THE NEXUS BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF TWO MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES IN LUSAKA DISTRICT.

By

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A dissertation submitted to the University of Zambia in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Science in Peace Leadership and Conflict Resolution

The University of Zambia in collaboration with Zimbabwe Open University

Lusaka

2018

DECLARATION

Student's Declaration

I wish to declare that this dissertation is my original work and the content therein was generated by me except for that content whose sources have been acknowledged accordingly. I further declare that the views and opinions contained in this dissertation do not in any way represent those of the university but my own.

Signature ………………………   Date ………………………………………….

Name ………………………….

APPROVAL

Supervisor's Declaration

I wish to confirm that the work reported in this dissertation was carried out by the candidate under my supervision as University supervisor. I therefore approve that this dissertation be submitted in partial fulfillment for the award of a Master's Degree in Peace Leadership and Conflict Resolution.

Signature ………………………………...   Date ……………………………………

Name ……………………………………….

Department……………………………….

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my wife for the immeasurable support she rendered to me throughout the period of study. I also wish to dedicate it to my children Gift and Robert Theo for sometimes staying up late with me as I worked on this dissertation. I further dedicate it to my late sister Georgina Theo who would have loved to be part of this achievement.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to thank Dr P.H. Moyo, my research supervisor for his immeasurable guidance as I undertook the research proposal process, data analysis as well as documentation of this work. I have learnt a lot about research from you Dr P.H. Moyo and your efforts have been and will continue to be actualized. I will live to appreciate your humility and sense of accommodation each time you corrected my work.

I also wish to acknowledge the invaluable support from my wife, family, friends and course mates. To you Abigail my wife, I say thank you for your patience, sense of humor and perseverance throughout the period of this study. I further extend my heartfelt thanks to my children Robert Theo Jr. and Gift Theo for sometimes staying up late with me as I worked on this dissertation.

My special thanks also go to management at FODEP, CAZ, GEARS, CCZ, ZCCB, ECZ, Patriotic Front and UPND Secretariats for having allowed me to collect data from participants at the afore named institutions. I also wish to thank the civic leaders and political party supporters that made part of the sample of this study.

Lastly, I would like to thank all those who directly or indirectly contributed to the successful completion of this work. To you all, I am highly indebted.

ABSTRACT

This study examined the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence with particular focus on two major political parties in Lusaka district. The study was anchored on the following objectives: To explore the leadership styles of the two major political parties; to establish whether or not the leadership styles of the two major political parties could influence violence before, during and after elections; to ascertain whether or not violence was used as a strategy for winning elections and to analyze some campaign messages made by politicians so as to ascertain whether or not they had the potential to influence violence before, during and after elections.

Methodologically, the study used a qualitative descriptive survey design. The following instruments were used to gather data: individual interviews, focus group discussion and document analysis. Using a homogeneous purposive sampling, the study comprised ten (10) participants from civil society organizations and one (1) official from ECZ. It also comprised four (4) participants from PF and UPND, who were at management level and two (2) councilors (one from each party). It further comprised fourteen (14) supporters including four youths who had served in the security wings of the two political parties.

The findings of the study have shown that all things being equal, there is a nexus between political leadership and electoral violence. In the first place, the study established that political leaders in the two major political parties mostly used leadership styles which were a mixture of autocracy, dictatorship, personalized charismatic and laissez faire; all of which had the potential to influence violence before, during and after elections. Secondly, the study established that in as much as political leaders claimed that they preached peace, they mostly peddled hate messages before, during and after elections. Lastly, the study established that in as much as they were not the carriers of violence themselves, political leaders tolerated violence amongst their supporters and further used it as a strategy for winning elections.

The study recommended inter alia the need for political leaders to adopt democratic leadership styles that would foster co-existence, peace, love and reconciliation. Also the need for political leaders to refrain from issuing statements which had the potential to cause violence, and non-usage of violence as a strategy for winning elections or cowing losers into accepting election results.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMNS

ACP – All People's Congress

ACLED – Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project

CAZ – Civic Association of Zambia

CCZ – Council of Churches in Zambia

ECZ – Electoral Commission of Zambia

EMB – Election Monitoring Board

EV – Electoral Violence

FDD – Forum for Democracy and Development

FODEP – Foundation for Democratic Process

GEARS – Governance Elections Advocacy Research and Service Delivery Initiative Zambia

HRW – Human Rights Watch

ICC – International Criminal Court

IFES – International Foundation for Election Systems

MMD – Movement for Multi-party Democracy

NELDA – National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy

PEV – Post Electoral Violence

PF – Patriotic Front

SCAD – Social Conflict in Africa Database

UNIP – United National Independence Party

UPND – United Party for National Development

UPP – United Progressive Party

ZCCB – Zambia Council of Catholic Bishops

ZEIC – Zambia Elections Information Centre

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ix

CHAPTER ONE

1.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the background to the study. It explores the perceived correlation between leadership and electoral violence as advanced by previous studies. The chapter also presents the problem statement, research objectives, research questions and purpose of the study. It further presents the significance the study, delimitations, limitations of the study and definitions of key terms. Lastly a summary of what has been advanced in the chapter is presented.

1.2. Background

There is a perceived increase in politically motivated violence across the world (Wilkinson, 2006; UNDP, 2011; Norris, 2012; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; Daxecker, 2014; Fischer, 2017). In the United States, studies show that leading political candidates fueled violence in the 2016 Presidential election through hateful rhetoric (Fischer, 2017). In Spain, the Basque separatist organization, ETA, has repeatedly used violence to disrupt elections (Norris, 2012). According to Wilkinson (2006) politicians in India incite or suppress ethnic violence depending on whether the support of ethnic minorities is necessary for their electoral success. Politically motivated violence is also not uncommon in some Asian countries such as Pakistan, Philippines and Malaysia (UNDP, 2011; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; Daxecker, 2014). Other studies have found that in countries such as Mexico, the Philippines, India and Thailand the electoral process is routinely accompanied by massive organized campaigns of violence and intimidation (UNDP, 2011; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; Daxecker, 2014).

In Africa, studies have revealed that most political leaders use violence to perpetrate their stay in power or overturn election results (Suberu 1993; Lewis 1994; Hoglund, 2009; Burchard, 2015; Wallsworth, 2015). According to Wallsworth (2015) so often than not, violence is encouraged publicly from leading political figure heads, who use existing ethnic tensions to divide and conquer during elections. Amankwaah (2013) observes that in as much as the youths are to blame for electoral violence, the real culprits are 'Big men" who fund them, and would do everything at their disposal to win an election. In Kenya, the post-election violence of 2007/2008 which left approximately over 1,500 people dead and 660,000 displaced is said to have been technically instigated by leaders on tribal lines (Hansen, 2012;

Burchard, 2015). Some of the current leaders were even indicted before the charges were dropped (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Elections in Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad have been characterized by politically organized violence (Motsamai, 2010).

In Zambia, reports of politically motivated violence are not uncommon before, during and after elections (William, 2002; Mwizenge, 2016; Edward &Wahman, 2016; Commonwealth Report, 2016). Mwizenge (2016) observes that the leaders of political parties are unwilling to openly condemn and take responsibility where the violence and even deaths have reportedly occurred due to political election violence caused by some members of their political parties. According to Edward and Wahman (2016), some incidents of electoral violence have reportedly been perpetrated in full view of some political leaders. There have also been reports of political leaders orchestrating, sponsoring and instigating violence before, during and after elections (Commonwealth Report, 2016). Preceding elections have revealed similar trends too.

However, little has been done to try and analyze the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence especially in Zambia. This is a serious omission particularly when put into consideration that political leadership is a central component for both violent conflict and peace processes. According to Lederach (1997), leaders have the capacity to fuel, reduce conflict or promote peace processes by virtue of their high public profile. For example, Adolf Hitler influenced his country to go to war while late Nelson Mandela de-escalated foreseeable conflict in post-apartheid South Africa by placing emphasis on peace, love and reconciliation (Choi, 2007). Ligon et.al (2013) observes that leaders can influence violence or promote peace depending on the leadership characteristics they have nurtured. They observe that charismatic leaders with personalized characteristics have the potential to fuel violence while charismatic leaders with socialized characteristics are less likely to fuel violence because they de-emphasize their places in the structures they lead, share decision-making and sacrifice themselves in the interest of the structures they lead (Ligon et.al, 2013).

Achebe (1960) contends that failure of leadership is the root cause of all evil, including violence. According to Choi (2007) leadership can influence for the positive or negative depending on the type of leadership governing the structures. He argues that through his democratic leadership style, late Nelson Mandela emphasized peace and reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa thereby preventing violent retaliatory actions from the black majority both before and after his election victory. And that his emphasis for love, peace and reconciliation further led to direct democratic elections (Choi, 2007). Brummer (2016) points out that there is a direct link between conflict and leadership. He observes that leaders with high self-confidence traits are likely to have a propensity to pursue conflictual strategies, a move which can lead to violence.

According to Hermann (1999) it is important to know something about a leader's personality and characteristics in order to understand the influence they will have on the people he or she is leading. For example, late president Mwanawasa's leadership style is reportedly to have relatively influenced for the positive before, during and after elections. According to Stewart (2009), violence is the result of unscrupulous leaders who out of greed for power and resources exploit their own people into violence on their behalf, provoking them with the 'usual suspects': religion, racism, poverty and fear among others. This study therefore examines the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence with particular focus on selected political parties in Zambia.

1.3. Statement of the Problem

Political leadership has been found to be a central component for both violent conflict and peace processes (Lederach, 1997). By virtue of their high public profile, leaders have the capacity to fuel, reduce conflict or promote peace processes (Lederach, 1997). For example, through his inclusive leadership style, late Nelson Mandela emphasized peace and reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa thereby preventing violent retaliatory actions from the black majority before and after his election victory (Choi, 2007). However, despite research confirming that leadership has the capacity to fuel or reduce violence, little has been done to analyze or document the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence in Zambia. This is a serious omission particularly when put into consideration that political leaders are key stakeholders in the electoral process, and can play a critical role in preventing

or fueling violence because of the influence that they have on their party structures and supporters (Mwizenge, 2016). Besides, if no further effort is undertaken to investigate the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence, it might lead to open if not misguided interpretation on how the two relate especially by interested parties. It is against this background that this study examines the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence in Lusaka district.

1.4. Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of this study was to examine the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence with particular focus on two major political parties in Lusaka district.

1.5. Research Objectives

The study was guided by the following objectives:

a. To explore leadership styles of leaders of the major political parties in Zambia.

b. To establish whether or not the leadership styles of the leaders of the major political parties can influence violence before, during or after elections.

c. To analyze some campaign speeches made by political leaders so as to ascertain whether or not they have the potential to influence violence before, during or after elections.

d. To find out whether or not political leaders use electoral violence as a strategy for winning elections or overturning elections in Zambia.

1.6. Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions:

a. What are the main leadership styles that leaders of the selected major political parties use in their electoral mobilization processes in Zambia?

b. Can the leadership styles of the selected political parties influence violence before, during and after elections in Zambia?

c. Do political party leaders issue campaign messages which have the potential to influence violence before, during or after elections?

d. Do political leaders use electoral violence as a strategy for winning elections or overturning election results?

1.7. Significance of the Study

The findings of this study may inspire political leaders to adopt leadership styles that promote peace processes and reconciliation before, during and after elections. It may also inspire political leaders to issue statements that promote unity before, during and after elections, and further adopt campaign strategies that do not influence violence. Additionally, the study may stimulate a nationwide initiative for addressing electoral violence and inspire would be researchers to carry out more research in a similar perspective. The study may further motivate the general public to develop keen interest in examining the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence and demand that political leaders seriously address the scourge as they had massive influence over their supporters and other stakeholders.

1.8. Delimitations of the Study

The study examined the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence and not political violence in general like other studies have done. The study was confined to Lusaka district. The researcher chose Lusaka district because the secretariats for the selected political parties and the head offices for civil society organizations that informed the study were all in the above named district. This facilitated quick clearance particularly when put into consideration the sensitivity of the study.

1.9. Limitations of the study

The study was confined to selected political parties and civil society organizations in Lusaka district hence the findings may not be representative of all political parties in the country. Additionally, out of the projected thirty-two participants only thirty-one were interviewed as one organization did not avail the required number of participants on the premise that protocol entailed as such.

1.10. Theoretical Framework

1.10.1. Standard Theory

This study used the standard theory. The standard theory is not one specific formal theory but rather a set of general assumptions about the relationship between power and influence which is shared by all the classic theories of social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Festinger, 1953, 1954; French & Raven, 1959; Kelman, 1958). The basic ideas of the standard theory are that power is the capacity to influence other people, that it is conferred by the control of resources (positive and negative outcomes, rewards and costs, information, etc.) that are desired, valued or

needed by others and which make them dependent upon the influencing agent for the satisfaction of their needs or reaching their goals, and that different types of resources confer different types of power leading to different kinds of influence. A further important idea widely shared and relevant to the meaning of power is that some kinds of influence are more informational or cognitive in character, reflecting needs for information or to reduce uncertainty, and lead to private acceptance (private attitude change in line with the influence attempt), whereas other kinds are more social or goal-oriented in character, embodying group pressure or compulsion, and lead only to public compliance.

1.10.2. How the theory guided the study:

This theory helped in understanding diverse influences that leaders exerted on their subordinates in the political parties that they led. It further helped in understanding how leaders used their power over resources, rewards and information to influence supporters and other stakeholders in electoral processes before, during and after elections. Lastly, the study used this theory in understanding compliance by supporters towards the influencing agents (political leaders) before, during and after elections in Zambia.

1.11. Conceptual Framework

To win support from the electorate during mobilizations, political leaders use their power and control over resources, rewards and information to influence cadres in implementing campaign strategies that would sway the outcome of the election in their favor. Hate, threats, use of weapons, disruption of political rallies, character assassination, blocking of voters on Election Day and differences of opinion are encouraged. Conversely, the losing candidates are more likely to use their power, resources and information to influence their supporters in protesting election results, while the winning party is likely to influence its supporters and state machinery to coerce the aggrieved parties into accepting the official results hence the onset of post-election violence. On the part of supporters and other stakeholders, the resources which are under the control of their leaders are critically desired, valued or needed by them, a move which makes them to be dependent upon the influencing agent as they seek satisfaction of their needs or reaching their goals.

Figure 1: Illustrates the perceived link between political leadership and electoral violence.

1.12. Definition of terms

Electoral Violence: Electoral violence can be defined as any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay or to otherwise influence the electoral process (Fischer, 2002). It can be directed against people and property, and includes acts such as killing of candidates and their supporters, fights among rival groups, riots, threats, intimidation, coercion of opponents,

voters, electoral officials, destruction of property, forceful displacement and unlawful detentions (Laakso, 2007; Sisk, 2008).

Hate Speech: Speech or expression that denigrates a person or persons on the basis of alleged membership in a social group identified by attributes such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, appearance, physical or mental disability and others (Curtis, 2017). Typical hate speech involves epithets and slurs, statements that promote malicious stereotypes, and speech intended to incite hatred or violence against a person or group. It can also include non-verbal depictions and symbols. Thus, it does not only cause psychological harm to its victims and physical harm when it incites violence, but also undermines the social equality of its victims (Curtis, 2017).

Leadership Style: It can be defined as the manner and approach of providing direction, implementing plans and motivating people. It includes the total pattern of explicit and implicit actions performed by leaders (Davis, 1993).

Nexus: This can be understood as a central link or connection within a particular situation or system (Cambridge Learners Advanced Dictionary, 2008).

Patrimonialism: It is a form of political organization in which authority is based primarily on the personal power exercised by a ruler, either directly or indirectly (Hoglund, 2009). Under patrimonialism, the power and the right to rule are ascribed to a person rather than an office (Hoglund, 2009; Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994). The ruler acts as if the state or organization where his/her private domain and sovereignty is considered as belonging to him/her and not the people. If perpetrated therefore, it can act as a recipe for violence as the led try to keep their leader in power at all costs since theirs is just to offer servitude.

Political Leadership: Political leadership can be understood as leadership that acquires legitimacy through the ballot box with the aim and capability to expediently address the political, economic, social and cultural development (Dada, 2007). One of its key features,

even in strongly controlled democracies, is the ascendancy of assertive leaders to whom voters look when deciding on which party to vote for (Teles, 2013).

1.13. Summary

The above chapter has presented the background to the study, the problem statement, the purpose of the study, research objectives and research questions. It has also presented the significance of the study, its delimitations and limitations. The study has further presented definition of key terms. The background provides the framework of what necessitated this study and so does the problem statement. The objectives have pointed out specific areas that the study addressed. The significance has outlined the contributions that this study might make to the research body of knowledge and to policy formulators. It has also outlined the motivational impact that the study might have on the general public. The scope of the study has given the expected field of coverage for the study while operational definitions have explained the context in which the key terms in this study have been used. Additionally, the limitations segment has outlined the main challenges that this study faced. In the next chapter, literature is reviewed.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0. Introduction

This chapter presents the academic literature that addresses political leadership and electoral violence. In terms of presentation the chapter starts by presenting the differences between electoral violence and other forms of political violence. Thereafter, leadership and violence is reviewed. This is followed by a critical review of academic literature on pre, on and post-election violence while showing the knowledge gaps in the same literature. Lastly, the chapter shows that the few existing studies reviewed on electoral violence have not yet adequately addressed the question of how political leadership shapes a country's predisposition to experience electoral violence.

2.1. The difference between electoral violence and other forms of political violence

What distinguishes electoral violence from other forms of political violence such as armed conflict, state repression or terrorism is primarily the *motive* and *timing* (Hoglund, 2009). Bekoe (2012:2) adds that "it is a kind of political violence distinguished by its timing, perpetrators and victims as well as objectives and methods." Thus, even though electoral violence often occurs in countries that are experiencing other forms of violent conflict, it is the motive and timing that make it an analytically distinct phenomenon and a form of violence with unique causes and consequences (Höglund, 2009). The general motive behind electoral violence is to influence the electoral process. This characterization is in line with most of the conceptual literature on electoral violence which stresses the instrumental or goal-oriented nature of such violence (Laakso, 2007; Sisk, 2008).

With regard to timing, electoral violence takes place during the electoral process and generally falls into one of the following three periods: the pre-election period, the election day(s), or the post- election period. In this respect it is important to note that the motives behind the use of violence are different in the three periods. While violence in the pre-election phase and during the election day(s) is generally aimed at increasing the vote share of the perpetrator or disrupting the electoral process altogether, violence in the post-election period tends to be aimed at challenging or defending the 'official' results (Laakso, 2007; Sisk, 2008; Hoglund, 2009; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014).

