of 600 workers.<sup>16</sup> The number of tobacco estates was quite substantial as Zgambo observed:

In 1947 about 88 tobacco planters in Fort Jameson alone were working 118 estates which produced 3 million pounds worth £321,494. A year later the number rose to 100 planters working 130 estates. The number of planters in production increased steadily up to the early 1960s when the majority of the farmers went out of production.

Prosperity in tobacco farming lasted until the late 1950s when the industry experienced a depression. In 1957 the D.O. Chipata, reported that 'some 200 farms now stand derelict and only forty or so farms now operate..<sup>18</sup> The collapse of tobacco farming was due to the fact that during the Federation tobacco from Eastern Province was fetching uneconomic prices in Salisbury. In the first place, tobacco from Eastern Province was being sold separately from that produced in Southern Rhodesia and the former North-Western Rhodesia on the grounds that its distinct tang rendered it of poor quality to buyers on the Salisbury auction floor.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, Eastern Province farmers were incurring additional costs of transport



following the closure of the auction floor at Chipata.<sup>20</sup> Thirdly, the subsidies on fertilizer were inadequate seeing that the geographical position of Eastern Province entailed additional expense on transporting fertilizer.<sup>21</sup> In fact, the Federal government was not giving the tobacco farmers support in form of financial assistance and subsidies like the Northern Rhodesia government had been doing.

Even though tobacco farming declined as a source of employment for African labour, the Northern Rhodesian government had emerged as a major employer of Africans in the district by the 1940s following the expansion of government departments such as Public Works, Health, Education, Native Treasuries and Co-operatives.<sup>22</sup> The government had begun to employ Africans as clerks in its departments from the 1920s. By 1936 government employees had formed a Native Town committee with a membership of fifty and a branch of the African Civil Servants with a membership of thirty.<sup>23</sup> This nucleus of the Chipata urban population stimulated trade within the township in fowls and fish with Africans from the Luangwa Valley, Petauke and Mpika.<sup>24</sup> As a result of the expansion in government departments, there was increased employment for Africans as clerks, teachers, district messengers and labourers. Divorced from direct production and susceptible to European consumer patterns, the increased government employees influenced the development of African trade.

Domestic service also emerged as an important source of employment for Africans by the 1940s. An increase in the European technical staff and settlers which resulted from the expansion in government departments and the revival of tobacco farming gave rise to domestic employment. Female employees in Chipata rose from about 555 in 1931 to 1086 in 1946 and to 2497 in 1951.<sup>25</sup> Domestic employment played a significant role in increasing the purchasing power among women which, in turn enhanced the development of African trade.

The second World War also offered employment to Africans as askari (soldiers) and tenga-tenga. This war time employment enhanced the development of African trade in two major ways. Firstly, the wives of the askari received a regular living allowance which they utilised on meeting social obligations and consumer needs while their husbands were at war.<sup>26</sup> Secondly, at the end of the war ex-askari (demobilised soldiers) were paid deferred salaries and gratuities which led to an increase in the amount of money in the hands of Africans since many men from Eastern Province took part in the war. Deane observed that 'the average amount brought back in gratuities and savings by the askari in 1945 exceeded ~~f~~45 per head, and in addition to this, they brought many goods acquired abroad'.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to wage employment, self employment such as carpentry and vegetable gardening as well as cash

crop farming emerged as an important sources of cash to Africans in Chipata. The township population provided a growing market for products of carpenters and vegetable growers. For example, in 1952 five carpenters from chief Mshoro's area were selling chairs in the Township at 12 shillings to Europeans and 8 shillings to Africans for a chair.<sup>28</sup> In fact Katete Area School had been established to offer training to Africans in carpentry, metal work, leather work, tailoring, bricklaying and homecraft.<sup>29</sup> The African craftsmen established themselves in the Native Quarter or in the villages. Vegetable growing by Africans became established by the late 1930s. In 1939 the PC observed that 'vegetable gardening is becoming popular around Fort Jameson and about 100 Africans are engaged in this business. Among other things they produce excellent strawberries'.<sup>30</sup> A substantial income could be earned from vegetable gardening. For example, in 1946 Nkweche from chief Mbangombe's area earned a profit of 40 pounds from selling rice and vegetables to Asians and Europeans.<sup>31</sup> In 1960 Africans in chief Mlolo's area earned 1,210 pounds from selling vegetables to Nsadza Mission.<sup>32</sup>

Rice was increasingly being grown as a cash crop in chief Mwangala's, Mlolo's, and Kawaza's areas.<sup>33</sup> In 1946 a few individuals 'claimed they had made as much as £10' from selling rice.<sup>34</sup> In the Katete area Asians were paying a 'Black market' price of as much as 20 shillings per ton or 6 pounds per bag as they were buying it to

export to Lusaka. In 1948 the Katete Area Development Team reported that Africans had increased their rice acreages in response to lucrative prices and estimated the 1947 rice crop output at 100,000 pounds.<sup>35</sup> In fact the Team began to market rice and offered Africans what it considered an economic price of 6 shillings per tin to induce African cultivation of rice.<sup>36</sup> Thus, rice was one of the earliest cash earners for the African in Chipata.

Maize and tobacco also emerged as established African cash crops in the post-depression period due to African initiative as well as support from the government. Tobacco farmers who generally found it cheaper to buy maize from Africans than grow it themselves as ration for farm labour were the earliest market for maize in the area. The government began to give support to African cash crop farming in order to encourage the growth of the African entrepreneur class in agriculture through the Parish Scheme and the African Farming Improvement Scheme which attracted the generally enterprising Anabwela elements.<sup>37</sup> By 1947 there were 981 registered African farmers of Burley tobacco in addition to a substantial number of tenant farmers concentrated in Chipata.<sup>38</sup> The most enterprising farmers could earn a fairly reasonable income from small-scale tobacco farming. For example, in the 1950s farmers in Katete Area were earning as much as 50 pounds annually from growing tobacco.<sup>39</sup> The growth of African cash crop farming resulted

in the increased purchasing power in the district which, in turn, widened trading opportunities in African trade as Africans were becoming almost completely dependent on traders for consumer goods such as food and clothes. In 1955 the PC observed that:

In Fort Jameson District the business activities of 50 bakers and 16 butcheries, and the licensing of 21 motor vehicles, 11 motor cycle and 2300 bicycles in the township are an indication of a rising standard of living. Cheap blue prints are going out of fashion: khaki shorts are giving way to flannel trousers: better clothes are being increasingly bought on the mail order, and there are more purchases today of cheap groceries such as tinned meats and dried milk.<sup>40</sup>

On the whole, enlarged African employment and cash crop farming resulted in some economic prosperity in Chipata. In 1957 Chipata recorded an income of 535.000 pounds made up as follows.<sup>41</sup>

Agriculture	168.00	pounds
Animals	43.000	pounds
Government wages	150.000	pounds
Native Authority Wages	130.000	pounds
Private Wages	130.000	pounds
Postal remittances	20.000	pounds
Boma remittances	8.000	pounds

By 1960 the African population was handling about one million pounds and subsistence production was estimated at 50 pounds per family annually.<sup>42</sup> This prosperity was

enhanced by a tremendous improvement in commercial transport between Chipata and the line of rail as well as in marketing of African agricultural produce by the marketing co-operative.<sup>43</sup> Thus, African prosperity in Chipata in the post-second World War years stimulated the growth of African trade.

## 2.2 GOVERNMENT TRADING POLICIES AND REGULATIONS. 1935-1964

Trading policies and regulations pertaining to African trade were deeply influenced by racism in the sense that the Government followed a policy of Africanisation of trade in rural areas which entailed discriminating against Asian business in favour of African business. In this section, I will demonstrate that in practice Licencing Authorities in Chipata subjected Asian traders to racial discrimination in regard to trading in Native Reserves as well as in the European Quarter. I argue that the Government utilised discriminatory regulations in favour of emerging African traders in order to cushion African business from direct Asian competition in rural areas. This was a measure meant to restrict Asian expansion into the Native Reserves and to encourage growth of African traders.

The statute which regulated trading in Northern Rhodesia was the Trades and Licensing Ordinance Number 24, 1930, which was repealed and replaced by the Trades and Business Ordinance Number 45, 1947, amended in 1958.<sup>44</sup>

This statute did not embody outright discrimination between European and Asians because the Colonial Office rejected legislation conceived purely on racial grounds. For example, in 1924 the Governor, Stanley, failed to convince the Colonial Office to approve a law meant to restrict Asian entry into Northern Rhodesia because it was conceived purely on racial grounds.<sup>45</sup> The only discrimination contained in the Trades and Business Ordinance was Africanisation of trade in rural areas. In spite of this ordinance the actual implementation of trading policies by European administrators in Chipata was heavily influenced by racial prejudice. Thus, they utilised racially conceived administrative measures to prevent Asian competition in European trade. This meant that Asian traders could not diversify into European trade and the European Quarter remained a trading zone exclusively for European firms, namely, Charterland, Mandala and Carters throughout the colonial period.

Discriminatory regulations in favour of emerging African traders especially in Native Reserves was justified on economic grounds as the government contended that the nascent African business deserved to be nurtured, in contrast to the established European and Asian business, in order to encourage the rise of the African entrepreneur class in African trade. Therefore, it was a recurring outcry in annual reports that the African trader was greatly handicapped in competing with the Asian trader mainly because the African lacked capital and business

connections with external suppliers. Thus, in 1935 the PC observed that:

it cannot be expected that natives with their more limited capital should be able to compete with European and Indian traders in the same vicinity and it is hoped that the village shop licence which is being introduced to enable natives to trade from their own villages in payment of a reduced fee, will enable them to conduct <sup>46</sup>more lucrative business than formerly.

It was realised within the administrative circles that the African trader, who was generally still an underdog to the sophisticated Asian trader, deserved to be nurtured in some practical ways. As a result, in 1935 the Government introduced a Village Store Licence for African traders in the Native Reserves. At 2 pounds and 10 shillings this licence was cheaper than the general dealer's licence of 7 pounds and 10 shillings.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, in 1939 the Provincial Commissioners' Conference resolved to adopt a regulation which would exclude Europeans and Asian traders from the Native Reserves by restricting them to principal trading centres which would be established by PC's in consultation with respective Native Authorities.<sup>48</sup> By 1944 the PC, Eastern Province, had implemented this regulation by confining Asians to principal trading centres along the Great East Road such as Katete, Sinda, Kawere and Nyimba. This policy also entailed limiting the number of Asian stores at each principal trading centre to leave room for Africans to establish stores at these centres if they so wished. Henceforth all trading in the Native Reserves was to be done exclusively by Africans.<sup>49</sup>



Moreover the PC made it very clear that it was Government policy not to sell land within Chipata township to Asians but to rent out trading plots to them only on monthly tenancy basis.<sup>50</sup> In view of this policy, whatever land Asians managed to purchase away from the Township was purchased from Charterland or settlers.

In furtherance of encouraging the rise of the African entrepreneur class in Northern Rhodesia as a whole, in 1945 Legco passed a trading regulation which empowered Native Authorities to be responsible for approving applications for non-Africans wishing to trade in their respective Native Reserves.<sup>51</sup> In practice Legco empowered Native Authorities to veto Asian applicants in particular on the grounds that Asian business was prejudicial to the well-being of African business in Native Reserves. In Chipata this policy of Africanisation of trade in the rural areas played a role of reinforcing racist attitudes towards Asians by Native Authorities who began to veto Asian applicants especially in the 1950s when inter-racial rivalry between Africans and Asians became very pronounced. In this regard the 1951 APC resolved that 'no new leases for Indian stores should be granted'.<sup>52</sup> I will examine the causes of anti-Asian attitudes towards Asians in Chipata in a later section.

In addition to the policy of Africanisation of African trade in Native Reserves, price control

regulations also greatly impinged upon Asian business. The Government adopted Price Control Regulations as a wartime measure to deter anticipated profiteering owing to shortage of trade goods. This shortage of goods was created by a sharp decline in overseas imports during the war which made Northern Rhodesia to be almost entirely dependent on South Africa for its imports. As a result 'local produce from the Union [South Africa] rose in value from £376,140 in 1936 to £1,669,978 in 1943, while similar figures for Southern Rhodesia rose from £592,433 in 1936 to £1,493,273'.<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, imports from South Africa were insufficient to meet the demand for trade goods in Northern Rhodesia. Thus, in 1942 the government created the Departement of Price Control which was charged with the task of determining prices for traders to adhere to.<sup>54</sup> Prior to this date, traders themselves determined the prices within the framework of profit control regulations. According to Mulla, a trader fixed his prices within the profit margin range of 25-35%.<sup>55</sup> After the war the Department of Price Control continued to operate in order to keep the prices of essential goods 'within reasonable bounds' through the mechanism of both price and profit control.<sup>56</sup> In 1947 the the PC made it very clear that:

the Price Controller in Lusaka very carefully works out how much it costs to transport - [the commodity] here: he then fixes the maximum price of goods. The storekeeper can sell for less than that price, but he cannot sell for more ... If any person finds a trader selling at more than the fixed price he should report to the Police or District

Commissioner so that he [the trader] can be punished and we can stop traders selling above the fixed price<sup>57</sup>.

In Chipata price control regulations were felt much more by the Asian traders because law enforcers were harder on the Asian traders contravening price control regulations than on their African counterparts. Profiteering was rife among both Asian and African traders in spite of the price control regulations. In 1947 they were selling cloth at between 3 shillings and 4 shillings per yard instead of the controlled price of one shilling and 7 pence.<sup>58</sup> African traders in Kawaza's area particularly were overpricing cloth at 3 shillings and 6 pence per yard whose wholesale price at the Traders' Association was one shilling and 4 pence. The DC, Chipata, merely warned them that licences would be withdrawn if they did not desist from profiteering.<sup>59</sup> The PC held the view that 'expulsion from the Association may be introduced as a more effective means of dealing with traders who contravene price control regulations'.<sup>60</sup> In contrast Asians were prosecuted for profiteering as European officials strictly enforced price regulations on Asian traders who, in any case, were proficient in procuring trade goods inspite of the shortage of goods. In 1943 nineteen Asians were fined a total of 4155 pounds for overpricing goods.<sup>61</sup> In March 1947, fifteen were fined an undisclosed amount for not marking the prices on their goods. The following month 4 were fined a total of about 112 pounds for overpricing.<sup>62</sup> Twenty six Asians had

been fined a total of 1,080 pounds between April and June and between July and September 16 Asians were fined 94 pounds for contravening price control regulations.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, price control regulations were largely helpless as long as the shortage of goods persisted. Thus the PC observed that a lot more Asians would have been prosecuted if the police force had been stronger and the African more willing to give evidence.<sup>64</sup>

Strict enforcement of price control regulations on Asian traders in the township culminated in organised Asian protest against what they considered government high handedness. The imprisonment of a Mr. B. Patel in September 1947 'for offering a bribe to a native constable who had caught him evading the price Control Regulations' was the immediate cause of this protest.<sup>65</sup> Asians closed their stores for a week in protest against the jail sentence in particular and the stringent price control regulations in general. This closure of stores greatly inconvenienced Africans who, in fact, did not sympathize with Asians.<sup>66</sup> Jasat and Afghan were the Asian leaders in the township and Kazimule respectively. This Organised Asian protest did not only demonstrate Asian ability to associate politically to advance a common cause but it also exposed the intra-community altercation which found expression in the dissension between Jasat and Afghan. Afghan and his followers had re-opened their stores on being assured by the Administration that the

Government would review the regulations to the displeasure of Jasat who wished to prolong the protest. On 12 August Jasat and his follows attacked Afghan and his followers who had come to pray at the mosque in the township. In the ensuing fight one of Afghan's supporters was shot dead and Jasat. Daya and Munshi were charged with murder.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, Asians succeeded in registering their grievances to the administration.

On the whole, the shortage of goods created a trading boom for Asian traders particularly because they succeeded in cornering the cloth market. As a result, during the 1946 tobacco season 'several thousands of pounds - up to ~~£~~6,000 at the beginning of the week - were handed in daily at the bank, mainly by the Indian storekeepers ...'.<sup>68</sup> The war period was characterised, as wars normally are, by shortage of goods which gave rise to profiteering inspite of the price control regulations.

The shortage of goods also influenced the government to support African traders in two practical ways. Firstly, during the war the government acted as a wholesale agent for Asian <sup>European</sup> business by importing goods to sell mainly to African traders. In 1944, for example, the government bought 2,000,000 yards of cloth to the value of 75,000 pounds for the purpose of supplying the generally impoverished African traders in Northern Rhodesia as a whole. From this consignment, Eastern Province received

cloth worth 2,500 pounds from which Petauke and Chipata received shares worth 1000 pounds each and the remaining share worth 500 pounds went to Lundazi. There were then 118 African traders in Chipata, 109 in Petauke and 44 in Lundazi at the time so the shares were proportionate to the number of traders in each district.<sup>69</sup>

Secondly, at the end of the war the government assisted the African traders to form a traders' association which embarked on purchasing goods from suppliers on the Copperbelt as well as in Southern Rhodesia seeing that goods were not easily forthcoming from the Asian to the African trader as shortages persisted into the immediate post-war period. In fact it was government policy at the end of the war to promote traders' associations among Africans as co-operative wholesalers. The Fort Jameson Traders Association was formed in 1945 with an Administrative Officer as Chairman and it took over from the Administration as wholesale agent for African traders.<sup>70</sup> To some extent the above measures made it possible for African traders to procure goods during the duration of the shortage of goods. However, in the final analysis the association failed to successfully compete with the long established Asian wholesaler.

Asian business was also affected by the customs and tariffs of Northern Rhodesia as well as the creation of

the Federation. The customs tariffs of Northern Rhodesia generally provided for preferential rates for the goods originating from the Empire. Locally produced goods from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were not subject to customs duty owing to the Customs Union Tariff Agreement with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.<sup>71</sup> In 1947 customs duty on essential goods such as foodstuffs, blankets, clothing and footwear were suspended to provide some relief against the rising cost of living. In the 1950s Federation emerged as a single customs area so trade between South Africa and the federation became subject to tariffs. Jasat observed that in 1954 the Federal government introduced 10% tariff on United Kingdom (UK) and South African goods and 20% on others, but cloth from India bore the heaviest duty 'of as much as 50%'.<sup>72</sup> For this reason he asserted that duties 'on certain goods commonly consumed by Africans were exorbitant thus contributing to the high cost of living among natives'.<sup>73</sup> The Asian trading class succeeded in achieving a tremendous growth inspite of the foregoing customs constraints.

### 2.3 GROWTH OF ASIAN BUSINESS AND POPULATION, 1935-1964

In this section I will demonstrate that growth of the Asian trading class was influenced by three major factors. Firstly, established Asian traders embarked on establishing branches of their Chipata business in the principal trading centres on the Great East Road.

Secondly, there occurred an influx of both male and female immigrants into Chipata particularly between 1935 and 1953. Thirdly, the most enterprising Asian employees started establishing their own businesses in the Indian Quarter as well as in the principal trading centres.

Asian traders were able to spread into principal trading centres on the Great East Road because considerable business was possible with the travelling public as a result of greatly improved communication between Chipata and the rail line which gave impetus to increased incoming and outgoing human and cargo traffic. Furthermore since trading centres were established very close to areas of highest concentration of population, considerable trade in essential goods was also possible. Sinda, for example, was situated near Chief Kawaza's area which comprised 35 villages.<sup>74</sup>

The initial expansion of Asian business into the principal trading centres was spearheaded by leading traders such as Jasat, Meman and Dudhia.<sup>75</sup> The general pattern of this expansion was that an established trader in Chipata embarked on setting up a chain of stores in the trading centres more or less as the European trading firms had done in the early period. Thereafter he set about importing relatives from India to serve as shop assistants in the newly established branches. Since he had external business connections and sufficient capital, the leading



trader was in a position to procure goods for his stores. For example, between 1933 and 1937 Hussein Muhamed and Jasat of Kazimule succeeded in establishing business connections with Kaufman and Sons, a Jewish firm in Salisbury, from whom they obtained goods. They used to hire a truck to freight goods to Chipata via Tete. Similarly, they established business connections with wholesale agencies in Nyasaland. Additionally, they were ordering goods from the United Kingdom and India.<sup>76</sup> Consequently, this firm emerged as one of the leading ones in retail and wholesale trade in Chipata. When the partnership between Jasat and Muhamed broke up, Jasat established his own firm at Kazimule which succeeded in creating a network of stores covering Katete, Sinda, Kawere, Old Petauke, Minga and Mugubudu between 1938 and 1942. By 1947 he held 14 general dealers licences and had imported '29 persons - apart from members of his family - as employees'.<sup>77</sup> He also diversified into haulage transport and maize buying. At this stage he had become the epitome of an Asian businessman in Chipata. In 1948 he moved to the Indian Quarter where he erected trading premises valued at 600 pounds.<sup>78</sup> Although there is lack of evidence pertaining to the rise of other leading traders like Sundi, Meman and Dudhia, it is plausible to propose that the Jasat case exemplifies the general pattern of expansion of Asian business in Chipata.<sup>79</sup> Mitah and Company created a network of stores covering Milambe and Katete and Noman and Brothers had done the

same in Chadiza, Kavulamunga, Msoro and Mwangazi.<sup>80</sup> In fact Asian firms became involved in intense competition with each other to expand into the trading centres. As a result Asian traders had penetrated all the principal trading centres in the province at the dawn of the Federation.

This growth of Asian business meant a big demand for Asian shop labour on the part of leading traders. As a result the leading traders were also major sponsors of Asian employees. Thus

those coming in the 1930s and after were basically employees sponsored by the pioneers who were already established by this time. They would open branches in remote areas and then send newcomers to man the new branches.<sup>81</sup>

Muhamed Daya, who came to Chipata in 1938 as a shop employee at the age of 18 years, explained that there existed a 'Permit System' arrangement under which established Asian traders could import shop labour from India. This meant that a trader obtained a permit from the government for relatives or friends he wanted to come and work for him. The immigrants used this permit as evidence that they had secured employment in Northern Rhodesia. Thus many Asian employees came into Chipata under this arrangement:

There was a 'Permit System' for the youngsters wishing to work in Northern Rhodesia. Mr. I. Bobat sent me a permit as my elder brother was already working for

him. When I came to Chipata I.S. Meman, a good friend of Bobat, became my boss. On my steamer there were between 20 to 30 boys going to work for different bosses in Northern Rhodesia.<sup>82</sup>

The permit was necessary because the economic test had begun to be vigorously applied as a qualification for admission of Asians to Northern Rhodesia. Manjira confirmed that the government wanted intending immigrants to prove they had secured employment or that they possessed sufficient money to initiate a business.<sup>83</sup> Available statistics demonstrate that the expansion of Asian business in the post-depression period effected Asian demographic growth in the district owing to an influx of Asian immigrants. Between 1930 and 1952 the population grew as follows-<sup>84</sup>

1930	31
1931	37
1933	35
1937	67
1938	92
1946	161
1950	330
1951	407

Over the given period the Asian population grew by 366. In fact this growth included females and children. In 1937 there were 55 males, 4 females and 8 children. By 1950 there were 165 males, 66 females and 99 children as

the statistics given below show:<sup>85</sup>

YEAR	MALES	FEMALES	CHILDREN
1931	32	5	0
1937	55	4	8
1946	120	41	-
1950	165	66	99
1951	251	156	-

The higher proportion of males in the population was due to the influx of bachelor employees. For example of the 46 immigrants who came to Chipata in 1946, thirty-five were adult males, 10 adult females and one child. The provincial Newsletter for December observed that 'almost without exception they arrive as shop assistants or families of traders. Most of them hope to own their businesses eventually'.<sup>86</sup> It was a common practice for a married employee to leave his family behind and lead a family life only after he had secured ample income to pay the passage of his family as well as meet its subsequent maintenance. The disproportion in sexes began to be considerably reduced by the 1950s owing to the immigration of females coming to join their spouses.

The influx of male Asian immigrants was controlled by the Federal Immigration Act of 1954 as it was families of Asians already domiciled in the Federation who began to be admitted in Northern Rhodesia during this time. Nevertheless a natural increase of the population was already underway and by 1956 the Asian population in

Chipata had grown to 700 composed of the following:.<sup>87</sup>

	MALES	FEMALES
TOWNSHIP	164	126
RURAL	234	176
TOTAL	398	302

Five years later the Township population increased from 290 in 1956 to 350 in 1961.<sup>88</sup> In all the growth in Asian population arising from immigration coincided with the period of accelerated expansion in Asian business and the influx of shop assistants between 1938 and 1952 marked social differentiation in the Asian trading class between the strata of a few Asian employers and a large body of employees.

In addition to the expansion of business by the leading Asian traders, growth of Asian business was further encouraged by the fact that in the 1940s and 1950s the most enterprising Asian employees began to increasingly set up trading enterprises of their own. In fact some of them established enterprises which soon began to expand into the principal trading centres to compete with the pioneer trading enterprises. Others were setting up stores in relatively remote trading centres to evade stiff competition in the principal trading centres. To some extent, the stores which the former employees were establishing were filling up room created by the immigration to Southern Rhodesia of some of the leading traders such as Meman and Afghan in the 1950s. This was

possible due to the fact that during the Federation Southern Rhodesia provided a lot of trading investment opportunities. By 1964 former employees came to constitute a sizeable proportion of Asian businessmen in Chipata. Daya observed that, 'at first there were few bosses' as the majority of Asians were employees. At independence a lot of Asians who were workers had established their own businesses. . There are many bosses now and very few Asian workers'.<sup>89</sup> The change from a handful of leading Asian traders to a proliferation in small traders accelerated the growth of Asian business between 1940 and 1964.

This proliferation in small traders also marked social differentiation in the Asian trading class among three stratas as small traders came to constitute a distinct strata from employers and employees. The leading traders were the major employers of labour but the small traders essentially relied on family labour. Asian labour tried to engage in trade unionism in the 1950s. For example, in 1950 Asian workers attempted to form a trade union in order to fight for better working conditions. The process of employees turning into traders continued unfolding in the post-colonial era.

The proliferation in small traders also effected a marked spread of Asians into Chipata rural. Around 1931 almost all the 37 Asians resided in the township but by

1946 there were 99 Asians in the township and 62 in Chipata rural. Five years later there were more Asians in Chipata rural than in the township as shown below.<sup>90</sup>

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
TOWNSHIP	118	73	191
RURAL	133	83	216
TOTAL			407

Thus growth in Asian business and population was marked by penetration of Chipata rural by Asian traders. This situation prevailed till the economic reforms of 1968.

#### 2.4 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE EMERGENCE OF FORMER EMPLOYEES AS TRADERS

The growth of Asian business was hastened by the increase in the number of former employees turning themselves into traders. This was the case because the most enterprising employees ventured into business after working for at least three years during which time they had acquired sufficient experience and some initial capital. To make it in trading, the upcoming trader had to triumph over the constraints of insufficient capital, small turnover and hard conditions of life especially in the rural areas. In this section I will demonstrate that the credit system, intra-community assistance, partnership, experience, frugality, strong character as well as the racially stratified economic framework were crucial

factors in the progression of a shop assistant into a trader.

The credit system encouraged the rise of a shop assistant into a trader because an industrious employee with insufficient capital could go into business by relying on the credit system provided by the sponsors in particular and leading traders in general. It should be observed that unlike the pioneer traders who started off from spring-boards of relative affluence in Nyasaland, the strata of former employees started off with little capital earned while in the employment of sponsors in Chibata. Mulla, for example, set up an enterprise of his own by relying on easy credit term facilities in the form of goods provided by Meman. He emphasised that 'even if one did not have capital, he could set up his own business by relying on the credit system provided by rich Indians. 600 pounds worth of goods at that time could fill up a big store with all kinds of goods'.<sup>91</sup> Sponsors themselves were keen to render help to their former employees. Mawere observes that:

There was much cooperation among Indians in matters of trade. It was in very few instances that an upcoming trader failed in business since his rich relatives always propped him up by giving him goods on credit to repay bit by bit. Jasat, Adams and Afghan made poor Indians rich in this way. Their cooperation is a secret: outsiders are not supposed to know. I came to know because I worked for Afghan Brothers.<sup>92</sup>



At this stage internecine trade rivalry among Asians was superseded by intra-community cooperation. Daya confirms that 'co-operation among Asians was very good. The rich Indians like Patel were helping poor ones by selling on very easy credit terms. Asians were helping each other very much'. Furthermore, sponsors were renting out trading premises to upcoming traders on reasonable terms.<sup>93</sup> Intra-community co-operation was enhanced by close family ties between the rich Asians and the upcoming traders because the permit system revolved around a tightly knit extended family network. The majority of the Asians in Chipata today trace their origin to Surat district of Gujarat because the principal sponsors originated from there. Similarly, several others trace their origin to Kutch and Bauchhi.<sup>94</sup>

The sponsors rendered support to their former employees for both social and economic reasons. Socially, the sponsor derived prestige from assisting his former employees as they looked up to him as a godfather. Economically, proliferation in small traders meant increased wholesale business for the sponsor. In turn, the former employee derived economic advantages by maintaining business connections with his sponsor. Firstly, his sponsor would take a personal interest in the success of a trader indebted to him by offering him management and fatherly advice. Secondly, the upcoming trader obtained goods from the sponsor on flexible credit

terms. As a general rule, Asians were not charging interest and, so far, only the Khamisas appear to have been charging interest in 1912.<sup>95</sup> In Chipata Asians adhered to the Islamic ethic which prohibits charging and receiving interest since they are a fundamentalist Sunni group who are strict followers of the Koran.<sup>96</sup> Intra-community assistance was also possible since there was ample room for expansion due to the economic growth taking place among Africans in the area. In all kinship was the cornerstone of the credit system among Asians in Chipata.

Trading firms in Southern Rhodesia also provided credit facilities through either travelling salesmen or the mail order. Travelling salesmen from wholesale agencies or firms in Salisbury and Bulawayo brought along samples of goods for sale and traders could place orders on credit terms of up to 180 days with the salesmen who would then arrange for their freight to Chipata.<sup>97</sup> Traders could also order goods on credit terms straight from Southern Rhodesia by mail order. Thatcher and Hobson was the major freight agency. Additionally, well-stocked local wholesalers could deliver goods to the doorstep to traders situated in easily accessible areas<sup>98</sup>. Freight costs were credited to the recipient who, in turn, passed on the cost to the consumer. It appears that interest charged, if any, by suppliers was affordable considering that my respondents did not indicate this to be a source of their business burdens. In fact the credit system

encouraged a spirit of competition among Asian traders as each trader worked extremely hard in order to settle his debts. Moreover, the travelling salesman gave good management advice to a regular buyer because he was aware of the fact that his debtors bankruptcy could mean of business loss to the supplier. At this stage it has been established that the credit system was a crucial factor in the rise of the generally undercapitalised former employees as traders.

Partnership was another factor important in the rise of former employees as traders. Partnership became the major form of business among former employees because it allowed undercapitalised traders to raise their capital base by pooling their resources together. With sufficient capital put together by partners it was possible to establish or rent several stores manned by family labour provided by the partners.<sup>99</sup> As a result the former employees began to use male children as shop labour on an increasing scale. Partners were either brothers or very close friends because partnership worked on the basis of trust even though legal documents were drawn up. Bhura confirms that it was rare for brothers or friends in partnership to disagree to the detriment of their business so long as trust constituted the cornerstone of the partnership.<sup>100</sup> Gradually a partnership dissolved when each of the partners had earned enough to establish his own business after sharing the assets. Thereafter most of

them established family firms. for example. the partnership between Daya and Patel culminated into a partnership among Daya. and his young brother. Mohamed. who had been working for Meman and his cousin. S. Daya. who had been working in Mazabuka. Each of them also later founded family firms.<sup>101</sup> Partnership was a crucial factor in the rise of former employees as traders because it provided one avenue through which they could raise sufficient capital to trade on a larger scale than was possible for one undercapitalised trader.

Possession of experience in African trade was another crucial factor. Each of the former employees possessed sufficient experience in African trade acquired while working for his sponsor. Experience meant a combination of the know-how of the technical side of commerce. competence and personal charm in persuading a customer to buy as well as to win the goodwill of a customer. Apprenticeship of the employee to the sponsor made the employee become acquainted with the practical intricacies of book-keeping and the consumer pattern of the Africans in the area. Former employee. already knew. for example. the favourite calico. pots. pans and plates which women customers preferred. Moreover. they stocked 'anything an African was bound to require: from a sewing needle to a plough part.'<sup>102</sup> Thus former employees were familiar with catering for a wide spectrum of the African market in the area.

The appropriate business methods they utilised in winning over the customers particularly when goods were easily available were mbasela, price bargaining and nkongole (credit sales)<sup>103</sup>. After a customer purchased goods, the trader gave him or her mbasela which the recipient understood to be a gesture of generosity on the part of the trader. This mbasela was given in the form of Chikondamoyo (sweet buns), lumps of sugar or salt or chitambala (head-dress) to one who had bought a big item like a dress.<sup>104</sup> It was necessary for traders to portray a benign image because competition was very stiff in principal trading centres and trade very slow in relatively remote areas. In the first place Africans were largely occasional shoppers owing to the fact that peasants earned their income seasonally. Thus annual trading booms coincided with the dry season when peasants marketed their crops. In the rainy season, turnover was very slow as trade occurred mainly in dire necessities such as salt, paraffin, matches and soap rather than items with a higher profit margin like clothes.

In the principal trading centres and the township stiff competition could lead to very low profit margins as traders offered competitive prices to the customers. Sulleiman recalls that there were almost 12 Asian stores in Katete area where he first worked in the early 1950s and there were about six Asians at Sinda stop.<sup>105</sup> As a

result of such a constellation of stores intra-Asian trading competition was stiff and profit margins were generally low:

Even when Africans had money turnover was low because these days competition was very stiff. Goods were plenty but customers were few so traders reduced their profit margin to attract customers. If you were making 1 or 2 pounds a day you considered yourself lucky. Big stores could make between 3 and 4 pounds a day. Because of this a few traders actually went bankrupt and got employed by rich Indians.<sup>106</sup>

Price bargaining worked on the basis of reducing the profit margin. To the average customer, the transaction involving price bargaining used to convey the impression that the Asian trader could be talked into low prices. Former employees resorted to partnership partly because the bigger the trading enterprise the more competitive prices it was able to offer.

Selling on nkongole was one way of promoting sales especially in the rainy season when trade was very slow. The trader was not necessarily taking a big risk by selling on nkongole since the people were very honest and they almost always paid their nkongole.<sup>107</sup> A customer indebted to a trader turned out to be a regular one in the sense that he would come back to settle his debt and buy something else on cash basis or nkongole. In this way he became personally known to the trader and the trader could have regular customers especially among salaried Africans in the township. Furthermore, traders utilised tailors to

sew garments for customers in order to attract women customers particularly who preferred stores where they could buy materials and then have dresses of their own designs made to those selling ready-made garments. It appears that the Asian did not directly demand sewing charges where there was stiff competition. Instead he employed tailors specifically to 'sew garments for customers as well as garments to sell ready-made in the store.<sup>108</sup> Later I will demonstrate that even though Asian traders generally offered competitive prices they did not hesitate to profiteer in times of acute shortage of goods as was the case during the war as well as the immediate post-war period.

Frugality also played a crucial role in the ascendancy of former employees as traders as was the case with the pioneering Asian traders. Although the African market had grown concomitantly with the economic growth of the area, this economic growth was uneven. Thus in relatively remote areas where cash crop farming was slow in taking root, the African market was also relatively small. Traders who ventured to trade in such areas had no choice but to eke out a living from their enterprises. For example, Chadiza area offered slow business compared to Katete area throughout the year because subsistence farming predominated up to the 1950s and Africans earned some cash sporadically largely by selling handicrafts.<sup>109</sup> This notwithstanding the trader succeeded in accumulation

by maintaining a low standard of living. In fact business sense dictated that accumulation would be possible by reducing consumption and increasing saving meant for investment. Mehl observes that

Over the years I have noted that compared to his African counterpart, the Indian shows better business sense. He was willing to set up stores in relatively remote areas because he had patience to wait for future results. Europeans and Africans, for example, demanded cash payment when an Indian could extend credit facilities and wait for a month or two for the cash. An Indian was able to save because in the bush there was nothing to spend his money on. Meanwhile he existed on a very simple diet of rice.<sup>110</sup>

Saving among Asians was influenced by frugality. To some extent, fundamentalist Islam had an indirect impact on promoting frugality in the sense that it encouraged asceticism in life rather than indulgence. In essence, frugality was dictated by the business realities of the time.

Strong character and a driving ambition to succeed in trade also influenced the successful rise of former employees as traders. The fact that their predecessors had become rich in African trade acted as a motivating force to the most ambitious employers to succeed as traders. Employees were essentially young men utilising the permit system to come to Northern Rhodesia with the main objective of becoming traders by using sponsors as stepping stones.<sup>111</sup> The marked tendency of young immigrants meant that the shop-assistants were generally



energetic and enterprising young men immigrating for economic reasons. For example, Mussa Daya came in 1936 at the age of 26 years. The 1946 census for the whole country noted that about 53 to 56 percent of the Asian immigrants were in the age range of 20 to 35 years.<sup>112</sup> It is generally young men of strong character who venture from their motherlands to better their economic well-being. Writing of Lebanese traders in West Africa, Kaniki ranked young age, strong character and a driving ambition to overcome poverty as crucial factors which influenced the success of Lebanese immigrants as businessmen.<sup>113</sup> This observation is largely true for the Asian employees in Chipata some of whom had failed to enter college after matriculation examinations due to lack of financial resources.<sup>114</sup> Today the strata of former employees pride themselves on having succeeded as traders 'through sheer hard work, perseverance and determination'.<sup>115</sup> To the young immigrant, trading was a career which provided a source of livelihood and a decent life. Thus it has been demonstrated that strong character and high motivation influenced the rise of the most enterprising shop-assistants as traders.

The racially stratified economic structure also influenced the ascendancy of shop-assistants as traders because the Northern Rhodesian government adhered to the practice of employing Africans as minor government bureaucrats and not Asians as was the case in Nyasaland. Furthermore, the railways and the mines in Northern

Rhodesia did not undertake massive utilisation of Asian labour. Jasat observed that 'the reason why Asians were mainly employed in storekeeping was that other opportunities were more or less denied them'.<sup>116</sup> This meant that the ambitious Asian immigrants in Northern Rhodesia had no choice but to pursue a career in trading. Thus, the progression of a shop-assistant into a trader was influenced by a combination of the credit system, intra-communal assistance, individual resourcefulness as well as the racially stratified economic structure.

## 2.5 DIVERSIFICATION OF ASIAN BUSINESS 1940-1964

The most successful Asian traders were able to embark on diversification into haulage and passenger transport, tobacco farming and small-scale tailoring factories from the late 1930s to the early 1960s. In this section I will examine the extent of diversification of Asian business into transport, farming and tailoring. I will also examine why Asians failed as tobacco farmers.

It is Asian traders who initiated both haulage and passenger transport between the township and the outlying centres of Chipata such as Jumbe in the late 1930s. Transport became an attractive business venture owing to the increasing human and cargo traffic between the township and the evolving marketing centres in the outlying areas of Chipata as one consequence of the post-depression economic growth in the area. One of the

earliest Asians to go into transport was Walli Adams who utilised a lorry to transport both human and cargo traffic particularly along Lundazi Road. This transport service terminated when Adam died because the heir was too young to take over the business:<sup>117</sup> Sundi also went into transport in the late 1930s which operated on the local routes especially between the township and Jembe.

Local freight transport was also initiated by Asians largely because the leading Asian wholesaler was compelled to freight goods he bought from his sources either in Nyasaland or Southern Rhodesia. Asian traders who did not own transport of their own could hire a lorry from a fellow Asian for the purpose of freighting their goods. By 1939 Jasat had acquired a lorry which was utilised in freighting goods from external suppliers as well as hauling maize he bought from the surrounding villages to sell in the township.<sup>118</sup> Later some of the European farmers were hiring his lorry to freight their produce from their farms to the township. However, Asian diversification into transport was unsuccessful by the 1950s.

The failure of Asian diversification into transport can be attributed to three major reasons. Firstly, Asians were excluded from the Great East Road route as Thatcher and Hobson had secured a monopoly from the government on this route. Transport business on this route must have

been relatively profitable owing to the rise in human and cargo traffic between Chipata and the line of rail. Thus Thatcher and Hobson did not welcome competition as this would have resulted in reduction of their business on this route. Mawere recalls that the Administration made it very clear to Zilole and others that their buses should only operate on the local routes and not on the Great East Road.<sup>119</sup> Thus, Africans and Asians were excluded from the Great East Road route because the Government was promoting the sectional interests of European transport business at the expense of Asian and African transport business.

Secondly Asians faced competition from Zilole, a leading African trader diversifying from trading and farming into transport, on the local routes. In the 1940s for example, Sundi was facing stiff competition from Zilole who had purchased a lorry from an Asian at 600 pounds.<sup>120</sup> Sometimes Sundi and Zilole were forced to share passengers or surrender passengers to each other owing to the fact that business was very low on the local routes.<sup>121</sup> It appears that competition from Zilole forced Sundi to pull off from passenger transport. Zilole continued in transport business and in 1955 he was running a 'twice-weekly regular service between Jumbe and Chipata'.<sup>122</sup> By the 1960s he owned three buses. In fact Zilole succeeded in becoming the leading transporter in the district from the 1950s up to the 1960s. Thus African competition mitigated against expansion of Asian transport

business.

Thirdly, Asians also faced competition in haulage transport from Zilole and the cooperatives. In addition to buses Zilole had bought two lorries for hire to haul produce between the township and the marketing centres in its outlying areas. In fact Zilole was a registered transporter with the cooperatives. Later the cooperative also began buying their own lorries and became less dependent on hired transport.<sup>123</sup> As a result Asians began to concentrate on freighting trade goods for their stores instead of hiring out their lorries for haulage business. Therefore the colonial bias against Asian competition in transport business and non-European exclusion from the relatively busy Great East Road route, in favour of Thatcher and Hobson, as well as African competition on the local routes contributed to the failure of Asian diversification into transport.

Asians also diversified into tobacco farming in the years immediately after the Second World War. Since the administration in the province adhered to a policy of discrimination against Asians in selling land outside the Indian Quarter, Asians managed to purchase land for farming in two ways. Firstly, Asians were able to purchase land from Charterland which embarked on selling off its idle land to whoever had the money<sup>124</sup>. Prosperous Asian traders who had gained from war time profiteering

took this opportunity to purchase land from Charterland. In 1946 Jasat spent well over 2,208 pounds to purchase 3301. 489 acres of land in Kazimule.<sup>125</sup> By January 1947 four Asians had bought a total of 10,600 acres and three Coloureds had bought 6,500 acres.<sup>126</sup> Two months later another four Asians bought 5,072 acres.<sup>127</sup> Between 1946 and 1947 Charterland sold well over 20,000 acres to Asians around Chipata and Petauke for farming purposes.

Secondly. Asians were able to acquire land by buying it from Europeans and Coloureds reselling land they had bought from Charterland.<sup>128</sup> The 1947 Provincial Newsletter observed that

There is a big demand by wealthy Indians for land. Several Europeans have had good offers, and there are signs that some land presently owned by Eurafricans [Coloureds] may fall into Indian hands before long, though only one Eurafrican owned farm of 1770 acres is known to have been bought by an Indian during the quarter.<sup>129</sup>

At this time the Asian demand for land was so high that some of them were offering Europeans and coloureds highly inflated prices. Thus,

one of these Europeans was recently offered 3,000 pounds for a 200 acre farm he had bought at 800 pounds earlier this year and on which he had cleared twenty-five acres. Now that there is no North Charterland land available, applications for crownland are being received from the Europeans and Indians.<sup>130</sup>

In 1950 there were 18 Asians owned farms in the province

as a whole largely situated in the outlying areas of Chipata acquired through the above mentioned ways. However, ten years later Asian tobacco farming had failed.

Even though I do not have data to demonstrate the scale of Asian tobacco production, evidence on tobacco farming in the province shows that Asian tobacco farmers had collapsed in the province as a whole by 1960. Between 1945 and 1955 this was a result of inexperience and poor management. In the succeeding years tobacco farming in Eastern province collapsed owing to a slump. Asians were inexperienced as tobacco farmers compared to the settlers because they had been specialising in African trade from the earliest times whereas Europeans had been specialising in tobacco farming. Growing Virginia flue-cured tobacco, an export crop, demanded specialised management from the seedling stage up to the curing and grading stages. Because of the specialised nature of growing flue-cured tobacco, some of the Asians opted to grow Burley tobacco which demanded less sophisticated management.<sup>131</sup> Daya confirmed that inexperience contributed to the failure of tobacco farming.<sup>132</sup> Khanshab attributes the failure of Asian tobacco farming to poor management in the sense of lack of supervision and dedication to duty. Asians were devoting more time to African trade than farming even though in the majority of cases Asians purchased virgin land which had to be developed from scratch and, so, needed total involvement

and close supervision of labour. At the same time inexperienced Asian farmers were competing with settlers able to offer relatively better working conditions to their farm workers<sup>133</sup>. Settlers had already set the precedent of providing posho and paying workers in cash. In contrast Asians persisted in paying labour in kind instead of cash which Africans preferred. In fact Asians were generally considered bad employers by both Africans and European officials largely because the prosperous settler and the company owned farm offered better working conditions than the nascent Asian farmer. Moreover, Asians had to contend with the problem of poor communications because their farms were mostly situated at great distances from Chipata and Petauke in comparison to European farms situated at short distances from the bomas.<sup>134</sup>

Another factor which contributed to the failure of Asian tobacco farming was the tobacco slump which hit Eastern Province in the mid 1950s resulting in the eventual collapse of tobacco farming in Eastern Province. The poorly managed Asian farms must have collapsed more rapidly than the European farms. This collapse created room for the rise of small-scale African farmers specialising in Burley and Turkish tobacco for consumption in Northern Rhodesia rather than Virginia flue-cured tobacco which was an export crop. Having failed in tobacco farming, Asians concentrated on African trade and



started diversifying into tailoring firms.

They began to diversify into tailoring firms in the early 1960s because they possessed ample financial resources earned from African trade and government policy in the area was directed at encouraging the creation of manufacturing industries. For example, in 1957 the PC for the province had proposed establishing secondary industries in order to promote industrial development in the area.<sup>135</sup> The favourable attitude and a market for clothes owing to rising economic prosperity among Africans made tailoring firms a sound business venture. By 1962 Patel had established a tailoring firm known as Central African Manufacturers.<sup>136</sup> This company had a market not only in Eastern Province but also in Nyasaland. Such a business venture was a response to the felt need seeing that the area was almost entirely dependent on distant places such as Bulawayo and Salisbury for its trade goods. Moreover, African tailors were cheaply available. In 1954, for example, African tailors employed by Asians in Lundazi had gone on strike to demand for higher pay but eventually returned to work or were replaced at old rates.<sup>137</sup> Three other firms in this line of business were established prior to 1964.<sup>138</sup> Furthermore, diversification into travel agencies, hardware, motor vehicle spare parts, construction, stationery, butchery, restaurants and haulage transport took place in the post-colonial period.

2.6 CAUSES OF AFRICAN ANTI-ASIAN ATTITUDES IN CHIPATA,  
1939-50

Anti-Asian attitudes in Chipata and the province as a whole became widespread during the seven years of war as well as in the years immediately after the war. Prior to the war there was no overt conflict between Asians and Africans. In fact it appears that initially traditional rulers were not against Asians and Europeans setting up stores in their areas.<sup>139</sup> But during the war African traders, the clerical class, traditional chiefs and, to some extent peasants, developed anti-Asian attitudes. The anti-Asian attitudes crystallised and became entrenched among Africans in the years immediately after the war. In this section I will examine the causes of anti-Asian attitudes among different classes of Africans, namely African traders, the clerical class and traditional rulers. I will demonstrate that competition in African trade, acquisition of land by Asians and an influx of Asian immigrants to Chipata were the causes of the development of racism towards the Asians among Africans.

In the 1940s African traders had emerged as economic rivals with Asian traders in African trade. This rivalry was accentuated by the war-time scarcity of goods in the province which hit the African trader more than the Asian trader for several reasons. Firstly, the Asian

wholesaler was able to procure goods from Southern Rhodesia since he possessed adequate financial resources as well as his own transport to freight the goods he succeeded in scouting for. Due to the shortage of goods at this time, the Asian wholesaler first supplied his own network of stores, then Asian traders tied to him by chains of credit and kinship and African traders were considered last. In this situation African traders found it difficult to acquire trade goods from the Asian who was their traditional source of goods. Moreover it became a general practice for Asians to dump slow selling stock on the African by conditional selling as the African was always hungry for trade goods. Conditional selling was one consequence of the scarcity of popular line goods. Thus:

The trader has found difficulty in supplying the demand for the more popular lines as he is apt to become himself saddled with less saleable goods by his own wholesaler, who, in his turn is often unable to obtain from the manufacturer what he wants without taking quantities of goods he did not want. <sup>140</sup>

Furthermore, the Asian trader was conducting lucrative trade in popular line goods such as cloth, pots and pans on account of war-time profiteering. Because the Asian wholesaler was giving preference to fellow Asians in supplying trade goods, African traders came to resent Asians in general on the grounds that they were only interested in exploiting Africans and not in helping

indigenous traders.<sup>141</sup>

Secondly, African traders who possessed ample financial resources and their own transport such as Zilole could only manage to procure groceries but not cloth in Salisbury and Johannesburg because Asians had cornered the cloth market.<sup>142</sup> It is likely that Asians succeeded in cornering the cloth market by entering into 'gentlemen's agreements' with their long established suppliers as Miracle demonstrates on the Copperbelt.<sup>143</sup> Asians, unlike Africans, had developed business relations with external suppliers due to their early start in trading as well as credit worthiness. For example Pelletier of Ndola and Carters of Chipata preferred long standing Asian traders to the nascent African traders.<sup>144</sup> Because Asians succeeded in cornering the cloth market, African traders came to resent them for being selfish traders.

Thirdly, wholesaling by the government as a war time measure and by the Traders' Association in the immediate post-war period was inadequate for the needs of African traders. Moreover, some of the cloth supplied by the government found its way into Asian hands in two ways. Since the government was doing business with Africans on cash basis, some of the African traders were purchasing cloth from the government in collaboration with Asian traders who had readily available cash. Others were selling cloth they had bought from the government at inflated prices.<sup>145</sup> These practices contributed to the high prices

of cloth. Goods supplied by the Traders' Association were not enough for the needs of African traders in Chipata in spite of its efforts to procure sufficient goods from external suppliers. In 1947, for example, although the Secretary had travelled to the Copperbelt and Southern Rhodesia to order goods and the Chairman had conducted 'voluminous correspondence with wholesale firms' to secure orders, they managed to secure only goods to the value of 600 pounds.<sup>146</sup> The association mainly dealt in groceries since Asians had cornered the cloth market. The lack of goods among African traders meant that they lost even the meagre turnover they had been able to realise prior to the war when it was relatively easier for them to buy goods from the local Asian wholesaler. In Mugubudu, for example, four Africans closed their stores owing to lack of both capital and goods. In the whole area only 'one quite well run African store belonging to Jackson Kamungu' had survived Asian competition.<sup>147</sup> African traders generally failed to survive Asian competition due to the following reasons. Asian stores were more popular than African stores because they offered a wide range of material at competitive prices. The Asian trader was able to undersell his African competitors since he enjoyed the advantage of economies of scale by buying his goods in bulk. But the African trader who bought in small quantities from the Asian wholesaler and sometimes from the Asian retailer at retail price with 10% discount, overpriced his goods in order to realise a profit.<sup>148</sup> On

the whole the inadequacy in the supply of goods played a significant role in retarding the development of African business as well as encouraging the development of anti-Asian attitudes among African traders.

The development of anti-Asian attitudes among African traders was encouraged by increased economic rivalry owing to the proliferation in both Asian and African stores despite the shortage of goods. The high death rate notwithstanding, African stores increased from 26 in 1930 to 136 in 1947.<sup>149</sup> In March 1947 the number of stores in the district were given as follows.<sup>150</sup>

	TOWNSHIP	TRADING ZONES	ON FARMS	NATIVE RESERVES	TOTAL
ASIAN	35	37	72	—	144
AFRICAN	3	—	—	133	136
EUROPEAN	7	—	15	—	22

The following year African stores increased from 136 to 178. By 1953 there were 424 African stores in Fort Jameson. In the township African traders had risen from three in 1947 to 21 in 1955. Asian stores from 35 to 47 over the same period.<sup>151</sup> Thus, there occurred a remarkable growth in the African entrepreneur class in trading whose members were essentially trade rivals with Asians in the post-Second World War period in Chipata.

The proliferation in African stores particularly immediately after the Second World War was encouraged by a high propensity among the ex-askari to venture into trading. Even though I do not have data to demonstrate the scale of the ex-askari strata of traders, colonial reports noted that ex-askari generally ventured into business owing to the fact that they possessed financial resources earned while in the army. For example, in 1945, four-hundred and forty-six ex-askari in Eastern Province received between 20 and 30 pounds each. By September 1946, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-five were paid 52,750 pounds in total.<sup>152</sup> At this time it was government policy to give preference to the ex-askari who were interested in venturing into business as one way of helping them to resettle. Thus, some of the most enterprising ex-askari in Eastern province ventured into trading.

The ex-askari strata of traders played a significant role in exacerbating anti-Asian attitudes since their attitudes were influenced by their political re-awakening resulting from the war experiences. The ex-askari trying hard at trading also suffered from Asian competition. Some of them tried to avoid direct competition with the Asian by trading far away from the principal trading centres. For example, in Sinda they set up stores far away from Asian stores across Kapoche River.<sup>153</sup> Nevertheless most of them went bankrupt because

of hard trading conditions. Furthermore, African customers preferred Asians at Sinda. This meant that ex-askari traders began to express economic rivalry with Asians in racist terms. Racism was particularly pronounced among the ex-askari who had fought in Asian territories such as Burma because they were envious of Asian prosperity having seen that the Asian was as poor as the African in his original home.<sup>154</sup> Furthermore, the war experiences had acted as a study tour which helped to broaden the political consciousness of the askari and, this made them more susceptible to politics of decolonisation. Intense trade rivalry as a result of the scarcity of goods played a major role in the development of racial consciousness between African and Asian traders. Since the Asian trader was not the cause of the scarcity of goods, in essence, the African trader was using the Asian as a scapegoat for his misfortune in trading.

African traders continued to harbour racist attitudes in spite of improvement in the supply of goods during Federation because Asian competition remained a fundamental factor retarding the Africanisation of trade in Chipata. The Association failed to cater for African traders owing to Asian competition and lukewarm commitment from its members. Around 1950 it had a paid up share capital of 759 pounds from a membership of 102 and turnover of 3855 pounds.<sup>155</sup> Two years later the turnover rose to 5200 pounds but the following year the turnover



dropped to 3761 pounds and this decline continued until the Association became bankrupt in 1955.<sup>156</sup> African traders preferred the Asian wholesaler who provided credit facilities, to the Association which demanded cash payment.<sup>157</sup> Moreover, with the improvement in the availability of goods the Asian had begun to liberally cater for the African trader. In fact the generally impoverished African trader situated far away from Chipata relied on the Asian retailer for his trade goods as the DC. Chipata, observed in 1957.

most traders are under-capitalised and they have little access to wholesaler supplies but usually obtain their stocks from Indian traders at retail prices less a small discount. It is likely that these stores which operate efficiently with good stocks are heavily subsidised by Indians.<sup>158</sup>

Consequently, the African trader remained tied to the Asian trader, for whom he harboured racist feelings, out of economic necessity.

It must be noted that Asian competition was not the sole cause for the failure of Africanisation of trade even though African traders considered this to be so. Incompetence and inexperience were equally major factors which mitigated against Africanisation of trade. Africans lacked competence and business experience compared to Asians who gained on-the-job training as contract employees. The commonplace view which portrayed Asian competition as solely responsible for the failure of

Africanisation of trade was influenced by the fact that an alien entrepreneurial class in African trade was doing overwhelmingly well compared to the indigenous traders.

On the whole, the trade rivalry characterised by a scarcity of goods was one major cause of the development of racial consciousness between African and Asian traders. The fact that Asians were discriminating against Africans in supplying goods during the war period worked to the effect of encouraging the division between Africans and Asian even though they belonged to the same class of traders. In fact the failure of the Traders' Association meant that Africans lacked the services of a body which they could use to influence the administration over policies pertaining to African trade. Instead the clerical class and traditional rulers took up the clarion call for Africanisation of trade in Native Reserves because they also harboured racist attitudes towards the alien Asian trader.<sup>159</sup>

The clerical class and traditional rulers developed racist attitudes towards the Asian owing to five major reasons, namely: conditional selling, overpricing, trade competition, land ownership and alleged miscegenation. Conditional selling, and overpricing were rife as long as the shortage of goods persisted in spite of the price control regulations. Asian traders received more blame than the African traders for these practices largely

because Asian stores were better stocked and, thus, conducted more trade than African stores. Since members of the clerical class were very dependent on Asian traders for consumer goods, they quickly developed sensitivity towards conditional selling, overpricing and short measure. As far as they were concerned the Asian trader was purposefully overpricing goods to enrich himself very quickly at the expense of the African. The African Provincial Council and the Native Authority meetings became forums where the clerical class articulated their grievances against the Asian trader. Thus, at the second Provincial Council Meeting in 1944 Mkanda complained that Asians were subjecting Africans to conditional buying.

A man could not buy what he wanted in an Indian store unless he bought a lot of other things which he did not want. For example a man was not allowed to buy a bicycle tyre unless he bought ~~£~~5 worth of goods.<sup>160</sup>

Two years later Sikeva, a counsellor, complained that prices of cotton goods were very high even though the war was long over. At the 1948 meeting Mkanda, again, complained that the price of cloth was very high partly because Asians were overcharging on sewing up charges. A pair of shorts could cost 13 shillings even though khaki drill was going at four shillings per yard due to high sewing up charges.<sup>161</sup> The PC pointed out that this practice was against trading regulations and one Asian was fined 30 pounds for overcharging on sewing up charges.<sup>162</sup> It appears that one result of stringent price

control regulations and heavy penalties must have been the introduction of sewing up charges by Asian traders. This indicates that even though the general practice was to sew up a garment for a customer 'free' of charge, the Asian resorted to charging sewing up charges at the time of scarcity of goods which, in addition to profiteering, encouraged resentment for Asian traders in the ranks of the clerical class.

Actual and potential economic rivalry in African trade also encouraged the growth of resentment for the Asian trader by the clerical class and the traditional rulers. The clerical class emerged as economic rivals with Asians in the sense that the tendency among government employees to venture into business was becoming marked in the post Second World War period. For example, by 1948 Kalongola had ventured into hotel business in the Native Quarter after thirty years service in the Public Works Department.<sup>163</sup> By 1951 Mekani Banda, a former Post Office Messenger, had established one of the four most successful African stores in Chief Kawaza's area and by 1959 a Post Master at Mgoro was running a bakery in addition to growing vegetable and rice for sale.<sup>164</sup> In this year he sold 55 bags of rice to the Co-operative.<sup>165</sup> Furthermore, members of the clerical class contemplated going into business particularly on retirement.<sup>166</sup> In view of the fact that they considered Asian competition a fundamental obstacle to their possible mobility into the entrepreneurial class, the clerical class politically

identified their interests with these of the African traders and traditional rulers over Africanisation of trade. Like African traders, the clerical class considered that the privileged position occupied by alien traders ought to have been occupied by indigenous traders. Since African business was developing at a time that Asian business was already developed, they wanted a political solution which would limit the growth of Asian business but encourage the expansion of African business. Thus the first session of the African Representative Council in 1947 called for political help biased towards the development of the African entrepreneurial class in African trade<sup>166</sup>. Ghai's contention that the clerical class in East Africa came to resent Asian control of trade is particularly true for Chipata.

Asians control of trade is particularly hated. There is a feeling among Africans that Asian traders have conspired together to hinder the participation of Africans in commerce and that were it not for their conspiracy, the Africans would rapidly and effectively engage in commerce. This view overlooks that skills, experience and hard work are needed to succeed in the retail trade.<sup>168</sup>

Traditional rulers were themselves economic rivals with Asians because they were going into business. Between 1932 and 1938 Chiefs such as Sayiri, Kawaza, Msoro, Madzimawe and Mwanga had gone into African trade<sup>169</sup>. Being actual and potential economic rivals with Asians in African trade, traditional rulers developed

anti-Asian attitudes as a result of economic competition.

Traditional rulers also resented Asian traders because from the late 1930s Asian competition was an impediment to diversification into African trade by Native Treasuries in order to raise additional revenue. For example, on seeing that Asians were beginning to control the maize trade in his area, in 1939 Chief Kawaza of the Chewa Native Authority proposed that the Administration should exclude Asian traders from this trade in order to give monopoly of the maize trade to the Native Treasury. He further argued that Asians should be excluded from the maize trade because of their persistence in paying in cloth instead of cash preferred by the peasants. In fact Chief Kawaza banned Jasat from trading in his area for paying in cloth even though cloth payment was not illegal.<sup>170</sup> The need for Native Treasuries to raise additional revenue for its enlarging social services was compelling entrepreneurship in the Native Authorities.<sup>171</sup> By 1945 Kalindawalo Native Authority was trading at its headquarters with difficulty owing to the scarcity of goods and Asian competition. As a result of the foregoing factors traditional rulers were envious of Asian traders and began to campaign against Asian business in purely racial terms. In 1947, for example, Chief Nyampande complained that:

the Indians are like snakes: you knew their nature when they bite you .... They were like Germans .... If a man bought things at

an Indian store and then asked for shelter for the night he was turned away perhaps to be eaten by wild animals.<sup>172</sup>

Since Asian traders were not philanthropists operating rest houses for their customers, in essence racist sentiments amongst traditional rulers were an expression of their resentment of Asian control of African trade.

Traditional rulers also developed resentment against Asian business because, like the clerical class, they perceived Asian competition to be a fundamental obstacle to the development of African business. This perception was supported by the fact that outstanding African traders were emerging in areas where there was no direct Asian competition.<sup>173</sup> Consequently Native Authorities began to resort to a political measure of vetting Asian applicants for trading plots in Native Reserves in order to protect African traders in the reserves from Asian competition.<sup>174</sup> The actions of the Chewa Native Authority provides a picture of the magnitude of anti-Asian attitudes by Native Authorities in the 1950s. At its 1950 meeting in March, the Chewa Authority resolved not to renew Asian leases unless 'all stores were managed by African store capitalists and that all non-Europeans withdrew.<sup>175</sup> The following year's 'meeting unanimously did not approve the renewal of Asian leases on the grounds that the Indian stores were not wanted in the area because

they ruined any trade. In fact traditional rulers in Northern Rhodesia were calling for Africanisation of trade in order to enhance the development of an indigenous entrepreneur class in African trade. In Barotse Province, for example, the Paramount Chief and Kuta called upon the government to pass legislation meant to proscribe Asian traders from the province.<sup>177</sup> Growth of racism among traditional rulers was one consequence of inter-racial economic rivalry with Asians whom they perceived as an impediment to accumulation on their part as well as Native Treasuries and African traders.

In the years immediately after the war, two other factors emerged and became very crucial in generating xenophobia against Asian traders among the African elite (clerical class and traditional rulers) namely, Asian land acquisition and miscegenation which here implies the practice of Asian men having children with African women outside marriage.<sup>178</sup> Between 1945 and 1947 Asians were buying land for tobacco farms from Charterland, Europeans and Coloureds. This aroused African emotions against Asian presence largely because they were suspicious that Asians were buying land for the purpose of settling their incoming relatives and friends. This suspicion was well-founded to a large extent since Asian land acquisition coincided with increased Asian immigration



into the district. In 1946 the Provincial Newsletter observed that 'some Indians have said openly they want to get friends and relatives over from India before India attains independence'.<sup>179</sup> Moreover, it was feared that Asians would end up acquiring land at the expense of Africans as the Asians possessed sufficient financial resources to compete with Europeans in purchasing land at a time when Africans could not afford this. Thus at the 1947 African Provincial Council meeting Somati, a counsellor, complained that instead of emigrating to India which was about to achieve self government, Asians were immigrating into the area on an ever increasing scale.<sup>180</sup> Phiri, another counsellor, proposed that Asian immigration should be proscribed because they 'underpaid the African for his labour and agricultural produce' compared to Europeans who taught Christianity.<sup>181</sup> Chief Mwase added that Asians should only be allowed to trade at the Bomas but should not be allowed to farm.<sup>182</sup> Xenophobia<sup>1</sup> was encouraged by the fact that as traders Asians could be regarded as temporary immigrants but as landowners they were regarded as settlers. Zilole provided a concise rationale for African xenophobia over Asian land acquisition:

These here have found the country good and were able to buy land so they now wrote to their brothers and friends to tell them to come and could offer more than the Africans. But Africans were increasing in numbers and the time could come when they would need land and would find it all gone. When this time came

the Africans would be forced to be servants and the labourers of Indians in order to live. They did not like this because the Indian was unfair to his labour. They secured women and children for labour with tobacco without stating their conditions of service and paid them inadequately with cloth. The Indian was very cunning and however the Governemnt tried to protect the people he found a way around. Many Africans were ignorant, they did not know the law and could not protect themselves. The only way was to keep Indians out entirely.<sup>183</sup>

Asian land acquisition gave rise to xenophobia among the African elite because the land question touches the source of livelihood of a people.

This xenophobia also found expression in cultural rivalry over concubinage involving Asian men and African women. It is true that there was a marked propensity for Asian men as well as Europeans to maintain informal relations with African women resulting in coloured children. The presence of coloured children gave rise to complaints of miscegenation which were focussed on the Asian rather than on the European. In 1946 the PC observed that 'Indians cohabiting with Africans' was exacerbating conflicts between Africans and and Asians.<sup>184</sup> The African Provincial Council went to the extent of calling upon the government to legislate against interracial intercourse.<sup>185</sup> Chief Nyamphade asserted that this legislation was necessary because 'Indians went into the villages to buy the women and if the woman herself would not consent they would importune her parents with

offers of money'.<sup>186</sup> Complaints also abounded over the failure by Asians to take custody of their coloured children. Asians were regarded as less responsible than Europeans towards their coloured children owing to the propensity for Europeans to marry the African women in the traditional sense in contrast to Asians who did not:

It was common for Asians to have children with African women while legally married to Indian women. At times they would be living with local women but still import their wives from India. Europeans tended to marry the African women and were much more willing to take custody of their children compared to the Indian who paid more attention to his children from the Asian wife rather than those from his African women.<sup>187</sup>

On the whole the rise of xenophobia among the African elite had the result of encouraging racial pride among Asians in their overwhelming competence in African trade.

The peasants attitude to the Asian traders were mixed. There was some hostility because they did not like the Asian's tendency to pay in goods for their produce instead of cash which they generally preferred.<sup>188</sup> Nevertheless around 1948 peasants in areas such as Jumbe, Kakumbi, Mkhanya, Tindi and Msoro were profitably selling their maize to Asian traders<sup>189</sup>. As already demonstrated peasants in Katete area were benefiting considerably in their rice trade with Asians. Anti-Asian attitudes among peasants were mild largely because Asian participation in buying of agricultural produce was restricted by an Administrative regulation which required traders to

obtain a permit in order to buy maize 'as a measure meant to prevent anyone cornering the market and ensure that available supplies are as equitably distributed as possible'<sup>190</sup>. Later the marketing co-operatives monopolised the buying of agricultural produce from the peasants.

Thus far several conclusions can be drawn as regards the causes of racism towards Asians by Africans in Chipata. Firstly, Asian competition with Africans in an environment characterised by shortage of goods encouraged intense inter-racial trade rivalry. This rivalry was accentuated by the fact that Asian wholesalers were biased towards fellow Asians in supplying goods and the Asian trader had succeeded in cornering the market in popular line goods to the detriment of African business. Secondly, Asian immigration aroused African xenophobia because Africans were suspicious that Asians were acquiring land in order to settle their incoming relatives at expense of Africans. Furthermore, the marked tendency among Asians to cohabit with African women also aroused xenophobia because Asians were generally neglecting the African women and their coloured children. Thirdly, the Africans' perception of the Asian as the major impediment

to the development of an African entrepreneurial class in African trade gave rise to political resentment of Asian business expressed in the call for Africanisation of trade in Native Reserves.

NOTES

1. Report Appendix VI Survey of Developement since 1953. Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constituion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 1960. p. 326.
2. NAZ. SEC 2263. Native Markets. 1930-1947. Interview between the Secretary for Native Affairs and Mr. G. Hardie, ALC, 21 April. 1947.
3. Clerical class refers to African employees who had received some formal education.
4. NAZ. SEC 2/25. Eastern Province. Fort Jameson District Annual Reports. 1935-38. Annual Report, Fort Jameson. 1935.
5. NAZ. SEC 2/284. Five Year Development Plan: Eastern Province. 1943. District Commissioner. For Jameson. to Provincial Commissioner. Fort Jameson, 16 December. 1943.
6. NAZ. SEC 2/699. Chipata Tour Report. 1957. Tour Report of September. 1957.
7. Zgambo. 'Farm Labour.' 3.
8. Deane. Social Accounting. p. 254.
9. Report on the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia. p. 35.
10. Baldwin. Economic Development and Export Growth. pp. 32-33.
11. NAZ. SEC 4 2/699. Chipata Tour Reports. 1957. Tour Report of September. 1957.
12. NAZ. SEC 2/284. Five Year Development Plan: Eastern Province 1959. District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner. Fort Jameson. 16 December. 1943.
13. T.C. Gardner. 'The Economic Future of Northern Rhodesia' in Study Conference Number 1: The Economic Future of Northern Rhodesia (Lusaka: The Central African Studies Association, 1961) p.4
14. NAZ. SEC 2/89. Native Affairs Annual Report Eastern

Province, 1939.

16. Interview. E.R. Divine, farmer, Chipata, 9 February, 1989.
17. Zgambo, 'Farm Labour,' 35.
18. NAZ, SEC 2/699, Chipata Tour Reports, 1957. Report of a Tour in September, 1957.
19. A Report on the Agro Economic Recovery and Development of the Eastern Province(Lusaka. Government Printers, 1956) p. 1
20. Report Appendix VIII. Volume 1: Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. See Oral Evidence by John Moffat, Territorial Member, p. 266
21. A Report on the Agro Economic Recovery and Development of the Eastern Province, p. 16.
22. In the 1940s the Government assumed the character of a modernising institution. The Development and Welfare Act passed by Britain to encourage limited development in the colonies worked to the advantage of enhancing rural development in Northern Rhodesia as a whole from the booming copper industry.
23. NAZ, SEC 2/433, Native Welfare Association, African Civil Servants, 1931-1947. Provincial Commissioner, Fort Jameson to Secretary, Lusaka, 6 November, 1935.
24. NAZ, SEC 2/263, Native Markets - General, 1930-1947. Provincial Commssioner, Fort Jameson to Secretary, Lusaka, 12 February, 1936.
25. Report of the Director of Census, 1931, p. 99; Report of the 1951 Census, p.4.
26. Interview, Mawere.
27. Deane, Social Accounting, p. 252
28. NAZ, SEC 2/693, Chadiza Tour Reports, 1951-1952. Report Number 4, 1957.
29. NAZ, SEC 2/699, Chipata Tour Reports, 1957. Tour Report of September, 1957.
30. NAZ, SEC 2/89, Native Affairs Annual Report -

Eastern Province. 1939. Native Affairs Annual Report. 1939.

31. NAZ. SEC 2/689. Chipata Tour Reports, 1940-1947. Tour Report Number 4. 1947.
32. NAZ. SEC 2/681. Chadiza Tour Reports, 1956-1957. Chadiza Tour Report Number 2. 1961.
33. NAZ. SEC 2/681. Chipata Tour Reports, 1938-1939. Tour Report Number 5. 1989.
34. NAZ. SEC 2/688. Chipata Tour Report, 1940-1947. Tour Report Number 4. 1947.
35. NAZ. SEC 2/704. Katete Development Team Tour Reports, 1948-1949. Katete Development Team Tour Report Number 1. 1948.
36. NAZ. SEC 2/704. Provincial Commissioner. Chipata, to Secretary for Naive affairs. Lusaka. 23 June. 1948.
37. S.M.C. Nkhata 'Settlement Schemes and labour Migration in Chipata. 1951-1976' MA (University of Zambia. 1987).
38. Pletcher. 'Agricultural Change.' 10.
39. NAZ. SEC 2/699. Chipata Tour Reports, 1957. Tour Report. September. 1957.
40. NAZ. SEC 2/88. Eastern Province. Provincial and District Organisation Annual Reports 1953-1955. Annual Report on African Affairs Eastern Province. 1955.
41. J.A. Hellen. Rural Economic Development in Zambia, 1990-1964. (Munchen: Weltforum Verland. 1968). p. 180.
42. Hellen. Rural Economic Development. p. 180
43. Pletcher. 'Agricultural Change', 12. There exists a detailed study on co-operatives in Petauke, Eastern Province. See E.A.M. Banda 'The Impact of the Petauke Co-operative Petauke District of Eastern Province in Northern Rhodesia. 1947-1964: A case study' M.A. (University of Zambia. 1984).



44. Report of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Business Ordinance (Lusaka: Government Printers, 1959).
45. NAZ. RC/21. Asiatics Admission to Northern Rhodesia and Immigration Regulation. 1924-1927. Governor, Livingstone, to Colonial Office. London, 18 August, 1924.
46. NAZ. SEC 2/84. Annual Reports on Native Affairs: Eastern Province, 1935. Annual Report on Native Affairs, 1935.
47. NAZ. SEC 2/85. Eastern Province, Fort Jameson District Annual Report, 1935-1938. Annual Report for 1935.
48. NAZ. SEC 2/1. District circulars, 1939-1954. Volume 1. District Circular Number 31, 1931. Chief Secretary to all Provincial Commissioners, 23. June 1939.
49. NAZ. SEC 2/18. Tours by the Honourable Secretary for Native Affairs. Visit of the Secretary for Native Affairs to Petauke District, 1944.
50. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Eastern Province Minutes of Provincial Council Meeting, 1943-1948. Minutes of the Second Annual Meetings of the Eastern Province Regional Council, 1944.
51. NAZ. 2/1 District Circulars, 1939-1954. Volume 11. District Circular, 1945. Chief Secretary to Provincial Commissioners. District Commissioners and Labour Commissioners, 12 August, 1945.
52. NAZ. SEC 2/676. Chadiza Tour Reports, 1951-1952. Tour Report Number 5, 1951.
53. Report on the Development of Secondary Industries in Northern Rhodesia (Lusaka: Government Printers, 1945), p.50.
54. NAZ. SEC 2/676. Chadiza Tour Reports, 1951-1952. Tour Report Number 5, 1951.
55. Interview, Mulla, trader, Chipata, 25 January, 1989.
56. Northern Rhodesia Colonial Annual Report, 1948 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948) p. 22.

57. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Eastern Province Minutes of African Provincial Council Meetings. Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council. 1947.
58. NAZ. SEC 2/87. Eastern Province Native Affairs. 1947-1948. Annual Report on African Affairs. Fort Jameson District. 1947.
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60. NAZ. SEC 2/87. Annual Report on Native Affairs. Provincial Commissioners Report. 1947.
61. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Provincial Newsletter - Eastern Province. 1938-1948. Newsletter for the Quarter Ended 30 June. 1934.
62. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Eastern Province: Minutes of the African Provincial Council Meetings. Minutes of the African Provincial Council. 1947.
63. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Provincial Newsletter: Eastern Province. 1938-1948. Provincial Commissioner. Fort Jameson. to Secretary for Native Affairs. 16 October. 1947.
64. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Newsletter for the Quarter Ended 30 June. 1947.
65. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Provincial Commissioner. Fort Jameson. to Secretary Native Affairs. 16 October. 1947.
66. Interview. D. Banda. Manager. Nielson Building Contractors. Chipata. 26 January. 1989.
67. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Provincial Commissioner to Secretary for Native Affairs. 16 October. 1947.
68. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Newsletter for the Fourth Quarter. 1946.
69. NAZ. SEC 1/191. Newsletter for the Quarter Ended 31 December. 1944.
70. NAZ. SEC 2/87. Eastern Province African Affairs Annual Reports. 1947-1948. Annual Report on African Affairs. Fort Jameson. 1947.

71. Northern Rhodesia Annual Colonial Reports, 1948.  
pp14-17.
72. Report Appendix VIII, Volume 1, Advisory Commission  
on the Review of the Constitution. Oral  
Evidence by I.S. Jasat, p. 269.
73. Report Appendix VIII, Volume 1, Advisory Commission  
on the Review of the Constitution. Oral  
Evidence by I.S. Jasat, p. 269.
74. NAZ, SEC 2/689, Chipata Tour Reports, 1940-1947.  
Fort Jameson Tour Report Number 4, 1947.
75. Interview, Y.M. Bhura, trader, Chipata, 6 February,  
1989. Bhura informed me that Dudhia has since  
moved to Freedom Way, Lusaka and Meman to  
Zimbabwe.
76. Interview, M.I. Jasat, Businessman, 14 January,  
1989. He is Jasat's eldest son. Jasat's  
original source of capital is not clearly  
known. His son thinks that Jasat's paternal  
uncle who owned a gold mine in Zimbabwe could  
have helped him. Jasat came from a wealthy  
family.
77. NAZ, SEC 2/191, Provincial Newsletter: Eastern  
Province 1938-1948, Newsletter for the Quarter  
Ending 31 December, 1947.
78. Report of the Director of Census, 1921, p. 28
79. Sundi's grandson, who is in his middle age,  
declined to provide me with information.
80. Interview, A.A. Suleiman, trader, Chipata, 16  
January, 1989.
81. Interview, Z. Daya, businessman, Chipata, 20  
January, 1989.
82. Interview, M. Daya, trader, Chipata, 18 January,  
1989.
83. Interview, Y. Manjira, trader, Chipata, 30 January,  
1989.
84. The Statistics have been compiled from Chipata  
District Notebooks, NAZ, KDG 5/1, Volume V.  
The 1937 population of 67 includes Petauke and  
the 1950 includes 5 male adult Hindus: KDG 1/  
Governors visits, 1933: Report  
census for 1931; 1946; 1957.

## Population.

86. NAZ. KDG 2/191. Provincial Newsletter. Eastern Province 1938-1948. Newsletter for the Quarter Ending 31 December, 1947.
87. Census of Population, 1956 (Salisbury, Central Statistics Office, 1960), p.3
88. Hellen, Rural Economic Development, p. 169.
89. Interview. M. Daya
90. Report of the Director of Census, 1946, p. 65;  
Report of the Director of Census, 1951, p. 40.
91. Interview. Mulla.
92. Interview. Mawere.
93. Interview. M. Daya
94. Interview. Bhura.
95. NAZ. KDG 2/1/2. Civil Cases: Magistrates Court, 1913. Case Number 2, 1913. Mohamed Osman Vs. E. Haselton.
96. Interview. G.A. Mehl, teacher, Chipata, 27 January, 1989; Interview. I. Suleiman, trader, Chipata, 10 January, 1989.
97. Interview. Mulla.
98. Interview. M.M. Suleiman, trader, Chipata, 7 February, 1989.
99. Interview. Z. Daya
100. Interview. Bhura.
101. Interview. M. Daya.
102. Interview. A.A. Suleiman.
103. The trader gave items such as sweet buns, lumps of sugar or salt or a headdress to a customer who had made purchases which customers understood to be a gesture of generosity on the part of the Asian
104. Interview. L. Soko, Peasant, Kanjala ward, Chipata; M. Zulu, Peasant, Namuseche, Chipata, 6 February, 1989.

105. Interview, A.A. Suleiman.
106. Interview, Mulla.
107. Interview, Mulla.
108. Interview, A.A. Suleiman.
109. Interview, A.A. Suleiman.
110. Interview, Mehl.
111. Interview, I. Suleiman.
112. Report of the Census of Population, 1946, p. 63.
113. M.H.Y. Kaniki, 'The Psychology of Early Lebanese Immigrants in West Africa', Transafrican Journal of History, 5, 2 (1976), 139-147.
114. Interview, A.A. Suleiman. Most of my former employee sources indicated they had sat what they called Matriculation Examinations. Jasat held a Bachelor of Arts (Economics) Degree: I.S. Jasat, Personal files.
115. Interview, Mulla; Interview, M.A. Khanshab trader, 16 January, 1989.
116. Report Appendix VIII, Volume 1. Advisory Commission on the Constitution. Oral Evidence by I.S. Jasat, p. 269.
117. Interview, Adam.
118. NAZ, SEC 2/688, Chipata Tour Reports, 1938-1939. Tour Report Number 5, 1939.
119. Interview, Mawere. In fact the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Northern Rhodesia of which Thather and Hobson was a member was opposed to the government policy of encouraging co-operatives to venture into the transport business. See NAZ, HM1 AS 2/1/2/2, Associated Chambers of Commerce of Northern Rhodesia, 1939-1957. Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Commerce General Purposes Standing Committee, 13 February, 1956.
120. Interview, Mawere.
121. Interview, Mawere.

122. NAZ. SEC 2/697. Chipata Tour Reports. 1955-1956. Tour Report Number 7. 1955.
123. Interview. Mawere.
124. Interview. Khanshab.
125. I.S. Jasat. Personal files. Provincial Certificate issued by NCEC Ltd 28 November. 1946.
126. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Newsletter for the fourth Quarter. 1946.
127. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Newsletter Ending 31 March. 1947.
128. At this time Chipata had a sizeable coloured community whose history is not of immediate concern to this study.
129. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Newsletter for the Quarter Ending 31 March. 1947.
130. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Newsletter for the Quarter Ending 30 June. 1947.
131. Interview. D. Banda
132. Interview. M. Daya.
133. Interview. D. Banda.
134. Interview. M. Daya.
135. NAZ. SEC 2/699. Chipata Tour Reports. 1957. Report of Tour. September. 1957.
136. Interview. A. Patel. Businessman, Chipata. 10 February. 1989.
137. NAZ. SEC 2/88. Eastern Province, Provincial and District Organisation Annual Reports Annual Report of African Affairs. Lundazi. 1954.
138. Interview. A. Patel.
139. NAZ. KDG 1/8/4. East Luangwa Correspondence, Lands. 1917-1931. McKay to Provincial Commissioner. Fort Jameson. 23 April. 1930.
140. NAZ. SEC 2/87. Eastern Province Native Affairs. 1947-1948.. Annual Report on Native Affairs. Fort Jameson District. 1947.

141. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Eastern Province: Minutes of African Provincial Council Meetings. Minutes of the fifth session of Eastern Province African Provincial Council Meeting. 1947.
142. NAZ. 2/225. Minutes of the Fourth Session of the Eastern Province Provincial Council. 1946: Interview, Mawere. He confirmed that his brother Zilole, used to travel to Sena and South Africa to scout for goods.
143. M. Miracle in A.A. Beveridge and A.R. Oberschall. African Business men and Development in Zambia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 39-40.
144. NAZ. 2/225. Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council, 1945: NAC. SEC 2/225. Minutes of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council, 1947.
145. Interview, Mawere.
146. NAZ. SEC 2/87. Eastern Province Native Affairs Annual Reports. 1947-1948. Annual Report on Native Affairs. Fort Jameson. 1947.
147. NAZ. SEC 2/689. Chipata Tour Reports. 1940-1947. Fort Jameson Tour Report Number 3. 1947.
148. NAZ. SEC 2/689. Fort Jameson Tour Report Number 11. 1947.
149. NAZ. KSJ 4/1. Reports: Annual. Half-Yearly. Quarterly. Tours Fort Jameson. Petauke and Lundazi. Provincial Commissioner's Report. 31 December. 1930; NAZ SEC 2/191. Provincial Newsletter Eastern Province. 1938-1947. Newsletter for the Quarter Ending 31 March. 1947.
150. NAZ. SEC 2/85. Eastern Province, Fort Jameson District Annual Reports. 1935-1938. Annual Report. Fort Jameson. 1937; SEC 2/191. Provincial Newsletter - Eastern Province. 1938-1947. Newsletter for the Quarter Ending 31 March. 1947.
151. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Minutes of the Sixth Session of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council. 1948: SEC 2/93. Provincial and District Organisation. Eastern Province Annual Report. 1953-1953. Annual Report on African Affairs. Fort Jameson. 1953; HM 1 AS 2/2/3. Associated Chambers of Commerce of Northern Rhodesia

1939-1957. Fourth Annual General Meeting of North Eastern Rhodesia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 8 June, 1955.

152. NAZ, SEC 2/191, Newsletter for the Quarter Ended 30 September, 1945: Newsletter for the Third Quarter, 1946.
153. NAZ, SEC 2/689, Fort Jameson Tour Report Number 4, 1947.
154. NAZ, SEC 2/191, Newsletter for the Quarter Ended 31 March, 1946.
155. NAZ, SEC 2/225, Minutes of the Fifth Session, 1947.
156. NAZ, SEC 2/88, Eastern Province: Provincial and District Organisation Annual Reports. Annual Report on African Affairs, Fort Jameson, 1954: NAZ, SEC 2/88, Annual Reports on African Affairs, Eastern Province, 1955.
157. Interview, S. Phiri, trader, Chipata, 15 February, 1989: NAZ, SEC 2/91, Provincial and District Organisation Eastern Province, 1949-1950. Annual Report on African Affairs, Petauke, 1949.
158. NAZ, SEC 2/88, Annual Report on African Affairs, Fort Jameson, 1954.
159. In fact some of the traditional rulers had received formal education. For example three chiefs from Lundazi who sat on the African Provincial Council in 1947 were of Standard VI Education. NAZ, SEC 1/87, Eastern Province Native Reports, 1947-1948. Annual Report on Native Affairs, 1947.
160. NAZ, SEC 2/225, Minutes of the Second Session of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council, 1944.
161. NAZ, SEC 2/225, Minutes of the Sixth Session of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council, 1948.
162. NAZ, SEC 2/225, Minutes of the Sixth Session of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council, 1948.
163. NAZ, KDG 5/1, Chipata District Notebooks, Volume V, District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, Fort Jameson, 24 January, 1948.



164. NAZ. SEC 6/676. Chadiza Tour Report. 1951-52. Chadiza Tour Report Number 5. 1951.
165. NAZ. SEC 2/701. Chipata Tour Report. 1959. Chadiza Tour Report Number 6, 1959.
166. Interview. Mawere.
167. NAZ. SEC 3/328. Store Sites in Native Reserves. 1930-1948. Extracts from the Proceedings of the first session of the African Representative Council. November, 1946.
168. Y. P. Ghai. 'Prospects for Asians in East Africa' in Racial and Communal Tensions in East Africa (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1966). p. 13.
169. NAZ. SEC 2/686. Chipata Tour Reports, 1932-1933. District Travelling Report Number 6. 1932; Number 8. 1932; SEC 2/687. Chipata Tour Reports. Tour Report Number 3. 1938.
170. NAZ. SEC 2/91. Provincial and District Organisation Eastern Province. 1949-1950. Annual Report on African Affairs. Petauke. 1949.
171. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council. 1945.
172. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council. 1947.
173. NAZ. SEC 2/2/6. Chadiza Tour Reports, 1951-1952. Chadiza Tour Report Number 8. 1951.
174. Members of the clerical class such as councillors and treasury clerks were an important component of traditional administration at this-time.
175. NAZ. KDG 5/1. District Notebooks. Volume V. Minutes of the Meeting of the Chewa Native Authority. Chiparamba. March. 1950.
176. NAZ. KDG 5/1. Minutes of a Meeting of the Chewa Native Authority. Chiparamba. February. 1951.
177. NAZ. SEC 1/1576. General Dealer Asian Trading. 1937-1939. Provincial Commissioner. Mongu, to Secretary. Lusaka. 22 September, 1938.

178. Interview. Mehl.
179. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Newsletter for the Quarter Ended 30 June, 1947.
180. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council. 1947.
181. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council. 1947.
182. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council. 1947.
183. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Eastern Province APC 1947.
184. NAZ. SEC 2/191. Newsletter for the Quarter Ended 31 March 1946.
185. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Minutes of the Fourth Meeting. 1946.
186. NAZ. SEC 2/225. Minutes of the Fifth Session. 1947.
187. Interview. Mehl.
188. NAZ. SEC 1/18. Tours of the Secretary for Native Affairs 1943-1947. Minutes of a Meeting of Fort Jameson District Authorities. 26. July. 1944.; NAZ SEC 2/225. Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Eastern Province African Provincial Council Meeting. 1947.
189. NAZ. SEC 2/689. Chipata Tour Reports. 1940-1947. Fort Jameson Tour report Number 9. 1940. Annex Number 1. Farm and Grain Purchases.
190. NAZ. SEC 2/689. Chipata Tour Reports. 1940-1947. Fort Jameson Tour Report Number 9. 1940. Annex Number 1. Farm and Grain Purchases.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### ASIAN POLITICS AND NATIONALISM 1940-1964.

Asian politics in Chipata had taken root by the 1940s. In succeeding years the Federal debate and nationalistic politics revealed political conflicts between Asians and Africans because prior to 1963 Asians supported Federation which the African nationalists were opposed to. Around 1963, when self-government became imminent, Asians transferred their political allegiance from the losing settlers to the winning nationalists. In this Chapter I will demonstrate that the Asian traders pursued politics of collaboration with the settlers and the government of the day up to the time of the achievement of African self-government. I argue that as an economically privileged minority, Asians collaborated with the government of the day as the most expedient way to self-preservation.

Asian political allegiance to the government of the day in Chipata emerged by 1915 when they volunteered for sentry duties to contribute to the war effort on the grounds that they were British citizens.<sup>1</sup> In fact as British citizens they had equal franchise with settlers on the principle of the common voting roll.<sup>2</sup> Partly for this reason, the European administrators incorporated them into the local government called Town Management Board as far back as 1924. As there was no Asian then with 'a sufficient grasp of English to follow proceedings'

Asians themselves nominated a European, Mr. Staff, as their representative.<sup>3</sup> Eleven years later the PC insisted that an Asian should sit on the Board.<sup>4</sup> In later years Jasat and Motala became prominent members of the Board.<sup>5</sup> Through direct representation on the Board Asians in Chipata could influence important policy decisions in their favour to some extent.

In the post-Second World War period, Asian politics in Chipata developed within the context of Asian politics in Northern Rhodesia as a whole which had emerged by the 1920s. In 1927 the British Indian Association at Livingstone had written a petition to the Governor in protest over discriminatory practices in getting trading plots and issuing trading licences.<sup>6</sup> In the succeeding years Asians began to associate politically largely to oppose racially restrictive trading regulations because of the economic leverage they wielded as well as their awareness of their rights as British citizens. The Trades and Business Ordinance Bill, 1946 was particularly responsible for the crystallisation of Asian political activity for two reasons.<sup>7</sup> In the first place, Asians opposed representation by a white man on the Trades and Licencing Appeals Board provided for in this ordinance because the European business organisation, the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Northern Rhodesia, excluded Asians from its membership.<sup>8</sup> Two years later the Broken Hill Indian Chamber of Commerce made direct

representation to the Attorney-General to argue against representation by a European on the Appeals Board in particular and complain about discriminatory aspects of the Trades and Business Ordinance, 1947. in general.<sup>9</sup> The Asians were successful in compelling the government to concede to Asian representation on the Appeals Board. The Associated Indian Chambers of Commerce, which had meanwhile been formed, nominated Mr. T.V. Desai, BSc., of Lusaka as a representative of Asian business on the Appeals Board.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore pressure from Asians compelled the government to review the Trades and Business Ordinance, 1947.

Secondly, Asians took steps to oppose discrimination against Asian tobacco farmers by settlers. In 1948, for example, Asians in Broken Hill made representation to Beckett, Vice Chairman of Northern Rhodesia Tobacco Co-operative Society, and to Welensky, member of Legco, to argue that Asian should be allowed to form a co-operative society for Asian tobacco farmers because the existing European society was excluding Asians from its membership.<sup>11</sup> As demonstrated earlier on, the government conceded to Asians forming a co-operative for Asian tobacco farmers. In the post-second World War period Asian political activity had taken shape in Northern Rhodesia as a whole. They succeeded in influencing policy decisions in their favour by co-existing and co-operating with the government

through collaboration and not confrontation. Since Asian business in Zambia was interconnected through a fairly tight web of business and ethnic relations, Asian political activity along the line of rail must have had a direct or indirect influence on the development of Asian politics in Chipata.<sup>12</sup>

Asians in Chipata had begun to organise themselves politically by the Post-Second World War period under the Muslim Indian Community later known as the Fort Jameson Muslim Association.<sup>13</sup> This Association was not only a religious organisation but it was also a business organisation in the sense that in practice it worked in the interests of Asian business. It was also a political association in so far as it articulated Asian interests in Chipata in political terms. It is likely that its formation was spearheaded by Jasat whose education, wealth and political interest must have enhanced his rise to the leadership of the Asian community in the township.<sup>14</sup> Asians in the township found it relatively easy to unite under a religious umbrella because of homogeneity in occupation, religion and origin.

There were several factors which encouraged Asians to begin to associate politically. Firstly, African xenophobia and Africanisation of trade policy must have influenced the political orientation of the Association. Administrative practices and trading regulations

out-rightly in favour of African traders also provided Asians with economic grievances which began to be articulated in political terms. Their boycott over the stringent application of price control regulations demonstrated that Asians had begun to engage in political activity against what they considered unfair economic regulations and practices. Secondly, they began to exert pressure on the administration to erect a school for Asians as the number of their children was growing. In June 1949 the Chairman of the Association wrote to the PC imploring the government to expedite the question of erecting a school for Asians in the district to which he received a sympathetic response.<sup>15</sup> Asian pressure reached fruition with the building of Norman Price School by the government in the 1950s<sup>16</sup>. Asians contributed 1,000 pounds to the building of staff houses<sup>17</sup>. As a result, Asians are proud of the fact that their leadership succeeded in pressing for the building of this school.

Thirdly, like elsewhere in Northern Rhodesia, Asian political activity in Chipata was directed towards achieving equality of opportunity with Europeans within the colonial context. They used their vote to influence Europeans politicians since Europeans and Asians shared a common voting roll. Asians exercised influence on European politicians for the Electoral Area because in a multi-party setting the Asian vote was crucial at election time as an appreciable number of Asians in

Chipata were eligible voters since franchise was based on income and property qualifications. In 1950, for example, there were 64 eligible Asian voters and 351 Europeans.<sup>18</sup> Two years later there were 85 Asians and 353 European qualified voters.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, in 1959 Asians, began to be represented in Legco by an Asian nominated by the Governor.<sup>20</sup>

Asians could also bring pressure to bear on the administration by sitting on the Town Management Board. In the 1950s the Asian members of the Board succeeded in pressing for the creation of an Asian residential area because the Indian Quarter was becoming overcrowded. Hitherto Asians lived behind their shops within the Indian Quarter.<sup>21</sup> The Board was amenable to the creation of a residential area for Asians since it would be able to raise revenue from rates in addition to encouraging estate development. Furthermore this conformed with the existing policy of spatial segregation as well as Asian social exclusiveness. It appears that Asians were fairly satisfied with the trading arrangement in the township as there is no evidence to demonstrate that they challenged the Board over township spatial trading segregation.

Asian political activity along the line of rail also benefitted Asian trader in Chipata in the sense that it effected changes in the trading ordinances which



safeguarded Asian interests to a limited extent in Northern Rhodesia as a whole. As a privileged minority, Asians vied for equality of opportunity within the given colonial framework through collaboration with the settlers and the government with substantial success.

With the rise of African nationalism in the post-Second World War period, Asians in Chipata found themselves in conflict with African nationalists. ANC, the pioneer African nationalist party in Northern Rhodesia founded in 1947, led African opposition to Federation largely because Federation entailed settler domination instead of eventual self-government from the British government. As a result ANC politics in Eastern Province took the form of opposition to Federation. But Asians in Chipata supported Federation and aligned themselves with the United Federal Party (UFP) and not ANC because Asian leadership envisaged improved economic benefits accruing from closer association with Southern Rhodesia, an idea they had cherished as far back as 1938.<sup>22</sup> Jasat and Sundi, influential Asians in the district, had supported amalgamation on condition that the amalgamated territory would not adopt the racially restrictive immigration laws of Southern Rhodesia.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, Asians aligned themselves to UFP because they fell under Federal responsibility together with European in contrast to Africans who fell under Territorial responsibility.

The paucity of evidence makes it difficult to demonstrate the extent of Asian influence on the European Federal MP in Chipata. Considering that the Asian electorate in Chipata was influential in a multi-party setting, it is very likely that UFP politicians took the Asian vote in Federal elections very seriously. Banda recalls that Robertson, a Federal European politician, frequented Jasat's residence presumably to liaise on politics.<sup>24</sup> It is plausible to propose that Robertson's visits to the local Asian leaders were meant to seek Asian support. In this way, to a limited extent, Asians could influence the Federal politician to give attention to Asian interests in the Federation.

Asian support for the Federation in Chipata was especially articulated in 1960. Jasat and Moosa appeared before the Monckton Commission as leaders of the Muslim Association and demonstrated that Asians in Chipata had accommodated themselves fairly well to Federation.<sup>25</sup> They complained against prevailing disabilities to Asians which had succeeded in depriving Asians in the Federation of manpower from India, exorbitant customs duty on certain goods commonly consumed by the majority of Africans, Federal neglect of European agriculture leading the province to 'the verge of collapse,' and poor communications in the area<sup>26</sup>. As a result of the 1954 Federal Immigration Act only families of Asians already

residents in the Federation were allowed entry. Since European agriculture was important to the growth of Asian business they proposed that the Federal government should render support to the European farmers in the district. To improve communication in the area they proposed that the railway line should be extended to Fort Jameson either from Beira or Salima. The two Asian representatives only articulated issues pertaining to Asian interests but said nothing on African self-determination.

Asians came out in full support of Federation precisely at the time nationalist leadership in Chipata had resorted to mass political mobilisation to intensify the fight for self-government. Mass political mobilisation had permeated the outlying areas of Chipata by the 1950s. In 1954, for example, ANC nationalist activists were operating in Kunda Native Authority.<sup>27</sup> In fact nationalist propaganda had become overtly anti-government in general and anti-European and Asian in particular. J.B. Zulu and Alfred Chitambala were calling upon the people in Chief Malama's area of the Kunda Native Authority to defy the government by boycotting tax payment and infringing soil conservation regulations.<sup>28</sup> The largest Ngoni reserve of Chief Madzimawe was experiencing similar Congress activities.<sup>29</sup> By 1956 mass political activity in Chipata had taken root. Some Congress activities were going to the extent of inciting

members to beat up District Messengers for attending political meetings where 'strong anti-European propaganda' was disseminated because Messengers were considered informers.<sup>30</sup> The following year in January Kuunika (to light up), a government sponsored newsletter, reported that ANC held a meeting at Fort Jameson at which 'many things were said against the government and the people who work for the government'.<sup>31</sup> In this situation the Government considered nationalist activists as political rebels.

Asians in Chipata reacted in different ways at varying times towards nationalist politics. Prior to the 1960s they aligned themselves to the settlers and the government. Asians shied away from nationalism partly to avert the possible repercussions from the government. Citing his experiences in Nyasaland, Manjira asserts that Asians kept aloof from nationalist politics because of fear of punishment from the government which was particularly intent on discouraging Asian nationalist militants:

Asians did not support Africans because they feared to suffer. For example, if you attended a political rally with the knowledge of the colonial officers, the police would keep an eye on you. We feared to be black listed. So we kept our distance from nationalists. Here Asians acted in the same way.<sup>32</sup>

This fear was well founded considering that Asians were

still dependent on colonial officials for their livelihood in the sense that the colonial officials were the Licensing Authority in the district. Moreover, Asians were an alien group who did not command grassroot support as a rallying point for nationalistic politics. Even some of the privileged sections of the Africans such as traditional rulers, civil servants and established traders acquiesced in colonial rule as an expedient way of self-preservation. In 1956 Chief Mbangombe banned Congress activists from his area after being censured by the government for contravening an order banning Congress meetings in his area.<sup>33</sup> African Civil Servants were prevented by a government regulation from taking part in politics since the 1930s.<sup>34</sup> The most successful African businessman, in the area, Zilole, offered his support to nationalists in the dark in fear of losing favour with government officials who acted as his referees in some of his business transactions:

Zilole behaved like a businessman and not like a politician towards European officials. He was friends with the DC who was helping him obtain loans. He used to give assistance to ANC in secrecy in order not to fall in disfavour with Europeans. Sometimes he used to disappear presumably on business errands with his lorry when, in actual fact, he was assisting Congress with transport. This is one thing many people do not know about today.<sup>35</sup>

In fact African traders and Asians were essentially members of the same class but the racial factor played a fundamental role in emphasising the division between the

two sections especially in times of economic and political crisis. Impoverished traders generally took an active part in nationalist politics largely because they hoped that self-government would offer political solutions to their plight.<sup>36</sup> In general the privileged sections of the colonial society acquiesced in colonial rule.

Asian leadership was fairly well satisfied by working within the existing colonial framework. But African nationalist leadership generally felt that the colonial set up could not provide them with economic rewards and political rights commensurate with their aspirations. As a result racism became embedded in the ideological orientation of nationalist activists whose perception of the Asian trader was coloured by the stereotype of an unscrupulous foreigner all out to get rich at the expense of the Africans which had taken root in the 1940s. Being privileged foreigners, Asians were included in anti-European campaigns. In 1957, for example, nationalists organised a successful boycott of Asian stores in Jumbe area:

This was a follow up of accusations of bad treatment made at meetings. There is no truth in the statement that people have been badly treated, but store owners had not been listing the price for goods as was agreed upon by a meeting of Indian traders after last years boycott in Fort Jameson.<sup>37</sup>

Fervent nationalists tended to condemn Asians as the cause

of the high cost of living and disseminated propaganda to the effect that Asian traders would be replaced by indigenous traders as colonial rule would be replaced by black rule<sup>38</sup>.

Around 1960 political schism between nationalists and Asians was heightened by the fact that Asian leadership appeared before the Monckton Commission to support Federation precisely at the time that African nationalists adopted a political strategy of boycotting this commission to back up their call for immediate self-government. To the nationalists the action of the Asian leadership was further testimony of Asian indifference to the nationalist cause. Thus, although the Asian was not the oppressor, he was considered to be acquiescing in settler domination of the African. Mehl recalls that:

Nationalist hated Asians for supporting the Federation. Jasat, a very influential and active local Indian leader, was well known in the district. But he openly supported Federation. This brought him trouble. After independence his shop was closed for some time because he could not be granted a licence.<sup>39</sup>

Moreover, Jasat was unpopular among nationalists for practising segregation in his stores because his store was divided into two sections, one section for Africans and another for Europeans.<sup>40</sup>

Asians supported Federation because at this time the idea of African self-government appeared far-fetched to the conservative Asians of Chipata considering the general backwardness of African education in the province. The average Asian trader was a conservative by political outlook in contrast to the radical African nationalists. In general Asians shared a common view with Europeans that Africans were not yet capable of attaining self-government in the light of the paucity of African education in Northern Rhodesia as a whole. Nevertheless by 1962 Asian leadership in Chipata began to support nationalism because political events were demonstrating that African self-government was imminent.

Africans had won limited franchise based on property and educational qualifications in 1958 in addition to sectional representation on Legco and Federal Parliament. Nkumbula, the ANC leader, accepted this but his more fervent lieutenants denounced limited franchise and representation on Legco in favour of universal franchise and majority representation. As a result the dissenting leaders of ANC formed the United National Independence Party (UNIP) which proved adept at turning popular grievances among the masses into anti-government activities which culminated in the 1961 territory wide campaign of civil disobedience. The following year this campaign resulted in a constitutional review paving way for African majority rule. At this



point some Asians began to offer support to nationalists in the dark in an effort to win the goodwill of the nationalists without endangering their relations with settlers. The average Asians took the middle-of-the-road stand. Mehl observed that:

Collectively Asians did not support nationalism although some individuals made money donations while paying lip service to nationalism. Between 1961 and 1962 most of them came to adopt the wait-and-see attitude. They sat on the fence to see which way to jump. In 1963 they collectively supported nationalism openly. Indians<sup>41</sup> are never losers, they are always winners.

In 1963 Asians came out in full support of nationalism because the Federation was dissolved and it was now known that Africans would achieve self-government the following year. As the day of self-government drew nearer, Asians shifted their support from the losing Europeans to the winning nationalists. Infact they offered their political allegiance to UNIP which had emerged more powerful than ANC in the district.<sup>42</sup> Thus support was largely in the form of money and material goods. Chichezo, a one time party treasurer for UNIP in the district, confirmed that:

Although Asians never offered active support to the struggle for independence, they offered a lot of monetary and material support once they realised independence was coming. They openly supported UNIP through donations in the form of money, bicycles, sugar, rice and blankets for organising party meetings like they still do today.<sup>43</sup>

Since no records were kept and receipts issued, it is not possible to quantify Asian contributions.<sup>44</sup> It is plausible to propose that Asian contribution from the whole community was quite substantial considering they had to atone for supporting the Federation instead of nationalism. Asian relationship with nationalists along the line of rail appears to have assumed a similar character even though a handful of Asians openly supported nationalism during Federation because they considered that settler domination would be more oppressive than the British government. Furthermore they believed that Africans desire to rule themselves was aninalienable right. On the whole, as an alien trading class Asians came to collaborate with the black government which has supplanted colonial rule for their self-preservation. Thus they emerged from colonialism as winners in both the economic and political sense.

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12. By 1944 Asians in Luanshya. Ndola. Broken Hill and Livingstone were associating in business associations representing nearly 90% of Asians. See NAZ. SEC 1/239. Reports on the Trades and Business Ordinance Extract from the Secretary. Broken Hill Indian Chamber of Commerce. 3 February. 1948.

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14. Jasat was highly educated by British standards since he held a Bachelor of Arts (Commerce) degree. See I.S. Jasat's Personal Files in the custody of M.I. Jasat, businessman, Chipata.
15. NAZ. KDG 5/1. Provincial Commissioner to Chairman, Muslim Indian Community, Fort Jameson, 10 June, 1949.
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17. Report Appendix VIII. Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution. See Oral evidence by I.S. Jasat, p. 269.
18. Certified Register of Voters (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1950).
19. Revised Register of Voters (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1952).
20. Northern Rhodesia Legco Daily Hansard No. 976, Wednesday 8th April, 1959, p. 78.
21. Interview, Mehl.
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23. Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, 1939, p. 23
24. Interview, D. Banda.
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37. NAZ. SEC 2/699. Chipata Tour Reports. 1957. Tour Report Number 22. 1957.
38. Interview. Mawere; Interview. Mehl.
39. NAZ. SEC 2/699. Tour Report Number 22. 1957.
40. Interview. D. Banda
41. Interview. Mehl.
42. Interview. Chirwa.
43. Interview. Chichezo Phiri. peasant and politician. Chipata. 6 February. 1989.
44. Interview. C. Phiri. Although he was Treasurer he can neither read nor write.

### CONCLUSION

This study has examined the development of the Asian trading class in Chipata from 1905 to 1964. The presence of Asian traders in the district owes its origin to the BSA administration which introduced Asian traders into North-Eastern Rhodesia for the purpose of developing African trade in order to hasten the integration of the African into the money economy. This policy was conceived by Codrington, Administrator of North-Eastern Rhodesia, within the wider colonial perspective of utilising manpower from Asia in the colonising process of Africa. Thus, the colonialists allotted to the Asians the role of traders and Asians performed this role successfully. Pioneer Asian traders in Chipata were already established traders in Nyasaland coming to North-Eastern Rhodesia to open up new areas of trade. By the 1930s Asian traders had become established and penetrated the remote areas of the district where Europeans were not prepared to undertake African trade. At this time the Asian trading class had evolved owing to the fact that pioneering Asian traders possessed ample financial resources and commercial skills for African trade. Furthermore, Asian business utilised organisational and business methods which made it possible for Asian traders to beat European as well as African competition in trade.

In the years succeeding the 1929-1933 depression, leading Asian traders embarked on expanding their enterprises into the principal trading centres in the province as a whole. This expansion, in turn, effected a rise in the Asian population as established traders resorted to importing shop labour from India to man the newly established stores. By the 1940s shop workers began to make their way to becoming traders by using established traders as stepping-stones. The propensity for the most enterprising shop workers to venture into business greatly contributed to the growth of the Asian trading class in the 1940s and 1950s. This growth was also encouraged by the growing purchasing power in the African population resulting from the accelerated economic growth in the area. Asians began to diversify into transport, tobacco farming and tailoring firms in the post-Second World War period. By 1964 the Asian trading class had long emerged dominant in African trade in Chibata and Eastern Province as a whole.

In conclusion I will focus on the relationship between the factors of class and race in relation to the evolution of the Asian trading class in Chibata. This study confirms Wolbe's theoretical postulate of complex determinism of social processes in history in the sense that the interplay between economic and racial relations in a colonial environment was complex and varied over time. Even though economic interests were

the overriding cause of inter-racial antagonisms amongst Europeans, Asians and Africans in Chipata, racism became embedded in colonial politics due to the fact that in the colonial Political economy economic positions and privileges coincided with racial stratification. Therefore, in a racially stratified colonial society racism influenced both the legislation and implementation of the trading regulations.

The primary cause of antagonism between Europeans and Asians in the period preceding the 1929-1933 depression was competition in African trade. Settlers and the European employees of Mandala were opposed to Asian business in the area for fear of Asian competition in African trade which they had pioneered because of the limited trading opportunities then prevailing. This fear was real because Asian traders were capable of undermining European business in African trade by underselling owing to their ability to cut down on overhead costs by leading a frugal life. Similarly conflicts between Asians and the emergent African entrepreneur class in African trade emanated from economic rivalry. Native Authorities particularly pursued the policy of Africanisation of trade in Native Reserves in order to encourage the development of African business by excluding Asian business. This bias of Africanisation of trade influenced the division of the two races belonging to the same trading class.



Economic competition among rivals belonging to different racial stocks worked to the effect of generating racial consciousness. The commonplace view that Asians were unscrupulous traders and that Asian competition was solely responsible for the failure of African traders was influenced by racism. Racism was institutionalised in colonial politics to create and sustain economic and social inequalities among the races in Chibata throughout the colonial period. Colonial rule subjected Asians to racially restrictive trading regulations and practices which succeeded in excluding Asian traders from European trade. Discrimination against Asian traders in the European Quarter and the Native Reserves played a fundamental role in reinforcing racial consciousness. Thus, racism influenced the colonial policy of spatial segregation which succeeded in confining Asian business to the Indian Quarter and principal trading centres in the outlying areas.

In spite of inter-racial antagonism, the Europeans, Asians and Africans were mutually dependent on each other in matters of trade and commerce. Thus, the settlers and the European trading firms traded with the Asian. African traders also traded with Asians and were almost entirely dependent on the Asian wholesaler for their supplies. The Asian wholesaler was preferred by African traders since he provided flexible trading terms to the

generally impoverished African trader. The Asian wholesaler was dependent on the African trader for his business. In the post-depression period antagonisms in trade between Europeans and Asians diminished largely because the settlers concentrated on farming and the European firm on European trade rather than African trade.

The hard conditions of trade resulting from the wartime shortages of goods and the development in acquisition of land by Asians in Chipata in the post-Second World War period accentuated the growth of racism. During the war racism grew and asserted itself in economic competition between Asians and Africans as a result of intense inter-racial economic rivalry which was caused by the scarcity of goods. Asian wholesalers resorted to supplying fellow Asians with goods they were managing to procure from their external suppliers rather than Africans. This worked to the detriment of the development of African business due to the fact that hitherto the African trader was entirely dependent on the Asian for wholesale facilities. In fact racism influenced the evolution of the Asian business structure because leading Asian traders were recruiting and training fellow Asians rather than Africans. Kinship ties in business relations helped Asians to preserve their dominance in African trade. To counteract this discrimination, African traders in the district formed the Fort Jameson Traders' Association so that it would

of trade entailed indigenisation of the government. Asians pursued politics of collaboration with the ruling government as the most expedient way of self-preservation as they were a privileged minority in the racially stratified colonial society. In fact Asian leadership in Chipata supported the Federation in the belief that Asian business would derive increased economic benefits from it. In 1963, Asians switched their political allegiance from the whites to the Africans since it became evident that self-government was imminent. As a result Asians supported the nationalists at the last hour as the most expedient way of preserving their economic interests. Thus race and economic interests were intertwined in the overall Asian political strategy throughout colonial period.

The Asian trading class made a positive contribution to the development of capitalism in the area in so far as wholesaling and retailing are concerned. The impact of the Asian trading class in the district between 1905-1964 is threefold. Firstly, the development of African trade worked to the effect of stimulating the growth of cash earning activities among Africans as African trade induced demand for consumer goods in the rural economy. To satisfy their consumer needs Africans were compelled to undertake economic activities from which they could accrue cash necessary in the purchase of consumer goods from stores. Thus Asians were agents in

hastening the integration of Africans into the capitalist economy throughout the colonial period. Secondly, they were agents of social change in the sense that they made available to the Africans goods such as clothes, plates and pots which effected social change in the culture of Africans who became dependent on factory goods. Thirdly, Asian traders played a double-edged role in relation to the development of the African entrepreneur class in African trade. As wholesalers catering for African traders on flexible terms of credit, they encouraged the development of the African trading class. As competitors with the emergent African traders, they were one of the major factors hampering the development of African business especially during lean trading times. Moreover, Asians recruited and trained family members whom they helped to advance rather than the Africans. On the whole it was by providing consumer goods and wholesaling facilities in African trade, thus, indirectly enhancing the integrating of the African consumer into the capitalist economy, that Asians exercised the greatest impact in Chipata.

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