AN ASSESMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ELECTORAL CONFLICT RESOULTION MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES IN ZAMBIA: A CASE STUDY OF NAMWALA DISTRICT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

BY

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DECLARATION

I, Enala Chirwa, do hereby declare that this research report represents the outcome of my own effort and that its contents have never been presented elsewhere. I also declare that the charts, figures, tables contained in this report were generated by me except for those whose origin has been acknowledged. I further declare that the views and opinions contained in this report do not represent those of the University of Zambia but my own.

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NAME OF STUDENT   **SIGNATURE**   **DATE**

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

This dissertation has been approved for the partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of Master of Science in Peace Leadership and Conflict Resolution by the University of Zambia.

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ABSTRACT

This study is an assessment of the effectiveness of the Namwala district electoral conflict management committee in resolving electoral conflicts. Despite the Committee's its establishment in 2001, the electoral conflicts in the district have been escalating which even led the ECZ to suspend the campaigns in the 2016 general elections for ten days. The study used a qualitative descriptive research design and found that while the committee have powers and responsibilities to mediate electoral disputes, they still cannot make certain decisions which are a reserved for ECZ and the Judiciary. The committee decisions are non-binding and therefore their impact on resolving the electoral conflicts to an extent is not considered serious compared to the decisions which are made by the courts of law. Inadequate training of the CMC members, an ad hoc membership arrangement, and inadequate provision of the law are some of the challenges that greatly impact on the CMC effectiveness in resolving electoral conflicts. Therefore, the study has established that increment of awareness, provision of adequate training and materials, strengthening of the legal framework are some of the factors that could help in curbing electoral conflicts. ECZ and all political players should have a platform of discussing electoral issues before, during and even after elections.

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my family, especially my daughter, Tazyo who has been very tolerant and supportive and understanding during my study period. I also say thank you to my mother, Naomi Phiri Chirwa for her moral and spiritual support. I also dedicate this study to my late cousin Lembamo, who had been a source of inspiration in my life.

I further dedicate this piece of work as well to my nieces and nephew, Beauty, Lisa, Gloria and Musa who had been understanding even in the times when I was not with them. I also dedicate this research to my brothers and sister for their continued support, encouragement and great inspiration. Thank you for the virtues of hard work, patience, and perseverance that you have instilled in me.

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APPROVAL

On behalf of the University of Zambia (UNZA), I wish to confirm that I did supervise Enala Chirwa's dissertation. I further wish to state that to the best of my knowledge, I believe that the said student conducted this research work. I therefore approve that this dissertation by Enala Chirwa be submitted in partial fulfilment of the award of the Degree in Masters of Science of Peace, Leadership and Conflict Resolution.

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TABLE OF CONTENT

ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS

CMCs	-	Conflict Management Committees
NCMC	-	National Conflict Management Committee
CSOs	-	Civil Society Organisations
DCMC	-	District Conflict Management Committee
ECZ	-	Electoral Commission of Zambia
EU	-	European Union
FODEP	-	Foundation for Democratic Process
GP	-	Green Party
IFES	-	International Foundation of Electoral Systems
MMD	-	Movement for Multi-party Democracy
NDA	-	National Democratic Alliance
NDC	-	National Democratic Congress
PF	-	Patriotic Front
RP	-	Rainbow Party
SADC	-	Southern Africa Development Community
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UPND	-	United Party for National Development
UNIP	-	United National Independence Party

CHAPTER ONE

1.0   Background

Electoral conflict is a global phenomenon (Fischer, 2002). This is because elections are central to the existence, stability and development of democracies; and political parties play significant role in such democracies. This is evident, as a free and fair election promotes and ensures democracy. Following the waning influence and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, democratization spread across the African continent. Consequently, elections have become so common that between 2000 and 2006 only ten countries failed to hold some form of direct national election Hoglund (2009). As national election is a high-stakes competition for acquiring power in the state, it is a truism that conflict is an expected feature of any election. In many countries elections the winner of a national election assumes many privileges especially in allocation of resources. This has resulted in conflicts and violence in the process of holding elections.

Atta-Asamoah (2010) described that elections, if left unchecked in the context of the complex development and security challenges in Africa, could derail the sustainability of democratic gains, development strides, and the maintenance of peace and security in many fragile states. For instance, the most part, winner-takes-all politics has the tendency of increasing the cost of losing elections for political parties in any country or political system. Such a situation and the perceived impact thereof on the future of political parties also have implications for the nature of political participation and competition.

Ntomba, (2016) recited that opposition parties can become desperate to win power by all means and at whatever cost; whilst the incumbents, mindful of the cost of losing elections, may also go to similar lengths to maintain power. Such entrenching tendencies therefore have the possibility of motivating losers to reject results and contribute to election-related conflicts and violence. According to UNDP (2012) Africa's experiences of post-election violence in countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Togo, Ivory Coast, Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and Zambia have pointed to the volatility of electoral processes on the continent. Thus, if political parties are made to over-rate the cost of losing elections, the probability of countries moving close to the precipice of violence whenever elections are due is high and could render elections a probable conflict triggering exercise.

Zambia's electoral history has been comparatively more peaceful than other sub-Saharan African countries (Strauss and Taylor, 2012) until 2001 when electoral conflicts and violence were experienced. Zambia, formerly known as Northern Rhodesia, gained independence in 1964 from Britain. In order for the indigenous to be independent and take part in political affairs of the nation, many people were imprisoned and even killed (Ntomba, 2016). In 1964 Kenneth Kaunda took over as Zambia's first Republican President. However, instead of nurturing democratic electoral systems, in 1972 Zambia was declared a one-party-state, with the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) being the sole political party. In general elections citizens were restricted to voting for either Kenneth Kaunda or a frog. Voting for a frog meant nothing as Kaunda was always considered the winner. However, although Kaunda was a de facto unopposed presidential candidate, some conflicts took place at parliamentary and councillor levels especially against those who opposed UNIP's vetted candidates (Ntomba, 2016). However, in 1991, social, economic, and political factors forced Kaunda to constitutionally revert to allow for multiparty politics.

The first election after change of the constitution brought in Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in government which many people believed would create a more democratic space in Zambia. However, these expectations were disappointed by the MMD's mistreatment of the opposition political parties as multipartism led to birth of many political parties. The phenomenon of electoral violence became particularly acute in the coming years (Burnell, 2002). Incidences such as the oft-cited Chawama fracas where opposition supporters were hacked with machetes (Post Newspaper, 2001). Therefore, concerns were raised of finding ways of curtailing the electoral conflicts and violence that were escalating in the nation (SACCORD, 2010).

The Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) which was established by an Act of Parliament in 1996 to deliver credible elections was tasked with the responsibility through Article 122 of the Constitution of Zambia to manage and resolve electoral conflicts. The tensions and conflicts that characterise the 2001 general elections led the ECZ to establish Conflict Management Committees (CMCs) in all the districts that would militate against mounting conflict, clarify responsibilities for dispute resolution, and provide complainants with an effective outlet for their concerns before, during, and after an election before they could spread (EU, 2016). The concept of conflict management mediation mechanisms was adopted from the Electoral Commissions' Forum of Southern African Development Community

(SADC) countries and it was first deployed in South Africa with the aim of helping to reduce tension and violence by providing prompt and localized resolution of disputes (SADC, 2001).

The growing tensions during the 2001 Zambian elections led Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), to recognize the increasing need for managing the conflict that arose throughout the run-up to elections. Accordingly, Zambia aimed to establish "a new mechanism that would stave off mounting conflict, clarify responsibilities for dispute resolution, and provide complainants with an effective outlet for their concerns before, during, and after an election" (ECZ Election Report, 2016). The ECZ thus introduced Conflict Management Committees (CMCs) to mediate and resolve electoral disputes. CMCs were established at a national level – the National Conflict Management Committee (NCMC) – as well as via 74 district offices that were set up to tackle different local issues. Their membership comprised a variety of different stakeholders, including political parties and civil society organizations that aimed to solve electoral disputes via mediation or conciliation. However, CMCs had no power to compel parties to participate in conflict resolution, nor did they have the power to introduce sanctions (Carter Center, 2016).

Zambia's political parties were among the stakeholders involved, the ECZ met with political party leaders prior to announcing CMCs. "Before formally announcing their intention to use the CMC model, the commissioners and senior staff began meeting with political parties to ensure that political party members understood and supported the idea." This formed an important part of ECZ general "open-door policy" to all stakeholders engaged in the Zambian election in 2001. Accordingly, the ECZ and other stakeholders could freely engage and consult on matters related to the elections, which improved relations when compared with the 1996 elections (EU, 2016).

The impact of CMCs was that it created the first formal democratic procedure in Zambia to issue complaints against political candidates and even against employees of the ECZ itself. This represented an important step for Zambia in monitoring its democratic process. Throughout the elections that took place between 2001 and 2016 in Zambia, the impact of the CMCs was mixed. The ECZ as well as international observers agreed that they helped to reduce violence and tension during campaigns.

Despite these improvements, in the 2016 election campaign "several violent clashes, mainly between the ruling party's cadres and those of the opposition were reported. Clashes reportedly involved the use of machetes, clubs and other weapons, with frequent reports alleging that the parties were recruiting and training militia'' (European Union (2017). To reduce these clashes, the NCMC met five times to mediate high-profile political campaign disputes between the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party for National Development (UPND), resulting in several agreements between them. Although the precise number of disputes solved via the 106 district-level CMCs cannot be determined, in many districts "CMC mediation helped diffuse tensions and solve minor disputes between parties" (European Union, 2017).

ECZ (2006) report explained that if a District Conflict Management Committee (DCMC) fails to handle a dispute, the issue is referred to the National Conflict Management Committee (NCMC). NCMC comprised of representatives of the leadership of Zambia's registered political parties, representatives from law enforcement agencies, Ministry of Justice, Human Rights Commission, faith based organisations and nonpartisan civil society organisations that work on election-related governance issues. The districts paralleled the NCMC structure, however with variations based on which parties or organizations were active in a given district. For example the district level, the magistrates take the place of the Ministry of Justice representative (ECZ, 2006).

However, despite CMCs being in existence for over a sixteen years, the general elections that were held in 2016 were reported to have shown a marked increase in electoral conflicts and violence involving both the ruling party as well as the opposition political parties. Indeed, electoral violence was drastically higher in 2016 compared with past elections. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (2016), there were more than fifty incidents of electoral violence in Zambia between January and July 2016 of which many resulted in severe injuries or death of cadres. Notably, cases of electoral conflicts and violence were reported in Lusaka, Kazungula and Namwala districts in Southern Province, Shiwangándu district in Muchinga Province and Itezhi-tezhi district in Central Province during the general elections. These reported electoral conflicts and violence even led the ECZ to take a drastic decision of suspending campaigns for ten days in Lusaka and Namwala districts to reduce electoral tension. (ECZ Press Release, 9th July, 2016).

Hence, this study aims to assess the effectiveness of conflict management committees using Namwala as a case study. However, the study wishes to recognize from the start that, electoral conflict is not a simple matter. Therefore, this study is by no means exhaustive. Rather, it is a collection of issues and experiences tied to electoral conflicts and violence in Zambia.

1.2   Statement of the Problem

Zambia has a history and reputation of largely peaceful elections Kilmer (2012). However, the reports of a marked escalation of violence in the recent elections compared to previous ones are a great concern (European Union, 2016). On the other hand, since the establishment of CMCs in 2001 to the contrary electoral conflicts are still on the rise.

Essentially, some stakeholders are dissatisfied over the effectiveness of the CMCs. According to Carter Centre (2016) there is a marked increase in the number of concerns that have been raised as regards to the effectiveness of the CMCs to manage electoral conflicts. Election observers during the recent general elections observed that occurrences of electoral conflict and violence were widespread in other towns besides Lusaka and have fuelled hatred and caused damage to property, resulted in injuries and in some cases even death. Since the CMC inception, numerous complaints have been raised in relation to its effectiveness in performing one of its constitutional functions. To this researcher's knowledge, the problem of increasing election-related violence and the apparent failure of CMCs to curtail the escalation has not been addressed in existing literature. There is, therefore, a knowledge gap that need to be filled about the serious problem threatening the democratic process in Zambia.

1.3   Main Objective

The main aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the Electoral Conflict Management Committee of the Electoral Commission of Zambia in resolving electoral conflicts.

1.4   Specific Objectives

1.   To establish the composition, competence and capacity of the Namwala DCMC.

2. To investigate adherence to the mechanisms, procedures, and regulations the Electoral Management Committee uses to resolve electoral violence.