2.2. Leadership and violence

According to Hermann (1999) it is important to know something about a leader's personality in order to understand the influence they will have on the people he or she is leading. She adds that leaders with poor personality traits have usually portrayed authoritarian tendencies in order to cover up their inadequacies. I agree with Hermann on this one. Most autocratic leaders have little space for tolerance. They view themselves as "Alphas and Omegas" especially in the political setting. They lack tolerance and have no regard for others, especially those from different groupings. This in itself becomes a recipe for violence in electoral contests (Bandera, 2010). It is important therefore to direct research in this area so as to ascertain the extent to which political leadership relates to electoral violence in the Zambian context.

Brummer (2016) describes high self-confidence as one of the traits that leads to failures within politics. According to him, a high level of self-confidence increases the inclination to pursue conflictual strategies. Brummer depicts political leadership in this context. A leader's leadership styles and indeed his or her traits are critical in their governance processes because they are likely to socialize their followers with the same traits. Thus, if leaders champion violence in their speeches and campaigns, followers would also be socialized in the same manner because leaders have much power over their supporters. Violence is then engendered in them.

Going a step further than his colleagues, Stewart (2009) observes that his extensive studies on what causes violence, have given him the conclusion that in most cases violence is the result of unscrupulous leaders who out of greed for power and resources, exploit their own people into violence on their behalf provoking them with the usual suspects: religion, racism, poverty and fear among others. These findings are in line with the findings of Seifu. Seifu (2012) has observed that during electoral contests, political leaders have used violent methods to sway the electoral process in their favor. Therefore, Stewart's findings and those of Seifu may guide this study which seeks to explore the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence in Zambia.

2.3.   Pre-election Violence

Chaturvedi (2005) uses formal models and journalistic evidence to develop an agent-centered theory of pre-election violence. He treats pre-election violence as a form of electoral manipulation that can be substituted with ideological exhortation (Chaturvedi, 2005). He argues that in an electoral contest between two parties, the potential for pre-election violence will decrease as the fraction of undecided voters goes up. In other words, very 'close' electoral contests do not bode well for stability. He also suggests that incumbent parties will be more likely to resort to violent manipulation of the electoral contest given their access to state resources. While it could be true that close electoral contests do not bode well for stability, I do not agree with Chaturvedi when he hypothizes that whenever there is a close electoral contest then the likelihood of the incumbent parties resorting to violence is very high. I argue here that it depends on the type of leadership in power. In Zambia for example, when it was clear that MMD was losing against PF in a closely contested election in 2011, the then President, Mr Rupiah Banda, did not resort to violence. Instead, he exhibited true statesmanship and later handed over power to Mr Michael Sata (ZEIC, 2012). Thus, Chaturvedi's findings leave a knowledge gap that has to be explored using the Zambian context.

In his seminal study on ethnic riots and elections in India, Wilkinson (2006) treats pre-election violence as a form of strategic manipulation that can be used by politicians to increase their vote share in 'close' electoral contests. He provides a detailed sub-national analysis of electoral violence in India and argues that politicians incite or suppress ethnic violence depending on whether the support of ethnic minorities is necessary for their electoral success. Wilkinson in this context highlights the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence. Empirical evidence suggests that politicians have done this before. In Kenya, politicians have long been known for spurring violence on tribal lines (Buchard, 2015). However, even though Wilkinson does provide some statistical evidence to support his claims, the focus on regional elections in India means that his findings cannot be readily generalized to other countries. Also, it cannot be generalized that political leaders mainly incite their ethnic tribes to perpetrate violence. In Zambia for instance, the pre-election violence that led to the loss of two lives in Lusaka prior to the August 2016 elections was not triggered on tribal lines but party lines instead. This perception therefore lives a knowledge gap in itself. But what is of significance however is that

Wilkinson provides a basis for this study by highlighting the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence using the ethnic dimension.

In his study of the electoral violence that characterized the American 2016 Presidential elections, Fischer (2017) attributes the violence to social and economic inequalities that have existed in that country for a long time now. He also attributes it to Mr Trump and Mrs Clinton's hateful campaign strategies. He points out that the Pre-General Election Phase which lasted from the end of the primaries until Election Day (July until November 9 2016) were marred with incidents of violence mainly attributed to political rhetoric from Mr Trump and Mrs Clinton. He adds that political rhetoric became more hateful and intense, with hash tags like "Hillary for prison" trending in response to Mrs Clinton's continued email scandal. And that polarization on both sides of the aisle increased when Mrs Clinton called half of Mr Trump's supporters a "basket of deplorables" (Fischer, 2017). Fischer provides linkage between political leadership and electoral violence in this sense. However, Fischer's use of the American perspective leaves a knowledge gap because his findings cannot be generalized to other countries. This study will therefore use the Zambian political perspective to try and establish whether or not hateful speeches from political leaders had the potential to influence violence before, during and after elections.

Collier and Vicente (2012) develop a theory of pre-election violence that is similar to the one put forward by Chaturvedi (2005) and Wilkinson (2006). They also treat electoral violence as a form of "strategic manipulation" used by politicians to shape the electoral process in their favour. They argue that electoral violence is most likely when unpopular incumbents fear losing elections. Collier and Vicente (2012) somewhat highlight the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence in this context; they link violence to the behavior of political players who use it as means for disturbing campaign strategies for others. Collier and Vicente (2012) are closer to the current study. A study by Edward & Wahman (2016) on the 2016 general elections in Zambia reveals that when the ruling party realized that it was losing grip on the electoral contest to the opposition in the August 2016, it resorted to all tactics of violence such as threatening presiding officers and polling assistants, with some of the GI forms containing original poll results in Kanyama constituency being discovered in the dust bin after the polls (Edward & Wahman, 2016). However, their failure to bring out the impact of opposition political leaders on electoral violence leaves a knowledge gap that has to be explored. This study

therefore intends to feel this gap by exploring the nexus between electoral violence and political leadership in general, using the Zambian perspective.

In the same context, they observe that electoral violence is likely to be the dominant strategy of weak challengers that want to increase their vote share (Collier & Vicente, 2012). However, we may not entirely agree with them on this one especially if we were to use the Zambian context as an example. In Zambia, recent studies have showed that the main perpetrators of violence have been the parties in power where even the police watch helplessly if not appearing partisan (Edward & Wahman, 2016; Commonwealth Report, 2016). In Zimbabwe, during Mr Robert Mugabe's reign, violence became synonymous with ZANU PF. Youths and the police could be used by the top leadership to brutalize leaders of the opposition political parties with their sympathizers facing the same fete (Kizera, 2012).

In her conceptual analysis of electoral violence, Höglund (2009) observes that leaders in weak states tend to practice politics of patronage to the extent of even incorporating security wings. In line with arguments previously put forward by Chaturvedi (2005) and Wilkinson (2006), she maintains that politicians in 'close races' have strong incentives to foment pre-election violence (Höglund, 2009). She also argues that the design of the electoral system will impact a country's likelihood to experience electoral violence. We may agree with Hoglund on the part where she argues that politicians in 'close races' have strong incentives to foment pre-election violence. Kizera (2012) observes that when it was clear that Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was headed for victory in the first round of the 2007 Presidential elections in Zimbabwe, the ruling ZANU PF resorted to high levels of violence in order to sway the result. And that in the run up to the second round, the ZANU PF, through its youth militia, became more violent than ever, with Mr Morgan Tsvangirai being forced to withdraw from the race (Kizera, 2012). However, we do not entirely agree with her presupposition that the country's electoral system will impact the likelihood to experience electoral violence. It can be argued here that the occurrence of violence mainly depends on the perception of the political players themselves. If the political players choose to accept the result for instance, the electoral system may have no direct impact on violence in such an instance. This perception therefore, leaves a knowledge gap that has to be explored.

Straus and Taylor (2009) analyze the phenomenon of electoral violence from a cross-national, quantitative perspective. They code a relatively crude four-point scale to measure the level of violence in all African elections between 1990 and 2007. While their primary aim is to map the frequency and spread of electoral violence across Africa, Straus and Taylor also develop a number of hypotheses to explain the variation in electoral violence across countries. Amongst other things, they predict that the likelihood of electoral violence is influenced by the 'closeness' of the electoral race, the country's regime type, its growth rates and the level of ethnic polarization. We may agree with Strauss and Taylor on the part where they link the type of regime to electoral violence in Africa. However, it would be unfair to insinuate that only the leadership in power can perpetrate electoral violence as some studies suggest that both ruling parties and opposition political parties can perpetrate electoral violence (Burchard, 2015). This in itself leaves a knowledge gap that has to be explored using the Zambian context.

Drawing systematic empirical analyses on the causes of pre-election violence, Hafner-Burton et al. (2014) argue that the likelihood of pre-election violence can be predicted by a combination of two factors: Firstly, the incumbent's fear of losing power as the result of an election and, secondly, the 'institutionalized constraints' placed on her decision-making powers. Hafner-Burton et al. hypothesize that the more uncertain the incumbent's victory and the less constrained she is to use state powers in her favor, the more likely it is that a country will experience pre-election violence. They systematically assess the observable implications of their argument using variables from the NELDA dataset, which contains cross-country information on all election rounds between 1981 and 2004 (Hyde & Marinov, 2012). Hafner-Burton et al. find empirical support for their theoretical argument, while controlling for perceptions of pre-election fraud, the incumbent's age and tenure, economic development, population size, civil war, and the overall level of repression. Their paper presents perhaps the most thorough quantitative investigation into the causes of pre-election violence.

However, it suffers from a number of shortcomings; Hafner-Burton et al. do not specify the perpetrator of the electoral violence in the coding of their main dependent variable ("Nelda33"). This is problematic because the paper's central argument relies on the assumption that it is the incumbent who commits acts of pre-election violence in order to increase his/her chances of winning the election (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014:150). However, Nelda33 codes "any significant

violence relating to the elections that resulted in civilian deaths" (Hyde and Marinov, 2012:16), *regardless* of whether it was committed by the incumbent's forces or by supporters of the opposition. This conceptual confusion is particularly unfortunate in light of recent studies on electoral violence in Africa, which suggest that the issue of who is the primary perpetrator of electoral violence is far from settled. While Daxecker (2014) and Collier and Vicente (2012) suggest that non-state actors or 'challengers' are the primary perpetrators of electoral violence, Straus and Taylor (2009), Onapajo (2014) as well as Fjelde and Höglund (2015) find that incumbents are responsible for an overwhelming majority of violent events in the electoral period. It can be argued therefore that such rich bodies of literature portray knowledge gaps if viewed from the perspective of the topic under consideration, and would do well if they depicted political leadership in general so as to include both the opposition and parties in power.

In his thesis titled *'Institutions and Electoral Violence'* Dunaiski (2015) uses a panel data set to isolate the causes of electoral violence. He demonstrates that institutional factors such as the electoral system, decentralization, the separation of powers, and state capacity all have an important impact on the likelihood of electoral violence. He adds that, all else being equal, centralized states with majoritarian electoral systems, semi-parliamentary regimes and weak state capacity are most at risk of experiencing electoral violence. His paper also provides evidence suggesting that the effect of institutions on electoral violence differs between the pre and the post-election period as well as between pro and anti-government perpetrators. In this context, we find political leadership to be skewed in a cluster of other factors. Pro and anti-government perpetrators can mean anyone who supports government as well as anyone who does not support government. Dunaiski's thesis therefore, does not clearly relate political leadership to electoral violence. Besides, by 'institutional factors' he implicates even civil servants that serve in these institutions at the pleasure of top political leadership. For example, every institution that facilitates electoral processes in Zambia has its top leadership appointed by those in power. ECZ, Zambia Police and all the key institutions have their top leadership appointed by the head of state. It would be unfair therefore to heavily link electoral violence to such institutions in the Zambian context as they have been so weakened that even cadres from the ruling party command them (Edward and Wahman, 2016).

Hafner-Burton et al. (2012) examine how the use of pre-election violence affects the chances of the incumbent to stay in power. To begin with, they hypothesize and show that the use of pre-election violence by the incumbent increases her chances of being re-elected by swaying voter turnout in her favor and precipitating election boycotts of opposition parties. Secondly, they argue that the use of pre-election violence increases the likelihood of post-election protests. These protests in turn make the annulment of elections more likely and often force the incumbent to resign. I agree with Hafner-Burton et al. (2012) on the aspect that the incumbents may resort to use of pre-election violence in order to increase their chances of being re-elected by swaying voter turnout in their favor and precipitating election boycotts of opposition parties. However, it is also fair to argue that before they even boycott, opposition political parties can resort to violence so as to disturb the whole electoral process. Thus, in as much as Hafner-Burton et al. (2012) have highlighted political leadership by putting incumbents in the limelight of electoral violence, I find it not appropriate to leave out the opposition political leadership because it can as well perpetrate electoral violence as witnessed in Kenya before and after the 2007 general elections.

In their work titled *"Democracy in Reverse: The 2016 General Election in Zambia"* Wahman and Edward (2016) have attributed the electoral violence that characterized the pre-election phase of the 2016 general elections to a number of key factors such as socio-economic factors, state repression and political parties. On socio-economic factors, they argue that vulnerable youths made themselves readily available for violence to whoever promised an incentive. On political parties, they observe that the PF and UPND campaigns had serious elements of violence. They also observe that some political leaders were not willing to restrain youths who perpetrated violence in their full view. In as much as Edward and Wahman somewhat highlight linkage between political leadership and electoral violence by referring to political parties and the named FDD parliamentary candidate who incited her supporters to beat people in Namwala. This study may therefore guide this study. However, they focused on democracy in general and not political leadership in isolation. This in itself leaves a knowledge gap that has to be explored. This study therefore intends to use the perspective of leadership and electoral violence to try and establish whether or not there is a nexus between the two.

In his article titled *"The Dangers of Election Violence and Tribalism",* Mwizenge (2016) attributes two factors to pre-election violence to tribalism and political parties. He observes that amidst too many provocative allegations and grievances that have been boiling underneath the political surface, the leaders of political parties are unwilling to openly condemn and take responsibility where the violence and even some deaths have reportedly occurred due to political election violence and sometimes recklessness caused by some members of their political parties. Mwizenge's article may guide this study which examines the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence. However, his emphasis on tribalism leaves a knowledge gap as some previous studies have shown that leaders can influence violence on party lines. Besides, he implicates tribalism which he does not clearly substantiate in the Zambian context hence citing the tribal civil wars in Nigeria and Rwanda respectively. Additionally, we may suppose that he does not clearly link political leadership to violence save for the silence on the part of party leaders. This in itself leaves a knowledge gap which has to be filled.

2.4. Violence during elections

Daxecker (2014) suggests that violence during Election Day (s) should be conceptualized as strategic manipulation or a form of election fraud. Those in power would want to manipulate elections in their favor on polling days through voter intimidation. For example, voters would be coerced to vote for the incumbent, failure to which they would not be helped if he or she retained power. These study findings are also elucidated by Birch (2007) who points out that political elites seek to influence the outcome of elections by circumventing democratic procedures at all levels of an election cycle including election days. We may agree with Daxecker's findings; Often times than not political élites have indirectly sponsored youths to sternly coerce voters into voting for their preferred candidates if not cowing them into voting for their preferred candidates as observed by Burchard (2015). However, while Daxecker and Burchard use the context of other African countries to link political leadership to violence on election days, this study will use the Zambian perspective to try and establish the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence.

Fischer (2017) uses the 2016 Presidential elections to show how political rhetoric from leaders informs violence on election days. He observes that while Election Day and night were largely peaceful throughout the United States, the few cases of voter intimidation and some

uncorroborated instances of violence near the polling station were mainly precipitated by Mr Trump who had earlier urged his supporters to vigorously guard the election he claimed had already been rigged by the Democrats. Thus, other than using physical and verbal intimidation, some supporters displayed peculiar behavior which showed the extent to which the Trump rhetoric had sunk in them. For example, a woman in Iowa is said to have cast her vote twice, in fear of her vote being rigged (Fischer, 2017). Besides, some supporters from both camps continued to flash demeaning hash tags against Mr Trump and Mrs Clinton on Election Day. This trend provoked violent verbal abuse and intimidation. Fischer's findings are plausible. Some previous studies done in Africa have revealed same trends. Motsami (2011) explains that spontaneous demonstrations broke out on election days in Ivory Coast in the 2010 presidential elections when the incumbent, Mr Quattara, alleged that that country's electoral body was taking long to release results because his predecessor was trying to rig the election. However, in as much as the findings of these two eminent scholars could be plausible, they leave a knowledge gap because they cannot be generalized to all political settings. This study therefore intends to make an investigation using the Zambian perspective with the view of adding the findings to this well-grounded body of literature.

Wilkinson (2004) shows how some Indian politicians strategically instigate inter-ethnic riots to ensure the electoral support of their own ethnic group when the electoral race is particularly close. He points out that during election days, some sponsored supporters have often times than not, intimidated voters into voting for their preferred candidates on the premise that they would be dealt with if they voted otherwise. He also adds that political elites often play a central role in defining the limits and the meanings of even spontaneous and localized riots or resource conflicts during election days (Wilkinson, 2004).Wilkinson makes a plausible contribution to the current study on the part where he links political leadership to ethnic violence on election days. Studies done in Kenya by Burchard (2015) have revealed similar trends. However, we may not agree with Wilkinson on the part where he uses the perspective of ethnicity. A study by Wahman and Edward (2016) on the 2016 general elections held in Zambia has revealed that violence on election days was not incited on tribal lines but party lines. His findings therefore, leave a knowledge gap that has to be explored by using the Zambian perspective.

Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski (2014) have also presented cross-national evidence showing that incumbent governments rely on electoral violence to prevent an unfavorable electoral outcome when they fear being defeated at the ballot box. We may agree with Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski (2014) on their findings. Their findings can act as a basis for this study which seeks to examine the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence. However, their insistence on 'incumbents' leaves a knowledge gap that has to be explored. Previous studies have shown that even opposition political parties can spur violence on election days. Thus, this study looks at political leadership as a whole (both ruling elites and the opposition) and not in isolation like the above scholars have done. The study intends to add the findings that will be generated to this existing body of literature.

