THE AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL 1946-1958;

A FOCUS ON AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND POLITICS IN NORTHERN RHODESIA

by

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ABSTRACT

The British colonialists in Northern Rhodesia, experienced in the discomforting problems arising from the conjunction of 'politically-minded' elites with mass discontent in their colonies, and aware of such embryonic 'middleclass' leadership and mass stirrings in Northern Rhodesia itself during the Second World War and post war years, evolved what had been initially and fundamentally an administrative system of urban(advisory) and rural (Native Authority) councils into a characteristically subtle and flexible political device for the incorporation and containment of the acutal - and potential - modern African political leadership in this country. This pyramid of African councils rising through provincial councils to a peak in the African Representative Council was portrayed as, and actually developed into, an increasingly 'democratic' system - both in order to endow it with an aura of legitimacy as representing the voice of the African population of the country and in order to ensure the incorporation therein of the actual local and national leaders of the African 'politically-minded middleclass'. This strategy was manifestly successful, for , from both the rural and urban bases of this pyramid, the range of men entering and selected upwards by their fellow councillors into the ARC itself was that balance of supposedly 'authentic traditional' and actual 'modern middleclass' leadership elements desired by the colonialists. The Native Authority leaders in the ARC were, however, rather less 'traditional' than the colonialists claimed for, in personal characterisation, they belonged to the same urbanised or 'westernised' educated elite as the non-Native Authority councillors from both urban and rural areas. In terms of both educational and occupational criteria, the African Representative Council membership in fact actually consisted solidly of 'modern middleclass elements'. These 'modern middleclass' elements in turn, however, proved to be nothing other than petty-bourgeoise and aspirant bourgeoise 'born out of' and shaped (or reshaped) by the colonial capitalist system, and fully oriented towards and striving for a higher and unfettered place in that system, politically

socially and economically. The emergent class character and bourgeois orientation of the ARC men was, what is more, thoroughly representative of that of African political leadership in general in Northern Rhodesia in that period - not only for the direct reason of the presence amongst them of many of the most prominent political figures of the time but because the ARC, in both personnel and political content, was a representative selection and reflection of the broad territory-wide spread of African councillors, themselves representative of both the rural 'traditional' and urban (and rural) modern African leadership. The petty-bourgeois character and bourgeois orientation of African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia reflected similarly a more specific section of that leadership continuum - namely that in and of the African National Congress. In so far as there was a duplication of leadership social type, actual personnel, political method and political orientation/participation in colonialist structures, including the African councils, up to and beyond 1958, the ANC has clearly to be classified with the ARC. Thus the substantive documentation of the Northern Rhodesia African political leaderships class character and bourgeois ideology provided in and by the ARC phenomenon is relevant to the entire Northern Rhodesia African leadership continuum, right down to 1958. As such it is also directly relevant to a definition of African nationalist leadership and nationalism in that period. That nationalism and the nationalist leadership of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia in the post 1958 period similarly, were petty-bourgeois and aspirant bourgeois appears to be indicated by the embracing quality and on-going character of pre 1958 political leadership personnel and characteristics into the post 1958 period down to the present day. Full substantiation however of the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois character of present-day leadership in this country lies outside the scope of the present study.

PREFACE

In 1946, the South African 'Native Representative Council' sitting in Pretoria declared itself adjourned sine die in protest against its own 'toy telephone' ineffectiveness as representatives of the African voice to the governing powers in the political status quo in that country. They cited their inability to stem or alter in any real way the continuing flood of racially-based legislation prejudicial to the interests of the African population of South Africa as their major criticism of the councils system (Karis and Carter: Stanford, 1972). A much more politically radical and principled campaign against the South African 'dummy' councils system for Africans had, however, been waged by African political leaders in that country ever since the inception of and/or elaboration upon the system in 1935.(Karis and Carter: Stanford 1972) (Peter Walshe:London 1970). This was expressed in terms of boycott of all separate and inferior institutions and forms of 'representation' for Africans in South Africa and non-collaboration in and with the system of the oppressors of the mass of the population of that country (I.B. Tabata: Cape Town 1944).

In the very same year of 1946 in Northern Rhodesia, the British Colonial administration was busily completing their system of ('rural Native administration', urban 'advisory' and national 'representation') African councils with the institution of an African Representative Council in Lusaka. The whole was influenced indirectly (mainly through the settler population in Northern Rhodesia) by the South African model and even to a degree officially patterned upon it. (see Chapter One of present study). African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia had already been incorporated into these councils since the later 1930's. In 1946 they plunged wholeheartedly into the new ARC, and from 1946 to 1958, and beyond, continued to collaborate in and operate the same system (or type of system) - although by the latter date the tactic of principled boycott of separate and inferior political institutions and forms of representation for Africans had at last entered

the arena of political debate in Northern Rhodesia.

It was such (administrative pradtice) similarities and (African political) contrasts illustrated in and in regard to these two councils systems of similar type and potential that initially attracted me to the Northern Rhodesia African Representative Council as a subject of research and, although many of the structural and functional similarities of the two systems proved, on closer analysis, to have been rather less than originally supposed, the striking contrasts between the level and character of political debate, perception and perspectives of African political leadership in South Africa and that in Northern Rhodesia were sustained and reinforced. They were reinforced, above all, by a close study of the Northern Rhodesia ARC's own debates which, in the context of the times, revealed a naivete about and degree of non-perception of the character and aims of colonialism in Africa that seemed very significant. The character and conceptions of Northern Rhodesia African political leadership illustrated in the ARC were, what is more, all the more remarkable for being not only in sharp contrast to the level and nature of African political debate in South Africa, but in clear contrast also to the claims made about the 'anti-colonialist' history of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia by national leaders (K.Kaunda Forward to H.Meebelo: Manchester 1971), and nationalist historians (H.Meebelo: Manchester 1971). This voluminous verbatim evidence contrasted also with the interpretations made of Northern Rhodesia history, and the 'rise of nationalism' in this country by authoritative liberal historians (R.Hall: London 1965; R.Rotberg: Cambridge 1965 et al).

Where the present writer and present study differs from such analysts of the history of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia in general, and the African councils system in particular, is not so much in 'making advances upon' their interpretations as in being a departure from them. In fact, apart from some early semi-official portrayals made of the lower urban African councils by colonial administrators (see Bibliography: Journal Articles), and some useful information and perceptive critical comments on the Luanshya Urban Advisory Council by A.L. Epstein (Manchester: 1958), no full study and analysis of the entire African councils

pyramid throughout its duration has been made. The Howman 'Report on African Local Government in East and Central Africa' (Salisbury: 1950-53) would probably have been useful to a description and comparative analysis of the councils' structure and functioning but, unfortunately, it proved to be unavailable in Zambia and/or from Salisbury. This is the one notable lacuna in the sources used in this study. Even this gap is, however, of but limited significance given the fact that Howman's report on the Northern Rhodesia Councils was apparently based essentially on the same official documentary sources in Northern Rhodesia as the present researcher had access to and, more importantly, was a different kind of focus to that of the present study.

In regard to the ARC as such, no full original study has been made. Where established histories of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia do (largely in passing or illustratively) touch upon the African Representative Council itself, it is either in respect of its form and 'purpose' in (laudatory) illustration of 'decolonising developments' in Britain's 'tutelary' administration of the territory (L.H. Gann: London 1964), and/or with regard to the contents of its debates as (critical) 'oral' evidence and exemplification of the evils of racial discrimination and the racial insults and burdens suffered by Africans in this country under colonial rule (R.Hall: London1965) (R.Rotberg: Cambridge 1965). Certain pointers to the political character of this group of men were provided in references to their stands on Federation and partnership and so on (R.Hall 1965; R. Rotberg 1965; D.C. Mulford: London 1967). Here again these were largely incidental and cited essentially in reference to or illustration of processes external to the ARC as such. Neither the full political content and implications of the ARC debates has been analysed, nor these debates' fuller, broader and even more significant socio-economic content utilised, scrutinised and assessed. Equally significantly, no attempt has been made to make a full examination of the ARC men themselves with a view to establishing their social and socio-economic as well as full political identities and character and their position in and in relationship to general African political leadership in this country. It is most probably in its

analysis and documentation of the socio-economic characteristics of leadership in Northern Rhodesia that the present study makes a useful contribution to the analysis of the history of African politics in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia.

It is not only, however, in its closer scrutiny and analysis of the men and motions, the debaters and debates of the ARC that the present study departs from the others (in so far as they were 'studies of the ARC' at all) as in the methodological approach and theoretical perceptions that directed this research. There are three fundamental features to the underlying methodology in this study. The first is the perception of colonialism not merely as the imposition of foreign rule on Africa, nor even merely as the structuring and implantation of foreign political systems on the continent. Colonialism defined as the progressive and full incorporation of Africa into the world capitalist system and as a system of economic exploitation is closer to the raison d'etre and realities of the process. Nonetheless, to be full, comprehensive and explain effectively a wide range of phenomena, colonialism must also be seen as entailing a dramatic and eventually embracing socio-economic transformation 'on the ground' in Africa. The end product of this process of transformation was the dominant and later full characterisation of the entire social system - certainly in the case of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia - in capitalist socio-economic terms.

This introduces the second perception underlying the present analysis. This is that the social formation in terms of which the type of elements and developments in this study must be analysed and defined is not 'traditional' African polities or socio-economic systems, or real or apparent 'survivals' of the same; nor even in terms of dualist models of the survival of such forms 'within' or 'alongside' the 'modern' 'industrial' (read capitalist) system. In so far as the capitalist system was, during the period under examination, already the dominant force, superimposed upon other forms and modes of production, and setting the parameters within which even these continued to 'survive'; and in so far as the end

product of this dominance is a fully-fledged capitalist system, the whole process must be characterised in such terms.

Finally, as a corollary to the above, this study was fundamentally affected and directed by the theoretical position that social classification and analysis of people in a colonial-capitalist situation must be made not on the basis of apparent survivals of certain seeming 'traditional' features and characteristics but in terms of the individuals' real personal occupational histories and positions, and socio-economic characteristics and status within the colonial-capitalist system. This is fundamentally the basis to the divergence of the present researcher from the orthodox definition - well established since Thomas Hodgkin produced his pioneering work on African Nationalism (London: 1956) - of nationalist leadership in Africa as essentially ' middle class'. The present study differs also from later developments on and refinements of the earlier analyses - essentially with the use of the status concept of the 'elite' (P.C. Lloyd: London 1966) (M. Kilson: Cambridge Massa 1966). The conceptual validity and analytical effectiveness of such terms compared with class concepts and analysis is fundamental to this entire study.

Finally, the establishment of the class character and bourgeois orientation of African political leadership in this country in decades prior to independence is of significance not merely to a fuller understanding of the phenomenon of nationalism but to a fuller understanding and explanation of the contemporary African situation. While the latest trends in the analysis of colonialism and neo-colonialism, imperialism and 'independence' or dependence, underdevelopment and the development of underdevelopment are making contributions of great importance to an understanding of the contemporary situation and dilemmas of Africa - and the Third World - they will remain incomplete and of but limited effectiveness as long as they see Africa, African states and Africa's leaderships as being merely and essentially victims dominated and manipulated by international imperialism. Capitalist imperialism certainly does still dominate and control the continent but it does so in collaboration with its class agents and allies here in the form of the burgeoning national bourgeoisies - entre-

preneurial, managerial, administrative and 'political'.

As this study seeks to show there is a reality in J.F. Ajayi's (in T.O. Ranger: Nairobi 1968) assertion that Africans were (and are) not mere passive pawns in the hands of all-powerful, all-seeing colonialists/imperialists. The present researcher's concept of 'African initiative' differs, however, from that of Ajayi and T.O. Ranger (in Gann and Duignan/II, Cambridge 1969) in that this initiative is seen in dialectical interaction with the colonialists' within and oriented towards the colonial capitalist system. The same thesis applies to an understanding of the present dependence of Africa on and within the world capitalist system. It derives not merely from the dominant power (and/or 'skillfulness') of international imperialism but from the interaction of the interests of capitalist-imperialism with the new national bourgeoisies of Africa. If this study has served to stress the importance of shifting from purely nationalist reactions to (and in so far as they are reactions to) colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism to a class analysis of the nature and implications in the world capitalist system and a class analysis of the sources of the dependence and attendant dilemmas of modern Africa then it has achieved its most fundamental purpose.

In a study of this nature entailing such a wide range of sources - documentary and oral - and analytical approaches and theoretical concepts commonly associated with so-called 'other disciplines' such as sociology and political science, the present writer was profoundly conscious of her inadequacies in analytical equipment and theoretical foundations in many directions. Scrutiny of and critical comments on this study by a number of 'non-historians' proved, therefore, to be invaluable in confirming and/or criticising the validity of the analyses.

In this regard I should like to express my thanks to Professor Jack Simons and Dario Longi of the Sociology Department for their readings of and comments on Chapter III, and to Morris Szeftel and especially to Dr. Joel Samoff of the Political Science Department for scrupulous reading and critical comments on Chapter

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Mr. Fergus MacPherson and Mr. Simon Zukas very kindly allowed me access to their personal collections of political papers.

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CHAPTER ONE

SOURCES, FORCES AND PURPOSES

At the beginning of 1940 the then Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir John Maybin, in response to a request from the Colonial Office in London drew up an extended confidential memorandum[1] on the "cardinal points to a sound native policy for Northern Rhodesia." This memorandum, in its political aspects, was at one and the same time a summation of British Colonial 'indirect rule' policy developments[2], and their application[3] to and implementation[4] in Northern Rhodesia over the preceeding decade, and a projection into the immediate and remoter future of a specifically and separate 'African mode' of political development for the indigenous population of the territory, as distinct from that being followed in regard to and by the colonial settler population. This 'African mode' was outlined as follows[5]

> "I consider that the best form of government (for Africans) is one based on their own institutions but that this should not be rigidly so based but capable of adaption to meet modern conditions and needs. There need be no difficulty in this...(but)...Sooner or later we must advance beyond the stage of tribal rule. Our plans should envisage the eventual share of Africans in the Central government. Is this to be achieved by putting him on the common electoral roll or by some totally different method?.....I do not myself believe that (a common voters roll) is the right policy. I envisage several stages at each of which the educated African can play his part within a scheme of development more natural to his race viz:
>
> 1. Interconsultation by conferences between different Native Authorities such as the Chiefs' Conferences in Nigeria.
> 2. Provincial Councils attended by representatives chosen in some way to be determined later in consultation with the Native Authorities. We would build up from the bottom not down from the top.
> 3. The further stage is more difficult to foresee. It might take the form either of a National Council to act in an advisory capacity to the Central Government or of representation of Natives on the Legislative Council by nomination made by the Provincial Councils."

Although the Northern Rhodesia Secretary for Native Affairs' draft[6] for this memorandum had referred also to "councils of their

residents" to "control as far as possible" the African satellite townships adjacent to all the growing urban centres in the country, the final version contained no reference to urban African councils, which is doubly significant in view of the fact that a type of urban council, as distinct from tribal-based and oriented 'Elders Councils', had already been in existence on the Copperbelt since 1938. In that year it had been suggested[7] to District Commissioners in the Copperbelt towns that some sort of "representative body of Natives" was desirable to enable the Administration to keep in direct contact with African opinion[8], and "Native Advisory Committees" were in due course nominated, starting in Luanshya and then Kitwe and Mufulira.[9]

In official eyes, however, this administrative innovation in the urban areas was neither significant (nor permanent?) enough to be incorporated in the comprehensive policy statement of 1940, nor an integral part of the scheme of future 'African political development' in Northern Rhodesia, for the focus of the 'Maybin memorandum' was clearly on the rural areas and 'tribal' administration. Furthermore, since this system of 'African political development' was to be built from that 'bottom up', whereas the Native Authorities were, at that stage, still but rudimentally formed and functioning,[10] it followed that neither the proposed Provincial Councils nor (and even less so) a 'National Council' was envisaged for any but the indefinate future.[11] Thus, in reply to a request in November of that year from the Secretary of State for the Colonies[12] for material to reply to a House of Commons Question by Arthur Creech Jones on the political future of Africans in Northern Rhodesia, Governor Maybin[13] stressed the further development of the "Native Authorities" and their "inter-tribal consultation" which "might develop into Regional Councils" but that these latter "would now be quite premature"; making no mention at all of any, even distantly projected, central council for Africans and dismissing urban African political development saying "I am not ready to put forward proposals for that yet."[14] By the end of 1940, therefore, the Official position on African 'political development' in Northern Rhodesia was that, while Africans were to have "an

eventual share" in Central Government, this was to be preceeded by a gradual drawn-out process of development, separate from that of the European settlers, based firmly in 'African' institutions in the rural areas and developing out of Native Authority administration rather than a system of African political representation.

C.O. theory interacting with local factors and forces.

In the meantime, however, some non-rural innovations relating to problems of administration had already been made that both carried within them implications, and directly raised the issue of 'political representation' for Africans and the development of a system of both urban and rural African councils. And these innovations were stimulated or 'inspired' not simply by 'theories' of Government emmanating from London but more by forces at work in Northern Rhodesia and, more concretely, by the impact and repercussions of the totally unexpected and unprecedented African mineworker rioting on the Copperbelt in 1935. The main conclusion[15] derived from that unanticipated violent manifestation of urban African discontent was that the Colonial Administration had inadequate contact with and information on African opinion and grievances - and it was this lesson of 1935 that underlay two important administrative innovations of the later 1930's. The first was at a 'grass roots' level, namely the aforementioned ad hoc nominated Native Advisory Committees on the Copperbelt to facilitate the D.C.'s administration. The second was at the topmost governmental level in the "stop gap"[16] appointment to Legislative Council of a European "Unofficial Member for Native Interests" to assist the colonial administration to arrive at sound decisions on 'native policy'.[17] The former innovation proved useful and in due course resulted in the suggested extension of the Copperbelt "Native Advisory Councils", as they came to be called, to all the urban areas in the country.[18] Even more significantly, these 'advisory' councils had begun to assume a 'representational' character since the essence of 'advising' the D.C.'s was to present' or 'represent' (apparent) African views.[19] In the mean-

time, too, the second innovation, the Legislative Council member 'for Native Interests' had also assumed a representational character, partly by virtue of its being cited in the highest representative body in the land, and partly as a result of the ambiguity in the designation 'Member for Native Interests'. The member himself, 'pioneer' settler Colonel Stewart Gore-Browne, envisaging himself as a father-figure leader for millions of Africans, perceived his function as that of "conveying what Africans themselves actually thought and felt",[20] in contrast to the official instruction to merely "give his own opinion as to what was in the best interests of the Native"[21] (although he was by no means averse to doing that as well[22]). The result was that, energetic though he was, Gore-Browne was encountering considerable difficulties in trying to fulfill his function, as he saw it, of canvassing African opinion across the vast frequently inaccessible expanses of Northern Rhodesia in an increasingly complex and heterogeneous society. Although he met with official bodies such as the rural Native Authority Councils and urban Native Advisory Councils, as well as 'unofficial' bodies such as the urban and rural Native Welfare Societies, he found that method too "impracticable and haphazard".[23] The solution that suggested itself, and was seemingly suggested to him[24], was a more systematic and coordinated series of African councils

> "representing different classes of Natives, tribal and urban, who should be encouraged to put up recommendations on matters affecting their own interests to some central council which in its turn would instruct the Nominated Member ('for Native Interests')"[25]

Thus simultaneously, and unintentionally, two very ad hoc, purely administrative innovations emmanating from the urban areas of Northern Rhodesia were assuming political 'representational' characteristics and raising concrete suggestions for the creation of an African councils system incorporating both rural and urban councils, and 'tribal' and urban "classes of natives". This proposed councils system was, therefore, both more 'representational' and more comprehensive, and closer to the current realities of social change in Northern Rhodesia, than those councils envisaged

for the distant future by colonial officialdom by the beginning of 1940.

During the course of 1940 these two sources of an African councils system, the immediate practical and urban (or forward) looking and the long-term theoretical and essentially rural (and backward?) oriented were interacting,[26] and the whole process given a sharp impetus by the repetition in March of that year of serious (and doubly shocking because still unanticipated) African mine-worker rioting on the Copperbelt. The pressing need underscored by this second violent manifestation of urban African discontent for a really effective 'early warning system' for the colonial administration moved Gore-Browne to urge in Legislative Council[27] the necessity for an organised system for "making sure that the views of Natives as held by Natives themselves finds some utterance"[28] or else "we shall be sitting on a safety valve...if not doing so already".[29] And further justification for this sense of urgency was probably provided[30] by the revival of the proto-political African middleclass 'welfare' associations, during these early 1940's,[31] which if unheeded and frustrated were a potential articulate leadership for that manifest mass discontent.

Thus, despite the fact that it was the "express wish of (Legislative) Council that wherever possible legislation be deferred in war-time",[32] Gore-Browne took the step of placing a proposal before LegCo in September, 1942 that[33]

> a) Government extend the principle of Native Urban Advisory Councils, similar to those which are now in existence in the Copperbelt, to all urban areas in the Territory;
> b) Government inaugurate Native Provincial Councils to be elected in each province of the Territory by the members of the Native Advisory Councils and of the Native Authorities in the Province affected.

He stressed that he recognised the difficulties entailed in setting up such councils but that the need was so great for "giving representation (to Africans) that will really be representation"[34] that Government should

> "not delay in trying to find some workable solution even if it is only a temporary one (because)...concessions... wrung from an unwilling Government (are) accepted without

> gratitude and immediately followed by demands for fresh concessions"[35]

(citing the examples of Ireland and India). The Government Officials were in agreement with Gore-Browne as to the necessity for and general objectives[36] of such a system and supported the proposal - although maintaining their fundamental committment to the Native Authorities as the main direction and means of African 'political development'.[37] The "Unofficial" settler members of Legislative Council also - and unanimously - supported the proposal, for they saw in it further possibilities for keeping the Africans separate from themselves and, more specifically, out of the political representation mainstream and legislative system being developed in Northern Rhodesia.[38] They had, no doubt, been primarily impressed with and convinced by the parallels drawn by Gore-Browne between 'his' system of African councils and that then being developed in South Africa.[39]

Impact of the war and post-war world 'situation'.

Thus whatever their particular political orientations and motivations, the colonial administrators, Gore-Browne and the other settlers all saw 'sound' reasons for and were all agreed upon the desirability of the extension of the African 'Urban Advisory Councils' and the creation of African Provincial Councils. These "Regional Councils"[40] were, immediately after, duly discussed[41] at the annual Provincial Commissioners Conference of November, 1942,[42] but it was not until May, 1944 that the system could be said to have really been launched.[43] While the practical exigencies of the war situation in which they were being created affected the pace of the implementation of the Provincial Councils, it was the political (propaganda) needs of the 'war effort' that really influenced the method of implementation and presentation of the Provincial Councils - if not their actual character as officially claimed.[44] Thus, in their desire to present the new councils as being essentially representational, a channel of communication for Africans to the Government, and a step in the direction of that 'democracy' in 'defence' of which the war was being fought,

colonial officialdom went to pains to stress that the Regional Councillors should freely express "what is in the hearts of the people".[45] It was urged upon them that they had been chosen by the Native Authorities or Urban Advisory Councils, as the case may be,

> "to represent them and their people and to speak for them so that we members of the Government and the Member ('for Native Interests') nominated by the Governor can hear what the people think and wish us to know. What you say will be written down and copies of your discussions will be sent to the Home Government in England".[46]

In the meantime, however, the Second World War was also proving a boon to the political ambitions of the European settler population in Northern Rhodesia, for the 'exigencies of war' had resulted in de facto settler membership of the Executive Council. Exploiting this strategic advantage they were demanding not only that settler representation on the Executive Council be formally confirmed and legalised but that it be accompanied by a similar recognition of the political importance of the settlers through the establishment of an "Unofficial" (meaning themselves) majority over the Officials in the Legislative Council. The Colonial Office was not averse to these settler ambitions but it had to take into account reservations held by some members of the war-time coalition government in Britain,[47] as well as 'proving' its self-professed committment to the political advance of its colonial peoples in particular and 'democracy' in general. While therefore conceding to the European settlers in Northern Rhodesia three members on the Executive Council and an overall total of thirteen 'Unofficials' as against nine Officials on the Legislative Council, the Colonial Office, in October, 1944,[48] offered the Africans in Northern Rhodesia a quid pro quo in the form of an increase in their (white) 'Native Interests' representatives on the Legislative Council from one to three and a promise that, in the near future, Africans would themselves, through a 'Central African Council' arising out of the existing Provincial Councils, select two of their own number to sit on the Legislative Council.

Thus the African councils system, but recently launched, was much earlier than had been envisaged moving towards its 'representational' fruition - in the creation of a central African

council for the entire country and in the orientation and real, if tenuous, linking of the councils system as a whole to the central legislative structures of Northern Rhodesia. The settlers, needless to say, were not at all happy about this orientation and the direct association of the separate African system of 'representation' with 'their' legislature,[49] but the Colonial Office was, by 1945, in greater need than ever to present evidence, to the post-war world in general, and the new United Nations Organisation in particular, of its fulfillment of its 'protectorate' or 'trusteeship' 'mission' and its committment to the advance of 'political rights' and 'democracy' in Africa. And so 1945 saw colonial administration officials across the length and breadth of Northern Rhodesia busily considering[50] suggestions for the constitution of a "Northern Rhodesia African Council."[51] A sense of some urgency gripped officials[52] and non-officials[53] alike as the post-war world was witness to anti-colonial uprisings surging up across the continent of Asia and stirrings of unrest in Africa itself; the latter coming dangerously close to home with the formation of the Nyasaland African Congress in October of 1944. This last, in fact, moved the Northern Rhodesia Secretary for Native Affairs to stress in his Confidential Quarterly Newsletter of June, 1945[54]:

> "As you may know a Nyasaland Congress has been formed and is in Nyasaland threatening to become a rival body to the (African) Councils which have been formed there. We want to avoid the same thing happening here and I believe we will manage to avoid it if the African Provincial Councils are made representative of all classes and if they are given real freedom of debate in all subjects and do not become like the old 'indabas'. Our Councils certainly have been most encouraging so far and it is most important that we should keep one step ahead of African progress."

The challenges in and potential dangers of the stimulated and burgeoning political aspirations of colonial peoples everywhere therefore precipitated the Northern Rhodesia colonial administration into launching their "African Representative Council"[55] as quickly as possible in order to "keep one step ahead of" or pre-empt similar developments in their Territory. This was all the more pressing in view of the continuing resurgence and

emergence of African 'Welfare' Societies in the war and post-war years and their coalesence into one "Federation of African Societies" in May, 1946. So the first meeting of the First Council of the ARC was duly, rather hurriedly, held in November, 1946. That that, and the two subsequent meetings of the First Council in July, 1947 and July, 1948, were each followed by, and held in the general context of, intensive mutual consultations among colonial officials at all levels on numerous lacunae and anomalies in the constitution and proceedures of the ARC in particular and the councils system in general[56] is testimony both to the partially ad hoc nature of the origins of the councils and the somewhat precipitate, politically urgent nature of the launching of the ARC itself.[57] Similarly, the continued vital underlying colonialist political purpose for this system in the later 1940's, while India broke through to 'independence' and Africa in general and Northern Rhodesia itself began to stir, is testified to by the repeated secret warnings to colonial administrators in Northern Rhodesia to "keep our eyes open for odd societies springing up about the country",[58] urging "at the same time" that the need to

> "meet the legitimate aspirations of our left wing intelligentzia (sic), a rapidly growing class, is one of the greatest importance at the present time, and if we do not tackle it seriously we shall find ourselves in difficulties".[59]

Thus in 1947! And in 1948 following the manifest evidence that the innocuous Federation of African Societies[60] was hesitantly but surely transforming itself into a possibly less innocuous 'Congress', the SNA once again confidentially warned[61] his senior administrative officers that the Africans

> "are entering a difficult phase of race consciousness and it is more important than ever that we should hold their trust and confidence and maintain the closest contact with all classes, not excluding the rising middle-class. We may deplore the fact that this class is becoming politically minded but we cannot ignore it and must take every opportunity to retain its trust and to guide it into safe channels."

These 'safe channels' were of course those being provided by the variety of official African councils, rural and urban, 'traditional' and modern that constituted the African councils system.

Double - pronged political containment strategy.

But the colonial authorities were not convinced that the councils per se as a channel of political expression for the "left wing intelligentsia" and as an opening for politically ambitious members of the "political-minded middleclass",[62] were an adequate safeguard or "safety valve"[63] against the development of 'undesirable' trends in African politics in Northern Rhodesia; and they continued to develop and refine their political strategy both in the structuring of the councils as such and in their methods of utilising the councils system. This consisted, on the one hand, in the strengthening and consolidation of the structural linkage of the urban councils to the rural, of the modern non-tribal institutions with the 'traditional''tribal'-based Native Authorities. The aim in this was to ensure an institutionalised relationship of the 'progressive' middleclass elements with the more conservative rural 'traditional' elements - in effect to shape and utilise the total councils structure to achieve a close interaction between the potentially politically troublesome educated 'middleclass' elements and the more 'reliable' (and directly controllable) 'traditional' leadership. The assumption of course was that it would be the latter that would exercise an edifying influence on the former.[64] This objective was variously expressed by a number of colonial officials on different occasions,[65] but possibly most clearly by the Secretary for Native Affairs who warned[66] that

> " it would be a disaster to encourage the (African) intelligentsia to political activity on lines separate from the Tribal Government.....No doubt urbanised Africans must have their separate organisations but they need not necessarily branch off on a path of their own but could be made to run parallel with the Native Authorities in the tribal areas and join forces with them through the African Provincial Councils and the African Representative Council."

And, just to make sure of the preponderance of Native Authority influence in this 'joint force', the allocation of seats on the African Provincial Councils (and hopefully, through them, the ARC) was weighted in favour of the Native Authorities.[67]

This aspect of colonialist strategy vis-a-vis the councils

system was implemented largely covertly, at the practical level[68] in the structuring of the councils system,[69] but the other aspect of their strategy had to be effected overtly and publically for it was at the political propaganda level by means of the councils system. This was (seemingly paradoxically[70]) to urge upon and convince the African councils' members in particular, and the African intelligentsia in general, of their 'duty' to the African people as a whole and of the reprehensible nature of their higher aspirations as and for 'educated' men alone, as distinct from the great uneducated mass of the population. Or, as Chief Secretary Gartmel Robinson put it to the Western Province African Provincial Council in 1947[71]

> "I want you to remember that you are representing not yourselves but the people of this Province - a very large number of people and with different standards of life and different ways; but they are all part of the community which you represent and it will be disastrous to the Africans of this Territory in general if the leaders seek to advance only those who have reached the highest stage. They must advance the people together.... I want you to lead wisely so that you may avoid some of the dangers that have happened in other African colonies ....in some parts of Africa the intelligent educated ones are very few but they speak sometimes as if they were the only people and in their progress they have forgotten the very great number of their brothers who have remained behind."

This 'noble' political injunction was repeatedly impressed upon the members of all the African councils by a variety of colonial officials during the later 1940's,[72] the rather less noble idea being that if they could be convinced of the indivisibility of the African population and of their places as leaders in and inextricably within the African population, the tendancy already observed in other parts of Africa[73] for the educated African elite to organise themselves politically to demand full admission, 'initially' for themselves, into the colonial political system and colonial society, could be averted, or at least postponed. This, hopefully, would be achieved by pointing to the manifest continued unpreparedness of the so-called 'great unwashed' masses - from whom they were inseparable - for such integration. The first step in this attempted undermining of the aspirations of the African elite

was to convince - or indoctrinate - those of them already a convenient 'captive audience' in the African councils and from there (and also through them) influence the wider African middleclass. This was of course but an unavowed (re)application of the - 'Southern Rhodesian' - two pyramids' policy, which itself had been designed to evade the admission of those Africans who had achieved or aspired to achieve 'European' standards into the 'white' pyramid and, as such, both pre-dated[74] and went far beyond the councils system as such. Nonetheless this line of reasoning and injunction by colohial officials vis-a-vis and within the African councils system constitutes a current worth noting in the changing underlying political purpose(s) which the African councils system was employed to serve during the years of the later 1940's - and beyond!

Thus a two-pronged strategy was being developed in regard to the African councils based not merely on a passive councils system into which to direct or 'guide' African political aspirations but on the active employment of that political contrivance to try to directly influence and shape the content and character of inexorably developing African political consciousness.[75] And this strategy was dual also in the sense that it was aimed not only at the narrower African political leadership <u>in</u> the councils but at the outside and potential African political leadership <u>by means of</u> the councils (and councillors) - the overriding purpose in this earlier phase being the avoidance of the emergence in Northern Rhodesia of one of those middleclass - inspired and led African political organisations then springing up all over the continent.

<u>Strategy modifications for political leadership incorporation.</u>

When, however, by the end of the 1940's, it was decisively confirmed that the multi-fold efforts[76] of the colonial authorities had not succeeded in containing and so influencing the educated African middleclass as to pre-empt the formation of a <u>non</u>-official, purely African, overtly political, national organisation in the territory, British colonial officialdom in Northern Rhodesia

took due note of the fact and characteristically made the necessary modifications in their political strategy - and alterations in the form and functioning of the African councils system[77] - to cater to the new situation. Thus, with the Northern Rhodesia African Congress a fait accompli in July, 1948,[78] the First Council of the ARC was duly dissolved - in the very same month in fact[79] - and preparations advanced for the selection of entirely new councils throughout the system. If the African Congress could not be, as it had not been, averted, both it and the 'politically-minded middleclass' who had created it had to be 'guided' into 'safe channels'. The instructions therefore sent out to all Provincial Commissioners towards the end of 1948,[80] in regard to the pending selection of new Urban Advisory Councils and African Provincial Councils from which would be elected a new African Representative Council, stressed that the selection of the new UAC's

> "should be conducted in accord with normal democratic principles as far as circumstances and the wishes of the people permit....It is most important that the best and most representative Africans should be chosen and you are at liberty to adopt any method you consider to be most suitable so long as it accords with the general wishes of those concerned".[81]

and, similarly, in regard to the APC's that

> "It is very important that we should get the very best into those councils, which may assume greater responsibilities in the future, and it is important that the members should have the full confidence and respect of those they represent".[82]

This manifest drive to endow the African councils with more 'democratic'[83] origins (at the urban council level at any rate) and with as much prestige and even, possibly, 'greater responsibilities' (at the Provincial Council level at any rate), and as truly 'representative' a character as possible was the colonialists' direct counter-action to the definitive emergence in Northern Rhodesia of one of that rash of 'African Congresses' so discomforting to colonial officialdom across the length and breadth of the continent. If the general, especially urban, African population was to be kept away from the new Congress in Northern Rhodesia they had to be offered an attractive alternative focus of political attention. It was important, therefore, that they be drawn towards

the Urban Advisory Councils, in the first instance, by the 'democratic' (consultative) methods - in any form or manner 'they' wished - of selection of the members thereto; and then kept to the new UAC's, APC's and the councils system in general by their 'full confidence' in and 'respect for' the leaders so chosen. And, if the urban population was not to be divided in its loyalties, it was important also that the council members chosen, or nominated,[84] should actually <u>be</u> the real leaders-to-be and/or those already recognised by the people. This is the reason for the stress laid not only on elections - whether at place of work, or in occupational group, or in place of residence or ward, or even if necessary by tribal group[85] - but also on the necessity for incorporating the 'best' and 'most representative' men into the councils. What is more, the councillors had to be the 'best' men available, in both urban <u>and</u> rural areas, in order to enhance the prestige of the councils themselves and, thus, not only retain the confidence and committment of the general African population but actually encourage politically ambitious or 'politically-minded' men, including and <u>especially</u> the founders of the new Congress, to actively seek a place therein[86]. The new councils with the ARC at the peak had, therefore, to be politically 'representative', or convincing, and prestigeous enough and/or offer enough of an 'important' enough outlet for political expression, as well as real political status,[87] to attract both the kind of men and even the very same individuals who had resorted to setting up the Northern Rhodesia African Congress. In this way the colonialists were simultaneously seeking to counteract the new Congress by setting up an 'effective' rival to it for African allegiance, and undermine it by giving its existing adherants and leaders every encouragement, and 'reason', to see the councils system as a real avenue of political expression and/or personal political advancement. That was why, while refusing Congress as a <u>body</u> any reserved seats on the ARC, colonial officialdom urged Congress <u>members</u> to seek a place therein individually[88] via elections to the lower councils - whence they could be elected to the higher councils and to the ARC itself.

No sooner, however, had the array of new councils been

selected and the first meeting of the Second Council of the ARC held in July of 1949 than Northern Rhodesia began to move into[89] the politically troubled years of the early 1950's of the debate over, protest against and imposition of Federation on central Africa. And this politically agitated period not only constituted a vital factor in the political stimulation of the African population - of the whole central African area - and the radical physical growth and even political development of the African National Congress(es)[90], but had a direct bearing and impact on the functioning of the African councils - and African attitudes thereto[91] - most conspicuously in regard to the ARC itself.[92] On account of all these developments further modifications appeared in the colonialists' attitude to and use for the councils system.

Tactical manoeuvres to utilise the councils politically.

The colonialists' tactical reactions to the political situation as such and to the ARC itself varied from sector to sector within the colonialist camp and according to the specific phase of their campaign for Federation. The colonial administrators, for their part, before the full impact of the Federation issue on and in the ARC had become publically clear[93] and definitively and formally expressed, continued convinced that the most effective way of influencing, and containing, both Congress and general African political expression[94] was in and by means of the African councils. To this end the latter had to be endowed with a more formal character and elevated to a yet more 'significant' status - hence the launching in September of 1949 of a prolonged meticulous review[95] of the councils system with a view to systematising the whole in a series of comprehensive constitutions[96] and then sealing them with the official stamp of an imposing order-in-council.[97] In the meantime, however, while this exercise was under way, the colonial authorities took the added precaution of ensuring that the Federation issue did not surface in the African councils before they had been satisfactorily 'adjusted' to be entrusted with such a 'complex' and important matter.

these precautions were, in the first place, to keep the subject off the African councils' agendas in 1949,[98] then to issue instructions that the tone of the APC's discussions on the subject during 1950 be 'tempered'[99] and, thirdly, to omit deliberately to summon any meeting of the ARC itself during 1950[100] - since it had not yet been guaranteed that it could be counted upon to 'temper' its 'tone' any more than the APC's had (or rather hadn't) done during that year.[101] Colonial officialdom was, therefore, already manipulating the councils to ensure, at the outset, if not a positive at least not a prompt negative reaction by them to the Federation question.

The settlers too were convinced, initially, that the African councils could be used to further their campaign for Federation.[102] Given, however, the strong manifestations in the lower African councils, during 1950, of African opposition to Federation, settler representatives in Legislative Council performed a sharp volte face and began to deny the right of the African councils to any kind of veto - or voice - on the Federation or any national political question. This they expressed in the demand for the clear-cut divorce of the African councils system from the 'European' legislative system and any African claims for rights or a voice - therein, or on decisions taken therein; hence the efforts initiated by Welensky in the Legislative Council from 1950[103] to have the African councils system with the ARC at the peak modified into a strictly parallel, totally separate (apartheid-ist) 'legislative' system for the African population of Northern Rhodesia.[104] When this ploy failed to gain the support of colonial officialdom,[105] who remained unconvinced of the efficacy of their own strategy in regard to the containment of African politics,[106] Welensky then resorted to demanding the total abolition of the ARC.[107] According to him,[108] its position was like the kind of "upper house" considering, and confirming, [illegible] of the Legislative Council was totally unacceptable to the members of that august body.....and potentially harmful to their campaign for Federation.[109]

The 'liberal' wing of the settler population, however,

approached the problem of effecting the Federation of Northern Rhodesia with 'the south', and the 'problem' of African political advancement in Northern Rhodesia per se, not by seeking to suppress the African voice but by trying to influence it in the 'right' direction. It was, in fact, Gore-Browne who had in 1949 impressed upon the Government the need for the aforementioned systematisation and formalisation of the councils system.[110] It was he again who, at the beginning of 1950,[111] urged the Government to take heed of the "vocal and influential" section of the African population criticising the African councils as being ineffective government-sponsered, and controlled, organs, and

> "do all we can to hasten the time, even if it means going faster than might be normally desirable, when these councils become genuine democratic institutions exercising actual statutory powers in certain defined directions.....Unless these councils are recognised by the mass of the Africans as something both democratic and efficient which they are operating themselves for their own good, they will be less than no answer to the demand for universal adult suffrage when it comes, as it will very soon."

This self-enlightened strategy to engineer and employ the African councils so as to, as earlier although at a higher level, 'keep one step ahead of' African political demands was a recurrent theme in Gore-Browne's approach to developments in African politics during these years.[112] The line gained over time such active adherants as John Moffat, Commissioner for Native Development[113] and the Reverend Nightingale, one of the 'Native Interests' members of Legislative Council[114] - the latter introducing his own developments thereupon[115] - and eventually the upper echelons of the colonial administration.[116]

This 'thoroughgoing full democritisation'[117] of the African councils system was, however, a long-term and potentially explosive exercise needing time to organise and implement and, what is more, could not be implemented in a situation as volatile as that of Northern Rhodesia, immediately prior to Federation, in which neither the impact of the mere staging nor the outcome of any 'elections' by the Africans was at all certain. Anyway, the colonialists were faced with the immediate and more pressing

problem of getting their Federation 'accepted' and set up. Thus the elections for new African councils scheduled for the beginning of 1952[118] were put off,[119] and the new draft 'democratic' councils constitutions put 'on ice',[120] while the colonial authorities concentrated on priming and preparing the African councillors - both for the day when they, or others like them, would be/the 'democratically' chosen representatives of the masses, and for the immediate present and the actual political issues confronting Northern Rhodesia. The former, and the more general future, required that African leaders in Northern Rhodesia fully understand the nature of 'representational democracy' as practised in the 'great democracies' of the West.[121] It was one thing for the councils system in Northern Rhodesia to be 'democratised' in order to win over, or at least steal the thunder of, the actual and potential African political leadership, but it was quite another matter for these councils to be a genuine reflection of the, as yet unascertained and possibly 'dangerous', 'will of the people'. The African councils' members had therefore to be 'enlightened' as to the character and role of leaders in relation to the led, and weaned from their tendancy to insist upon consulting their 'constituents' before pronouncing on any issues.[122] In this way the practice would be established and precedents set for the 'independent' comportment of African leaders in the true spirit of representational democracy before the actual launching of any, even partial and pseudo, 'democratic' exercises in Northern Rhodesia.

What is more, this campaign to create an 'independent-minded', 'courageous' African leadership capable of taking decisions 'in the name of' and 'in the best interests of'[123] the African population was urgently needed in order to be able to contrive and present to the world some evidence of African endorsement of Federation. The need, therefore, both to <u>wean</u> the members of the African councils from their 'attachment' to those they 'represented' and to <u>win</u> them over to the colonialists' cause[124] so that they became an active influence on wider African opinion, rather than the other way round, became at this stage the dominant among the political purposes running beneath and through the utilisation of

these councils. The full variety of representatives of the colonialist camp rallied to this overriding immediate aim.[125] A growing campaign is, in fact, quite evident in the years leading up to Federation both to convince the African councillors about Federation and the related issue of 'partnership'[126] and to imbue them, and more especially those of the ARC, with a sense of their own importance and independence of the masses. They were repeatedly confronted with their obligation to give a 'courageous' and 'correct' lead to the African population[127] - or as the Reverend Nightingale advised in Mutende in 1952:[128]

> "African representatives must be men of good education able to grasp the meaning of the things that they are dealing with, thoroughly acquainted with African thought and custom and, above all, men of strong character who are willing to take an independent line and go back to their people and say 'This is what I have done in your interests.'"

Double-pronged containment strategy sustained.

Although this double-pronged strategy of so structuring (and restructuring) and manipulating the African councils, and hopefully the councillors, so as to contain and/or influence African politics in Northern Rhodesia never succeeded in obtaining the desired statement in support of Federation by any of the constituent bodies in the councils system,[129] it continued to characterise the colonial authorities' attitude to and utilisation of the African councils even after the imposition of Federation. In fact, the imposition of Federation raised the immediate problem for the colonialists of accomodating and disarming the still unconvinced, and hostile, African population. A variety of measures had therefore to be taken[130] to cater to the situation - one of which was so to develop and present the African councils as, once again, to try to outflank and, if possible, encompass the, by 1953, more 'radical',[131] and certainly more nearly national, African National Congress. Thus, on the one hand, the suspended 'democritisation' programme was launched, with much propaganda,[132] in the long-overdue UAC elections in September, 1953[133] (coinciding with the establishment of Federation). This was in order to

simultaneously give the general urban African population a sense of participation in some, if not the political process in their country, and to give the actual and potential African political leaders, and especially certain of the 'Congress types', every justification (or excuse) - and possibility - to secure a place on the lower councils. And, on the other hand, in order to offer not only a political rationalisation for African political leaders to get onto the councils but a positive incentive to do so, the already initiated and much advocated[134] enhancing of the prestige of the councils was carried further. This was by means of the full formalisation of the constitutions and proceedures of the whole system (and the closer approximation of the latter to those of the Legislative Council)[135] and, more importantly, through the increased status attaching to membership thereof consequent upon the greater number and variety of even more elevated and prestigeous positions to be filled therefrom.[136]

During the life of the Third Council of the ARC (1953-1958), coinciding with the first 'phase' of Federation, the colonialist position in regard to the councils system continued to undergo modifications in terms of the ebb and flow of African politics in this period, and in terms of the differing political viewpoints of the various sectors within the colonialist camp. Thus, in the years immediately following the African defeat over Federation, as the chorus of mutual recriminations between ANC and the ARC and their respective supporters[137] died down, and the ANC itself entered a difficult period of internal reappraisal and reorganisation, African politics in Northern Rhodesia entered the doldrums, and the ARC too went into a virtual eclipse from the public eye.[138] This was not, however, merely a reflection of the nature of the proceedings of the ARC in this period, nor even of a direct and telling attack on the ARC in LegCo by one of the African MLC's, Lakement Ng'andu,[139] but because the ARC's projection onto the centre stage and the degree of prominence given its proceedings by colonial officialdom and the mass media[140] varied in direct proportion to the degree of wider African political activity and the nature of the impact of Congress on the African

population at any given time. Hence, 1954 and 1955 are notable for the absence of colonialist comment upon[141] - or indeed great immediate political use for[142] - the African councils. In 1956, however, with the re-emergence of the ANC into active politics, with the urban boycott campaigns, and the resurgence of African unrest and protest in the form of the Copperbelt mineworker 'rolling strikes', and with the related re-emergence of African criticisms of the ARC and the councils system,[143] a variety of colonialists' comments upon and suggestions for the improvement of - and even on - the councils system also immediately reappeared. Once again, however, whereas the settlers, like MLC John Gaunt, with little subtlety of political perception, or expression, plunged in and declared the African councils "useless"[144] and a failure because so thoroughly 'infiltrated' by Congress,[145] the colonial administrators and some of the more self-enlightened 'liberal' settler members of Legislative Council, by contrast, stressed that the latter was precisely what was required.[146] They, in fact, urged the ANC to follow 'proper' constitutional channels and, even if dissatisfied with the African councils, to stand for election to the UAC's so as to change the system 'from within' and work through it rather than resorting to 'unconstitutional' direct action to express and seek redress of African grievances.[147]

What settler Gaunt did, however, suggest[148] (although he was by no means the first to do so[149]), and the government take up, was that what was needed was African bodies with some 'real' executive and financial responsibilities. These responsibilities would both impress, and by their very weight overwhelm and 'tame' politically ambitious Africans, and simultaneously undermine 'hostile' propaganda on the ineffectiveness of the councils as an avenue of African political activity.[150] Since, however, a moratorium had been declared[151] on any proposals for changes at the central government level - for the Northern Rhodesia constitutional review was not due until 1958 - no changes could be considered at that stage in relation to the ARC. The UAC's, however, fell within the ambit of 'local government' and had, anyway, during these years assumed a greater significance by

being more frequently in session[152] and closer to the public eye.[153] The settler-controlled urban local government had itself, what is more, become a focus of African political attention[154] by virtue of its distinct lag behind central government in the introduction of a degree of African participation.[155] Thus, in turning to consider ways and means of giving to the African population some councils with 'real' responsibilities, the colonialist focus was on the lower levels of the councils pyramid and on urban local administration.

The Brown Commission was therefore duly set up, during 1956, purportedly to investigate ways and means of increasing the participation of Africans in local government.[156] Since however the 'worsening' political situation in 1956 and 1957 required some radical remedies, the revamping of the old UAC's had to be carefully disguised, and they therefore re-emerged in the Brown Commission Report of 1957[157] as 'African Housing Area Boards'. These would be delegated, by the settler local government councils, some financial and executive responsibilities in the running of the affairs of the African satellite townships and from their memberships would be elected [redacted] half of the African members designated to make up half of the African Affairs Committees[158] of the main (settler) municipal or township councils. This was thus in fact a form of dual urban administration differing not at all <u>in principle</u>[159] from that pertaining in the days of the old Urban Advisory Councils.[160] Once again therefore the colonial government wished to be seen to be introducing reforms and 'new' rights and responsibilities for Africans while in fact simply offering a modified, slightly 'improved', more attractive version of its long-standing, separate system of councils for Africans, contrived and still being utilised for the containment of African politicians and politics.

By the second half of 1957, with the old UAC's due to be 'upstaged' and/or replaced[161] by the 'new' and 'different' African Housing Area Boards, and with the consideration of national constitutional changes for Northern Rhodesia now under way, the possible demise of the ARC itself began to be officially

hinted at[162] and, by Africans[163] and settlers[164] alike, actively advocated. The African councils as a system was clearly reaching the end of its life, deprived of its raison d'etre at both lower levels and topmost peak - the latter partly effected by the new Federal constitution electoral college system for the election of two African members for Northern Rhodesia to sit in the Federal Assembly.

The abolition of the ARC was in fact officially announced on the 3rd October, 1958[165] and it held its last meeting on the 20th of the same month, and this system of and phase in African 'political development' in Northern Rhodesia (supposedly) ended with the constitutional reforms introduced soon after ushering the African population of the country into an, ostensibly, qualitatively 'different' phase in and form of political representation and participation. Gone, at last, was the gradual, separate, 'African' mode of political development towards an 'eventual share' in the Central Government envisaged by the Maybin Memo in 1940 and carried further in the indirect system of nominal 'representation' on the Legislative Council from 1948 - and kept in operation with slight modifications during the succeeding two decades.[166] It was 'replaced' at last by a 'phased' (gradual!) special (separate!) communal (African!) type of representation in the form of the a non-democratically 'elected' fixed number of African members (a minority share!) in the central legislature of Northern Rhodesia.[167] So much for the 1958 'departure' from the separate, minority, non-democratic and, on all three counts, therefore inferior form of representation offered Africans in Northern Rhodesia since 1953....1949....1946....1944....1942.... 1940....

What emerges from this examination of the sources of 'inspiration' and example for the African councils system in Northern Rhodesia is, firstly, that they were both theoretical and practical, administrative and political, local (settler) and metropolitan (colonial administration), and at one and the same time British Colonial Office (so-called 'non-racial') and South

African (racialist and segregationist) derived. Secondly the councils system was developed out of a number of different, divergent and even conflicting forces at work within and without Northern Rhodesia. These were the threat in mass discontent and its conjunction with African 'middleclass' aspirations, as against (and against!) settler demands and actual political advances. These in turn were interacting in the context of Britain's self-professed committment to the social, economic and political advancement of her African proteges. And this last was being stimulated to provide real (or apparent) 'proof' by actual - and potential - colonial upheavals throughout the world, and anticipated (and later actual) African unrest in Northern Rhodesia itself. And it is not insignificant that this range of forces underlying the creation of the councils system both begins and ends with the dangers of and in African unrest in Northern Rhodesia. It was fundamentally in relation to this that the purposes of and for the African councils were evolved.

Of the purposes which the African councils system was designed and developed to serve it is evident that there were both publically professed and unpublicised underlying purposes, and of both it can be said that they underwent changes in form and relative significance over time in conformity with the changing political context of the country - and in terms of the differing and changing interests and political viewpoints and relative 'power' of the propagators of the system. Similarly, not only the presentation but the actual form of the African councils system underwent changes in terms of the changing political purposes it was required to serve. Thus in the later 1930's and the beginning of the 1940's, with the shock of the repeated African rioting still reverberating in Northern Rhodesia, the councils were conceived as a channel[168] (or series of channels) through which Government could keep itself informed on what was going on at grass roots level in the African population. This urgent purpose required as extensive and comprehensive a network of contact points possible with the African population - hence the incorporation in the largely ad hoc councils at the earliest stages of representatives

of virtually every and any organised group of Africans available, including and especially the Welfare Societies, and even lone but key-placed individuals.[169]

With the development of the Second World War, however, and the related war propaganda stress on, and claims about, 'democracy' and such, a subtle alteration of emphasis was made from a 'channel of communication' for the Government on the Africans into a much-publicised channel of communication of the Africans to the Government. And, as the official mouthpiece[170] of the Africans, the African councils had to be so developed individually and so related collectively as to ensure that it could be pointed out that all Africans, whether urban or rural, modern or 'traditional', 'middleclass' or mass, had in principle some avenue of access thereto, if so desired, whether through official or non-official bodies and/or directly in one or another of the councils or indirectly through the large number and variety of 'delegates' - hence the emerging shape of the councils system in this period with its rural and urban, official and non-official bases.[171]

But the years immediately following the war were so politically troubled - and the, by now, Labour Government in Britain rather more concerned about its 'duty' to the colonial peoples[172] - that the 'mouthpiece' had to be a representative mouthpiece. Thus it had to be, on the one hand, very broadly based and, on the other, progressively structured upwards in a pyramid shape[173] to a national peak in the ARC addressing itself 'directly' to and oriented towards the highest organs of power in the country, to one of which the Legislative Council it actually selected two of its own number as members in 1948. This system of representation[174] into which the councils had been, somewhat pretentiously, elevated was constantly commended to the African population in the later 1940's as the true and effective means of presentation and redress of their political and other grievances, and the effective avenue and evidence of their real political progress. The underlying political purpose in this period was to so impress and influence the relevant sections of the African

people as to prevent the emergence, if not of an 'undesirable' African political organisation, at least of undesirable African politics. Hence the continued application of this rationale vis-a-vis the African councils both before and even (or especially) after the formation of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress in 1948.

With the change of government in Britain in 1951 and, more importantly, the changed political climate in Northern Rhodesia in the early 1950's, the African councils 'system of representation' underwent an unpublicised modification back into the earlier 'channel of communication', with the difference that, given the colonial government's need at that stage to have some, or as many, and as effective means possible of actively influencing the African population in favour of Federation, the earlier channel of communication was now to be neither one way nor the other but a <u>two-way channel of communication</u>.[175] And it was 'two-way' in the sense that the councillors were to 'frankly' and 'impartially' inform the Government of the opinions and grievances of the people and equally 'honestly' and 'impartially' inform the African population of the Government's 'good works and intentions' on their behalf, not least of all in supporting the Federation of the north with the south! This particular political purpose did not entail a change in the structure of the councils system so much as a change in its functioning - in the functional relationship of the higher to the lower councils and of them all to the general population - in an attempt to exploit the councils to influence the African population and/or (failing the former) divorce African political leadership from African public opinion.

The imposition of Federation, however, required the appearance of exactly the opposite, that is the thoroughgoing participation of the demos in the councils system, the pressing need at that stage being to 'buy off' African discontent over Federation and anticipated demands for greater rights <u>in</u> Northern Rhodesia - hence the re-presentation of the councils system as the 'interim'[176] <u>democratic representative mouthpiece</u>[177] of the Africans, as well as the <u>training ground for and means towards</u>[178] even greater political participation. Hence also the alteration

in the structure so as to exclude representation of and by small, non-official African bodies and urban population groups in favour of generalised 'democratic' selection of urban council members. The hope here was that such atomised (and secret ballot) expression of African opinion would be less formed and concerted (or 'influenced') and would make for the choice of more 'reasonable' and amenable councillors. Such a selection would not necessarily totally exclude, nor was it desired that it should exclude, Congress men, but would tend to divide their ranks by drawing off the moderates leaving isolated, it was hoped, those diehard 'extremists' who had resisted the lures of the rewards offered in the councils and especially those in and through the ARC. With many Congress men thus drawn into the salutory atmosphere of the African councils, another 'generation' and/or layer of such African political leaders would have been incorporated in such a way as to be subject to the necessary influences and processes of conditioning containment. And with Congress itself, hopefully thus partially decapitated or denuded of leaders, and weakened - while the ARC participants were, by contrast, being elevated to great status and high rank - the stalwarts in the Congress would 'next time' be more susceptible to and even more acceptable to colonial political lures.

There was no 'next time' to test the eagerness of the remaining Congress leaders outside the ARC to get into the councils system - at least in its old form[179] - because by 1956 and 1957 the 'winds of change' were so rapidly gathering force across the continent and the political situation worsening even in Northern Rhodesia - reflected also in and in regard to the African councils in settler charges that they were dominated by Congress and in Congress charges that they were too controlled by the colonialists[180] - that 'radical' measures were required. So the old African councils system was 'abolished' in favour of 'new' and 'fuller' forms of African participation in both local and central government institutions - which the colonialists now hurriedly proclaimed had always been their inexorably advancing long-term programme. Thus the ARC at its demise in 1958 was brushed off

with a retrospective reinterpretation as a mere interim electoral college to Legislative Council[181] while the African population underwent the necessary 'maturation' to fit them for fuller and direct participation in government. And so, in the final version of the ARC presented by the colonialists, the councils emerged not (it was undeniable) with any power in themselves, but as the real and pre-planned pathway to power created by the 'benevolent', 'decolonising' colonialists for the African population in Northern Rhodesia.

If the colonialists' purposes for and the consequent form and/or presentation of the African councils system are characterised by change within continuity, even radical change and apparent about turns within continuity; the purposes for, methods of utilisation and character of the African councils system must be described as continuity within change. Thus, of all the colonialist aims for and behind the African councils, the one constant underlying and fundamental purpose throughout was to contain African political development in Northern Rhodesia - and 'contain' in the multiple sense of 'set restraints upon' and 'keep in check and under control' (that is hold it back from too rapid or embracing a physical spread); and in the sense of 'set boundaries to' or 'shape' (that is hold it to acceptable political objectives and methods) - as well as in the more literal sense of 'hold' - by incorporation. Thus, despite their various adjustments in immediate tactic, the fundamental colonialist strategy throughout was, by an interchange of indirect 'threats', negative counterweights and positive inducements, to incorporate into the colonialist political structures first the 'politically-minded' of the African 'middleclass' or 'intelligentsia', second (also in historical sequence) African political leaders actual and potential, and thirdly (which was also the latest and the last resort) the leaders of the African National Congress itself. Finally, despite repeated modifications in the structure and functioning of the African councils system, its essential character as a separate 'sub' political structure, in form and methods modelled upon LegCo and oriented - and orienting African political aspirations and

activities - towards the main colonialist political structures in Northern Rhodesia, was sustained throughout the lifetime of the ARC...and continued beyond it in the rather more developed and sophisticated but not qualitatively different form of the Brown Local Government African councils and the Benson Constitution's system of representation.

The foregoing analysis thus provides further illustration of the character and content of British colonial policy, the subtleties and flexibility of British colonial methods of rule, and above all the British strategy of containment[182] of 'anti-colonial' and potentially anticolonialist forces on the African continent. This analysis also provides indications of the structure and functioning of the African councils system itself - which however require fuller description as the starting point from which to assess the degree of success of British colonial strategy in Northern Rhodesia. Most significantly of all, however, the foregoing examination of the apparent and fundamental colonialist political purpose(s) being served by the African councils provides the basis from which to assess the nature of African participation and the actual participants in the councils system and, from this, a basis from which to make an analysis of African politics and political leadership in Northern Rhodesia, and more specifically the leadership in and of the African National Congress, in two crucial decades after the Second World War.

CHAPTER TWO
FORM AND FUNCTIONING

It is necessary at the outset to examine the form and functioning of the African Representative Council in conjunction with those of the African Provincial Councils (APC's) and the Urban Advisory Councils (UAC's) - and even, to a degree, the Native Authority Councils, firstly because the colonialists themselves perceived and utilised them all, whether as a fully integrated, consistent system or not,[1] in terms of their political containment strategy.[2] The second reason is that the composition and character of the lower councils appear to have had a direct bearing on the composition and character of the ARC at the top, and the latter cannot be properly assessed without reference to the nature of the sources of both its membership and the subjects of debate with which it dealt.

The essence of this functional relationship resided in the officially designed selective role of the lower councils in regard to the memberships of the successive higher councils whom they apparently chose themselves from among their own number. In the case of the UAC's and Native Authority Councils to the African Provincial Councils this was essentially on the basis of individual merit,[3] but in the case of the Provincial Councils to the ARC it was in accordance with officially fixed rural:urban, or Native Authority: non Native Authority ratios based, supposedly, upon the demographic characteristics of the province in question.[4]

Similarly, the members of the primary councils, whether urban advisory councils or rural administrative Native Authority Councils or the secondary level rural (-cum urban in some cases[5]) Provincial Councils, were charged with raising on their own initiative and/or (preferably) raising on the mandate of the populations of their respective areas,[6] the grievances and desires of the people whose views they were supposed to have canvassed in tours around, and public and private meetings in their respective 'constituencies'. The more important matters and those most repeatedly raised were submitted by the councillors to the local District Commissioners -

in the urban areas to be tabled on the agenda of the next UAC meeting or, in the rural areas, to be forwarded to the Provincial Commissioners who then drew up the Provincial Councils' agendas therefrom. These matters of public concern, worded as formal motions, were duly debated and voted upon by the respective councils - together with other motions presented for their consideration by colonial officialdom local or territorial[7] - under the chairmanship of the local DC's in the UAC meetings and Provincial Commissioners in the APC meetings. Such motions as were passed by the councillors by a simple majority vote and were of territorial import, or for one reason or another of great enough general significance, were then selected by them, apparently by the same proceedure[8], to be forwarded for discussion at the next higher council meeting. In the case of the APCs' selections of motions for the ARC's attention this meant being sent to the Secretary for Native Affairs himself.

Given the largely ad hoc character of some of the councils, and the pragmatism characteristic of British colonial methods of rule; given also the gradually developing and changing character of the councils separately and as a system in terms of British colonial political strategy in Northern Rhodesia, there were variations of methods of constitution, actual composition of membership (in 'type' and even number) and proceedures in meetings and, from these all, variations in council character and functioning at the middle and lower levels from area to area and over time[9]. Nonetheless, out of these variations and changes, the essence of the functional relationship of the three subsidiary types of councils was, throughout, an upward oriented process of deputation and delegation progressively narrowing to an eventual single focus in the ARC. Similarly, despite changes over time in the number of constituent bodies in the different categories of councils - with a very large and repeatedly altered number of Superior Native Authority Councils,[10] with the UAC's steadily increasing over time from five (early 1940's) to ten (1949) and then over twelve after 1953,[11] and with the number of Provincial Councils changing between eight (1944), six (1946), five (1950), six (1953)

and seven (1958)[12] - and despite also the consequent relative changes in the positions of the different types of councils, there was a consistently upwardly diminishing number of councils to a peak of one in the ARC that also resulted in a roughly pyramidal shape (see TABLE I).

TABLE I



This, then, was the essential structure and functioning of the African councils system as officially designated and described. Whether it was a fully accurate portrayal is a matter for closer scrutiny, but of more immediate importance is the fact that even such a description of the structure upon which the ARC rested and functioned is inadequate to an assessment of that body for there were, in addition to the above three categories of official councils, a number of other official and non-official bodies which apparently had a material effect on the composition and character of the African councils by virtue of their role in the selection of members to the system.[13] What is more, the foregoing description of the functioning of the system is incomplete and superficial without the inclusion of a closer examination of the methods, as well as the organs, involved in the selection of members to the system and hence the relationship of the overall councils system to the African population - or sections thereof.

Democratic basis, and Representative System?

The claims made by colonial officialdom[14] were that the African councils pyramid was solidly based on all elements and 'classes' of the African population, both urban and rural, and was a thoroughly 'representative' system[15] not only on this score but on account of the 'active participation' of the population in the selection of members thereto. Thus, the official portrayal[16] (see TABLE II) of the representation of the rural masses in the councils system not only claimed a 'customary' exercise of the 'popular will' in the confirmation and sustenance of the 'traditional' leaders in the Native Authority Councils[17] (and a quasi-mystical identity anyway of 'traditional' chiefs and councillors with their people), but the exercise also of popular choice in 'tribal gatherings' of the rural members of the African Provincial Councils.[18] Official propaganda similarly portrayed the urban masses as actively selecting, with increasingly 'western' type democratic electoral methods, some and then all of the members of the Urban Advisory Councils.[19] And, finally, even the relatively small number of 'detribalised' individuals of the African 'middle-class' or 'intelligentsia' were specifically catered for through the reservation of a number of seats on both UAC's and APC's for representatives of both urban and rural African welfare societies who chose their delegates according to their own, but generally 'democratic' proceedures.[20] Since all the councils in the pyramid purportedly selected their delegates to the next higher council by regular democratic proceedures,[21] colonial official claims about the 'representative' character and 'democratic' origins of the African councils, and hence of the ARC itself, apparently rested on solid grounds. The reality was, however, rather different.

Firstly, on the rural side of the pyramid, although at the earliest stages choice of rural Provincial Councillors by the people in 'tribal gatherings' by "show of hands" or "popular acclaim" was officially indicated[22] as the desirable proceedure, in practice this seldom happened[23] and, even in the few areas in the earlier stages where it was exercised, such popular choice

TABLE II

OFFICIAL PORTRAYAL* OF THE 'REPRESENTATIVE' CHARACTER AND 'DEMOCRATIC' ORIGINS OF THE A.R.C.



* My [illegible] interpretation of verbal portrayal by [illegible]

was subject to the considerable influence and even manipulation of the chiefs[24] and/or local colonial officials.[25] In fact, the numerically preponderant rural delegates on the Provincial Councils[26] were invariably Native Authority Council members or nominees, whether chiefs, 'traditional' councillors, 'progressive' (usually part-time) advisory councillors[27], or full-time administrative or 'technical' employees[28] - these last increasingly more numerous on the Native Authority Councils with the growing scale and complexity of these councils' functions and, over time, more and more frequently selected to 'represent the Native Authorities' on the Provincial Councils.[29] The Native Authorities occasionally also nominated, instead of Native Authority Councillors, prominent rural personalities[30] - either in the absence of enough 'suitably qualified' or available men on the Native Authority Councils or in order to 'give recognition to' (or incorporate) otherwise potentially 'troublesome' elements.[31] Since, once it was officially admitted that the so-called direct popular choice was rarely if ever exercised[32] and colonialist claims about the 'representative' and 'democratic' rural base of the councils were shifted to rest more fully[33] on the supposedly popularly endorsed and intrinsically popularly oriented 'traditional leaders' in the Native Authority Councils, it is necessary to stress what their real character was. Firstly, not only was the Native Authority Council membership of a number and ever-increasing number of Native Authority 'Councillors'[34] based on their technical or educational skills, rather than on their kinship, clan or any other 'traditional' positions and roles, but even such 'traditional' elements as survived in the Native Authority Councils were no indication of the necessarily 'popular' basis of those colonial administration bodies. This is because, whether or not the influence of the 'popular will' in and on the ruling elements had characterised certain politics in this part of Africa at different periods of the pre-colonial era, such customary 'control by the demos' on the 'traditional leaders' was very limited and/or largely illusory in a colonial situation in which the realities of power were such that what decided which 'traditional' leaders should be - or continue to be - 'native authorities',

and how they should function, was in the final analysis decided in terms of interests and by methods anything but 'customary' or 'democratic'.[35]

Although the colonial administration in 1952 briefly flirted with the idea of changing the basis of selection to the Provincial Councils from nomination by the Native Authorities to some electoral system "based on wards or districts"[36] - largely under the influence of the discussions on African Local Government at the 1951 Colonial Office Summer School on African Administration[37] - the suggestion went no further. This was most probably for the reason that the more pressing need then was for the introduction of the 'democritisation' programme into the urban areas and that such a potentially explosive experiment was better phased.[38] Thus, the rural membership of the Provincial Councils continued to the end to be overwhelmingly from and chosen by the Superior Native Authorities themselves, and only a tiny minority of the rural councillors in some provinces were not so nominated. These were not however much nearer being the choices of the rural masses for they were either representatives elected by and from the middleclass welfare societies[39] or, in a few instances in the earlier period, actually nominated by the local DC or PC to represent 'detribalised' Africans in areas where there were no 'suitable' or any welfare societies.[40] So much for the 'representation' of the rural masses and the 'democratic' rural angle to the base of the councils pyramid.

As regards the representation of the urban masses in the councils system, colonial officialdom made even more grandiose claims[41] which also bore little relationship to the realities - either of the Urban Advisory Councils or of such of the African Provincial Councils as had urban representation, and least of all to the ARC itself, a number of steps removed as it was from the minor degree of direct popular participation officially catered for and the even lesser degree actually achieved.

Thus in the earliest stages of the formation of UAC's[42] the between nine and twelve members of the first ad hoc committees on the Copperbelt were mainly nominated by the DC's from among the

THE AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL 1946-1958;

A FOCUS ON AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND POLITICS IN NORTHERN RHODESIA

by

D.L. KEET

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ABSTRACT

The British colonialists in Northern Rhodesia, experienced in the discomforting problems arising from the conjunction of 'politically-minded' elites with mass discontent in their colonies, and aware of such embryonic 'middleclass' leadership and mass stirrings in Northern Rhodesia itself during the Second World War and post war years, evolved what had been initially and fundamentally an administrative system of urban(advisory) and rural (Native Authority) councils into a characteristically subtle and flexible political device for the incorporation and containment of the acutal - and potential - modern African political leadership in this country. This pyramid of African councils rising through provincial councils to a peak in the African Representative Council was portrayed as, and actually developed into, an increasingly 'democratic' system - both in order to endow it with an aura of legitimacy as representing the voice of the African population of the country and in order to ensure the incorporation therein of the actual local and national leaders of the African 'politically-minded middleclass'. This strategy was manifestly successful, for , from both the rural and urban bases of this pyramid, the range of men entering and selected upwards by their fellow councillors into the ARC itself was that balance of supposedly 'authentic traditional' and actual 'modern middleclass' leadership elements desired by the colonialists. The Native Authority leaders in the ARC were, however, rather less 'traditional' than the colonialists claimed for, in personal characterisation, they belonged to the same urbanised or 'westernised' educated elite as the non-Native Authority councillors from both urban and rural areas. In terms of both educational and occupational criteria, the African Representative Council membership in fact actually consisted solidly of 'modern middleclass elements'. These 'modern middleclass' elements in turn, however, proved to be nothing other than petty-bourgeoise and aspirant bourgeoise 'born out of' and shaped (or reshaped) by the colonial capitalist system, and fully oriented towards and striving for a higher and unfettered place in that system, politically

socially and economically. The emergent class character and bourgeois orientation of the ARC men was, what is more, thoroughly representative of that of African political leadership in general in Northern Rhodesia in that period - not only for the direct reason of the presence amongst them of many of the most prominent political figures of the time but because the ARC, in both personnel and political content, was a representative selection and reflection of the broad territory-wide spread of African councillors, themselves representative of both the rural 'traditional' and urban (and rural) modern African leadership. The petty-bourgeois character and bourgeois orientation of African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia reflected similarly a more specific section of that leadership continuum - namely that in and of the African National Congress. In so far as there was a duplication of leadership social type, actual personnel, political method and political orientation/participation in colonialist structures, including the African councils, up to and beyond 1958, the ANC has clearly to be classified with the ARC. Thus the substantive documentation of the Northern Rhodesia African political leaderships class character and bourgeois ideology provided in and by the ARC phenomenon is relevant to the entire Northern Rhodesia African leadership continuum, right down to 1958. As such it is also directly relevant to a definition of African nationalist leadership and nationalism in that period. That nationalism and the nationalist leadership of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia in the post 1958 period, similarly, were petty-bourgeois and aspirant bourgeois appears to be indicated by the embracing quality and on-going character of pre 1958 political leadership personnel and characteristics into the post 1958 period down to the present day. Full substantiation however of the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois character of present-day leadership in this country lies outside the scope of the present study.

PREFACE

In 1946, the South African 'Native Representative Council' sitting in Pretoria declared itself adjourned sine die in protest against its own 'toy telephone' ineffectiveness as representatives of the African voice to the governing powers in the political status quo in that country. They cited their inability to stem or alter in any real way the continuing flood of racially-based legislation prejudicial to the interests of the African population of South Africa as their major criticism of the councils system (Karis and Carter: Stanford, 1972). A much more politically radical and principled campaign against the South African 'dummy' councils system for Africans had, however, been waged by African political leaders in that country ever since the inception of and/or elaboration upon the system in 1935.(Karis and Carter: Stanford 1972) (Peter Walshe:London 1970). This was expressed in terms of boycott of all separate and inferior institutions and forms of 'representation' for Africans in South Africa and non-collaboration in and with the system of the oppressors of the mass of the population of that country (I.B. Tabata: Cape Town 1944).

In the very same year of 1946 in Northern Rhodesia, the British Colonial administration was busily completing their system of ('rural Native administration', urban 'advisory' and national 'representation') African councils with the institution of an African Representative Council in Lusaka. The whole was influenced indirectly (mainly through the settler population in Northern Rhodesia) by the South African model and even to a degree officially patterned upon it. (see Chapter One of present study). African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia had already been incorporated into these councils since the later 1930's. In 1946 they plunged wholeheartedly into the new ARC, and from 1946 to 1958, and beyond, continued to collaborate in and operate the same system (or type of system) - although by the latter date the tactic of principled boycott of separate and inferior political institutions and forms of representation for Africans had at last entered

the arena of political debate in Northern Rhodesia.

It was such (administrative pradtice) similarities and (African political) contrasts illustrated in and in regard to these two councils systems of similar type and potential that initially attracted me to the Northern Rhodesia African Representative Council as a subject of research and, although many of the structural and functional similarities of the two systems proved, on closer analysis, to have been rather less than originally supposed, the striking contrasts between the level and character of political debate, perception and perspectives of African political leadership in South Africa and that in Northern Rhodesia were sustained and reinforced. They were reinforced, above all, by a close study of the Northern Rhodesia ARC's own debates which, in the context of the times, revealed a naivete about and degree of non-perception of the character and aims of colonialism in Africa that seemed very significant. The character and conceptions of Northern Rhodesia African political leadership illustrated in the ARC were, what is more, all the more remarkable for being not only in sharp contrast to the level and nature of African political debate in South Africa, but in clear contrast also to the claims made about the 'anti-colonialist' history of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia by national leaders (K.Kaunda Forward to H.Meebelo: Manchester 1971), and nationalist historians (H.Meebelo: Manchester 1971). This voluminous verbatim evidence contrasted also with the interpretations made of Northern Rhodesia history, and the 'rise of nationalism' in this country by authoritative liberal historians (R.Hall: London 1965; R.Rotberg: Cambridge 1965 et al).

Where the present writer and present study differs from such analysts of the history of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia in general, and the African councils system in particular, is not so much in 'making advances upon' their interpretations as in being a departure from them. In fact, apart from some early semi-official portrayals made of the lower urban African councils by colonial administrators (see Bibliography: Journal Articles), and some useful information and perceptive critical comments on the Luanshya Urban Advisory Council by A.L. Epstein (Manchester: 1958), no full study and analysis of the entire African councils

pyramid throughout its duration has been made. The Howman 'Report on African Local Government in East and Central Africa' (Salisbury: 1950-53) would probably have been useful to a description and comparative analysis of the councils' structure and functioning but, unfortunately, it proved to be unavailable in Zambia and/or from Salisbury. This is the one notable lacuna in the sources used in this study. Even this gap is, however, of but limited significance given the fact that Howman's report on the Northern Rhodesia Councils was apparently based essentially on the same official documentary sources in Northern Rhodesia as the present researcher had access to and, more importantly, was a different kind of focus to that of the present study.

In regard to the ARC as such, no full original study has been made. Where established histories of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia do (largely in passing or illustratively) touch upon the African Representative Council itself, it is either in respect of its form and 'purpose' in (laudatory) illustration of 'decolonising developments' in Britain's 'tutelary' administration of the territory (L.H. Gann: London 1964), and/or with regard to the contents of its debates as (critical) 'oral' evidence and exemplification of the evils of racial discrimination and the racial insults and burdens suffered by Africans in this country under colonial rule (R.Hall: London1965) (R.Rotberg: Cambridge 1965). Certain pointers to the political character of this group of men were provided in references to their stands on Federation and partnership and so on (R.Hall 1965; R. Rotberg 1965; D.C. Mulford: London 1967). Here again these were largely incidental and cited essentially in reference to or illustration of processes external to the ARC as such. Neither the full political content and implications of the ARC debates has been analysed, nor these debates' fuller, broader and even more significant socio-economic content utilised, scrutinised and assessed. Equally significantly, no attempt has been made to make a full examination of the ARC men themselves with a view to establishing their social and socio-economic as well as full political identities and character and their position in and in relationship to general African political leadership in this country. It is most probably in its

analysis and documentation of the socio-economic characteristics of leadership in Northern Rhodesia that the present study makes a useful contribution to the analysis of the history of African politics in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia.

It is not only, however, in its closer scrutiny and analysis of the men and motions, the debaters and debates of the ARC that the present study departs from the others (in so far as they were 'studies of the ARC' at all) as in the methodological approach and theoretical perceptions that directed this research. There are three fundamental features to the underlying methodology in this study. The first is the perception of colonialism not merely as the imposition of foreign rule on Africa, nor even merely as the structuring and implantation of foreign political systems on the continent. Colonialism defined as the progressive and full incorporation of Africa into the world capitalist system and as a system of economic exploitation is closer to the raison d'etre and realities of the process. Nonetheless, to be full, comprehensive and explain effectively a wide range of phenomena, colonialism must also be seen as entailing a dramatic and eventually embracing socio-economic transformation 'on the ground' in Africa. The end product of this process of transformation was the dominant and later full characterisation of the entire social system - certainly in the case of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia - in capitalist socio-economic terms.

This introduces the second perception underlying the present analysis. This is that the social formation in terms of which the type of elements and developments in this study must be analysed and defined is not 'traditional' African polities or socio-economic systems, or real or apparent 'survivals' of the same; nor even in terms of dualist models of the survival of such forms 'within' or 'alongside' the 'modern' 'industrial' (read capitalist) system. In so far as the capitalist system was, during the period under examination, already the dominant force, superimposed upon other forms and modes of production, and setting the parameters within which even these continued to 'survive'; and in so far as the end

product of this dominance is a fully-fledged capitalist system, the whole process must be characterised in such terms.

Finally, as a corollary to the above, this study was fundamentally affected and directed by the theoretical position that social classification and analysis of people in a colonial-capitalist situation must be made not on the basis of apparent survivals of certain seeming 'traditional' features and characteristics but in terms of the individuals' real personal occupational histories and positions, and socio-economic characteristics and status within the colonial-capitalist system. This is fundamentally the basis to the divergence of the present researcher from the orthodox definition - well established since Thomas Hodgkin produced his pioneering work on African Nationalism (London: 1956) - of nationalist leadership in Africa as essentially ' middle class'. The present study differs also from later developments on and refinements of the earlier analyses - essentially with the use of the status concept of the 'elite' (P.C. Lloyd: London 1966) (M. Kilson: Cambridge Massa 1966). The conceptual validity and analytical effectiveness of such terms compared with class concepts and analysis is fundamental to this entire study.

Finally, the establishment of the class character and bourgeois orientation of African political leadership in this country in decades prior to independence is of significance not merely to a fuller understanding of the phenomenon of nationalism but to a fuller understanding and explanation of the contemporary African situation. While the latest trends in the analysis of colonialism and neo-colonialism, imperialism and 'independence' or dependence, underdevelopment and the development of underdevelopment are making contributions of great importance to an understanding of the contemporary situation and dilemmas of Africa - and the Third World - they will remain incomplete and of but limited effectiveness as long as they see Africa, African states and Africa's leaderships as being merely and essentially victims dominated and manipulated by international imperialism. Capitalist imperialism certainly does still dominate and control the continent but it does so in collaboration with its class agents and allies here in the form of the burgeoning national bourgeoisies - entre-

preneurial, managerial, administrative and 'political'.

As this study seeks to show there is a reality in J.F. Ajayi's (in T.O. Ranger: Nairobi 1968) assertion that Africans were (and are) not mere passive pawns in the hands of all-powerful, all-seeing colonialists/imperialists. The present researcher's concept of 'African initiative' differs, however, from that of Ajayi and T.O. Ranger (in Gann and Duignan/II Cambridge 1969) in that this initiative is seen in dialectical interaction with the colonialists' within and oriented towards the colonial capitalist system. The same thesis applies to an understanding of the present dependence of Africa on and within the world capitalist system. It derives not merely from the dominant power (and/or 'skillfulness') of international imperialism but from the interaction of the interests of capitalist-imperialism with the new national bourgeoisies of Africa. If this study has served to stress the importance of shifting from purely nationalist reactions to (and in so far as they are reactions to) colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism to a class analysis of the nature and implications in the world capitalist system and a class analysis of the sources of the dependence and attendant dilemmas of modern Africa then it has achieved its most fundamental purpose.

In a study of this nature entailing such a wide range of sources - documentary and oral - and analytical approaches and theoretical concepts commonly associated with so-called 'other disciplines' such as sociology and political science, the present writer was profoundly conscious of her inadequacies in analytical equipment and theoretical foundations in many directions. Scrutiny of and critical comments on this study by a number of 'non-historians' proved, therefore, to be invaluable in confirming and/or criticising the validity of the analyses.

In this regard I should like to express my thanks to Professor Jack Simons and Dario Longi of the Sociology Department for their readings of and comments on Chapter III, and to Morris Szeftel and especially to Dr. Joel Samoff of the Political Science Department for scrupulous reading and critical comments on Chapter

CHAPTER ONE

SOURCES, FORCES AND PURPOSES

At the beginning of 1940 the then Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir John Maybin, in response to a request from the Colonial Office in London drew up an extended confidential memorandum[1] on the "cardinal points to a sound native policy for Northern Rhodesia." This memorandum, in its political aspects, was at one and the same time a summation of British Colonial 'indirect rule' policy developments[2], and their application[3] to and implementation[4] in Northern Rhodesia over the preceeding decade, and a projection into the immediate and remoter future of a specifically and separate 'African mode' of political development for the indigenous population of the territory, as distinct from that being followed in regard to and by the colonial settler population. This 'African mode' was outlined as follows[5]

> "I consider that the best form of government (for Africans) is one based on their own institutions but that this should not be rigidly so based but capable of adaption to meet modern conditions and needs. There need be no difficulty in this...(but)...Sooner or later we must advance beyond the stage of tribal rule. Our plans should envisage the eventual share of Africans in the Central government. Is this to be achieved by putting him on the common electoral roll or by some totally different method?.....I do not myself believe that (a common voters roll) is the right policy. I envisage several stages at each of which the educated African can play his part within a scheme of development more natural to his race viz:
>
> 1. Interconsultation by conferences between different Native Authorities such as the Chiefs' Conferences in Nigeria.
> 2. Provincial Councils attended by representatives chosen in some way to be determined later in consultation with the Native Authorities. We would build up from the bottom not down from the top.
> 3. The further stage is more difficult to foresee. It might take the form either of a National Council to act in an advisory capacity to the Central Government or of representation of Natives on the Legislative Council by nomination made by the Provincial Councils."

Although the Northern Rhodesia Secretary for Native Affairs' draft[6] for this memorandum had referred also to "councils of their

residents" to "control as far as possible" the African satellite townships adjacent to all the growing urban centres in the country, the final version contained no reference to urban African councils, which is doubly significant in view of the fact that a type of urban council, as distinct from tribal-based and oriented 'Elders Councils', had already been in existence on the Copperbelt since 1938. In that year it had been suggested[7] to District Commissioners in the Copperbelt towns that some sort of "representative body of Natives" was desirable to enable the Administration to keep in direct contact with African opinion[8], and "Native Advisory Committees" were in due course nominated, starting in Luanshya and then Kitwe and Mufulira.[9]

In official eyes, however, this administrative innovation in the urban areas was neither significant (nor permanent?) enough to be incorporated in the comprehensive policy statement of 1940, nor an integral part of the scheme of future 'African political development' in Northern Rhodesia, for the focus of the 'Maybin memorandum' was clearly on the rural areas and 'tribal' administration. Furthermore, since this system of 'African political development' was to be built from that 'bottom up', whereas the Native Authorities were, at that stage, still but rudimentally formed and functioning,[10] it followed that neither the proposed Provincial Councils nor (and even less so) a 'National Council' was envisaged for any but the indefinate future.[11] Thus, in reply to a request in November of that year from the Secretary of State for the Colonies[12] for material to reply to a House of Commons Question by Arthur Creech Jones on the political future of Africans in Northern Rhodesia, Governor Maybin[13] stressed the further development of the "Native Authorities" and their "inter-tribal consultation" which "might develop into Regional Councils" but that these latter "would now be quite premature"; making no mention at all of any, even distantly projected, central council for Africans and dismissing urban African political development saying "I am not ready to put forward proposals for that yet."[14] By the end of 1940, therefore, the Official position on African 'political development' in Northern Rhodesia was that, while Africans were to have "an

eventual share" in Central Government, this was to be preceeded by a gradual drawn-out process of development, separate from that of the European settlers, based firmly in 'African' institutions in the rural areas and developing out of Native Authority administration rather than a system of African political representation.

C.O. theory interacting with local factors and forces.

In the meantime, however, some non-rural innovations relating to problems of administration had already been made that both carried within them implications, and directly raised the issue of 'political representation' for Africans and the development of a system of both urban and rural African councils. And these innovations were stimulated or 'inspired' not simply by 'theories' of Government emmanating from London but more by forces at work in Northern Rhodesia and, more concretely, by the impact and repercussions of the totally unexpected and unprecedented African mineworker rioting on the Copperbelt in 1935. The main conclusion[15] derived from that unanticipated violent manifestation of urban African discontent was that the Colonial Administration had inadequate contact with and information on African opinion and grievances - and it was this lesson of 1935 that underlay two important administrative innovations of the later 1930's. The first was at a 'grass roots' level, namely the aforementioned ad hoc nominated Native Advisory Committees on the Copperbelt to facilitate the D.C.'s administration. The second was at the topmost governmental level in the "stop gap"[16] appointment to Legislative Council of a European "Unofficial Member for Native Interests" to assist the colonial administration to arrive at sound decisions on 'native policy'.[17] The former innovation proved useful and in due course resulted in the suggested extension of the Copperbelt "Native Advisory Councils", as they came to be called, to all the urban areas in the country.[18] Even more significantly, these 'advisory' councils had begun to assume a 'representational' character since the essence of 'advising' the D.C.'s was to 'present' or 'represent' (apparent) African views.[19] In the mean-

time, too, the second innovation, the Legislative Council member 'for Native Interests' had also assumed a representational character, partly by virtue of its being cited in the highest representative body in the land, and partly as a result of the ambiguity in the designation 'Member for Native Interests'. The member himself, 'pioneer' settler Colonel Stewart Gore-Browne, envisaging himself as a father-figure leader for millions of Africans, perceived his function as that of "conveying what Africans themselves actually thought and felt";[20] in contrast to the official instruction to merely "give his own opinion as to what was in the best interests of the Native"[21] (although he was by no means averse to doing that as well[22]). The result was that, energetic though he was, Gore-Browne was encountering considerable difficulties in trying to fulfill his function, as he saw it, of canvassing African opinion across the vast frequently inaccessible expanses of Northern Rhodesia in an increasingly complex and heterogeneous society. Although he met with official bodies such as the rural Native Authority Councils and urban Native Advisory Councils, as well as 'unofficial' bodies such as the urban and rural Native Welfare Societies, he found that method too "impracticable and haphazard".[23] The solution that suggested itself, and was seemingly suggested to him[24], was a more systematic and coordinated series of African councils

> "representing different classes of Natives, tribal and urban, who should be encouraged to put up recommendations on matters affecting their own interests to some central council which in its turn would instruct the Nominated Member ('for Native Interests')"[25]

Thus simultaneously, and unintentionally, two very ad hoc, purely administrative innovations emmanating from the urban areas of Northern Rhodesia were assuming political 'representational' characteristics and raising concrete suggestions for the creation of an African councils system incorporating both rural and urban councils, and 'tribal' and urban "classes of natives". This proposed councils system was, therefore, both more 'representational' and more comprehensive, and closer to the current realities of social change in Northern Rhodesia, than those councils envisaged

for the distant future by colonial officialdom by the beginning of 1940.

During the course of 1940 these two sources of an African councils system, the immediate practical and urban (or forward) looking and the long-term theoretical and essentially rural (and backward?) oriented were interacting,[26] and the whole process given a sharp impetus by the repetition in March of that year of serious (and doubly shocking because still unanticipated) African mine-worker rioting on the Copperbelt. The pressing need underscored by this second violent manifestation of urban African discontent for a really effective 'early warning system' for the colonial administration moved Gore-Browne to urge in Legislative Council[27] the necessity for an organised system for "making sure that the views of Natives as held by Natives themselves finds some utterance"[28] or else "we shall be sitting on a safety valve...if not doing so already".[29] And further justification for this sense of urgency was probably provided[30] by the revival of the proto-political African middleclass 'welfare' associations, during these early 1940's,[31] which if unheeded and frustrated were a potential articulate leadership for that manifest mass discontent.

Thus, despite the fact that it was the "express wish of (Legislative) Council that wherever possible legislation be deferred in war-time",[32] Gore-Browne took the step of placing a proposal before LegCo in September, 1942 that[33]

> a) Government extend the principle of Native Urban Advisory Councils, similar to those which are now in existence in the Copperbelt, to all urban areas in the Territory;
> b) Government inaugurate Native Provincial Councils to be elected in each province of the Territory by the members of the Native Advisory Councils and of the Native Authorities in the Province affected.

He stressed that he recognised the difficulties entailed in setting up such councils but that the need was so great for "giving representation (to Africans) that will really be representation"[34] that Government should

> "not delay in trying to find some workable solution even if it is only a temporary one (because)...concessions... wrung from an unwilling Government (are) accepted without

gratitude and immediately followed by demands for fresh concessions"[35]

(citing the examples of Ireland and India). The Government Officials were in agreement with Gore-Browne as to the necessity for and general objectives[36] of such a system and supported the proposal - although maintaining their fundamental committment to the Native Authorities as the main direction and means of African 'political development'.[37] The "Unofficial" settler members of Legislative Council also - and unanimously - supported the proposal, for they saw in it further possibilities for keeping the Africans separate from themselves and, more specifically, out of the political representation mainstream and legislative system being developed in Northern Rhodesia.[38] They had, no doubt, been primarily impressed with and convinced by the parallels drawn by Gore-Browne between 'his' system of African councils and that then being developed in South Africa.[39]

Impact of the war and post-war world 'situation'.

Thus whatever their particular political orientations and motivations, the colonial administrators, Gore-Browne and the other settlers all saw 'sound' reasons for and were all agreed upon the desirability of the extension of the African 'Urban Advisory Councils' and the creation of African Provincial Councils. These "Regional Councils"[40] were, immediately after, duly discussed[41] at the annual Provincial Commissioners Conference of November, 1942,[42] but it was not until May, 1944 that the system could be said to have really been launched.[43] While the practical exigencies of the war situation in which they were being created affected the pace of the implementation of the Provincial Councils, it was the political (propaganda) needs of the 'war effort' that really influenced the method of implementation and presentation of the Provincial Councils - if not their actual character as officially claimed.[44] Thus, in their desire to present the new councils as being essentially representational, a channel of communication for Africans to the Government, and a step in the direction of that 'democracy' in 'defence' of which the war was being fought,

colonial officialdom went to pains to stress that the Regional Councillors should freely express "what is in the hearts of the people".[45] It was urged upon them that they had been chosen by the Native Authorities or Urban Advisory Councils, as the case may be,

> "to represent them and their people and to speak for them so that we members of the Government and the Member ('for Native Interests') nominated by the Governor can hear what the people think and wish us to know. What you say will be written down and copies of your discussions will be sent to the Home Government in England".[46]

In the meantime, however, the Second World War was also proving a boon to the political ambitions of the European settler population in Northern Rhodesia, for the 'exigencies of war' had resulted in de facto settler membership of the Executive Council. Exploiting this strategic advantage they were demanding not only that settler representation on the Executive Council be formally confirmed and legalised but that it be accompanied by a similar recognition of the political importance of the settlers through the establishment of an "Unofficial" (meaning themselves) majority over the Officials in the Legislative Council. The Colonial Office was not averse to these settler ambitions but it had to take into account reservations held by some members of the war-time coalition government in Britain,[47] as well as 'proving' its self-professed committment to the political advance of its colonial peoples in particular and 'democracy' in general. While therefore conceding to the European settlers in Northern Rhodesia three members on the Executive Council and an overall total of thirteen 'Unofficials' as against nine Officials on the Legislative Council, the Colonial Office, in October, 1944,[48] offered the Africans in Northern Rhodesia a quid pro quo in the form of an increase in their (white) 'Native Interests' representatives on the Legislative Council from one to three and a promise that, in the near future, Africans would themselves, through a 'Central African Council' arising out of the existing Provincial Councils, select two of their own number to sit on the Legislative Council.

Thus the African councils system, but recently launched, was much earlier than had been envisaged moving towards its 'representational' fruition - in the creation of a central African

council for the entire country and in the orientation and real, if tenuous, linking of the councils system as a whole to the central legislative structures of Northern Rhodesia. The settlers, needless to say, were not at all happy about this orientation and the direct association of the separate African system of 'representation' with 'their' legislature,[49] but the Colonial Office was, by 1945, in greater need than ever to present evidence, to the post-war world in general, and the new United Nations Organisation in particular, of its fulfillment of its 'protectorate' or 'trusteeship' 'mission' and its committment to the advance of 'political rights' and 'democracy' in Africa. And so 1945 saw colonial administration officials across the length and breadth of Northern Rhodesia busily considering[50] suggestions for the constitution of a "Northern Rhodesia African Council."[51] A sense of some urgency gripped officials[52] and non-officials[53] alike as the post-war world was witness to anti-colonial uprisings surging up across the continent of Asia and stirrings of unrest in Africa itself; the latter coming dangerously close to home with the formation of the Nyasaland African Congress in October of 1944. This last, in fact, moved the Northern Rhodesia Secretary for Native Affairs to stress in his Confidential Quarterly Newsletter of June, 1945[54]:

> "As you may know a Nyasaland Congress has been formed and is in Nyasaland threatening to become a rival body to the (African) Councils which have been formed there. We want to avoid the same thing happening here and I believe we will manage to avoid it if the African Provincial Councils are made representative of all classes and if they are given real freedom of debate in all subjects and do not become like the old 'indabas'. Our Councils certainly have been most encouraging so far and it is most important that we should keep one step ahead of African progress."

The challenges in and potential dangers of the stimulated and burgeoning political aspirations of colonial peoples everywhere therefore precipitated the Northern Rhodesia colonial administration into launching their "African Representative Council"[55] as quickly as possible in order to "keep one step ahead of" or pre-empt similar developments in their Territory. This was all the more pressing in view of the continuing resurgence and

emergence of African 'Welfare' Societies in the war and post-war years and their coalesence into one "Federation of African Societies" in May, 1946. So the first meeting of the First Council of the ARC was duly, rather hurriedly, held in November, 1946. That that, and the two subsequent meetings of the First Council in July, 1947 and July, 1948, were each followed by, and held in the general context of, intensive mutual consultations among colonial officials at all levels on numerous lacunae and anomalies in the constitution and proceedures of the ARC in particular and the councils system in general[56] is testimony both to the partially ad hoc nature of the origins of the councils and the somewhat precipitate, politically urgent nature of the launching of the ARC itself.[57] Similarly, the continued vital underlying colonialist political purpose for this system in the later 1940's, while India broke through to 'independence' and Africa in general and Northern Rhodesia itself began to stir, is testified to by the repeated secret warnings to colonial administrators in Northern Rhodesia to "keep our eyes open for odd societies springing up about the country",[58] urging "at the same time" that the need to

> "meet the legitimate aspirations of our left wing intelligentzia (sic), a rapidly growing class, is one of the greatest importance at the present time, and if we do not tackle it seriously we shall find ourselves in difficulties".[59]

Thus in 1947! And in 1948 following the manifest evidence that the innocuous Federation of African Societies[60] was hesitantly but surely transforming itself into a possibly less innocuous 'Congress', the SNA once again confidentially warned[61] his senior administrative officers that the Africans

> "are entering a difficult phase of race consciousness and it is more important than ever that we should hold their trust and confidence and maintain the closest contact with all classes, not excluding the rising middle-class. We may deplore the fact that this class is becoming politically minded but we cannot ignore it and must take every opportunity to retain its trust and to guide it into safe channels."

These 'safe channels' were of course those being provided by the variety of official African councils, rural and urban, 'traditional' and modern that constituted the African councils system.

Double - pronged political containment strategy.

But the colonial authorities were not convinced that the councils per se as a channel of political expression for the "left wing intelligentsia" and as an opening for politically ambitious members of the "political-minded middleclass",[62] were an adequate safeguard or "safety valve"[63] against the development of 'undesirable' trends in African politics in Northern Rhodesia; and they continued to develop and refine their political strategy both in the structuring of the councils as such and in their methods of utilising the councils system. This consisted, on the one hand, in the strengthening and consolidation of the structural linkage of the urban councils to the rural, of the modern non-tribal institutions with the 'traditional''tribal'-based Native Authorities. The aim in this was to ensure an institutionalised relationship of the 'progressive' middleclass elements with the more conservative rural 'traditional' elements - in effect to shape and utilise the total councils structure to achieve a close interaction between the potentially politically troublesome educated 'middleclass' elements and the more 'reliable' (and directly controllable) 'traditional' leadership. The assumption of course was that it would be the latter that would exercise an edifying influence on the former.[64] This objective was variously expressed by a number of colonial officials on different occasions,[65] but possibly most clearly by the Secretary for Native Affairs who warned[66] that

> " it would be a disaster to encourage the (African) intelligentsia to political activity on lines separate from the Tribal Government.....No doubt urbanised Africans must have their separate organisations but they need not necessarily branch off on a path of their own but could be made to run parallel with the Native Authorities in the tribal areas and join forces with them through the African Provincial Councils and the African Representative Council."

And, just to make sure of the preponderance of Native Authority influence in this 'joint force', the allocation of seats on the African Provincial Councils (and hopefully, through them, the ARC) was weighted in favour of the Native Authorities.[67]

This aspect of colonialist strategy vis-a-vis the councils

system was implemented largely covertly, at the practical level[68] in the structuring of the councils system,[69] but the other aspect of their strategy had to be effected overtly and publically for it was at the political propaganda level by means of the councils system. This was (seemingly paradoxically[70]) to urge upon and convince the African councils' members in particular, and the African intelligentsia in general, of their 'duty' to the African people as a whole and of the reprehensible nature of their higher aspirations as and for 'educated' men alone, as distinct from the great uneducated mass of the population. Or, as Chief Secretary Gartmel Robinson put it to the Western Province African Provincial Council in 1947[71]

> "I want you to remember that you are representing not yourselves but the people of this Province - a very large number of people and with different standards of life and different ways; but they are all part of the community which you represent and it will be disastrous to the Africans of this Territory in general if the leaders seek to advance only those who have reached the highest stage. They must advance the people together.... I want you to lead wisely so that you may avoid some of the dangers that have happened in other African colonies ....in some parts of Africa the intelligent educated ones are very few but they speak sometimes as if they were the only people and in their progress they have forgotten the very great number of their brothers who have remained behind."

This 'noble' political injunction was repeatedly impressed upon the members of all the African councils by a variety of colonial officials during the later 1940's,[72] the rather less noble idea being that if they could be convinced of the indivisibility of the African population and of their places as leaders in and inextricably within the African population, the tendancy already observed in other parts of Africa[73] for the educated African elite to organise themselves politically to demand full admission, 'initially' for themselves, into the colonial political system and colonial society, could be averted, or at least postponed. This, hopefully, would be achieved by pointing to the manifest continued unpreparedness of the so-called 'great unwashed' masses - from whom they were inseparable - for such integration. The first step in this attempted undermining of the aspirations of the African elite

was to convince - or indoctrinate - those of them already a convenient 'captive audience' in the African councils and from there (and also through them) influence the wider African middleclass. This was of course but an unavowed (re)application of the - 'Southern Rhodesian' - two pyramids' policy, which itself had been designed to evade the admission of those Africans who had achieved or aspired to achieve 'European' standards into the 'white' pyramid and, as such, both pre-dated[74] and went far beyond the councils system as such. Nonetheless this line of reasoning and injunction by colonial officials vis-a-vis and within the African councils system constitutes a current worth noting in the changing underlying political purpose(s) which the African councils system was employed to serve during the years of the later 1940's - and beyond!

Thus a two-pronged strategy was being developed in regard to the African councils based not merely on a passive councils system into which to direct or 'guide' African political aspirations but on the active employment of that political contrivance to try to directly influence and shape the content and character of inexorably developing African political consciousness.[75] And this strategy was dual also in the sense that it was aimed not only at the narrower African political leadership <u>in</u> the councils but at the outside and potential African political leadership <u>by means of</u> the councils (and councillors) - the overriding purpose in this earlier phase being the avoidance of the emergence in Northern Rhodesia of one of those middleclass - inspired and led African political organisations then springing up all over the continent.

<u>Strategy modifications for political leadership incorporation.</u>

When, however, by the end of the 1940's, it was decisively confirmed that the multi-fold efforts[76] of the colonial authorities had not succeeded in containing and so influencing the educated African middleclass as to pre-empt the formation of a <u>non</u>-official, purely African, overtly political, national organisation in the territory, British colonial officialdom in Northern Rhodesia

took due note of the fact and characteristically made the necessary modifications in their political strategy - and alterations in the form and functioning of the African councils system[77] - to cater to the new situation. Thus, with the Northern Rhodesia African Congress a fait accompli in July, 1948,[78] the First Council of the ARC was duly dissolved - in the very same month in fact[79] - and preparations advanced for the selection of entirely new councils throughout the system. If the African Congress could not be, as it had not been, averted, both it and the 'politically-minded middleclass' who had created it had to be 'guided' into 'safe channels'. The instructions therefore sent out to all Provincial Commissioners towards the end of 1948,[80] in regard to the pending selection of new Urban Advisory Councils and African Provincial Councils from which would be elected a new African Representative Council, stressed that the selection of the new UAC's

> "should be conducted in accord with normal democratic principles as far as circumstances and the wishes of the people permit....It is most important that the best and most representative Africans should be chosen and you are at liberty to adopt any method you consider to be most suitable so long as it accords with the general wishes of those concerned".[81]

and, similarly, in regard to the APC's that

> "It is very important that we should get the very best into those councils, which may assume greater responsibilities in the future, and it is important that the members should have the full confidence and respect of those they represent".[82]

This manifest drive to endow the African councils with more 'democratic'[83] origins (at the urban council level at any rate) and with as much prestige and even, possibly, 'greater responsibilities' (at the Provincial Council level at any rate), and as truly 'representative' a character as possible was the colonialists' direct counter-action to the definitive emergence in Northern Rhodesia of one of that rash of 'African Congresses' so discomforting to colonial officialdom across the length and breadth of the continent. If the general, especially urban, African population was to be kept away from the new Congress in Northern Rhodesia they had to be offered an attractive alternative focus of political attention. It was important, therefore, that they be drawn towards

the Urban Advisory Councils, in the first instance, by the 'democratic' (consultative) methods - in any form or manner 'they' wished - of selection of the members thereto; and then kept to the new UAC's, APC's and the councils system in general by their 'full confidence' in and 'respect for' the leaders so chosen. And, if the urban population was not to be divided in its loyalties, it was important also that the council members chosen, or nominated,[84] should actually <u>be</u> the real leaders-to-be and/or those already recognised by the people. This is the reason for the stress laid not only on elections - whether at place of work, or in occupational group, or in place of residence or ward, or even if necessary by tribal group[85] - but also on the necessity for incorporating the 'best' and 'most representative' men into the councils. What is more, the councillors had to be the 'best' men available, in both urban <u>and</u> rural areas, in order to enhance the prestige of the councils themselves and, thus, not only retain the confidence and committment of the general African population but actually encourage politically ambitious or 'politically-minded' men, including and <u>especially</u> the founders of the new Congress, to actively seek a place therein[86]. The new councils with the ARC at the peak had, therefore, to be politically 'representative', or convincing, and prestigeous enough and/or offer enough of an 'important' enough outlet for political expression, as well as real political status,[87] to attract both the kind of men and even the very same individuals who had resorted to setting up the Northern Rhodesia African Congress. In this way the colonialists were simultaneously seeking to counteract the new Congress by setting up an 'effective' rival to it for African allegiance, and undermine it by giving its existing adherants and leaders every encouragement, and 'reason', to see the councils system as a real avenue of political expression and/or personal political advancement. That was why, while refusing Congress as a <u>body</u> any reserved seats on the ARC, colonial officialdom urged Congress <u>members</u> to seek a place therein individually[88] via elections to the lower councils - whence they could be elected to the higher councils and to the ARC itself.

No sooner, however, had the array of new councils been

selected and the first meeting of the Second Council of the ARC held in July of 1949 than Northern Rhodesia began to move into[89] the politically troubled years of the early 1950's of the debate over, protest against and imposition of Federation on central Africa. And this politically agitated period not only constituted a vital factor in the political stimulation of the African population - of the whole central African area - and the radical physical growth and even political development of the African National Congress(es)[90], but had a direct bearing and impact on the functioning of the African councils - and African attitudes thereto[91] - most conspicuously in regard to the ARC itself.[92] On account of all these developments further modifications appeared in the colonialists' attitude to and use for the councils system.

Tactical manoeuvres to utilise the councils politically.

The colonialists' tactical reactions to the political situation as such and to the ARC itself varied from sector to sector within the colonialist camp and according to the specific phase of their campaign for Federation. The colonial administrators, for their part, before the full impact of the Federation issue on and in the ARC had become publically clear[93] and definitively and formally expressed, continued convinced that the most effective way of influencing, and containing, both Cohgress and general African political expression[94] was in and by means of the African councils. To this end the latter had to be endowed with a more formal character and elevated to a yet more 'significant' status - hence the launching in September of 1949 of a prolonged meticulous review[95] of the councils system with a view to systematising the whole in a series of comprehensive constitutions[96] and then sealing them with the official stamp of an imposing order-in-council.[97] In the meantime, however, while this exercise was under way, the colonial authorities took the added precaution of ensuring that the Federation issue did not surface in the African councils before they had been satisfactorily 'adjusted' to be entrusted with such a 'complex' and important matter.

these precautions were, in the first place, to keep the subject off the African councils' agendas in 1949,[98] then to issue instructions that the 'tone' of the APC's discussions on the subject during 1950 be 'tempered'[99] and, thirdly, to omit deliberately to summon any meeting of the ARC itself during 1950[100] - since it had not yet been guaranteed that it could be counted upon to 'temper' its 'tone' any more than the APC's had (or rather hadn't) done during that year.[101] Colonial officialdom was, therefore, already manipulating the councils to ensure, at the outset, if not a positive at least not a prompt negative reaction by them to the Federation question.

The settlers too were convinced, initially, that the African councils could be used to further their campaign for Federation.[102] Given, however, the strong manifestations in the lower African councils, during 1950, of African opposition to Federation, settler representatives in Legislative Council performed a sharp volte face and began to deny the right of the African councils to any kind of veto - or voice - on the Federation or any national political question. This they expressed in the demand for the clear-cut divorce of the African councils system from the 'European' legislative system and any African claims for rights - or a voice - therein, or on decisions taken therein; hence the efforts initiated by Welensky in the Legislative Council from 1950[103] to have the African councils system with the ARC at the peak modified into a strictly parallel, totally separate (apartheid-ist) 'legislative' system for the African population of Northern Rhodesia.[104] When this ploy failed to gain the support of colonial officialdom,[105] who remained convinced of the efficacy of their own strategy in regard to the containment of African politics,[106] Welensky then resorted to demanding the total abolition of the ARC.[107] According to him,[108] its position as the kind of "upper house" considering, and confirming, decisions of the Legislative Council was totally unacceptable to members of that august body.....and potentially harmful to their campaign for Federation.[109]

The 'liberal' wing of the settler population, however,

approached the problem of effecting the Federation of Northern Rhodesia with 'the south', and the 'problem' of African political advancement in Northern Rhodesia per se, not by seeking to suppress the African voice but by trying to influence it in the 'right' direction. It was, in fact, Gore-Browne who had in 1949 impressed upon the Government the need for the aforementioned systematisation and formalisation of the councils system.[110] It was he again who, at the beginning of 1950,[111] urged the Government to take heed of the "vocal and influential" section of the African population criticising the African councils as being ineffective government-sponsered, and controlled, organs, and

> "do all we can to hasten the time, even if it means going faster than might be normally desirable, when these councils become genuine democratic institutions exercising actual statutory powers in certain defined directions.....Unless these councils are recognised by the mass of the Africans as something both democratic and efficient which they are operating themselves for their own good, they will be less than no answer to the demand for universal adult suffrage when it comes, as it will very soon."

This self-enlightened strategy to engineer and employ the African councils so as to, as earlier although at a higher level, 'keep one step ahead of' African political demands was a recurrent theme in Gore-Browne's approach to developments in African politics during these years.[112] The line gained over time such active adherants as John Moffat, Commissioner for Native Development[113] and the Reverend Nightingale, one of the 'Native Interests' members of Legislative Council[114] - the latter introducing his own developments thereupon[115] - and eventually the upper echelons of the colonial administration.[116]

This 'thoroughgoing full democritisation'[117] of the African councils system was, however, a long-term and potentially explosive exercise needing time to organise and implement and, what is more, could not be implemented in a situation as volatile as that of Northern Rhodesia, immediately prior to Federation, in which neither the impact of the mere staging nor the outcome of any 'elections' by the Africans was at all certain. Anyway, the colonialists were faced with the immediate and more pressing

problem of getting their Federation 'accepted' and set up. Thus the elections for new African councils scheduled for the beginning of 1952[118] were put off,[119] and the new draft 'democratic' councils constitutions put 'on ice',[120] while the colonial authorities concentrated on priming and preparing the African councillors - both for the day when they, or others like them, would be the 'democratically' chosen representatives of the masses, and for the immediate present and the actual political issues confronting Northern Rhodesia. The former, and the more general future, required that African leaders in Northern Rhodesia fully understand the nature of 'representational democracy' as practised in the 'great democracies' of the West.[121] It was one thing for the councils system in Northern Rhodesia to be 'democratised' in order to win over, or at least steal the thunder of, the actual and potential African political leadership, but it was quite another matter for these councils to be a genuine reflection of the, as yet unascertained and possibly 'dangerous', 'will of the people'. The African councils' members had therefore to be 'enlightened' as to the character and role of leaders in relation to the led, and weaned from their tendancy to insist upon consulting their 'constituents' before pronouncing on any issues.[122] In this way the practice would be established and precedents set for the 'independent' comportment of African leaders in the true spirit of representational democracy before the actual launching of any, even partial and pseudo, 'democratic' exercises in Northern Rhodesia.

What is more, this campaign to create an 'independent-minded', 'courageous' African leadership capable of taking decisions 'in the name of' and 'in the best interests of'[123] the African population was urgently needed in order to be able to contrive and present to the world some evidence of African endorsement of Federation. The need, therefore, both to <u>wean</u> the members of the African councils from their 'attachment' to those they 'represented' and to <u>win</u> them over to the colonialists' cause[124] so that they became an active influence on wider African opinion, rather than the other way round, became at this stage the dominant among the political purposes running beneath and through the utilisation of

these councils. The full variety of representatives of the colonialist camp rallied to this overriding immediate aim.[125] A growing campaign is, in fact, quite evident in the years leading up to Federation both to convince the African councillors about Federation and the related issue of 'partnership'[126] and to imbue them, and more especially those of the ARC, with a sense of their own importance and independence of the masses. They were repeatedly confronted with their obligation to give a 'courageous' and 'correct' lead to the African population[127] - or as the Reverend Nightingale advised in Mutende in 1952:[128]

> "African representatives must be men of good education able to grasp the meaning of the things that they are dealing with, thoroughly acquainted with African thought and custom and, above all, men of strong character who are willing to take an independent line and go back to their people and say 'This is what I have done in your interests.'"

Double-pronged containment strategy sustained.

Although this double-pronged strategy of so structuring (and restructuring) and manipulating the African councils, and hopefully the councillors, so as to contain and/or influence African politics in Northern Rhodesia never succeeded in obtaining the desired statement in support of Federation by any of the constituent bodies in the councils system,[129] it continued to characterise the colonial authorities' attitude to and utilisation of the African councils even after the imposition of Federation. In fact, the imposition of Federation raised the immediate problem for the colonialists of accomodating and disarming the still unconvinced, and hostile, African population. A variety of measures had therefore to be taken[130] to cater to the situation - one of which was so to develop and present the African councils as, once again, to try to outflank and, if possible, encompass the, by 1953, more 'radical',[131] and certainly more nearly national, African National Congress. Thus, on the one hand, the suspended 'democritisation' programme was launched, with much propaganda,[132] in the long-overdue UAC elections in September, 1953[133] (coinciding with the establishment of Federation). This was in order to

simultaneously give the general urban African population a sense of participation in some, if not the political process in their country, and to give the actual and potential African political leaders, and especially certain of the 'Congress types', every justification (or excuse) - and possibility - to secure a place on the lower councils. And, on the other hand, in order to offer not only a political rationalisation for African political leaders to get onto the councils but a positive incentive to do so, the already initiated and much advocated[134] enhancing of the prestige of the councils was carried further. This was by means of the full formalisation of the constitutions and proceedures of the whole system (and the closer approximation of the latter to those of the Legislative Council)[135] and, more importantly, through the increased status attaching to membership thereof consequent upon the greater number and variety of even more elevated and prestigeous positions to be filled therefrom.[136]

During the life of the Third Council of the ARC (1953-1958), coinciding with the first 'phase' of Federation, the colonialist position in regard to the councils system continued to undergo modifications in terms of the ebb and flow of African politics in this period, and in terms of the differing political viewpoints of the various sectors within the colonialist camp. Thus, in the years immediately following the African defeat over Federation, as the chorus of mutual recriminations between ANC and the ARC and their respective supporters[137] died down, and the ANC itself entered a difficult period of internal reappraisal and reorganisation, African politics in Northern Rhodesia entered the doldrums, and the ARC too went into a virtual eclipse from the public eye.[138] This was not, however, merely a reflection of the nature of the proceedings of the ARC in this period, nor even of a direct and telling attack on the ARC in LegCo by one of the African MLC's, Lakement Ng'andu,[139] but because the ARC's projection onto the centre stage and the degree of prominence given its proceedings by colonial officialdom and the mass media[140] varied in direct proportion to the degree of wider African political activity and the nature of the impact of Congress on the African

population at any given time. Hence, 1954 and 1955 are notable for the absence of colonialist comment upon[141] - or indeed great immediate political use for[142] - the African councils. In 1956, however, with the re-emergence of the ANC into active politics, with the urban boycott campaigns, and the resurgence of African unrest and protest in the form of the Copperbelt mineworker 'rolling strikes', and with the related re-emergence of African criticisms of the ARC and the councils system,[143] a variety of colonialists' comments upon and suggestions for the improvement of - and even on - the councils system also immediately reappeared. Once again, however, whereas the settlers, like MLC John Gaunt, with little subtlety of political perception, or expression, plunged in and declared the African councils "useless"[144] and a failure because so thoroughly 'infiltrated' by Congress,[145] the colonial administrators and some of the more self-enlightened 'liberal' settler members of Legislative Council, by contrast, stressed that the latter was precisely what was required.[146] They, in fact, urged the ANC to follow 'proper' constitutional channels and, even if dissatisfied with the African councils, to stand for election to the UAC's so as to change the system 'from within' and work through it rather than resorting to 'unconstitutional' direct action to express and seek redress of African grievances.[147]

What settler Gaunt did, however, suggest[148] (although he was by no means the first to do so[149]), and the government take up, was that what was needed was African bodies with some 'real' executive and financial responsibilities. These responsibilities would both impress, and by their very weight overwhelm and 'tame' politically ambitious Africans, and simultaneously undermine 'hostile' propaganda on the ineffectiveness of the councils as an avenue of African political activity.[150] Since, however, a moratorium had been declared[151] on any proposals for changes at the central government level - for the Northern Rhodesia constitutional review was not due until 1958 - no changes could be considered at that stage in relation to the ARC. The UAC's, however, fell within the ambit of 'local government' and had, anyway, during these years assumed a greater significance by

being more frequently in session[152] and closer to the public eye.[153] The settler-controlled urban local government had itself, what is more, become a focus of African political attention[154] by virtue of its distinct lag behind central government in the introduction of a degree of African participation.[155] Thus, in turning to consider ways and means of giving to the African population some councils with 'real' responsibilities, the colonialist focus was on the lower levels of the councils pyramid and on urban local administration.

The Brown Commission was therefore duly set up, during 1956, purportedly to investigate ways and means of increasing the participation of Africans in local government.[156] Since however the 'worsening' political situation in 1956 and 1957 required some radical remedies, the revamping of the old UAC's had to be carefully disguised, and they therefore re-emerged in the Brown Commission Report of 1957[157] as 'African Housing Area Boards'. These would be delegated, by the settler local government councils, some financial and executive responsibilities in the running of the affairs of the African satellite townships and from their memberships would be elected [redacted] half of the African members designated to make up half of the African Affairs Committees[158] of the main (settler) municipal or township councils. This was thus in fact a form of dual urban administration differing not at all <u>in principle</u>[159] from that pertaining in the days of the old Urban Advisory Councils.[160] Once again therefore the colonial government wished to be seen to be introducing reforms and 'new' rights and responsibilities for Africans while in fact simply offering a modified, slightly 'improved', more attractive version of its long-standing, separate system of councils for Africans, contrived and still being utilised for the containment of African politicians and politics.

By the second half of 1957, with the old UAC's due to be 'upstaged' and/or replaced[161] by the 'new' and 'different' African Housing Area Boards, and with the consideration of national constitutional changes for Northern Rhodesia now under way, the possible demise of the ARC itself began to be officially

hinted at[162] and, by Africans[163] and settlers[164] alike, actively advocated. The African councils as a system was clearly reaching the end of its life, deprived of its raison d'etre at both lower levels and topmost peak - the latter partly effected by the new Federal constitution electoral college system for the election of two African members for Northern Rhodesia to sit in the Federal Assembly.

The abolition of the ARC was in fact officially announced on the 3rd October, 1958[165] and it held its last meeting on the 20th of the same month, and this system of and phase in African 'political development' in Northern Rhodesia (supposedly) ended with the constitutional reforms introduced soon after ushering the African population of the country into an, ostensibly, qualitatively 'different' phase in and form of political representation and participation. Gone, at last, was the gradual, separate, 'African' mode of political development towards an 'eventual share' in the Central Government envisaged by the Maybin Memo in 1940 and carried further in the indirect system of nominal 'representation' on the Legislative Council from 1948 - and kept in operation with slight modifications during the succeeding two decades.[166] It was 'replaced' at last by a 'phased' (gradual!) special (separate!) communal (African!) type of representation in the form of the a non-democratically 'elected' fixed number of African members (a minority share!) in the central legislature of Northern Rhodesia.[167] So much for the 1958 'departure' from the separate, minority, non-democratic and, on all three counts, therefore inferior form of representation offered Africans in Northern Rhodesia since 1953....1949....1946....1944....1942.... 1940....

What emerges from this examination of the sources of 'inspiration' and example for the African councils system in Northern Rhodesia is, firstly, that they were both theoretical and practical, administrative and political, local (settler) and metropolitan (colonial administration), and at one and the same time British Colonial Office (so-called 'non-racial') and South

African (racialist and segregationist) derived. Secondly the councils system was developed out of a number of different, divergent and even conflicting forces at work within and without Northern Rhodesia. These were the threat in mass discontent and its conjunction with African 'middleclass' aspirations, as against (and against!) settler demands and actual political advances. These in turn were interacting in the context of Britain's self-professed committment to the social, economic and political advancement of her African proteges. And this last was being stimulated to provide real (or apparent) 'proof' by actual - and potential - colonial upheavals throughout the world, and anticipated (and later actual) African unrest in Northern Rhodesia itself. And it is not insignificant that this range of forces underlying the creation of the councils system both begins and ends with the dangers of and in African unrest in Northern Rhodesia. It was fundamentally in relation to this that the purposes of and for the African councils were evolved.

Of the purposes which the African councils system was designed and developed to serve it is evident that there were both publically professed and unpublicised underlying purposes, and of both it can be said that they underwent changes in form and relative significance over time in conformity with the changing political context of the country - and in terms of the differing and changing interests and political viewpoints and relative 'power' of the propagators of the system. Similarly, not only the presentation but the actual form of the African councils system underwent changes in terms of the changing political purposes it was required to serve. Thus in the later 1930's and the beginning of the 1940's, with the shock of the repeated African rioting still reverberating in Northern Rhodesia, the councils were conceived as a channel[168] (or series of channels) through which Government could keep itself informed on what was going on at grass roots level in the African population. This urgent purpose required as extensive and comprehensive a network of contact points possible with the African population - hence the incorporation in the largely ad hoc councils at the earliest stages of representatives

of virtually every and any organised group of Africans available, including and especially the Welfare Societies, and even lone but key-placed individuals.[169]

With the development of the Second World War, however, and the related war propaganda stress on, and claims about, 'democracy' and such, a subtle alteration of emphasis was made from a 'channel of communication' for the Government on the Africans into a much-publicised channel of communication of the Africans to the Government. And, as the official mouthpiece[170] of the Africans, the African councils had to be so developed individually and so related collectively as to ensure that it could be pointed out that all Africans, whether urban or rural, modern or 'traditional', 'middleclass' or mass, had in principle some avenue of access thereto, if so desired, whether through official or non-official bodies and/or directly in one or another of the councils or indirectly through the large number and variety of 'delegates' - hence the emerging shape of the councils system in this period with its rural and urban, official and non-official bases.[171]

But the years immediately following the war were so politically troubled - and the, by now, Labour Government in Britain rather more concerned about its 'duty' to the colonial peoples[172] - that the 'mouthpiece' had to be a representative mouthpiece. Thus it had to be, on the one hand, very broadly based and, on the other, progressively structured upwards in a pyramid shape[173] to a national peak in the ARC addressing itself 'directly' to and oriented towards the highest organs of power in the country, to one of which the Legislative Council it actually selected two of its own number as members in 1948. This system of representation[174] into which the councils had been, somewhat pretentiously, elevated was constantly commended to the African population in the later 1940's as the true and effective means of presentation and redress of their political and other grievances, and the effective avenue and evidence of their real political progress. The underlying political purpose in this period was to so impress and influence the relevant sections of the African

people as to prevent the emergence, if not of an 'undesirable' African political organisation, at least of undesirable African politics. Hence the continued application of this rationale vis-a-vis the African councils both before and even (or especially) after the formation of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress in 1948.

With the change of government in Britain in 1951 and, more importantly, the changed political climate in Northern Rhodesia in the early 1950's, the African councils 'system of representation' underwent an unpublicised modification back into the earlier 'channel of communication', with the difference that, given the colonial government's need at that stage to have some, or as many, and as effective means possible of actively influencing the African population in favour of Federation, the earlier channel of communication was now to be neither one way nor the other but a <u>two-way channel of communication</u>.[175] And it was 'two-way' in the sense that the councillors were to 'frankly' and 'impartially' inform the Government of the opinions and grievances of the people and equally 'honestly' and 'impartially' inform the African population of the Government's 'good works and intentions' on their behalf, not least of all in supporting the Federation of the north with the south! This particular political purpose did not entail a change in the structure of the councils system so much as a change in its functioning - in the functional relationship of the higher to the lower councils and of them all to the general population - in an attempt to exploit the councils to influence the African population and/or (failing the former) divorce African political leadership from African public opinion.

The imposition of Federation, however, required the appearance of exactly the opposite, that is the thoroughgoing participation of the demos in the councils system, the pressing need at that stage being to 'buy off' African discontent over Federation and anticipated demands for greater rights <u>in</u> Northern Rhodesia - hence the re-presentation of the councils system as the 'interim'[176] <u>democratic representative mouthpiece</u>[177] of the Africans, as well as the <u>training ground for and means towards</u>[178] even greater political participation. Hence also the alteration

in the structure so as to exclude representation of and by small, non-official African bodies and urban population groups in favour of generalised 'democratic' selection of urban council members. The hope here was that such atomised (and secret ballot) expression of African opinion would be less formed and concerted (or 'influenced') and would make for the choice of more 'reasonable' and amenable councillors. Such a selection would not necessarily totally exclude, nor was it desired that it should exclude, Congress men, but would tend to divide their ranks by drawing off the moderates leaving isolated, it was hoped, those diehard 'extremists' who had resisted the lures of the rewards offered in the councils and especially those in and through the ARC. With many Congress men thus drawn into the salutory atmosphere of the African councils, another 'generation' and/or layer of such African political leaders would have been incorporated in such a way as to be subject to the necessary influences and processes of conditioning containment. And with Congress itself, hopefully thus partially decapitated or denuded of leaders, and weakened - while the ARC participants were, by contrast, being elevated to great status and high rank - the stalwarts in the Congress would 'next time' be more susceptible to and even more acceptable to colonial political lures.

There was no 'next time' to test the eagerness of the remaining Congress leaders outside the ARC to get into the councils system - at least in its old form[179] - because by 1956 and 1957 the 'winds of change' were so rapidly gathering force across the continent and the political situation worsening even in Northern Rhodesia - reflected also in and in regard to the African councils in settler charges that they were dominated by Congress and in Congress charges that they were too controlled by the colonialists[180] - that 'radical' measures were required. So the old African councils system was 'abolished' in favour of 'new' and 'fuller' forms of African participation in both local and central government institutions - which the colonialists now hurriedly proclaimed had always been their inexorably advancing long-term programme. Thus the ARC at its demise in 1958 was brushed off

with a retrospective reinterpretation as a mere interim electoral college to Legislative Council[181] while the African population underwent the necessary 'maturation' to fit them for fuller and direct participation in government. And so, in the final version of the ARC presented by the colonialists, the councils emerged not (it was undeniable) with any power in themselves, but as the real and pre-planned pathway to power created by the 'benevolent', 'decolonising' colonialists for the African population in Northern Rhodesia.

If the colonialists' purposes for and the consequent form and/or presentation of the African councils system are characterised by change within continuity, even radical change and apparent about turns within continuity; the purposes for, methods of utilisation and character of the African councils system must be described as continuity within change. Thus, of all the colonialist aims for and behind the African councils, the one constant underlying and fundamental purpose throughout was to contain African political development in Northern Rhodesia - and 'contain' in the multiple sense of 'set restraints upon' and 'keep in check and under control' (that is hold it back from too rapid or embracing a physical spread); and in the sense of 'set boundaries to' or 'shape' (that is hold it to acceptable political objectives and methods) - as well as in the more literal sense of 'hold' - by incorporation. Thus, despite their various adjustments in immediate tactic, the fundamental colonialist strategy throughout was, by an interchange of indirect 'threats', negative counterweights and positive inducements, to incorporate into the colonialist political structures first the 'politically-minded' of the African 'middleclass' or 'intelligentsia', second (also in historical sequence) African political leaders actual and potential, and thirdly (which was also the latest and the last resort) the leaders of the African National Congress itself. Finally, despite repeated modifications in the structure and functioning of the African councils system, its essential character as a separate 'sub' political structure, in form and methods modelled upon LegCo and oriented - and orienting African political aspirations and

activities - towards the main colonialist political structures in Northern Rhodesia, was sustained throughout the lifetime of the ARC...and continued beyond it in the rather more developed and sophisticated but not qualitatively different form of the Brown Local Government African councils and the Benson Constitution's system of representation.

The foregoing analysis thus provides further illustration of the character and content of British colonial policy, the subtleties and flexibility of British colonial methods of rule, and above all the British strategy of containment[182] of 'anti-colonial' and potentially anticolonialist forces on the African continent. This analysis also provides indications of the structure and functioning of the African councils system itself - which however require fuller description as the starting point from which to assess the degree of success of British colonial strategy in Northern Rhodesia. Most significantly of all, however, the foregoing examination of the apparent and fundamental colonialist political purpose(s) being served by the African councils provides the basis from which to assess the nature of African participation and the actual participants in the councils system and, from this, a basis from which to make an analysis of African politics and political leadership in Northern Rhodesia, and more specifically the leadership in and of the African National Congress, in two crucial decades after the Second World War.

CHAPTER TWO
FORM AND FUNCTIONING

It is necessary at the outset to examine the form and functioning of the African Representative Council in conjunction with those of the African Provincial Councils (APC's) and the Urban Advisory Councils (UAC's) - and even, to a degree, the Native Authority Councils, firstly because the colonialists themselves perceived and utilised them all, whether as a fully integrated, consistent system or not,[1] in terms of their political containment strategy.[2] The second reason is that the composition and character of the lower councils appear to have had a direct bearing on the composition and character of the ARC at the top, and the latter cannot be properly assessed without reference to the nature of the sources of both its membership and the subjects of debate with which it dealt.

The essence of this functional relationship resided in the officially designed selective role of the lower councils in regard to the memberships of the successive higher councils whom they apparently chose themselves from among their own number. In the case of the UAC's and Native Authority Councils to the African Provincial Councils this was essentially on the basis of individual merit,[3] but in the case of the Provincial Councils to the ARC it was in accordance with officially fixed rural:urban, or Native Authority: non Native Authority ratios based, supposedly, upon the demographic characteristics of the province in question.[4]

Similarly, the members of the primary councils, whether urban advisory councils or rural administrative Native Authority Councils or the secondary level rural (-cum urban in some cases[5]) Provincial Councils, were charged with raising on their own initiative and/or (preferably) raising on the mandate of the populations of their respective areas,[6] the grievances and desires of the people whose views they were supposed to have canvassed in tours around, and public and private meetings in their respective 'constituencies'. The more important matters and those most repeatedly raised were submitted by the councillors to the local District Commissioners -

in the urban areas to be tabled on the agenda of the next UAC meeting or, in the rural areas, to be forwarded to the Provincial Commissioners who then drew up the Provincial Councils' agendas therefrom. These matters of public concern, worded as formal motions, were duly debated and voted upon by the respective councils - together with other motions presented for their consideration by colonial officialdom local or territorial[7] - under the chairmanship of the local DC's in the UAC meetings and Provincial Commissioners in the APC meetings. Such motions as were passed by the councillors by a simple majority vote and were of territorial import, or for one reason or another of great enough general significance, were then selected by them, apparently by the same proceedure[8], to be forwarded for discussion at the next higher council meeting. In the case of the APCs' selections of motions for the ARC's attention this meant being sent to the Secretary for Native Affairs himself.

Given the largely ad hoc character of some of the councils, and the pragmatism characteristic of British colonial methods of rule; given also the gradually developing and changing character of the councils separately and as a system in terms of British colonial political strategy in Northern Rhodesia, there were variations of methods of constitution, actual composition of membership (in 'type' and even number) and proceedures in meetings and, from these all, variations in council character and functioning at the middle and lower levels from area to area and over time[9]. Nonetheless, out of these variations and changes, the essence of the functional relationship of the three subsidiary types of councils was, throughout, an upward oriented process of deputation and delegation progressively narrowing to an eventual single focus in the ARC. Similarly, despite changes over time in the number of constituent bodies in the different categories of councils - with a very large and repeatedly altered number of Superior Native Authority Councils,[10] with the UAC's steadily increasing over time from five (early 1940's) to ten (1949) and then over twelve after 1953,[11] and with the number of Provincial Councils changing between eight (1944), six (1946), five (1950), six (1953)

nd seven (1958)[12] - and despite also the consequent relative hanges in the positions of the different types of councils, here was a consistently upwardly diminishing number of councils o a peak of one in the ARC that also resulted in a roughly yramidal shape (see TABLE I).

TABLE I



This, then, was the essential structure and functioning f the African councils system as officially designated and escribed. Whether it was a fully accurate portrayal is a matter or closer scrutiny, but of more immediate importance is the fact hat even such a description of the structure upon which the ARC ested and functioned is inadequate to an assessment of that body or there were, in addition to the above three categories of fficial councils, a number of other official and non-official odies which apparently had a material effect on the composition and haracter of the African councils by virtue of their role in the election of members to the system.[13] What is more, the foregoing escription of the functioning of the system is incomplete and uperficial without the inclusion of a closer examination of the ethods, as well as the organs, involved in the selection of embers to the system and hence the relationship of the overall ouncils system to the African population - or sections thereof.

Democratic basis, and Representative System?

The claims made by colonial officialdom[14] were that the African councils pyramid was solidly based on all elements and 'classes' of the African population, both urban and rural, and was a thoroughly 'representative' system[15] not only on this score but on account of the 'active participation' of the population in the selection of members thereto. Thus, the official portrayal[16] (see TABLE II) of the representation of the rural masses in the councils system not only claimed a 'customary' exercise of the 'popular will' in the confirmation and sustenance of the 'traditional' leaders in the Native Authority Councils[17] (and a quasi-mystical identity anyway of 'traditional' chiefs and councillors with their people), but the exercise also of popular choice in 'tribal gatherings' of the rural members of the African Provincial Councils.[18] Official propaganda similarly portrayed the urban masses as actively selecting, with increasingly 'western' type democratic electoral methods, some and then all of the members of the Urban Advisory Councils.[19] And, finally, even the relatively small number of 'detribalised' individuals of the African 'middle-class' or 'intelligentsia' were specifically catered for through the reservation of a number of seats on both UAC's and APC's for representatives of both urban and rural African welfare societies who chose their delegates according to their own, but generally 'democratic' proceedures.[20] Since all the councils in the pyramid purportedly selected their delegates to the next higher council by regular democratic proceedures,[21] colonial official claims about the 'representative' character and 'democratic' origins of the African councils, and hence of the ARC itself, apparently rested on solid grounds. The reality was, however, rather different.

Firstly, on the rural side of the pyramid, although at the earliest stages choice of rural Provincial Councillors by the people in 'tribal gatherings' by "show of hands" or "popular acclaim" was officially indicated[22] as the desirable proceedure, in practice this seldom happened[23] and, even in the few areas in the earlier stages where it was exercised, such popular choice

TABLE II

OFFICIAL PORTRAYAL* OF THE 'REPRESENTATIVE' CHARACTER AND 'DEMOCRATIC' ORIGINS OF THE A.R.C.



* [illegible] interpretation of verbal portrayal by [illegible]

was subject to the considerable influence and even manipulation of the chiefs[24] and/or local colonial officials.[25] In fact, the numerically preponderant rural delegates on the Provincial Councils[26] were invariably Native Authority Council members or nominees, whether chiefs, 'traditional' councillors, 'progressive' (usually part-time) advisory councillors[27], or full-time administrative or 'technical' employees[28] - these last increasingly more numerous on the Native Authority Councils with the growing scale and complexity of these councils' functions and, over time, more and more frequently selected to 'represent the Native Authorities' on the Provincial Councils.[29] The Native Authorities occasionally also nominated, instead of Native Authority Councillors, prominent rural personalities[30] - either in the absence of enough 'suitably qualified' or available men on the Native Authority Councils or in order to 'give recognition to' (or incorporate) otherwise potentially 'troublesome' elements.[31] Since, once it was officially admitted that the so-called direct popular choice was rarely if ever exercised[32] and colonialist claims about the 'representative' and 'democratic' rural base of the councils were shifted to rest more fully[33] on the supposedly popularly endorsed and intrinsically popularly oriented 'traditional leaders' in the Native Authority Councils, it is necessary to stress what their real character was. Firstly, not only was the Native Authority Council membership of a number and ever-increasing number of Native Authority 'Councillors'[34] based on their technical or educational skills, rather than on their kinship, clan or any other 'traditional' positions and roles, but even such 'traditional' elements as survived in the Native Authority Councils were no indication of the necessarily 'popular' basis of those colonial administration bodies. This is because, whether or not the influence of the 'popular will' in and on the ruling elements had characterised certain politics in this part of Africa at different periods of the pre-colonial era, such customary 'control by the demos' on the 'traditional leaders' was very limited and/or largely illusory in a colonial situation in which the realities of power were such that what decided which 'traditional' leaders should be - or continue to be - 'native authorities',

and how they should function, was in the final analysis decided in terms of interests and by methods anything but 'customary' or 'democratic'.[35]

Although the colonial administration in 1952 briefly flirted with the idea of changing the basis of selection to the Provincial Councils from nomination by the Native Authorities to some electoral system "based on wards or districts"[36] - largely under the influence of the discussions on African Local Government at the 1951 Colonial Office Summer School on African Administration[37] - the suggestion went no further. This was most probably for the reason that the more pressing need then was for the introduction of the 'democritisation' programme into the urban areas and that such a potentially explosive experiment was better phased.[38] Thus, the rural membership of the Provincial Councils continued to the end to be overwhelmingly from and chosen by the Superior Native Authorities themselves, and only a tiny minority of the rural councillors in some provinces were not so nominated. These were not however much nearer being the choices of the rural masses for they were either representatives elected by and from the middleclass welfare societies[39] or, in a few instances in the earlier period, actually nominated by the local DC or PC to represent 'detribalised' Africans in areas where there were no 'suitable' or any welfare societies.[40] So much for the 'representation' of the rural masses and the 'democratic' rural angle to the base of the councils pyramid.

As regards the representation of the urban masses in the councils system, colonial officialdom made even more grandiose claims[41] which also bore little relationship to the realities - either of the Urban Advisory Councils or of such of the African Provincial Councils as had urban representation, and least of all to the ARC itself, a number of steps removed as it was from the minor degree of direct popular participation officially catered for and the even lesser degree actually achieved.

Thus in the earliest stages of the formation of UAC's[42] the between nine and twelve members of the first ad hoc committees on the Copperbelt were mainly nominated by the DC's from among the

'tribal elders' in the municipal compounds and from the tribal elders and 'boss boys'' committees in the mine compounds, with a few individuals later chosen from, and even by, the local welfare societies,[43] and a few other individuals 'at large' nominated by the DC on account of their prominence in one way or another in the affairs of Africans in the urban areas.[44] This selection, based simultaneously on tribal, occupational, associational and residential criteria,[45] entailed extremely limited electoral elements[46] and no direct popular participation and was the basis for the selection of members of the UAC's into the early 1940's and hence the basis also of urban representation in certain of the new 'Regional Councils' set up in 1943 and 1944.[47]

In 1945, however, when it came to the creation of a convincing ARC, the SNA was concerned about the manifestly unrepresentative character of the existing councils[48] and the fact that it had already been reported[49] that some Africans regarded the UAC nominees as "mere yes-men" and "friends of the Bwana." He therefore urged all the Provincial Commissioners to consider ways and means of rendering the origins of the ARC "as democratic as possible."[50] Their decision, in turn, at the annual Provincial Commissioners Conference of 1945 was that, in the urban areas, representatives "should be chosen by those they represent by whatever means is found to be most successful."[51] They left the details however up to the local DC's to decide in accordance with "local conditions" - in practice meaning according to their own individual proclivities - for the PC's were far more preoccupied with the questions of 'fair' allocation of the ARC places per provinces and with a 'sound' balance within the provinces between the urban (where applicable) and rural areas and/or between the various Native Authorities within one province. The final Executive Council decision[52] on the Provincial Commissioners' recommendations was that the various existing Provincial Councils would elect twenty-nine delegates to the ARC from among their own members[53] as follows:

Northern Province	6 (all rural)
Eastern Province	4 (3 rural, 1 urban)
Southern Province	3 (2 rural, 1 urban)
Central Province	4 (2 rural, 2 urban)
54 Western Province	5 (1 rural, 4 urban)
55 Kaonde-Lunda Province	3 (all rural)
56 (Barotse Protectorate	4 (all rural)

The resultant membership elected by and from the six Provincial Councils to the First Council of the ARC (see Appendix B(iv)) consisted of nineteen men nominated to the Provincial Councils by the Native Authorities, three men nominated thereto by District Commissioners, three elected by rural African welfare societies and nine originally elected thereto by Urban Advisory Councils. Although this first ARC did, in fact, have a relatively higher proportion of originally elected members (twelve as against twenty-two nominees[57]) than later councils,[58] that does not reflect a necessarily more 'democratic' character. This is because the election was removed by a repeated selective process from the ARC itself and was, above all, by and from private bodies of restricted membership[59] - the middleclass welfare societies - or by and from still largely nominated bodies, the UAC's. Real popular participation was insignificant and small wonder therefore popular interest in the councils was virtually non-existent.[60] By contrast, despite the "considerable inequality in the level of education and mental development"[61] of the councillors themselves, indicating that they were not all of the African educated elite, some "advanced elements" from both rural and urban areas were apparently well integrated into the councils.[62] To colonial officialdom the councillors were, in fact, a pleasing blend of chiefs and their councillors with such "advanced elements",[63] although to the colonial settlers' mind there were rather too many of the latter and too few chiefs.[64] Either way, the First Council of the ARC while on the one hand barely touching the masses, on the other, indicated the already active participation in the councils system of not only 'traditional' 'tribal' leaders but a variety of representatives of the 'advanced'

or 'modern' leaders of the African 'middleclass'.

Middleclass participation and popular apathy.

Following the dissolution of the First Council in mid-1948, the colonial authorities set administrative wheels in motion to ensure an apparently greater degree of popular participation in the election of new UAC's, the prime aim being to attract and ensure a fuller integration of African middleclass political leadership therein.[65] Thus, the SNA's instructions were that, although it was "too soon to lay down hard and fast rules", elections to the UAC's

> "should be conducted in accordance with normal democratic principles as far as circumstances and the wishes of the people permit..."[66]

but his emphasis was more on getting the "best" men possible and the DC's were, once again, given considerable latitude to "adopt any method (they) consider(ed) to be most suitable."[67] The result was that a wide variety of methods were employed for the selection of the new UAC's in early 1949[68] - in the great majority of cases by electoral colleges and even with the continuation of direct nominations by the DC's themselves - entailing very little direct popular participation. In contrast, however, to the limited role of the masses in the UAC's, the African 'intelligentsia' or urban 'middleclass' elements apparently responded enthusiastically to the direct opening now offered them for places on the UAC's, which were the source of access to and through the Provincial Councils to the ARC and even to the Legislative Council itself.[69] Thus there was "wholesome competition"[70] between the"good standard candidates"[71] resulting in an "improved quality" of councillors on the new UAC's.[72] This was reflected also in such of the APC's as had UAC representation in an overall change in the balance of the membership away from the older and more 'traditional' types towards younger 'modern' men belonging more fully to the urban milieu.[73] So, although the urban middleclass welfare societies were largely eliminated at this stage from direct representation on the

UAC's, the urban middleclass as such was apparently participating therein even more fully than before.

Such elected urban middleclass participation was but one part of the colonialist requirements in the membership of the African councils, however, the fuller aim being their secure integration therein with the 'traditional leadership' elements.[74] Thus the 'elected' UAC's had but limited access to only four of the African Provincial Councils and not only were the other four councils[75] totally rural, but both they and the rural delegates in the 'mixed' APC's were more than ever dominated by Native Authority Council members and nominees.[76] What is more, with APC representation on the ARC weighted in favour of the rural councils - in the guise of a fair reflection of population distribution[77] - such 'modern leaders' as were elected by the Provincial Councils to the ARC were bound to be outnumbered by the 'traditional' and/or nominated members. In fact, the overall membership of the Second ARC was expressed by colonial officialdom as a gratifying combination of a varied range of individuals of the African middleclass interspersed among a selection of chiefs and both 'traditional' and 'progressive' councillors.[78]

Thus the 'democratic principles' ostensibly applied in the UAC elections of 1949 indeed appear to have succeeded in attracting the desired degree of African middleclass participation in the councils system in general and the ARC itself but, with the membership of the Second Council of the ARC consisting of twenty-two Native Authority nominees, as against eight men elected by the UAC's and two by rural welfare societies (see Appendix C(iv)), and even, these two latter groups of dubiously 'democratic' origins, the ARC was, if anything, further than ever from being a body elected by and representative of the African masses urban or rural.

Nonetheless, colonial officialdom continued in its claims and supposed endeavours to make the councils ever more 'representative' and the choice of the members of the lower councils, now both urban and rural, more fully 'democratic'.[79] The outcome of the council systematisation and democritisation

exercise between 1949 and 1952 was the SNA's Circular Minute to all PC's in February, 1953[80] conveying detailed instructions for the conduct of UAC elections on a geographical ward basis by secret ballot, with only residential qualifications for the vote (but excluding women!) and candidature[81] (but excluding civil servants[82]). This sweeping 'democratic enfranchisement' and the "prolonged and careful explanations and encouragement"[83] given the urban populations to take part in the elctions of new UAC's in all the urban centres in Northern Rhodesia in September, 1953, failed to impress the urban masses, however, as is evident in the abysmally low percentage polls recorded.[84] The African urban 'politically-minded middleclass' by contrast responded with alacrity, as is illustrated by the fact that the new UAC's were characterised both by a much higher educational standards than the previous ones[85] and by an apparently fullsome participation therein of a wide range of urban African leaders including both trade unionists and Congressmen.[86]

This latter participation was reflected also in the UAC's elections to the APC's, more especially the Western (now Copperbelt) Provincial Council in which fully nine of the fourteen councillors were now trade unionists.[87] Similarly, the Provincial Councils in general were now characterised by a very much higher educational standard of the members[88] - although in the case of the rural APC's this was due to the increasing nomination by the Native Authorities of their educated administrative and technical personnel in preferance to the older chiefs and traditional councillors[89] rather than the indirect effect of any, even unsuccessful, democratic elections. In fact the rural areas had been entirely left out of the much-publicised 'democritisation' of the African Councils system[90] and, if the urban masses had failed to take advantage of the opportunity given them to elect their 'own' local council leaders - and sustained that position to the end[91] - the rural masses were not even offered the suggestion of an opportunity of doing so. Further, if the masses were represented therein but partially and indirectly, this was in sharp contrast to the African elite, whether 'traditional' or 'modern', rural or

rban, who in large numbers[92] participated in the councils from he bottom up and were solidly represented in all the new African rovincial Councils.

With these last selecting the Third Council of the ARC rom among their own number and with the resultant ARC membership onsisting of fully twenty-seven Native Authority nominees, hether 'traditionals' or 'progressives' and eleven urban middle-lass 'electees' (see Appendix D(iv)), not only is the colonialist-esigned relative position of the rural and urban elites in the RC further illustrated, but the sharply contrasting attitudes nd representation of the African elite and the African masses to nd in the councils system, and most markedly in the ARC itself, nce again made abundantly evident.

On the basis of the foregoing evidence the more accurate ortrayal of the sources of the ARC's membership would be a omposite picture (as in TABLE III) which conveys the multiplicity f methods involved and the extremely limited employment of direct emocratic elections to the system as opposed to the (apparent) tilisation of democratic proceedures within the pyramid. It is hus, manifestly, mainly by means of such purported internal lements of democratic practice that the colonialists sought to haracterise the whole as a 'democratic system'. This line had herefore clearly been designed not to draw in the African masses, s such, but in the first place to create a device for the in-orporation of the 'political minded' African 'middleclass'. his device would, what is more, provide both a lure - and a ationalisation - for the willing participation of especially such f the African political leaders as were (ostensibly) oriented by nd towards the interests of the masses. Finally, it constituted 'convincing' propaganda gesture towards liberal British, and nternational 'public opinion' (as exemplified in the UN) regard-ng the 'development of democracy' in this part of Africa.

If, however, the evidence is that the colonialists' democratic' devices were clearly aimed at and apparently success-ully effected the active and comprehensive participation of the frican elite - not merely the 'progressive' or 'modern' educated


ELECTION directly by popular vote
ELECTION indirectly by
ELECTORAL
NOMINATION by
NOMINATION by Native Authorities
A.R.C.
URBAN
ADVISORY COUNCILS
WELFARE SOCIETIES
NATIVE
AUTHORITY
COUNCILS
CHIEFS
TRADITIONAL
COUNCILLORS
EDUCATED
EMPLOYEES
PROGRESSIVE
ADVISERS
RURAL 'PERSONALITIES'
TRIBAL ELDERS
'BOSS BOYS' COMMITTEES
URBAN 'PERSONALITIES'
ELECTORAL COLLEGES
POPULAR ELECTORATE
RURAL
URBAN

'middleclass' elements, not merely a 'sound' balance of representatives of both the rural and urban, 'traditional' and 'modern' African leaderships, but even members of the most prominent and 'radical' African organisations of the period, the trade unions and Congress - two questions nonetheless still require clarification. The first is whether what are, after all, largely colonialist assessments (or allegations!), cited above, of the successive memberships in the lower level councils accurately reflected the real socio-economic and political characteristics of the participants in the councils system and more especially those selected to the ARC. The second question is whether, given the manifest falseness of colonialist claims about both the 'representative' character and 'democratic' origins of the African councils, their claims about even the mere internal democratic proceedures and the general functioning of the system were equally remote from the realities. The first can best be answered by a close examination of biographical data on the men forming the ARC, which is an involved analytical exercise in itself, undertaken in Chapter Three, but the second is an integral part of the present examination of the form and functioning of the councils system - and essential to an accurate assessment of the nature of the role and participation of the members therein.

Democratic elections within the pyramid?

Following the inauguration by 'election' or nomination of each new set of councils, the members of the UAC's and APC's in their very first meetings set about electing the member(s) designated them on the next higher council. As is characteristic of such processes, there is evidence that the councils' elections entailed both energetic prior lobbying among the members[93] and various efforts from without to influence the outcome - including expressions of opinion in[94] and by[95] the press, and advice (and possibly even attempted pressure) from unofficial African bodies including the ANC.[96] These elections were also accompanied by the attempted exertion of influence within the councils system in the

form of 'guidance' from officials participating therein, couched as 'disinterested advice' on the qualities and characteristics desirable in men to be so elected.[97]

As regards the last, however, it must be pointed out that the colonialist role in the process does appear to have been limited to such indirect 'influence' rather than any degree or form of direct interferance in or manipulation of the balotting - even to the point of having anomalous situations arise out of their non-intervention. Thus, for example in the earlier period (before, what is more, they had committed themselves so fully to so thoroughgoing a 'democratic' line in regard to the councils system!) a case arose in which it appeared that special efforts might be necessary to ensure that one of the first two African Members of the Legislative Council, the Reverend Henry Kasokolo gain re-election to the ARC[98] which was essential since it was the source of his legitimacy as African representative on LegCo. Although his chances of re-election to the Second ARC were in grave doubt,[99] the Governor's Executive Council limited themselves merely to advising the African MLC's confidentially to make every effort to be so re-elected since "a delicate situation might arise" if they failed to regain their places on the African Council.[100] In the event, Kasokolo did fail to gain re-election in 1949 and the colonial authorities contrived an alternative constitutional accomodation[101] by which he could complete his term in LegCo although no longer a member of the council that had originally elected him thereto. It was, however, an unsatisfactory recourse[102] and the case serves to illustrate the determination of the colonial authorities not to interfere directly with the 'free' democratic electoral processes within the pyramid which would place in jeopardy the legitimacy of the whole.

Similarly, after 1949, when many of the most prominent figures in the councils and even the ARC were Congress men[103] and there was a distinct possibility that they would be - as they were - elected by the ARC to be the African members of the Legislative Council,[104] the colonialists limited themselves merely to giving the electors advice about the desired qualities and calibre of men in

such high office[105] - accompanied in fact by a far more vociferous and sustained campaign of advice and instructions by the ANC[106] - prior to the formal elections. In the same connection, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia himself confidentially raised the constitutional query whether - it being laid down that the Governor would nominate as African MLC's such men as had been elected by and from the ARC for sudh appointment - any discretion resided with him to accept or reject any person(s) so selected.[107] He was however hastily informed by his legal and political advisers that the choice of the ARC was in fact the choice to be followed[108] and that his role in the process was a mere constitutional formality.[109] The evidence is therefore that the colonialists were more concerned that democratic form should be followed, and the image - and conviction in the minds of the councillors themselves - of the fully democratic nature of the processes of election within the pyramid sustained, rather than with the precise individuals to be so chosen. The social composition of the membership as such, and the nature of the system, would 'take care' of the latter but it was the apparent legitimacy of the councillor-electors themselves and hence of the men they chose that it was more important for the colonialists to be able to assert convincingly.

Formal electoral proceedures were thus followed throughout and, if 'influence' and even pressure were exerted from any quarter to any degree, the secret ballot employed in the elections[110] justifies the conclusion that, in so far as that device can and does ensure 'free choice', the men elected to the Provincial Councils by the UAC's and by the Provincial Councils to the ARC reflected the collective decisions of the memberships involved. Of course restrictions were set on the range of options in APC elections to the ARC[111] on account of the officially fixed rural: urban and Native Authority:non Native Authority ratios. In so far, however, as there was any choice of individuals within these limits, the selection made was that of the councillors themselves. And, in regard to the restricted range of choices allowed them, it is significant to note that they themselves actually rejected[112] a suggestion for widening the range from which they could select

THE AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL 1946-1958:

A FOCUS ON AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND POLITICS IN NORTHERN RHODESIA

by

D.L. KEET

A thesis submitted for the M.A. degree at the University of Zambia, 1975.

NOT TO BE REMOVED FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA

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ABSTRACT

The British colonialists in Northern Rhodesia, experienc in the discomforting problems arising from the conjunction of 'politically-minded' elites with mass discontent in their colonies and aware of such embryonic 'middleclass' leadership and mass stirrings in Northern Rhodesia itself during the Second World War and post war years, evolved what had been initially and fundamental an administrative system of urban(advisory) and rural (Native Authority) councils into a characteristically subtle and flexible political device for the incorporation and containment of the acutal - and potential - modern African political leadership in th country. This pyramid of African councils rising through provinci councils to a peak in the African Representative Council was portrayed as, and actually developed into, an increasingly 'demo- cratic' system - both in order to endow it with an aura of legitim cy as representing the voice of the African population of the coun and in order to ensure the incorporation therein of the actual loc and national leaders of the African 'politically-minded middle- class'. This strategy was manifestly successful, for , from both the rural and urban bases of this pyramid, the range of men enter- ing and selected upwards by their fellow councillors into the ARC itself was that balance of supposedly 'authentic traditional' and actual 'modern middleclass' leadership elements desired by the colonialists. The Native Authority leaders in the ARC were, how- ever, rather less 'traditional' than the colonialists claimed for, in personal characterisation, they belonged to the same urbanised or 'westernised' educated elite as the non-Native Authority councillors from both urban and rural areas. In terms of both educational and occupational criteria, the African Representative Council membership in fact actually consisted solidly of 'modern middleclass elements'. These 'modern middleclass' elements in turn, however, proved to be nothing other than petty-bourgeoise and aspirant bourgeoise 'born out of' and shaped (or reshaped) by the colonial capitalist system, and fully oriented towards and striving for a higher and unfettered place in that system, political

socially and economically. The emergent class character and bourgeois orientation of the ARC men was, what is more, thoroughly representative of that of African political leadership in general in Northern Rhodesia in that period - not only for the direct reason of the presence amongst them of many of the most prominent political figures of the time but because the ARC, in both personnel and political content, was a representative selection and reflection of the broad territory-wide spread of African councillors, themselves representative of both the rural 'traditional' and urban (and rural) modern African leadership. The petty-bourgeois character and bourgeois orientation of African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia reflected similarly a more specific section of that leadership continuum - namely that in and of the African National Congress. In so far as there was a duplication of leadership social type, actual personnel, political method and political orientation/participation in colonialist structures, including the African councils, up to and beyond 1958, the ANC has clearly to be classified with the ARC. Thus the substantive documentation of the Northern Rhodesia African political leadership's class character and bourgeois ideology provided in and by the ARC phenomenon is relevant to the entire Northern Rhodesia African leadership continuum, right down to 1958. As such it is also directly relevant to a definition of African nationalist leadership and nationalism in that period. That nationalism and the nationalist leadership of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia in the post 1958 period, similarly, were petty-bourgeois and aspirant bourgeois appears to be indicated by the embracing quality and on-going character of pre 1958 political leadership personnel and characteristics into the post-1958 period down to the present day. Full substantiation however of the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois character of present-day leadership in this country lies outside the scope of the present study.

PREFACE

In 1946, the South African 'Native Representative Council' sitting in Pretoria declared itself adjourned sine die in protest against its own 'toy telephone' ineffectiveness as representatives of the African voice to the governing powers in the political status quo in that country. They cited their inability to stem or alter in any real way the continuing flood of racially-based legislation prejudicial to the interests of the African population of South Africa as their major criticism of the councils system (Karis and Carter: Stanford, 1972). A much more politically radical and principled campaign against the South African 'dummy' councils system for Africans had, however, been waged by African political leaders in that country ever since the inception of and/or elaboration upon the system in 1935.(Karis and Carter: Stanford 1972) (Peter Walshe:London 1970). This was expressed in terms of boycott of all separate and inferior institutions and forms of 'representation' for Africans in South Africa and non-collaboration in and with the system of the oppressors of the mass of the population of that country (I.B. Tabata: Cape Town 1944).

In the very same year of 1946 in Northern Rhodesia, the British Colonial administration was busily completing their system of ('rural Native administration', urban 'advisory' and national 'representation') African councils with the institution of an African Representative Council in Lusaka. The whole was influenced indirectly (mainly through the settler population in Northern Rhodesia) by the South African model and even to a degree officially patterned upon it. (see Chapter One of present study). African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia had already been incorporated into these councils since the later 1930's. In 1946 they plunged wholeheartedly into the new ARC, and from 1946 to 1958, and beyond, continued to collaborate in and operate the same system (or type of system) - although by the latter date the tactic of principled boycott of separate and inferior political institutions and forms of representation for Africans had at last entered

the arena of political debate in Northern Rhodesia.

It was such (administrative practice) similarities and (African political) contrasts illustrated in and in regard to these two councils systems of similar type and potential that initially attracted me to the Northern Rhodesia African Representative Council as a subject of research and, although many of the structural and functional similarities of the two systems proved, on closer analysis, to have been rather less than originally supposed, the striking contrasts between the level and character of political debate, perception and perspectives of African political leadership in South Africa and that in Northern Rhodesia were sustained and reinforced. They were reinforced, above all, by a close study of the Northern Rhodesia ARC's own debates which, in the context of the times, revealed a naivete about and degree of non-perception of the character and aims of colonialism in Africa that seemed very significant. The character and conceptions of Northern Rhodesia African political leadership illustrated in the ARC were, what is more, all the more remarkable for being not only in sharp contrast to the level and nature of African political debate in South Africa, but in clear contrast also to the claims made about the 'anti-colonialist' history of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia by national leaders (K.Kaunda Forward to H.Meebelo: Manchester 1971), and nationalist historians (H.Meebelo: Manchester 1971). This voluminous verbatim evidence contrasted also with the interpretations made of Northern Rhodesia history, and the 'rise of nationalism' in this country by authoritative liberal historians (R.Hall: London 1965; R.Rotberg: Cambridge 1965 et al).

Where the present writer and present study differs from such analysts of the history of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia in general, and the African councils system in particular, is not so much in 'making advances upon' their interpretations as in being a departure from them. In fact, apart from some early semi-official portrayals made of the lower urban African councils by colonial administrators (see Bibliography: Journal Articles), and some useful information and perceptive critical comments on the Luanshya Urban Advisory Council by A.L. Epstein (Manchester: 1958), no full study and analysis of the entire African councils

pyramid throughout its duration has been made. The Howman 'Report on African Local Government in East and Central Africa' (Salisbury: 1950-53) would probably have been useful to a description and comparative analysis of the councils' structure and functioning but, unfortunately, it proved to be unavailable in Zambia and/or from Salisbury. This is the one notable lacuna in the sources used in this study. Even this gap is, however, of but limited significance given the fact that Howmans report on the Northern Rhodesia Councils was apparently based essentially on the same official documentary sources in Northern Rhodesia as the present researhher had access to and, more importantly, was a different kind of focus to that of the present study.

In regard to the ARC as such, no full original study has been made. Where established histories of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia do (largely in passing or illustratively) touch upon the African Representative Council itself it is either in respect of its form and 'purpose' in (laudatory) illustration of 'decolonising developments' in Britain's 'tutelary' administration of the territory (L.H. Gann: London 1964), and/or with regard to the contents of its debates as (critical) 'oral' evidence and exemplification of the evils of racial discrimination and the racial insults and burdens suffered by Africans in this country under colonial rule (R.Hall: London1965) (R.Rotberg: Cambridge 1965). Certain pointers to the political character of this group of men were provided in references to their stands on Federation and partnership and so on (R.Hall 1965; R. Rotberg 1965; D.C. Mulford: London 1967). Here again these were largely incidental and cited essentially in reference to or illustration of processes external to the ARC as such. Neither the full political content and implications of the ARC debates has been analysed, nor these debates' fuller, broader and even more significant socio-economic content utilised, scrutinised and assessed. Equally significantly, no attempt has been made to make a full examination of the ARC men themselves with a view to establishing their social and socio-economic as well as full political identities and character and their position in and in relationship to general African political leadership in this country. It is most probably in its

analysis and documentation of the socio-economic characteristics of leadership in Northern Rhodesia that the present study makes a useful contribution to the analysis of the history of African politics in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia.

It is not only, however, in its closer scrutiny and analysis of the men and motions, the debaters and debates of the ARC that the present study departs from the others (in so far as they were 'studies of the ARC' at all) as in the methodological approach and theoretical perceptions that directed this research. There are three fundamental features to the underlying methodology in this study. The first is the perception of <u>colonialism</u> not merely as the imposition of foreign rule on Africa, nor even merely as the structuring and implantation of foreign political systems on the continent. Colonialism defined as the progressive and full incorporation of Africa into the world capitalist system and as a system of economic exploitation is closer to the raison d'etre and realities of the process. Nonetheless, to be full, comprehensive and explain effectively a wide range of phenomena, colonialism must also be seen as entailing a dramatic and eventually embracing socio-economic transformation 'on the ground' in Africa. The end product of this process of transformation was the dominant and later full characterisation of the entire social system - certainly in the case of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia - in capitalist socio-economic terms.

This introduces the second perception underlying the present analysis. This is that the social formation in terms of which the type of elements and developments in this study must be analysed and defined is not 'traditional' African polities or socio-economic systems, or real or apparent 'survivals' of the same; nor even in terms of dualist models of the survival of such forms 'within' or 'alongside' the 'modern' 'industrial' (read capitalist) system. In so far as the capitalist system was, during the period under examination, already the dominant force, superimposed upon other forms and modes of production, and setting the parameters within which even these continued to 'survive'; and in so far as the end

product of this dominance is a fully-fledged capitalist system, the whole process must be characterised in such terms.

Finally, as a corollary to the above, this study was fundamentally affected and directed by the theoretical position that social classification and analysis of people in a colonial-capitalist situation must be made not on the basis of apparent survival of certain seeming 'traditional' features and characteristics but in terms of the individuals' real personal occupational histories and positions, and socio-economic characteristics and status within the colonial-capitalist system. This is fundamentally the basis to the divergence of the present researcher from the orthodox definition - well established since Thomas Hodgkin produced his pioneering work on African Nationalism (London: 1956) - of nationalist leadership in Africa as essentially ' middle class'. The present study differs also from later developments on and refinements of the earlier analyses - essentially with the use of the status concept of the 'elite' (P.C. Lloyd: London 1966) (M. Kilson: Cambridge Massa 1966). The conceptual validity and analytical effectiveness of such terms compared with class concepts and analysis is fundamental to this entire study.

Finally, the establishment of the class character and bourgeois orientation of African political leadership in this country in decades prior to independence is of significance not merely to a fuller understanding of the phenomenon of nationalism but to a fuller understanding and explanation of the contemporary African situation. While the latest trends in the analysis of colonialism and neo-colonialism, imperialism and 'independence' or dependence, underdevelopment and the development of underdevelopment are making contributions of great importance to an understanding of the contemporary situation and dilemmas of Africa - and the Third World - they will remain incomplete and of but limited effectiveness as long as they see Africa, African states and Africa's leaderships as being merely and essentially victims dominated and manipulated by international imperialism. Capitalist imperialism certainly does still dominate and control the continent but it does so in collaboration with its class agents and allies here in the form of the burgeoning national bourgeoisies - entre-

preneurial, managerial, administrative and 'political'.

As this study seeks to show there is a reality in J.F. Ajayi's (in T.O. Ranger: Nairobi 1968) assertion that Africans were (and are) not mere passive pawns in the hands of all-powerful, all-seeing colonialists/imperialists. The present researcher's concept of 'African initiative' differs, however, from that of Ajayi and T.O. Ranger (in Gann and Duignan/II) in that this initiative is seen in dialectical interaction with the colonialists within and oriented towards the colonial capitalist system. The same thesis applies to an understanding of the present dependence of Africa on and within the world capitalist system. It derives not merely from the dominant power (and/or 'skillfulness') of international imperialism but from the interaction of the interests of capitalist-imperialism with the new national bourgeoisies of Africa. If this study has served to stress the importance of shifting from purely nationalist reactions to (and in so far as they are reactions to) colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism to a class analysis of the nature and implications in the world capitalist system and a class analysis of the sources of the dependence and attendant dilemmas of modern Africa then it has achieved its most fundamental purpose.

In a study of this nature entailing such a wide range of sources - documentary and oral - and analytical approaches and theoretical concepts commonly associated with so-called 'other disciplines' such as sociology and political science, the present writer was profoundly conscious of her inadequacies in analytical equipment and theoretical foundations in many directions. Scrutiny of and critical comments on this study by a number of 'non-historians' proved, therefore, to be invaluable in confirming and/or criticising the validity of the analyses.

In this regard I should like to express my thanks to Professor Jack Simons and Dario Longi of the Sociology Department for their readings of and comments on Chapter III, and to Morris Szeftel and especially to Dr. Joel Samoff of the Political Science Department for scrupulous reading and critical comments on Chapter

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CHAPTER ONE

SOURCES, FORCES AND PURPOSES

At the beginning of 1940 the then Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir John Maybin, in response to a request from the Colonial Office in London drew up an extended confidential memorandum[1] on the "cardinal points to a sound native policy for Northern Rhodesia." This memorandum, in its political aspects, was at one and the same time a summation of British Colonial 'indirect rule' policy developments[2], and their application[3] to and implementation[4] in Northern Rhodesia over the preceeding decade, and a projection into the immediate and remoter future of a specifically and separate 'African mode' of political development for the indigenous population of the territory, as distinct from that being followed in regard to and by the colonial settler population. This 'African mode' was outlined as follows[5]

> "I consider that the best form of government (for Africans) is one based on their own institutions but that this should not be rigidly so based but capable of adaptation to meet modern conditions and needs. There need be no difficulty in this...(but)...Sooner or later we must advance beyond the stage of tribal rule. Our plans should envisage the eventual share of Africans in the Central government. Is this to be achieved by putting him on the common electoral roll or by some totally different method?.....I do not myself believe that (a common voters roll) is the right policy. I envisage several stages at each of which the educated African can play his part within a scheme of development more natural to his race viz:
> 1. Interconsultation by conferences between different Native Authorities such as the Chiefs' Conferences in Nigeria.
> 2. Provincial Councils attended by representatives chosen in some way to be determined later in consultation with the Native Authorities. We would build up from the bottom not down from the top.
> 3. The further stage is more difficult to foresee. It might take the form either of a National Council to act in an advisory capacity to the Central Government or of representation of Natives on the Legislative Council by nomination made by the Provincial Councils."

Although the Northern Rhodesia Secretary for Native Affairs' draft[6] for this memorandum had referred also to "councils of their

residents" to "control as far as possible" the African satellite townships adjacent to all the growing urban centres in the country, the final version contained no reference to urban African councils, which is doubly significant in view of the fact that a type of urban council, as distinct from tribal-based and oriented 'Elders Councils', had already been in existence on the Copperbelt since 1938. In that year it had been suggested[7] to District Commissioners in the Copperbelt towns that some sort of "representative body of Natives" was desirable to enable the Administration to keep in direct contact with African opinion[8], and "Native Advisory Committees" were in due course nominated, starting in Luanshya and then Kitwe and Mufulira.[9]

In official eyes, however, this administrative innovation in the urban areas was neither significant (nor permanent?) enough to be incorporated in the comprehensive policy statement of 1940, nor an integral part of the scheme of future 'African political development' in Northern Rhodesia, for the focus of the 'Maybin memorandum' was clearly on the rural areas and 'tribal' administration. Furthermore, since this system of 'African political development' was to be built from that 'bottom up', whereas the Native Authorities were, at that stage, still but rudimentally formed and functioning,[10] it followed that neither the proposed Provincial Councils nor (and even less so) a 'National Council' was envisaged for any but the indefinate future.[11] Thus, in reply to a request in November of that year from the Secretary of State for the Colonies[12] for material to reply to a House of Commons Question by Arthur Creech Jones on the political future of Africans in Northern Rhodesia, Governor Maybin[13] stressed the further development of the "Native Authorities" and their "inter-tribal consultation" which "might develop into Regional Councils" but that these latter "would now be quite premature"; making no mention at all of any, even distantly projected, central council for Africans and dismissing urban African political development saying "I am not ready to put forward proposals for that yet."[14] By the end of 1940, therefore, the Official position on African 'political development' in Northern Rhodesia was that, while Africans were to have "an

eventual share" in Central Government, this was to be preceeded by a gradual drawn-out process of development, separate from that of the European settlers, based firmly in 'African' institutions in the rural areas and developing out of Native Authority administration rather than a system of African political representation.

C.O. theory interacting with local factors and forces.

In the meantime, however, some non-rural innovations relating to problems of administration had already been made that both carried within them implications, and directly raised the issue of 'political representation' for Africans and the development of a system of both urban and rural African councils. And these innovations were stimulated or 'inspired' not simply by 'theories' of Government emanating from London but more by forces at work in Northern Rhodesia and, more concretely, by the impact and repercussions of the totally unexpected and unprecedented African mineworker rioting on the Copperbelt in 1935. The main conclusion[15] derived from that unanticipated violent manifestation of urban African discontent was that the Colonial Administration had inadequate contact with and information on African opinion and grievances - and it was this lesson of 1935 that underlay two important administrative innovations of the later 1930's. The first was at a 'grass roots' level, namely the aforementioned ad hoc nominated Native Advisory Committees on the Copperbelt to facilitate the D.C.'s administration. The second was at the topmost governmental level in the "stop gap"[16] appointment to Legislative Council of a European "Unofficial Member for Native Interests" to assist the colonial administration to arrive at sound decisions on 'native policy'.[17] The former innovation proved useful and in due course resulted in the suggested extension of the Copperbelt "Native Advisory Councils", as they came to be called, to all the urban areas in the country.[18] Even more significantly, these 'advisory' councils had begun to assume a 'representational' character since the essence of 'advising' the D.C.'s was to 'present' or 'represent' (apparent) African views.[19] In the mean-

time, too, the second innovation, the Legislative Council member 'for Native Interests' had also assumed a representational character, partly by virtue of its being cited in the highest representative body in the land, and partly as a result of the ambiguity in the designation 'Member for Native Interests'. The member himself, 'pioneer' settler Colonel Stewart Gore-Browne, envisaging himself as a father-figure leader for millions of Africans, perceived his function as that of "conveying what Africans themselves actually thought and felt",[20] in contrast to the official instruction to merely "give his own opinion as to what was in the best interests of the Native"[21] (although he was by no means averse to doing that as well[22]). The result was that, energetic though he was, Gore-Browne was encountering considerable difficulties in trying to fulfill his function, as he saw it, of canvassing African opinion across the vast frequently inaccessible expanses of Northern Rhodesia in an increasingly complex and heterogeneous society. Although he met with official bodies such as the rural Native Authority Councils and urban Native Advisory Councils, as well as 'unofficial' bodies such as the urban and rural Native Welfare Societies, he found that method too "impracticable and haphazard".[23] The solution that suggested itself, and was seemingly suggested to him[24], was a more systematic and coordinated series of African councils

> "representing different classes of Natives, tribal and urban, who should be encouraged to put up recommendations on matters affecting their own interests to some central council which in its turn would instruct the Nominated Member ('for Native Interests')"[25]

Thus simultaneously, and unintentionally, two very ad hoc, purely administrative innovations emanating from the urban areas of Northern Rhodesia were assuming political 'representational' characteristics and raising concrete suggestions for the creation of an African councils system incorporating both rural and urban councils, and 'tribal' and urban "classes of natives". This proposed councils system was, therefore, both more 'representational' and more comprehensive, and closer to the current realities of social change in Northern Rhodesia, than those councils envisaged

for the distant future by colonial officialdom by the beginning of 1940.

During the course of 1940 these two sources of an African councils system, the immediate practical and urban (or forward) looking and the long-term theoretical and essentially rural (and backward?) oriented were interacting,[26] and the whole process given a sharp impetus by the repetition in March of that year of serious (and doubly shocking because still unanticipated) African mine-worker rioting on the Copperbelt. The pressing need underscored by this second violent manifestation of urban African discontent for a really effective 'early warning system' for the colonial administration moved Gore-Browne to urge in Legislative Council[27] the necessity for an organised system for "making sure that the views of Natives as held by Natives themselves finds some utterance"[28] or else "we shall be sitting on a safety valve...if not doing so already".[29] And further justification for this sense of urgency was probably provided[30] by the revival of the proto-political African middleclass 'welfare' associations, during these early 1940's,[31] which if unheeded and frustrated were a potential articulate leadership for that manifest mass discontent.

Thus, despite the fact that it was the "express wish of (Legislative) Council that wherever possible legislation be deferred in war-time",[32] Gore-Browne took the step of placing a proposal before LegCo in September, 1942 that[33]

> a) Government extend the principle of Native Urban Advisory Councils, similar to those which are now in existence in the Copperbelt, to all urban areas in the Territory;
> b) Government inaugurate Native Provincial Councils to be elected in each province of the Territory by the members of the Native Advisory Councils and of the Native Authorities in the Province affected.

He stressed that he recognised the difficulties entailed in setting up such councils but that the need was so great for "giving representation (to Africans) that will really be representation"[34] that Government should

> "not delay in trying to find some workable solution even if it is only a temporary one (because)...concessions... wrung from an unwilling Government (are) accepted without

> gratitude and immediately followed by demands for fresh concessions"[35]

(citing the examples of Ireland and India). The Government Officials were in agreement with Gore-Browne as to the necessity for and general objectives[36] of such a system and supported the proposal - although maintaining their fundamental committment to the Native Authorities as the main direction and means of African 'political development'.[37] The "Unofficial" settler members of Legislative Council also - and unanimously - supported the proposal, for they saw in it further possibilities for keeping the Africans separate from themselves and, more specifically, <u>out</u> of the political representation mainstream and legislative system being developed in Northern Rhodesia.[38] They had, no doubt, been primarily impressed with and convinced by the parallels drawn by Gore-Browne between 'his' system of African councils and that then being developed in South Africa.[39]

<u>Impact of the war and post-war world 'situation'.</u>

Thus whatever their particular political orientations and motivations, the colonial administrators, Gore-Browne and the other settlers all saw 'sound' reasons for and were all agreed upon the desirability of the extension of the African 'Urban Advisory Councils' and the creation of African Provincial Councils. These "Regional Councils"[40] were, immediately after, duly discussed[41] at the annual Provincial Commissioners Conference of November, 1942,[42] but it was not until May, 1944 that the system could be said to have really been launched.[43] While the practical exigencies of the war situation in which they were being created affected the pace of the implementation of the Provincial Councils, it was the political (propaganda) needs of the 'war effort' that really influenced the method of implementation and presentation of the Provincial Councils - if not their actual character as officially claimed.[44] Thus, in their desire to present the new councils as being essentially representational, a channel of communication for Africans to the Government, and a step in the direction of that 'democracy' in 'defence' of which the war was being fought,

colonial officialdom went to pains to stress that the Regional Councillors should freely express "what is in the hearts of the people".[45] It was urged upon them that they had been chosen by the Native Authorities or Urban Advisory Councils, as the case may be,

> "to represent them and their people and to speak for them so that we members of the Government and the Member ('for Native Interests') nominated by the Governor can hear what the people think and wish us to know. What you say will be written down and copies of your discussions will be sent to the Home Government in England".[46]

In the meantime, however, the Second World War was also proving a boon to the political ambitions of the European settler population in Northern Rhodesia, for the 'exigencies of war' had resulted in de facto settler membership of the Executive Council. Exploiting this strategic advantage they were demanding not only that settler representation on the Executive Council be formally confirmed and legalised but that it be accompanied by a similar recognition of the political importance of the settlers through the establishment of an "Unofficial" (meaning themselves) majority over the Officials in the Legislative Council. The Colonial Office was not averse to these settler ambitions but it had to take into account reservations held by some members of the war-time coalition government in Britain,[47] as well as 'proving' its self-professed committment to the political advance of its colonial peoples in particular and 'democracy' in general. While therefore conceding to the European settlers in Northern Rhodesia three members on the Executive Council and an overall total of thirteen 'Unofficials' as against nine Officials on the Legislative Council, the Colonial Office, in October, 1944,[48] offered the Africans in Northern Rhodesia a quid pro quo in the form of an increase in their (white) 'Native Interests' representatives on the Legislative Council from one to three and a promise that, in the near future, Africans would themselves, through a 'Central African Council' arising out of the existing Provincial Councils, select two of their own number to sit on the Legislative Council.

Thus the African Councils system, but recently launched, was much earlier than had been envisaged moving towards its 'representational' fruition - in the creation of a central African

council for the entire country and in the orientation and real, if tenuous, linking of the councils system as a whole to the central legislative structures of Northern Rhodesia. The settlers, however, (needless to say), were not at all happy about this orientation and the direct association of the separate African system of 'representation' with 'their' legislature,[49] but the Colonial Office was, by 1945, in greater need than ever to present evidence, to the post-war world in general, and the new United Nations Organisation in particular, of its fulfillment of its 'protectorate' or 'trusteeship' 'mission' and its committment to the advance of 'political rights' and 'democracy' in Africa. And so 1945 saw colonial administration officials across the length and breadth of Northern Rhodesia busily considering[50] suggestions for the constitution of a "Northern Rhodesia African Council."[51] A sense of some urgency gripped officials[52] and non-officials[53] alike as the post-war world was witness to anti-colonial uprisings surging up across the continent of Asia and stirrings of unrest in Africa itself; the latter coming dangerously close to home with the formation of the Nyasaland African Congress in October of 1944. This last, in fact, moved the Northern Rhodesia Secretary for Native Affairs to stress in his Confidential Quarterly Newsletter of June, 1945[54]:

> "As you may know a Nyasaland Congress has been formed and is in Nyasaland threatening to become a rival body to the (African) Councils which have been formed there. We want to avoid the same thing happening here and I believe we will manage to avoid it if the African Provincial Councils are made representative of all classes and if they are given real freedom of debate in all subjects and do not become like the old 'indabas'. Our Councils certainly have been most encouraging so far and it is most important that we should keep one step ahead of African progress."

The challenges in and potential dangers of the stimulated and burgeoning political aspirations of colonial peoples everywhere therefore precipitated the Northern Rhodesia colonial administration into launching their "African Representative Council"[55] as quickly as possible in order to "keep one step ahead of" or pre-empt similar developments in their Territory. This was all the more pressing in view of the continuing resurgence and

emergence of African 'Welfare' Societies in the war and post-war years and their coalesence into one "Federation of African Societies" in May, 1946. So the first meeting of the First Council of the ARC was duly, rather hurriedly, held in November, 1946. That that, and the two subsequent meetings of the First Council in July, 1947 and July, 1948, were each followed by, and held in the general context of, intensive mutual consultations among colonial officials at all levels on numerous lacunae and anomalies in the constitution and proceedures of the ARC in particular and the councils system in general[56] is testimony both to the partially ad hoc nature of the origins of the councils and the somewhat precipitate, politically urgent nature of the launching of the ARC itself.[57] Similarly, the continued vital underlying colonialist political purpose for this system in the later 1940's, while India broke through to 'independence' and Africa in general and Northern Rhodesia itself began to stir, is testified to by the repeated secret warnings to colonial administrators in Northern Rhodesia to "keep our eyes open for odd societies springing up about the country",[58] urging "at the same time" that the need to

> "meet the legitimate aspirations of our left wing intelligentsia (sic), a rapidly growing class, is one of the greatest importance at the present time, and if we do not tackle it seriously we shall find ourselves in difficulties".[59]

Thus in 1947! And in 1948 following the manifest evidence that the innocuous Federation of African Societies[60] was hesitantly but surely transforming itself into a possibly less innocuous 'Congress', the SNA once again confidentially warned[61] his senior administrative officers that the Africans

> "are entering a difficult phase of race consciousness and it is more important than ever that we should hold their trust and confidence and maintain the closest contact with all classes, not excluding the rising middle-class. We may deplore the fact that this class is becoming politically minded but we cannot ignore it and must take every opportunity to retain its trust and to guide it into safe channels."

These 'safe channels', were of course those being provided by the variety of official African councils, rural and urban, 'traditional' and modern that constituted the African councils system.

Double - pronged political containment strategy.

But the colonial authorities were not convinced that the councils per se as a channel of political expression for the "left wing intelligentsia" and as an opening for politically ambitious members of the "political-minded middleclass"[62], were an adequate safeguard or "safety valve"[63] against the development of 'undesirable' trends in African politics in Northern Rhodesia; and they continued to develop and refine their political strategy both in the structuring of the councils as such and in their methods of utilising the councils system. This consisted, on the one hand, in the strengthening and consolidation of the structural linkage of the urban councils to the rural, of the modern non-tribal institutions with the 'traditional''tribal'-based Native Authorities. The aim in this was to ensure an institutionalised relationship of the 'progressive' middleclass elements with the more conservative rural 'traditional' elements - in effect to shape and utilise the total councils structure to achieve a close interaction between the potentially politically troublesome educated 'middleclass' elements and the more 'reliable' (and directly controllable) 'traditional' leadership. The assumption of course was that it would be the latter that would exercise an edifying influence on the former.[64] This objective was variously expressed by a number of colonial officials on different occasions,[65] but possibly most clearly by the Secretary for Native Affairs who warned[66] that

> " it would be a disaster to encourage the (African) intelligentsia to political activity on lines separate from the Tribal Government.....No doubt urbanised Africans must have their separate organisations but they need not necessarily branch off on a path of their own but could be made to run parallel with the Native Authorities in the tribal areas and join forces with them through the African Provincial Councils and the African Representative Council."

And, just to make sure of the preponderance of Native Authority influence in this 'joint force', the allocation of seats on the African Provincial Councils (and hopefully, through them, the ARC) was weighted in favour of the Native Authorities.[67]

This aspect of colonialist strategy vis-a-vis the councils

system was implemented largely covertly, at the practical level[68] in the structuring of the councils system,[69] but the other aspect of their strategy had to be effected overtly and publically for it was at the political propaganda level by means of the councils system. This was (seemingly paradoxically[70]) to urge upon and convince the African councils' members in particular, and the African intelligentsia in general, of their 'duty' to the African people as a whole and of the reprehensible nature of their higher aspirations as and for 'educated' men alone, as distinct from the great uneducated mass of the population. Or, as Chief Secretary Gartmel Robinson put it to the Western Province African Provincial Council in 1947[71]

> "I want you to remember that you are representing not yourselves but the people of this Province - a very large number of people and with different standards of life and different ways; but they are all part of the community which you represent and it will be disastrous to the Africans of this Territory in general if the leaders seek to advance only those who have reached the highest stage. They must advance the people together.... I want you to lead wisely so that you may avoid some of the dangers that have happened in other African colonies ....in some parts of Africa the intelligent educated ones are very few but they speak sometimes as if they were the only people and in their progress they have forgotten the very great number of their brothers who have remained behind."

This 'noble' political injunction was repeatedly impressed upon the members of all the African councils by a variety of colonial officials during the later 1940's,[72] the rather less noble idea being that if they would be convinced of the indivisibility of the African population and of their places as leaders in and inextricably within the African population, the tendancy already observed in other parts of Africa[73] for the educated African elite to organise themselves politically to demand full admission, 'initially' for themselves, into the colonial political system and colonial society, could be averted, or at least postponed. This, hopefully, would be achieved by pointing to the manifest continued unpreparedness of the so-called 'great unwashed' masses - from whom they were inseparable - for such integration. The first step in this attempted undermining of the aspirations of the African elite

was to convince - or indoctrinate - those of them already a convenient 'captive audience' in the African councils and from there (and also through them) influence the wider African middleclass. This was of course but an unavowed (re)application of the - 'Southern Rhodesian' - two pyramids' policy, which itself had been designed to evade the admission of those Africans who had achieved or aspired to achieve 'European' standards into the 'white' pyramid and, as such, both pre-dated[74] and went far beyond the councils system as such. Nonetheless this line of reasoning and injunction by colonial officials vis-a-vis and within the African councils system constitutes a current worth noting in the changing underlying political purpose(s) which the African councils system was employed to serve during the years of the later 1940's - and beyond!

Thus a two-pronged strategy was being developed in regard to the African councils based not merely on a passive councils system into which to direct or 'guide' African political aspirations but on the active employment of that political contrivance to try to directly influence and shape the content and character of inexorably developing African political consciousness.[75] And this strategy was dual also in the sense that it was aimed not only at the narrower African political leadership in the councils but at the outside and potential African political leadership by means of the councils (and councillors) - the overriding purpose in this earlier phase being the avoidance of the emergence in Northern Rhodesia of one of those middleclass - inspired and led African political organisations then springing up all over the continent.

Strategy modifications for political leadership incorporation.

When, however, by the end of the 1940's, it was decisively confirmed that the multi-fold efforts[76] of the colonial authorities had not succeeded in containing and so influencing the educated African middleclass as to pre-empt the formation of a non-official, purely African, overtly political, national organisation in the territory, British colonial officialdom in Northern Rhodesia

took due note of the fact and characteristically made the necessary modifications in their political strategy - and alterations in the form and functioning of the African councils system[77] - to cater to the new situation. Thus, with the Northern Rhodesia African Congress a fait accompli in July, 1948,[78] the First Council of the ARC was duly dissolved - in the very same month in fact[79] - and preparations advanced for the selection of entirely new councils throughout the system. If the African Congress could not be, as it had not been, averted, both it and the 'politically-minded middleclass' who had created it had to be 'guided' into 'safe channels'. The instructions therefore sent out to all Provincial Commissioners towards the end of 1948,[80] in regard to the pending selection of new Urban Advisory Councils and African Provincial Councils from which would be elected a new African Representative Council, stressed that the selection of the new UAC's

> "should be conducted in accord with normal democratic principles as far as circumstances and the wishes of the people permit....It is most important that the best and most representative Africans should be chosen and you are at liberty to adopt any method you consider to be most suitable so long as it accords with the general wishes of those concerned"[81]

and, similarly, in regard to the APC's that

> "It is very important that we should get the very best onto those councils, which may assume greater responsibilities in the future, and it is important that the members should have the full confidence and respect of those they represent".[82]

This manifest drive to endow the African councils with more 'democratic'[83] origins (at the urban council level at any rate) and with as much prestige and even, possibly, 'greater responsibilities' (at the Provincial Council level at any rate), and as truly 'representative' a character as possible was the colonialists' direct counter-action to the definitive emergence in Northern Rhodesia of one of that rash of 'African Congresses' so discomforting to colonial officialdom across the length and breadth of the continent. If the general, especially urban, African population was to be kept away from the new Congress in Northern Rhodesia they had to be offered an attractive alternative focus of political attention. It was important, therefore, that they be drawn towards

the Urban Advisory Councils, in the first instance, by the 'democratic' (consultative) methods - in any form or manner 'they' wished - of selection of the members thereto; and then kept to the new UAC's, APC's and the councils system in general by their 'full confidence' in and 'respect for' the leaders so chosen. And, if the urban population was not to be divided in its loyalties, it was important also that the council members chosen, or nominated,[84] should actually <u>be</u> the real leaders-to-be and/or those already recognised by the people. This is the reason for the stress laid not only on elections - whether at place of work, or in occupational group, or in place of residence or ward, or even if necessary by tribal group[85] - but also on the necessity for incorporating the 'best' and 'most representative' men into the councils. What is more, the councillors had to be the 'best' men available, in both urban <u>and</u> rural areas, in order to enhance the prestige of the councils themselves and, thus, not only retain the confidence and committment of the general African population but actually encourage politically ambitious or 'politically-minded' men, including and <u>especially</u> the founders of the new Congress, to actively seek a place therein[86]. The new councils with the ARC at the peak had, therefore, to be politically 'representative', or convincing, and prestigeous enough and/or offer enough of an 'important' enough outlet for political expression, as well as real political status,[87] to attract both the kind of men and even the very same individuals who had resorted to setting up the Northern Rhodesia African Congress. In this way the colonialists were simultaneously seeking to counteract the new Congress by setting up an 'effective' rival to it for African allegiance, and undermine it by giving its existing adherants and leaders every encouragement, and 'reason', to see the councils system as a real avenue of political expression and/or personal political advancement. That was why, while refusing Congress as a <u>body</u> any reserved seats on the ARC, colonial officialdom urged Congress <u>members</u> to seek a place therein individually[88] via elections to the lower councils - whence they could be elected to the higher councils and to the ARC itself.

No sooner, however, had the array of new councils been

selected and the first meeting of the Second Council of the ARC held in July of 1949 than Northern Rhodesia began to move into[89] the politically troubled years of the early 1950's of the debate over, protest against and imposition of Federation on central Africa. And this politically agitated period not only constituted a vital factor in the political stimulation of the African population - of the whole central African area - and the radical physical growth and even political development of the African National Congress(es)[90], but had a direct bearing and impact on the functioning of the African councils - and African attitudes thereto[91] - most conspicuously in regard to the ARC itself.[92] On account of all these developments further modifications appeared in the colonialists' attitude to and use for the councils system.

Tactical manoeuvres to utilise the councils politically.

The colonialists' tactical reactions to the political situation as such and to the ARC itself varied from sector to sector within the colonialist camp and according to the specific phase of their campaign for Federation. The colonial administrators, for their part, before the full impact of the Federation issue on and in the ARC had become publically clear[93] and definitively and formally expressed, continued convinced that the most effective way of influencing, and containing, both Congress and general African political expression[94] was in and by means of the African councils. To this end the latter had to be endowed with a more formal character and elevated to a yet more 'significant' status - hence the launching in September of 1949 of a prolonged meticulous review[95] of the councils system with a view to systematising the whole in a series of comprehensive constitutions[96] and then sealing them with the official stamp of an imposing order-in-council.[97] In the meantime, however, while this exercise was under way, the colonial authorities took the added precaution of ensuing that the Federation issue did not surface in the African councils before they had been satisfactorily 'adjusted' to be entrusted with such a 'complex' and important matter.

These precautions were, in the first place, to keep the subject off the African councils' agendas in 1949,[98] then to issue instructions that the 'tone' of the APC's discussions on the subject during 1950 be 'tempered'[99] and, thirdly, to omit deliberately to summon any meeting of the ARC itself during 1950[100] - since it had not yet been guaranteed that it could be counted upon to 'temper' its 'tone' any more than the APC's had (or rather hadn't) done during that year.[101] Colonial officialdom was, therefore, already manipulating the councils to ensure, at the outset, if not a positive at least not a prompt negative reaction by them to the Federation question.

The settlers too were convinced, initially, that the African councils could be used to further their campaign for Federation.[102] Given, however, the strong manifestations in the lower African councils, during 1950, of African opposition to Federation, settler representatives in Legislative Council performed a sharp volte face and began to deny the right of the African councils to any kind of veto - or voice - on the Federation or any national political question. This they expressed in the demand for the clear-cut divorce of the African councils system from the 'European' legislative system and any African claims for rights - or a voice - therein, or on decisions taken therein; hence the efforts initiated by Welensky in the Legislative Council from 1950[103] to have the African councils system with the ARC at the peak modified into a strictly parallel, totally separate (apartheid-ist) 'legislative' system for the African population of Northern Rhodesia.[104] When this ploy failed to gain the support of colonial officialdom,[105] who remained convinced of the efficacy of their own strategy in regard to the containment of African politics,[106] Welensky then resorted to demanding the total abolition of the ARC.[107] According to him,[108] its position as some kind of "upper house" considering, and condemning, decisions of the Legislative Council was totally unacceptable to the members of that august body.....and potentially harmful to their campaign for Federation.[109]

The 'liberal' wing of the settler population, however,

approached the problem of effecting the Federation of Northern Rhodesia with 'the south', and the 'problem' of African political advancement in Northern Rhodesia per se, not by seeking to suppress the African voice but by trying to influence it in the 'right' direction. It was, in fact, Gore-Browne who had in 1949 impressed upon the Government the need for the aforementioned systematisation and formalisation of the councils system.[110] It was he again who, at the beginning of 1950,[111] urged the Government to take heed of the "vocal and influential" section of the African population criticising the African councils as being ineffective government-sponsored, and controlled, organs, and

> "do all we can to hasten the time, even if it means going faster than might be normally desirable, when these councils become genuine democratic institutions exercising actual statutory powers in certain defined directions.....Unless these councils are recognised by the mass of the Africans as something both democratic and efficient which they are operating themselves for their own good, they will be less than no answer to the demand for universal adult suffrage when it comes, as it will very soon."

This self-enlightened strategy to engineer and employ the African councils so as to, as earlier although at a higher level, 'keep one step ahead of' African political demands was a recurrent theme in Gore-Browne's approach to developments in African politics during these years.[112] The line gained over time such active adherants as John Moffat, Commissioner for Native Development[113] and the Reverend Nightingale, one of the 'Native Interests' members of Legislative Council[114] - the latter introducing his own developments thereupon[115] - and eventually the upper echelons of the colonial administration.[116]

This 'thoroughgoing full democritisation'[117] of the African councils system was, however, a long-term and potentially explosive exercise needing time to organise and implement and, what is more, could not be implemented in a situation as volatile as that of Northern Rhodesia, immediately prior to Federation, in which neither the impact of the mere staging nor the outcome of any 'elections' by the Africans was at all certain. Anyway, the colonialists were faced with the immediate and more pressing

problem of getting their Federation 'accepted' and set up. Thus the elections for new African councils scheduled for the beginning of 1952[118] were put off,[119] and the new draft 'democratic' councils constitutions put 'on ice',[120] while the colonial authorities concentrated on priming and preparing the African councillors - both for the day when they, or others like them, would be the 'democratically' chosen representatives of the masses, and for the immediate present and the actual political issues confronting Northern Rhodesia. The former, and the more general future, required that African leaders in Northern Rhodesia fully understand the nature of 'representational democracy' as practised in the 'great democracies' of the West.[121] It was one thing for the councils system in Northern Rhodesia to be 'democratised' in order to win over, or at least steal the thunder of, the actual and potential African political leadership, but it was quite another matter for these councils to be a genuine reflection of the, as yet unascertained and possibly 'dangerous', 'will of the people'. The African councils' members had therefore to be 'enlightened' as to the character and role of leaders in relation to the led, and weaned from their tendancy to insist upon consulting their 'constituents' before pronouncing on any issues.[122] In this way the practice would be established and precedents set for the 'independent' comportment of African leaders in the true spirit of representational democracy before the actual launching of any, even partial and pseudo, 'democratic' exercises in Northern Rhodesia.

What is more, this campaign to create an 'independent-minded', 'courageous' African leadership capable of taking decisions 'in the name of' and 'in the best interests of'[123] the African population was urgently needed in order to be able to contrive and present to the world some evidence of African endorsement of Federation. The need, therefore, both to <u>wean</u> the members of the African councils from their 'attachment' to those they 'represented' and to <u>win</u> them over to the colonialists' cause[124] so that they became an active influence on wider African opinion, rather than the other way round, became at this stage the dominant among the political purposes running beneath and through the utilisation of

these councils. The full variety of representatives of the colonialist camp rallied to this overriding immediate aim.[125] A growing campaign is, in fact, quite evident in the years leading up to Federation both to convince the African councillors about Federation and the related issue of 'partnership'[126] and to imbue them, and more especially those of the ARC, with a sense of their own importance and independence of the masses. They were repeatedly confronted with their obligation to give a 'courageous' and 'correct' lead to the African population[127] - or as the Reverend Nightingale advised in Mutende in 1952![128]

> "African representatives must be men of good education able to grasp the meaning of the things that they are dealing with, thoroughly acquainted with African thought and custom and, above all, men of strong character who are willing to take an independent line and go back to their people and say 'This is what I have done in your interests.'"

Double-pronged containment strategy sustained.

Although this double-pronged strategy of so structuring (and restructuring) and manipulating the African councils, and hopefully the councillors, so as to contain and/or influence African politics in Northern Rhodesia never succeeded in obtaining the desired statement in support of Federation by any of the constituent bodies in the councils system,[129] it continued to characterise the colonial authorities' attitude to and utilisation of the African councils even after the imposition of Federation. In fact, the imposition of Federation raised the immediate problem for the colonialists of accomodating and disarming the still unconvinced, and hostile, African population. A variety of measures had therefore to be taken[130] to cater to the situation - one of which was so to develop and present the African councils as, once again, to try to outflank and, if possible, encompass the, by 1953, more 'radical',[131] and certainly more nearly national, African National Congress. Thus, on the one hand, the suspended 'democritisation' programme was launched, with much propaganda,[132] in the long-overdue UAC elections in September, 1953[133] (coinciding with the establishment of Federation). This was in order to

simultaneously give the general urban African population a sense of participation in some, if not the political process in their country, and to give the actual and potential African political leaders, and especially certain of the 'Congress types', every justification (or excuse) - and possibility - to secure a place on the lower councils. And, on the other hand, in order to offer not only a political rationalisation for African political leaders to get onto the councils but a positive incentive to do so, the already initiated and much advocated[134] enhancing of the prestige of the councils was carried further. This was by means of the full formalisation of the constitutions and proceedures of the whole system (and the closer approximation of the latter to those of the Legislative Council)[135] and, more importantly, through the increased status attaching to membership thereof consequent upon the greater number and variety of even more elevated and prestigeous positions to be filled therefrom.[136]

During the life of the Third Council of the ARC (1953-1958), coinciding with the first 'phase' of Federation, the colonialist position in regard to the councils system continued to undergo modifications in terms of the ebb and flow of African politics in this period, and in terms of the differing political viewpoints of the various sectors within the colonialist camp. Thus, in the years immediately following the African defeat over Federation, as the chorus of mutual recriminations between ANC and the ARC and their respective supporters[137] died down, and the ANC itself entered a difficult period of internal reappraisal and reorganisation, African politics in Northern Rhodesia entered the doldrums, and the ARC too went into a virtual eclipse from the public eye.[138] This was not, however, merely a reflection of the nature of the proceedings of the ARC in this period, nor even of a direct and telling attack on the ARC in LegCo by one of the African MLC's, Lakement Ng'andu,[139] but because the ARC's projection onto the centre stage and the degree of prominence given its proceedings by colonial officialdom and the mass media[140] varied in direct proportion to the degree of wider African political activity and the nature of the impact of Congress on the African

population at any given time. Hence, 1954 and 1955 are notable for the absence of colonialist comment upon[141] - or indeed great immediate political use for[142] - the African councils. In 1956, however, with the re-emergence of the ANC into active politics, with the urban boycott campaigns, and the resurgence of African unrest and protest in the form of the Copperbelt mineworker 'rolling strikes', and with the related re-emergence of African criticisms of the ARC and the councils system,[143] a variety of colonialists' comments upon and suggestions for the improvement of - and even on - the councils system also immediately reappeared. Once again, however, whereas the settlers, like MLC John Gaunt, with little subtlety of political perception, or expression, plunged in and declared the African councils "useless"[144] and a failure because so thoroughly 'infiltrated' by Congress,[145] the colonial administrators and some of the more self-enlightened 'liberal' settler members of Legislative Council, by contrast, stressed that the latter was precisely what was required.[146] They, in fact, urged the ANC to follow 'proper' constitutional channels and, even if dissatisfied with the African councils, to stand for election to the UAC's so as to change the system 'from within' and work through it rather than resorting to 'unconstitutional' direct action to express and seek redress of African grievances.[147]

What settler Gaunt did, however, suggest[148] (although he was by no means the first to do so[149]), and the government take up, was that what was needed was African bodies with some 'real' executive and financial responsibilities. These responsibilities would both impress, and by their very weight overwhelm and 'tame' politically ambitious Africans, and simultaneously undermine 'hostile' propaganda on the ineffectiveness of the councils as an avenue of African political activity.[150] Since, however, a moratorium had been declared[151] on any proposals for changes at the central government level - for the Northern Rhodesia constitutional review was not due until 1958 - no changes could be considered at that stage in relation to the ARC. The UAC's, however, fell within the ambit of 'local government' and had, anyway, during these years assumed a greater significance by

being more frequently in session[152] and closer to the public eye.[153] The settler-controlled urban local government had itself, what is more, become a focus of African political attention[154] by virtue of its distinct lag behind central government in the introduction of a degree of African participation.[155] Thus, in turning to consider ways and means of giving to the African population some councils with 'real' responsibilities, the colonialist focus was on the lower levels of the councils pyramid and on urban local administration.

The Brown Commission was therefore duly set up, during 1956, purportedly to investigate ways and means of increasing the participation of Africans in local government.[156] Since however the 'worsening' political situation in 1956 and 1957 required some radical remedies, the revamping of the old UAC's had to be carefully disguised, and they therefore re-emerged in the Brown Commission Report of 1957[157] as 'African Housing Area Boards'. These would be delegated, by the settler local government councils, some financial and executive responsibilities in the running of the affairs of the African satellite townships and from their memberships would be elected and nominated half of the African members designated to make up half of the African Affairs Committees[158] of the main (settler) municipal or township councils. This was thus in fact a form of dual urban administration differing not at all <u>in principle</u>[159] from that pertaining in the days of the old Urban Advisory Councils.[160] Once again therefore the colonial government wished to be seen to be introducing reforms and 'new' rights and responsibilities for Africans while in fact simply offering a modified, slightly 'improved', more attractive version of its long-standing, separate system of councils for Africans, contrived and still being utilised for the containment of African politicians and politics.

By the second half of 1957, with the old UAC's due to be 'upstaged' and/or replaced[161] by the 'new' and 'different' African Housing Area Boards, and with the consideration of national constitutional changes for Northern Rhodesia now under way, the possible demise of the ARC itself began to be officially

hinted at[162] and, by Africans[163] and settlers[164] alike, actively advocated. The African councils as a system was clearly reaching the end of its life, deprived of its raison d'etre at both lower levels and topmost peak - the latter partly effected by the new Federal constitution electoral college system for the election of two African members for Northern Rhodesia to sit in the Federal Assembly.

The abolition of the ARC was in fact officially announced on the 3rd October, 1958[165] and it held its last meeting on the 20th of the same month, and this system of and phase in African 'political development' in Northern Rhodesia (supposedly) ended with the constitutional reforms introduced soon after ushering the African population of the country into an, ostensibly, qualitatively 'different' phase in and form of political representation and participation. Gone, at last, was the gradual, separate, 'African' mode of political development towards an 'eventual share' in the Central Government envisaged by the Maybin Memo in 1940 and carried further in the indirect system of nominal 'representation' on the Legislative Council from 1948 - and kept in operation with slight modifications during the succeeding two decades.[166] It was 'replaced' at last by a 'phased' (gradual!) special (separate!) communal (African!) type of representation in the form of the a non-democratically 'elected' fixed number of African members (a minority share!) in the central legislature of Northern Rhodesia.[167] So much for the 1958 'departure' from the separate, minority, non-democratic and, on all three counts, therefore inferior form of representation offered Africans in Northern Rhodesia since 1953....1949....1946....1944....1942.... 1940....

What emerges from this examination of the sources of 'inspiration' and example for the African councils system in Northern Rhodesia is, firstly, that they were both theoretical and practical, administrative and political, local (settler) and metropolitan (colonial administration), and at one and the same time British Colonial Office (so-called 'non-racial') and South

African (racialist and segregationist) derived. Secondly the councils system was developed out of a number of different, divergent and even conflicting forces at work within and without Northern Rhodesia. These were the threat in mass discontent and its conjunction with African 'middleclass' aspirations, as against (and against!) settler demands and actual political advances. These in turn were interacting in the context of Britain's self-professed committment to the social, economic and political advancement of her African proteges. And this last was being stimulated to provide real (or apparent) 'proof' by actual - and potential - colonial upheavals throughout the world, and anticipated (and later actual) African unrest in Northern Rhodesia itself. And it is not insignificant that this range of forces underlying the creation of the councils system both begins and ends with the dangers of and in African unrest in Northern Rhodesia. It was fundamentally in relation to this that the purposes of and for the African councils were evolved.

Of the purposes which the African councils system was designed and developed to serve it is evident that there were both publically professed and unpublicised underlying purposes, and of both it can be said that they underwent changes in form and relative significance over time in conformity with the changing political context of the country - and in terms of the differing and changing interests and political viewpoints and relative 'power' of the propagators of the system. Similarly, not only the presentation but the actual form of the African councils system underwent changes in terms of the changing political purposes it was required to serve. Thus in the later 1930's and the beginning of the 1940's, with the shock of the repeated African rioting still reverberating in Northern Rhodesia, the councils were conceived as a channel[168] (or series of channels) through which Government could keep itself informed on what was going on at grass roots level in the African population. This urgent purpose required as extensive and comprehensive a network of contact points possible with the African population - hence the incorporation in the largely ad hoc councils at the earliest stages of representatives

of virtually every and any organised group of Africans available, including and especially the Welfare Societies, and even lone but key-placed individuals.[169]

With the development of the Second World War, however, and the related war propaganda stress on, and claims about, 'democracy' and such, a subtle alteration of emphasis was made from a 'channel of communication' for the Government on the Africans into a much-publicised channel of communication of the Africans to the Government. And, as the official mouthpiece[170] of the Africans, the African councils had to be so developed individually and so related collectively as to ensure that it could be pointed out that all Africans, whether urban or rural, modern or 'traditional', 'middleclass' or mass, had in principle some avenue of access thereto, if so desired, whether through official or non-official bodies and/or directly in one or another of the councils or indirectly through the large number and variety of 'delegates' - hence the emerging shape of the councils system in this period with its rural and urban, official and non-official bases.[171]

But the years immediately following the war were so politically troubled - and the, by now, Labour Government in Britain rather more concerned about its 'duty' to the colonial peoples[172] - that the 'mouthpiece' had to be a representative mouthpiece. Thus it had to be, on the one hand, very broadly based and, on the other, progressively structured upwards in a pyramid shape[173] to a national peak in the ARC addressing itself 'directly' to and oriented towards the highest organs of power in the country, to one of which the Legislative Council it actually selected two of its own number as members in 1948. This system of representation[174] into which the councils had been, somewhat pretentiously, elevated was constantly commended to the African population in the later 1940's as the true and effective means of presentation and redress of their political and other grievances, and the effective avenue and evidence of their real political progress. The underlying political purpose in this period was to so impress and influence the relevant sections of the African

people as to prevent the emergence, if not of an 'undesirable' African political organisation, at least of undesirable African politics. Hence the continued application of this rationale vis-a-vis the African councils both before and even (or especially) after the formation of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress in 1948.

With the change of government in Britain in 1951 and, more importantly, the changed political climate in Northern Rhodesia in the early 1950's, the African councils 'system of representation' underwent an unpublicised modification back into the earlier 'channel of communication', with the difference that, given the colonial government's need at that stage to have some, or as many, and as effective means possible of actively influencing the African population in favour of Federation, the earlier channel of communication was now to be neither one way nor the other but a <u>two-way channel of communication</u>.[175] And it was 'two-way' in the sense that the councillors were to 'frankly' and 'impartially' inform the Government of the opinions and grievances of the people and equally 'honestly' and 'impartially' inform the African population of the Government's 'good works and intentions' on their behalf, not least of all in supporting the Federation of the north with the south! This particular political purpose did not entail a change in the structure of the councils system so much as a change in its functioning - in the functional relationship of the higher to the lower councils and of them all to the general population - in an attempt to exploit the councils to influence the African population and/or (failing the former) divorce African political leadership from African public opinion.

The imposition of Federation, however, required the appearance of exactly the opposite, that is the thoroughgoing participation of the demos in the councils system, the pressing need at that stage being to 'buy off' African discontent over Federation and anticipated demands for greater rights <u>in</u> Northern Rhodesia - hence the re-presentation of the councils system as the 'interim'[176] <u>democratic representative mouthpiece</u>[177] of the Africans, as well as the <u>training ground for and means towards</u>[178] even greater political participation. Hence also the alteration

in the structure so as to exclude representation of and by small, non-official African bodies and urban population groups in favour of generalised 'democratic' selection of urban council members. The hope here was that such atomised (and secret ballot) expression of African opinion would be less formed and concerted (or 'influenced') and would make for the choice of more 'reasonable' and amenable councillors. Such a selection would not necessarily totally exclude, nor was it desired that it should exclude, Congress men, but would tend to divide their ranks by drawing off the moderates leaving isolated, it was hoped, those diehard 'extremists' who had resisted the lures of the rewards offered in the councils and especially those in and through the ARC. With many Congress men thus drawn into the salutory atmosphere of the African councils, another 'generation' and/or layer of such African political leaders would have been incorporated in such a way as to be subject to the necessary influences and processes of conditioning containment. And with Congress itself, hopefully thus partially decapitated or denuded of leaders, and weakened - while the ARC participants were, by contrast, being elevated to great status and high rank - the stalwarts in the Congress would 'next time' be more susceptible to and even more acceptable to colonial political lures.

There was no 'next time' to test the eagerness of the remaining Congress leaders outside the ARC to get into the councils system - at least in its old form[179] - because by 1956 and 1957 the 'winds of change' were so rapidly gathering force across the continent and the political situation worsening even in Northern Rhodesia - reflected also in and in regard to the African councils in settler charges that they were dominated by Congress and in Congress charges that they were too controlled by the colonialists[180] - that 'radical' measures were required. So the old African councils system was 'abolished' in favour of 'new' and 'fuller' forms of African participation in both local and central government institutions - which the colonialists now hurriedly proclaimed had always been their inexorably advancing long-term programme. Thus the ARC at its demise in 1958 was brushed off

with a retrospective reinterpretation as a mere interim electoral college to Legislative Council[181] while the African population underwent the necessary 'maturation' to fit them for fuller and direct participation in government. And so, in the final version of the ARC presented by the colonialists, the councils emerged not (it was undeniable) with any power in themselves, but as the real and pre-planned pathway to power created by the 'benevolent', 'decolonising' colonialists for the African population in Northern Rhodesia.

If the colonialists' purposes for and the consequent form and/or presentation of the African councils system are characterised by change within continuity, even radical change and apparent about turns within continuity; the purposes for, methods of utilisation and character of the African councils system must be described as continuity within change. Thus, of all the colonialist aims for and behind the African councils, the one constant underlying and fundamental purpose throughout was to contain African political development in Northern Rhodesia - and 'contain' in the multiple sense of 'set restraints upon' and 'keep in check and under control' (that is hold it back from too rapid or embracing a physical spread); and in the sense of 'set boundaries to' or 'shape' (that is hold it to acceptable political objectives and methods) - as well as in the more literal sense of 'hold' - by incorporation. Thus, despite their various adjustments in immediate tactic, the fundamental colonialist strategy throughout was, by an interchange of indirect 'threats', negative counterweights and positive inducements, to incorporate into the colonialist political structures first the 'politically-minded' of the African 'middleclass' or 'intelligentsia', second (also in historical sequence) African political leaders actual and potential, and thirdly (which was also the latest and the last resort) the leaders of the African National Congress itself. Finally, despite repeated modifications in the structure and functioning of the African councils system, its essential character as a separate 'sub' political structure, in form and methods modelled upon LegCo and oriented - and orienting African political aspirations and

activities - towards the main colonialist political structures in Northern Rhodesia, was sustained throughout the lifetime of the ARC...and continued beyond it in the rather more developed and sophisticated but not qualitatively different form of the Brown Local Government African councils and the Benson Constitution's system of representation.

The foregoing analysis thus provides further illustration of the character and content of British colonial policy, the subtleties and flexibility of British colonial methods of rule, and above all the British strategy of containment[182] of 'anti-colonial' and potentially anticolonialist forces on the African continent. This analysis also provides indications of the structure and functioning of the African councils system itself - which however require fuller description as the starting point from which to assess the degree of success of British colonial strategy in Northern Rhodesia. Most significantly of all, however, the foregoing examination of the apparent and fundamental colonialist political purpose(s) being served by the African councils provides the basis from which to assess the nature of African participation and the actual participants in the councils system and, from this, a basis from which to make an analysis of African politics and political leadership in Northern Rhodesia, and more specifically the leadership in and of the African National Congress, in two crucial decades after the Second World War.

CHAPTER TWO
FORM AND FUNCTIONING

It is necessary at the outset to examine the form and functioning of the African Representative Council in conjunction with those of the African Provincial Councils (APC's) and the Urban Advisory Councils (UAC's) - and even, to a degree, the Native Authority Councils, firstly because the colonialists themselves perceived and utilised them all, whether as a fully integrated, consistent system or not,[1] in terms of their political containment strategy.[2] The second reason is that the composition and character of the lower councils appear to have had a direct bearing on the composition and character of the ARC at the top, and the latter cannot be properly assessed without reference to the nature of the sources of both its membership and the subjects of debate with which it dealt.

The essence of this functional relationship resided in the officially designed selective role of the lower councils in regard to the memberships of the successive higher councils whom they apparently chose themselves from among their own number. In the case of the UAC's and Native Authority Councils to the African Provincial Councils this was essentially on the basis of individual merit,[3] but in the case of the Provincial Councils to the ARC it was in accordance with officially fixed rural:urban, or Native Authority: non Native Authority ratios based, supposedly, upon the demographic characteristics of the province in question.[4]

Similarly, the members of the primary councils, whether urban advisory councils or rural administrative Native Authority Councils or the secondary level rural (-cum urban in some cases[5]) Provincial Councils, were charged with raising on their own initiative and/or (preferably) raising on the mandate of the populations of their respective areas,[6] the grievances and desires of the people whose views they were supposed to have canvassed in tours around, and public and private meetings in their respective 'constituencies'. The more important matters and those most repeatedly raised were submitted by the councillors to the local District Commissioners -

in the urban areas to be tabled on the agenda of the next UAC meeting or, in the rural areas, to be forwarded to the Provincial Commissioners who then drew up the Provincial Councils' agendas therefrom. These matters of public concern, worded as formal motions, were duly debated and voted upon by the respective councils - together with other motions presented for their consideration by colonial officialdom local or territorial[7] - under the chairmanship of the local DC's in the UAC meetings and Provincial Commissioners in the APC meetings. Such motions as were passed by the councillors by a simple majority vote and were of territorial import, or for one reason or another of great enough general significance, were then selected by them, apparently by the same procedure[8], to be forwarded for discussion at the next higher council meeting. In the case of the APCs' selections of motions for the ARC's attention this meant being sent to the Secretary for Native Affairs himself.

Given the largely ad hoc character of some of the councils, and the pragmatism characteristic of British colonial methods of rule; given also the gradually developing and changing character of the councils separately and as a system in terms of British colonial political strategy in Northern Rhodesia, there were variations of methods of constitution, actual composition of membership (in 'type' and even number) and procedures in meetings and, from these all, variations in council character and functioning at the middle and lower levels from area to area and over time.[9] Nonetheless, out of these variations and changes, the essence of the functional relationship of the three subsidiary types of councils was, throughout, an upward oriented process of deputation and delegation progressively narrowing to an eventual single focus in the ARC. Similarly, despite changes over time in the number of constituent bodies in the different categories of councils - with a very large and repeatedly altered number of Superior Native Authority Councils,[10] with the UAC's steadily increasing over time from five (early 1940's) to ten (1949) and then over twelve after 1953,[11] and with the number of Provincial Councils changing between eight (1944), six (1946), five (1950), six (1953)

and seven (1958)[12] - and despite also the consequent relative changes in the positions of the different types of councils, there was a consistently upwardly diminishing number of councils to a peak of one in the ARC that also resulted in a roughly pyramidal shape (see TABLE I).

TABLE I



This, then, was the essential structure and functioning of the African councils system as officially designated and described. Whether it was a fully accurate portrayal is a matter for closer scrutiny, but of more immediate importance is the fact that even such a description of the structure upon which the ARC rested and functioned is inadequate to an assessment of that body for there were, in addition to the above three categories of official councils, a number of other official and non-official bodies which apparently had a material effect on the composition and character of the African councils by virtue of their role in the selection of members to the system.[13] What is more, the foregoing description of the functioning of the system is incomplete and superficial without the inclusion of a closer examination of the methods, as well as the organs, involved in the selection of members to the system and hence the relationship of the overall councils system to the African population - or sections thereof.

Democratic basis, and Representative System?

The claims made by colonial officialdom[14] were that the African councils pyramid was solidly based on all elements and 'classes' of the African population, both urban and rural, and was a thoroughly 'representative' system[15] not only on this score but on account of the 'active participation' of the population in the selection of members thereto. Thus, the official portrayal[16] (see TABLE II) of the representation of the rural masses in the councils system not only claimed a 'customary' exercise of the 'popular will' in the confirmation and sustenance of the 'traditional' leaders in the Native Authority Councils[17] (and a quasi-mystical identity anyway of 'traditional' chiefs and councillors with their people), but the exercise also of popular choice in 'tribal gatherings' of the rural members of the African Provincial Councils.[18] Official propaganda similarly portrayed the urban masses as actively selecting, with increasingly 'western' type democratic electoral methods, some and then all of the members of the Urban Advisory Councils.[19] And, finally, even the relatively small number of 'detribalised' individuals of the African 'middle-class' or 'intelligentsia' were specifically catered for through the reservation of a number of seats on both UAC's and APC's for representatives of both urban and rural African welfare societies who chose their delegates according to their own, but generally 'democratic' proceedures.[20] Since all the councils in the pyramid purportedly selected their delegates to the next higher council by regular democratic proceedures,[21] colonial official claims about the 'representative' character and 'democratic' origins of the African councils, and hence of the ARC itself, apparently rested on solid grounds. The reality was, however, rather different.

Firstly, on the rural side of the pyramid, although at the earliest stages choice of rural Provincial Councillors by the people in 'tribal gatherings' by "show of hands" or "popular acclaim" was officially indicated[22] as the desirable proceedure, in practice this seldom happened[23] and, even in the few areas in the earlier stages where it was exercised, such popular choice

TABLE II

OFFICIAL PORTRAYAL* OF THE 'REPRESENTATIVE' CHARACTER AND 'DEMOCRATIC' ORIGINS OF THE A.R.C.



* [illegible]

was subject to the considerable influence and even manipulation of the chiefs[24] and/or local colonial officials.[25] In fact, the numerically preponderant rural delegates on the Provincial Councils[26] were invariably Native Authority Council members or nominees, whether chiefs, 'traditional' councillors, 'progressive' (usually part-time) advisory councillors[27], or full-time administrative or 'technical' employees[28] - these last increasingly more numerous on the Native Authority Councils with the growing scale and complexity of these councils' functions and, over time, more and more frequently selected to 'represent the Native Authorities' on the Provincial Councils.[29] The Native Authorities occasionally also nominated, instead of Native Authority Councillors, prominent rural personalities[30] - either in the absence of enough 'suitably qualified' or available men on the Native Authority Councils or in order to 'give recognition to' (or incorporate) otherwise potentially 'troublesome' elements.[31] Since, once it was officially admitted that the so-called direct popular choice was rarely if ever exercised[32] and colonialist claims about the 'representative' and 'democratic' rural base of the councils were shifted to rest more fully[33] on the supposedly popularly endorsed and intrinsically popularly oriented 'traditional leaders' in the Native Authority Councils, it is necessary to stress what their real character was. Firstly, not only was the Native Authority Council membership of a number and ever-increasing number of Native Authority 'Councillors'[34] based on their technical or educational skills, rather than on their kinship, clan or any other 'traditional' positions and roles, but even such 'traditional' elements as survived in the Native Authority Councils were no indication of the necessarily 'popular' basis of those colonial administration bodies. This is because, whether or not the influence of the 'ppular will' in and on the ruling elements had characterised certain politics in this part of Africa at different periods of the pre-colonial era, such customary 'control by the demos' on the 'traditional leaders' was very limited and/or largely illusory in a colonial situation in which the realities of power were such that what decided which 'traditional' leaders should be - or continue to be - 'native authorities',

and how they should function, was in the final analysis decided in terms of interests and by methods anything but 'customary' or 'democratic'.[35]

Although the colonial administration in 1952 briefly flirted with the idea of changing the basis of selection to the Provincial Councils from nomination by the Native Authorities to some electoral system "based on wards or districts"[36] - largely under the influence of the discussions on African Local Government at the 1951 Colonial Office Summer School on African Administration[37] - the suggestion went no further. This was most probably for the reason that the more pressing need then was for the introduction of the 'democritisation' programme into the urban areas and that such a potentially explosive experiment was better phased.[38] Thus, the rural membership of the Provincial Councils continued to the end to be overwhelmingly from and chosen by the Superior Native Authorities themselves, and only a tiny minority of the rural councillors in some provinces were not so nominated. These were not however much nearer being the choices of the rural masses for they were either representatives elected by and from the middleclass welfare societies[39] or, in a few instances in the earlier period, actually nominated by the local DC or PC to represent 'detribalised' Africans in areas where there were no 'suitable' or any welfare societies.[40] So much for the 'representation' of the rural masses and the 'democratic' rural angle to the base of the councils pyramid.

As regards the representation of the urban masses in the councils system, colonial officialdom made even more grandiose claims[41] which also bore little relationship to the realities - either of the Urban Advisory Councils or of such of the African Provincial Councils as had urban representation, and least of all to the NRC itself, a number of steps removed as it was from the minor degree of direct popular participation officially catered for and the even lesser degree actually achieved.

Thus in the earliest stages of the formation of UAC's[42] the between nine and twelve members of the first ad hoc committees on the Copperbelt were mainly nominated by the DC's from among the

'tribal elders' in the municipal compounds and from the tribal elders and 'boss boys'' committees in the mine compounds, with a few individuals later chosen from, and even by, the local welfare societies,[43] and a few other individuals 'at large' nominated by the DC on account of their prominence in one way or another in the affairs of Africans in the urban areas.[44] This selection, based simultaneously on tribal, occupational, associational and residential criteria,[45] entailed extremely limited electoral elements[46] and no direct popular participation and was the basis for the selection of members of the UAC's into the early 1940's and hence the basis also of urban representation in certain of the new 'Regional Councils' set up in 1943 and 1944.[47]

In 1945, however, when it came to the creation of a convincing ARC, the SNA was concerned about the manifestly unrepresentative character of the existing councils[48] and the fact that it had already been reported[49] that some Africans regarded the UAC nominees as "mere yes-men" and "friends of the Bwana." He therefore urged all the Provincial Commissioners to consider ways and means of rendering the origins of the ARC "as democratic as possible."[50] Their decision, in turn, at the annual Provincial Commissioners Conference of 1945 was that, in the urban areas, representatives "should be chosen by those they represent by whatever means is found to be most successful."[51] They left the details however up to the local DC's to decide in accordance with "local conditions" - in practice meaning according to their own individual proclivities - for the PCs were far more preoccupied with the questions of 'fair' allocation of the ARC places per provinces and with a 'sound' balance within the provinces between the urban (where applicable) and rural areas and/or between the various Native Authorities within one province. The final Executive Council decision[52] on the Provincial Commissioners' recommendations was that the various existing Provincial Councils would elect twenty-nine delegates to the ARC from among their own members[53] as follows:

	Northern Province	6 (all rural)
	Eastern Province	4 (3 rural, 1 urban)
	Southern Province	3 (2 rural, 1 urban)
	Central Province	4 (2 rural, 2 urban)
54	Western Province	5 (1 rural, 4 urban)
55	Kaonde-Lunda Province	3 (all rural)
56	(Barotse Protectorate	4 (all rural)

The resultant membership elected by and from the six Provincial Councils to the First Council of the ARC (see Appendix B(iv)) consisted of nineteen men nominated to the Provincial Councils by the Native Authorities, three men nominated thereto by District Commissioners, three elected by rural African welfare societies and nine originally elected thereto by Urban Advisory Councils. Although this first ARC did, in fact, have a relatively higher proportion of originally elected members (twelve as against twenty-two nominees[57]) than later councils,[58] that does not reflect a necessarily more 'democratic' character. This is because the election was removed by a repeated selective process from the ARC itself and was, above all, by and from private bodies of restricted membership[59] - the middleclass welfare societies - or by and from still largely nominated bodies, the UAC's. Real popular participation was insignificant and small wonder therefore popular interest in the councils was virtually non-existent.[60] By contrast, despite the "considerable inequality in the level of education and mental development"[61] of the councillors themselves, indicating that they were not all of the African educated elite, some "advanced elements" from both rural and urban areas were apparently well integrated into the councils.[62] To colonial officialdom the councillors were, in fact, a pleasing blend of chiefs and their councillors with such "advanced elements",[63] although to the colonial settlers' mind there were rather too many of the latter and too few chiefs.[64] Either way, the First Council of the ARC while on the one hand barely touching the masses, on the other, indicated the already active participation in the councils system of not only 'traditional' 'tribal' leaders but a variety of representatives of the 'advanced'

or 'modern' leaders of the African 'middleclass'.

Middleclass participation and popular apathy.

Following the dissolution of the First Council in mid-1948, the colonial authorities set administrative wheels in motion to ensure an apparently greater degree of popular participation in the election of new UAC's, the prime aim being to attract and ensure a fuller integration of African middleclass political leadership therein.[65] Thus, the SNA's instructions were that, although it was "too soon to lay down hard and fast rules", elections to the UAC's

> "should be conducted in accordance with normal democratic principles as far as circumstances and the wishes of the people permit..."[66]

but his emphasis was more on getting the "best" men possible and the DC's were, once again, given considerable latitude to "adopt any method (they) consider(ed) to be most suitable."[67] The result was that a wide variety of methods were employed for the selection of the new UAC's in early 1949[68] - in the great majority of cases by electoral colleges and even with the continuation of direct nominations by the DC's themselves - entailing very little direct popular participation. In contrast, however, to the limited role of the masses in the UAC's, the African 'intelligentsia' or urban 'middleclass' elements apparently responded enthusiastically to the direct opening now offered them for places on the UAC's, which were the source of access to and through the Provincial Councils to the ARC and even to the Legislative Council itself.[69] Thus there was "wholesome competition"[70] between the"good standard candidates"[71] resulting in an "improved quality" of councillors on the new UAC's.[72] This was reflected also in such of the APC's as had UAC representation in an overall change in the balance of the membership away from the older and more 'traditional' types towards younger 'modern' men belonging more fully to the urban milieu.[73] So, although the urban middleclass welfare societies were largely eliminated at this stage from direct representation on the

UAC's, the urban middleclass as such was apparently participating therein even more fully than before.

Such elected urban middleclass participation was but one part of the colonialist requirements in the membership of the African councils, however, the fuller aim being their secure integration therein with the 'traditional leadership' elements.[74] Thus the 'elected' UAC's had but limited access to only four of the African Provincial Councils and not only were the other four councils[75] totally rural, but both they and the rural delegates in the 'mixed' APC's were more than ever dominated by Native Authority Council members and nominees.[76] What is more, with APC representation on the ARC weighted in favour of the rural councils - in the guise of a fair reflection of population distribution[77] - such 'modern leaders' as were elected by the Provincial Councils to the ARC were bound to be outnumbered by the 'traditional' and/or nominated members. In fact, the overall membership of the Second ARC was expressed by colonial officialdom as a gratifying combination of a varied range of individuals of the African middleclass interspersed among a selection of chiefs and both 'traditional' and 'progressive' councillers.[78]

Thus the 'democratic principles' ostensibly applied in the UAC elections of 1949 indeed appear to have succeeded in attracting the desired degree of African middleclass participation in the councils system in general and the ARC itself but, with the membership of the Second Council of the ARC consisting of twenty-two Native Authority nominees, as against eight men elected by the UAC's and two by rural welfare societies (see Appendix C(iv)), and even, these two latter groups of dubiously 'democratic' origins, the ARC was, if anything, further than ever from being a body elected by and representative of the African masses urban or rural.

Nonetheless, colonial officialdom continued in its claims and supposed endeavours to make the councils ever more 'representative' and the choice of the members of the lower councils, now both urban and rural, more fully 'democratic'.[79] The outcome of the council systematisation and democritisation

exercise between 1949 and 1952 was the SNA's Circular Minute to all PC's in February, 1953[80] conveying detailed instructions for the conduct of UAC elections on a geographical ward basis by secret ballot, with only residential qualifications for the vote (but excluding women!) and candidature[81] (but excluding civil servants[82]). This sweeping 'democratic enfranchisement' and the "prolonged and careful explanations and encouragement"[83] given the urban populations to take part in the elctions of new UAC's in all the urban centres in Northern Rhodesia in September, 1953, failed to impress the urban masses, however, as is evident in the abysmally low percentage polls recorded.[84] The African urban 'politically-minded middleclass' by contrast responded with alacrity, as is illustrated by the fact that the new UAC's were characterised both by a much higher educational standards than the previous ones[85] and by an apparently fullsome participation therein of a wide range of urban African leaders including both trade unionists and Congressmen.[86]

This latter participation was reflected also in the UAC's elections to the APC's, more especially the Western (now Copperbelt) Provincial Council in which fully nine of the fourteen councillors were now trade unionists.[87] Similarly, the Provincial Councils in general were now characterised by a very much higher educational standard of the members[88] - although in the case of the rural APC's this was due to the increasing nomination by the Native Authorities of their educated administrative and technical personnel in preferance to the older chiefs and traditional councillers[89] rather than the indirect effect of any, even un-successful, democratic elections. In fact the rural areas had been entirely left out of the much-publicised 'democritisation' of the African Councils system[90] and, if the urban masses had failed to take advantage of the opportunity given them to elect their 'own' local council leaders - and sustained that position to the end[91] - the rural masses were not even offered the suggestion of an opportunity of doing so. Further, if the masses were represented therein but partially and indirectly, this was in sharp contrast to the African elite, whether 'traditional' or 'modern', rural or

urban, who in large numbers[92] participated in the councils from the bottom up and were solidly represented in all the new African Provincial Councils.

With these last selecting the Third Council of the ARC from among their own number and with the resultant ARC membership consisting of fully twenty-seven Native Authority nominees, whether 'traditionals' or 'progressives' and eleven urban middle-class 'electees' (see Appendix D(iv)), not only is the colonialist-designed relative position of the rural and urban elites in the ARC further illustrated, but the sharply contrasting attitudes and representation of the African elite and the African masses to and in the councils system, and most markedly in the ARC itself, once again made abundantly evident.

On the basis of the foregoing evidence the more accurate portrayal of the sources of the ARC's membership would be a composite picture (as in TABLE III) which conveys the multiplicity of methods involved and the extremely limited employment of direct democratic elections to the system as opposed to the (apparent) utilisation of democratic procedures within the pyramid. It is thus, manifestly, mainly by means of such purported internal elements of democratic practice that the colonialists sought to characterise the whole as a 'democratic system'. This line had therefore clearly been designed not to draw in the African masses, as such, but in the first place to create a device for the incorporation of the 'political minded' African 'middleclass'. This device would, what is more, provide both a lure - and a rationalisation - for the willing participation of especially such of the African political leaders as were (ostensibly) oriented by and towards the interests of the masses. Finally, it constituted a 'convincing' propaganda gesture towards liberal British, and international 'public opinion' (as exemplified in the UN) regarding the 'development of democracy' in this part of Africa.

If, however, the evidence is that the colonialists' 'democratic' devices were clearly aimed at and apparently successfully effected the active and comprehensive participation of the African elite - not merely the 'progressive' or 'modern' educated

TABLE III

METHODS OF SELECTION OF MEMBERS TO AND WITHIN THE AFRICAN COUNCILS PYRAMID TO THE A.R.C.



'middleclass' elements, not merely a 'sound' balance of representatives of both the rural and urban, 'traditional' and 'modern' African leaderships, but even members of the most prominent and 'radical' African organisations of the period, the trade unions and Congress - two questions nonetheless still require clarification. The first is whether what are, after all, largely colonialist assessments (or allegations!), cited above, of the successive memberships in the lower level councils accurately reflected the real socio-economic and political characteristics of the participants in the councils system and more especially those selected to the ARC. The second question is whether, given the manifest falseness of colonialist claims about both the 'representative' character and 'democratic' origins of the African councils, their claims about even the mere internal democratic procedures and the general functioning of the system were equally remote from the realities. The first can best be answered by a close examination of biographical data on the men forming the ARC, which is an involved analytical exercise in itself, undertaken in Chapter Three, but the second is an integral part of the present examination of the form and functioning of the councils system - and essential to an accurate assessment of the nature of the role and participation of the members therein.

Democratic elections within the pyramid?

Following the inauguration by 'election' or nomination of each new set of councils, the members of the UAC's and APC's in their very first meetings set about electing the member(s) designated them on the next higher council. As is characteristic of such processes, there is evidence that the councils' elections entailed both energetic prior lobbying among the members[93] and various efforts from without to influence the outcome - including expressions of opinion in[94] and by[95] the press, and advice (and possibly even attempted pressure) from unofficial African bodies including the ANC.[96] These elections were also accompanied by the attempted exertion of influence within the councils system in the

form of 'guidance' from officials participating therein, couched as 'disinterested advice' on the qualities and characteristics desirable in men to be so elected.[97]

As regards the last, however, it must be pointed out that the colonialist role in the process does appear to have been limited to such indirect 'influence' rather than any degree or form of direct interferance in or manipulation of the balotting - even to the point of having anomalous situations arise out of their non-intervention. Thus, for example in the earlier period (before, what is more, they had committed themselves so fully to so thoroughgoing a 'democratic' line in regard to the councils system!) a case arose in which it appeared that special efforts might be necessary to ensure that one of the first two African Members of the Legislative Council, the Reverend Henry Kasokolo gain re-election to the ARC[98] which was essential since it was the source of his legitimacy as African representative on LegCo. Although his chances of re-election to the Second ARC were in grave doubt,[99] the Governor's Executive Council limited themselves merely to advising the African MLC's confidentially to make every effort to be so re-elected since "a delicate situation might arise" if they failed to regain their places on the African Council.[100] In the event, Kasokolo did fail to gain re-election in 1949 and the colonial authorities contrived an alternative constitutional accomodation[101] by which he could complete his term in LegCo although no longer a member of the council that had originally elected him thereto. It was, however, an unsatisfactory recourse[102] and the case serves to illustrate the determination of the colonial authorities not to interfere directly with the 'free' democratic electoral processes within the pyramid which would place in jeopardy the legitimacy of the <u>whole</u>.

Similarly, after 1949, when many of the most prominent figures in the councils and even the ARC were Congress men[103] and there was a distinct possibility that they would be - as they were - elected by the ARC to be the African members of the Legislative Council,[104] the colonialists limited themselves merely to giving the electors advice about the desired qualities and calibre of men in

such high office[105] - accompanied in fact by a far more vociferous and sustained campaign of advice and instructions by the ANC[106] - prior to the formal elections. In the same connection, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia himself confidentially raised the constitutional query whether - it being laid down that the Governor would nominate as African MLC's such men as had been elected by and from the ARC for sudh appointment - any discretion resided with him to accept or reject any person(s) so selected.[107] He was however hastily informed by his legal and political advisers that the choice of the ARC was in fact the choice to be followed[108] and that his role in the process was a mere constitutional formality.[109] The evidence is therefore that the colonialists were more concerned that democratic form should be followed, and the image - and conviction in the minds of the councillors themselves - of the fully democratic nature of the processes of election within the pyramid sustained, rather than with the precise individuals to be so chosen. The social composition of the membership as such, and the nature of the system, would 'take care' of the latter but it was the apparent <u>legitimacy</u> of the councillor-electors themselves and hence of the men they chose that it was more important for the colonialists to be able to assert convincingly.

Formal electoral proceedures were thus followed throughout and, if 'influence' and even pressure were exerted from any quarter to any degree, the secret ballot employed in the elections[110] justifies the conclusion that, in so far as that device can and does ensure 'free choice', the men elected to the Provincial Councils by the UAC's and by the Provincial Councils to the ARC reflected the collective decisions of the memberships involved. Of course restrictions were set on the range of options in APC elections to the ARC[111] on account of the officially fixed rural: urban and Native Authority:non Native Authority ratios. In so far, however, as there was any choice of individuals within these limits, the selection made <u>was</u> that of the councillors themselves. And, in regard to the restricted range of choices allowed them, it is significant to note that they themselves actually rejected[112] a suggestion for widening the range from which they could select

men to fill the fixed type and number of seats on the ARC by allowing for elections by the councillors but from within or outside of the African councils' memberships if so desired.

As regards, therefore, the selection of councillor delegates from one council to the next up to the ARC - and from the peak of the pyramid to the Legislative Council - the men so chosen do appear to have represented the considered choices of the participants in the councils system from the base up although within parameters set by the colonial authorities. This is important because it indicates the conclusion that the membership of the ARC itself was indeed representative - not of the African population to be sure but of the participants themselves in the entire councils system. Furthermore, just as the ARC members' personal qualities and the ARC memberships' collective character reflected the value system (influenced by colonial officials or not - and what value system is uninfluenced!) upon which the assessment of leadership qualities by the councillors was based, so too were their range of interests and aspirations, their attitudes and values a reflection of those upheld by the wider membership of the entire councils pyramid.

Representative selection of ARC members and motions.

In fact the content of the proceedings of the ARC also reflected the preoccupations and opinions of the much wider number of African councillors than merely those of the ARC itself in the very direct sense that it was they who originally raised, debated and selected such motions as were advanced through the succession of council debates to be tabled before the ARC. And here the colonialist claims about and representation of the method or procedures entailed are in most respects an accurate, although in one major aspect an inaccurate, portrayal of the actualities. Inaccurate in the sense that the fundamental source of the proposals for topics of discussion by the African councils was not the idealised picture of councillors consulting the common man about his grievances and aspirations in mass meetings up and

down the country,[113] but the product of the councillors' own initiatives and inclinations. This meant most generally that such 'consultations' as they undertook were with the easily accessible private associations, such as the welfare societies, and with the Native Authority Councils[114] and rarely if at all with the masses in public meetings.[115] In other words the original sources of the selection of topics of debate for the African councils were as little a direct, and even less so a full, reflection of the opinions and participation of the masses as the selection of the membership thereof had been - and a further illustration of the dominant role of the African elite 'modern' or 'traditional', urban or rural vis-a-vis and in the functioning of this system.

On the other hand, however, the official portrayal of the process of selection of motions for debate <u>within</u> the councils pyramid does appear to be an accurate description of the realities. Documentary evidence[116] does indeed indicate a considerable official hand in the framing of motions due to be placed before the councils, under the guise of merely ensuring correct English or concise expression - more especially in the earlier period and with purely rural Provincial councils[117] - and in this way officialdom could influence and subtly alter the content and implications of the motions before the councils. Furthermore, the minutes of the UAC's and APC's meetings indicate a very active - in some cases paternalistic, in others domineering and, in the Western Province's urban and provincial councils especially, at times positively aggressive - role played by the DC's and PC's as the chairmen of the various councils. Nonetheless, the evidence of all former council members interviewed affirmed that it was they themselves, in committee who had decided which of the motions that they themselves had earlier approved (and sometimes reframed) in debate should be forwarded for debate in the ARC, with the Provincial Commissioners playing a merely administrative or at most advisory role in the process.[118] This oral evidence is rendered all the more credible in view of the fact that many of the same interviewees simultaneously testified to the otherwise active role of the PC's <u>in</u> the debates and their overt attempts to influence the councillors

therein.[119]

The colonial authorities did devise various regulations, or contrivances, to place controls or brakes on the motions selected by the Provincial Councils for the ARC debates - such as the proviso that any such motions for the ARC had first to be submitted for the assessment and expression of opinion of at least one other Provincial Council;[120] or that motions could not be resubmitted to the ARC in substantially unaltered form until after the lapse of one year.[121] Despite (in fact precisely because of) these impediments placed upon the persistent raising of their unanswered demands by the African councillors, it can safely be averred that such motions as were forwarded to the SNA for inclusion in the ARC agenda had first been debated and approved by at least two different APC's and had then been selected for further higher debate by the councillors themselves.

As regards the role of the SNA in the process of drawing up the ARC agenda from the country-wide influx of APC motions, the evidence is that here, too, attempts were made to exert some influence on the final product. As the SNA had generally not only to arrange but "boil down" the invariably excessive number of provincial selections pouring into the Secretariat in Lusaka into an agenda of manageable proportions,[122] he could resort to a number of methods of affecting the shape and apparent character of the whole. This could be either in his selection of the less provocative or more 'reasonable' of two very similar motions from different APC's, under the guise of avoiding repition or duplication; or in his ordering of the motions (diminishing or accentuating the prominence and potential impact of any specific motion by the position it was given on the agenda[123]); or indeed by the inclusion and strategic placing of a number of Government motions on the agenda[124] and so on.

In the final analysis, however, whatever the nature of the SNA's role,[125] and the nature and degree of his active impact on the shape of the ARC agenda, the ultimate type, wording and order of the motions that was produced in the ARC meetings was that decided, approved or at worst acquiesced in by the ARC men

themselves. There was formal provision,[126] in fact, for them to receive the proposed agenda well in advance of each meeting and, having examined it, they had the constitutional right to table entirely new motions on their own individual initiatives without going through the prior proceedure of debate, approval and selection, through the lower councils in the pyramid.[127] Such motions did, however have to receive subsequent approval for the agenda from the rest of the ARC members - unlike their formal Questions on any topic they wished, within the constitutional format laid down, which could be tabled on purely individual initiative.[128] More importantly, however, as a reflection of the total membership's endorsement of the agenda was the fact that they spent many days in Committee Stage under their own elected (African) Chairman, prior to the public sessions, going through the proposed agenda. In these sessions they had the further constitutional right[129] to change the order of the motions, or the wording thereof or even to modify the terms of any specific motion. So it can safely be concluded that the final agenda presented at the ARC meetings carried the approval or at least acceptance of the ARC councillors. Thus, while any single ARC agenda did not necessarily in toto reflect the preoccupations or all the preoccupations,and outlook or the total outlook of any, or every, single African Provincial Council and any or every single member of the ARC, it certainly did in sum reflect the interests and subjects of concern of the African councillors themselves, as opposed to those of the colonialists who at most had merely influenced the shape of the whole and not decided the subject matter(s) thereof.[130]

Colonialist influence on debaters and debates?

There were, however, a variety of other ways, covert and overt, in which the colonialists sought to influence not the mere agenda but the actual content of the ARC debates thereon and the actual political perceptions and positions of the ARC councillors. For example, the preparatory Committee Stage of the ARC sessions was ostensibly for the mutual consultation of the members themselves,

during which they examined the agenda, decided on proposers and seconders for the various motions,[131] and ironed out such procedural matters as arose. The authorities however, also fully utilised these closed sessions for the informal 'briefing' of the councillors by the SNA and various Government Departmental Heads[132] - and even the Governor himself on one pressing political issue[133] - on whose spheres of responsibility motions had been tabled. The officially expressed aim was to correct "erroneous notions" and avoid "misleading statements" by the councillors in public debate.[134]

There were also a variety of non-constitutional, unrecorded meetings in between and 'around' the formal sessions as recorded in the ARC hansards which materially affected the character of the latter.[135] These ranged from strictly informal evening 'get-togethers' of the ARC members, or groups thereof, with the SNA or one or another 'friendly' official, to 'go over' that or the following day's proceedings; right across to the other extreme of formal invitations to tea with the Governor at Government House[136] where His Excellency would prefer his fatherly advice to the ARC members collectively and individually.[137]

Then there were the 'Special' ARC sessions of 1951 September, 1954 January and 1957 January when the ARC met with none other than the Secretary of State for the Colonies himself - which meetings were the occasion not of debate between the councillors themselves but of debate or 'exchange of views' between the councillors and the Colonial Office chief; and, which is equally interesting, the contents thereof are not recorded in the relevant ARC hansards.[138]

The foregoing were all more or less covert means of seeking to influence the debaters and debates of the ARC[139] - covert in so far as they were either unpublicised and/or no record was kept of the exchanges - but there were also overt efforts to shape the ideas and direct the political orientation of the African councillors. There were overt efforts made to correct, condition and channel the ideas and attitudes of the ARC men - and these were to be effected by the very debating proceedures laid down,

manifested in the actual debates and actually and deliberately recorded in the published minutes thereof. Thus, while insisting on formal debating proceedure[140] closely modelled on that of the Legislative Council,[141] the colonial authorities' main objective was actually to condition the African councillors into the application and uncritical acceptance of the entire panoply of British political methods, constitutional proceedures and constitutionalist preoccupations.[142] While enshrining the right of the ex-officio "President" of the African Representative Council, the Secretary for Native Affairs, to intervene in the debates on 'points of order',[143] the colonialists were ensuring not only that the debaters could be publically corrected and contradicted, if need be, but that a constitutional opening was created through which it could be ensured that the Government point-of-view or position could be directly counterposed in debate to that of its critics or 'opponents'. With the SNA thus in effect both Speaker and Opposition in the ARC debates[144] their intention was, if possible, to affect the outcome of the debates and, if not, at least have the Government view standing juxtaposed in the published record thereof. Furthermore the "President" was endowed with not only the right to intervene in the debates (and even with a casting vote in the event of a tied vote by the councillors themselves[145]) but the power, on the one hand, to call upon the white MLC's 'for African Interests' to express their opinions in - and exert their influence upon - the ARC debates,[146] and on the other hand to expell any or all spectators from the public galleries if they presumed to express their opinions in a manner or with an effect unpleasing to the SNA.[147] In so doing the colonialists were seeking to ensure the active exertion and dominance of their own influences upon the debaters so as to channel them in the desired political direction. This essential political rather than merely formal administrative role of the colonial officials in the ARC debates is the fundamental reason why the Government would never countenance the idea of African chairmen for these councils - although they readily agreed to Deputy Chairmen - for that would have removed the prime guarantee of the achievement of one of the fundamental purposes of the

system. In fact, the African councillors' own comprehension that, in the ARC meetings, they were 'debating' more with the Government than among themselves is evident in their own endorsement of the necessity for the presence of the SNA in their midst, although repeatedly suggesting the replacement of the ex-officio colonialist chairmen at the lower levels of the councils pyramid.[148] In the event, the Government rejected even the latter so essential was it for their representatives to participate directly in and exert their influence upon the African councils' debates.

In sum, then, there were a number of methods, formal and informal, overt and covert by which the colonialists sought to exert their influence in and upon the ARC debates - and this is to say nothing of the much wider multifarious efforts they made lower down in the councils pyramid[149] and outside the pyramid altogether.[150] If, however, the forms and methods by which colonialist viewpoints, opinions or influences were brought to bear on the ARC councillors require the above illustration, the fact of such attempted influence does not need to be belaboured. It can be taken for granted, in fact, given the manifestly evident aims and endeavours of the colonial authorities in and underlying the very creation of the councils system - not merely to <u>incorporate</u> African political leaders constitutionally and channel them politically but to <u>contain</u> the qualitative development of their political consciousness and political perceptions.[151] What is here of more immediate significance is not so much whether the African councillors were or were not 'influenced' and the specific degree and directions in which they were influenced - for that, in fact, is not really possible of accurate assessment - but the degree to which what they said in debate was what they themselves felt they wanted to say and whether what is recorded in the government printed "Proceedings of the African Representative Council" is what they actually said.

<u>ARC debates as a 'frank' and 'full' record.</u>

On this point all the former ARC members questioned[152] were adamant that they had expressed themselves "freely", "frankly"

and "fully" in debate and that, within the limitations of usage and abusage laid down in the Standing Rules and Orders,[153] at no time were they directly impeded from expressing their opinions.[154] Similarly, although one interviewee[155] claimed that the recorded minutes of the ARC debates were doctored by the authorities, documentary evidence indicates that even where such 'censorship' of the ARC debates was felt to be necessary by the authorities, they were scrupulously correct about carrying it out by 'constitutional' means through a formal proposal that the matter in question be stricken from the record[156] - even where it meant publically admitting to such a departure from verbatim record - and even that happened only once! More importantly, however, the very Standing Rules and Orders of the ARC provided for the necessary formal confirmation by the ARC councillors themselves of the recorded[157] minutes of their debates following each meeting,[158] which proviso, together with the overwhelming oral evidence confirming this practice by the majority of the interviewees themselves,[159] testifies to the accuracy of both the subsequently recorded verbatim individual contributions and the individual and collective voting positions of the ARC councillors in their public debates.

There does thus appear to be some foundation to and even a fair degree of accuracy in colonialist claims about the modelling of the proceedures of the ARC on those of the Legislative Council - the dual purpose being both the training of future African members of parliament in 'proper' proceedures of political debate and comportment,[160] as well as the (unpublicised) need for presenting 'convincing' evidence of the status and significance of the ARC in itself - but any resemblance between the two bodies remains partial and very superficial. This is not only because the similarities were largely in form and format only[161] (or, worse, mere trappings) and not in actual functioning and content, as is evident for example in the foregoing illustrations of the role of the ARC equivalent of a Speaker in the ARC debates; but more tellingly in the important respect that in the LegCo cogent argument and convincing presentation were part of a real process of

decision-making with real practical implications and repercussions whereas in the ARC the debates were a mere expression of opinion[162] and an end in themselves. Equally significant is the fact that whereas in the central political structures, while there was a disequilibrium of power between officials and 'unofficials', the latter did have some real legislative and executive responsibilities, in the ARC such 'powers' as the participants had were either largely illusory, such as the 'power' to 'reject' government motions,[163] or were merely confined to certain processes within the system itself and in no way reflected upon or diminished the ultimate power of colonial officialdom in relation to the whole.

In fact, this overall control of the system by the colonialists resided not only in the fact that they were the creators of the institution and initiators of its form and functioning but in the forms of continued direct control by them entrenched in the very ARC constitution. Thus, it was the Governor who was empowered to convoke meetings of the ARC and designate the dates and locations thereof[164] (which he did in conformity with the immediate political needs of his Administration[165]). It was the SNA who was empowered to decide the duration and occasion(s) of adjournment of these sessions.[166] It was the colonial authorities who initiated the inauguration and decided on the dissolution of the separate ARC councils (abruptly dismissing the First Council, unilaterally prolonging the life of the Second and extending the term of office of the Third in terms of their own political needs). Finally, to cap it all, although provision was made for the participation of all the African councillors themselves in the framing of the councils' Constituions and Standing Rules and Orders,[167] and even for subsequent changes therein, by them, if passed with a two-thirds majority,[168] the ultimate control still resided in colonialist hands in the form of the Governor's reserved right of veto thereon.

It has been necessary to explicitly point out these forms of entrenched and overall colonialist control not because the 'government' nature of the system needs stressing but in order to indicate the 'fool-proof' framework within which the councillors

were allowed, and thus could confidently be allowed, so much apparent freedom of choice of men and motions and so much freedom of expression in debate. It was, in fact, precisely because it was a 'government system' that such a practice both could be and had to be followed. Thus if empirical evidence indicates a picture of considerable rights of choice and expression by the council participants, the very logic in the colonial political strategy underlying the councils system lends even stronger credibility to that picture. Given their essential purpose to contain African political development in Northern Rhodesia, the colonialists had not only to effect the physical participation of African political leadership in colonialist political structures but to achieve their active and willing collaboration therein with a view to ensuring their committment to a particular political philosophy as much as a general political orientation.[169] It would have been self-defeating for the colonialists to have operated a system in which the members could clearly perceive that they were being manipulated and the entire functioning of the councils system merely contrived. Thus, not 'in spite of the fact that' but precisely because the African councils system was government sponsored, and Government control was final and all-embracing - if largely kept in abeyance - it was essential that every effort be made to ensure some real apparent powers and some real rights of 'free' expression and 'independent' decision by the participants within the system.

What emerges of greatest significance from this examination of the form and functioning of the African councils system in terms of the present study is, in fact, precisely this last point, that in characteristic 'liberal democratic' fashion the British colonial authorities in Northern Rhodesia allowed the African councillors considerable rights of freedom of speech and powers of selection of delegates within the system. Thus, although a number of other features have been touched upon, the main focus has been not on such issues as the degree and directions of similarity of the ARC with the Legislative Council; nor the differences between them

and the degree and forms of Government control over the former; nor the degree of Government direct intervention as against indirect 'influence' exerted upon the African councils and councillors (although these may well be valid and fruitful avenues of investigation in themselves); nor even on the actual functioning of the system per se, so much as on the functional relationship between the lower councils and the ARC. The aim here has been to assess the nature of the processes constituting the overall functioning of the whole in order to establish the degree to which the members of and motions debated by the ARC were representative of the will of the African population or at least those elements or strata of the African population participating in the councils system, and reflected the interests and aspirations and actual opinions and decisions of the same.

The weight of evidence, both oral and documentary, lends strong support to three conclusions. The first is that the participants and proceedings, character and content of the ARC did indeed represent the end product of processes of selection by the membership of the system themselves. The second conclusion is that both the topics of discussion and the actual recorded debates of the ARC did indeed reflect the actual grievances and aspirations of, and opinions expressed and decisions taken by, that body of men. And finally the ARC debates, as such, do provide a legitimate basis from which to make an analysis of the participants and politics of the ARC and to regard these as being a reflection of the character and views of the much wider number of participants in the total system, themselves representative not of the African masses but of certain specific elements or strata of the African population.

The more immediate issue requiring clarification, however, is whether - as already mentioned,[170] - these participants in the councils system really were representative of those elements and strata of the African population desired for incorporation - and alleged by the colonialists to have been successfully incorporated - in the colonialist political structures, namely a particular blend of the Native Authorities 'traditional leadership' in the rural areas

and the 'modern' leadership emerging outside the 'traditional' 'tribal' system and largely outside the rural areas of Northern Rhodesia.

CHAPTER THREE

MEMBERSHIP COMPOSITION

An analysis of the composition of the membership of the African Representative Council has simultaneously to refer to the designs for and successive interpretations of the changing social and political characteristics of these men made by the colonialists,[1] establish the degree to which their assessments reflected the realities of the socio-economic and political identities of the individuals constituting the memberships of each of the three councils, and of the total membership of the ARC, and analyse not only the accuracy of the colonialists' assessments but the actual validity of the terms they employed to categorise these men and the very social groups and strata to which they belonged.

An examination of the socio-economic positions, leadership roles and political affiliations of the individuals constituting the memberships of the three successive ARC councils has therefore to focus simultaneously on five different aspects. The first is on the degree to which these men were part of the African educated elite and/or the African leadership elite.[2] The second aspect is the relative numerical positions and social similarities and differences of the so-called 'traditional' and the modern African leaderships represented on the ARC, and the third the internal composition and characteristics of the 'traditional' sector of the ARC membership and the numerical balance and comparative characteristics of chiefs, 'traditional' councillors, progressive part-time advisory councillors, and administrative and technical personnel therein. The fourth focus in this examination must be on the 'modern' or 'advanced' 'middleclass' elements, the more detailed social composition of this group, both urban and rural, their educational standards, occupations, political affiliations and so on. And, finally, this analysis has to try to reach some conclusions on the accuracy, sufficiency and very validity of such terms as traditional leadership[3] in regard to the Native Authority members on the ARC, African middleclass[4] as an embracing term to describe the 'modern' educated elements of the African population,

and even African elite as a definition of all the various elements in the upper strata of the African population.

First Council Membership

Of the total membership of the First Council of the ARC, between 1946 and 1948[5], the direct[6] Native Authority representatives therein consisted of five chiefs, eleven councillors and four Native Authority employees. Then there were three mission teachers (one of whom, Johane Nabanyama, was a mission school head) and two preachers. Four other members were employed on the mines - one (Ashton Musonda) as a hospital orderly at Nchanga mine, one as head of the Mufulira mine primary school (Moses Mubitana), one as a compound clerk at Rhokana mine (Edward Sampa), while the fourth (Amos Makalu) was a "Grade One Capitao" or foreman on the flotation plant at Broken Hill mine. There were also two ARC members employed by private enterprise, other than the mines, one of whom was Nelson Nalumango as a clerical shop assistant in Livingstone and the other, Jephas Somati, as a bus conductor with the Thatcher and Hobson Bus Company in the Eastern Province. Of the ARC members in 'independent' self-employment five were businessmen (essentially traders) and two progressive farmers. This total of thirty-eight (see TABLE IV) exceeds the actual number of twenty-nine seats on the ARC by nine because of five changes in the membership personnel during the course of the life of the First Council[7], and because three members held positions as part-time Native Authority councillors simultaneously with other occupations[8], while one member Johane Nabanyama changed his employment from that as a mission school head to a Native Authority education 'councillor' during the course of his membership of the ARC.

Although, on this basis, the apparent ratio of Native Authority to non-Native Authority members of this council at 20 : 18 appears to favour the former slightly, a closer examination of the occupational, educational and general social data obtained on these men reveals certain details in regard to the fuller social character of the so-called traditional elements that raises certain

TABLE IV

ARC MEMBERSHIP OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION *a

	FIRST (1946-48)	SECOND (1949-53)	THIRD (1953-58)
CHIEFS	5	4	2
COUNCILLORS *b	11	11	8
N.A. EMPLOYEES	4	5	13
MISSION TEACHERS *c	3	3	5
MISSION PREACHERS	2	1	-
MUNIC. WELFARE OFFS. *d	-	2	1
MINE WELFARE OFFS.	1	-	-
MINE SCHOOL HEADS	1	1	-
MINE CLERKS	1	1	1
MINE CAPITAOS	1	-	-
PRIVATE ENT. EMPLOYEES *e	2	2	1
T.U. ORGANISERS	-	-	2
BUSINESSMEN	5	5	5
FARMERS	2	4	3
M.L.C.'s *f	-	1	2
TOTALS *g	38	40	43

*a see Appendices B,C,D, columns (v)

*b of the Councillors in the First Council 8 were full-time 'traditional' councillors and 3 'progressive' part-time or advisory councillors; in the Second the ratio was 7 full-time 'traditionals' to 4 part-time 'progressives' and in the Third Council 4 'traditionals' to 4 'progressives'.

*c of the Mission teachers in the First Council one was actually a mission school head(J. Nabanyama), in the Second Council similarly (M.Chobola), while in the Third Council fully three were mission school heads (M.Chobola,J.Kabalata,M.Katowa).

*d actually a hospital orderly (A.Musonda).

*e of the ARC councillors employed in private enterprise, other than the mines, those in the First Council were a clerical shop assistant (N.Nalumango) and bus conductor (J.Somati); in the Second Council a farm foreman (J.Mkupo) and bus conductor; and in the Third a lawyer's clerk (P.Mukanza).

*f of the 2 MLC's elected in 1948 only one (N. Nalumango) figures in that category in the Second Council since the other (H.Kasokolo) was no longer a member of the ARC.

*g these overall totals do not tally with the actual number of men participating in the 3 councils (34,33 and 38 respectively) because of dual positions or changed occupations (4,7 and 5 respectively).

questions about the total accuracy or adequacy of their classification therein. Firstly, four of the Native Authority men were not 'traditional' leaders in any sense of the word being educated Native Authority employees occupying specific administrative and technical positions in the rural 'native' administration.[9] Secondly not even all of the eleven councillors as such held their positions on traditional grounds, three of them being co-opted part-time 'progressive' advisory councillors, J. Chitimpa, M. Sangamba and D. Siwale, whose own full-time occupations were as trader, mission teacher and progressive farmer respectively. Furthermore, although of the remaining eight full-time 'traditional' councillors fully five were Lozi indunas, and one (Ledi Mkanda) a 'traditional' Chewa councillor and another (Philip Sikaswe) a 'traditional' Lungu councillor, the eighth the Eastern Lunda councillor Joseph Chipepa was actually also a retired long-time Government clerk.[11] Similarly, although the five chiefs on the first ARC probably held their 'tribal' leadership positions on the traditional grounds of their clan or kinship ties and lineage positions, there are grounds to conclude that none of them, personally, belonged totally within the 'traditional', 'tribal' milieu - if such existed anywhere in Northern Rhodesia by this period. All of them had had some western - mission - education[12] (three having completed primary school) and at least two of them[13] had actually lived and worked for long periods in the urban areas - Chief Ikelenge having spent most of his childhood and the earlier adult years on the Copperbelt where he was at one stage actually employed as a "houseboy" by a European "bwana";[14] and Chief Musokotwane having spent some twenty four years of his earlier life in employment in Livingstone, fifteen years as an orderly in the European hospital there and nine as a store capitao.[15] This latter was in fact officially designated an outstanding "progressive chief" in the award of a Certificate of Honour to him by the colonial administration in 1947.[16] And all these 'traditional' chiefs and councillors must in fact be assessed not merely on the ostensible grounds[17] upon which they occuped their leadership positions, nor even by the degree to which those positions were or were <u>not</u> still truly 'traditional' in power and responsibility,[18] but in terms of the actual influences, pressures

and processes of social change to which they personally had been subject during their lives and which had almost inevitably effected considerable changes in their own values and outlooks. This latter, in conjunction with the manifestly non-traditional nature of, if not basis of appointment to, the leadership (colonial administrative) positions they occupied, must be the essential basis from which to assess the full social character of such men.

If it has been observed that many of the Native Authority members of the ARC and even some of its so-called traditional elements, including two of the chiefs themselves, could with a considerable degree of legitimacy be classed in the educated and/or urbanised or modernised African middleclass category - at least simultaneously with, if not in place of, any other 'traditional', 'semi-traditional' or even 'pseudo-traditional' classifications[19] - it becomes evident that in fact, contrary to initial impressions, the 'modernised middleclass' component of the membership of the first ARC might well have actually included the majority of the members. And when this is noted in conjunction with the fact that the more obviously and fully-fledged educated 'middleclass' elements on the council included men in some of the most exalted positions then open to Africans in Northern Rhodesia, such as preachers and school heads, as well as fully seven independent businessmen and progressive farmers (including among the latter the variously employed, much-travelled, multi-lingual, already prominent personality of Donald Siwale), it becomes evident that even this First Council of the ARC was, if anything, already more predominantly composed of members of the modernised and modernising leadership elements of the African population, rather than essentially of 'traditional' 'tribal' leaders with merely "a variety of representatives of the 'advanced' or 'modern' leaders of the African middleclass" among them.[20]

Second Council membership.

If, however, the colonialist assessment of the First ARC was, if anything, an underestimation of the degree to which that

body was actually composed of 'modern middleclass' elements, it did not necessarily follow that the middleclass components (or rather those classified as such by the colonialists) were exactly[21] or remained what was wanted - more especially after the formation of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress in 1948 when it became necessary to cast the net out more widely among the 'political-minded middleclass' to capture those 'dangerous' new actual and potential African political leaders emerging therefrom and standing as yet outside the ARC. As a result of the seried elections held in early 1949, fully sixteen of the members of the Second Council of the ARC were new to that body,[22] with the remaining thirteen being re-elected former First Council members. The new members of the ARC included three traders, two teachers (one a mission teacher[23] and the other, Pascale Sokota a mine school head from Kitwe), two municipal welfare officers, Knox Kaniki and J.B.Mkupo from Kitwe and Broken Hill respectively, a mine clerk (Gabriel Musumbulwa) from Luanshya, and a fairly large-scale progressive farmer and Native Authority Treasury Clerk from the Southern Province (Amos Walubita); with the remaining seven numbering two Native Authority employees (education 'councillors' Dauti Yamba and Maliko Chitambala), three new Lozi indunas replacing fellow indunas, and two new chiefs - the last two entering the ARC in replacement of a 'traditional' councillor[24] and filling an entirely new seat on the ARC respectively.[25]

With fully eleven of the new members clearly belonging in the 'modern' or 'progressive' 'middleclass' category it would appear that the ARC membership was moving firmly in the direction of incorporation of more and more modern as against so-called traditional African leaders in Northern Rhodesia. A fuller analysis in fact, of all the available occupational, educational and general social data on the total membership of the Second Council of the ARC, between 1949 and 1953,[26] reveals that although the ratio of Native Authority to non-Native Authority members now apparently stood on par at 20 : 20 (see TABLE IV) the figures for the former had in fact been inflated by the inflated number of Lozi indunas participating in the ARC (seven instead of the stipulated four).

This was a result of the Litunga's practice of frequently substituting his kuta representatives attending the ARC meetings and all of them appear in the list of ARC members. Secondly, of the Native Authority contingent all seven of the 'traditional' councillors in the total of eleven Native Authority councillors on the ARC were, in fact, the aforementioned Lozi indunas, with the remaining four being merely part-time advisory councillors co-opted from among the prominent 'progressive' personalities in the rural areas - two of them simultaneously progressive farmers,[27] one an independent trader[28] and the fourth a school head at Fiwale Hill Mission outside Ndola.[29] What is more, of the remaining eight Native Authority members on the ARC, five were educated employees not 'traditional' leaders, and even the four chiefs themselves clearly belonged also to the class of the 'educated African elite', three having completed primary school[30] and the fourth showing by his fluency in English in the ARC debates that he was a man with, at the very least, a certain degree of western education.[31]

As for the more <u>obviously</u> educated 'modern middleclass' elements on the ARC, the number and range of occupations they represented included one preacher (Paul Mushindo from Lubwa), two mission school teachers (Mateo Kakumbi and Jesse Sandasanda), one mission school head, one mine school head, one mine clerk, two municipal welfare officers, one private farm foreman,[32] one bus conductor[33] and fully five independent businessmen and four progressive farmers, with one member, Nelson Nalumango, occupying the unprecedentedly elevated position - for an African in Northern Rhodesia - of Member of Legislative Council. This information, taken together with the available data on the educational qualifications of these eighteen men[34] - one Standard 7 certificate (plus a typing certificate)[35], two Standard 6's with Higher Teaching Certificates, five Standard 6's with Elementary Teaching Certificates, one Standard 6 with an Industrial Training Teachers Certificate,[36] three straight Standard 6 certificates, two Standard 4's with teaching certificates and one simple Standard 3[37] - lends strong support to the conclusion that what we are dealing with in this the Second Council of the ARC are in fact men employed in most of the highest

occupations then open to Africans in Northern Rhodesia[38] and men representative of the most highly educated strata of the African population in this country at that time.

This observation, taken in turn together with the information that of the four chiefs three had completed primary school and of the five Native Authority employees on the ARC two had achieved Standard 6 level plus teaching certificates (Amos Walubita and Dauti Yamba), two Standard 5 with teaching certificates (Maliko Chitambala and Moses Sangambo) and one (Richard Chimkoko) Standard 3 with teaching training, makes it evident that the Second Council of the ARC actually consisted overwhelmingly of members of the African educated elite, predominantly of members of the 'modern middleclass' and, even, far more largely of representatives of the educated modern African leadership than the old 'traditional' leadership. This last assessment is lent even more weight by the observation that fully fifteen members of the Second ARC were or had been members of the proto-political African voluntary associations in the 1930's and/or 1940's[39] (including quite a few Native Authority members among them[40]). Three of them had been founder-members and leaders of the first national African organisation in Northern Rhodesia, the Federation of African Societies,[41] including its President and moving spirit, Dauti Yamba, and eight were active members of the new Northern Rhodesia African Congress,[42] five of them actually prominent executive members or office bearers thereof.[43]

If the main conclusion deriving from this closer analysis of the Second Council is that the members consisted of younger,[44] more urbanised and educated, modern (political) leaders of the African population, even more so in fact than the colonialists concluded in their own assessments;[45] the indications are not only that the colonialists were already achieving considerable success in their campaign to incorporate both actual and potential African political leaders into the ARC - more especially those of the new African Congress - but that there is a considerable likelihood that their more concerted thoroughgoing campaign towards the same end, from 1953, achieved even more telling results.

Third Council membership

In fact, of the twenty new members of the Third Council of the ARC elected in 1953[46] fully thirteen were members of the African National Congress (eight of these actual or future office-bearers of that organisation[47]) who, combined with the other four ANC men among the longerstanding (pre-1953) members of the ARC[48] and the five Congress men (four of them ANC office-bearers)[49] who became ARC members, for one reason or another, only after 1953,[50] make a total of fully twenty two active African National Congress members out of a total of thirty eight members of the Third Council of the ARC. The Congress contingent in the ARC totals almost two-thirds of the council's total membership when the three self-professed Congress sympathisers[51] are included, and the proportion becomes even higher when the Lozi delegation is excluded from this estimation - which proceedure, once indicated, is valid given the fact of the extreme unlikelihood of their being associated with Congress and that their inclusion in the comparative analysis of the ANC and non-ANC membership on the ARC would tend to mask the full degree of ANC support in or the proportion of ANC supporters in the ARC.

Thus with the modern African political leadership clearly dominant in the ARC, and the so-called traditional leaders reduced to a mere four Lozi indunas and two chiefs (and even these latter of dubiously 'traditional' 'tribal' character), and one of the last actually claiming to have been a Congress sympathiser at the time;[52] with the remaining Native Authority members of the ARC consisting of four part-time advisory councillors three of whom were Congress members (and two actually local office bearers[53]) and thirteen educated administrative and technical employees of whom fully eight were Congress supporters (and one, Peter Habumbu, at considerable risk to himself and his job,[54] the Deputy Southern Province President of Congress); the entire interpretation of a dichotmous or distinct separate representation of 'traditional' and modern African leadership - in the Third Council of the ARC at any rate! - must be revised. What is more, given the manifest evidence that the Native

Authority section of the Third ARC membership (see TABLE IV) actually consisted primarily of thirteen employees and four co-opted advisers, all of these of the educated and/or 'progressive' rural leadership,[55] the doubts expressed earlier, in the analysis of the First and Second ARC Councils, about the real character of the Native Authority 'traditional leadership' representation are here strongly borne out. What remains, however, to be clarified is whether these men could actually be identified in socio-economic and/or educational terms with the more explicitly non-traditional African leadership represented in the Council in the light of the above evidence of their considerable overlap of administrative and political leadership roles and affiliations.

With the Congress-ite components of the Third Council of the ARC constituting, at the very least, two-thirds of that body's membership the conclusion might be drawn that this inclusion of so many members of a 'mass' national political organisation in the African council resulted in some clear changes in the social character of the membership of that body. In fact close analysis of the available socio-economic and educational data on these men reveals a continuation of the trends and characteristics observed in the earlier councils and, if anything, a more thoroughly 'middleclass', educated elite composition than ever before.

Thus, apart from the already mentioned Native Authority group of two chiefs, eight councillors (four full and four part-time) and thirteen employees, there were among the remaining members of the Third ARC Council (see TABLE IV) now five mission teachers (fully three of them mission school heads), one mine clerk (G. Musumbulwa), one lawyers clerk (Peter Mukanza), and a large group of 'independents' including two full-time trade union organisers (Lawrence Katilungu and Mathew Nkoloma, the President and General Secretary respectively of the Northern Rhodesia African Trades Union Congress), five businessmen, three progressive farmers and two Members of the Legislative Council.[56] Not only is there a notable increase in the number of men in occupations endowing them with a considerable degree of both economic and political 'independence', not only is there a general rise in the overall occupational

status of the ARC men, but equally noteworthy are their much higher educational levels. Of those for whom such data was obtained[57] the great majority had completed primary school and eight had completed or had had some secondary schooling, of whom four had also then obtained, respectively, a Higher Teachers Certificate,[58] a labour relations diploma[59] (Ruskin College Oxford), a social work diploma[60] (Jan Hofmeyer School of Social Work, Johannesburg) and an agricultural diploma[61] (Fort Cox Agricultural College, Cape Province, S.A.). And, as capping evidence of the educational status of the entire membership, it is interesting to note that for the first time in the history of the ARC all the members addressed the Council in English[62] and the need for interpretation from and into the vernacular languages fell away.

Education as a defining criterion

The colonialists' assessments, in 1953, of the membership of the new African councils as being generally of a much higher educational calibre[63] than those of the earlier councils are certainly borne out by a comparative analysis of the available educational data on the memberships of the three ARC Councils (see TABLE V), and lend conclusive support to the designation of the ARC as being predominantly - and increasingly - composed of members of the 'educated African elite'. But, although this latter classification suggests both great social prestige and high economic status (given the sparse educational facilities available under colonial rule and the very much higher incomes - in African terms - attached to employment for those in the educated category), this term remains an inadequate definition of such men. This is, firstly, precisely because their socio-economic status is only 'suggested', secondly because this term classifies them essentially on the basis of only one (although an important) factor, and most importantly because it defines them in terms of their 'elevated' position, and defines their position per se, relative only to the African population itself. Of course if the assumption is made that all Europeans in Africa were all of a superior educational

TABLE V

ARC MEMBERS' EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS *a

	FIRST (1946-48)	SECOND (1949-53)	THIRD (1953-58)	
S.A. Matriculation *b +	2(+teaching certs)	-	1(+agric diploma)	POST SECONDARY
G.C.E. 'O' Level +	-	-	3(plus other training) *c	SCHOOL
G.C.E. 'O' Level (Form Four)	-	-	1	SECONDARY
Form II + HTC *d	-	-	1	SCHOOL
Form II	-	-	2	
Std 7	-	1	-	COMPLETED
Std 6 + HTC	2	2	7	PRIMARY
Std 6 + TC *e	3(+other training) *f	7	9	SCHOOL
Std 6	4	4	-	
Std 5 + TC	-	3	1	
Std 5	2	1	-	SOME
Std 4 + TC	-	2	1	PRIMARY
Std 3 + TC	2	1	1	SCHOOLING
Std 3	1	1	-	
Std 2	1	-	-	
*g Lozi delegates-educated, std unknown	5	7	4	SOME
*h Evidence of some education, std not verified	12	4	7	SCHOOLING (std unknown)
TOTALS	34	33	38	

*a see Appendices B, C, D, columns(vi).

*b South African matriculation at the end of 5 years secondary school.

*c one teaching certificate and social work diploma; one labour relations diploma; one HTC.

*d HTC = Higher Teaching Certificate at completion of primary school.

*e TC = Elementary Teaching Certificate after certain primary schooling.

*f one a typing certificate, the other an industrial teachers training certificate.

*g Given the generally more advanced state of education in Barotseland at this time and the preferance in access to educational institutions given the sons of the traditional elite there is very strong ground for assuming a certain level of primary education (at least!) in all these men, but it was not possible to ascertain their exact levels.

*h (p.t.o.)

and socio-economic, as well as political, status to all Africans, it would follow that the educated elite of the African population would automatically stand at the top of that racial group but below the higher, the European group, and hence their position relative to the white population would be 'understood'. But this other comparative position is based on an assumption and, more importantly, is not explicit in the definition itself. And, since definitions - by definition - should be both concise and as comprehensive as possible, it follows that 'educated African elite' while descriptive of certain important social features characterising such men can be of only limited analytical usefulness and theoretical precision, being a general summation based on and conveying only a few relative factors.

Socio-economic criteria

An assessment that would result in a more effective definition of 'educated Africans' - both in terms of the rest of the African population, in relation to the European settler population and in terms of the colonialist system itself - would, for a start, have to incorporate the essence(s) of their socio-economic characteristics. From this standpoint, a summary of the occupational data on the overall membership of the ARC (as in TABLE VI) is useful for the elucidation of their socio-economic characteristics and a classification thereof. What emerges most significantly from Table Six is the observation that the forty-five occupations registered for the non-Native Authority members can, in terminology used to classify occupations in industrial capitalist society, be grouped under the headings pettybourgeois (the independent businessmen and farmers), professional (the teachers, preachers and welfare officers), white collar (the clerks and trade union organisers), and blue collar workers. The last, in fact, includes only one member of the ARC (Amos Makalu, a mine capitao[64]) for,

*h indirect evidence, but based mainly on their use of and/or fluency in the English language and on the occupations in which they were engaged which presupposed a minimal literacy at least; indicated Std-? in the Appendices.

TABLE VI

ARC MEMBERSHIPS' OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS *a

B. *b	N.A. Chiefs and Councillors *c	28	48 NATIVE AUTHORITY
B.	N.A. Employees	20	
P.B.	Independent Businessmen	14	
P.	Mission and mine teachers *d	10	
P.B.	Independent Farmers	6	
P.	Municipal Welfare Officers	3	
W.	Trade Union Organisers	2	
P.	Mission preachers	2	45 NON-NATIVE AUTHORITY
W.	Mine clerks	2	
w.	Mine capitao	1	
W.	Mine hospital orderly	1	
W.	Lawyers clerk	1	
W.	Clerical shop assistant	1	
W.	Farm foreman	1	
W.	Bus conductor	1	
	TOTAL	93 *e	

*a see Appendix E; occupations while actually members of the ARC indicated by the symbol *.

*b key to occupational groups (left-hand column)
- B - bureaucratic
- PB - petty bourgeois
- P - professional
- W - white collar
- w - blue collar

*c of this total of 28 - 7 were chiefs, 14 were full-time 'traditional' councillors (11 of these Lozi indunas), and 7 were part-time 'progressive' councillors holding other positions or occupations simultaneously; the latter indicated by the symbol / in second column of Appendix E.

*d of this total of 10 - 4 were mission teachers, 4 were mission school heads and 2 were mine school heads; the heads indicated by the symbol H in columns (x) and (xv) of Appendix E.

*e this overall total of 93 exceeds the actual total of 79 ARC councillors by 14 because there were 7 men who held full time positions simultaneously with their part-time councillorships; 2 who were simultaneously 'progressive' farmers and NA employees; and 5 who changed their occupations during their terms of membership of the ARC.

in the conditions of colonial Northern Rhodesia, a 'hospital orderly' (there is a strong possibility,[65] in fact, that Ashton Musonda was some kind of medical assistant denied the privilege of the title), a farm-foreman like Joseph Mkupo (who, given his educational and occupational background,[66] probably occupied a clerical and/or supervisory position and, had he been white, would have been entitled a 'manager' or at least supervisor) and even a bus conductor like Jephas Somati (which being a semi-skilled, non-labouring position and one entailing considerable 'authority' and status) can quite justifiably be included in the 'white collar' category. On this basis a numerical assessment of the various non-Native Authority occupational groups in the ARC would come to twenty petty bourgeoise, fifteen professionals, nine white collar and one blue collar worker.

A similar method of analysis must be applied to the Native Authority members of the ARC, defining them not in terms of the categorisation made by colonial administrators nor even merely in terms of the survival (or rescuscitation?) of certain seeming traditional forms and functions, but in terms of their actual positions in relation to and within the colonial system, and more specifically the colonial administrative system which they operated. Excluding the eleven Lozi councillors, who were virtually only observers in the ARC anyway,[67] and the seven merely part-time advisory councillors,[68] leaves a total of seven chiefs and three councillors and twenty council employees in the Native Authorities group. With the latter consisting of five Administrative Secretaries, four Treasury Clerks, three Education Secretaries/Councillors, two Agricultural Councillors and one Public Works Councillor[69] they must clearly be defined as administrative and technical personnel and, together with the rest of the Native Authority men, whether chiefs or councillors, classified as functionaries of the colonial administrative bureaucracy whether in the professional (educational), technical (agricultural) or white collar (administrative) sub-categories.

On the basis of this analysis the conclusion must be reached

that the ARC men belonged solidly within the upper occupational - and hence highest socio-economic - strata then open to Africans in Northern Rhodesia.[70] This assessment, what is more, is confirmed even with regard to the occupational backgrounds of these men before they became members of the ARC. Analysis of such earlier data obtained[71] (see TABLE VII) reveals that although, not surprisingly, there was in their pasts a slightly higher representation of working class occupations[72] (three domestic servants, one hotel waiter and four miners) there was at the same time a very much higher proportion of white collar and professional occupations, particularly in the category of teachers - which appears to have been much more the 'apprenticeship' served by these men than in more lowly occupations. What is more, it is clearly indicative of the social background and status of these men that, in a country where the overwhelming majority of the so-called 'detribalised', in fact urbanised, Africans were in or had been in the Copperbelt mining towns in the capacity of miners, a mere number of four of the ARC had apparently ever worked down a mine and even then for but a limited period as manual labourers soon rising into the supervisory 'capitao' category[73] or the clerical.[74] Equally significantly, three of these miners or former miners were members of the ARC but briefly in the First Council, 1946-48[75] and then disappeared, together with other working class elements, from the later councils (see TABLE IV). Indeed, this is quite in accordance with the clear tendancy in the ARC membership composition towards increasingly white-collar and higher level occupational and social status, together with the elimination of even those few working class elements who, in the earlier stages, had slipped into that august body.

Modern middleclass?

If, however, the ARC can clearly confidently be described as not working class, in what terms can they properly be positively defined? This raises the question, first of all, of the analytical applicability - and theoretical validity - of the much-used

TABLE VII

ARC MEMBERS' OCCUPATIONS*a
(both before and while on the ARC)

	Mission school teachers	36
	Native Authority employees	21
	Native Authority councillors	21
	Independent businessmen	17
	Independent farmers	11
	Mission school heads	8
	Government clerks	8
	Chiefs	7
	Mine clerks	7
	Mission preachers	6
*b	Shop assistants	6
	Mine school teachers	4
	Mine underground workers	4
	Mine capitaos	3
	Mine school heads	3
	Mine welfare workers	3
	Trade union organisers	3
	Municipal welfare officers	3
	Domestic servants	3
	Medical orderlies	2
	Government school head	1
	Native Authority school head	1
	Government game warden	1
	Government agricultural assistant	1
*b	Private farm foreman	1
*b	Labour recruiting agent	1
*b	Travelling salesman	1
*b	Lawyers clerk	1
*b	Hotel clerk	1
*b	Hotel waiter	1
*b	Bus conductor	1

a see Appendix E; occupations before becoming ARC members indicated by the symbol 'x' and while councillors by the symbol ''.

*b all listed in Appendix E, column (xvi), that is private enterprise employees of various categories; the total here exceeds that in Appendix E for it was not possible to indicate there the two forms of employment of Nelson Nalumango in private enterprise, namely as shop assistant and as a labour recruiting agent with 'Wenela'.

colonialist term of 'modern middleclass' to define such men. If by 'modern' is actually meant the assimilation of 'European' (or so-called western) material culture, practices and values, the same term could of course be quite properly applied to the more thoroughly urbanised of the modern African industrial working class growing up in the towns. If, however, the term 'modern' expressly attached to middleclass is used to denote a more thoroughgoing assumption of and/or distinctive patterns and standards of life, social practices and values than those characterising the modern embryonic African working class, then the 'modern-ism' of the non-working class 'modern' elements of the African population should have been described for what it was, namely the assumption of or aspiration towards not merely a 'European' or 'western' but a petty-bourgeois or even a bourgeois way of life. In fact, what the term modern per se boils down to in this light is simply a euphemism for modern industrial capitalist society and so-called 'modernisation' the process of integration of Africans in one class or another into that system.

If, however, there are various theoretical shortcomings in this use of the term 'modern', this applies even more so to the concept 'middleclass'.[76] firstly because - like the term 'elite' - it describes only a relative social position between one social (racial) group and another (although, unlike the term elite, this relative location does directly imply two other groups), without explicitly relating to the socio-economic system as such. Secondly, in so far as it does carry connotations of socio-economic position, these derive from the appearance and association of the term 'middleclass' in and with a particular English historical epoch, namely the later feudal period, in which embryonic (mercantile) capitalism was manifesting itself in the social sphere in the emergence of a class of 'new' 'middle class' men (great merchants, bankers and the like) arising between the undistinguished mass of the 'common people' below and the feudal aristocracy above. There is of course a similarity between - and hence the colonialists' adoption of - that model of European social change and the pattern in colonial Africa of the emergence of African 'new' men[77] above

the 'undifferentiated' mass of the African population but below the superior colonial aristocracy. But the similarities are superficial and the use of the term 'middleclass' in the colonial African context is of dubious legitimacy given the fact that that earlier European 'middleclass' was in fact an actually emerging capitalist class, the developing bourgeoisie of Europe, and unless applied with such connotations in colonial Africa.

Here, however, given the racial (caste) characteristics superimposed upon and to a large degree coincident with the class structures emerging, the rising African 'middleclass' in Northern Rhodesia, in the historical period upon which this study is focussed, in so far as they were of an actual and emerging African capitalist class (commercial or agrarian[78]) were not, at that stage, being allowed to develop fully within the 'logic' and possibilities of their socio-economic positions as pettybourgeoise into full-blown bourgeoise. They would thus have to be defined as an embryonic or emerging capitalist class and aspirant bourgeoisie.

In analysing, therefore, the theoretical validity of the terms 'modern' and 'middleclass' the conclusion on both counts was that it would appear that the section, or at least certain elements of the section of the African population so defined would in fact be more correctly described as 'aspiring bourgeoise' or 'aspiring petty-bourgeoise'. In so far as such elements were well represented in the ARC, the question whether they were, in fact, aspiring for a fuller and/or higher level of integration into the colonial capitalist system can best be confirmed by a close examination of their own self-expressed grievances and aspirations, opinions and suggestions (social, economic and political) as recorded in the actual debates of the ARC, which is an involved analytical exercise in itself, undertaken in Chapter Four. In the meantime, however, the biographical (socio-economic and political) data at present under examination can yield further evidence in support of the appelations 'aspiring bourgeoise' and/or 'aspiring petty-bourgeoise' to describe the human components of the complex of occupational groups of the one broad social stratum that the colonialists called the 'modern middleclass'.

Petty bourgeois orientation

A closer analysis of both the earlier and actual occupations of the ARC men (see Appendix E) reveals that, in fact, although they did constitute four clearly defineable occupational groups,[79] these in terms of their human components were not rigidly demarcated or mutually exclusive of each other. Thus, for example, of the twenty petty-bourgeoise on the ARC eleven were by training members of the professional group (i.e. teachers);[80] of the fifteen professionals four were part-time members of the 'African local government' bureaucracy;[81] while of the twenty-nine bureaucrats a great number were still,[82] or had been, petty-bourgeois 'improved' or 'progressive' farmers;[83] and three of the improved farmers themselves were part-time members of the bureaucracy.[84] What is more, fully thirteen of the bureaucrats - and five of the white-collar workers[85] - were actually by training of the professional class (teachers)[86], and a further five were professionals (or technical personnel) of one kind or another other than pedagogic.[87] There was thus clearly both considerable duplication of and/or frequent switching or horizontal mobility between one occupational group to another by the members of the so-called 'modern middle-class'.

Put more concretely, what this data illustrates is that such men, in their eager desire for 'self-improvement', 'progress' and 'advancement', seldom felt themselves bound within one, let alone the original, occupational group in which they began their adult working lives.[88] Teacher training, for example, as such was essentially a means towards gaining higher educational qualifications and teaching the (temporary) 'price' to pay for having received such valuable educational qualifications. This is quite evident in the large number of the very many trained teachers on the ARC who never completed more than a few years in that profession and, what is more, those in the earliest stages of their working careers. Even active service in the teaching profession (for that short or even a longer period) was most frequently judged as a useful proving ground for higher occupational advances

such as and very often into the colonial bureaucracy,[89] and/or the financial source for a 'take off'[90] into independence and greater affluence in trade, as is evident in the fully eight of the fourteen traders on the ARC who had first been teachers. Similarly, whether bureaucrat or professional, the ideal while employed or the goal (especially for retirement) was certainly to work simultaneously to create some extra guarantee of economic security either in a business or a farm.[91] Thus the occupational tendancy was not only towards the achievement of ever higher economic and/or social status but also strongly oriented towards the achievement of petty-bourgeois personal occupational independence and affluence.

Petty bourgeois orientation tested

All in all, therefore, these occupational groups actually constituted an interrelated complex of socio-economic positions, the whole oriented in a petty-bourgeois direction, with the individual human components switching around frequently within the complex; and this is illustrated even more clearly in an examination of such data as was obtained[92] on the ongoing occupational histories of the ARC men in the post - ARC period, in many cases up to the present day (see Appendix F). What emerges from such an analysis is, first of all, that of fifteen bureaucrats of the ARC membership on whom such later data was obtained (see TABLE VIII) nine continued for some time in that capacity and a further three are administrative bureaucrats at the present day - one of these, Bisset B. Nkonga, Under - Secretary in the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister - while another former Native Authority bureaucrat on the ARC, Lakement H. Ng'andu, is now in the managerial class in the Personnel Division of Nchanga mine. Six assumed direct petty-bourgeois status as commercial farmers and businessmen, of whom four are occupied in such economic activities at the present time, and six entered (or aspired to enter)[93] the field as professional politicians, two of whom, A.D. Chilimboyi and S.M. Mununga are present-day members of the National Assembly of the Second Republic.

Similarly, an examination of the subsequent careers of

TABLE VIII

OCCUPATIONAL DATA OF POST-ARC PERIOD

ON ARC BUREAUCRAT OCCUPATIONAL GROUP *a

ARC members NAMES	PETTYBOURGEOISE		BUREAUCRATS		POLITI-	PROFES-	*b	*c
	Comm. Farmers	Business -men	Mnag- erial	Admin- s'tive	CIANS	SIONALS	R	D
A.D. Chilimboyi	X	X		X	*			
Chief Ikelenge				X			*	
Remus Kalepa		*		X				
Chief Kopa				X			*	
Chief Mboshya				X			*	
D. Mukimwa				X		X	*	
I.C.H. Mulando				*	X			
S.M. Mununga				X	*			
A. Musumali				*				
E. Namweleu	*			X				
L.H. Ng'andu			*	X	X			
G. Nguluwe		*						
B.B. Nkonga				*	X			
P. Sikazwe	X							*
D. Yamba		*			X			
x Post ARC	2	1	-	9	4	1	-	-
* At present	1	3	1	3	2	-	4	1

*a see Appendix F *b Retired *c Deceased.

the eleven men of the professional group on the ARC on whom such information was obtained shows that (see TABLE IX) while five of them continued in their professions for some time, four of these branched off into other occupations, only Paul Mushindo remaining in his ecclesiastical profession to the end.[94] Of this group as a whole fully six entered politics, two being present-day members of parliament, Francis B. Chembe and William Nkanza (the latter also Cabinet Minister for the Eastern Province); six were or are in bureaucratic positions, the latter being M. Chobola in the Ministry of Education and M. Katowa (now Chief Mapanza) former Zambian Ambassador to Addis Ababa and Cairo and now a member of the Public Service Commission; and finally four were and two still are businessmen, the two latter prominent in the commercial life of the Copperbelt.

Thirdly, an analysis of available later information on eleven petty-bourgeois members of the ARC (see TABLE X) shows

TABLE IX

OCCUPATIONAL DATA OF POST-ARC PERIOD ON ARC PROFESSIONAL OCCUPATIONAL GROUP *a

ARC members NAMES	PETTYBOURGEOISE Comm. Farmers	Business -men	BUREAUCRATS Mnag- erial	Admin- s'tive	POLITI- CIANS	PROFES- SIONALS	*b R	*c D
F.B. Chembe				X	*	X		
M. Chobola				*		X		
M. Kakumbi					X			*
K. Kaniki		*						
H. Kasokolo		X			X	X	*	
M. Katowa				*	X	X		
J.B. Mkupo			X					*
M. Mubitana		X		X				*
P. Mushindo						X		*
W. Nkansa				X	*			
P. Sokota		*			X			
x Post ARC	-	2	1	3	4	5	-	-
* At present	-	2	-	2	2	-	1	4

*a see Appendix F *b Retired *c Deceased.

TABLE X

OCCUPATIONAL DATA OF POST-ARC PERIOD ON ARC PETTY BOURGEOIS GROUP *a

ARC members NAMES	PETTYBOURGEOISE Comm. Farmers	Business -men	BUREAUCRATS Mnag- erial	Admin- S'tve	POLITI- CIANS	PROFES- SIONALS	*b R	*c D
S.N.E. Chembe		*	X					
S. Chibanza	X		X				*	
S.H.Chileshe	*	*	*		X			
W. Kazoka	*				X			
A. Kazunga		X					*	
J.Mangwende		*						
R.Nabulyato		X			*			
R.C. Puta		*	X		X			
D. Siwale	X	X					*	
J. Sokoni		X			*			
A.Walubita	*				X			
x Post ARC	2	4	3	-	5	-	-	-
* At present	3	4	1	-	2	-	3	-

*a see Appendix F *b Retired *c Deceased

that, although Seven entered full-time politics, five soon returned full-time to their petty-bourgeois occupations, the other two remaining to the present day prominent political figures - R. Nabulyato as Speaker of the National Assembly and John Sokoni, former Zambian diplomatic representative to East Germany and former Zambian High Commissioner to Botswana, now Political Principal in the Cabinet Office for the Southern Province. Safeli Chileshe holds a number of directorships in private and public corporations, including Barclays Bank, but maintains his successful commercial farming and business enterprises. Similarly, three others assumed high managerial positions in parastatal bodies - R. Puta as managing director of Zambia Railways, and S.N.E. Chembe and S. Chibanza in the Cold Storage Board of Zambia and the Credit Organisation of Zambia respectively - but all three later returned to private enterprise. All in all therefore every one of the petty-bourgeois members of the ARC here analysed continued for some time to be or still is a member of the entrepreneurial class in post 1958 Northern Rhodesia and/or present day Zambia.

Finally, of four white collar members of the ARC included in this type of examination (see TABLE XI) all of them entered the

TABLE XI

OCCUPATIONAL DATA ON POST-ARC PERIOD ON ARC WHITE-COLLAR GROUP *a

ARC members NAMES	PETTYBOURGEOISE Comm. Farmers	Business -men	BUREAUCRATS Mnag- erial	Admin- s'tive	POLITI- CIANS	PROFES- SIONALS	*b R	*c D
L.Katilungu					X			*
P. Mukanza				X	X	*		
G.Musumbulwa			*		X			
M.D.Nkoloma			*	X	X			
x Post ARC	-	-	-	2	4	-	-	-
* At present	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	1

*a See Appendix F *b Retired *c Deceased

field of politics for longer or shorter periods, Gabriel Musumbulwa earning the dubious distinction of being one of the first two African 'Ministers' in Northern Rhodesia under the umbrella of the United Federal Party; and the positions they hold today (with the

exception of Lawrence Katilungu who died in 1960) are on the editorial staff of the Zambia News Agency, ZANA (Peter Mukanza), in the Personnel Division of Rhokana Consolidated Mines (G. Musumbulwa) and in a top managerial position in the parastatal Dairy Produce Board (Mathew Nkoloma).

Although such information raises a variety of questions and seemingly opens up a number of avenues of possible further investigation, what is here of more immediate significance is the evidence that, although individuals at any one time generally - but not invariably or necessarily - belonged to only one occupational group, the groups as such were so closely interrelated, drawing on the same type, range and even the very same individuals for their memberships, that both these occupational groups and their membership(s) must be considered part of one socio-economic complex or continuum. Whether the now commonly-used term 'new elite'[95] is an adequate or accurate enough overall definition of this socio-economic complex raises the same queries as those raised in regard to the general designation 'African elite'[96] - with the added objection that they obviously are not all that 'new' (if not in terms of their sources and degrees of affluence, power and prestige certainly in terms of the human components) if these derive, as clearly at least some do, from the earlier pre-independence elite, itself incorporating elements of an even earlier pre-colonial 'elite'.

Aspirant petty-bourgeoise and bourgeoise

If this closely interconnected, clearly identifiable - and mutually identifying[97] - socio-economic complex is to be defined more accurately and in terms of the class society of which it is a part, it appears that it will be necessary to employ a term or combination of terms from the socio-economic terminology used to describe the classes of capitalist society. Since the actual (past or present) petty-bourgeois component is so large,[98] since the possible (crypto) petty-bourgeois component is larger still (with many apparent professionals, politicians or bureaucrats simultaneously maintaining commercial enterprises, whether directly, or

run by, or in the name of some member of the family); and since the potential or future petty-bourgeois component (former politicians, or retired bureaucrats and professionals turned businessmen or farmers) is largest of all, serious consideration must be given to the possibly dominant petty-bourgeois, or at any rate, aspirant petty-bourgeois character of the individuals comprising this socio-economic complex. And in a, by now, fully-fledged class society with still great possibilities for upward mobility and property ownership - including the means of production - together with the capitalist 'logic' of capital accumulation, entrepreneurial expansion and development of petty-bourgeoise into bourgeoise, the degree to which this socio-economic complex can be characterised predominantly 'petty-bourgeois' or 'aspirant petty-bourgeois' to that degree also is it 'potentially bourgeois' or actually 'aspirant bourgeois'.

Now, projecting backwards from such evidence and such assessments, the description of these same men as, two decades earlier, either aspirant African petty-bourgeoise or aspirant bourgeoise seems more than justified; what is more, such a definition has the added merit of not only simultaneously conveying their social status or position relative to the other African social classes, and describing such social elements explicitly in terms of and within the (colonial) capitalist system introduced into, imposed upon and coming to fully characterise the Northern Rhodesia social system, but also hence relates them to the range of settler social classes in the same system. Above all it conveys both their actual and potential class character(s) and thus explicitly describes them not only in terms of the processes of social change of which they are a product but in terms of the very ongoing dynamics of rapid social change characterising such elements and such a society as Northern Rhodesia since the Second World War was - and Zambia is.

Political roles and affiliations

Finally, if the evidence is that the ARC men not only

were but, equally clearly, continued as part of the African elite - later the ruling elite - and if the evidence is that very many of them were and many continued as actual or aspiring political leaders[99] within the elite and later the ruling elite, some closer attention must be paid to the data collected on the political associational links and political role(s) of the ARC men with a view to assessing their character and position as African leaders and within African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia after the Second World War.

The evidence so far has clearly been that contrary to superficial impressions - and the colonialists' own claims - the ARC membership actually consisted more fully, and increasingly so, of 'modern', 'educated' 'middleclass' elements, rather than 'traditional' elements and that this was not merely due to the ever-increasing professional or technical full-time employee and part-time 'progressive' components of the Native Authority representation on the ARC but even more fundamentally to the not immediately apparent modern, educated or urbanised character of even the few ostensibly traditional members of the Native Authorities who continued in the ARC. With the Native Authority contingent in the ARC membership being thus assessed on the basis of their own real personal socio-economic characteristics and on their actual occupational histories, leadership (administrative) roles and political affiliations, not only does the ARC membership as a whole turn out to have been far more thoroughly of the 'educated African elite' and/or 'progressive' or 'modern middleclass' but, equally surprisingly, to have consisted predominantly of members of the modern African leadership in Northern Rhodesia and to have actually been an integral part of the modern political leadership in this country in the two crucial decades prior to the achievement of political independence.

A comparative analysis of the political associational links of the respective memberships of the three ARC councils (see TABLE XII) shows that, throughout, well over half of the membership of each council were or had been members of African voluntary associations, some of them having been prominent or the moving

TABLE XII*a

ARC MEMBERS' POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONAL LINKS*b

AFRICAN BODIES	FIRST (1946-48)	SECOND (1949-53)	THIRD (1953-58)
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS*c	12 (+11)	15 (+4)	16 (+7)
F.A.S.*d	3	3	6
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS			
Members-to-be*e	4	-	-
Sympathisers*f	-	1 } 9	3 } 25
Members*g	-	8 }	22 }
Office bearers*h	-	5	13
(Possible members)*i	-	(5)	(2)
Supporters in post-ARC period*j	6	2	3
TRADE UNIONS*k	-	2	4
TOTAL ARC MEMBERSHIP*m	29	26	34

*a see Appendices B,C,D, columns (viii)(ix)(x) and (xi).

*b excluding membership of 'multi-racial' or not purely African bodies.

*c only data for 1930's and 1940's included; indicated by symbol x in column(viii) of appendices where positive information obtained, by symbol ? in same where evidence suggestive of such membership but not verified; the latter listed in brackets beside verified figures above.

*d Federation of African Societies(1946-48); no attempt made to distinguish members from office bearers since <u>all</u> were office bearers.

*e since in period of First Council the ANC was not yet formed; these four members-to-be M.Kakumbi, N.Nalumango and D.Siwale and Chief Ikelenge, a sympathiser, indicated in column(x).

*f self-professed that is; indicated by symbol S in column(x).

*g indicated by symbol * in column(x).

*h indicated in column(xi) but not included in total of ANC membership per ARC since already included as part of (x).

*i evidence would seem to suggest ANC membership but, since not absolutely ascertained, indicated by symbol *? in column(x) and not included as part of total ANC membership.

*j this applies both to i) those men who became ANC supporters when no longer ARC members - indicated by * in column(x) where certain and ? where surmised only; ii) those men who continued as ANC supporters after ARC ceased to exist - indicated by symbol *p in column(x), but not included in total ANC memberships of various ARC councils because already included in earlier figures.

*k (p.t.o.)

forces in the initial launching of such organisations as the Northern Rhodesia African Teachers Association (Dauti Yamba), the Copperbelt African Traders Association (Abner Kazunga) and even the very first welfare society in Northern Rhodesia, the Mwenzo Native Welfare Association (Donald Siwale). Furthermore, the most prominent founders and leaders of the first national African organisation in Northern Rhodesia, the Federation of African Societies, were simultaneously, or later, ARC members.[100] Even more significantly each of the ARC councils had a strong representation of future or actual African National Congress members, reaching fully two-thirds of the membership of the Third Council and, most significantly of all, included many outstanding figures and top leaders of that organisation. Finally, there was also a strong representation of the national executive of the Northern Rhodesia African Trades Union Congress in the ARC - and through them many other powerful African trade unions in the country - including the head and controlling force of the African Mineworkers Union, Lawrence Katilungu, one of the two most prominent, powerful and influential African leaders in Northern Rhodesia at that time.

What this data illustrates in sum, is that the ARC were not merely 'African leaders' so designated and elevated by the colonialists but part of the leadership of the African population of this country in the very real sense of being active leaders of, participants in (or secret sympathisers with) the most prominent and (then) vanguard African national political organisation in Northern Rhodesia, the ANC. They were also leaders not only in their administrative and executive (colonial bureaucracy) roles but leaders in the broader sociological sense of being modernisers, innovators and initiators of 'new' social and economic practices and above all 'new' forms of political organisation of Africans in

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*k no attempt made to distinguish members from office bearers since they were all in fact office bearers; only G. Musumbulwa, Executive Member of the NR African Mineworkers Union, not so indicated in Appendices C and D, and R.C. Puta, former Vice President of TUC, similarly not indicated in Appendix D.

*m in totals of membership of each ARC council Lozi delegates have been excluded (5,7,4 respectively) since likelihood of their being associated with Congress was so remote that their inclusion would have been pointless.

this country. They were thus simultaneously political leaders and/or administrative rulers and/or leading innovators representing the entire range of leadership roles in the broadest sense, and most significantly of all they clearly were not only part of a wider embryonic class but a dynamic part of the general continuum of modern African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia with its emergence in the 1930's, its growth and development in the 1940's, its maturation in the 1950's and its fulfillment in the 1960's.

As such, the membership of the ARC offers scope for a detailed analysis of the political affiliations and aspirations, perspectives and perceptions of African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia and, by extension, a fuller understanding of some of the social forces, socio-economic interests, political aims and conceptions that underlay the development of African politics and African nationalist politics in this country prior to independence. The foregoing socio-economic and political data on this group of seventy-nine men must, therefore, be examined in conjunction with their actual self-expressed interests and aims, political positions and objectives, as well as their collective political performance and role. This requires a detailed examination of the content of the ARC debates and the nature of their decisions, as well as an examination of the political functioning and role of the ARC as such vis-a-vis British colonialism and African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICS AND POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS

Since the ARC membership was so patently largely petty-bourgeois and aspirant petty-bourgeois in social composition, and so manifestly an integral part of the continuum of African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia during the 1940's and 1950's; and since the implications of these observations are of far-reaching significance, it is important to establish firmly the presence of two relevant characteristics in the content of the proposals constituting the self-expressed grievances and aspirations, opinions and suggestions of this representative cross-section of the African leadership elite of this country. The first is whether, in fact, the matters raised and endorsed by the territory-wide spread of African councillors for the attention of the ARC reflected any degree of elite-ism and, more specifically, petty-bourgeois socio-economic interests and aspirations, and what the ARC's own corporate response was to these interests and aspirations. The second concerns the nature of the (more explicitly[1]) political motions before the ARC and whether their political approaches and objectives, perspectives and perceptions similarly reflected a degree of elite-ism and were in any way related to their broader and deeper socio-economic positions.

The debates and decisions of the ARC, in fact, constitute a sound source of evidence on the socio-economic and political aims and conceptions of African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia not only because they are a voluminous record[2] of such African opinions and suggestions during a crucial span of two decades after the Second World War, nor even only because they are a verbatim record of the same[3] but, equally importantly, because they are a reflection of the views not merely of the ARC itself but of the much more numerous representation of African political leadership participating in the entire territory-wide councils system.[4] Finally, this material is very useful as a basis from which to assess the socio-economic and political aims and conceptions of such men because it appears to cover the entire

range of experience, social, economic and political, of Africans under colonial rule. Assessing and sorting the 379 motions[5] tabled before the ARC over thirteen years on the basis of their explicit subject matter and the direct consequences that would result therefrom and/or indirect implications,[6] produces twenty-four categories of ARC motions[7] which do in fact cover virtually all the aspects of life of a country under colonial domination, although with the not insignificant exceptions of mining and industrial development,[8] the national economy as a whole and matters of higher finance such as the annual budget, etc.

What the major problems and preoccupations of the people - or more correctly the participants in the councils system - were are not only indicated by the topics they raised and did not raise for discussion, but are also partly indicated by the number of times the various topics were tabled for debate.[9] On the basis of the number and the incidence, of motions under each topic heading,[10] the indications are that not all these subjects exercised the minds of African leaders to the same degree - or with the same persistence or at the same period(s). As an indication of what constituted the greatest sources of complaint or concern to Africans in Northern Rhodesia, or rather those elements of the population participating, directly or indirectly, in the councils system, it is noteworthy (see TABLE XIII) that education tops the poll, followed very closely by the questions of increased Native Authority responsibilities and powers, and rural development. These last two are, of course, a refledtion of the predominantly rural - and Native Authority - character of most of the African Provincial Councils from which these motions came.[11] None of the top-ranking ARC topics of debate come as any particular surprise but what is, initially, rather more surprising is the observation that the issues of racial discrimination all rank at the bottom in this type of assessment of degrees of apparent interest or concern. Taken together, however, what are in fact actually sub-topics of the one broad category of racial discrimination actually constituted almost the largest single topic of discussion in the ARC - second only to the Native Authority division of

TABLE XIII[*a]

ARC TOPICS OF DEBATE IN ORDER OF OCCURENCE

1.	EDUCATION	34	X[*b]
2.	N.A. RESPONSIBILITIES	32	NA
3.	RURAL DEVELOPMENT	29	X
4.	COLONIALIST POLITICS	28	P
5.	HEALTH AND WELFARE	27	X
6.	AFRICAN REPRESENTATION	24	P
7.	LABOUR AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT	23	Xp
8.	SOCIAL ISSUES - GENERAL	22	X
9.	N.A. FINANCES	22	NA
10.	TRADE AND COMMERCE	21	Xp
11.	TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS	20	X
12.	SOCIAL WELFARE AND HOUSING	19	X
13.	NATURAL RESOURCES	17	Xp
14.	N.A. FUNCTIONING	17	NA
15.	AFRICAN COUNCILS	15	P
16.	LAND AND MINERAL RIGHTS	15	P
17.	R.D. TRADE	13	RD
18.	R.D. MISCELLANEOUS	12	RD
19.	CHIEFS' STATUS AND PRIVELEGES	12	NA
20.	R.D. FIREARMS	11	RD
21.	PASS SYSTEM AND THE POLICE	10	P
22.	ALCOHOLIC DRINK	10	P
23.	R.D.PUBLIC PLACES AND FACILITIES	8	RD
24.	R.D.EMPLOYMENT AND PROMOTIONS	8	RD

*a see Appendix G column (i).

*b see Appendix G column (vii) and methodological notes.

KEY to symbols in right-hand column:

P - directly and fully political topics
Xp - indirectly and/or partly political topics
X - 'non-political' practical or developmental topics
NA - Native Authority topics
RD - political racial discrimination topics

topics.[12] Even more significant, however, is the African councillors' apparently greater concern with such 'non-political' topics as education, health and welfare, transport and communications, and so on, evident in the concentration of all these 'non-political' developmental social and economic subjects in the top half of this listing. But most significant of all is precisely this last fact - that an assessment of each motion for political content - that is, in this study,[13] its direct indictment or at least implication of the colonial system in the question - indicates an apparently non-political approach and perception among these men in motions debated on education, rural development, social welfare and housing and so on, for these topics emerge as essentially non-political in overall content and character.[14]

This apparent greater concern with 'non-political' as against political matters would appear to be confirmed in the incidence of formal Questions tabled at the ARC sessions to receive Government replies. Of course, these questions coming as they did mainly on individual initiative,[15] rather than provincial or urban council briefing, tended to reflect more the personal positions and preoccupations of the ARC men rather than necessarily general characteristics or currents in the Council itself or the councils system as a whole. Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe in the listing of questions (see TABLE XIV) that, although Colonialist Politics now occupies the top position and Land and Mineral Rights leaps into much greater prominence, in general the pattern of 'practical' over political matters is much the same as in the listing of motions. Of the departures from the general pattern it is worth noting here that matters raised individually reflect a relatively greater concern with racial discrimination in employment and promotions and with conditions of service in the Native Authority Councils[16] - there are relatively more individuals' questions as compared with council motions on these topics - whereas the other Native Authority topics drop significantly in incidence in questions as compared with motions. The implications of these exceptions to the general patterns appear to relate not only to the personal preoccupations, aspirations and frustrations

TABLE XIV*a

ARC QUESTIONS IN ORDER OF OCCURENCE

1.	COLONIALIST POLITICS	27	P
2.	EDUCATION	25	X
3.	RURAL DEVELOPMENT	18	X
4.	LAND AND MINERAL RIGHTS	17	P
5.*b	'TRIBAL'/REGIONAL INTERESTS	15	X
6.	AFRICAN REPRESENTATION	14	P
7.	HEALTH AND WELFARE	12	X
8.	TRADE AND COMMERCE	12	Xp
9.	TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS	12	X
10.	SOCIAL WELFARE AND HOUSING	12	X
11.	N.A. FUNCTIONING	12	NA
12.	R.D. EMPLOYMENT & PROMOTIONS	10	RD
13.	LABOUR & CONDITIONS EMPLOYMENT	10	Xp
14.	N.A. RESPONSIBILITIES	10	NA
15.	AFRICAN COUNCILS	9	P
16.	N.A. FINANCES	7	NA
17.	R.D. FIREARMS	7	RD
18.	R.D. MISCELLANEOUS	7	RD
19.	R.D. PUBLIC PLACES AND FACILITIES	6	RD
20.	SOCIAL ISSUES - GENERAL	6	X
21.	ALCOHOLIC DRINK	6	P
22.	NATURAL RESOURCES	4	Xp
23.	CHIEFS' STATUS & PRIVELEGES	4	NA
24.	R.D. TRADE	3	RD
25.*b	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	3	X
26.	PASSES AND THE POLICE	2	RD

*a Based on the same topics and criteria as TABLE XIII.

*b do not figure in TABLE XIII since no such motions were tabled.

of the educated white collar, professional and bureaucrat elements represented in the ARC but would seem also to reflect something of the disparities between the personal professional interests and Native Authority committments per se of the African councillors - including the so-called Native Authority men among them.

These suggestions seem to require further examination and elaboration,[17] but of more immediate concern are the implications of the apparent predominance of purely 'developmental' or 'practical' subjects over political in both ARC motions and questions. In fact, closer examination of the overall incidence of political motions shows that these, per se, actually constituted the majority of all motions tabled before the ARC[18] - whereas closer examination of the incidence of political motions per topic confirms a strongly a-political approach to developmental and general socio-economic issues. It is this latter characteristic, rather than a mere quantitative assessment, that is of greater significance, for it immediately suggests something of the African councillors' conceptions of colonialism - more specifically an apparent failure to relate the economic development or rather under-development problems of Northern Rhodesia directly to its colonial status.

Interesting as these general indications are of the ARC's political character, they remain a somewhat mechanistic and superficial judgement of the political content of the ARC debates and the political perceptions of the members, for they do not detail their actual political approach and methods, their demands of the colonial authorities or their attitude to and, more especially, explicit or implicit conceptions of colonialism. Similarly, the above general assessment says nothing of the ARC's own corporate reactions to the matters, political and non-political, placed before it for consideration by the wider African councillor body. To arrive at a clearer and more accurate picture of the politics and political perceptions of the ARC as a body an analysis is necessary, topic by topic, of their formal suggestions or demands and official decision.[19]

Debates on the African Councils

For a start, the ARC's debates on its own functioning and responsibilities and the African councils system as a whole, could be expected to show something of its political views. At their very first meeting in 1946 the ARC members produced a veritable flood of expressions of gratitude and appreciation for the channel of communication to the government provided by the councils system and for the great step forward in political representation and 'say' for Africans that this system in general and the ARC in particular constituted.[20] Also, at that first meeting they took a significant unanimous decision stressing[21] that the ARC members could address the Council in English if they preferred,[22] thereby firmly establishing the 'rights' - and priorities - of the educated men among them.[23] In the following year, what is more, they were even more unequivocal in "viewing with anxiety" the adverse effects on the calibre of the Provincial and Representative Councils' memberships of the

> "failure of the Native Authorities to attract and obtain the services of the most enlightened and progressive elements in the country"[24]

thereby manifesting something of their own notions as to the prime qualifications for leadership (which, in turn, carried connotations of leadership competition between the 'progressive' and traditional leaders in Northern Rhodesia). They later made suggestions for the broadening of the Native Authorities', and their own, horizons by mutual exchanges and visits to other Native Authorities outside Northern Rhodesia,[25] and a better preparation for their work by attendance of overseas local government courses.[26] In the meantime, however, it was mainly such continued doubts amongst them about their own, and general African, competence that led the majority to vote against Nelson Nalumango's proposal of the motion, in 1947, that the European Member of Legislative Council 'for Native Interests' should be elected by the ARC "by itself or in conjunction with other recognised African organisations in the Territory."[27] But the conflicting positions in this debate also derived from an element of corporate leadership competition between the 'supreme' official 'spokesmen' of the African population, the ARC, and the

various unofficial African bodies. And this emerged even more clearly in the debate on the suggestion, in 1948,[28] that the newly conceded two seats for Africans on LegCo should be filled from within or outside of the ARC itself if need be. The motion was rejected, but not without a fair number of divergent voices[29] pointing out that such a vested interests position by the ARC men would place restrictions on the possible choices and optimum calibre of the men to be so selected.

With the change of membership brought with the Second African Representative Council[30] - to say nothing of the changed, and charged, political climate by the early 1950's - the motion in January, 1951[31] that the Governor should consult the ARC before nominating the two European MLC's 'representing' African interests received unanimous support. This drive for an increased and enhanced political role for the African councils was similarly expressed in three other motions passed at the same meeting - asking for direct representation for every urban and rural district on the ARC[32] and/or increased and more balanced African Provincial Council representation on the ARC;[33] as well as direct representation for the Urban Advisory Councils at the annual District Commissioners Conferences.[34] And the following year a further attempt was made to advance the 'representative' and 'independent' 'African' character of the councils system by suggesting that Africans take over as chairmen of the urban and provincial councils.[35] Of the same genre were the suggestions made by the Third Council of the ARC - in 1954 for increased fees for APC members;[36] and in 1955 for an increased number of annual meetings for both the APC's and the ARC![37]

Following that meeting in 1955, however, the motions on the council system ceased (see TABLE XV A). Except for the discussion and endorsement, with a few amendments, of the new councils constitutions in 1956 submitted for their consideration by the authorities;[38] the ARC thereafter debated no further motions on their own or the other councils' rights or responsibilities. This would seem to suggest that, after ten years of not only participating in the councils system but of attempting, in a variety of ways, to

TABLE XV

INCIDENCE OF TOPICS A-L

A.
AFRICAN COUNCILS



B.
AFRICAN REPRESENTATION



C.
COLONIALIST POLITICS



D.
LAND/MINERAL RIGHTS

E.
N.A. RESPONSIBILITIES



F.
N.A. FINANCES



G.
N.A. FUNCTIONING

H.
CHIEFS' PRIVILEGES

I.
R.D. TRADE



J.
R.D. FIREARMS



K.
R.D. EMPLOYMENT



L.
R.D. PUBLIC PLACES

develop it 'from within'[39] and to transform the councils and the ARC in particular into a more 'representative' 'African' body with some 'real' political powers, the African councillors had seemingly finally given up their hopes for and lost interest in the council system per se and were more concerned with the issues of wider and more real political participation than they could gain in or through the existing African councils.[40]

What emerges of greatest significance, however, from their range of motions on the councils system, and even more from their very participation all along and continued participation, even after 1956, in the system[41] is the fact that they were eager, or at least willing or at the very least prepared to participate in a system of 'representation' that was not only separate, with implications of and potential for apartheid-like developments,[42] and that was not only inferior to that offered the settlers but, even more significantly, was not democratically based. These facts not only illustrate a moderate participationism and gradualist reformism 'from within' but, most significantly, point to a self-interested readiness to participate in a system that offered only men like themselves a political voice and outlet[43] - and of course access to prestigous positions on the Legislative Council.[44] In fact their own specific decision to guard the few African seats on the LegCo as the exclusive preserve of the ARC men is clear testimony to this characteristic and carries implications not only of individual elite-ist ambition but of individual and corporate leadership competition within the general African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia.

Debates on 'African representation'

If, however, the African councillors evinced such apparent self-interested ambition and elite-ism, and individual and group opportunism in their participation in a system of 'representation' that was not only undemocratic but soon revealed its own ineffectiveness,[45] that is not to say that they confined themselves solely to and within that system of separate communal

'representation'. Debates on wider African representation[46] in the mainstream political representation system(s) in Northern Rhodesia were, in fact, a constant and consistent part of the proceedings of the ARC - with the exceptions only of the first sessions of the First and Second Councils in 1946 and 1949 respectively[47] (see TABLE XV B).

Not only did the ARC recommend African representation on commissions of enquiry into matters affecting African interests,[48] and both rural (Native Authority Councils) and urban (UAC's) representation at the District Commissioners Conferences,[49] but they repeatedly raised and unanimously endorsed the right of Africans to 'representation' - by nomination that is! - to all the (settler-controlled) local authority councils in townships and municipalities.[50] Similarly, the ARC not only dealt with the method of selection and term of office of the few African Members of Legislative Council,[51] and the number and method of selection of the few nominated 'African interests' European MLC's[52] - and even, in 1955, the replacement of the latter by nominated Africans[53] - but their attention was increasingly concentrated and their requests increasingly strongly worded in the direction of more,[54] and direct,[55] and above all directly elected African representation in the central legislative system of the country.

Thus, in 1952, in the person of Donald Siwale, the ARC presented[56] "the demand" of the Africans for parity with the Europeans on both the Legislative Council and Executive Council, and in 1955, through Mathew Nkoloma,[57] "strongly recommended" an African member of the Executive Council - which, by 1957,[58] had climbed to a demand for parity between Africans and Europeans on both LegCo and ExCo "during the transitional period" while the vote was being gradually extended to Africans. The ARC's position on enfranchisement of Africans is evident in the series of motions passed by the Third Council in 1953, 1954, 1956 and 1957 respectively, starting with Dauti Yamba's "strong request" that British Protected Persons (indigenous Africans) of Northern Rhodesia be enfranchised[59] - on the basis of high income and/or property qualifications, although the literacy test could be based on

competence in one of the vernacular languages rather than English only[60] - which was repeated as a "strong demand" the following year.[61] By 1956, however, this repeated unanimous demand had been altered to a recommendation, proposed by F.B. Chembe and Pascale Sokota,[62] for a rather lower qualified franchise for Africans - over 21 years of age, of three years fixed residence, able to read and write in the vernacular and earning over £5 per month or owning fixed property to the value of £50. In 1957 a modified version of this was proposed by Lawrence Katilungu[63] which excluded the residential requirement and reduced the income qualification, slightly, to £50 per annum. This was unanimously approved by the ARC, and they took the further unanimous decision[64] to set up a franchise committee to consist of the four African MLC's,[65] the two Northern Rhodesia African Federal MP's[66] and Mr. Lawrence Katilungu or, in his absence, Mr. Robinson Puta. The ARC was, however, abolished in the following year without this committee having presented any proposals; so the 1957 franchise proposal for a separate qualified franchise for a small minority of the African population stands as the ARC's last word on the subject.[67]

What emerges of significance, however, about the ARC's series of motions on African representation is the fact that their approach was not only gradualist but clearly elite-ist for their proposals were designed to enfranchise 'initially' (?) only the educated, chiefly, propertied and higher income groups. What is more, they not only argued for 'African representation' that excluded the masses of the people from any participation, direct or indirect, but even supported and advocated African 'representation' that was merely colonialist nomination of (a nominal number of) Africans to various central and local government bodies. The significance of this, as with their very participation in the African 'Representative' Council, is the manifest evidence that it was not political 'representation' that they were concerned with so much as political participation and that, just as the so-called 'representation' that they were ostensibly arguing for was for their own social strata, so too would the participation that they were actually seeking to effect automatically be for men of their own

educational calibre and 'class'.

These fundamental characteristics of the ARC's positions on African political representation entailed other lesser but important assumptions about political representation per se and the African population itself that are worth noting. The most important of these are that they manifestly equated representation for Africans with representation of the Africans and assumed not only that any 'black faces' on government bodies, whatever their number and however they got there, was 'better than none' but that any Africans, whatever their personal or political character, could be counted on to 'represent' the African population. They assumed both that mere African presence on such bodies and that nominal African enfranchisement automatically represented an advance for 'the Africans'. Above all, the assumption underlying all these characteristics was that 'the Africans' were one.

Debates on colonialist politics

That all Africans were not 'at one', even simply in terms of their approach to the question of how to interpret and react to the colonialists' political moves, was quite evident to the ARC men even in their own debates on colonialist politics.[68] At their very first meeting in 1946, in fact, they were sharply divided over a proposal to send a delegation to Southern Rhodesia to investigate the 'Native Policy' in operation there.[69] It was not that they differed so much in their attitudes to the settlers as on whether, given their own extensive knowledge - and first-hand experience - of conditions in Southern Rhodesia, such an exercise was really necessary. Such tactical differences emerged even more clearly in a whole series of conflict - ridden debates on the definition of partnership in December, 1951[70] for, while most were prepared to give partnership per se a 'fair trial' and others to try to influence its interpretaion, partnership as such was already so intimately associated with the burning issue of Federation, and being so manipulated by the colonial authorities as to contrive the appearance of African endorsement of Federation,[71] that the ARC

men were thrown into confusion about how to handle the matter.

Differences of political approach characterised a number of the ARC's debates on motions related to colonialist politics,[72] but this was more so in the earlier period and less so in the later, and was evident in their reactions to the colonial government and not in their attitude to the European settlers. The distinction drawn by them between the colonial government in Britain and the colonial settlers in Northern Rhodesia is, in fact, one of the most marked characteristics emerging from this series of motions. This is illustrated not only in the First Council with their profusion of thanks to the British Government[73] and professions of loyalty and gratitude to His Majesty the King,[74] in conjunction with motions against the settler 'Native Policy' in Southern Rhodesia[75] and settler drive for Responsible Government in Northern Rhodesia,[76] but also in the Second Council and even during the controversial years of the campaign against Federation. What is very significant about the debate after debate in which the ARC rejected the proposals for Federation[77] is not only their intransigence and unanimity on the issue but the fact that, while passionately rejecting the official linking of their country with the more completely settler-controlled Southern Rhodesia, they continued to the very end[78] to cling to their special 'protected' status and to appeal to their 'protectors' the British Government against Federation. Not only did the ARC men manifest a naive view of the real colonial status of Northern Rhodesia, but they apparently failed to perceive the real character of colonial government and the relationship between the Colonial Government and the Central African colonial settlers. Even more importantly, however, they apparently failed to see the relationship between the political, strategic and above all economic interests of British colonialism as such and the creation of the Central African Federation - otherwise they could not have continued to petition the British Government itself against Federation.

Such political naivete did not, of course, characterise every single member of that Council[79] and, more especially in the Third Council, a growing scepticism, or at least a dawning

suspicion amongst some members, of the British Government's intensions is evident. This is illustrated in the sharply divided votes in the 1951 motions on partnership,[80] despite - for some clearly because of - the very active eagerness of the colonial authorities,[81] right up to the Governor himself,[82] to get the ARC so committed. It is evident also in the divergent positions taken in 1952 in regard to the colonialist proposal to enfranchise (otherwise) qualified Africans in Northern Rhodesia on the basis of their naturalisation as British subjects.[83] While many ARC members were inclined to accept the proposal out of self-interest,[84] a fair number resorted to abstainining in the final vote[85] because the debate had brought out the point that the proposal would possibly jeopardise the 'protectorate' status of the country as a whole. This is the first clear indication by the ARC as such of a distrust of the total reliability of the British Government's committment to its 'trusteeship mission' in Northern Rhodesia, but it is also significant that they were nonetheless divided over the question. That the ARC men in general still maintained a fundamental trust in the British Government's essential reliability, or at least its susceptibility to appeals to its humanitarian responsibilities, is evident, even in the Third 'Congressite' Council in their continued and repeated appeals to the Sedretary of State for redress of their grievances, such as continued racial discrimination,[86] and for fulfillment of their right to some participation in ruling the country[87] in terms of Britain's committment to the advance of her African proteges. And this orientation in fact contradicts the otherwise quite frequent sharp criticisms of, and professed suspicion of, the British Government by these same men.

This essential belief in Britain's 'protector' stance is paralleled by their continued tendancy to see the colonial settlers as the major enemy - and cause of (any) British Government deviations from or derelictions of its duties - hence their sharp reactions to the settler proposal for the division of Northern Rhodesia into 'European' and 'African' areas;[88] hence their repeated motions against further European immigration;[89] hence also their demand for an accurate African population census,[90] and request that

"the phrase Native Affairs should be retained in the title of the Member (of Executive Council) responsible for this subject"[91] - apparently to strengthen African as against settlerclaims in and to Northern Rhodesia. But probably of most significance in regard to the distinction drawn by the ARC between the colonialists, local and metropolitan, was their unanimous support[92] for the 1957 proposal by two African MLC's Robinson Nabulyato and Pascale Sokota demanding the secession of Northern Rhodesia from the (Colonial Office-imposed) Federation in favour of "Colonial Office Trusteeship."[93]

Even the other increasingly radical motions passed by the ARC in these last years of its life - demanding full freedom of association,[94] refusing to elect African Federal MP's,[95] and rejecting the 1958 Constitutional White Paper[96] - must be seen in the context of their strategy to advance African rights within, in fact by means of, British constitutionalism, 'democracy' and 'fair play' and most especially on the basis of the British 'protectorate' over Northern Rhodesia. It is also necessary to note that in both the debates and voting on these final 'radical' motions not insignificant divergences appeared[97] that testify to continuing political differences within the ARC membership and the incompleteness of the process of 'radicalisation' not only in regard to the nature of their political perceptions but even in relation to the total council membership. It was only in the very last meeting of the ARC that a united and unanimous[98] 'radical' stand was taken - on the White Paper - but by then the forthcoming demise of the ARC had already been announced and that concerted burning of their boats must be seen in this light.

What emerges from the ARC debates on colonialist politics is not only that it was the colonists whom they distrusted and feared rather than the Colonial Government, but that even following the Africans' disillusioning experience over Federation and the dawning suspicions amongst some councillors about the British Government's total reliability in terms of its committments to its African proteges, they nonetheless continued to view its shortcomings as mainly the effect of settler intrigue and influence,

and continued to appeal to that same Government on the basis of its 'historic mission'. Their petitionism was based on the belief that, if they could but reach the ear of the Colonial Office[99] to counterbalance settler influence, British colonialism would, if possibly rather more slowly than could be desired,[100] fulfill its promises to the people under its protection. The men of the ARC did not, in fact, even view the colonisation of their country in the light of colonialism but in terms of the colonialists' own self-professed 'humanitarian', missionising and 'civilising' role in Africa, and they viewed the settlers and other negative features of British rule as unfortunate but unrelated side effects of an otherwise welcome and beneficial presence. Not only did this interpretaion fail to take into account - or even perceive - the British Government's and British colonialism's own multifarious political and economic interests in Northern Rhodesia but apparently <u>failed to perceive colonialism as such</u>, let alone in its full integrated political, social and economic dimensions. The question, however, whether their positions on colonialist politics as such reflected in full their perception, or <u>non</u>-perception of colonialism, demands examination of the other topics of ARC debate, first and foremost their motions on land and the 'mineral rights' issue.

Land and mineral rights motions

Since the land and mineral rights issues were in principle directly related not only to the original form of and motivation for the colonisation of Northern Rhodesia but also to the continuing exploitation of the wealth (and labour power) of the country, especially by foreign mining corporations to the overwhelming advantage of those corporations and the colonialist states, the motions tabled and decisions taken by the ARC on this subject should reveal much of their position vis-a-vis and their perceptions of colonialism.

What is immediately notable about the ARC motions on land and the mineral rights question[101] is the fact that only two such motions were debated[102] in the entire period of the First and

Second Councils, and that it was not until the years after the imposition of Federation that the Third Council debated a veritable flood of such motions (see TABLE XV D). The clear indications here are that the underlying motivation for this apparently sudden concern for their land lay in the African's deep distrust of the European settlers' intentions vis-a-vis the land. This fear for their land was in fact stated directly, time and again, in the ARC debates on Federation[103] and emerged explicitly in the one land motion debated during the critical period of the early 1950's in which the ARC men insisted, in the formal wording of the motion itself, that it was "owing to the unreliability of the present partnership policy" that all Trust Land should be converted into "Native Reserves proper."[104] Immediately following the imposition of Federation the Third ARC showed their "deep concern" over the land and mineral rights position "in connection with the Native Authorities" by requesting a "profound review of the state of affairs,"[105] stating more explicitly, in 1954, that they wished the Trust Lands to be converted into "Native Reserves proper."[106] So defensively-offensive and intransigent was the immediate and sustained colonial official reaction to this attempt to modify the land status quo and so insistent was colonial officialdom on the 'legal' origins of, 'legal' safeguards in and entire legitimacy of the situation pertaining in regard to land in Northern Rhodesia[107] that the African councillors thereafter resorted to other proposals to defend what they considered to be the African allocation in the status quo (meaning both Trust and Reserve land). This aim was to be achieved by the prevention of any further creeping encroachments into the Trust Lands that would reduce the overall proportion and potential areas of (agricultural) expansion of the African population. Thus, in 1954, they all adamantly rejected the proposal, tabled by the Secretary for Native Affairs himself, to allow European farmers grazing rights on African Trust Lands and Reserves[108] - lest that de facto presence be somehow transformed into de jure possession. And this was followed up with a motion in 1956[109] requiring the clear delineation on paper and - literally - on the ground of all three categories of land, and if necessary further

surveys, to prevent - amongst other things[110] - any further sneaking encroachments by the settler farmers. The ARC similarly protested the further alienations of African Trust Lands occasioned by recent developmental projects such as the controversial Kariba Dam, the (?) sugar scheme and Nkandabwe Mine[111] - even going to the extent of demanding a halt to such programmes. Following the African councillors' own criticisms of this last, however, they then compromised by requesting instead that "an equal part of Crown Land be made as a replacement for land so taken".[112] They stressed that they were not at all opposed to 'economic development' but simply required that it should not result in any further uncompensated alienations of land.

Thus their attitude to the land question was basically that the overall African - European allocation should not be further disturbed. The existence of the Crown Lands and their specific siting was not questioned,[113] nor was further land alienation for 'economic development', as long as it did not result in any further reduction of the overall African proportion. This was to be secured directly (preferably)[114] or indirectly to Africans for their future expansion - and in so arguing the African councillors manifested an essentially agriculturalist attachment to the land. They also, incidentally, endorsed exclusive 'tribal' rights to specific lands within the African allocation.[115] More importantly, however, a political current emerged in the ARC debates on the land - although not evident in the wording of the motions themselves - that because Northern Rhodesia was an African 'protectorate' the land should be reserved for the Africans, and it was in so far as the land was reserved for the Africans that some guarantee was secured that Northern Rhodesia would remain an African 'Protectorate.'

Most significantly of all, however, in terms of the ARC's perceptions of colonialism, was the fact that they accepted and appealed to Britain's power to distribute the land one way or another. Not only did they not query the existence of Crown Land per se in their country[116] but not once did the African Councillors question the historic origins of the Crown's 'ownership' of fully one hundred per cent of Northern Rhodesia that had enabled the

British Government to so categorise and - according to the SNA - magnanimously 'give' and 'keep in trust' land for the Africans[117] - and that entitled them to continue taking decisions on the matter. The ARC's total silence on this score adds further significance to one of the very first motions tabled before the ARC. This was the bland request made to the Government in 1946 to "consider whether it would not be possible (for it) to acquire the Congo Pedicle"[118] because of the difficulties encountered by African travellers traversing that broad peninsularof Belgian-colonised land jutting into the Copperbelt area. Not only did the African councillors reveal a seeming (and not entirely unjustified) ignorance of the hard international bargaining and naked exploitative hopes that had lain behind that particular border delineation, but a rather more startling apparent unawareness of any particular significance residing in the 'coincidence' of this curious border feature with the presence of vast mineral wealth in that geographical area. Ignorance of historical facts is one thing but failure to perceive concrete economic realities quite another. This conforms, however, quite clearly with their views, as evinced in their debates on colonialist politics, on the nature of the colonisation of their country as a disinterested humanitarian committment by the British without a suggestion of self-interest, let alone base economic motivations.

This naivete in regard to the British colonisation of Northern Rhodesia is reflected also in the African councillors' failure to point to the British Government's direct collusion with straight capitalist economic interests in for example (in this context) their legal confirmation and defence of the validity of the British South Africa Company's 'rights' to the mineral wealth of much of Northern Rhodesia. The ARC men's total silence on this score is even more significant in the light of the SNA's suspiciously aggressive refusal to countenance any suggestion tending towards a query of the fundamental 'legality' of the mineral rights award,[119] and his persistent assertion that the question had been scrupulously examined and settled with finality by 'none other than' the House of Lords in 1924.

In fact, the ARC in its series of motions on the 'mineral rights' of the BSA Company[120] was not even focussed on the British Government's recognition of the BSA Company's 'rights', nor even on the principle of the original award made in the 1890's. They were simply querying whether the Lozi ruler had had the right to sign on behalf of lands not his and whether it was, therefore, he or the Native Authorities of the mining areas who should have been receiving the annual payments from the BSA Company. This was the essence also of the later motions[121] demanding proof that any other chiefs had signed such agreements with the BSA Company, the aim being to clarify the continued 'legal' ownership by the Africans of their mineral resources and their rights to negotiate better terms of compensation or payment than those obtained by the 'innocent' chiefs signing (or not signing!) in the past, in the event of future mining developments in their respective areas.

Needless to say, the mineral rights motions occasioned a direct confrontation between the Lozi delegation and the rest of the councillors.[122] More significantly, however, the Lozi vested interests in the mineral rights status quo was being challenged merely in the name of the exclusive rights of other 'tribes' - or more correctly Native Authority Treasureies - to the (fringe) revenue benefits deriving from the exploitation of minerals in their respective areas. One parochial vested interest was being challenged in the name of the parochial interests of other claimants - and the principle of the 'ownership' and 'disposal' of that wealth whether by foreigners or African chiefs virtually ignored. It was not in fact the principle of the minerals 'ownership' by foreigners that these motions were focussed upon but simply the geographical extent of and terms (and recipients) of compensation for those 'rights'. Equally significantly, not once in these debates did the ARC in any way query the fact of the exploitation of those minerals by foreign mining corporations, let alone criticise or condemn it.

These are very significant indications of the African councillors' attitudes to the economic exploitation of their country by colonialism. The further indications are that they

regarded these land and mineral alienations as necessary concomittants to 'economic development', requiring only that 'due compensation', in land or revenues, be awarded to the local interests concerned - both in regard to historic alienations and in the event of further land being required for future 'economic development' projects, or any further minerals being discovered and exploited in the interests of 'economic development'. Next, not only did they perceive neither the original economic motivations of British colonialism in this part of Africa, nor the direct collusion of the British Government with exploitative economic interests, but they actually continued to the end to petition that very same government for a legal re-examination and legal redefinition of the principle of the ownership of the natural resources of Northern Rhodesia. Finally, in so far as they associated Britain in any way with these questions, it was in the light of its governmental role in amending unsatisfactory aspects of the status quo, and in so far as any doubts were evinced about British motivation - in maintaining the Trust Lands, not in upholding the BSA Company mineral rights! - it was in respect of its suspected susceptibility to settler agricultural ambitions vis-a-vis the Trust Lands and not related to the land's wider and deeper economic value especially potential mineral wealth; and the British Government's 'susceptibilities' in that direction! While, therefore, the settlers emerge once again as the main threat and the British Government appears as erring but essentially disinterested, it is the real exploiters of the country's natural resources, the mineral and mining companies which actually emerge in these debates with the greatest approval of the ARC men.

Motions related to the Native Authorities

The fundamental belief of the African councillors in the pretensions and propaganda of the British colonial rulers - that their presence in Northern Rhodesia was a disinterested humanitarian committment to the 'advancement' of the African population and their preparation for eventual self rule - was reflected also in the

ARC's series of motions related to various aspects of the Native Authorities System. These motions were, in fact, rather less political than might have been supposed[123] pointing to the councillors' failure to interpret this system correctly in terms of Britain's system of colonial administration, and to their tendancy - not surprising in a body containing so many Native Authority Council members - to regard this 'African Local Government' as both genuinely African and simultaneously a continuation of traditional African self-rule and a development of the same towards modern self-government.[124] Not once was the system, let alone the 'traditional' or modern political credentials of the participants in the Native Authorities system, called into doubt,[125] and the ARC as a whole, in fact, supported and indeed rushed to the defence of the Native Authorities, especially in the years immediately before and the years immediately after the imposition of Federation. The marked upsurge of such motions in the Third Council (see TABLE XV E,F,G) was clearly occasioned by the widespread African anticipation of a settler assault on the advances in 'African government' in the rural areas of Northern Rhodesia, and on the status and rights of chiefs,[126] along with the rights of Africans in general.[127] Once again, the ARC was manifesting their characteristic acceptance and utilisation of colonialist mental constructs and political and administrative contrivances, and embracing the creations of the colonial government in their reactions to the colonial settlers' suspected aims and actual advances.

The African councillors, then, made various suggestions tending towards the enhancement of the formal status of the chiefs,[128] and wide-ranging recommendations and demands for increased and broader responsibilities and powers for the Native Authority Councils in the spheres of justice,[129] administration,[130] health[131] and social welfare,[132] trade and commerce,[133] rural development[134] and natural resources.[135] They also made concomittant demands for an increased share of and even total redirection of revenues for the Native Authorities from the colonial government, central or local. These ranged from timber royalties and sales fees,[136] through claims on part of and later the total rents and licence

fees paid in Native Authority areas;[137] and even went to the extent of demanding a capitation tax on the mining companies to be paid into the Native Authorities Treasuries in proportion to the amount of mine labour drawn from the respective Native Authority areas.[138] They also repeatedly demanded more, and more direct, government grants and loans to the Native Authority Treasureies.[139] Finally, in the sphere of Native Authority Functioning,[140] the African councillors were primarily concerned with the poor conditions of service for and hence poor calibre of the memberships of these councils.[141] Their suggested remedies lay, on the one hand, in the direction of improved conditions of service[142] so as to attract "enlightened and progressive elements" - serving in the process, and not merely coincidentally, their own vested professional interests therein - and, on the other hand, in a variety of government-sponsored educational tours, mutual exchanges and local government courses for Native Authority members.[143]

What emerges of interest about the general political perceptions of the ARC from their debates on the Native Authorities is, firstly, the confirmation that the ARC not only defended and propagated a colonialist administrative system in 'self-defense' against a colonialist (settler) onslaught, but seemingly failed all along to perceive the colonialist 'theory' and purposes[144] underlying the artificial resuscitation and maintenance of 'traditional' chiefs and their 'tribes' through the creation of 'tribal' administrations. Indeed, it was not until its final year that the ARC discussed two motions manifesting even the beginnings of reservations about the system. The first was a debate rejecting the proposal that,[145] rather than the Central Government, the (long-argued) 'real representatives' of the rural masses, the Native Authorities, be empowered to permit - or ban - public gatherings in the rural areas.[146] The second was a motion demanding that "chiefs' tours of the Copperbelt should be free from Government influence"[147] although, as could be expected where the awakening realisation was but recent, it was also partial, extending neither to all the ARC members[148] nor to a penetrating and consistent view of the Native Authorities as a system. It was, nonetheless, an advance on their earlier

characteristic outlook which, far from perceiving the use made of the 'traditional' African leaders to legitimise colonial rule, rules and regulations, the ARC had even, for example, strongly supported a suggestion[149] that the Native Authorities administer the hated pass system on behalf of the colonial government.

Secondly, the ARC men in their support for the Native Authorities system did not apparently perceive the apartheid-like characteristics, parallels and potential in the system[150] - whereas the settlers themselves certainly did, and trumpeted their views as to where the Native Authorities could and should lead in the highest legislative body in the land.[151] To the contrary, the ARC actually lent support to the settler claims that the towns and line-of-rail were 'European' areas by, themselves, equivocating over Native Authority claims on people residing in the urban areas or over aspects of life as such in the urban areas.[152] This implied that the sphere of 'African local government' was restricted to the rural areas alone (while claiming the whole of the country to be an African 'protectorate') thus lending credence to settler claims that the line-of-rail was 'European' while only the rural backwoods were 'African'. If only the rural areas were the sphere of African local government it followed that the urban areas - and all residing therein - were the sphere of 'European' local government.

Furthermore, related to that failure to see the broader implications of their support for the rural Native Authorities, the ARC also failed to see the possible repercussions of the system even within the African population alone - first and foremost the implications and effects of the 'tribal'-based Native Authority administrations, and the regionalistic vested interests being encouraged therein. What is more, they even lent support to this trend by, for example, recommending a tribal-based assessment of the capitation tax on the mining companies,[153] and by demanding, in 1955, that a share of the revenue paid by the mining companies to the central government be given instead to the Native Treasuries "<u>in the province</u> in which the mine is established."[154]

But possibly of greatest interest in terms of the present study, is the manifest evidence that the ARC's support here was not

merely for a system of 'African local government' but for the specific social elements and strata participating therein and especially for the vested personal and professional interests therein of a large proportion of the very membership of the African councils system itself. That the nature of the support of the ARC for the Native Authorities was strongly elite-ist and, what is more, anti-democratic is borne out not only in the colonialist character of the system as such but in their own explicit endorsement of the Native Authorities' divorce from and ever-increasing independence of the popular will or any form of control by the demos.[155] This illustrates once again the marked ARC characteristic of equating the African elite with the Africans and of speaking in terms of 'the Africans' when in fact propagating the interests of only some Africans.

Racial discrimination debates

An examination of the great number of motions under the general topic heading of Racial Discrimination sent up to the ARC by the African Provincial Councils similarly reveals a concern among the councillors not so much with discrimination against the African population as with discrimination in various fields against a specific stratum of the African population; while the ARC debates on these motions illustrate, once again, their practice of speaking in the name of the rights of the Africans while in fact supporting advances in the rights of merely a few Africans. It is also interesting to note that the motions on racial discrimination not only occasioned a very high degree of agreement among all the ARC councillors but that they constituted almost the largest topic of debate in the ARC and the one subject most constantly and consistently raised. Although the rate of incidence of the various sub-topics in this category (see TABLE XV J to L and TABLE XVI M and N) shows that, separately, these motions were tabled somewhat sporadically, together they formed an unbroken series of attacks on the racialist fabric of colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia.

Nonetheless, the tables of incidence also reveal a

TABLE XVI

INCIDENCE OF TOPICS M-X

M.
R.D. MISCELLANEOUS



N.
PASSES & POLICE



O.
LABOUR



P.
SOCIAL WELFARE



Q
HEALTH



R
EDUCATION



S.
SOCIAL ISSUES



T.
ALCHOHOLIC DRINK



U.
TRADE

V
TRANSPORT



W.
RURAL DEVELOPMENT



X.
NATURAL RESOURCES



heavier concentration of attacks on racial discrimination in Trade in the First and Second Councils and a virtually total absence of any such motions on the notorious racial-based Pass System until the years immediately prior to and following the imposition of Federation. This apparently sustained indifference in the earlier years among the largely Native Authority and/or educated elite memberships of the African Provincial Councils and the ARC to a system of control and surveillance that affected and inconvenienced them but little,[156] while it was the bane of the lives of the labouring masses and migrating workers, appears to reflect a degree of preoccupation with the problems of their own social group(s) among the African councillors. It was only with the direct confrontation brought with the settler break-through with Federation that the African councillors raised and the ARC, albeit with some exceptions, condemned the infamous situpa system[157] and its legal ramifications,[158] and the police surveillance and assaults entailed in the operation of the system.[159]

By contrast, discriminatory measures - far less pervasive and systematic than the pass system - against African traders, that is actual and aspiring petty-bourgeoise, was an immediate, strong and sustained concern of the African councillors. Not only did they, on the one hand, demand freedom of trade for Africans in all urban areas, be they government municipalities or 'closed' mining townships,[160] but also, on the other hand, demanded that "trading by non-Africans be restricted to township areas," thereby attempting to guard the rural areas as their own monopolistic trading preserve.[161] Motions on the limitations in urban trading and various other disabilities[162] suffered by hopeful African traders and businessmen diminished slightly in the years of the Third Council - possibly because they had by then already made some headway in their campaign against restrictions in African trade, which seems quite feasible in the light of the deliberate colonialist strategy, especially with Federation, of fostering the growth of a 'stable African middleclass.'[163]

In terms of sheer number of motions tabled, Trade tops the list of racial discrimination topics. It is followed by the

series of motions protesting legal restrictions on the ownership of firearms by Africans.[164] These motions demanded not only that Africans be allowed to buy more than a mere one hundred shotgun cartridges per annum,[165] be allowed to keep their arms in their own possession while in or if residing in the urban areas,[166] but that they be permitted to acquire modern rifles, new from arms dealers if they so desired.[167] Of special interest in these debates is the fact that, although protesting other restrictions, at no time did the African councillors question the restriction of arms ownership to "chiefs and other Africans of proved responsibility" duly endorsed by the chief and/or local DC.[168] Equally worth noting is the fact that, once again, this attack on racial discrimination was in a sphere that was of direct concern to but a small number of Africans for - quite apart from the legal restriction - there was a straight economic bar to the aspirations by the mass of the African population in that direction.

The motions raised in the sphere of racial discrimination in public places and facilities[169] were, by contrast, rather more general than elite-ist, for most of these motions dealt with discrimination in Post Offices and other public places[170] and with the notorious 'window system' for sales to Africans from European shops in the urban areas.[171] Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that a goodly number of these motions related only to areas of public discrimination where the common people could not hope to venture for reasons other than the colour bar, such as high-priced, European shops in the 'first class trading areas' and European-only "hotels, restaurants and cafes".[172] The racial barriers in these areas were frustrating to the African elite who possessed something of the necessary financial resources and the life-style and aspirations in that direction.[173]

These protests of, by and for the upper strata of the African population in Northern Rhodesia emerge most clearly of all in the motions relating to racial disdrimination in employment and promotions[174] for, apart from one (rather dubious) appeal for pay for Africans doing the same work as Europeans "near to that of a European but not the same pay",[175] <u>all</u> the other motions in this

sub-group were concerned only with protesting bars to appointments and promotions for highly educated Africans, most especially into elevated positions in the civil service.[176]

This preoccupation of the African councillors with the grievances and aspirations of the African elite is illustrated also in their repeated motions protesting restrictions on the purchase of (high priced) 'European' liquor by Africans,[177] culminating in a request, in 1958, that African air travellers (!) and first or second class railway passengers (!) be allowed to "purchase such liquor as they require"[178] - which was all very well, and quite justifiable, but hardly had much bearing on the lives and problems of the mass of the population. These motions on discriminatory legislation in regard to consumption of alcohol are grouped under the sub-heading Racial Discrimination - Miscellaneous,[179] and it is of some interest to note that it was only in this group of racial discrimination motions that any significant degree of divergence of opinion emerged in the ARC debates.[180] This is not only because they differed individually, in purely social attitudes, as to whether consumption of spirits was commendable or not and should be allowed to spread into the African population or not, but also because included in this 'miscellaneous' category are motions relating to race relations between Africans and the Indian settlers in Northern Rhodesia[181] and between Africans and so-called 'Coloureds'.[182] These motions evoked considerable differences in political reactions and racial(ist) attitudes among the ARC men.[183]

What emerges of overall significance from the ARC debates on racial discrimination is not only the informative insights they provide into the racialism and racial insults suffered by Africans in this country under colonial rule, but that anti-racist protest politics on behalf of the African elite constituted a goodly proportion of the overall political content of the debates of the ARC.[184] Equally significantly, although manifesting a rather clearer vision of the colonial administration's culpability, along with the settlers, on the score of racial discrimination, the ARC continued in its petitionistic approach to the 'Home' Government to 'influence' the Territorial Government in this regard.[185]

Since strong elite-ist characteristics have been clearly observed in both of the largest divisions of topics debated by the ARC, namely Native Authorities and Racial Discrimination, and since elite-ist aspirations and outlook characterised also the proposals before and decisions by the ARC on the African Councils and African Representation topics, and since the implications of this observation are of far-reaching significance, it is clearly necessary to test for this apparent orientation and motivation of the African councillors in the broader spheres of and more wide-ranging ARC social and economic topics of debate. The remaining range of ARC topics are so varied and the motions discussed so numerous, however, that it is necessary to divide them into the more strongly 'developmental' topics and the more 'socio-economic problem' topics[186] since they tend to share a rather wider range of the same characteristics on that basis than in the straight 'social' and 'economic' categorisation.[187]

Development debates

Of the (more strongly) developmental topics - Transport and Communications, Health and Welfare, Education and Rural Development - it can, at the outset, be said that these were not only matters of considerable concern to the African councillors, there being a solid number of motions under each of these topic headings, and three of them ranking at the top in the order of numerical weight (see TABLE XIII) but were a consistent concern throughout the lifetime of the ARC, there being a constant representation of these subjects in all three councils, although with certain variations from council to council (see TABLE XVI Q,R,V,W). Also noteworthy is the fact that in their responses to these developmental matters the ARC men manifested a consistently very high rate of total unanimity or strong accord.[188]

In the debates on the development of transport and communications, for example, the ARC approved every one of the motions tabled and registered a fully 90% absolute unanimity on the proposals. Only two of the motions occasioned any contrary

individual votes at all, neither of any numerical or motivational significance,[189] and all the remaining eighteen motions were passed with total unanimity - whether concerning road and railway passenger transport,[190] or goods transport facilities,[191] or even such regional problems as Barotseland's very poor land communications system,[192] or the Copperbelt's dearth of bus and railway station shelters,[193] or the demand for better bus services along the line-of-rail[194] or for more roads in the rural areas.[195]

Educational development, similarly, occasioned a remarkably high degree of unanimity among the ARC members whether in the sphere of extended and improved primary school education,[196] or secondary and college education,[197] or in the sphere of such special educational needs as female education,[198] adult education,[199] and commercial, technical[200] and boarding school requirements.[201] They also repeatedly criticised the artificial barriers raised against Africans advancing further in their education,[202] and it was from this, and especially their attacks on the 'pyramid system' of education that much of the political content of the education debates derived.[203] Not only was the ARC's handling of education thoroughly comprehensive, as could be expected of a body composed largely of teachers and former teachers,[204] it was also commendably impartial - in objectively recognising, for example, the prior claims of (mainly urban) concentrations of population in school building programmes. In a number of such motions on regional educational needs[205] the voting was either unanimous or overwhelmingly in support.

Incipient if not actual narrower social interests did, however, manifest themselves in the proposals tabled on education. One early example was the recommendation, in 1947,[206] that the £75,000 voted by the Legislative Council as a "token of gratitude" to the Africans for their contribution in the recent war be used to build a "War Memorial College" - who and how many in a largely illiterate population could have taken advantage of that facility? - with an afterthought added that the balance (?) "be devoted to the support of dependants of Askari who (had) lost their lives." Similarly, the request that certain secondary school places be

reserved for those prepared (able!) to pay[207] was clearly to the advantage of only a very small elite - just as the motions on financial help to secondary school graduates and university students and the establishment of an "inter-racial technical college" were calculated to contribute to this elite's ever higher educational advance.

All these latter motions are somewhat paradoxical coming from a body that condemned the pyramid system of education and, if it can be argued that increased and improved educational facilities for Africans whether at the base or peak of the educational pyramid - which was a given factor anyway - was nonetheless some advance for Africans, that cannot obscure the fact that it was only some Africans. It must also be kept in mind that any who entered the pyramid at all constituted per se part of the relatively privileged 'educated' minority of the African population and, what is more, that in orienting fully one third of their educational motions towards the peak of the educational pyramid, the African councillors were not only expressing the narrower interests of but potentially contributing towards the further and ever higher advancement of the small educated African elite and widening the gap between them and the illiterate mass of the people.

The ARC's series of twenty seven motions on Health and Welfare were also notable for their wide-ranging and general scope, and for the high degree of unanimity with which they were passed by the ARC councillors, whether dealing with specific health problems[208] or specific areas of the country.[209] The most significant divergence of opinion in this category was over the suggestion, in 1949, that "a separate African Medical Department should be instituted "which raised objections over its apartheid implications and was rejected.[210] The only other noteworthy divided vote in this group of motions followed the debate on the suggestion for the introduction of fee-paying medical facilities for those Africans prepared (able!) to pay[211] in which, once more, the interests of a small relatively well-off group of Africans was manifest.[212]

The instances cited so far of elite-ist concerns amidst general developmental preoccupations are relatively few in number, although clear in content and implications, and their significance

derives more from their incidence given the much wider and more dominant manifestations of elite-ist interests in the topics of debate examined earlier. In the category of motions on rural development, however, the concerns of the modern rural elite, especially the 'progressive' farmers, are not only manifest but constitute almost half of all these motions. Thus, while dealing with general rural development needs in the spheres of improved farming techniques,[213] marketing facilities,[214] communications,[215] health and welfare,[216] the ARC equally frequently debated motions concerned only with the needs and aspirations of the small class of so-called 'progressive' or 'improved' farmers. Not only did the African councillors, in 1948, table a motion to "welcome Government's scheme for peasant farming"[217] and recommend, in 1951,[218] increased technical personnel and efforts to extend "improved farming' schemes "as widely as possible", but soon showed themselves conscious of some of the most fundamental prerequisites for successful modern commercial farming, namely in the sphere of land ownership. Thus, in a very significant motion with far-reaching social implications and socio-economic repercussions, the African councillors recommended in 1952 that

> "African farmers should be guaranteed permanent security to stay on their land and should not be subject to removal by Government or the Native Authorities."[219]

Then in 1953[220] they asked that African 'improved' farmers be allowed an area larger than the prescribed thirty acres each - the more 'reasonable' allocation being in the region of 300 acres! - which could only be fully and profitably cultivated if the farmer was either to be an employer of labour and/or an employer of modern agricultural equipment, more especially tractors for ploughing.[221] These earlier expressions of the requirements of the embryonic African capitalist farmers were not very well received by the whole ARC who divided in their votes on these motions, the main objection being that these proposals would both limit the areas of potential expansion for other Africans and create a class of 'great landowners'.[222]

By the period of the Third Council, however, a much more favourable reception was given to such motions propagating the

interests of the rural petty-bourgeoisie and aspirant bourgeoise. These motions included proposals for increased crop prices for African farmers,[223] and repeated strongly supported requests[224] for loans to both African farmers and businessmen

> "in order to make rural development a natural local and personal expression of the people who are to achieve betterment by this development".[225]

But possibly most significant of all was the motion tabled in 1955[226] to the effect that

> "in view of the varying stages of understanding of agriculture among African farmers, and since both the peasant and improved farmer schemes do not meet the needs of the more enterprising land-husbandman, this Council requests Government to give an immediate and sympathetic consideration to the granting of financial assistance to men of character, industry and understanding who accept farming in accordance with the orders of their respective Native Authorities."

These motions, in contrast to the voting on the earlier motions pointing in the same direction of the emergence of a class of African capitalist farmers - "the more enterprising land-husbandmen" - were passed with the overwhelming approval of the ARC. Thus, in the sphere of rural development the clear manifestation of the interests and ambitions of the emerging rural African petty-bourgeoisie - whether farmer or trader - and eventually the expression of strong support for these interests by the ARC, lend further significance to the otherwise seemingly rather insignificant, because few and scattered, illustrations of the sectional interests of the elite of the African population in Northern Rhodesia as represented in the development debates in the ARC.

There are a number of other significant features that emerge from the ARC's rural development debates, and indeed development debates as a whole. The first is the clear confirmation of an absence of any appreciable number of political motions in this category - that is their failure to indicate, let alone indict the colonial government, and even less so colonialism as such, in regard to the lack of development in or partial and imbalanced 'development' of the country. Even where the colonial administration as such did enter at all into the ARC's reckoning

in these spheres it was only in respect of its legislative and administrative role in amending the situation. If anything the underdevelopment of Northern Rhodesia was perceived as a 'given' and 'African' dilemma in which the colonial administration had, and had always had an essentially benevolent and only constructive role to play. In fact even where, largely in passing, worsening rural underdevelopment was (partially and vaguely) perceived as an effect of the development of the mining areas and 'line-of-rail' it was interpreted in terms of the culpability of the African men (and women) themselves who would so insist on going to and remaining in the urban areas rather than dutifully developing their own village homes.[227] Never were the designs and devices of colonialism in ensuring this stream of labour in the first place and even less so the colonial government's collaboration in the process ever raised.[228]

Furthermore, the councillors' failure to see the real connection between the underdevelopment and maintenance of the underdevelopment of the rural areas in general and African agriculture in particular - and the development of the 'European' areas, urban and rural, underlay their manifest belief that, if they could but establish the infrastructure (more especially a communications system - less railways! - and marketing facilities) and acquire the requisite technical and financial assistance, the 'African' rural areas would soon - and automatically - take off into the type of economic, agricultural development that characterised the 'European' farming areas. In fact, it is precisely this emphasis on agriculture that needs underscoring for, apart from concern shown for the advance of rural African trade and traders, no other rural economic development suggestions were tabled either in the spheres of mineral exploration or industrial (and urban) development. This characteristic is evident also in the significant absence of any general topics on mining, manufacturing, finance and the economy as a whole[229] in the range of motions tabled before the ARC.[230] The indication is that these economic activities not only <u>were</u>, but were perceived by the councillors as, specifically European areas of concern.

Finally, if the development demands and perspectives of the African councillors were naive, modest and noncomprehensive and were characterised by an acceptance of a specifically 'European' sector of the economy, they were also characterised by an unquestioning acceptance that economic development meant capitalist type economic development. Their very own stress was heavily and explicitly on individual enterprise and industriousness, personal initiative and advancement and other good bourgeois values. Not once, even within the mere limits of commercial agricultural development, was the idea of cooperative - let alone communal! - enterprise mooted to counter the many advantages of and enormous advances already achieved by the Europeans - to say nothing of trying to liberate the people as such from their multifold exploitation resulting from (and ensured by) the unproductiveness of their agriculture.

The rural African elite, in so far as they even noted and concerned themselves with the plight of the rural masses and the poverty of the rural areas, clearly saw the solution as lying in the direction of-state aided[231] - capitalist modes of 'development' and more specifically their own individual - but state assisted - capitalist enterprise. The African Provincial councillors in raising, debating and approving these ambitions and this orientation, and the ARC itself in endorsing them clearly supported both the general orientation and the specific interests involved. Finally, it is interesting to note that while supporting and expressing these petty-bourgeois and aspirant bourgeois interests and aims in terms of <u>African</u> development and presenting narrower (if embryonic) class benefits as synonymous with African advancement, the African councillors here also couched many of their demands in explicitly narrower group and even individualistic terms. The 'general' and 'African' terminology just could not express such directly and totally sectional interests.

<u>Socio-economic 'problem' debates</u>

The manifestation of elite-ist and specifically petty-

bourgeois interests, outlook and aspirations in the proposals tabled before and approved by the ARC have been so clearly substantiated that it remains only to confirm whether, in the remaining 'socio-economic problems' range of topics, such characteristics are also evident. Whether there is that similarity or not, however, there are some clear contrasts between these socio-economic and the developmental topics of debate that are immediately evident. Firstly, there was, in contrast to the developmental division of the ARC debates, and somewhat paradoxically, a far greater proportion of political motions in the socio-economic division, with the general Social Issues group alone not registering any appreciable number of political motions. These topics are also characterised by a far lower degree of unanimity amongst the members than in any of the other topics of debate, and analysis of the occasions of sharply divided votes in the ARC proceedings[232] shows all these topics ranking in the top half (and in fact at the very top in four cases) in terms of comparative degrees of disagreement or conflict (see TABLE XVII). Thirdly, not only did these 'conflict debates' tend to appear more in the first two ARC Councils, but this range of socio-economic motions as such also tended to appear more frequently in the First and Second ARC's than in the Third (see TABLE XVI O,P,S,T,U,X). This could mean either that the ARC had managed to make some headway in the earlier period in getting such problems attended to and 'out of the way' or, which is also quite likely, that the African councillors were by the later period simply becoming much more interested in directly and purely political topics related to political and civic rights for Africans or, most likely of all, that the ongoing processes of social change and adjustment, of which most of these motions are a manifestation,[233] had by the later 1950's, themselves, resolved a number of these issues.

This observed tendancy in the incidence of these socio-economic motions is, however, also explicable in terms of other factors related to the separate topics of this general range. The decline in the incidence by the Third Council of Labour motions, for example, is partly explicable in terms of the dominant view amongst

TABLE XVII*a

TOPICS OF DEBATE: SHARP VOTING DIVISIONS

1.	ALCOHOLIC DRINK	5/10	50%
2.	SOCIAL ISSUES - GENERAL	10/23	43%
3.	NATURAL RESOURCES	6/18	33%
4.	TRADE AND COMMERCE	7/21	33%
5.	CHIEFS' STATUS	4/12	33%
6.	RD: MISCELLANEOUS	4/13	31%
7.*b	NA: RESPONSIBILITIES	9/32	28%
8.	COLONIALIST POLITICS	8/34	23%
9.	RD: TRADE	3/13	23%
10.	LABOUR CONDITIONS	5/24	21%
11.*b	AFRICAN COUNCILS	3/16	19%
12.	AFRICAN REPRESENTATION	4/24	17%
13.	SOCIAL WELFARE & HOUSING	3/20	15%
14.	RURAL DEVELOPMENT	4/29	14%
15.	NA: FINANCES	3/22	13%
16.	NA: FUNCTIONING	2/17	12%
17.*b	EDUCATION	4/34	12%
18.	HEALTH AND WELFARE	3/28	11%
19.*b	RD: FIREARMS	1/11	9%
20.	LAND AND MINERAL RIGHTS	1/13	8%
21.	RD: EMPLOYMENT	-/8	-
22.	RD: PUBLIC PLACES	-/9	-
23.	PASS SYSTEM & THE POLICE	-/10	-
24.	TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS	-/20	-

*a see Appendix G column (iv).

*b the total numbers of motions indicated for these topics differ from the totals in the Appendix owing to the exclusion here of those motions on which no vote was taken (see explanatory notes to Appendix G) - the inclusion of which would have tended to distort somewhat the final percentages.

-i) topics underlined are socio-economic topics analysed
-ii) all percentages are presented at nearest whole figure

both colonial officials and trade unionists themselves that labour problems were a purely economic or 'industrial' matter and the exclusive domain of the trade union.[234] Thus, during the First ARC term, before the formation of African trade unions in Northern Rhodesia, and during the Second's while they were still in the process of being set up and many types of workers were still not unionised, such motions could make their way into the ARC with quite significant frequency; whereas seemingly paradoxically, in the Third Council, with its strong representation of top trade union leaders

fewer labour motions were tabled.

Of greater importance, however, than the relative number was the type of labour motions in these later years and the reception they got from the ARC. Not only were the eight labour motions debated between 1956 and 1958 overtly political and radical, attacking some of the worst abuses against African workers - for example in regard to the obligatory surrender of their 'situpa' to their employers,[235] compulsory unpaid labour for touring government officials[236] and legal punishment for 'desertion' if they 'broke contract'[237] - but equally significantly were passed with the unanimous support of the whole ARC.

This contrasts markedly with the labour motions, in the first two councils, between 1946 and 1953, which may have been rather more numerous[238] but were also much more piecemeal and moderate and, most significantly of all, were frequently received with very divergent views by the ARC men. Thus, for example, not only were the councillors' opinions and voting divided on motions demanding family allowances for African employees,[239] a minimum wage scale,[240] specified hours of work for domestic labour[241] and the right of African workers to paid leave after four years continuous service,[242] but they even rejected the idea of the controversial controlled contract labour system being abolished.[243] In contrast to this manifestation of apparent opposition or, at best, a degree of indifference to amerlioration of the conditions of the workers, the ARC men in these years were quick and unanimous in their condemnation of child labour[244] and in their demands for better pay for teachers[245] - to say nothing of their unanimous demands for better employment and promotion opportunities in the Civil Service for highly educated Africans,[246] improved conditions of service for the educated technical and administrative employees of the Native Authority Councils,[247] and larger allowances for chiefs![248] That is not to say that the African councillors in this earlier period did not at any time raise and lend their support to proposals responding to the needs and claims of the African workers,[249] but it is rather significant that they far more frequently equivocated over those claims.

Probably most important of all, in terms of the nature of the wider political perspectives of the African councillors is the fact that, whether the ARC supported them or not, their motions on behalf of the African workers were almost totally[250] confined within and directed against the sphere of settler employment of African labour - in the European stores,[251] and in their homes[252] and on the European settlers' farms.[253] Not once was the largest employer of African labour in the country - namely the mining corporations - directly cited. This could of course be testimony to the relatively better conditions of employment provided by the 'paternalistic' mining companies and/or the more highly developed trade union organisation of the mine workers, but it also conforms, hardly merely coincidentally, with the pervasive tendancy of the African councillors to exclude the mining corporations from their vision of the negative aspects of the foreign presence in their country. As such this labour topic feature is further evidence of their somewhat imbalanced focus on the exploitative settlers and their uncritical view of the most thorough and highly profitable type of exploitation of Africans and Africa - that by the international capitalist corporations.

Of all the socio-economic topics of debate Social Welfare and Housing was both the least controversial of these debates in the ARC (see TABLE XVII) and the most general in relevance and comprehensive in scope. Thus, the councillors not only touched on child,[254] aged and destitute[255] and family[256] welfare but also general community welfare facilities in both urban[257] and rural[258] areas. They also dealt with both better quality urban municipal housing for Africans[259] and improvements in the general siting and servicing of urban African housing schemes.[260] But it is interesting to note, amidst these general-interest social welfare and housing concerns, the appearance, at the very first meeting of the Third Council in 1953, of a demand for special areas of urban land for middleclass 'home ownership' schemes[261] where the more urban-stabilised and better-off Africans could acquire land and build houses for themselves.[262] This motion highlights, in fact, the two most significant features appearing in this category of debates -

not only the further manifestation of the aspirations of the (urban) African elite, but interesting illustration of the processes, problems and effects of urbanisation as such in Northern Rhodesia on both the urban and the rural populations. In this latter regard, probably the most significant motion in this group is that rejected by the ARC in 1948 suggesting compulsory family remittances to the rural areas to

> "ensure that those away at work maintain their parents and families at home".[263]

The considerable number of motions tabled on general social issues,[264] and alcoholic drink[265] in particular, are similarly both a general manifestation, and a confirming illustration in the very ARC memberships' reactions, of the processes and effects of social change in Northern Rhodesia. What is significant about these series of motions is not only their wide-ranging character and specific content but their controversial nature in the eyes of the ARC members, evident in the very high rate of sharply divided votes they occasioned (see TABLE XVII). These motions dealt with changes in social custom and practice in the spheres of marriage[266] and the family,[267] witchcraft[268] and religion,[269] and the law,[270] in the latter regard concerned primarily with the form and functioning of the 'native law' court system in the urban areas.[271] Of greatest immediate relevance in this group of motions, however, is the considerable number of proposals dealing with property ownership[272] and laws of inheritance. The repeated proposals for the introduction of legislation to enable Africans to bequeath their property to nominated heirs[273] are evidence not merely of 'social change' but of clear tendancies in this change towards bourgeois concepts of private property ownership and inheritance, and are all the more significant for being both an effect of and necessary concomittant to the development of a property-owning African petty-bourgeoisie.

The concern of the African councillors for the needs of the African petty-bourgeoisie are also manifest in the range of twenty one proposals tabled on Trade and Commerce.[274] These motions reiterated the repeated requests of African traders and business-

men for greater rights and scope of operation in the urban areas.[275] They also dealt with a variety of aspects of rural trade (starting with the demand that the rural areas as a whole be preserved for African traders alone[276]), including such matters as the terms and scope of rural trade licences[277] and provincial loans committees.[278] General concerns with terms of licencing,[279] and sources and conditions of loans to African traders individually[280] or collectively[281] are also a marked feature of this series of motions.

In so far as ARC members had reservations about these proposals - and there was indeed a fairly high incidence of sharply divided votes in this category of debates (see TABLE XVII) - it was mainly in so far as some of these motions were tabling suggestions for the advance or protection of regional or local trade interests.[282] This type of trade competition, however, (or internal contradictions in the African petty-bourgeoisie) evoked, it is interesting to note, not just divided votes but a high rate of abstention by the ARC men. One such motion was that tabled in 1953 requiring that "in order not to discourage Africans from carrying on trade in their own areas" encroachment by other traders, European or African be forbidden[283] - which suggestion evoked only nine supporting votes and fully seventeen abstentions from the ARC men. A similar high rate of abstention was recorded in the 1957 debate[284] on a motion on urban market facilities, in which a confrontation of rural African producers-cum-aspirant-distributors-cum-retailers with urban African retailers was manifest. The only controversial motion in the trade and commerce debates of the ARC not falling into the category of internal petty-bourgeois contradictions was that tabled in 1957 suggesting that

> "Africans be permitted to run African bars and dry canteens on the same lines as the Congo system"[285]

in which differing attitudes to the consumption of alcohol, rather than conflicting trading interests, divided the ARC men.

In general, therefore, what characterises the ARC reactions to the motions tabled before them on African trade and commerce is a tendancy to unanimity or strong accord where these motions entailed the interests of or demands by African traders

vis-a-vis the colonial authorities but divided reactions (mainly abstention) where they entailed conflicting relations between or competition within the African traders group themselves.

This is not, of course the first manifestation of internal contradictions within the African elite evident in the proceedings of the ARC - some of their debates on the status and priveleges of chiefs,[286] the responsibilities and powers of the Native Authorities,[287] and the interests and aspirations of commercial farmers[288] being other examples. Nor are differences within the elite the only type of contradiction as such observable in these debates, for other divergences of interest and conflicting ARC responses thereto have been noted in the foregoing analysis - the regionalistic reactions to the mineral rights controversy being one example. There were also a number of sharp 'conflict debates' deriving purely from attitudinal differences among the ARC men over social issues such as the consumption of alcohol,[289] or economic issues such as the conservation of natural resources,[290] or differences of political approach and perception as manifested in the debates on colonialist politics.[291] The varied nature of the sources and causes of the conflict debates in the ARC - including elite and petty-bourgeois internal relative contradictions - are here pointed out not in order to exaggerate their significance, for the ARC was, more especially in its third phase, far more often united than divided over those same sectional elite interests - whether those of the chiefs, Native Authority councillors, civil servants, mission teachers, traders or farmers. The observation is necessary in order to note the incidence and character of incipient and actual internal - relative - contradictions among the African elite and contradictions between the African elite and the mass of the population; precisely because of the otherwise overwhelming unanimity or strong accord of the ARC men be it over specific petty-bourgeois, particular elite, 'general' African or - in its last phase - even working class and mass interests. In these last observations reside, in fact, the three main characteristics of the total proceedings of the ARC.

The first major characteristic of the debates of the ARC is the remarkably high degree of agreement amongst the members over this great volume and variety of subjects over a period of fully thirteen years. Even more significant, however, is the fact that this unanimity is stronger and more clearly marked in the Third Council of the ARC - as close analysis of the ARC voting patterns,[292] session by session, show (see TABLE XVIII).

TABLE XVIII*a

ARC SESSIONS IN ORDER OF DEGREE OF UNANIMITY

COUNCIL	SESSION	Unanimous Motions	% Unanimity
3	1958 Oct	2/2	100%
3	1955 June	31/33	94%
3	1957 June	28/30	93%
3	1956 June	25/27	93%
2	1951 Jan	26/30	86%
3	1953 Dec	6/7	86%
3	1958 June	23/27	85%
1	1947 July	28/34	82%
1	1946 Nov	17/21	81%
2	1953 July	24/30	80%
3	1954 Oct	20/25	80%
2	1951 July	24/31	77%
1	1948 July	29/40	72%
2	1949 July	12/19	63%
2	1952 Dec	15/24	62%
2	1951 Sept Dec	3/7	37%

*a actually an assessment of their strong accord rather than absolute unanimity.

NOTE - percentages indicated at nearest whole figure

The second major feature of the range of motions tabled before the ARC is that, while strongly characterised throughout by elite-ist preoccupations and approaches and specifically petty-bourgeois interests and aspirations, their scope and comprehensiveness broadens markedly in the period of the Third Council to encompass also - and/or now agree upon![293] - not only the interests of chiefs, rural councillors, farmers, traders, teachers and the like but even certain of the interests of the labouring masses,[294] more

especially the urban working class. Thirdly, not only is there this greater comprehensiveness of scope with increased unanimity in the period of the Third Council, but the gradual radicalisation characterising the proceedings of the ARC is also most marked in the Third Council. This is evident not only, for example, in their ever more daring constitutional proposals,[295] increasingly intransigent stand on such issues as Federation[296] and stubborn insistence on the land and mineral rights questions,[297] but also in the generally higher concentration of their political motions as such in this later period - as assessment of the incidence, session by session, of all the ARC's political motions shows (see TABLE XIX). And, finally, as capping evidence of both the

TABLE XIX

ARC SESSIONS IN ORDER OF PERCENTAGE OF POLITICAL MOTIONS

COUNCIL	SESSION	Political Motions	% Political
2	1951 Sept Dec	4/4	100%
3	1957 Jan	5/5	100%
3	1958 Oct	2/2	100%
3	1954 Oct	19/23	83%
3	1958 June	18/25	72%
3	1953 Dec	5/7	71%
3	1957 June	18/30	60%
3	1955 June	19/33	58%
3	1956 June	15/28	57%
1	1946 Nov	11/20	55%
1	1947 July	16/30	53%
2	1949 July	10/19	53%
1	1948 July	21/41	51%
2	1951 Jan	13/27	48%
2	1952 Dec	11/24	46%
2	1951 July	13/31	42%
2	1953 July	11/30	37%

NOTE - percentages presented at nearest whole figure.

increasingly politically 'radical' nature of the ARC's proceedings and the increasingly united stand of the members, even on such political 'radicalism', it is noteworthy that analysis of the

incidence of sharp conflict debates[298] on specifically political issues (see TABLE XX) reveals a very low rate of such clashes of

TABLE XX

ARC SESSIONS IN ORDER OF DEGREE OF POLITICAL CONFLICT

COUNCIL	SESSION	Poltical Conflict Motions	% Conflict
2	1951 Sept Dec	5/8	62%
2	1949 July	5/10	50%
2	1952 Dec	5/11	45%
1	1948 July	8/21	38%
2	1951 July	4/13	31%
3	1954 Oct	5/19	26%
1	1947 July	4/16	25%
3	1953 Dec	1/5	20%
1	1946 Nov	2/11	18%
3	1955 June	2/19	10%
2	1953 July	1/11	9%
2	1951 Jan	1/13	7%
3	1956 June	1/15	7%
3	1957 June	1/18	6%
3	1958 June	1/18	6%
3	1958 Oct	-/2	-

NOTE - percentages presented at nearest whole figure.

opinion in the period of the Third Council with the exception only of its two earliest sessions.

Of course, both the unanimity and comprehensiveness and the radicalisation evident in the proceedings of the ARC, and the Third Council in particular, were only relative. The very high unanimity of the Third Council members was still accompanied by instances of sharp differences of opinion among them - in a few significant cases testifying to some clear divergences of interest and/or attitude among the ARC councillors, these, in turn, reflections of contradictions within the African population at large. The comprehensiveness of the scope of their proposals was also only relatively greater - compared to the more predominantly

sectionalist character of their earlier debates - and remained, still imbalanced and largely superficial for, although 'all' African interests were now apparently being encompassed, they continued to receive differential degrees of attention from the African councillors. Finally, the 'radicalisation' of the councillors, their proposals and decisions, was also only a relative process of escalating demands and clearer conceptions, and it remained incomplete both in terms of the nature of their political perspectives and perceptions and in terms of the total council membership.

It remains, nonetheless, true to say that the Third Council of the ARC was both more radical in its demands of the colonial authorities, more embracing in its concern for the African people, and more strongly united in both these regards than in the earlier phases. And what emerges of overall significance from this inter-related range of major features of the African Representative Council and, more specifically, the Third Council from 1953 to 1958 is the fact that this more 'nationalistic',[299] politically radical and strongly united council was also that which was composed most predominantly of African National Congress leaders, members and sympathisers.[300] This observation carries with it some far-reaching implications about the political character not only of the African Representative Council but of the African National Congress itself and demands a closer examination of the political roles and inter-relationships of the ARC and ANC - more especially during the mid-1950's (undertaken in Chapter Five).

The more immediate and fundamental conclusions, however, about the politics and political perceptions of the ARC deriving from the foregoing analysis of its recorded proceedings concern the nature of the perceptions of colonialism and the colonialist system in Northern Rhodesia manifest in their debates and decisions. Despite the overall changes in the ARC over time and the memberships' general political 'evolution', and despite also certain differences in political outlook from individual to individual, there were certain constants and consistencies in the political analysis and approach of the ARC, and in their general political strategy to the

end, that allow for certain conclusions to be reached as to the politics and political perceptions of this body of men as a whole.

The most striking thing is that they were not anti-colonialist. Not only did they draw a clear distinction between the different agents of colonialism - settlers, missionaries, local administrators and the 'Colonial Office' in London - with their heaviest opprobrium falling upon the settlers; and not only did they to the end maintain a naive belief in the essential benevolence of the British Government - most clearly evident in their continued basic petitionism, whatever they might have been 'demanding' and however they might have worded their 'demands'; but their focus was very clearly simply upon the 'shortcomings' in colonial rule and the offensiveness of colon(ial)ist racialism - which they criticised and condemned - and not on colonialist economic exploitation of their country - which they did not criticise let alone condemn! Furthermore, not only did they distinguish between colonial rule, which they saw as finite, and the colonialist political structures and political system which they accepted uncritically as 'natural' and right; but they failed to even perceive colonialism in its full dimensions and integrated political and socio-economic character and failed to even perceive the British hegemony over their country as colonisation or as an integral part of British colonialism in Africa.

Secondly, as much as the African political leadership of Northern Rhodesia, as represented in the ARC, were not anti-colonialist were they pro-capitalist - although they did not employ that term or express it that way. When focussing on the capitalist economic system, and 'western' technology, introduced into Northern Rhodesia by colonialism, they regarded it as 'economic development' and 'progress'. When focussing on the political and social institutions and the network of social practices and cultural values of western capitalist society introduced into Northern Rhodesia by the various agents of colonialism - missionaries, settlers and administrators - it was grandiosely referred to as 'civilization'. And their degree of assimilation and successful emulation of western values and practices was testimony to the

extent to which Africans were becoming 'civilised' and was evidence of their 'progress' and 'advancement'. The African councillors' endorsement of the capitalist socio-economic system introduced into, superimposed - and imposed! - upon, and coming to fully characterise the Northern Rhodesian social system, is manifest not only in their acceptance and utilisation of bourgeois values and rationale in their debates but, most significantly of all, in their desire and drive for a fuller and improved place and role for themselves and for the African elite as such in the colonial capitalist system politically, socially and economically.

Finally the self-expressed participatory political social and economic objectives of the African elite strongly characterising the proceedings of the ARC are of significance in two other respects. The first is that, being not only political and generally elite-ist but economic and specifically petty-bourgeois and aspirant bourgeois in character, they provide supporting evidence of the emergent class character[301] and identification of the representative cross-section of African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia participating in the African councils system. The second observation is that their embryonic class character and class aspirations shaped not only the specific demands that they made of the colonial authorities but their very political methods, their attitudes to and perceptions of colonialism as such. It was precisely because they were petty bourgeoise and aspirant bourgeoise, oriented towards and gradually approximating 'European' patterns and standards of life, that they came up against racial barriers and hence their strong consciousness of racial discrimination. And it was because their ambitions, initially and fundamentally socio-economic, were being thwarted by the self-protective racial barriers being sustained and strengthened by the colonial settlers that their focus was on settler domination. So strong was this preoccupation that it coloured not only their interpretations of and reactions to colonialist politics but even their perceptions of colonialist economic exploitation - as evident in the strong settler orientation of their demands on behalf of the African workers. In fact, there was barely any critical perception amongst these men of

capitalist economic exploitation - particularly that by the vast mining corporations - partly possibly because they did not experience it themselves but more fundamentally because they were actually benefitting - even if only marginally so - from the capitalist system, and themselves accepting and utilising bourgeois practices, values and rationale. Not only was capitalism equated with progress and development but it was as a system taken for granted and uncritically accepted as 'right' and 'natural'. What was 'unnatural' and manifestly 'man-made' was the artificial racial barriers - statutory and customary - in their way to further development and fulfillment in the system; and, since it followed that such barriers could be removed by similar processes of legislation and/or moral suasion, their political practice lay in the direction of moral and political reform of the settlers and the system. Since this could best be achieved by entry, expression of 'principles' and exertion of 'influence' and/or power in the political structures of the system, their focus was on gaining admission into any and every colonial political body; and since they wanted only piecemeal reforms in the system and since, in terms of parliamentary politics, partial African enfranchisement - for themselves - and minimal 'parity' with the settlers in legislative bodies was in principle enough to achieve this, their constitutional demands were both gradualist and moderate. Although perceiving, with time, that mere expression of principles and indivual and collective example to and before the settlers wherever possible would, without actual preponderant power, achieve very little, they sustained their essential political participationism because, especially at the individual level, this carried its immediate financial and socio - psychological 'perks' and remained, to a degree, a valuable end in itself. Finally, it was precisely because they were the recipients - and products - of whatever 'humanitarian', missionising and 'civilising' operations that figured in the colonisation of their country that they could even perceive such facets in the British hegemony over Northern Rhodesia and actually characterise it in those terms. And it was precisely because they were the heirs apparent to the 'tutelary' British administrators and legislators that they were

convinced that colonial rule was a preparatory exercise and finite, but saw colonialist political and administrative structures as absolute. Thus it was essentially in so far as they as a 'class' experienced colonial rule or 'protection' with essentially positive political, social and economic aspects and prospects, and the settler feature thereof in its full negative impact, and future even more dangerous potential, that their attitudes and reactions to colonial rule or 'protection' and to colonists were so different. And it was in so far as they as a 'class' did not experience direct colonialist exploitation that that was not the main focus of their attention and that, in so far as they did focus at all on the multinational capitalist exploitation of Northern Rhodesia and its people, their view was fundamentally approving.

This evidence of the political characteristics of the African councillors and the relationship between this range of inter-connected political characteristics and the class character and aspirations of Northern Rhodesian African political leadership, as represented in the councils system, is of considerable interest in itself for the light it casts upon the political character of that leadership. It remains, however, of somewhat limited significance unless extended into an examination of the implications of the pro-capitalist, not anti-colonialist politics of the petty-bourgeois and aspirant petty bourgeois African political leadership of Northern Rhodesia vis-a-vis the politics of nationalism and the nationalist movement in this country. This clearly requires an examination and analysis of the relations and inter-relationship of the ARC and ANC and African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia (undertaken in Chapter Five).

There is, however, one further and final conclusion deriving from the foregoing analysis that needs to be pointed out, and that is that, if the evidence is so strong that these men, as part of a particular social class, were 'born out of' and being shaped (or at least re-shaped) by the colonial system, and if their self-expressed orientation and aspirations were so clearly for a fuller and higher level of integration into that system, then some refinement can now be made of the findings of Chapter One and Two

of this study. The picture conveyed earlier is largely one of colonialist manoeuvering and manipulation of African political leadership to 'channel' them in the desired directions, 'incorporate' them into colonialist political structures and 'contain' their political development, their perspectives and perceptions. That is not an erroneous portrayal but what the findings of the present chapter indicate is that less was required of the colonialists in their political strategy than is immediately apparent, for the African political leadership was anyway already in and itself oriented and aspiring towards the colonialist system. Thus a far more complex - and accurate - picture emerges here of an interaction of African initiative and effort with colonialist moves and countermoves, rather than the simplistic interpretations either of passive and 'ignorant' Africans being merely manipulated by the wily colonialists[302] or of the colonialists frantically manoeuvering to outflank and contain a challenging African onslaught against their system.[303] Concretely this means that the African petty-bourgeois political leadership in Northern Rhodesia was pro-capitalist and that the most enlightened colonialists, perceiving this, gradually elaborated a strategy to accomodate to these aspirations and encourage their orientations to ensure that they remained that way (or became more so).

And, at a higher level of abstraction what this material illustrates is something of the nature of the dynamics of so-called 'cause and effect' in history. That these men were petty-bourgeoise with pro-capitalist sentiments and a participationist orientation was both a cause of their wanting to participate in the colonialist political structures and an effect of their so participating. Their actual petty-bourgeois positions and aspirations is what decided their political inclinations and perspectives as much as their actual political participation consolidated their socio-economic positions and political and ideological perceptions. In other words, there is a dialectical relationship between these factors, socio-economic and political, and institutional and ideational, that is not simply one-way. If the petty-bourgeois character of these men shaped their politics and political philosophy, their political philosophy and its practice also enhanced their petty-bourgeois

character. If certain factors effected others, they were in turn affected by them. Thus if the real socio-economic positions and composition of African political leadership in this country shaped African politics, those politics similarly had an effect on the socio-economic positions and composition of African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia. This will emerge more concretely in the analysis that follows.

CHAPTER FIVE

ANC - ARC RELATIONSHIP

The focus of this study has so far been essentially on the African Representative Council itself in order to establish, first of all, the colonialist containment strategy it was serving[1] - which in itself provides a useful starting point from which to assess the political nature of Arican participation, and participants, therein - and secondly to detail the political perceptions and methods characterising the proceedings of that body[2] to confirm and concretise what that very participation therein itself intimated. In other words, the aim has been to establish firstly - although initially largely implicitly[3] - that participation in the African councils per se suggested a certain type of African political perception, or non-perception, of British colonialist methods of rule and political strategy; and secondly, explicitly through substantive evidence from the actual proceedings of the ARC, illustrate what this type of political perception, and/or non-perception, amounted to, in real terms and full detail, in regard not only to British colonial rule and colonialist interests and aims but to colonialism as such.

Then, because British colonial political strategy was explicitly aimed at specific strata and elements of the African population, and claimed to have successfully incorporated the types and actual elements of African political leadership aimed at,[4] it proved necessary to document the social character and political leadership character of the membership of the ARC.[5] Analysis of both the social composition and political roles and affiliations of the council membership,[6] and the socio-economic - rather than simply 'straight' political - content of their explicit proposals and aspirations,[7] confirmed and substantiated their elite status and characteristics and, more conretely, their petty-bourgeois and bourgeois characteristics and/or aspirations. What is more, this analysis established not only the actual and emergent class character of African political leadership as represented directly and indirectly in the councils system, but a fundamental relation-

ship between their class character-cum-aspirations and their political practice and ideological positions in relation both to colonialism and capitalism.[8]

The ARC/thus constitutes both a substantive documentation of the emergent class character and related bourgeois ideology of the African political leadership in this country participating and/or represented in the councils system; and a useful indicative criterion by which to assess the politics and political character of African leadership in general. And it is useful as a measure by which to assess the politics of African leadership in this country not simply because in its formation, form and functioning its purposes and character are objectively so clear, but because the participants therein came in later years to be categorised, in the eyes of nationalist politicians themselves, as a group of 'collaborators with colonialism'[9], an 'older', 'earlier' and 'different type' of African political leadership to later 'real nationalist political leaders' - meaning, whoever it was, themselves. Radical nationalist politician Munukayumbwa Sipalo expressed this concisely at the end of 1958 when he dismissed them as "weak-kneed politicians of the old ARC, the old school of yes-men",[10] and even former (but until very recently) prominent Congress leaders tend today to portray the men of the ARC as "stooges" and politicians of an earlier and different order to themselves.[11] Whether the ARC men were in fact 'collaborators' in the way or 'yes-men' to the degree attributed them by nationalist politicians can best be ascertained by reference to their own self-expressed positions and decisions[12] and is, anyway, here of less immediate significance than the fact that they are represented as an earlier, older and qualitatively different type of politician to the 'nationalists' whether the earlier and older 'moderates' of Congress or the later and younger 'radicals' of ZANC and UNIP. Such an assertion that 'nationalist' politicians were of a different order altogether to the councillor-politicians can best be tested by an analysis, in the first instance, of the position in relation to the ARC of that 'nationalist' organisation, the African National Congress, whose embryonic beginnings in 1946, and physical growth and

political development, to the moment of the historic split in 1958, actually coincided with the lifespan of the African Representative Council between 1946 and 1958.

Such an analysis of the ANC category or section of African political leadership in relation to the councils system is, what is more, indicated not only in order to be able to assess the wider applicability of the findings or the foregoing analysis and the possible farther-reaching implications therein, but equally because some role and involvement of the ANC in and in regard to the ARC emerged repeatedly in the foregoing analysis - although that analysis was actually concentrated on the ARC itself. These indications of an ANC involvement and role in the councils system and in the ARC itself appeared not only in the analysis of colonialist aims[13] and claims[14] in regard to the integration of African political leadership into the councils system, but also in the detailed analysis of the actual composition and political affiliations of the ARC membership.[15] Finally, not only involvement, but an apparently active impact of the ANC on the political evolution and (especially later) character of the ARC was indicated[16] which, whether direct (within and/or in cooperation with the councils memberships) or indirect (from without and essentially in competition with the councils) carries some important implications about the political relations and relationship of the ANC and ARC and/or the very political character of the ANC itself.

The focus of the present study must, therefore, now shift from the ARC as such to an examination of the African National Congress in terms of its position towards, and in, and its general relationship with and to the African Representative Council. Such an analysis must follow the lines of four main questions which derive from the arguments later presented by top Congress leaders themselves[17] to adduce evidence of a clear distinction and qualitative difference between themselves and (hence) their organisation and the 'old' politicians of the ARC and councils system in general. These arguments are basically that the manifest participation of Congressmen[18] in the councils system represented only rank-and-file or, at most, 'lower-level' and/or 'earlier' and/or 'former' leader-

ship participation therein. The second is that that participation reflected an individual initiative and responsibility and not organisational policy. The third argument presented is that the ARC differed markedly from the ANC in that it adopted more moderate positions compared to those of Congress on such crucial issues of the day as Federation, partnership, African representation in central and local government, African enfranchisement and so on. And, finally, the argument is presented that the type of men in the councils system were primarily concerned with admission into government bodies in order to appeal to and/or persuade the colonialists or (worse still) to serve their own personal political ambitions, whereas the 'nationalist' leaders were 'representing the interests' of and 'mobilising' the masses and so on.

The questions that must, therefore, direct an analysis of Congress' position in relation to the African councils system are firstly whether, in fact, it was only earlier, former and/or lower level Congress leaders who participated therein while the top (and 'real'?) Congress leaders kept themselves steadfastly aloof from such a system and method of operation. The second question is whether Congressmen's participation in the councils system was a mere individual initiative in clear contrast to and even in contradiction with Congress' own organisational position. The third question is whether clear contrasts are evident during this period between the formal political positions and proposals of the 'old moderate reformist' politicians of the councils and the 'dynamic anti-colonialist radical' political leadership in Congress. And the fourth question is whether the evidence is that the 'reformism and opportunistic participationism' characterising the councillor-type of African politician did indeed contrast clearly with the methods and motivations (as far as these latter can be ascertained) of the leaders of Congress. The answers to these questions from the actual evidence of the ANC's position and practice in regard to or compared with that of the councils at that time is the basis from which to ascertain whether a clear distinction can, in fact, be drawn between the 'old-style' African political leaders in the councils and the 'nationalist' African leadership in Congress.

Early Congress and the First ARC, 1946-1948

When the immediate forerunner and progenitor of the African National Congress, the Federation of African Societies was formed in 1946, one of the first approaches[19] it made to the colonial administration was to apply for a reserved block of five seats for itself on the about-to-be formed African Representative Council.[20] The request was formally repeated in July, 1948[21] - for "one or two seats"[22] - by the, at that point, renamed Northern Rhodesia African Congress. The Secretary of Native Affair's response to this application - as it had been to the earlier[23] - was that such a proposal was not feasible since it did not conform with the already-established proceedure and practice of selection of the ARC members through, and by, the lower councils of the pyramid, and would actually require a formal amendment of the councils constitution.[24] Nonetheless, colonialist concern was already as much to attract the creators of the Congress as it was, at that stage, to counter the organisation itself,[25] and the SNA therefore, while discouraging to the Congress, hastened to encourage the Congress leaders, at his next formal meeting with them in December, 1948,[26] to seek places individually in the councils system through the forthcoming council elections.[27]

In fact, although the top Congress office bearers present at that meeting with the SNA - namely Dauti Yamba, Mbikusita Lewanika, Robinson Nabulyato and L.M. Lipalile - were not themselves then members of the councils system,[28] other founders of the Federation of African Societies and leaders of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress, such as Nelson Nalumango and Mateo Kakumbi, certainly were - and on the ARC itself what is more. Furthermore, there is evidence that this simultaneous Congress - and - Council membership was also a feature of the lower levels of the councils pyramid and local Congress leadership - a significant case in point being that of local Congress activist and official in Mufulira and UAC member in the town during this period, school teacher Kenneth Kaunda.[29]

Thus the position of the Northern Rhodesia African

Congress, in its earlier forms and earliest stages, in relation to the First Council of the ARC can be characterised in two ways. It consisted of clear overlapping of leadership - membership of the Congress and the councils deriving from an essentially individual initiative and drive for political participation and expression, in any bodies and in any form, by members of the 'politically-minded middleclass'; and simultaneously a clear organisational drive by the Congress itself for such participation.[30] The underlying motivation for Congress' organisational position in relation to the ARC appears to have derived from the fact that Congress leaders were then still striving to establish themselves as legitimate African spokesmen - as is reflected, for example, in their official position established during this period that both the ARC[31] and the African Congress[32] were "mouthpieces" of the Africans. This early Congress drive for identification, together with the ARC, as African leaders is evident also in Congress' manifestation, both in practise[33] and verbally, of their "desire to work as closely as possible with the ARC".[34]

This position emerged most fully in the Congress General Secretary Robinson Nabulyato's open letter of January, 1949 to the two recently ARC-selected African MLC's, Nelson Nalumango and the Reverend Henry Kasokolo,[35] deploring their failure - though as African leaders invited - to attend the recent Congress General Council Meeting. His assertion was that, as members of the "educated class", their identification was "logically" with the Congress.[36] Equally significantly, while thus equating the Congress with 'educated African leaders' and explicitly characterising the ARC largely, but unavoidably and temporarily,[37] 'uneducated', the Congress General Secretary endorsed both bodies, whatever their respective calibres, as legitimate spokesmen of the Africans. Furthermore, he asserted that if any apparent conflicts existed between them these were spurious and artifically fabricated by "divide and rule...ill-wishers",[38] for the desire of Congress was "fully formed to back you up".[39]

The conflicts Nabulyato (somewhat self-flatteringly) described as deriving largely from the 'inferiority complex'

suffered by the ARC men in relation to the 'more educated' Congress men[40] was hardly merely such or solely on the side of the ARC for, if anything, it was the Congress leaders themselves who were at that stage in a distinctly disadvantageous position compared to that of the councillors, in terms of access to the minimal openings and opportunities then available to politically ambitious Africans. That 'conflicts', in so far as they existed, between the ARC and ANC men at this stage, were in fact essentially at the level and in the form of mere rivalry over nominations to the few prized political places then open to Africans emerges quite clearly in Congress' protests[41] to the colonial authorities during this period that nominations - such as of the African members of constitutional delegations to London - were to be made from and/or by the ARC alone. These protests by the African Congress go a long way, in fact, to elucidating the motivation behind the Congress' efforts during this period to get their organisation on to or, failing that, at least officially on a par with the ARC.

Similarly, Nabulyato's assertion of clear contrasts between the respective memberships of the Congress and the Council were both an overstatement and a misrepresentation of the realities. This is firstly because, while the Congress might then have consisted more fully of more 'educated' men than the ARC, that is not to say that the latter were 'uneducated'.[42] More importantly, while the respective memberships of the peak of the pyramid and the top Congress executive at that stage ostensibly overlapped only in a few instances there was, in fact, a far more considerable overlap in the sense that both actual lower and future top Congress leaders were then or, like Harry Nkumbula, had earlier been[43] integrated, less prominently, in the lower levels of the pyramid. Most significant of all, however, is the fact that leaders of the Congress and the councils were to a very large degree interchangeable and did interchange their positions. Thus the First ARC included a considerable number of future prominent figures and top leaders of the African National Congress - such as Mateo Kakumbi, Nelson Nalumango and Donald Siwale - and, conversely, the then Congress leadership included many future councillors - men such as Robinson

Nabulyato,[44] Dauti Yamba[45] and L.M. Lipalile.[46] Thus the first councillors were to become later Congress leaders, just as the earliest Congressmen were to become later councillors - because they all belonged to the same 'politically-minded middle class' motivated by the same participationist ambitions and reformist notions.

During the period of the First Council of the ARC patterns were, therefore, laid of both individual aspirant petty-bourgeois initiative towards and incorporation in and their official organisational orientation towards the African councils system. With colonial official encouragement towards, and Congress' own formal endorsement of, the councils[47] - and a practical opening thereto provided by the UAC elections of March, 1949 - this pattern of both general independent, and specific Congress-directed[48] petty-bourgeois participation in the councils system was to be even more marked in the period of the Second Council of the ARC.

Northern Rhodesia African Congress and Second ARC, 1949-1952

The councils pyramid membership during this period was characterised not only by an 'improved quality'[49] but by the incorporation therein of many of the top leaders of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress. These included, most prominently in the ARC itself, men from the Congress national executive such as Dauti Yamba (Vice-President), Mateo Kakumbi (General Treasurer) and Nelson Nalumango (Vice-Treasurer General); but there were also a larger number of less prominent middle and lower level Congress officials both on the ARC itself[50] and less conspicuously integrated into the lower levels of the pyramid. Included among the latter were, for example UAC members and/or Provincial Councillors, Harry Nkumbula and Kenneth Kaunda, the last by his own testimony[51] only very narrowly missing being elected in 1949 by the Western Province APC to the ARC itself.[52] Thus the councils membership, at this date - that 'older' and 'earlier generation', chronologically and politically, of African politicians - in fact included both actual and future top leaders of the then national and later nationalist organisations in Northern Rhodesia.

This increased individual - but organisationally encouraged - Congressmen's participation in the councils system was accompanied by an increased and ever-increasing support for the organisation within the ARC. This probably resulted as much from the Second ARC's own initial composition in 1949 as from the general impact of the political climate of the early 1950's[53] on the political development and character of the members and the motions they debated.[54] But this increased Congress influence within the councils system and the ARC itself was also the result of direct and active exertion of its influence - and pressure - by Congress itself upon the ARC. This is evident most conspicuously in the ARC's selection in January, 1951 of twoCongress-backed Congressmen, Pascale Sokota and Dauti Yamba as the new African members of LegCo.[55]

Since, in contradistinction to the above evidence, assertions were, at that time, being made that Congress was making some sharp criticisms of the councils system,[56] and since this was subsequently made the basis of conclusions that Congress, as early as the beginning of the 1950's, had rejected and disassociated itself from the councils system,[57] a close examination is called for of both the nature and the real sources of criticism of the councils system during this period. In fact, as became characteristic[58] at the time of elections both to and through the councils system to the ARC and by the ARC to LegCo, a spate of comments upon[59] and African public criticisms of the councils did indeed appear - in the press - during 1951. These latter were in the form of letters-to-the-editor, but whether they were written by Congress leaders/members or not is not easily ascertainable and is, anyway, of less immediate importance than their content and implications. One such letter complained that the APC's were too dominated by chiefs and other 'uneducated' men,[60] and another that the ARC's selection of African MLC's was restricted to its own ranks;[61] while others vindicated the claims of the ANC to being, if not the, as much a representative of the African people as the ARC.[62] What is significant about these criticisms - or more correctly complaints about mere aspects of the African councils - rather than criticisms of the

system as such - is that, whether they issued from the Congress or not - and in fact even more significantly if they did - they show that it was not the councils form of leadership but the encumbents themselves, and the exclusive political rights they enjoyed, that was under fire. Thus the basis of (such) criticisms (as were) made of the African councils - during this period, too,[63] - derived essentially from relative contradictions - more literally competition for leadership - within the African elite. These were clearly in the nature of leadership competition between social groups (chiefs and the rest, educated and 'uneducated'), between bodies or groups (ANC and ARC) and between individuals (those already within and those, as yet, outside the ARC - mainly for places on LegCo[64]). And if, in fact, these 'criticisms' did actually come from Congress members, their character and motivation are all the more significant, and are most significant of all in the light of the fact that they were manifest within the general context of an actual close cooperation between the Congress and the ARC during this period.[65]

These criticisms of mere aspects of the African councils contrast somewhat markedly, what is more, with attacks on the Northern Rhodesia African councils system as a whole and per se made - as early as 1949 - at the Annual Conference of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress,[66] and by a group of white and black Rhodesian radical intellectuals calling themselves the "Rhodesia Study Club",[67] as well as by Dr. Hastings Banda in London[68] - all of which rejected the councils system in Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, in detail and their entirety and on political principle. It was in fact quite evidently[69] <u>these latter criticisms</u> that Gore-Browne had in mind when he referred, during 1950 and early 1951, to the "vocal and influential section of Africans" condemning the councils[70] (and hence the need to 'democratise' them in order to undermine such "extremist" attacks[71]) - both for the reason that it was these criticisms that preceeded his warning statements, and on the grounds that the evidence[72] does <u>not</u> point to any such condemnatory public criticisms, during this period, in Northern Rhodesia itself, emmanating either from the

'vocal and influential' Africans or from the 'extremists' of the ANC.

Quite the contrary, in fact, the evidence is that both the 'vocal and influential' elements of Northern Rhodesia and the 'extremist' Congress itself were, during this period, still individually and organisationally oriented towards and seeking ever fuller participation within the African councils system. That the African intelligentsia in general - even the most highly educated of them in the civil service - were oriented both to Congress and the councils system, and saw no contradiction between the two, emerges quite clearly, for example, in the colonialist debate over the constitutional proposal in regard to the ARC put forward by 'Native Interests' MLC, the Reverend Nightingale in July, 1952.[73] His idea was to simultaneously give a form of franchise to the "higher salaried"[74] and better educated - especially civil servant - Africans, and 'improve the quality' of the ARC itself, by introducing into the ARC a group of twelve directly elected members. The unanimous response to this proposal, however, by both Secretariat officials[75] and local PC after PC,[76] was that such direct elections to the ARC by the African intelligentsia would not, as Nightingale anticipated, introduce more educated and 'moderate' elements into the Council but merely provide a lot of (electioneering) publicity for the ANC and result in a landslide for the 'extremist' Congress. This, colonial officials cautioned, was both because the Congress leaders themselves had their ambitious sights focussed on the ARC and because they had the support of the African intelligentsia. These repeated colonialist assertions are significant, therefore both for the further light they cast on the social composition of Congress' support, and for the additional evidence they provide of Congress' actual attitude, during the earlier Second Council period, to the African councils system.

African National Congress and Second ARC, 1952-53

Congress during the period of the Second Council was, in fact, engaged not only in a fullsome participation within the coun-

cil pyramid but in a full political cooperation with the ARC itself - both before and even after the replacement of the moderate Mbikusita by the 'radical' Nkumbula as leader of the Congress in July, 1951.[77] It is noteworthy, in fact, that even after this supposedly significant date and the 'symbolic' renaming of the Congress as the 'African National Congress' in 1952,[78] the ANC's position in relation to the councils system continued to be characterised by actual individual participation in the councils, and repeated attempts to get direct corporate representation on the ARC itself,[79] as well as continued "good relations"[80] and close cooperation with the Council. The last was manifest principally in their mutual consultations and coordination of the Federation issue, involving "many joint conferences"[81] - some small secret and ad hoc, such as their pre-Victoria Falls Conference strategy consultations, on the questions of Federation and partnership in September, 1951;[82] others large public meetings of representatives of their own and other groups of African leaders, such as the October, 1951 joint Copperbelt meeting of prominent Congressmen, local UAC and national ARC councillors, and trade unionists to formally reject Federation and partnership.[83]

The degree to which Congress during this period can be closely identified with the ARC derives, moreover, not only from the almost complete duplication of their support and membership - both in terms of its social composition and the precise individuals involved - nor only from their close cooperation and mutual consultations, but from the very similarities of their formal political proposals and official positions and practice vis-a-vis colonialist political structures and schemes. This emerges clearly in a comparison of their respective proposals and practices during this period - both in regard to the clear-cut issue of Federation and to the as-yet 'wide open' question of African 'political advancement' within Northern Rhodesia itself.

In regard to the latter the ARC itself, while seeing some future day when Northern Rhodesia Africans would emerge from their 'protected political infancy into adult self-government' and 'true democracy'[84] had, by 1953, reached the stage of proposing concretely

only 'parity' of African members with the 'unofficial' whites on both Legislative and Executive Councils[85] and the enfranchisement of 'British Protected Persons' (Africans indigenous to Northern Rhodesia) on very high income (£100 p.a.) and educational qualifications.[86] Congress, similarly, while speaking boldly - for the first time in June, 1952[87] - of "majority rule", in practice two months later drew up its draft constitution for "self-government"[88] that proposed merely a bicameral legislature in which the lower house would be 'non-racial', elected by a single voters roll based on a highly qualified franchise (£100 p.a.) for both British subjects and 'British Protected Persons'; while the upper house would be composed of equal racial representation - method of selection unspecified but, probably, on the African side based on communal representation by the chiefs.[89] The franchise for the lower house would be gradually broadened in a phased process "only in the final stages" of which would universal adult suffrage be introduced.[90] The close correspondence of the ARC and ANC positions, during this period, on 'African political advancement' in their country, thus derives not only from the close similarities of their (qualified) franchise proposals but from the fact that, while both were - apparently - oriented towards the ultimate objective of democratic African self-rule in their country, in practice what they both actually produced were merely gradualist proposals for the - 'initial' - participation of only the African elite, modern and so-called traditional, in the colonialist political system and colonial political structures.

There is a similar contradiction between their verbal positions and actual practice even in regard to the clearcut issue of Federation. What is significant about the <u>common</u> and <u>equally</u> intransigent ARC and ANC rejections of Federation is not only that they advanced the same reasons[91] and employed the same reasoning against Federation - in favour of their 'protectorate' status that 'guaranteed' Africans 'unimpeded' progress towards 'inevitable' self rule[92] - but the fact that they <u>both</u> then proceeded to participate in the very Federal political structure that they had both 'on principle' rejected. And, what is equally interesting

about the common ARC and Congress leadership participation - in the case of the latter, attempted participation, as it turned out to be[93] - in the Federal political system is that this entailed on the African National Congress' side (another) formal organisational drive to work through the indirect electoral college system of representation.

It is worth elaborating further on this last point, for it was only after it had failed to get into the Federal Assembly via the electoral college, indirect representation system of the African councils[94] that the Congress then proceeded to turn necessity into a political virtue and make much of its 'principled boycott' of the Federal system in toto and its 'rejection in principle' of the electoral college system of representation.[95] These are still cited today as 'proof positive' of 'fundamental differences' between Congressmen and councillors[96]. What the evidence shows however is that while the Congress leaders were manoeuvering to get into the Federal Assembly, and while, in so doing, they were careful to elaborate their reasons - or rationalisation - for participating in the Federal parliament, they made no criticism whatsoever, at that date, of the electoral college method entailed. For example, the Secretary General of Congress himself, by this date Kenneth Kaunda, in an extended commentary in November, 1953 on the forthcoming selection of the two Northern Rhodesia African Federal MP's[97] showed himself concerned only about the inadequate 'time' given the newly-elected councillors[98] through all the pyramid stages of the process to 'know each other well enough' to ensure the selection of the 'best men possible.' Similarly even the much-quoted Congress petition of 30th November, 1953 to the Governor-General of the Federation,[99] while protesting the 'unconstitutional' nature of the proposed selection of the two African Federal MP's from Northern Rhodesia, was not in fact rejecting the indirect electoral college proceedure entailed[100] but merely the fact that the selection was to be from among the ARC membership alone.[101]

In this petition, in fact, resides the other significant feature of Congress' position in relation to the ARC, and that is

that its apparent 'differences with' or 'rejection of' the system were not only a rationalisation after the event that bore little relationship to the earlier realities, but that, even in so far as any such ANC 'criticisms' of the ARC system did emerge during this period, their origin lay essentially in mere rivalry for leadership positions. That the ANC's 1953 petition to the Governor-General protested that MP selections were to be made from among the ARC men alone derived basically from the fact that certain of the Congress candidates for selection for both the Federal and Territorial legislatures[102] - most significantly Nkumbula and Kaunda themselves for the Federal positions! - were not then members of the ARC. Why they were not so members of the ARC was manifestly not a question of 'political principle', and deliberate boycott of the councils system, for they were quite willing to work through that system and put themselves forward as legislature candidates for the consideration of the ARC itself. What is more the official Congress Gazette itself later testified[103] to the fact that Nkumbula himself had avowed to the Secretary of State that if he was not a member of the councils system it was merely by default not intention.[104]

The full import of the November, 1953 ANC petition becomes clearer, and the fact that it was motivated by a drive by the top Congress leader(s) to occupy the Federal Assembly positions emerges fully when an examination is made of the chain of events leading up to the petition. Having decided by mid-October to 'tactically' participate in the Federal Assembly,[105] the top Congress leaders then realised, too late,[106] that this unavoidably required their own membership of the councils system and the ARC in particular. They then, belatedly,[107] sought an alternative means of (direct) access to the ARC by applying to the colonial administration for organisational representation for the African National Congress - and the Trade Unions Congress - on the ARC.[108] It was only after this tactic had failed that they issued their - last ditch - petition protesting the restriction of choices for the Federal Assembly positions <u>to members</u> of the ARC alone. Clearly what was worrying the top Congress leader(s) was not that they

would not be able to get their own trusted Congressmen (and even their own 'alternative' candidates themselves, for that matter) selected as Federal MP's by the ARC - for experience had already shown that the ARC was 'susceptible' to Congress 'advice' on such matters,[109] and the new Third ARC was, what is more, more dominated than either of the earlier councils had been by Congress supporters, office-bearers and top leaders.[110] What was clearly motivating the ANC's protest was simply the fact that, with the ARC membership as it was, not just 'Congressmen' or 'Congress candidates' but specific - and the real - Congress choices as Federal MP's, Nkumbula and Kaunda themselves, would automatidally be excluded from that selection.

This evidence of continued Congress individual and organisational (attempted) participation in the councils system, and this evidence that (such) Congress criticisms (as were) made of (aspects of) the councils system were still motivated by and in the nature of leadership rivalry at the organisational and individual levels (the former patently essentially an expression of the latter) is significant for confirming the continuity of the basic characteristics of Congress' position in relation to the ARC from the first right through to (the inauguration of) the last council of the ARC in 1953-1954. In fact the entire 1953-1954 period of ANC-ARC relations, including the specific subsequent controversy provoked by Congress' November, 1953 petition, requires closer examination, for it was largely on the basis of this 'interlude' that assertions were, at the time, made of a clear-cut ANC-ARC "rift"[111] and interpretation subsequently put forward of fundamental Congress-Council contradictions and essential political differences.[112]

Congress - Council 'conflicts', 1953 - 1954

The first much-publicised such "rift <u>between Congress leaders</u>"[113] within and outside of the ARC was in the form of a sharp attack by Nkumbula on the two ARC-selected - and originally Congress-backed - African MLC's, Yamba and Sokota, for having

failed to cooperate with Congress in the anti-Federation fight with full vigour, which he concluded with the words

> "But I do hope that members of the ARC as well as African members of the Legislative Council will in future cooperate with the people they represent".[114]

This was hardly an incisive attack on the ARC as a body or as a system of representation! What is more, its real significance becomes clearer when it is noted that it was made in conjunction with an even stronger attack on Katilungu, and occurred in the politically critical weeks immediately following the failure of Congress' call for two days of 'National Prayer' against Federation.[115] That 1953 should have been witness to such mutual recriminations among African leaders is small wonder given the then pervasive sense of defeat over Federation and the search by the top (especially Congress) politicians - as well as the general African public - for some explanation or even a scapegoat. But there is certainly no evidence that this outburst by Nkumbula against Yamba and Sokota was any official Congress statement or intention against the ARC as such and amounted to anything more than a 'passing of the buck'. It is, in fact, worth quoting, by contrast with the Congress leaders' position, a lone and somewhat unique pseudonymous attack made on the ARC in this same period by a certain "Kwacha" from Solwezi in a letter-to-the-editor of the Central African Post in July, 1953.[116] Whether this unidentified writer was or was not a Congressman, and even more significantly if he was, his position was far more radical than that of the Congress leaders when he wrote

> "Recent political trends reveal that the ARC is hopelessly dormant...The campaign against Federation has been waged almost entirely by the Congress. This does not of course mean that the ARC did not appear in the field; it did but kept a safe distance behind...ARC is a puppet under Government control and the existence of this body is a deliberate call for a halt to African political advancement...it is just time(sic!) that the ARC better quit the field"[117]

Far from quitting the ARC, however, both prominent and less prominent Congressmen were soon after flocking into the councils system in greater numbers than ever before. The September, 1953 UAC elections in all the urban centres of Northern Rhodesia

were remarkable - and remarked upon[118] - for the influx of local and national Congress - and trade union - leaders, which was reflected in turn in the memberships of the new APC's and the Third ARC.[119] What is more, it was at this stage that the Congress repeated its bid for organisational representation on the ARC.[120] And the close identification of Congress and Council in both personnel and political position is further testified to by the Congress' shift from its own earlier constitutional scheme to that put forward by the ARC - namely for an 'interim' minimal parity of Europeans and Africans on the Legislative Council - which Congress officially endorsed in November, 1953.[121] This was the period, too, of their common focus on the African admissions into the Federal legislature.

It is against this - largely unpublicised - background of close identification in personnel and politics of the ANC and ARC that the ensuing - press inflated - rumpus between Congress and Council, or more correctly Nkumbula and Kakumbi,[122] must be assessed. Soon after the publication of the Congress petition to the Governor-General the Central African Post blazoned the headlines that

> "The ARC the highest African body in the country and the African Congress with whom it has always had the closest relationship, have split"[123]

detailing rather differently - and more accurately - beneath that Kakumbi had issued a demand for an apology from Nkumbula for his having branded the ARC "stooges" in the November petition. Nkumbula's reported reply was that he had done no such thing. He had in fact, he averred, personally approached the ARC Chairman for 'consultations'[124] prior to the issuing of the said petition and, he retorted, if Kakumbi now interpreted the petition as being an attack on the ARC itself he had patently misunderstood it in detail and spirit.

Echoes of this altercation continued to reverberate during the early months of 1954 mainly in the form of letters to the press, both in defence of the ANC[125] and the ARC[126] and both simultaneously,[127] which served to escalate the issue far beyond what it had been and remained in the eyes of the Congress leaders.[128]

Similarly, although a series of criticisms of the councils appeared at this stage in various provincial councils[129] and even one UAC debate,[130] what is most significant about them is that, with only one exception,[131] they were merely criticisms internal to the system and, even then, contrasted with the Congress leadership's own official attitude. That the Congress leadership itself was anxious to repair relations with the ARC (in so far as these had been damaged) and clear away any remants of ill-feeling, and/or possible insinuations of 'sour grapes' on their part,[132] is evident in the effusive endorsement and official approval given, in early 1954, by both the President and Secretary General of Congress to the ARC's selection of the four new African MLC's. Congress President Nkumbula declared the ARC's choice of Safeli Chileshi, Robinson Nabulyato, Lakement H. Ng'andu and Pascale Sokota (all Congress officials and/or supporters) "an excellent selection" and promised the new MLC's "full Congress backing and assistance".[133] Secretary General Kaunda, for his part, is reported as having declared that

> "the results pleased him very much because they had proved that Congress officials whether in or out of that body (the ARC) were the real representatives of the African people".[134]

So much for any so-called clear distinctions - in the eyes of the top Congress leaders themselves - between Congress politicians standing - perforce - outside of the councils system and those constituting - largely - the membership of the Third ARC. What is more, Nkumbula's promise of "full backing and assistance" to the councillors was duly honoured, and proved thereafter to be the dominant characteristic of the ANC's relations with the ARC.

Congress' relations with the Third ARC, 1954-1958

Congress' continued participation within and close interaction with the ARC during its third phase are attested to in a variety of ways and from a number of sources, and followed the same general patterns laid down during the earlier phases of the histories of both bodies. Thus, such apparent Congress-Council 'conflicts' as appeared during this period were still merely

confrontations between individual leaders from both sides, clearly motivated by individual leadership conflicts, and characterised, on Congress' side, by attacks on certain individual councillors - notable also for being prominent 'parliamentary' African leaders - and not on the ARC itself or the system as a whole. This is evident as much in Congress' 1954 expulsion of Pascale Sokota from the National Executive,[135] as in the 1957 attack on Safeli Chileshe,[136] and in both these cases, in fact, far from using the erring councillors to 'get at' the Council, Nkumbula drew a clear distinction between the objects of his criticisms and the body they represented. What is more, he actually produced in these instances further evidence of Congress' practice of working within and/or upon the ARC,[137] and its formal endorsement of the leadership legitimacy of that body.[138] If anything any criticism and/or outright rejections of the ARC and the councils system in general during this period came from the councillors themselves in the ARC[139] and even in the Legislative Council[140] and not from the official Congress.[141]

Not only did the Congress not criticise the system, but both Congressmen's individual participation and Congress' organisational utilisation of the councils system continued as marked features of the later 1950's. The participation of Congressmen and leaders in the system is evident from the top to the bottom of the pyramid. In the ARC itself, ANC's strength was such - including such dominant figures there as Lawrence Katilungu, Robinson Nabulyato, Mathew Nkoloma and Robinson Puta - that it was referred to by a friendly observer as the "ruling party" on the Council,[142] and repeatedly protested by unfriendly observers - namely the settlers in LegCo[143] and in their press[144] - as one and the same with Council, or rather vice versa. The same could be said, on logical[145] and empirical grounds, to hold true at the lower, especially urban, levels of the pyramid. Thus, for example, Kaunda himself makes the interesting observation[146] that three of the four ANC accused in the May, 1956 'Mufulira boycott' test case were simultaneously the top Congress officials in the area and members of the Mufulira UAC. What is more, the evidence is that,

even as late as December, 1957, Congressmen and top Congressmen, what is more, were still seeking admission into the councils system, for in UAC by-elections held in Lusaka at that date ANC "swept the board"[147] - and among the new Lusaka UAC members was now included the 'radical' General Treasurer of the ANC, Simon Kapwepwe.[148]

This sustained Congress leadership individual participation in the councils system from bottom to top was accompanied by continued Congress organisational utilisation of the councils system at the base and the peak. Not only did Congress itself directly work through the UAC's[149] and, by its own testimony[150] try to effect reforms, for example, in the sphere of racial discrimination in public places, through the medium of the UAC's, but it actually directed the African public to seek redress for grievances "through the UAC's right up to the Legislative Council where the law could be amended".[151] And this was despite clear evidence of the African masses own apathy towards the system.[152]

Even more importantly, Congress was also utilising the ARC itself throughout this period in a number of ways, some overt - to project the image of Congress and its leaders to the African public and the colonialists - and others covert - to influence the councillors and Council decisions in directions and ways desired by Congress. The first took the form of continued public 'consultations between African leaders in the ANC and ARC' on such crucial issues as the Land question[153] - the presence of the ARC leaders at such consultations serving to lend added significance to the issue at hand and the other leaders involved. This campaign also took the form of deliberate publicity given to evidence of mutual recognition, identification and unity of 'all African leaders' both in the ARC and the ANC. It is interesting in this regard to note the care with which the ANC leadership identified the top councillors of the time with their organisation[154] and its leaders. This latter, in its turn, is evident in the self-satisfied promptness with which they publicised any evidence of endorsement by the parliamentary African leaders[155] of the top leader(ship) of Congress as at least fellow (although not officially recognised) African leaders if not - mainly insinuated -/the African leaders. The

Congress leadership's utilisation of the ARC leadership to give a (semi-official) stamp of legitimacy to themselves as leaders was in fact paralleled by the councillors own eagerness for a (non-official African) endorsement by the Congress - hence their deliberate affirmation both in the ARC debates[156] and even in the LegCo itself[157] of their adherance to the ANC. Thus the top ANC leadership sought to be identified with the top councillors as leaders, as much as the Councillors themselves sought to be so identified. This mutual identification and support or, at another level, 'unity' of the top African leaders was explicitly attested to by both sides. For example what is significant about Safeli Chileshe's declaration in 1955 that

> "those who believe that Congress and the four African members of LegCo (are) at variance are wrong. Congress and the members of LegCo are one and the same, and they are united in the struggle for self-determination"[158]

is the publicity and approval it was given by the official Congress mouthpiece in that period, the Congress Gazette.[159]

This overt campaign by the Congress leadership to exploit whatever status the councillors and councils enjoyed, with both the colonialists and the 'African public', in order to boost their own status individually and collectively, was accompanied by a more covert campaign to utilise the councillors and councils to put across the Congress 'line'. This, in turn, required the exertion of Congress influence directly and indirectly upon the councillors individually and collectively which, according to first-hand and varied sources of information,[160] entailed so variegated and constant a form of interaction of the Congress with the ARC as to constitute a significant characteristic of the functioning of the ARC during this period. This Congress-Council interaction took a number of forms. The most direct exertion of ANC influence upon the ARC was through ANC leaders on the ARC who, having been 'briefed at ANC executive council sessions', then carried the ANC position to and through the ARC committee stage[161] (and shaping of ARC strategy) into the ARC's public debates and decisions. They were assisted in this exertion of ANC influence upon the overall ARC membership by an active ANC caucus in the

ARC.[162] Other direct and more open methods of exerting its influence upon the ARC were through political pamphlets distributed at the ARC's meeting place;[163] vocal ANC-packed 'galleries' at ARC meetings especially on the occasions of crucial constitutional debates;[164] and the corridor-lobbying of the ARC men on these occasions by high-powered ANC contingents,[165] including Nkumbula himself, present at the sessions. The top ANC leadership also sought to exert their influence upon the ARC members outside the framework of the ARC sessions altogether. This took the form of private meetings of the ANC leader(s) with small groups of ARC men, both Congressmen and non-Congressmen,[166] and with various individual councillors[167] (whom they considered to be 'influential' or 'promising'[168]) to explain Congress and its position to them.

Whether this close interaction of Congress with the Council had the effect of influencing the latter towards Congress' line or whether, in fact, the influence worked more the other way is not possible of confirmation.[169] What is more, it is of less importance than the fact that the end product of this interaction between the two groups of leaders was a series of political proposals and constitutional schemes produced by the ARC and ANC between 1954 and 1958 that are so similar in detail and type as to suggest if not an effective direct Congress impact upon the ARC then, even more significantly, a common ARC and ANC social and political source, outlook and aspiration.

Starting from their common position at the end of 1953[170] on African parity with the 'unofficials' on the Legislative Council, and African ('British Protected Persons') admission onto the highly qualified British Subjects' (essentially white) voters roll of Northern Rhodesia, the two bodies then proceeded to produce a series of almost identical constitutional proposals in the years that followed. In 1954, the ARC repeated their earlier demand for the enfranchisement of 'British Protected Persons' on the same basis as British Subjects and, in 1955, once again demanded a "move forward to one franchise for all races" which proposal, although not specifying any qualifications, can safely be concluded[171] to refer to the established ARC position on the matter. The ANC in the same

year made their franchise position clear to the Secretary of State when they declared their demand for "nothing short of full adult suffrage" but adding - more significantly - that this was an "ultimate" objective to be "achieved step by step",[173] - which could mean nothing other than one form or another of qualified franchise in the meantime. What the nature of the immediate of these qualified franchise "steps" was the Congress made evident in their October, 1956 petition to the Secretary of State in which, amongst other things,[174] they demanded 'British Protected Persons' admission onto the voters roll then reserved for 'British Subjects' alone - which was nothing other than the demand that the ARC itself had been putting forward since 1953. By 1956, however, the ARC has moved forward to demanding a common voters roll with a rather lower franchise qualification,[175] which was lowered slightly further in their 1957 franchise proposal[176] made in conjunction with a repitition of their earlier demand for interim parity of Africans with the 'unofficial' Europeans on both LegCo and ExCo.[177] Congress, similarly made their constitutional priorities clear when they declared for racial parity on both LegCo and ExCo at their Annual Conference of 1957.[178] This last would have signified a fairly 'radical' step forward by the ANC[179] had it not been that they modified it soon after in their formal constitutional proposal to the Sedretary of State, in February, 1958, which specified parity of (all) Europeans with Africans on the LegCo alone and parity of (only) unofficial Europeans and Africans on the Executive Council.[180] The 1958 Congress constitutional proposals did, however, mark an important step forward by the ANC in that it incorporated, for the first time, an official demand for "one man one vote". It was, in fact, only at this stage that the ANC could be said to have made a qualitative departure from the ARC position, for the ARC in that year, while still committed to an 'ultimate' democratic form of government, continued to propose only racial parity of unofficials on LegCo and ExCo and produced no advance on its established franchise position. Any far-reaching conclusions about an ANC divergence from or 'surge ahead' of the ARC at this stage are, however, immediately contradicted by

the observation that, although both groups of leaders adamantly rejected the Lennox Boyd Constitutional White Paper presented later that year,[181] they both then proceeded to participate in the Benson Constitution elections that followed therefrom in March, 1959.

This continued discrepancy between ostensible political positions and actual practice that had long characterised the - participationist - politics of the African political leadership in both the Councils and the Congress is worth examining closer for the clearer light it casts on the fuller political character of this leadership. Formal proposals to the colonial authorities - thoroughly moderate and gradualist as these were - could well, even then, have simply constituted mere forward or 'extremist' bargaining positions to guarantee the achievement of rather more moderate real objectives. Similarly, declarations about 'majority rule' and 'one man one vote' could well have been mere demagogy (before the African public) or, even more likely, rhetoric (before both the colonialists and the African population) to give a stamp of authenticity to claims to being the champions of the masses, democracy and the like, in the face of the negation of the same by their settler opponents. Whatever the case, and whether their formal proposals and verbal political positions were what they appeared to be or not, they are not in themselves a <u>sufficient</u> basis from which to assess the political character of African political leadership in this country. Both the real character of those political positions and professions and the <u>full</u> character of that leadership can only begin to emerge from an examination of <u>actual political practice</u> in conjunction with, if not in comparason to, self-professed political positions and aims.

In this regard it must, at the outset, be noted that Congress' much-focused-upon[182] inconsistent participation in the Benson Constitution was inconsistent only in so far as it contradicted their earlier rejection of the same proposals. It was certainly not inconsistent with ANC's long established practice and real political character. Not only had there been similar contradictory participationist practice earlier on in regard to

central government or major political schemes, such as the Federation, but also in regard to local govenment and lesser political bodies such as the nominated African Affairs Committees of the Municipal Councils throughout the country.[183] The significance here of the Congress leaders' drive for inclusion in these latter bodies lies in the fact that they, like the ARC councillors once again,[184] were working through a form of both minority representation among, and one based on nomination by, the very people who were purportedly their opponents and even 'enemies'. And as the foregoing analysis has shown this participation, in contradiction to professed positions, went to the extent even of membership in,cooperation with and utilisation of the most clearly undemocratic and ineffective form of political 'representation' then offered to Africans in this country, namely the councils pyramid.

Finally, and most noteworthy of all the later evidence of ANC's participationism, is the fact that, as late as 1958, when the political tactic of boycott of separate and inferior political institutions and forms of representation for Africans was at last becoming a political factor, publically advocated,[185] in Northern Rhodesia, these same Congressmen - and even the very few who had not (in recent years, at any rate) been directly and personally implicated in the councils system - rushed headlong into the latest political contrivance devised for their containment by the colonialists. This latest channel was none other than the modified version of the old UAC's in the shape of African Housing Area Boards offered to Africans by the Brown Commission, in 1957, as a 'real' form of political 'representation' with 'real' financial and executive 'powers'.[186] What is most interesting about the elections to the African Housing Area Boards held in April, 1958, is the evidence, firstly, that an attempted boycott of the same in Ndola by Congress militants was promptly broken up by the top Congress leadership.[187] Secondly those same top Congress leaders were everywhere else actively putting themselves up as candidates for these bodies. It was in Ndola alone, where only three of the eighteen men elected were Congressmen, albeit very prominent ones,[188] that ANC

did not sweep the board. The picture everywhere else was of overwhelming Congress victories.[189] In Lusaka, for example, ANC "romped home"[190] - with only the Chinika seat being captured by a non-Congressman, Safeli Chileshe - and among the victorious ANC candidates were such prominent figures as Simon Kapwepwe, Kenneth Kaunda and Lewis Changufu. The latter two were subsequently elected by their Housing Area Board to constitute the elected half of the African half of the African Affairs Committee of the Lusaka municipal council.[191]

The full significance of this wholesale, and organisationally directed, Congress leadership participation in the African Housing Area Boards resides, firstly, in the fact that while far less publicised then - and analysed since - than the Benson constitution 'sell out', it in fact constituted a form of African leader participationism no less pronounced than that entailed in taking part in the Benson constitution. If anything, it was of greater impact and implication involving, as it did, a much greater number of African leaders, far more actively and constantly, in operating colonialist political contrivances - and imbibing the colonialists' political practices, procedures and philosophy in the process. Secondly, this information is important, and especially important in this examination of the ANC's position in relation to the councils system, for showing that the Congress leadership's participation in, cooperation with and utilisation of the African councils system extended to all the key figures in Congress - in a modified version of these councils - and extended into the years beyond the lifespan of the ARC itself. There is thus in this participationism an embracing quality and ongoing continuity that appears to carry some important implications about African politics and political leadership in Northern Rhodesia even in the years after 1958.

Of course, as with their earlier (attempted) participation in the Federal Assembly, Congress could produce a range of reasons - or rationalisations - for their taking part in these later colonialist political contrivances;[192] just as (former) Congress leaders can today, once confronted with the facts, explain - or

explain away - in 'tactical' terms the fact of their leadership and organisational involvement in the African councils system.[193] When mere 'tactic' turns out, however, to have entailed so long-standing, constant and pervasive a Congress involvement in such a variety of questionable forms of 'representation' of the 'African people' - none of more dubious legitimacy than the African councils system - then doubts must be cast on the mere 'tactical' nature of that involvement.

In fact, what is indicated in this constant and consistent method of operation of the ANC is that the underlying and real motive force for Congress leadership participationism lay in the same range of inter-connected political characteristics that were observed, in the analysis of the ARC's politics,[194] to be a direct dialectical reflection of the preoccupations, perspectives and perceptions of general petty-bourgeois African political leadership. This means essentially that the Congress was focussed on gaining admission into any and every political body[195] not, basically, just to 'keep stooges out',[196] or to 'get the Congress into the public eye and mind',[197] nor even merely for reasons of individual ambition and political opportunism, but in conformity with their overall political perspectives and perceptions of the political problems and opponents facing them. Since they accepted the colonial government as fundamentally reliable and persuadable,[198] and the colonialist system as 'natural' and 'right',[199] and wished only to effect reforms therein in certain specified directions - most especially the elimination of racial discrimination[200] - and since the main culprits in this direction were the settlers, Congress' political practice lay in the direction of getting their voice heard (persuasively) and/or their comportment observed (reassuringly) and/or their presence felt (forcefully). The aim in all this clearly was to effect a moral reform and/or provide a fear-assuaging reassurance and/or even, if necessary apply political pressure to the settlers (and/or the colonial government itself if need be[201]) to effect the political reforms and achieve the African political incorporation desired by the Congress leadership.

These concluding observations, deriving from the foregoing evidence, about the political character of the African National Congress are not in fact new[202] - although further evidence and/or a new dimension may here have been added to existing historical evidence and interpretations. Nor indeed was such an analysis the main object of, nor such observations the prime conclusion to be drawn from, the foregoing examination of the relationship of the ANC to the ARC. What the main purpose was of - and what indeed emerges most significantly from - the total foregoing analysis of the Congress position in and in relation to the councils system between 1946 and 1958, was the establishment of evidence of ANC's real relationship to the African councils. And the evidence is, in fact, that the ANC relationship to the councils system entailed forms and a degree of interaction of Congress and councils so sustained, pervasive and constant as to indicate the conclusion that what we are, in effect, here dealing with are persons and politics so intimately related and inter-related and so nearly identical in <u>detail</u> and <u>type</u> as to, in turn, justify the conclusion that to try to draw a clear distinction between them would be an artificial dichotomisation - for they all constituted part of one political continuum and political leadership continuum in this country.

Thus, just as the ARC men had, earlier in this study,[203] been identified as an integral part of the continuum of African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia, so too must 'African political leadership' in Northern Rhodesia (at that period meaning essentially the Congress) be identified with the ARC and general councils system. If Congress can be identified in this way with the councils system that is because, in brief, it so identified itself - by participating therein and by working <u>with</u>, <u>through</u> and <u>upon</u> the African councils system from bottom to top and from beginning to end (and beyond).

Finally, this last observation in turn indicates the conclusion that the political <u>and</u> socio-economic features that have been established as characterising African political leadership as represented in the ARC, and their political <u>and</u> socio-economic

positions and aspirations, can be regarded as a reflection also of those of a more specific section of African leadership, namely the ANC. This is important for, while there is much direct and indirect evidence available on the political character and orientation of African political leadership as represented in the ANC, it is rare to find[204] such a volume of verbatim and African evidence of both a political and socio-economic nature, as that available in the ARC, by which to assess the full character, aims and aspirations of African political leadership in this country.

The fullest importance, therefore, of establishing the relationship of the ANC to the ARC lies not so much, in the final analysis, in the usefulness of the ARC as an indicative criterion (by which to measure Congress' politics and practice) as in its great value as substantive documentation of the class character and aspirations and related bourgeois ideology of African political leadership in this country - including that in and of the African National Congress.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

This focus on African political leadership in Northern Rhodesia has documented substantively that it was not only one continuum from the 1930's right through to the late 1950's but that that leadership continuum was fundamentally petty-bourgeois and aspirant bourgeois in character and orientation.

The same men who founded and operated the 'proto-political'[1] Native Welfare Societies, in the 1930's, were to be found, in their individual capacities and as official 'delegates' of their welfare societies in the earliest Urban Advisory Councils and African Provincial Councils in the later 1930's and early 1940's. The same men who founded the first national, overtly political 'proto-nationalist'[2] organisation in Northern Rhodesia, the Federation of African Societies - cum - Northern Rhodesia African Congress, were simultaneously in, or clamouring for places in the First African Representative Council in the later 1940's. The same men, who were the 'radical' leaders of the earliest 'nationalist'[3] organisation in this country, the African National Congress, during the 1950's, were in or trying to get into the African Representative Council individually and organisationally, and were working with, through and upon that body of men, and system of councils, to get their grievances heard and aspirations expressed.

On the grounds of both the elite-ist participationism and moderate reformism implicit in their political practice vis-a-vis the colonial political system and their explicit petty-bourgeois interests and bourgeois aspirations for a fuller and higher level of political, social and economic integration into the colonial capitalist system, as expressed in their verbal proposals and positions, this petty-bourgeois and aspirant bourgeois African leadership continuum must be characterised as not anti-colonialist and as manifestly pro-capitalist.

This African political leadership must, what is more, be inextricably identified with the emergence, development and

maturation of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia. This is because, at the objective level, they were the actual founders and leaders of the 'proto-political', 'proto-nationalist' and 'nationalist' organisations in this country; and because, at the subjective level, they are today so classified by the nationalists themselves. If nationalist (and national) political leaders today are interpreting all those earlier forms of political organisation and protest as earlier manifestations of the later nationalist 'struggle against foreign rule'[4] they manifestly classify all these forms and forces as part of one general political continuum leading towards ultimate independence.[5] Similarly, if Zambian nationalist historians today are interpreting nationalism as a "historical development which began with the establishment of colonial rule itself"[6] they too are manifestly accepting the image[7] of a multiplicity of little source streams all pouring into the 'mighty torrent' of African nationalism right through to its estuary in independence in the 1960's.[8] If there is such a continuity between the earliest and the later, the 'simplest' and the 'most highly developed' forms of political and nationalist political expression and organisation by Africans in this country from the 1930's (and earlier) through to the 1950's (and later),[9] then the 'anti-colonialist' nature of that entire continuum must be cast into serious doubt.

There are two possible conclusions in this regard. If, as this analysis has explicitly substantiated, the continuum of African politics and political leadership from the 1930's right through to 1958 was not anti-colonialist, then it follows that African nationalism defined as anti-colonialism must be dated as having emerged in this country at some time after 1958. If, however, as the foregoing analysis has indirectly implied and directly indicated and concretely illustrated, there is an ongoing quality in the pre-1958 political characteristics and actual personnel of African nationalist leadership into the post-1958 period, then the years of the 1960's must indeed be classified as an integral part of the one political continuum stretching back through the 1950's and 1940's into the 1930's and earlier. In that case African

nationalism must be redefined altogether as the social, economic and political drive initiated, led and shaped by the aspirant African petty-bourgeoise and aspirant bourgeoise for total and unfettered integration into the capitalist social formation introduced into this part of Africa by European colonialism.

In regard to the first proposition, the reason for citing 1958 as a possible terminal (or take-off) point of some sort is largely merely a function of the temporal parameters of the present study. It also derives, however, from the 'significant' political crisis within the nationalist movement in that same year, the break-away of the ANC 'militants', their gradual re-grouping as ZANC and then UNIP - and their subsequent claims that 1958 signified a distinct break with 'earlier moderate nationalism' and the emergence of 'real fullblown nationalism' in Northern Rhodesia in and in the shape of ZANC and especially UNIP.

Such claims, however, that ZANC and/or UNIP constituted a qualitative departure from the 'old ANC-type' nationalists would appear to be a contradiction of their own full 'theoretical' position on African politics and the 'roots of nationalism' in Northern Rhodesia. More importantly such claims are contradicted by empirical evidence. As the foregoing study has indicated and documented, there is an embracing quality to the political and socio-economic characteristics of African leadership in this country 'on both sides' of 1958 and well beyond into the post-independence years, and an ongoing continuity in the orientation of and methods employed in their actual political practice beyond 1958 that contradicts the notion of 1958 as a sharp dividing line and/or ZANC-UNIP as a qualitative departure from (ANC-)ANC. The 'differences' between them were, in fact, merely of degree not type - were quantitative not qualitative. In concrete terms this means that the evidence is that ZANC-UNIP differed from the ANC essentially only in methods of internal organisation and leadership 'style'[10] and in the (relatively) higher level or the relatively more 'advanced' minimal preconditions they set for their point of entry into and operation of the colonial political system. Their conditions for their political participation in the colonial system

were simply quantitatively more 'advanced' (more African seats on LegCo, more Africans included on the voters roll, etc.). This did not constitute a qualitative departure from the well-established and long standing orientation towards and acceptance of the colonialists' system and colonial political structures, practice and philosophy by nationalist political leaders in this country.

These indicators do not, of course, constitute anything like a full and thorough analysis of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia after 1958 but, if UNIP as the 'fullest' and 'highest' expression and form of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia did constitute a qualitative departure from the pre-1958 political continuum in this country that, in the final analysis, lies beyond the scope of the present study.

Suffice it here to stress only that the weight of evidence here presented and analysed indicates that the answer to the (re) definition of nationalism does not appear to lie in the direction of a mere temporal adjustment, nor in an artificial dichotomisation of the single political process and phenomenon of nationalism. The answer appears to lie in the direction of the second hypothesis presented above, namely that nationalism in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia must be (re) defined as a petty-bourgeois phenomenon oriented towards and serving the interests of the bourgeois system on a national scale...and thence the international scale.

APPENDIX A

ARC CONSTITUTION*

1. (a) The African Representative Council (hereinafter referred to as the Council) shall consist of the Secretary for Native Affairs as President and thirty-one African members elected from among and by the delegates at meetings of African Provincial Councils, with the exception of those from the Barotseland Protectorate who shall be chosen in such a manner as the Paramount Chief of the Barotse shall decide.

Provided that the Governor may, after consultation with the Council, vary this representation.

(b) The function of the Council shall be to advise the Governor on matters affecting the African population of the Territory.

(c) The Council in committee may elect one of its members to preside over the Council when in committee.

(d) In the event of a member ceasing to be a delegate to an African Provincial Council he shall cease to be a member of the Council.

(e) A person shall be disqualified for election as a member, or, having been elected, for sitting or voting in the Council if such person-

(i) is not Northern Rhodesia born or has not become registered in the Territory;
(ii) is a District Messenger, a member of the African Civil Service, armed forces, the Northern Rhodesia Police or the Northern Rhodesia Prison Service; or
(iii) has ever been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of six months or more and has not received a free pardon:

Provided that disqualification under this sub-clause shall cease five years after the date of discharge from prison:

And provided further that the Governor in Council may in any particular case remove such disqualification.

(f) The names of all members of the Council shall be published by notice in the Government Gazette.

2. (a) Any member may resign his seat by informing the President in writing that he wishes to do so.

(b) The President shall declare the seat of a member to be vacant-

(i) in the event of the death of the member;
(ii) if the member resigns:
(iii) if the member be certified mentally disordered or defective;

* see ARC 16 (1957) - but first published in December, 1953.

(iv) if the member be absent from two consecutive meetings without the leave of the President;
(v) if the member be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of six months or more;
(vi) if the member be disqualified under regulation 1 (e).

(c) When elections to the Council are made at meetings of Provincial Councils those councils shall at that time indicate, in order of votes cast, two, and in the case of the Northern Province three, further members who shall be available to fill vacancies which may occur in the Council:

Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall have force and effect only during the lifetime of the Third African Representative Council.

(d) Whenever a vacancy occurs, before the next general election to the Council, in the representation of a province, the President shall through the Provincial Commissioner inform the Provincial Council concerned which council shall then fill the vacancy from those indicated in accordance with paragraph (c) of this regulation, choosing from those indicated and available the one in whose favour the greatest number of votes were cast:

Provided that in the case of the Barotseland Protectorate a successor shall be chosen in such manner as the Paramount Chief of the Barotse shall decide:

And provided further that the provisions of this paragraph shall have force and effect only during the lifetime of the Third African Representative Council.

3. The Council shall have power to make Standing Rules and Orders for the proper conduct of its business:

Provided that such Standing Rules and Orders shall be subject to the approval of the Governor.

4. The Council shall meet at such times as may be prescribed by Standing Rules and Orders and at such places as the President shall notify.

5. Any resolution proposing an amendment to this Constitution shall be lost unless supported by not less than nineteen members of the Council. No such amendment shall be of effect until it has been approved by the Governor.

6. Save as provided in regulation 5, all questions proposed for decision in the Council shall be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present. The President shall not have an original vote but, if upon any question the votes shall be equally divided, he may exercise a casting vote.

7. Subject to any special directions by the Governor, there shall be at least one session of the Council every year.

8. (a) The Governor may at any time by notice in the Gazette dissolve the Council.

(b) The Council shall be dissolved by the President before the expiration of five years from the date of the first day of the first meeting of the Council, if it shall not have been sooner dissolved.

9. This Constitution supersedes the earlier Constitution of the African Representative Council and the earlier Constitution is hereby repealed.

Standing Rules and Orders

1. Meetings shall be held at such times and places as the Governor shall appoint.

2. The Secretary for Native Affairs shall attend and preside in Council unless prevented by illness or other good and sufficient cause and in his absence some other officer appointed by the Governor shall take his place.

3. The President shall have authority to enforce all Standing Rules and Orders.

4. (i) A meeting of the Council shall begin on such day as the President shall decide.

(ii) Notice of the meeting shall be given in writing by the Clerk of the Council at least forty-five days before the date of a meeting and despatched to each member. In the case of any emergency the Governor may call a meeting at such shorter notice as he shall decide and such notice may be given to members by any means.

(iii) The Council shall sit on such days as the President shall decide.

(iv) When the Council is adjourned to a specific date no further notice shall be necessary.

(v) A meeting of the Council shall be deemed to commence when it first meets after being summoned, and to terminate when it is adjourned sine die.

5. (i) The proceedings and debates of the Council shall be in the English language or in any African dialect commonly spoken in Northern Rhodesia.

(ii) Speeches made by members may be interpreted from a dialect into English only.

(iii) The President may if he thinks fit direct a member who begins to speak in English to continue his speech in an African dialect and any member so directed shall comply with this direction.

6. (i) There shall be a Clerk of the Council who shall keep the minutes of the proceedings of the Council.

(ii) The minutes shall record the names of members attending the meetings and all decisions of the Council.

(iii) In the case of divisions of the Council the minutes shall include a record of the numbers and the names of members voting for or against the motion, or abstaining.

(iv) Before the opening of each day's proceedings, the Clerk will distribute to members a copy of the Order of the Day.

(v) The Clerk shall keep an Order Book showing all business appointed for any future day and any notices of Questions or Motions which have been set down for any future day. The Order Book shall be open to the inspection of members at all reasonable hours.

(vi) Council records shall be kept and these shall be open to inspection by members and other persons under such arrangements as may be permitted by the President.

7. An official report of the proceedings in Council which shall be as nearly as possible verbatim shall be prepared under the supervision of the Clerk.

8. The quorum of the Council shall be nineteen, and if at any time a quorum is not present, the President shall adjourn the Council.

9. The President may at any time suspend or adjourn any meeting.

10. (i) The meetings of the Council shall be open to the public.

(ii) No person who is not a member of the Council may take part in its deliberations; provided that members of Legislative Council nominated to represent African Interests shall have the right to address the Council.

(iii) The President may at any time exclude members of the public or call upon any member of the public present at any meeting to withdraw.

11. Members of the public must preserve silence and good order during a sitting.

12. Reporters for the Press may be provided, at the discretion of the Clerk, with seating accommodation but otherwise shall be subject to all Orders applying to members of the public.

13. (i) The Order of the Day shall be as follows:

(a) Prayer.
(b) Confirmation of minutes.
(c) Announcements by the President.
(d) Papers to be laid on the Table.
(e) Questions.
(f) Motions.

(ii) The President may alter the Order of the Day for reasons given.

(iii) Business of the day shall be confined to the business set out in the Order of the Day.

14. The minutes of a meeting shall be confirmed at the next sitting of the Council. After confirmation by the Council the minutes shall be signed by the President.

15. (i) All Rules, Regulations and Orders made by the Governor or the Governor in Council which are of special interest to Africans shall be laid on the Table at the next meeting of Council after their publication.

(ii) All Rules approved by the Governor under the Native Authority Ordinance and all minutes of Provincial Councils shall be laid on the Table at the next meeting of Council after they have been made.

(iii) When any paper is laid on the Table, the title of the paper shall be announced verbally at the time. An explanatory statement only may then be made. No opinion shall be expressed and no debate shall take place and no questions shall be put.

16. (i) Except in the case of a meeting called in an emergency, copies of the Agenda and relevant documents shall be circulated to members at least twenty-eight days, if possible, before the meeting.

(ii) Any member of Council wishing to bring up any matter for discussion which is not included in the Agenda shall inform the President who will refer it to the Council sitting in Committee.

(iii) The President may at any time permit the consideration, in Committee, of items on the Agenda.

(iv) No Motion, other than those of the kind enumerated in Rule 18, shall be put without the leave of the President unless notice of such Motion in writing shall have been received by the Clerk at least thirty days previously.

(v) When a Motion has been proposed, debated and disposed of, no member may without the special permission of the Council, propose a Motion to rescind such a Motion or propose a similar Motion or propose a Motion substantially identical, within one year; provided that a Motion withdrawn by leave of the President may be proposed again at a subsequent meeting.

(vi) Motions will be on subjects which have been proposed, debated and carried by Provincial Councils, but individual members may always apply to the President for special leave to propose Motions on other subjects.

17. If a member wishes to vary the terms of a Motion standing in his name, he may do so by giving at the Table an amended notice of

Motion, provided that such amendment does not, in the opinion of the President, materially alter any principle in the original Motion or its scope.

18. The following Motions may be proposed without notice:

(i) A Motion for the amendment of any Motion.
(ii) A Motion for the adjournment of the Council or of the debate.
(iii) A Motion for the suspension of Standing Rules and Orders put with the permission of the President.
(iv) A Motion for the amendment of the minutes of the Council.
(v) A Motion for the withdrawal of strangers.
(vi) A Motion that the Council resolve itself into Committee of the whole Council.
(vii) A Motion when Council is in Committee.
(viii) A Motion for the suspension of a member.

19. (i) Questions may be put relative to public affairs, proceedings pending in Council, or any matter of administration.

(ii) Except with the special permission of the President, all Questions must be put in writing and sent to the Clerk at least one month before the Council meets.

(iii) The reply to any such Question shall be given by the President and a copy thereof in writing supplied to the member asking the Question.

(iv) No debate shall take place on the giving of notice of any Question or when the answer to any Question is given in Council.

(v) The Object of a Question should be to obtain information on a matter of fact within the special knowledge of the Government and the right to an answer to such a Question shall be governed by the following Rules, as to the interpretation of which the President shall be the sole judge:

(a) A Question shall not include the names of persons or any statements of fact unless they are necessary for the understanding of the Question and unless any statement of fact can be proved.
(b) A Question may not contain any arguments, expressions of opinion, or offensive expressions.
(c) A Question may not be asked which has been answered at the African Representative Council or at any African Provincial Council during the past twelve months.
(d) A Question may not be asked regarding proceedings in Committee of Council which have not been placed before the Council by a report from the Committee.
(e) A Question may not ask for an expression of opinion or the solution of an imaginary case.
(f) A Question may not be asked which makes personal accusations.

(g) A Question may be disallowed when, in the opinion of the President, it is trivial or frivolous or when the publication of it or the answer to it would not be in the public interest.

20. (i) A special Committee of the Council may be appointed by the President, or by the Council with the permission of the President, at any stage of the proceedings.

(ii) Every special Committee shall consist of at least six members of the Council who shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the Council. A special Committee so appointed shall elect its own Chairman.

(iii) Four members of a special Committee shall form a quorum if the Committee consists of six members, and six if the Committee consists of more than six members.

(iv) If for any reason a member of a special Committee is unable to act, the President may appoint another member in his stead.

(v) All special Committees shall, as far as possible, have the services of the Clerk of the Council.

(vi) The Chairman of a special Committee shall have an original as well as a casting vote.

(vii) A special Committee may continue its investigations after the Council's sittings are ended and shall not be dissolved until it has made its report or is dissolved by Council.

(viii) The report of every special Committee shall be signed by every member who agrees with it. Any member disagreeing may put in a written statement of the reasons why he disagrees.

(ix) The report of the special Committee shall be laid on the Table by its Chairman and notice of Motion for the adoption of the report shall be given by one of the members of the Committee who has signed it.

21. In speaking in the Council or in Committee of the whole Council, the following Rules shall be observed:

(i) Every member, except the President, shall speak standing and shall address his observations to the President, or, in Committee, to the Chairman.
(ii) When a member wishes to speak he shall stand in his place but shall not begin until the President or the Chairman shall ask him to do so.
(iii) When the President or Chairman speaks any member speaking shall immediately sit down.
(iv) When a member has finished speaking he shall sit down and any other member wishing to address the Council or Committee may stand up.
(v) If more members than one stand up at the same time the

President or Chairman will decide who shall speak.

(vi) Every member shall confine his remarks to the subject being discussed and, where an amendment to a Motion has been proposed, the debate must refer to the amendment so proposed until it has been dealt with.

(vii) The Chairman may require any amendment to be put in writing and delivered to the Clerk.

(viii) The mover of any Motion or amendment may speak in support of it but no further debate shall be allowed until the Motion or amendment has been duly seconded; but when the Council is in Committee a Motion or amendment may be put or debated without being seconded.

(ix) (a) When an amendment has been moved and, if necessary, seconded it shall be debated and put to the vote before the original Motion.

(b) When an amendment to a proposed amendment is moved and, if necessary, seconded it shall be debated as if the previous amendment were an original Motion.

(x) No member shall speak more than once on any matter before the Council except in explanation or to a point of order or in the exercise of the right of reply or when Council is in Committee. The President may address the Council at any time.

(xi) The proposer may reply after all other members present have had an opportunity of speaking and before the Motion is put to the vote. This reply must concern only points which have been made during the debate and not any new arguments in favour of the Motion. When such reply has been made no other member may speak.

(xii) When an amendment has been proposed and, if necessary, seconded, a member who has already spoken to the original Motion may speak to the amendment, and a member who has not spoken to the original Motion and speaks to the amendment does not lose his right to speak to the original Motion.

(xiii) A member merely seconding a Motion without saying anything else does not lose the right of addressing the Council afterwards during the discussion of the Motion.

(xiv) A member must not-

(a) impute improper motives to any other member;
(b) make a personal charge against any other member;
(c) use offensive expressions;
(d) use personalities.

(xv) If a member has used objectionable words and on being called to order has not explained or withdrawn them or offered an apology to the satisfaction of the Council, the President may refuse to allow him to be heard.

(xvi) No member may speak on any matter in which he has a financial interest without first stating how much interest he has.

(xvii) No reference shall be made to any matter on which a Court decision is pending, in such a way as may prejudice the interests of the parties in the case.

(xviii) Members shall be referred to by name.

(xix) (a) A member of the Council who departs from the Rules may be immediately called to order by the President or Chairman, upon which such member shall immediately sit down.

(b) Any member may rise to a point of order at any time during the speech of another member stating that he rises to a point of order. The member who was speaking must thereupon sit down and so also must the member who rose to a point of order when he has concluded his appeal to the Chair.

(c) No other member may, except by leave of the President or Chairman, speak to the point of order, and the President or Chairman shall, after the statement of the point has been concluded, give his decision thereon, after which the member who was speaking at the time the point of order was raised shall be entitled to proceed with his speech, giving effect to the ruling of the Chair.

(xx) No member may speak to any Motion after it has been put from the Chair, but at any time after a Motion has been put from the Chair and before the votes have been counted, a Motion may, with the leave of the President or Chairman but not otherwise, be withdrawn by the member who proposed it. If an amendment has been proposed to a Motion the original Motion cannot be withdrawn until the amendment has been disposed of.

(xxi) (a) The President may suspend any member who wilfully disregards any of these Rules or obstructs any of the proceedings of the Council.

(b) The Chairman in Committee shall have the same power.

(c) A member suspended under this Rule shall leave the Council immediately and shall absent himself from the Council until the President shall permit him to return.

(d) The President or Chairman may direct such steps to be taken as may be required to enforce his Order.

(xxii) By the indulgence of the Council a member may explain matters of a personal nature although there be no proposition before the Council, but such matters may not be debated and the member must confine himself strictly to an explanation of his own conduct.

(xxiii) The President or Chairman, after having called the attention of the Council or Committee to the conduct of a member who does not keep to the point and continues to repeat either his own arguments or arguments used by other members in the debate, may direct the member to stop speaking, in which case he shall immediately sit down.

22. (i) Any Motion, other than one proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the African Representative Council, shall be decided by

a majority of the votes of the members present. The President may exercise a casting vote but no original vote. When the Council is in Committee the Chairman shall have an original and a casting vote.

(ii) All voting shall be carried out in a manner to be decided by the President.

(iii) No member may speak on any Motion after it shall have been finally put by the President or Chairman.

23. (i) In all cases of doubt, the Standing Orders of this Council shall be interpreted by the President.

(ii) Any of these Standing Rules and Orders may be suspended with the consent of the President and the majority of members.

(iii) Any question of order or procedure not provided for in these Rules shall be decided by the President whose decision in the matter or on any disputed point of interpretation of any of these Rules shall be final.

(iv) The Standing Rules and Orders of the Representative Council previously in force are hereby repealed.

24. No member shall without good cause absent himself from the meetings of the Council without leave from the President. Any member who is absent without good cause and without such leave may be suspended by the President for such time as he shall see fit.

APPENDICES B to D

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON ARC MEMBERSHIP

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

column (i): symbol '+' represents those members who joined the ARC at any point later than the inauguration of the respective Councils; and conversely the symbol '-' represents those who, for one reason or another, ceased being members before the end of the term of the respective Councils; symbol (12) represents those members entering the ARC for the first time.

column (ii): indicates the constituency for which the members were originally chosen for their respective APC's and not ARC constituencies as such; U = urban; R = rural.

column (iii): indicates the respective Provincial Councils from which members were elected to the ARC: B = Barotse, C= Central, E = Eastern, K-L = Kaonde-Lunda, L = Luapula, N = Northern, N(c) = Northern (central areas), N(n) = Northern (northern areas), N(w) = Northern (western areas), NW = North-Western, S = Southern, W(e) = Western (eastern areas), W(u) = Western (urban areas), W(w) = Western (western areas).

column (iv): indicates sources of APC membership of councillors from whence elected to the ARC; nom = nominated, NA = Native Authority, elect = elected.

column (v): indicates occupation(s) or position(s) of councillors at the time that they became and while they were ARC members.

column (vi): indicates educational standards achieved at time of ARC membership; Std = standard, Std 3? = information not absolutely verified; Std-? = evidence of some education but standard not ascertained; TC = Teachers Certificate; HTC = Higher Teachers Certificate; SA Matric = South African matriculation (=Form 5).

column (vii): indicates languages in which members addressed Council, E = solely in English, e = at times in English, '-' = in vernacular alone.

column (viii): indicates voluntary association membership; x = direct evidence of such; ? = indirect evidence not absolutely verified.

column (ix): indicates Federation of African Societies founder - member - leadership since all instances cited were such.

column (x): indicates African National Congress membership; * = member; *? = indirect evidence of membership but not verified; L* = member when no longer an ARC councillor; *p = member in post-ARC period; S = self-professed sympathiser.

column (xi): indicates official positions held in ANC.

APPENDIX B

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MEMBERSHIP OF FIRST COUNCIL OF ARC (1946-1948)

(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)	(ix)	(x)	(xi)
1. CHIMKOKO Richard	Petauke	E	nom Nsenga NA	NA treasury clerk	Std 3 + TC	E	?			
+2. CHIMYAMA Thomas	Balovale	KL	nom Lunda NA	NA treasury clerk	Std 3 + TC	-	?			
3. CHIPEPA Joseph	Kawambwa	N(w)	nom B.Lunda NA	NA councillor	Std 3 (?)	-	?			
4. CHITIMPA Jonas	B-Hill(R)	C	nom Lenje NA	trader (and part-time NA councillor)	Std 6	e	?			
5. IKELENGE Chief	Mwinilunga	KL	nom Lunda NA	Chief	Std 3 (?)	-			S	
+6. INYAMAWINA Induna	Lealui	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - (?)	E				
7. KABATI Induna	Mankoya	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - (?)	-				
8. KAKUMBI Mateo	Serenje	C	nom DC (?)	mission school teacher	Std 6 + in-dust train	E	x	X	*	
9. KALEPA Remus	Kasempa	KL	nom Kaonde NA	NA treasury clerk	Std 6	e	x		*	
10. KALIDZA Jacob	Lusaka	C	elect Lusaka UAC	trader	Std - (?)	-	?			
11. KASOKOLO Henry	Kitwe(R)	W	elect Kitwe UAC	preacher	SA Matric + TC	E	x	X	*	
12. KOPA Chief	Mpika	N(e)	nom Bisa NA	Chief	Std 5	-				
13. LEWANIKA Induna	Senanga	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - (?)	-				
14. LUKUKU Induna	Sesheke	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - (?)	e				

Appendix B (continued)

(i)		(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)	(ix)	(x)	(xi)
15. MAKALU	Amos	B.Hill(U)	C	Elect B.Hill UAC	mine espitao	Std 2	-	?			
+16. MANGWENDE	James	Mufulira	W	elect Muf UAC	trader (?)	Std - (?)	E	?			
17. MKANDA	Ledi	F.Jameson	E	nom Chewa NA	NA councillor	Std - (?)	-				
-18. MUBITANA	Moses	Mufulira	W	elect Muf UAC	mine school head	SA Matric + TC	E	x		*	
19. MUSHINDO	Paul	Chinsali	N(e)	elect Welf Soc	preacher	Std 6 + HTC	E	x			
20. MUSOKOTWANE	Chief	L'stone(R)	S	nom TokaleyaNA	Chief	Std 3	-	x			
21. MUSONDA	Ashton	Chingola	W	elect Ching UAC	mine hospital orderly	Std - (?)	-	?			
-22. MUYUMBANA	Induna	Lealui	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - (?)	E				
+23. MWASE	Chief	Lundazi	E	nom Chewa NA	Chief	Std 6	E				
24. NABANYAMA	Johane	Namwala	S	nom Tonga NA(?)	mission school head then NA Ed.Councillor	Std 6 + HTC	E	?		*	
25. NALUMANGO	Nelson	L'stone(U)	S	elect L'stone UAC	shop assistant	Std 6 + TC type dipl.	E	x	X	*	
26. PARDON	Joseph	F Roseberry	N(w)	elect Welf Soc	trader	Std - (?)	e	x			
-27. PIKAMALAZA	Chief	Lundazi	E	nom Tumbuka NA	Chief	Std 6	e				
28. SAMPA	Edward	Kitwe(U)	W	elect Kitwe UAC	mine clerk	Std 3 (?)	E	x			
-29. SANGAMBO	Moses	Balovale	KL	nom DC (?)	mission teacher + pt-time NA councillor	Std 5 + TC(?)	-			?	
30. SIKAZWE	Philip	Abercorn	N(n)	nom Lungu NA	NA councillor	Std - (?)	-	?		?	
31. SITAMBULI	Alton	Ndola(R)	W	nom Swahili NA	farmer	Std - (?)	e	x			

Appendix B (continued)

(i)		(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)	(ix)	(x)	(xi)
32. SIWALE	Donald	Isoka	M(m)	elect Welf Soc	farmer + part-time NA councillor	Std 6 + Tc	E	x		*	
+33. SOMATI	Jephas	PJameson	E	elect PJames UAC	bus conductor	Std - (?)	e	x			
-34. ZIKOLE	Mawere	PJameson	E	nom DC	trader	Std - (?)	e	?			

APPENDIX C

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MEMBERSHIP OF SECOND COUNCIL OF ARC (1949-1953)

(i)		(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)	(ix)	(x)	(xi)
(1.) BYUNDANGONO	Induna	Senanga	B	nom Litunga	NA Councillor	Std - (?)	E				
2. CHIMKOKO	Richard	Petauke	E	nom Nsenga NA	NA treasury clerk	Std 3 + TC	E	?			
3. CHINYAMA	Thomas	Balovale	W(w)	nom Lunda NA	farmer + part-time NA councillor	Std 3	-	?			
(4.) CHITAMBALA	Malike	FRoseberry	W(e)	nom Ushi NA	NA Education councillor	Std 5 + TC	-				
5. CHITIMPA	Jonas	B-Hill(R)	C	nom Lenje NA	trader + part-time NA councillor	Std 6	e	?			
+6. CHOBOLA	Manasara	Ndola(R)	W(u)	nom Swahili NA (?)	mission school head + pt-time NA councillor	Std 6 + HTC	E	?		*?	
(7.) CHOLA	Eli	Mporokoso	N	elect Welf Soc	trader	Std -(?)	-	x			
(8.) FUNDULU	N	Mankoya	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std -(?)	-				
+9. IMUTULO	Induna	Senanga	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std -(?)	-				
10. KAKUMBI	Mateo	Serenje	C	nom Lenje NA	mission school teacher	STd 6 + indust train	E	x	X	* Gen Treas 49-53	

Appendix C (Continued)

(i)		(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)	(ix)	(x)	(xi)
11. KALONGA	Induna	Mengu	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - ?	E				
12. KANIKI	Knox	Kitwe	W(u)	elect Kitwe UAC	municipal welfare officer	Std 6	E	x		*	
13. KAZUNGA	Abner	Ndola(U)	W(u)	elect Ndola UAC	trader	Std 4	E	x		*	W.Prov treas. 49-58
14. KOPA	Chief	Mpika	N	nom Bisa NA	Chief	Std 5	-				
±15. LEWANIKA	Induna	Senanga	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - ?	-				
16. LUKUKU	Induna	Sesheke	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - ?	e				
17. MBOSHYA	Chief	Mkushi	C	nom Lala NA	Chief	Std 5 + TC	-				
18. MKUPO	Joseph	B.Hill(U)	C	elect B.Hill UAC	municipal wlf off, then priv farm foreman	Std 6	E	x		S	
19. MUSHINDO	Paul	Chinsali	N	elect Welf Soc	preacher	Std 6 + TC	E	x			
20. MUSUMBULWA	Gabriel	Luanshya	W(u)	elect Luan UAC	mine clerk	Std 6 + TC	E	x			
±21. MUYUMBANA	Induna	Lealui	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - ?	E				
22. MWASE	Chief	Lundasi	E	nom Chewa NA	Chief	Std 6	E				
-23. NALUMANGO	Nelson	L'stone	S	elect L'stone UAC	M.L.C.	Std 7	E	x	X	*	Vice GenTreas 49-52
24. SANDASANDA	Jesse	Kasempa	W(w)	nom DC (?)	mission school teacher, then trader	Std 6 + TC	e			*?	
25. SANGAMBO	Moses	Balovale	W(w)	nom Lovale NA	NA Agricultural Councillor	Std 5 + TC	-			*?	
26. SAYIRI	Chief	FJameson	E	nom Mpeni NA	Chief	Std - ?	E				

Appendix C (continued)

(i)		(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)	(ix)	(x)	(xi)
27. SITAMBULI	Alton	Ndola(R)	W	nom Swahili NA	farmer	Std - ?	e	x		*?	
28. SIWALE	Donald	Isoka	N	nom Wina NA	farmer(+ part-time NA councillor)	Std 6 + TC	E	x		*	
29. SOKOTA	Pascale	Kitwe	W(u)	elect Kitwe UAC	mine school head	Std 6 + HTC	E	x		†	Gen treas 53-56
30. SOMATI	Jephas	PJameson	E	elect PJames UAC	bus conductor (?)	Std - ?	e	x			
31. TEMBO	Esau	Masabuka	S	elect Mas UAC	trader	Std 4 + TC	E	x		*?	
32. WALUBITA	Amos	Masabuka	S	nom Tonga NA	NA treasury clerk and farmer	Std 6 + TC	E	x		*p	?
33. YAMBA	Dauti	Kawambwa	W(e)	nom E.Lunda NA	NA Educ Sec	Std 6 + TC	E	x	X	*p	Vice pres 49-53

APPENDIX D

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MEMBERSHIP OF THIRD COUNCIL OF ARC (1953-58)

(i)		(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)	(ix)	(x)	(xi)
1. BYUNDANGONO	Induna	Senanga	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - ?	E				
(2.) CHEMBE	Francis B.	B-Hill(U)	C	elect B-Hill UAC	municipal welfare officer	GCE TC 'O' + dip	E	x	X	*	Exec mem 52-
(3.) CHEMBE	Shadrack	Petauke	E	nom Nsenga NA	trader	Form 2	E	?		*	Exec pres 52-54
(4.) CHIBANZA	S.	Solwezi	NW	nom Kaonde NA	farmer(+ pt-time NA councillor)	Std 4 + TC	E	?		*	Dist Office
(5.) CHILESHE	Safeli	Lusaka	C	elect Lusk UAC	trader	Std 6 + HTC	E	x	X	*	?

Appendix D (continued)

(i)		(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)	(ix)	(x)	(xi)
+6. CHILIMBOYI	Alan	Mumbwa	C	nom Kaomde NA	NA Admin Secretary	GCE 'O'	E			*	Dist Treas 53-
-7. CHIMKOKO	Richard	Petauke	E	nom Nsenga NA	NA Treasury Clerk	Std 5 + TC	E	?			
-8. CHOBOLA	Manners	Ndola(R)	W	nom Ndola NA	mission school head + pt-time NA councillor	Std 6, HTC	E	?		*?	
-9. HABUMBU	Peter	Masabuka	S	nom Plateau Tonga NA	NA Public Works councillor	Std 5 + TC	E			*	Dep S Prov Pres 55-
10. IKELENGE	Chief	Mwinilunga	NW	nom Lunda NA	Chief	Std 3-?	e			S	
11. KABALATA	Jeremiah	L'stone	S	elect L'stone UAC	mission school head	Std 6 + HTC	E	x	X		
12. KAKUMBI	Mateo	Serenje	C	nom Lenje NA	mission school teacher	Std 6 + indust train	E	x	X	*	
13. KALONGA	Induna	Mongu	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - ?	E				
14. KATILUNGU	Lawrence	Kitwe	W	elect Kitwe UAC	TUC organise + President	Std 6 + TC	E	x		*	Act: pres. 1958
+15. KATOWA	Maurice	Choma	S	nom Tonga NA	mission school head, pt-time NA councillor/	GCE 'O' +	E			*	Dist see
16. KAZOKA	William	Choma	S	nom Tonga NA	farmer + NA agric councillor	SA Matric +agric dip	E			s	
17. LEASHIMBA	Induna	Senanga	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - ?	E				
18. MUBIANA	Simunja	Kalabo	B	nom Litunga	NA councillor	Std - ?	e				
+19. MUKANZA	Peter	Ndola(U)	W	elect Ndola UAC	lawyers clerk	Form 2	E	x		*	Dist offic.
20. MUKIMWA	David	Kasempa	NW	nom Lunda NA	NA employee	Std 6 + HTC	E			*	
21. MULANDO	Isaiah	B-Hill(R)	C	nom Lenje NA	NA Admin Secretary	Form 2 + HTC	E	?		*	

Appendix D (continued)

(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)	(ix)	(x)	(xi)
22. MUNUNGA	Samson Kawambwa	L	nom Shila NA	NA Admin Secretary	Std 6 + TC	E	x		*	Dist Offic
23. MUSUMALI	Alexander F Rose-Berry	L	nom Ushi NA	NA employee	Std ?	e				
24. MUSUMBULWA	Gabriel Luanshya	W	elect Luan UAC	mine clerk	Std 6 + TC	E	x			
(25) NABULYATO	Robinson Namwala	S	elect Masab UAC	trader	Std 6 + TC	E	?	X	*	Gen Sec 48-53
(26) NAMWELEU	Eliezer Mperokose	N	nom Bemba NA	NA employee	Std 6 + TC	E				
(27) NG'ANDU	Lakement Kasama	N	nom Bemba NA	NA Admin Secretary	Std ?	E	x		*	
(28) NGULUWE	Gideon Lundazi	E	nom Nsenga NA	NA employee	Std ?	E	?		*?	
(29) NKANZA	William Balovale	NW	nom Lunda NA	mission school teacher	Std 6 + RTC	E	x		S	
(30) NKOLOMA	Mathew Kitwe	W	elect Kitwe UAC	TUC organiser + General Sec.	GCE 'O' + labour dip	E	x		*	Ast Gen Sec 56-
(31) NKONGA	Bisset Luwingu	N	nom Bemba NA	NA Admin Sec.	Std 6 + TC	E	x		*	
+32. PUTA	Robinson C. Bancroft	W	elect Bane UAC	trader	Std ?	E	x		*p	Dep Prem. 53-
33. SAYIRI	Chief FJameson	E	nom Ngoni NA	Chief	Std ?	E				
34. SIWALE	Donald Iseka	N	nom Wina NA	farmer + pt-time NA councillor	Std 6 + TC	E	x		*	
35. SOKONI	Crispino FRoseberry	L	nom Ushi NA	NA employee	Std ?	E				

Appendix D (continued)

(i)		(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)	(ix)	(x)	(xi)
(36) SOKONI	John M.	Chimsali	M	elect Chimsali district	trader	Std 6 + TC	E			*	NProv Pres 53
37. SOKOTA	Pascale	Kitwe	W	elect Kitwe UAC	M.L.C.	Std 6 + HTC	E	x		*	Treas 53-56
38. YAMBA	Dauti	Kawambwa	L	nom Luapula NA	M.L.C.	Std 6 + HTC	E	x	X	*p	

APPENDIX E

OCCUPATIONAL DATA ON ARC MEMBERSHIP

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

First Category: Native Authorities

column (i): chiefs
(ii): councillors
(iii): employees

Second Category: Government

(iv): general
(v): education
(vi): clerical

Third Category: Mines

(vii): clerical
(viii): supervisory (capitaos)
(ix): labour (miners)
(x): education
(xi): welfare (personal)

Fourth Category: Other

(xii): medical (orderlies)
(xiii): welfare (officers)
(xiv): mission preachers
(xv): mission teachers
(xvi): private enterprise
(xvii): domestic service

Fifth Category: Independent

(xviii): businessmen
(xix): T.U. organisers
(xx): farmers

* : while member of the ARC
x : before becoming member of the ARC
x?: indirect evidence not absolutely verified
H : school headmaster

APPENDIX E

1.	BYUNDANGONO		B	Senanga	1949-58
2.	CHEMBE	Francis Bruno	C	B-Hill(U)	1953-57
3.	CHEMBE	Shadrack N.E.	E	Petauke	1953-58
4.	CHIBANZA	S.	NW	Solwezi	1953-58
5.	CHILESHE	Safeli Hammock	C	Lusaka	1953-58
6.	CHILIMBOYI	Alan	C	Mumbwa	1957-58
7.	CHIMKOKO	Richard A.	E	Petauke	1946-57
8.	CHINYAMA	Thomas	W	Balovale	1947-53
9.	CHIPEPA	Joseph	N	Kawambwa	1946-48
10.	CHITAMBALA	Maliko	W	F-Rosebery	1949-53
11.	CHITIMPA	Jonas	C	B-Hill(R)	1946-53
12.	CHOBOLA	Manners	W	Ndola	1952-58
13.	CHOLA	Eli	N	Mporokoso	1949-53
14.	FUNDULU	N.	B	Mankoya	1949-53
15.	HABUMBU	Peter	S	Masabuka	1953-57
16.	IKELENGE	Chief	KL	Mwinilunga	1946-58
17.	IMUTULO	Induna	B	Senanga	1951 Sept
18.	INYAMAWINA	Induna	B	Lealui	1948 July
19.	KABALATA	Jeremiah	S	L'stone	1953-58
20.	KABATI	Induna	B	Mankoya	1946-48
21.	KAKUMBI	Mateo	C	Serenje	1946-58
22.	KALEPA	Remus	KL	Kasempa	1946-48
23.	KALIDZA	Jacob	C	Lusaka(U)	1946-48
24.	KALONGA	Induna	B	Mongu	1949-
25.	KANIKI	Knox Andrew	W	Kitwe	1949-53
26.	KASOKOLO	Henry	W	Kitwe(R)	1946-48
27.	KATILUNGU	Lawrence Chola	W	Kitwe	1953-58
28.	KATOWA	Maurice	S	Choma	1957-58
29.	KAZOKA	William	S	Choma	1953-58
30.	KAZUNGA	Abner	W	Ndola(U)	1949-53

*	1	12	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	4	-	-	6	1	3
x	-	-	1	2	1	3	2	1	2	1	2	1	-	2	9	4	2	-	-	2
TOTAL	1	12	8	2	1	3	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	13	4	2	6	1	5

Appendix E (continued)

31.	KOPA	Chief	N	Mpika	1946-53	*
32.	LEASHIMBA	Induna	B	Senanga	1953-58	*
33.	LITIA	Lewanika Induna	B	Senanga	1946-53	*
34.	LUKUKU	Induna	B	Sesheke	1946-53	*
35.	MAKALU	Amos	C	B-Hill(U)	1946-48	* x
36.	MANGWENDE	James	W	Mufulira	1947-48	x
37.	MBOSHYA	Chief	C	Mrushi(R)	1949-53	* x
38.	MKANDA	Ledi	E	FJameson	1946-48	*
39.	MKUPO	Joseph	C	B-Hill(U)	1949-53	x
40.	MUBIANA	Simmuja	B	Kalabo	1953-58	*
41.	MUBITANA	Moses	W	Mufulira	1946 Nov	* x
42.	MUKANZA	Peter	W	Ndola(U)	1958	x
43.	MUKIMWA	David	NW	Kasempa	1953-58	* x
44.	MULANDO	Isaiah H.C.	C	B-Hill(R)	1953-58	* x
45.	MUNUNGA	Samson M.	L	Kawambwa	1958	* x
46.	MUSHINDO	Paul Bwembya	N	Chinsali	1946-53	x
47.	MUSOKOTWANE	Chief	S	L'stone(R)	1946-48	* x
48.	MUSONDA	Ashton	W	Chingola	1946-48	*
49.	MUSUMALI	Alexander	L	FRosebery	1958	x
50.	MUSUMBULWA	Gabriel	W	Luanshya	1949-58	* x
51.	MUYUMBANA	Matsa	B	Lealui	1946-47	*
52.	MWASE	Chief	E	Lundazi	1948-53	* x
53.	NABANYAMA	Johane	S	Namwala	1946-48	* x
54.	NABULYATO	Robinson	S	Namwala	1953-58	* x
55.	NALUMANGO	Nelson	S	L'stone(U)	1946-52	x
56.	NAMWELEU	Eliezer	N	Mporokoso	1953-58	* x
57.	NG'ANDU	Lakement H.	N	Kasama	1953-58	* x?
58.	NGULUWE	Gideon	E	Lundazi	1953-58	* x
59.	NKANZA	William	NW	Balovale	1953-58	*
60.	NKOLOMA	Mathew D.	W	Kitwe	1953-57	x
						*
						x
						TOTAL

| | | | | | |

Appendix E (continued)

61.	NKONGA	Bisset	M	Luwingu	1953-58	
62.	PARDON	Joseph	M	PRosebery	1946-48	
63.	PIKAMALAZA	Chief	E	Lundasi	1946-47	
64.	PUTA	Robinson C.	W	Bancroft	1957-58	
65.	SAMPA	Edward	W	Kitwe(U)	1946-48	
66.	SANDASANDA	Jesse	W	Kasempa	1949-53	
67.	SANGAMBO	Moses	KL	Balovale	1949-53	
68.	SAYIRI	Chief	E	PJameson	1949-58	
69.	SIKAZWE	Philip	M	Abercorn	1946-48	
70.	SITAMBULI	Alton	W	Ndola(R)	1946-51	
71.	SIWALE	Donald	M	Isoka	1946-58	
72.	SOKONI	Crispino	L	PRosebery	1958	
73.	SOKONI	John Malama	M	Chinsali	1953-58	
74.	SOKOTA	Pascale	W	Kitwe	1949-58	
75.	SOMATI	Jephas	E	PJameson	1948-53	
76.	TEMBO	Esau	S	Mazabuka	1949-53	
77.	WALUBITA	Amos	S	Mazabuka	1949-53	
78.	YAMBA	Dauti L.	W	Kawambwa	1949-48	
79.	ZILOLE	Mawere	E	PJameson	1946-47	

| | | | | | |

APPENDIX F

OCCUPATIONAL DATA OF POST ARC PERIOD

ON ARC MEMBERSHIP

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

Column (i): Indicates the occupational groups to which the members belonged while on the ARC. B = bureaucratic; PB = pettybourgeois; Prof = professional; W = white collar; w = blue collar; L = Lost.

Column (ii): Indicates those members already deceased. D = deceased; D? = evidence not confirmed.

First Category: Pettybourgeois occupations

Column (iii): commercial farmers
(iv): businessmen

Second Category: Bureaucratic occupations

(v): managerial bureaucrats/bourgeoise
(vi): administrative bureaucrats

Third Category: Professional occupations

(vii): professional occupations general
(viii): professional politicians
(ix): indicates those members now retired

x : occupations in post ARC period
*** :** occupations at present time.

APPENDIX F

| | | |

Appendix F (continued)

| | | |

Appendix F (continued)

							I	II	III
61.	NKONGA	Bisset	N	Lawingu	1953-58			*	X
62.	PARDON	Joseph	N	P-Rosebery	1946-48				
63.	PIKAMALAZA	Chief	E	Lundazi	1946-47				
64.	PUTA	Robinson C.	W	Bancroft	1957-58		*	X	
65.	SAMPA	Edward	W	Kitwe(U)	1946-48				
66.	SANDASANDA	Jesse	W	Kasempa	1949-53				
67.	SANGAMBO	Moses	KL	Balovale	1949-53				
68.	SAYIRI	Chief	E	P-Jameson	1949-58				
69.	SIKAZWE	Philip	N	Abercorn	1946-48				
70.	SITAMBULI	Alton	W	Ndola(R)	1946-51				
71.	SIWALE	Donald	N	Isoka	1946-58		*	X	
72.	SOKONI	Crispino	L	P-Rosebery	1958				
73.	SOKONI	John Malama	N	Chinsali	1953-58				*
74.	SOKOTA	Pascale	W	Kitwe	1949-58		*		
75.	SOMATI	Jephas	E	P-Jameson	1948-53				
76.	TEMBO	Esau	S	Mazabuka	1949-53				
77.	WALUBITA	Amos	S	Mazabuka	1949-53		*		
78.	YAMBA	Dauti L.	W	Kawambwa	1949-48				X
79.	ZILOLE	Mawere	E	P-Jameson	1946-47				

APPENDIX G

ARC TOPICS OF DEBATE

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

*a Voting Patterns and Political Content - for full explanation of rationale underlying and methodology entailed see Methodological Notes.
*b NA = Native Authorities.
*c RD = Racial discrimination.
* beside figures in the body of table - there are discrepancies in these instances between the totals of the figures in columns (iii) and (iv) - and those of columns (i) and (ii); for there were in all these cases one or more motions tabled on which (for one reason or another) no vote was taken.

APPENDIX H

ARC MEMBERS' WIDER/LATER POLITICAL AMBITIONS

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

column (i): indicates period of ARC membership
(ii): indicates ARC elections to N.R. LegCo - for two places in 1948 and 1951 and four places in 1954; vts = votes received; 2/6 = came second out of six candidates.
(iii): indicates elections to Federal Assembly - for two places by ARC in 1953; and two places by a larger (essentially former APC councillers) electoral college, in 1958.
(iv): indicates 1959 NR Benson Constitution elections; 'failed' candidates are those who (for one reason or another) failed to file their papers (or on time).
(v): indicates 1962 NR Macleod Constitution elections; 'failed' candidates here are those involved in contests where no candidates qualified (failing to receive the requisite % of 'other' race votes).
(vi): indicates 1964 Zambia independence elections.
(vii): indicates other central and (where information available) local government elections after 1964.

*a The information included in this Appendix is very incomplete owing to the non-availability of such data (especially on local government elections) even from the 'primary source', the Office of the Director of Elections.

APPENDIX G:

ARC TOPICS OF DEBATE

		(i) MOTIONS			(ii) No. motions per AR Council			(iii) Reception by ARC		(iv) Voting patterns						(v) Absolute unanimity		(vi) Strong Accord		(vii) Political content
		orig tabled	amend.	total	1st	2nd	3rd	Rej	App	Unan −	Maj −	Divid −	Divid +	Maj +	Unan +	Total	% motion	Total	% motion	no. of motions
A.	AFRICAN COUNCILS	15	1	16	6	5	5	3	13	-	-	3	-	6	7	7	(44%)	13	(81%)	all
B.	AFRICAN REPRESENTATION	24	1	25	7	7	11	6	18*	2	-	4	-	4	14	16	(67%)	20	(83%)	all
C.	COLONIALIST POLITICS	28	7	35	6	12	17	5	29*	1	1	3	5	12	12	13	(38%)	26	(76%)	all
D.	LAND AND MINERAL RIGHTS	15	-	15	2	1	12	1	12*	1	-	-	1	4	7	8	(62%)	12	(93%)	all
	b*																			
E.	N.A.: RESPONSIBILITIES	32	-	32	3	14	15	5	27	1	-	4	5	14	8	9	(28%)	23	(64%)	8
F.	: FINANCES	22	-	22	3	6	13	-	22	-	-	-	3	7	12	12	(55%)	19	(86%)	13
G.	: FUNCTIONING	17	-	17	6	5	6	1	16	-	-	1	1	7	8	8	(47%)	15	(88%)	5
H.	CHIEFS' STATUS & PRIVILEGES	12	-	12	1	6	5	1	11	-	-	1	3	4	4	4	(33%)	8	(66%)	9
	e*																			
I.	R.D.: TRADE	13	-	13	5	5	3	-	13	-	-	-	3	4	6	6	(46%)	10	(77%)	all
J.	: FIREARMS	11	-	11	1	4	6	1	10	-	-	1	-	3	7	7	(64%)	10	(91%)	all
K.	: EMPLOYMENT & PROMOTIONS	8	-	8	2	2	4	-	7*	-	-	-	-	1	6	6	(86%)	7	(100%)	all
L.	: PUBLIC PLACES & FACILITIES	8	1	9	2	3	4	1	7*	-	1	-	-	2	5	5	(62%)	8	(100%)	all
M.	: MISCELLANEOUS	12	1	13	4	3	6	1	12	-	-	1	3	4	5	5	(38%)	9	(69%)	all
N.	PASS SYSTEM & THE POLICE	10	-	10	1	2	7	-	10	-	-	-	-	7	3	3	(30%)	10	(100%)	all
O.	LABOUR & CONDITIONS EMPLOYMENT	23	1	24	6	10	8	3	21	-	-	3	2	8	11	11	(46%)	19	(79%)	21
P.	SOCIAL WELFARE & HOUSING	19	1	20	4	8	8	2	18	-	1	1	2	7	9	9	(45%)	17	(85%)	7
Q.	HEALTH & WELFARE	27	1	28	10	10	8	1	27	-	-	1	2	5	20	20	(71%)	25	(89%)	3
R.	EDUCATION	34	1	35	10	11	14	3	31	-	1	2	2	5	24	24	(71%)	30	(88%)	6
S.	SOCIAL ISSUES - GENERAL	22	1	23	11	10	2	7	16	-	1	6	4	7	5	5	(22%)	13	(57%)	1
T.	ALCOHOLIC DRINK	10	-	10	3	3	4	1	9	-	-	1	4	3	2	2	(20%)	5	(50%)	all
U.	TRADE AND COMMERCE	21	-	21	6	8	7	2	19	-	-	2	5	6	8	8	(38%)	14	(66%)	10
V.	TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS	20	-	20	3	7	10	-	20	-	-	-	-	2	18	18	(90%)	20	(100%)	none
W.	RURAL DEVELOPMENT	29	-	29	4	13	12	2	27	-	-	2	2	11	14	14	(48%)	25	(86%)	1
X.	NATURAL RESOURCES	17	1	18	6	6	6	2	16	-	1	1	5	6	5	5	(33%)	12	(66%)	10

APPENDIX H

ANC MEMBERS' WIDER AND LATER POLITICAL AMBITIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS[*a]

	(i)	(ii) 1948	(ii) 1951	(ii) 1954	(iii) 1953	(iii) 1958	(iv) 1959	(v) 1962	(vi) 1964	(vii) Post-Indep	(viii)
1. CHEMBE, F.B.	1953-57			1vts 14/14	4vts 7/10	54vts 2/15		ANC Lwr Kafue Nat roll (elected)		UNIP, Mkushi 1973 (elected)	Fed MP 1958-61 Z.MP 1973-
2. CHEMBE,S.N.B.	1953-58					15vts 10/15	Ind., Eastern Spec seat (defeated)				
3. CHILESHE,S.H.	1953-58			16vts 2/14	3vts 10/10		Ind. Southrn Res.seat (defeated)			Ind,Lusaka local govt 1960's (elected)	NR MLC 1954-58 LCC councillor 1960 LCC alderman 1970's
4. CHILIMBOYI,A.	1957-58								ANC, Mumbwa (elected)	ANC,Mumbwa 1968(electd) UNIP,Mumbwa 1973(electd)	Z MP 1964-71 Z MP 1973-
5. KAKUMBI,M.	1946-58	11vts 3/5	8vts 4/6		10vts 1/10	18vts 7/15			UNIP, Serenje (unopposd)		Fed MP 1953-58 Z MP 1964-68
6. KASOKOLO,H.	1946-48	16vts 2/5						ANC, Bengwlu Lwr roll (defeated)			NR MLC 1948-51
7. KATILUNGU,L.	1953-58			9vts 6/14		47vts 3/15	Ind,CBelt Spec seat (defeated)				

Appendix H (continued)

	(i)	(ii) 1948	1951	1954	(iii) 1953	1958	(iv) 1959	(v) 1962	(vi) 1964	(vii) Post-Indep	(viii)
8. KAZOKA, W.	1953-58			6vts 9/14	8vts 3/10	10vts 14/15	UFP, SouthC Res Seat (elected)				NR MLC 1959-62 NR Minister of African Agriculture
9. MUKANZA, I.	1958						DP, Luangwa Res Seat (failed)				
10. MULANDO, I.	1953-58			2vts 13/14			UFP, SouthW Spec Seat (failed*)				
11. MUNUNGA, S.M.	1958						Ind. Lusapula Spec Seat (elected)			UNIP, Chiengi 1973 (unopposed)	NR MLC 1959-62 Z.MP 1973-
12. MUSUMBULWA, G.	1949-58			4vts 11/14	6vts 5/10	21vts 6/15	UFP, CBelt Spec Seat (elected)	UFP, Lusaka E Upper roll (elected)			NR MLC 1959-64 NR Minister of African Education
13. NABULYATO, R.	1953-58			18vts 1/14	7vts 4/10		Ind. South W Spec Seat (defeated)				NR MLC 1953-58 Z Nat Assembly (Deputy+) Speaker
14. NG'ANDU, L.H.	1953-58			13vts 4/14			Liberal, Lusapula Nat Roll (failed)				NR MLC 1953-58

Appendix H (continued)

	(i)	(ii) 1948	1951	1954	(iii) 1953	1958	(iv) 1959	(v) 1962	(vi) 1964	(vii) Post-Indep	(viii)
15.NKANZA,W.	1953-58			9vts 6/14		11vts 12/15	Ind., NorthW Spec Seat (elected)	UNIP, Kabompo Nat Roll (elected)	UNIP, Solwezi (unopposed)	UNIP BalovaleE 1968 + 1973 (unopposed)	NR MLC 1959-64 Z.MP 1964-
16.NKOLOMA,M.	1953-56									UNIP,Lusaka R,North 1968 (elected)	Z.MP 1968-73
17.NKONGA,B.	1953-58					22vts 5/15	Liberal, N Res Seat (failed)				
18.PUTA, R.C.	1957-58						Ind., CBelt Spec Seat (defeated)	UNIP, Lwr Kafue Nat Roll (failed*)			
19.SOKOTA,P.	1949-58	14vts 1/6		13vts 3/14	5vts 6/10	45vts 4/15	Ind., CBelt Spec Seat (defeated)			UNIP,Kitwe C.C.Wrd16 1970 (unopposed)	NR MLC 1951-58 K.C.C.councillor 1970-
20.WALUBITA,A.	1949-53	8vts 4/6							ANC, Magoye (elected)	UNIP, Magoye,1968 (defeated)	Z.MP 1964-68
21.YAMBA,D.	1949-58	13vts 2/6			9vts 2/10	56vts 1/15		ANC, Northern Lwr Roll (defeated)			NR MLC 1951-53 Fed MP 1953-61

METHODOLOGY: NOTES ON

1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Acquiring biographical information on this large number and nation-wide range of men - many of whom are now deceased - proved to be a complicated exercise and demanded recourse to a number of methods of enquiry and a variety of sources. This is evident in the accompanying list of the major sources of biographical information on each of the ARC men.

The main, fullest and most accurate source of information was, of course, the former ARC men themselves either directly (through oral interviews) or indirectly (through postal questioneers - see accompanying list). This source provided first-hand information on twenty two of the councillors, while the 'second hand' but generally reliable evidence (on major points) of close relatives, friends or colleagues of ARC members, now deceased, accounted for a further seven biographies or biographical outlines.

A very usefulofficial documentary source of such data were the confidential reports on a number of prominent African political figures in Northern Rhodesia - including among them six of the ARC men - preserved in file N/0118 Box 205 in the National Archives. The official Biographical Notes incorporated into the introductions to the minutes of the meetings of many of the African Provincial Councils during the 1950's were similarly generally reliable having been compiled by local DC's in direct consultation with 'their' local councillors. This type of source had a limitation, however, in not providing information beyond the period of the ARC or ARC membership of the individuals in question. The debates recorded in the APC minutes - and the ARC hansards themselves - were also an invaluable source of 'bits' of biographical detail, as many councillors were wont to introduce into their contributions in debate autobiographical information and anecdotal references to their past and (then) present experiences. These scattered items of information proved useful and, in fact, were invaluable biographical indicators in fully

thirteen cases of members of the First and Second Councils - most of whom are now deceased and/or didn't achieve the prominence of later ARC men to facilitate the search for information on/then at the present time.

No doubt, direct access to local bomas and local interviewees would in many cases have yielded fuller information on these early ARC men - as scattered but useful references to them in DC and PC tour reports showed them to have invariably been prominent leaders at the local level in social and economic as well as political spheres. The limited financial resources at the disposal of the present researcher, however, made such a wideranging tour around Zambia impossible. Postal communication with District Secretaries proved useful in getting the questioneers distributed to men whose probable present whereabouts I had surmised from the (home?) 'constituencies' they had 'represented' on the ARC. Other enquiries, however, or requests for such information directed to (and/or through) the District Secretaries themselves proved rather less successful.

The above sources were supplemented by recourse to the major 'histories of Northern Rhodesia' although these most usually mentioned only the most prominent African political figures - on whom other detailed primary sources were already available anyway. Close scrutiny of the daily newspapers, especially the 'political' and 'business and management' columns yielded much information on the present-day whereabouts, occupations and status of a number of ARC men.

Finally, discussions with and enquiries of all the former ARC men interviewed supplied important supplementary information on other former ARC men and/or confirmed information acquired from other sources. Wherever possible such confirmation of data obtained was sought, and where information was not from a reliable original source, or subsequently substantiated by another source, it has been so indicated(by the symbol '?')in the respective Appendices to and tables in Chapter III.

It must be stressed, however, that considerable as is the biographical data so obtained, it remains incomplete - more especially in the very earliest period of the ARC and in the

post-ARC period down to the present day.

The QUESTIONEER sent out consisted of the following enquiries:

1. Where were you born (town/village and district) and in what year?
2. To what tribe(s) did your father and mother belong?
3. What was your father's occupation during your childhood?
4. Where did you live during most of the years of your childhood?
5. What has been your education (up to the present day)?
   School/Institution Date Course(s) completed
6. What has been your employment (up to the present day)?
   Place Date Position held
7. What has been your membership of any other bodies, groups, associations or organisations, whether official or unofficial, administrative, professional, educational, religious, welfare, social or other?
   Group Place Period Position held (if any)
8. Were you a member/sympathiser of the African National Congress (or its predecessors) or any other political organisation?
   Period of membership/support Position held (if any)
9. Were you at any time after 1958 a member of the NR Legislative Assembly or of the National Assembly of independent Zambia?
   Assembly Period of Membership Constituency
10. Have you ever been outside of Zambia?
   Place Date For What Purpose
11. Is there any other biographical information you might wish to give?

MAJOR SOURCES OF BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MEMBERSHIP OF THE AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL 1946-58.

1.	BYUNDANGONO	-	-
2.	CHEMBE	Francis Bruno	Personal Evidence
3.	CHEMBE	Shadrack N.E.	Personal Evidence
4.	CHIBANZA	S.	Personal Evidence
5.	CHILESHE	Safeli Hannock	Personal Evidence
6.	CHILIMBOYI	Alan	Personal Evidence
7.	CHIMKOKO	Richard A.	L. Chimkoko (brother)
8.	CHINYAMA	Thomas	Biog.Notes APC WP(1950)

9.	CHIPEPA	Joseph	SEC/NAT/103I(8/1)
10.	CHITAMBALA	Maliko	Biog Notes APC WP(1950)
11.	CHITIMPA	Jonas	SEC/NAT/105(1) and (11/1)
12.	CHOBOLA	Manners	Biog Notes APC WP(1950)
13.	CHOLA	Eli	SEC/NAT/75(26/3);ARC5(c.15)
14.	FUNDULU	N.	- -
15.	HABUMBU	Peter	Biog Notes APC SP(1949)
16.	IKELENGE	Chief	Personal Evidence
17.	IMUTULO	Induna	- -
18.	INYAMAWINA	Induna	- -
19.	KABALATA	Jeremiah	Biog Notes APC SP(1949)
20.	KABATI	Induna	- -
21.	KAKUMBI	Mateo	Biog Notes N/0118(23)Box 205
22.	KALEPA	Remus	Personal Evidence
23.	KALIDZA	Jacob	SEC/NAT/96(53);SEC/NAT/105(11/1)
24.	KALONGA	Induna	- -
25.	KANIKI	Knox Andrew	Biog Notes APC WP(1950)
26.	KASOKOLO	Henry	SEC/NAT/102I(49)II(71);ARC3(c131
27.	KATILUNGU	Lawrence Chola	Biog Notes N/0118(14)Box205
28.	KATOWA	Maurice	Personal Evidence
29.	KAZOKA	William	Personal Evidence
30.	KAZUNGA	Abner	Personal Evidence
31.	KOPA	Chief	Personal Evidence
32.	LEASHIMBA	Induna	- -
33.	LITIA	Lewanika Induna	- -
34.	LUKUKU	Induna	- -
35.	MAKALU	Amos	SEC/NAT/105(11/1);113I(155)
36.	MANGWENDE	James	SEC/NAT/102II(71);ARC3(c193)
37.	MBOSHYA	Chief	Personal Evidence
38.	MKANDA	Ledi	SEC/NAT/101(12);ARC3(c.216)
39.	MKUPO	J.	F.B.Chembe (long-time friend)
40.	MUBIANA	Simunja	- -
41.	MUBITANA	Moses	Lily Monze (daughter)
42.	MUKANZA	Peter	Personal Evidence
43.	MUKIMWA	David	Personal Evidence
44.	MULANDO	Isaiah H.C.	Personal Evidence
45.	MUNUNGA	Samson	Personal Evidence
46.	MUSHINDO	Paul Bwembya	Autobiography - I.A.S. Comm 1.(1973)
47.	MUSOKOTWANE	Chief	Biog Notes N/0118(15)Box 205
48.	MUSONDA	Ashton	SEC/NAT/102I(49),II(71)
49.	MUSUMALI	Alexander	APC NP(1956)
50.	MUSUMBULWA	Gabrfel	Biog Notes N/0118(10)Box 205
51.	MUYUMBANA	Mataa	- -
52.	MWASE	Chief	Biog Notes SEC/NAT/101(56)
53.	NABANYAMA	Johane	A.Nabanyama(son)
54.	NABULYATO	Robinson	Biog Notes N/0118(13)Box 205
55.	NALUMANGO	Nelson	S.U. Nalumango (brother)
56.	NAMWELEU	Eliezer	Personal Evidence
57.	NG'ANDU	Lakement	APC NP(1953); B. Nkonga (colleague)
58.	NGULUWE	Gideon	APC EP(1953); B. Nkonga (colleague)

59.	NKANZA	William	Personal Evidence
60.	NKOLOMA	Mathew	Personal Evidence
61.	NKONGA	Bisset	Personal Evidence
62.	PARDON	Joseph	SEC/NAT/103I(8/1)
63.	PIKAMALAZA	Chief	Biog Notes SEC/NAT/101(29)
64.	PUTA	Robinson C.	Zambia Who's Who
65.	SAMPA	Edward	SEC/NAT/102I(18);ARC2(c.5)
66.	SANDASANDA	Jesse	SEC/NAT/106(19/1)&(43/1)
67.	SANGAMBO	Moses	Biog Notes APC WP(1950)-1(1951)
68.	SAYIRI	Chief	Biog Notes APC EP(1954)
69.	SIKAZWE	Philip	SEC/NAT/103I(5/1); Notes APC NP([redacted]953)
70.	SITAMBULI	Alton	SEC/NAT/102I(49)II(71) Notes APC WP(1950)
71.	SIWALE	Donald	Personal Evidence
72.	SOKONI	Crispino	Biog Notes APC NP(1953)
73.	SOKONI	John Malama	Biog Notes APC NP(1953)
74.	SOKOTA	Pascale	Biog Notes N/0118(9) Box 205
75.	SOMATI	Jephas	Biog Notes SEC/NAT/101(82)
76.	TEMBO	Esau	Biog Notes SEC/NAT/104I(106)
77.	WALUBITA	Amos	Biog Notes APC SP(1949); ARC 10(c.152)
78.	YAMBA	Dauti L.	Biog Notes APC WP(1950)
79.	ZILOLE	Mawere	SEC/NAT/101(44/1)

2. ANALYSIS OF ARC DEBATES

In order to render this enormous volume of material more amenable of analysis each and every one of the 379 motions tabled had to be assessed and subject to typological sorting on the basis of its explicit subject matter(s) as well as the direct consequences that would result therefrom and/or its indirect implications. On this basis a number of motions had, perforce, to be listed under more than one topic heading - accounting for the discrepancy of 70 between the number of original motions actually tabled and those so recorded in column(i) of Appendix G. These instances of 'duplication' do not, however, artificially boost figures (in so far as quantitative assessments in such a study have any precise or absolute significance) nor do they distort content assessment per council since the patterns derived from this typology are considered only within and between the various topics of the ARC debates (in which comparative figures <u>are</u> of some assistance and relative significance) and not in relation to a comparative analysis of each ARC session.

On this basis twenty four topics of discussion in the ARC debates emerged, themselves grouped into five main divisions of 'Directly Political', 'Native Authorities', 'Racial Discrimination', 'Social' and 'Economic' content. This is, however, but a general categorisation for convenience of topical analysis and comparason in no way implying a mutually exclusive character to the content of the various divisions and in no way reflecting the full 'political' or 'non-political' nature of the motions themselves. Of course, in a colonial situation there is hardly any aspect of life that is not more or less directly political but, in a study focussed on assessing the politics and actual political perceptions of a group of men, such an 'objective' political character to their discussions would be of little value in assessing their specific perceptions and conceptions. The approach therefore was to treat as political only such motions on which the overall discussion of the debaters as a whole made a direct indictment of or - rather more often - directly implicated the colonialists and/or colonial system in the question. The topical distribution of such political motions is indicated in column(xii) of Appendix G.

The assessment of the overall content of the debates in order to establish the full nature and implications of the subject matter and political character of the proposals carried its own methodological hazards. The major of these was the danger of allowing individual contributions in debate to weigh too heavily in the final overall assessment of the debates' general character and hence the overall memberships position thereon and, by extension, the groups' political character. Where such individual divergences were numerous enough to constitute a trend or 'faction' in the debate they were reflected in the overall assessment of the debate - as was the practice in the body of this study. The probable (or invariable) rhetorical and/or demagogic character to public debates of this nature in a body of this kind was another factor kept constantly in mind. The soundest guarantee, however, of minimising such influences or avoiding such pitfalls lay in basing the assessments of the ARC debates on as wide a range of criteria as possible. Such criteria in a study of this kind would be the

nature of the motion in the context of the time, the nature of the motion in the context of other motions or topics of comparative significance, the nature of the debaters verbal and voting responses thereto and so on.

As regards the voting positions and patterns in the ARC debates, their treatment was simplified by the overwhelming unanimity or strong accord amongst the ARC men on the great majority of the motions confronting them. Because this was not uniform over time and topics, however, the very appearance of sharply divided opinions amidst such strong unanimity suggested some possible significance. Care was therefore taken in the analysis of the ARC debates to include reference to the total memberships' voting position - particularly since in many cases only a small number of the members actually contributed verbally to the debates and in some cases no more than the proposer and seconder spoke. It is the present writers' conviction, in fact, that the details of voting patterns are themselves of but limited value without a wider range of supplementary information - often in itself impossible of ascertainment or verification - such as the voters' self-expressed reasons and actual motivations in taking particular positions, and factors and forces internal and external to the group/body under study. Nonetheless, to guard against any possible assertion that the conclusions derived from the analysis in Chapter Four of this study did not necessarily reflect the political positions of 'all' the ARC men, it was considered necessary to include references to all divergences of opinion and voting where they occurred and to subject the 'conflict debates' as such to close scrutiny (in TABLES XVIII and XX) to forestall such arguments.

Thus the methodology employed in analysing the ARC's policies, politics and perceptions was to reach a general conclusion about the character and implications of each motion from its specific wording, in conjunction with the fuller elaboration thereon in debate; and then to examine it in terms of other motions of the same genre tabled over the entire period of the ARC's life and in the general context of the political situation in Northern Rhodesia at the time in question.

3. ORAL EVIDENCE

First hand testimony of former ARC members - employed in this study for its own intrinsic value and interest and as comparative and/or confirming evidence of other primary sources, official and non-official - was acquired directly through personal interviews and indirectly by means of postal questioneers. The latter took the form of the succession of questions listed below. These questions were the basis also of the oral interviews - although that medium allowed for many supplementary questions to be added arising from the interviewees responses.

In the great majority of cases the responses made and information provided by the interviewees, directly and indirectly, were in strong accord, and where divergences of opinion did appear effort has been made in the body of this study to indicate this.

The QUESTIONEER sent out consisted of the following queries:

1. How did you become a member of the ( ) Provincial Council? By election or nomination and by whom?
2. How long were you a member of your provincial council before you were elected to the African Representative Council?
3. Why did you want or agree to become a member of the Provincial Council and the ARC?
4. Did the Provincial Commissioner allow the Provincial councillors full freedom to decide the items on the agenda and to speak freely and fully on all motions? If not, how did he exert his influence and could you give any examples?
5. Who decided which Provincial Council motions should be sent up to the ARC for discussion? Was it the Provincial Commissioner, or the Councillors, or both in consultation?
6. Did the Chairman/President of the ARC, the Secretary for 'Native' Affairs or other officials try, outside of debates, directly or indirectly, to influence the ARC members as to <u>what</u> they should debate and <u>how</u> they should speak? Could you please give examples where possible.
7. Did all members of the ARC as far as you can tell express themselves fully, frankly and without fear in debates? If not,

which kind of members did not and why?

8. Was there much lobbying amongst members of the ARC before or outside debates on what should be said, and by whom, and how members should vote? Could you give any examples?

9. Were there ever any strong differences or divisions, inside or outside debates, between ARC members, for example either between
   a) chiefs and commoners?
   b) rural and urban delegates?
   c) Congress and non-Congress members?

   If so could you give any examples?

10. About what proportion, in your estimation, of the ARC were Congress members or sympathisers? What was their relationship with and effect upon the rest of the members if any?

11. Were there ever direct discussions or consultations between you as a member of the ARC and the ANC leadership outside the ARC? Could you give details of the place, date and subject of discussions?

12. Can you describe in greater detail the nature of the relationship between the African Representative Council and the African National Congress?

13. What was the attitude of the general public in your area towards the ARC in its early years? Did the people's attitude change over time? If so how and why?

14. Why do you think the colonial government set up the 'African Councils'(urban advisory councils, 'native' authority councils, provincial councils and African Representative Council)? What were their intentions in so doing? Do you think that they were successful?

15. Do you think the ARC contributed positively towards the struggle for political power for Africans in Northern Rhodesia and eventual independence for Zambia? Or do you think it had a negative effect? Could you explain how and why?

16. Please add anything else you may wish on the African Representative Council.

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_____.	1948	SEC/NAT/114
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Int 1 - Francis B. Chembe MP. Member of the ARC, 1953-57, at present Member of the National Assembly for Old Mkushi; interviewed at National Assembly 24/1/74 and 1/2/74.

Int 2 - Alan D. Chilimboyi MP. Member of the CP APC, 1953-58 and the ARC, 1957-58, at present Member of the National Assembly for Mumbwa; interviewed at National Assembly 24/1/74.

Int 3 - Peter Mukanza. Member of the Ndola UAC and WP APC, 1953-58 and the ARC, 1958, at present on the editorial staff of ZANA; interviewed at his Lusaka Residence, 29/1/74.

Int 4 - The Hon. William Nkanza MP. Member of the ARC, 1953-58, at present Cabinet Minister for the Eastern Province, interviewed at the National Assembly 30/1/74.

Int 5 - Mathew D. Nkoloma. Member of the ARC, 1953-56, former Minister of State in Rural Development and at present Managing Director of the parastatal Dairy Produce Board; interviewed at his Lusaka Residence 31/1/74.

Int 6 - Samson M. Mununga MP. Member of the NP APC, 1953-58 and the ARC, 1958, at present Member of the National Assembly for Chiengi, interviewed at National Assembly 1/2/74.

Int 7 - Chief Mapanza, formerly known as Maurice Katowa. Member of the SP APC, 1953-58 and ARC, 1957-58; former Zambian Ambassador to Cairo and Addis Ababa, at present Member of the Public Service Commission; interviewed at the Secretariat, Lusaka 13/2/74.

Int 8 - The Hon. Sikota Wina. Prominent Zambian journalist in the mid 1950's, former Minister of Information, at present Member of the Central Committee of UNIP; interviewed at UNIP headquarters 15/2/74.

Int 9 - The Hon. Mungoni Liso. Longtime activist and leader of the African National Congress and Vice President at the time of the ANC disbandment in 1973, at present Member of the UNIP Central Committee; interviewed at UNIP headquarters 20/2/74.

Int 10- Harry Nkumbula MP. President of the African National Congress, 1951-73, at present Member of the National

*2 in the present author's personal collection; Int=interview.

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Int 11- Bisset B. Nkonga. Member of the ARC, 1953-58, at present Under Secretary in the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister; interviewed at the Secretariat, Lusaka 17/7/74.

Int 12- Abner Kazunga. Member of the WP APC, 1949-53 and the ARC, 1949-53, at present retired, father of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education; interviewed at his farm outside Lusaka 25/11/74.

Int 13- Simon Zukas. Prominent political figure close to the ANC during the 1950's, at present a civil engineer and director of various parastatal bodies; interviewed at his Lusaka Residence 21/1/75.

Int 14- Safeli H. Chileshe. Member of the ARC, 1949-58 and Member of LegCo, 1953-58, first African Mayor of Lusaka and prominent Alderman to present day, at present successful commercial farmer and businessman and director of various corporations; interviewed at his Lusaka Residence 31/1/75.

II. INTERVIEWS BY QUESTIONEER*3

Q 1 - S.N.E.Chembe. Member of the ARC, 1953-58, former Managing Director of the Cold Storage Board of Zambia, at present a businessman in Chipata.

Q 2 - S. Chibanza. Member of the ARC, 1953-58, former Manager of the Credit Organisation of Zambia in the North Western Province, at present in retirement in Solwezi.

Q 3 - Lawrentino Chimkoko. Brother to Richard Chimkoko Member of the ARC, 1946-57, now deceased; at present Court President of Luembe Local Court, Petauke District.

Q 4 - Chief Ikelenge. Member of the ARC, 1946-58, at present resident at his village, Melenge near Mwinilunga.

Q 5 - Remus Kalepa. Member of the ARC, 1946-48 and the NWP APC, 1949-58, at present a businessman at Solwezi, resident at Kalepa's village.

Q 6 - William Kazoka. Member of the ARC, 1953-58, former UFP Minister for African Agriculture in Northern Rhodesia, 1959-62, at present a commercial farmer near Pemba.

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*3 in the present author's personal collection; Q=questioneer

Q 7 - Chief Kopa. Member of the ARC, 1946-58, at present Senior Chief Kopa, Mpika District.

Q 8 - Chief Mboshya. Member of the ARC, 1949-53, at present Chief Mboshya, Kabwe District.

Q 9 - The Hon Lily Monze. Minister of State in the Ministry of Finance, daughter to Moses Mubitana, Member of the ARC, 1946-47, now deceased.

Q 10 - David Mukimwa. Member of the ARC, 1953-58, at present in retirement in Kasempa District.

Q 11 - Gideon Mutale. Director of the National Housing Board, father-in-law to Henry Kasokolo, Member of the ARC, 1946-48 and Member of LegCo, 1948-51.

Q 12 - I.C.H. Mulando. Member of the ARC, 1953-58, at present Secretary to the Mumbwa Rural Council.

Q 13 - A. Nabanyama. Executive Officer in the Department of Information, son to Johane Nabanyama, Member of the ARC, 1946-48.

Q 14 - S.U. Nalumango. San Likolo Local Court Limulunga, brother to Nelson Nalumango, Member of the ARC, 1946-52 and Member of LegCo, 1948-51, now deceased.

Q 15 - E. Namweleu. Member of the ARC, 1946-58, at present in retirement in Mporokoso District.

Q 16 - Donald Siwale. Member of the ARC, 1946-58, at present in retirement at his farm, Isunda Estate, Nakonde.

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*4 in the personal collection of Mr. Fergus MacPherson to whom I am most indebted for this access to otherwise inaccessible ANC material.

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*5 in the personal collection of the present author.
*6 in the personal collection of the present author.
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FOOTNOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

used in footnotes

AAAR	-	"African Affairs Annual Report"
Abs	-	abstention (in ARC voting)
Act	-	Acting
APC mins	-	African Provincial Council Minutes
ARC 3(1948)	-	Volume Three of "ARC Proceedings"
ASR	-	"African Social Research"
c.	-	Column in LegCo or ARC hansards
CAP	-	Central African Post
Chap	-	Chapter
Circ Min	-	Circular Minute
C.O.	-	Colonial Office
Conf	-	Confidential
Cong	-	Congress (African National)
C.S.	-	Chief Secretary
D.C.	-	District Commissioner
deleg	-	delegation
Dist Circ	-	District Circular
D.O.	-	District Officer
FAS	-	"Federation of African Societies"
Gov	-	Governor
IAS	-	Institute of African Studies (Lusaka)
Int	-	Interview
JAA	-	"Journal of African Administration"
mins	-	minutes
NA	-	Native Authorities
NRAC	-	Northern Rhodesia African Congress
NP	-	Northern Province
PC(WP)	-	Provincial Commissioner (Western Province)
P. PP	-	page pages
para	-	paragraph
prop	-	proposed by (ARC motions)
Q	-	Questioneer
Quart Conf News.	-	Quarterly Confidential Newsletter
RLI	-	Rhodesia-Livingstone Institute
Sec	-	seconded by (ARC motions)
S.G.	-	Secretary General
SNA	-	Secretary for Native Affairs
S.S.	-	Secretary of State for the Colonies
unan	-	unanimous position (by councillors on ARC motions)

CHAPTER ONE

1. SEC/NAT/92(12) 4/3/40, Maybin Memorandum.

2. Lord Hailey. "An African Survey Revised 1956" (1957), p. 201-204.

3. starting with the 1929, 'Native Authority Ordinance'.

4. exemplified in the 1936 re-enactment of the same.

5. SEC/NAT/92 (12) 4/3/40, Maybin Memo. (p.14.)

6. ibid (9) ?/1/40, SNA draft memorandum (p.5).

7. SEC/NAT/75 (2) 8/6/38, PC(WP). Provincial Circular to DC's (2)
"There are at present in existence councils of Elders in certain locations whose function is to keep the compound manager or the Location Authority in touch with the Natives of the area, and I am aware that the DC's frequently make use of these organisations...But it is felt in many cases that the DC has only indirect contact with these bodies whereas direct contact with some representative body of natives is desirable".

8. Russell Commission Report, 1935.

9. G.C.R. Clay "African Urban Advisory Councils on the Copperbelt of N.R." in JAA I(1), 1/49.

10. Lord Hailey "Native Administration in the British African Territories" Part II (1950), p. 83-84.

11. SEC/NAT/92 (29) 19/11/1940, Gov to C.S.

12. ibid (44) Dec 1940, SS. to Gov NR. - informed that in fact Creech Jones had agreed to withdraw his proposed Question on receiving a confidential personal communication from the SS. explaining the situation.

13. ibid (30) 19/11/40, Gov NR. to SS.

14. ibid.

15. Russell Commission Report, 1935.

16. Hansard 39 (c.66) 12/3/41, Gore-Browne.

17. ibid (c.111), C.S.

18. SEC/NAT/92 (70A) 15/8/41, DC's (WP) Conference Mins
"The question was raised whether the type of

representation now to be provided for the Copperbelt in the form of Advisory Councils should be extended to cover the whole country, leading eventually to one body which would nominate the member to represent native interests on the Legislative Council and make recommendations on economic and administrative matters."

19. ibid.

20. SEC/NAT/91 (6) 5-11/10/43, PC's Conference Mins, Item 14. Gore-Browne is reported as saying that "when he became nominated Legislative Council Representative for Native Interests five years ago, the then Governor Sir Hubert Young had considered that he should merely speak in LegCo giving his own opinion as to what was in the best interests of the Native. He was not in agreement with this opinion and thought that he should try to pepresent what Africans themselves actually thought and felt. He had taken every opportunity of holding meetings with Africans..."

21. ibid.

22. see "Proceedings of the ARC "for the frequency and nature of the interventions therein by Gore-Browne, more especially ARC 3 (1948) C.45-49 on his "Responsible Government" proposal.

23. Hansard 43 (c.153) 17/9/42, Gore-Browne.

24. SEC/NAT/92 (24) 13/11/40, Gore-Browne to SNA
"A native speaker...volunteered a suggestion for a council of sons of chiefs who were to be specially educated and who were to select a representative to assist the nominated member on LegCo. Other speakers ...while endorsing this idea (felt that) the native council should be open to any properly qualified African".

25. ibid. Gore-Browne proposed motion for LegCo.

26. ibid (24-35) exchanges between Gore-Browne, SNA, C.S. and Gov of N.R. on the subject.

27. Hansard 39 (c.66) 12/3/41. Gore-Browne.

28. ibid.

29. ibid.

30. unfortunately the inaccessibility of the Gore-Browne papers makes this impossible of confirmation, but indirect evidence, such as Gore-Browne's close contact with a wide variety of Africans, and his frequent meetings even with Welfare Societies

(see SEC/NAT/91 (5.17.47 etc. for official correspondence - and complaints - on the subject) together with his frequent warnings about the growing political consciousness of the Africans, lends strong support to such a conclusion; see also R. Rotberg "Rise of Nationalism...", 1965 (pp. 202-203) for his assertion of Gore-Browne's awareness and warnings of this danger.

31. R. Rotberg "Rise...",1965. (p. 202-203); see also R. Hall, "Zambia", 1965 (p. 122-123).

32. Hansard 43 (c.9) 12/9/42. Gov's address to LegCo.

33. Hansard 43 (c.148) 17/9/42. Gore-Browne Proposer, T.Page (Member for the Eastern Electoral Area) Seconder.

34. ibid (c.149).

35. ibid.

36. ibid (c.157) SNA Sandford
(It is necessary) "not merely to know Native views on the actual management of affairs in the Compound. but it is necessary that Government and the Member representing Natives should know what industrial Natives think about the affairs of the whole of the industrial population of the area."

37. ibid (c.164) C.S.'s expression of the Government's position.

38. ibid (c.155-156) see opinions of Welensky and Major McKee (Member for the Midlands Electoral Area).

39. ibid (c.151) Gore-Browne.

40. as they were originally called until, in 1944, see Hansard 48 (c.291) August, 1944, Gore-Browne raised the question in LegCo whether their name should not, in fact be 'Provincial Councils'; with which the SNA agreed.

41. as the Official members had rqquired and made a condition of their support for the proposal; see C.S. in Hansard 43 (c.164).

42. P.C.'s Conference Mins Nov, 1942, Item I (p.8-9)

43. The eight Provincial Councils (excluding that of the Barotseland Protectorate which was of a different order altogether) were launched as follows:

Western Province	1943	December 20th
Central Province	1943	December 29th
Eastern Province	1943	December ?
Northern Province (Central Areas)	1944	May 19th
Northern Province (Northern Areas)	1944	May 22nd

Northern Province (Western Areas) 1944 May 23-24th
Southern Province 1944 May 30th
Kaonde-Lunda Province 1944 September 29-30th.

44. see Chapter Two (p.33).

45. SEC/NAT/104I(1) May, 1944, SNA to APC (SP).

46. SEC/NAT/105(11/1) Dec, 1944, PC to APS(CP).

47. see SEC/NAT/92 for frequent references to Questions being tabled in House of Commons by Labour MP's on present and future plans for the advance of political participation of the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and 'East' Africa in general.

48. Administrative Conference of PC's, Oct, 1944, Gov's Address.

49. see Hansard 49 (c.190-345) Jan, 1945. Debate on Constitutional Development.

50. see SEC/NAT/113 I (6-35) the responses of administration local officials to SNA's suggestion to all PC's in Dist Circ 15.

51. SEC/NAT/113 I(4) 3/5/45 Dist Circ 15.

52. ibid. (para 15)

53. ibid (11) 29/5/45. C.S. to Gov referred to Gore-Browne's sense of and reasons for haste.

54. SEC/NAT/109 I(13) 5/6/45, SNA Quart Conf News.

55. SEC/NAT/113 I(11), May, 1945, C.S. to Gov. - after having toyed with such names as Central African Council, Northern Rhodesia African Council, Northern Rhodesia Native Council, they eventually settled on African Representative Council.

56. SEC/NAT/113 I(151-200), and almost the whole of file SEC/NAT/113 II.

57. After speaking vaguely in early 1945, in terms of a "dress rehearsal" and "trial meeting" of the central council the next year (see C.S. in SEC/NAT,113 I(11) and (37) respectively), the ARC itself was officially and fully launched in 1946; see also in Hansard 58 (c.176) 26/9/47, Gore-Browne's observation that

> "...with the rest of Africa as it is, it was a step which could not safely have been delayed..."

58. SEC/NAT/109 I(32) 3/4/47, SNA Quart Conf News. (p.3).

59. ibid.

60. ibid. for illustration of colonialist reluctance to offend the inoffensive Federation.

61. ibid (59) 17/7/48.

62. R. Rotberg "Rise...", 1965 (p.180) for his interpretation of these channels merely as a bureaucratic device into which to "direct the current of African grievances."

63. see Hansard 54 (c.8-9) 6-7/5/46, for T.Page's (Member for Eastern Electoral Area) long exposition on free speech as a "safety valve" and his comparison of the platform of the ARC with Hyde Park Corner.

64. R. Hall "Zambia", 1965.(p.121) comments on this intention that
> "instead of the chiefs and other rural representatives paternally guiding urban members of the councils the former were politically activated by the latter."

65. see, for example, such comments as those in SEC/NAT/113 I(103) 30/1/46 S.S. to Gov NR
> "The success of the system of representation which is now being built up in NorthernRhodesia depends to a large degree on the extent to which these two elements of the population can be combined".

SEC/NAT/103 II(13) 8/4/47 SNA to APC(NP-W Areas) recorded as saying that
> "it was good to see the chiefs and progressive educated Africans sitting together giving advice to Government..."

AAAR 1949 (p.71) PC report on the S.Province observed that
> "there is no doubt that these (African Provincial) Councils are serving a most useful purpose in bringing together town and country and in maintaining contact which would otherwise be ommitted."

66. SEC/NAT/109 I(23) 4/6/46 SNA Quart Conf News. (p.5)

67. see Chapter Two (p.36)

68. but not to the total exclusion of the propaganda level; see, for example, ARC 3(1948) c.310, SNA exhortation to chiefs and urban representatives to cooperate, etc...

69. And the importance of this aspect of the structuring of the African Councils system is testified to further by the fact that the linkage of the <u>administrative</u> Native Authority Councils to the '<u>political representation</u>'councils pyramid was sustained despite the recommendations of the 1951 Colonial Office Summer School on African Administration - see Africa Paper 1178, Report on the Fourth Summer School on African Administration, Group I Report para 9 (p.42) - and despite the consequent recommendation by the Gov of NR - see N/0088 III

(247) 29/5/52, Circ Min to all PC's that the link between the Native Authorities and the APC's be severed; and the subsequent debate thereon, see loc cit (248-251).

70. in view of their later tactic of trying to divorce the leaders from the led (see pp 18-19).

71. SEC/NAT/102 II(67) 10/7/47, C.S. Farewell Speech to APC(WP).

72. Administrative Conference of PC's, Oct, 1944, minutes, Gov's Address

> "The educated African must be encouraged and given fair treatment to accord with his intellectual attainments but he must recognise that those attainments must be used to further the interests of the Africans as a whole".

see also ARC 1 (1946) (c 2-3) S.S. message to the ARC
see also SEC/NAT/105(27) 31/7/45, SNA to APC(CP) (p.33)

> "The chosen members (from the APC to the ARC) should not only speak for the Native Authorities but for the people as well, and in the same way not only for the townspeople and educated Africans lving in the compounds but for all the Africans..."

73. see footnote (71).

74. see for example AdministrativeConference of PC's 1944 Mins Gov's Address.

75. and even to influence their views on specific issues; see for example the SNA's advice to the PC's - SEC/NAT/109II(27) 7/1/47, SNA Quart Conf News. (p.7) to "intensify" their "propaganda" through the APC's and the ARC on the questions of influx control and rural repatriation.

76. such as socio-psychological campaigns, economic inducements, and security measures - lest the present focus on one device employed by the colonialists lead the reader to conclude that the present writer is unaware of the great number and variety of means employed by the colonialists to achieve their ends.

77. not uninfluenced by the conclusions reached by the 1947 Colonial Office Summer School on African Administration on "African Local Government", Africa Paper No 1173 - and confirmed by the African Governor's Conference of 1947 November, AGC No 12 (Conf).

78. SEC/NAT/353 (90/1) Record of the Meeting 9-13/7/48 of the Congress of Northern Rhodesia African Societies.

79. see ARC 3(1948) c. 308 - but this is not to say there was a direct cause - and - effect relationship between these two facts.

80. Sec/NAT/95 (390) 8/12/48 SNA Circ Min (N) NAT/A/57.

81. ibid (para 1)

82. ibid (para 3)

83. see Secretary of State's Confidential Despatch No 31 of 24/2/47, and the doubts expressed by another top Colonial Office official on the advisability of the use of 'democratic' rather than 'representative' therein - at the 1948 Conference of African LegCo Delegates in London, Africa Paper No 1176 (p.33)

84. SEC/NAT/95 (390) 8/12/48 SNA Circ Min (para 1)

85. ibid "In some towns in may be desirable to arrange for elections by wards, in others by tribe and in others by occupation...There is no objection to local bodies such as welfare societies electing members of the Advisory Councils..."

86. for the degree of success they achieved in these 'elections' see Chapter Two (p.39) and Chapter Three (p.66).

87. not merely the status of the ARC in itself but its importance as the avenue of access to LegCo membership.

88. SEC/NAT/353 (139) 28/12/48 SNA Meeting with Congress Delegation, Minutes Item 3 (and see Chapter Five footnote 26).

89. of course, the infamous Victoria Falls Conferences had started earlier, but the Federation campaign only really gathered impetus from 1950.

90. referring to the three African Congresses of Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia; in the latter of which cases the name of that body had by now become "African National Congress".

91. see Chapter Five (p.151.).

92. Hansard 73 (c.78) 2/7/52 Dauti Yamba averred that the ARC "should die (its) natural death".

93. for they were not enabled or allowed a formal debate on the subject until 1951 (see p. 16).

94. regarding, and wider than, the Federation issue as such.

95. N/0088 Vols I to III Sept 1949 - May 1952.

96. although a very limited one had existed, for the ARC itself, at any rate, since 1946 - see ARC 1(1946).

97. Hansard 64 (c.431-2) 6/7/49 Gore-Browne suggestion
ibid (c.502) SNA reply in agreement.

98. Hansard 66(c.376) 25/11/49 Gore-Browne commended the APC's and ARC for their restraint in not discussing the Federal Proposals, as officially advised, until these were finalised and published.

99. SEC/NAT/109 II (no number) 30/6/50, SNA Quart Conf News. (p.4)
"I would be grateful if DC's would warn councillors to be temperate in their speeches, before they attend meetings".

100. ibid (no number) 31/12/50 SNA Quart Conf News. (p.2)

101. AAAR 1950 Foreward by SNA (P.3).

102. Hansard 66 (c.420) 28/11/49 Welensky suggested that, in so far as African opinion on Federation should be consulted, it should be done
"through the machinery we have been trying to create here, that is to say the machinery of the ARC, of the Provincial Councils and the other (sic) Native Authorities that have been created."

103. Hansard 68(c.50-51) 2/6/50 Welensky
"I wonder if it would not be more advisable for the Africans to develop along political lines in a legislature more suitable to themselves..." (and)
ibid (c.370) 19/6/50
"I am of the opinion that the ARC should be developed and extended. It offers the nucleus of the idea I am trying to put forward...(of) an African legislature"
and see also Hansard 73 (c.53) 1/7/52, Welensky
"Is it the intention of Her Majesty's Government to try and develop some sort of parallel development (sic)...If the Government of the UK is of the opinion that there should be some separate method of political development of the LegCo idea, then let them tell us. If they intend to follow a policy of apartheid..."

104. which had in fact been implicit in (the settlers' perception or interpretation of) the system ever since the beginning (see page 6).

105. although they didn't immediately reject it 'out of hand'. See Hansard 68 (c.533) Act. C.S. Thornton.

106. This is not to say that they were totally agreed on that strategy; that there were not some (or many) who were not inclined towards the South African type of model for 'African political representation'; or that such suggestions would not have been considered in a different immediate political context and/or a slightly different balance of population, and (potential) political power in Northern Rhodesia.

107. Hansard 72 (c.905) 19/12/51, Welensky.

108. ibid 73 (c.53) 1/7/52, Welensky and
ibid 79 (c.41) 11/11/53 Welensky.

109. It is worth noting, at this point, that some Africans - for rather different reasons - were also in this period suggesting the abolition of the ARC; - see Chapter Five (p.152).

110. see footnote (9).

111. N/0088 I(36A) 3/1/50, Gore-Browne to SNA.

112. see also Hansard 68 (c.581) 7/6/50, Gore-Browne; and see N/0088 II (171) 12/2/51, Gore-Browne in Meeting of the African Councils' Constitutional Review Committee.

113. N/0088 I (168) 13/2/51, Moffat to SNA
"In view of the present agitation by the African Congress, I consider it of the very greatest importance that the election rules for these Urban Advisory Councils should be satisfactorily determined at the earliest possible date."

114. N/0088 III(254) 10/7/52, SNA to Gov referred to a suggestion made by Nightingale, in December, 1950, for the introduction of a directly elected element into the ARC; which was discussed by ExCo on 29/12/50 and withdrawn by the author for the time being.

115. see Hansard 73 (c.420) 11/7/52, Nightingale raising once again a scheme for the enlargement of the ARC by "the addition of a popularly elected element..." (which proposal he published in full in Mutende 455 (p.1) 30/9/52); for more detail on his proposal see Chapter V (p. 153)

116. N/0088 III(247) 29/5/52, SNA Circ Min.

117. so-called; because it was never total; amongst other things excluding the rural areas entirely - see Chapter Two (p.36).

118. N/0088 I(23/1) 10/9/49, Minutes of the Meeting of the African Councils Constitutional Review Committee (p.3).

119. according to R.Rotberg "Rise..." 1965 (p.243), quoting N/001/2/5, Vivian Fox Strangeways of the Nyasaland Government to SNA Bush of NR, 6/10/52, by mutual agreement between the two governments.

120. N/0088 III(247) 29/5/52, SNA Circ Min informing all PC's that
"His Excellency, has now directed that further consideration (of the draft African councils' constitutions) should be deferred for the present."

121. Hansard 72 (c.905) 19/12/51, Welensky
"...it has to be said to the Africans that representative democracy does not mean their representatives are merely instructed to say 'Yes' or 'No'. If you become a leader in politics generally in British states you are expected to recognise standards and try to lead the people you represent... That, Sir, is what democracy stands for; we are not trying to run a state in which one runs between one's constituents and the central assembly. We have to be prepared to accept a greater degree of responsibility."

122. meaning consultation of the lower councils, at any rate; which they had always formerly been instructed todo; see for example - SEC/NAT/105(53) 20/4/48, PC to APC(CP); and
SEC/NAT/113 II(252) 15/12/48, SNA meeting with all representatives of Africans in LegCo, resolved that
"We must be on our guard against stampeding these (Arc) councils to express views before they have consulted those they represent."
probably on the assumption that general African public opinion would be lagging far behind that of the 'politically-minded' minority and act as a moderating influence upon them.

123. see, for example, Hansard 68 (c.217) 2/6/50, Welensky
"I feel that the Hon. Gentlemen who sit here (the African MLC's) are here as leaders more than representatives and it is their duty, as far as they can possibly carry it out, to try and decide what is in the best interests of the Africans at this stage..."

124. see for example the SNA instructions to all PC's in SEC/NAT/109 II (no numbers) Dec 1950 and June 1951 Quart Conf News. that they must try to dispell African suspicions of the Government, and, then, to note that Africans reactions to the Federation Report would depend on how it was presented to the APC's and UAC's.

125. SEC/NAT/109 II (no number)27/12/51, SNA Quart Conf News. (p.5)
"At a private meeting Mr. Stubbs and I had with the ARC we emphasised the necessity of members shouldering their responsibilities and not acting as mere mouthpieces of their constituents. I know that PC's and DC's already are trying to impress upon Africans this necessity..."
N/0088 III(234) 23/4/52 R.S. Hudson (by then of the Africa Bureau of the Colonial Office) to SNA
"Africans in Northern Rhodesia, as elsewhere, have not yet learned to be 'representative' as MPs are representative. When an MP has been elected he regards himself as completely free to express his own views on any matter before parliament irrespective of the views of his constituents.."

ARC 10(1953) c.6-7 Gov's Address to the ARC
"The first part of your work is also very important but you no doubt realise that true leadership consists not merely in submitting the views of your people to the Government but also in trying to mould those views into a form that represents the bests interests of the Africans."

126. see Richard Hall "Zambia", 1965 (p.156) and D.C. Mulford "The Politics of Independence", 1967 (p.34) for the kind of back-stage manoeuvering the colonialists resorted to in order to secure ARC support for 'partnership' the wedge opening the door to Federation.

127. see footnote (125) - especially remarkable in the contrasting light of the earlier colonialists instructions to the ARC always to follow the people's lead.

128. Mutende (455) 30/9/52 front page.

129. see ARC, 4,5,7,8,9,10,16, and 17 for ARC motions rejecting and condemning Federation; see also Chapter IV (p.102).

130. security...military...economic...socio-psychological, etc. but falling outside the scope of the present study.

131. see Chapter V. (p. 154).

132. see, for example, The African Eagle 1953 Vol I. No's 5 (3rd Feb), 19 (12th May) and 27 (14th July).

133. see footnote (119).

134. see Gore-Browne's proposals as of footnotes (110) and (111) above and N/0088 II (149) 10/1/51, SNA(NR) to SNA Nyasaland.

135. see Appendix A; and Chapter Two (pp 54-55).

136. These were as follows: not only two seats in the Federal Assembly; four (now) in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council; and various much-sought-after positions on delegations going overseas, generally for constitutional consultations; but also positions on a variety of local government African Affairs Committees, as well as African Educational and other committees incorporating a nominal representation of (nominated) Africans.

137. see Chapter Five (p.159).

138. although they were, of course, still meeting annually see ARC 12(1954) 13 (1955) 14 (1956).

139. Hansard 81 (c.638) 29/7/54, Lakement H. Ng'andu
"I must make it clear that my reference to the ARC does

not necessarily mean that arrangements under which it selects African representatives to this Council are acceptable to the African people as a whole. We have always condemned that arrangement and now feel that the ARC has outlived its usefulness and must be replaced by something else."

140. see, for example, the notable diminution of comment on the ARC in the government subsidised successor to 'Mutende' the 'African Eagle', during 1954 and 1955; similarly 'The Central African Post' for the same period.

141. One exception being the comment by John Moffat (in passing) in Hansard 81(c.632) 29/7/54, who referred to the ARC method of selecting African MLC'S as being "out of date".

142. which is not to imply it was not of still general political use and, even more, not still useful as a source of 'information and a channel of communication of colonial administration projects and plans; see ARC proceedings during these years.

143. see Chapter Five (footnotes 139 and 140).

144. Hansard 87(c.413) 13/7/56, John Gaunt MLC (Broken Hill)

145. ibid (c.513) 18/7/56, Rendall MLC (Ndola)
ibid (c.724) 24/7/56, Derby MLC (Livingstone)
ibid (c.721) 24/7/56, Sergeant MLC (Lusaka area)

146. ibid (c.541) 18/7/56, Watmore MLC (Northern Electoral Area)
ibid (c.728) Act. CS Unsworth
ibid (c.754-5) Franklin (nom 'Af.Rep')
"I spent a certain ammount of time explaining to these Congress leaders how a political party works. It works through its representatives in the established bodies Legislative Council, municipalities, African Urban Advisory Councils and so on."
ibid (c.765) 18/7/56, Roberts (Executive Council) Member for Lands and Local Government).

147. ibid (c.773-4) 18/7/56, SNA Stubbs
"I would point out that in the Urban Advisory Councils in particular the elections have been influenced very considerably by the ANC...The Hon. Member Mr. Ng'andu referred to them (African Councils) as Government organisations. Well, Sir, they are only Government organisations to the extent that they are recognised by Government...and set up by Government but so is the legislature and Government has not nominated the members of these (African) councils...Any political party must work through such bodies."

148. ibid (c.413) 13/7/56 Gaunt.

149. see for example N/0088 I(56A) 3/1/50, Gore-Browne; and SEC/NAT/109II(no number) 31/12/50, SNA Quart Conf News. (p.3)
AAAR 1952 (p.44) PC(CP) J.P. Murray
AAAR 1954 (p18) PC(WP) G.E. Faye Smith reported one DC as saying that
"The lack of executive and financial responsibilities is exasperating to the (UAC) members and District Officers alike" and concluded, himself, that "It is quite clear that continued attempts to find a means to give these councils more responsibilities must be made."
ibid (p.88) PC(SP) Gervas Clay
"It is to be hoped that before long these (UA) Councils will be given some administrative and financial responsibilities."

150. Hansard 87(c.413) 13/7/56 Gaunt MLC (Midlands Area)
ibid (c.721) 24/7/56 Sergeant MLC (Lusaka Area)

151. Hansard 91 (c.488) 16/7/57 C.S.

152. they were supposed to meet monthly and, although few actually did consistently, they certainly met more often than the APC's or the ARC - officially once a year; this despite R. Hall's "Zambia", 1965 (p.121) assertion that the UAC's "died out after 1954!"

153. not merely because they met locally, physically closer to the people, but because there was actually far more reporting during this period on the UAC's in the press than on the ARC; see The African Eagle (1954-1956) and Central African Post (1954-1956).

154. Hansard 84 (c.629) Aug 1955, Robinson Nabulyato MLC tabled a formal Question: why there was no direct African representation on all Municipal Councils.
Hansard 85 (c.374) 9/12/55, S. Chileshe, R. Nabulyato proposed and seconded respectively a Motion that Africans should have direct representation on all Municipal Councils.

155. also, possibly, because it was considered a more local and accessible issue.

156. "Commission appointed to examine ways and means by which Africans resident in Municipal and Township areas should be enabled to take an appropriate part in the administration of those areas" (Brown Commission).

157. ibid. Report 1957.

158. the other half ofthe African members were tobe nominated; and the other half of the total African Affairs Committee membership was to be European!

159. this, in brief, residing in the separate arrangements for 'racial' groups.

160. and the apartheid similarities, and potential, of the proposed 'new' councils were, in fact, perceived immediately by the African members of the Legislative Council. See Hansard 91 (c.1477) 7/8/57, P. Sokota MLC, ibid (c.1482) S.H. Chileshe MLC, ibid (c.1493) H.Franklin (Member for Education and Social Services) similar observations.

161. AAR 1957 (p.3) PC Report on the Central Province J.P. Murray
> "With the development in local government representation which will follow the implementation of the Brown Report however, it may well be that some change in the functions and constitutions of these (Urban Advisory) Councils may become necessary..."

showing an initial doubt - and degree of confusion - about their status thenceforth.

162. Hansard 91 (c.9) 17/6/57, Gov's Address to LegCo in which he announced that the Northern Rhodesia African Federal MP's
> "would continue to be elected as at present by <u>such bodies</u> as the Governor may designate as bodies representative of Africans" (emphasis added).

163. see ARC 15 (1956) c. 120-121 F.B. Chembe.

164. Hansard 92 (c.912) 28/11/57, Sergeant MLC (Lusaka Area)
> "I am going to throw a suggestion over to Government and that is disband the ARC which to me is just another Congress...according to Congress the ARC is Congress. Instead of Congress, Sir, I would say let us call the chiefs together and have a council of chiefs."

165. see <u>The African Eagle</u> VI (40) 7/10/1958 report on the Gov's announcement in Legco on 3rd October, 1958.

166. Such as the increase in the number, but not in the indirect form of 'election', of the African members of the Legislative Council from two (1948) to four (1953).

167. This, of course, was the notorious Benson Constitution which offered the franchise to some 7000 Africans in Northern Rhodesia and offered the entire African population 'representation' in LegCo in the form to a total of 8 seats to 14 for the settlers. What is more, the approval of a specific number of recognised chiefs was required for the candidature of the 6 'special' seats for Africans; see D.C. Mulford's "Politics ...", 1967 (p.56-61).

168. see footnote (7); see also SEC/NAT/75 (83) 29/3/43, Circ Min C.S. para 4
> "The object of sudh councils is to enable DC's (and others who may be concerned) to consult and keep in touch with African opinion in the towns and to provide a channel through which the Africans can put forward any proposals".

169. see Chapter Two (p.37)

170. see footnotes (45) and (46); see also SEC/NAT/92 (70), Nov.1941, Gore-Browne proposed motion
"That the time has now come for the introduction of a system of African representation under which a central (African) council, the members of which would be elected by local African councils, should be formed. This Council would act as a mouthpiece of African opinion..."

171. see Chapter Two Table II (p.34).

172. for interesting illustration of this preoccupation see Colonial Office Summer School on African Administration First Conference (1947) "African Local Government", Africa Paper No 1173, Introduction (p. 1-9).

173. see Chapter Two, Tables I and II (pp 32,34).

174. see footnotes (45) and (46); see also ARC 3 (1948) c.308 SNA's Address to the ARC.

175. ARC 10 (1953) c. 6-7 Gov's Address to the ARC
"I know that you members of the ARC have a very difficult task in carrying out your two-fold functions. You have to keep the Government informed of the views and wishes of the people you represent and you have also to explain Government policy and proposals to them. The more you succeed in the second of these functions the more successful will be the work of the Government for the Africans and the more rapidly will Africans benefit and progress".
(and see footnote (125) for continuation of this speech)
see also APC(Western Province) Minutes, 15-16/5/53, Meeting. SNA (R.Bush)Closing Council
"You have this dual purpose of representing your people to the Government and representing the Government to the people; it is both ways and the Government is grateful for the way you have done this."

176. Hansard 73 (c.542) 17/7/52, SNA Bush had already conceded that the ARC might have to be replaced some day...whether by the APC's themselves or by some other body altogether.

177. see page 201

178. see C.O. Summer School on African Administration, 1951, Fourth, "African Local Government", Africa Paper No. 1178, Introduction (p.6) and S.S. Griffith Address (p.14). See also AAAR 1950 (p. 46) PC Report on Central Province.

179. see Chapter Five (p.168-69) for evidence of what actually did happen thereafter.

180. both being correct see Chapter Five (p.162).

181. Colonial Office Annual Report on Northern Rhodesia, 1958, (p. 103).

182. The Oxford Dictionary definition of 'containment' is, amongst other things

> "policy of building up strength against a possible enemy in the hope of eventual agreement with him"

The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 5th ed. 1964.

CHAPTER TWO

1. see Chapter I, footnote (69)

2. see Chapter I - which is also the reason why the first chapter dealt with all the councils in examining the purpose(s) being served by the ARC.

3. in the earlier stages it was even officially indicated that the preferable choices for Native Authority representatives on the APC's would be the chiefs themselves if they possessed the right personal qualities; see SEC/NAT/95(390) 8/12/48, SNA Circ Min (N) NAT/A/57 to all PC's

> 3 "...any advice should be directed to ensuing that influential men are chosen. Where the chief is influential progressive and able, he would be the most suitable."

4. see page 38; but based also on political considerations - see Chapter I (p.10).

5. Western (now Copperbelt), Central, Southern and Eastern Provinces had some urban representation on their APC'S.

6. SEC/NAT/95(344), 9/4/48 SNA Circ Min (N) NAT/A/57 to all PC's

> "It has always been one of the duties of these (APC) members to travel around the areas which they represent and to sound the opinions of their 'constituents' on any topics coming before the Council, as well as to notice any widespread feeling in the area about any subject which is deserving of attention in Council."

7. the most noteworthy of such Government motions placed before the ARC itself were those on partnership in 1951 (ARC 8) and the White Paper on Constitutional Proposals in 1958 (ARC 18); for others see Chapter IV.

8. W.V. Brelsford "Urban Councils on the Copperbelt" Corona III(11) Nov 1951 (p.432); see also Appendix A, SR and O clause16(vi).

9. see Gervas Clay, JAA I(1)Jan 1949, "African Urban Advisory Councils on the Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt"; and F.M.N. Health, loc cit V(3)July 1953, "The Growth of African Councils on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia"; and W.V.Brelsford "Urban Councils..." in Corona III(11) Nov 1951.

10. Lord Hailey "Native Administration..."1950, (p.85).

11. these were Luanshya, Kitwe, Mufulira, Broken Hill and Lusaka in the early 1940's; Ndola, Mufulira, Kitwe, Luanshya, Chingola, Lusaka, Broken Hill, Fort Jameson, Livingstone and Mazabuka by 1949; with Bancroft, Petauke, Choma and (possibly?) Chinsali included thereafter.

12. these totals exclude the Barotse 'Protectorate'; the frequent changes in the number of AFC's was caused by the frequent changes in the number of provinces in Northern Rhodesia - more especially with the repeated division and recombination of the Northern Province, and the combining of part of the Northern Province and/or the North-Western (Kaonde-Lunda)Province with the Western(Copperbelt)Province.

13. See Chapter I (p.25).

14. see Colonial Office Annual Report for NR 1947-1952 in which, under the section on Local Administration, the same portrayal of the councils system was produced year after year, including the claim that

> "These Councils consist of Chiefs and Native Authority Councillors selected at tribal gatherings and at urban advisory councils and certain other bodies. Thus all elements of the African community are represented."

15. SEC/NAT/109II(2) 4/10/48 SNA Quart Conf News (p.6); see also Hansard 73(c.541) 17/7/52 SNA that the system was "very representative".

16. largely piecemeal and verbal - diagrammatic interpretation is my own.

17. SEC/NAT/113I(4) 3/5/45 SNA Dist Circ No15(para 8)

18. Hansard 60(c.288-89) 19/3/48 SNA reply to Gore-Browne Question described this form of "tribal meeting"; see also Africa Paper No 1176,1948

> "Conference of Legislative Council Delegates from British African Colonies and Protectorates, Lancaster House"(p.36) Rev. Nightingale(N.R. MLC 'for African Interests') reporting on the councils system claimed that
>
> "Representatives of the people in the rural areas are chosen at meetings of the people and are appointed by acclimation. It is the considered opinion of those who are in a position to know that there is very little doubt that the men appointed actually represent the popular choice."

19. ibid, referring to the methods used in the urban areas
"we have various modifications of electoral systems some of them approaching very closely indeed the ballot"
see also W.V.Brelsford "Urban Councils..."Corona III(11),Nov 1951(p.431) claimed the UAC's to be "elected bodies...fully representative..."

20. N/0088 III(196) 29/6/51, C.S.(NR) to C.S.(Kenya) 8
"African Welfare Societies at District and Provincial Headquarters elect, usually by secret ballot, representatives to the Provincial Councils and this provides a means of expression of opinion for those Africans whom employment has removed from their tribal areas".

21. C.O.Annual Report on Northern Rhodesia op.cit.
"From these councils...and from Barotseland delegates are elected to attend an ARC for the Territory..."

22. Administrative Conference of PC's(1945) Minutes ItemI (d).

23. N/0088 III(196) 29/6/51, C.S.(NR) to C.S.(Kenya) para b
"...it is fair to say that in all cases the Tribal Council (that is the recognised Native Authority) nominates the representatives (to the Provincial Council)"; see also
op.cit. (234) 23/4/52, C.O. Africa Bureau Director R.S. Hudson to SNA recommended that election to the APC's should have been by
"the tribal council rather than the Native Authority as such...I would recommend the disocciation of Native Authorities as statutory bodies from the political pyramid. Tribal meetings or 'district baraza's should choose representatives for Provincial Councils from the rural areas, or whatever similar device is appropriate should be used."

24. oral evidence - Int 2 with A.D. Chilimboyi, 24/1/74; Int 4 with William Nkanza, 30/1/74; Int 6 with S.M. Mununga 1/2/74.

25. oral evidence - Int 2 with A.D. Chilimboyi, 2/1/74; Int 1 with F.B. Chembe, 24/1/74; Int 7 with M.Katowa 13/2/74. See also footnote (3) above, for SNA advice to local officials on their role in "influencing" the outcome of selections of rural councillors for the APC's.

26. only the Western (now Copperbelt) Province had a majority of urban members on its African Provincial Council.

27. such as Donald Siwale member of the Northern Province APC nominated by the Winamwanga Superior Native Authority; and many others - see Appendices B to D.

28. such as Dauti Yamba member of the Northern Province APC nominated by the East Lunda Superior Native Authority; and many others. See Appendices B to D.

29. see APC minutes; see also Chapter III Table IV (p.61).

30. such as Mateo Kakumbi member of the Central Province APC, nominated by the Lenje Superior Native Authority; and a number of others - see Appendices B to D.

31. see Chapter I (p.10).

32. see footnote (23) above.

33. C.O. Annual Report for Northern Rhodesia 1953: in the Local Administration section a sudden alteration appeared, after six years of precisely the same wording, to make it read that rural members were elected by "native authority councilsW rather than the former "tribal gatherings".

34. since all members of the Native Authorities were called 'councillors' until into the early 1950's, some confusion can arise about their real nature; see Chapter III for analysis.

35. see, for example, the motions tabled and debated in ARC 10 (1953) c.154-176 and ARC 13(1955) c.312-327 on the colonialist practice of unilaterally deposing chiefs as and when they saw fit; see also footnote 17 Chap III.

36. N/0088 III(247) 29/5/52, SNA Circ Min to all PC's informing them that

> "His Excellency invites discussion and suggestions for African Provincial Council constitutions on the basis of this suggestion..."

37. ibid. evident in the fact that the same circ min contained explicit suggestions for the severing o f the link between the administrative Native Authorities and the political pyramid of councils, which had been one of the prime recommendations of the 1951 C.O. Summer School on African Administration; see Group II report para 4 in Africa Paper No. 1178 (p.62).

38. see Chap I (p.17).

39. such as the Chinsali, Fort Rosebery, Isoka and Mporokoso Welfare Societies; see Appendices B and C column (v) and APC mins.

40. such as Mawere Zilole appointed by the Fort Jameson D.C. to the Eastern Province APC in 1946; see Appendix B column (iv); and APC mins.

41. see footnote (19); see also 1951 C.O. Summer School on African Administration, Report submitted by N.R. delegation, Africa Paper No 1178 (p.51)

> "African Provincial Councils exist comprising members elected from Native Authorities, Urban Advisory Councils and welfare societies. They act as electoral colleges

for the ARC".
see also W.V. Brelsford "Urban councils..." Corona III (11) Nov 1951 (p.431) referes to UAC's as "elected bodies...fully representative."

42. F.M.N.Heath "Growth African Councils..." in JAA V (3) July 1953.

43. such as Mufulira School teacher Kenneth David Kaunda who was a member of the Mufulira UAC and the Western Province APC until 1949; see Chap V (p.147) and (p.150)

44. such as Kitwe school teacher Harry Nkumbula who was a DC-nominated member of the Kitwe UAC and Western Province APC from 1943; see R.Hall "Zambia" 1965 (p.120).

45. F.M.N. Heath "Growth...", 1953 (p.127)

46. only in so far as tribal elders were 'elected' and the representatives of the welfare societies were elected.

47. see Chap I (p.6).

48. SEC/NAT/113I(4) 3/5/45, SNA Dist Circ No 15 (para 3).

49. Hansard 43(152) 17/9/42, Gore-Browne.

50. SEC/NAT/113 I(4) SNA Dist Circ No 15 (para 7).

51. Administrative Conference of PC's (1945) Mins Item I(a).

52. SEC/NAT/113 I(93) Feb 1946, Dist Circ 2 - produced after many behind-the-scenes debates and adjustments, see ibid (46-87) Jan-Feb 1946.

53. for alternative methods had been considered and placed before the APC's for their consideration during 1945, see SEC/NAT/101/(29); 103 I(40-42); 104 I(12/1) and 106 (19/1) in which the APC's debated and opted for election to the ARC both by and from the APC's themselves, although with variations in opinion in their numbers, term of office etc...

54. the present-day Copperbelt Province.

55. the present-day North-Western Province.

56. Barotse 'Protectorate' differed from the other provinces in Northern Rhodesia in that all their delegates on the ARC were to be nominated by the Litunga; see Appendix A ARC Constitution Clause II(b).

57. for explanation why this total exceeds the number of twenty-nine seats on the ARC see Chapter III (p.60).

58. see pages 40 and 42.

59. H.Meebelo "Reaction to Colonialism...", 1971 (p.238).

60. AAAR 1947 (p.9) P.C. Report on the Western Province
"Although the fullest publicity is given to the Provincial Councils meetings and every possible facility is offered by way of accomodation for those of the African population who wish to attend the proceedings, the number of spectators is small and suggests that the mass of the African population is not greatly concerned with the political aspects of its development"
see also AAAR 1948 (p.7) PC Report on Western Province for same.

61. C.O. Annual Report on Northern Rhodesia since 1946 (p.12)

62. ibid.

63. AAAR 1947 (p.3) SNA Foreward.

64. Hansard 56 (c.305) 4/12/46, Campbell (Member for Southern Electoral Area)
"Well my opinion always was that those were too many urbanised natives and that there were too few chiefs (on the ARC) I have a lot of sympathy for the chiefs..."

65. see Chap I (pp 12-13).

66. SEC/NAT/95 (390) 8/12/48, SNA Circ Min to all PC's (para 1)

67. ibid.

68. N/0088 III(261A) 12/8/52, SNA to Gov NR, provided a summary of the methods used in the 1949 UAC elections as follows:

WESTERN PROVINCE
Ndola 18 members - elected by 11 'wards' on occupational basis
Mufulira 17 members - elected by 8 'wards' on occupational basis (2 each), and further 1 nominated by DC.
KItwe 14 members - elected by electoral colleges in 6 wards (2 each), and further 2 nominated by DC.
Luanshya 17 members - elected by four electoral colleges (4 eadh) and further 1 bywelfare society.
Chingola 7 members - elected by ballot on a ward basis (6 altogether), and further 1 nominated by DC.

CENTRAL PROVINCE
Lusaka 10 members - elected by show of hands at a mass meeting
Broken Hill 12 members - elected by ballot on a ward system (but in one ward by an electoral college)

EASTERN PROVINCE
Fort Jameson 7 members - elected from occupational wards

SOUTHERN PROVINCE
Livingstone 12 members - 6 elected in secret ballot by welfare societies, 4 elected by show of hands at occupational

meetings, 2 nominated by DC.
Mazabuka 9 members - elected at mass meetings on occupational basis.

69. SEC/NAT/109 II(2) 4/10/48, SNA Quart Conf News (p.7)
"There is much more interest in the ARC now than when it started and I believe we shall have keener competition for membership than in the past, especially now that Africans realise that membership of LegCo depends on elections to Provincial Councils and to the ARC."

70. AAAR 1949 (p.3) SNA Foreward.

71. SEC/NAT/90 (no. number) 31/3/49, W.Prov Quart Conf News (p.2)
"...Methods varied greatly but a form of election was acopted in several places. In urban areas this was in most cases based on 'electoral colleges' system and different groups voted for one or more candidates to sit on the Advisory Councils. The Urban Councils subsequently elected delegates to sit on the Provincial Council. Africans appear to be taking more interest in these matters and, generally speaking, a good standard of candidate has been returned."

72. SEC/NAT/109 II(37) 30/6/49, SNA Quart Conf News.

73. AAAR 1950(p.46) P.C. Report on the Central Province
"The most interesting feature of the proceedings and one which may be indicative of future trends was that leadership and initiative within the (Provincial) Council was largely assumed by the non-traditional element within it and more especially by those hailing from the urban areas"; see also
A.L. Epstein "Politics in..." (p.77) commenting upon the new UAC elected in Luanshya in 1949
"The new Councillors...were not merely better educated than their predecessors, they also belonged to a younger generation whose vision and values were no longer confined within the narrow limits of tribal politics."

74. see Chap I (p.10)

75. The Provinces in Northern Rhodesia at this stage were Western (Eastern*); Western (Urban); Western(Western*); Northern*, Central, Southern and Eastern...and Barotseland*-with those indicated by an * sending only rural delegates to the ARC.

76. since, by this stage, the earlier endeavours to carry out instructions (see footnote 22) that 'tribal gatherings' should elect the Provincial Councillors, were already giving way to the more convenient, 'safer' practice of such selections being made by the Tribal Councils or Native Authorities themselves (see footnote 23).

77. see page 38; although changes were made in the provinces of Northern Rhodesia, the APC representation of the ARC was maintained weighted in favour of the rural areas...but not the rural population, of course, since they were hardly drawn into this system of 'representation' at all. Thus the colonialist claims about population ratio to ARC representation were merely a manipulation of figures; see for example N/0088 I(50) Chart showing 'Representation on the (Second) ARC in proportion to population'

Western(E)	2 seats = 1 :	76,000 people
Western(W)	3 seats = 1 :	57,000 people
*Western(U)	5 seats = 1 :	39,000 people
Northern	4 seats = 1 :	80,000 people
*Southern	3 seats = 1 :	66,000 people
*Eastern	4 seats = 1 :	76,000 people
*Central	4 seats = 1 :	54,000 people
(Barotse	4 seats = 1 :	66,000 people

claiming that, with the desired ratio at 1 : 60,000, the urban areas were far better represented than the rural which had much higher population ratios per ARC seat and since the APC's with urban representation* had lower rations - 'ignoring the fact, however that of these APC's only the Western(U) actually had a majority of urban ARC seats (4), the others having only 1 (Southern) 1 (Eastern) and 2 (Central) 'urban' seats on the ARC respectively.

78. AAAR 1949 (p13) SNA Foreward.

79. see Chap I (p.17) and page 36.

80. SEC/NAT/388 II(101) 9/2/53, SNA Circ Min N/2156 to all PC's.

81. and the proviso that such persons had never been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 6 months or more; see ARC Constitution clause (e) (iii) Appendix A.

82. this too had always been a condition of membership of the African councils and is the prime reason - and explanation - why so many otherwise prominent and highly educated Africans were not - because they should not be - members of the ARC; see ARC Constitution clause (e)(ii) Appendix A; see however Chap V (p.153) for evidence of their indirect participation in the African councils system.

83. AAAR 1953(p.4) SNA Foreward

> "In spite of the increased interest in politics, the October elections for the African UAC's conducted by secret ballot aroused little excitement and the percentage poll was low. The secret ballot is popular in theory but it is surprising how comparatively few Africans exercised their privelege as voters in spite of prolonged and careful explanations and the encouragement given them to do so."

84. ibid; and see also for example, ibid (p.49) P.C. Report on the Central Province - Chilenje in Lusaka registered a 10% poll, Matero in Lusaka registered a 2% poll. Ibid (p.64) P.C. Report on the Eastern Province - made a similar remark about apathy in the UAC elections.

85. ibid (p.6) P.C. Report on the Western Province - that the new UAC's' members were "in general of a highter educational standard".

86. ibid. the new Western Province APC "contains strong trade union and Congress elements"; see also A.L. Epstein "Politics..." 1958 (p.230), analysing the new 1953 Luanshya UAC, commented that it

> "was made up almost exclusively of Trade Union officials, Congress officials and other leading urban personalities. The clear breach with the earlier councils is clearly brought out in the fact that for the first time in its history the council was able to dispense with the services of an interpreter at its meetings".

87. AAAR 1953 (p.6) 9 of the 14 members of the Western Province APC were trade unionists.

88. ibid (p.20) P.C. Report on the North-Western Province - remarked that the new APC "displays a higher standard of education and understanding";
ibid (p.33) P.C. Report on the Northern Province -

> "This (new APC) was a very different body as compared with its predecessor...nearly 100% literate and English-speaking...a more reasonable and progressive outlook..."

ibid (p.49) PC Report on Central Province.

89. oral evidence - Int 6 with S.M. Muhunga 1/2/74; Int 7 with M. Katowa (now Chief Mapanza) 13/2/74. This was probably due not only to the fact that the membership of the Native Authority Councils was, by this stage, composed primarily of educated employees (see footnote 29), but also that with the increasingly 'modern' 'educated' composition of the non-Native Authority members on the provincial councils, the lesser educated 'traditional' councillors felt themselves - and/or were considered to be - 'out of place' or at any rate, at something of a disadvantage in such a milieu.

90. see, for example, the Government subsidised "African Eagle" (successor to Mutende) Vol I No 5 (February 3rd), No 19 (May 12th), No 27 (July 24th), No 37(September 22nd) of 1953.

91. AAAR 1955 (p.1) P.C. Report for the Western Province

> "Generally the majority of Africans showed little interest in politics as evinced by the few who turned up to vote at elections and the fact that the same people are elected to almost all representative bodies"; see also Chap V (p.168) for attitude of Copperbelt general public as late as 1958.

92. With the number of members of the UAC's varying between 7 and 8 (see footnote 68) and averaging 12, and with at least 12 UAC's this indicates a total of about 250 UAC members at this time in Northern Rhodesia; and with the 8 APC's consisting of 14 members each, giving a total of (another) approximately 100 participants in the councils system (excluding from this total the UAC members on the APC's) - produces a total of some 350 men at this stage alone participating in this system.

93. oral evidence - Int 1 with F.B. Chembe, 24/1/74; Int 2 with A.D. Chilimboyi, 24/1/74; Int 4 with Hon.W.NKwasa, 30/1/74.

94. see The African Eagle I (47) 1/12/53 for letters to the editor; ibid II (1) 12/1/54 for letters to the editor; ibid II (3-7) Jan and Feb for letters to the editor. See also the Central African Post (405) 24/11/53 for Congress opinions reported and (412)22/1/54 for letter to the editor - for further details see Chap V.

95. Mutende 368, 30/1/51 editorial opinion, and see The African Eagle I (5) 3/2/53 for editorial opinion.

96. see Chap V (p. 151) and footnote (137).

97. see ARC 3 (c.4-5) 5/7/48, Gov's Address to the ARC; ARC 5 (c.259) 27/1/51, Gore-Browne and Nightingale comments on qualities and comportment desirable in African Representatives; and ARC 11 (c.3-4) 11/1/54 Gov's Address to the ARC - for colonialist efforts to influence the outcome of ARC elections of African MLC's.

98. see ARC Constitution 1946 clause II (c) (in ARC 1); see also ARC Constitution 1953, clause I(d), Appendix A.

99. SEC/NAT/113 II(194-210) 26/2/47 to 31/3/47 corresp between the SNA and Western Province PC and Kitwe DC on the subject of Kasokolo's loss of his seat on the Kitwe UAC (owing to the withdrawal of his sponsorship thereon by the welfare society that had elected him) and hence in theory on the APC as well...and the ARC...and LegCo!

100. SEC/NAT/113 II(261) ?/12/48 ExCo Meeting Mins para (d)

101. that is, that it was the Governor who had nominated him to Legco on the advice of the ARC, for a thirty month period (1948-1951) which was to be completed regardless of what happend in the interim regarding his membership of the ARC or the lower councils.

102. and one which was avoided thereafter by an arrangement for the 30 month term of the African MLC's to coincide with the 5 year term (or mid-term) of LegCo; see N/0088 III(196) 29/6/51, C.S.(NR) to C.S. (Kenya).

103. see Chap III Table XII (p.86)

104. these were Dauti Yamba (Vice President ANC) and Pascale Sokota (Congress-backed candidate) in 1951; and Pascale Sokota, Robinson Nabulyato (ex General Secretary ANC but still ANC supporter), Safeli Chileshe (ex Vice-Treasurer General ANC but still ANC supporter) and Lakement Ng'andu (ANC supporter) in 1953.

105. which 'requirements' they never made formally-despite, for example, Gore-Browne's suggestion that certificates of fluency in English - as required in West Africa of Legislative Council Members - be made compulsory.

106. see Chap V (p.151) and footnote (137).

107. SEC/MISC/72 I(155) 30/7/48 Act Gov (NR) to Attorney General

108. ibid (156) 4/8/48 AG to Gov NR.

109. since there was no provisi n in the Northern Rhodesia Constitution for indirect elections, only direct 'democratic' elections or gubernatorial nominations.

110. see UAC and APC mins of meetings in the relevant periods viz: Jan-Mar, 1947 - UAC elections to APC's; Apr-May, 1949 APC's elections to ARC: Sept-Oct, 1953 - UAC elections to APC's; Oct, 1953 - APC's elections to ARC.

111. but the UAC elections to the APC's were not thus restricted.

112. see footnote (53); see also the ARC's own rejection of motions in 1947 that the ARC chose African MLC's in conjunction with "other recognised African organisations" (ARC 2.c.153) and in 1948 that the ARC be allowed to select African MLC's from within or outside of its own ranks if so desired (ARC 3.c.90).

113. see p.30.

114. oral evidence Int 1 with F.B. Chembe, 24/1/74; Int 2 with A.D. Chilimboyi, 24/1/74; Int 6 with S.M.Mununga, 1/2/74.

115. A.L. Epstein "Politics in...", 1958 (p.186) relates the opinions expressed at a Luanshya public meeting in 1954, one of which was that the Luanshya UAC men were "useless" because "they did not hold meetings to inform the public of the Councils discussions or to hear the complaints of the people"; see also Central African Post (370) 24/7/53 Letters to the Editor by one J.B.Kwacha (Solwezi) contrasting Congress' practice of "consulting" the people with that of the ARC which "holds no such meetings(with the people)".

116. there are, in fact, a number of official files in National Archives, Lusaka devoted solely to exchanges and material on or for the ARC agendas; see for example complete files such as SEC/NAT/114, NAT/A/82/3, NAT/A/82/7; quite apart from scattered

exchanges on the same in other more general files on the ARC.

117. where the standard of English spoken was generally poorer and where fewer APC members could actually speak English.

118. oral evidence-Int 1, F.B. Chembe(CP), 24/1/74; Int 4, W. Nkanza (NWP), 30/1/74; Int 6, S. Mununga (LP), 1/2/74. Personal (written evidence) - Q.9 I.Mulando (CP), Q.6 Chief Kopa (NP), Q.11 D. Siwale (NP), Q.1 S.N.E.Chembe (EP), Q.5 W.Kazoka (SP).

119. oral evidence - Int 1 - F.B. Chembe (CP) 24/1/74.
"The PC tended rather to educate the Africans so that they could be able to understand Government policy and try to educate other people about what he felt should be the polciy that Africans should follow".
Int 4 - W. Nkanza (NWP) 30/1/74
"Of course sometimes he (the PC) didn't want certain things to be talked about...He tried to discourage such things but, however, he didn'tstop them completely..."
Int 6 - S.M. Mununga (LP) 1/2/74 the PC's
"were trying to control it (the APC) so that it didn't become a political organisation. They wanted it merely to advise the administration about development in the province."

120. SEC/NAT/109 II(2) 4/10/48 SNA Quart Conf News (p.6).

121. see Appendix A; SR and O clause 16(v).

122. SEC/NAT/109 I(37) 30/6/47 SNA Quart Conf News (p.8).

123. See, for example, the way in which a motion rejecting Closer Association was placed 18th in the 1951 January agenda (ARC 5 c.175) sandwiched between a discussion on rural hospitals and another on the registration of African births and deaths; or similarly in 1951 July the proposal to transform Trust Land into Native Reserves (ARC 6,c.105) in between debates on fishing regulations and the 'scandal' of chiefs marrying divorced women; and thirdly the insignificant position given the ARC's rejection of Federation in 1952 between two relatively unimportant motions on education (ARC 9,c.172).

124. see, for example ARC 2(1947) for the way in which the character of the agenda was quite substantially altered by the inclusion of a considerable number of Government motions.

125. which did undergo modifications over time both with the development of the councils system and changes in the immediate and general political climate of Northern Rhodesia and with the different characters, political outlooks and methods of work of the persons occupying the position of SNA; and if scant attention seems to have been paid to the last by the present author it is not because such factors or differences are not given due cognisance but because the focus of the present study

is not in such specific directions or levels of analysis.

126. see Appendix A SR and O clause 16(i).

127. ibid clause 16 (iv) and (vi).

128. ibid clause 19 (i) to (v).

129. ibid clause 16 (i) to (iii), 17,18.

130. except for the (relatively few) Government motions tabled - a total of some 10 out of a total of 379 motions tabled before the ARC during its lifetime; see Chap IV (pp.90-91).

131. oral evidence - Int. 1 with F.B. Chembe MP 24/1/74; Int 4 with Hon. W. Nkansa, 30/1/74. for it did not necessarily follow that it had to be members of the NPC's that had originally raised and approved any specific motion who had to propose and second it in the subsequent ARC debates thereon.

132. SEC/NAT/113II(250) 14/12/48, Decisions of meeting of SNA with 'African representatives' on LegCo (para c)

> "correction of mis-statements, a common problem, would be partly corrected by prior committee meetings and Nominated Members (for 'Native Interests') would be invited (by the SNA) to intervene"; see also SEC/NAT/388 II(86) 29/11/52, SNA Circ Min N/0052/3/1, 2
>
> "The Committee Stage is a preliminary to the main proceedings and it affords an opportunity to Members, Secretaries and Heads of Departments to speak informally to (AR) Council on any matters affecting the African which they wish to get across to him...Members, Secretaries and Heads of Departments will be informed in advance of those motions put forward by Provincial Councils which are of concern to them It is sometimes of advantage both to Council and to the Officers concerned if Heads of Departments talk to Council in Committee about these motions".

133. SEC/NAT/109 II(no number) 31/3/51; SNA Quart Conf News (p.4) namely Federation.

134. see footnote (132); there was in fact considerable concern in colonialist ranks about the so-called "misleading remarks" and "mis-statments" in the ARC debates - see for example Hansard 56 (c.70-125) 3/12/46, McKee (Member for Midlands) Electoral Area) and comments by Gore-Browne and SNA on same; ibid 68 (c.89-90) 5/6/50, Robertson (Member for Ndola) criticism of African councils for "wild statements and lack of truth" and comments by Goro-Browne, ibid (c.580) and SNA (c.142) on same; see also SEC/NAT/113 II (257) 14/12/48, SNA in meeting with 'African representatives' in LegCo concluded

> "Generally speaking it was considered that there had been an improvement in 1948 over previous years in regard to mis-statements (in the ARC)."

135. the most notable example being in the 1951 December meeting to consider the decisions of the Victoria Falls Conference of the same year and, more specifically, the question of 'partnership'; see ARC 8 (1951).

136. reported, sometimes accompanied by photographs, in the press at the time.

137. this in contrast to his more formal impersonal addresses delivered in lofty pedagogic style at the opening of each ARC session... but serving the same purposes; see ARC Hansards.

138. see ARC 7 (1951), ARC 11(1954), ARC 15(1957).

139. but were not the only such forms; there were also such devices as generous allowances (5 shillings per day) while attending ARC sessions, see SEC/NAT/95 (384); special gowns and badges, frequent appearances (photos) in the press and so on - all designed to cater to a sense of self-importance and encourage in the councillors an ever greater committment to the system.

140. see Appendix A, SR and O clauses 21(i) to (xxii) and 22.

141. Administrative Conference of PC's (1945) Item I(h)
"That the meetings should be conducted in a formal manner as closely relating to the proceedings of Legislative Council as possible".

142. see Chap IV (p. 140) for the success of this conditioning.

143. see Appendix A, SR and O clauses 21 (xiv)(xv)(xix) (xxi).

144. which completely escaped the comprehension of the colonialists, settlers and administrators alike, who expressed repeated concern at the 'lack of an opposition' in the ARC, the absence of 'true honest debate'; see for example Hansard 56 (c.142) 4/12/46 Welensky suggesting
"that some form of opposition in the (AR) Council should be introduced. One does not want to have a Reichstag..."
ibid (c.305) 4/12/46 Campbell (Member for Southern Electoral Area) in the same veing see also SEC/NAT/109 I(27) 7/1/47 SNA Quart Conf News and AAAR 1948 (p.3) SNA Foreward.

145. see Appendix A; SR and O clause 22 (i).

146. ibid clause 8(ii)

147. ibid clause 8(iii).

148. see UAC and APS debates, and ARC 9(1952) c.26.

149. see p. 48.

150. for example in the press, more especially the Government sponsored "Mutende" and "African Eagle"

151. see Chap I.

152. all responses both oral and written testify to this, except for those of A.D.Chilimboyi (CP) and Mathew Nkoloma (WP), see below footnotes (155) and (156).

153. Appendix A - SR and O clause 19v(a-b), 21 (xiv-xviii).

154. but see the perceptive observation made by A.D. Chilimboyi when interviewed 24/1/74 that

> "Some members were really strong because they belonged to the ANC or to the trade unions. But, apart from the members who belonged to those sound bodies, others belonged to the teaching service or semi-government bodies, like myself. At that time I was working for the rural (Native Authority) council so that I had to be careful of whatever I said because if I spoke things which were very strong against the Government I was looking for a sack..."

in other words that there were some indirect pressures or impediments on free speech.

155. oral evidence Int 5 - Mathew Nkoloma 31/1/74

> "The recording was carried out by their own staff so that anything not required was just brushed aside."

156. see ARC 8 (1951) c.65.

157. in the 1940's and earlier 1950's by a "palantype team" but by tape recorder in the later years.

158. See Appendix A SR and O clause 14.

159. which so repeatedly asserts the same things as to undermine the allegation made by M.D. Nkoloma (see footnote 156).

160. see AAAR 1950 (p.46).

161. such as the formal opening of each session by the Gov, the "tabling of Government papers" before, the council, the presentation of an "Order of the Day" by the "Clark of the Council", the tabling of formal "Questions" in "Question Time" etc...

162. hence the great majority of the ARC motions begin "This Council recommends that..."

163. The colonial authorities, in fact, made much of their 'consultation' of African opinion through the African councillors and the latters' rights of free speech and criticism and so on; but when it 'came to the crunch' on a really important issue affecting important colonialist interests or plans the true nature of this 'consultation' emerged. Thus, in the earlier years they made much play of the Government's consultation of African opinion, see SEC/NAT/105 (27) July 1945, SNA to APC(CP) closing the meeting assured them that their views

"would help the Government to decide what to do. He wanted all to remember that the views of all the councillors all over the country were being heard and if all the people think the same about a thing a great deal of notice was taken of it...";
similarly in SEC/NAT/103 II(13) April 1949, SNA to APC(NP,W areas); and ARC 3(1948) (c.308) SNA to ARC;...When, however, the Africans proceeded to take them at their word and complained that the Government was, for example, ignoring their opposition to Federation, the colonialists' prompt response was, see ARC 8(1951)c.56 SNA to ARC

"You said that you had been informed that the Africans' consent would have to be obtained first(before setting up of Federation). I don't remember Africans ever being assured that their consent would first have to be obtained. They were assured that they would be consulted and they have been consulted."

164. see Appendix A, ARC Constitution clauses 4 and 8(a); SR and O clauses 1 and 4.

165. thus summoning the ARC a number of times in one year (such as 1951 - four times!) or not at all (1950); and holding the meetings away from Lusaka - the usual meeting place Munali Secondary School - when of a crucial or delicate nature (such as the 1958 meeting on the White Paper held at Serenje or the very first meeting of the ARC in 1946 held at Chalimbana) see SEC/NAT/113 I(45) 31/12/45, SNA to Gov

"If the meeting is held at Chalimbana there should be little risk of too much of a crowd."

166. see Appendix A, SR and O clauses 4 and 9.

167. ibid ARC Constitution clause 3; see also N/0088 III(202)July,1951 for Constitutional Review Committee's Consultati n of the African councillors on the draft councils' Constitutions and Standing Rules and Orders.

168. Appendix A, ARC Constitution clause 5.

169. although the two were so closely dialectically linked that the latter generally ensured the former, as much as the former oriented them to the latter; see Chap IV (pp 141-42) for further elaboration of this.

170. see p. 44.

CHAPTER THREE

1. see Chapter II.

2. since, while an educated man was automatically 'a leader', a leader - especially the chiefs - was not necessarily, although

by this period most usually, educated.

3. traditional leadership here defined according to the colonialists' own usage - interchangeably with 'Native Authorities' - evident in the official documentary sources cited in Chapters One and Two as: chiefs and their councillors holding their positions on the traditional grounds of their clan or kinship ties and lineage positions; still fulfilling the ritual and other 'traditional' roles and functions associated with the respective positions in the respective 'tribal groups' in NR; and simultaneously deriving their authority from the approval and allegiance of their 'commoner' 'tribesmen' and identifying themselves with and representing (in some quasi-mystical way) the interests and aspirations of the same. Any non-traditional 'modern' functions and powers they were endowed with by the colonial administration were merely a result of their 'traditional leadership' status and authority, and were assumed over and above their traditional responsibilities and powers, in no way reflecting upon to dimish, augment or in any way alter the same.

4. modern middleclass here defined according to the colonialists' own usage - interchangeably with 'modern strata' and/or 'progressive elements' - evident in the official documentary sources cited in Chapters One and Two as: all those elements of both the rural and urban African population who, by virtue of their education - cum professional status and/or their occupations-cum-income level and by virtue of their assimilation of 'western' or 'modern' culture and practices and their conspicuous and successful employment or practice of the same stood out (in the colonial administrators' eyes) from the 'undifferentiated mass' of the African population; and yet differed from other distinguishable figures such as chiefs and councillors in not deriving their distinctiveness from 'traditional' status and roles.

5. see Appendix B.

6. because some could possibly be termed "indirect" Native Authority representatives since, although not of the Native Authorities, they were nominated by them to the ARC - see Chap II (p.35).

7. such changes are indicated by the symbol '+' in the left-hand margin where the individual joined the council at any point later than its inauguration and, similarly by the symbol '-' where they ceased to be members of the council before the end of its term; such changes in the First Council were T. Chinyama who replaced M. Sangambo, J. Mangwende who replaced M. Mubitana, Chief Mwase who replaced Chief Pikamalaza and Induna Inyamawina who replaced Induna Muyumbana.

8. see Appendix B, column(v); the methodology employed in this regard was to include both occupations in the initial assessment, firstly, in order to record this type of dual occupation

and, secondly, because although the fulltime occupation was of more significance in regard to an individual's socio-economic character, it was the part-time occupation as a NA councillor that had largely decided his membership in the councils system.

9. namely three Treasury Clerks (R. Chimkoko, T. Chinyama and R. Kalepa) and one Education 'Councillor'(J. Nabanyama).

10. although interestingly enough the official description of Philip Sikazwe, in SEC/NAT/113 I(26) no date, PC(NP), to SNA was as the Lungu "Head Councillor" and "a progressive".

11. his own personal evidence in the NP APC debates, see SEC/NAT/103 I(8/1) p.17.

12. see Appendix B, column(vi); which means a great deal in terms of what education had been available in Northern Rhodesia in the 1920's and earlier!

13. further background data was not obtained on the other three chiefs (Kopa, Mwase and Nkamalaza) andmight well have yielded equally surprising and significant information.

14. personal evidence - Q 3 Chief Ikelenge.

15. SEC/NAT/104 I(106) Biographical Notes on RPC(SP) members.

16. see ARC 2 (1947), c.5.

17. ostensible because it is the opinion of the present author that, although in setting up their system of so-called indirect rule the colonialists exploited the extant leadership of the African population and turned the prestige, knowledge and leadership skills they possessed to serve colonialist interests and legitimise colonial rule; and although, therefore, the Native Authorities really were, generally, in the earlier period of their development, actual chiefs and councillors of the people on traditional grounds, this was only in so far and as long as it suited its to have them so. If at any time the negative aspects of any individual chiefs (such as intractable conservatism, or incompetence, or indeed political radicalism) outweighed in colonialist eyes the positive advantages of their traditional status, the colonial authorities could, as they frequently did, simply 'depose' the undesirable chief and replace him (or have him replaced) with the next in line of succession or even with a controversial pretender, etc...or even, in extreme cases, with a "commoner" or a total outsider with no 'traditional' claim whatsoever to the position.

18. see Chap II (pp 35-36).

19. expressed thus because the present study does not, in fact, encompass a detailed examination of the Native Authorities per

se and, although the present author is convinced that these authorities were not 'traditional', she is not in a position to reach any fine conclusions about how they could be positively defined in this regard, and simply wishes to convey an awareness that there are most probably a number of possibilities and gradations of perception, analysis and conclusion in this direction.

20. see Chapter II (pp 38-39).

21. see, for example, colonial official laments about the unsatisfactory calibre of the First ARC councillors in SEC/NAT/95(387) ?/12/48 Draft SNA Circ on pending elections to UAC's.

22. indicated by a circle around the numbers in the left-hand margin of Appendix C.

23. nameley Jesse Sandasanda 'representing' Kasempa.

24. namely Chief Sayiti who replaced Chewa councillor Ledi Mkanda.

25. namely Chief Mboshya 'representing' Mkushi.

26. see Appendix C; 33 men are listed as against 29 ARC seats because M. Chobola entered in 1952 in replacement of A. Sitambuli who died (although N. Nalumango who died in the same year was not replaced) and 3 substitute Lozi indunas alternated with the other.

27. namely T.Chinyama and D.Siwale.

28. that is J. Chitimpa.

29. namely Manners Chobola.

30. these being Chiefs,Kopa, Mboshya and Mwase who had completed Stds 5,5 and 6 respectively.

31. and such further indirect evidence as the fact that the colonial authorities themselves advocated selecting chiefs to the EPC's if they had certain minimum qualifications such as literacy, 'intelligence' and so on; see Chap II footnote (3).

32. namely J.B.Mkupo who had earlier been a municipal welfare officer in Broken Hill.

33. that is Jephas Somati - but there is some doubt about his occupation by this stage, and this listing is based on the fact that it was his occupation while he was in the First ARC (1946-48); it proved impossible to confirm this one way or the other because he has since emigraged to Malawi.

34. although twenty occupations had been recorded for the non-Native Authority group - because two men changed their occupations in midstream, namely J.B. Mkupo (see footnote (32) above)

and J. Sandasanda (who changed from teacher to trader).

35. namely Nelson Nalumango.

36. this being Mateo Kakumbi a long-time 'Industrial Instructor' at Chitambo Mission near Serenje.

37. with the remaining three, Eli Chola, AltonSitambuli and Jephas Somati, indirect evidence indicates that they were men of some education but it proved impossible to ascertain their exact levels.

38. less the civil service; see Chap II (footnote (82); but note also Chapter V (p.153).

39. see Appendix C, column(viii); indicated by the symbol 'x' where certain and '?' where suspected but not actually verified.

40. such as Richard Chimkoko, AmosWalubita and Dauti Yamba.

41. see Appendix C, column (ix); indicated by an X.

42. ibid, column (x); indicated by an * where definite information obtained and an *? where indirect evidence suggestive of such an affiliation but not absolutely confirmed.

43. ibid, column (xi)

44. Unfortunately information on the birth dates of these men is so scanty and imprecise that it proved impossible to include such data in the biographical appendices, but on the basis of the limited information collected it is evident that there were many more younger men - in their thrities and one even aged 27 - in the Second Council than in the First.

45. see Chap II (p.40).

46. see Appendix D, circles around the numbers in the lefthand margin indicate the new members, and * in column (x) indicates ANC members.

47. see Appendix D, column(xi).

48. namely M.Kakumbi, D. Siwale, P. Sokota and D. Yamba who had been members of the Second Council.

49. namely A.D. Chilimboyi (District Treasurer) M. Katowa (District Secretary) P. Mukanza (District ?) S.M. Mununga (District ?) and R.C. Puta (Deputy President).

50. there was a fairly considerable number of men who became ARC councillors only in the later stages - three in 1958 for the newly-created Luapula Province (indicated by an 'L' in the

left hand margin of Appendix D); and A.D. Chilimboyi in 1957 in replacement of F. Chembe; M. Katowa to replace P. Habumbu in 1957; P. Mukanza to replace M. Chobola; and R.C. Puta to replace M.D. Nkoloma who had been detained in the 1956 state of emergency.

51. personal evidence of Chief Ikelenge, William Kazoka and William Nkanza; indicated by an 'S' in column(x) of Appendix D.

52. that is Chief Kelenge - personal evidence Q3.

53. namely S. Chibanza and M. Katowa.

54. oral evidence - Int 7 with M.Katowa (now Chief Mapanza) 13/2/74.

55. see Appendix D, column(vi)

56. these being Pascale Sokota and Dauti Yamba who have been included in the 'independent' occupations category owing both to the munificent remuneration - by African standards - they received as MLC's and the fact that they owed that position to their fellow ARC councillors and not to any type or sector of the colonialist camp; see Chap II (pp 44-47).

57. see Appendix D, column(vi).

58. namely Mauric Katowa.

59. Mathew Delux Nkoloma.

60. Francis Bruno Chembe.

61. William Kazoka.

62. see Appendices B,C,D columns(v); indicated by an E where they spoke only in English; 'e' where they spoke at times in English and at times in the vernacular; and '-' where they did not use English in the ARC debates at all.

63. see Chap II (p.41).

64. and even so he was already in the supervisory category...and above ground!

65. personal evidence - that is his apparent knowledge in the field of medecine; see for example ARC 3(1948) c.109.

66. he was a former welfare officer.

67. see Chap IV.

68. since they have already been assessed in this summation in terms of their full-time occupations.

69. details of the positions of the other five Native Authority employees are not known.

70. less, once again, the civil service!

71. which is unfortunately incomplete, it having proved increasingly difficult to obtain data the further back into these men's pasts one delved - see Methodological Notes 1 on the sources and analysis of bibliographical data.

72. it being recognised that these figures most likely do not reflect the full facts owing to a very probable reluctance in some people to discuss such sensitive matters as 'lowly' origins and 'unbecoming' occupations.

73. that is 'boss-boy' Amos Makalu, interpreter Remus Kalepa, and stores capitao Edward Sampa.

74. namely Lawrence Katilungu following an underground accident.

75. only Katilungu did not belong in the earlier council.

76. that is the colonialist usage of the term - not to be confused with the Marxist use of the term as denoting only "white-collar employees or self-employed professional men", see G. Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia" 19[illegible] (p.21.).

77. L.H. Gann "History of NR....."1964(p.379) refers to the "rise of new men in African trade and agriculture".

78. It is the present writer's conviction that not only were African 'commercial farmers' actual or embryonic capitalist producers; and 'improved farmers' another embryonic version of the same; but that even the much smaller-scale barely above subsistence level and not totally market-oriented peasant producers, in so far as they were no longer fully 'traditional' subsistence producers, were also part of the one process of social change pointing in the direction of the emergence of capitalist modes and relations of production in the rural areas and the eventual total characterisation of the same in capitalist terms. Needless to say, this is an enormous field of investigation and theoretical debate in itself. Suffice it here merely to say that it would appear to the present writer that, rather than starting with 'social categories', the methodological approach should be to start from a high level of abstraction and see these apparently discrete social categories as actually, in essence, representing <u>phases</u> in a process of social change. Despite this tentative theoretical position, the more orthodox categorisation of 'peasant', 'improved' and 'commercial' farmers has been followed in the body of this study - only those farmers employing labour in their agricultural production being defined as 'capitalist'.

79. the blue-collar 'group' has been here left out of the analysis

since the number of representatives was no negligible...and anyway it transpired that no wider information was obtained on the man in question.

80. that is 8 traders and 3 farmers - see columns(x), (xv), (xviii) and (xx) of Appendix E.

81. namely Chobola, Katowa, Nabanyama and Sangambo.

82. that is Kazoka and Walubita.

83. the direct evidence is that Chinyama, Chipepa, Habumbu, Namweleu, Sangambo and Yamba all owned fairly large-scale farms; and the indirect evidence that many others of the NA bureaucrats also owned farms derives from the fact that the conditions of their employment, far from excluding them from maintaining outside commercial interests, actually encouraged them to do so in order that they could be used and cited by the NA's and the Government in their 'schemes' of African agricultural improvements, etc.

84. namely Chibanza, Chinyama and Siwale.

85. these white collar/ex-teachers being Katilungu, Mukanza, Musumbulwa, Nalumango and Nkoloma.

86. see Appendix E, columns (x) and (xv).

87. these being R.Chimkoko, T. Chinyama and R. Kalepa as accounting clerks, P. Habumbu as a public works advisor and William Kazoka as a trained agricultural officer.

88. the number of men recorded in one occupation only in Appendix E are 4 chiefs, 4 teachers, 3 traders, 2 NA employees, 1 bus conductor, 1 mine capitao and 13 NA councillors; but in the great majority of these cases this reflected a dearth of further occupational information on these individuals rather than so many instances of actual 'single occupation' men.

89. hence the enormous number of former teachers, and even former school heads in NA employment among the ARC.members...to say nothing of the same in the civil service (and hence barred from ARC membership)

90. K.Kaunda "Zambia..." 1969 expresses precisely this approach and aspiration in relating his own early life and ambitions when he writes (p.24) that he and Simon Kapepwe

> "...realised that we could not start (a gumpole plantation) without capital, so we determined to go to the towns to look for work that would enable us to amass enough capital to start farming. I still remembered that there were opportunities in the army for qualified teachers so Simon and I decided to go to Lusaka to apply..."

and (on p.29)similarly, after relating his attempted foray into the field of professional trade union organising he concludes

"I now realised that having being trained as a teacher my best chance of earning capital was in teaching work."

91. almost all rural bureaucrats were involved directly or indirectly (wife or family) in farming and even in small-scale local trade; see also footnote (83).

92. this data is imcomplete both in terms of the information obtained on each individual and in terms of the total ARC membership; with regard to the latter, it was possible to gather such later information on only 41 of the 79 ARC men because many have since died (indicated by a D in the second column of Appendix F, and by a D? where suggested but not absolutely confirmed), one has emigrated to Malawi and it proved impossible to track down another 7.

93. that is they entered the political arena but were unsuccessful candidates in various elections; see Appendix H which is illustrated more fully in Chap V.

94. he is now deceased.

95. P.C.Lloyd "New elites of tropical Africa." 1966.

96. See pp. 69-71.

97. see Chap IV for their mutual support and agreement.

98. the composite findings of Tables XVIII to XI are as follows:

	PettyBourgeoise,	Bureaucrats,	Politicians,	Professionals
Post ARC-	11	18	17	6
Present -	13	8	6	1
TOTAL -	25	26	23	7

and, in fact, if the number in the sometimes designated 'managerial' Bourgeoisie' (rather than 'managerial bureaucracy') is assessed with the petty-bourgeois category, the latter constitutes the largest single category in terms of the data here being analysed and the figures above, revised, emerge as 32, 18, 23, and 7 respectively.

99. see Appendix H, examined more fully in Chap V.

100. The most prominent of these being Dauti Yamba, Mateo Kakumbi, Robinson Nabulyato, Henry Kasokolo, Nelson Nalumango.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. for in a colonial situation virtually all aspects of life are political. See methodological notes2 analysis of ARC Debates, [redacted].

2. fourteen full volumes and four lesser ones; see Bibliography.

3. see Chap II (p.54)

4. see Chap II (p.50)

5. this total differs from that in Tables XVIII and XIX. owing to the inclusion in the latter of amendments to motions; and differs from the total number of motions in Appendix G owing to duplication of motions in the latter, see methodological notes.2.

6. see methodological notes, 2. Analysis of ARC Debates.

7. see Appendix G.

8. see page 124.

9. although, of course, the number of times a topic was raised could also be due to the intractability of the various problems and/or the unresponsiveness or unsatisfactory responses of the authorities to the ARC suggestions.

10. see Appendix G, columns(i) and (ii).

11. see Chap II (p.36).

12. see Appendix G for the five broad divisions; and methodological notes 2 for clarification.

13. see methodological notes.

14. see Appendix G, column(vii).

15. see Chap II (p.50).

16. namely the 'Native Authority - Functioning' Topic which was largely concerned with conditions of service for the personnel of the Native Authority Councils; see p.112.

17. which the scope and focus of the present study does not, unfortunately, allow for.

18. the political motions in all totalled 221, and the non-political 158; see Table XIX, p.134.

19. see methodological notes, 2.Analysis of ARC Debates.

20. ARC 1 (1946) c.7-16.

21. ibid, c.36- : Prop Kakumbi, sed Kasokole; vote unan.

22. actually an amendment of the original motion that the members should address the Council in vernacular translated into English.

23. already actually the majority - see Chap III (p.63).

24. ARC 2(1947) c.37-43; prop Kalepa, sec Kasokolo; vote unan.

25. ARC 3(1948) c. 235-240; prop Kalepa, sec Ikelenge; vote - Yes 23, No 2.

26. ARC 12(1954) c. 105-119: prop S. Chembe, sec F. Chembe; vote: unan.

27. ARC 2(1947) c.153-160: prop Nalumango, sec Sampa; vote: No 19, Yes 9.

28. ARC 3(1948) c.90-96: prop Nabanyama, sec Pardon; vote: No 17, Yes 8, Abs 4.

29. ibid. Note voting patterns.

30. see Chap III(p.64).

31. ARC 5(1951)c.112-127: prop Mkup, sed Siwale; vote-unan.

32. ibid, c.84-111: prop Musumbulwa, sec Chinyama; vote - Yes 28, Abs 1.

33. ibid.

34. ibid, c.240-242: prop Walubita, sec Kaniki; vote - Yes 28, No 2/Abs 1.

35. ARC 9(1952)c.26-29: prop Chobola, sec Musumbulwa; vote - Yes 23, Abs 3.

36. ARC 12(1954)c.239-249: Prop Kabalata, sec S. Chembe; vote-unan. Interestingly enough, however, the parallel plea that UAC members get a fee of 10/- per meeting was rejected; the vote - No 17, Yes 3, Abs 8; see ibid c.250.

37. ARC 13(1955)c.207-218: prop Sokota, sec Kazoka; vote - Yes 22, No 9.

38. ARC 14(1956)c.221-224; prop Nkoloma, sec Kazoka; vote-unan.

39. see Chap I (p.21) for colonialist advice to African politicians to do precisely this.

40. This emerged explicitly, in fact, in one or two statements made by ARC members in these years; see for example Hansard 73(c.78) 2/7/52 D.Yamba MLC, reporting on suggestions made by African representatives to S.S. in London in 1951, said that
> "we felt (that) the time would come when the ARC will have to die its natural death";

see also ARC 14(1956)c.120-121, F.Chembe with the same sentiment and virtually same wording; and Hansard 87(c.532)18/7/56,

L.H.Ng'andu, MLC said that "these (African) councils have outlived their usefulness."

41. It is, at this point, interesting to note that in a very similar situation ten years earlier, the members of the South African 'Native Representative Council' sitting in Pretoria, after a similar long period of reformist participationism in a dummy council and system of councils, perceiving at last the "toy telephone" nature of the system, declared themselves adjourned sine die rather than continue to operate a system which they were now all convinced could achieve nothing real and offered them very little-see Lord Hailey "An African Survey", 1957 (pp 162 and 429).
In both its similarities and contrasts the South African version of the African Councils System - the latter modelled to a degree on the former - see SEC/NAT/113 I(4) (63) (84-86) (also Chap I (p.6) - is an interesting comment on both colonialist and African politics in Northern Rhodesia - and a possible avenue of fruitful investigation in itself by future researchers. Interesting in this regard are the documents preserved in T Kanis and G. Carter "From Protest to..."Vol II, 1970 (pp 224-61).

42. see Chap I (p.16)

43. note the assessment made by present day UNIP Central Committee Member Sikota Wina - personal interview. Int 8, 15/2/74
> "I don't think the ordinary African really took much notice of it (the ARC) except the few educated ones who perhaps hoped to become members of such a type of body at one stage or another. And even those only hoped to become so just to advance their own personal status. That is what one would call the era of opportunism. An African would jump at anything that would give him a ray of hope of rising."

44. and a whole range of lesser bodies throughout the country such as 'African Affairs Committees' of the Municipal Councils, local Education and Bursaries Committees, Commissions of Enquiry affecting African interests, etc.

45. see Chap V (p.152) for early criticisms of the African councils.

46. see Appendix G(B)

47. the other gaps in graph XV (B) being the special sessions of 1951 September and December and 1958 October, and the last full session of the ARC in 1958 July.

48. ARC 2(1947)p.12-17: prop Nabanyama, sec Musokotwane; vote-unan.

49. ARC 5(1951)p.240-242: prop Walubita, sec Kaniki; vote - Yes 21, No 2, Abs 6.

50. ARC 2(1947)c.145-150: prop Nalumango, sec Kalidza; vote - unan.
ARC 6(1951)c.45-50: prop Kaniki, sec Tembo; vote - unan.
ARC 13(1955)c.280-287: prop Chileshe, sec Yamba; vote - unan.

51. ARC 3(1948)c.90-97: prop Nabanyama, sec Pardon; vote-No 17, Yes 8 Abs 4 (on ARC LegCo selections from within or outside ARC).
ARC 3(1948)c.99-107: prop Kasokolo, sec Chitimpa; vote - No 19, Yes 9, Abs 2 (on 4 year term for African MLC's)
ARC 10(1953)c.217-219: prop Mushindo, sec Musumbulwa; vote - Yes 23, Abs 3 (on equal term of office for African MLC's with Europeans.)

52. ARC 2(1947)c.79-85: prop Ikelenge, sec Chinyama; vote - negatived (on increased number 'Native Interests European MLC's and, of these, one especially for Kaonde-Lunda area)
ARC 2(1947)c.158-160: prop Nalumango, sec Sitambuli; vote - No 19, Yes 9 (on selection of 'Native Interests' European MLC's by ARC "from a list of names given to them by the Government")
ARC 5(1951)c.112-127: prop Mkupo, sec Siwale; vote - unan. (that the Governor should consult the ARC before nominating the European MLC's for 'Native Interests')

53. ARC 13(1955)c.177-193; prop F. Chembe, sec Katilungu; vote - unan.

54. ARC 5(1951)c.112-127: prop Mkupo, sec Siwale; vote - unan. (demanding eight African MLC's - one per province, and one each for the Copperbelt and the rest of the line-of-rail).

55. see footnote(53).

56. ARC 9(1952)c.73-100: prop Siwale, sec Sokota; vote-unan.

57. ARC 13(1955)c.200-206: prop Nkoloma, sec Kazoka; vote - unan.

58. ARC 16(1957)c.57-72: prop Siwale, sed Chileshe; vote - unan.

59. ARC 11(1953)c.128-170: prop Yamba, sec Ng'andu; vote - unan.

60. as was required of other non-British persons applying for franchise registration in Northern Rhodesia 'white or black' the other main qualification being £100 annual income/property or house to that value.

61. ARC 12(1954)c.250-276: prop Yamba, sec Chileshe; vote - unan.

62. ARC 14(1956)c.78-122: prop F. Chembe, sec Sokota; vote - Yes 28, Abs 1.

63. ARC 16(1957)c.24-28: prop Katilungu, sec Nkonga; vote - unan.

64. ARC 16(1957)c.296. prop Sokota, sec Nabulyato; vote - unan.

65. namely S.H. Chileshe, R. Nabulyato, L.H.Ng'andu and P. Sokota - see ARC (11) 1954, c.11.

66. namely M. Kakumbi and D. Yamba see ARC 11 (1953)c.173.

67. although, in rejecting the 'franchise' proposals in the 1958 White Paper, they made an indirect statement on their attitude to enfranchisement; see Chap V (p. 167) for what they then did in practice, however.

68. see Appendix G(c).

69. ARC 1(1946)c.16-29: prop Siwale, sec Sampa; vote - Yes 15, No 13, Abs 1.

70. ARC 8(1951)c.11-52: both original motion and three amendments.

71. Ibid. c.66-68: namely the motion and amendment on the African representatives' statement at the 1951 September Victoria Falls Conference; for full details of colonialist manoeuvering on this, see D.C. Mulford "The Politics of Independence" 1967 (p.28-29)

72. See Appendix G(C) column (iv).

73. ARC 1(1946)c. 7-16.

74. ARC 1(1946)c.132-134: prop Mubitana, sec Kakumbi; vote - unan.
ARC 2(1947)c.8-12: prop Nalumango, sec Kakumbi; vote - unan.

75. ARC 1(1946)c.16-29: prop Siwale, sec Sampa; vote - Yes 15, No 13.

76. ARC 3(1948)c.8-51: prop Chitimpa, sec Nalumango; vote - unan.

77. ARC 5(1951 Jan)c.175-198: prop Siwale, sec Yamba; vote - unan.
ARC 7(1951 Sept)whole: prop Siwale, sec Mwase; vote - unan.
ARC 8(1951 Dec)c.52-62: prop Musumbulwa, sec Kaniki; vote - unan.
ARC 9(1952)c.172-174: prop Siwale, sec Kakumbi; vote - unan.
ARC 10(1953)c.93-114: prop Yamba, sec Musumbulwa: vote - Yes/23 Abs 3 (Lozi's)

78. see footnote (93).

79. but see methodological notes 2. on this question of individual divergences.

80. see footnote (70).

81. see D.C. Mulford "Politics Independence..."(pp. 28-29).

82. see Chap II (footnote 133).

83. ARC 9(1952)c.157-168: prop Chimkoko, sec Chinyama; vote - Yes 18, No 2, Abs 7.

84. Since they personally would qualify for such enfranchisement.

85. see footnote (83).

86. ARC 14(1956)c.122-137: prop Kakumbi, sec Sokota; vote - unan. ARC 15(1957)c.14-22: prop Chileshe (because it was a special sessiwn with S.S. there was no seconder and no vote since only unanimous topics were placed before this meeting).

87. ARC 17(1958)c.27-150: prop Nabulyato, sec Chileshe; vote - Yes 25, Abs 5 (4 Lozi's and William Nkanza).

88. ARC 13(1955)c.193-198: prop Nkoloma, sec F. Chembe; Vote - Yes 30, Abs 1.

89. ARC 14(1956)c.227-237: prop Katilungu, sec Kakumbi; vote - unan. ARC 17(1958)c.315-328: prop Chileshe, sec Ng'andu; vote - Yes 26, Abs 1.

90. ARC 17(1958)c.176-179: prop Chobola, sec Ng'andu; vote - unan.

91. ibid. c.185-186: prop Chileshe, sec Nabulyato; vote - unan.

92. less the Lozi delegation.

93. ARC 16(1957)c.150-197: prop Nabulyato, sec Sokota; vote - Yes 25, No 3 (Lozi's) - all the more significant (and defiant) in view of the Governor's own strong words against the motion in his opening address to the Council c.3.

94. ARC 17(1958)c.161-176: prop Puta, sec Musumbulwa; vote - Yes 24, No 4 (3 Lozi's and Mukimwa), Abs 2 (1 Lozi and Nkonga).

95. ARC 17(1958)c.367-388: prop Puta, sec Chileshe; vote - Yes 21, No 1(Nkanza), Abs 6 (4 Lozi's, Kazoka and Ikelenge).

96. ARC 18(1958)c.42-83: prop Yamba, sec Puta; vote - Yes 26, Abs 3.(Lozi's)

97. see footnotes (94) to (96) for voting patterns.

98. <u>still</u> less the Lozi delegation!

99. see for example the statement after statements made by the councillors to the S.S. for the Colonies present at their 1957 Jan special session in ARC 15 (1957).

100. not in the earlier period of the ARC's life, however, in which the councillors exhibited a very long - term view of the progress of Africans towards self-government; see for example ARC 3(1948) c.8-51 debate on the (European settler sponsered) proposal for responsible government.

101. see Appendix G (C).

102. a further one was tabled, in 1946, but withdrawn following the SNA's assurance that the "land question" was under review, see ARC 1 (1946) c.97-102.

103. see footnote (77).

104. ARC 6(1951)c.105-116: prop Kakumbi, sec Mkapo; vote - Yes 18, Abs 8.

105. ARC 11(1953)c.17-73: prop Katilungu, sec Yamba; vote - Yes 27, Abs 4 (Lozi's).

106. ARC 12(1954)c.19-41: prop Yamba, sec Katilungu; vote - unan. (because it did not involve the question of the mineral rights award, the Lozi's did not, in their usual style, abstain).

107. see ARC 11 (1953) c.37-48, 66-68 for SNA's interventions (see also AAAR, 1954 (p.3) for report on S.S. statement to the ARC on the same subject at their next session, but did not recorded in ARC 11(1954)); see also ARC 12(1954)c.37-39 for further SNA interjection on the subject.

108. ARC 12(1954)c.318-321: prop SNA, sec ____, vote - negatived.

109. ARC 14(1956)c.34-38: prop Nkoloma, sec Chileshe; vote - unan.

110. the other preoccupation being the conflicts between Native Authorities arising over land disputes owing to unclear boundaries.

111. ARC 14(1956)c.38-55: prop Nabulyato, sec Katilungu; vote - Yes 29, No 1 (Mukumwa); see also
ARC 16(1957)c.291-294: prop Nabulyato, sec Mukimwa; vote-unan. on the"lake rights of the Gwembe people", being threatened by the development of Lake Kariba fishing grounds.

112. ARC 16(1957)c.137-143: prop Sokota, sec Ng'andu; vote - unan.

113. for they never debated motions dealing with the Crown Lands per se, and only once tabled a suggestion actually proposing to (re)obtain for Africans part(s) of the Crown Lands, that is in ARC 16(1957)c.128-137: prop Chileshe, sec Chimkoko; vote-unan.
"The Government should consider much about the shortage of land in Native Reserves and allow Native Authorities to but adjoining unused farms."

114. this is evident in their raising, once again, at the special ARC 15(1957) session with the S.S. Lennox Boyd, the motion that all Trust Lands be converted into Reserve Lands.

115. most clearly evident in their debate on boundary disputes between Native Authorities; see footnote (110), ([redacted]t,
116. the ARC men explicitly stated in their debates on land (above) that they quite agreed and it was perfectly reasonable for a (small) proportion of the land tobe reserved for Europeans.

117. see for example the SNA's own extended intervention in this re regard (and the vulnerability of his arguments) in ARC 16 (1957)c.141-143.

118. ARC 1(1946)c.102-108: prop Kopa, sec Pardon; vote - unan.

119. which interventions were also very frequent and drawn out, see ARC 11(1953)c.56, 64, 68-69.
ARC 13 (1955) c.227-230, ARC 14(1956)c.193-194 and c.197; to quote the last, the question of the original mineral rights award

> "was very carefully gone into by the authorities in England...(and)...His Majesty's Government was satisfied that it was taking over valid and existent rights (from the BSA Company) and taking them over for all time(sic), and that is included in the Order in Council;"

see also ARC 16(1957)c.201-202 for further of same above.

120. ARC 11(1953)c.17-73: prop Katilungu, sec Yamba; vote - Yes 27, Abs 4 (Lozi delegation).
ARC 13(1955)c.223-232: prop Chileshe, sec Sokota; vote - Yes 24, Abs 7 (4 Lozi's, Kabalata, Kazoka and Ng'andu); ARC 14(1956) c.183-197: prop Ng'andu, sec Chobola; vote - unan (because this motion did not challenge or even refer to the Lozi treaty with the BSA Company; requesting only the copies of similar (if any) treaties signed by other chiefs);
ARC 16(1957)c.197-203: prop Katilungu, sec Kazoka; vote - Yes 24, Abs 3 (Lozi delegation).

121. ARC 14 and 16 in footnote (120) above.

122. see voting positions in footnote (120) above.

123. see Appendix G(E,F,G) column(vii).

124. into which the Native Authorities were elevated in colonialist propaganda, in the 1950's.

125. formally and directly in a motion, that is, although individuals in the last stages of the ARC did express such doubts and they emerged, indirectly, in certain motions; see p.112.

126. although motions on the chiefs' status and prileges were not more numerous after 1953, see Appendix G(H) column(ii), their reception by the ARC was much more favourable than in the earlier stages.

127. which the ARC men stated time and again in their debates against Federation; see footnote (77) above.

128. such as the provision of "suitable accomodation" at all District Headquarters - ARC 4 (1949) c.7-14; motor transport when summoned by the DC's - ARC 9(1952)c.54-56; increased subsidies - ARC 12(1954)c.199-208; housing out of public funds - ARC 16 (1957)c.28-51; and so on.

129. Such as the right to have "lockups" at their courts - ARC 4 (1949)c.29-34; or their right of jurisdiction over 'coloureds' living in Native Authority areas - ARC 14(1956)c.206-210: prop Namweleu, sec F. Chembe; vote - unan.

130. such as the registration of African births and deaths - ARC 5(1951)c.208-211: prop Yamba,sec Walubita; vote - Yes 23, Abs 6.

131. such as the conduct of campaigns against VD - ARC 4(1948) c.107-119: prop Mangwende, sec Musonda; vote - Yes 22, No 5, Abs 2.

132. such as the construction f rural welfare centres - ARC 12(1954) c.159-172: prop Ikelenge, sec Kakumbi; vote - Yes 21, No 5, Abs 4; and such as the care of orphans - ARC 13(1955)c.90-100: prop Katilungu, sec Nkonga; vote - unan.

133. such as the power to grant rural trader licenses - ARC 17(1958) c.179-185: prop Ng'andu, sec Ikelenge; vote - unan; and such as the authorisation to grant loans to "deserving traders and businessmen" - ARC 13(1955)c.124-131: prop Chibanza, sec Katilungu; vote - yes 30 No 1.

134. in general, as in ARC 10(1953)c.56-61: prop Walubita, sec Chimkoko; vote - Yes 22, Abs 3; and in particular, as in ARC 10(1953)c.222-227: prop Sandasanda, sec Kaniki; vote - Yes 24, Abs 2, for sub-post offices at "tribal headquarters."

135. such as the control of game, as in ARC 4(1948)c.296-298; and ARC 14(1956)c.72-78; and the control of fish and the fishing industry as in ARC 6(1951)c.99-105, ARC 9(1952) c.30-43, and ARC 10(1953)c.202-209 - as well as general responsibility for natural resources as in ARC 5(1949)c.161-174 and ARC 113(1955) c.219-223.

136. As in ARC 5(1949)c.24-29; ARC 10(1953)c.42-45; ARC 16(1957) c.270-272, and ARC 17(1958)c.207-216.

137. such as rents and license fees paid by Africans ARC4(1948) c.213-220; or Europeans - ARC 13(1955)c.114-118 and ARC 16 (1957)c.143-146 - in the rural areas ; as wellas rural arms license fees, as in ARC 6(1951)c.185-186 and ARC 12(1954) c.119-124.

138. ARC4 (1948)c.207-213: prop Kakumbi, sec Sitambuli; vote - Yes 24, No 1, Abs 4.

139. Such as grants for developing rural postal services as in ARC 13(1955)c.35-40; and improving rural roads as in ARC 13 (1955)c.137-147 and ARC 16(1957)c.265-269; as well as long term loans as in ARC 16(1957)c.205-209, as well as long term loans as in ARC 16(1957)c.205-209.

140. see Appendix G (G).

141. ARC 1(1946)c.83-85: prop Kalepa, sec Musokotwane; vote - Unan. ARC 2(1947)c.37-43: prop Kalepa, sec Kasokola; vote - unan.

142. such as paid leave as in ARC 2(1947)c.161-162; living and travel allowances as in ARC 9(1952)c.105-112; subsistence allowances as in ARC 13(1955)c.100-104; improved salaries as in ARC 14(1956)c.197-200; pensions and gratuities as in ARC 17(1958)c.398-403; and so on...fully 10 out of the 17 motions.

143. see ARC3(1948)c.235-240, ARC 10(1954)c.126-135, and ARC 12 (1954)c.105-119.

144. see Chap III footnote (17); plus the policy and practice of 'divide and rule'.

145. ARC 17(1958)c.150-176: prop Sayiri, sec Nkonga;unan. no.

146. in terms of the legislation enacted by the Colonial Government requiring special authorisation of any public gathering beyond a certain size, in favour of an amendment rejecting any such restrictions, whether by the central or the 'local'African' government, in favour of full freedom of association and speech; ibid.

147. ARC 17(1958)c.341-367: prop Musumali, sec Puta; vote - Yes 18, No 4, Abs 5.

148. as is evident not only in the divided voting ibid, but in the actual debate itself in which many speakers based themselves on traditionalists arguments about the "proper" status of chiefs, rather than concern with the role and aims of the colonial authorities as such.

149. ARC 10(1953)c.191-197: prop Chola, sec Chimkoko; vote - yes 24, Abs 2.

150. Although they were quick to see such potential in the local government system in the town context; see Chap I (footnote 160.).

151. See, for example, the settlers' comments in the debate on Constitutional Developments in Hansard 49(c.190-273) Jan 1945.

152. such as that Native Authorities Treasuries have a share of the fines and fees collected in Urban Native Courts, as in ARC 4 (1949)c.83-86:prop Chipyama, sec Sangambo; vote - Yes 8, No 7, Abs 14; and the proposal that Native Authorities should receive the unclaimed property of deceased persons in the urban areas, as in ARC 4(1949)c.14-24: prop Sandasanda, sec Chinyama; vote - Yes 18, No 9, Abs 2; as well as the repeated motions on the Native Authorities authorisation of urban arms ownership and owners, as in ARC 3(1948)c.266-274: prop Kasokolo, sec Chinyama; vote No 18, Yes 8, Abs 3 and in ARC 17(1958) c.286-314: prop Puta, sec Nkanza; vote - No 19, Yes 8, Abs 2.

153. see footnote (138).

154. ARC 13(1955)c.104-113: prop Ng'andu, sec Nkoloma; vote - Yes 26, No 3, Abs 2 (emphasis added).

155. see, for example, ARC5(1951)c.80-82: prop Yamba, sec Siwale; vote - yes 24, Abs 5, advocating the delegation of the tribal councils powers to the Native Authority Councils while ostensibly defending the former.

156. least of all the Native Authority and/or rural-based men of the professional and petty-bourgeois groups.

157. ARC 14(1956)c.138-147: prop Sayiri, sec Nkoloma; vote - Yes 24, Abs 6.

158. ARC 12(1954)c.321-331: prop F. Chembe, sec Nkoloma; vote - Yes 27, No 3.

159. hencethe grouping of motions on the police, and especially police brutality, in this category.

160. see motions on this aspect in ARC 1(1946)c.148-151; ARC 3 (1948)c.298-301; ARC4(1949)c.75-83; ARC 9(1952)c.117-123 and ARC 13(1955)c.244-255.

161. ARC 1(1946)c.135-140: prop Pardon, sec Kasokolo; vote-unan.

162. such as in wholesale buying, as in ARC 2(1947)c.93-99; credit facilities, as in ARC 4(1949)c.87-101; and the running of bars, as in ARC 12(1954)c.276-282.

163. personal recollection of the present writer of life and politics in the Rhodesias under Federation.

164. see Appendix G (J).

165. ARC 4(1949).c.132-139: prop Walubita, sec Yamba; vote - Yes 21, No 4, Abs 4.

166. ARC 6(1951)c.176-180;prop Musumbulwa, sec Nalumango; vote - Yes 20, Abs 6, and ARC 12(1954)c.282-291: prop Katilungu, sec Kakumbi; vote - Yes 28, No 1 (for Africans were required to deposit their arms with the DC while in town;)

167. ARC 14(1956)c.205-206: prop Nkonga, sec Ikelenge; vote - unan. ARC 17(1958)c.282-286: prop Chimboyi, sec Chobola; vote - unan. (for Africans were restricted to buying second hand arms and only from other Africans - in order to control both the quality and quantity of arms owned by Africans in Northern Rhodesia).

168. see for example ARC 2(1947)c.99-101: prop Chimkoko, sec Musokotwane; vote - unan. What they did try to modify,

however, was the clause that required (even long-time) urban residents to receive the endorsement of their "home" chiefs before they could acquire firearms - in favour of approval by the urban DC's and/or UAC's, as in ARC 3(1948) c.266-274: prop Kasokolo, sec Chinyama; vote - No 18, Yes 8, Abs 3; or in favour of approval by urban DC's and/or local authorities and/or employers, as in ARC 7(1958)c.286-314: prop Puta, sec Nkanza; vote - No 19, Yes 8, Abs 2.

169. see Appendix G(L).

170. Arc 5(1951)c.242-250; prop Somah, sec Musumbulwa; vote-unan. ARC 12(1954)c.72-105: prop Sokota, sec Nkoloma; vote - unan.

171. ARC 2(1947)c.43-52: prop Nalumango, sec Kalidza; vote - unan. ARC 5(1951)c.198-207: prop Tembo, sec Mkupo; vote - unan.

172. ARC 2(1947)c.43-52, see footnote (171). ARC 17 (1958)c.201-206: prop Ng'andu, sec Nabulyato; vote - unan.

173. see also, for example, the motion protesting racial discrimination in transport facilities "for Africans travelling on public duty" in ARC 13(1955)c.66-77.

174. see Appendix G (K).

175. ARC 1(1946)c.140-146: prop Makalu, sec Kalidza; vote - unan.

176. such as Dc's, as in ARC 5 (1951)c.233-240; prop Mkupo, sec Walubita; vote - Yes 26, Abs 3; and DO's as in ARC 10(1953) c.61-76: prop Sokota, sec Yamba; vote - unan; and generally into "higher posts", as in ARC 16(1957)c.287-291: prop Puta, sec Nabulyato; vote - unan.. Fully seven of the eight motions were of this genre.

177. ARC 1(1946)c.123-132: prop Nalumango, sec Mubitana; vote - Yes 18, No 4, Abs 7; Arc 9 (1952)c.147-151: prop Kakumbi, sec Yamba; vote - Yes 20, Abs 7; ARC 12(1954)c.127-159; prop Katilungu, sec Yamba; vote - No 14, Yes 10, Abs 6.

178. ARC 17(1958)c.272-281: prop Sokota, sec S.Chembe; vote- unan.

179. see Appendix G(M).

180. see Table (XVII)-two of the four conflict debates in this group were on alcoholic drink, one on African relations with "coloureds and one on Indian settler attitudes to Africans, see footnotes (181) and (182).

181. ARC 2(1947)c.17-36: prop Chimkoko, sec Zilole; vote - Yes 17 No 7, Abs 5 "that Government should prohibit all Indian immigration since Indians bring no good to us but cheat us when we buy from them and when we work for them"

182. ARC 2(1947)c.55-64; prop Kalepa, sec Kopa; vote - Yes 20 No 4, Abs 5. requiring that European fathers be constrained to give support for their "coloured" offspring, and regretting

> "the increasing tendancy to accord to coloureds priveleges that are denied to Africans."

183. In contrast to their careful "non-racialism" and repeated assurances to their white masters - see debates above, and on other racial discrimination topics; note also their approval of the motion - put forward by the SNA - that "Europeans be prohibited by law from cohabiting with African women", so as to produce no further "coloureds" in the country, in ARC 2(1947)c.64-67, vote Yes 23, No 5.

184. See Appendix G column (vii); the political Racial Discrimination motions alone totalled 65 out of a total of 246 political motions debated in the ARC.

185. ARC 15(1957)c.14-18: prop S. Chileshe at special session with S.S. Lennox Boyd.

186. Although these are not, ~~of course~~, mutually exclusive categories.

187. see Appendix G, fourth and fifth general divisions.

188. see Appendix G, columns (v) and (vi).

189. one on transport rates in ARC 3(1948), and the other on first aid boxes in buses in ARC 19(1953).

190. such as that road transport for Africans be in buses not open trucks in ARC 1(1946)c.151-155; that bus transport be provided along all trunk roads, as in ARC 10(1953)c.48-55; or that Africans be allowed in emergencies to travel on goods trains as in ARC 4(1949)c.140-144; and that more third-class coaches be provided on trains as in ARC 14(1956)c.56-64.

191. such as that goods depots be provided at rural bus-stops as in ARC 10(1955)c.76-79; or that baggage lorries always travel ahead of passenger buses as in ARC 13(1955)c.20-30.

192. ARC 2(1947)c.166-168.

193. ARC10(1953)c.45-48.

194. ARC 6(1951)c.50-69.

195. ARC 16(1957)c.265-269.

196. such as in ARC 2(1947)c.77-79 for more Standard 5 and 6 places; in ARC 4(1949)c.155-161 for improved boarding conditions; in ARC 9(1952)c.116-117 for extended compulsory education age for

African children between 7 and 15 years etc.

197. as in ARC 3(1948)c.124-130 for "another secondary" school; ARC 15(1957)c.22-25 for "more secondary technical and vocational schools", or ARC 13(1955)c.327-331 for an "inter-racial technical college"etc...

198. as in ARC 1(1946)c.109-116 and ARC3 (1948)c.130-143.

199. as in ARC 14(1956)c.64-72.

200. as in ARC 4(1949)c.109-113 and ARC 15(1957)c.22-25.

201. as in ARC 5(1951)c. 136-142.

202. such as in ARC 3(1948)c.287-293 that "B" class students could not proceed beyond Standard 4, or in ARC 6(1951)c.38-45 that the sharply narrowing pyramid system allowed too few Africans to advance higher; repeated in ARC 12(1954)c.172-180.

203. see Appendix G (R) column (vii) - education having the highest number of political motions of the developmental debates, four of these being on barriers to individual African educational advance; one a debate rejecting an official motion that Native Authorities increase their levies to provide more educational facilities and the sixthe being a demand for an inter-racial technical college.

204. see Chap III Table VII (p. 75).

205. as in ARC 5(1951)c.136-142 a plea for four boarding schools near the urban areas, or in ARC 10(1953) c.84-93 for more schools on the Copperbelt, or in ARC 13(1955)c.55-65 for facilities for railway employees' children along the rail line.

206. ARC 2(1947)c.86-91: prop Kasokolo, sec Pardon; vote - No 14, Yes 11, Abs 4; see also the proposal in ARC 2(1947)c.191-195 for an "inter-racial club" for young people.

207. ARC 6(1951)c.10-16: prop Sangambo, sec Nalumango; vote - unan.

208. such as leprosy as in ARC 1(1946)c.146-148 and ARC 13(1955) c.132-136; VD as in ARC 2(1947)c.188-190 and ARC 4(1949) c.67-75; TB as in ARC 3(1948)c.293-296, or mental illness as in ARC 9(1952)c.10-12.

209. such as <u>rural areas</u> as in ARC 2(1947)c.199-204 for sanitary inspectors; ARC 10(1953)c.197-202 for rural ambulances or ARC 13(1955)c.49-55 for rural hospitals; facilities for "<u>thickly populated areas</u>", as in ARC 17(1958)c.259-261; and even <u>for specific places</u> as in ARC 10(1953)c.227-232 for a Hospital at Chingombe stream.

210. ARC 4(1949)c.174-184: prop Mkupo, sec Kakumbi; vote - No 10 Yes 9, Abs 4.

211. ARC 6(1951)c.195-200: prop Walubita, sec Musumbulwa; vote - Yes 11, No 9, Abs 6.

212. the interesting thing in their divided opinions over the question being that it was not over the principle of the matter but the mere timing - that the proposal was premature for there were so very few Africans who could so pay.

213. as in ARC 2(1947)c.101-116 for example.

214. as in ARC 3(1948)c.69-77 for example.

215. such as bridges and pontoons in ARC 6(1951)c.153-160 and ARC 10(1953)c.219-222; and improved roads as in ARC 6(1951) c.159-160 and ARC 13(1955)c.137-147.

216. such as more dispensaries and hospitals in ARC 5(1951)c.166-170 and ARC 13(1955)c.49-55, and for welfare centres as in ARC 12(1954)c.159-172.

217. ARC 3(1948)c.157-164: prop Kalepa, sec Sitambuli; vote - no vote because the motion was withdrawn on official suggestion while the scheme was still under further investigation.

218. ARC 6(1951)c.86-92: prop Kakumbi, sec Walubita; vote - unan.

219. ARC 9(1952)c.101-105: prop Mkupo, sec Walubita; vote - Yes 42 Abs 15.

220. ARC 10(1953)c.176-191: prop Yamba, sec Kakumbi; vote No 11, Yes 9, Abs 6.

221. which they <u>had</u> also asked for - on the basis of a Government tractor-hiring service, see ARC 5(1951)c.21-35.

222. this type of reasoning is of considerable interest in itself for, far from being based on an anti-capitalist rationale, it resembled and reflected, if anything, the typical emergent European bourgeois criticism of the old feudal order and landed aristocracy impeding their own full development.

223. as in ARC 11(1953)c.73-80: prop Kazoka, sec Nabulyato; vote - Yes 27, Abs 4, and in ARC 10(1953)c.171-176: prop Mushindo, sec Walubita; vote - Yes 17, Abs 9, and ARC14(1956)c.237-247: prop Chobola, sec Kazoka; vote - Yes 11, No 11, Abs 4.

224. as in ARC 10(1953)c.150-153: prop Walubita, sec Chitimpa; vote - Yes25, Abs 1; and ARC 16(1957)c.209-210: prop Chobola, sec Nabulyato; vote - unan.; and ARC 16(1957)c.205-209: prop Chileshe, sec Katilungu; vote-unan.

225. ibid.

226. ARC 13(1955)c.294-307: prop Ng'andu, sec Chileshe; vote - Yes 30, Abs 1.

227. see for example one of the ARC's debates on the "repatriation" of people from the towns to their villages in ARC 3(1948) c.174-187.

228. reminiscent of their reactions on the mineral rights issue and with even less reason for they had evidence of this before them in the Government's taxes to force people out to work.

229. see Table XIII (p. 91)

230. although there were three questions tabled on economic development topics (see Table XIV) in ARC 9(1952)c.134: Induna Kalonga
"When shall manufacturers of some useful products like sugar, leather, cotton or cloth, etc...be established in Northern Rhodesia?"
in ARC 13(1955)c.235: Chileshe
"What progress is made in prospecting for minerals in the country?"
and ARC 17(1958)c.110: Yamba
"Will Government state the number of mines discovered in the territory up to now, what kind of minerals discovered, where are these mines found, and how many of them have started production?"

231. whether central government or local - Native Authority - government.

232. see metholodological notes 2.

233. which seems more than likely in the light of the observation of the clear and sharp reduction in the incidence of the general "social issues" motions in the 1950's (see Table XVI S) which were almost all the direct product and manifestation of the process of social change in Northern Rhodesia.

234. for elaboration on characteristic African Trade Unionist attitudes see I.Henderson "Wage Earners and Political Protest in Colonial Africa" in African Affairs Vol 72 (288)July 1973.

235. ARC 14(1956)c.138-146: prop Sayiri, sec Nkoloma; vote - Yes 24, Abs 6.

236. ARC 16(1957)c.72-86: prop Yamba, sec Nakumbi; vote - unan.

237. ARC 17(1958)c.263-272: prop Nabulyato, sec Chileshe; vote-unan.

238. see Appendix G (O) column (ii), and Table XVI O.

239. ARC 3(1948)c.248-253: prop: Kasokolo, sec Makalu; vote - Yes 15, No 11, Abs 3.

240. ARC 4(1949)c.52-64: prop: Kaniki, sec Tembo; vote - Yes 15, No 7, Abs 7

241. ARC 4(1949)c.64-67: prop Kaniki, sec Sitambuli; vote - No 16 Yes 8, Abs 5.

242. ARC 5(1951)c.212-216: prop Tembo, sec Walubit; vote - Yes 21, Abs 8.

243. ARC 5(1951)c.221-229: prop Chimkoko, sec Mwase; vote - No 23, Yes 3, Abs 3.

244. ARC 2(1947)c.184-187: vote - unan; ARC 4(1949)c.113-124; vote - unan.

245. ARC 6(1951)c.200-205: prop Kaniki, sec Mkupo; vote - unan.

246. see Racial Discrimination in Employment and Promotions (pp 117 - 118).

247. see Native Authority - Functioning (p.212).

248. see Chiefs' Status and Priveleges (p.111).

249. such as their demands for a Government enquiry into the low wages and unsatisfactory employment conditions of shop assistants and domestic servants in ARC 3(1948)c.260-262: vote- unan; and their request for reduction in municipal rents or increased African wages to cater to these high rents, in ARC 5(1951)c.229-233: vote - Yes 28, Abs 1.

250. except for two motions; one explicit - on government employment of labour - see footnote (236) above; and the other implicit - on the employment of semi-skilled whites in preference to Africans - see ARC 14(1956)c.227-an indirect reference to the mines.

251. see footnote (249) above.

252. see footnotes (240), (241) and (249).

253. see for example ARC 5(1951)c.221-229, ARC 14(1956)c. 138-147.

254. see for example motions on free feeding schemes in ARC 6(1951) c.16-23 and on orphanages in ARC 13(1955)c.90-100.

255. such as pensions for the aged and destitute in ARC 2(1947)c.168-175 and ARC6(1951)c.138-141.

256. as in their pleas for family allowances in ARC 10(1953)c.13-21 and ARC 14(1956)c.16-22.

257. as in ARC 5(1951)c.82-84 on welfare rates and in ARC 9(1952) c.145-147 on welfare centre construction.

258. see ArC 12(1954)c.159-172.

259. ARC 10(1953)c.31-41, and ARC14(1956)c.247-250.

260. ARC 12(1954)c.189-194.

261. ARC 11(1953)c.98-108: prop Nabulyato, sec Habumbu; vote - Yes 16, No 13, Abs 4.

262. all the more significant in view of the then current discussions about the plans of Dr. Alexander Scott to set up, what was to become, the Lilanda African Home Ownership scheme in Lusaka.

263. ARC 3(1948)c.191-198: prop Pardon, secSekota; vote - No 13, Yes 11, Abs 5.

264. see Appendix G(S).

265. see Appendix G (T).

266. testified to in the repeated laments about the "fragility" of African marriages and the need to find means to "strengthen" the institution, for example in ARC 1(1946)c.43-66; ARC 2(1947) c.136-144 and ARC 5(1951)c.52-67; and in the concern expressed over the incidence of adultery in the urban areas in ARC 9 (1952)c.56-73.

267. the motion on the introduction of compulsory family remittances from the urban to the rural areas, testifying to the break down in the family caused by the migrant labour system, in ARC 3 (1948)c.191-198; and the suggestion for the abolition of the matrilineal system evidence of changes of another sort in African conceptions of the family as in ARC 5(1951)c.69-79, vote - No 12, Yes 2, Abs 15.

268. as in ARC 2(1947)c.129-136.

269. evident in the motion in ARC 5 (1951)c. 142-164 deploring the practices and influence of the Watchtower Movement; vote - Yes 10, No 3, Abs 16.

270. for example in the suggestion that tribal assessors be abolished in the urban areas in ARC 3(1948)c.241-248; vote - No 26, Yes 2, Abs 1.

271. As in ARC 9(1952)c.56-73; Arc 10(1953)c.144-149 and ARC 16 (1957)c.98-102.

272. fully seven of the twenty-two motions in this wide ranging and varied group of motions; the most explicit statement on the "rights" of "private property" being in ARC 6(1951)c.176-180;

273. as in ARC 1(1946)c.67-72; vote Yes 22, No 1, Abs 6; Arc 2(1947) c.116-121; vote -unan. and ARC 9(1952)c.123-139; vote- Yes 16, Abs 11.

274. see Appendix G (U)½

275. see Racial Discrimination in Trade (p.116).

276. ARC 1 (1946)c.135-140: prop Pardon, sec Kasokolo; vote - unan.

277. as in ARC 5(1951)c.8-20 and c.37-42 and ARC 14(1956)c.224-226.

278. ARC 14(1956)c.168-176 and ARC 16(1957)c.209-210.

279. as in ARC 3(1948)c.150-157.

280. for example in ARC 13(1955)c.124-131 tom "deserving traders and businessmen".

281. as in ARC 10(1953)c.209-216; to African traders through their assocations.

282. see for example ARC 5(1951)c.8-21 for such rival conflicts and ARC 9(1952)c.117-123 for urban competition amongst traders.

283. ARC 10(1953)c.119-121: propSangambo, sec Chinyama; vote - Yes 9, Abs 17.

284. ARC 16(1957)c.272-283; prop Nkanza, sec Chibanza; vote - Yes 7, No 5, Abs 14.

285. ibid c.245-256: prop Katilungu, sec Ikelenge; vote - Yes 16, No 4, Abs 6.

286. see p. 111.

287. see p. 112-113.

288. see p. 122.

289. although the ten motions in the alcoholic drink category have not been specifically analysed in the text.

290. in which there were repeated divisions of opinion betweenthose who were convinced by colonialist propagandaand/or the
= principle of the long-term conservation of natural resources, and those who saw such programmes as a mere colonialist ploy to further expropriate the Africans,and/or took the more short term view of the immediate livelihood needs and demands of the rural areas. Although the Natural Resources group of motions is not specifically examined in the MS body of this study its content is largely as above.

291. see p. 103-105.

292. see methodological notes 2.

293. this being an important change; see p. 128.

294. see p. 128.

295. see pp 100, 104.

296. see p. 104.

297. see pp 106-107.

298. involving divergence of opinion among the whole membership rather than merely a few divergent voices; see methodological notes 2.

299. "Nationalism" employed here only in the more limited sense of a broad political focus upon the widest national entity and all regions, social elements, and interests involved therein. For fulk discussion of the definition of nationalism, see Chap VI.

300. see Chap III Table XII (p.86).

301. that this was a class-in-the-making, manifesting not only the internal (relative) contradictions characterising social classes but contradictions of another order arising from the still forming nature of their class-consciousness, is also manifest in the proceedings of the ARC. Further examination and elaboration on this theme, however, lies outside the scope of the present study.

302. the kind of "debunking" interpretation made of the ARC men by certain nationalist polititians today; oral evidence: Int 8 with Sikota Wina 15/2/74 and Int 9 with Mungoni Liso 20/2/74.

303. the kind of "heroic" interpretation made of all such earlier forms of political expression and protest by Africans, by other nationalist polititians and historians - see Chap VI (p. 194).

CHAPTER FIVE

1. see Chap I.

2. see Chap IV.

3. but see Chap I (p.29)

4. See Chap II.

5. ideally an examination and detailed analysis should have been made of the membership of all the councils but that would have been an exercise of such dimensions and resulted in a study of such a scale and scope as to lie outside the range and possibilities of the present and author. It is nonetheless clearly a feasible and fruitful avenue of further investigation by other

6. see Chap III.

7. see Chap IV.

8. ibid.

9. oral evidence - Int 8 with Sikota Wina 15/2/74.

10. Northern News 20/12/58.

11. oral evidence - Int 9 with Mungoni Liso 20/2/74. Int 10 with Harry Nkumbula 28/2/74.

12. See Chap IV.

13. see Chap I (p.27).

14. see Chap II (p.41)

15. see Chap III (pp 86-87)

16. see Chap IV (p.136)

17. see footnote (11) above.

18. which evidence was produced by the interviewer in the later stages of the interviews, and not offered as information by the interviewees themselves.

19. see SEC/NAT/353 - that is, apart from earlier applications for registration as a society and so on.

20. ibid (24) 28 October 1946, FAS to SNA.

21. SEC/NAT/113 I(236) 20 July 1948. S.G. Cong to SNA.

22. ibid, but note also SEC/NAT/353 (106) SG Cong to SNA, 16 Oct 1948, where the request was for three seats.

23. SEC/NAT/353 (42) 19Dec 1946, SNA to FAS deleg. led by Dauti Yamba.

24. ibid. (82) 31 July 1948 SNA to SG Cong.

25. SEC/NAT/109 II (ii) 4th Oct 1948, SNA Quart Conf News (p.8); see also Chap I (p.9).

26. SEC/NAT/353 (139) 28 Dec 1948, SNA to Cong deleg.

27. see Chap II (p.39)

28. although three of the four did later become council members, see p. 150.

29. Kenneth Kaunda "Zambia..." 1967 (p.30) says he was chosen by his fellow teachers "to represent them on the Urban Advisory Council".

30. the continuity and consistency of the position of the earlier Federation and later Congress does not appear to support the conclusions by authoritative historians such as R. Rotberg "Rise...."1965 (p.212) and D.C. Mulford "Politics..." 1967 (p.17) that there was a distinctly different position taken by the later Congress to the earlier Federation on the question of organisation representation on the ARC.

31. SEC/NAT/ 353 (91) 11 Sept 1948. SG Cong to SNA referred to the ARC as "our mouthpiece".

32. ibid. (94) ? Sept 1948, Tentative Constitution of the NRAC, clause (b).

33. ibid (52) 15 May 1948, SG Cong invitation to ARC members to attend NRAC General Council Meeting.

34. ibid (139) 28th Sept 1948, Cong deleg. to SNA, item 3 of Mins.

35. ibid (144) 7th Jan 1949, SG Cong open letter.

36. ibid

37. ibid "they are indispensable at the moment until we have an educated majority in the whole country."

38. ibid.

39. ibid.

40. ibid. "The members of the ARC think that they are despised by the educated African class".

41. SEC/NAT/353 (62) 29 June 1948, FAS deleg. to SNA. Record of meeting (p. 2), FAS objected that the ARC were to select the African members of the "Responsible Government" deleg. to London; ibid. (65) 10 July 1948, SG FAS to SNA "soliciting" a place for the FAS on the constitutional delegation to London.

42. see Chap III Table V (p.70.)

43. R.Hall "Zambia" 1965 (p. 120) records that Nkumbula was nominated in 1943 to the Kitwe UAC by the local DC.

44. *Congress General Secretary who joined the ARC in 1953.*

45. Congress Vice President who became an ARC member in 1949.

46. Earlier General Treasurer of Congress who was a Western Province

Provincial Councillor in the early 1950's.

47. as little as two months before the elections - see footnote (35) above.

48. oral evidence - Int 9 with Mungoni Liso 20/2/74. He referred to an organised ANC infiltration into the UAC's at this period.

49. see Chap II (p.39).

50. such as Western Province, Congress Treasurer, Abner Kazunga and another provincial Congress leader (exact office unknown) Pascale Sokota.

51. K. Kaunda "Zambia..."1969 (p.31)

52. ibid (p.33) as evidence that he did attach some importance to this fact it is interesting to note that, in describing some racial discrimination experiences he had in shops in Mufulira, he relates how the local DC came to his defense and remonstrated with a local chemist at fault:

> "Do you realise that you have been behaving like this to a man who may before long be sitting in the Legislative Council? (it was just at the time when I had been elected to the Provincial Council) The proprieter was a little taken aback and asked me to his dispensary to apologise".

53. see Chap I (p.15)

54. see Chap IV.

55. R.Rotberg "Rise...."1965 (p.235); see also DC. Mulford "Politics ...."1967 (p.21).

56. see Chap I. (p.17); according mainly to Gore-Browne.

57. oral evidence - Int 10 with Harry Nkumbula 28/2/74.

58. see p. 160.

59. see for example newspaper editorials on the ARC in C.A.P. (144) 11 Jan 1951 and Mutende (368) 30 Jan 1951.

60. Mutende (381) 1st May 1951, no name.

61. C.A.P. (151) 1st Mar 1951, by Malitonga.

62. Ibid (173) 2nd Aug 1951, by Chanda; and ibid (179)13 Sept 1951 by Shiyanda.

63. see p. 149.

64. in this regard it is interesting to note that when a proposal

was put to the various APC's and the ARC that the Congress be given seats directly on the ARC, their reaction was that Congress men should go through the same processes of election and upward selection as they had had to do. Clearly the councillors were not prepared to allow anyone from "outside" easy access to the "prizes" that they had to work so hard for. The proposal did not even surface in the ARC's public debates but was thrown out in committee stage; see SEC/NAT/109 II (46) 30 Sept 1949, SNA Quart Conf News. (p.4)

65. see p. 154.

66. N/0088 I(2) a newspaper clipping from "Africa Weekly" 29 July 1949, reporting on the Southern Rhodesia ANC annual conf. held in Salisbury on 11 July 1949.

67. Hansard 66 (c.111-113) "Rhodesian Study Club" pamphlet quoted at length by Welensky 16 Nov 1949; checked also in the personal collection of documents of Simon Zukas.

68. N/0088 I (3) no date, Hastings Banda to Gore-Browne.

69. firstly because Gore-Browne had heard Welensky's diatribe against the Rhodesia Study Club pamphlet, see footnote (67) above; and had himself received Hasting Banda's opinion, see footnote (68); what is more these criticisms all immediately preceeded Gore-Browne's dire warnings about African attacks on the councils, whereas such "criticisms" from within Northern Rhodesia as were traced by the present writer came in a later period.

70. see Chap I (footnote 111.)

71. see Chap I (p. 17)

72. since the dearth of direct Congress documentary evidence in this direction could be a function of the inaccessibility of the Congress' party files, the failure to locate such ANC criticism, in itself, is not adequate evidence; taken together, however, with the absence of any such comments or reports at the time in the press; and taken together with the oral evidence of Simon Zukas, Int 13 31/1/75 (a man active in Northern Rhodesia political pamphleteering at the time), the conclusion that no such published criticisms were then made seems justified.

73. Hansard 73(c.420-21) 11 July 1952. Nightingale.

74. Ibid.

75. N/0088 III(276) 21Oct 1952. Notes for ExCo.

76. Ibid (280) 29 Oct 1952. PC (SP) to SNA.
Ibid (281) 3 Nove 1952. PC (WP) to SNA.
Ibid (262 A) no date. PC (CP) to SNA.

77. R. Rotberg "Rise..."1965. (p.235)

78. K. Kaunda "Zambia" 1967 (p.97)

79. Mins. WP APC 23-25th April 1951, Lipalile (p.9) proposing the motion that the ANC be officially recognised as the African spokesman, said that" the African Congress is now demanding a seat on the ARC"; see also footnote (107) below.

80. Ibid.

81. Congress Newsletter (Vol I, No 1, p. 8) message from the Sec Genrl.

82. ARC 8(1951).66. N. Nalumango; see also Hansard 72(c.73) 10 Nov 1951. Moffat.

83. C.A.P. (187) 8 Nov 1951.

84. see R. Hall "Zambia" 1965. (p.155) quotation of a mimeographed ARC statement to this effect dated 20th July 1953.

85. see Chap IV (p.99)

86. see Chap IV (pp 99-100)

87. R.Rotberg "Rise..." (p.235).

88. Ibid. (p. 246)

89. the main evidence deriving from the fact that the occasion of the publication of this constitutional proposal was Nkumbula's 1952 August conference - attended by a great number of chiefs.

90. R.Rotberg "Rise..."1965 (p.246)

91. compare, for example, ARC reasons in their debates against Federation, see Chap IV (footnote 77); and ANC reasons, as exemplified in the Nkumbula - Banda Memorandum against Federation issued in London in 1948. See R.Hall "Zambia" 1965 (pp 147-148.)

92. see, for example, the position taken by Secretary General K. Kaunda in a Circular in December, 1956 to ANC members in regard to

> "the fight against...this dreadful monster Federation which is intended to be a central African Dominion, in other words, the fight for remaining a Protectorate under the direct control of the Colonial Office until we are ready to participate fully in the running of our Protectorate's affairs."

quoted in K.Kaunda "Zambia..." (p.65-66)

93. see p. 157-158.

94. Ibid.

95. see, for example, xxxxxthe circular issued by Secretary General Kaunda in Feb 1954 demanding the abolition of communal representation, quoted in African Eagle II (5) 9 Feb 1954, p.1; see also "Congress news III (3)no month, 1954. p. 5. for statement by Nkumbula against the unsatisfactory

> "present arrangements whereby a position in LegCo could be obtained by Africans by means of winning a series of elections to lower bodies..."

96. oral evidence - Int 9 with Mungoni Liso 20/2/74, and Int 10 with Harry Nkumbula 28/2/74.

97. "Cong News" I (2) Nov 1953 "Opinion by Hyde"(p.7-8)

98. see Chap II (p.41).

99. "Letters to the Governor General", President's Office 30/11/53 N 70-180 by President H. Nkumbula and Secretary General K. Kaunda.

100. the confusion arising over the distinction between election by and electi n merely from the ARC, see below.

101. Ibid

> "Our understanding of this therefore is that while this body (the ARC) is authorised to elect the two African Members to Parliament their choice of candidates should not be confined to the Members of the said body (the Governor of Northern Rhodesia) has madé a breach in the Constitution in that he has restricted the election of such (Federal Assembly) members from only the thirty British protected persons in the Arc)"

102. C.A.P. (405) 24 November 1953, published Congress' list of legislature candidates as follows:
Federal Assembly - two out of P.Sokota, D.Siwale, H.Nkumbula and K.Kaunda; European representative for Africans Gore Browne or MacKenzie.
Territorial legislature - four out of D.Yamba, M.D.Mkoloma, P.Mabubumba, E.C.Duta, Saidi Mayanda, Kasende and Mungoni (Liso?); nominated members for 'African Interests' L.Katilungu, R.Nabulyato and MacKenzie.

103. "Cong News" III (3) no month 1954 (p.5)

> "Mr. Nkumbula said [to the Secretary of State] that he had been unable to stand for the Lusaka U.A.C. at the last elections in 1953, a necessary first step to obtain [sic] a place in Legislative Council, because he had been away at the time."

104. ibid

105. ANC Press Communique 13 October 1953, quoted in K.Kaunda "Zambia..." (1967)(p.56-57)

106. since the U.A.C. elections were held in September and earlier October; the urban elections to APC's during October, and the APC's elections to the ANC in November 1953; see The African Eagle I (numbers 37 to 47).

107. this must have been in early or mid November because D.C.Mulford "Politics..." 1967 (p.37) cites archival file NE/1/3 vol.I Box 1672 in which, on 14 November 1953, N.S.Price to C.S. reported ANC application for direct representation on the ANC for itself and the Trade Union Congress

108. ibid.

109. see page 151

110. see Appendix B, column (xi).

111. C.A.P.(341) 14 April 1953.

112. oral evidence - Int 13 with Harry Nkumbula 21/2/75.

113. C.A.P.(341) 14 April 1953, front page report (emphasis added).

114. ibid.

115. R.Hall, "Zambia" 1965 (pp.157-58).

116. C.A.P. (370) 24 July 1953, by J.B.Kuncha.

117. ibid.

118. see Chapter II (p.41).

119. ibid.

120. see page 157.

121. "Congo News" I(1) ? November 1953,(p.5).

122. who was Chairman of the ANC at this time.

123. C.A.P. (411) 15 December 1953, front page report.

124. whether these consultations did take place not being clear.

125. African Eagle II(1) 12 January 1954.
ibid. (2) 19 January 1954.
ibid. (6) 16 February 1954.

126. ibid. (4) 2 February 1954
ibid. (6) 16 February 1954
ibid. (7) 23 February 1954
ibid. (8) 2 March 1954

127. ibid. (7) 23 February 1954

128. see page 161.

129. Mins WP APC May 1954.
Mins GP APC June 1954.

130. Mins Kitwe UAC, reported in African Eagle II(30), 3 August 1954.

131. namely Councillor Tom Ntine's criticism of the system as "Government sponsored", and the WP APC's demand that UAC's be abolished; see Mins WP APC May 1954,(p.16); referred to also by A.L.Epstein "Urban Politics..." 1958(p.25).

132. which was the standard colonialist reply to any criticism of the councils made by people standing outside it, see for example N/0088 I(9), 6 September 1949, Act PC(WP) to SNA in response to Hastings Banda's criticism of the councils.

133. African Eagle II(2) 19 January 1954.

134. ibid.

135. ibid. II(51) 28 December 1954.

136. ibid. V(43) 29 October 1957.

137. see footnote 135; that is the fact that Pascale Sokota was criticised for having opportunistically joined the ANC simply in order to obtain his seat on LegCo through Congress "influence" the ANC.

138. see footnote 136; that is the fact that Safeli Chileshe was called upon to resign his LegCo seat since he had betrayed the body, the ANC, that had put him there.

139. see for example ARC 14 (1956) c.120-21, F.B.Chembe.

140. see Hansard 81(c.638) 29 July 1954 for Ng'andu's condemnation of the system; see also Hansard 87(c.531-577) 18 July 1956 for similar comments by Ng'andu, Chileshe and Sokota.

141. the General Secretary of the ANC, for example, complained that the trouble was that the Government simply 'ignored' its own bodies; see Gong Gazette II(3), 31 March 1956; while Harry Nkumbula went to the extent of commending the transfer of some executive powers to the UAC's "to deal with African Affairs", see C.A.P.(no number) 11 June 1956, page 1 headlines, in which he was quoted as saying that

"Government has turned a deaf ear to the advice freely given it by African leaders. It has not listened to or given executive powers to the ANC, provincial councils and urban advisory councils."

142. C.A.P. (no number) 18 June 1956, interview with Dauti Yamba.

143. see Chapter I (footnote 145).

144. see for example the editorial in the C.A.P.(no number) 1 June 1956.

145. that is to say that, given the internally 'representative' nature of the system, see Chapter II (p.47), it seems reasonable to assume that if so many ANC men were selected by the lower councils to go to the ANC that reflected an even larger ANC membership or at least support in these lower councils.

146. K.Kaunda "Zambia..." 1967(p.75).

147. African Eagle V (48) 3 December 1957.

148. ibid.

149. African Eagle II(7) 23 February 1953 editorial reproving the UAC's for having had to be pushed by the ANC to take steps against racial discrimination.

150. Cong Gazette II (3) 31 March 1956 (p.5) and also ibid. II (4) 30 April 1956.

151. A.L.Epstein "Urban Politics..." 1958(p.170) reported this statement made in reply to African hawkers' complaints before the Western Province ANC Conference in 1954.

152. African Eagle III (27) 12 July 1956, editorial comment.

153. Cong Gazette No.1 vol.VIII[sic!] 18 October 1955(p.3).

154. ibid. II(6-7) 31 July 1956,(p.5) commented on the heated debate in LegCo on proposed investigation' of the ANC in which

"the four African members put up a wonderful fight for their organisation against the unofficials", see also p.161.

155. Cong Gazette I(IX)[sic!] 15 November 1955, reporting on Safeli Chilembo's presence and words at Nkumbula's send-off to London; similarly ibid. I(X) 24 December 1955, on his return; see also ibid. II(2) 29 February 1956 for report on the formal visit to ANC headquarters by Federal MP's Yamba and Kakumbi; and the same again, ibid. II(3) 31 March 1956, by LegCo members Sokota, Mabulyato and Ng'andu.

156. see ANC 14 (1956) c.210-221.

157. see Hansard 87 (c.531-577) 18 July 1956 for such affirmations by Mg'andu, Chileshe, Sokota and Nabulyato.

158. Gong Gazette I(IX)[sic!] 15 November 1955 (p.4).

159. ibid.

160. the informants included former leaders of the ANC who had participated in the ANC (F.Chembe, S.N.K. Chembe and M.D.Nkoloma) and others who had not (M.Liso and H.Mkumbula); various members of the ANC who had been ANC members at that period (S.Chibanza, S.Chileshe, S.Mununga and M.Katowa) and others who continued for long after to be (A.D.Chilimboyi and A.Kasunga); various ANC men who were not then, or later, Congressmen (Chief Ikelenge, Chief Kapa, W.Kaseka, W.Mbanza); as well as observers on the scene at the time who were neither in the ANC or the ANC (Sikota Wina and Simon Zukas).

161. oral evidence - F.B.Chembe, M.Liso.

162. oral evidence - F.B.Chembe, A.D.Chilimboyi, S.Mununga, W.Mbanza, M.D.Nkoloma, S.Wina.

163. oral evidence - F.B.Chembe.

164. oral evidence - F.B.Chembe, A.D.Chilimboyi, M.Liso; see also African Eagle VI(25) 24 June 1958 for report on ANC public influence and Mkumbula's own presence at the recent ANC meeting in which the White Paper on constitutional proposals was discussed and rejected; included in the report was a photograph of Mkumbula in conversation with ANC councillors with the caption beneath pointing out Mr. Mkumbula as
"one of the many Congressites who filled the Public Galleries at the ANC Chambers in Lusaka recently".

165. oral evidence - F.B.Chembe, A.D.Chilimboyi, S.Wina.

166. oral evidence - S.N.K.Chembe, Chief Ikelenge, I.C.M.Mulando, D.Mukimwa, W.Mbanza.

167. oral evidence - S.Chibanza, W.Kaseka, Chief Kapa.

168. oral evidence - S.Zukas.

169. oral evidence in response to such a question was so conflicting as to render it of little value...indicating in fact a certain degree of invalidity to the question.

170. see page 160.

171. the reason for their not repeating the details of their franchise proposals lying in the official prohibition on the tabling of the same motions year after year; see Chapter II (p.49).

172. Gong Gazette I(X)[sic!] 24 December 1955 (p.3).

173. ibid.

174. namely an end to the state of emergency, and an acceptance of the right of Northern Rhodesia to secede from the Federation; see P.Mason "Year of Decision" (1960) (p.118).

175. see Chapter IV (p.99).

176. see Chapter IV (p.100).

177. ibid.

178. D.C.Mulford "Politics..." 1967 (p.54-55).

179. for there is a significant difference between 'unofficials' parity (of Africans and whites) on LegCo and ExCo which did not entail an African majority on these bodies or even genuine parity,(for the 'official' Europeans could not be counted as constituting part of the African contingent)... and racial parity which was genuine numerical parity between (all) whites and the Africans.

180. D.C.Mulford "Politics..." 1967 (p.56-57). The details of the proposals being as follows:

Legislative Council		35 elected members, to consist of
		21 elected Africans
[parity]	21	14 elected whites
		+7 government officials
Executive Council		9 members
		3 elected Africans
[parity]		3 government officials
		3 elected whites

181. see ANC 18 (1958) whole volume, for ANC rejection and K.Kaunda "Zambia..." 1967 (p.97) for ANC "rejection"; see also Appendix H however, for their subsequent participation in both the 1958 Federal and the 1959 N.R. Bemsen elections.

182. by both African politicians at the time and historian commentators since.

183. see A.L.Epstein "Urban Politics..." 1958(p.166) for evidence that the ANC was "seeking representation within the Municipal system, for example on the African Affairs Committees" of municipal councils.

184. for ANC's position on nominations to municipal African Affairs Committees see Chapter IV (p.99).

185. see the "African Times" (no number) 6 December 1957, for a report on a Western Province (Copperbelt) mass rally of the ANC at which a popular demand was made for such a boycott; see also the prompt counter-argument in an editorial in the African Eagle V (50) 17 December 1957 against boycott of separate forms of representation for Africans, like the ANC's; see also African Eagle V (51) 24 December 1957 for argument in support of boycott of all separate forms of representation for Africans in letter to the editor by W.G.Banda (Lusaka)

186. see Chapter I (p.22).

187. reported in the African Eagle VI (14) 8 April 1958.

188. ibid., namely J.Chivunga, H.D.Banda and J.Mulenga.

189. ibid.

190. ibid.

191. ibid. VI (17) 29 April 1958.

192. see for example African Eagle VI (14) 8 April 1958, report of an interview with Acting Secretary General of Congress, Titus B.Mkupo, in which he is quoted as explaining Congress' recent 'seizure' of all the African Housing Area Boards as follows:

> "Congress [is] planning to be represented on as many bodies as possible beginning from the very bottom to the top, so that the authorities cannot escape its claims in any way".

193. oral evidence - Int 9 with Mungomi Liso 20/2/74 :

> "...our aim was to disrupt in any way any government institution that pretended in any way to represent the people politically. Apart from infiltrating it and breaking it from within, that did not stop us from criticising it as a government body. There are so many ways of killing a cat. We thought we could kill it [ANC] with two stones, one from within, one from without."

194. see Chapter IV (pp.138-40).

195. ibid.

196. K.Kaunda "Zambia..." 1967 (p.57)

> "We were afraid that if the African organisations boycotted the elections the Federal Parliament might change the constitution after Federation so as to enable Governors of each territory to nominate African stooges."

197. see footnote 192 above.

198. see footnote 92 above; see also K.Kaunda's letters to Colin Morrison "A Humanist in Africa" (1966) (p.21) in which Kaunda referred to Britain as follows :

> "we occupied the superior moral position. This fact enlightened colonial powers like Britain recognised and could no longer rule us without forfeiting their self-respect."

199. The degree to which the African nationalist leadership in Northern Rhodesia had not even begun to question the colonialist ptructures and system is given interesting illustration in the words of President Kaunda himself, almost ten years after independence when he said, at the 20th Anniversary Celebrations of TANU in Dar es Salaam in July 1974 : and

> "...Africans must break the economic/ social structures which provide a basis for foreign control and exploitation of the continent...neo colonialism will continue to find nourishment in these structures".

quoted in Daily Mail (Lusaka) 4/7/74.

200. see for example the statement by R.Hall "Zambia..." 1965 (p.168) :

> "Although Federationist might blame African opposition to white rule on 'agitators' and 'mischief makers', yet the driving force of African nationalism was everywhere provided by racial discrimination; political control was seen as the alternative to humiliation."

201. in so far as they allowed themselves to be swayed by settler influence to depart from their 'Protectorate' practices and promise.

202. writers such as A.L.Epstein "Politics in an Urban African Community", R.Rotberg "The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa" and D.C.Mulford "The Politics of Independence" have all raised the above points in a variety of combinations.

203. Chapter III (p.88).

204. and even rarer to find analysed from a class rather than an orthodox bourgeois and/or African nationalist(bourgeois) point of view.

CHAPTER SIX

1. R.Hall "Zambia" 1965 (p.111).

2. G.Gann and P.Duignan "Colonialism in Africa" vol.II, introduction (p.8).

3. H.Meebelo "Reaction..." (1971) (p.283) quoting with approval A.H.L.Wina that it was in the years of the early 1950's that "a nationalist movement under a determined leadership was born".

4. K.Kaunda Foreword to H.Meebelo "Reaction..." (p.vii) refers to

> "...the protest movement, the refusal of the people to accept foreign rule, and their struggle to rid themselves of foreign rulers, existed long before the copper mines were born and long before the line of rail brought masses of populations to what are now urban centres."

5. ibid. states that Meebelo's examination of early protest politics is

> "...a proud story, for it confirms that the struggle for Zambia's independence is long and bitter..."

6. H.Meebelo "Reaction..." 1971 (pp.283-84) criticises

> "...the assumption that African nationalism only came into existence with the formation of modern political parties which fostered a 'territorial nationalism' and were later organised as a mass movement for independence. This is clearly a mis-reading of a historical development which began with the establishment of colonial rule itself. Such a misunderstanding would probably not arise if African protest movements and later independence movements were seen as only phases of the same historical phenomenon - nationalism..."

7. R.Rotberg "Rise.." 1965 uses the same image.

8. H.Meebelo "Reaction..." 1971 (p.x) describes

> "the tidal wave of belligerent nationalism in post-war Northern Rhodesia [which] was the estuary of an ever-flowing river of African political thinking and activity which came running down the years having as its source the inception of colonial rule."

9. about which thesis the present writer has strong reservations - full elaboration of which, however, lies outside the immediate scope of the present study.

10. D.C.Mulford "Politics..." 1967 (pp.74-76).