3 To investigate the reasons for unresolved cases of electoral conflicts in Namwala District.

4. To make recommendations to Namwala DCMC on resolving electoral conflicts.

1.5   Research Questions

1.   What is the institutional capacity of the Namwala DCMC?

2.   What is the adequacy of mechanisms, procedures, and regulations does the Electoral Management Committee use to resolve electoral violence?

3.   What are the reasons for the unresolved electoral conflicts in Namwala DCMC?

4.   What recommendations can inform Namwala DCMC in resolving electoral conflicts?

1.6   Significance of the Study

The findings of this study will contribute to the understanding of the effectiveness of the conflict management committees in performing their core functions of electoral conflict management. The findings of this study will be useful to ECZ, political parties, researchers and other local and international stakeholders in the Zambian electoral process system.

This study will also contribute to the body of literature that exists in the field of electoral conflict management. There are theories, models, and empirical findings on electoral conflicts and their management. This study will contribute by way of providing data and analysis that may challenge or corroborate existing theories, models, and empirical findings. In this way, this study stands to fill in some existing knowledge gaps, both theoretical and empirical.

1.7   Theoretical Framework

This study will be guided by the two theory on violence by Dollard's Frustration-Aggression theory also known as the displacement theory. Frustration, according to Dollard et al. (1939), is a state that sets in if a goal-oriented act is delayed or thwarted. The instigation remains even though the chances of realization are constrained by interfering influences. Under these frustrating conditions, Dollard et al. (1939) argue that aggressive behavior is stimulated to an extent that corresponds to the intensity of the instigation and the degree of blockage of goal attainment. Aggression is defined as the deliberate violation of an organism or an organism substitute. It is primarily directed toward the cause of frustration but may be redirected toward any other people or objects. The inhibition of aggressive behavior represents in itself a factor of frustration and can reinforce aggressive tendencies (Gienath, 2008).

In its first general definition, the frustration aggression theory (or hypothesis) (FA-H) proposes that aggression is always the result of frustration (Dollard et al. 1939).   This corresponds with the following two postulates: (1) aggressive behavior requires the existence of frustration, and (2) the existence of frustration leads to some kind of aggressive behavior. Manifest aggression reduces aggressive tendencies and results in 'catharsis'. However, this only applies to that part of aggression caused by inhibition of aggression, not to aggression caused by the original instigation. The latter lasts as long as the frustrating conditions continue. A 'catharsis' in its comprehensive meaning will only be achieved if aggression eliminates exactly those obstacles in the way of the original goal (Catharsis Theory).

FA-H is based on Sigmund Freud's and Clark Hull's drive theories. In contrast to mere drive theories, FA-H presupposes a frustration-inducing external incident that can be interfered with. It thereby transcends the defeatism and the implicit justification of violence contained in biological approaches, explaining aggression via law of nature as a condition of self-reproducing physical privation (Gienath, 2008).

The above theory is applicable in the Zambian context in which aspects of political frustration and discontentment has been growing for the past twenty years. For example, the 1996, 2001, 2008, 2015 and 2016 elections have been characterised with claims of rigging and other electoral malpractices that are believed to have disadvantaged the opposition parties in favour of the ruling party. This situation, and many other have resulted into the aggrieved parties to develop a form of defence mechanism to ensure that factors that lead to their frustration are dealt with. Among such mechanisms are violent acts as seen more recently in

the previous elections. This theory is suitable in this study as it exposes the mechanism behind various process that results from social events such as elections in countries such as Zambia. As such, using the theory's assumptions, it will be possible to assess the effectiveness of electoral resolution committees in Zambia in order to have a clear picture of how the phenomenon is being addressed and to identify possible gaps leading to its persistence.

1.8   Limitation of the Study

This study was conducted in Namwala District, Southern Province of Zambia. As such, the findings from the Namwala CMCs may not be generalized to other CMCs across the country. To this effect, similar studies will need to be conducted in other CMCs outside Namwala. The main practical constraint in this study was that it was difficult to collect data as most members of the DCMC who handled electoral conflict issues arising from the 2016 general elections were transferred to other districts due to the nature of their formal employment as the DCMC is an adhoc committee.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0   LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

This section reviews various literature on electoral conflict. This is for the sole purpose of giving clarity to what the research is all about as well as to locate this study in the wider research context. The literature reviews the causes of electoral conflicts and violence before narrowing down to the various studies on electoral conflict management in European and African continents. A summary of literature with a focus on the Zambian scenario regarding the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia by the CMCs makes has also been given.

2.1   Conflict Definition

The literature on conflict and conflict theories reveals a lack of consensus on the definition and description of conflicts among scholars which has led, among others, to the misuse of the related terms 'conflict', 'violence' and 'crisis'. Several authors draw attention to the need to distinguish between the related yet distinct terms 'conflict', 'violence' and 'crisis'.

Conflict is often mistakenly used as a synonym for violence. Conflict is generally understood as a social phenomenon which results from the differences in the social circumstances and/or disparate interests of at least two parties (individuals, groups, states, etc). Violence, on the other hand, is the execution of physical or psychological force of one party on another. Trutz von Trotha defines violence ('Gewalt') as the employment of physical force (Adejumbi, 2003). According to him, the starting point for any analysis on the sociology of violence lies in the recognition that violence is the infliction of bodily harm and physical suffering. With regard to the concept of conflict, violence is defined as a mode of execution or the (physical) manifestation of an acute, persistent and intense level of conflict (Plattner, 2013) In essence, since violence can never be based on common consensus, it occurs in social situations which are marked by conflicts between various parties. Violence always entails that one party, whether intentionally or not, comes to harm. As a rule, the victim opposes this use of violence. Therefore, the resort to violence can either mark the onset of a conflict or it can be a measure adopted in an already existing conflict which until then, had been non-violent. Conflict may not necessarily be destructive, whilst violence is. Another important aspect highlighted by Kriesi and Bochscher, (2012) is the 'exclusive' character of violence. The resort to violence inevitably implies the exclusion of other means of shaping social relations.

Violence negates the diverse possibilities of dealing with, communicating and understanding each other.

Just as conflict is frequently confused with violence, crisis is oft en perceived tantamount to conflict. However, crises are structurally differentiated from conflicts. In the context of this study and in keeping with Idowu's exposition, the term crisis refers to the persistent manifestation of conflicts and/or violence (NJogu, 2011) In other words, a single incidence of conflict or violence does not signify a state of crisis (Diamond, 1989) The main focus of this study is to identify why those involved in disputes in the given societies resort to violence to settle their disputes and grievances. The focus is therefore not on conflicts within the communities *per se*, but on those conflicts which exhibit a violent character, in other words where physical force is used as a coercive means of attaining one's objectives. Regardless of the actors involved and the various motives which justify their actions, the actions are always violent and in the following will be referred to as 'violent conflicts'.

2.2   Causes of Electoral Conflicts and Violence

According to UNDP (2009) the causes of electoral conflicts and violence are classified into two; namely the process and structural factors. The process as the name denotes means the violence that occurs during the electoral cycle. The process or internal factors could also be called the triggers of electoral conflicts and violence because they go into the very nature of the entire electoral processes. Therefore, if the electoral processes or internal factors are not professionally handled, they could lead to the eruption of electoral conflicts and violence since elections are by their very nature competitive of ideology and struggle for political post. Iff (2011) identified process factors that trigger electoral violence to include: contested and unfit legal frameworks for elections; ineffective and mistrusted dispute resolution mechanisms, lack of trust in electoral management bodies; technical problems, which as a consequence may favour particular political actors; hate speeches during election campaigns and mismanagement of appeals.

European Union (2017) also identified two broad factors as responsible for the occurrence of electoral violence. The first factor is the process factors that serve as immediate causes of eruption of electoral violence. These factors include demarcation, registration, nomination, campaigning, voting, counting, collation and the final declaration of election results. The

second was the external factors which, also serve as fertile grounds for electoral conflicts and violence to occur. The external factors are existing socio-economic problems like marginalisation, discrimination, politicisation high level of unemployment, poverty and societal conflicts such as tribal elements that were experienced in Rwanda, Kenya and Zambia where each tribe want their member to the president of the country and would not accept if a member of another tribe emerges as a winner.

Another cause of electoral conflicts and violence is what Bombande (2010) emphasized is the critical roles played by elections management bodies in ensuring credible elections. In other words if the EMB is suspected of a lack of impartiality, the credibility of the electoral process is diminished and there are high levels of violence when the results are announced. UNDP (2009) expressed that the occurrence of electoral violence in some cases is attributed to the work of the body responsible for the conduct of elections. This is because, stakeholders and the public do not understand the way and how the EMBs work. Hence, both the government and oppositions parties tend to accuse the EMB of being biased or partial towards each of them when decisions of EMB do not favour any at a point in time. The stakeholders therefore do not have faith and trust in the work, the outcome of the elections results from the EMB, and the ultimate is to resort to violence. For example the recent happening in Zimbabwe where results for Presidential candidates were delayed to be announced. This caused people to resort to protests which eventually lead to the death of six people. Therefore Huntington (2006) stressed that the perception people have against the EMB is a total recipe for electoral conflicts and violence in a lot of countries.

Sisk (2008) also added that another common cause of election conflicts and violence is the stakes of winning and losing valued political posts. This is in agreement to Ake (1996) who described that elections Africa are characterised by implications coined as the winner takes all. This always takes place especially in conditions of high scarcity, poverty and inequality. When winning a state office is the key to livelihood not just for an individual, but for his or her entire clan, faction, or even ethnic group, parties and candidates often refuse to contemplate the consequences of failure. Studies of election related violence often highlight the perpetuation of highly personal or patronage politics or a system in which politicians are gang-like 'bosses' that control resources (such as access to jobs and income) and dispense public services such as housing, health care, or lucrative government contracts (UNDP 2009). Stewart (2001) cited that the stakes of elections are often seen as opportunities to engage in

corruption and economic rent-seeking. This in turn leads to highly factionalized politics often along religious, sectarian or ethnic lines, or along party-political divides where control of the state leads to the reinforcement of class divisions or along lines of social difference. The above view re-echoes the issues of exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination as basis of electoral violence as attributed by Hoglund (2006).

The certainty of the outcomes of elections can also generate electoral violence. According to Hoglund (2006) when parties are quite certain of defeat or exclusion in an electoral contest, especially when they expect to be 'permanent minorities' (to lose not just once, but again and again due to patterns of identity voting), the certainty of outcomes is also a strong causal of violence. For example, the post-election violence stemming from the controversial 2005 elections in Iraq seems to fit this pattern. When a party or faction expects to be systematically excluded from political power (in the Iraq case, the erstwhile powerful Sunni communities, described below), they may well resort to violence to either prevent their exclusion or to prevent the election's success. Similarly, Zambia during its 2016 general elections faced the similar cause of electoral conflict and violence which the country has never experienced before. Further Hoglund (2006) believed that the situation is more pronounced when the design of the electoral system is based on winner takes all concepts or a zero-sum game where the losers are excluded from forming government. The zero-sum game motivates political parties or candidates to the elections to go all out to win the elections even through dubious ways.

UNDP (2009) echoed that intimidation of voters through violence can be directed at specific individuals. Thus at the national level, violence could occur in the form of perpetrators attempting to control social institutions that influence voter opinions, such as the media or civil society. Dahl (1989) urged that contenders in the electoral system at times develop tactics of direct intimidation against voters in areas to reduce their participation in order to win an election. This in the process may engender conflicts and violence as these tactics have become incentive to perpetrators because often the offenders are not sanctioned. The intimidation could be physical assault, use of threats, insults or anything that is capable of influencing the choice of voters to the advantage of others in elections. Additionally Bombande (2010) expressed that the design of an electoral system could have a direct impact either by exacerbating or deescalating electoral violence. Bombande (2010) postulates that the extent to which a system is regarded as free and inclusive may determine the possibility

of post-electoral conflict. Violence often occurs when elections are zero-sum-event and losers excluded from participating in governance. Therefore the concept of winner takes all is a product of the kind of electoral system a country opted for in their democratic dispensation. This concept gives incentives to the political party that has been able to meet certain threshold in an election to form the government, however, it also encourages contenders in the electoral system to win even including violent means (Hoglund, 2006).

Structure or the external factors are those existing socio-economic problems that serve as the remote causes of electoral violence (Ghana Elections Report, 2008). These are always underlying social issues in which elections take place and these factors may include existing community conflicts or violence. Iff (2011) voiced that, elections do not take place in a vacuum as there is always an underlying social context in which they take place and it may include; existing violence among ethnic, religious, organized crime, violence against women, terrorism, guerrilla fighting, tensions in society for instance latent conflicts including segregation, discrimination, and structural factors like unemployment, corruption, poverty, illiteracy.

Diego (2002) opined that if a particular group being in power dominate access to resources and exclude other parties because it perceives itself as 'better' or 'cleverer' thereby creating a social gap of 'have' and 'have not', violent eruption are inevitable. On the other hand the organization of electoral processes in violent and volatile surroundings always entails risks for electoral actors, events and materials. These community conflicts or violence include ethnic, religious, organized crime, segregation, discrimination and marginalization. Electoral violence may also evolve from structural factors like unemployment, corruption, poverty. For example, the 2007 electoral violence in Kenya was fuelled by deep ethnic divisions and years of economic frustration. Therefore the violence that rocked Kenya should be seen, perhaps more as a reaction to a history of exclusion and an earnest desire for a future of inclusion (Biegon, 2009).

In the words of Sisk (2008) another cause of electoral conflicts and violence is very common in countries in transition. These are countries that have experienced transitions from authoritarian or single-party rule to multiparty politics but which are considered to be partial, unconsolidated, façade, or gray-zone (mixed) systems may be especially prone to or vulnerable to conflict due to the uncertainties of transition that these societies experience. For

example countries such as Libya, Kenya and even Zimbabwe. In these countries beneficiaries of the older system of authoritative or one party regime find it difficult to shift multiparty democracy with fear of losing the elections and hence adopt various mechanisms including violence to resist any attempt directed to wrestle power. The exploitation sentiments and politicization of existing social problems is another factor that is responsible for the eruption of electoral violence. Politicians try to influence and fuel already existing community problems with the aim of getting political favours during elections. Peace Brief (2004) has stated that politicians exploit sentiments of economic discrimination or dominance of one ethnic group by another.

According to Iwu (2010) electoral violence is any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse of a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process. In a related development, Balogun in Obakhedo (2011) posited that electoral violence connotes all forms of violence (physical, psychological, administrative, legal and structural) at different stages engaged in by participants, their supporters, and sympathizers (including security and election management body staff) in the electoral process. These forms of violence take place before elections, during elections and after or post-election, and could also be intra or inter-party.

Buttressing further, Motsamai (2016) posited that, in Zambia, the worrisome aspect of this problem is that electoral conflict or threat to violence has become a veritable tactics of the rich in politics to recruit jobless men and women to harass, intimidate and physically hurt not only political opponents but the entire society. Taking a look at the causes of electoral violence in Zambia Cater Centre (2016) identified that greed, electoral abuses, and rigging of elections; abuse of political power, alienation, marginalization and exclusion; and the political economy of the country's resources, are some of the causes of electoral violence in Zambia. Similarly, Tembo (2016) highlighted that ineffectiveness of security forces and culture of impunity; weak penalties; weak governance and corruption, contributes immensely to electoral violence in Zambia.

2.3   Democracy

Democratization has been widely promoted in developing countries after the end of the Cold War. As exemplified by Boutros-Ghali's quote, the prevailing idea has been that by increasing the legitimacy and the accountability of elected representatives, elections would de

facto improve governance and thereby reduce the risk of conflict. Yet in spite of expectations, a majority of elections organized in recent democracies have been marked by violence (Diamond, 1989), with dramatic consequences for civilian populations and their economies.

More than a thousand people died and over 500,000 people were forced to flee their homes following political and ethnic violence which sparked in the aftermath of the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya. In 2010, the presidential election in Ivory Coast also resulted in political turmoil, leading to over 1,000 deaths and 500,000 displaced. More recently, the candidacy of the Burundian president Pierre Nkurunziza for a third term triggered a violent political crisis in Burundi, resulting in hundreds of deaths and about 200,000 refugees who fled to neighbouring Tanzania, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo. While electoral violence is pervasive, its causes and dynamics remain poorly understood (EU, 2015)

In contemporary democracies, elections are acceptable means of electing leaders, an important process that strengthens democratic institutions and facilitate peaceful transition of power (Ake, 1993). However, for example in Nigeria all elections conducted since her independence in 1960 have been characterized by widespread violence, intimidation, bribery and corruption. Njogu (2011) reported that the prevalence of one political violence or the other has been the mainstay of elections in Nigeria with youths as the major actors in the theatre of electoral violence and that such violence have assumed a serious dimension. Electoral violence according to the International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES) is any act or threat of physical or psychological harm to a person or damage to property, directed at anyone directly involved in an electoral process (voters, candidates, party officers, election workers, election monitors, journalists, etc.) which may disrupt or attempt to disrupt any aspect of the electoral process (Fischer, 2002). Electoral violence could therefore be described as a pre- meditated act that intends to influence the electoral process using foul language, verbal intimidation, blackmail, dangerous weapons, arson and assassination. (Ake, 1993).

The concepts of democracy and good governance have not only dominated the global political realm but also different disciplines, including development studies, economics, and social and political sciences. They are among the most valued concepts in the world and yet the vaguest in terms of definition and application. This has led to some scholars claiming that we are living in a world whereby democracy is qualified by an array of adjectives hence

loosing meaning (Plattner,2013; Mwangola, 2007).According to Plattner (2013), the two concepts have attained the status of buzzwords nationally and internationally, making it difficult to give them a precise meaning. So what do these terms exactly mean and what is the alliance between these important concepts?

2.3.1 Meaning and Models of Democracy

Democracy is one of the most contested concepts in the world. All manner of political systems refers to themselves as democracies. In Africa, the concept is widely preached but least exercised. For example, in a country like Uganda where competitive elections are seldom witnessed, the country considers itself as a democratic republic. Democracy is equated with popular power and can be defined as a rule by the people and for the people (Plattner, 2013). In comparison to dictatorships, oligarchies, monarchies and aristocracies, where people have little or no say, democracy, theoretically seeks input from the citizenry in decision-making processes (ibid). Democracy in its classic sense seeks to realize human potential through their active participation and has therefore been historically associated with the struggle against social injustices that mostly arise from tyrannical leadership (Adejumobi, 2003).

Everyday democracy is about a shared assumption, whether in articulated or unrecognized, of how citizens want their country to be. The citizens determine the economic, social, political structures and systems they want, how they want their laws administered and how they want to be governed. Consent in terms of shared will is essential for a democracy to be achieved (Adejumobi, 2003).

In Zambian's context, as in many multi-ethnic and multi-religious states, democracy ought to ensure that minority groups in each of these categories are not excluded in decision-making processes (ibid). Mustapha and Whitfield (2009), citing William (2003), asserts that democracy is not a state but a process whereby the liberty of citizens and residents is protected through the process of holding those in power accountable, so that the ruled can achieve an adequate political representation. Important in William's definition, is that the governed have a say in the decisions that affect their lives. He further observes that "the process involves the acts of defining, defending and creating institutions and cultures that promotes a set of goals.... the process of democratization facilitates debates about public

issues including the nature of conditions of democratic politics" (Williams, 2003). The definition of democracy affects the outcome of different plans.

The definition of democracy affects the outcome of different plans of a particular context. For example the definition of this concept affects the way leaders are recruited into office and how they leave office. It also affects how the constitution is viewed. It is indisputable that the way democracy is defined has a great influence on the direction a people take with regards to their development and the speed at which this development is going to take place (Mustapha and Whitfield, 2009). Mwangola (2013) observes that in the Zambia context, as it is in many African countries, citizens have been cultured to look at democracy as an aspiration rather than something that is practical and realistic to achieve. He, therefore, emphasizes the need to look at this concept as a verb i.e. a word that conveys action and activity rather than a noun. In practice, especially in developing countries, the concept of democracy has been equated to multi-party elections.

While discussing democracy, it is natural in most contexts that the attention automatically shifts to the elections of representatives both at the local and the international levels. Elections are done every five years in Zambia and practically, voting is seen as a marker of 'true democracy' (Hoglund, 2009). From the above definitions, it is true to say that elections represent a small fraction of what real democracy entails. It is not just about elections every fifth year or about constitutions and electoral law, but about how people are involved, get a national consensus to choose their leaders through sharing their opinions without feeling that their freedoms or rights are being threatened. Important in making choices is the knowledge of the opportunities that exist. This, therefore, requires people whose experiences have grown through time. "Democracy at the basic level is reflected in respect and the acceptance of the law. At the national level, it is reflected in checks and balances of the important institutions: the Executive, Judiciary, and the Legislature" (IED, 1996).

A conceptual definition of democracy also entails an understanding of its complex dynamics such as the need to evaluate and analyse the past, the present, and the protracted future. In the case of Zambia, its definition has to take into consideration the history of the country, including its precolonial societies, the colonial period and the postcolonial period for it to be well covered and be inclusive. Although different definitions and characteristics of democracy have been promulgated, as shown above, the central theme that characterizes

these definitions is the idea of making governance come closer to the people. In addition to voting, real democracy, therefore, entails the ability to participate truly in the decision-making process in everyday discourse in the public sphere (Hoglund, 2009)

2.3.2   Forms and Types of Democracy

The quest for democracy is a global affair that has been going on for decades with the existence of different forms and types of democracy. Most scholars on the concept of democracy perceive it in relation to the liberal type of democracy. However, several other types of democracies are practiced in different countries, including social democracy and socialist democracy (Njogu, 2011). In its classical sense, the concept of democracy means the people having an opportunity to express power. The liberal democracy narrows down to people electing their representatives through competitive elections. The elected individuals make up the government and they have a duty to protect as well as uphold the rule of law, political and civil rights, and must be accountable to the people who elected them to the position of power (Adejumobi, 2002).

Liberal democracies are more concerned with the right and freedoms of individuals as opposed to collective rights. According to him, although the concept of democracy shares some characteristics like the right to political participation and public accountability and the rule of law, they have their differences by definition (Freire, 1970).

Democracy, in general, has an emancipatory element but liberal democracy, on the other hand passively accepts immunity. He states that replacing the definition of democracy with liberal democracy devalues and trivializes the essences of the term (Adejumobi, 2003). The table below shows the differences between the two types of democracy.

Difference between classical and liberal democracies

Classical Democracy	Liberal Democracy
The main objective is to realize human development	It only offers protection for human development
Freedom is positive and activist	Passive acceptance of immunity
It enables as well as empowers	It prevents and protects

	Historically, this form of democracy emerged to cause a political structure, which seeks to protect the economy, involving protection of emerging revolutions, particularly industrial and Technological and protection of private property. Thus, this type of democracy is compatible with market economy (Ake 2000).

Adejumobi (2003) further observes that the liberal type of democracy within the western societies was geared towards representing and protecting the bourgeois' hegemonic interests, as well as the interests of the capital class. Therefore, in this form of democracy, the concepts of socio-economic rights and equality are quite abstract resulting in the marginalization of members of the lower social classes.

In addition to the different forms of democracies, two types of democracies exist: Direct democracy and representative democracy. Direct democracy is a form of democracy whereby all members of a, nation get the opportunity to decide (Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012). On the other hand, a representative democracy establishes an intermediary actor between the people being governed and the political institutions that govern the state. The political actor is chosen through elections that ought to be free, fair and representative in nature and are tasked with the responsibility of making decisions on behalf of their subjects and representing the interests of the people who have elected them (IED, 1996). Non-state actors like the civil societies, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations also play an important role in the governance process within a democratic system. Zambia is considered to be a representative democracy.

2.3.3   Linkage between Democracy and Good Governance

There is a big dilemma for political and development practitioners on how democracy and good governance relate. Some authors like Albritton (2009) argue that democracy is not a prerequisite for a state to achieve good governance. They have noted that good governance can exist without democracy being in place. Solid examples include some countries in Asia like Singapore and Dubai. It has also been argued that democracy can also exist without the principles of good governance being adhered to, as it is the scenario in most third world countries (Albritton, 2009). Democracy can end up becoming unpopular in the long run if it does not deliver what is important to the citizens of a society. On the other hand, authors

Adejumobi (2003) see democracy, in particular, liberal democracy, and good governance, as having mutually reinforcing elements observing that democracy is a precondition for the achieving of good governance.

2.3.4   Democracy and Good Governance in Africa

Different types of scholars have perceived democracy as an important aspect of governance in African states just as it is to other nations across the world. Beginning from the 1980s there have been attempts both nationally and internationally to gradually achieve political pluralism and democratization in Africa due to the hopelessness and disillusionment trends that have been caused by poverty, disease and abuse of human rights in Africa (Whitfield and Mustafa, 2009).