Commenting on election violence that characterizes the electoral cycles of Kenya, Burchard (2015) points out that politicians in Kenya have used violence to both suppress and mobilize voters. Her findings reveal that in 1992 for example, former Kenyan president, Arap Moi and his party supporters allegedly killed around 1,500 and forced the displacement of approximately 250,000 residents in Rift Valley in order to prevent them from voting for the opposition. Mr Moi won the 1992 elections with 36.4 percent and a margin victory of approximately 500,000 votes (Burchard, 2015). In the lead up to the 2007 elections some residents of the Rift Valley stated that they were told to vote for Raila Odinga or else, with the "else" being interpreted as a veiled threat. The same trend was reported on the Election Day in other parts of the country (Burchard, 2015). Burchard further observes that strategic electoral violence is pre-planned. It is deliberately employed to affect the outcome of an election before and during an election. Thus, it can be used for a multiplicity of electoral purposes including suppressing voter intention, turnout, mobilizing voter support, or disrupting an election altogether. We may agree with Burchard on this part. Her findings are plausible. However, we may suppose that her perspective of 'ethnicity' would not count much in the Zambian context as violence is mainly instigated on party lines. Also, where as she looks at it from the Kenyan political set up, this study will use the Zambian political set up to determine whether or not there is a link between political leadership and violence perpetrated on election days if any.

Amankwaah (2013) observes that rarely the direct perpetrators of violence themselves local MPs are frequently cited as a group that creates space for violence in some remote parts of Ghana

during elections. This group is mostly responsible for organized violence even on Election Day. He adds that these MPs have strong links with national political parties, party youth/youth coordinators and local authorities and the police. His findings further show how these local MPs were very active in working between local constituents or youth, their political party and authorities such as the police to keep some of their "boys" from being charged with a crime (Amankwaah, 2013). Though not very explicit, Amankwaah highlights political leadership in his findings. Local MPs are strategic officials with direct links to top political leadership as he has indicated. His paper therefore forms part of the basis for this study which seeks to explore the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence using the Zambian context. However, whereas he looks at it from the Ghanaian point of view, this study will use the Zambian perspective to make further investigations on this critical presupposition. The findings so generated will be added to this well-grounded body of knowledge.

Sterck (2017) links electoral violence on election days to militant behavior especially by rebel-turned politicians who transform their rebel movements into political parties. Drawing his evidence from Burundi Sterck observes that during voting periods most events involving intimidation relate to threatening of the civilian population to vote for a particular candidate. If they do not vote for such, they risk attacks. For example, on 20th May 2010 in Mutaho Burundi, CNDD – FDD militants armed with spears, machetes and batons walked in front of houses of FNL militants to "terrorize them" (Sterck, 2017). He adds that in other incidences, property belonging to sympathizers of rival parties is deliberately torched so as to send a strong message to the people in affected areas to vote in coerced pattern. This is aimed at coercing the victims into voting out of fear for their future safety and not informed decisions per se.

Sterck is partly right in his findings; political parties with a rebel movement background can indeed perpetrate violence. Research evidence shows how late Jonas Savimbi's men intimidated the electorate to vote for their party UNITA or they would die if the election results showed otherwise. However, it can be argued here that electoral violence is not a preserve of people with militant behavior. Even democratic political leadership has been cited for electoral violence during election days by scholars like Amankwaah (2013) and Burchard (2015) in their studies. In opposition strongholds for example, most voters are deliberately blocked from voting so that the ruling party can eventually win an election. And the same can be reported about some ruling

party supporters, with the trend being extended to voter registration processes. Sterck's findings therefore leave a knowledge gap which has to be explored using the perspective of political leadership. Besides, his studies conducted in Burundi cannot readily be generalized to other countries with different political dispensations altogether.

The Commonwealth Report (2016) raises serious concerns on politically motivated violence that characterized elections recently held in Zambia. The report highlights that most stakeholders indicated that there had been a significant increase in the frequency and intensity of politically-motivated violence ahead of the 2016 elections with some incidents being reported during and after election days. The report highlights that leaders of political parties often traded accusations concerning rigging and instigation of violence before, during and after elections. The Commonwealth report somewhat highlight the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence by observing that the leaders of these parties often traded accusations at each other for systematically orchestrating, sponsoring and instigating violence. However, it is not clear whether or not the cadres from the ruling party were instigated by their political leadership as the report just indicates that leaders of 'these parties often traded accusations at each other for systematically orchestrating, sponsoring and instigating violence.' We may suppose here that the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence is somewhat skewed hence the need to direct research in this perspective. There is also need for future researchers to explore the extent to which the police relate to electoral violence in Zambia as highlighted in the Commonwealth report (2016).

2.5. Post-election Violence

Norris (2012) puts forward a similar argument as Tucker (2007). She maintains that the failure to observe international standards of "electoral integrity" by those in leadership is one of the most important factors contributing to post-election protests and electoral violence in general. She also argues that the probability that electoral manipulation will trigger post-election protests is particularly high in post-authoritarian regimes that have little experience with democratic competition. Norris is right in her observation. Authoritarian or post authoritarian regimes have less respect for rule of law. For example, in 1993, what is often regarded as one of Nigeria's freest and fairest presidential elections was annulled by the then military government headed by General Ibrahim Babangida, thus denying the widely acclaimed winner of the election, Moshood

Abiola, a chance at the presidency (Lewis 1994; Suberu 1993).This resulted in violence and social disruption in the form of strikes, riots and government repression of the press and civil society (Suberu, 1993; Lewis 1994). However, one of the main problems with Norris's empirical analysis is that her main explanatory variable ('electoral integrity') also includes incidences of electoral violence. This is problematic because she is trying to establish the extent to which violations of "electoral integrity" impact the likelihood of electoral violence. Thus, Norris should have used NELDA's measure of post-election protest as her main dependent variable instead of including it in her model as an explanatory variable as observed by Dunaiski (2015). This in itself leaves a knowledge gap that has to be explored.

Using an ACLED based measure of post-election violence and original data on election monitoring in Africa, Daxecker (2012) shows that the presence of reputable international election monitors increases the likelihood of post-election violence if the elections in question were fraudulent. She argues that fraudulent elections monitored by international organizations will be more susceptible to subsequent violence because an independent third-party can reveal fraud more reliably than domestic institutions. Thus, international election monitors can serve as a trigger for violent contestation of election results in the aftermath of fraudulent elections. Although it is true that 'careless' statements attributed to international observers can ignite post-election violence, Daxecker should have done well in her study to emphasize the influence of political leadership as well. The actions of political leadership can trigger post electoral violence as was the case in Kenya in 2007/2008 (Burchard, 2015). In Nigeria the 1993 presidential electionresults were annulled by the then military government headed by Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, thus denying the widely acclaimed winner of the election, Moshood Abiola, a chance at the presidency. This resulted in violence and social disruption in the form of strikes, riots and government repression of the press and civil society (Lewis 1994; Suberu 1993). In Côte d'Ivoire, PEV was triggered by Laurent Gbagbo's, refusal to relinquish power to the rightful winner after the November 2010 presidential election. This led to civil war warranting the United Nations and French military intervention (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

In line with Daxecker's argument, Borzyskowski (2013) maintains that the presence of international monitors and their criticism of fraudulent elections increase the likelihood of post-

election violence. She uses data on electoral violence in Africa gathered by Straus and Taylor (2009) to measure the occurrence and intensity of post-election violence. Borzyskowski criticizes Daxecker's research design for assuming that fraudulent elections are always mechanically translated into negative reports if international monitors are present. However, as Kelley has shown in her book, even reputable international election monitors are often reluctant to criticize fraudulent elections for fear of flaming post-election violence (Kelley, 2012). We may argue here that just as Kelley has observed, most election observers have been reluctant to criticize fraudulent elections for fear of causing post conflict violence.

A good point in case here is Kenya; it is only after the 2017 elections were nullified by the Supreme Court that some election observers like John Kelly apologized to the opposition for having urged them to accept the results of that election (eNCA News, November, 2017). This confirms how observers can be tactical in issuing inflammatory remarks. Besides, we may argue that in countries were political leadership is not privy to violence, even if the reports of external election observers were to indicate the contrary, they would just go to court as has been the case in Zambia (Edward & Wahman, 2016). Thus, while it is true that careless statements and reports from election observers can trigger violence from the losing political parties, it is also fair to bring to the fore the influence of political leadership. We may therefore suppose that the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence is not very pronounced in this endeavor.

Going one step further than Daxecker (2012) and Borzyskowski (2013), Hyde and Marinov (2014) show that the information provided by credible external election observers increases the likelihood and duration of post-election protests when election fraud occurred, and simultaneously discredits 'sole loser' protests when the elections were actually free and fair. Hyde and Marinov (2014) provide empirical evidence for the positive relationship between international election monitors and 'accurate' post-election protests. It may be quite true that the information provided by credible external election observers can increase the likelihood and duration of post-election protests when election fraud occurred because most stakeholders will treat such information which is coming from an independent person as Gospel truth. However, it is also imperative to note that political leadership plays a key role in such. For example, when some international observers had indicated that the 2008 Presidential by election had some

anomalies, late Michael Sata categorically forbade his supporters to protest. He argued that he would not be that patriot that allowed bloodshed over an election (ZEIC, 2011).

Stewart (2009) points out that his extensive studies on what causes violence, have given him the conclusion that in most cases violence is the result of unscrupulous leaders who out of greed for power and resources, exploit their own people into violence on their behalf provoking them with the usual suspects: religion, racism, poverty and fear among others. These findings are in line with the findings of Seifu. Seifu (2012) has observed that during electoral contests, political leaders have used violent methods to sway the electoral process in their favor. Therefore, Stewart's findings and those of Seifu may guide this study which seeks to explore the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence in Zambia.

In his article titled *"The Dangers of Election Violence and Tribalism",* Mwizenge (2016) attributes two factors to pre and post-election violence; tribalism and political parties. He observes that amidst too many provocative allegations and grievances that have been boiling underneath the political surface, the police appear to be powerless in Zambia, and that the leaders of political parties are unwilling to openly condemn and take responsibility where the violence and even some deaths have reportedly occurred due to political election violence and sometimes recklessness caused by some members of their political parties. He further observes that many nations in Africa have experienced tremendous racial and tribal based turmoil violence, deaths and sometimes war due to deeply entrenched racial, tribal and religious differences, citing the Biafra war in Nigeria that lasted from 1967 to 1970. We may find Mwizenge's article with some shortcomings particularly when weighed against the current study. In the first place, he does not clearly link political leadership to violence save for the silence on the part of party leaders. Secondly, he implicates tribalism which he does not substantiate in the Zambian context, hence citing the tribal civil wars in Nigeria and Rwanda. Mwizenge should have also done well by pointing out the many provocative allegations and grievances that have been boiling underneath the political surface including the perpetrators. This in itself leaves a knowledge gap which has to be filled.

In their paper titled *Democracy in Reverse*: *The 2016 General Election in Zambia*, Edward and Wahman (2016) observe that some of the violent demonstrations witnessed in some parts of the

country exhibited by some opposition political parties in some parts of the country could be attributed to the delay in announcing of results by ECZ and unsubstantiated reports circulated by some of their top leaders. They argue that rumors that alleged that some of the top named PF officials and other top ranking State House officials were receiving ballot boxes from Kenneth Kaunda International Airport and transporting them to Mulungushi International Conference Centre for tallying, incensed UPND supporters who quickly concluded that the said group was manipulating the ballot boxes hence resorting to staging spontaneous demonstrations in some parts of the country (Edward and Wahman, 2016). To the extreme, some supporters in Lusaka resorted to impounding any vehicle that they suspected to be illegally ferrying ballot boxes in the as counting of results was under way. This led to clashes with cadres from the ruling party in certain instances (Edward and Wahman, 2016). These findings may therefore form a basis for this study which examines the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence. However, the fact that they do not isolate political leadership leaves a knowledge gap that has to be filled as leadership can either fuel or reduce violence as observed by Lederach (1997).

2.6. Research Gap

As can be evidenced from the literature reviewed above, the studies that have examined electoral violence have not adequately addressed the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence. The few studies that have examined pre-election violence and Election Day violence for example, have largely examined the impact of majoritarian electoral systems (Höglund, 2009; Opitz et al., 2013; Fjelde and Höglund 2015). Others have attributed it to greed and grievance (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier,), ethnicity and tribalism (Fearon &Laitin, 2003; Wilkinson, 2006; Burchard, 2015; Mwizenge, 2016). Others have implicated all state institutions (Dunaiski, 2015). The few studies that have examined post-election violence on the other hand have largely focused on the impact of external election observers and do not adequately address the question of how political leadership can shape a country's predisposition to experience post-election violence (Daxecker, 2012; Borzyskowski, 2013; Hyde and Marinov, 2014). Other studies have attributed it to failure to observe international standards of 'electoral integrity' (Tucker, 2007; Norris, 2012). Others have implicated all state institutions (Dunaiski, 2015). It is encouraging however, that some studies have indirectly addressed the aspect of political leadership by making attributions to manipulative identity politics (Kaufman 2006; UNDP, 2011; Amankwaah, 2013; Buchard, 2015; Wallsworth, 2015; Edward & Wahman, 2016;

Fischer, 2017). However, the general picture is that these studies have so far not adequately examined the role of political leadership in shaping the country's predisposition to experience electoral violence. This study therefore, aims to fill this gap by systematically examining how political leadership can shape a country's predisposition to experience electoral violence in the country with particular focus on two major political parties.

2.7.   Summary

The above chapter has presented the literature relating to the topic under study. The literature reviewed was relevant to the study in that it acted as a basis upon which that was used in examination of the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence was anchored. In terms of presentation, the chapter started by presenting the theoretical framework that guided this study. Electoral violence was then defined, while at the same time bringing out the differences between electoral violence and other forms of political violence. This was meant to show that this study does not explore political violence in general, but one of its components, electoral violence. Thereafter, the chapter presented the literature on the causes of both pre and post-election violence while bringing out the existing knowledge gaps in the same literature. Lastly, the research gap which necessitated this study is highlighted. It is this same research gap that the study sought to fill. In the next chapter the methodology that was used in this study is presented.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1.   Introduction

This chapter explores the methodology used in this study. The chapter thus addresses the research design, sampling procedures, Population sample as well as sample size. It also addresses instruments used, instruments validation, data collection and analysis. It further addresses data validation and the ethical considerations. Lastly, a summation of what has been addressed in the chapter is presented.

3.2.   Research Design

This study used a descriptive survey design. Orodho (2003) defines descriptive survey as a method of collecting information by interviewing or administering a questionnaire to a sample of individuals. The study used this design because it involved demographic statistics and further concerned itself with the views, insights and opinions of the participants on electoral violence and political leadership. According to Orodho and Kombo (2002) descriptive survey is best suited for collecting information about people's attitudes, opinions, habits, insights or any of the variety of education or social issues. Research has also shown that descriptive surveys usually generate facts because they depict social problems as they exist (Kombo & Tromp, 2016). Kerlinger (1969) elucidates the foregoing by pointing out that descriptive studies are not only restricted to fact findings, but may often result in formulation of important principles of knowledge and solutions to significant problems. The authorities quoted above and indeed my own informed perception were justification enough to use the descriptive survey design in this study.

3.3.   Target Population

The participants for this study were drawn from organizations that were privy to electoral activities and political leadership. As such, participants were drawn from two political parties, five civil society organizations and the Electoral Commission of Zambia. They were also drawn from civic chamber respectively. The study targeted the aforementioned because they were privy to matters relating to elections, political leadership and electoral violence. They thus proved to be pertinent sources of data for this study which sought to examine the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence.

3.4. Sample Size

A sample is a subset of a population selected to participate in the study (Creswell, 2012). This study had a sample size of thirty- two (32) participants. There was an average distribution of two participants from each organization and selected political parties who were at decision making level, two civic leaders and a further distribution of seven (7) supporters from each of the two selected political parties. Thus, the study had six (6) participants from FODEP, CAZ and GEARS; four (4) participants from CCZ and ZCCB; one (1) participant from ECZ; four (4) participants from the two political parties who were senior leaders and two (2) civic leaders respectively. The study also had fourteen (14) party supporters four (4) of whom were youths from the security wings of the two political parties.

3.5. Sampling and Sampling Procedure

Sampling refers to the process of selecting a portion of the population that conforms to a designated set of specifications to be studied (Cresswell, 2012). The study used purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is where the researcher purposely targets a group of participants believed to be relevant and reliable to the study (Kombo & Tromp, 2016). The study used purposive sampling because it targeted participants that were privy to the phenomenon under study. These participants proved to be a rich source of data. Welman and Kruger (1999) consider purposive sampling as the most important kind of non-probability sampling with which to identify primary participants who have profound knowledge on the phenomenon to be researched. As regards the actual purposive sampling technique, the researcher used homogeneous sampling as presented below.

3.5.1. Homogeneous Sampling

Homogeneous sampling is a purposive sampling technique which aims to achieve a homogeneous sample with similar characteristics to describe some particular sub-group in depth (Kombo & Tromp, 2016). The study used homogeneous sampling because the researcher wanted to select certain sites or people who possessed similar characteristics and were privy to the topic under consideration. Homogeneous sampling was therefore used to select participants who were familiar with matters to do with political leadership and electoral violence. The participants were thus drawn from civil society organizations, the civic chamber, ECZ and two political parties. The participants proved to be rich sources of information as they were very privy to the topic and study.

3.6.   Research Instruments

The study used semi-structured questionnaire to obtain primary data from participants. It also used document review to obtain secondary data. On face to face interview, structured questionnaires served as interview guides. The questions that were asked in these interview guides were simple, clear and topic oriented. Besides, the researcher incorporated research assistants who translated questions into *Icibemba* and *Chinyanja* to aid those that did not understand English. As for document review, it involved review of campaign speeches / statements issued by political leaders. These were obtained from newspapers, magazines, reports, and other relevant materials.

3.6.1. Face to face interview

The study used face to face interview to obtain primary data from participants because they proved to be a very effective way of collecting data pre-testing phase. Besides, they are recommended for descriptive surveys. According to Kombo & Tromp (2016) face to face interviews help the researcher to collect data which is factual because participants tend to value the presence of the interviewer. Besides, interviews save researchers on irrelevances as they themselves direct the flow of information (Orodho, 2003). To effectively achieve this, semi-structured questionnaires were used. The questions asked in these semi-structured questionnaires were simple, clear and topic oriented.

3.6.2. Focus Group Discussion

A focus group discussion is a structured group process used to obtain detailed data. It is usually composed of 6 – 8 individuals who share certain characteristics, which are relevant for the study (Kombo and Tromp, 2016). This technique was used on political party supporters who included some youths who had served in the security wings of both the Patriotic Front and UPND. This was meant to obtain their experiences on electoral violence vis-à-vis political leadership. Specifically, this technique helped to unveil how this special group of youths related with their top leaders, the leadership styles of their leaders as well as their leaders' approach to violence. It was further meant to sample out political leaders' campaign messages before, during and after elections.

This approach was vital because it allowed participants to freely share their opinions, perceptions and above all their experiences. The technique also allowed note taking in the likes of head nods,

eye contact between participants and other clues that would indicate level of agreement or otherwise.

3.6.3. Document Analysis

This approach involved review of some political speeches made by political leaders before, during and after elections documented by media houses, credible organizations or scholars that whose work related to the phenomenon under study. For purposes of this study, a systematic analysis of what constituted hate messages and careless statements was conducted to illuminate whether or not political leaders issued statements that had the potential to influence violence before, during and after elections. The data so captured helped in realizing balanced representation of findings during data analysis and presentation. According to Kombo and Tromp (2016) document review gives balance to a researcher's work especially when coupled with interview and a questionnaire. Thus, where some participants tried to protect the interests of their respective organizations by giving false information, the actual published statements and data on electoral violence revealed the contrary. For example, where some respondents indicated that their leaders never issued careless statements which had the potential to influence violence, analysis of some speeches proved otherwise. It showed that leaders from both political parties issued both defamatory and careless statements which had the potential to fuel violence.

3.7.   Validity of Research Instruments

Validity refers to the extent to which the instrument measures what it was designed to measure (Kombo & Tromp). It also implies the degree to which an instrument accurately measures what it intends to measure. Reliability on the other hand, is a measure of how consistent the results from the test are and the validity of the data. Validity helps to insure the quality and a researcher's measurement and of the data collected for the study (Mugenda, 1999). The validity of the research instruments that this study used therefore lied in the fact that they were pilot tested and cross checked in line with the phenomenon which they were intended to measure. This meant modification of the instruments in areas with potential errors.

3.8.   Data collection Procedure

Kombo and Tromp (2016) define collection as the process of finding information for the research problem. It may involve conducting interviews, administering a questionnaire or focus group discussions. The study used interview technique, focus group discussion and document analysis

or check list. Document review was meant for purposes of checking some speeches made by politicians to try and see if they had the potential to influence violence before, during and after elections.

3.8.1. Validity and Reliability of data

Reliability and validity is demonstrated when participants recognize the reported research findings as their own experiences (Maxwell, 2005). To ensure reliability and validity, the researcher employed the following measures: The interviews were recorded and transcriptions were made of each interview for referral adequacy. Some key responses were also recorded on interview sheets. The researcher also made a follow up on certain participants to ascertain whether the transcribed data was a truthful version of their narratives or experiences. Besides, three methods of collecting data were used. Research has shown that multiple methods of data collection validate research work. A combination of methods further ensures removal of inconsistencies thereby realizing valid and reliable data (Patton, 1990).

3.9. Data analysis

Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 9) define data analysis as the "Systematic procedures to identify essential features and relationships." It is thus a way of transforming data collected through thorough interpretation. According to Kombo and Tromp (2016) data analysis refers to examining what has been collected in a survey or experiment and making deductions and inferences. As regards the actual approaches of data analysis, this study used thematic analysis and SPSS.

3.9.1. Thematic Analysis

Braun and Clarke (2006:79) define thematic analysis as "A method for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns within data." They add that the approach emphasizes pinpointing, examining and recording patterns or themes in the data. Thus, this approach is best suited for this study because it involves generation of themes from interview data. According to Braun and Clarke (2013) thematic analysis is perfect for both novice and expert qualitative researchers because the steps involved in it are easy to follow but rigorous enough to generate meaningful findings from the data.

Thus, qualitative data from interviews and focus group discussion was collected, transcribed and coded into themes and sub themes that emerged through narrative analysis. This was carefully

done by listening to the recorded conversations in order to interpret, reduce and code key responses into major and sub-themes that emerged for later discussion. This was done in light with the research questions at hand. Some responses were also isolated to be used as original quotes for verbatim, to highlight important findings of the study. This strategy was applied to both data generated from face to face interviews and focus group discussion.

3.10. Ethical Considerations

Ethics refer to the quality of research procedures, with regard to their adherence to professional, legal and social obligations to the research participants (Maxwell, 2005). The study took into account pertinent ethical considerations like clearance from the University, anonymity, privacy, courtesy and academic usage of data collected. It also took into account non-inclusion of the researcher's opinions. According to Kombo and Tromp (2016) researchers should maintain integrity, anonymity, privacy and honesty in data collection, analysis and presentation processes. Thus, anonymity of the participants and indeed their privacy was given utmost regard. Also, the data obtained from the participants was solely used for academic purposes. Additionally, courtesy was extended to the participants as in respecting their views, routine, work culture, schedules and appointments. Furthermore, objectivity was adhered to in data collection, analysis and presentation processes.

3.11. Summary

The chapter discussed the descriptive survey design and outlined the procedure to its application. The study used a descriptive survey design because it involved gathering of demographic data, views, opinions and insights from participants. Presentation of such data did not only involve description but also quantification because of the statistics that were generated. The chapter has also presented methodological approaches that were used in the study. These included face to face interview, focus group discussion and document analysis. The study used face to face interview and focus group discussion because they were an effective way of obtaining first-hand information from participants as they attached emotions, feelings, beliefs and actual experiences to their narrations. Additionally, the chapter has presented the sampling procedure, the population sample, the sample size as well as the mode by which data was analyzed. Lastly, the chapter has presented ethical considerations that informed the study from data collection through to discussion of findings. On the next page findings of the study are presented.

CHAPTER FOUR
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

4.0.   Overview

This chapter presents an overview of the findings of the study. The views so presented were obtained from participants at FODEP, GEARS, CAZ, ECZ, CCZ and ZCCB who were at decision making level. The views were also collected from participants that were drawn from the United Party for National Development and the Patriotic Front. This category of participants included senior leaders and supporters respectively. Thus, the views so presented reflect only the opinions of the participants that formed the sample of this study. The purpose of the study was to examine the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence with a particular focus on the two major political parties.

The study attempted to examine the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence because political leaders are key stakeholders in elections and could be very critical in addressing electoral violence in Zambia. It was therefore imperative to weigh political leadership against electoral violence with the sole purpose of ascertaining whether there was a correlation or not. The study relied much on qualitative modes of data analysis even though demographic data was analyzed quantitatively.

The research questions which guided the study were as follows:

a. What are the leadership styles that that leaders of the two major political parties use in their leadership processes?

b. Can the leadership styles exhibited by the leaders of the two major political parties influence violence before, during or after elections?

c. Do political party leaders of the two major political parties in any way use violence as a strategy for winning elections or overturning election results?

d. Do political party leaders of the major political parties issue statements which have the potential to influence violence before, during or after elections?

4.1.   Presentation of findings on leadership styles that characterized the leadership of the two major political   parties

On the research question that sought to establish the leadership styles that characterized the two major political parties, most participants highlighted a mixture of leadership styles. The most consistently cited styles were autocracy, dictatorship, personalized charismatic and monarchical. The remaining few made reference to democracy and laissez faire while one respondent just indicated that the leadership styles that characterized the two major political parties were a replica of the Kaunda rule. Some of the views are presented below.

4.1.1. Views of participants from FODEP, GEARS, CAZ, CCZ and ZCCB

Almost all the respondents in this category indicated a mixture of leadership styles with the most consistently cited being autocracy, personalized charismatic, dictatorship and monarchical. Others made reference to laissez faire and personalized charismatic and only a few participants made reference to socialized charismatic and democracy. The few participants that highlighted a mixture of charismatic and democracy attributed it to the PF, arguing that it was the only party thus far whose leadership had allowed intra-party elections. Some of their views are presented below:

> *"Well, in Zambia it is some kind of unmoferrous you have dictatorial leadership you have also laissez faire type of leadership where people should do their own way the way they want. You also have democratic leadership and there are also those using autocratic leadership and there are also monarchs among these political parties who are exercising monarch like leadership where the president acts as a chief and no other person should challenge the chief until Jesus comes. Then there are also those who are tolerant and intolerant."* ***(Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018).***

"As for the Patriotic Front they are trying to borrow from leadership types; autocratic, dictatorship, democracy and some monarch kind of arrangement. It is partly a dictator, autocracy….it is just mixed with these elements so to speak but it is not a democracy." ***(Interview with a participant from CAZ, 2018).***

> *"Well as for the UPND their ideology is liberal but I think the practice is that of a monarch where you don't say anything against your leaders within the party so you*

find that people are just there because they are already there, so they cannot really come out in open to say this is not right. So from the outlook it is liberal but in practice, it is a monarch. It is also a party that has failed for a long time to hold intra-party elections… why don't they throw themselves to the public for refreshing their mandate? Why is it that everyone is just appointed at the top there? That kind of arrangement is only exercised in a monarch." **(Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018).**

"In the case of Zambia I think there is a lot of mixing in terms of what kind of leadership is being exhibited. For example, in most political parties we see a lot of dictatorial tendencies where the leader of a political party wants to make decisions regardless of certain structures that are within the political party. Others would embrace the system where they are mixing a bit of dictatorship and autocracy while others would want to use democracy, but I am yet to find a political party in Zambia that purely uses democracy because in most cases it is autocracy and dictatorship." **(Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018).**

*"Well, I think that leadership styles have really not differed from the Kaunda leadership where you have one figure of authority and basically everything revolves around that figure of authority. Yes, we are now in a democratic dispensation but essentially if you look at the leadership styles exhibited whether one is in the ruling party or opposition , there will always be one figure and that figure is almost suggested to be anointed from above to the extent that even dissenting opinion is not allowed especially against this leader."***(Interview with a participant from FODEP, 2018).**

The above presented views demonstrated that in as much as Zambia was in a democratic dispensation, leaders chose to adopt elements which were not democratic. If one was able to lead until the second coming of Jesus as observed by one participant, then that leader did not practice true democracy. Such leaders were also likely to exhibit high levels of intolerance against those that criticized them.

Participants from CCZ and ZCCB also highlighted a mixture of leadership styles with the most consistent being autocracy, dictatorship and monarch. Some of them made reference to democracy as well.

"For me I think they are some kind of too personal, autocratic because we have leaders with too much power. We say we are in a democracy but these political parties are operating like one party systems, there isn't really democracy. For example the UPND… that is more like autocratic; it is really a one man's show…he calls the shots and everyone dances to his tune." **(Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018).**

"As for PF the leadership has demonstrated that it is dictatorial even at national level. Their leader has already declared his eligibility to stand in 2021 and yet the matter is still in court. Can he then tolerate a competitor at party level?" **(Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018).**

"Well, I think there is some sort of mixing, they portray themselves with the semblance of Christianity when in fact they are intolerant and have no regard for the led." **(Interview with a participant from ZCCB, 2018).**

4.1.2. Views of the participant from ECZ

The participant drawn from ECZ could not pin-point the actual leadership styles that characterized the two major political parties studied. However, the participant was quick to point out that most leadership styles were a replica of the Kaunda rule.

"You know, most of the leadership styles that our leaders use are a replica of the Kaunda rule…it is really difficult to pin-point but they are just a replica of the Kaunda rule really." **(Interview with a participant from ECZ, 2018).**

If the foregoing were to go by, it would mean some elements of democracy, autocracy and dictatorship as these are some of the elements that characterized the Kaunda rule as research has suggested. This would resonate with the views of other participants who demonstrated a mixture of leadership styles highlighted above.

4.1.3. Views of senior political leaders and councilors

The respondents in this category had a mudsling approach; they attributed bad leadership styles to their opponents. In line with the question that was under consideration, the participants highlighted autocracy, dictatorship, charismatic and democracy. The participants from the Patriotic Front indicated that they were the only party whose leadership practiced democracy as

evidenced from intra-party elections that the party held. They labeled the UPND as a 'monarch' whose leadership was not only autocratic but also dictatorial. The two participants from UPND also indicated that their party was the only one with a democratic constitution and democratic leadership which even transcended to the grass root structures. They labeled the PF as an autocratic and dictatorial party where the leader owned both the party structures and the followers at large. Some of the participants' views are presented below:

> *"Well, there is democratic leadership like for the UPND where power has been devolved. Even in terms of picking candidates, it has been left to the grassroots like for example the adoption of Charmaine Musonda in Chilanga. Apart from that, there is also autocratic type of leadership. With all bias, I will give you the example of PF where power is central to a particular figure and that figure decides everything."* ***(Interview with a senior UPND leader, 2018).***

"You know, these other political parties like the UPND…UPND from the word go and I have no regret, I think has been very autocratic, dictatorial…and that kind of leadership has cost the growth of that party" ***(Interview with a participant from PF, 2018).***

*"And you see, that thing in UPND where you are worshiping one person as if he is a god is really undemocratic and has to some extent cost them elections."****(Interview with a civic leader from PF, 2018).***

4.1.4. Views of supporters including those from the security wings

Most participants in this category highlighted a mixture of monarch rule, autocracy and dictatorship. Only a few made reference to charismatic and democracy. Thus, some youths who spoke on partisan lines indicated that the top leadership of PF and UPND was democratic and all embracing.

*"I think in Zambia it is not democracy per se because in most cases decisions do not involve us. For instance, we are just told what to do."****(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).***

"Well in most cases leaders don't want to be challenged in these political parties once you do that you will be chased out of the party." ***(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).***

*"Well like our president, he can joke with you dance with you ...and I think he is very charismatic." (**Focus Group Discussion, 2018**).*

*"Most parties are like households you do not really have to question figure heads because those are in authority." (**Focus Group Discussion, 2018**).*

4.2. **Participants' views on whether or not the leadership styles that characterized the two major political parties had the potential to influence violence before, during and after elections**
On the question that sought to establish whether or not the leadership styles that characterized the two major political parties had the potential to influence violence, almost all participants answered in the affirmative. Only a few participants answered on partisan lines and chose to play blame games. Even then, they demonstrated that the leadership styles of their opponents' political parties had the potential to influence violence before, during or after elections. Some of their views are presented below.

4.2.1. **Findings from FODEP, GEARS, CAZ, CCZ and ZCCB**
All the participants in this category indicated that the leadership styles of the two political parties under study had the potential to influence violence. Asked how such leadership styles could influence violence, most participants made reference to intolerance and non-anticipation of electoral defeat by either party. The participants indicated that the top leadership of the two parties exhibited high levels of intolerance and championed character assassination which was a recipe for violence. Below are some of their verbatim:

*"Well, we have some leaders who have not exercised tolerance and said please go out there and defend yourselves…it is panga for panga. That kind of leading will definitely incite followers to go and attack others." (**Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018**).*

*"Most political party leaders have embraced polarized politics and the influence that this has had is that it has divided followers on party lines and they attack one another following the dictates of their leaders."(**Interview with a participant from CAZ, 2018**).*

*"Character assassination is the order of the day from both leaders and cadres. Not long ago we presided over a dispute of name calling in Livingstone the two parties involved were PF and UPND. There was even a fight among cadres, so that is how serious it is my brother."(**Interview with a participant from FODEP, 2018**).*

As for participants from CCZ and ZCCB, they all indicated that the leadership styles of the two political parties under study had the potential to influence violence. Asked how leadership styles of the two major political parties could influence violence in electoral cycles, all the participants consistently cited intolerance, character assassination and non-anticipation of electoral defeat by the top leadership.

> *"Yes, the implication that leadership has is that you will have followers who regard their leaders as semi-gods. So whatever a leader says is taken as gospel truth... so there comes a time when such leaders just issue careless statements and their followers fight. I mean we have seen this on several occasions."*(**Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018**).

"For me, the major challenge is that leadership from both political parties has demonstrated that it is not ready to tolerate...because all this violence we are seeing is as a result of leadership failure which has embraced intolerance." (**Interview with a participant from ZCCB, 2018**).

"You cannot have people who do not anticipate defeat in an election that is why there is so much fighting among cadres because these are used by leaders to achieve their goals. There is no room for losing really."(**Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018**).

4.2.2. Views of the participant from ECZ

The participant drawn from ECZ also indicated that the leadership styles that characterized the two major political parties had the potential to influence violence. Asked how that could be, the respondent brought to the fore critical aspects similar to those of participants from civil society organizations. The participant observed that most leaders from the two parties did not embrace coexistence as they peddled hate speech and intolerance. The respondent also observed that neither of the two camps envisaged electoral defeat thus making the electoral contests very confrontational.

"Really...the levels of intolerance we have gotten to are just something else. Political opponents have now become enemies and that should not be the norm in a democracy."(**Interview with a participant from ECZ, 2018**).

4.2.3. Views of senior political leaders and councilors

All the respondents from top leadership answered in the affirmative but with partisan variations. They each apportioned blame on opponents while painting a somewhat good picture about their party. Asked how the leadership styles that characterized the two political parties under consideration could influence violence, the respondents made reference to intolerance and dictatorial tendencies exhibited by their opponents. To this effect, the participants from UPND indicated that the PF leadership was very autocratic, intolerant and violent. On intolerance, both participants asserted that anyone who never agreed with the PF was an enemy hence fueling violence before during and after elections. The PF leaders interviewed also had a similar approach. Asked how such leadership could influence violence, the participants indicated that in as much as the PF had been implicated in violence, it was in retaliation against the UPND's aggressive behavior.

"All this violence we are seeing is because of UPND. Its leadership is dictatorial and autocratic. They send thugs to attack innocent people and in most cases, the PF acts out of retaliation." **(Interview with a PF official, 2018)**

"I can confirm that the PF is the most violent and intolerant party. The way they suppress their own people in the party is the way they want to cow every member into worshipping them. If you do not agree with them, you are gone." **(Interview with a UPND official, 2018).**

> *"You know, there is just this tension that is created just because of the stance that a particular leader has taken may be against a particular party and the followers are ready to execute his orders regardless of the place or time. I mean, we saw what happened at the courts where our friend had his clothing badly torn."* **(Interview with a PF official, 2018).**

Civic leaders interviewed also acknowledged that the leadership styles in both parties had the potential to influence violence. However, they did so with variations. The participant drawn from PF indicated that the violence that the country witnessed before, during and after elections was orchestrated by the UPND which had embraced militant behavior with the view of usurping power from the PF. Asked why there were media reports of the two parties clashing the participant attributed the blame to the UPND's top leadership. The civic leader drawn from the

UPND had a similar approach too. He labeled the PF as a very violent and intolerant party that gave no space for freedom of assembly to both citizens and the UPND structures.

*"Our party is very democratic and all-embracing because our president preaches peace and unity while those in opposition are peddling hate and name calling. It is their irresponsible and militant behavior that fuels violence during elections."***(Interview with a PF civic leader, 2018**)

> *"You see, PF leadership is synonymous with violence; its founder was a violent leader, he orchestrated a bloody fracas in Chawama constituency in 2001 to prevent the election of Geoffrey Samukonga of FDD. The current leadership is not different either, maybe it's even worse off because they sponsor cadres to beat innocent citizens."***(Interview with a civic leader from UPND, September, 2018).**

4.2.4. Views of political party supporters

Almost all the participants in this category acknowledged that that leadership styles in both parties had the potential to influence violence before, during or after elections. Only a few endeavored to speak on partisan lines and chose to defend their parties. When asked further during the flow of the focus group discussion, they also demonstrated that the leadership styles had the potential to influence violence. Asked about how they related with their superiors in their respective political parties for instance, those from the security wings demonstrated that they were mostly instructed to carry out operations by their superiors.

*"We just take orders that go and defend the party. You can't be quiet when your father is being insulted…so it's about defending the party and our leaders"***(Focus Group Discussion, 2018)**

*"There is no debate really because our role ends at mobilization so we just have to do that. Most of our colleagues are just called, bought beer and food and later commanded to go and fix certain elements…so it is from bosses." ***(Focus Group Discussion, 2018)**

*"They just influence us youths to fight. They know we have no power to say no so they take advantage. You will see violence will end once the two leaders resolve their differences… I know what I am talking about." ***(Focus Group Discussion, 2018)**

*"Honestly, how does a leader train youths as militias in his own backyard? That is the starting point of violence during elections. Our leaders should sober up." (**Focus Group Discussion, 2018**)*

4.3. Participants' views on whether or not political leaders issued defamatory or careless statements which had the potential to influence violence before, during or after elections

On the question that sought to establish whether or not political leaders issued statements or made speeches that could influence violence, all the participants answered in the affirmative. However, top leaders, civic leaders and a few supporters embraced partisan variations while the rest of the participants did not as shown below.

4.3.1. Findings drawn from FODEP, GEARS, CAZ, CCZ and ZCCB

All the participants in this category indicated that political leaders from the two major political parties had peddled hate speech. Asked to cite some of the careless statements or speeches that had the potential to influence violence, respondents gave an array of examples some of which are presented below:

*"We have had cases where leaders have been called kabotolo, freemason, drunkard, thief and so on and so forth. This has the potential to incite the followers to rise against those perpetrating such."(**Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018**).*

*"There have been cases where leaders have indicated that they will go for their opponents' throat; this can be misunderstood by leaders and supporters of the other party and they can clash." (**Interview with a participant from CAZ, 2018**).*

*"Yes, there have been instances of name calling… freemason, Satanist, drunkard, thief and so forth and so forth."(**Interview with a participant from FODEP, 2018**).*

*"Oh yes, several of them: panga for panga, I'll go for your throat, drunkard, vodka and many more." (**Interview with a participant from FODEP, 2018**).*

*"Yeah…they are a lot in fact, If HH refuses to accept defeat he will see what I will do to him, drunkard, sicklier and others." (**Interview with a participant from CAZ, 2018**).*

Asked how such statements could influence violence before, during and after elections, the respondent observed that leaders in these political parties were regarded as figure heads so

anything bad targeted at them would attract the attention of their followers who are to even shed blood and this could lead to clashes.

Participants from CCZ and ZCCB also answered in the affirmative. They all indicated that political leaders issued statements or made speeches that had the potential to influence violence. Asked to sample out some of the statements or speeches that had the potential to influence violence, the most consistent were as presented below:

"Yes… HH is a freemason, Kalusa, Satanist, under five and so forth and so forth." (Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018).

"Yes, statements like I will go for your throat, sicklier, thief, drunkard." (Interview with a participant from ZCCB, 2018).

"Yes, there have been instances of name calling… freemason, Satanist, drunkard, thief and so forth and so forth."(Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018).

"There shall be Armageddon if I lose these elections. We shall not accept electoral defeat because we are winning these elections"(Interview with a participant from ZCCB, 2018).

Asked how such statements could influence violence before, during and after elections, the respondents observed that whatever leaders said in these political parties was considered as gospel truth and could easily incite followers to react to such, a move that could lead to clashes.

4.3.2. Views of the participant drawn from ECZ
The participant drawn from ECZ also indicated that the leadership from the two political parties often than not traded defamatory speech against each other if not issuance of careless statements. Asked to cite some of the statements the respondent brought to the fore the following;

"HH is an under five, HH is a freemason, I'll go for your throat, we shall not accept electoral defeat because we are winning these elections, If HH refuses to accept defeat he will see what I will do to him and panga for panga among others."

Asked how such statements could influence violence before, during and after elections, the respondent observed that whatever leaders said in these political parties was considered as gospel truth and could easily incite followers to react to such.

4.3.3. Findings from political leaders and civic leaders

All the participants in this category indicated that political leaders were in the habit of issuing hate speech before, during and after elections. However, the respondents took partisan stances in their explanation, blaming opponents for hate speech while shielding their party. Thus when asked to cite instances where political leaders had issued hate speech, each of them never highlighted the hate speech or careless statements that were made by their political opponents. The most consistent were those highlighted above.

"You see, it is quite sad…calling the head of state drunkard, thief, sicklier, vodka and all sorts of names. It is really unfortunate." **(Interview with a PF councilor, 2018).**

"Yes, careless statements like, 'there shall be Armageddon if I lose these elections.' Honestly, who would love to see Armageddon in this peaceful country? Armageddon is very fearful my brother… its total chaos…and that person wants to be President." **(Interview with a participant from PF, 2018).**

"Yes, yes there are quite a lot… freemason, Kalusa, Satanist, tribalist, Kachema, under five, villager and others." **(Interview with a participant from UPND, 2018).**

As for civic leaders, they both acknowledged that party leaders of the two major political parties peddled hate speech before, during and after elections. However, just like their counterparts they also took partisan stances in their acknowledgement. Thus when asked to cite instances where political leaders had issued hate speech, each of them never highlighted the hate speech or careless statements attributed to leaders in their parties. Each of them instead chose to highlight negative statements issued by their opponents. The most consistent were those highlighted above:

"Yes, yes there are quite a lot… freemason, Kalusa, Satanist, tribalist, Kachema, under five, villager and others." **(Interview with a participant from UPND, 2018).**

"You see… names like drunkard, thief, sicklier, Kabotolo, swindler and all sorts of names. It is as if we are not in a Christian nation" **(Interview with a PF councilor, 2018).**

4.3.4. Findings from political party supporters

All the participants in this category acknowledged that the top leadership of the two major political parties issued statements that had the potential to cause violence before, during and after elections. However, a few participants made their acknowledgement on partisan lines. Only during the course of discussions did they indicate that their leaders issued derogatory statements. Below were some of their views:

"Yes Sir, there are quite a lot; drunkard, thief, sicklier, vodka…."(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).

"As for me I did not like it where our president said that there shall be Armageddon if we lost elections. Some people feared and took us to be very violent people." (Focus Group Discussion, 2018).

"Yes boss, freemason, Kalusa, Satanist, Kachema, villager and others."(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).

"Yes, yes there are quite a lot Sir… freemason, Kalusa, Satanist, tribalist, Kachema, under five, villager and others."(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).

"Oh yes, land grabber, freemason, Satanist, Kalusa etc." (Focus Group Discussion, 2018).

"Meno meno, chakolwa, vodka, kabotolo, thief, swindler….Some are too embarrassing to be mentioned here." (Focus Group Discussion, 2018).

"Chimbwi no plan (hyena without a plan), chipante pante (one without a vision), kabotolo, thief, sicklier and others." (Focus Group Discussion, 2018).

Thus, in as much as other participants wanted to play it to the gallery, they later affirmed that their leaders issued defamatory statements by even citing some examples especially during the flow of the discussion.

4.4. Presentation of findings on whether or not political party leaders used violence as a strategy for winning elections or overturning election results

On the question that sought to establish whether or not violence was used as a strategy for winning elections all the participants interviewed acknowledged that the top leadership from the

two major political parties entertained violence as a strategy for winning elections. However, most participants never indicated that violence was used to overturn election results after elections. The following were some of the consistent views from participants:

4.4.1. Views of participants drawn from FODEP, GEARS, CAZ, CCZ and ZCCB

All the participants in this category indicated that violence was used as a strategy by major political parties. Asked how it was used as a strategy, most participants indicated that party leaders sponsored their youth structures to issue threats, hail verbal abuse and carry out physical attacks on opponents and the electorate before or during elections. Some of the participants indicated that the ruling party even used state institutions like the police to intimidate the opposition. Below are some of the participants' views:

*"Oh yes…what explanation would you give to cadres wanting to bring down a helicopter in Shiwang'andu? That was a planned move by the party in power so that their friends could not campaign in their so called strongholds."(**Interview with a participant from CAZ, 2018**).*

> *"Yes, we have seen political players intimidate their opponents and the electorate using cadres like if you vote for that you will see tomorrow and all that. So you intimidate both the electorate and political opponents and if the opponents do not campaign there it means they will not appeal to a certain group of people so the aggressors will have an upper hand in terms of changing the perception of those voters." (**Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018**)*

> *"Yes, we have had instances where these political parties have sponsored cadres to stifle their opponents. They beat their opponents in their strongholds badly so as to instill fear in them. Even on election days, parties have blocked perceived voters for the rival camp from voting, turning them away at 'screening points' while the police watch helplessly. We see these things first hand in the field and it is very unfortunate." (**Interview with a participant from FODEP, 2018**).*

> *"You see, violence is openly used to stifle opponents in Zambia. In 2016 there were several instances when the police purposefully disrupted rallies staged by opposition political parties, leading to the death of an innocent girl…and also you*

are aware of the famous mapatizya formula which the UPND used in mapatizya."
(Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018).

Asked if violence had been used to overturn election results below were the participants' views:

*"After an election basically violence isn't much there. Well, some threats here and there and those are meant to silence the losers especially but nothing much."***(Interview with a participant from CAZ, 2018).**

*"Not to the best of my knowledge because we have never had such serious cases in Zambia…what normally happens is that those on the losing side will have may be their property burnt, themselves beaten or even mocked"***(Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018).**

"That one is more pronounced in countries like Kenya and Ivory Coast not here in Zambia. Yes we had cases in Southern province where people rioted in 2016 but I think that was more out of frustration than to sway the election result." **(Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018).**

As for the participants drawn from CCZ and ZCCB they all indicated that violence was often than not used a strategy for winning elections by major political parties. Asked how it was used as a strategy, most participants indicated that party leaders sponsored the youth to block potential voters of the rival party from voting. They also indicated that the same youths were instructed to attack political opponents so as to intimidate them.

> *"Yes, those in power use violence to intimidate the opposition and those that support them. The opposition will then have fear to campaign freely and while they are trying to gather courage their opponents would have been miles away campaigning and that disadvantages them."* **(Interview with a participant from ZCCB, 2018).**

> *"Yes, the ruling party uses the police to stifle the opposition. The police selectively pounce on cadres for the opposition and brutalize so as to impart fear in them while leaving the cadres from the ruling party. If you were to ask me, the police have become more like a department for the ruling party in this country."***(Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018).**

Asked whether violence was used as a strategy for overturning election results, the four participants indicated the contrary as well.

4.4.2. Views of the participant from ECZ

The participant from ECZ did not categorically state that violence was used by political leaders as a strategy for winning elections but indicated that it would appear as though that was the case because the attacks appeared to be pre-planned and well-coordinated. Asked to give instances of such and what happened, the respondent's views were as presented below:

"You know… the violent clashes in Namwala and Lusaka districts prior to the 2016 general elections left the ECZ with no option but to suspend campaigns in the two districts. It was really getting out of control."

Asked on challenges that the institution faced in relation to electoral violence, the respondent's views were as follows:

> *"We have had logistical problems….ferrying materials to far flung places, an issue which has raised all sorts of accusations especially state helicopters are used. There have also been challenges in making results known within the stipulated period of time due to unforeseen circumstances and this has raised dust. Also, you cannot rule out political interference during elections, our staff on the ground have been accused falsely and victimized."* **(Interview with a participant from ECZ, 2018).**

From the foregoing it can be deduced that the institution faces logistical challenges. Also of critical consideration is the part of political interference. From the narrative it can be deduced that politicians had done little in fulfilling their obligation of fair play. There is no point in victimizing people entrusted with overseeing electoral processes if one truly believed in democracy and the rules that governed it.

4.4.3. Views of senior political leaders and civic leaders

When asked whether or not violence was used as a strategy for winning elections by political leaders, all the participants in this category answered in the affirmative. Asked how it was used as a strategy, all the participants indicated that party leaders were to a large extent to blame

because they usually sponsored their youth structures to carry out physical attacks on opponents especially before and during elections. Some of their views are as presented below:

> "Yes, like in Chimanja ward, when the PF were satisfied that their people had voted, by 12 hours, vehicles and buses full of cadres arrived at Chimanja polling station. They were firing live ammunition and teargas canisters and all the electorate scampered. Some of them never even went back to vote and those were obvious votes for the UPND which were lost."*(**Interview with a UPND leader, 2018**)*

"So in Chilanga PF cadres just went there and ambushed everyone…took over the operations and control of polling stations and before it was too late results were announced and their leaders were on top of things celebrating the victory." (**Interview with a senior UPND leader, 2018**).

"UPND leadership sent their thugs at St. Patricks polling station in Kabwata….threatened polling assistants and tampered with the ballots with the sole purpose of offsetting the ballots for the incumbent mayor."(**Interview with a senior PF leader at the party secretariat, 2018**).

"Yes violence has been used before as a strategy with which to usurp power. HH and his colleagues incited their people to peddle violence with the view of causing anarchy in the country and later usurp power." (**Interview with a senior PF leader, 2018**).

On whether or not violence was used as a strategy for overturning election results, the participants indicated the contrary. From the views presented, it can be deduced that in as much as the participants in this category tried to show that their political parties never indulged in electoral violence, the general picture created is that they did particularly when put into consideration the going by the examples that were advanced by either side.

As for civic leaders, they also indicated that political leaders often than not used violence as a strategy for winning elections. Asked how it was used as a strategy, they indicated that political leaders mostly influenced the youth to attack their opponents. However, neither of the two participants made reference to the police. Asked to cite instances when such happened the following were some of their views:

*"You see UPND terrorized innocent electorate in mapatizya. They attacked everyone who was not in their political standing....several people were injured in the process if you may recall and they won with a landslide victory."***(Interview with a PF councilor).**

"PF thugs attacked our members and killed one of them in Mtendere in 2016. That was meant to instill fear in all of us. To date, the police have not arrested his killers" **(a UPND councilor).**

The views of the participants in this category demonstrated that both political parties had indulged in electoral violence. The researcher was even challenged in separate interviews to access such records from media houses if he so wished.

4.4.4. Views of political party supporters

All the respondents in this category affirmed that politicians used violence in certain instances to win elections. Focus group discussions with the participants revealed that political leaders influenced the youth especially to fight for their cause. Both PF and UPND youths demonstrated that some leaders had hired or instructed them to beat opponents so as to scare them, if not *'defending'* the party. Some participants who had served in the security wings also revealed that leaders instructed them to disrupt rallies and gatherings staged by their opponents. Below are some of the participants' views:

"In Chilanga, we were told to defend ourselves if attacked by our boss. It was very ideal because it is too much of attacks from PF." **(Group Discussion, with a UPND Supporter, 2018).**

*"Like in Shiwang'andu we chased them like foxes up to Chinsali. They wanted to 'misbehave' in our own backyard...that's what our boss was against at."***(Focus Group Discussion with a PF supporter, 2018).**

*"In Nampundwe, our bosses instructed us to protect our votes from polling assistants who were UPND sympathizers. We were instructed to rough them up so as to instill fear in them."***(Focus Group Discussion with a PF supporter, 2018).**

*"In Matero,our team was told to defend itself from attacks because if it failed to do so, it would not campaign."***(Focus Group Discussion with a UPND supporter, 2018)**

*"They just buy the youth tujili jili (banned sachet brand) and tell them to attack opponents especially in their strongholds."***(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).**

The views given above demonstrated that political leaders used violence as a strategy for winning elections and did little to inculcate democratic values in the youth. Sanctioning an attack to a youth who is ready to please his pay masters could have severe bearings on the nation during electoral periods. Asked why they could not refuse to carry out attacks, most youths indicated that they had to survive. One of the youths who had served in the security wing indicated that such a move would attract exclusion if not being labeled as an enemy of the party.

*"Like us, if we were to refuse some orders the direct interpretation would be that we are working with the opposition, that's how serious it is. Sometimes I could feel bad but I had to do it."(**Focus Group Discussion, 2018**).*

If such views were to go by, it would suffice to say that politicians incited youths to attack opponents. They did little if any to inculcate values of democracy in them.

4.5.   Presentation of findings from the reviewed documents (media search)

This section presents some of the derogatory or careless statements attributed to the leadership of both the Patriotic Front and the UPND. The excerpts were extracted from some of the documents that were reviewed during the course of this study. These were statements which were thought to have the potential to influence violence during electoral cycles. With regard to presentation the section starts with the excerpts from the FODEP and Commonwealth Reports and ends with the excerpts extracted from newspapers. As for excerpts from FODEP and the Commonwealth reports they do not attribute derogatory statements to specific individuals but the party as a whole. Thus, only excerpts extracted from newspapers have individual leader attributions. Lastly the section shows that the extracted statements which leaders issued during electoral cycles had the potential to fuel violence among supporters.

4.5.1. Use of defamatory language as depicted in the FODEP final Report of 2015

> *"FODEP monitors noted the use of defamatory language by political party officials from both the opposition and the ruling party which was considerably prevalent during the campaign period. Of particular importance was the frequent use of such defamatory statements as "vodka" by party campaigners of UPND and to a lesser extent, the FDD in reference to the PF candidate Edgar Lungu, whom they frequently depicted as one addicted to excessive beer drinking habit." (FODEP Final Report 2015:18)*

"On the other hand, those in the ruling party frequently used the term 'Satanist or 'freemason' to depict the UPND candidate Hakainde Hichilema as a person of detestable character that was incompatible with the value of Zambia as a Christian nation, and with the intention of making him detestable in the minds of the electorate. A prominent religious leader was even prominently covered in the media projecting such at a PF rally in Kabwe. UPND leader also suffered accusations that he was running a regional and tribal party from PF supporters." (FODEP Final Report of 2015: 18).

4.5.2. Use of hate speech and careless statements as depicted in Newspapers (2011- 2018)

"We have seen the opposition inciting members to attack investors but as youths we say no. We don't want them to dare us, "If things continue we are ready to effect citizens' arrests on those inciting violence in the province. We know what Mr HH has done to the people of Zambia. We will make Copper belt a no go area for Mr HH and his party." (Cobber belt Youth PF Chairperson quoted in The Mast November 4, 2018).

"I am here to tell you that this time around it is 'panga for panga '(machete for machete). Where someone cuts your ear, cut off there as well because even the Bible teaches us to retaliate. So you should do the same." (UPND Vice President Mr Mwamba quoted in the Daily Nation on May 4, 2018).

In the first quote, the PF youth chairperson was presenting a petition to the provincial Permanent Secretary on the Copper belt against Mr Hichilema over the remarks that the latter had made concerning the alleged sale of ZAFFICO. In the second quote, the vice UPND leader was said to be addressing supporters in Chilanga when he and the president of UPND had gone to drum up support for their parliamentary candidate in the Chilanga by election.

"We will not accept the results if we lose these elections." (UPND President, quoted in The Post [in Liquidation] in 2016).

"There shall be Armageddon if we lose these elections." (UPND President, quoted in The Post [in Liquidation] in 2016).

"If HH refuses to accept election results he will see what I will do to him." (The head of state quoted in The Post [in liquidation], 2016).

In the third quote, the head of state is said to have been referring to Mr Hichilema's insistence that he would not accept the election result if he lost in the August 11, 2016 general elections.

"I will fall on you and crash you like a ton of bricks." (The head of state referring to the then Editor in Chief of The Post newspaper, quoted in The Post [in liquidation], 2016).

> *"We cannot boycott the coming elections and leave the country in the hands of a drunkard whose pre-occupation is socializing and going to nightclubs. The Presidency cannot be left to a reckless person like Edgar Lungu who only enjoys socializing and going to night clubs. It is common knowledge that Lungu is adrunkard, and we are not going to boycott the elections so that the country remains in his hands." (The UPND President quoted in The Post [in liquidation] on May 8, 2016pg. 4).*

In this case, the UPND leader was making reference to the statement where the head of state is alleged to have suggested that if the opposition were not ready to accept the decision of having the ballot papers to be printed by a named company on the premise of rigging, then they would do well not contest.

"Don't sit idle, if attacked, defend yourselves. It will not help you to sit idle while they are attacking you, you have to defend yourselves." (The UPND vice President Mr Mwamba quoted in The Post [in liquidation], May 10 2016 pg. 4).

In this case the UPND vice president said to have been referring to an incident where PF cadres attacked UPND members who were holding a youth meeting in Matero on 8th May, 2016.

"They are a 'bit mad' why do they always have to criticize me for undertaking international trips." (The head of state quoted in The Post [in liquidation], 2016).

In this case, the President is said to have been referring to the two top leaders in UPND. He is said to have argued that when Mr Sata (late) never travelled, the same leaders criticized him. Again when he himself undertook international trips they criticized him.

"Let Mulenga Sata go to UPND, he is not a factor. He does not even have a Grade 12 certificate. In fact, he was a dog seller before he was offered a job in government." (The PF Deputy Secretary General quoted in The Post [in liquidation] on May 10, 2016 pg. 8 issue no. 7144).

In this case the Honorable PF deputy secretary general was referring to the above named leader who had reportedly defected to UPND at the time.

> *"If at all they will ever be in power, may be a 100 years from now, not in my generation, may be a 100 years from now. They are polygamous by nature, so may be as they have more children, they can be in power but not under the leadership of Hichilema. I don't think it will happen. And the way they show hate towards other tribes, it is unbelievable. They can commit genocide and I don't think we can give chance to Hichilema to ever rule this country. That is why I said if I had the powers myself, I would ban it completely not to participate in the political life of this country, but I don't have those powers…" (The former PF Secretary General Hon. Mr Davies Chama quoted in Lusakatimes.com on June 22, 2015).*

Whatever behavior that the UPND had exhibited, such foul language was not befitting especially that it came from a very key figure in the party. Informed leadership etiquette would have demanded for better terms and not the foul language highlighted above.

"Even if we don't reconcile with those chiefs, what do we get from them because they still don't vote for us?" (Honorable Jean Kapata quoted in The Post [in liquidation] on July 22, 2015 pg. 9).

In this case, the Honorable Minister is said to have been referring to the Tonga speaking chiefs in Southern province who demanded that they could only dialogue with the head of state if he fired Mr Chama who at the time had not yet rendered an apology over his alleged tribal remarks.

"Some people are very bitter for having been losing elections…they complain and we are listening… but he who shows no gratitude is a dog because it is clear." (The head of state quoted in The Post [in liquidation] on July 22, 2015).

In this case the head of state is said to have been referring to the UPND and its supporters. This was at Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula airport after the chiefs had refused to dialogue with him on account that the PF Secretary General at the time had not apologized over his alleged tribal remarks and the president had done nothing to him.

"HH is a freemason, a Satanist." (Bishop Chomba quoted in the Daily Nation, 2015).

In this case, the named clergy is said to have made the above remarks at a PF rally in Kabwe in the presence of senior leaders of the party. It is good to note that the acting President then, Dr Guy Scott had apologized. However, there was no need to utter such sentiments at a public rally as such could influence violence among the supporters of the affected party.

"Rupiah is a very bad leader who is vindictive, undemocratic and harbors hatred against me." (Honorable Masebo quoted in The Post [in liquidation], July 12, 2011).

In this case the honorable is said to have been referring to how the head of state at the time had maligned her when he confided with close associates. Again, whatever the differences the two had, leadership would have demanded better selection of words. Such utterances could easily attract retaliation from lower structures especially that held their leader in high esteem.

"It will be immoral for Luapula to vote Rupiah." (The late Luapula PF Chairperson Mr Sakeni quoted in The Post [in liquidation], August 21, 2011).

The former chairperson (late)is said to have spoken in line with the perceived underdevelopment in the province at the time. However, leadership etiquette demanded that he finds a civil way of convincing voters not to vote for the MMD at the time as such sentiments could be misinterpreted by the then ruling party officials and their members.

4.6.   Summary

The chapter has presented the findings from the participants in line with the research questions. The research questions under consideration included whether or not the leadership styles of political leaders had the potential to influence violence, whether or not political leaders issued statements that had potential to influence violence and whether or not political leaders of the two political parties used violence as a strategy for winning elections. The chapter has also presented some of the statements that leaders from the two political parties had issued or made between

2011 and 2018. On the check list of some speeches attributed to political leaders, the chapter has shown that in as much as political leaders claimed that they were democratic and peace loving, they also issued defamatory statements which had the potential to influence violence before, during and after elections. The next chapter discusses the findings presented in chapter four.

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

5.0.   Overview

Chapter four has presented the findings of the study on the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence. This chapter therefore advances a detailed discussion of the findings presented in chapter four. The flow of the discussion is guided by the objectives so as to actualize the main purpose of the study. The discussion therefore takes the form of themes guided by the objectives.

5.1.   Leadership styles used by political leaders of the two major political parties

On the objective that sought to establish the leadership styles that characterized the two major political parties, most participants indicated a mixture of leadership styles. The most consistently cited styles were autocracy, monarch and dictatorship. Only a few participants made reference to laissez faire, democracy and charismatic leadership. The general picture therefore, demonstrated that political leadership had done little to embrace the tenets of democracy save for the most consistently cited styles which would do little to influence for the positive before, during and after elections.

> *"Well, in Zambia it is some kind of unmoferrous you have dictatorial leadership you have also laissez faire type of leadership the I don't care type where people should do their own way the way they want. You also have democratic leadership and those using autocratic leadership. There are also monarchs among these political parties who are exercising monarch like leadership where the president acts as a chief and no other person should challenge the chief until Jesus comes. Then there are also those who are tolerant and intolerant."* ***(Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018).***

> *"For me I think they are some kind of too personal, autocratic…because we have leaders with too much power…we say we are in a democracy but these political parties are operating like one party systems there isn't really democracy. "For example the UPND that is more like autocratic, it is really a one man's show…he calls the shots and everyone dances to his tune."**(Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018).***

"The leadership styles characterizing the major political parties today are just a replica of the Kaunda rule" (**Interview with a participant from ECZ, 2018**).

"I think in Zambia it is not democracy per se because in most cases decisions do not involve us…we are just told what to do." (**Focus Group Discussion, 2018**).

> *"For me I think they are some kind of too personal, autocratic…because we have leaders with too much power. We say we are in a democracy but these political parties are operating like one party systems there isn't really democracy. "For example the UPND that is more like autocratic, it is really a one man's show…he calls the shots and everyone dances to his tune."* (**Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018**).

"As for PF the leadership it has demonstrated that it is dictatorial. Even at national level…their leader has already declared his eligibility to stand in 2021 and yet the matter is still in court… can he then tolerate a competitor at party level?" (**Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018**).

"As for PF the leadership has demonstrated that it is dictatorial even at national level…their leader has already declared his eligibility to stand in 2021 and yet the matter is still in court… can he then tolerate a competitor at party level?" (**Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018**).

"Well, I think there is some sort of mixing, they portray themselves with the semblance of Christianity when in fact they are intolerant and have no regard for the led." (**Interview with a participant from ZCCB, 2018**).

"The leadership styles characterizing the major political parties today are just a replica of the Kaunda rule" (**Interview with a participant from ECZ, 2018**).

Focus Group Discussion revealed similar trends too. In as much as some respondents tried to defend their party legacies, the consistent responses from most respondents indicated the contrary. They brought to the fore elements of autocracy and dictatorship.

*"I think in Zambia it is not democracy per se because in most cases decisions do not involve us for instance we are just told what to do." **(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).***

*"Well in most cases leaders don't want to be challenged in these political parties once you do that you will be chased out of the party." **(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).***

*"Well like our president, he can joke with you dance with you ...and I think he is very charismatic." **(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).***

*"Most parties are like households you do not really have to question figure heads because those they are in authority." **(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).***

The above caped views from participants demonstrated that in as much as leaders of political parties claimed that they were democratic and tolerant, it would appear as though in practice they borrowed a lot from autocracy and dictatorship as observed by most participants. This is unfortunate because high levels of intolerance that characterizes dictatorship and autocracy for instance, had the potential to fuel violence within political parties and the electoral space at large.

Some respondents made reference to democracy and charismatic leadership. Political leaders and councilors interviewed indicated that their political parties were democratic and charismatic to some extent. However, it would appear as though that was not the correct position. Respondents from within their parties and indeed many others indicated the contrary. For example, where leaders of the Patriotic Front demonstrated that their party was democratic, focus group discussion revealed the contrary.

"Mr Kambwili was chucked out for wanting to challenge our president. Again, plans are under way to expel another leader who has openly declared his interest to challenge the president at the convention." (Focus Group Discussion, 2018).

"The UPND can only be led by Tonga. The wife to the late Mazoka made the decree and set that precedence." (Interview with a PF leader, 2018).

"You have to be Tonga in order for you to rule UPND. This has always been emphasized by some of our leaders during meetings. (Focus Group Discussion, 2018).

If the foregoing was the kind of democracy that the respondents meant then it was unfortunate. Democracy should cut across the board, starting from top leadership through to the grassroots. What kind of democracy would allow the hounding out of an aspiring candidate who was merely exercising his democratic right?

As for those respondents that made reference to charismatic leadership, it would appear as though they meant personalized charismatic and not the socialized one. Research has shown that a socialized charismatic leader is ready to listen and inspire others for leadership (Ligon et.al, 2013). So, if others are blocked from challenging the leader then that ceases to be socialized charismatic but personalized instead which has proven to be a recipe for violence both within and outside organizations (Ligon et.al, 2013).Ligon et.al (2013) further observes that personalized charismatic leaders would tolerate even lawlessness from the structures that they led provided that would assure enhancement of their personal goals. This was perhaps demonstrated in the time of Mr Sata where supporters violently demonstrated against a named former Secretary General before he was relieved of his position. Furthermore, the other picture portrayed was that of laissez fare. A check on the speeches issued by some political leaders showed that they made careless statements which never attracted penalties from the top leaders. This kind of arrangement would be interpreted as typical laissez faire and not democracy.

"We know what Mr HH has done to the people of Zambia. We will make Copper belt a no go area for Mr HH and his party." (Cobber belt Youth PF Chairperson quoted in The Mast November 4, 2018).

"I am here to tell you that this time around it is 'panga for panga '(machete for machete). Where someone cuts your ear, cut off there as well because even the Bible teaches us to retaliate. So you should do the same." (UPND Vice President Mr Mwamba quoted in the Daily Nation on May 4, 2018).

"Even if we don't reconcile with those chiefs, what do we get from them because they still don't vote for us?" (Honorable Jean Kapata quoted in The Post [in liquidation] on July 22, 2015 pg. 9).

"HH is a freemason, a Satanist." (Bishop Chomba quoted in the Daily Nation, 2015).

"FODEP monitors noted the use of defamatory language by political party officials from both the opposition and the ruling party which was considerably prevalent during the campaign period. Of particular importance was the frequent use of such defamatory statements as "vodka" by party campaigners of UPND and to a lesser extent, the FDD in reference to the PF candidate Edgar Lungu, whom they frequently depicted as one addicted to excessive beer drinking habit." (FODEP Final Report 2015:18)

"On the other hand, those in the ruling party frequently used the term 'Satanist or 'freemason' to depict the UPND candidate Hakainde Hichilema as a person of detestable character that was incompatible with the value of Zambia as a Christian nation, and with the intention of making him detestable in the minds of the electorate. A prominent religious leader was even prominently covered in the media projecting such at a PF rally in Kabwe. (FODEP Final Report of 2015: 18).

"Let Mulenga Sata go to UPND, he is not a factor. He does not even have a Grade 12 certificate. In fact, he was a dog seller before he was offered a job in government." (The PF Deputy Secretary General quoted in The Post [in liquidation] on May 10, 2016 pg. 8 issue no. 7144).

Some of the speeches reviewed via media search also demonstrated some tendencies of dictatorship, autocracy and laissez faire:

"And the way they show hate towards other tribes, it is unbelievable. They can commit genocide and I don't think we can give chance to Hichilema to ever rule this country. That is why I said if I had the powers myself, I would ban it (UPND) completely not to participate in the political life of this country, but I don't have those powers…" **(The former PF Secretary General Hon. Mr Davies Chama quoted in Lusakatimes.com on June 22, 2015).**

"If HH refuses to accept election results he will see what I will do to him." (The President quoted in The Post [in liquidation], 2016).

In a democracy, it would not be ideal for a leader or leaders to contemplate the idea of banning other political parties. It would also not be ideal for a leader to out rightly indicate that they would never give chance to the named opposition leader to rule. Additionally, it would not be right to pre-determine the results of an election that has not yet been held like the head of state did by observing that he would deal with the opposition leader if the latter refused to accept election results. As for the two top leaders, it would appear as though they exhibited traits of personalized charismatic leadership and laissez faire for tolerating such sentiments from their juniors. For example, statements like '*panga for panga*'*Kabotolo, Vodka and thief* were all seemingly tolerated by the top because the perpetrators went unpunished.

The views above demonstrated that leaders of the political parties did not out rightly use democracy or charismatic leadership. They borrowed much from autocracy, dictatorship and laissez faire. It should also be noted that the above findings were consistent with the findings generated by previous studies.

Studies that have been done elsewhere have revealed similar trends too. Hoglund (2009) has observed that most leaders in conflict prone societies practiced patron-client type of politics where the led served at the mercy of the rulers. She adds that in some instances, the elite even reach to the extent of incorporating the security wings. Even if Zambia could not be classified as a fragile state yet, Hoglund's findings still appeared consistent with the findings from most respondents in this study as can be observed above. Seifu (2012) also observed that most leaders in Africa exhibited dictatorial tendencies, with the led being viewed as their own subjects. Amankwaah (2013) pointed out that most leaders in Africa liked being the 'Figure Heads'.

Thus, in view of the most consistent responses, it can be concluded that the leadership styles governing the two major political parties were less democratic; where some leaders had portrayed charisma, it would appear that it was the personalized type and not socialized, as tendencies of intolerance were reported by some of their own members and many other respondents. If the most consistent responses were to go by, the general picture would be that the leadership styles of the two major political parties were far from being fully democratic. Even though some senior political leaders, civic leaders and supporters portrayed their parties as democratic, the responses from civil society organizations, faith based organizations and other

participants suggested the contrary. Even the responses from some of the youths from the security wings suggested the contrary too.

5.2. Discussion of findings on whether or not leadership styles of the two major political parties had the potential to influence violence before, during or after elections

On the objective that sought to establish whether or not leadership styles of the two major political parties had the potential to influence violence, almost all the participants in this category indicated that the leadership styles of the two political parties under study had the potential to influence violence. Asked how such leadership styles could influence violence, most participants made reference to intolerance and non-anticipation of electoral defeat by either party. The participants indicated that the top leadership of the two parties exhibited high levels of intolerance and tolerated character assassination, something which was a recipe for violence.

5.2.1. Findings from Participants on how leadership styles influenced violence before elections

Most respondents indicated that in both parties, the leadership was not ready to embrace co-existence as they exhibited high levels of intolerance. This had the potential to trickle down to the supporters that regarded whatever their leaders did and said as gospel truth. Also, most respondents indicated that leaders in the two political parties peddled and tolerated hate speech as opposed to issue based campaigns, a move which had the potential to fuel violence among supporters during electoral cycles.

*" Well, we have some leaders who have not exercised tolerance and said please go out there and defend yourselves ...it is panga for panga. That kind of leadership will definitely incite followers to go and attack others." (**Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018**).*

*"Most political party leaders have embraced polarized politics and the influence that this has had is that it has divided followers on party lines and they attack one another following the dictates of their leaders." (**Interview with a participant from CAZ, 2018**).*

*"Character assassination is the order of the order of the day from both leaders and their cadres. Not long ago we presided over a dispute of name calling in Livingstone. The two parties involved were PF and UPND and there was even a fight among cadres. So that's how serious it is." (**Interview with a participant from FODEP, 2018**).*

"All this violence we are seeing is because of UPND its leadership is dictatorial and autocratic. They send thugs to attack innocent people in most cases the PF acts out of retaliation." **(Interview with a PF official, 2018)**

"I can confirm that the PF is the most violent and intolerant party the way they suppress their own people in the party is the way they want to cow every member into worshipping them if you do not agree with them you are gone." **(Interview with a UPND official, 2018).**

> *"You know there is just this tension that is created just because of the stance that a particular leader has taken may be against a particular party and the followers are ready to execute his orders regardless of the place or time. I mean we saw what happened at the courts where our friend had his clothing badly torn by cadres."* **(Interview with a PF official, 2018).**

The above findings were consistent with the findings of previous studies. According to the Commonwealth Observer Report (2016) there had been reports of political leaders trading insults against each other prior to the 2016 general elections and during elections. Edward and Wahman (2016) also highlighted the same. They argued that name calling and sponsoring of violence was common place in the build up to the 2016 general elections. They further report that on Election Day, some leaders instructed cadres to block voters from voting. This was very unfortunate because such behavior had the potential to influence violence especially where the rival party tried to retaliate. For example, in trying to outsmart the other camp, supporters could end up fighting so as to save their leaders from embarrassment.

In addition, the laissez faire approach to controlling of party structures had negative consequences before and during elections. Some respondents indicated that some incidents of violence were perpetrated in full view of political leaders who made no effort to restrain their cadres. *"In Mtendere PF cadres attacked us with pangas in the presence of their party leaders." (Focus Group Discussion, 2018). "In Matero, both the police and some party leaders watched as PF cadres attacked us. Luckily, we managed to fend them off though not without a fight." (Focus Group Discussion, 2018).* Edward and Wahman (2016) also reported such in their study. They observed that some political leaders showed no signs of restraining their supporters involved in the acts of violence. They observed that in Namwala, a named aspiring candidate incited

supporters to beat her rivals. Mwizenge (2016) observes that the leaders of political parties are unwilling to openly condemn and take responsibility where the violence and even deaths have reportedly occurred due to political election violence or recklessness caused by some members of their political parties.

Leadership in this case could be seen to have an invisible hand in such acts; failure to restrain supporters from engaging in violence could be interpreted by cadres as an endorsement of their bad acts. This could also compel the affected to lose confidence in such leaders and use any means possible to defend themselves. For example, one of the youths from the UPND security wing indicated that they were once attacked by PF cadres in full view of the named leaders in Matero and had to defend themselves when they realized that both the police and the named leaders could not restrain the cadres and guarantee protection.

*"We were having a meeting in Matero when the cadres came in the company of their bosses and started beating us. Both the police and the named leaders just watched from a distance. We had no option but to fight back in self-defense." (**Focus Group Discussion, 2018).***

*"In Monze, we were badly beaten by UPND cadres while some of their leaders just watched…some of our members sustained serious injuries." (**Focus Group Discussion, 2018).***

Perhaps the UPND Vice president summed it up all when he contended that it is in fact leaders who influenced violence among supporters: *"It is us politicians that are perpetrating violence… panga for panga, tribalism and divisions among our people for our selfish motives."* (The Globe, July 6 2018).

If the foregoing were to by, it could be concluded that leadership contributed to violence. The mere fact that they did not bother to restrain their cadres let alone bother to call for police intervention demonstrated that they were also part of the scheme. In this case, leadership failure escalated violence instead of inspiring for the positive. It is in this vein that Achebe (1960) contends that failure of leadership is the root cause of all evil, including violence. Though he made particular reference to the Nigerian set up at the time, the same could be said about leadership styles that tolerated violence in the two major political parties. Ligon et.al (2013) observes that leaders can influence violence or promote peace depending on the leadership characteristics they have nurtured. They observe that, if a leader emphasizes his place in their

organizations like most participants observed, they were likely to fuel or nurture violence in and outside such organizations. Leaders should therefore be tolerant and de-emphasize their places in the structures they lead, share decision-making and sacrifice themselves in the interest of the structures they lead and others (Ligon et.al, 2013). However, the findings have demonstrated that leadership styles in the two major political parties had to a larger extent fueled violence. It can be concluded therefore that leadership there was a link between leadership and violence before elections.

5.2.2. How leadership styles influenced violence during elections

Most respondents indicated that political leaders influenced violence through their defamatory language, blocking of potential voters and intimidation of ECZ officials. On blocking of potential voters, some respondents indicated that some leaders incited cadres to block potential voters for their opponents from voting on election days, a move that sparked retaliation from rival camps.

> *"Yes like in Chimanja ward, the PF took their electorate, camp them in one area and bought them food…hungry lion…. name it. Early in the morning they were taken to the polling station to vote; when they were satisfied that their people had voted, by 12 hours, vehicles and buses full of cadres arrived at Chimanja polling station. They were firing live ammunition and teargas canisters and all the electorate scampered away. Some of them never even went back to vote and those were obvious votes for the UPND which were lost."* **(Interview with a UPND leader, 2018)**

"So, in Chilanga, PF cadres just went there and ambushed everyone. They took over the operations and control of polling stations and before it was too late, results were announced and their leaders were on top of things celebrating the victory." **(Interview with a senior UPND leader, 2018).**

"UPND leadership sent their thugs at St. Patricks polling station in Kabwata….threatened polling assistants and tampered with the ballots with the sole purpose of offsetting the ballots for the incumbent mayor." **(Interview with a senior PF leader at the party secretariat, 2018).**

*"In Nampundwe, our bosses instructed us to protect our votes from polling assistants who were UPND sympathizers….we were instructed to rough them up so as to instill fear in them….in the process, violence spilled over to the rival camp."***(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).**

Of concern also on election days was apprehension about is rigging exhibited by political leaders. Most respondents indicated that since neither party was ready to lose, they did whatever they could do to secure victory, to the extent of even instructing cadres to guard votes using any means possible.

*"UPND leadership sent their thugs at St. Patricks polling station in Kabwata….threatened polling assistants and tampered with the ballots with the sole purpose of offsetting the ballots for the incumbent mayor."***(Interview with a senior PF leader at the party secretariat, 2018).**

*"In Nampundwe, our bosses instructed us to protect our votes from polling assistants who were UPND sympathizers….we were instructed to rough them up so as to instill fear in them….in the process, violence spilled over to the rival camp."***(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).**

"In 2016 UPND cadres caused havoc… they went on rampage pouncing on any vehicle they suspected to be carrying extra ballots meant for rigging elections." **(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).**

Some studies done elsewhere showed a similar pattern too. Fischer (2017) observed that the rigging rhetoric advanced by Mr Trump escalated verbal abuse and *'vote guarding'* on Election Day to the extent that one female voter had to cast her vote twice in Iowa (Fischer, 2017). In their study of the 2016 general elections in Zambia, Edward and Wahman (2016) reported similar findings too. They observed that the rigging rhetoric incensed UPND cadres to pounce on any vehicle that they suspected to be carrying extra ballots in Lusaka district. The findings in the study therefore, demonstrated a link between electoral violence and political leadership.

5.2.3. How leadership styles influenced violence after elections
Most respondents interviewed indicated that neither of the two parties was ready to accept electoral defeat. They also indicated that most acts of violence that the country witnessed after elections were partly grounded in the pre-election phase as well. For example, some respondents indicated that prior to the 2016 general elections the opposition leader categorically stated that he

was not going to accept election results that indicated the contrary. Others indicated that the incumbent had already passed verdict on his counterpart a thing that perhaps annoyed his supporters in Southern province in the 2016 post-election era.

> *"You know, there is nothing wrong with someone exercising his or her democratic right to tell their supporters that they are winning, but it becomes dangerous when a leaders says he is going to win even before elections are have taken place because if things do not go his way obviously his supporters tend to be violent because the leader had already pronounced himself elected."* **(Interview with a participant from FODEP, 2018).**

> *"Also, the aspect of declaring others as sole losers even before an election has taken place has the potential to ignite violence in the post-election era because the supporters of the losing candidate will conclude that the one who had said such words had rigged the election when in fact not. So yes…leaders should exercise virtues of democracy."* **(Interview with a participant from CAZ, 2018).**

Other respondents indicated that accusations of rigging have usually ignited post-election violence not only in Zambia but elsewhere as well.

> *"Like President HH, he categorically stated that the state had stolen his election. Such had the potential to fuel violence. Perhaps this explains some spontaneous demonstrations that we saw in some parts of the country after the 2016 general elections and this happened even during the time of Sata when he was in opposition. In 2008, it took him to restrain his supporters to stop rioting in some parts of copper belt and Lusaka."* **(Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018).**

Of course such an approach to elections would be a recipe for violence in the post-election era. Supporters hold what their leaders say as gospel truth and they would not accept defeat. Edward and Wahman (2016) reported similar findings too. They observed that riots broke out in Namwala and some other parts of Southern Province immediately after it was announced that the UPND had lost elections. They add that this might have had some direct correlation with the earlier behavior portrayed by their leader who never envisaged defeat but victory. Fischer (2017) reported similar findings in his study of the 2016 presidential election in America. He observed

that the rhetoric from Mrs Clinton's camp of rigging incensed her supporters who resorted to both verbal and physical attacks against those perceived to be sympathizers of Mr Trump. Also of serious consideration would be the laissez fare approach. Studies have shown that sometimes leaders have not demonstrated the willingness to condemn their supporters. Mwizenge (2016) observed that leaders of political parties were unwilling to openly condemn and take responsibility where the violence and even deaths had reportedly occurred due to political election violence or recklessness caused by some members of their political parties.

A review of some speeches made by political leaders also showed that leaders issued careless statements that had the potential to incite violence in the post-election era. This was not an indicator of democratic leadership at all:

"We will not accept the results if we lose these elections because as far as we are concerned we are winning."

"There shall be Armageddon if we lose these elections." (UPND President, quoted in The Post [in Liquidation] in 2016).

"Some people are very bitter for having been losing elections…they complain and we are listening… but he who shows no gratitude is a dog because it is clear." (The head of state quoted in The Post [in liquidation] on July 22, 2015).

If the foregoing were to go by, it would appear that leadership styles of political leaders had the potential to influence violence after elections. The findings above demonstrated that leaders had done little to portray exemplary leadership which could influence for the positive. In this way, it could be argued that their leadership styles had an invisible hand in violence as their language before, during and after elections was consistently that of character assassination and defiance. To this effect, even the UPND vice president acknowledged this. *"It is us politicians that are perpetrating violence… panga for panga, tribalism and divisions among our people for our selfish motives."* (The Globe, July 6 2018).

5.3. Whether or not political leaders issued statements that had the potential to influence violence before, during or after elections

On the objective that sought to establish whether or not political leaders issued defamatory statements, all the participants indicated that the top leadership of the two major political parties propagated hate messages during mobilizations and after elections.

5.3.1. Participants views on defamatory and careless statements issued by political leaders and how they could influence violence before elections

"Yes, yes... HH is a freemason, Kalusa, Satanist, under five and so forth and so forth." ***(Interview with a participant from CCZ, 2018).***

"Yes statements like I will go for your throat, sicklier, thief, and swindler." ***(Interview with a participant from ZCCB, 2018).***

Studies done elsewhere revealed a similar trend too. In her study of the causes of violence in the Kenyan electoral cycles, Burchard (2015) observed that during mobilizations, hate messages were emphasized by politicians who mainly used ethnic differences to peddle such. Fischer (2017) observed that in as much as the pre-election violence that characterized the 2016 presidential elections had much to do with socio-economic influences and others, the rhetorical hate from Mr Trump and Mrs Clinton influenced violence among their supporters to a greater extent. Careless statements like *panga for panga* though later retracted, had the potential to influence violence as pointed out by most respondents because some cadres could not configure the fact that their leader meant self-defense or fighting back in retaliation.

"In Chimanja ward, the moment we saw PF thugs advancing, we readied ourselves for a fight. They were lucky they had guns but even then, we managed to beat some of them when they attacked us" ***(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).***

Thus, in such instances, supporters saw no need of seeking police intervention save readying themselves for a fight, a move which escalated violence to say the least. There was need therefore for political leaders to embrace leadership styles that would influence for the positive. Name calling also had negative influence on supporters. Some cadres reported aggressive behavior in retaliation to such:

"They cannot be despising our President that he is a finished patient who would soon die…that's the worst insult of its kind. That is the more reason we beat them in Kafue." (**Focus Group Discussion, 2018**).

In the same vein, a respondent indicated that a named sympathizer of the PF was almost lynched at the Courts because of his continued unproven accusations that Mr Hichilema was a freemason. Also of significance was the respondent who highlighted the fight that ensued in Livingstone as a result of name calling:

> *"Character assassination is the order of the day from both leaders and cadres. Not long ago we presided over a dispute of name calling in Livingstone. The two parties involved were PF and UPND and there was even a fight among cadres. So that's how serious it is."* (**Interview with a participant from FODEP, 2018**).

The quote above suggests that the PF cadres beat their rivals in Livingstone prior to the 2016 general elections because the UPND leaders and their supporters had alleged that the incumbent President was a finished patient that awaited death. If such were to go by, it would follow that there was a correlation between hate speech and the fight that ensued thereafter. There is need therefore for political leaders to desist from practicing politics of hate as whatever they said had a bearing on supporters. This had the potential to cause violence before, during and after elections.

The findings from document analysis also demonstrated that political leaders used defamatory language and issued statements which had the potential to influence violence before elections. Below are some of the sentiments:

"Let Mulenga Sata go to UPND, he is not a factor. He does not even have a Grade 12 certificate. In fact, he was a dog seller before he was offered a job in government." (The PF Deputy Secretary General quoted in The Post [in liquidation] on May 10, 2016 pg. 8 issue no. 7144).

"They are a 'bit mad' why do they always have to criticize me for undertaking international trips." (The head of state quoted in The Post [in liquidation], 2016).

"Don't sit idle, if attacked, defend yourselves…it will not help you to sit idle while they are attacking you, you have to defend yourselves." (The UPND vice President Mr Mwamba quoted in The Post [in liquidation], May 10 2016 pg 4).

"HH is a freemason, a Satanist." (Bishop Chomba quoted in the Daily Nation, 2015).

> *"We cannot boycott the coming elections and leave the country in the hands of a drunkard whose pre-occupation is socializing and going to nightclubs. The Presidency cannot be left to a reckless person like Edgar Lungu who only enjoys socializing and going to night clubs. It is common knowledge that Lungu is a drunkard, and we are not going to boycott the elections so that the country remains in his hands." (**The UPND President quoted in The Post [in liquidation] on May 8, 2016 pg 4).***

5.3.2. How hate messages and careless statements could influence violence on Election Day

According to Dexecker (2012), most of the activities that happen before elections have a huge bearing on election days. This was particularly true when put into consideration the Zambian context as observed by some participants. Continued peddling of rumors of rigging had a direct influence on what transpired on election days. Thus, most participants indicated that accusations of rigging peddled before and during elections have the potential to fuel violence because cadres would take that as gospel truth and get to defend their votes. They observed that perpetual accusations of rigging were a recipe for violence. For example, some respondents indicated that the violence that characterized St Patricks polling station in the Mayoral elections and Nampundwe in the Chilanga by election were partly as a result of apprehension about rigging and other careless statements.

*"UPND leadership sent their thugs at St. Patricks polling station in Kabwata….threatened polling assistants and tampered with the ballots with the sole purpose of offsetting the ballots for the incumbent mayor they were acting upon a rumor."(**Interview with a senior PF leader at the party secretariat, 2018).***

*"In Nampundwe, our bosses instructed us to protect our votes from polling assistants who were UPND sympathizers….we were instructed to rough them up so as to instill fear in them….in the process, violence spilled over to the rival camp."(**Focus Group Discussion, 2018).***

"We cannot have a situation where someone is telling his supporters that Kalusa is losing again. That's why our youths got agitated and fought with PF cadres during the polls in Kasempa and mind you, that is our stronghold."(Interview with a civic leader from UPND, 2018).

Edward and Wahman also reported similar findings from their study of the 2016 general elections. They observed that UPND cadres pounced on any vehicle that they suspected to be carrying extra ballots meant for rigging especially in Lusaka district. Some studies done elsewhere showed a similar pattern too. Fischer (2017), observed that the rigging rhetoric advanced by Mr Trump escalated verbal abuse and *'vote guarding'* on Election Day to the extent that a female voter cast her vote twice in Iowa (Fischer, 2017). The study thus demonstrated that political leaders had an invisible hand in electoral violence. Telling youths who had no formal training in policing to guard votes was a recipe for anarchy. Again, the same youths could not refuse to do so because their leaders owned the party structures and above all, they were their pay masters. It is imperative therefore that political leaders issue well thought after statements that would promote peace, unity, love and reconciliation before and during elections.

5.3.3. How hate speech and careless statements influenced violence after elections
On this one, most respondents indicated that the rigging rhetoric was one of the main catalysts for post-election violence. Some respondents indicated that immediately after it was announced that late Michael Sata had lost the 2008 by election, some cadres, acting upon rumours of rigging peddled by some senior PF members, took to the streets to riot in some parts of Copper belt and Lusaka respectively. It had to take Mr Sata to restrain them from rioting. The same happened in some parts of Southern province after the announcement of the August 2016 general elections. Others observed that hate speech also had a bearing on violence in the post-election period:

"How can someone who has won an election with a questionable margin say some people were bitter for having been losing elections?…. that agitated the UPND leadership and its supporters!" (Interview with a civic leaders from UPND, 2018).

> *"You go on telling your supporters that Kalusa will always be a loser when in fact*
> *you rigged the election…all those false figures that had to be knocked down were a*
> *clear testimony of rigging but then someone goes on to say Kalusa will always be a*
> *loser…that is inciting violence to say the least because you don't expect his*

supporters to fold their hands and watch." **(Interview with a participant from UPND, 2018).**

The findings from document analysis (media search) demonstrated that political leaders used defamatory language and issued statements which had the potential to influence violence after elections. Some of the statements derived from media search are presented below:

"Some people are very bitter for having been losing elections…they complain and we are listening… but he who shows no gratitude is a dog because it is clear." (The President quoted in The Post [in liquidation] on July 22, 2015).

"If HH refuses to accept election results he will see what I will do to him." (The President quoted in The Post [in liquidation], 2016).

"We will not accept the results if we lose these elections." "There shall be Armageddon if we lose these elections." **(UPND President, quoted in The Post [in Liquidation] in 2016).**

"Even if we don't reconcile with those chiefs, what do we get from them because they still don't vote for us?" **(Honorable Jean Kapata quoted in The Post [in liquidation] on July 22, 2015 pg. 9).**

> *"If at all they will ever be in power, may be a 100 years from now, not in my generation, may be a 100 years from now. They are polygamous by nature, so may be as they have more children, they can be in power but not under the leadership of Hichilema. I don't think it will happen." (The former PF Secretary General Hon. Mr Davies Chama quoted in Lusakatimes.com on June 22, 2015).*

In the case where the UPND leader asserted that they would not accept the results if they lost, such statements could have negative consequences if the party lost. Supporters would not welcome such a loss because their leader had already predicted victory in the first place. Lederech (1997) leaders have the capacity to fuel, reduce conflict or promote peace processes by virtue of their high public profile and the influence that they have over their supporters. As such, such statements could incite supporters to riot after an election. On the part where the head of state indicated that, *"Some people are very bitter for having been losing elections…they complain and we are listening…but he who shows no gratitude is a dog because it is clear",*

75

such statements could fuel violence from the aggrieved as they would take that as mockery of the worst kind especially if there were allegations of rigging.

Some studies that have been done elsewhere have revealed a similar trends too. Burchard (2015) observes that the post-election violence that engulfed Kenya in 2007/2008 was ignited on tribal lines by political leaders. Though Kenya's violence was incited on tribal lines, it still gets back to political leadership which was the main stay of this study. Fischer (2017) observes that the rigging rhetoric championed by Mrs Clinton in the 2016 post-election period had influenced violence among her supporters in some parts of the United States of America especially where she had massive support. Also, continued character assassination from both Mr Trump and Mrs Clinton just worsened the situation. The findings in this case demonstrated that political leaders had a hand in electoral violence.

If the above findings were to go by, it would suffice to say that politicians issued statements which had the potential to fuel violence after elections. The onus was upon political leaders therefore to issue statements that would influence for the positive after elections so as to foster peace, love, unity and reconciliation.

5.4. Discussion of findings on whether or not violence was used as a strategy for winning and overturning election results

On the objective that sought to establish whether or not violence was used by politicians for winning elections, all the respondents answered in the affirmative. Asked how it was used as a strategy, most of the respondents indicated that politicians sponsored cadres to attack opponents so as to intimidate them. Some respondents indicated that the ruling party even used the police in such maneuvers. A few others observed that there was also threatening and blocking of potential voters which took the form of *'screening'*. On whether or not violence was used as a strategy for overturning election results, most participants indicated that it was rarely used in Zambia as it would not work. Some respondents instead reported incidents of usage of violence as a strategy for cowing losers into 'accepting' the election results.

5.4.1. Participants' views on how violence was used by political leaders as a strategy for winning elections in the pre-election phase.

Most respondents indicated that during mobilizations, political leaders emphasized hate messages as opposed to issue based campaigns. They also championed name calling. The implication would be that such tarnished the image of the opponent.

"Imagine someone telling voters at a huge rally that our leader is a freemason…who would vote for a freemason in Zambia?"(Focus Group Discussion, 2018)

"They call our leader a careless drunkard, swindler….honestly who would give the instruments of power to a swindler or drunkard? No wonder our boys beat them!" (a PF participant during an interview, 2018).

The above views were consistent with the findings from other studies. Burchard (2015) observed that during mobilizations, hate messages were emphasized by politicians who mainly used ethnic differences to peddle such. This would be aimed at tarnishing the opponent's name in order to sway the potential voters from identifying with such a candidate. Some respondents indicated that the same leaders sponsored youths to disrupt opponents' rallies and other gatherings so that they could not properly appeal to their supporters and the electorate at large.

*"Oh yes …what explanation would you give to cadres wanting to bring down a helicopter in Shiwang'andu? That was a planned move by the party in power so that their friends could not campaign in their so called strongholds." (**Interview with a participant from CAZ, 2018**).*

> *"Yes we have seen political players intimidate their opponents and the electorate using cadres if you vote for that you will see tomorrow…so you intimidate both the electorate and political opponents and if the opponents do not campaign there it means they will not appeal to a certain group of people so the aggressors will have an upper hand in terms of changing the perception of those voters." (**Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018**)*

> *"Yes we have had instances where these political parties have sponsored cadres to stifle their opponents they beat their opponents in their strongholds badly so as to instill fear in them…even on election days, parties have blocked perceived voters for the rival camp from voting, turning them away at 'screening points' while the*

police watch helplessly we see these things first hand in the field and it is very unfortunate." **(Interview with a participant from FODEP, 2018).**

"You see violence is openly used to stifle opponents in Zambia in 2016 there were several instances when the police purposefully disrupted rallies staged by opposition political parties leading to the death of an innocent girl…and also you are aware of the famous mapatizya formula which the UPND used in mapatizya and are still using it in their strongholds." **(Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018).**

Other respondents made similar observations while a focus group discussion with some youths from the two parties' security wings revealed the same too. Some youths from the security wings indicated that leaders sponsored youths to attack political opponents so as to stifle their campaign space.

"Like in Shiwang'andu…we chased them like foxes up to Chinsali…they wanted to 'misbehave' in our own backyard! That's what our boss was against at." *(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).*

Other studies had revealed similar trends too. According to the Commonwealth Observer Report (2016) there had been reports of political leaders orchestrating, sponsoring and instigating violence before and during elections. Kelman et.al (1958) whose theory this study used, also observed that power had the capacity to influence other people through control of resources (rewards and costs, information, etc.) that are desired, valued or needed by others and which make them dependent upon the influencing agent for the satisfaction. Amankwaah (2013) points out that though rarely the direct perpetrators of violence themselves, politicians sponsored youths to attack their opponents. He adds that they are even ready to protect the same youths from being prosecuted, through the networks that they have created. According to Wilkinson (2006) politicians in India incite or suppress ethnic violence depending on whether the support of ethnic minorities is necessary for their electoral success. Research has also shown that politically motivated violence was not uncommon in some Asian countries such as Pakistan, Philippines and Malaysia (UNDP, 2011; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; Daxecker, 2014). Other studies have found that in countries such as Mexico, the Philippines, India and Thailand the electoral process is routinely accompanied by massive organized campaigns of violence and intimidation (Hafner-

Burton et al., 2014; Daxecker, 2014). Thus, if the foregoing were to go by, it would suffice to say that leaders used violence in the pre-election phase as a strategy for winning elections.

5.4.2. How violence was used as a strategy for winning elections on election days.

The most consistent findings on this one were intimidation of voters, intimidation of ECZ officials and blocking of voters from voting altogether. Intimidation of voters was reportedly in two fold; the electorate could either be threatened to vote for a certain preferred candidate by the adversaries or threatened earlier enough not to even turn up at polling stations to vote. If they did, they could be 'screened' and roughed up by unruly cadres. This was said to be more prominent in areas where the adversaries thought were strongholds for their opponents. Ironically, those perceived to be pro adversaries, could be allowed to vote.

> *"Yes, like in Chimanja ward, the PF took their electorate, camp them in one area and bought them food…hungry lion…. name it." "Early in the morning they were taken to the polling station to vote; when they were satisfied that their people had voted by 12 hours, vehicles and buses full of cadres arrived at Chimanja polling station…They were firing live ammunition and teargas canisters and all the electorate scampered…some of them never even went back to vote and those were obvious votes for the UPND which were lost."(**Interview with a UPND leader, 2018**)*

*"UPND leadership sent their thugs at St. Patricks polling station in Kabwata….threatened polling assistants and tampered with the ballots with the sole purpose of offsetting the ballots for the incumbent mayor."(**Interview with a senior PF leader at the party secretariat, 2018**).*

*"In Nampundwe, our bosses instructed us to protect our votes from polling assistants who were UPND sympathizers. We were instructed to rough them up so as to instill fear in them….in the process, violence spilled over to the rival camp."(**Focus Group Discussion, 2018**).*

The other respondent indicated that even monitors from political parties had become victims of electoral violence.

"In Nampundwe, the key leaders within the UPND who were monitoring….one of them was injected with an unknown chemical he fainted and became unconscious. He was rushed to Levy

*Mwanawasa Hospital where he was resuscitated."(**Interview with a senior UPND leader, 2018**).*

The foregoing were also reported by the youths from the security wings during a focus group discussion. Unfortunately, it even extended to polling assistants and other monitors.

*"In Nampundwe, our bosses instructed us to protect our votes from polling assistants who were UPND sympathizers….we were instructed to rough them up so as to instill fear in them."(**Focus Group Discussion, 2018**).*

"In Shiwang'andu, most of our voters were blocked from voting. They were turned away before they could reach the polling stations by PF cadres."(Focus Group Discussion, 2018).

The same was reported about areas like Mapatizya where the UPND is said to have beaten people who were perceived to be sympathizers of other parties before and on Election Day.

> *"In mapatizya, the UPND used violence to win that election. Before elections, they beat up any one who was perceived to be a sympathizer of other political parties. On election day, they made sure they cowed everyone into voting for their candidate and their candidate won with a landslide victory." (**Interview a district Chairperson for FODEP, 2018**).*

The foregoing demonstrated very unfortunate tendencies that needed not to be entertained in a democratic dispensation like that of Zambia. In a democracy, competitors in an electoral contest were expected to embrace one another in even in defeat. But it would appear as though electoral contests were a matter of 'do or die' with intolerance being extended to polling assistants and party monitors as indicated by some participants.

Other studies that have been done elsewhere have revealed similar trends too. Kizera (2009) points out that the electorate in Angola could be threatened with death if the results showed that they had voted for the ruling party in the area controlled by the late rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi. As such, they had no option but to vote for UNITA. In Burundi, Sterck (2017) observed that machete wielding militants threatened and instructed voters to vote for their candidates on election days. Such developments were nowhere near democracy. If someone is threatened with a machete the chances are that they would vote for the aggressors' preferred candidate, not

necessarily out of their own conviction but out of fear. Other studies have found that in countries such as Mexico, the Philippines, India and Thailand the electoral process is routinely accompanied by massive organized campaigns of violence and intimidation (UNDP, 2011; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; Daxecker, 2014). Thus, if the foregoing were to go by, it would suggest that leaders used violence on elections days. It would also suffice to say that political leadership sponsored electoral violence on election days so as to disfranchise their opponents.

5.4.3. Whether or not electoral violence was used by political leaders to overturn election results

On whether or not violence was used as a strategy for overturning election results, most respondents indicated that it was rarely used in Zambia as it would not work. Some of the participants' views were as follows:

"After an election basically violence isn't much there…well some threats here and there and those are meant to silence the losers especially but nothing much."(**Interview with a participant from CAZ, 2018**).

"Not to the best of my knowledge because we have never had such serious cases in Zambia…what normally happens is that those on the losing side will have may be their property burnt, they themselves beaten or even mocked"(**Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018**).

"That one is more pronounced in countries like Kenya and Ivory Coast not here in Zambia. Yes, we had cases in Southern province where people rioted but I think that was more out of frustration than to sway the election result." (**Interview with a participant from GEARS, 2018**).

On the same, some participants indicated that violence was mostly used as a strategy for cowing losers into 'accepting' election results and further instilling fear in them. This surfaced during a focus group discussion with the youth from the security wing.

"Like in Kanyama, our bosses told us to beat up UPND supporters so that they could fear to openly support that party."(**Focus Group Discussion, 2018**).

"We have been instructed to beat anyone wearing UPND regalia in town. Our bosses just want to see PF everywhere." (**Focus Group Discussion, 2018**).

Thus, in as much as some studies like the one done by Burchard (2015) revealed that losing politicians used violence to try and overturn election results, the findings of this study revealed the contrary. However, the study demonstrated that political leaders used violence as a strategy for winning elections. It also revealed that violence was mostly used to intimidate losers of an election, and not necessarily overturning election results as other studies had revealed. Losers had to be mocked, beaten and even have their property burnt so that they start distancing themselves from the losing candidates and accept the results.

5.5.   Summary

This chapter presented the findings on the four objectives highlighted above. It also advanced a discussion of the same findings. On demographic data, the general picture created was that most respondents were males. As regards education, only those respondents that were in management had advanced qualifications while most youths that formed the representative sample for the focus group had very low qualifications. It is encouraging however, that they were a selected few who had Grade 12 certificates while one had a diploma though not yet employed at the time. On the types of leadership that characterized the two major political parties, the general picture was a mixture autocracy, monarch, dictatorship and laissez faire. A few participants made reference to democracy and charismatic leadership but even then, findings from interviews, document review and focus group discussion revealed consistent trends of autocracy, monarch, dictatorship and laissez faire as can be evidenced from the presentation and discussion segments above.

On whether or not leadership styles that characterized the two major political parties had the potential to influence violence during electoral cycles, the general picture was that they were capable of doing so. The most consistent aspects to the foregoing were intolerance, hate messages and non-anticipation of electoral defeat by either party. The youths from the security wings also indicated that the command structures they belonged to were more or less than that of the military. On whether or not political leaders issued careless statements or hate messages, all the respondents answered in the affirmative. They further observed that such had the potential to influence violence before, during and after elections as highlighted above.

On whether or not political party leaders used violence as a strategy for winning elections, all respondents interviewed answered in the affirmative. However, some of the respondents chose to shield their party; they indicated that it was only their opponents that used electoral violence to

their advantage and not them. However, focus group discussion revealed that both parties had used violence to their advantage. The general impression therefore was that political leaders used violence as a strategy for winning elections. The study also revealed that winners of elections used violence as a way of intimidating losers into accepting election results. In the next chapter a conclusion and recommendations are presented.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0.   Overview

This chapter presents the conclusion and recommendations of the study whose main purpose was to examine the nexus between political leadership and electoral violence. The conclusion and recommendations are based on the findings from the study.

6.1.   Conclusion

From the findings of the study, it would suffice to conclude that there is a nexus between political leadership and electoral violence. In as much as leaders of the two major political parties had endeavored to portray themselves as democratic and peace loving, the findings on their leadership styles indicated the contrary to a greater extent. The findings from interviews, document review and focus group discussion revealed styles which were nowhere near the democratic spectrum; autocracy, monarch and dictatorship. Where a few respondents, portrayed their party structures as democratic and charismatic, it would appear as though they did it out of indoctrination and subordination as research findings from the two other research techniques revealed the contrary.

Additionally, the study revealed that to a greater extent, the leadership of the two major political parties had the potential to influence violence because not only did they tolerate violence but also influenced it through background influence over supporters, careless statements and hate speech. In some instances, some leaders were not even ready to condemn violence perpetrated in their full view. These findings were also consistent with those of studies conducted by Mwizenge (2016), Edward and Wahman (2016) and the Commonwealth Observer Report (2016).

Furthermore, the study revealed that political leaders used violence as a strategy for winning elections. Interviews and focus group discussions revealed that political leaders of the two major political parties used violence as a strategy for winning elections before and on election days. They also tolerated violence among their supporters. To this effect, the study revealed that some incidents of violence were perpetrated in full view of some political leaders who showed no signs of restraining the perpetrators. These findings were also consistent with previous studies. Studies done by Amankwaah (2013) and Burchard (2015) have also revealed that though rarely the carriers of violence themselves, political figure heads sponsored youths to fan violence on their behalf. Thus, where some participants in the study observed that it was their opponents that

84

used violence as a political strategy for winning elections, the general findings of the study revealed that both political parties had used violence as a strategy by sponsoring youths, and even use of the police by the ruling party.

All things being equal therefore, it can be concluded that there is a nexus between political leadership and electoral violence as shown by the findings presented in the study which were generated through interviews, document review and focus group discussions.

6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

- Political leaders to seriously condemn violence and adopt democratic leadership styles that would foster peace, love and reconciliation before, during and after elections.
- Political party leaders to refrain from issuing statements which had the potential to cause violence before, during and after elections.
- Political leaders to stop using violence as a strategy for winning elections vis-à-vis cowing losers of an election into accepting the results.
- Political leaders to disband security wings in their respective political parties as they were a machination of violence.
- The youth to be empowered with entrepreneurial skills and be transformed into agents of change and not violence.
- Institutions that oversee elections like ECZ and Police Service to be independent of the three wings of government.
- Continuous democratic education for political leaders, the youth and all stakeholders.

6.3. Suggestions for further Research

The following studies could be carried out:

a. The extent to which the Police Service relates to electoral violence in the Zambia.
b. How political leaders can be made to embrace leadership styles that influence for the positive in their leadership processes.
c. How the youths could be empowered so that they are not used as tools of violence by political leaders.

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RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS, POLITICAL LEADERS AND ECZ OFFICIALS

1. What do you understand by the term electoral violence?

2. In your own understanding, what does the term political leadership mean?

3. What are some of the leadership styles that leaders of the major political parties use in Zambia?

4. Are the leadership styles used by leaders of the major political parties able to influence violence before, during or after elections in Zambia? If yes, explain how. If no, justify your answer.

5. Do political party leaders in any way issue campaign statements or make speeches which have the potential to cause violence before, during or after elections in Zambia? If yes, give examples of such statements and instances. If no, justify your answer.

6. Is violence in any way used as a strategy for winning elections or overturning unwanted election results by political leaders in Zambia? If is yes, explain how. If no, justify your answer.

7. What role do you play (as civil society organisations, political leaders or ECZ officials) in mitigating electoral violence before, during and after elections?

8. What challenges do you face in your quest to mitigate electoral violence?

9. In your view, what alternative strategies do you think would help in mitigating violence before, during or after elections in Zambia?

APPENDIX B: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What is your understanding of the term electoral violence?

2. In your own understanding, what does the term political leadership mean?

3. What are some of the leadership styles that leaders use in your political parties?

4. Are the leadership styles used able to influence violence before, during or after elections? If yes, explain how. If no, justify your answer.

5. What's your role in your political parties? Do you in any way participate in decision making processes?

6. Do political party leaders in any way issue campaign statements or make speeches which have the potential to cause violence before, during or after elections in Zambia? If yes, give examples of such statements and instances. If no, justify your answer.

7. Is violence in any way used as a strategy for winning elections or overturning unwanted election results by political leaders in Zambia?

8. Have you ever been influenced to perpetrate violence by political leaders? If yes, explain when and how. If no, justify your answer.

9. In your view, what alternative strategies do you think would help in mitigating violence before, during or after elections in Zambia?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION