

**CONTRIBUTION OF KAPASA MAKASA TO ZAMBIA'S
POLITICAL HISTORY FROM 1947 TO 1991**

BY

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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY
OF ZAMBIA IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
ARTS IN HISTORY**

UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA

LUSAKA

2002

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DEDICATION

The dissertation is dedicated to my husband, Captain Francis M. Kanchebele and our children Maureen, Lydia, Angela, Francis Junior and Kelvin and to my late father, John Mulenda and my mother Regina Matafwali for inspiring me to aim for academic excellence.

DECLARATION

I, FLORENCE BWALYA MULENDA KANCHEBELE, do hereby declare that this dissertation represents my own work and that it has not been previously submitted for a degree at this or any other University.



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APPROVAL

This dissertation of FLORENCE B. M. KANCHEBELE, is approved as fulfilling part of the requirements of the award of the degree of Master of Arts in History at the University of Zambia.

Examiners

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| 4. | | Date: _____ |

ABSTRACT

Many studies exist on the rise and growth of African nationalism in Zambia. They include autobiographies and biographies by and on politicians who participated in the struggle for independence. However, several veteran politicians who pioneered the independence struggle have not attracted scholars' attention. Most studies focus on the leaders of the struggle and the first president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, at the expense of subordinate leaders such as Kapasa Makasa who also played significant roles.

Even in his autobiography, Makasa has not come out clearly on his role in the politics of independence. What has been presented is not really his story but that of Zambia's struggle for independence. After independence, he held important posts in the government starting from Provincial Resident Minister to full Cabinet Minister, Ambassador and ending as Member of the Central Committee (MCC) of UNIP by the time he retired in 1991. Yet, this aspect of his career is unaccounted for in his autobiography which ends with the country's attainment of independence in 1964. This study argues that Makasa was instrumental in raising the rural population of Northern Province, which included the present day Luapula Province, from its attitude of psychological subservience as a result of years of white domination to a sufficiently high level of political consciousness to demand a change in the status quo.

Another major argument of this study is that although Makasa held such important posts in the nationalist government which he served for twenty seven years, his contribution to national development was not as significant as that to the independence struggle. The main reason is that after independence, Kaunda pursued a

y of authoritarianism in the party and government. Those who did not agree with his
es where either dismissed or forced to resign. This alienated him from many of his
er colleagues in the struggle including Malama Sokoni, Simon Kapwepwe and
sa.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to the academic staff of the Department of History of the University of Zambia for their useful comments on my research proposal. To Drs Y. A. Chondoka, B. S. Siamwiza and Messrs B. Kakoma and F. Mulenga, I register gratitude for their words of encouragement during my study.

I sincerely wish to thank Dr. B. J. Phiri who supervised me in the writing up of my research proposal and dissertation. In fact, it was through him that I developed interest in a biographical study. His thorough comments on drafts of this dissertation enabled me to avoid many pitfalls in the analysis of data. Dr Phiri's commitment to duty greatly inspired me.

I am indebted to my employer, the Ministry of Education for awarding me a paid study leave and sponsorship. I also wish to thank Mr. Kapasa Makasa for allowing me to write on him and for the personal papers he made available to help me accomplish my task.

I got valuable assistance from the staff of the Library at the University of Zambia, the National Archives of Zambia, Freedom House UNIP Library and the White Fathers Archives at Woodlands, Lusaka. I also thank Miss Ethel Katota of Duard Computer Enterprises, Kasama for her almost flawless typing and printing of the dissertation.

Finally, profound gratitude goes to my husband, our children, my mother, brothers and sisters for their patience, understanding and support during the long periods I denied them of my company. Their sacrifice was not in vain.

ABBREVIATIONS

AFA	African Freedom Action
AME	African Methodist Episcopal
ANC	African National Congress
ANIP	African National Independence Party
BSAC	British South Africa Company
COZ	Credit Organisation of Zambia
CSBZ	Cold Storage Board of Zambia
DC	District Commissioner
DCC	District Commissioner's Conference
FP	Federal Party
FWSNR	Federation of Welfare Association of Northern Rhodesia
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
LEGCO	Legislative Council
MCC	Member of the Central Committee
MMD	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
MP	Member of Parliament
NAMBOARD	National Agricultural Marketing Board
NAZ	National Archives of Zambia
NC	Native Commission
NRAC	Northern Rhodesia African Congress
NRG	Northern Rhodesia Government
PAFMESCA	Pan African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa
PC	Provincial Commissioner
PCC	Provincial Commissioner's Conference
SIDO	Small Scale Industrial Development Organisation
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
UCP	United Congress Party
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UFCS	United Free Church of Scotland
UFP	United Federal Party

URP	United Federal Party
UNFP	United National Freedom Party
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UPP	United Progressive Party
UNZA	University of Zambia
ZANC	Zambia African National Congress
ZECCO	Zambia Engineering and Construction Company

INTRODUCTION

Many studies have been conducted on the political history of Zambia. One noticeable thing, though, is that scholars have concentrated on political institutions and processes. The role of individuals in those institutions and processes has not been emphasised. The purpose of this study is to view the political history of Zambia through the life of Kapasa Makasa, one of the prominent nationalists. Although he wrote a book on the political history of Zambia's independence struggle, the book was mainly on the United National Independence Party (UNIP). His role in UNIP and the struggle for independence was not clearly brought out.

Studies alluded to include biographical writings on politicians who participated in the struggle for independence.¹ However, a survey of such writings show that those written from a historical perspective are not only limited but also focus on the life of the leader, Kenneth Kaunda. Many veteran politicians who pioneered the fight for independence have not attracted scholars' attention despite their valuable contribution to the struggle and the growth of UNIP as a political party. A review of literature clearly demonstrates this imbalance. Because of this imbalance, this study seeks to contribute by bridging the gap in the political historiography of Zambia.

Literature Review

Fanwell Sumaili² and Mwizenge Tembo³ reviewed most of the books written in the 1980s. Although the books showed a wide range of political and social histories in the making of a nation, many lacked in depth research and focus and suffered from uncritical use of sources.⁴ Sumaili referred to one such book as "a manual of how to achieve power, wealth, fame or to find an

affirmation of how much the author deserved them.”⁵ The present work is a biography conducted from a historical point of view. It is anticipated that the study will stimulate further research by students of political history and social sciences.

While Fergus MacPherson acknowledged that it was Kaunda and Makasa who initiated the idea of forming a branch of the African National Congress (ANC) in Chinsali in 1950,⁶ and that Kaunda was elected as Secretary and Makasa as Chairman, he concentrated on Kaunda's role in organising the party. The role of Makasa as Chairman is not made clear.

Arie N. Ipenburg has shown that Makasa was one of the first party activists in Chinsali together with Kaunda and Malama Sokoni.⁷ They played a leading role in the mobilisation of the district and province against the Central African Federation. He singled out Makasa and Kaunda as leading members of the ANC. Like other scholars, Ipenburg did not concentrate on Makasa in his own right as party organiser. He is only mentioned as part of a group.

In a similar manner, Wittington Sikalumbi detailed the party activities in the African National Congress from its formation to the emergence of the Zambia African National Congress in 1958.⁸ Subordinate leaders under Nkumbula and Kaunda were commended for their work. According to Sikalumbi, Makasa was an outstanding leader but we are not told what specific traits lifted him above other provincial leaders. Moreover, Sikalumbi limited Makasa's outstanding leadership in organising the party at provincial level and yet, at national level, Makasa also played a part. This information is glossed over as Sikalumbi focuses attention on Nkumbula and Kaunda. The differences that arose in the ANC are discussed, as is the formation of the

Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). The rôle of Makasa in the ANC/ZANC split is obscure. Our study seeks to address these imbalances in the mentioned studies.

Though Colin Legum attributed the success of the independence struggle to Kaunda as leader of UNIP, he has acknowledged that Kaunda could not have, by himself, achieved that feat without the support of his colleagues⁹. One serious limitation of Legum's study, however, lies in the fact that despite that acknowledgement only Kaunda's contribution is documented. Contribution by Kaunda's colleagues have not been emphasised. They are put under Kaunda's shadow and yet their role was crucial to the struggle.

Unlike Legum, Bizeck Phiri¹⁰ and Mwelwa Musambachime¹¹ have brought to light the rôle played by other colleagues. Phiri detailed the contribution of Godwin A. Mbikusita Lewanika, a founder member and the first president of the first nationalist party. Similarly, Musambachime showed the rôle played by Dauti Yamba in the development of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia between 1941 and 1964. He argued that though Yamba did not join a nationalist party, he acted as a voice of the underprivileged Africans through government-sponsored forums such as the African Provincial Council, the African Representative Council and the Federal Parliament. This study adds on the works of scholars like Phiri and Musambachime in documenting the rôles veteran politicians played in the fight against colonial rule.

Of significance to the present study is the work of David Mulford and Robert Rotberg. Mulford showed the party organisation strategies used by Makasa in the provinces he worked. For Mulford, these strategies were so successful that when ZANC was founded it rapidly spread in Northern and

Luapula Provinces. And after the formation of UNIP, Makasa's tactics were adopted by Kaunda and used in organising rural areas.¹² Mulford's study ends in 1964. This study finds out what influences were behind the success of the pre-independence political career of Makasa. It also goes beyond 1964 to look into how Makasa fared in the post independence political scene.

Rotberg pointed out that one of the strategies Makasa used was to encourage villagers to take positive action against colonial rule by defying government instructions.¹³ This meant disregarding Native Authority orders, government conservation measures and land development methods. Rotberg noted that the strategy was successful in making Northern Province appear ungovernable. This study considers the impact of using the environment for a political strategy and investigates how Makasa fared as the first Resident Minister for Northern Province *vis-a-vis* the manner in which UNIP presented the issue of conservation measures during the struggle for independence.

Kenneth Kaunda also observed that Makasa's contribution to the struggle for independence marked him as an outstanding veteran freedom fighter.¹⁴ However, he did not explain the factors that made Makasa outstanding. The present study seeks to bring out such factors. A major aspect in which this study differs from previous works is its attempt to discuss not only Makasa's role in the independence struggle but also his involvement in the nationalist government. Studies alluded to above end at Zambia's attainment of independence. This includes Makasa's autobiography. He restricted his work to the independence struggle. When he moved from being a freedom fighter to a post-independence leader, not much is known about his career. The present study seeks to fill in the gap left in his autobiography.

A further difference is that this study seeks to demonstrate that an outstanding contribution to the struggle was not synonymous with getting a high-ranking post in the nationalist government. Neither was it synonymous with ensuring a comfortable life after retirement from active politics. The first required an unquestioning loyalty to Kaunda's policies while the second required careful planning while in politics. Our study hopes to fill the vacuum created by such omissions in previous works.

Previous studies have laid emphasis on Kaunda and attributed the success of the struggle to him personally. After independence scholars continued to focus on Kaunda as the first president of Zambia. This approach put the leader at the centre of all activities at the expense of his subordinates. This work shifts the focus from Kaunda to a man who joined the party at branch level and rose through the ranks to hold provincial and national posts. He first became involved in politics as a teacher in 1950 but became a full time party organiser from 1953–1958 under the ANC and from 1959 under UNIP. After independence, he rose from Resident Minister for Northern Province to full Cabinet Minister, Ambassador and finally Member of the Central Committee (MCC) of UNIP.

Objectives of the Study

This study seeks to identify the contribution of Makasa to the anti-colonial struggle from 1947–1964. It also seeks to establish the extent to which he contributed to national development from the time the country achieved independence to his “forced” retirement in 1991.

Rationale of the Study

From the review of literature, one of the features that surfaces is that not much has been done to document the role of veteran politicians who pioneered the fight against colonial rule. A biographical study of Makasa is justified on the grounds that it is one way of showing the contribution to the independence struggle of veteran politicians left out in the existing literature. As a politician, Makasa's biography widens into a historical study of Zambian politics and his experiences translate into history. A further justification is that it would stimulate scholarly interest in adding political biographies to the historiography of Zambia.

Organisation of the Study

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first of these covers the historical background. It is a summary of Zambia's political history from the early 1940s to the early 1990s. The second chapter introduces Makasa and deals with his early life. Briefly, the chapter traces the influences that impinged on his life. The third chapter covers the period from 1947 to 1964. It concerns itself with the emergence of Makasa as a politician and his role in the conscientisation of the rural masses. Factors that made him an outstanding politician of this period have been discussed. His contribution to the struggle through the different assignments he was given has been brought out.

The fourth chapter seeks to reconstruct his post independence career from 1964 to "forced" retirement in 1991. In brief, the chapter demonstrates that Kaunda was intolerant to opposing views. Even views of colleagues were not tolerated. As a result, intra-party quarrels and in fighting for the control of the party became part of the post colonial political culture. Makasa who was a

hero during the struggle was now an object of manipulation by Kaunda. Forced retirement from politics is discussed, as is the life Makasa is leading after retirement. The last chapter is a conclusion of the study.

Methodology

Data for this study was derived from published, unpublished works and interviews. However, the most important sources were interviews and archival materials from the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ). Most of the interviews were conducted in Chinsali. Informants were those connected with Makasa's life and career. They included family members, schoolmates at Lubwa and colleagues in the early period of his political career. In Lusaka, veteran politicians of his era were consulted. The main source of archival materials was the National Archives of Zambia. UNIP Archives at Freedom House and the White Fathers' Archives at Woodlands were also consulted. At Freedom House, documents were inaccessible because most of them were destroyed or misplaced. At Woodlands, the archives did not have relevant materials either on the role of Makasa as a freedom fighter in Northern Province or as a post-independence leader. Extensive interviews with more veterans as well as documents at Freedom House would have thrown more light on the post independence politics of Zambia. However, financial and time limitations in addition to poor record keeping at Freedom House could not allow this. Despite these limitations, we feel that the data collected was sufficient to meet the objectives of the study.

ENDNOTES

1. Among the biographies are: Fergus MacPherson, *Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: The Times and the Man*, (Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, 1974), Godwin Mwangilwa, *Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula: Biography of the 'Old Lion of Zambia'* (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1984) also Godwin Mwangila *The Kapwepwe Diaries* (Lusaka: Multimedia, 1986). Studies also include autobiographies such as Kapasa Makasa's, *Zambia's March to Political Freedom*, (Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, 1981) and Vernon J. Mwaanga, *An Extra-ordinary Life*, (Lusaka: Multimedia, 1982).
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6. MacPherson, *Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia*, p. 81.
7. Arie N. Ipenburg, *All Goodmen, The Development of Lubwa Mission, Chinsali; Zambia 1905-1967* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1991), pp. 203-214
8. Wittington K. Sikalumbi, *Before UNIP* (Lusaka: Neczam 1978). Sikalumbi's study traces the formation of the ANC up to the formation of UNIP in 1959.
9. Colin Legum, *Zambia: Independence and Beyond, The Speeches of Kaunda* (London: Thomas Nelson, 1966), p. vii.
10. Bizeck J. Phiri, 'Coping with Contradictions- Class, Ethnicity and Nationalism: The case of Godwin A. M. Lewanika and Zambian nationalism', University of Zambia, History Department Seminar Series, July, 1993.
11. Mwelwa C. Musambachime, 'Dauti Yamba's Contribution to the Rise and growth of nationalism in Zambia, 1941-1964,' *African Affairs*, 90, 359,(1991), p. 260.
12. David C. Mulford: *Zambia: The Politics of Independence 1957-964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 4
13. Robert Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia 1873-1964* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 273.
14. Kaunda's foreword to Makasa's autobiography, *Zambia's March to Political Freedom*, Revised Edition, Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda Foundation 1985), p. vi.

CHAPTER ONE

POLITICAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

This chapter is a summary of the main issues in Zambia's political history from the early 1940s to 1991 when the first multiparty elections since independence took place. It traces the main phases in the protest against colonial rule from welfare associations, which demanded an improvement in the social welfare of the people to political parties that demanded the end of colonial rule. Post independence political and economic scenes are discussed with a view to bringing out factors that led to the fall of the UNIP government in 1991.

Colonisation of Northern Rhodesia

Penetration of Africa by Europe was formalised by the Berlin Conference in 1851. In Central Africa, John Cecil Rhodes spearheaded British imperialism through his company, the British South African Company (BSAC). The Royal Charter, which Britain granted to Cecil Rhodes, served both Rhodes' commercial interests through the BSAC and British imperialism. When the Charter was granted in 1889, the BSAC was assigned as its sphere of operation the area immediately north of British Bechuanaland and to the north and west of South Africa Republic and to the west of the Portuguese Dominions.¹ This area covered what came to be known as Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Unlike Southern Rhodesia with her mineral wealth, Northern Rhodesia offered little economic attraction. As late as 1888, it was considered pestilential and useless to the empire.² However, when British

imperial interests in the area were threatened by the Portuguese, Britain annexed Northern Rhodesia by extending the Charter to include the territory north of the Zambezi in 1891.

Even then, the actual areas of influence were not defined until Britain, Germany, Portugal and Belgium concluded treaties to that effect. Thereafter, the BSAC gained recognition from European powers of its right to occupy a specified area north of the Zambezi. According to the resolution of the Berlin Conference, recognition of areas of influence had to be confirmed by effective occupation of the area. This involved making treaties with local chiefs or waging wars of conquest, whichever was more expedient.

The Birth of a New Society

The BSAC ruled Northern Rhodesia up to 1923. By 1901, taxation was introduced in the territory and consequently, fundamental changes were introduced in society and a new colonial state was born. Previously people paid tribute to their chiefs in a reciprocal traditional arrangement between the chief and his subject. But the new political order demanded that tax be paid to rulers from whom no immediate benefit could be realised. The company appointed white administrators variously called Collector, Resident Magistrate, Native Commissioner and District Commissioner. The imposition of foreign rule disturbed people's lives so that it was no longer possible to live as their forefathers had done. Frank H. Melland, Native Commissioner (NC) for Mpika in 1908 described the changes in society thus:

The Native Commissioner took the place of the chief. He is in the eye of the native much more of unsympathetic foreign ruler than a guide, philosopher and friend. He taxes, he fines, he imprisons...³

By the early 1920s, a new political economy had emerged in Northern Rhodesia. The role of the African population was to provide unskilled labour for local, Southern Rhodesian farms and South African Mine. In fact, it was partly to ensure a steady flow of the required labour and partly to meet the company's administrative costs that Africans were taxed. A priest at Kayambi wrote in 1898 that the first objective of the colonisers was to fill their own pockets; and for improving the lot of poor natives, that was the business of the poor missionary people who did not know the value of gold.⁴ First by looting, then by taxation, the supposed benefits of foreign rule were overshadowed by the hardships and disruption of life brought by tax.

In 1923, Southern Rhodesia was granted self-government and in 1924, the administration of Northern Rhodesia was transferred to the British colonial office. The change in administration did nothing to alter the racial attitudes that were already formed. Africans continued being relegated to inferior positions.

Welfare Associations

The formation of welfare association in Northern Rhodesia by educated men from Christian and mission schools marked the emergence of a new social group. Membership comprised of teachers, evangelists, civil servants, clerks, and shopkeepers. Through welfare associations, Africans made timid demands for an improvement in their social welfare. However, the government paid little attention to their demands. Although a Federation of Welfare Associations of Northern Rhodesia (FWSNR) was formed in 1946 to strengthen their position, nothing much came out of welfare associations.

Disillusionment with the failure of welfare associations made leaders of the FWSNR to adopt the next phase of protest. This was the formation of a political party and the beginning of radical demands to end colonial rule.

The party was formed in 1948 and it was named the Northern Rhodesia African Congress (NRAC). It was led by Godwin Mbiikusita Lewanika. Consequent to the transformation of the FWSNR into a political party, most of its branches became branches of the NRAC. Welfare associations, therefore, provided the foundation upon which congress built up its membership.

Mobilising People For Political Action

From 1951, Harry M. Nkumbula took over leadership of the ANC and congress grew into a mass party. Organising secretaries were assigned to each province and Kaunda was appointed to take charge of Northern Province, which, until 1958, included Luapula province. In 1953, the federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland was imposed on the Africans in the three territories. As the first Federal Assembly met, Africans expected an indication that would allay fears expressed against federation. Dauti Yamba, African member from Northern Rhodesia moved that equality be applied in public places. Some of the contemptuous comments he received from white MPs are worth reproducing to help us understand the events that followed. Mr N.G. Barrette, (Southern Rhodesia) said:

Everybody based their hopes on federation bringing economic advantages to all people within the territories. Had the motion of social equity been put before the Federal Referendum or had there been any thought in the minds of the great majority of people that social equity was visualised, then Mr Speaker, we would not be assembled today.⁵

Mr. I. D. Smith (Southern Rhodesia) said that: "most of these discriminations are here for the sole purpose of protecting the African." The federal Prime Minister, Mr G. Huggins sealed the fate of Africans when he said, "it is

perfectly obvious that the system we have at present ... is the most satisfactory to both sides.”⁶ Such pronouncements convinced Congress that partnership was a farce since neither the Federal nor Territorial government was prepared to change the status quo.

Even though the Federal Government created an African Affairs Board to safeguard the interests of Africans, speeches made in parliament made it clear that the Board was deemed to be impotent. Therefore, a decision was made by the National Executive of Congress to end the talking stage that had failed to stop the imposition of federation and start active protest that would spell the demise of federation. As Rotberg observed, instead of ensuring white domination for the foreseeable future, the federal gambit hastened the day when Nyasas and

Northern Rhodesians would govern themselves.⁷

The formation of the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC), 1958.

Response to the imposition of federation led to differences among Congress leaders. While Nkumbula advocated for continued moderation, others wanted militancy injected into the struggle. David Mulford has argued that the reasons for the formation of ZANC were more complex than the struggle over tactics during 1958 might suggest.⁸ It is true that complaints against the leadership of Nkumbula were deep rooted. They ranged from accusing him of dictatorial and undemocratic practices to misuse of party funds. Another issue that brought division in the party was Governor A. T. Benson's proposed amendments in the constitution of Northern Rhodesia which had not been changed since 1953 when federation was imposed. Through a complicated voting system, the colonial government gave Africans

very few of the available seats in the Legislative Council. Nkumbula and Kaunda worked together to oppose the proposed amendments.

However, at the October Emergency Conference, which Nkumbula called in order to gauge support for his leadership, he persuaded delegates to accept the Benson Constitution, contrary to the views of his national executive. By then, he had dissolved various provincial, district and branch committees, expelled many leaders and quarrelled with nearly every member of the executive. At the conference, it was revealed that save for those from Southern Province, other delegates had complaints against him. Simon Kapwepwe walked out of the conference supported by Makasa, Kaunda, Reuben Kamanga, Dixon Konkola, Paul Kalichini and others. The walk out was not a sudden spontaneous action but it was something planned in advance by people who were dissatisfied with Nkumbula's leadership and had lost confidence in him. The Kapwepwe led faction formed a new party, which was named Zambia African National Congress (ZANC).

Birth of UNIP.

Within four months of its formation, ZANC mobilised people to support opposition to the election based on the disputed constitution. The elections were scheduled to take place on 20 March 1959. The government, threatened with the boycott of the elections by Africans, reacted by banning ZANC on 11 March 1959, and restricting its leaders to rural areas. Elections took place as scheduled but evidently, the government had underestimated people's support for ZANC. Africans reacted in support of their restricted leaders. In Northern and Luapula (now separate from Northern) provinces for instance, violence was reported in Luwingu, Kasama, Chilubi and Chinsali where the

house of a teacher who voted was burned, as were a kraal and six other buildings at Lubwa and residences and courts of chiefs Nkweto and Chibesakunda.⁹

To the government, the immediate need of preserving law and order during elections overshadowed the long-term consequence of restriction, which took ZANC to areas not yet reached by the young party. Even in prison, ZANC leaders continued clandestine party work with the help of civil servants, African postal staff, drivers and conductors. They communicated not only with one another but also with people in their districts of restriction.

Other parties emerged to fill the vacuum left by the banned ZANC. The most important of these were the United Congress Party (UCP), the United National Freedom Party (UNFP) and the African National Independence Party (ANIP). IN August 1959, UFP and ANIP merged to form the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Dixon Konkola initially led it but Paul Kalichini replaced him in the October elections. Kalichini's was just a caretaker committee waiting for the release of the imprisoned ZANC leaders. Thus fresh elections were held after Kaunda was released in January 1960. Kaunda was ushered into office as party President.

The End of Colonial Rule.

Negotiations leading up to Northern Rhodesia's 1962 Constitution were led by British Secretary of State for Colonies, Ian Macleod. He proposed a constitution that would make possible African majority rule but later amended it to accommodate settler demands which meant European's continued hold on political power. UNIP reacted by staging a campaign of civil disobedience called Cha Cha Cha in Northern, Luapula, Copperbelt and Eastern Provinces.

To curb the violence, the British Government offered to replace the disputed Macleod constitution. After the violence, Kaunda reorganised the party in view of the two options that he faced: to continue with further protest actions to speed up the pace of negotiations or to prepare for an election campaign should the colonial government relent. He divided party branches into sections for effective mobilisation.

Elections for the Legislative Council were held in October 1962 with no clear majority party emerging. UFP won 15 seats, UNIP 14 seats and ANC 5 seats. Nkumbula agreed to form a coalition government with Kaunda and the first African government in Northern Rhodesia was installed on 16 December 1962. The government's immediate task was to call for secession from the federation as an essential gateway to self-government. On 31 December 1963, the federation was officially dissolved and Northern Rhodesia became the Independent Republic of Zambia on 24 October 1964. Kaunda was elected as the country's first President.

From Independence to the Emergence of Multi-Party Politics, 1991.

At independence, Zambia inherited mineral wealth but faced other major challenges. These were a scarcity of skilled and educated manpower; a surplus of unskilled labour and dependence on foreigners at most levels of employment in both the public and private sectors.

On the political front, the 1962, 1964 and the 1968 were the last three multi-party elections held until 1991. Many scholars have written about the events leading to the declaration of Zambia as a one party state.¹⁰ Among the reasons advanced are the international cold war then prevailing between Eastern and Western powers, the colonial situation in Southern Africa and the

fact that *One-Party rule* had become fashionable in Africa in the 1970s. Suffice here to note that by December 1972, it was clear that UNIP had failed to contain the challenge of multi-party politics. Various reforms to cope with internal conflicts did not bring tangible results. For instance, between 1964 and 1967, there was minimal state participation in the economy but from 1968, many parastatal organisations were formed to create positions for Zambians in managerial positions. Ironically, as industrial and commercial undertakings were nationalised, competition for top positions fuelled, not curtailed sectional rivalries. To reduce sectional rivalries and the threat to his position, Kaunda banned opposition parties by law. All other political parties were outlawed and Zambia became a de jure one party state.

By the late 1980s, Zambia's economy continued facing a lot of problems resulting in the shortage of basic necessities, goods and services. This precipitated discontent among the people. They showed dissatisfaction with Kaunda's government and demanded an end to one party rule. At first Kaunda refused to comply but in 1990, food riots and an attempted coup forced him to enact a new constitution that ended his monopoly of power. In October 1991, multi-party elections were held.

A new party formed in 1990, the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) contested the elections on the promise of an ambitious economic recovery programme that appealed to the electorate. The MMD presidential candidate, Frederick Chiluba won. UNIP with only twenty-five out of MMD's hundred and twenty five seats in parliament was relegated to an insignificant opposition party.

Conclusion

Welfare associations lacked a basis for mass participation because membership was confined to a small section of the population. Political parties pointed out complaints against colonial rule which virtually affected all members of the society and this made it easier to harness support. The ANC raised Africans to a sufficiently high level of political consciousness to withstand internal conflicts in the party that led to the formation of UNIP. Kaunda successfully led the fight for independence, which was granted to the country in October 1964. From the mid 1970s depressed earnings from copper led to economic hardships among the people. They protested against the shortage of basic necessities and against Kaunda's rule in general. Consequently, Kaunda was compelled to call for multiparty elections in October 1991. The MMD won the elections.

The coming chapters will seek to show the role of Kapasa Makasa in the events and historical processes highlighted in the background discussion on Zambia's political history.

ENDNOTES

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clerks and craftsmen. David Julizya Kaunda, father of Zambia's first president, was a student at Overtoun. He was sent to Chinsali District in 1905 and in 1907, he reported that:

Chinsali is growing and many people are coming searching for school; some spoke to me that I am spoiling their lives in not sending them to school. They are very much willing to hear of the words of God preached among them. Many are crossing the Chambezi River in search of school ... there must be many teachers for Chinsali.²

To increase the number of teachers, Kaunda selected young men and took them for training in religious education and the three R's. After four years, they assisted in teaching lower grades. Even when the first white missionary R. D. MacMinn joined Kaunda in 1913, Lubwa gave priority to education as the main method of expanding the church.

Protestant - Catholic Antagonism in Chinsali District

When 'David Julizya' Kaunda arrived in Chinsali, he was welcomed by the Commissioner for Native Affairs Robert Young who even built a house and a school for him. This did not please Bishop Dupont. He strongly believed that for his part in subduing the Bemba, the British government should reward him by placing all the Bemba under Catholic influence. Consequently, he wrote a letter of protest to Robert Cordington, administrator of North East Rhodesia, arguing that the area had been promised to the White Fathers. Correspondence between Cordington and Dr. Laws of Livingstonia in addition to a meeting in London between Cordington and representatives of Livingstonia Mission in 1907 resolved to place Chinsali and Isoka districts under Livingstonia Mission.³ That resolution did not bring about a permanent solution to the Catholic expansionist policy. In 1922, White Fathers opened a

mission station at Malole in Kasama District and conflict between the UFSC and Catholics resurfaced.

From Malole, White Fathers launched pastoral visits to the area given to Livingstonia, preaching and baptising converts. This antagonised Lubwa. MacMinn threatened to reiterate by building Protestant schools in Kasama. Although the threat was not carried out, the incident provided a reason for the expansion of schools in Chinsali District. Lubwa missionaries argued that placing schools and teachers in every important village would saturate the minds of the entire population with the knowledge of the scriptures, which would neutralise Roman Catholic advances. In the process of neutralising Catholic advances, Lubwa established many schools in the district. From 25 schools in 1919, the number increased to 99 in 1952.⁴

A stimulus to this growth was the fact that White Fathers established missions in or near areas where Lubwa had previously enjoyed a monopoly. Ilondola Mission which opened in 1934 is a case in point. A girl's school started there was a direct challenge to the long established girls school at Lubwa. Soon after, another school was to be opened at Mundu had it not been for MacMinn's successor, Dr D. M. Brown, who complained to the District Commissioner that Lubwa already had a school there.⁵

By way of reducing conflicts about opening new schools, an education committee was formed in 1936. The two denominations, chiefs in the district and the District Commissioner were members. An agreement was also reached to the effect that children of one denomination could attend the school of another denomination but religious instruction should not be forced on children of another faith. In spite of such measures, conflicts continued

unabated until 1959 when Lubwa Mission handed all its schools to the government. Until then, conflicts went beyond establishing schools to attacking each other's beliefs. To Dr Brown of Lubwa, Catholicism was an inferior and perverted form of Christianity, while to the White Fathers at Ilondola, Lubwa Missionaries were heretics.⁶

That Chinsali benefited from the rivalry cannot be doubted. White Fathers who had previously scorned Lubwa's preoccupation with education began to establish schools that had to be equal to or better than those of Lubwa. As one scholar observed:

Education was now to become the battleground on which the missionary protagonists engaged in a holy war to win over the hearts, minds and souls of the African village people⁷.

For Chinsali, this meant that in nearly every village, a school was opened while some villages had as many as two schools. This made Chinsali one of the most educationally developed districts in Northern Rhodesia and many youths were availed a chance to obtain elementary education. On the other hand, whereas the two groups of missionaries over the years adopted a policy of mutual avoidance or polite indifference, there existed at the village level friction between members of the two denominations.

The Birth of Makasa

Kapasa Makasa was born as Robert Speedwell Makasa in Chinsali on 29th January 1922 at Musanya's Village in Chief Nkula's area. His father was James Chipaila and his mother was Theresa Bowa. In June 1973, according to Bemba traditional custom, he inherited the chieftainship of Kapasa Wabulomba.⁸ Accordingly, he dropped the first two names and adopted the

name of Kapasa. On the mother's side, Makasa belongs to the Bemba Royal family. According to family history, Chitimukulu Chileshe married Kanonka, the daughter of Kapasa Wabulomba.⁹ He had two children, a son called Mukuka and a daughter called Mumbo. Mukuka was sent as chief Musanya to the territory bordering Chinsali and Isoka. Mukuka took his sister Mumbo in order to get an heir in accordance with the matrilineal political system of the Bemba.

Mumbo married Nkweto and had seven children: four sons and three daughters. The last-born daughter became Makasa's mother. The political system of the Bemba also assigns the mother's clan to her children. Makasa, therefore, belongs to the Bowa clan. Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, the first Prime Minister of Zambia also belonged to the Musanya family. His father was a nephew of chief Kapasa Wabulomba.¹⁰ Therefore, through the Musanya lineage, Makasa and Kapwepwe were cousins.

Bowa had three children with Chipaila. When Makasa, the youngest of the three children was only one month old, Chipaila died. Chewe, Chipaila's brother married Bowa in order to raise his brother's children. In spite of this good intention, the marriage did not last long because Chewe was a difficult man to live with. He had married two wives but the second wife ran away citing frequent quarrels and beatings as reasons why she could not stay. Bowa, the third wife was determined to make the marriage work in order to provide security for her children, but she too was forced to return back to her relatives. She had no child with him.

She married again and had two more children. However, the third husband died when the two children were both under five years old. By then,

Bowa had seven children under her care. Three were her own from Chipaila, two from the third marriage while the other two were her late sister's.

When she divorced Chewe and married again, Bowa forfeited a chance to get help from her late husband's family. As a result, the onus of bringing up the seven children fell on her and her family. As a small boy, Makasa often changed residences as he lived either with his mother or one of her relatives. This type of life continued until he started school.

Education

At the age of nine years, Makasa started his education at Fonkofonko, a school under Lubwa Mission. He was there up to Sub B. For Standard One, he went to Lubwa as a day scholar, covering a distance of sixteen km to and from the school to the Boma where he lived with his brother. To curb the daily walking, he transferred to Chalesi Central School as a weekly boarder in Standard Two.

His complaint about Chalesi Central School was that emphasis on manual work distracted him from "real learning". Lubwa Mission shared the view of other mission educationists of the 1930's who saw full life for Africans as life in the rural areas. To this effect, their curriculum was practical and directed towards the development of the village economy. But practical subjects and manual work contrasted sharply with pupils and their parents' expectation of education. They believed that it was the gateway to power, status, money and influence.

Malama Sokoni, another Lubwa Mission graduate echoed Makasa's observation that education was necessary for them and their fellow citizens to

help the betterment of their lives and bring development to the country.¹¹ This education, however, was not easy to get.

In 1924, the Colonial Office took over the government of Northern Rhodesia. It was more supportive of the educational work of missionaries than its predecessor, the BSAC. In 1925, a sub-department of Native Education was established in the Department of Native Affairs. It became a department in its own right in 1930. Despite the above developments, education for Africans was not given high priority. Limited places led to competitive entrance examinations to the next Standard and made it very difficult to pass through the educational system. For Makasa to go to Standard Three at Lubwa, it entailed competing with other pupils within and beyond Chinsali since Lubwa, the headquarters of the UFCS schools in the district, also catered for other UFCS schools in the country. These were Mwenzo in Isoka, Chitambo in Serenje and Chasefu in Lundazi. Mbereshi in Kawambwa under the London Mission Society as well as the government school at Kasama also sent pupils to Lubwa.

Fees were another barrier to educational attainment for they were too high for Africans to afford. Only those with relatives who were working could manage to pay the fees. As Snelson remarked:

The educational story of less fortunate children who had no close relative in wage-earning economy could not have a happy ending, no matter what sacrifices their parents might be ready to make on their behalf.¹²

Makasa passed the highly competitive examinations and was selected to go to Lubwa, but his brother who was working at the Boma suddenly lost his job. This brother was expected to pay for him because his mother had no means to raise money.

Makasa's problem was made worse because he had no father. Nonetheless, even those with fathers who were working did not fare much better either. Simon Kapwepwe, for instance, whose father was a Boma Messenger failed to raise £2.10 school fees.¹³ His father could not afford the fees on his meagre salary. Meagre salaries were a common feature to all African workers except those working on the mines. Therefore, the issue of school fees was a challenging one to those who wanted to get education.

In a bid to raise the required fees, Makasa, then fifteen years old, had to find work. Better prospects could only be obtained in Kasama although this meant walking there for three days. He found work as a kitchen boy for the Provincial Commissioner (PC), but after only one month, the PC was transferred to Barotseland (Western Province). The struggle to raise fees had not achieved anything and Makasa was desperate. At this point, relationship to the Musanya Chieftainship paid dividends because Musanya recommended him for a bursary to the Bemba Superior Native Authority.

Native authorities were established in 1924 when Britain assumed administration of Northern Rhodesia in line with the policy of indirect rule. The government resolved to train Africans to run the local affairs of their country. It was also stated that:

No further advance can be made in responsibility and self-government until the Native Authorities collect their own revenue and control their expenditure.¹⁴

Consequently, Ordinances 9, 10 and 25 of 1936 were passed in order to create Native Treasuries. They were charged with many responsibilities such as paying their clerks and buying uniforms for Boma Messengers. In the post war period, they were even expected to fund some development projects in

rural areas. Furthermore, as early as 1938, some treasuries provided funds for the education of possible heirs to chiefs. Malama Sokoni, a relative of Chief Chibesakunda in a similar way benefited from the Bisa Native Treasury. Both Makasa and Sokoni were given bursaries to study at Lubwa Training School.

Lubwa Training School in Makasa's days was the summit of academic accomplishment. Makasa asserted that the prestige and joy of being at Lubwa could be likened to those of being an undergraduate at today's universities. Government equally commended the educational work of Lubwa. The Acting Director for Native Education reported that:

The government was getting better value for money from Livingstonia than any other mission. Its European educationalists are well qualified and of a superior type, its policy is 'educational' and 'progressive'. Its teachers are competent fellows with a real pride in their work.¹⁵

Three years later, the Director of Native Education, ranked Lubwa first among the twenty educational missions of Northern Rhodesia. He pointed out that the value of its educational work was outstanding.

To whatever was 'progressive' and 'outstanding' about Lubwa, one could include the fact that it provided an environment in which political and social ideas were nurtured. In 1918, R.D. McMinn had formulated the ultimate aim of mission education as bringing out righteousness, usefulness, helpfulness, and loyalty in the individual and in the masses. In 1942, Dr Brown formulated Lubwa's education policy on similar lines. However, by 1943, the Mission Council of Lubwa changed the former policy of stressing mass education to concentrating on real and effective education of leaders.¹⁶

When Makasa started school in 1931, Lubwa was catering for too many

schools that were offering only elementary education. By the time he left Lubwa as a teacher in 1947, the policy had changed so that academic, not practical, subjects were stressed. The target of education was also shifted from the masses to a few individuals.

When Lubwa was upgraded to a teacher training college in 1930, Rev. David Maxwell Robertson was appointed as Principal. He did more than run the college and minister to Lubwa converts. He introduced the Boy Scout movement in Northern Rhodesia. At Lubwa, he ran the school as a scout troupe. Students were divided into patrols; each patrol was assigned to a dormitory under a leader and his deputy. Discipline was maintained through the Troups Court of Honour where Robertson rarely intervened.¹⁷ Makasa, John Kamaña and Malama Sokoni all pointed out that they received valuable training in leadership, self-reliance and discipline from the scout movement.

Racial Discrimination at Lubwa

Many young Africans in Chinsali first came in close contact with White Missionaries at Lubwa. Many were already familiar with the District Commissioner (DC) who they had even nicknamed "Collector of taxes." But at Lubwa, they were able to see other vices such as racial discrimination practised by the men of God. Johnson Bwali, a medical officer at Lubwa Hospital, who was born in 1919 pointed out that the first Missionaries were not unlike the colonial officers at the Boma. He recalled that:

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McMinn travelled on a pushcart when visiting villages. African pushers were made to run so that McMinn could travel quickly through the villages. To cross a river, McMinn was carried on the back by the pushers. When Dr Brown came in 1927, he used a bicycle. Even then, one African always ran alongside the bicycle so that in case of a puncture, he could repair it or carry it on his shoulders.¹⁸

Chinsali district on foot.²⁰ That assertion is not borne out by facts because pictures of Dr Brown on 'ulendo' in the early 1940s show him with a bicycle.²¹ While some Africans have luggage on their heads, one is pushing a bicycle. Clearly, Bwali's testimony is plausible

Church services at Lubwa were not spared from racial discrimination. Three bells were rang. The first was a warning for Africans to get ready; the second was for them to enter the church while the last was for Europeans to enter. After the third bell, the services started and no one could join in thereafter. That arrangement may have been to the benefit of European's keen sense of time keeping but African students saw it in racial terms. They wondered why Africans were made to wait for missionaries after the second bell. Kamana suggested that:

The best thing to do was for everybody to go in church after the second bell and start the service. That way no one group would be made to wait for the other.²²

Inside cushioned benches were reserved for the exclusive use of Europeans while Africans used hard benches. Students perceived that as yet another example of racial discrimination by Missionaries.

Health services were equally clouded in racial overtones. Lubwa Mission Hospital had two separate entrances and wards. One for Africans and the other for Europeans. Incidences such as the above made Africans, especially students, to question the sincerity of missionaries' interest in their affairs. They also wondered why missionaries failed to practice the Christian love and equality of all people before God that they preached. Through the students questioning, one can detect the first stirring of political awakening.

This study suggests that what Makasa and other early nationalists educated at Lubwa saw of Missionaries supports David Cook's view that Missionaries were agents of African political awakening. He has argued that it was at mission stations and schools served by Livingstonia Mission that new traditions of political organisation by educated Africans flowered into native welfare associations, the fore runners of political parties.²³

At the end of 1943, he completed the first year of the two-year teacher-training course at Lubwa. Though he was on a Native Authority bursary which paid his fees, he needed additional funds to buy other school requisites. That was why, in January 1944, he went to the Copperbelt to look for employment. At Nchanga Mine in Chingola, he secured a job as a Clerk. While his job description was clearly that of a clerk at the mine clinic, the White nursing sister added other chores: heating water, cleaning the floors and windows of the clinic, feeding the chickens the sister kept behind the clinic and tending the flower garden. Makasa was in need of money but he was not prepared to lose his dignity, be exploited and humiliated in the process of getting that money. As soon as she finished numerating the additional chores, he told her he was leaving there and then. When dealing with Whites, Makasa did not allow poverty to erode his dignity. But he seemed to behave differently when dealing with fellow Africans. This is evident later in life, when one considers his relationship with Kaunda. It is clear that he allowed himself to be manipulated then.

From Chingola, Makasa went to Mufulira. Reverend Bedford at Mufulira School where he secured a teaching job was a better Supervising Officer. Even so, Makasa did not intend to stay there for along time. He nursed a

secret ambition of going to Munali for Secondary education. His bursary was still open but he needed a recommendation from his employer before he could be considered for a place at Munali. This, Reverend Bedford refused to give because Makasa's services were still needed at the school. In frustration, Makasa left for Kitwe.

Appetite for learning prompted him to leave Kitwe for Choma. Katebe, a teacher at Nachula School had been sent by the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) to South Africa for further education. Makasa's plan was to replace Katebe so that when he came back, he too would be sent to the same college. Two years later when Katebe returned, the Director of African Education at Mazabuka refused to sanction the plan on the grounds that Makasa had not completed his teacher-training course at Lubwa. Makasa was not convinced by the Director's answer. He explained that:

The Director's reasoning did not convince me because the education I was to get in South Africa was higher than the teacher training course in Lubwa. I was convinced that Reverend Bedford and the director at Mazabuka were both denying me the chance of higher education for their own selfish and the racist reasons.²⁴

Makasa went back to Lubwa in 1947 to complete the teacher's course. The journey to the Copperbelt enabled Makasa to earn money for school requirements but it did not fulfil the desire to further his education. Nonetheless, he went back to Chinsali a changed man. The exploitation of Africans and the racial prejudice against them that he had seen on the Copperbelt and his personal experience of racism left impressions on his mind that were to change his career from teaching to politics.

Marriage

Makasa taught for two years in Southern Province before going back to Lubwa to complete the teacher's course. In spite of his happy stay at Choma, he did not marry from there. He pointed out that:

I was born, brought up and educated in the rural areas of Northern Province. I was convinced that a Tonga woman would find it difficult to adapt to the Bemba way of life.²⁵

His mother had a lot to do with that decision. She had expressly cautioned him against marrying an outsider. She sought in a daughter in law someone who would be as close to her as her son was. According to her, such a daughter in law could only be found among her own people. Therefore, she was very happy that her son was still a bachelor when he returned from Southern Province.

Makasa married Delila Chali. Delila's father was Zakaria Chali who had been a teacher at Lubwa. This gave Delila a chance to go to school. She completed Standard IV and did two-year teachers' training course at Lubwa. She was home with her parents at the end of her training when Makasa started making inquiries about a suitable girl to marry. Elders directed him to a village where Chali was teaching then. When he met her, Makasa was delighted to note that his future wife was not a complete stranger to him. Delila was the Girl Guide leader who used to carry a flag during the prayers for scouts at Lubwa. Apart from being a member of the Scout Movement, Makasa also became leader of the School Band when the former leader, Alick Nkhata joined the second world war in 1940. Both responsibilities often brought him in contact with the Girl Guide leader.

Wedding arrangements were quickly finalised and they married as soon as Makasa completed the teacher-training course in 1948. His first posting was at Chinsali Boma School where Delila also taught. In 1950, Delila was appointed as matron of Lubwa Girls Boarding School. Due to her appointment, Makasa also went to teach at Lubwa Mission School. However, because of Makasa's involvement in politics, he was transferred to Nkula Middle School thereby forcing Delila to resign her position. Though Makasa retained his position as head teacher for sometime, the government did not allow Delila to teach again. Delila was victimised by the government because she was the wife of a political activist.

The couple had seven children, all born during the years of the independence struggle. The two girls are Kasonde and the late Mulenga, while the five boys are Chali, Mwenya, Kangwa, Robert and Mukuka. Because Makasa was constantly on the move during the struggle, the children were deprived of fatherly care and attention. It was Delila who shouldered the responsibility of caring and providing for them. Allowances from UNIP headquarters were not only insufficient but were rarely paid out as well. And so to support the family, she sold fritters at the market. This was supplemented by doing piecework as a kitchen hand or farm labourer. She remembered how she laboured making six ridges in return for a tablet of bathing soap. "After getting the soap, I made another set of ridges for a small cup of salt"²⁶ she recalled. These are some of the hardships she endured in support of her husband.

Children's education was often interrupted because of their father's movements. Kasonde, the eldest daughter born in 1949 pointed out that it

was very difficult to cultivate any meaningful friendships with other pupils because she did not stay long enough at any school. One particularly bad year was 1959 when she changed schools four times. The government declared a state of emergency and Makasa with other party leaders were restricted. Makasa was taken to Solwezi. For fear of harassment from the government, Makasa arranged for his family to go back to Chinsali. Kasonde resumed studies at the Boma School but three months later, she relocated to another school at Musanya, where Makasa instructed the family to go in order to avoid further harassment from government officials at the Boma.

Interruption of their education was just one of the problems Makasa's children, Kasonde and her brothers and sisters as politician's children had to contend with. The other was ridicule from many teachers and schoolmates who did not share their fathers political optimism that Zambia would be free.²⁷ Makasa's wife faced the same problem. Her friends and relatives failed to understand why her husband left a secure job of teaching and entered a political career which was considered to have an uncertain future

She supplemented the family income by doing menial work and yet she was a qualified teacher. Her domestic life was often disturbed because whenever Makasa held party meetings there, his wife and children were asked to leave the house whether it was during the day or night. Moreover, the house was subjected to frequent raids by the police. Delila did not react by leaving her husband as some of her friends and relatives advised. Neither did she blame him for the hardships and ridicule. Instead, she took them as her contribution to the independence struggle. By so doing, she provided Makasa with a stable home to operate from.

The colonial environment that Makasa grew up in shaped his political career. During the course of the struggle, hardships that his wife and children went through were a further inspiration for him to continue fighting colonial rule up to its logical conclusion: independence for Northern Rhodesia.

Conclusion

Cipaila died when his son Makasa was only three months old. This left Makasa vulnerable to an insecure childhood. His mother's subsequent marriages failed to provide him a stable environment to grow in. Through education he hoped to obtain money, status and influence in society. The quest for education brought him into contact with missionaries who practised racial discrimination against Africans, just like other colonial officers.

The next chapter shows how hardships in his early life, disillusionment with missionaries' failure to practice the love and equality of all races that they preached inspired him to join the struggle for independence. Marriage to Delila provided him a stable home to operate from.

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CHAPTER THREE

STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 1947 TO 1963

Introduction

The chapter discusses Makasa's political career from the time he joined the Chinsali Welfare Association in 1947 to the eve of Zambia's Independence in 1963. It highlights the role Makasa played in raising first Chinsali District, then Northern and Luapula provinces to a high level of political consciousness. It argues that due to the effectiveness of his organisational strategies in the two provinces, his approach was adopted and applied by UNIP to all rural areas.

Chinsali Welfare Association

As soon as he returned to Lubwa Training School, Makasa joined the Chinsali Welfare Association which was formed in 1946. Kenneth Kaunda and Malama Sokoni were already members. The Chairman was Thom Sabi, a teacher and elder of Lubwa Church. When Makasa and Kaunda were elected to the Executive Committee in 1948, they impressed upon the chairman to ask the District Commissioner to provide boots for the barefooted messengers so as to maintain their dignity. They also proposed to increase the number of upper school places in the district on a self-help basis. These two members of the new social group, were attempting to improve the welfare of the people through the association. In this respect, Welfare Associations throughout the country provided training for future politicians. Association members were inspired to form nationalist parties at a later date.

The government did not pay much attention to grievances by Africans. In government circles, it was felt that in rural areas, Native Authorities were

the right channels for such suggestions to be channeled through. The Department of Native Affairs, under which Native Authorities fell, had one of its aims as allowing Africans to participate in running their affairs. Native Authorities were even empowered to make orders or local legislation for the welfare of the people of the area. Despite that empowerment, all the orders that they made were subject to the veto by the Provincial Commissioner, while any local legislation was subject to the approval of the Governor.¹ Therefore, Native Authorities were under the paternalistic control of the government. Precisely, because of that control, they served the interests of the government and not of the people they were meant to serve. Small wonder that younger men declined to align their aspirations to those of Native Authorities.

However, neither Native Authorities nor Welfare Associations were able to meet their aspirations. Even the formation of the Federation of Welfare Association of Northern Rhodesia did not improve the situation. That was why leaders of the FWSNR decided to transform it into a political party in 1948 and named it as the Northern Rhodesia African Congress (NRAC).

Many branches of the FWNR became branches of the NRAC. In Chinsali, however, although the Chinsali Welfare Association affiliated to the FWNR, it did not immediately transform itself into a branch of the NRAC. Conservative members wanted to maintain the status quo but younger men did not. As a result, they felt obliged to spearhead the formation of congress, as a separate organisation from the Welfare Association. Because Makasa and Kaunda were the force behind the idea, they were elected Chairman and Secretary respectively in March 1950. There after, they used the political

party to infiltrate the association so that by 1953, the Chinsali Welfare Association ceased to exist as such.

The role of Lubwa in preparing the young for future leadership roles was a tradition of Livingstonia Mission. As far back as 1907 Dr Robert Laws, the founder of the first mission in Nyasaland wrote that:

Full electoral native franchise and native members of a legislative assembly are a long way off yet, but this has to come in future, and the sooner the ABC of such responsibilities are learned the safer for the country.²

The time did come and by the mission's policy of a self governing church in the period 1939–1953, many Africans were elected church elders as the following table shows:

TABLE I: CENTRES OF WORSHIP AND CHURCH ELDERS OF LUBWA PRESBYTERY, 1939–1953

Year	1939	1940	1946	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Number of Centres of worship	12	13	-	5	70	22	36	36
Number of elders	26	28	34	53	46	42	70	66

Source: NAZ, HM 28 UN9/2 Church of Scotland statistical returns.

With decentralisation went delegation of responsibility from Europeans to Africans. In this way, Lubwa gave young men experience in church organisation that they used for party organisation. Among the thirteen elected committee members in 1950, eleven had a connection with Lubwa Mission, church or school as the list shows: Chairman; Kapasa Makasa (teacher and Church elder), Vice; Rueben Mulenga (Evangelist), Secretary; Kenneth Kaunda (teacher), Vice: Eneya Mumba (Church elder), Treasurer; S. M. Sula

(Mission Bursar) and Vice; J. D. Mpuku (Secretary of the School Management Committee). Other committee members were: Daniel Besa (Synod Evangelist), I. M. Mutubila (Pastor of Lubwa Church), Thom Sabi (Lubwa trained teacher at that time a government school inspector) and John Malama Sokoni (Lubwa Trained teacher at that time a farmer). Clearly, Lewis Gann's assertion that the Northern Rhodesia African Congress retained a strong protestant and missionary flavour applied to Chinsali.³

Unlike other denominations, combining church membership and political activities was not prohibited at Lubwa. High-ranking church members were not prevented from taking leadership roles in Congress. Makasa's positions as church elder and teacher both helped him in his role as Chairman of Congress.

Organising Congress in Chinsali 1950–1953

Immediately after their election, Makasa and Kaunda pledged to dedicate themselves to the fight against colonial rule. Kaunda told Makasa that:

Rob, the work we are given today by our people is hard. What is needed, boy, is courage and determination. As such we must agree here before we depart that we are never going to fail. We are going to struggle up to the end in the name of God, no matter what the difficulties are.⁴

For the two men, their election marked the beginning of a long and protracted struggle for independence. It was Makasa's duty as Chairman to work out a strategy for reaching all sections of the district. This entailed visiting villages, explaining to the people what the aims of the political party were and forming other branches of Congress in the district. He was helped by Kaunda and Sokoni, the other two members who were very active in the committee.

Part of Makasa's strategy was to infiltrate associations and clubs under the Welfare Association. Chinsali had many such clubs. There was a social club, Northern Rhodesia African Civil Servant Association, Farming Association and the African Teachers Association. The Social Club embraced a Christian Association, an evening dancing club and a debating society. The proliferation of associations in a small and remote rural district was an example of how Africans were using alternative outlets to express themselves and not through the government sponsored forums such as Provincial Councils and Native Authorities. For Makasa, the many associations made the perfect set up for propagating political issues. He made sure that members of the executive joined as many associations as possible. He explained that:

By belonging to all social clubs under the Welfare Association, the executive was able to reach many people, especially civil servants who were not allowed to attend political meetings.⁵

At the time the Welfare Association phased out, Makasa had penetrated a large section of the community and most of the people turned their allegiance to the African Congress.

Makasa's typical week followed this routine: teaching from Monday to Friday, cycling with Kaunda to one of the villages on Saturday. In the evening, Kaunda played a guitar while they both sang political songs around a campfire. On Sunday morning, Church elder Makasa would usually preach. Immediately after the church service, Congress Chairman Makasa would hold a political meeting. Sunday afternoons were used to form branches and elect the leaders.

Makasa was not worried about mixing religion and politics. With Kaunda, they agreed that Christianity with the church as its visible symbol was used by imperialists to penetrate and colonise Africa. Therefore, they would use the same church to spell the demise of the imperialists. Based on such sentiments, they used church buildings to mobilise the people. They also began party meetings with a prayer. As a result, ties with Lubwa were slowly but surely beginning to be cut. These "vehemently fiery young men" as Andriya Masiye described Makasa and Kaunda, "used their Christian sentiments as a crucible for their political aspirations:"⁶

What topics did the "fiery young men" talk about at political meetings? Thomas Rasmussen observed that:

Nationalism as a large-scale popular political movement drew much of its strength by capitalising on essentially local grievances and national political issues were essentially defined in local terms.⁷

That was the principle Makasa and his committee members used. Their first responsibility was to awaken people to the fact that they did not have to accept foreign rule but that they were as capable of governing themselves as any race was. To do that, they took local grievances and situated them in the context of the general grievances against foreign rule. Training as a teacher equipped Makasa to take local situations familiar to the people, cite specific examples known or could be verified by them and use these to explain the evils of colonialism in general, then federation in particular.

There were many examples that showed how tax, the most directly felt manifestation of colonial rule, and the labour migration affected the people. Government consciously set the rate of tax at a level that compelled men to

leave their homes. At one time in Chinsali, 81% of adult males were away from home.⁸ The effect of migration was not felt in the same way in the whole country but among those practising the chitemene system, it was noted that:

The work of cutting down branches up to a height of 20 or 30 feet is one that requires great skill and daring. It cannot be done by women, children or old men who remained.⁹

Among the Bemba, food production was adversely affected. Because of large numbers of men who were absent from home, many women in Chinsali whose male relatives were away from home supported the activists.

War veterans made another popular topic. War propaganda had a politicising influence on Africans in Northern Rhodesia. For instance in 1940, the Government explained the war to the African population in the following words:

It is your war as well as our war for the precious things for which the Europeans are fighting, namely freedom in all its aspects are just as precious and important to Africans.¹⁰

Freedom was precious but educated Africans began to question how much of the freedom they fought for they received afterwards. "We used to tell people that the British fought Hitler to preserve their freedom yet, here they are keeping us in colonial yokes"¹¹, Makasa recalled. The chance of having a war veteran in the audience or someone closely connected to the war effort was quite high. Recruitment figures varied from year to year but in 1943, the quota from Chinsali was set at three recruits per week.¹² At the time congress was formed, there were still many war veterans in the district.

After years of absence, former askari, the term used to refer to African soldiers, were alienated from traditional society and were often dissatisfied with their conditions of discharge. They had insufficient opportunities for work

in towns. They formed an important element of social and political unrest in the critical phase immediately after the war, clearly discernible in for example, the Accra riots of 1948.¹³ In Northern Rhodesia, there were no riots by the askari. Nonetheless, their experience made them psychologically receptive to nationalists' agitation against colonial rule. One askari, Andrey Masiye, stated that:

I cannot really regret this war. It was responsible to a very great extent for the African nationalism that sprung up soon afterwards. We soldiers from all over Africa, meeting men from America, France and Britain. Naturally, we got new ideas about ourselves and began questioning things¹⁴.

This askari worked with Makasa in Tanganyika (Tanzania) in the struggle against colonial rule.¹⁵ Among the things the askari questioned when they were discharged was why discharge conditions were not fulfilled.

War propaganda, used to enlist support in the prosecution of the war made joining seem advantageous. Very often, it went as far as telling outright lies. As a seventeen-year-old student at Lubwa at the beginning of the war, Makasa witnessed recruiting officers promising senior students that if they enlisted, they would be awarded certificates without sitting for any examination. Further, they would be given any job they wanted even if that meant taking over jobs from those who would remain behind. Promises made to students were not fulfilled, neither were those to ordinary villagers. Von Albertin writes that:

The British in India and the French in North and West Africa were astute enough to treat the war veterans as a privileged group, thereby binding them more closely to the colonial power.¹⁶

The British in Northern Rhodesia did nothing of that sort. War veterans were not accorded any special status.

The chief Secretary for Native Affairs asked DCs to find out from African soldiers what they wanted to do after demobilisation so that the government could plan for them. The DC for Chinsali reported that of the 150 askari interviewed, 2 opted for self-employment, 30 wanted to go back to school but the rest expected the government to honour its promises of giving them jobs. While 16 left it to the government to decide on which jobs to give them, the majority clearly indicated their preferences as the following table shows.

TABLE II: JOB PREFERENCES OF THE ASKARI

Type of work	Farmer	Store Keeper	Police man	P.W.D. Captain or Foreman	District Messenger	Carpenter	Wireless or telephone operator	Driver	Game Guard	Medical Orderly	Shoe Maker
No. of Askari	35	3	8	5	7	5	2	25	6	3	3

Source: NAZ, SEC 1/1766. Views of African soldiers on post war employment and resettlement: Report by District Commissioners

The government scheme that came up failed to take into account the askari's wishes. District Commissioners' Conferences in Northern Province among other options agreed to give the askari land holdings near the Bomas and to employ some of them as District Messengers.¹⁷ In Chinsali, there is no evidence that such agreements were implemented. Congress leaders were quick to point out how the government had discriminated the askari against white ex-soldiers with whom they had fought side by side, but were given better discharge conditions.

When addressing chiefs, Congress leaders pointed out how the colonial government had eroded their power and authority. They made a case against

indirect rule that it promoted tribal separation instead of national unity by delimiting a district into tribal units or Native Authorities. They argued that Native Authorities on which chiefs presided were meant to serve the interests of the government and not develop the hitherto stable African societies. By designating paramount, senior and subordinate chief to each tribal group even among societies where there were no chiefs before, the government ended up interfering in the traditional way of appointing chiefs. While some chiefs were desposed, others had their chieftainships completely scrapped off. At this point, Makasa would use a personal example by telling people that:

My uncle Musanya was an important Bemba chief. His chieftainship was dismantled and incorporated into chief Nkweto's in 1938. Now, we only have Musanya's village.¹⁸

By carefully selecting topics to suit the audience and starting from local to national issues, Makasa sealed an important flaw that Welfare Associations had. They lacked a basis for mass participation. For a political party, complaints against colonial rule virtually affected all members of the community and so it was easier to harness support.

From 1948 to 1953, federation was the most important issue the NRAC dealt with. Led by Roy Welensky, Europeans in Northern Rhodesia forced the pace for federation between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland by relentlessly putting forward their case in the Legislative Council (Legco), the *Northern News* and on radio. Ironically, as Roberts pointed out:

It was precisely this attempt to subordinate Northern Rhodesia to the white south, which provoked the rise of a popular African movement dedicated to overthrowing colonial rule.¹⁹

When enlightened Africans tried to use *Mutende*, a government newspaper to put across opposition to federation, Welensky and his cohorts cried foul. It was up to Congress to educate the masses on the disadvantages of the scheme.

After alluding to the evils of colonial rule by targeting specific issues, it only remained for Congress to tell the people that under federation, life would be worse. It would mean strengthened European domination; institutional colour bar and the introduction of pass laws from the south. Alienation of tribal land, as the case was in Southern Rhodesia, carried the greatest emotional force. Makasa exploited that force to the full.

When Gore-Brown toured Northern Province in the late 1950s, he was particularly impressed to find that in Chinsali, the old Welfare Association had been invigorated. In a letter to Ethel Locke-King, he wrote:

How amazed the early District Commissioners (would be) to find the Chinsali villagers discussing African representation ... and the immigration policy for the Territory.²⁰

Congress had stimulated political awakening in Africans. That they also discussed federation cannot be doubted because when the Secretary of State for the Colonies, James Griffith visited Chinsali in the company of the Governor of Northern Rhodesia on 17 August, 1951, chiefs on behalf of the people presented a petition to him. It tabulated eight reasons why chiefs rejected federation.²¹ The reasons given demonstrated a clear understanding of the issues involved.

In recognition of his role in raising Chinsali to a high level of political consciousness by establishing many branches in the district, Makasa was elected District Organising Secretary in 1951, a post he held until 1953.

Resignation From Teaching

Although ANC was not officially banned, the government looked with suspicion at African political development. Political activists who were in government employment were the prime targets of this suspicion. From Lubwa, Makasa was transferred to Nkula Middle School as a Head teacher in 1951. With more responsibilities as ANC District Organising Secretary, he was put under surveillance by the government. The same year, he sat for the efficiency Bar Examinations and passed. This was usually followed by a rise in salary and a place at Chalimbana to obtain a Higher Teacher's Certificate. However, his results were withheld. When he got them three months later, he obtained the salary increment but time to go to Chalimbana had lapsed, therefore, he forfeited a chance of furthering his education. Another chance was forfeited in similar circumstances. The Bemba Superior Native Authority wanted to employ Makasa as stipulated in the bursary he got from the Authority. They proposed to the government that Makasa be sent to Durban or Makerere to study local government. The colonial government refused to sanction the proposal. These hindrances to further education were very frustrating to Makasa because he hoped to use education as a gateway to a position of influence in society. On the other hand, this frustration inspired him to work harder in agitating against colonialism.

Nkula, where Makasa was transferred, was a government school that catered for both Protestant and Catholic pupils. Protestant children were supposed to be taught Religious Education from a booklet prepared by Lubwa Mission entitled "50 reasons why I have not joined the Church of Rome". Similarly, Ilondola Mission had produced a booklet entitled "50 reasons why I

have joined the Church of Rome" for their children.²² Makasa refused to perpetuate denominational antagonism between the two faiths. He simply taught Religious Education to the children and allowed them to pray together. This riled both missionaries. None was ready to acknowledge the changed relationship between missionaries and nationalists. Even Lubwa, whose mission seemed pro-African in the early days of Congress in Chinsali was not prepared to accommodate an African who was not submissive to Church authorities.

Unscheduled visitors went to Makasa's school. After one such visit from the Provincial Education Officer, C.H. Green, Makasa received a letter from Fergus McPherson, Education Secretary at Lubwa. It read:

The Nceje (Executive Council of the Bemba) Council at Chitimukulu has called you to the Paramount's court at once in connection with recent trouble at Nkula. I therefore, give you leave of absence to go at once by bike, returning in one week.²³

Makasa went. Paramount Chief Chitimukulu Kafula Musungu disclosed that actually, the PC had asked him to help frame charges against Makasa. As a relative and supporter of Congress, Musungu refused to reprimand Makasa.

Next, it was the Director of Native Education himself, Mr J. A. Cottrell who drove to Nkula School. Back in Lusaka, Cottrell instructed McPherson to transfer Makasa immediately to a small school in a remote part of the district. In his report for 1953, Cottrell wrote:

It has been necessary to ask managers of schools to pay special attention to the problem that has risen in some areas of teachers engaging in politics to the neglect of their work and obligations.²⁴

Neglecting work was not the issue. Makasa's background of poverty could not allow him to neglect his work. The fact was that his post in Congress was

becoming increasingly incompatible with his work as a government employee. However, it was the coronation celebration in June that culminated in the immediate transfer and the subsequent demotion of Makasa.

Describing coronation celebrations in the country, the Secretary for Native Affairs reported that:

A few misguided agitators attempted to organise boycotts of the coronation celebrations as a protest against the implementation of the federal proposals. This agitation was very limited in extent and did not seriously interfere with the general rejoicing.²⁵

The Secretary was suppressing the truth because, everywhere Congress disrupted the celebrations. Rejoicing was only confined to a small section of the country, to the embarrassment of the government. In Chinsali, the event provided Makasa as District Organising Secretary an opportunity to show the strength of the party in the area. A special task force, called the Underground Movement (UM) was appointed to spearhead the boycott campaign. Kaunda, though he was Northern Province Organising Secretary at that time was a member of the UM. School children were coached by the UM on what they were to do at the celebrations.²⁶ They threw away coronation medals, refused food prepared for them and refused to plant the coronation remembrance tree. Moreover, they sang a near seditious song that riled the colonial administration at home and abroad. The Director of Native Education was instructed from London to deal with the teachers concerned.²⁷

The children sang, 'It is sad, it is sad that Europeans have taken our country.'²⁸ At such an occasion as the coronation of a new ruler of the British Empire, the protest nature of the song was clear. Makasa's transfer, therefore, was in response to the Director's instructions. In fact, the move from heading Nkula, a Middle school, to Musunsu, an Elementary School entailed a

reduction in rank. After two months at Musunsu, he resigned in August 1953. That very month, federation was imposed on the people. Makasa realised that the struggle ahead required full time work in politics instead of combining two mutually exclusive jobs as he had been doing until then.

ANC Provincial Organising Secretary 1953–1959

Under the leadership of Harry M. Nkumbula from 1951, Congress grew into a mass party. Organising Secretaries were assigned to each province. Makasa remained in Chinsali as District Organising Secretary. Kaunda was appointed Provincial Organising Secretary of Northern Province, which, until 1958, included Luapula province. When Kaunda became General Secretary, Makasa was appointed in his place. He worked in that province from 1953 to 1960.

After the federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland was imposed in 1953, a decision was made by the National Executive to end the talking stage that had failed to stop the imposition of federation and start active protest that would spell the demise of federation. That meant defying Native Authority orders, customary hospitality to touring officials, government conservation measures and land development efforts. Makasa wrote to the PC informing him that no free food would be given to touring administrative officials because the government gave them money for that purpose. Although the PC explained that the food was not free since it was paid for in kind, his explanation was not acceptable.²⁹ Therefore, Makasa went ahead with enforcing the decision of the National Executive. Committees of Congress were formed to precede touring officials urging villagers not to give hospitality in the form of free labour, food, water and firewood. Makasa

persuaded chiefs to lead their people in the civil disobedience by forming small Congress groups to ferment discontent on a wide range of issues. The response in the province was very good. Ushi and Kabende chiefs in Fort Rosebery (Mansa) led their people in disregarding laws relating to game, forestry, fisheries and agriculture. In Kawambwa (which included Nchelenge), people showed flagrant disregard for fishing regulations. In Chinsali, the campaign was so successful that one village had to be moved far from the Boma. The Mobile Unit, a wing of the Police Force that dealt with riots, was also called in. Generally speaking, touring officers found that villagers had completely changed since their last visits. Women refused to draw water unless they were paid, recruiting carriers proved difficult and in yet another instance, men refused to provide free labour for pitching up a camp for the visitors.³⁰

Further, the Provincial Executive decided to deal with a racist manager of a shop owned by Thom and Company. So as to force an end to the obscene-racist language used by the manager, E.O. Gliemann, Makasa mobilised people to boycott the entire chain of Thom shops in the province. When it appeared that visitors to the Lumpa Church at Kasomo would derail the boycott in Chinsali, the shop was burned down. Using the slogan, 'Now for Thom,' business virtually ground to a halt and Gliemann was forced to close the shop and leave the province.

For conspiring to injure a white man in his trade, Makasa and two others were imprisoned. Being the provincial leader, he got the longest term of eighteen months. Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, just returned from studies in India was sent to fill Makasa's place. Together with Sokoni, he concluded the

Thom case by insisting that the new Indian shop owner change the name to 'Chawama' meaning it is good that Gliemann has left. The Indian obliged. Other European businesses changed their stance on Africans as a result of the overwhelming success of the 'Now for Thom' campaign. Congress morale in the province was greatly boosted by the success of the campaigns.

Makasa continued mobilising the masses even though he was constantly harassed by the Provincial Administration. Not to let Makasa be discouraged by the hardships in the struggle, Kaunda often wrote to bolster his spirit. Even when he was out of the country on his many international travels for the cause of UNIP, Kaunda was apprised of the situation at home. That was how, after the successful campaigns in Northern Province in which a number of chiefs lost their posts, some were demoted and others detained or banished, Kaunda wrote to Makasa from London that:

I realise that you people at home are really undergoing a very serious test of leadership but I do not for a moment doubt that God has given us the right type of Boys on the field to do the job. The main thing is to try and keep non-violence in the struggle ... shame the devil by the right type of behaviour.³¹

From Dar-es-Salaam where he went to attend a World Assembly of Youth Conference, Kaunda wrote a letter of encouragement in support of the shop boycott and civil disobedience that Makasa was directing. He glowingly narrated the success of a boycott of European liquor trades organised by Julius Nyerere, leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). He intimated that through such acts of protest, the ANC in Northern Rhodesia may also emerge victorious.

On his release from prison, Makasa went to Chinsali to visit his family. He found that Lubwa Hospital was still practising colour bar by having two separate entrances, one for Europeans and the other for Africans. In a 'Now for Lubwa' campaign, he forced missionary in charge, Dr David Livingstone Wilson to open the doors to both races.³² Relationship between Lubwa Mission and the early activists was not cordial any more. Activists could no longer tolerate a Church that seemed pro-African but was in reality racist. Soon after that, Makasa left the UFSC and joined the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church which was more committed to Christian teachings of non-racism and equality of all men.

ZANC Provincial President 1959–1960

ZANC was formed after members of the national executive differed over reaction to the imposition of federation. The differences reached a climax at the October 1958 national conference where it was revealed that most of the members had complaints against the party president, Nkumbula. Makasa's complaint hinged on the inability of Nkumbula to seek redress from the government when party members were severely assaulted by the mobile police unit during the campaign against native and government regulations that he led. Instead, Nkumbula accused Makasa of provoking the confrontation. This was a very demoralising response from the national president.

In the new party, Makasa was assigned the same work but under a new title of Provincial President. One of the complexities Mulford referred to, as a cause of the differences among ANC members was ethnicity. It was alleged that ANC was a Tonga party, hence Kapwepwe led a faction that left ANC in

order to form a Bemba party and because of that, ZANC was readily accepted in Bemba speaking areas.³³ However, the ascendancy of ZANC and later UNIP over ANC in all regions but one and the composition of ZANC leadership does not support the ethnicity argument. If the allegations were true, UNIP would not have received support from other provinces. Moreover, with reference to Makasa's area of operation, Northern Province (including Luapula) was already highly politicised by 1958. Compared to other provinces, ANC's provincial organisation was far superior in Makasa's province.³⁴ The success of the campaigns also ascertains that especially when it is noted that Nkumbula never made a tour of Northern province as ANC National President. Even in 1957 when he accompanied British Labour Party Member of Parliament, James Johnson, to the province to hear African's views on federation, Nkumbula disappointed a huge crowd that gathered to meet him by refusing to address them. He promised to do that during his next visit which never materialised.³⁵ Therefore, many people in the province joined the ANC not due to the personal effort of Nkumbula, rather it was due to the efforts of the Provincial Committee, led by Makasa.

Consequently, when ZANC was formed, it recorded its most rapid spread in Northern Province because the committee was able to persuade the people who were already politically conscientised to join the new party which it believed would obtain independence for the country. The committee's efforts were supplemented by those of the national leaders who, unlike the ANC leaders, made it a point to tour provinces regularly.

Four months after its formation, ZANC was outlawed by the government and its leaders restricted to rural areas. Makasa was restricted to Solwezi.

UNIP Provincial President 1960–May 1961

On his release, Makasa was welcomed back to Northern Province by a large enthusiastic crowd, which sent signals to the Provincial Commissioner, Major Wealthy that support for the party was not affected by restricting its leaders. In fact, by restricting them, the colonial government had made them national heroes. In a bid to check Makasa's heroism, Wealthy acted swiftly. He summoned Makasa to his office and offered him a senior post in the Native Authority. Makasa refused to serve the government through the Native Authority as he had earlier refused to serve it through teaching. The harsh realities of colonial rule did not allow him to see any virtue in serving the colonial government. By joining a political party his ambition was to fight, not serve, that kind of government.

Soon after his release from restriction in Solwezi, Makasa was posted to Luapula Province as UNIP President. Due to his organisational efforts, the number of UNIP branches steadily increased in the province. For the whole country, the number of branches rose from 28 in April to 482 in December 1960. Of the 482, 305 were in Luapula Province.³⁶ This figure showed a very high level of politisation in the province. Due to his outstanding record in Northern and Luapula Provinces, Makasa was called to Lusaka to intensify party organisation in the capital in view of the envisaged new political situation in the country. He adopted two methods for this assignment.

One was the system of dividing the city into small sections in order to penetrate the hitherto ANC stronghold. According to Makasa, the rationale for that method was:

To avoid bloodshed by holding large formal political meetings. Canvassing for Membership through small sections proved effective without openly antagonising ANC members.³⁷

The method proved to be effective as many people joined UNIP without recourse to violence. The other involved thwarting the United Federal Party's (UFP) advances into rural areas. The UFP was formed in 1957. It was a merger of the United Rhodesia Party (URP) in Southern Rhodesia and Welensky's Federal Party. This marked the beginning of the Federal government's drive for dominion status which would make it more difficult to achieve African majority rule in the territories.

In the same year, the African Affairs Board was dissolved, making the Federal Government intentions even clearer. The policy of the UFP was to stem African nationalism and maintain federation. This made UFP directly opposed to UNIP's aspirations. In 1960, as the time for the review of the federal constitution was drawing near and UFP harboured a possibility of obtaining dominion status, it could no longer afford to ignore the African electorate. It wanted to broaden its electoral base by going to rural areas. Indiscreet remarks by UFP African member, Justin Simukonda that UNIP would be challenged in Chongwe prompted Makasa into action. With Solomon Kalulu, Makasa went to Chongwe and in a door-to-door campaign urged Africans to boycott the planned UFP meeting. On the day of the meeting, they went to the venue and sent away any African who still harboured ideas of attending the meeting. When UFP officials from Livingstone, Lusaka and Copperbelt found only Makasa and Kalulu at the venue of the meeting they realised that UNIP had foiled their plans. The meeting was aborted. Shortly afterwards, Simukonda was expelled from the

party and further efforts to mobilise African supporters from rural areas were dropped.

UNIP Representative in Tanganyika (Tanzania) 1961–1962

The idea of sending resident party representatives to selected world capitals first crossed Kaunda's mind during his first visit to Britain in 1957. However, it was not implemented until 1961 when the political situation in the country pointed to a possibility of independence. Makasa was sent to Tanganyika while Arthur Wina went to the United States, Mainza Chona to Britain, Reuben Kamanga to Egypt and Humphrey Mulemba to Ghana. When introducing Makasa to Julius Nyerere, leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and President of Tanzania, Kaunda wrote:

Robert S. Makasa is one of my most trusted men and he is coming there to represent the party. Deal with him knowing that he has my confidence. Find him an office in town because I consider that our Dar office is going to be the most important

38

Indeed, Dar-es-Salaam was of vital importance to UNIP because Tanzania was the hub of African freedom movements. Even the Pan African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa, (PAFMECSA) had its headquarters there. At this stage in the struggle, Kaunda regarded Makasa as a partner and not someone to manipulate as the case was after independence.

Makasa's duties included organising scholarships for Northern Rhodesians in anticipation of Zambia's manpower requirements, mobilising Northern Rhodesians for the independence struggle at home and looking after political refugees in his capacity as chairman of the Refugees' committee of PAFMECSA.

In 1962, his most important work was to spearhead the 1962 general elections from Tanzania. He helped to choose, create and edit political songs that were broadcast from Tanzania and meant to persuade people to vote for UNIP. Elections campaign posters printed in Tanzania were prohibited from entering Northern Rhodesia. Makasa, however, found a way of ensuring that the posters duly reached their destination.

The World Peace Brigade for Non-violent Action against colonialism was founded in Lebanon in January 1962. It had three co-chairmen, one each from India, Britain and the United States. An Asian Council was formed to look after Asian affairs while African Freedom Action (AFA) was for African affairs. The main objective of the Peace Brigade was to help organise and join hands with colonised people in their non-violent struggle for self determination. In Tanganyika, AFA comprised of UNIP, TANU, and PAFMECSA representatives. Northern Rhodesia was doubly represented by Makasa for UNIP and Kaunda as PAFMECSA chairman. When AFA organised volunteers to help the cause of UNIP, Makasa warned that:

African Freedom Action is keeping volunteers on an alert basis all over the world and will continue preparations for any positive action deemed necessary unless elections are held before October. Some volunteers are going to Europe to organise all out financial and moral support of UNIP's struggle ...³⁸

By harnessing support for UNIP, AFA helped to put pressure on Britain so that elections were held in October 1962 and the first African government in Northern Rhodesia was installed on 16th December 1962.

Regional Secretary, Eastern Province 1962–1963.

While in Tanzania, Makasa asked for leave to further his education up to secondary school level. The response from party headquarters was that the stage of political development at home was such that they could not let him go to school at that time.⁴⁰ Instead, the party sent Makasa for a three months course at Oxford University to study Public Administration and Public Finance. The party was preparing people to take positions of responsibility in the new government. For that, Makasa's Standard Six education was considered adequate.

Before the end of the course, he was instructed not to go back to Tanzania, but report to Eastern Province. In his absence, the party had been restructured. Provinces were divided into regions headed by Regional Secretaries instead of the former Provincial Presidents. Even though ANC was part of the coalition government, ANC/UNIP antagonism was as bad as the UFP/UNIP one. In Eastern Province, it led to the death of the Regional Secretary for Katete-Chadiza region A. Mumba and his deputy, G. Miti after the beating they received from ANC cadres. Their death further fuelled the antagonism. Makasa was sent to the province as the new Regional Secretary in the midst of such tension. That the party sent Makasa from Britain to Katete instead of sending some one already in the country was a measure of confidence UNIP national leadership had in him. His first duty was to diffuse the tension in the area. Thereafter, he mounted a campaign for the 1963 election to help UNIP win a majority and dissolve the uneasy ANC/UNIP coalition.

That Lubwa Training School catered for other Church of Scotland schools in Eastern Province paid dividends to UNIP. Makasa found that most

of the chiefs were his former schoolmates at Lubwa as were many Native Authority employees. In particular, senior Chief Mwase was his bandmaster in the Scout movement at Lubwa. This greatly facilitated Makasa's campaign tours and meetings in the villages with or without permission from the government. After three months, he was sent to stand as member of Parliament in Chinsali. He won the 1963 elections.

Conclusion

Through welfare associations, Africans demanded an improvement in their social welfare. When the government refused to do so, Africans adopted the next phase of protest. This was the formation of political parties to demand the end of colonial rule. Makasa received training for political organisation from the Chinsali Welfare Association where he was a committee member and from Lubwa Mission Church where he was an elder. The driving force behind Makasa's political activism was the oppressive nature of colonial rule in the rural area he grew up in, the racial discrimination he experienced on the Copperbelt, disillusionment with missionaries as custodians of people's rights and poverty in his family. Like many leaders, political control was seen as the only way out of the discrimination and humiliation at the hands of whites. In spite of his unstable upbringing, he still emerged as an outstanding leader during the struggle for independence. In the first nationalist government, he was appointed as Resident Minister for Northern Province.

ENDNOTES

1. NRG, *Native Affairs Annual Report for 1947*, (Lusaka: Government Printers, 1947), p. 29.
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CHAPTER FOUR

MAKASA'S POLITICAL CAREER FROM 1964 TO 1991

Introduction

This chapter covers the period from independence in 1964 to Makasa's retirement in 1991. Pertinent issues of appointments to various posts will be highlighted. It will be shown in this chapter that the course of Zambian politics in the second republic undermined Makasa's effective contribution to national development. Retirement and life thereafter will also be discussed.

Crisis of Expectation After Independence

Makasa was appointed Resident Minister for Northern Province in January 1964.¹ This meant that he was in charge of the civil service and party structure in the province. Arthur Wina, the first Minister of Finance summed up Zambia's problems at independence as the crisis of education and the crisis of expectation.² The crisis of education the Minister mentioned referred to the three major problems the country faced at independence as a result of the neglect of education for Africans during colonial rule. These were a scarcity of skilled and educated manpower, a surplus of unskilled labour and dependence on foreigners at most levels of employment in both the public and private sectors. This state of affairs confronted Makasa as he took up the appointment of supervising the civil service and party structure in the province.

The civil service was dominated by Europeans, most of whom opposed the struggle for independence by Africans. When Africans emerged victorious, there was a general feeling of insecurity among expatriates. Many of them failed to accustom themselves to the political change and left, thereby

worsening the shortage of skilled manpower. Those who remained had to re-orient themselves to the new political order. For Provincial Commissioners, it meant taking junior positions as Resident Secretaries to the Zambian Ministers. On leaving his official residence for the Minister, the PC in Kasama had all the flowers uprooted. From his office, he attempted to remove all the furniture for the provincial head to his new subordinate office so that the Minister could buy his own. Both incidences indicated how some expatriates who remained in various positions accepted change with restrained reluctance. Not yet fully reconciled to their changed status, they accepted the new government with scepticism and apprehension, expressing doubt as to whether their standard of efficiency and discipline would be maintained.

As things turned out, their apprehension was justified. Although lack of a sound educational background mitigated against achieving a capable civil service immediately after independence, the attitude of African civil servants contributed as well. They thought independence meant less discipline. A 1964 report revealed that the civil service lacked direction and that it was characterised by apathy, sheer lack of initiative and indiscipline.³ One aspect of indiscipline was the reluctance to accept the fact that retaining expatriates was inevitable. When a white man still continued to be in authority, that the nation was self-governing did little to reduce that reluctance. In Northern Province, Makasa often dealt with cases arising from such perceptions. When they were reprimanded by the Resident Secretary, junior officers often ran to the Minister to complain. The reprimand was attributed not to the offence but to the colour of the supervisor.⁴ Makasa's duty was to advise the

complainants to desist from such behaviour and approach him only when the complaint was genuine.

In so doing, Makasa was trying to foster mutual confidence between the two groups and thus enhance the operations of the civil service. On the other hand, he failed to uphold the efficiency he was promoting by interfering in the operations of the civil servants. Although they supported the independence struggle, civil servants were opposed to UNIP's political interference in their administrative duties after independence. Starting from the top, the President's frequent reshuffles of officers in the public service created job insecurity to the officers and also sacrificed efficiency. A similar process of interference was conducted at lower levels. Many politicians failed to understand that despite a nationalist government being in power, the public service was to be left free if it was to function satisfactorily. They also ignored the fact that by dictating to the public service even in matters they were not competent in, they jeopardised the very development they were supposed to bring to the people. The problems of civil service and political leadership relationship after independence were even more pronounced if they involved expatriates. Makasa was involved in a case of that nature in Abercorn, (Mbala).

Plans for a new district veterinary office and diagnostic laboratory were approved by the Northern Planning Authority in Ndola. Construction was about to start but Makasa directed that the project be halted. Instead, the Minister ordered that the proposed buildings be annexed to or be included in other government offices to save money for other projects. The Provincial Veterinary Officer, an expatriate, responded that for very obvious reasons,

laboratories which handled dangerous biological materials must be kept isolated from other communal buildings.⁵ From the Minister's point of view, the report portrayed insubordination, yet the Veterinary Officer was technically correct.

A possible explanation of why the Minister held such a view was that he was sent to a province where he had been a political activist, directing the anti-colonial struggle. The whites he was supposed to work in harmony with were the same people who were responsible for his harassment and imprisonment. Instead of listening to technical advice, he expected to be obeyed without question to show that he was now their superior. Construction of the laboratories did not start until Makasa left the province, an indication of how interference often delayed development.

In a way, politicians contributed to the crisis of expectation. A favourite issue that Makasa used to arouse people's agitation against colonial rule was that of taxes. He promised the people that, a nationalist government would abolish them. Such promises resulted in unrealistic expectations of what independence would bring because no government can operate without taxes of one kind or another.

In another incidence, one chief was promised a railway line through his area, an electricity generating plant to supply electricity in his villages and luxurious cars for chiefs. After independence, the chief challenged local UNIP officials to make good their promises.⁶ Even though the government initiated programmes to upgrade the standard of living in rural areas by constructing schools, hospitals and clinics, it soon became apparent that people's expectations were stirred to a level higher than what the

economy could fulfill. Such disillusionment as the above chief experienced manifested itself in complaints that the government was not distributing development projects evenly throughout the country. Yet, resources were simply not enough to allow that and so there was need to prioritise. Sectionalism that dominated the political scene from 1967 to 1972 can, in part, be traced to the above scenario.

Party cadres expected immediate rewards in terms of jobs. These were mostly youths in the age group of 18 to 30 years who left school at the lower levels of standards two and four. Arising from the legacy of colonial neglect of African education, they had no opportunities for either higher education or vocational training. The same factors that limited their education also limited the development and subsequent creation of jobs in rural areas. The provinces in which Makasa worked as Minister namely Northern, Luapula and North-Western were among the least developed rural provinces in the country. To the youths in such provinces, politics gave them an ideal, a purpose and possibility of employment.

Take the case of youths in Chinsali, where Makasa started his political career as Branch Chairman, for example. A proliferation of elementary schools due to the protestant-Catholic antagonism produced many school leavers every year. Makasa drew support from these youths to ferment anti-colonial protests. As members of the youth wing of the ANC, and later UNIP, they played leading roles in the coronation celebration boycott, disregard of government conservation measures and the Cha Cha Cha civil disobediences. The last was significant in forcing the British Colonial Secretary to replace a contentious constitution by another that paved the way

for independence. After independence, the youths expected some form of reward but there were no employment opportunities in villages.

Government's Response to the Crisis of Expectations

After independence, control of government meant control over the distribution of resources. That was why the government applied itself to offset the colonial legacy of underdeveloped rural areas. The first National Development Plan (1966–1970) spelled the role of the agricultural sector as to divert the economy away from copper to agriculture; increase personal incomes and employment especially in rural areas; increase purchasing power of rural areas and thus provide an expanded market for the industrial sector and decrease dependence on imports by stimulating rural production of food and rural materials.⁸

When he addressed a UNIP National Council in 1968, Kaunda set the pace for the proliferation of rural institutions that followed. He told the delegates that:

Up to now, regional development has been the privilege of the line of rail provinces. This, we can no longer accept for now we have a people's government. The basis for the creation of a genuine and balanced regional development is the decision to spread economic activities and to give considerably more weight to the development of the undeveloped areas within the country.⁹

Rural councils, Provincial, district, ward and village production committees as well as co-operatives were established. When these proved unsuccessful, they were replaced in 1975 by Rural Reconstruction Centres and the Zambia National Service (ZNS). This was initially called the Zambia Youth Service. In 1975 all Form Five School Leavers were to undergo six months compulsory

military training under the Zambia National Service followed by a fourteen month production service at ZNS run production camps.

Makasa's responsibility as Provincial Minister involved overseeing the operations of these institutions in line with party policy. This included implementing projects given to the province through various ministries, making project recommendations to the Central Government and supervising the operations of all government departments. The government sent money to the Provincial Headquarters not only for development projects but emergencies as well. This was put in a revolving fund.

When he was Cabinet Minister for Luapula Province from 1970 to 1972, Makasa mobilised the people not only to depend on government funding which was never enough but to use local resources to raise more money for development projects. He got money from the revolving fund gave it to the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) to buy mangoes from the Luapula Valley where they were plenty but without a market and take them to the Copperbelt for sale. This activity raised a lot of money so much that the revolving fund was able to cater for emergencies such as repair of bridges without waiting for government funding.

However, many of these institutions failed for various reasons.¹⁰ Some of the problems were management deficiencies, poor road infrastructure, and inefficient transport system. Arising from their expectations, people construed independence to mean receiving free services but doing little work. A number of parastatal organisations were also formed to facilitate the functions of the above institutions. Some of the parastatals were: The National Agriculture Marketing Board (NAMBOARD), Cold Storage Board of Zambia (CSBZ),

Credit Organisation of Zambia (COZ), Agriculture Finance Company (became Lima Bank later) and the Small Scale Industrial Development Organisation (SIDO). Involvement in rural development did not end when Makasa ceased to be Provincial Cabinet Minister. Save for seven years that Makasa worked in Foreign Service as Minister of State in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Ambassador to Ethiopia and High Commissioner to Tanzania and Kenya, other appointments had something to do with rural development.

Member of Parliament for Chinsali 1964 to 1972

For the first eight years after independence, he was the MP for Chinsali. Mindful of the hardships people in rural areas went through, he sought to bring development as a way of improving their lives. In this regard, he proposed the construction of the Chinsali-Chama road to link Northern and Eastern Provinces and the provision of a flying doctor service in Northern Province. In the field of education, he moved motions that schools be built for handicapped children in Kasama and for fishermen at Chilubi, a college to train the people in better fishing methods.¹¹

When a flying doctor service was provided and a school for handicapped children built later, part of the credit can go to Makasa for initiating the projects and having them considered during the Second National Development Plan. However, in the communication section, he did not achieve much. The Chinsali-Chama road was never given serious attention by the government while the road network in Chinsali remained pathetic. Even when he was in Tanzania as Zambia's Ambassador, he took up the case of the poor roads and lack of public transport in Chinsali with the Provincial Minister. What he had failed to achieve while in the country was

not made easier just because he was then an Ambassador. The road and transport situations remained unchanged.

Politics and the Environment

Makasa was the longest serving provincial political activist in Northern Province before independence. Kaunda gave the circumstances in which he assigned Makasa to the same province as the first Minister after independence. He explained that:

One reason I appointed Resident Minister Makasa here is that he used to help me to condemn the colonialists and we used to say, they are stopping us from killing our game. These people are very bad. We must cut all our trees and they are stopping us from cutting near streams. These people are very bad and so on. So, I appointed him here to undo the damage that he did

Although the rationale for the appointment was put in a humorous manner, the use of the environment for a political strategy was a serious one. One way in which colonial rule undermined African economies was by disturbing the ecological balance between man and his environment. As game, forests, water, soil and fish all became objects of colonial legislation, the government made changes in the ecological system with disastrous consequences.¹³ The chitemene system widely practiced in Northern Province was under attack by the government.

During the era of tribal wars and Arab raids, people in Northern Province lived in larger villages for better protection. Later, they dispersed into smaller communities and practiced the chitemene system of food production with its attendant temporal living in mitanda huts. After the consolidation of colonial rule, smaller villages were discouraged because they conflicted with colonial district administration, which entailed collecting taxes and levies, keeping population and other statistics and generally maintaining

law and order. Further, it was argued that the chitemene system would lead to eventual deforestation.⁴ Consequently, Africans were ordered to live in larger villages and the chitemene system was banned in 1907. People grew no millet and as a result, they were so starved that in one district, the government was forced to provide food for them.¹⁴ Reluctantly, the ban was lifted in 1909.

In 1936, studies on the ecology of the country and soil types recommended that natural vegetation, soil and other environmental factors should provide the most efficient guide to the agricultural potential of a given area.¹⁵ After the establishment of the copper mining industry, however, the government urged people in all parts of the country, in spite of its experience in Northern Province in 1907, to abandon the time tested traditional crops suited to their particular environment. Instead, people were urged to grow commercial crops especially maize to feed miners on the Copperbelt. Without financial and technical support, this failed in Northern Province and chitemene continued to be the mode of food production.

During the independence struggle, Makasa persuaded chiefs and their people to disregard conservation measures as a sign of protest against colonial rule. After independence, the nationalist government realised that natural resources needed to be preserved. However, undoing the harm done during the struggle was not easy because damage done to the environment in a few years take many more years to be repaired. Besides, changing people's attitudes was not easy either. People who were made to believe that independence meant freedom to do what they liked with their resources could not be expected to change their beliefs in a short time. They needed constant

urging and reminding by government officials. Moreover, so soon after independence, it was politically inexpedient to use force to ensure that the new instructions were complied with. As a result, conservation measures continued to be ignored.

Like the colonial government before it, the nationalist government urged Zambians to abandon traditional crops in preference for commercial ones. In Northern Province, it meant abandoning the chitemene system and adopting new farming methods to grow maize. Yet, an economic survey of Northern Rhodesia conducted just before independence noted that soil fertility decreased from south to north due to the leaching effects of sudden, heavy rains in the north. The report categorically stated that without massive investment in chemical fertilisers, it was impractical to have settled agriculture in many parts of Northern Province because of the highly leached soils.¹⁶ Political considerations which included wooing people back to rural areas to reduce high unemployment levels in urban areas and growing maize to reduce the high food import bill worked to over rule sound technical advice of both the 1936 and 1964 reports cited above.

For Makasa, as provincial leader before and after independence, issues of politics and the environment meant conflicting interpretations of conservation measures. Like its predecessor, the nationalist government failed to enforce a complete abandonment of the chitemene system. The situation that emerged was that there were few isolated maize growers surrounded by villagers sustaining food production under proven traditional methods was the situation that emerged. Both governments ignored sound technical advice; the former because undermining African economies fell

within the colonial policy of strengthening the position of whites while weakening that of Africans. The nationalist government had good reasons for encouraging commercial crops but it too ignored technical advice. It should have improved upon traditional methods of food production, which had proved suitable to particular environments instead of discouraging them. In Northern Province, Makasa should have been promoting the growth of millet and cassava on a large scale, leaving maize production to the few who could afford the inputs.

Political and Personal Differences in UNIP

When Makasa was appointed to serve as an electoral commissioner at the 1967 UNIP general conference, little did he realise that the results of the election would have an adverse impact on his career. Kapwepwe beat Reuben C. Kamanga to become the first Vice-President of not only UNIP but the republic as well. Two years later, Kapwepwe resigned from this position and eventually left UNIP and formed his own party.

At this point, the 1967 elections will be briefly discussed in the context of post independence politics in Zambia in order to understand the significance of the results. Much of UNIP's support before independence came from Northern, Luapula and Copperbelt provinces. Southern and Central Provinces supported ANC. There was some support for UNIP in Eastern Province but Barotseland (Western Province) and North-Western Province did not identify themselves with any party until later in the struggle. After independence, the Bemba expected to have more posts in the first cabinet proportionate to their support, as things turned out, that was not the case.¹⁷

Apart from their support, the Bemba perceived another reason to expect more posts. According to official account of the Cha Cha Cha disturbances, Barotseland stood aloof while all other provinces were affected in varying degrees. The worst affected provinces, in other words, the most violent cases were recorded in Northern and Luapula Provinces.¹⁸ Because the Colonial Secretary offered Northern Rhodesia a conducive constitution to the attainment of independence as a direct response to the disturbances, the Bemba took it that they fought hardest to achieve independence. As a result, they assumed that they deserved more posts instead of having the same number as Barotseland which stayed aloof. They even went as far as taunting the Lozi by telling them that, "at that time, what were you doing?"¹⁹ Such was the level of the Bemba's self praise.

According to Thomas Rasmussen, the root causes of political competition often lie in divergent economic and political interests not in tribal differences. Real causes are often changes in the distribution of power and resources within the party and these normal, inevitable political differences sometimes flow into tribal channels.²⁰ In Zambia, to some extent, they did. Rasmussen went on to show that the Lozi apathy to UNIP for instance, was partly because of UNIP's failure to implement development effectively in Barotse Province which was isolated because of its geographical isolation and poor communication. The Lozi perceived that the Bemba were favoured in the allocations of development funds while their expectations were not being met and their interests were being ignored.

Even those speaking the Bemba language were not an economically homogenous group. Hence, the Luapulans also complained that they were

not getting as much development as their Northern Province neighbours. Minister of State for the province Matias Ngalande told delegates at a UNIP Provincial meeting that if they were realistic about developing all provinces in Zambia evenly, they should start at once to work on the Samfya - Serenje road to link Luapula and Central Provinces.²¹ Even in parliament, Luapula members pressed for development similar to that in Northern Province. That is why, when construction of the Tanzania–Zambia Railway line began, Luapulans remarked that:

Before independence we were united with other provinces but since then, other provinces want to have the lions share (of the benefits of independence). In Northern Province, government has established a railway line and so we want mines in Luapula Province.²²

These remarks seem to support Rasmussen's observation that political competition is inevitable and would exist even if all the people belonged to one tribe so long as there was unequal distribution of resources.²³ However, the main reason for competition for posts at the conference was centred on the personalities of Simon Kapwepwe and Reuben Kamanga.

Given their ethnic backgrounds and the strategic importance of the posts, competition was intense. Results of the election showed that both the president and his vice came from one province. Consequently, sectional fragmentation reflected in provincialism dominated the political scene from 1967 to 1972. Scholars have alluded to the lack of cohesion, which leads to division and segmentation as a characteristic of politics in developing countries. Gerald Heegar is of the opinion that the segmentary character of the new political system limits the capacity of any regime, regardless of the type, to consolidate that political system.²⁴ Heegar's description can be

applied to the trend in Zambian politics followed up to 1972. Kaunda found it difficult to consolidate his hold on the political system. Sectional fragmentation reflected in the flaring up of opposition parties characterised the political scene. Kaunda's reaction was to ban opposition parties

Makasa and the Anti Bemba Campaign 1969–1972

Protest at the election results manifested itself in more pronounced antagonism against the Bemba. Kaunda expressed displeasure at the rate sectionalism was growing by briefly resigning as Zambia's President. This was at UNIP's National Council held on 5th February 1968. Kapwepwe and other cabinet ministers were appointed by the council to persuade the president to rescind his decision. Makasa was among those who, on their own, offered to add their appeal to that of the official delegation. He reminded Kaunda of the pledge they both made to serve the country no matter what the difficulties were. That was when they were elected to lead the first political party in Chinsali in 1950. At this point in time, even if Kapwepwe had ambitions for the presidency, it was not possible to usurp power. He and Kamanga were the central figures in the fight for tribal power while Kaunda was the only one considered to be above tribal inclinations. He was acceptable to both factions. For that reason, many people spent the night of February 5th persuading Kaunda not to resign. Some cried uncontrollably while others protracted themselves in Kaunda's path to physically prevent him from leaving the venue of the conference.²⁵

They laboured so much to see Kaunda take up the presidency not necessarily because they approved of his conduct of government affairs. Even at this stage, there were some who did not agree with his policies. What

prompted people's action was mainly the fear of creating a vacuum in the party and national leadership, which no one seemed ready to fill at that time. It is in this light that the roles Makasa and Kapwepwe played in averting Kaunda's resignation must be viewed.

By labouring so much to persuade Kaunda to continue leading the nation, it created an impression to him that he was the only one who could lead the people. Sokoni was of the view that the feeling that Kaunda was indispensable greatly contributed to his firm authoritarian control of both party and government especially after he declared Zambia a one party state in December, 1972.

Kaunda rescinded his decision and dissolved the contentious Central Committee but provincialism continued unabated. Unity in the East Movement (Umodzi Ku Mmawa) was formed to register protest against the removal of Kamanga from power. The Bantu Botatwe Movement in Central Province was formed with the express purpose of removing Kapwepwe from his post. On the other hand, the Bemba were determined to maintain Kapwepwe in power. They saw in him a chance to realise their political dominance which they allegedly deserved. Makasa often appealed to Kaunda to intervene in tribal wrangles. Further, he warned of serious consequences if people from Northern Province reacted. He wrote:

I have been perturbed on a number of occasions to hear of scandalous utterances against one section of the community. Leaders from Northern Province like others have an obligation to represent the views of their people of Northern Province and they are bound to reply or react against these utterances in the same language and action, the consequences of which will be regrettable ... I trust that you will find it possible to use your influence in the search of peace.²⁶

Makasa welcomed the election of Kapwepwe to the second most important post in the Party. It broadened the prospects of getting more development projects to Chinsali for although Kaunda was also born and brought up in Chinsali District, affinity for the people of that district was not as pronounced as that of Makasa and Kapwepwe. The painful experience of his own background of poverty in a district which was politically advanced but economically backward compelled Makasa to be on the lookout for opportunities to improve the situation in his home area.

On a personal basis, Kapwepwe's election also broadened prospects for advancement. After all, Kapwepwe was closer to Makasa. Apart from sharing similar political views, they were relatives as well. Because of the above reasons, Makasa strongly spoke against those vying for the removal of Kapwepwe from the Republican Vice Presidency. The peace he referred to was the acceptance of Kapwepwe's election. In his search for that peace, he did not end with Kaunda. Even at political meetings, he urged fellow leaders to promote peace in the nation by accepting Kapwepwe's elevation to the post of Vice President. These remarks reflected the views of the Bemba speaking people.

The Formation of the United Progressive Party (UPP)

Sensing hostility to his position, Kapwepwe resigned as Republican Vice President in 1969, but was persuaded by Kaunda to stay on until his term of office ended in August 1970. However, Kapwepwe was transferred from the post of Vice President to that of Minister of Cultural Affairs. Even then, hostility continued. As if to reduce the hostility and appease Easterners, Kaunda worked to minimise alleged Bemba dominance. The climax of this

exercise was reached in May 1971 when Kaunda announced a tribally balanced Central Committee. In August 1971, Kapwepwe resigned from both the party and government to form the United Progressive Party (UPP).

In his resignation statement, Kapwepwe accused UNIP of pursuing wrong political and economic policies. UPP was founded on ideologically different inclinations from UNIP. Kaunda embraced socialist policies while Kapwepwe advocated capitalism. Kaunda was warned that free services he was offering in line with the philosophy of humanism would lead to economic chaos, but with the economy still booming, Kaunda regarded the warning as mere propaganda. However, a few years later, Kapwepwe was proved right. UPP's agenda for capitalism included promoting free enterprises and diversification of the source of income through small-scale enterprises. Kapwepwe felt that his was a better vision for Zambia and many people agreed with him. Since UNIP could not accommodate him, he opted to leave.

Some government ministers such as Jameson Chapoloko (Minister of State for Health), John Chisata (Minister of State for Labour) and Justin Chimba (Minister of Trade) identified themselves with Kapwepwe's vision and left UNIP to join UPP. Although Makasa did not leave UNIP, his actions in 1969 and later clearly showed that he was one of Kapwepwe's supporters. Those who felt that UPP threatened their interests were against him. They included Kaunda who launched a massive propaganda campaign to project UPP as a tribal party. That was an old political strategy to discredit the opposition. In pre-independence era, UNIP was labelled as a tribal party by ANC while it was called a party of illiterates by the colonial government. UNIP

went further. Its president portrayed UPP as a dangerous party in order to stir mass castigation of the new party. He alleged that:

Disgruntled politicians have resorted to gun running and sending out our people for military training to countries hostile to Zambia with a view of subverting the tranquillity of the republic.²⁷

Kaunda failed to prove these allegations and Kapwepwe successfully sued the daily papers for publishing unsubstantiated stories. This shows that Kaunda perceived UPP as a serious challenge to his presidency and was even prepared to use unsubstantiated allegation to stem its spread. However, Kapwepwe was not the first person to leave UNIP and form an opposition party. In 1968, for instance, intra-party rivalry led Nalumino Mundia to leave UNIP and form the United Party (UP). Since UP was mostly confined to Barotseland where Mundia came from, Kaunda saw it as no real threat to his political dominance. Indeed, after two years, it merged with the ANC. With UPP, it was different. It had a wider support. Resignations from UNIP to join UPP created twelve vacancies in the National Assembly and by-elections were arranged for December 1971. Kapwepwe contested one of the seats and convincingly beat the UNIP candidate. Nonetheless, according to Valentine Musakanya, what worried Kaunda most was the potential of an alliance between ANC and UPP. In such a situation, UNIP was posed to become a minority party.²⁸

Makasa and UPP

When Kapwepwe first resigned in 1969, Makasa was in Ethiopia as Zambia's Ambassador to that country and the Organisation of African Unity. Upon learning of Kapwepwe's resignation, he sent three telegrams to Zambia.

He congratulated Kapwepwe for his bold stand, showed understanding for his action and pledged solidarity with him by not supporting anyone who would replace him. The message to both Foreign Affairs Minister Elijah Mudenda and Kaunda were essentially the same: he wanted permission to return home immediately.²⁹ Telegrams were sent through Mudenda's Ministry with instructions that copies be forwarded to the press for publication. They were never published. The permission he sought was not granted either. Instead, he was kept away from home until December 1969. Early in the New Year, he was appointed Minister for Luapula Province.

Makasa was Minister of State for Luapula Province when UPP was formed. Other members of the cabinet were officially appraised of the new party by the Head of State, but Makasa was not. His public support for Kapwepwe in 1969 had earned him the label of dissident by Kaunda.

Apart from public denunciation of Kapwepwe, circulars were sent from Cabinet Office to all Ministers of State for onward transmission to the districts. Makasa refused to distribute the circulars. He fully appreciated circumstances that led to the formation of UPP and supported Kapwepwe. He substantiated support for Kapwepwe further when political hooligans at Kamwala Shopping Centre beat the latter in January 1972.

Makasa was also in Lusaka for the official opening of parliament by the President. As soon as he learned of what happened to Kapwepwe, he rushed to State House. Believing that Kaunda was behind the beating, Makasa expressed disapproval by telling Kaunda that, "You are in charge of security, why let Kapwepwe be killed? People will say you have killed him."³⁰ Makasa recalled that, Kaunda let him vent out his anger without uttering a single word

in reply. Many leaders in UNIP were aware of the events leading to Kapwepwe's beating but none dared to criticise Kaunda to his face over the matter. The beating did not kill Kapwepwe but from then on, Makasa's days in UNIP were not happy ones. To Kaunda and his lieutenants, Makasa had no respect for authority, was disloyal and unpatriotic. Kaunda felt particularly betrayed by a man who was expected to support the official policy of the President against Kapwepwe.

He went back to Mansa for only a short time before a vehicle was sent to collect him and his family allegedly on transfer to Lusaka. On arrival, it became clear that the transfer was a farce. He was promptly suspended for three months. "He was given neither accommodation nor salary for these three months,"³¹ A cousin who accommodated and fed the family at his home during that period testified. Kaunda vented his anger on the cousin as well. For no apparent reason he was suspended for five months from his work in the civil service as Director of Game and Fisheries at Chilanga.

Makasa was reinstated and sent into Foreign Service where he stayed from 1972 to 1978. He worked as High Commissioner of Zambia to Tanzania and Kenya. Sending people into Foreign Service was an example of Kaunda's political manoeuvres when dealing with alleged dissidents. For Makasa it was also a demotion because after 1973, he lost his cabinet post which, according to the Second Republic Constitution, was higher than that of an ambassador.

During the period between the formation of UPP and going into Foreign Service, Makasa was socially and politically ostracised. To the Kaunda faction, he was an underground UPP member who remained in UNIP to spy for Kapwepwe. They attributed that to Makasa's family relationship to

Kapwepwe and the sympathy he expressed for Kapwepwe's cause. On the other hand, the Kapwepwe faction saw Makasa as a traitor. By remaining in UNIP he was seen to be supporting the harassment the Bemba were subjected to. Makasa's actions did not fall into either of the two categories. He was simply caught up in a dilemma. On the one hand, he identified himself with Kapwepwe. On the other, he tried to maintain relations with Kaunda and UNIP because the independence he fought for gave him a job and with it security. He could not leave UNIP before the new party established itself for fear of the uncertain prospects in UPP. As a result of his cautiousness, he remained ostracised by both camps even after UPP was banned in 1972. Former UPP members shunned him while UNIP colleagues looked at him with suspicion.

One Party Participatory Democracy and its Effects on Makasa's Career

Many scholars have written about the events leading to the declaration of Zambia as a one party state.³² Among the reasons advanced are the international scenario of the cold war then prevailing between Eastern and Western powers, the colonial situation in Southern Africa and the fact that One-Party rule had become fashionable in Africa in the 1970s. Suffice here to note that by December 1972, it was clear that UNIP had failed to contain the challenge of multi-party politics. Various reforms to cope with internal conflicts did not bring tangible results. For instance, between 1964 and 1967, there was minimal state participation in the economy but from 1968, many parastatal organisations were formed to create positions for Zambians in managerial positions. Zambians lacked financial or managerial skills to compete with expatriates in the hitherto private companies. Ironically, as

industrial and commercial undertakings were nationalised, competition for top positions fuelled, not curtailed sectional rivalries.

To reduce sectional rivalries and the threat to his position, Kaunda banned opposition parties by law. Consequently, UPP and other political parties were outlawed and Zambia became a de jure one party state.

Kaunda took a firm authoritarian control of both the party and the government after the declaration of a one party state. Members of the party and government were expected to follow loyally and unquestioningly party policies as propounded by the top leadership. Dissenting views or new ideas were condemned. Opponents, real or imagined were harassed psychologically or tormented physically. Makasa, Vernon Mwaanga and Sokoni were among those who were harassed yet, foreign biographers have portrayed Kaunda as a moderate African leader. John Hatch writes of Kaunda that:

The unique importance of Kaunda to Africa stems from his personal belief in the innate and equal worth of the human being. *Kaunda is deeply religious with an ecumenical approach. This reinforces his beliefs. It is from this connection that arises his passionate devotion to social justice, non-racialism ... which makes him a man of peace rather than violence.*³³

Florence T. Polatnick and Alberta Saletan have also given praise to Kaunda's leadership. They write:

In the United States, we tend to be cynical about our officials. We often think of politics as a dirty game whose players maybe expected to seek victory as best as they can. Kaunda is a politician, of course, but one cast in a different image. He is a refreshing example of a political leader who lives in the service of his fellow man.³⁴

Such biographers refer to the fact that Kaunda's opponents were not assassinated or confined to life imprisonment as in other countries. While Kaunda had humane qualities, he was no political angel.

People who closely worked with Kaunda seriously doubted the accuracy of such descriptions of Kaunda as a man of passionate devotion to social justice, a man of peace and a leader who lived in the service of his fellow man. To them, he was a leader who was not sincere in his dealings with colleagues. He pretended to be friendly while secretly harbouring grudges against them.³⁵ Makasa added that Kaunda did not forgive and forget easily as the word of God teaches.³⁶ These observations explain why and how Makasa was treated from 1967 to 1991.

In the One Party Participatory Democracy (OPPD), loyalty to the party meant support of the party leadership and its ideological goals. Government, party and parastatal organisations were staffed with party sympathisers and supporters of Kaunda. While other factors were considered, loyalty to the party was the most important qualification. Political control made portfolios interchangeable so that distinction between party and state was eroded. Officers changed posts from UNIP headquarters, Freedom House, to the civil service, parastatal or defence forces. Eventually, integration of party and government was consolidated and the euphemism, "Party and its Government" took a new meaning.

A change of jobs in itself was an indication of an individual's standing with Kaunda. For instance, the removal of Vernon Mwaanga from Foreign Affairs Ministry in 1974, Elijah Mudenda from Prime Minister in 1977 and Malama Sokoni from Provincial Secretary in 1977 to lower posts indicated that

they had fallen out of favour with Kaunda. Mwaanga was appointed to be Member of the Central Committee (MCC). Though the post was senior to that of a cabinet minister in the party hierarchy, removal from a post involving international exposure to a moribund one could not be taken as promotion. Mwaanga resigned. Mudenda was left with the MCC post only while Sokoni was reverted to District Governor. Like Mwaanga, Sokoni resigned in protest.

Hatch has further alluded to the fact that Kaunda acted through teams of colleagues and that decisions were reached collectively. However, B. O. Nwabueze, a Nigerian scholar has described Kaunda's role, which is in agreement with the way Kaunda operated in the OPPD. Nwabueze observed that:

The Zambian President is the government; his responsibility for it is entire and undivided. The executive power is rested in him alone, and in the exercise of it he is bound by no one else's advice. Within him too lies the ultimate responsibility for policy.³⁷

Makasa's views entirely agree with Nwabueze. He pointed out that although consultations with various institutions were done and advice of individuals was sought, Kaunda's dominant personality and the power attached to his position made it easy for him to have his own way. He also supported other colleagues who revealed that it was not uncommon to go to a press conference without knowing what the conference was all about.

Concerning reshuffles, these were secretly guarded so that officers only learned of their fate at the press conference. Mudenda observed that in most cases, the reason for the removal was not given. That had a negative impact on one's political career because the general public might think that

the person stole or was involved in other sinister activities.³⁸ The tone of Kaunda's language when announcing changes of policy or transfer of officers was also a useful pointer to the extent of his consultation with colleagues. "I have decided to ..." was the usual prefix to announcements. The one Party Participatory Democracy was not a democracy at all. It was a one-man dictatorship.

Parliament, which was supposed to be a forum for people's views, was not spared of Kaunda's increased dictatorial tendencies either. He warned backbenchers to refrain from criticising the party and its government's policies. Members of Parliament were expected to endorse and implement policies formulated by Kaunda through the party, not to question them. At a UNIP national council, Kaunda categorically stated that:

I regard Parliament as a committee of the national council charged with the responsibility of enacting laws of this country. It is not an opposition device to the party itself or to other party institutions under the one Party Participatory Democracy.³⁹

In such a political climate, Makasa's dilemma as a result of his cautious approach to UPP could not find an expression. The right to criticise one's government regarded as a cardinal feature of western democracies was not for Zambia.

From Foreign Service to Rural Development

Makasa was recalled from Foreign Service in 1978, a year in which presidential and general elections were held. Kaunda nominated him to the Central Committee and put him in charge of Lusaka Province. One major conclusion can be made from this appointment. It was to put him under close observation to see if Foreign Service had made him repent and re-establish

loyalty to the president. From what happened to Kapwepwe and the UPP, Makasa was aware of the power Kaunda held over his destiny. Elections successfully conducted, Kaunda seemed satisfied that Makasa had repented for although he removed him from Lusaka Province, he appointed him to another post as Chairman of the Rural Development Committee of the Central Committee in 1979.

The government was still grappling with the problem of developing rural areas and reducing the poverty gap between urban and rural areas. Earlier programmes initiated immediately after independence had considerably failed. As the liberation war ended in Zimbabwe in 1980, the government no longer had the war as a scapegoat for Zambia's economic problems. It is arguable that liberation war in Zimbabwe was just a scapegoat because Kapwepwe had warned that Kaunda's socialist policy would lead to economic problems. Falling copper prices reduced the country's revenue so that from 1977, chronic shortage of foreign exchange that resulted led to many hardships among the people. Kapwepwe's observation about the economy was correct, after all.

In rural areas, the failure of earlier programmes caused discontent among the people. Referring to failed co-operatives and the poverty that persisted in villages people complained that their lives had not improved even though a nationalist government was in power. "It is now the same as the colonial government. We must turn out the government,"⁴⁰ they remarked.

A disgruntled rural electorate was a political threat for once the people are frustrated, they withdraw their support for the government. Kaunda

wanted someone to re-activate the rural development sector. He made that point clear in Makasa's letter of appointment when he wrote that:

This is a very serious and rather heavy responsibility. The future of Zambia lies in rural development and you will have to travel extensively in the country to check on what is actually happening.⁴¹

The post involved appointing other members of the committee, preparing national programmes of rural development, initiating and supervising projects in the country. Even so, there was not much that Makasa achieved during the three years he was in that post. Rural development was still beset with unresolved operational problems, dating back to the early years of independence. These problems help to explain how and why many of the government programmes to develop rural areas failed to sustain their own operations and ended up being economic burdens.

Kaunda's reference to the fact that the future of Zambia lay in rural development was not backed by financial and other logistical support from the government which followed a socialist policy. This made economic development elusive, just as Kapwepwe had predicted.

The 1983 Presidential Elections and the Fall of Makasa

Many people were not happy at the manner in which challenge to Kaunda as the country's president was checked at the general elections of 1978. Political manoeuvres such as changing the 1973 constitution to specifically halt Kapwepwe's challenge was not lost on the nation. And this included Makasa. Another was Malama Sokoni, a close friend of Kapwepwe and also a brother-in-law because his first wife was Kapwepwe's sister. Like Makasa, Sokoni did not support the introduction of a one party state. "It was

against the democracy we fought for",⁴² he pointed out. That view earned him harassment from Kaunda. His downfall was typical of those who fell out of Kaunda's favour. From being advisor to the President, he was sent into Foreign Service as Zambia's Ambassador to Botswana. On his return, he was appointed Provincial Secretary for Southern Province before being demoted to District Governor. Makasa was about to follow the same path.

As the 1983 elections were approaching, Kaunda wanted to gauge Makasa's loyalty, with special reference to the change of constitution from the 1973 one to that of 1978. He wrote to Makasa that:

Before the end of this year, we are going to hold presidential and general elections ... In view of this, I would like to invite you comrade, to write to me about what you think should be done to make the constitutional and legal existence of our state more effective and more meaningful.⁴³

Before the 1978 UNIP general conference, proposed amendments to the existing constitution were circulated to National Council members, which included Makasa, for comments. At the conference, however, an entirely new document amending the whole constitution was presented and duly approved. Makasa did not approve of the amendments especially those pertaining to a presidential candidate. These were that he should have twenty supporters instead of ten from each province and he should be a member of the party for at least the five previous years. The second point targeted Kapwepwe who rejoined the party in 1977. Makasa communicated his disapproval to the Secretary General of the party. The essence of the letter was that in order to enhance democracy even in a one party state, impediments in the way of presidential candidates must be kept to a minimum.⁴⁴ He wanted Kapwepwe to regain a position of influence in the party.

Makasa did not get a reply from the Secretary General but his letter was passed on to the President. It is probable that Kaunda's request to Makasa was simply to find out whether he had abandoned his earlier views. Makasa's reply was contrary to this expectation. He wrote:

In 1978 while in Kenya when we were approaching the General elections, I took the trouble of expressing my feeling on the constitution of our Republic of Zambia and I wrote to the Secretary of the Party dated 18th February 1978. In this minute, I tried to air my view on the constitution, which I still maintain very strongly ... I wish to enclose a copy of the said minute, which is very detailed.⁴⁵

In effect, Makasa was criticising the party for not allowing Kapwepwe to contest the 1978 presidential election because in 1978, he proposed that party members be allowed to contest any party post without undue restrictions. The letter was dated 22 February, 1983. At the UNIP National Council meeting in August, Makasa was one of the six members of the Central Committee who were dropped.

For the next eight months, Makasa had no job. He was told to stay at home until his next assignment. Consolidation of Kaunda's power was achieved by a systematic suppression of the opposition done in various ways. One way was to make an alleged opponent suffer a bit by denying him a job, then give him a job later as a way of coersing loyalty from him. That was the method used to check Makasa's disloyalty. In 1969 and in 1983, he stayed for three months and eight months respectively without a job.

Kaunda had not forgiven Makasa for supporting Kapwepwe. While some of Makasa's appointments were clear demotions, others though high ranking like that of MCC disguised the fact that Kaunda still held a grudge against him. At the end of that forced leave, he worked as member of the

Rural Development Committee of the Central Committee from 1984 to 1987. Thereafter, he took up his last appointment as chairman of both Lima Bank (formerly called the Agriculture Development Bank) and of SIDO on part time basis. Going from Rural Development to Lima Bank and SIDO did not change his position. More importantly, he was effectively removed from the political arena.

From September to October 1989, the government sent Makasa on a study tour of Kenya, Tanzania, India, Italy, Germany and Britain to find out how rural development schemes were implemented there. Valuable lessons were learned. In Britain, for instance, he learned how the British Rural Development Commission operated a scheme of establishing small industries in rural areas thereby attracting many people there.⁴⁶ The commission had many similarities with Zambian government's objectives in rural development schemes. Even so, Makasa's visit failed to enhance the operations of SIDO, a government assistance programme to small industries in Zambia. Reasons for the failure were basically the same as those noted earlier for all rural development programmes in general.

Kaunda was manipulating Makasa for his personal gain. Despite the harassment, suspensions and demotions, Kaunda did not actually dismiss Makasa. The value in keeping Makasa was to maintain a political base in Chinsali. After the ruthless treatment of Kapwepwe and the way Sokoni was harassed until he was forced to resign, Kaunda could not afford antagonising everybody and remaining isolated. By keeping Makasa, he avoided to be labelled anti Chinsali, his place of birth. If he were too harsh with Makasa, Makasa would have left UNIP and followed Kapwepwe. Kaunda retained

Makasa to show that he was not against the Bemba, especially those three he had worked closely with in the early days of nationalist politics.

Makasa admitted that he was aware of being manipulated by Kaunda and would have resigned and left the party earlier than 1991 like many of his colleagues did. However, his background rendered that difficult and subjected him to be manipulated by Kaunda. Makasa came from a large, poor family in rural Chinsali where economic prospects to reduce poverty levels were not viable. None of his brothers and sisters was in formal employment. Therefore, he was obliged to look after many relatives. For instance, as a teacher, he used to keep as many as ten dependants in addition to his children.⁴⁷ After independence, improved financial standing went with increased level of dependants from his extended family. The support included educating their children to help them secure a better future. Though he could not take dependants with him into Foreign Service he still sent money to support them. This made it difficult for him to save money to fall on in the event of resignation. With no other means of sustenance, he continued working.

Lack of education also made him vulnerable to Kaunda's manipulative tendencies because options for another career were limited. First by the colonial government, then by UNIP he was denied a chance to get further education beyond the standard six level he reached at Lubwa Training School. UNIP sent him for a short course at Oxford University in 1962 but it was too short to equip him with a professional certificate in the subjects he went to study. He sought permission from the party to extend his study period but it was refused on the basis that the political situation in Eastern Province

needed his urgent attention. To Makasa then, there were no other better career prospects than those in the party and its government. As such prospects depended on Kaunda, he could not afford to break ties with him.

More significantly, while in Foreign Service, the Zambia Engineering and Construction Company (ZECCO), a subsidiary of UNIP's National Holdings was contracted to build houses for Makasa, Kaunda and Kapwepwe in Chinsali on loan. When Kapwepwe left UNIP, Kaunda instructed ZECCO to abandon work on the house. Makasa was aware that if he left UNIP, he would have to find other means of completing his house because ZECCO was sure to abandon it. Other means he did not have, so he continued working. Kaunda knew Makasa's constraints and so he used that knowledge to manipulate him to his advantage. He suspended, demoted, and took him from one post to the other but did not actually get rid of him. In 1990, when the mortgage on the house was paid, Makasa gave notice of retiring from Lima Bank and SIDO. By then, Kaunda's days in the political limelight were numbered and so he had no further use of Makasa. He allowed him to retire in January 1991.

Retirement and Life Thereafter

UNIP worked out pension and retirement benefits for former leaders in 1990.⁴⁸ When it lost elections to the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in the 1991 general elections, the new government cancelled those benefits. Maxwell Lusambo, Assistant Administrative Officer at Freedom House was of the view that veteran politicians like Makasa worked for the party and its government as one entity. The government paid their salaries and therefore, the same government should give them retirement benefits.⁴⁹

The MMD government held a different view and argued that only the President can be retired with benefits, the rest being dependent on their parliamentary benefits.⁵⁰ Makasa did not have such benefits because he ceased to be a Member of Parliament in 1972. In support of UNIP's views, a correspondent wrote:

It is standard practice all over the world that employees in all formal enterprises and institutions are provided with benefits and pensions on leaving or retiring from employment. Government leaders are also in formal institutions, so are full time party cadres.⁵¹

The debate about how veteran politicians should be looked after is likely to continue but we need to find out how and why Makasa found himself in the predicament of retiring without benefits.

From the very beginning of nationalist movements in Northern Rhodesia, politics was made a full time career. After independence, the trend continued. One can therefore infer that Zambia's founding fathers left jobs and joined politics not only because they detested foreign rule but also to make it a pensionable job. They spent the most productive years of their lives serving the government expecting the government to look after them in old age. This view, however, is subject to a serious challenge.

Like other veteran politicians, Makasa was rewarded for his contribution to the independence struggle by the nationalist government. Posts held were given to him not on the basis of his qualification as a teacher but on loyalty to the struggle. Besides, political office holders worked on contract, they did not contribute to any government pension scheme like civil servants did. Without such contribution, it is very difficult for the MMD government to find money to pay those retiring. The onus lies on UNIP to

look after its retirees but former party President Kaunda reiterated that his party had no money for such an expensive undertaking.⁵² Instead he shifted responsibility to the MMD government.

The MMD government was constitutionally correct to give retirement benefits to the former Republican President only. It is not realistic to expect the government to extend help to former UNIP cadres because it has its own MMD cadres to look after. Kaunda created the post of District Governor to absorb UNIP supporters just as Chiluba has created the post of District Administrator for MMD cadres. While the hardships, Makasa, one of the founding fathers of this nation, is going through cannot be approved by any one, blame cannot be justifiably apportioned to the MMD government.

To ask for help from Chiluba and the MMD government is a sign of Makasa's desperation because former UNIP politicians did not fully prepare for retirement. Makasa's last appointment was that of Chairman of SIDO. While those who worked under him came out prosperous, he did not. He worked under Kaunda long enough to know how Kaunda's critics were either dismissed or else resigned on their own because their political careers were made untenable. In spite of that knowledge, he did not make provisions for his life after leaving UNIP.

Party slogans such as "Kaunda is forever" blinded them to the fact that retirement was inevitable, whether through old age, dismissal or change of government. Kaunda's lack of foresight also contributed to Makasa's retirement problems. With his national philosophy of humanism and the leadership code, which was introduced under the 1973 constitution, leaders were deprived of a legal chance to engage in profit making ventures to help

them when they retired. Traditional recourse to help from one's children has made a significant difference in the life of many veteran politicians, notable among them, Malama Sokoni and Chibesa Kankasa. For Makasa, that was not possible. His only child who was financially able to help him died in December 1999.

Conclusion

This chapter has noted the political career of Makasa from 1964 to 1991. It has shown that after independence Kaunda was obsessed with maintaining power. In the context of holding on to power at the exclusion of others, he imposed One-Party rule in Zambia. Anyone who opposed his policies was seen as a threat to his political hegemony. Such a one was victimised through demotion, suspension or dismissal. There were many politicians who left the party and its government because of victimisation. Sikota Wina, Nalumino Mundia and Vernon Mwanga were some of them. Makasa's open support for Kapwepwe strained his relationship with Kaunda. Instead of dismissing him, Kaunda kept Makasa in the party but manipulated him to help his survival as President by maintaining a political base in Chinsali.

Makasa's contribution to national development was not as effective as his contribution to the independence struggle because Kaunda evolved a highly centralised and personalised party and government. Attack on party policies was construed to mean attack on the President. Therefore, when he protested against the way Kapwepwe was treated, he fell out of Kaunda's favour. However, he was forced to stay in the party due to the absence of another reliable means of earning a living.

ENDNOTES

1. At different times during the period under review, the post was referred to as Under Minister, Resident Minister, Minister of State and Provincial Minister.
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3. Richard Hall, *The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969), p. 171.
4. NAZ, NPI/2/144 No. 155, Northern Province Development Committees: Resident Minister's opening speech to the Provincial Development Committee 24 March, 1967.
5. NAZ, NP1/2/144 No. 155, Northern Province Development Committees: Provincial Veterinary Officer, Abercorn, four year development plan progress report to the Provincial Development Committee 24 March, 1967.
6. NAZ, NWP 1/2/102: Provincial Annual Report on African Affairs, 1965.
7. NAZ, SEC 2/764: Chinsali Tour Reports Nos. 20 and 35 of November 1959.
8. GRZ, *First National Development Plan 1966–1970* (Lusaka: Government Printers, 1966), p. 5, 21–30.
9. NAZ, Box 130A, Towards Economic Independence in Zambia: Address of President Kenneth Kaunda to the UNIP National Council, 1968.
10. For discussions of the reasons, see Ado Tiberondwa, 'Back to the Land: Zambia's Goals and Problems', *Zango* 1 (September 1976), p. 6–38 and Mwelwa C. Musambachine, 'The Problems of Rural Development in Zambia', *Zango* 7 (June 1980), p. 24–32.
11. See Hansards of this period such as Zambia, *Hansard* No. 4, Debates of the Second Session (Resumed) of the first National Assembly, 13 July–22 Sept, 1965. (Lusaka: Government Printers, 1965).
12. NAZ, NP 1/2/44 No. 153, Northern Province Development Committees: Kaunda's opening speech at a seminar held on 12 January, 1966.
13. See also Mwelwa C. Musambachine, 'Colonialism and the Environment in Zambia, 1890–1964' in Samuel N. Chipungu (ed.) *Guardians in Their Time: Experience of Zambians Under Colonial Rule 1890–1946* (London: Macmillan, 1992) and Y. A. Chondoka, 'Economy and Society in North-Eastern Rhodesia up to 1945' in A. M. Kanduzi (ed.), *Social-Economic Change in Eastern Zambia: Pre-Colonial to the 1980's* (Lusaka: Historical Association of Zambia, 1992).

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16. UN/ECA/FAO Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia, Seers Report, (Ndola: Falcon Press, 1964), p. 54.
17. Patrick Ollawa, *Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy of National Development* (Devon: Arthur Stock well, 1979), p. 235.
18. An Account of the Disturbances in Northern Rhodesia July to October 1961 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1961), p. 7.
19. Hall, *High Price of Principles*, p. 168.
20. Thomas Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One Party Democracy in Zambia', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 7, 3, (1969), p. 419. See also Robert I. Rot berg, 'Tribalism and Politics in Zambia', *Africa Report* 12, (December, 1967), p. 30.
21. Minutes of UNIP National Council of 1968, p. 2 for similar sentiments in Parliament, see Mansard No. 18, July 1969; Columns 9–12.
22. Minutes of the Chiengi UNIP Regional Conference held on 25 March, 1971 cited in Robert H. Bates, 'Rural Development in Kasumpa village, Zambia', *Journal of African Studies* 2, 3(1975), p. 354.
23. Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One Party Democracy in Zambia', p. 420.
24. Gerald Heegar, *The Politics of Under Development* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), p. 49–50.
25. Interview with Chibesa Kankasa, Lusaka 13 May, 2000, see also Sikota Wina, *Night Without a President* (Lusaka: Multimedia, 1985), p. 44.
26. Makasa Papers: Makasa to Kaunda 2 August, 1969.
27. *Times of Zambia*, 21 September, 1971, p. 1.
28. Musakanya as cited by Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika, 'Dictatorship Challenged', *Today; Zambia Research Foundation Newsletter* 3 (1991), p.2.
29. Makasa Papers: Telegrams dated 26 August, 1969 from Makasa in Ethiopia to Kapwepwe, Kaunda, Mudenda and Zambia News Agency.

30. Interview with Makasa, Chinsali 3 February, 1998 collaborated by Jonas Mubanga, Chilanga, 16 May, 2000. According to Mubanga, that confrontation was the immediate cause of the suspension.

31. Interview with Jonas Mubanga, Chilanga, 16 May, 2000.

32. They include Patrick Ollawa, *Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy of National Development*, (Devon: Arthur Stockwell, 1979), Cherry Gertzel (ed.), *The Dynamic of the One Party State in Zambia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) and Chiponde Mushingeh, 'The evolution of One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1964–1972', *Trans African Journal of History* Vol. 22 (1993) p. 100–121.

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34. Florence T. Polatnick and Albert Saletan, *Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda* (New York: Julian Messer, 1972), p.6.

35. Martin Wamunyima, 'Changufu: Cha Cha Cha Mastermind', *Sunday Times of Zambia*, May 14th 2000, p. 9, see also V. J. Mwaanga, *An Extra-ordinary Life* (Lusaka: Fleetfoot Publishing Company, 1985), p. 281–282.

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37. B. O. Nwabueze, *Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa* (London: C. Hurst, 1974), cited in G. F. Lungu, 'The Church, Labour and the Press in Zambia: The Role of Critical Observers in One-Party State', *African Affairs* 85, 34, (July 1986), p. 388.

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39. Opening Address to UNIP National Council as reported by the *Times of Zambia*, 13 December, 1977.

40. Bates, 'Rural Development in Kasumpa village, Zambia', p. 353. For reasons why earlier programmes failed, see also M. Musambachine, 'The Problems of Rural Development in Zambia', *Zango* 7 (1980), p. 24–32.

41. Makasa Papers: Kaunda to Makasa, 29 December, 1978.

42. Interview with Malama Sokoni, Lusaka, 4 November, 1999.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we will recapitulate some aspects of Zambia's political history and also assess the role Makasa played in it. Makasa was a founder member of the first political party in Chinsali where he played a major role in the concretisation of the people. His organising ability in Luapula and Northern Provinces in the 50s (then one Province called Northern Province) brought great political awakening and consciousness. The result was that people in the province supported and joined the African National Congress. His many arrests and imprisonments by the colonial government also proved the effectiveness of his organisation ability. He was also a founder member of ZANC, and later UNIP which spearheaded the fight against colonialism.

This study has demonstrated that the independence struggle did not depend solely on Kaunda as national leader but also on other individuals such as Makasa. Its success was a collective effort of leaders at all levels. For example, the strategy Makasa used in Northern and Luapula Provinces was to persuade chiefs to ferment protest among the people. Led by their chiefs, people put up a successful protest against government regulations. UNIP adopted this method in all rural areas.

When he was called to help organise the party in Lusaka in the face of ANC antagonism, he used the method of working through small sections. Again, UNIP adopted the method of using sections in party organisation to mobilise the masses before and even after independence. The two tactics were important contributions to the evolvment of UNIP as a mass party poised to lead the independence struggle.

After achieving independence, Makasa served the country in many capacities such as Cabinet Minister, Minister of State, Diplomat, Member of the Central Committee and Chairman of Lima Bank and SIDO. In the foreword to Makasa's autobiography, Kaunda described Makasa as a man who had a depth of vision, rare commitment to the cause of the masses, courage and determination. In the post independence politics of Zambia, however, Kaunda deviated from enshrining in UNIP the democracy that politicians had fought colonisation for. He became more and more authoritarian. Service to the country meant unquestioning loyalty to Kaunda. This made Makasa's contribution to national development not as significant as that to the independence struggle inspite of the positive attributes of his leadership.

When Kapwepwe left UNIP to articulate other policies in a new party, he was censured by Kaunda. Even then, Makasa openly identified himself with Kapwepwe. Kaunda considered this as betrayal from a man who was obliged to follow the President's policy on all issues. Makasa believed in Kapwepwe's vision for the country and that was why he supported the latter's decision to leave UNIP and even congratulated him for that move. To Kaunda, the demand for independence was not synonymous with a demand for democracy. He was highly intolerant to opposing views even within UNIP itself. In that respect, UNIP became as repressive and authoritarian as colonial rule had been. Despite that situation in UNIP, Makasa could not leave and join UPP before it established itself. He was being cautious in order not to jeopardise his future. While waiting, UPP and all other opposition parties were banned. In addition, his mentor Kapwepwe, died in 1980. After that, he had little option but to stay in UNIP.

Kaunda's response was to harass Makasa through suspensions and demotions. In this regard, we see that Makasa's contribution to national development was not as effective as that to the struggle for independence because of Kaunda's intolerance to criticism and disregard for advice from colleagues. This argument is vindicated by the fact that during the struggle, Makasa was regarded as a champion. However, this image does not conform to the realities of the post independence political scenario in Zambia in which Makasa was manipulated by Kaunda to serve the latter's interests. Kaunda feared to be isolated by antagonising all his colleagues from Chinsali. That was why even though Makasa fell out of his favour, he did not actually dismiss him but simply moved him from one post to the other.

A significant conclusion of this study is that a background of lack of education, poverty and deprivation did not augur well for Makasa's political career. Though he differed with Kaunda on some aspects of the conduct of party and government affairs, Makasa could not resign. This forced him to serve a government in which he did not agree with the policies of its leader. Kaunda was fully aware of the vulnerable position Makasa was in and he exploited it to the full. Life after retirement has also been adversely affected by poverty and lack of planning. Without any other source of income to fall back on, Makasa, one of the founding fathers of this nation has retired to a life of hardship.

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