Several factors have been mentioned to influence democratic processes in Africa including; internal and external processes; historical memories, group loyalties, aid dependencies, geopolitical factors and political economy issues. Ake (1993) states that democratization studies in Africa should encompass more multi-sided and elaborate studies due to the nature and developments that are taking place in the continent. Many studies that have been done in this field concentrate more on the political and legal sphere of life which focus mostly on state-led arenas such as the electoral and institutional arenas of governance. The author calls for the expansion of the analytical framework by looking at democratization discourses in light of other broader interdisciplinary issues like generational change, class and gender issues and change in social norms, as depicted by the civil society in and outside state arena. This, he says, will result in meaningful results on the achievements and failures of democratization processes.

Adejumobi (2003) observes that there is an overemphasis of elections as the main component of democracy in the African continent, which is treated as a magical wand that can heal most of Africa's problems. He adds that African countries have remained relatively poor in performance despite the fact that some of them have faithfully held elections as provided by the constitution. An effect of the very emphasis on elections is the use of political capital and energies on electoral politics leading to dictators and autocrats getting the space and time to devise new ways permitted by democratic principles, to stay in power (Plattner, 2013).

He further states that the citizenry in the African context possesses abstract political rights for Therefore, questioning the practicability of the liberal democracy. In line with election as the center of discussion, Plattner (2013) claims that democratic electorates do not necessarily make wise decisions while choosing their representatives leading to the election of inferior and dishonest leaders, as opposed to competent and trustworthy ones. This ends up creating a vicious cycle whereby the inferior leaders get into power for personal gain instead of serving the electorate by providing services and implementing gainful policies.

Building stable democracies is very challenging, and it would be unrealistic to think that changing leaders and constitutions lead to stable and effective governments that interest themselves in delivering (Diamond, 1989). Supporting Diamond's assertion, Ndegwa (2001) posits that democracy is work in progress whose achievements are measured by the ability of a regime to secure and promote the rights of its citizenry both at the social, political and at the economic level. Democratization occurs is a messy process that requires a social foundation whereby that advocates for significant changes in political structures and political culture, social structures and the relationship between state and society calling for a change in the mentality of the leaders and the led (Diamond, 1989).

National contexts matter in the analysis of the successes and failures of democratic governance with Whitfield and Mustafa (2009) warning intellectuals to be careful in their analysis of what democracy means in different contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa. They note that in the regard of Sub-Saharan Africa as a unitary region, the outcome of this overgeneralization having had major regrettable consequences in democratization process one of which is the implementation of major economic policies. Though some similarities can be drawn from the different states, different authors continue to note that the different states have had different journeys in there democratization process, making their experiences unique to their context (Whitfield and Mustafa, 2009; Harrison, 2004; Abrahamsen, 2000).

Whitfield and Mustafa (2009) demonstrate a diversity of outcomes of the democratization processes, therefore, refuting the overgeneralization of democratic processes in Africa. For example, Freedom House considers Ghana as among the countries in Africa that are free while considering Kenya and Nigeria, who have experienced a mixed assortment of democracy since their independence, as partly free. Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast, on the other hand, are considered as not free due to the disastrous authoritarian pattern of governance

throughout their history. Though some of them are in the same group or class in relation to freedom, their trajectories can be explained by different factors for example for oil in Nigeria or aid dependence in Ghana crucial in explaining their democratization process (Whitfield and Mustafa, 2009).

2.3.5   Zambia's Democracy

Unlike many of its neighbours, Zambian political history has been relatively stable since it gained independence in 1964. Despite a number of failed attempts by the military to overthrow the government, conflict have generally been resolved through non-violent means, mostly through the courts, whose decisions are generally accepted. However, since Zambia turned to multipartism conflicts caused by elections have continued to rise that even led the Electoral Management body to establish CMCs in 2002 in all the districts in the country.

With the transition from a one-party state to a multiparty democracy in the early 1990s, Zambia was initially considered a poster child for Africa's development. Zambia have held eight multiparty elections since 1991. Except the 1991 elections the rest of the elections have been marred with election disputes that were based on election rigging and outright caused non acceptance of results forcing political party players to violence. Hoglund (2009) expressed that Zambian politics is also based on systems of patronage where political party supporters are rewarded with incentives. This create political insecurity ensues whenever there is a change of government since it is generally based on the establishment of new patronage networks and the necessary disruption of existing ones as a results violence from both parties erupt in the other side fighting to maintain the status quo while the other party wanting to get power in ruling the nations.

Currently, political stability rests on a fragile foundation, with widespread poverty and glaring social inequalities simmering below the surface. Thus, political and social harmony may not be sustainable in the long term without a genuine and determined eff ort to promote political and social justice. Broad-based economic growth and equitable sharing of benefits are imperative to the prevention of violent conflict in any society. Mwangola (2013 opined that without consented efforts from all key players in elections, electoral conflicts and violence may constitute deep-seated structural threats to the future of democracy and economic development.

3.0   Conflict Management

Conflict management is complex and requires certain competencies and skills among individuals holding the responsibility to execute these duties. The complex nature of electoral conflict makes it extremely challenging to, predict with certainty when, how, and where conflict will occur and strategise on mechanisms for its management. The fact that the management of electoral conflicts is a challenge requires effective management. Literature below shows some of the major works.

3.1   European Electoral Conflict Management Studies

Stephen E. Gent and Megan Shannon (2011) in their study, Bias and the effectiveness of third-party conflict management mechanisms using quantitative analysis finds that the conflict management strategy significantly influences the likelihood of ending a claim and further that arbitration is significantly more likely to lead to an agreement ending the claim than good offices or mediation. The study also finds that a more intrusive type of diplomatic intervention, such as arbitration, is significantly more likely to end a claim than a less intrusive strategy, such as mediation or good offices. Regardless of the conflict management strategy used or the extent of the claim that is addressed, a goal of any settlement attempt is for the claimants to reach some sort of agreement. However, the study was only limited to quantitative approach limiting the amount of information and insight the researchers could obtain on the topic. The study focused on how bias would affect the effectiveness of third party conflict management mechanism. This means that the study did not address clearly the effectiveness of conflict management committees even after understanding the effect of bias on their effectiveness.

Beardsley Kyle and Nigel Lo (2013) in their paper entitled Democratic Communities and Third-party Conflict Management using Event History Analysis of the Issue obtains results that are consistent with the theoretical expectations that disputes that are in stronger democratic communities have a greater propensity for conflict management, especially by democratic states in salient and non-protracted conflicts.   The study also confirm that democratic leaders appear quite eager to become involved in nearby disputes that have important implications but also quite hesitant to become involved in relatively difficult

disputes. This indicates that the political capital that democratic leaders reap for helping to manage important conflicts is limited in many cases and that the embarrassment from failure can be substantial. Further that third parties would use their involvements for political gain that are somehow an impediment to conflict resolution. This means that such political parties are likely to push for quick fixes that might actually prove unstable in the long run when their involvement is no longer affecting the bargaining dynamics.

According to Aman (2013) from the Australian Electoral Commission in his paper Electoral Conflict Management in Australia there is no history of violence and only rare instances of minor physical altercations between party political workers, typically over the placement of posters. Australian elections are characterized by an absence of any police let alone military presence. Disputes occur, mostly during vote counting scrutiny processes, but they are generally settled by agreement between scrutineers and polling officials without involvement of any kind of electoral committees. While the AEC has not directly used the International IDEA tool of CMCs, it does follow a path that largely mirrors the structure of the internal and external factors proposed in the model. Australia faces an election conflict management challenge that is driven essentially by external factors. Australia has been fortunate, thus far, in having experienced only isolated incidents of extremist-inspired violence. The impact of those incidents on election security is difficult to estimate but there is no known threat to the next major electoral event in Australia. In this regard, the AEC's consideration of mitigation options of conflict management has been a zero to low visibility of police in the vicinity of polling places to maintain the traditional atmosphere around elections.

Further, Michael Brecher and Patrick James (1988) in their study of Patterns of Crisis Management used a protracted conflict crisis model using quantitative approach. The study finds that Arab-Israeli crises are distinct not because of their geographic location but because of the patterns of conflict management which are protracted. The study is also quantitative in nature and is limited to the Middle East hence giving a limited view of other situations such as those of Africa. Therefore this study seeks to feel this gap by focusing on a qualitative approach to ensure that the gaps are filled.

Furthermore, Magnus Lundgren (2016) in her article, Conflict Management Capabilities of Peace-brokering International Organizations, using regression analysis finds that there has been a general surge of supranational conflict management since the end of the Second World

War, with the number of International Organisations (IOs) active in this domain increasing from 3% to 21%. The study also finds that the IOs tend to delegate authority more for instruments with lower sovereignty costs, such as mediation. However, the study is mostly descriptive which just gives a brief scratch of the topic of conflict management. Further, the study is also quantitative in nature limiting the extent of information that can be generated from the study.

However, the study was only limited to quantitative approach limiting the amount of information and insight the researchers could obtain on the topic and similarly, like previous study, the study focused on how the domestic political institutions of states in the neighbourhood of international disputants affect the incentives for third-party conflict management. This means that the study did not address clearly the effectiveness of conflict management committees even after understanding the association between democratic communities and third party conflict management.

3.2   African Electoral Conflict Management Studies

According to Erik Asplund (2016) in his study of Electoral Conflict Management in Kenya, Nepal and Nigeria demonstrated how conflict management approaches such as mediation can be integrated into an Electoral Management Body's (EMB) day-to-day work and one common element that was established is that all three EMBs established conflict management units that operate in parallel with election management operations. The creation of these specialized units with dedicated staff has ensured that regular electoral activities proceed unhindered while the EMBs are able to monitor and identify any deviation from implementation or negative external influences that jeopardize their efforts. The study has established that in Kenya, Nepal and Nigeria, conflict management is a new element of electoral administration which is still in its infancy. However, in all three cases the study has revealed that the EMBs were initially concerned about security risks, but found the use of Conflict Management Committees Tool useful as it covers all aspects of electoral conflict issues.   However, due to the Committees lack of binding power they are gradually being incorporated with legal, political, operational and technical conflict management frameworks.

Further, Asplund (2013) in his seminar article Electoral Conflict Management Practices in South Africa concluded that although faced with various risks to its businesses, the

Commission has not yet adopted an all-inclusive framework for managing electoral conflict as a whole. He stated that the conflict management in the organization focused on coordination of conditions for free and fair elections that is inclined towards conflict management and mediation. This inclination arises from the nature of the external risk factors in elections dating back to 1994, while also addressing the challenges arising from the service delivery protests and inter- and intra-party conflict in the new South Africa. In addition to mediating in conflicts, where circumstances allow they identify and report on risks to elections. A panel of mediators is set up, trained and deployed in each of the nine provinces to assist with mediation as and when required. However, there is a perception among some opposition parties that presiding officers who are members of the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) are not impartial. This arises from the fact that SADTU is an affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) which is believed to be in alliance with a major political party. This has led to electoral conflict resolution in piecemeal way and hence ineffective.

In Zambia, according to Jackson (2012), the growing tensions surrounding the 2001 elections made the Commission to recognize the need for a new strategy that would extinguish mounting conflict, by clarifying responsibilities for dispute resolution, and provide complainants with an effective outlet for their concerns before, during, and after an election. The Commission turned to the idea of conflict management committees groups that would mediate disputes between different political parties that included election commission staff, police, civil society organizations, and the media. The committees advised against the lengthy recourse to the country's existing legal structure because they were advisory rather than punitive in nature. Although Zambia's political parties did engage with these committees and the ECZ they did not view the process as being fully independent.

Commonwealth Observer Group report (2016) observed that there were concerns on the escalating pattern of ethnic-centred politics in these elections. It was observed that although politicians have repeatedly sought to appeal to particularly ethnic or regional groupings since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1991, the level and degree to which this has been exploited were more pronounced in 2016 general elections and referendum.

Further, ECZ (2016) report claimed that the political parties' direct engagement with CMCs demonstrated the confidence they have in the CMC model as part of the dispute resolution

process and were directly involved if campaigns resulted in violent disputes. The report highlighted that both the DCMCs and the NCMC managed to handle all complaints that were brought before them. However, according to ECZ (2016) report concerns were raised that both the DCMCS and the NCMC decisions lacked binding authority as some political parties could not adhere to the decisions made by the committees. Further some political parties when summoned by the CMCs committees could not avail themselves before it.

In the study conducted by Magasu (2016), he also shed light on the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia which revealed that electoral conflicts had the potential to become chaotic thereby undermining the integrity and credibility of the electoral process. This study revealed that CMCs were mandated to resolve and manage electoral conflicts in a prudent and timely manner. The strategy used by CMCs to resolve and manage electoral conflicts in Zambia was mediation. However, the findings also revealed that such a strategy was not punitive enough to punish the perpetrators of the vice. Furthermore, the findings dismiss the assertion that CMCs were compromised owing to the fact that the composition of these committees was a representative of different stakeholders.

Essentially, Section 6 of the Electoral Code of Conduct (2006) restricts behaviour that might fuel violence or disrupt the right to freedom of campaigning. These behaviours 26 include among others, bans on violent behaviour or inflammatory speech, the carrying or display of arms, making false defamatory or inflammatory allegations, disrupting campaign meetings, defacing campaign materials, vote buying, bribery among others.

The procedure for conflict resolution is that any member of the general public can make a complaint in writing and addressed to the area Town Clerk/Council Secretary or to the Electoral Commission of Zambia. The committee chairperson will then convene a meeting to the dispute within twenty four (24) hours from the date of receipt of the complaint. The members would choose a lead mediator to spearhead the mediation. Then the members of the parties to the dispute would be invited to attend the mediation session. The mediator would then assist the parties to find an agreement solution. The agreed solution is reduced in writing and signed by all parties. The committees largely apply the Electoral Code of Conduct when resolving disputes. Any person not satisfied with the mediation by the District Committee may appeal to the National Committee or to the Electoral Commission (Conflict Management Training Handbook, (2016).

However, it appears the CMCs are facing serious challenges and have failed to meet the expectations of some stakeholders as evidenced in the frequent and intense electoral violence witnessed in Zambia especially Lusaka and Namwala where the Electoral Commission had to suspend campaigns for a period of 10 days (ECZ Press Release, 9th July, 2016).

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 METHODOLOGY

The general aim of the study was to assess the performance of electoral conflict resolution committee in electoral conflict resolution. In interrogating this topic, the proposed study was essentially relied on primary sources such as interviews of key players in elections conflict management and secondary sources such as district conflict management reports and minutes of the meetings were used for document analysis. The study presents the research design, research site, research instruments, population, sampling procedure, data collection instruments, data collection procedure, data analysis, presentation of data, validation and reliability, ethical considerations and limitations of the study.

3.1   Research Design

The study was focused on the effectiveness of Electoral Conflict Resolution Committees in Zambia, the case study of Namwala district. A qualitative descriptive research design was used. A descriptive research refers to research studies that have their main objective the accurate portrayal of the characteristics of persons, situations or groups (Hiatt, 1986). This approach was used to describe variables rather than to test a predicted relationship between variables. The descriptive approach in data collection gives the ability to collect accurate data on and provide a clear picture of the phenomenon under study (Hillman, 2005).

The essence of a qualitative descriptive research design is first to state the status quo, then formulating important principles of knowledge and later provides solutions to the problem. Essentially, this design was appropriate because it gave an accurate and authentic description of the lessons and experiences of electoral conflicts in Zambia.

This study was conducted in Namwala district. Namwala District is a district in the Southern Province of Zambia. As of the 2000 Zambian Census, the district had a population of 82,810 people (CSO, 2006). This district was purposively selected as a case site due to the many cases of electoral conflicts that had ended violently during the 2016 General Elections. Furthermore, it is in this district that the CMCs seem to be active.

3.2   Population

Cooper and Schindler (2003) define population as the total collection of elements from which individuals wish to draw a conclusion. With the above definition, in this regard the study population was drawn from all the people who sit on the district electoral conflict management committee in Namwala and some residents in Namwala who were affected with escalating violence in the district. National CMC based in Namwala was also included in the population as they are used as a referral in instances where the district failed to resolve some electoral conflict. ECZ which formulate policies regarding electoral conflict management and CSOs, political parties and church mother bodies were also included in the population.

3.3   Selecting the Sample

A sample is a portion of the population. Sample refers to the number of participants selected from the universe to constitute a desired sample (Bless, 1995). The Namwala district CMC, the Patriotic Front party (PF), the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy party (MMD), the United Party for National Development (UPND), Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Transparency International Zambia (TIZ), Caritas Zambia and the three (3) Church mother bodies (Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ), Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ) and Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC). Therefore, the two (2) Conflict Management Committees (1 at national level and another at district level); three (3) major political parties as ranked on the basis of the results of the 2011 tripartite elections; three (3) Civil Society Organisations that are involved in issues of democracy and good governance; three (3) Church mother bodies, One (1) department of the ECZ (the Legal department) served as valuable study population. Therefore, twelve (12) interviews were conducted.

Therefore, the sample for this study was 35 which were broken down as follows 19 DCMC members, 6 members of NCMC, 2 members of ECZ Board and 7 stakeholders in Namwala district.

3.4   Sampling Technique

The study used purposive or non-probability sampling. This sampling method involved deliberate selection of particular units of the universe for constituting a sample which represents the universe. This was because there are limited members of DCMCs.

Webster (1985) defined a sample as a finite part of a statistical population whose properties are studied to gain information about the whole population. A sample is a subset of the population. Sidhu (2012: 253) defines sampling as "the process of selecting sample from the population." In this study, purposive sampling technique was used to identify respondents from the targeted population. According to Kombo and Tromp (2006), purposive sampling involves targeting a group of people believed to be reliable for the study. From the researcher's category of respondents, the ECZ, CSOs, political parties and members of the Namwala based CMCs stand out.

The ECZ in particular provided useful information on the actual situation on the ground while at the same time outlined the government's position on electoral conflict and violence. At least 1 respondent was targeted from each of the organisations, mainly the Public Relations Officer, Executive Director or any other individual assigned with the responsibility of speaking on behalf of the organisation. This was to ensure that only information relevant to the study was collected thereby saving both the researcher's and respondents' time.

3.5   Methods of Data Collection

The data collected in this study was comprised of both primary and secondary. Data collection is the precise, systematic gathering of information relevant to the research, using methods such as interviews, participant observation, focus group discussion, narratives and case histories (Hiatt, 1986). Interviews were used to gather data from the respondents. To maintain originality, the voice recorder was employed in some cases and content later transcribed so as to identify the critical junctions. Closed ended questions were employed to get precise answers to the questions. In addition, unstructured open ended questions were used to encourage elaboration and further discussion.

Primary data was collected from interviews from members of DCMC, NCMC, ECZ Board and district electorates. Both primary and secondary data was used in this study. Primary data was collected from data held by various libraries, institutional reports, the internet, media and newspaper reports were also used with a view to capture recent updates of electoral conflict and violence in the country. Electronic media articles, journals, research reports, conference proceedings, magazines and books also constituted an important source of secondary data. It is important to note that secondary data was mainly a complement to primary data collected from the field. The interview questions were pre-tested to avoid ambiguous questions.

3.6   Research Instruments

In this study, data was collected using the structured interview guide. This was because the study was qualitative in nature. In this method, the researcher personally met the informants and asked necessary questions to them regarding the subject of enquiry (Creswell, 2012). Using this approach, the researcher was able to efficiently collect the data from the key informants by cross examining them. This technique was used to collect data from the DCMC as well as the NCMC. The major advantage of this technique was that there was no chance of non-response as the interviewer personally collected data and also allowed probing in order to get in-depth information. Further, as argued by Kasonde-Ngandu (2013), data collected in form of interviews is so reliable since the interviewer tactfully collects the data by cross examining the responders.

3.7   Processing and Analysis of Data

The study employed qualitative methods of data collection in order to collect data to answer the research questions. According to LeCompte and Schensul (1999), data analysis is the process a researcher uses to reduce data to a story and its interpretation. Therefore, data analysis is a mechanism for reducing and organising data to produce findings that require interpretation. Data from tape recorders, interviews were transcribed having read text files and listened to the tape recorders thoroughly for a general understanding. Common themes were then identified and clustered to categorise the data. Relevant information was labelled and grouped according to category.

Furthermore, the data was then reduced to its essence and representative and most striking quotes were identified. Codes related to the objectives were identified and a thematic analysis

was done. Throughout this process of categorising pattern, similarities and contrasting viewpoints were highlighted and critically interpreted on the basis of the theoretical framework.

3.8 Validity and Reliability

The validity of a research, according to Leedy and Ormrod (2001) refers to whether the findings of a study are true and certain. 'True' in the sense that research findings accurately reflect the situation, and 'certain' in the sense that research findings are supported by the evidence. To increase the study reliability and validity, the preliminary research findings were presented to five respondents who include ECZ, three political parties and one CSO to do a member checking. This checking opened opportunities for clarifications, feedback and discussion of the conclusion.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

Furrow (2004: 43) defined ethics as 'a morality or a position of doing what is right both morally and legally.' To start with, permission was sort from the University of Zambia to carry out this study. It is important to protect participants who willingly present themselves for the purpose of advancing understanding in research. Therefore, a strict set of guidelines and code of conduct was adopted and adhered to.

Confidentiality was an important aspect in this study and hence, all the names of the respondents were not mentioned. The researcher ensured that participant's consent to participate in the research was voluntary by making them sign a consent form, free of any coercion or promises of benefits as a result of participation. Since the study was to evaluate the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia, the researcher ensured that the participants received a full disclosure of the nature of the study, expected benefits to the participants and society with an extended opportunity to ask questions, including the fact that they could choose to withdraw their participation even in the middle of the research.

3.11 Summary

This chapter began by identifying and describing the research design for the study and argued that a qualitative research design would be appropriate because it gives the researcher the ability to collect accurate data and provide a clear picture of the phenomenon under study. It

went on to discuss the research site, the population of the study, the sampling procedure, data collection instruments, data collection procedure, how data was analysed, presentation of data, validating data while taking into account ethical considerations and finally, limitations of the study. The next chapter presents the findings of this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 Presentation of the Findings

This chapter discusses the data analysis and findings from 35 members of CMC who were interviewed and some respondents selected randomly in Namwala district to comment on the effectiveness of CMCs in resolving electoral conflicts. Further some respondents were interviewed from the NCMC and ECZ which is the secretariat. The purpose of this study was to assess the effectiveness of DCMC in resolving electoral conflicts in Namwala district.

The objectives of the study were to

1. To establish the composition and capacity of the Namwala DCMC.

2. To investigate adherence to the mechanisms, procedures, and regulations of the Electoral Management Committee uses to resolve electoral violence.

4   To investigate reasons for unresolved cases of electoral conflicts in the Namwala District Electoral Conflict Management Committee in resolving electoral conflicts.

5. To make recommendations to Namwala DCMC on resolving electoral conflicts.

Interviews were conducted to members of the CMCs and some electorates in Namwala District. This was after obtaining consent of their willingness to participate in the study. A

total of 35 members of the CMCs, NCMC, ECZ Board and some electorates were interviewed.

The data obtained from the interviewed were statistically analyzed. The SPSS version 11program was used for some of the data analysis. The findings are discussed according to the variables in the interview question guide and with reference to the objective of the study.

Basically, this chapter is exclusively devoted to the presentation and analysis of data collected through interviews. Not all the issues reflected in the interview guide have been included in the presentation but only those issues that strongly relate to the management of electoral conflicts have been included.

Table .1 Composition of Namwala District CMC

NO	DESCRIPTION	ORGANISATION
1	Chairperson	Civil Society Organization
2	Vice Chairperson	Faith-based Organization
3	Secretary	District Council
4	1 Member	Zambia Police Service
5	1 Member	Patriot African Congress (PAC)
6	1 Member	Human Rights Commission
7	1 Member	Green Party (GP)
8	1 Member	Resident Magistrate
9	1 Member	United Party for National Development (UPND)
10	1 Member	Patriot Front (PF)
11	1 Member	UPP
12	1 Member	Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)
13	1 Member	United National Independence Party (UNIP)
14	1 Member	Democratic Alliance (DA)
15	1 Member	Non-Governmental Organization
16	1 Member	Civil Society Organization
17	1 Member	Rainbow Party (RP)
18	1 Member	Forum for Development & Democracy (FDD)
19	1 Member	Zambia Correctional Service

Table 1 above shows the composition of the Namwala CMC. The committee is comprised of 19 members from various organizations as shown above. Each political is represented by one person. The members are formally appointed by the Council Secretary basing on the number of active political parties, faith based organizations and the civil society organizations. The appointment of the chairperson of the committee is done by the Council Secretary while the

vice chairperson is elected amongst the members of the district committee.   The District Council Secretary is the secretary of the committee.

The composition of the district committee is similar to the National Conflict Management Committee and is backed by Electoral Commission of Zambia regulations. The NCMC members are all appointed by ECZ. Each registered political party is represented on the committee by one person. Selected government institutions such as Zambia Police Service, Anti-Corruption Commission and Faith Based Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations dealing in gender, disabilities or conflict related activities are also represented. The ECZ appoints the chairperson while the committee members elect the vice chairperson among themselves. The legal department of ECZ forms the secretariat of the NCMC.

Table. 2 Income level in Namwala District

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	below 1000	3	8.6	8.6	8.6
	1000 - 4000	29	82.9	82.9	91.4
	4000 - 7000	3	8.6	8.6	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

The monthly household income revealed that 82.2% of the respondents were in income groups 1000-4000 which was quite a low income bracket. However, 8.6% of the respondents did not earned income in the income bracket of 4000-7000 while the equal proportion of 8.6 also earned incomes below K 1000. It is believed that respondents with high and constant incomes are more likely to be in formal employment and most likely with formal education.

Table 3. Gender of the Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	28	80.0	80.0	80.0
	Female	7	20.0	20.0	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Table 3. Shows that most of the respondents interviewed were men. It shows that 80% of men were interviewed compared to only 20% of women.

Table 4. Age of respondent

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18-24	2	5.7	5.7	5.7
	25-30	5	14.3	14.3	20.0
	31-34	3	8.6	8.6	28.6
	35-40	8	22.9	22.9	51.4
	41-45	5	14.3	14.3	65.7
	46-50	4	11.4	11.4	77.1
	51-55	4	11.4	11.4	88.6
	56-60	4	11.4	11.4	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Table.4 shows that the respondents' ages ranged from 18 to 60, with the majority being between the ages of 35 to 40 (22.9%). It should be borne in mind that young respondents aged between 18-24 probably were not involved in electoral issues, indicating that more knowledge about elections need to be attained by the age of 24 or even earlier.

Level of Education Attained

Level of Education attained

Figure.1 above represents the highest level of school education that the respondents had obtained. Of the respondent's majority, 60% had certificates and only 8.57% had a master's degree.

Table 5. Religion denomination of respondent

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Catholic	8	22.9	22.9	22.9
	SDA	20	57.1	57.1	80.0
	Pentecost	5	14.3	14.3	94.3
	UCZ	1	2.9	2.9	97.1
	Other	1	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

In table 5, of the respondents, 57% were belonging to SDA church whereas 22.9% were Catholics. The study shows that most of the respondents were Christian with only 2.9% belonging to other religious groupings. The implication of this finding is that most of the respondents were Christian.

Table 6. Understanding of Electoral Conflict

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	31	88.6	88.6	88.6
	No	4	11.4	11.4	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Table 6 represents the level of understanding of electoral conflict of the electorates. The table shows that of respondents interviewed, 88.6% understood electoral conflict, compared only to 11.4% who said they did not understand. This implies that with more knowledge and intervention electoral conflict could be curbed.

Table 7. Understanding the role and mandate of CMCs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	18	51.4	51.4	51.4
	No	17	48.6	48.6	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Table 7 shows that 51.4% of the respondents understand the role of the DCMC compared to 48.6% who said that they did not understand. This reveals that more awareness of the DCMC needs to be made in the district.

Table 8. DCMCs have adequate capacity to resolve conflict

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	12	34.3	34.3	34.3
	No	23	65.7	65.7	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Table 8 above indicates that most of the respondents expressed that the DCMC does not have adequate capacity to resolve electoral conflicts. The electoral laws which provides for their existence does not empower them to take action against perpetuators of electoral conflicts. Further the law also does not give them powers to summon offenders and witnesses to appear before the committee hence capacity is compromised.

Table 9. Understanding mechanism, procedures and regulations of CMCs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	6	17.1	17.1	17.1
	No	29	82.9	82.9	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Most of the responded interviewed indicated that they did not understand the mechanism, procedures and regulations of DCMC. The above table shows that 82.9% said that they did not understand the mechanism, procedures and regulations of DCMC compared to 17.1 who responded in the affirmative.

Table 10. Sharing of challenges of electoral conflicts and violence in Zambia from 2001 to days

Responses	Number of participants
Yes	25 shared
No	10 Did not share

The above shows the number of members who shared their challenges of electoral conflicts and violence in Zambia from 2001 to date. Twenty-five members indicated that they had encountered challenges since the inception of the conflict management committees. 10 members indicated that they could not tell as they are new on the committee.

Table 11. Youths involvement in electoral conflicts and violence?

Responses	Number of participants
Youths	30

Adults	05

Of all the interviewees 30 respondents stated that youths were the perpetuators of electoral conflicts and violence while 5 respondents said adults were perpetuators as they are the ones responsible of sponsoring the youth to engage in political violence. Therefore they are indirect perpetuators of electoral conflicts and violence. However, all respondents that both male and female youths get involved in electoral violence. This implies that regardless of gender, respondents perceive the factors from the same point of view. This could be attributed to the fact that electoral violence is a common phenomenon and the fact that the youths involved in electoral violence live within the community. In the case of the differences, this could be due to the divergent values respondents attach to issues in the said item. Thus the finding of the study is in agreement with that of Ake (1993) who also identified poverty, illiteracy, desperation of politicians to cling unto power and that of Njogu (2011) who submitted that unemployment, poverty as well as lack of transparency on the part of electoral body as causes of election violence among the youths.

Table 12. Successful stories of resolving the electoral conflicts and factors that led to the successful resolution.

Responses	Number of Participants
Yes	16
No	9

Of the 25 members who shared their experience of resolving conflicts 16 indicated that they successful resolved the electoral conflicts that were presented to them. Most of the issues that they had to preside were arising from matters such as disruption of campaign meetings, defacing of campaign posters, character assassination and alleged bribery, vote buying. The reasons attributed to successful resolution of electoral conflicts ranged from adequate training, funding and provision in the law, political parties willingness to find solution to electoral conflicts.

However, nine (09) members indicated that they were not able to resolve the electoral conflicts that were presented them. Previous before the amended Constitution, the committees were constructed to perform administrative functions without law backing. This proved to be very difficult to the committees as parties to the disputes were not obliged to attend dispute hearings as they could to attend or not. Nevertheless this kind of scenario has continued as conflict committees still cannot summon parties to a dispute hearing.

The nine (9) members who indicated that they were unable to resolve the electoral conflicts provided the following as some of their reasons for failures:-

- Inadequate training of the CMC members
- Inadequacy of law provisions
- Unwillingness of the parties to the conflict to appear before the committee
- Lack of awareness of the CMC role

The nine (09) members indicated that though the committee has powers and responsibilities to mediate electoral districts, they still cannot make certain decisions which are solely reserved for ECZ and the Judiciary.

Table 13. Understanding of electoral conflict and DCMCs adequate capacity to resolve conflict

			DCMCs have adequate capacity to resolve conflict		
			Yes	No	Total
Understanding of electoral conflict	Yes	Count	11	20	31
		% within Understanding of electoral conflict	35.5%	64.5%	100.0%
	No	Count	1	3	4
		% within Understanding of electoral conflict	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	12	23	35
		% within Understanding of electoral conflict	34.3%	65.7%	100.0%

Table 13 shows a cross tabulation of understanding electoral conflicts and DCMC capacity to resolve electoral conflicts. The main aim of the table was to examine the interaction of the

two variables. It clear from the responses that even respondents who were aware of the electoral conflict indicated that the DCMCs had no adequate capacity to resolve the conflict. The finding that respondent who understood electoral conflict doubted the capacity of the committee shows the urgent need to continue to increasing the capacity of the committee in order to make the committee effective.

Table. 14 Level of education attained and DCMCs adequate capacity to resolve conflict

			DCMCs have adequate capacity to resolve conflict		
			Yes	No	Total
Level of Education attained	Certificate	Count	10	11	21
		% within Level of Education attained	47.6%	52.4%	100.0%
	Diploma	Count	0	6	6
		% within Level of Education attained	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Degree	Count	2	3	5
		% within Level of Education attained	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
	Masters	Count	0	3	3
		% within Level of Education attained	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	12	23	35
		% within Level of Education attained	34.3%	65.7%	100.0%

The respondents were asked whether the level of education had an effect on the adequacy of capacity of DCMCs to resolving conflict by generating a cross tabulation of level of education attained and DCMCs adequate capacity to resolve conflict in table 12. Of the respondents, 100 % of those that had a high qualification i.e. degree and masters indicated that level of education had nothing to do with capacity to resolving conflict. The finding therefore indicates that education is not really a factor in having capacity to resolve conflict.

Table 15. Level of education attained and understanding the mechanism, procedures and regulations of CMCs

			understand mechanism, procedures and regulations of CMCs		
			Yes	No	Total
Level of Education attained	Certificate	Count	2	19	21
		% within Level of Education attained	9.5%	90.5%	100.0%
	Diploma	Count	1	5	6
		% within Level of Education attained	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
	Degree	Count	2	3	5
		% within Level of Education attained	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
	Masters	Count	1	2	3
		% within Level of Education attained	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	6	29	35
		% within Level of Education attained	17.1%	82.9%	100.0%

The respondents were asked whether the level of education had an effect on the understanding of the mechanism, procedures and regulations of CMCs to resolving conflict by generating a cross tabulation of level of education attained and understand mechanism, procedures and regulations of CMCs in table 15. Of the respondents, 90.5 % of those that had certificate level of education indicated that level of education had nothing to do with understand mechanism, procedures and regulations of CMCs. This was equally true to those who had a diploma as of those respondents interviewed 83.3% arrived at the conclusion with the respondents with a certificate. The finding therefore indicates that education is not really a factor in understanding mechanism, procedures and regulations of CMCs.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0   Discussion of the Findings

This chapter presents the discussion of the findings presented in the previous chapter. It is organized based on the following subtitles arising from the research objectives: to establish the capacity of the Namwala CMC; to investigate adherence to the mechanisms, procedures, and regulations the Electoral Management Committee uses to resolve electoral violence; and, to investigate reasons for unresolved cases of electoral conflicts in the Namwala District Electoral Conflict Management Committee in resolving electoral conflicts.

5.1   Management of CMCs

The initial goal of the CMCs was to enforce Zambia's electoral code of conduct more effectively. In order to do that, they had three clear objectives:

- To prevent and manage electoral conflicts with a view to achieving peaceful elections and mutual agreement on resolutions through mediation of conflicts that arise in the electoral process;

- To strengthen the capacity of the ECZ to deliver successful, free and fair elections by providing an early warning system that can assist it in responding to potential conflicts in the pre-election and post-election phases;

- To nurture a democratic culture through encouraging and promoting the conduct of conflict-free elections.

The revealed that all political parties and other stakeholders were represented on the NCMC as well as the DCMC. The NCMC was set up to comprise "various election stakeholders, including representatives of registered political parties, NGOs, the police, the Ministry of Justice, and the Anti-Corruption Commission. Committees were also established at a district level. However, the composition of district-level CMCs could be considered as unfair if it

were chaired by a party member. For example if a party member was the Chairperson of the CMC this could undermine impartial decision-making and the Namwala DCMCs could have been accused of being politically biased. It is a notorious fact that most disputes are brought before the Committee by political parties. Therefore, in the event that the chairperson is a member of a political party, the impartiality and indeed credibility of such a Committee could be compromised.

5.1.1 Measurement

The ECZ and external election observation missions, such as the Carter Center, touched upon the effectiveness of the CMCs and the ECZ as a whole in their post-election reviews on conflict management. However, there exists only limited evidence of internal evaluations or statistics. A post-election review on conflict management was concluded by the ECZ in 2017, with the help of the United Nations Development Programme and with funding from the EU, UK Aid, Irish Aid, and the US Agency for International Development. The review consisted of four workshops for district-level CMC members. This was one of the few times when CMC stakeholders were able to review the conflict management process and the mediation between political parties during elections. The review emphasized the need for strengthened partnerships between [district-level] CMCs and the NCMC as well as other role-players, and generated information that will serve as a baseline for future conflict interventions."

Up until the 2011 elections, international observers had been largely skeptical about any concrete successes made by the CMCs, but the EU remarked that after the 2011 campaign CMCs began to have a positive effect. The CMCs "were very active in the constituencies that were closely contested and served a valuable role in resolving issues such as disputes over posters, incidents of any insults traded between candidates, and threats of violence. This provided a very effective process of linking the NCMC and DCMC.

5.1.2 Feasibility

The study revealed that the ECZ initially delayed the training process for their staff and ran into time constraints as a result, which affected their ability to function effectively during Zambia's first democratic election in 2016. In addition, the legal structure of CMCs did not allow for independent investigations, relying instead on individuals submitting a formal complaint for the dispute resolution process to be activated. This compromised the CMCs ability to mediate electoral conflicts successfully. The committees had to wait for an

individual to submit a formal written complaint outlining an alleged violation of the electoral code of conduct before intervening in a conflict.

When the committee began its work three months before the elections, it was not yet at full strength because the CMC's employees had only just completed a course in basic conflict management. This problem was exacerbated by the limited funding available for them to organize themselves fully before the campaign.

5.2.1   Capacity of the Namwala CMC.

From the findings presented in this study, it is evident that the Electoral Act No. 12 and the Constitution (Amendment) Act No 2 of 2016 granted the ECZ powers to establish CMCs. It is clear that the subsidiary legislation allows ECZ had established a National Conflict Management Committee based in Lusaka and several others in all the districts in Zambia like Namwala. These committees were established in August 2006 for the sole purpose of resolving and managing electoral conflicts.

As it can be seen from the findings of this study, the structure and composition of the Namwala CMCs in particular was intact and that functions and responsibilities were as provided for the guidelines. However, due to the part-time nature of the job the operations of the committees affected. But, it was observed that the members had a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities, although the other respondents interviewed submitted that they did not know the roles of the Committee. It was also clearly indicated that the chairperson chaired the meetings while the secretary who was also the District Electoral Officer was in charge of the administrative but, the findings show that DCMCs did not have adequate capacity to resolve conflict although the structure of the committee was intact.

What also stood out from the findings was that the members of the CMCs were answerable to ECZ. In view of the discharge of functions on the part of the National Committee, it was clear from the findings that most of the members had the perquisite qualification to sit in the Committee.

This study however, established from the findings that CMCs had challenges in resolving and managing electoral disputes and that most of the respondents interviewed did not understand mechanism, procedures and regulations of CMCs in Namwala district. It was also clear from

the findings that while the Committee was charged with procedures, these procedures were not known by most of the respondents affecting the conflict resolution processes in the district. They maybe need to sensitise the people in the district.

This study also found out that the manner in which CMCs were constituted was essentially basic and largely not known by many of the stakeholders. It was also noted that the Committee comprised of all registered political parties, CSOs relevant to the electoral process, the local authority, the Police, ACC and faith based. But the study established that from the findings Namwala CMCs was weak.

5.2.2 *Adherence to the mechanisms, procedures, and regulations the Electoral Management Committee uses to resolve electoral violence.*

The study established the CMCs were guided by mechanisms, procedures and regulations in the management and resolution of electoral violence. The mechanisms were provides for in the Electoral Conflict Management Handbook. Before beginning the process of managing electoral conflicts, it is important to weigh the conditions and choose the appropriate method. This includes assessing whether or not the conflict management process can be effective. The handbook identified four steps in managing conflicts as follows:-

1. Preparation − identify and analyse the electoral conflict; conduct research; contact other actors associated to the conflict in order to verify crucial facts; explain intentions and build relationships; plan strategically;

2. Open process to manage the conflict − call the parties to a meeting; introduce them; define issues and set agendas;

3. Explore interests and find solutions − Think creatively; communicate effectively; listen empathetically; identify interests; assess the options against objective standards. In analysing conflict, it is helpful to try and understand the interest that underlies the positions taken by the parties in a dispute. This makes it easier to find alternative ways of meeting the interests of parties than satisfying their positions.

4. Positions -If people are in conflict they tend to think and talk in direct or even aggressive terms. Positions are statements or demands set out in that manner.

5. Interest – Beneath all positions lies the interest of the parties. Interests extend beyond positions and encompass such things as needs, concerns, expectations and hopes.

6 Closure and agreement – explore the best options; make concessions; reach agreement; write formal settlement and agree working framework/plan of implementation.

These procedures and mechanisms are very important to ensure that all the Committee country wide and Namwala district specifically are implement use similar methods to resolve conflict. However, for there to be adherence to these mechanisms, procedures, and regulations in Electoral Management Committee members of the Committee and other respondents should be made aware of them. If these stakeholders are aware of these processes it will be easy to resolve conflict at any stage of election since whoever is affected will be clear on what to do.

However, some practitioners who participated in the deal with violence contend that it is one of the greatest threats to free and fair elections. This may be especially true if related to new and emerging democracies. However, Ilona also notes that elections are adversarial in their nature as they represent a contest for power. Therefore, the focus on Elections and Security, "the emergence of electoral violence is not a result of the process being followed, but signals a critical departure from the adherence to the mechanisms, procedures, and regulations the election body uses to resolve electoral violence.

However, it is argued that discussing prevention strategies that could be implemented in order to mitigate electoral violence firstly requires the identification of the different types of electoral violence before these any mechanism is implemented. Carl Dundas (2003) suggests distinguishing between violence aimed at disrupting elections by actors who do not want the elections to take place at all, and violence triggered by the rivalry between the contesting candidates/parties for the conflict resolution to be effective. This is not supported by this study which found out that mechanisms were very important in resolving disputes without differentiating the time of violence.

Some pundits (1996) argued that if violence occurs, national security forces should be mobilized and target the obstructionists instead of using committees. They submit that elections committees are inefficient because they composed of local people. Further, Noor Mohammed (2004) says conflict where some parties do not agree on whether or when to hold elections, and likewise suggests using force on one hand and educating the public on the other hand can easily be handled by district electoral committee. Additionally, European Union report (2016) considers active disruptions of the voting process by spoiler groups and refusals to participate in elections either due to the shape of earlier negotiations, which were perceived as biased for instance due to such a measure as constituency demarcation or due to fears of power loss.

This study however, established that most of the respondents did not understand the mechanism, procedures and regulations of CMC in Namwala. The study also found that the level of education not a factor in understanding these processes. The respondents did not know what were the drivers of electoral violence, although still accepted committees as a better way to resolve dispute. It was however; found out that the processes were not just availed to the people in the easiest way. These processes should be distributed to people in the district and probably some sensitisation should be carried out in the district more especially before election.

5.2.3 *Reasons for unresolved cases of electoral conflicts in the Namwala District Electoral Conflict Management Committee in resolving electoral conflicts*.

The study conducted some interviews to try to find out what could be reason why they were unresolved cases of electoral conflicts in the Namwala District Electoral Conflict Management Committee in resolving electoral conflicts. Although the reasons given by the respondents were diverse the study outlines some of the most pronounced ones including the following:

(a) Cadrelism

It was observed from the findings, that political parties used cadres to fix political opponents. These cadres use violence against each other and become powerful than even police to the extent that they could even fight in their presence. In the recent past cadres have even

possessed guns which they have used against other political players. Therefore, the study established that there was need for sensitization and leadership within political parties to check the behaviour of some cadres. To this effect, this study strongly noted that democracy should encourage coexistence.

(b) Political Parties not tolerant to each other

It was deduced from the finding of the study that the wanting of power at all cost has caused intolerance among political parties. From the findings presented on this matter, the conclusion is that the most current politicians were not willing to work together although they pretend to want to work for the people. This intolerance is leading to the rise in electoral conflicts. The study attributed this situation to the limitation in awareness on the importance of democracy. Also some respondents argued that problems of society affect everyone and that encouraging awareness should be seen as one of the vices that tried to solve some of the problems of society. In this regard, the need for all the citizens to have the knowledge of governance and government structures, and the process that embrace political patriotism and cultural diversity was encouraged. Therefore the study found out that the awareness in the affairs of government should be encouraged.

(c)   Political Commitment

The study revealed that although Zambia's political parties did engage with the CMCs and the ECZ in the election monitoring process, they did not view the process as being fully independent. FODEP have argued that the political parties' direct engagement with CMCs demonstrates the confidence they have in the CMC model as part of the dispute resolution process. They are represented at national and local level and are directly involved if election campaigns result in violent disputes. However, the political parties themselves have long questioned the independence of the ECZ, which established the CMCs. For example during the 2003 election campaign, Mr. Sikwindi Sitwala, the presidential campaign coordinator of the UPND, expressed his distrust of the ECZ: "the ECZ is not independent, not credible and not transparent". This distrust stems largely from the involvement of CMC leaders with specific political parties. For example, "during the 2008 presidential elections,

the then opposition PF party indicated that the NCMC could not address its complaint due to impartiality of some of the NCMC members.

(d) Weak Legal Framework

The study established that if CMCs were to be more effective in the management of electoral conflicts, there was need to strengthen the legal framework. This is to mean that the mandate of CMCs mandate should be made very clear. The enhancing of the legal framework would ensure that these committees were provided with powers to arrest and recommend for prosecution for ailing candidates and that the decisions made during mediation were legally binding. This development will ensure that those people who want to engage in electoral violence would be deterred. This study has established that this measure would improve the performance of CMCs and ensure that cases of electoral conflicts and violence were reduced.

The study established that most electoral conflicts are managed or resolved through the court system and little through CMCs that are established by ECZ in accordance with section 111 of the Electoral Act. Any voter or candidate who is not satisfied with the way Presidential elections have been were conducted could petition the Constitution Court which has powers to nullity or uphold the results. Election results for National Assembly can be petitioned in the High Court, while Local Government elections can be channeled to Local Government Elections Tribunal. However, one can still appeal to the Constitutional Court when not satisfied with the decision of the High Court or the Local Government Elections Tribunal.

(e) No special election adjudication bodies

The findings also found out that there was need to create a special adjudication body specialised in handling electoral matters. Currently it was observed that litigation in electoral matters were delayed and surrounded with a lot of uncertainties. The unclear picture over electoral dispute resolutions indicated ineffectiveness of CMCs in handling these issues which eventually end up in courts. It was for this reason that the study established that there was need for the introduction of special election adjudication bodies to resolve electoral disputes expeditiously. To this effect, mandate of the CMCs should be clear so as to help resolve electoral cases expeditiously by forwarding the cases to adjudication body.

(f) CMCs are ad hoc

The findings of the study found out that the committees were ad hoc in nature. Although the study did not completely object to the idea of the committees been ad hoc, it was important to that the committees meet once in a while to review the cases in the district. This will ensure that subsequent election benefit from the continuous review of the factors of violence. This will help in the organization and management of electoral conflicts for any success in their operations. In the quest to effectively manage electoral conflicts, the findings of this study were that there was need to increase access to CMCs. This measure came out because of the current operations of the CMCs. The argument here was that these committees were mostly not accessible to the general public because they were purely ad hoc and been reconvened when there was an electoral dispute to mediate on. It was further argued in this study that if these committees were to be permanent or mobile in all the districts, then they would be in a better position to stop any electoral dispute from turning violent.

(g) Lack of Awareness Activities

The study established that it was important to educate communities about the importance of elections with regards with the operation of government to increase social cohesion. These findings call for the need to have an enlightened citizenry. To have such citizenry requires massive and appropriate Civic Education that would fully involve the citizens in governance issues through active participation. There was a general call from the findings that all the electoral stakeholders should partner with the CMCs to carry out massive sensitization programmes to educate the electorates on the importance of holding a peaceful election and the dangers electoral conflict to development. It was further argued in this study that if citizens were enlightened, they would be able to critically analyse governance matters and to a larger extent, avoid engaging themselves into activities that were not democratic such as electoral violence. If this strategy was fully supported and implemented, it would ensure effective management of electoral conflicts by CMCs.

(h) Youths

The concepts of democracy and politics and youth involvement, as seen from the above findings and discussion, seem to be intertwined. The study revealed that the relationship between these terms electoral violence and youth can generally be looked at politics as the exercise of power whereby the distribution of national resources play a key role while democracy is the context in which power is exercised (Plattner, 2013).

In this part, the study revealed that the in Zambian politics the battle for supremacy where political leaders from different political parties fight for power or seek to rise to the position of having a say in the national issues are done by the youth. These youths are incited to fight other political party camps and as a result also that other political party retaliate. However, the study also revealed that are just used and they see politics as "a dirty game", whereby the players only sought their interests. According to the Hoglund (2009) politics in democracy are associated with a specific group of people i.e. the economically powerful who are mostly also the political elite. She described that these individuals who are active in political affairs as "sharp", well connected, learned and rich.

According to the UNDP (2010) report the youth in Zambia constitute approximately 60% of the total population and in recent years, some have faced high unemployment rates, HIV/AIDS infection rates amongst other developmental drawbacks. However, they represent a pool of resource for the country's future development. Zambia being one of the most peaceful countries in Africa. Historically, Zambia has not been plagued by the violence that has hit other countries in the region, but the 2016 general election had sparked an upsurge in violent incidents by some of the cadres "mostly youths" the activist supporter groups of the political parties. It is therefore heartbreaking to according to IFFES to see youth being used to perpetrate violence during elections instead of exercising their rights to vote and participate positively in the elections.

This study has revealed that it is evident that poverty is one of the main drivers of political violence. Poverty levels in many African countries like Zambia are quiet high and this gives room for the unemployed majority mostly youths to be manipulated to perpetuate all forms of electoral violence. Poverty is a condition where people's basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter are not being met. An individual exposed to these hardships is more likely to engage in electoral violence than a rich person in society. When the economic hardships become too unbearable, the propensity for violence increases. Unemployed youths then become tools for electoral violence.

Usually youths who are largely unemployed, mostly politically ignorant on electoral processes and many who are illiterates are used to score violent political points by selfish political elites. This lack of adequate knowledge or information, high levels of deprivation, unemployment etc. among youths in Zambia makes them readily available to take the job opportunity of implementers of electoral violence. Because of these horrible conditions

youths are facing, they are easily deceived into the hands of selfish politicians who manipulate them by presenting them with irresistible baits so that they undertake to electoral violence. The worst and sad part is that most promises made to the youth's by the instigators are never fulfilled. Yet, youths still go back to the same instigators again over a small/ worthless sum and continue being tools of electoral violence (EU, 2016).

(i)   *Media*

From the findings, it was clear that the media in Zambia today was a source of concern in as far as sparking electoral violence was concerned. It has been observed from the findings that instead of the media doing its role of informing, educating and entertaining, the media (both public and private) had taken partisan and politic stands. As noted in the findings, the reporting was biased and aimed at championing selfish motives aimed at disadvantaging political opponents. The public media was used for the ruling party propaganda while the private media for opposition political parties. The lack of objectivity in reporting led to the seizure of broadcasting of licences for some radio stations and a television stations namely, Itezi-tezhi radio station, Comboni radio station and Muvi Television. This showed that the media in Zambia was facing serious challenges in as far as media ethics were concerned. The media can spark electoral violence if the reporting was not objective and biased media coverage can heighten tensions which could lead to conflict.

This chapter has discussed the findings of the study by addressing each research objective. In order for CMCs to be effective people should be made aware of the role of the committee among others. The next chapter presents the overall conclusion of the study. It further provides recommendations and suggestions for further research based on the findings of this research.

CHAPTER SIX

6.0   Recommendations and Conclusion

The previous chapter analyzed the Namwala CMC in addressing electoral dispute resolution. The aim of the study was to assess the effectiveness of the Electoral Conflict Management Committee of the Electoral Commission of Zambia in resolving electoral conflicts a case of Namwala District.

6.1   Recommendations

After critically analyzing public finance legislation in Zambia, the study made the following recommendations:

i.   Electoral Conflict Management Committee is fairly a new process in electoral management, it is recommended that communities are sensitised about the roles and mandated of these committees. It is further recommended that short intensive trainings should continuously be conducted for law enforcement officers, judges and other stakeholders in the district to so as to enhance their knowledge with regards to operations of the Committee. Once this happens and people become aware of the purpose of committee and its benefits, they will make better decisions on what to do if there was electoral violence.

ii. The law should be enhanced so that implementers and enforcers in these committees focus more on ensuring prevention of the occurrence of electoral violence. To this end, ECZ and other institutions that are charged with election management should put more concerted efforts towards sensitising the public on the importance peaceful election.

iii. Since the study revealed that the respondents did not understand mechanism, procedures and regulations of CMCs, it is recommend that these processes are made available to people in the district preferably in local language.

iv. Since the findings of the study show that Namwala CMCs have inadequate capacity to resolve conflict, the structure of the membership on the committees should be reviewed. It would probably be recommended that the members are trained before been appoint to sit on the committee.

v. It is recommended that adequate resources be provided to all institutions involved in implementation and enforcement electoral management.

vi. It is also recommended that a special adjudication body is established to deal with issues of electoral dispute. This will ensure speed prosecution of electoral dispute cases.

vii. Vocational Guidance should be given a place of priority as youths these days do not have the perquisite qualification to be gainfully employed, hence the temptation for them to engage in anti-social behaviour such as electoral conflicts and violence.

viii. (Counsellors should conduct lectures, seminars, workshops for public office holders on topical issues such as good leadership skills, creativity, crisis management, emotional intelligence skills among others.

ix. Reorientation programmes should be organised for youths by counsellors about values, ethics and morals as the general decadence in the body polity has caught up with the youths.

6.2   Conclusion

Following the outcome from the study and of the recommendations made therein it can be concluded that there are a various short coming in the operations of Electoral Conflict Management Committee in Namwala district in Zambia. The Electoral Commission of Zambia is the body mandated to run free and fair election as provide for in the Constitution and the Electoral Process Act, of 2016. It is worth to noting that even though there are these laws to help manage elections, dispute do erupt before, during and after election. To this effect CMCs are constituted to help disputes before escalating to the courts of law if there is need.

Notwithstanding the various pieces of legislation addressing the electoral management the country continues to struggle with electoral violence. In this regard, finding other process of resolving dispute is paramount in holding free and fair elections like CMCs.

To this regard, the following conclusions were drawn from this research

(i) Inadequate financing to institution charged with the responsibility to run elections including the CMCs. Therefore these institutions are made ineffective to resolving disputes are compromised.

(ii) Effective and speedy prosecution of offenders is another key issue which very important in ensuring amicable resolution of disputes. It is worth noting that if people get prosecuted and sentenced, would be offenders will discouraged and hence dispute reduced.

(iii) The effectiveness of legislation is also dependent on the involvement of the citizenly. Particularly the active participation of the civil society is needed to help social accountability awareness of the general populace. However, currently citizens are not sensitised about the law and operations of the CMCs due to poor engagement mechanisms. Mechanisms should be put in place to help citizen's awareness and hence improve public resource management.

Therefore, the general conclusion is that although the electoral law is comprehensive a combination of weak enforcement and poor implementation, insufficient capacity, and insufficient to ensure the participation of citizens has affected the effectiveness resolution of electoral disputes.

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Appendix I Interview guide

AN ASSESMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ELECTORAL CONFLICT RESOULTION COMMITTEE IN ZAMBIA: A CASE STUDY OF NAMWALA CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES.

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Section One

1. Age: (kindly tick)

    24 and below   [   ]

    25 -29   [   ]

    30 – 34   [   ]

    35 – 39   [   ]

    40 – 44   [   ]

    45 – 49   [   ]

50 – 54　　　　　[　]

55 and above　　[　]

2. Gender:

Male　　　　　[　]

Female　　　　[　]

Others　　　　[　]

3. Highest Level of Education Attained:

School Certificate/GCE　　[　]

Tertiary Certificate　　　　[　]

Diploma　　　　　　　　[　]

Bachelors　　　　　　　[　]

Masters　　　　　　　　[　]

PhD　　　　　　　　　[　]

4. Can   you   please   share   about   your   work   background?
…………………………………………

5. Religious Denomination?
Roman Catholic　　　　　[　]
United Church of Zambia　[　]
Seventh Day Adventist　　[　]
New Apostolic Church　　[　]
Pentecostal　　　　　　[　]
Jehovah Witnesses　　　[　]

6. What   are   your   current   income   generating   activities?
…………………………………………

7. Average Monthly Income Level:……………………………………………………

8. Position held in CMC :…………………………………………………………………..

9. What is your ethnicity: …………………………………………………………………..

10.   How long have you been on the NCMC/DCMC? If so, (mentions the elections).

    …………………………………………………………………………………………

    …………………………………………………………………………………………

    …………………………………………………………………………………………

    …………………………………………………………………………………………

Section Two

11.   What is your understanding of electoral conflict?

    …………………………………………………………………………………………

    …………………………………………………………………………………………

    …………………………………………………………………………………………

    …………………………………………………………………………………………

12.   Please would you share about the laid down mechanisms/procedures for resolving
      electoral conflicts?

    ………………………………………………………………………………………….

    …………………………………………………………………………………………..

    …………………………………………………………………………………………..

13.   Please tell me about the laid down regulations for resolving electoral conflicts?

    …………………………………………………………………………………………..

    …………………………………………………………………………………………..

14. What is your understanding of the role and mandate of Conflict Management Committees in the electoral process?

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

15. Please tell me about your role in resolving electoral conflicts in DCMC and give me examples of how you executed your role/function in resolving past electoral conflicts?

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

16. In your view, does DCMC have sufficient/adequate capacity to resolve electoral conflicts in a district?

Yes   [   ]

No   [   ]

17. If your answer is YES to question 17, kindly elaborate

………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………..

Section Three

18. Do you think the current mechanisms/procedures of CMCs are adequate for managing electoral conflicts? Please elaborate

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

19. Can you please tell me about the unresolved electoral conflicts you have experienced since you joined the DCMC?

....

....

20. What from your experience do you think are some of the reasons that lead to failure to resolve electoral conflicts?

…………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………..

21. Could you share your challenges in terms of electoral conflicts and violence in Zambia from 2001 to date?

…………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………….

22. Do you have any success stories about DCMCs?

…………………………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………………………..

23. What key factors led to the success? …………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………………………..

……………………………………………………………………………………………..

24.   Do you have any disappointing cases/stories about DCMCs?

……………………………………………………………………………………………..

……………………………………………………………………………………………..

25.   What key factors led to the failure? …………………………………………………..

……………………………………………………………………………………………..

……………………………………………………………………………………………..

Section Four

26.   What are your recommendations for improving capacity of DCMCs in the

management of electoral conflicts in terms of the following?

a. Composition……………………………………………………………………………

b. Recruitment: ……………………………………………………………………………

b. Training: ……………………………………………………………………………

c. Legal Framework: ………………………………………………………………..

27.   Any recommendation regarding strategies used by DCMCs in conflict management.

……………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

Thank you very much for your participation

Appendix II .Research budget

NO	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	UNIT COST	AMOUNT
1.0	**Stationery**			
1.1	A4 Bond Paper	x 6 reams	K 30.00	K180.00
1.2	Pens	x 20	K 2.00	K 40.00
1.3	Note books	x 3	K 5.00	K 15.00
1.4	Flash disk	x 1 8 GB	K150.00	K150.00
1.5	Folders	x 5	K 2.00	K 10.00
1.6	Box file	x 1	K 20.00	K 20.00
1.7	Typing Services			K400.00
1.8	Photocopying	x 150	K 0.20	K 30.00
1.9	**Binding of Dissertation**	x 5	K 150.00	K750.00
1.10	Binding of proposal	x 1 set	K 20.00	K 20.00
1.11	Correction fluid	x 1	K 40.00	K 40.00
1.12	Stapler	x 1 packet	K 10.00	K 10.00
1.13	Staples	x 2 packets	K 8.00	K 16.00

1.13	Paper clips			K300.00
	Internet cost			K1200.00
			Sub-Total	**K2,981.00**
2.0	Transportation	3 persons	K500 x 5 days	K2500.00
			Sub-Total	K2500.00
3.0	Lunch allowance	3 persons	K50 x 5 days	K1,050.00
			Sub-Total	K1,050.00
	Sub-Total			**K3,550.00**
	Contingency		10% of Sub-total	K653.10
	Grand Total			**K7,184.10**

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DATE: 9 - 07 - 18

To Whom it may Concern

Dear Sir/Madam

RE: CONFIRMATION OF STUDY

Reference is made to the above subject.

This serves to confirm that Enala Chinwa of NRC Number 196833/3,1 and computer number 716812816 is a bonafide student of the University of Zambia in collaboration with the Zimbabwe Open University (UN ZA-ZOU).

The student is pursuing a Master of Science in Peace, Leadership and Conflict Resolution Programme and that he/she will be carrying out a research on Assessment of the Effectiveness of Electoral Conflict Resolution management Committees in Zambia. A Case Study of Namwala district Conflict management Committee.

Any assistance rendered to him/her will be greatly appreciated.

Prof. Boniface Namangala (PhD)
DIRECTOR
INSTITUTE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION