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THE IMPACT OF THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT  
PROGRAM ON EDUCATION IN ZAMBIA.

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## INTRODUCTION

The dominant mode of explaining the education crisis in Zambia and elsewhere in the Sub-saharan African countries is to relate it to the prevailing economic and demographic constraints. While this level of analysis is pertinent given the current economic and demographic problems the crisis in education cannot however be exclusively explained in these two perspectives only. Education is a complex system and factors that contribute to problems in it are many. Critical analysis would therefore demand that there be a search for a multiplicity of factors to explain any education crisis. This article attempts to analyse the impact of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) on education in Zambia. By so doing the author hopes to make a contribution to the current debate on the causes of the educational crisis in Sub-saharan African countries.

## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM

Ajit Mozoomdar, former Director of the World Bank's Economic Development Institute once remarked that: "The great weakness of the international system is that it is always looking for new approaches."<sup>1</sup> The truth of this statement lies not so much in the integrity of the individual that made it. Rather, it is in the frequency of donor initiated approaches to development problems that developing have to contend with all the time. Structural Adjustment Program [SAP] is one such approach orchestrated by the international system of Donors led by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. SAP as this approach is generally known has come to be the basis through which the center-periphery<sup>2</sup> relationship between developed and developing countries is defined.

To most countries in sub Saharan Africa in particular, meeting the conditionalities of SAP has become the basis upon which to enter into economic ties with the community of Donors and by extension with the developed industrialized countries as a whole. The seriousness with which SAP is adhered to by its advocates leads one to believe that the program is not just about donor recipient relationship. Instead, it is in fact a theoretical model of development, with the power of transforming the political economy of the country following it. The assumptions of SAP do testify to the truth of this proposition.

1 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) World Development (New York: UNDP, January, 1991.) p.10.

2 The concept of center-periphery is taken from Gunder Andre Frank's work on the theory of dependency.

## THE ASSUMPTIONS OF SAP

The dominant explanations of the contemporary economic problems of developing countries focuses on internal and external factors. The internal factors are generally perceived problems in the local economy which constrain growth. Some of the common internal indicators which inhibit growth that have gained popularity include: high rate of population growth, dominance of highly subsidized inefficient state corporation sector; overgrown public service; unrealistic government subsidization policies; lack of incentives that foster agricultural productivity; over-valued local currencies; unnecessary government control of the economy particularly as this relates to prices of commodities, labor wages and trade.

The external factors embrace constraints in the domestic economy brought about by unfavorable international economic conditions. Indicators of the external economic constraints in local economies include: the oil crisis; the astronomic rises in interest rates and debt services on external loans; deliberate reductions in the prices of Third world commodities on the international market through monopsony (single buyer) and also the development of substitutes; and the trend towards trade protection.

There are significant differences between the internal and external contributing factors to the economic problems of developing countries. The internal factors lean more on the existing policy and management capabilities within the country in addition to what are considered as structural distortions in the local economy. The internal factors are the production of the local political economy's own making it is assumed. The external factors are forces over which the individual countries have no control. External factors can only be changed by the internal dynamics in the global political economy. However, between the two explanations of the economic malaise of developing countries, the proponents of SAP focus more on the internal conditions. There are at least seven assumptions to structural economic constraints that inhibit growth proposed by advocates SAP:

1. Local currencies are viewed as highly over-valued. The position taken in SAP is for the currencies to be depreciated through floating rates in order to correct the bias against exports and to promote efficient import-competing industries.
2. Price control of commodities pose unrealistic value of items. Domestic prices should be decontrolled or

adjusted so that they reflect the real value of goods and services and remove distortions from the economy. Towards this same end, the demand is to relax trade protection and remove subsidies on food prices.

3. Agriculture development is hindered by low prices of products. Farm produce prices should be allowed to rise-- even at the expense of higher food prices for urban consumers in order to increase incentives for agricultural productivity. Government agricultural marketing boards which often absorbed much of what should have been farmers' profits have to be replaced by private enterprises.
4. Foreign exchange is not allocated efficiently. Scarce foreign exchange should be allocated through auction or other market mechanisms so that market forces can channel the funds to most efficient business users.
5. Government resources are overstretched by subsidizing state corporations. Inefficient state corporations should either be liquidated or sold to private business enterprises.
6. The civil services are overgrown and should be trimmed down through lay-offs, attrition and wage freezes.
7. Scarce public resources have been wasted on splashy expensive projects. Emphasis in public investment should shift towards rehabilitation and maintenance of existing road- rail and utility system<sup>3</sup>.

What is clear about SAP is its underlying ideological objectives. From the assumptions just outlined above, SAP is pushing for the ideology of capitalist economic organization in which the market forces are the determinants of the mode of production, distribution and consumption. From a development theory point of view, the ideology of SAP is very clear and less ambiguous than its predecessor the Big Push Theory which emerged from the Western world as a model for development and dominated development objectives in the sixties<sup>4</sup>. The goal was for

- 3 May, D. H. Africa Heading for Tomorrow: Economic Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. Bretton Woods Committee Special Report on Sub-Saharan Africa.(Washington D.C. Bretton Woods Committee, 1988)
- 4 The Big Push Theory assumed that development was tenable in developing countries through planning, large scale investment and industrialization.

developing nations to undertake large-scale investments directed at rapid industrialization and economic self-sufficiency (Actually, the Soviet Union best exemplifies this theory in the 20th century).

Equipped with the assumptions of the theories of modernization and human capital, the Big Push Theory as a model of development was rooted in imitation and integration. The model assumed that development was more of a process of imitating the experiences of the industrialized countries with the consumption levels of the people living in the United States as the goal. This model was unrealistic and to all intend and purposes highly untenable from many points of view by many developing countries.

Unlike the Big Push Theory, SAP as a development model tries to place itself in the context of the domestic political economy. Strategically, SAP attempts to address those internal indicators in the local economy which make growth and reform untenable. This way, the policies and programs developed through SAP carry the stamp of approval by the recipient governments of the day. The readiness with which governments have embraced SAP is I contend, reason why most of its criticisms have centered more on the outcomes of the programs developed than on the underlying ideological assumptions and the accompanying development model arising therefrom.

The reason why SAP raises little debate to a recipient country is because of pressure of economic deterioration. To most countries SAP comes as a possible way out of the economic difficulties and maintenance of political legitimacy and stability. Zambia is a case in point here. At the time the country entered into SAP agreement with the IMF/World Bank, the economy had reached significant levels of strain<sup>5</sup>. The indicators of the strain were, the steep decline in the price of copper the country's major export and the main foreign exchange earner and the rise in the oil importation bill. These factors combined with the rise in the re-routing of the trade route from the south to the north in Tanzania, the devaluation of the local currency, the liberation wars in Southern Africa, and the heavy subsidies to social services and parastatal sectors plunged the country into economic difficulties and easily became a candidate

5 ILO. Zambia: Basic Needs in an Economy Under Pressure. (Addis Ababa: ILO 1981). Mwanza, Allast M. "Structural Adjustment Programmes in Tanzania and Zambia: Some lessons for late starters in SADCC" in Southern African Political and Economic Monthly. April 1991. pages 4-11.

for SAP.

Zambia like most other countries in desperate economic conditions embraced SAP in its entirety. The country entered into the IMF/World Bank SAP directed economic reforms as far back as 1984. The SAP conditionalities accepted at the time, and which have only undergone slight modifications were:

- a. changes in foreign exchange rates budgeting and import licensing system.
- b. acceptance that there should be no arrears under debt rescheduling agreements together with a reduction in commercial payments arrears.
- c. limits on government's external borrowing on commercial terms.
- d. reduction of government budget deficit and expenditure growth.
- e. introduction of new tax measures.
- f. limits on government personnel emoluments and a freeze on employment levels in Ministries other than health, education and agriculture.
- g. limits on internal and non-government borrowing and increase in money supply.
- h. improvements in the efficiency of parastatals.
- i. liberalization of interest rates and
- j. decontrol of prices<sup>6</sup>.

These conditionalities were invitations for the country to enter into a macro economic system highly dependent on the invisible hand of the market. The dominance of government control in the economy was considered by the proponents of SAP to be an inefficient way of running the economy. The key concept that has served as the economic policy guideline since 1984 is liberalization.

The former government under ex-President Kaunda was rather ambivalent to SAP conditionalities. The agreements with the IMF/World Bank were frequently abrogated at different periods oftentimes straining the country's relationship with the donor community as a whole. A good example was the cancellation by the government of the IMF/World Bank economic directed reforms in 1987. The reforms were replaced with a development plan based on the notion of development from the country's own resources<sup>7</sup>.

- 6 See Makgetla Seidman N. "Theoretical and Practical Implications of IMF conditionality in Zambia". Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 24, 3 1986 pp 395-422.
- 7 Gulhati, Ravi. Impasse in Zambia: The Economics and Politics of Reform. EDI Development Policy Case Series Analytical Case Studies. Number 2. (Washington D.C.:

The reasons for the unfavorable relationship between Kaunda's government and the IMF/World Bank have not been fully explored. My conjecture is that Kaunda's political strength had a role to play in the relationship. Under his rule, national policies were influenced more by his ideological, political, historical, and social considerations than by systematic economic analysis of the technocrats whether inside or outside.

However, the new government that took over following the 1991 popular general elections did from the outset willingly embrace and totally accept SAP to be the basis of its economic policy reform. The Minister of Finance put the government's position towards SAP very clearly in his first budget speech namely:

the government is determined to continue on the path of the economic reforms [i.e. SAP] without faltering....I should hasten to add that this budget and its attendant policy measures represents a beginning of a length reform process<sup>8</sup>.

The length economic reform process referred to is the restructuring of the economy under the guidelines set by SAP. In fact, the entire 1992 budget could correctly be described as having been formulated in the framework of SAP. The objectives established in the budget confirm the point namely:

- a. balancing the government budget in two years.
- b. limiting money supply to 25 percent per year.
- c. liberalization of the foreign exchange and interest rate system.
- d. discouraging unnecessary government borrowing.
- e. instilling financial discipline and accountability among controlling officers to avoid excessive expenditure.
- f. major reduction and eventual abolition of government subsidies.
- g. reduction in the size of the civil service.
- h. promotion of the private sector.
- i. reduction of government involvement in the parastatal companies. and;
- j. broadening the tax base<sup>9</sup>.

The World Bank, 1989.)

- 8 Republic of Zambia. Budget Address. (Lusaka: Ministry of Finance. 1992).
- 9 Republic of Zambia. Budget Address. (Lusaka: Ministry of Finance 1992).

These measures are part of the government's efforts of continuing to liberalize and stabilize the economy so as to enhance economic efficiency. This objective, it must be stated, is the underlying ideological objectives of SAP.

#### CURRENT CRITICISMS OF SAP

The goal of SAP is privatization or what Ramanadham called marketisation<sup>10</sup>. As stated earlier, the point of concern among the critics of SAP is not about the mode of production that is expected to emerge from countries following it. The criticisms of SAP are mainly at two levels namely, lack of serious attention to the impact of SAP on the existing sectors and the social consequences of the program particularly on the poor and most vulnerable low income groups.

A good example of the negative impact of SAP on the existing sectors within the local economy is Otto Sano's study of the effect it has had on the agriculture<sup>11</sup>. Tracing the development of agriculture in Zambia, Sano noted the changes in the participation levels of small scale farmers before and after the removal of government subsidies in the sector.

Prior to SAP, the effect of government subsidies in the agricultural sector was stimulation of small scale farmers in production. Government subsidies on transportation, handling, marketing, and agriculture inputs like fertilizer acted as incentives to small scale farmers in remote parts of the country to take up cash crop growing. This was possible because what the small scale farmers perceived in the subsidies were opportunities to generate income through agriculture production.

10 UNDP. World Development (New York: UNDP, January, 1991). Agreeing with the notion of privatization as the goal of SAP Mwanza states that, "Almost all SAPs are aimed at reducing state participation in the economy and thus to allow market forces to operate more freely. The underlying assumption is that the private sector is more efficient and flexible than the public sector and will, therefore, lead the economic recovery and development of any given country. In actual fact, SAPs are privatization programs." Mwanza, Allast M. "Theory and Practice of Structural Adjustment Program". in Southern African Political and Economic Monthly Vol.4 No.5 1991 pp. 23-27.

11 Sano, Otto. "The IMF and Zambia: The Contradictions of Exchange Rate Auctioning and De-subsidization of Agriculture". African Affairs Vol.87, 349 October 1988, pp. 563-578.



The participation of small scale farmers in cash crop growing Sano contends, raised their incomes and this in turn contributed to the narrowing of the rural-urban income gap.

The effect of the reductions in the subsidies to agriculture from 19 percent of the total government recurrent expenditure in 1980 to 6.5 percent in 1983 was according to Sano, low participation rates by small scale farmers. Small scale farmers who were integrated in the commercial sector as emerging commercial farmers were discouraged from engaging in production by rising prices of inputs like fertilizer, machinery high handling charges and transport costs. Sano further reports that even the established commercial farmers were discouraged from taking up the growing of cash crops like maize because of rising costs of inputs.

Commercial farmers ended up growing import insensitive crops in particular, soyabean, sunflower, and cotton. From these observed negative consequences, Sano concluded that the argument by advocates of SAP that the reforms can contribute to reducing rural-urban income gaps is a myth. Sano's findings are supported by experiences from elsewhere. Signals from countries with long periods of implementing SAP are that:

benefits like agricultural production remain fragmentary and there is no significant rise in output or exports that might portend economic recovery<sup>12</sup>.

The strength of Sano's work is in the relationship it established between SAP and the local economic sector. Implementing measures like devaluation, desubsidisation, and decontrol of prices as joint packages without due regard to the prevailing local economic circumstances can create negative consequences. Devaluation, desubsidisation, and price decontrol generally result in reductions in the value of a local currency and sharp increases in the prices of most commodities. Politically, these two factors are potential sources of discontent in the population. Seddon for example observed that the social unrest arising from bread riots in Tunisia and Morocco in 1984 and those of Egypt and Sudan in 1977 were a result of the IMF stabilization measures<sup>13</sup>. Zambia experienced similar riots in 1986 and 1990. The riots of 1986 on the Copperbelt resulted in fifteen deaths and the riots which covered Lusaka, Kafue and

12 Makgetla, Seidman N. "Theoretical and Practical Implications of IMF Conditionality in Zambia". Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 24, 3, 1986, pp 395-422.

13 Cited in Mukela, J. "Zambia: The IMF Fall-OUT". African Report, January- February, 1987 pp 65-67.

Kabwe resulted in the death of a policeman.

In addition to the general discontent that might arise from implementing SAP, a more serious problem is the impact it has on the poor low income families. For a long time, SAP has tended to be a recipe that took little or no account of human conditions. The impact of SAP on human welfare has generally been the major concern among its ardent critics. The contention has been that SAP and its conditionalities tend to lower the standards of living of most individuals. The groups affected most are those living at or below the threshold of poverty. The composition of such groups include women and children (especially in households with no male wage earners) the young school leavers, the disabled, agricultural smallholders and the unemployed. SAP produces these economic hardships because:

real wages tend to decline due to rising inflation; the introduction of user charges like school fees and hospital fees further reduces the incomes of the poor; the removal of subsidies on basic commodities only help to further institutionalize poverty and extend the scourge of malnutrition, particularly in high-density urban surburbans<sup>14</sup>

These observations caution us to pay special attention to the conditionalities of SAP on human welfare especially:

- a. the effect on the standard of living of the poor groups as prices rise due to decontrol and reductions in subsidies
- b. the lives of those individuals and their families who are laid off from public service and state corporations.
- c. the effect of rising agricultural implements on the production capacities of the poor peasant farmers.
- d. the effect of cost sharing mechanisms like school fees and health fees on the quality of life of the poor and low income families.

The negative impact of SAP on human conditions tend to be indefinite because the promised economic recovery has no time frame. That is, no one has stated with precision when economic recovery under SAP might take place. Indeed, and if available data from countries following the program are anything to go by, the benefits of SAP are not easy to pinpoint. Zambia is a good case where the government has admitted that the economic problems experienced throughout the period of economic structural reform under SAP have:

14 Southern African Political and Economic Monthly, Vol.4, No. 7. April 1991. p.2.

adversely affected the living standards especially among the poorest and most vulnerable groups. Key indicators of social development in health, nutrition, education and other areas have deteriorated significantly. Household incomes have been squeezed as employment opportunities and wages have fallen<sup>15</sup>.

Social services in Zambia have, according to recent studies, declined significantly as resources plummeted<sup>16</sup>. It is experiences like the one described by the government that make analysis of the impact of SAP on different sectors necessary and important. The section that follows focuses on the impact of SAP on the education sector.

### THE IMPACT OF SAP ON EDUCATION

Zambia's educational system has been a subject of intense study in recent years<sup>17</sup>. The underlying conclusion in all the reports is that the educational has, since the eighties been in a major crisis manifested in: reduced government spending especially on capital projects, equipments, teaching materials and maintenance; overcrowded classrooms in urban primary schools; dilapidation in educational facilities; unattractive conditions of service for teachers; poor teaching and learning environment; scarcity of learning materials and equipments; exodus of teachers from the educational system and decline in the quality of education. The policy analysis in education has been good but not profound enough to search for deeper causes of the problems in the system.

Economic difficulties and population growth have been

- 15 Republic of Zambia. Social Action Program 1990-1993. (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1990) p. 1.
- 16 See Seshamani, V., Saasa, O.S., Bhat, G.J., Lungwangwa, G., Milimo, M.C., and Osborne, C.M. Zambia: Constraints to Social Service Delivery. A Study Commissioned by the World Bank (Lusaka: The World Bank May, 1993.)
- 17 See Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Education. Focus on Learning: Strategies for the development of school education in Zambia. (Lusaka: Ministry of Education, May 1992.) Kelly, M.J. Education in a Declining Economy: The Case of Zambia 1975-1985. (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1991.) FINNIDA. Supporting Zambia's Education Sector Under Structural Adjustment. (Helsinki: FINNIDA. 1990)

isolated as the contributing factors to the deterioration in the educational system<sup>18</sup>. Unlike studies in other sectors like agriculture mentioned earlier, the focus of the research and policy analysis in education has not paid attention to the impact of SAP on the system. The neglect of SAP in all the studies aimed at understanding the deterioration in education can be attributed to the sources of their support. Most of the studies have been donor funded and the interest has focused more on identifying areas within which to develop technical assistance co-operation with the government.

It is true that the crisis in education emerged simultaneously with the decline in the government's revenue-earning capacity. However, to attribute the causes exclusively to economic and population constraints is to miss the power of the forces that have influenced the shaping of the decision-making process in education. SAP has acted as the dominant force that significantly influenced the logic of the decision making process in education throughout the eighties. The premise of the logic was that productive sectors of the economy had to take higher priority in investment. Social sectors like education had to rely on the support of the users for resources.

Throughout the eighties, education and other social sectors like health, cost recovery became the underlying rationale in resource allocation decisions to the sector. The burden of meeting the cost of education has come to be borne more by parents through both direct and indirect measures such as user charges, school fees, student loans, and supply of educational requisites.

The effect of SAP in education has been greater on its internal efficiency, equity, policy and management. The variables that stand out as clear indicators are; the expenditure ratios both at capital and recurrent levels, enrollment rates both in terms of admission rates, gross enrollment ratios and participation rates, teacher salaries, educational expansion and the policy process itself. These areas of the educational system have been highly strained since the conditionalities of SAP were effected in the early eighties. The internal efficiency of the educational system under SAP has been more pronounced at the level of resource supply. The demand by the advocates of SAP to cut expenditures on the social sectors plunged the educational system into a position of deep cuts in financial allocations.

18 See example in Kelly, M.J., Nkwanga, E.B., Kaluba, L.H., Achola, P.P.W. Educational Reforms Implementation Project (ERIP). Towards the Implementation of Zambia's Educational Reforms under Demographic and Economic Constraints 1986-2000. (Lusaka: School of Education The University of Zambia 1986.)

The percentage of the Gross National Income (GNP) going to education dropped from 6.5 percent in 1982 to a low of 2.4 percent in 1989. When seen against the background that the average GNP going to education in Sub-Sahara Africa even under severe economic difficulties is 5 percent, Zambia's position show a very low public support to education. The developments in financial allocations to education show significant changes between the period prior to and since SAP. The share of the GNP going to education levelled off from an annual average of 5.5 percent between 1975 and 1984 to 3.4 percent between 1985 and 1990.<sup>19</sup>

The share of education in the government budget also indicate significant reductions. Between 1975 and 1984 the percentage of the national budget going to education was a yearly average of 12.2 percent. On the other hand the share of education in the national budget dropped to an annual average of 9.0 percent since the country effected the conditionalities of SAP in 1984. The reductions in resource allocation to education has affected the per capita education expenditure which dropped from a high of 72 Kwacha in the seventies to a low of 30 Kwacha since 1984.<sup>20</sup> This represent a drop from 65 Us dollars to 0.003 Us dollars.

8 The reductions in resource allocations to education has affected all sectors of the educational system. I will use the primary education level to illustrate the magnitude of the reductions. The ruling policy in education since Zambia effected SAP has been that, "The responsibility for the education of children rests primarily with parents and it is they who must ultimately provide the necessary resources for education."<sup>21</sup> This is a statement of cost sharing and cost shifting. Significant costs of education have indeed continuously come to be borne by parents. One way in which parents' contributions to the cost of education has been invited is by reducing per capita allocations. The per capita annual allocations in the primary education sector dropped from 139.1 Kwacha between 1980 and 1984

19 For details of these reductions see Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Education. Focus on Learning: Strategies for the Development of School Education in Zambia. (Lusaka: Ministry of Education, 1992.)

20 Kelly, M.J. "Financing and Costing of Basic Education For All". A paper presented at the National Conference on Education For All Lusaka, 7-8 March, 1991.

21 Republic of Zambia. New Economic Recovery Program July 1987- December 1988. (Lusaka: Government Printer 1987 p 67.)

to 65.9 Kwacha between 1985 and 1989<sup>22</sup>.

• At the level of teaching materials in primary schools, the government withdrew responsibility to it as far back as 1986. This means that no money has been allocated to teaching materials since then. The cost of supplying teaching and learning materials to children has been the responsibility of parents. From 1986, 96 percent of the recurrent expenditure allocations to education has mainly been for personal emoluments i.e. salaries of the education personnel. In other words, the government has shifted away from its responsibility of educating children to maintenance of its education employees.

The reductions in public financial support to primary education was not only confined to recurrent expenditures. Financial allocations to capital projects dropped from an annual average of 4.4 million Kwacha between 1980 and 1983 to a low of 0.75 million Kwacha from 1984 to 1989<sup>23</sup>. The reductions in money for capital projects in primary education hindered its expansion during the same period.

The condition of resource allocation has been extremely low in the non-formal education i.e. literacy sector. Since the introduction of SAP financial resources for literacy programs plummeted from an annual average of 126.5 thousand Kwacha to 25.7 thousand Kwacha in the periods 1980 to 1983 and 1984 to 1989, respectively. This represents a reduction of 80 percent of public resources going to literacy programs. At the same time, the per capita expenditure to literacy programs dropped from 26.9 Kwacha to 5.9 Kwacha in the periods 1980 to 1983; and 1984 to 1989 respectively. These sharp reductions in financial allocations to literacy programs resulted in significant drop in enrollment in literacy programs from 10,000 to 4,000 in the same period<sup>24</sup>.

- 22 Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Education Unpublished Educational Statistics.
- 23 See Ramakrishnan, S. " Budgeting and Financial Management in Education Sector in Zambia," in Institutional Development in Education and Training in Sub-saharan African Countries, ed. J. Auerhan et.al. (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1985.). Republic of Zambia. Ministry of Education Focus on Learning: Strategies for the development of school education in Zambia. (Lusaka: Ministry of Education, 1992.)
- 24 Republic of Zambia. Ministry of Education. Basic Education in Zambia: Past Experiences and Future Strategies to Attain Quality Education For All. A Country Paper Presented at the World Conference on Education For All. (Lusaka: Ministry of Education,

The supply side of internal efficiency is not the only way in which SAP has affected the education sector. Equity has become an area of concern and there a number of ways in which SAP has affected equity in education. First, the deep reductions in resources to education effected since the early eighties constrained educational expansion making access at different levels increasingly difficult for many people. At the primary school level, school places have not expanded to the point where they could keep pace with the rise in the population of school age children.

The effects of diminishing opportunities of access to primary education are more pronounced in the urban areas. The worst hit being Lusaka and Copperbelt. The gross admission ratios of seven year old children [i.e. the school age children] in these two urban areas currently stand at an annual average percentage of 75 and 55 respectively<sup>25</sup>. The majority of children growing without opportunities to attend school come from low income families. In a study on street children in Zambia for example, a significant proportion of the sample had never been to school or dropped out early. The children were from low income families.

Opportunities for secondary and tertiary education have become even fewer due to lack of expansion. The proportion of children entering grade eight has remained at an annual average of 28 percent since 1985. On the other hand, the ratio of pupils proceeding to grade ten after finishing junior secondary has remained at a constant level of 38 percent since 1985. Furthermore, the proportion of secondary school leavers with opportunities to enter the university has remained at 6 percent since 1985. When the data are disaggregated by gender, the opportunities of girls for secondary and higher education have not improved. The enrollment ratio of girls at secondary school level has remained at an annual average of 36 percent throughout the eighties.

The decline in educational opportunities arising from lack of expansion in educational facilities largely stem from the deep cuts in resource allocation to education experienced since the introduction of SAP. The combined total effect of the conditionalities of SAP reveal even a more serious negative impact on education. What is of significant importance here is the combined effect of such offshoots of SAP like the devaluation of the local currency, reduced government support to social sectors and the demand for cost sharing to meet social services.

1989.)

25 Republic of Zambia. Ministry of Education. Unpublished Data. 1989.

Constant devaluations of the local currency [the Kwacha] form 5 Kwacha to 1 US dollar in 1985 to the current rate of 580 Kwacha to 1 US dollar has reduced the income levels of teachers in real terms. When seen against the constant 1984 Kwacha the annual average incomes of primary school teachers declined by a 75.9 percent margin from 1981 to 1991. The drop in the real incomes of teachers in the midst of an inflation level that rose from 37.4 percent in 1984 to 214.8 percent by November 1993 has lowered the morale and motivation of the teaching force<sup>26</sup>. A big number of teachers estimated at 3,500 have left Zambia to seek better conditions of service in countries like Botswana, South Africa and Namibia<sup>27</sup>.

Cost sharing measures have in addition, created major opportunity costs to children from low income families. Daily newspapers do at different times carry reports of children leaving school because they can not afford the cost or they have lost interest in education<sup>28</sup>. The opportunity cost of education has become a major concern especially among low income families. A growing response to a harsh economic environment characterized by high inflation, unemployment, and declining real household incomes and standards of living among low income families is to withdraw children from school. Instead of sending their children to school such families engage them in income generating ventures like street vending and farming to supplement family incomes.

High income families on the other hand, have responded differently to the changing conditions of education under SAP. Such indicators of declining educational standards like overcrowded classrooms, unmotivated teachers, short school hours, and lack of teaching and learning materials have compelled high income families to send their children to private schools. A study on private schools has observed that parents [ 96.2 percent from a sample of 736] who have children in these institutions believe that they offer high quality education than government schools. In response to the growing demand for quality education among the elites, private schools of different descriptions are being established in urban and wealth farming areas. The number of private primary schools has risen from 16 in 1979 to 75 in 1982. Some of these schools charge as high as 400, 000 Kwacha per child per term. The demand for places in these schools is reported by proprietors to be so high that entrance

26 Times of Zambia 5th November 1993.

27 Financial Mail (Zambia) July 27-August 2 1993.

28 See reports in; Zambia Daily Mail 25/8/87 and 25/9/87 and Times of Zambia 12/5/90; 8/6/90 and 12/6/90.



tests have to be applied as a condition for admission<sup>29</sup>.

At the education policy level, the position since the introduction of SAP has been a greater dependency on bilateral and multilateral donors for funding and ideas. The entire educational system is currently run on projects identified and funded by a group of leading donors like the World Bank, British Council, CIDA, SIDA, FINNIDA, UNICEF, EEC, ODA, JICA, etc. The projects include production and supply of school textbooks and readers, in-service training for teachers, education management training for planners and headteachers, rehabilitation of schools, construction of schools, education policy studies, to mention but a few.

The magnitude of donor involvement in education over the years since SAP has made education officials spectators in educational development. The community of donors have taken the lead in shaping the direction of the educational system. The officials in the Ministry of education have come to accept these developments because of the prospects for funding without which they cannot manage the system. The Planning Unit in the Ministry of Education is the worst hit. Very little direction comes from the Planning Unit by way of directing the future development plans of the education system in the country.

Zambia's condition enhances the argument for center-periphery analysis when dealing with the problems of education in the country even further. SAP and its conditionalities has made the elites in education more dependent on external assistance for funding and ideas to run the educational system. The donors have responded to these developments very effectively through support for consultancies in education out of which projects for funding have been developed.

29 For an empirical study report on private schools in Zambia see: Lungwangwa, G. Prospects for Private Entrepreneurs in Primary Education in Zambia. (Lusaka: School of Education, The University of Zambia. 1993.)

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion it should be stated that the policy reforms which have been brought about by SAP have deepened the structures of dependency in education both in domestic and international terms. Domestically, the reductions in funding for education have created a condition whereby communities and parents bear the burden of funding and maintaining schools. Internationally, donors have come to occupy a leading role in directing "viable and appropriate" projects to address the pressing problems in education at all levels. These developments indicate a condition of dependency that is growing to proportions which in the long run could threaten the government's ability to run its educational system equitably, efficiently and equally without being highly dependent on external assistance.