

ZAMBIA'S ROLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A RE-INTERPRETATION


By

MUKELABAI SONGISO

**A DISSERTATION IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE AWARD OF
MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA.**

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Dedicated to my children MUBUYAETA and GREGORY



Approval

This disseration of Mukelabai Songiso
is approved as fulfilling part of the require-
ments for the award of the degree of Master
of Arts in Political Science at the University
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Declaration

This dissertation was written and submitted in accordance with the rules and regulations governing the award of Master of Arts Degree of the University of Zambia. I further declare that the dissertation has, neither in part nor in whole, been presented as a substance for award of any degree, either to this or to any other University. Where other people's work has been drawn upon, acknowledgement has been made.

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Abstract

This thesis is a critical study of two approaches used to analyse Zambia's regional policies in Southern Africa in the period 1964-80. One approach, the idiosyncratic, regards personality and ideology as the central factors that have shaped the country's regional behaviour while the political economy school treats economic interests and class formation as the key to the understanding of Zambia's regional policies. These two approaches have generated debate amongst scholars as to the relative impact of these two sets of factors on the country's regional policies. This thesis has endeavoured to expose the theoretical as well as the analytical strengths and weaknesses of these approaches when applied to Zambia's responses to U.D.I. in Rhodesia, the civil War in Angola in 1975-76 and to Zambia's relations with South Africa. What has emerged from this study is that neither of these approaches offers an adequate analysis of Zambia's regional policies since their exponents are selective in their choice of evidence: Zambia's foreign policy consistently and simultaneously reflected elements of ideology and interest. However, the insights outlined by the two approaches have been utilized in this thesis to provide a comprehensive analysis of Zambia's regional policies in the period 1964-80.

Acknowledgements

Academics in the field of international relations have discussed at length the controversy that surrounds the study of this subject. Controversy or heated debate, unfortunately, also characterised my experience in the initial stages of this study. I was told, by respectable academics who were exponents of either the idiosyncratic or the political economy approach, that my task as a critic was bound to be unrewarding since their school of thought was practically unassailable. I was indeed on the verge of despair, that is, until I came under the supervision of Dr. Mushota whose comments were invaluable not only in the writing of the dissertation but more importantly, he instilled confidence in me to carry on with the work. So it is not only out of mere courtesy that I write that this work would not have been possible without him although the final product is my responsibility.

I would like to thank my wife, Irene Maimbolwa for her encouragement and my two children, Mubuyaeta and Gregory whose uncertain future in a dependency spurred me on. I would also like to thank Ms. Mary B. Chakulanda of the University of Zambia for her diligent typing of the manuscript.

Abbreviations

AAC	Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd.
ANCSA	African National Congress of South Africa.
EIU	The Economist Intelligence Unit.
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (Angolan National Liberation Front).
FRROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe.
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola.)
OAU	Organization of African Unity.
SWAPO	South West Africa People Organisation.
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence.
UNIP	United National Independence Party.
UNITA	Uniaa Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).
ZAMANGLO	Zambia Anglo-American Limited.
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union.
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This study deals with two main interpretations of Zambia's foreign policy¹ on Southern Africa in the period 1964 to 1980. These interpretations have followed contrasting lines of argument. One school of thought regards class formation² and economic interests³ as the basic determinants of Zambia's regional behaviour. The other school treats ideology⁴ and personality as the main factors that have influenced Zambia's regional policies.

In response to these interpretations of Zambia's regional policies, this thesis aims to do the following:

- a) offer a detailed critique of the existing interpretations;
- b) assess critically the impact of ideology and personality on the one hand; and class formation and economic interests on the other, on Zambia's regional policies;⁵
- c) offer a more balanced interpretation of Zambia's regional behaviour during the period under study.

This exercise will be carried out in relation to three issues, the independence struggle in Rhodesia, relations with South Africa and the 1975-76 civil war in Angola. It should be pointed out that in terms of the interpretations of Zambia's regional policies, these issues are in many ways

interrelated.

It should also be mentioned from the outset that these two contrasting interpretations of Zambia's regional policies both recognise the importance of ideology and personality; class formation and economic interests as factors that have shaped Zambia's regional policies. Their major difference lies in the conditions that each school stipulates as governing the interactions of these factors. Inevitably, this leads to different conclusions or judgements in the analyses of Zambia's regional policies.⁶

1.1 The Approach of the Study

The burden of this thesis is to provide a critique of the existing approaches to the study of Zambia's regional policies and in so doing offer a comprehensive and balanced analysis of this topic. It was deemed that this task could best be carried out by utilising an eclectic approach. This is because the idiosyncratic and the political economy approaches⁷ which are discussed in this thesis, have provided insights in the study of Zambia's foreign policy that no critical study of this subject can ignore. The eclectic approach has therefore borrowed the concepts of ideology and personality from the idiosyncratic approach and economic interests and class formation from the political economy approach.

However, exponents of these two approaches have not

been able to produce a comprehensive, noncontradictory analysis of Zambia's regional policies. Because of their theoretical preconceptions, they are selective in their choice of evidence (Anglin and Shaw 1979a). The idiosyncratic approach is based upon the personality of a powerful, charismatic leader within his domestic environment and pays scant attention to systemic factors. The political economy approach⁸ is deterministic: Zambia is an economic dependency, therefore in regional issues it has to serve the interests of western countries on whom it depends for economic survival.

As a result of their selectivity or bias, the two approaches above have given rise to two contrasting interpretations of Zambia's role in Southern Africa. On the one hand' those analysts who have utilised the idiosyncratic approach have tended to credit the Zambian political leadership with carrying out, under difficult conditions, regional policies based on strong moral and ideological commitments (Hall 1969); on the other hand' those analysts who have used the political economy approach have charged the Zambian leadership with hypocritical stances in the region because of their strong connections with western capitalism (Shaw and Mugomba 1977).

The eclectic approach, therefore, while, utilising the factors identified by the idiosyncratic and political economy approaches, viz, personality, ideology. economic interests and class formation;

- 1) questions the accuracy of the rules or conditions which the exponents of the two schools stipulate govern the interactions of these factors. This is done in Chapter Two and Three.
- 2) critically assesses the validity of the interpretations of Zambia's regional policies as proffered by the two schools of thought. This is done in Chapters Four, Five and Six.

It must be pointed out that there is considerable theoretical justification for adopting an eclectic approach in the analysis of foreign policy. A number of international relations authorities recommend this approach because of its comprehensiveness. For example, Jacobson and Zimmerman (1969:6) state that there is considerable consensus among foreign policy specialists that analysis must be multicausal and probablistic rather than monocausal and deterministic. Rosenau (1971:107) agrees with this view.

Indeed many analysts move from one level of analysis to another. For instance, Shaw, one of the chief exponents of the political economy approach which asserts the primacy of the international economic system over domestic variables in determining the international behaviour of an African state also acknowledges the leading role an African president plays in shaping his country's foreign policy (Shaw 1973, 1976b). In a later work, Shaw advocates a combination of approaches to enhance the understanding of African foreign policies. As he argues:

Given the wide variety of policies and behaviours to be analysed, some combination of variables and approaches seems essential for comprehensive and confident explanation (Shaw 1979: 60-61).

The eclectic approach, though not explicitly stated is apparent in Shaw (1976a) which is an analysis of Zambia's development and foreign policy. In other works, Shaw and his associates move from one approach to another. For instance, in his review of Anglin and Shaw (1979a), Southal points out that:

Anglin and Shaw in their recent work manage to straddle these two contradictory positions. In their introduction, the first of five factors determining the country's 'obsessive pre-occupation with the liberation of Southern Africa' is said to be an ideological commitment to the eradication of colonialism on the continent of Africa and 'moral indignation at the gross injustices perpetuated in the name of civilisation South of the Zambezi'. Later however in a chapter entitled 'Dependence and Underdevelopment' reference is made to growth of a new class which 'until ... challenged by domestic demands ... is likely to maintain its comfortable collaboration with global economic interests and to reveal continuing ambiguity about fundamental regional change (Southal 1980:3).⁹

A study of analyses of Zambia's regional policies consistently shows that interest and ideology are used as alternative explanations of Zambia's regional behaviour. For example Shaw and Mugomba (1977) maintain that interests especially that of the emergent national bourgeoisie, best explains Zambia's stance in the subregion while Anglin and Shaw (1979b:205) argue that ideological commitment is the more accurate explanation.

These alternative interpretations point to the fact that while ideology and personality, class formation and economic interests are important to the understanding of Zambia's regional behaviour, their relative impact on this behaviour is a subject of debate among scholars.¹⁰ This debate is fuelled by apparent contradictions in Zambia's regional behaviour during the period under study. For example, while Zambia conducted trade and official contacts with South Africa, she was also one of the main centres of the liberation movements, thereby earning herself the hostility of the white minority regimes (Grundy 1973, Pettman 1974). In order to provide a critique of existing interpretations and a comprehensive analysis of Zambia's regional behaviour; the problem which this thesis tackles within the framework of an eclectic approach is: what was the impact of class formation and economic interests on the one hand and ideology and personality on the other, on Zambia's regional policies in the period 1964-1980?

1.2 Hypotheses

In order to answer the research question, two hypotheses have been formulated as guidelines. These are:

- 1) The formulation and conduct of regional policies in Zambia originates at a central point (the Chief Executive) in the Zambian state as opposed to any

discernible group or class in Zambian society.

- 2) Zambian regional policies have been moral and ideological in their foundation but pragmatic in their implementation.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

- 1) To analyse critically, the interpretations of Zambia's foreign policy on Southern Africa in the period 1964 to 1980.
- 2) To consider the extent to which these interpretations are contrasted by the relative importance given to the factors of class formation and economic interests on the one hand, and ideology and personality on the other.
- 3) To assess the validity of these contrasting interpretations of Zambia's regional policies by reference to:
 - a) Zambia's political economy and foreign policy making establishment.
 - b) Zambia's relations with South Africa and her responses to events in Rhodesia and Angola during the period 1964 to 1980.

1.4 Methodology

The study of foreign policy presents special

difficulties in that diplomacy is still mostly conducted in secrecy. Interviews are, therefore, of limited value. However, interviews with present and past practitioners in the Zambian foreign policy system were conducted where possible to shed light on such issues as Zambia's relations with the various liberation movements, Zambia's stand on the Angolan civil war and Zambia's contacts with South Africa. Other questions dealt with the roles and relationships of the various actors in Zambia's foreign policy-making establishment.

The following people were interviewed because of their intimate knowledge of Zambia's foreign policy making system and of their familiarity with issues discussed in the present study.

- 1) Two serving diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Headquarters in Lusaka.
- 2) A former Special Assistant on Political Affairs to President Kaunda, Mr. Mark Chona.
- 3) A former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mwaanga.

Other people who could have been interviewed said that foreign policy matters were too sensitive to be discussed with an outsider, for example, I was turned away by representatives of liberation movements.

For the same reason of sensitivity, the identity of some of the people interviewed remains anonymous and

interviews with them have been classified as confidential.

For reasons outlined above, this study, therefore, relied heavily on library research. This meant a critical review of published and unpublished material in the field combined with an analysis of changes in Zambia's political economy. The gathering of material lasted three months.

1.5 Rationale

Since independence in 1964, Southern Africa has been the main focus of Zambia's foreign policy (Anglin and Shaw 1979). While this is generally accepted, the factors that have influenced Zambia's regional behaviour are still matters of dispute. However, no study so far has offered a detailed critique of the existing interpretations of Zambia's regional policies. By discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments used to interpret Zambia's regional policies, this study attempts to fill this gap. It has already been pointed out that the problem that has beset the analysis of Zambia's foreign policy is to determine the levels of interaction between personality, ideology, class formation and economic factors. By offering detailed critiques of the existing interpretations, this study attempts to provide answers to this problem.

1.6 Limitations

It has already been pointed out above that the study

of foreign policy presents special difficulties in that diplomacy is mostly conducted in secrecy.¹¹ Hence I cannot state categorically that my informants revealed all that they knew in an interview situation. Neither did I gain access to official, classified documents. Moreover, when one is discussing ideology and interest, one is not studying acts but reasons for acting and given the close overlap between ideology and interest (Zartman 1966), the official announced reasons of a government might serve to obscure rather than clarify the motives of decision-makers. This problem has been succinctly put by Cowling:

Those who govern are apt to take actions for which reasons can not be given: and often the reasons that are given are designed to lead those who study them as far away from the true reasons as possible (Cowling 1963 as quoted by Worral, D. 1976:1).

As a result this study's heavy reliance on indirect evidence such as speeches, policies adopted and the decision-making process can be taken to be a limitation. However, as the objectives of this thesis have made clear, my purpose in undertaking this work is not to settle the issue of Zambia's regional policies in the period 1964-1980 for all time but to offer a well-researched, even-handed treatment of it.

NOTES ON CHAPTER ONE

1. Students of international relations are not agreed on what the term 'foreign policy' ought to mean (Wallace 1971). For the purposes of this study, therefore, two concerns frequently encountered in definitions of foreign policy have been isolated. These are:
 - a) a stable set of ideas or general principles guiding a country's relations with other countries; an active view of what ought to be the country's position in regional and international affairs.
 - b) the regulation of a country's economic relations with other countries (Wallace 1971:11).
2. Class formation: Exponents of the political economy approach argue that Zambia's Economic Reforms and state capitalism have given rise to a property-owning class or emergent bourgeoisie which has maintained control over the state and affluence by its close collaboration with international capital. The study of this dominant group has presented theoretical and analytical problems and it has therefore received a variety of names from academics depending on the inclination of the author. It has been called 'the managerial bourgeoisie' (Sklar 1975) 'the ruling class' (Shaw 1976a) and Ollawa 1979) ruling elites (Mezger (1980) a bureaucratic bourgeoisie (Woldring ed. 1984) 'political class divided into factions (Burdette 1984a) 'bourgeoisie divided into fractions (Mudenda 1984). I have adopted the term 'political class' since the dominant property-owning class derives its privileges and status not from the ownership of the means of production but from its control of the state and the commanding heights of the economy (Burdette 1984a).
3. Economic interests: Under the idiosyncratic approach economic interests are equated to national interests (Hall 1969, Mtshali 1972). Under the political economy approach economic interests are narrowly defined as the interests of Zambia's emergent bourgeoisie and their class allies, the international bourgeoisie. The losers in this alliance are the

Zambian masses (Shaw 1973, 1976a). However there are some economic imperatives such as Zambia's need for reliable outlets to the sea that can not be interpreted in class terms.

4. Ideology has been defined as:

the more or less coherent and consistent sum total of ideas and views on life and the world ... that guides the attitudes of actual or would-be power-holders: leaders of political units, such as nation-states or city-states or of major organisations of movements, such as churches or political parties (Herz 1968:69).

5. The identification and isolation of the two sets of variables, personality and ideology on one hand and economic interests and class formation on the other, has been done to facilitate analysis and to distinguish the two schools of thought, that is the political economy and the idiosyncratic. Neither of the two schools of thought maintain that economic interests and ideology can influence policy on their own independent of social class or personality. In the thesis a personality or a group that represents an ideology or economic interests has been identified. In other words ideologies or economic interests are always linked to an influential personality or social group.
6. The intellectual paradigms or frameworks that analysts adopt will determine to a great extent the 'facts' that they think are important and even if two or more analysts with divergent paradigms agree on the 'facts' their different paradigms will lead them to differing interpretations. This problem has been discussed by Kuhn (1962) and Myrdal (1969) among others.
7. The analysis of Zambia's regional policies have been undertaken by various writers. These authors have been classified under two approaches: the idiosyncratic or the political economy approach. The classification was based on two factors:
- 1) a writer's dominant variables.
 - 2) the rules or conditions that the writer stipulates as governing the interactions of his variables

For instance Mtshali's dominant variables are personality and economic interests. The rules or conditions that govern the interactions of these variables state clearly that the personality of President Kaunda is the more potent variable therefore Mtshali (1970, 1972) is classified under the idiosyncratic approach with Hall (1969) whose dominant factors are personality and ideology.

8. The political economy approach is based on the following insights.
 - a) History involves the intermixing of economic, political and social factors in an on-going process.
 - b) The border of a state are permeable to capital and the political influence that accompanies it.
 - c) Its main focus is on the relationship of classes or their fractions - a Marxist perspective. The state can not be said to be neutral in the struggle between labour and capital although it can function with 'relative autonomy' in some situations.
 - d) The dominant mode of production will determine the role that individual actors and the state will play in a social formation. For example in a social formation where the capitalist mode of production is dominant, the state must serve the long-term interests of the various fractions of the bourgeoisie (Burdette 1977, Sandbook 1982: 79).
9. Some of the books referred to in this thesis were published after 1980. However, these works are relevant to the period under study 1964 to 1980. For example Aluke and Shaw (1984) is currently the most authoritative exposition of the political economy approach to the study of African international relations.
10. Cf. Shaw (1976c: 3) and Tordoff (1977: 69).
11. Wallace (1971: 10).

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 Theoretical Frameworks

It has been established in Chapter One that the interpretations of Zambia's regional policies (1964 to 1980) have been dominated by two slightly overlapping but fundamentally different approaches to the analysis and interpretation of African foreign policies. These two approaches have been termed the idiosyncratic and the political economy approaches and they have formed the foundation on which many studies of African policies have been based (Shaw 1973: 213). It is therefore important to understand their attractions for academics who utilize them. Also important, however, is the need to discuss why neither of them have won universal acceptance.¹

This chapter therefore does the following:

- (a) Presents the theoretical underpinnings of each approach;
- (b) Discusses the limitations and/or the theoretical issues raised by each approach.

2.1 The Idiosyncratic approach

It is a widely held view that the Executive in a modern state monopolises foreign policy making and implementation (Frankel 1967: 35), Jacobson and Zimmerman

(1969: 12), Morse (1970: 378), Rosenau (1971: 432), Wallace (1971: 10). While this view is discussed with reservations when applied to the states of the developed North; foreign policy making in the South is said to be the exclusive domain of the Head of state. It is argued that the leaders of the new states in Africa and other parts of the Third World are less restrained in foreign policy formulation than their counterparts in the West. As Boyce writes:

Foreign policy making in a new state will normally be a centralized personalized process involving an authoritarian (possibly military) head of government assisted by a few political proteges 'at court' and a small, low-powered unco-ordinated bureaucracy. Neither legislatures, political parties, trade unions nor communication media will tend to exert much influence on government, and foreign affairs interest groups will be few and far between (Boyce 1977: 55).

And Zartman (1966: 33) has also recognised the tendency among African heads of states to arrogate to themselves the right to make and conduct foreign policy.

Interpretations of Zambia's regional behaviour that have utilized the idiosyncratic approach, have as a result, stressed:

(i) the ideology, (ii) personality, (iii) style and (iv) the power of President Kaunda as subsequent discussions in this and the other chapters will show. While these studies have recognised the significance of the national interest, domestic economic structure, external linkages and class formation; these factors are regarded as of peripheral

importance.

For instance, Mtshali (1970) argues that Zambia's regional foreign policy respected the national interest and relied on adequate resources from copper for its implementation but he traces the genesis of Zambia's regional behaviour to the perceptions of President Kaunda. As he comments:

As reflected in the (Lusaka) manifesto, Zambia's attitude towards the South may seem ambivalent and inconsistent. In reality, however, it shows Zambia's pursuit of a two-pronged policy governed by morality and the national interest. Why did Zambia embark on such a policy? The explanation lies in Kaunda's outlook, the objectives he has set, and the resources he has at his disposal for the pursuit of these objectives (Mtshali, 1970: 2)².

The following factors are cited in support of the idiosyncratic thesis. First it is noted that Independence constitutions have given President Kaunda wide executive powers.

In the exercise of any function conferred upon him by this constitution or any other law, the President shall, unless it is otherwise provided, act in his own deliberate judgement and shall not be obliged to follow the advice tendered by any other person or authority (Republic of Zambia; 1974: 240).

Hence the idiosyncratic approach has a very firm political basis. For example Boyce (1977) states that Commonwealth constitutions have followed the British tradition of leaving foreign affairs exclusively in the hands of the Executive. In regard to Zambia, for instance, the National Assembly has no constitutional role to play in the ratification

of treaties entered into by the Executive, the confirmation of appointments to diplomatic posts or the declaration of war. All these are the preserve of the President (Mtshali 1975).

Secondly, it is argued that in a post-colonial state the pronouncements of a national leader are turned into policy and ideology. Mtshali (1972) argues that this was true in the case of Zambia. Indeed the country's ideological stance in regional affairs has also been closely identified with the President (Hall, 1969). He is the founder of the national philosophy of Humanism (Parts I and II) and he is a believer in Pan-Africanism and Non-Alignment.

With regard to regional affairs, Humanism can be said to be an attempt to create a just society in Zambia in reaction to societies based on notions of racial superiority and racial exploitation that were characteristic of white-minority regimes in Southern Africa. By appearing to be steadfast on the side of justice Zambia acquired an international image that is far beyond its real power (Anglin and Shaw 1979a).

Another ideology to which Zambia sub-serves is pan-Africanism. This is the movement that inspired the pre-independence nationalist parties in Africa. Pan-Africanism aimed at eradicating racism and colonialism in Africa and later to establish a United States of Africa (Geiss 1968).

Zambia has been an active supporter of Pan-Africanist

ideals and the country has been a committed member of its off-shoot, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Zambia has also been a staunch supporter of the African Liberation Committee, the OAU organ set up to assist the liberation struggles in Africa (Anglin 1979).

The country has also helped shape the OAU policy on Southern Africa through the Lusaka Manifesto and the Dar-es-Salaam declaration (Anglin and Shaw 1979a).

Zambia is also a founder member of the Frontline States which try to co-ordinate their policies on Southern African issues (Osei-Hwedie 1983).

The third pillar of Zambia's ideological stance is Non-Alignment. The Third World countries that form the Non-Aligned movement have condemned racialism, colonialism, the arms race and the exploitation of the poor nations by the rich ones. In recent years, a major part of their diplomatic efforts have been devoted to attempts to bring about a New International Economic Order from which poor countries can benefit (Zartman and Sewell 1984, Chan 1984).

Thirdly, it is also argued that in African Presidential systems such as Zambia's, other people who would normally be present at the centre-point within the foreign policy establishment are not there. For instance, the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in many African countries is said to be insignificant because it is not professionally staffed (Cowan 1966, Mtshali 1975, Watson 1982, Woldring 1984).

Fourthly, it is argued that the President makes decisions against a weak legislature. In their study of the Zambian Parliament (Tordoff and Molteno (1974) observed that the legislature lacked effective committees to monitor, criticise, supervise and influence the actions of the Executive.

While making due allowance for the indication since 1969 of the Second Parliament's increasing vigour, we must still conclude that neither the National Assembly as an institution nor MPs in their individual capacities have played a crucial role in the Zambian political system (Tordoff and Molteno 1974: 241).

Indeed as Boyce (1977) rightly points out legislatures in the newer states like Zambia have not developed or been encouraged to develop much expertise in foreign affairs.

Fifthly, the new states such as Zambia are said to lack the informal aspects of a foreign policy establishment such as demonstrations for or against a foreign policy decision, the media or academic journals specialising in international affairs: all these are said to be practically non-existent in a developing nation (Boyce 1977).

It would therefore seem that because of President Kaunda's domination of the state and ideological spheres, he was strategically placed to shape Zambia's regional behaviour according to his principles and anxieties.³

2.2 Limitations of the Idiosyncratic Approach

However Resenau (1971) cautions us against such a hasty reliance on idiosyncratic variables. As he writes:

From our perspective, however, such an analysis overlooks the enormous constraints that the international system imposes on officials. While their own systems do permit them much greater leeway in foreign affairs;... this is more than offset by the international constraints (Rosenau 1971: 423).

And Duchacek (1971: 273-4) points out that national leaders may have different ideological beliefs but given the anarchic nature of the present international system, their behaviour has to follow established norms if they are to protect the vital interests of their nations.

Cox (1974) makes a similar point when he states that impersonal forces limit the room for manoeuvre of political leaders. In the same vein, Wallace (1971) points out that domestic support is crucial if a national leader's foreign policy is to meet with success in international affairs. He argues out that if a leader lacks domestic support for his international posture, then he risks not only failure but removal from office as well.

As for ideology, Zartman (1966) notes that it plays a very significant role in African diplomacy since these countries lack the material bases of national power. Generally, ideology is used to perceive events and their meanings, to identify enemies and friends, to justify or

legitimize a policy position. It is also a source of power.

However, despite this prominent role of ideology, the author recognises the limited nature it has in the actual practice of African diplomacy. He contends that in the clash between ideology and interest, reality is bound to prevail in Africa as happened in other parts of the world.

Therefore though it is now widely acknowledged that leaders and their ideological perceptions are important variables in the shaping of foreign policy (Verba 1969: 179), Brecher et al 1969, Rosenau 1971: 273), the ascription of causation to great men in international affairs has become outworn.⁴ Recent studies have increasingly come to recognise that states let alone an individual cannot be the sole determinant of a country's international behaviour.⁵ In international politics, other actors have increasingly come to the fore.

Whereas the study of international politics by analytical convention has been primarily concerned with a single level of interaction, the national or government to government level, it is clear that the international system is actually organized on at least four levels: subnational, national, transnational and supranational. That is national governments are but some actors among many on the international scene. Other prominent actors include international organisations and directorates, multinational corporations, functionally linked transnational groups such as regional political parties and international guerilla organisations and subnational groups such as departments of agriculture, ministries of finance or major labour unions, business firms or philanthropic foundations - all formulating and executing their own foreign policies in a quasi-autonomous fashion (Puchala and Fagan 1974: 251).

The idiosyncratic approach can be summarised as follows:

Zambia's foreign policy reflects the personal values of President Kaunda since he was strategically placed to leave his personal imprint on it through his domination of the ideological, political and legal frameworks in which that policy was formulated. This assumes that he had a broad freedom of choice in making foreign policy. The main weakness of this position is that it may not recognise or give sufficient weight to other national or systemic factors that do limit a leader's ability to make policy according to his perceptions. In other words, such an approach cannot be a comprehensive analysis of foreign policy.

2.3. The Political Economy Approach

The political economy approach emerged as a critical response to the idiosyncrantic interpretations of African foreign policies (Shaw and Aluko 1984). These authors point out that idiosyncratic explanations of African international behaviour were not analytical and were therefore of little predictive value. Moreover, foreign policy was treated as the exclusive domain of the political leader without taking into account the domestic economic and social structures and their critical linkages with international capitalism on which the African state might depend for political stability and economic survival.

In recent studies of Zambia's international behaviour, the political economy approach has provided persistent and

influential interpretations of Zambia's foreign policies. This approach minimises the role of ideology, diplomacy and personality in the formulation of foreign policy; rather it emphasises economic structures, international linkages and class forces (Shaw 1973: 1975).

Academics who apply the political economy approach to the analysis of African's foreign and development policies rely heavily on the literature of dependency and under-development (Shaw 1976a, b, d, Eriksen 1978, Burdette 1984a). Those who utilize this paradigm therefore do not place too much reliance on diplomatic incidents and speeches except in cases where they throw light on policy, rather they are more concerned with persistent international linkages and development choices.

In short, foreign policy is mainly analysed through domestic economic and social structures and their international connections. In their analysis and interpretation of foreign policy, the political economists are radical and critical; they disregard reformist measures. As pointed out above, these arguments fall within the paradigm of dependency theories.

In his discussion of dependency theories, Roxborough (1979) states that the central point of the dependency theorists is that the study of the development of the Third World Societies must be done within the context of the world economy; studies outside this framework are of limited value. This is because;

The mode of articulation of the underdeveloped economies with the world economic system may result in a transfer of resources from the periphery to the centre and/or this articulation may give rise to various blocking mechanisms which hold back or distort the economies of the periphery, thereby preventing an allocation of resources which will produce economic growth (Roxborough 1979: 63).

These observations apply with special cogency to Zambia's colonial and post-colonial experience.

From the 1930's onwards the economy has been dominated by the copper exporting enclave which is closely linked to outside capitalist multinationals and was completely foreign-owned until 1969 when it was partly nationalised. However, the copper industry still relied heavily on foreign capital, technical assistance and marketing facilities for its operations. Moreover the mineral sector has not been integrated in the domestic economy; its greatest impact on overall economic growth was mostly through tax revenues that the government could collect from the mining companies when the copper price was bouyant (Ollawa 1979).

Both in the colonial and post-colonial days capital investment was concentrated on the mining industry. Even infrastructural investment was mainly meant for the growth of this industry (Ollawa 1979).

Because the copper comapnies enjoyed a near monopoly in the allocation of investment capital, Zambia failed to develop viable and dynamic manufacturing and agricultural bases (Ollawa 1979).

The copper industry has been a big employer of both

expatriate and local labour (Fry 1979]. The big expatriate mining community diffused capitalist ethos into Zambian society to facilitate their operations into which the emergent indigenous bourgeoisie was drawn (Sklar 1975: 198-207).

As reflected in Table I, the copper industry contributed between 1964-80, 92-96% to the value of Zambia's exports and employed about 14% of the country's labour force.

This heavy reliance on the copper industry as an important employer, a chief earner of foreign exchange, a main source of funds for the government and the economy and a purveyor of capitalist values has given rise to two observations that are of interest in the study of Zambia's foreign policy.

Firstly, it is argued that the dominance of the copper industry meant its needs were of paramount concern to the country's decision makers both in the colonial and post-colonial days. Its executives have had ready access to the country's political masters (Burdette 1977: 478, Bierman 1979).

Secondly, in times when the price of copper is low, the government has to resort to foreign aid and large scale borrowing in order to keep the economy afloat. This, it is argued gives capitalist agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the World Bank, the Commercial Banks and their local allies, the emergent national bourgeoisie, greater leverage in the country's internal and external

TABLE 1

CONTRIBUTION OF COPPER TO GDP, REVENUE, EXPORTS AND EMPLOYMENT

Year	Contribution to GDP KM	%	Contribution to Govt, revenue KM	%	Copper + Value of exports	Copper Contribution to exports %	Employment contribution in employment '000	%
1964	290	40	57	53	302	92	46.7	17.7
1965	290	40	134	71	347	93	47.9	15.9
1966	379	44	163	64	465	95	48.9	15.7
1967	379	39	146	53	440	94	48	15.1
1968	411	38	183	60	520	96	48.2	14.7
1969	637	48	237	59	729	97	49.7	14.1
1970	457	36	218	52	688	97	49.7	13.6
1971	268	23	114	36	454	95	50.8	13.8
1972	317	23	56	19	500	93	52.8	14.1
1973	506	32	108	29	703	95	56.1	14.6
1974	607	32	341	53	846	94	57.5	15.5
1975	204	13	59	13	479	93	59.1	15.9
1976	330	18	12	3	705	94	56.7	15.4
1977	223	11	-1	-	661	92	55.5	14.9
1978	272	12	-	-	634	86	57.7	15
1979	470	18	-10	6	926	96		
1980	520	17	41		960			

Source: Meyns P. (1984) "The Political Economy of Zambia" in Woldring and Chibaye (eds.) Beyond Political Independence: Zambia's Development Predicament in the 1980s.

policies (Eriksen 1978, Burdette 1984a).

Moreover, the heavy reliance on copper means that Zambia is heavily dependent on the international trade and marketing system. Its major trading partners are Japan, West German, Britain and South Africa. For instance, in 1970 the five countries took in 60 per cent of Zambia's exports and they supplied her with 62 per cent of her import requirements (Republic of Zambia, 1985).

Zambia's dependent status in regional and global terms cannot therefore be contravened. Harvey identified the following features of the country's economic dependence at the time of political independence.

- (a) the dominance of copper,
- (b) the shortage of educated Zambians,
- (c) dependence on one international route,
the railway that runs through Rhodesia,
- (d) dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa for some
60 per cent of imports (Harvey 1973: 177).

The dependency theorists argue that essential economic reforms that a dependent nation might undertake in order to bring about self-sustaining and all-round economic development will not work unless it alters its links with the world economy. This is because a restructuring of the domestic economy will be opposed by the ruling class in the dependent country and the international bourgeoisie. The

dependency paradigm therefore prescribes a socialist revolution as the only way for the periphery to overcome its dependent status (Roxborough 1979: 69, Katz 1980: 32).

For example, it is argued that in Zambia, the economic reforms of 1968 and 1969 that created the huge parastatal sector did not lessen the country's dependence on international capitalism (Shaw 1976a, d, Burdette 1984a). On the contrary, the parastatals deepened and strengthened Zambia's ties with international capital. There was no concerted effort to diversify the economy and therefore move away from the heavy dependency on copper and apart from the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) which was built with Chinese aid, all the other parastatals had foreign partners from capitalist countries (Southall 1978: 118). Moreover, it is argued that the parastatals gave impetus to class formation that saw the emergence of a property-owning class that sought to dominate the state through its control of the means of production (Burdette 1984a). This class, it is further argued, stifled whatever socialist principles Humanism advocated in order to maintain a peripheral capitalism from which it benefits as a class (Shaw 1976a).

The interpretations of Zambia's foreign policy based on the political economy approach have therefore regarded the domestic economic structure, its external linkages and class formation as the basic determinants of foreign policy. In various works Shaw has argued that Zambia's foreign

policy is tailor-made to suit the Zambian political class and its benefactor - the international bourgeoisie.

The foreign policy of Zambia largely reflects the interests of the new ruling class and does not confront Zambia's collaborative ties with the global economy and multinational corporations (Shaw 1976a: 14).

The dependency paradigm regards the leaders of the dependent countries as servants of international capitalism. Indeed Shaw argues that internal inequalities are a reflection of the international division of labour (Shaw 1976a).

Elaborating on this point, Smith observes:

For what has occurred is that the local political elites in these areas have almost invariably structured their domestic rule on a coalition of interests favourable to the international connection. Thus it is not the sheer economic might of the outside that dictates the dependent status of the South but the sociological consequences of this power. The result as most dependency theorists see it, is that the basic needs of the international order must be respected by the South if this system is to continue to provide the services that the local elites need in order to perpetuate their rule in their turn. In other words a symbiotic relationship has grown up over time in which the system has created its servants whose needs dictate that its survival be ensured, whatever the short-term conflicts of interests may be (Smith 1979: 251).

Hence although the exponents of the political economy approach do concede that at the national level, President Kaunda dominates foreign policy decision-making they also maintain that he cannot afford to ignore the wishes of international capitalism since his rule depends on a coalition of economic and political forces favourable to that connection.

2.4. Theoretical Issues and Limitations of the Political Economy Approach.

The chief feature of the interpretations of Zambia as well as other African countries' foreign policies based on the political economy approach is that the world economic system is the more potent variable in determining an African country's international behaviour than internal economic and political conditions. Foreign policy is said to be a function of the international economic system because of the international division of labour which makes African countries play a subordinate role in international affairs (Shaw 1973, 1975, 1976a, b, c).

As pointed out above the political economy approach has absorbed the literature of dependency in order to explain African foreign policies (Shaw 1976d). On the one hand, such an approach is commendable, since as outlined above, it has established some important socio-economic insights without which research on Africa would be incomplete (Katz 1980). However, as Katz further points out:-

At the same time, underdevelopment and dependency theory has also produced some major theoretical errors and oversights of the highest practical concern (Katz 1980: 24).

It is to these 'oversights' that we now turn:

The political economy approach because of its incorporation of the dependency paradigm raises very important questions as regards the following which are interrelated.

- (a) the relationship between the international economic system and international politics;
- (b) the relationship of the post-colonial state in Africa to
 - (i) internal class formation
 - (ii) the international bourgeoisie.
- (c) the integrity of Third World leaders,
- (d) the position of the peripheral state in the present world system.

Firstly, the relationship between international politics and international economic relations is problematic. Does the latter determine the former? According to Shaw that would seem to be the case.

The political economy of Zambia is a classic case of dependence and underdevelopment. The theme of this article is that the development and foreign policies of Zambia cannot be explained without reference to its inheritance and acceptance of dependence (Shaw 1976d: 3).

Levi (1970) while acknowledging that the Third World Countries play subordinate role in international affairs because of their underdevelopment and their political and strategic insignificance for the great powers, disagrees with the view that international economic transactions determine regional or international politics.

The empirical evidence does not bear out the claim that international economics determine international politics: foreign aid has not led to an alignment of

the recipient's foreign policies with those of the donors'..... In brief, while there is evidence that, under certain circumstances, economic interests lead to supporting political domination, there also is very much evidence that economics can function autonomously (Levi 1970: 244).

And Domiquez (1971) contends that the important features of international politics in the periphery stem from local circumstances peculiar to each subsystem in the peripheries. These features, he argues, are not mere extensions of politics in the centre. He goes on to state that the international system has allowed dependent nations to pursue foreign policies which they perceive are in line with their national goals and values.

A related problem is whether economic dependence automatically leads to political dependence as well. Organski (1958) disagrees with such a view and points out that one important difference between an economic dependency and political one is that the economic dependency has an international recognised sovereign government that has the option (though it may not choose to put it into practice) of appropriating the foreign enterprises that dominate its economy

This brings us to the element of free choice in international relations so much recognised by Reynolds (1973). He argues that this element of voluntarism on the part of a dependent nation has been ignored by dependency theorists. Reynolds goes on to state that dependency does not entail passive reliance on the part of the peripheral state on international capitalism but it is made up of a network of

bargaining situations between the periphery and the centre.

And in this connection, Vital (1967) calls our attention to one privilege conferred on the nation state by the present international system, namely that:

.....the conventions of sovereignty and legal equality and of international behaviour generally are such that it remains possible, even for a small client state, to rebel against the paramount power without violating international practice and habits of thought, and possibly, with some prospects of receiving support from other major states. The ability in principle to alter course and reconsider political and economic arrangements entered into past times is a fair test of political independence at an elementary level (Vital 1967: 184).

Indeed as Boli-Bennet (1980: 81) rightly contends economic dependency does not mean that the peripheral state is politically immobilised as well.

By relying so heavily on the structural features of the present international economic system to explain international affairs, the political economy approach is open to the charge of being economistic (Hettne 1982). Moreover such an approach assumes a mechanistic response on the part of the peripheral states to international events and gives the impression that the exponents of political economy approach do not appreciate the political aspects of the international system.

With respect to African states, Ingham (1973: 235) points out that if the international economic system was the decisive factor in determining the policies of the developing nations, then they did not appear to be a satisfactory

explanation why these states should adopt policies that were radically different when they were subject to similar constraints emanating from the world economy. For example, Malawi and Tanzania have very different development and foreign policies.

Moreover, Mazrui and Gordon (1980) point out that in the preceding decade, Zambia and Malawi had received the same amount of aid from Western donors but their responses to the white minority regimes were different.

The propensity of the exponents of the political economy approach to interpret events in economic terms exclusively can be illustrated by the detente exercise between Zambia and South Africa in 1974-75. Shaw and Mugomba (1977) and Eriksen (1978) ascribe this to the need for Zambia to have a reliable transport route through Rhodesia, the down turn in Zambia's economic fortunes during this period and the rise of an indigenous property-owning class. Yet the most important political event of the decade is hardly analysed in connection with the detente exercise. This was the Portuguese withdrawal from Southern Africa in 1974-75 that changed the political and strategic map of the subregion and led to a change of tactics on the part of both the remaining white minority regimes and the independent black states (Seiler 1980)⁶.

Secondly, another important question raised by the dependency paradigm is the relationship between the state and

the dominant class(es) in a post-colonial social formation. Those who explain Zambia's international behaviour through the dependency theoretical framework assume that class formation in Zambia has produced a ruling class that controls the state with help from international capitalism. However, by assuming that the various bourgeoisies-local and foreign-control the state, the exponents of the political economy approach side-step the lively debate that surrounds the role of the post-colonial state in Africa. As Sandbrook rightly points out:

If the state in advanced capitalist countries possesses some autonomy from society, this independence is typically even more pronounced in the circumstances of post-colonial Africa. Dominant classes are not only recent creations here, but they have also depended upon the state for their emergence. Characteristically, there has been an inversion of the usual relationship between economic and political power; those who control, or have influence upon, the state apparatus have often sought to translate their political into economic power, thereby joining the indigenous bourgeoisie (Sandbrook 1982: 80).

The dominant role of the state in both the economic and political affairs is also noted by Cohen (1981: 98).

In their study of the emergency of an indigenous bourgeoisie in Zambia, Baylies and Szetfel state that, this class gained ascendancy over the other classes and was vociferous in pushing its demands on the state. However, the two authors conclude that this new property-owning class was a 'junior partner' not only to international capital but also

to the state and could not be regarded as a 'ruling class' (Baylies and Szetfel 1972: 212).

By adopting the classic Marxist view, that the state must serve the interests of the economically dominant class in a polity, the exponents of the political economy approach largely remain silent about the salient features of class formation in Africa. As Samoff (1982) rightly observes, the international extension of capitalist production does not mean that the state has become a derived or secondary phenomenon in that in Africa and the rest of the world, it has assumed greater responsibility for accumulation and it has thus become a major actor in the organisation of production.

As far as foreign policy formulation is involved, therefore, it is not only enough to identify a dominant class but it is also important to show how this class influences the process of foreign policy-making as a domestic pressure group.

Another problem related to the one just discussed is the relationship between the peripheral state and international capitalism, or more specifically its corporate representative the multinational Corporations. The dependency paradigm assumes that international capitalism plays a hegemonic role in the peripheral state (Cohen 1981: 98). This is because the state personnel in the periphery relies on the multinational corporation for capital, technology, expertise and markets. It is assumed that the indigenous ruling class cannot maintain its rule without assistance from international capitalism.

It is therefore argued that the indigenous ruling class has to do the bidding of international capitalism (Shaw and Mugomba 1977).

However other academics have challenged this view. Kasfir (1983) points out that transnational corporations investing in Africa cannot treat their host countries as mere transmission belts but as independent actors with power to impose limits on their activities.

Leonard (1980) also points out that dependency theories fail to distinguish adequately between dependency on the international trade and marketing system and dependency on the multinational corporation. He argues that dependency on multinational corporations may be manageable especially where raw materials are concerned through negotiated nationalization. Dependence on the international trade and marketing system, on the other hand, is not negotiable. For a country that depends heavily on the export of raw materials there may be no option but reliance on the prevailing international market conditions.

Sklar (1976) states that no one should assume that collaboration with international capital on the part of an African state means that the state has forsaken its nationalistic goals in domestic or foreign policy.

In particular, I have observed that South African and American controlled mining corporations domiciled in the Republic of Zambia complied faithfully with Zambian national policies of economic dis-engagement from the white-ruled states of Southern Africa even

before the Zambian government acquired majority ownership of those companies in 1970. They did so at considerable costs to themselves and despite the fact that the Zambian policies in question were largely inconsistent with economic values and policies espoused by the directors of parent companies in South Africa and the U.S.A. (Sklar 1976: 83).

Thirdly another important problem raised by the dependency paradigm is the integrity of Third World leaders. According to this mode of analysis, classes in the South are made by and for international capitalism (Katz 1980: 40). This reduces the leaders of the Third World to puppets of the centre (Sklar 1979: 531). Indeed Shaw (1975) argues that the indigenous bourgeoisie is more responsive to its external constituency (the international bourgeoisie) than to the needs of the masses in their respective countries. And the indigenous bourgeoisie's acceptance of dependence though beneficial to it as a class, is inimical to genuine development in Africa (Shaw 1975, 1976d). Furthermore the need to protect the economic interests of this indigenous class and that of their masters in regional politics has meant that the Zambian leaders have resorted to hypocrisy in order to maintain a correct pan-Africanist posture on regional affairs (Shaw and Mugomba 1977: 407-8).

However, Zartman (1966) points out that there is no evidence suggesting that African leaders are such skilful actors or total liars that they cynically use ideologies without believing in them. If this was the case, he argues, they would be prisoners of their own belief - systems, forced

to follow or break ideological solidarity.

Another objection to the portrayal of Third World leaders as puppets of international capitalism is raised by Leonard (1980) who argues that dependency theorists do not appreciate the psychological desire on the part of the Southern elites for control and status and the distaste they might feel for dependence on foreigners.

And Pfalzgraff, Jr. (1974) points to the deficiencies of the dependency theories in dealing with irrational charisma or ideology and the propensity of some leaders to adopt cautious or aggressive policies on their own. Indeed Herman (1980) distinguishes between an aggressive and a conciliatory national leader. She states that an aggressive leader would pursue a foreign policy that is active, independent and inflexible. Such a leader would urge his government to be suspicious of the motives of other states and he prefers international relations to be conducted on his nation's terms. A conciliatory leader, on the other hand, would persuade his government to adopt a participatory foreign policy as he prefers collective actions and solutions to international problems.

Hence Sklar (1979), while recognizing the economic dominance of the North over the South, disagrees with the view that the upper class in the periphery is a mere product and puppet of the international bourgeoisie. He says that there is a large body of evidence showing the leaders of the Third

World defying their counterparts in the West. And if we go along with the view that Southern leaders are puppets of the North, he argues, then, it would follow that they are not really responsible for their actions. Such things as economic mismanagement and political oppression prevalent in the Third World, are not then the responsibility of Southern leaders but of their supposed masters in the North.

Fourthly, another important question raised by the dependency paradigm is the position of the peripheral state in the modern world system. The exponents of the political economy approach regard the imperatives of the present international economic order as the decisive factors in shaping the political and economic policies of dependent nations like Zambia (Shaw 1975, 1976a, b, c, Eriksen 1978 and Burdette 1984a). And in a recent work exemplifying the political economy approach, Shaw and Aluko point out that this approach emphasises:

Structure rather than ideology, exchange rather than diplomacy and class rather than personality (Shaw and Aluko 1984: x).

The result of such an approach is that the peripheral state is reduced in typical Marxist fashion to a mere administrative body of the various bourgeoisies in the centre and periphery (Smith 1979: 262). For example, Shaw (1976c) identifies offices of the international corporations and organisations and foreign missions in addition to State House,

UNIP, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the parastatals as authoritative actors in the making of foreign policy in Zambia. The external actors, the foreign missions, international organisations and branches of multinationals are said to be authoritative because Zambia is a dependent nation. While this argument is valid, what is not made clear is the exact relationship between the state and these external actors for two possibilities exist. It is either that the peripheral state is a mere tool of international capitalism or it is a sovereign organisation which external actors seek to influence through bargaining and mutual concessions (Wagner 1974). Most dependency theorists take the former view because they argue, the state in the periphery depends on international capital for survival (Smith 1979).

This brings us to the viability of the peripheral state in the modern world system and its strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis international capitalism. According to many dependency theorists the state in the periphery is said to be weak in relation to international and external forces. As one influential academic in this school of thought has written:

....the world-economy develops a pattern where state structures are relatively strong in the core areas and relatively weak in the periphery (Wallerstein 1974: 355 as quoted by Smith 1979: 263).

The 'real mover of international affairs' is said to be 'the dynamic of economic forces' not even the strong state in the international system can equal the power of the

international economic system (Smith 1979: 263).

Meyer (1980: 135) decries this endeavour to describe the world system:

....as if it were primarily a free world economy operating in the absence of a controlling world state or empire; as if it permitted the forces of economic progress and exploitation to operate relatively freed from processes of political control or redistribution. This conception is modified by the definition of states as major actors under, and implementers of, the economic forces involved. States then enter the analysis as competing economic actors: central ones are capitalist; peripheral ones as proletarian or peasant. World politics is simply a direct reflection of world economic relations; a network of economic relations among competing nation-states along with a few other organizations (Meyer 1980: 113-114).

Meyer goes on to state that if the above argument reflected the reality of the present world system, the following consequences would have ensued.

Firstly, there would have been 'great organisational instability'. This would have been so because those states that did well economically would expand their boundaries and absorb bankrupt states in the manner of firms that are taken over by more powerful rivals. However, Meyer argues that this has not happened. Even weak and poor states in Africa have managed to maintain their colonial boundaries and organisational structures.

Secondly, while the international division of labour and inequalities persist, these aspects would have been greater were the World economy autonomous. However the reality is that industrial and service activity have increased in both

the periphery and the centre at approximately similar rates (Meyer 1980).

Thirdly, bankrupt states that are wards of the international economic order would be subordinated to or taken over^{by} the powerful transnational actors. Meyer points out that this has not occurred.

Fourthly, states in the centre would become stronger in their societies while states in the periphery would become weaker to reflect their positions in the world economy. However, this has not occurred. States in both rich and poor regions play an increasingly active role in their societies. This is reflected in the increasing amounts of revenue that the states in the core and periphery extract from the world economy (Meyer 1980). From 1910-1970 as Figure I shows government revenue as a percentage of national income rose from 11.5% to 24.3% and government revenue per capita increased fourfold from \$26.8, to \$106 (US dollars).

Fifthly, societies would adopt policies and institutions to suit their 'class' positions. States at the centre would modernize while those in the periphery would progressively become backward. However, both rich and poor states pursue broadly similar aims in regard to government, education, urbanization and other state services (Meyer 1980).

In addition the international capitalists are not recognised as legitimate actors in international politics.

The long-distance traders - in particular the




Fig. 1 Government revenue as a percentage of national income GR/Ni and government revenue per capita GRPC, 1910-1970 (independent countries only). GR/Ni (left hand scale is represented by—; GRPC (right-hand scale) is represented by-----.

NUMBER OF CASES STUDIES OUT OF INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES							
	1910	1920	1930	1938	1950	1960	1970
GN / NI	23	23	26	29	56	94	112
GR PC	51	53	55	55	65	102	132
Total Number of Independent Countries	56	66	68	67	82	113	142

Source : John Boli-Bennet (1980) "Global Integration and the Universal Increase of State Domumance, 1910-1970" in A. Bergesen (ed.) Studies of the Modern World-System, Academic press, New York page 78. (with minor modifications

multinational corporations that embody this process-are delegitimated, and states attempt direct controls over them. As it were, there are the Jews of the modern world polity; they are perceived as necessary, powerful, wealthy, but stigmatized in important ways as illicit pariahs. Attempts are made to ghettoise them and to restrict their bases of operation, control them, and separate their structures and values from the local population (Meyer 1980: 130).

Meyer then concludes that world political rules counteract powerfully some of the forces of exchange dependence built in the world economy (Meyer 1980: 134).

2.5 Conclusion

These limitations and theoretical issues discussed so far point to the fact that as far as foreign policy making is concerned in an African state it is not enough to assume that "the all-powerful" President is the sole source and inspiration of foreign policy formulation as the idiosyncratic approach argues. On the other hand, it is also not enough to assume that the political class in a dependent nation like Zambia merely does the will of international capitalism because of its economic interests. These two approaches are based on preconceived assumptions that do not explore in detail the relationship of various bourgeoisies to the state. As Kasfir rightly points out:

The important questions concern the limits within which classes can make effective use of states and the extent to which states possess the capability to act independently of either

internal or external social structures:
be they classes..... multinational corporations
or international agencies (Kasfir 1983: 1).

The next chapter will discuss Zambia's political
economy in order to throw light on these questions.

NOTES ON CHAPTER TWO

1. Wolfers (1962: 3) states that to theorize about any aspect of international relations is to engage in controversy. Rosenau and Knorr (1969) and Rosenau (1971: 9-19) also state that the field of international relations is characterized by much debate with regard to methods, approaches or theories to be used. Referring to this controversy in the study of international relations (Wagner 1974) observes that any critical work in this field is liable to the charge of attacking a strawman from some quarters. However, he goes on to state that such a work may be necessary to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of certain modes of analysis.
2. This approach has still got a great deal of attraction for some scholars see, for example, Woldring (1984).
3. According to Greenstein (1969) for an individual to shape events he must be strategically placed in an unstable environment. Zambia's domestic and regional environments could be said to be unstable during the period under study, see for example, Pettman (1974).
4. However, there are some academics who may argue that this conclusion is rather hasty where African states are concerned. For example Cartwright while welcoming recent studies that emphasize external economic relations for their broader perspectives and theoretical sophistication see as their main shortcoming the downgrading of idiosyncratic variables in African politics.

The dramatic shifts in foreign policy, in ethnic relations and in the personal security of citizens that have so often come about because of a change in regime underline the susceptibility of a leader's personal influence displayed by African states.... (Cartwright 1977: 435).

5. The extent to which a leader may mould the international behaviour of his country is hard to determine. Duchacek seems to have put the problem in a nutshell when he observes:

Two mathematically equal powers would represent quite different problems on the international scene if one were led by a Hitler and the other by a Ghandhi (Duchacek 1971: 196).

(This applies to leaders in dependent nations as well.

e.g. Gaadafi and Kaunda).

6. It is true that Shaw and Mugomba (1977) discuss the political implications of the withdrawal from the Southern Africa subregion in 1974-75. However, their analysis gives one the impression that it was the economic interests of the various bourgeoisies in the region that animated the political manoeuvres that followed the event rather than the imperatives of political change in the area.
7. In their criticism of the political economy approach Anglin and Shaw (1979) argue that it subordinates factual detail to theoretical assumptions, as they argue, it puts the theoretical cart before the factual horse (Anglin and Shaw 1979a: 21).

CHAPTER THREE

3.0. Changes in Zambia's Political Economy 1964-1980

In the preceding chapters two contrasting interpretations of Zambia's regional behaviour have been discussed. As we have seen, these interpretations raise a number of questions, the central one being the relationship of state personnel to the various bourgeoisie, local and foreign. As Cross has observed:

It is on this elite or political class that much of the new writing focuses: the assessment of the move towards the one-party state, the national ideology of Humanism, administrative and development policy and local level analyses all ultimately circulate around the perception of this group. While the general tenor is to see the political class in the fore front of battle, forging a new national destiny under Kaunda's leadership, what may be termed the avant-garde are beginning to question the whole basis of this perception. The single most important indication of the point in the spectrum from which Zambia's new men are viewed is the attitude towards Kaunda himself. Whereas the most uncritical admirers grant Kaunda a pre-eminent and uniquely progressive role, the avant-garde would see him more as a creature of the power structure subtended by the Party, in other words, is the political class the entrepreneurial national bourgeoisie of Marxian speculation, who play - despite themselves - a progressive role in the uplift of their society, or are they a passive and parasitic elite, masking their pursuit of power and greedy consumerism under a rhetoric of modernization and development? (Cross 1974: 110).

Since this question is central to the interpretation of Zambia's regional behaviour, a convincing critical study of the existing analyses of Zambia's regional policies has to

address the issues it raises in order to determine the foreign policy orientations of the Zambian state.

The purpose of this chapter is therefore to determine

- (a) the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Zambian state from internal and external classes.
- (b) the roles played by President Kaunda in Zambia's ideological, political, social and economic structure as they evolved during this period.

3.1. Mode of Analysis

As we have seen in Chapter Two, the relationship of the post-colonial state to internal and external classes is a difficult and controversial issue. Indeed, an adequate analysis of this problem has to be complex. However, in the interests of brevity and clarity, the features of state capitalism in Zambia will be discussed. These features are (i) economic nationalism (Hodges 1978: 87, Baylies 1982: 258-259), Shaw and Parpart 1983: 39), (ii) centralization of power (Ollawa 1978, Turok 1979), (iii) capitalist social relations (Meyns 1984, Tangri 1984), (iv) ideological incoherence (Martin 1972, Saxby 1980) and (v) economic vulnerability (Hodges 1978, Burdette 1984a, b, Meyns 1984). The discussion of these features, though it may not solve the problem of the Zambian post-colonial state, will at least delineate the milieu in which the country's regional policies

were formulated. In the discussion of these features recourse will be made to existing works on Zambia's political economy in particular and to some relevant theoretical works which deal with the problems of the Third World.

3.2. Economic Nationalism

Nationalistic impulses were the force behind state capitalism in Zambia: In the period 1968 to 1973, the Zambian government acquired controlling shares in the commanding sectors of the nation's economy (de Gaay Fortman 1969, Martin 1972, Burdette 1977, 1984c). The purpose of this analysis is not to assess whether the nationalisation policies were worthwhile or not (Libby and Woakes 1980, Burdette 1984c) but to determine how these policies affected the relationship between the state and the various branches of the bourgeoisie.

Zambia's economic nationalism took the form of acquiring 51 per cent shares in big companies apart from the banks. These nationalised enterprises were foreign-owned. The economic reforms were carried out within the existing capitalist framework (Baylies 1982). Radical neo-Marxists and dependency theorists reject such reformist measures. To them it is either a socialist revolution or continued economic stagnation and deprivation within the capitalist global system (Petras 1978: 84, Roxborough 1970: 69, Katz 1980 32, Sandbrook 1982:

78). The major thrust of the dependency theorists points to collaboration and subservience as the typical stances of state personnel in the Third World in their relationship with international capital (Sandbrook 1982).

These views are reflected in the interpretations of Zambia's regional behaviour based on the political economy approach which as we have seen in Chapter Two has incorporated the literature of the dependency paradigm.

According to Shaw (1976a) the relationship between the indigenous ruling class and the global economy is not predetermined and the ruling class can bargain for a greater share of the surplus produced from foreign investment through such measures as economic reforms. However, he sees a clear hegemony of international capital over the ruling class. The reason for this is that the ruling class cannot maintain its rule without support from the international bourgeoisie.

Although the relationship between Zambia and the world is characterised by unequal exchange, the Zambian elite is able to attract sufficient capital and patronage to perpetuate its national control. The hegemony of rich states is assured by their superior economic and technological performance and by the associated dependency of the Third World on foreign capital, skills, technologies and markets. Nevertheless, to insure continued access to raw materials and markets, rich states are now prepared to enter into a collaborative relationship with new elites in new states. Although the ruling class of Zambia is a junior partner in such joint ventures, its participation is crucial because of its formal control over the state apparatus. To secure its co-operation, foreign interests offer attractive terms which insure the continued dominance of the new elite on domestic politics. A symbiotic relationship is thus achieved between the rich in the periphery

and in the rich states; the losers in such a structure are the poor in the Third World (1976a: 4).

Economic reforms therefore merely means that the political class has formal control over the national economy while effective control remains with the international capitalist enterprises. In Zambia, joint enterprises between the state and foreign capital in the form of a dominant parastatal sector has prevented the rise of a genuine indigenous bourgeoisie (Shaw 1976b).

Burdette (1984c: 27, 51) talks of a 'a symbiosis' between the political class and international capitalism in an almost identical manner to that of Shaw. She also argues that the political class cannot remain in power without the support of international capital. The economic reforms were not meant to end the dependence of the political class on international capital but rather to acquire control of the means of production so that the political class could have access to a larger slice of the surplus produced in the economy (Burdette 1984c: 52). While Burdette (1984a) states that the political class is not totally submissive to international capitalism, the significance of this is not explained since the author states that the political class is merely a governing class; the ruling class (the international bourgeoisie) was outside the country but does not explain how this ruling class controls the governing class at the political level.

This new class [the political class] lacks economic power, therefore it was a governing class. The ruling class was composed of international mining companies and related financial institutions (Burdette 1984a: 202).

In summary, then, the relationship between the Zambian political class and international capitalism is characterised by collaboration and subordination on the part of the former. To bring about meaningful development, these writers opt for a curtailment of the subordinate relationship on the part of the peripheral African states. Thus, Shaw (1975, 1976a) argues that if Africa is to develop, the cord between the parasitic indigenous ruling classes and the world capitalist system has to be cut.

However, other academics have argued that the relationship between a host government and the multinationals operating in its territory is not governed only by the mutual interests of the rich in both poor and rich countries. Other important considerations have to be taken into account by host governments.

The fact that multinationals have come to dominate capitalist production in modern times has meant that collaboration with them by states has become an essential feature of international economics despite the political differences that divide governments. As Keohane and Ooms have noted:

Although this debate is by no means irrelevant, it does miss the key policy question faced by governments confronting multinational enterprises. This is rarely the simple query, should there be

direct foreign investment? or even should multinational firms be allowed to operate in our country? Rather the critical question focuses on the conditions under which various types of direct foreign investment should be allowed. Almost every government in the world, including communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, attempts to entice foreign capital. Yet no major government allows unrestricted, unregulated foreign direct investment, and some establish very strict conditions. Thus governments agree that foreign investment, can, under some conditions, be beneficial, but that the effects cannot be optimized without developing explicit policies.¹

Governments, in contrast to academic "scribblers" must take the world as it is and must therefore consider alternatives (Koehane and Ooms 1975: 170).²

And Rosenau observes that:

Penetrated systems are characterised by a shortage of capabilities on the part of the penetrated society and that an effort to compensate for or take advantage of, this shortage underlies the participation of non-members in its politics (Rosenau 1971: 130).

In this connection, various analyses of Zambia's economic reforms have noted the Zambian government's desire for effective control over the economy was thwarted by a critical shortage of educated Zambians with modern skills (Simwinga 1975, Saxby 1980, Baylies 1982).³

These observations would seem to suggest that it was not only the interests of the political class and the international bourgeoisie that facilitated collaboration between the two but other important factors were at play as well, such as the Zambia's lack of skills necessary to run a modern economy on either capitalist or socialist lines (Martin 1972).

Mazrui (1981) points out that the adoption of socialism by a Third World country does not facilitate the economic exit of that state from the world capitalist system. He gives examples of countries like Mozambique, Angola and Cuba that have introduced socialism into their societies but are still dependent on the international capitalist system as a market for their goods, or a source of technical or financial assistance. This would seem to indicate that collaboration between a Third World state and multinational enterprises and agencies can transcend political differences.

In the arguments advanced by Shaw, collaboration with multinationals and other capitalist agencies is accompanied by subservience on the part of the political class. However other academics have disputed the high degree of dominance analysts like Shaw accord to foreign enterprises. Turok, for example, argues:

Where I part company with Shaw is in the degree of dominance he allocates to foreign interests. While it is a common cause and widely acknowledged that the multinational corporations prevent the ruling class in Africa from consolidating control of the parastatals, there is nevertheless, a substantial difference between the status quo ante and post-nationalisation. In the former case the multinational corporation is in complete control and this condition is closer to the stage called neocolonialism. In the latter, multinational power is indirect and limited, partly by the formal powers taken by the state, and partly by the socio-political aspirations and imperatives of the local ruling group. An internal ruling class with its own aspirations dominates rather than mediates the process of exploitation and accumulation (Turok 1980: 9).

And Petras (1978) contends that those dependency

theorists who uncritically apply the neo-colonialism/socialism dichotomy lump together all countries that follow a capitalist development strategy in the Third World although there might be substantial differences in the postures of those countries towards international capital. Petras (1983) distinguishes three such postures, the neocolonial, national developmental and the national popular. Petras states that national popular regimes in the Third World aim at eliminating foreign exploitation which was never the purpose of Zambia's economic reforms (Sklar 1975, Southall 1978), hence only two of his models the neocolonial and the national developmental are apposite to our discussion here. In the neo-colonial model of development international capitalist enterprises and agencies enjoy a hegemony in internal and external affairs. The indigenous ruling class is a mere front of the international bourgeoisie. In the national developmental model, on the other hand, the indigenous ruling class collaborates closely with international capital but the political aspirations of the host government in domestic and external affairs obtrude in this relationship. Hence such a government will attempt to regulate the activities of its foreign economic partners through various measures such as nationalization and increased taxation (Petras 1983: 19-219).

Although the economic reforms did not lessen Zambia's dependence on the global economy, they nevertheless significantly altered the tenor of Zambia's relationship with

international capital. With reference to the two Petras models above, Zambia could be said to have opted for the national developmental model rather than the neo-colonial one (Sandbrook 1982, Berberoglu 1983). Indeed Turok observe

However, despite all continuities, the present system of state capitalism does represent a distinct departure from the previous system. The contradictions with foreign capital are significant and the present state cannot be conceived, as was possible formerly, as the outright agent or instrument of an economic class located abroad (Turok 1980: 8).

The balance of power between the Zambian state and foreign capitalist interests cannot be determined on empiric grounds, therefore, it is subject to various interpretations depending on the paradigm used by the analyst. Nevertheless a careful reading of the analyses of economic reforms gives the impression that during the period under study, the political class was determined to use its political power to redefine its terms of dependence on international capital in line with its domestic and regional political aspirations (Martin 1972, Sklar 1975, Kalaluka 1979, Libby 1983, Tangri 1984).⁴

While the economic reforms altered the Zambia's state's relations with international capital, they also laid the foundation for the emergence of a property-owning class with bourgeois pretensions (Baylies 1978, 1982, Southal 1980), Due to the economic policies followed by the colonial government an indigenous bourgeoisie was nonexistent at the time of independence in 1964 (Baylies 1978, Burdette 1984a). The

leadership that took over power from the colonial authorities could be described as a motley group of teachers, civil servants, trade unionists and petty businessmen. Economic power still remained with people of European and Asian origin (Saxby 1980). We shall see later this group is akin to Petra intermediary stratum whose chief weapon is political power (Petras 1978).

Hence one of the major aims of the economic reforms was to assist Zambians in their entrepreneurial endeavours (de Gaay Fortman 1969, Baylies 1982). While the state sector became dominant, certain areas of the economy were reserved for indigenous Zambians. These measures mainly benefitted influential Zambians who moved from the party, civil service, army or police into the parastatals and later established careers as representatives of international foreign firms or set up businesses of their own in commerce or agriculture (Sklar 1975). By the latter half of the 1970s there was widespread agreement amongst analysts of Zambia's political economy that a dominant class was in the process of formation (Scarrit 1983).

The question that concerns us here is what impact this articulate, assertive and influential emergent 'bourgeoisie' with strong ties with international capitalism had on government policies during the period under study.⁵

Present analyses are divided on this question depending on their theoretical perspectives. As Scarrit observed in a review of these studies;

There is consensus that class formation, especially formation of an emerging dominant class, is taking place but is incomplete, that the emerging dominant class is divided and that sections or fractions of this class make alliances with other classes or their sub-divisions. There is disagreement over the base of the emerging dominant class, the nature of its sub-divisions and the exact nature of class conflicts and alliances in Zambia. The most significant disagreement is between Baylies and Szeftel who define class exclusively in terms of roles in production and virtually all the other writers, who define the emerging dominant class as being based on crucial political roles in combination with closely interrelated economic roles... For Baylies and Szeftel political positions or roles, unlike those in production, do not constitute a class because they are not capable of reproducing themselves. These roles have been used to create or at least greatly expand, an indigenous owning class which has the potential to reproduce and augment itself and will try to do so, continuing to use state power as an important resource. In their analysis, whether this class will become dominant and reduce state autonomy to an absolute minimum is an empirical question. For other analysts, a bureaucratic political class, section or fraction, variously conceived controls the state by definition, and uses it in conflict with other classes or fractions; the state can never be meaningfully autonomous from class forces. Most of these analysts see the owning class or fraction (national and petty bourgeoisie) as subordinate to the bureaucratic-political class or fraction while Baylies and Szeftel see the former as inherently more likely to become dominant because it is a true class (Scarrit 1983: 16-17).

However, while this debate amongst academics was going on, national and regional issues arose and the following factors were decisive in their resolutions.

1. The state was a source of jobs and loans that were the foundation of the emergent bourgeoisie (Baylies and Szeftel 1982: 200).
2. The emergent bourgeoisie was not united in political

terms because of educational, ideological and ethnic differences (Tordoff and Molteno 1974, Pettman 1974, Burdette 1984a, Wina 1985).

3. The centralization of decision-making power and the huge patronage resources available to the Chief Executive in the Zambian state (Baylies 1978, Ollawa 1978, Saxby 1980).
4. The ambivalence of President Kaunda towards Zambian businessmen (Beveridge and Oberschall 1979, Baylies 1982).
5. The establishment of the one-party state in 1972 and the suppression of any opposition to UNIP policies by coercive means (Shaw 1982, Shaw and Parpart 1983, Woldring 1983, 1984).

The overall effect of the above factors on the relationship between the emergent bourgeoisie and the Zambian state was that the state was able to keep the emergent bourgeoisie at arm's length (Baylies 1982). The use of state power therefore became a contentious issue between state personnel and the emergent bourgeoisie (Southall 1980, Woldring 1983).

One remaining question concerning the economic reforms is the role played by President Kaunda in their formulation and execution. The prevailing view from the dependency spectrum is that the economic reforms were utilized by the political class to consolidate its hold on power by acquiring

control of the means of production (Burdette 1984c). Since such interpretations are committed to class analysis, the role of individuals is ignored or given only scant attention. However, in the Zambian context President Kaunda played a leading role in initiating and implementing the economic reforms (Simwinga 1975 Martin 1972, Chaput 1976, Mulwila 1978, Saxby 1980).

Simwinga (1975) notes that the nationalization decisions were taken by President Kaunda without consulting his colleagues in the cabinet and the central committee because of internal fueds within UNIP. And Saxby observes:

In less than 18 months, then, with a few largely personal decisions the President radically expanded the economic presence of the state apparatus, so much so that by the end of 1969, the Zambian government had majority ownership of perhaps three-quarters of the capitalist sector of the economy (Saxby 1982: 547).

In view of these observations one can justifiably state that in order to understand the relationship between the international bourgeoisie, the emergent national bourgeoisie and the Zambian state, the preferences, the beliefs and perceptions of President ^{Kaunda} have to be taken into account.

3.3 Capitalist Social Relations

Even after the economic reforms, capitalist social relations are salient features of Zambia's political economy.

As we have seen, the economic reforms were carried out within the context of the capitalist system of production and distribution. Despite the fact that the state acquired a controlling share in major industries in the country, the economy was still run on capitalist lines. As Tangri observes:

Public ownership has done little to diminish dependence on foreign capital and know-how. In addition, the principles of Humanism as espoused by the Zambian leadership have hardly been furthered: Indeco has remained strongly oriented towards capitalist relations (including wage/salary differentials, managerial prerogatives, and/or the hierarchy of authority, limited worker control and market determination or profit calculation. Most importantly, public ownership has not led to the emergence of a new structure of production (Tangri 1984: 126].

And other academics have commented on the extremely uneven distribution of income in Zambia's political economy (Seidman 1974, Saxby 1980 Meyns 1984]. Fry 1979: 92] estimates that the top ten per cent of the population consumed about 50 per cent of the national income.

The continued dominance of capitalist social relations in Zambia's political economy has been attributed to the country's continued dependence on international capitalism despite the economic reforms (Harvey 1976, Seidman 1979, Meyns 1984, Tangri 1984]. And the strong presence of international capital in the country's economy has led to the embourgeoisement of the political class (Sklar 1975).

In summary, Zambia's state capitalism has been

characterised by the following:

1. 1 State ownership of all major enterprises accounting for the greater part of total investment.
 2. A largely unplanned, competitive commodity market governed by profit making.
 3. A class structure in which workers and peasants are in a subordinate position.
 4. An emergent bourgeoisie which straddles public and private sectors of the economy and acting in varying forms of collaboration with foreign capital, penetrates the commanding heights of the economy and political system, and
 5. The continuity and persistence of the system which is ensured by the mediation of state power (Turok 1980: 20).
3. The Centralization of Power

Given the dominant position of capitalist social relations reinforced by collaboration with international capital, the emergence of an assertive national bourgeoisie and the economic difficulties discussed below, some analysts who utilise the political economy approach concluded that economic imperatives forced the Zambian government to adopt an accommodationalist stance in regional affairs (Eriksen 1978, Burdette 1984a, b). As Burdette observes:

The deep features of production dependency and the various fractions' attempts to push the regime in whatever direction will permit their survival and perhaps even ensure some profits, will be the motivating forces in foreign policy decisions. This tendency is likely to create great strains in the region as the Zambian regime pursues conservative regional policies and takes a decidedly pro-capitalist global stance (Burdette 1984: 218).

However, other analysts have argued that during the period 1964 to 1980, the emergent national bourgeoisie and international capital were not able 'to push the regime in whatever direction' despite the growing embourgeoisement of the political class and mounting economic problems. These analysts have noted the discrepancy between the demands of the emergent bourgeoisie and state policies and have attributed this phenomenon to the centralization of decision-making power in the Zambian political system.

In the final analysis it must be concluded that such neo-colonialist tendencies as do exist in Zambia and find expression in foreign policy attitudes of the national bourgeoisie have not had a great impact on President Kaunda's commitment to the liberation of Southern Africa. To the contrary, the success of the costly disengagement policy is reflected in the independence of Zimbabwe. It would be reasonable to argue that this success might not have been achieved with a multi-party system in Zambia. It would have been easier for foreign interests to strengthen the emergent comprador class in such a system (Woldring 1984: 245).

Turok (1979) states that although the departing colonial power went to great lengths to establish checks and balances on the power of the Executive, these have been progressively removed and power has become more concentrated at the centre-point in the Executive over the years. In this connection, Pettman (1974: 38) states that mechanical restraints on President Kaunda's powers are weak. And Ollawa (1987) argues that the economic reforms and the introduction of the one-party state in 1972 enhanced President Kaunda's power and resources as a patron of the system: to reward supporters or to punish

opponents. For this reason, Woldring (1984: 240) describes Zambia as a 'benevolent monarchy', Shaw (1982) discusses the growing tendency on the part of President Kaunda to incarcerate his political opponents.

It can be said therefore that the Zambian state is actively interventionist in political and economic matters (Turok 1979). More especially state power is exercised by or in the name of President Kaunda. And political power in Zambia is not confined to conventional uses only but it is also utilized to regulate access to top executive posts in the parastatals and in local branches of multinational companies (Ollawa 1978, Baylies and Szeftel 1982, Shaw 1982) and in the granting of business licences and loans and access to sources of imports (Beveridge and Oberschall 1979).

As we have seen President Kaunda's dominant decision-making powers have been acknowledged on both sides of the debate. The crucial issue, therefore, is how the concentration of power in the Executive, affects the state's relations with the emergent national bourgeoisie.

Indeed for some analysts, the possession of great formal powers is important but of limited analytical value. What is crucial is the social base of that power. For example, in his earlier writings, Shaw (1976a, b) states that although President Kaunda did not approve of the acquisitive tendencies of the indigenous ruling class, he was permissive towards them because his regime depended on their support. As a result

the rising bourgeoisie were able to subvert the socialist interpretations of Humanism contrary to the ideological preferences of President Kaunda. In these earlier writings Shaw tended to portray the property-owning group in Zambia as a monolithic comprador class bent on establishing a peripheral capitalism from which it benefitted as a class. Shaw (1976a) states that there is a ruling class in Zambia composed of members of the Central Committee, Ministers, Members of Parliament, Parastatal Managers and Senior Civil Servants. Private businessmen, commercial farmers, professionals and 'the labour aristocracy' identified with the above group.

However, the political events of the second half of the 1970s showed that the Kaunda regime did not enjoy such a broad social base. The workers occupied a subordinate position in Zambia's political economy (Turok 1980) and the emergent bourgeoisie was alienated from the regime because of its socialistic pretensions (Baylies 1982). As long as the Zambian economy was strong the contradictions between the regime and the emergent bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the workers on the other, did not come to the fore because the regime strived to satisfy both groups. However, the onset of the economic recession in 1974 exposed the regime's political vulnerability because of its narrow social base.

This development has been recognised by Shaw in later writings (Shaw 1979, Shaw and Parpart 1983).

Indeed, in the second half of the twenty-year

period being considered here, intraclass antagonism say between bureaucratic and national bourgeoisie fractions or between labour aristocrats and other workers, especially the unemployed - may be more central, at least for politics, than interclass antagonism. Moreover, transclass Coalitions, such as that between the national bourgeoisie and labour aristocracy, may explain more about the political economy than interclass contradictions (Shaw and Parpart 1983: 24-25).

The hostility of the workers and the emergent bourgeoisie to state policies such as Zambia's stand on regional issues has been noted by other scholars (Beveridge and Oberschall 1979, Baylies and Szeftel 1982, Woldring 1983). These authors point out that President Kaunda came to regard members of the emergent bourgeoisie as a threat to him and his regime more especially that the 1980 attempted coup was led by bourgeoisie elements. The workers also were regarded as an opposition political force by the regime.

ZCTU has emerged as a de facto opposition party. Although still mainly concerned with working conditions and wages, it has often criticised general political matters (Woldring 1983: 74).

Bearing these developments in mind Southall (1980) and Shaw and Parpart (1983) contend that Kaunda's political base lay in UNIP. These analysts point out that President Kaunda has protected the Party from the demands of the emergent bourgeoisie and the workers to have the Party establishment reduced.

Despite the publicly acknowledged inefficiencies of the civil service, especially the parastatals,

Kaunda has defended this class against recent attacks by the growing indigenous business class and others. He ignored the Mwanakatwe Report's conclusions that "political structures are a serious constraint to efficiency" and had done little to alter either the organisation of the Party or its position in the economy. Indeed, Kaunda has systematically increased his own power and that of the party on which his political base continues to be founded, at the expense of other social forces, by extending effective state control over the means of production (Shaw and Parpart 1983: 31).

Southal also explains the contradictions between state policies and increasing embourgeoisement of the political class and growing dependency on international capitalism on Kaunda's independent political base - the Party, UNIP - whose elements, aspire to the ranks of the national bourgeoisie but lack the accoutrements of such a status and can only acquire them through their membership of the Party. As he writes:

If it is the case that the government is now slowly implementing the most important proposals of its explicit capitalist oriented wing and increasingly reflecting the wishes of foreign capital - the international agencies and its allies in the indigenous bourgeoisie - how are apparent political differences to be explained?.... It is in the Party that the President's power base is to be found. Within the Party are to be found individuals whose relative affluence continues to depend on the maintenance of their position. Unlike some members of the new bourgeoisie who have used their tenure of office to good effect in ensuring themselves an independent base for the future, these elements remain at least for the moment, dependent on the Party. Any cuts in the latter's machinery means cuts in the spoils available to them. It is the tension between the ones who have made it and those who aspire to do that, that is at the root of political differences.... (Southal 1980: 107).

If the Zambian state was not controlled by the emergent

bourgeoisie or the workers as the above discussion has suggested, then the issue that remains to be determined is the class nature of state personnel during the period 1964-80. As we have seen Southal (1980) and Shaw and Parpart (1983) state that the Kaunda regime has its social base in the Party, UNIP. Southal goes further and characterises the UNIP elements as a group that aspires to be bourgeoisie but has not achieved that status yet. One can therefore say that the social stratum that imposed state capitalism on Zambia does not correspond to any of the classes described by Marx.⁶ The emergence of such a social stratum to political pre-eminence at certain moments in the history of the Third World has been noted by Petra (1978) and he calls such a stratum an intermediary one. He states that the intermediary stratum cannot be said to be bourgeoisie because it does not own the means of production, neither can it be characterised as a working class because it does not operate the means of production. As he writes:

State-capitalist oriented strata lack an independent socio-economic base of any importance. Whatever 'property' they own is incidental to their political and social power. Their key weapon is political capacity: their ability to take hold of the state machinery, alter the distribution of social power, and re-organise the economy (Petras 1978: 91).

In the case of Zambia, as the above discussion has shown such ambiguities of the class position of state personnel as exemplified in the ideological stance of President Kaunda

became a source of political conflict between UNIP on one side and the workers and the emergent bourgeoisie on the other, which culminated in an attempt to seize power in a coup by the property-owning group in 1980.

3.5 Ideological Incoherence

Many commentators on Zambian Humanism, the official ideology of the party and government., have noted its ambiguity. Scarritt (1971) states that the exact meaning of man-centredness, the basic tenet of the philosophy, is hard to ascertain. Martin (1972) points out that Humanism can be used on both sides of an argument; it could be used to support either the capitalistic or socialistic inclinations. The result of this ambiguity is that the country's ideological goals are not clear. For instance, while the government is said to be committed to the establishment of a socialist society, capitalist social relations have been promoted rather than discouraged by government policies (Sklar 1975, Saxby 1980). The result of this ideological incoherence is ambivalence in key areas of policy. A number of examples can be cited.

1. The leadership code had not been effectively implemented.
2. Nationalisation had led to state capitalism and increased dependence on multinational corporations. Parastatals seek profits in preference to public welfare.

3. Vascillating policies towards Southern Africa
(Scarritt 1983: 22-23).

Shaw (1976a, b) has attributed this ideological incoherence to the emergence of a bourgeoisie class with connections with international capitalism. This class, he argues, was opposed to the radical interpretation of Humanism and has instead implemented a peripheral capitalism from which it and its ally - the international bourgeoisie benefit.

While other analysts would agree with Shaw that class formation has thrown up an emerging dominant class, they assert that this group did not acquire the power and ideological hegemony to stamp its unreservedly capitalist blue-print on Zambian society (Baylies 1978, Beveridge and Oberschall 1979, Baylies and Szeftel 1982).

The ideological incoherence of the Kaunda regime cannot therefore be attributed to the ideological hegemony of a national bourgeoisie bent on legitimizing its exploitative rule. Rather this incoherence should be sought in the following:

1. the beliefs and personality of President Kaunda,
2. the values held by the Zambian state personnel,
3. the ideological propensities of state capitalist regimes in the Third World.

The factors are elaborated upon below.

3.5.1. The Beliefs and Personality of President Kaunda

Part of the explanation for the ambivalence found in Humanism can justifiably be sought in the character and beliefs of President Kaunda. This is because the founding texts of the philosophy are written by the President and ambivalence is their hallmark. The ambivalence of these texts on critical national issues have been commented upon by (Tordoff and Molteno 1974, Shaw 1976a, Baylies 1978, Saxby 1980, Baylies 1982). Hatch (1976) observes that policy details have remained vague in President Kaunda's exposition of his humanist doctrine. The following is a typical Presidential ideological pronouncement:

Zambia's destination is neither capitalism nor orthodox socialism. Some of our critics and observers in the world..... have wondered or asked whether we are going capitalist or socialist in the orthodox sense. The answer is clearly, neither (Kaunda 1970: 49).

Several commentators have identified religion (not socialism) as Kaunda's strongest belief and his guiding principle (Hall 1969, Hatch 1976).

Two elements in Kaunda's character should be understood. First, he is profoundly religious; second, he sees himself in a long-term perspective, as an agent for changes which will eventually bring society to a state of perfection, but which he will probably not live to see (Hatch 1976: 88).

Indeed the most advocative of socialism of President Kaunda's works (Kaunda 1974) exhibits his strong religious

beliefs to which socialism is subordinated. In this work, socialism is said to be a stage of development on the road to Humanism, the final and perfect level of human existence-God's Grand Design for Man. The effect of strong religious beliefs of its author on Humanism is that it is long on moral condemnations of such perceived evils as economic exploitation and racism but critically short on the appropriate political strategies to rid Zambia and the Southern African region of such evils. President Kaunda is said to prefer a persuasive to a coercive style of leadership (Tordoff and Molteno 1974). Given the fact that the reins of power are concentrated in the hands of the President, the vagueness of his philosophy led to a situation in which the strongest economic forces, international capitalism and the emergent bourgeoisie consolidated their positions in Zambia's political economy. Like in all revolutions, force applied by the political leadership would have been necessary for the triumph of Humanism.

We are forced to the conclusion that Humanism cannot be taken much further unless the level of coercion is increased. Humanism involves a revolution in values of Zambian society and, therefore, a frontal attack on the interests of the middle class (Tordoff and Molteno 1974: 398).

3.5.2 The values of State Personnel:

We have seen that President Kaunda's political base lies in the party, UNIP, which is the source of state personnel.⁷ A study of the values held by senior government and Party officials (Scarritt 1971) found that this group shared

Humanism's ambivalence on key economic and political issues. Scarritt found that while this group favoured political equality in terms of democracy, defined as periodic elections rather than complex procedures; it did not support absolute economic equality although indigenous millionaires were to be discouraged.

These political and economic values have taken concrete form in the evolving structure of Zambia's political economy. This is reflected in the establishment of the one-party state in 1972 and the two-pronged strategy employed in the implementation of the economic reforms: a dominant state capitalism which however left ample room for members of the political elite who wanted to enter private business. This was justified by Humanism despite its socialist tone. Indeed Humanism's ambivalence facilitates the transition of state personnel to the ranks of the emergent bourgeoisie. It is significant that while the political elite opposes a radical interpretation of Humanism (Tordoff and Molteno 1974, Shaw 1976a) the most ominous threat to the ideology has not come from this group but from those "who have made it" the emergent bourgeoisie who regarded Humanism as an impediment to their progress (Woldring 1983).

3.5.3 The Ideological propensities of state capitalist regimes in the Third World.

In order to put the ideological incoherence of the

Zambian state in a wider context, recourse will be made to Petras (1978) who has offered persuasive perspectives on state capitalism in the Third World. Petras states that the driving force behind state capitalism in the Third World is an intermediary stratum which emerges from the administrative structures that supervise mineral or agricultural expansion in the periphery.⁸ This group therefore lacks close ties with imperial capital or an indigenous property owning class where it exists. Indeed the key weapon of the intermediary stratum is its possession of political power which it uses to reorganise the economy. Its class position enables it to play an antiimperial role and its populist language enables it to attract working class support.

However, state capitalism does not alter the position of the working class in the system of production - capitalist - social relations still prevail. While state capitalism is based on a degree of nationalization of imperial capital, the intermediary stratum is still dependent on the international bourgeoisie with whom it shares the desire to maximize the exploitation of the working class. Slogans about labour discipline and increased productivity abound in the speeches of state-capitalists and heavy restrictions are placed on the operations of the trade unions.⁹

However, despite its collaboration with international capital, a state capitalist regime cannot be categorised as neocolonial since its raison d'etre is the limitation of imperial influence. On the other hand, it cannot be socialist since

the regime strives to establish a political base that is "above" the workers and peasants. Petras points out that in order to survive such a regime will avoid conflicts with both imperial capital and the working class but will not hesitate to form alliances with the right if attacked by the left or with the left if attacked by the right. Hence its zig-zag political course.¹⁰ Indeed the ideological hallmark of a state capitalist regime is that it employs collectivism without redistribution; it borrows socialist forms; politically - the one party state and economically - central planning to achieve capitalist ends (Petras 1978: 84-102).

Bearing the above discussion in mind, one can justifiably conclude that the apparent ideological incoherence of the Zambian regime during the period under review is not due to collusion between the emergent bourgeoisie and international capitalism in order to facilitate their exploitation of the Zambian masses but rather this incoherence largely reflects the values of President Kaunda and his supporters in UNIP who opted for state capitalism as a form of development. State capitalist regimes are characterised by ideological ambivalence because they use socialist forms to achieve capitalist ends. This is because state capitalists often come to power on a wave of popular discontent with colonial rule, traditional and/or neocolonial governments. Seeking to maintain their initial mass appeal, such regimes resort to populism; hence they find socialist forms and rhetoric appropriate. This in turn reflects the class position of state personnel in these

regimes who are neither bourgeoisie or working class in background but are products of administrative, military and intellectual establishments in the periphery.

3.6. Economic Vulnerability

As we have seen state capitalism did not lessen Zambia's economic dependence on international capitalism. Hence economic vulnerability due to unequal terms of trade in the world economy has been a prominent feature of Zambia's political economy (Meyns 1984).

This economic vulnerability is primarily reflected in unstable copper prices on the world capitalist market. Copper overwhelmingly dominates Zambia's economy but the contribution of the copper industry to overall national development has been unreliable because of fluctuating prices. This fact is illustrated in Table I which shows the contribution of copper to Gross Domestic Product, government revenue, exports and employment in the period 1964-80.

It is apparent from the table that the post-independence economic boom based on high copper prices has been followed by a slump in copper prices and an inevitable financial crisis. This was reflected in the critical lack of foreign exchange to service Zambia's import dependent industries and services. Economic decline manifested itself in the following ways:

1. The closure of industries and the loss of job opportunities (Hodges 1978).

2. A sharp reduction in government spending.
3. Resort to the International Monetary Fund (Hodges 1978, Ericksen 1978, Burdette 1984).

These economic difficulties have had serious political consequences for the regime.

When the copper prices were high and the economy was booming, the political scene in Zambia was characterised by polyclass euphoria for the regime because the government had the resources to implement the populist aspects of its ideology. This meant expanded welfare services and cheap subsidised food especially for the urban dwellers. The economic boom also benefitted Zambian businessmen since they could acquire loans and foreign exchange to import their requirements.

However, the fall of copper prices has meant a reduction in welfare spending, a cut in subsidies and scarcity of foreign exchange. This has led to the alienation of both the emergent bourgeoisie and the workers from the regime. Petras notes that workers' support for a state capitalist regime is tenuous.

On the other hand, the workers support - to the degree that it exists - is not based on any change in the relations of production but on promises of increases in consumption: when the state-capitalists restrict consumption they terminate the "populist" aspect of their politics and henceforth must rely on coercion (Petras 1978: 99).

The attacks on the Zambian government by the emergent bourgeoisie and the workers and the heavy-handed response of the state have been noted by Shaw (1979: 82) Shaw and Parpart

(1983] and Woldring (1983]; hence showing the narrow social base of the Kaunda regime - characteristic feature of state capitalist regimes (Petras 1978).¹¹

The resort to the IMF in 1972 has also severe implications for state capitalism in Zambia. Its initial vigour and assertiveness has given way to stagnation, increasing dependence and indebtedness. Table Two shows that as Zambia's foreign exchange position worsened, resort to the IMF's Special Drawing Rights became an annual necessity. As Hodges observes:

The direction in which the economy is now heading is to discard economic nationalism (which had largely ceased to work and Zambia seems headed to a more familiar pattern among African countries, run more overtly by the dictates of the consortia of and agencies of western bankers and governments (Hodges 1978: 87).

The economic and political experiences of the Kaunda regime discussed above indicate that it was following the trajectory of state capitalism in the Third World. This trajectory shows that state capitalism is of a transitory nature because it does not lead to a fundamental change in the relations of production (Petras 1978), but maintains capitalist social relations.

3.7. Conclusion

In this chapter an attempt has been made to discuss the domestic context in which Zambia's foreign policies were

TABLE 2

Trend of Foreign Exchange Reserves (\$ mn; and year)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Gold	6.4	7.1	7.2	6.9	6.9	7.2	9.1
IMF Special Drawing Rights	0.2	-	14.3	18.4	22.3	13.8	15.8
Foreign Exchange	158.2	185.5	150.1	123.6	70.4	52.5	31.3
Total	164.8	192.6	171.6	148.9	99.6	73.5	56.2

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd. Quarterly Review
of Zambia's Annual Supplement 1979 Page 23.

made in the period 1964 to 1980. This was a period of social, economic, political, and ideological changes whose significance is still a subject of debate among scholars. However, the following points can be safely stated about this period.

1. The economic reforms, while they did not end Zambia's dependence on the global economy, indicate that the political class adopted an active bargaining posture in its relations with international capital in attempts to realise its political aspirations.
2. The Zambian state was controlled by a group whose political-economic project was not socialism but was also different from the class project of the emergent bourgeoisie who advocate laissez-faire capitalism. State personnel advocated state capitalism with ample room for the private sector.
3. This period was dominated by a masterful President whose ideological pronouncements were ambiguous. However, the personal orientation of the President had a great impact on the details of Zambia's evolving political economy.

NOTES ON CHAPTER THREE

1. The Zambian government has over the years promulgated certain conditions to regulate the operations of multinationals in Zambia. As Turok has pointed out:

There are licensing rules, foreign exchange allocations and numerous other rules and procedures to ensnare the private investor and businessman especially of the foreign variety. The hey-day of flagrant exploitation of Zambia's resources by foreign firms is over, and the extraction of surplus which goes on now is a much muted version of foreign exploitation (Turok 1980: 17).

And Ndulo (1971) states that it is mandatory that any foreign investor wishing to open a new mine in Zambia must acquire indigenous partners.

2. The alternatives that faced the Zambian government over the nationalization of the copper mines are discussed in Martin (1972). He argues that the alternative adopted by the government (collaboration with the mining companies) was based on a realistic appraisal of certain key factors such as skilled manpower requirements that the mining companies commanded.
3. Jolly (1971) notes that at Independence in 1964, Zambia had only about 100 graduates and about 1000 secondary school leavers, Turok (1980) points out in Zambia, ownership control was achieved by the buying of shares, political control was effected by means of controlling appointments to top positions in the parastatals. However management control remained the most difficult since the country lacked skilled and professional manpower to run industry independent of expatriates.
4. The divergent stands taken by the Zambian government and the multinationals on regional political issues while maintaining economic collaboration have been discussed by Sklar (1975).
5. Martin (1972) notes that the branches of multinationals operating in Zambia had no direct political leverage on the Zambian government.
6. It should be pointed out that an ambitious Marxist analysis of Zambian society covering the period under study in this thesis exists (Mudenda 1984). However,

Mudenda acknowledges analytical and theoretical problems in applying orthodox Marxist categories to the Zambian social-economic structure. The meaning of bourgeoisie has to be stretched to include senior party, civil service, military and parastatal personnel who are designated as the managerial/bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In contrast, Baylies (1978) does not classify state personnel including top **parastatal** executives as bourgeoisie. She argues rather that the bourgeoisie proper have been recruited from these groups. As she writes:

Analysis of the Zambian situation suggests that even though parastatal management officials control large scale capitalist organisations and in some cases exercise considerable power in determining the allocation of surplus generated within them, they do not constitute either a separate class or a fraction of the bourgeoisie. For the **group** of parastatal management officials in Zambia is a highly unstable one, perhaps even more so than the incumbents of the state apparatus taken as a whole (Baylies 1978: 967).

7. It should be noted here that the Party can be said to be an umbrella organisation for the parastatals, Army, Civil service and to a lesser extent the trade unions. There are frequent movements of top personnel across these organisations (Ollawa 1979, Mudenda 1984).
8. It has already been noted that it is not possible to accommodate the Zambian state personnel in the classical Marxist class scheme without stretching the definitions of these orthodox categories.
9. Sklar (1975) notes that in Zambia:

Various measures have been devised to ensure that the potential power of the unions will not be unleashed in opposition to official policies that call for wage restraints and intensification of labour. Such measures include compulsory affiliation of all unions with a supervisory central labour organisation, restrictions on the right to strike, a procedure for compulsory arbitration and the introduction of works councils designed to improve industrial discipline (Sklar 1975: 206).
10. The zig-zag political and economic policies followed by the Zambian government in the period under review have been documented by Scarritt (1983).

11. Petras (1978) points out that because of its narrow social base drawn from civilian and military public functionaries, a state capitalist regime has to adopt a one-party system or resort to military dictatorship in order to survive.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 Zambia's Response to the Rhodesian Problem

In Chapter Three, we saw that the debate about Zambia's internal and external policies revolves around two tendencies that became salient in Zambia's political economy in the period 1964-80. These tendencies are:-

1. The emergence of an assertive national bourgeoisie concomittant with the embourgeoisement of state personnel and the increasing dependence of the Zambian state on international capital.
2. The centralization of decision-making power in the hands of President Kaunda who became increasingly authoritarian.

We have also seen that interpretations of Zambia's regional policies depends on which tendency one regards as primary and decisive. Hence the political economy approach regards economic interests and class formation as being more crucial variables than idiosyncratic factors in determining Zambia's regional policies because it regards the first tendency as being in the ascendancy in the Zambian social formation. On the other hand the idiosyncratic approach while not insensitive to economic imperatives and other domestic influences on foreign policy, regard personality and ideology

as the basic determinants of Zambia's regional policies because they argue that the second tendency has made a critical difference in Zambia's regional behaviour.¹

This Chapter and subsequent ones will assess the validity of these interpretations by discussing the impact and interaction of these two tendencies on the formation and execution of Zambia's regional policies. For as Rosenau points out:-

To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To uncover processes that affect external behaviour is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognise that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other (Rosenau 1971: 31).

In this chapter the assessment exercise will be undertaken through discussion of:-

- (i) The interplay of economic and ideological factors on Zambia's stance on Rhodesia in the period 1964 to 1980.
 - (ii) 'Detente' with South Africa over the Rhodesian issue.
 - (iii) The political expression of class formation: Members of Parliament's reactions to and impact on Government's policies on Rhodesia.
 - (iv) The political expression of dependency: Anglo-American Corporation's impact on Government's policies on Rhodesia.
- 4.1. The interplay of Economic and Ideological factors on Zambia's stance on Rhodesia in the Period 1964-80.

Zambia became embroiled in the Rhodesian Independence

issue after 11 November 1965 when Mr. Ian Smith, then Prime Minister of Rhodesia (a self-governing British colony) announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) whose intention was to halt progress towards black majority rule.² For fourteen years until the Lancaster House agreement of 17 December 1979, the Rhodesian problem was the central issue in Zambia's regional policies (Kaplan 1974: XLVII).

Zambia's stand on Rhodesia was clear and simple: that there should be no independence in Rhodesia before majority rule (Hatch 1976: 101). In order to realise this goal, the Zambian government urged the British government of Harold Wilson to topple the Smith regime by force of arms and supported British-sponsored United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia.³ Since the British Government rejected the option of force against Rhodesia (Sklar 1975: 135, Anglin and Shaw 1979a: 113-154, Good 1973], it was the second alternative; economic sanctions, in which Zambia became actively involved, and which provoked differing interpretations from scholars (Hall 1969, Mtshali 1972).

This debate was sparked off by Zambia's colonial legacy and her unfavourable geopolitical situation. During the colonial period, Northern Rhodesia, as Zambia was then known, was developed as an appendage of the white-dominated Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. At the time of independence, Zambia was dependent on Rhodesia for its very economic survival because of the following factors:

1. Zambia lacked a strong manufacturing sector; it was developed as a market for Rhodesian and South African goods, hence at the time of Independence 62 per cent of Zambian imports came from the South (Bailey 1976: 21).
2. The copper industry, the backbone of the Zambian economy, was dependent on energy from Rhodesia in the form of coal from Wankie and electricity from Kariba, controlled on the Rhodesian side of the border.
3. Oil came from the Umtali refinery in Rhodesia.
4. The whites whose skills were vital to the copper industry were sympathetic to minority rule in Rhodesia.
5. Rhodesia Railways carried virtually all Zambia's imports and exports (Bailey 1976, Harvey 1976).

One observer wrote that although sanctions were meant to topple the Smith Regime in Rhodesia, they would undoubtedly disrupt Zambia's economy first:

And given Zambia's own economic dependence on Rhodesia and susceptibility to rebel counter attack, how could Wilson expect to bring down Smith without first shattering Zambia? UDI was a time bomb. The mechanism was triggered in Salisbury; but the explosion was in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt (Good 1973: 87).

Given these factors, Hall (1969) argues that Zambia was an embattled country because of its principled stand on Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies.

He states that such a stand was costly to Zambia because it was bound to provoke reprisals from the white minority regimes in the region who were not only militarily stronger than Zambia but also controlled the country's lifelines to the sea. Moreover, given the white regime's expressed desire for friendly ties with Zambia, the Zambian leadership was intentionally foregoing economic benefits that

an accommodationist stand would bring to Zambia. Hall ends by wondering whether the Zambian leadership could afford such policies at a time when copper prices were low which would spell economic hardships for Zambia.

A Mtshali (1971) and (1972) disagrees with Hall (1969) and argues that Zambia's stand on Rhodesia was motivated more by economic interests than by principles. He states that the policy of economic disengagement from the South was opportunistic not altruistic in that it took advantage of a regional problem to enhance economic development and formal independence. He goes on to argue that the establishment of enterprises like Zambia Railways, Zambia Airways, the Oil Pipeline, Coal and Sugar industries in Zambia gave the country a large measure of self-reliance and strengthened its formal sovereignty.⁴

"Consequently, its moral aversion, to UDI and the South in general coincides with its own interests. For this reason, one can describe Zambia's attitude towards the South as one of those rare instances where principle and profit meet (Mtshali 1971: 52).

It must be pointed out that both Hall and Mtshali attribute Zambia's stance on Rhodesia to the personality and ideology of Kaunda and to then prevailing high copper prices. Where they differ is in that whereas Hall argues that principles were upper-most in Kaunda's decisions Mtshali states that economic interests took the priority (Mtshali 1972: 275-276).

These two writers see a clear division between interest

and ideology. For example Mtshali (1970: 128) states that 7
Zambia's foreign policy is moralistic in its pronouncements
but self-serving at the operational level. Hence Mtshali
(1972: 279) argues that economic disengagement from the
South was principally meant to promote economic development
and Zambia's support for liberation movements was aimed at
promoting the national interest in that the country desired
to have neighbours who were ideologically acceptable and could
therefore be relied upon to provide transport facilities to
the sea.⁵ Hall (1969) on the other hand, analyses Zambia's
economic disengagement from the South and her support for
liberation movements mainly in ideological terms because
economic and military risks were inherent in such policies.
These risks were inimical to Zambia's national interest. \

Both writers marshal impressive evidence to support
their arguments.⁶ Hence it is futile to treat interest and
ideology as alternative policy determinants in the assessment
of the validity of their interpretations. Moreover, other
writers Good (1973) Sklar (1974) argue that interest and
ideology played a part in Zambia's response to UDI in Rhodesia:

To a degree.... the norm of real politic has prevailed.
Zambia has refrained from extreme measures that
might have entailed disastrous results at home without
producing the desired effect in Rhodesia, but revolu-
tionary idealism has a powerful claim of its own upon
the Zambian government. Nor could that claim be
denied without shattering the Zambian government's
valued image as an example of fortitude in the African
liberation struggle. Zambia has always been willing
to accept the economic and military risks of partici-
pation in collective action against Rhodesia, if they
are realistically designed to dislodge the white minority

regime (Sklar 1974: 362).

Mtshali (1972)'s argument that Zambia's policy of economic disengagement from the South promoted her economic development and formal sovereignty is well-taken. However, the same policy enhanced Zambia's ability to express her ideological hostility to the white regime in Salisbury through such action as supporting liberation movements. The minority regimes in the region were prepared to use their control over Zambia's economic lifelines to dissuade her from supporting guerrilla movements (Grundy 1973: 210). The most famous example was Rhodesia's border closure of 1973 because the Smith government alleged that Zambia was supporting freedom fighters (Arnold 1976: 34, Wilkinson 1978). Zambia was able to resist Rhodesian demands to stop supporting freedom fighters and avoid a repeat of the 1966 oil crisis because an oil pipeline from the port of Dar-es-Salaam to Ndola had been completed in 1968 (Arnold and Weiss 1977: 78).

In short, Zambia's participation in UN sanctions gave her a measure of economic independence from the South. This, in turn enabled Zambia to give concrete expression of her ideological hostility to the white minority regimes in Rhodesia. In other words, there was an interplay between economic and ideological factors in Zambia's response to the Rhodesian issue throughout the period under study. Anglin (1979) for example points out that the Zambian leadership was not prepared for example to subject the country to

crippling damage through military or economic reprisals from the South. He further argues that if that happened, then Zambia would be useless as a base for freedom fighters. And in October 1978, while ZIPRA, the military wing of ZAPU led by Mr. Joshua Nkomo, was waging a war of liberation in Rhodesia from their bases in Zambia, President Kaunda opened the border between the two countries closed since 1973 to allow in consignments of fertilizer badly needed for the maize crop, Zambia's staple food. In reply to Nyerere, Machel and Mugabe who were critical of this action, President Kaunda said that Zambia was not abandoning the liberation struggle but had acted out necessity (Keesing contemporary Archives 1979: 29441). This shows that there was constant interplay between ideology and interest in Zambia's responses to the Rhodesian problem. This in effect indicates the validity of the eclectic approach to the analysis of Zambia's regional policies adopted by the study. Analyses that tend to highlight either the ideological aspects (the idiosyncrotic approach) or the socio-economic aspects (the political economy approach) have to be selective in their choice of evidence and are therefore controversial. An eclectic approach, on the other hand, is comprehensive in that it takes into consideration all the dimensions of Zambia's regional foreign policy, contradictory as they are. Only in this way can a balanced and more accurate treatment of the country's regional policies be possible.

4.2 'Detente' with South Africa over the Rhodesian issue

The Mtshali thesis whose main argument was that interest took priority over ideology in Zambia's regional policies was supported and given additional dimensions by exponents of the political economy approach.⁷ These analysts attributed the Zambian political class's foreign policy attitudes to the country's dependent status in the regional and world economy, increasing economic difficulties and the interests of an emergent bourgeoisie that controlled the state and economy (Shaw 1976a, b, c, Ericksen 1978, Burdette 1984a). Like Mtshali (1970) these analysts see a clear division between interest and ideology in Zambia's regional policies. They argue that Zambia paid lip service to the liberation of Southern Africa while in reality the political class maintained its rule and promoted its interests by collaborating with international capital:

Forced by the rhetoric of liberation support to open its borders to liberation fighters, the government began a set of hypocritical and certainly ambiguous policies which interfered with internal disputes of the liberation forces and some times undermined their ability to fight. Some analyses of this period of Zambia's regional foreign policy accuse the state of gross duplicity. Rather it might be more accurate to accept that the new political class had its own material interests to protect. These interests tended to direct its action; principled stands had less and less appeal as an economic noose was being tightened around the country (Burdette 1984a: 206).

These interpretations were prompted by the era of 'detente' in Southern Africa. In 1974-75 Zambia's strategy was to

enlist the support of the South African government in forcing the Smith government to accept majority rule.

The period of 'detente' was distinguished by the fact that the Frontline states and South Africa agreed to cooperate to solve Southern African problems (Spence 1977). Zambia's leading role in the 'detente' exercise was interpreted by political economy analysts as the ascendancy of interest over ideology because of changes in Zambia's socio-economic structure. For example (Shaw and Mugomba (1977) argue that Zambia and South Africa wanted a neocolonial regime in Rhodesia that they could both live with. They state that the ruling classes in Zambia and South Africa did not want Rhodesia to fall in the hands of a radical regime since both countries were opposed to a radical restructuring of the region. They also point out that a radical realignment of the region would jeopardise the interests of the Zambian political class since radical regimes would upset Zambia's collaboration with international capitalism.

On the other hand, the primacy of ideology in Zambia's regional behaviour discussed by Hall (1969) is recognised by Anglin and Shaw (1979a) in their interpretation of Zambia's role and motives in the detente exercise.⁸ Anglin and Shaw state that by enlisting the support of South Africa to end the rebellion in Rhodesia, Zambia was not abandoning her ideological opposition to racial domination neither was she adopting an accommodationist stance towards the white minority regimes. Zambia's involvement in the detente exercise was a

matter of tactical bargaining. Zambia was prepared to support the armed struggle in Rhodesia if negotiations proved unproductive.

Analysts of either persuasion have marshalled evidence to support their interpretations. The political economy analysts cite the following factors as the basis for their interpretation.

1. Zambia lacked reliable transport routes (Shaw and Mugomba 1977).
2. The fall of copper prices and the subsequent loss of revenue to the Zambian government (Shaw and Mugomba 1977, Eriksen 1978).
3. The high cost of imported oil (Shaw and Mugomba 1977).
4. The emergence of a fraction within the political class that favoured coexistence with the white regimes (Eriksen 1978, Shaw 1979),
5. The political class's collaboration with multinationals like the Anglo-American corporation that favoured detente (Shaw and Mugomba 1977).
6. The increasing dependence of Zambia on the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Eriksen 1978, Burdette 1984a, b).
7. The Government of Zambia's increased diplomatic contacts with the South African government (Shaw and Mugomba 1977).
8. Zambia's imprisonment of ZANU leaders who directed the armed struggle in Rhodesia thereby rendering the struggle leaderless and ineffective (Burdette 1984b).
9. Zambia's support for the Smith-Nkomo talks in 1976 when other frontline states like Mozambique and Tanzania had opted for the armed struggle because of the intransigence of the Smith Regime (Shaw and Mugomba 1977, Eriksen 1978, Shaw 1979, Burdette 1984a, b).

The following are the counter arguments used by those

analysts who argue that Zambia did not abandon her principles during the detente exercises.

1. Zambia's primary aim was to bring about black majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia (Hatch 1976, Anglin and Shaw 1979a).
2. Zambia was implementing the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa since South Africa, the leading white power showed willingness to negotiate a solution to the Rhodesian problem moreover; South Africa was the de facto colonial power in Rhodesia (Mwaanga 1982).
3. Diplomacy was the only instrument of foreign policy that Zambia could employ to achieve her goals in the region since she lacked military or economic power.
4. Radical regimes like Tanzania and Mozambique were involved in the detente exercise (Hatch 1976).
5. The era of detente was short lived 1974-1975 (Osei-Hwedie 1983).
6. Elements of the emergent bourgeoisie that favoured coexistence with the white regimes were excluded from decision-making (Osei-Hwedie 1983).

In order to evaluate the accuracy of these two sets of arguments, the views of Mr. Chona who was closely involved in the detente exercise on behalf of the Zambian government, were sought. He unhesitatingly pointed out that both interest and ideological considerations motivated Zambia's contacts with South Africa over Rhodesia.¹⁰ In 1973, after receiving intelligence reports that a coup was imminent in Portugal, State House made a forecast that Zimbabwe would be under majority rule by 1978. When the Portuguese coup occurred in April 1974, State House made strenuous efforts to make its forecast come true. Zambia chose to talk rather than fight because negotiations seemed appropriate at this time given

Zambia's resources and the changed political situation in Southern Africa after the Portuguese coup.¹¹

Mr. Chona stated that Zambia was not involved in detente with South Africa. Zambia had specific and limited objectives in her contacts with that republic. These were:-

1. To urge South Africa not to intervene in Mozambique in support of the rebellious anti-Frelimo section of the white population. This would assist the then new government in Mozambique to establish its authority.
2. On Zimbabwe, Zambia wanted South Africa to ditch Smith and pressurise him in releasing the black nationalist leaders. This would lead to constitutional talks about majority rule in Rhodesia.
3. Move towards independence in Namibia.
4. To get the South African government to remove its soldiers from the border with Zambia. State House felt that the presence of South African soldiers on the Zambezi River was a threat to Zambia as it was highly likely that they would occupy parts of Southern Province especially the Gwembe Valley to stop escalating guerrilla infiltration into Rhodesia. So the protection of Zambia's territorial integrity was a vital factor. Mr. Chona also stated that in the event of the failure of a negotiated settlement over Rhodesia, then the removal of South African forces could over-stretch Smith's soldiers and this would make subsequent guerrilla incursions less hazardous.

The Chona version demonstrates that in Zambia's dealings with South Africa, interest and ideological motives were important and this resulted in an ambiguous regional policy whose contradictory aspects have been used by our two schools of thought to support their arguments.

Indeed some analysts argue that the priority that Zambia began to attach to economic interests manifested

itself in its support for certain nationalist leaders who would be more inclined to take care of Zambia's interests in an independent Zimbabwe for this reason Kaunda preferred Nkomo to Mugabe (Eriksen 1978).

However, according to Mr. Mwaanga, ZAPU had closer ties with UNIP than ZANU because the UNIP leadership thought that ZAPU was the majority party in Rhodesia and Kaunda and Nkomo enjoyed very good personal relations. As a result ZANU did not enjoy strong support in Zambia. Despite this, Mr. Mwaanga pointed out that ZANU was allowed to operate in Zambia because it was regarded by the Zambian leadership as a genuine liberation movement that wanted to eradicate white domination in Rhodesia.

Moreover, the Zambian government did not discriminate against ZANU in international fora. For example, it was at Zambia's suggestion that the OAU budget for the Zimbabwean Liberation movements was shared equally between ZANU and ZAPU. This improved relations between ZANU and the Zambian Government. In 1974, ZANU was allowed to open a front in the East of Zambia. At this time Zambia's policy was to deny that it assisted freedom fighters.¹² In 1976, Zambia met the expenses of the ZANU delegation at the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia.¹³

The misunderstanding between Kaunda and Mugabe stemmed from the advice President Nyerere, then Chairman of the Frontline States, gave to President Kaunda in 1974 when the nationalist leaders were released by Smith. Nyerere,

exasperated at the continuous in-fighting amongst the Rhodesian liberation movements was angry at the replacement of Sithole by Mugabe as the leader of ZANU while the two were in prison at a time when nationalist unity was at premium. Nyerere therefore, advised Kaunda not to allow Mugabe to tell the ZANU cadres in Zambia that he was their new leader. Mugabe took this as a hostile act by Kaunda towards him.¹⁴

Other factors influenced ZANU's decision to move to Mozambique:-

1. There was no river to cross between Mozambique and Rhodesia. A river forms a natural hazard in the face of the enemy.
2. The people who occupy the border areas between Mozambique and Rhodesia are Shonas therefore, it was easier for the Shona-speaking leadership of ZANU to find support among these people and mobilise them. On the other hand, the Ndebele, the source of Nkomo's support occupied the northern part of Rhodesia bordering Zambia, so Nkomo made his headquarters in Zambia.

The intra- and inter-party fighting in the liberation movements was due to ethnic rivalries not to the 'detente' exercise. The Zambian government became involved because these clashes took place on its soil.¹⁵

In 1979 Kaunda told Nkomo that Zambia's support did not go beyond the liberation of a country. In other words, the Zambian government would not be involved in any moves to install any particular nationalist leader as the President or Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. Nkomo replied that he had always understood that.¹⁶

In assessing the motives of the Zambian government for engaging in the detente exercise, it is apparent that there was an interplay between ideology and interest. It is undoubtedly true that an independent Zimbabwe would have eased Zambia's economic problems especially in the transport sector:

The closure of the Benguela railway changed a critical economic situation into a disastrous one. Zambia was forced to declare force majeure on 40 per cent of copper exports from Nchanga consolidated copper mines and 30 per cent from the Roan consolidated Mines. This was a calamity for the Zambian economy (bearing in mind that copper represents over 90 per cent of Zambian exports). And for imports the transport situation has been even worse. Long delays have been experienced for vital commodities, including vital materials for the mines. Shortages, inflation and unemployment increased directly presenting President Kaunda with an acute political problem. His involvement in the detente movement has been a direct result of the difficulties of the Zambian economy caused by the twin problems of the low copper prices and the high cost of transport routes (Burgess 1976: 43).

Shaw (1976c) states that detente promoted both Zambia's interests and ideology. However, detente as a regional policy for the Zambian government failed because it could not advance Zambia's interests and ideology simultaneously. The era of detente was therefore very brief.

By March 1976, it had already become clear that the detente exercise launched in 1974 had collapsed... (Arnold and Weiss 1977: 9).

Despite mounting economic difficulties, Zambia refused to be a part to solutions of the Rhodesian problem that did not accommodate her ideological principles. As a result by 1977

Zambia was openly supporting the Patriotic Front guerrillas fighting the Smith Government and she condemned the Rhodesian internal settlement of March 1978 that established Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1979 as the first black Prime Minister of the rebel colony because effective power still remained in white hands (Clough 1982, Roberts 1983). This shows that the Zambian leadership's principled opposition to white minority rule had a detrimental effect on the promotion of the country's economic interests in terms of detente. Had economic interests been the only paramount and motivating factor as some exponents of the political economy approach contend (Burdette 1984a, b) then President Kaunda would have adopted a regional policy of accommodation towards the white South as some Zambian members of Parliament, elements of the emergent bourgeoisies advocated.

4.3 The Political expression of class formation:
 Members of Parliament's reactions to and impact on
 the Zambian government's policies on Rhodesia.

The 1973 and 1978 General Elections brought to the Zambian Parliament a number of wealthy Zambians who, because of their business links with international capital and their expressed preference for laissez-faire capitalism, came to be regarded as the embodiment of the political expression of class formation (Eriksen 1978, Hambote 1980).¹⁷ And one important dimension of the political economy interpretations of Zambia's regional policies is that it was designed to

TABLE 3

OCCUPATION OF WINNERS 1973-78 AND GENERAL ELECTIONS

Occupation	1973		1978	
	No.	%	No.	%
Businessmen only	28	22.4	21	16.8
Businessmen/MP	19	15.2	12	9.6
Civil Servants	15	14.4	17	13.6
MP only	24	19.2	24	19.2
Wage/Salary employees	5	4.0	15	12
Teachers	9	7.2	6	4.8
Farmers	-	-	15	12
Party Officials	-	-	6	4.8
Others	13	10.4	5	4
Unknown	9	7.2	4	3.2
Total No.	125	100	125	100

Source: B.C. Chikulo, Electoral Politics in Zambia's Second Republic An Empirical Analysis, 1973-83.. A Discussion Paper. Department of Political and Administrative Studies, UNZA.

serve the interests of the political class or the emergent bourgeoisie (Shaw and Mugomba 1977, Burdette 1984a).¹⁸

As far as these MPs are concerned, however, it is generally agreed that they acted as critics rather than initiators of Zambia's regional policies. They urged the government to relax investment controls, to have open trade with South Africa and coexist with the white minority regimes in the region. They blamed Zambia's economic problems on its regional policies (Eriksen 1978, Shaw 1979).

Despite their criticisms, this faction of the emergent bourgeoisie was not able to change the course of Zambia's regional policies. For example, they failed to get the border between Rhodesia and Zambia opened despite their lobbying of the government (Anglin and Shaw 1979a). Many commentators are agreed that this faction was not decisive in shaping Zambia's regional policies. In these analyses only the theoretical weaknesses of this faction are given for its ineffectiveness. These are summarized by Hambote as follows:

1. The bourgeoisie was in its formative years.
2. It was divided along educational, tribal and ideological lines.
3. It did not control the state apparatus (Hambote 1980).

However, a decision was made by State House to exclude other political institutions like the National Assembly and the bureaucracy, from participating in decision-making on Southern African issues. State House decided that since

the problems of Southern Africa affected the security of the State, these had to be dealt with at the highest level of authority, which is State House itself. It was also decided that the number of Zambian actors should be limited to a small team which had the ability and speed to respond to crises. In addition, State House was afraid that a large number of Zambian actors would lead to leakages of confidential diplomatic moves aimed at solving regional problems like the Rhodesian U.D.I.¹⁹

Hence the diplomatic contacts on the Rhodesian issue were handled mainly by State House. As a result President Kaunda at times engaged in regional diplomatic exchanges that were kept secret from the Zambian Foreign Affairs Establishment or he made regional policy announcements that had not been discussed and endorsed by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs. Those Members of Parliament who criticised Zambia's stance on Southern Africa were threatened with vetting at the following General Election by President Kaunda during UNIP caucus meetings.²⁰

However, the political economy analysts argue that even though President Kaunda monopolized formal decision making, he had to accommodate the interests of the emergent bourgeoisie, for one aspect of the political manifestation of class formation was that his rule depended on their support.

If this was the case one would have expected the emergent bourgeoisie to have supported the government's

regional policies since these policies were beneficial to them. As Russet and Starr point out:-

If an economic interpretation is to have validity, we should expect that those whose interests allegedly are served by such beliefs will express themselves most frequently and/or most strongly. That is, if as assertive, aggressive, or vigorously anticommunist foreign policy does indeed serve the interests of the capitalist class, then we should expect capitalists to support that policy even more than do other groups of classes (Russet and Starr 1981: 233).

In the case of Zambia, exponents of the political economy approach admit that the country's emergent bourgeoisie regarded Zambia's regional policies as inimical to their interests and therefore urged the government to change course but to no avail (Eriksen 1978, Shaw 1979).

On their part, Beveridge and Oberschall state that Zambia's regional policies were not tailored to promote the interests of the budding Zambian bourgeoisie:

Both Zambia's ideology and its government were ambivalent about private enterprise, even that controlled by African citizens... At the same time, abrupt disruptions in established patterns resulting from the sudden changes of import, supply and credit policies brought on by a trade boycott of Rhodesia benefitted neither businessman nor consumer (Beveridge and Oberschall 1979: 274).

From the foregoing one can justifiably conclude that:-

1. Economic interests played a part in Zambia's diplomatic efforts to end UDI in Rhodesia but these interests cannot be narrowly defined as the interests of one particular class in the Zambian social formation.
2. Those Members of Parliament who had close links with international capital acted more as critics rather than

modifiers of the government's regional policies.

4.4. The Political expression of dependency:
Anglo-American Corporation's impact on
government policies towards Rhodesia.²¹

Political economy analysts argue that Zambia's collaboration with multinational companies promotes economic interests at the expense of ideology in its regional policies. For example, Shaw (1976c) argues that, given Zambia's dependent status, local branches of the multinationals are authoritative actors in Zambia's foreign policy making system. Eriksen (1978) states that there was a correspondence of interests between the Zambian government and the multinationals in pursuit of foreign policy goals for the region. And Burdette (1984a) pinpoints the copper companies as the most decisive influence on Zambia's foreign policies.

But in the final analysis, it is mining capital which dominated the colony and set the perimeters for colonial and later independent Zambian domestic and foreign policy (Burdette 1984a: 200).

In order to assess the validity of these arguments the Zambian government's regional stance will be discussed with reference to the regional objectives of the multinationals. The Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa (AAC) will serve as an illustration. The AAC has been chosen because of the following reasons:

1. It produced most of Zambia's copper - the backbone

of the Zambian economy (Hall 1969).

2. Its headquarters are in South Africa whose government made strenuous efforts to bring the Zambian government under its sphere of influence (Hall 1969, Anglin and Shaw 1979a).
3. The Zambian Government and AAC were close economic partners (Oppenheimer 1975, Kalaluka 1979).
4. It was actively involved in diplomatic moves in the region.²²

The objectives of the multinational like the AAC in the region are as follows in order of importance:-

1. To promote and maintain capitalist social relations of production (Sklar 1975, Torstensen 1982).
2. To develop the region as a common market for optimum exploitation (Southal 1978, Torstensen 1982).
3. To maintain a peaceful climate in the region, a pre-requisite for their business activities.²³

In regard to the first objective, the multinationals like the AAC have met with great success despite the anti-capitalist rhetoric of Humanism. As we saw in Chapter Three, capitalist social relations are a salient feature of Zambia's political economy and the mining companies played a major role in their promotion (Sklar 1975). Baylies (1978) states that despite the lack of an indigenous bourgeoisie at the time of independence, Zambia's dependence on and collaboration with multinationals tipped the balance of class forces in favour of a capitalist form of development.

Difficulties, however, arise with the multinationals' second objective: the development of the region as a common

market for optimum exploitation. During the colonial period, the mining companies were closely involved in the integration of Zambia's economy to that of Rhodesia and South Africa. They invested huge sums of money in the Wankie Colliery, the Kariba Hydroelectric project and Rhodesia Railways to facilitate their exploitation of Zambian copper. Indeed the mining companies opposed the building of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) to the port of Dar-es-Salaam (Sklar 1975).

Zambia's policy of disengagement from the South, because of her opposition to the white minority regime in Rhodesia, therefore, went against the long-established regional economic policies of the mining companies:

Zambia's militant reponse to the Rhodesian declaration of independence nullified certain basic assumptions of long-term economic policies that had been adopted by both mining groups for their operations in central Africa. From their stand point, the existing arrangement for fuel, power and transportation were excellent and therefore, painful to abandon. Given its special interests in the Wankie Colliery and Rhodesia Railways, which rented rolling stock from an Anglo-American subsidiary, and its natural tendency to promote integrative relationships among the national economies of this region, the Anglo-American Corporation was far more deeply committed than Roan Trust to the established patterns of interdependence. From the Anglo-American stand point, the aftermath of UDI was nothing less than a logistical disaster (Sklar 1975: 165).

Fry (1972) contends that the mining companies were able to maintain their traditional sources of supply from the South even when the rest of the Zambian economy had been turned away from these trade routes. However, the AAC's annual reports indicate that Zambia's participation in economic

sanctions had some adverse effects on its operations.

1. Transport problems were critical.
2. Production costs went up (AAC Annual Reports, 1973, 1975, 1976).

Although ZAMANGLO, the local subsidiary of the AAC, supported the Zambian government's disengagement efforts from the South, the AAC leaders did not ascribe to the ideological principles that gave rise to Zambia's regional policies. For example, the leaders of the AAC believed:-

1. That apartheid was not morally wrong (Hocking 1973: 424).
2. In liberalised white rule for an indefinite period in South Africa and opposed sanctions against Rhodesia (Sklar 1975).

Hence the AAC invested heavily in Rhodesia after UDI to the displeasure of the Zambian government (Sprack 1974, Sklar 1975).

The third objective of the multinationals was the promotion of peaceful coexistence in the region to enable them to pursue their business interests. Hall (1969) points out that from 1968, South African businessmen lobbied the Zambian government to accept the South African hand of friendship. The AAC not only supported the 1974-75 detente exercise (Shaw and Mugomba 1977) but also acted as the communication channel between State House and the South African government.²⁴ However, despite the Zambian government's preference for peaceful solutions to regional problems, its

association with multinationals like the AAC which favoured peaceful coexistence in the region, did not deter the Zambian leadership from supporting guerrilla movements. As already pointed out, the era of detente was shortlived and by 1977 Zambia was openly supporting the armed struggle in Zimbabwe (Roberts 1983: 927).

It must be pointed out that the AAC's efforts to change Zambia's stand on Rhodesia were centred on State House. Hocking (1973) states that Harry Oppenheimer, the AAC magnate, urged President Kaunda to refrain from economic warfare with Rhodesia as that would ruin Zambia's economy. In general, Kalaluka (1979) states that the main political aim of the multinationals was to attract the attention of State House because it was the centre of public policy-making.

In an interview with Mr. Chona, he emphasized that the attitude of State House was that it was not necessary for the multinationals or even the International Monetary Fund to approve Zambia's stand on Southern Africa. At no time did the multinationals force the Zambian government to do anything it did not want to do. The role of the multinationals like the AAC was limited to providing information to State House on what was happening in the region.²⁵ And Sklar points out:

In Zambia, the strongest and most influential non-racial state within the traditional economic orbit of white-dominated Southern Africa, the political priorities of the mining magnates for Southern African development have been challenged in the name of liberation (Sklar 1975: 178).

From the above discussion, one can conclude that:-

1. The Zambian government's collaboration with multinationals was not decisive in shaping its relations with the white South. There were significant contradictions in the stances of multinationals and the Zambian government on Southern African issues.
2. President Kaunda (State House) mediated the domestic and external pressures that sought to influence Zambia's regional policies.

Hence Zambia's advocacy for neocolonial solutions to liberation issues in Southern Africa can partly be attributed to the perceptions of President Kaunda who preferred peaceful, negotiated settlements in the region (Raganathan 1985: 52) and partly to economic imperatives such as his regime's collaboration with multinationals and need for transit routes to the sea. These factors were reinforced by the nationalist but nonradical history of the Zambian political class (Mumbaraci and Muchnik 1974: 6). Hence the Zambian government wanted neighbouring states that were non-revolutionary, that is, states that were predictable, operated within internationally - recognised frameworks and did not destabilise the region.

This discussion of Zambia's response to UDI in Rhodesia clearly supports the first hypothesis; that the formulation and conduct of the country's regional policies originates from the Chief Executive in the Zambian State as opposed to any discernible group or class in Zambian society. It has been shown that elements of the emergent bourgeoisie acted

as ineffectual critics of the country's regional policies in the National Assembly.

In regard to the second hypothesis, the pragmatism of the Zambian leadership did not lead to the abandonment of moral considerations in their response to UDI. The discussion has shown that the ideological and moral concerns of the Zambian leadership shaped their definitions and perceptions of their country's interests.

NOTES ON CHAPTER FOUR

1. cf. Shaw and Mugomba (1977) to Woldring (1984).
2. Mr. Smith declared that he would never accept black majority rule in his life time (Hall 1969).
3. It must be pointed out that Zambia lacked the means to influence events in Rhodesia. The rebel colony was not only militarily and economically stronger than Zambia but Zambia depended on Rhodesia for her very economic survival as well. Zambia therefore, could only take part in collective actions against Rhodesia to attain her goals (Sklar 1974).
4. Mr. Mwaanga a former diplomat and Foreign Minister disputes this interpretation. He stated that once the Zambian government decided to participate in economic sanctions against Rhodesia, it was only necessary to develop the country's industries and infrastructure if the policy was to be meaningful. Moreover, the policy cost Zambia millions of Kwacha. (Interview 13.3.87).
5. Mtshali (1972) attributes Zambia's policies towards the South: economic disengagement and support for guerrilla movements, to the country's national interest. However, Zartman (1966: 22) points out that states do not act entirely on the basis of national interest to the exclusion of ideology or vice-versa. Actions are taken for mixed reasons of interest and ideology. And Pettman (1974: 73) criticises Mtshali for assuming a clear division between interest and ideology in Zambia's regional policies. She argues that such divisions are unrealistic since the definition of Zambia's interests depended on the ideological values held by the Zambian political elite.
6. Hall (1969) argues that the high price of principles is reflected in the huge sums of money Zambia spent to sustain its trade boycott of Rhodesia. On the other hand, Mtshali (1972) points out that Zambia was cautious in its application of economic sanctions against Rhodesia and in 1971, the country imported maize from Rhodesia.
7. Although he emphasized economic considerations in his analyses of Zambia's regional policies Mtshali (1972) did not regard these interests as those of one particular

class nor did he attribute the foreign policy attitudes of the Zambian political class to their international connections as the exponents of the political economy approach were to argue later.

8. Shaw's contribution towards the interpretations of Zambia's regional policies is paradoxical. He is a very able exponent of the political economy approach (Shaw 1976a , b, c, Shaw and Mugomba 1977) but at times he veers towards the idiosyncratic approach. For example:

We argue that Zambia's diplomacy in Southern Africa is a reflection of the interests of its new ruling class in the maintenance of its own affluence and control (Shaw and Mugomba 1977: 393).

But with Anglin, he writes:

At the same time a convincing case has yet to be made that class interest is a definite explanation of all of Zambia's foreign policy behaviour. This is particularly apparent in any analysis of Zambia's principled stance at regional level on Southern Africa liberation, the cumulative adverse socio-economic consequences of which for the country and its ruling elite have been substantial (Shaw and Anglin 1979b: 205).

9. Interview with Mr. Mark Chona on 6.4.87. Mr. Chona was the political Advisor to President Kaunda - 1968-1982.
10. Interview with Mr. Mark Chona on 6.4.87.
11. A negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian issue seemed appropriate in the aftermath of the Portuguese coup because:
 1. with the independence of Mozambique, the guerrilla war in Rhodesia would intensify.
 2. South Africa, on which the white regime in Rhodesia depended for its very survival, showed willingness to withdraw its support from the regime in favour of a negotiated settlement.
 3. As a result of the above reasons, the Smith regime seemed to be in a very weak position (Utete 1980, Clough 1982).
12. Interview with Mr. Mwaanga 13.03.87.

13. Confidential interview.
14. Interview with Mr. Chona 6.04.87.
15. Interview with Mr. Chona 6.04.87 and Mr. Mwaanga 13.03.87. Indeed the inter and intra-party conflicts in the Zimbabwean liberation movements predates the detente exercise (Anglin 1979). However, Burdette (1984b) argues that the Zambian government expelled a number of guerrillas back to Rhodesia in 1971 to face certain death because of its accommodationist stance on Southern Africa. Other observers however, point out that it was inter-party conflicts that led to their expulsions:

What precipitated their expulsion was the series of violent incidents in Zambia during April, 1970 and March 1971 when ZAPU was split by the power struggle between the Chikerema and Moyo factions. The Zambian authorities had finally lost all patience and rounded up all ZAPU... After sifting the evidence Mr. Milner issued an ultimatum. Either unite under Chikerema or be expelled from Zambia. A considerable number chose the latter course.... (Morris 1974: 44).

Despite the continuous conflicts within and between ZANU and ZAPU and the advent of detente, this action was not to become typical of relations between Zambia and Rhodesia. Legume(1977) states that internecine quarrels in ZANU camps in 1973 and 1974 culminated in the assassination of Chitepo in 1975.

16. Interview with Mr. Chona on 6.04.87.
17. See Table 3.
18. Under Zambia's One Party State, all MPs are members of the ruling Party, UNIP.
19. Interview with Mr. Chona on 06.04.87.
20. Interview with Mr. Mwaanga on 13.03.87. Mr. Mwaanga stated that Mr. Vorster's revelations in 1971 that he had been corresponding with President Kaunda on regional issues was a great surprise to the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Zambian diplomats abroad. At that time Zambia's policy was that there should be no official contacts with the South African Government.
21. Kalaluka (1979) discusses the perceptions of the

Zambian Government towards all the important multinationals operating in Zambia.

22. Interview with Mr. Mwaanga on 13.03.87.
23. Interview with Mr. Mwaanga on 13.03.87. Mr. Mwaanga stated that after leaving government service he worked for Lonrho.
24. Mr. Mwaanga pointed out the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not given access to these communications. Interview 13.03.87.
25. Mr. Chona stated that during the period under study, the IMF did not force Zambia to revise its policies in the region. The IMF's role was limited to comments on the effects of Zambia's policies on her economy. Interview 06.04.87.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 Zambia and Angolan Civil War 1975-76

This Chapter continues the assessment of the validity of the interpretations of Zambia's regional policies which began in the previous chapter. The present assessment will be carried out in regard to Zambia's stand on the civil war in Angola in the period 1975-1976.

5.1. Zambia's Position on Angola

Zambia's position on Angola was that there should be a government of national unity, although out of the three warring parties, the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA, it favoured the pro-western UNITA (EIU 1976). This has been interpreted into two contradictory ways; the political economy approach emphasizing economic interests as the central factors that determined Zambia's attitude on the issue. On the other hand, the idiosyncratic approach ascribes Zambia's stance mainly to the principles of the Zambian leadership, especially President Kaunda.

Azevedo (1977) argues that economic considerations were paramount in influencing Kaunda and Mobutu's positions on the Angolan civil war. Offers of aid from the United States of America and South Africa, when Zambia and Zaïre were under-

going economic problems due to the low price of copper and the need to use the Benguela Railway swayed the two leaders into supporting the pro-Western UNITA/FNLA coalition against the MPLA. Azevedo goes on to argue that if Humanism was truly socialistic, Zambia would have supported the MPLA which called itself a Workers' Party.

Shaw and Mugomba (1977) argue that the interests of the Zambian political class would not be served by an MPLA victory. They argue that as in the case of Rhodesia there was a coincidence of interests between the Zambian and South African ruling classes, they wanted to impose a neocolonial solution on Angola. The Zambian political class was apprehensive of radical regimes in the region since such governments would challenge its collaboration with western capital.¹

The rather insensitive and inappropriate foreign policy of Zambia over Angola was motivated by self-interest in the nature of the first independent government in Luanda and in transit privileges (Shaw and Mugomba 1977: 408).

The following aspects of Zambia's foreign policy behaviour inspired and sustained the above interpretation of Zambia's stance on Angola.

1. President Kaunda was more friendly to Savimbi than to NETO (Hallet 1978).²
2. Zambia delayed in recognising the MPLA government until April 1976 when it became apparent that the MPLA had vanquished UNITA and FNLA on the battle field (Shaw and Mugomba 1977).
3. The Zambian government closed the University of Zambia

in 1976, detained some students and deported a number of lecturers because of a pro-MPLA demonstration at the institution (Shaw and Mugomba 1977).

4. In 1975, President Kaunda while on a visit to Washington urged the Ford Administration to help UNITA and the FNLA to prevent an MPLA victory in Angola (Hallet 1978).
5. Zambia is said to be one of the African countries that requested the South African army to intervene in Angola on the side of the UNITA/FNLA coalition (Hallet 1978).
6. Zambia faced mounting economic problems because of lower copper prices, the high cost of imported oil and unreliable transport routes (Azevedo 1977, Shaw and Mugomba 1977).
7. Class formation in Zambia has thrown up an emergent bourgeoisie that favours pro-Western regimes in the region. Hence the Zambian leadership's advocacy of a government of national unity that would comprise the MPLA and such reactionary groups like the FNLA and UNITA was a subtle manoeuvre to sabotage the Angolan revolution (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1979).
8. President Kaunda condemned Soviet intervention in Angola strongly but refrained from criticising U.S. aid to UNITA and the FNLA (Anglin and Shaw 1979a).
9. UNITA controlled most of the Benguela Railway which was vital to Zambia at the start of the civil war (Rake 1975: 227).

Replying directly to the above interpretations and arguments, Anglin and Shaw (1979a) assert that Zambia's policy on Angola was rooted in principles of pan-Africanism, representative government and non-alignment. In other words, Lusaka wanted a government of national unity in Angola as a military solution was not possible. All the belligerents were minority parties that could not control the whole country singly. The authors state that Zambia's military support for UNITA should be regarded in this light; it was aimed at

strengthening the bargaining position of UNITA in view of the massive military aid the MPLA received from the USSR and Cuba. The role of these two countries was condemned harshly by Lusaka because their intervention in Angola not only introduced super power rivalries in the region which Lusaka abhorred but was also a violation of OAU principles that stated that African problems must be solved by the African leaders themselves. Despite their recognition of the importance of the Benguela Railway to Zambia and the adverse effects of recession on the Zambian economy, Anglin and Shaw argue that economic interests were not the central factors that influenced Zambia's position on Angola. They contend that:-

Certainly any suggestion that, even in the midst of an economic recession, policy on Angola was influenced by tempting offers of South African financial carrots can be dismissed as implausible and unworthy (Anglin and Shaw 1979a: 337).

These authors point to the following arguments as supportive of their interpretation of Zambia's motives in Angola.

1. Zambia was at the centre of reconciliation efforts for a government of national unity in Angola; that is, she did not want to exclude the MPLA from power.
2. A military solution was not feasible for Angola. So it was only realistic that all the parties should be part to a solution if the Angolan problem was to be solved satisfactorily.
3. Allegations that Zambia requested the South African government to intervene militarily in Angola emanate from questionable sources.

4. Zambia was not as obviously and as heavily committed to UNITA as Mobutu was to the FNLA.
5. There is no concrete evidence that Zambia received a huge loan from South Africa to finance its imports during the period in question.³
6. By condemning Russian intervention in Angola, Zambia was exercising her non-aligned stand on international affairs. Zambia had also condemned U.S. intervention in Vietnam (Anglin and Shaw 1979a: 310-339).

In order to assess the validity of the above interpretations, Zambia's foreign policy on Angola will be discussed with reference to various dimensions that had a bearing on the country's stand on the civil war.

5.2. Zambia's Relations with the MPLA and UNITA before and during the Civil War.

During the period 1966 to 1973, the Zambian government gave exclusive support to the MPLA led by Dr. Augustino Neto. Zambian diplomats championed the cause of the MPLA at the OAU and at home the movement enjoyed transit and radio facilities.⁴

This hospitality of the Zambian government turned the MPLA into an effective force against the Portuguese. As Minter points out:-

Only in 1966, with the opening of the Eastern Front, adjacent to Zambia, was MPLA able to mount military operations over large areas of Angola (Minter 1972: 62).

And Gibson (1972: 223) points out that MPLA headquarters

were transferred from Brazzaville to Lusaka after 1966 and a major base was established on the Zambian-Angola border.

For its part, the movement refrained from attacking the Benguela Railway because the railway was important for Zambia's external trade. Dr. Neto stated that he would attack the railway line only after the Tanzania-Zambia Railway was completed (Arnold and Weiss 1977: 163). As for UNITA, it was expelled from Zambia in 1967 after its cadres attacked the Benguela Railway (Grundy 1973: 210). The UNITA leader, Dr. Savimbi, was to remain estranged from the Zambian leadership until 1974.

According to Mr. Mwaanga Dr. Savimbi came to Zambia in 1974 on a private visit to see his sick mother who was living in Zambia. Mr. Mwaanga, then Zambian Foreign Minister and as a personal friend to Dr. Savimbi; put the visitor up in a private home. At this time, the Zambian government's official policy was to support Dr. Neto's MPLA. Through Mr. Mwaanga, a meeting was arranged between Dr. Savimbi and President Kaunda where the visitor convinced the President that he could guarantee Zambia's interests in Angola especially the use of the Benguela Railway, most of which was controlled by UNITA at this juncture. Dr. Savimbi's task in winning Zambian support was made easier by the split of the MPLA into three factions - a fact that rendered the movement ineffectual as a future government of Angola in the eyes of the Zambian leadership.⁵ And after the meeting, Dr. Savimbi's sojourn was upgraded to a state visit and he was given two villas at Mulungushi Village,

an exclusive residential area built to house Third World dignitaries who came to the Third Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries hosted by Lusaka in 1970.⁶

Mr. Mwaanga also recalled that throughout the Civil War, President Kaunda's attitude seemed to be the decisive factor that determined Zambia's relations with any of the warring factions in Angola.⁷ When the military and diplomatic tide shifted in favour of the MPLA in 1975, Mr. Mwaanga advised the Zambian Government to recognise the MPLA as the government of Angola. Mr. Mwaanga based his arguments on the OAU formula for recognising belligerent factions in a civil war: the faction that holds the capital gets OAU recognition. He argued that a government of national unity was not feasible as the MPLA had access to massive Russian arms to hold on to the capital. One of the reasons Mr. Mwaanga lost his job as foreign minister was that he advocated MPLA recognition at that time.⁸

Mr. Mwaanga also stated that President Kaunda did not invite the South African government to intervene in Angola in support of UNITA and when Dr. Savimbi fraternised with the South Africans, it was not possible for the Zambian government to support him.⁹

In 1976, the Zambian government recognised the MPLA government and there quickly followed close collaboration between President Kaunda and Neto on bilateral and liberation issues (Legum 1977). On the other hand, UNITA was once again

expelled from Zambian soil. (Keesing contemporary Archives (1977: 28226).

Referring to the above actions of the Zambian government, Anglin and Shaw (1979a) argue that the Benguela Railway though important to Zambia, was not a decisive factor in shaping the country's relations with the Angolan movements. Principles took precedence over interests including routes. However, such an interpretation ignores the sequence of events from 1966. As we have seen, in 1967 UNITA was expelled from Zambia because the movement's attacks on the line jeopardised the country's access to the railway. The Zambian government instead supported the MPLA which refrained from attacking the railway line in appreciation of Zambia's need of it. In 1974, Zambia welcomed Savimbi back because he controlled most of the line and the Zambian government became alienated from the MPLA which President Kaunda felt could not guarantee Zambia's use of the line because it was incapacitated by a three way split. In 1976, a principled stand on Angola would have entailed:-

- (i) non-recognition of the MPLA government in Angola because of its continued reliance on Russian arms and Cuban soldiers to which the Zambian government strongly objected (Anglin and Shaw 1979a).
- (ii) expulsion of UNITA from Zambian territory because of the movement's reliance on South Africa whose racial policies the Zambian leadership found repugnant

(Sklar 1975).

However, in 1976, when it became clear that UNITA would have no jurisdiction over the line, the Zambian authorities recognised the MPLA government, expelled UNITA from Zambia and sought to improve relations with the Neto government in anticipation of using the line (Tordoff 1977: 68). This shows that economic considerations, in the form of transit routes, played a decisive role in determining Zambia's relations with the warring parties, as the discussion below will show.

5.3. Zambia's Economic Situation and the Importance of the Benguela Railway line.

In order to appreciate the importance of the Benguela Railway to Zambia, two other points need to be discussed.

These are:-

- (a) The closure of the Rhodesia/Zambian border in 1973.
- (b) The Zambian/South African detente exercise over Rhodesia.

In the Zambian government's calculations, the Benguela Railway had a vital role to play in both instances.

On the advent of the Angolan civil war, the Benguela Railway was economically the most important outlet for Zambia's foreign trade. The closure of Zambia's traditional outlet to the sea, Rhodesia Railways to Zambian traffic in 1973, led to economic problems of great magnitude. As some observers put it:-

Zambia did not directly benefit from the border closure as she had done from UDI in the previous decade. The development of the copper industry was slowed down by the blockade, costs of imports increased, Development in fact, was retarded (Arnold and Weiss 1977: 80).

Zambia was able to withstand these problems and divert its trade from the South because of her access to the Benguela Railway. This is shown in Table 4 .

The importance of the Benguela Railway to Zambia was also reflected in her diplomatic efforts to end the Rhodesian problem. As we have seen, the Portuguese coup of 1974 brought about the detente' exercise between South Africa and the black African states, in which Zambia played a leading role. Zambia's continued access to the Benguela Railway strengthened its bargaining position vis-a-vis the Rhodesian and South African regimes.' Arnold and Weiss (1977) state that in Southern Africa, railways are not only arteries of trade but are also political and economic weapons to be employed against hostile landlocked neighbours. If the Benguela railway was closed to Zambian traffic, the Zambian leadership would have to revert to Rhodesia Railways thereby weakening their bargaining position.

At the start of 1975 when 50 per cent of her copper - one commodity vital to her economic survival was being exported through Angola along the Benguela Railway, Zambia might have at least thought that with the imminent opening of TAZARA Railway she was finally free of dependence upon routes through the white-dominated South. Meanwhile in her efforts towards solving the racial tension of the area

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ZAMBIAN FOREIGN TRADE BY VOLUME THROUGH DIFFERENT PORTS		
	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>
Lobito	51.3	49.7
Dar-es-Salaam	26.9	31.9
Mombasa	6.8	9.1.
Malawi	9.0	7.0
Others	4.1	2.3

Source: Burgess J. (1976) Interdependence in
Southern Africa.

without letting them escalate into full-scale warfare, her President had pursued his policy of detente' with South Africa. At that stage in his negotiations, Zambia's growing near total independence of routes through the south strengthened Kaunda's dealings with Vorster (Arnold and Weiss 1977: 17).

Anglin and Shaw (1979a) argue that the Benguela Railway was not decisive in Zambia's support for any Angolan Party that controlled all or most of the line like UNITA at the start of the civil war or the MPLA at the end of the conflict. Such arguments ignore the vital role the railway had come to play in Zambia's economic life and in her attempts to find a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem.¹⁰ Indeed Stockwell notes that Kaunda wrote to Savimbi warning him that Zambia's continued support for UNITA depended on the movement's ability to control the whole railway line.

President Kaunda was a potential problem. While he sympathized with Savimbi, he was primarily concerned with getting his copper to the sea and with the Benguela railroad closed, his only alternative was the expensive and humiliating route through Rhodesia and South Africa. On September 10, he gave Savimbi sixty days, until Angolan Independence, to get the Benguela railroad open. Otherwise he would not guarantee continued support (Stockwell 1978: 193).

5.4. Economic Aid from South Africa and the U.S.A.

Azevedo (1977) argues that Zambia's economic problems especially the fall in copper prices and the need to use the Benguela Railway made Kaunda and Mobutu support the

pro-Western factions in Angola. In return for their support, they received aid to solve their economic problems. Azevedo states that economic aid from South Africa started coming to Zambia in 1975. In that year South Africa is said to have granted Zambia an export credit amounting to R125 million, enough to pay for a quarter of Zambia's oil imports.¹¹ And following President Kaunda's visit to Washington in 1975, Zambia received 1.25 million ^{dollars} from the U.S.A. to pay for her vegetable imports. Azevedo concludes that:-

Economic stress and the dependence on the railway (at least before 1975), led the two leaders to assess the advantages of supporting the likely winner, assured by U.S. and South African assistance. Political pressures from both countries and the concomitant financial aid coupled with the desire for detente' with South Africa, ultimately determined the two leaders' stand (Azevedo 1977: 287).

Shaw and Mugomba (1977) argue that it was in the interests of the Zambian political class to support the pro-Western factions because of its dependence on international capital. The arguments advanced by Azevedo (1977) and Shaw and Mugomba (1977) lead one to conclude that Zambia was an agent of U.S. and South African foreign policies in Angola. However, Zambia's behaviour during the civil war does not conform neatly to that role for the following reasons:

- (a) The loan story from South Africa to Zambia has been discredited.¹² In addition as Table 5 shows the predicted trade boom failed to materialise. The figures indicate that Zambia reduced her trade with South Africa.

TABLE 5

SOUTH AFRICA'S SHARE OF ZAMBIAN IMPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VALUE 1964-1980

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
	20.5	19.7	23.8	23.6	23.4	22.4	17.4	15.3	14.7	11.9	7.7	6.8	7.7	7.2	6.6	10.9	15.8

Sources:

1964-1974: Burgess, J. (1976) Interdependence in Southern Africa.
The Economist Intelligence Unit, London.

1975-1980 excluding 1979: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Annual supplements
to the Quarterly Economic Review of Zambia (1977: 22). (1979: 22)
(1983: 23).

1979: Monthly Digest of Statistics, February/March, 1985.

- (b) While Zambia was sympathetic to the Pro-Western UNITA, the argument that it was an agent of American and South African policies in Angola cannot be sustained by accounts of Zambia's role in the civil war.
- (c) While Zaire's military commitment to the FNLA was substantial and easy to verify from the ground, Zambia's support for UNITA was modest, indecisive and difficult to substantiate (Hodges 1977, Stockwell 1978).¹³
- (d) Kaunda's support for UNITA depended on the movement's control of the Benguela Railway, not on its pro-Western stance. Hence the C.I.A regarded Kaunda as an unreliable ally in Angola (Stockwell 1978: 193).
- (e) Zambia expelled UNITA in 1976 despite its continued links with the West and South Africa (Marcum 1978: 277).
- (f) South Africa's intervention in Angola contributed to the demise of detente exercise (Legume 1976a: 751).

From the above discussion, it is very difficult to sustain the view that Zambia's stand on Angola was shaped by aid from South Africa and the U.S.A. as Legume notes:-

Although Mobuto and Kaunda were to some extent on the same side during the Angolan crisis, Kaunda never opposed the MPLA nor was he as closely committed to UNITA as Mobuto was to the FNLA. Like Zaire, Zambia has a strong interest in Angola's stability and especially in the secure passage of its copper exports to the sea along the Benguela Railway (Legume 1976b: A28).

Hence Shaw and Mugonda (1977) and Azevedo (1977) who place Zambia firmly on the side of UNITA because the Zambian leadership wanted economic assistance from UNITA's Western backers, ignore the ambivalent role the Zambian government played in the civil war, especially in regard to assistance towards the belligerent parties.

5.5. A Comparison of Zambia's responses to South Africa, Cuban and Soviet Intervention in Angola.

Guelke (1980) has outlined the fluid, troubled circumstances that surrounded the withdrawal of the Portuguese colonial authorities from Angola that the two super powers, together with their allies, sought to exploit in furtherance of their interests. The question as to which side intervened first in Angola in pursuit of its interests is controversial. Hallet (1978) contends that the Russian and Cuban intervention on the side of the MPLA provoked the South African intervention in support of the pro-Western UNITA/FNLA coalition. On the other hand, Ogunbadejo (1980) maintains that the Soviet Union with the help of Cuba, would not have intervened if the Western powers, with South Africa in the lead did not endeavour to stop the MPLA's victory over its rivals.

There was a marked difference between Zambia's responses to Russian and Cuban intervention in contrast to the South African incursion.

Zambia used very harsh words in condemning Russian intervention in Angola. Not only did she disapprove of the Cuban role in Angola, she actively sought the withdrawal of Cuban soldiers before recognising the MPLA government (Anglin and Shaw (1979a)).

However, Zambia's condemnation of the Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola did not lead to irreparable damage in relations between Zambia and the two socialist

allies. In fact in 1977, after an exchange of fire with Zambian and South African and Rhodesian forces, along the Zambezi River, the Zambian government announced that it was prepared to request Russian and Cuban military assistance if the need arose (E.I.U. 1977: 3).

While Zambia did not invite the Russians and Cubans to come to its defence, the incursions of Rhodesian and South African armed forces increased Zambia's military dependence on the Soviet Union. For example, after being rebuffed by the West, in 1979, Zambia purchased sophisticated military aircraft from Russia to be maintained by Soviet technicians (Keesing Contemporary Archives 1981).

Hodges (1976) states that Zaire and Zambia failed to condemn the South African invasion of Angola because of their economic dependence on the Republic. However, as pointed out above, the South African invasion of Angola, did not lead to an improvement in relations between South Africa and Zambia in the political, economic and military fields (Legum 1976). This shows that the most consistent trend in Zambia's regional policy was her opposition to racial domination in the subregion, as enunciated in Kaunda's philosophy of Humanism (Kaunda 1968). On the other hand, Zambia mended her relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, despite the arguments of some political economy analysts that their continued assistance to the radical MPLA was a threat to Zambia because of her economic links with the West (Shaw and Mugomba 1977).

5.6. The External and Domestic Reactions to Zambia's stance on Angola.

In general, the West including South Africa, welcomed Zambia's stance on Angola. Both the U.S. and South Africa claimed that they intervened in Angola at the request of Zambia and Zaire (Stack and Morton 1976).

Moreover, the Zambian and South African stances on Angola were very close to one another; they both supported UNITA during the civil war. Exponents of the political economy approach (Shaw and Mugomba 1977) attributed this to an overlap of interests between Lusaka and Pretoria based on their common regional perceptions and the resulting privileges such a coincidence offers them.

However, subsequent events showed that South African and Zambian support for UNITA could best be attributed to the political ambivalence of the Zambian government rather than to an enduring coincidence of interests between the two countries. Zambia's Angolan policy was not conducted in the framework of South African policy. For example in 1976, Zambia expelled UNITA while South Africa has continued to support the organisation. At the regional level, Zambia's foreign policy was conducted in the context of the Frontline States, a grouping hostile to South Africa's regional and domestic policies (Legum 1977: All, Osei-Hwedie 1983-84). This demonstrates that in political and military terms, Zambia regarded the white minority regime in Pretoria as a threat rather than the radical black governments backed by

Russia in Angola and Mozambique. As President Kaunda stated:

Zambians are completely at home with the Marxist/Leninist colleagues running governments in Angola and Mozambique... but South Africa, supported by the West built up bandit organisations that are busy destroying life and property day in and day out just because they do not accept that Angola and Mozambique in their so called area of influence should be run by Marxist/Leninist governments (Ranganathan 1985: 52).

✓ Domestic opposition to the Zambian government's foreign policy on Angola came mainly from University students in Lusaka who accused the government of siding with imperialism by supporting UNITA. The government reacted by closing the institution (Legum 1977: 8407). Some analysts for example, Shaw and Mugomba (1977) take this as evidence to show that Zambia supported the pro-Western UNITA/FNLA alliance as opposed to the MPLA. However, it would be more accurate to interpret the government's closure of the University as an act of an authoritarian government that brooked no opposition to its policies (Small 1977). As pointed out above, the government's support for UNITA was indecisive and of short duration, 1974-76. Indeed, on the political map of Africa, Johnson (1977) places Zambia among those states that are neither conservative and pro-Western nor radical, but among those that are politically ambivalent.

In assessing the validity of the interpretations of Zambia's foreign policy on Angola, it becomes clear that although Zambia's stand was enunciated in terms of principles,

the Zambian government was prepared to deal with any movement that controlled the Benguela Railway line. This reflected the ambivalence of the political and ideological attitudes of the Zambian government, discussed in Chapter Three. Although there is class formation in Zambia, a right wing ideology that would have made Zambia a more committed agent of South African and U.S. policies in Angola, did not shape the perceptions of the Zambian policy makers. On the other hand, despite the socialist bias of Humanism, Zambia distanced itself from the radical MPLA and hence to secure Zambia's use of the Benguela Railway. The ideological ambivalence of Zambian political class made it difficult for the Zambian government to come down firmly on one side unlike her friendly but more radical neighbours Tanzania and Mozambique that supported the MPLA unreservedly or her more conservative neighbour, Zaire which placed a significant proportion of its armed forces at the disposal of the pro-Western FNLA.

Indeed this discussion supports the first hypothesis in that it was the national interest as perceived by President Kaunda rather than the political and economic interests of Zambia's emergent bourgeoisie that determined her response to the Angolan civil war. This discussion also supports the second hypothesis in that while the Zambian leadership's response to the Angolan crisis was pragmatic in view of the country's capabilities and interests, ideological and moral concerns were also very evident in their policy statements on the issue.

NOTES ON CHAPTER FIVE

1. Subsequent events in the region have shown that even radical regimes do collaborate with international capital. Stevens observes:-

Even in Angola, the MPLA continues to sell Cabinda Petroleum to Gulf Oil and diamonds to the De Beers Mining Organisation, an offshoot of the Anglo-American Corporation (a major South African Firm) (Stevens 1980: 55).

2. A close source to State House revealed that President Kaunda and Dr. Neto remained friends during the Angolan civil war. When a Zambian emissary delivered the letter of recognition to Dr. Neto, he broke down with emotion: Confidential Interview.
3. Anglin and Shaw (1979a) point out that the Zambian government took the London Guardian to court for publishing a story that Zambia had received a loan from South Africa. The paper apologised and paid substantial damages to the Zambian government.
4. Interview with Mr. Mwaanga on 13-03-87.
5. Interview with Mr. Mwaanga on 13-03-87. This was also confirmed by Mr. Chona in an interview on 06-04-87. He said that the split in the MPLA was the decisive factor that made President Kaunda shift his support to UNITA;
6. Interview with Mr. Mwaanga 13-03-87.
7. Tiny Rowland of Lonrho lobbied President Kaunda to support Savimbi. Lonrho made available to Savimbi an executive jet. Interview with Mr. Mwaanga 13-03-87.
8. Interview with Mr. Mwaanga 13-03-87.
9. Mr. Chona also stated that President Kaunda did not request the South African government to intervene in Angola. Interview 06-04-87.
10. However, Anglin and Shaw (1979a) do admit that Zambia's advocacy for a government of national unity would have led to an orderly transfer of power thereby guaranteeing Zambia's access to the Benguela Railway.

11. We have already seen that such reports were proved false in a court of law. See note 3.
12. See note 3 again.
13. In separate interviews both Mr. Mwaanga and Mr. Chona denied knowledge of Zambian military supplies to UNITA.

CHAPTER SIX

6.0. Zambia's Relations with South Africa

Zambia's relations with South Africa are central to the question which this study seeks to answer: the impact of class formation and economic interests on the one hand, and ideology and personality on the other, on Zambia's regional policies in the period 1964-1980. This is due to the very important place South Africa occupies in the region's political economy.

6.1. Socio-economic pressures for contacts with South Africa.

The importance of South Africa in regional affairs is clearly manifested by pressures on countries like Zambia to maintain not only trade links with the Apartheid Republic but also to come to an accommodation with it. These pressures are:-

- (a) In terms of dependency, Zambia's relations with South Africa are asymmetrical in favour of the Apartheid regime. Zambia's dependence on South Africa is pronounced in terms of investment capital, imports, transport and skilled manpower (Pettman 1974, Torstensen 1982).
- (b) South Africa is the dominant economic power in the region and is a source of economic aid, cheaper imports, tourists and employs migrant labour on a large scale (Hall 1969 Molteno 1970, Pettman 1974, Grundy 1973, Geldenhuys 1982).

- (c) In regional politics, South Africa is the guardian of Western interests to which the Zambian political class is indebted in terms of economic assistance to maintain its affluence and rule (Turok and Maxey 1976, Shaw and Mugomba 1977, Mugomba 1979).
- (d) Some elements of Zambia's emergent bourgeoisie, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank favour free trade between Zambia and South Africa because South Africa is the cheapest source (Callinicos and Rogers 1977, Shaw 1979, Mezger 1980).
- (e) The multinational corporations, Zambia's economic partners, favour coexistence in the region (Sklar 1975, Southal 1978).
- (f) In terms of national power, Zambia was bound to be on the losing side in any conflict with the much stronger South Africa (Nolutshungu 1975, Torstensen 1982).

Given all these pressures, it was widely predicted by the South African Government and academics that economic imperatives would force Zambia to collaborate with Pretoria (Anglin and Shaw 1979a). Even those observers who believed that Zambia's stand on Southern African issues was rooted in ideological principles doubted whether Zambia could spurn the South African hand of friendship when the price of copper went down. For example, Hall observed:-

Yet quite apart from the price Kaunda must ultimately expect to pay for the freedom fighters... he must withstand the blandishments of South Africa in economic matters. Zambia is rich now, but exceedingly vulnerable. The price of copper has stayed high longer than any experts forecast, but it must fall within the next decade.... When it does, Zambia will suddenly find itself short of money and unable to live in the manner to which it has grown accustomed. The South Africans will be most ready to help out; on terms: that Zambia promises to be friendly, to cooperate and join the club. It is then that Kaunda's principles

will face their greatest test (Hall 1969: 249).

We have seen that the analyses of Zambia's relations with South Africa differ over this point; the exponents of the idiosyncratic approach maintaining that Zambia sustained her ideological opposition to Apartheid despite the fall in copper prices (Anglin and Shaw 1979a: 272-302) while the exponents of the political economy approach argue that Zambia adopted an increasingly accommodationist stance towards the white minority regimes mainly because of the fall in the prices of copper in the country's second decade of independence (Eriksen 1978, Burdette 1984a, b).

6.2. A Comparison of Zambian and South African policies for the region with reference to Angola and Rhodesia.

As Table I shows, the price of copper did fall ushering in a prolonged period of grave economic and political problems as pointed out in Chapter 3. In addition, there were strident calls among some sections of the Zambian political class for coexistence with South Africa (Callinicos and Rogers 1977, Southall 1978). The onset of the economic recession also coincided with the start of the 'detente' exercise which showed a willingness on the part of Zambian political class to collaborate with the South African government on regional issues (Spence 1977). For the exponents of the political economy approach 'detente'

was a signal that in Zambia's regional behaviour interest had triumphed over ideology because of Zambia's mounting economic problems and class formation (Shaw 1976c, Eriksen 1978, Burdette 1984a, b). Shaw argues:

In 1974 detente and coexistence became acceptable whereas in 1971 dialogue and non-aggression were impossible (Shaw 1976c: 103).

On the other hand, Anglin and Shaw (1979a) argue that despite Zambia's economic problems, economic interests did not over-ride ideological considerations in Kaunda's dealings with Vorster. They assert that Kaunda was endeavouring to achieve African objectives in Rhodesia: African majority rule, even at the risk of losing his reputation.

Shaw and Mugomba (1977) who advance a political economy interpretation of the 'detente' exercise concede that Zambia supported African nationalism. Shaw (1976a) points out that Zambia's Humanism abhors racism. However, these two authors argue that despite Zambia's support for African nationalist movements and her opposition to racism, the Zambian political class was able to collaborate with the white South African minority regime because the Kaunda government is dependent on Western capital for its survival. This meant that Zambia favoured neocolonial solutions to the issue of liberation in the region as was evident in Rhodesia and Angola. This stand is said to coincide with South African and Western interests. Shaw and Mugomba point out for example, that:-

The ruling classes of the detente faction may be an unlikely association; a new "unholy alliance", their understanding and coexistence, however, is based on the threats to all of them posed by the more radical liberation movements. Despite some differences of emphasis and interests, the Zambian elite is able to collaborate with the present South African regime because they both want to prevent a radical restructuring of the political economy of Southern Africa. Both they and their foreign associates are concerned lest radical governments in the region further disturb the seemingly established pattern of Africa's continental disunity and dependence (Shaw and Mugomba 1977: 413).

This interpretation was given more weight by Zambia's support for Nkomo in Rhodesia and Savimbi in the Angola civil war - leaders acceptable to the South African Government and the West.

However, despite Zambia's preference for 'neocolonial' solutions, the period of detente was very brief (Arnold and Weiss 1977, Legum 1977: A6, Osei-Hwedie 1983). Instead Zambia worked closely with the new radical regimes in Mozambique and Angola and later Zimbabwe in efforts to solve regional problems.

The four frontline presidents, joined by Angola's President Agostinho Neto, in September 1976, have come to play a remarkable role in the continent's affairs, acting as a closely knit caucus within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Although there is no formal approval for this role, the OAU has in fact endorsed all their major decisions to date. The original quartet emerged as a purely adhoc group of like-minded leaders - to Vorster's overtures in October 1974 (Legum 1977: P.A11)¹

South Africa, despite its potential as a donor nation to Zambia's troubled economy was kept at-an-arm's length by the

Zambian government (Tordoff 1977).

While Shaw and Mugomba (1977) recognise Zambia's opposition to racism and her support for liberation movements, they do under-play the implications of this factor for Zambia's relations with South Africa. Instead they concentrate on Zambia's dependency on Western capital. In their analysis, the perceptions of political leaders play a secondary role.

As a result subsequent events ran contrary to the scenario portrayed by Shaw and Mugomba (1977). Zambia's preference for negotiated 'neocolonial' solutions in Angola, Rhodesia and Namibia has earned her the active hostility of the South African government rather than its goodwill. This was because neocolonial solutions are a threat to the white settlers in that, such solutions, though not revolutionary, involve black majority rule which challenges white privileges (Baylies 1980, Clough 1982). The substantive issue in the region is racial rule. As Legum (1973) states the reality in Southern Africa is that the white minority is totally committed to maintaining white rule while the African states are striving to bring about a more democratic region.

The issue of majority participation in government has been the contentious issue in Zambia's relations with South Africa. Since 1964, when Zambia became independent, it has participated in efforts to dismantle white regimes in Rhodesia and Angola. In regard to Rhodesia, Zambia participated in

the U.N. sanctions against the rebel colony. When these proved ineffective, it stepped up military help to the ZAPU wing of the Patriotic Front in its war against the Smith regime. Diplomatically, it worked closely with other front-line states on the same issue (Clough 1982, Shaw 1982, Osei-Hwedie 1983).

In a similar manner, South Africa has worked with the other white minority regimes in the region to bolster white rule. It propped up the Smith regime from 1965 to 1979. Legum (1977) states that Vorster could have brought Smith down in five minutes by cutting down fuel and arms supplies which by then originated entirely from South Africa. In Angola, South Africa collaborated with Portugal while Zambia supported the MPLA (Gibson 1972, Minter 1972, Grundy 1973, Sprack 1974, Anglin 1979). South Africa therefore, came to be regarded by the Zambian political leadership as a threat to national security (Pettman 1974). Kaplan observes:-

More particularly, the need of Southern Rhodesia and Portugal for South Africa's support had the effect of further enhancing the latter's role as leader of the "white South". Consequently, although the Kaunda government continued to regard Southern Rhodesia as the immediate foe, South Africa was seen as the principal foe in the long run and the hegemonial power of the Southern African region, bent on extending its influence still further (Kaplan 1974: XLVI).

Despite the arguments advanced by the exponents of the political economy approach - class formation and mounting economic problems - the period of detente did not change

Zambia's perception that South Africa was a hostile power because of her support for and belief in white supremacy (Legum 1977, Tordoff 1977).

And events have showed that the Zambian perception of South Africa as an enemy power was well-founded. As Sprack states:

A third military matter in which South Africa acts in close collaboration with Rhodessa is in the relationship with Zambia. Since UDI, the two white-ruled countries have adopted an aggressive posture towards Zambia; in particular, and also other neighbouring black states. Incidents and crimes arising from this have received less attention than they deserve and nothing like the same amount of publicity in, say, the Western press, as the shooting of two Canadian women on the Zambezi in 1973. But when a list is compiled, a clear pattern of subversion against Zambia, with Rhodessa and South Africa as accomplices, emerges. Espionage, attack and sabotage are the methods (Sprack 1974: 69).

And the EIU (1975) points out that even in the period of detente, grave shooting incidents and landmine explosions continued and even intensified between Zambia and the minority regimes. And Rhodesian raids, made possible by South African assistance culminated in the destruction of eleven bridges in Zambia at the height of the Zimbabwean war of liberation thereby paralysing Zambia's transport system (E.I.U. 1980: 5, Clough 1982).

A comparison of South African and Zambian policies in Zimbabwe and Angola after 1974 sustains in part the arguments put forward by Shaw and Mugomba (1977) that both South Africa and Zambia preferred 'neocolonial solutions' to regional

problems. What the authors overlook is that the two countries had conflicting goals in their pursuit of these 'neocolonial solutions.' South Africa's aim was to block the tide of African nationalism advancing towards it while Zambia's aim was to strengthen and accelerate this advance. As a result, this common preference did not sustain detente or coexistence between South Africa and Zambia. Instead Zambia, along with the new radical regimes in Angola, Mozambique and later Zimbabwe came to regard South Africa as the common enemy.² Hence Le Melle and Shepherd's criticism that Western scholarship has failed to recognise the importance of race in international relations is applicable to the exponents of the political economy approach.³ These two point out that:-

Although Western scholarship has largely failed to recognise its importance, race has become the central problem of international politics. Disciplined analysis has lagged behind events and little systematic attempt has been made to relate the racial factor to the theories of international relations. In sum no consistent analysis has been applied to the problems of international racial conflict and integration. However, the impact of race may well revolutionize international studies as we come to understand how racial stratification influences national behaviour and sets a world pattern of conflict (LeMelle and Shepherd 1971: 302-3).

The point here to note is that although Zambia advocated 'neocolonial' solutions to the issues of liberation in Southern Africa, this did not amount to an accommodationist stance on the part of the Kaunda regime towards the white minority regimes as the exponents of the political economy approach maintain (Shaw and Mugomba 1977, Burdette 1984b).

Zambia was against racial domination in the region.

6.3. The forms, objectives and results of official contacts between the Zambian and South African governments.

The official or government-to-government communications between Zambia and South Africa in the period 1964 to 1980 are best characterised by the two forms of negotiations identified by Ikle (1964). These are tacit bargaining and explicit negotiations.

6.3.1. Tacit Bargaining

According to Ikle, tacit bargaining occurs when actors try to influence the behaviour of their opponents through hints and guesswork without laying down the exact conditions for agreement. This form of communication between governments is characteristic of situations where direct negotiations are difficult because of the opinions of domestic groups, allies and/or the absence of diplomatic relations. In the case of Zambia-South African relations, normal diplomatic ties were first rejected by the South African government in 1964 and later by the Zambian government because the Zambian government came to regard South Africa as a threat (Pettman 1974). However, due to the preponderant economic and military power that the Apartheid Republic possessed and its decisive influence

on regional affairs (Legum 1973), for example, South Africa was the chief backer of the Smith regime, it was imperative that Zambia maintains some form of contact with the Republic.

In terms of tacit bargaining, the Zambian political leadership especially President Kaunda constantly and consistently attacked Apartheid at home and abroad and stated that normal relations between the two countries were out of the question as long as Apartheid was in force in South Africa (McKay 1971). In return the South African government has urged the Zambian leadership to practise a policy of good neighbourliness so that mutual beneficial cooperation can take place between the two countries. The white minority government has persistently pointed out that Zambia's stance towards South Africa was provocative and therefore harmful for Zambia given the balance of power in the region (McKay 1971). This tacit bargaining has helped to keep the areas of hostilities limited and has restrained the use of force between the two countries.⁴ As Nolutshungu points out:

Of the black states of Southern Africa, Zambia has been the one most openly identified with militant opposition to the white regimes in that area, and at the level of public declarations South Africa has been the most vociferous of the white regimes in reciprocating such hostility. Yet at the level of actual, as distinct from verbal, interactions, relations between the two regimes testify to a higher degree of mutual tolerance between Zambia and South Africa than might be expected. This is most clearly so in economic relations (Nolutshungu 1975: 218).

6.3.2. Negotiations

In the period 1974-1975, tacit bargaining gave way to explicit negotiations between South Africa and Zambia.⁵ Ikle points out that for negotiations to take place two factors must be present: common interest and issues of conflict.

In the 1974-75 negotiations between Zambia and South Africa it is generally agreed that the issue to be resolved was minority rule in Rhodesia (Hirschman 1976, Shaw and Mugomba 1977, Anglin and Shaw 1979a, Clough 1982). What is in dispute is the nature of the common interests between Zambia and South Africa during this period. As already pointed out the exponents of the political economy approach maintain that the common interests between Zambia and South Africa lay in:

1. a neocolonial regime in Rhodesia that they could both live with.
2. Peaceful coexistence in the region so that economic problems especially for Zambia would be eased.

On the other hand, the exponents of idiosyncratic approach, while maintaining that Zambia wanted a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian issue, insist that the corollary was not a Pretoria - Lusaka Axis despite Zambia's economic problems and South Africa's readiness to render assistance (Anglin and Shaw 1979a).

The validity of these interpretations can best be

assessed by reference to two types of interests inherent in international negotiations. These are identical common interests and complementary interests (Ikle 1964).

Ikle points out that states have an identical common interest if they agree to pool their resources and efforts to achieve an object or arrangement after realising that individual efforts would be fruitless or more costly. Moreover, the parties must agree on the characteristics of the new arrangement because of their different preferences.

From all accounts of the 1974-75 Lusaka-Pretoria negotiations it appears that Zambia and South Africa shared an identical common interest in bringing about majority rule in Rhodesia.

1. They agreed to pool resources in order to avoid an escalation of the Rhodesian conflict - an eventuality that would have imposed heavy burdens on both countries. Zambia agreed to pressurise the liberation movements into negotiating with Smith, and South Africa undertook to persuade the rebel government to accept majority rule (Legum 1975, Utete 1982).
2. They agreed on the characteristics of the potential regime in Rhodesia. This would be a regime shaped by the process of negotiation rather by revolutionary violence. This would be a 'neocolonial' prowestern regime. This was evident from the text of the agreement between South Africa and the Frontline States

of which Zambia was the most active member. For example, all the Zimbabwean liberation movements were to lay down their arms and to merge under the conservative African National Council (ANC) led by Bishop Muzorewa (Utete 1982). Zambia closed the offices of ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI to strengthen unity within the conservative ANC (Essack 1976). It is therefore reasonable to argue that had the 1975 Victoria Falls Conference between the Smith government and the leaders of the ANC succeeded, a moderate regime acceptable to Zambia, South Africa and the West would have been established in Zimbabwe. As far as identical common interests are concerned, the exponents of the political economy approach are accurate in arguing that the Zambia and South Africa regimes wanted to establish a non-revolutionary, non-socialist regime in Zimbabwe.

However, the 1974-75 negotiations have to be assessed in terms of complementary interests as well. Ikle (1964) defines these as an exchange of different objects which the negotiating states cannot gain by themselves but can only grant to each other. In other words complimentary interests are trade-offs.

In terms of complementary interests South Africa had the broader aim of peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation within the region in return for its efforts to pressurise the Smith government to accept majority rule (Spence 1977, Clough 1982). This was because of its unpopular Apartheid policies.

In response, Zambia stated that these would be granted only if South Africa helped to bring about majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia and dismantled Apartheid. To strengthen this commitment Zambia enlisted the support of countries like Tanzania and Mozambique. Neither did Zambia allow bilateral issues to dominate the discussions. During these negotiations, South Africa offered Zambia a non-aggression pact but Zambia rejected it on the grounds that she was not an aggressor.⁶

Despite her economic problems, Zambia did not seek economic assistance from South Africa. Hirschman (1976) states that South African efforts to strengthen detente by offers of economic aid failed.

However, this does not mean that national interest considerations were absent from the minds of the Zambian leaders. The then Foreign Minister, Mr. Mwaanga, pointed out that one aim of Zambia's involvement in those negotiations was to reduce the instability prevalent on her borders. He pointed out that of Zambia's eight neighbours, only Tanzania was a stable and reliable neighbour. However, he insisted that there was no horse trading between the two countries. He revealed that, having failed to secure a formal pledge of coexistence from Zambia, South African negotiators repeatedly warned the Zambian government against using an independent Zimbabwe as a base for attacks against South Africa.⁷ From the foregoing, it is clear that despite Zambia's heavy dependence on South African and Western capital, her economic problems and the emergent bourgeois class that favoured improved

relations with South Africa, the official contacts between the Zambian and South African governments did not lead to a formal pledge of coexistence between the two states. In the perceptions of the Zambian political leadership, especially those of President Kaunda, South Africa's racial policies stood in the way of political cooperation.

6.4. Debate Over detente at the OAU

Zambia and other Frontline State's efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian problem with the help of the South African government was severely criticised by other OAU members notably Algeria, Kenya, Lesotho and Guinea - Conakry at the OAU Council of Ministers in Dar-es-Salaam in April 1975 (Mwaanga 1982). President Nyerere asked the Zambian Foreign Minister, then Mr. Mwaanga to defend the Frontline States' position. This Mr. Mwaanga successfully did by pointing out that it was only realistic to talk to South Africa since it was the de facto colonial power in Rhodesia. He further stated that during these negotiations, Zambia was not seeking to improve its relations with South Africa at the expense of the liberation struggle.⁸ Arnold (1975) points out that Zambia rebuffed those African countries that wanted to use 'detente' to establish political and economic links with South Africa.

As already pointed out the era of detente or explicit

negotiations between South Africa and Zambia was shortlived. By 1976, the contacts between the two countries had reverted to their typical form with President Kaunda stating that he would never speak to Vorster again in the spirit of detente (Tordoff 1977: 69).

The dominance of tacit bargaining in the relations between the two governments shows that there is a great deal of tension between the two countries despite Zambia's advocacy for neocolonial solutions. The tension emanates from the Zambian government's ideological opposition to racial domination. As President Kaunda stated:-

nothing stands between South Africa and Zambia in fostering friendship and cooperation except for that government's policy of apartheid... For South Africa ... to court friendship with us under prevailing conditions within that country amounts to asserting that we in Zambia are superior Africans to the Mandelas and Sobukwes (Zambia N.A. Debates 1968: 6).

From this discussion it is clear that the exponents of the political economy approach are accurate in asserting that there was a coincidence of interests between Zambia and South Africa over the character of the regime they wanted to bring about in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the discussion also shows that the exponents of the idiosyncratic approach are correct in maintaining that such a common interest between the two countries did not induce Zambia to form an Axis with Pretoria in regional affairs.

6.5 Zambia's responses to South African tactics in the region.

South Africa has sought to influence the behaviour of the black states in the region through economic and military pressures (Potholm and Dale 1972, Grundy 1973, Barber 1973, Pettman 1974, Torstensen 1982, Price 1984). Torstensen and Price point out that these two types of pressures reinforce each other.

6.5.1. Economic pressures.

As already pointed out South Africa enjoys an economic hegemony over all its black neighbours (Grundy 1973, Clough and Ravenhill 1982). Throughout the period under study South Africa has sought to turn its economic advantages into political assets when dealing with its neighbours. It has stressed its ability and readiness to contribute effectively to the economic development of any neighbouring state provided that its government respected the political status quo in the Republic (Barber 1973, Geldenhuys 1982, Price 1984).

Zambia was a key target of these South African blandishments. South Africa believed that its regional economic and political tactics would not bear fruit without the cooperation of Zambia. Hence it made strenuous efforts to bring Zambia under its sphere of influence (Hall 1969, Barber 1973, Pettman 1974, Anglin and Shaw 1979a).

In political terms Zambia managed to elude South Africa but it was unable to break the economic ties between the two countries. As Barber observes:

The South Africans' objective was to develop outwards from the subcontinent by building contacts and friendships throughout Africa. This helps to explain the particular frustration they felt at Kaunda's obduracy. Yet while Kaunda was not prepared to respond overtly to South Africa's offers of friendship, he realised the limitations placed on his country by her geographical and economic circumstances (Barber 1973: 268).

Indeed, throughout the period under review, Zambia maintained some trade with South Africa and utilized South African port facilities despite her policy of diverting her trade away from the South (Torstensen 1982).

Shaw attributes this duality in the relations between South Africa and Zambia - economic closeness and political distance - to the Zambian political class weak commitment to socialism and hence the triumph of class interests in Zambia's regional and domestic policies.

A socialist humanism would entail not only a redistribution of domestic resources but also a reorientation of Zambia's foreign relations away from association with the West and from a mixture of cooperation and conflict in Southern Africa. Meanwhile a reformist humanism is compatible with the policy of regional coexistence (Shaw 1976b: 102).

As already pointed out, the period of detente was brief and was followed by a period of escalating violence with South Africa and Zambia on opposing sides (Clough 1982).

Secondly relations between South Africa and her black neighbours are characterised by this duality of cooperation and conflict regardless of the ideological orientation of the black state (Barber 1981, Torstensen 1982, Geldenhuys 1982). Hence more recent studies conclude that the tenacity of economic ties between South Africa and her black neighbours is due mainly to geographical proximity reinforced by strong infrastructural linkages and the historical legacy of the region.¹⁰

The political composition of any one regime to address the current state of affairs is circumscribed by objective realities which may not be 'politicised away'. Consequently even socialist oriented regimes have been compelled to adopt a pragmatic, if not conciliatory, attitude to the republic (Torstensen 1982: 91).¹¹

Thirdly, Zambia sought to act as an alternative to South Africa for countries like Botswana and Malawi by strengthening transport links with them (Legum 1973, Gitelson 1977: 377).

In 1978, the South Africa Prime Minister Mr. P. W. Botha put forward his idea of a constellation of Southern African states that would enhance cooperation in economic matters but would also legitimate the political status quo in South Africa (Geldenhuys 1982: 148-158). Zambia rejected the South African inspired economic community and championed the creation of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference which can be regarded as a counter-constellation since its aim is to lessen the dependence of the member states on South Africa

(Clough and Ravenhill 1982, Hill 1983).

Hence it can be seen that Zambia has taken steps both individually and collectively to lessen its dependence on South Africa. Moreover, Eriksen (1978) states that Zambia did not accept South African financial aid despite the economic problems brought about by the fall in copper prices.

6.5.2. Military Pressures

South Africa, singly or in conjunction with the Smith regime, used its superior military capability against neighbouring black states that it deemed hostile to it, Zambia included (Sprack 1974). These attacks have taken various forms: commando raids, destruction of bridges as in the case of Zambia in 1979, letter bomb attacks, invasions and support for anti-government insurgents (Torstensen 1982, Price 1984).

Zambia has responded to these attacks by strengthening her defences (Peterson 1972, Mazrui 1977) and lodging complaints at the UN (Legum 1981.) Moreover South Africa has supported antigovernment rebels, the National Resistance Movement (MNR) in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola. The aims of these rebel movements are to overthrow the incumbent governments in these countries and to disrupt international railway traffic passing through these territories so that Zambia and Zimbabwe continue to be economically dependent on South Africa (Price 1984). While Zambia does not offer military assistance to the Angolan

and Mozambican governments in their fight against the rebels, she has condemned the rebel movements and their South African connections and has won the confidence of these governments in the political and diplomatic spheres (Legum 1977). This invalidates the arguments of some political economy analysts, for example, Shaw and Mugomba (1977) that the Zambian political class would prefer to collaborate with the white minority government in Pretoria rather than with black but radical governments in the region. Racial factors, rather than dependency, have set the pattern of political conflict in the Southern Africa.

6.6 Zambia's response to Apartheid: the forms of Zambian Assistance to the African National Congress of South Africa (ANCSA) and the South West Africa Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia.

Grundy (1970) states that the liberation movements are regarded as a means by which host countries like Zambia can remove regime ~~which~~ they find ideologically objectionable without direct involvement for which they have no resources. And in his study of African state's support for liberation movements, Khapoya (1976) found that the following were some of the ways in which Zambia supported these movements.

1. Regular payments of dues to the OAU Liberation Committee.
2. Provision of military facilities to the guerrillas.
3. Provision of asylum to exiles who are politically active against minority regimes.

4. Provisions of field offices for the liberation movements.

Mazrui and Gordon (1980) add that Africa's diplomatic support at the United Nations and other international fora has eroded the legitimacy of the white regimes in the region and increased that of the guerrilla movements that fight against them. They also point out that African states have played a critical role in thwarting South Africa's political aims in Africa.

In both instances, Zambia has played an active role. Cefkin observes:-

Zambia is the only state in the area which has militantly fought white supremacy. It provides sanctuary for exiled revolutionary parties from the supremacist states. It has played a leadership role in promoting United Nations action against Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese territories ... Kaunda has taken a personal hand in developing a world-wide constituency in support of national liberation (Cefkin 1973: 34).

However, Zambia placed restrictions on the operations of the liberation movements (Anglin 1979). Gibson (1972) points out that the Zambian government permitted SWAPO to operate from its bases in Zambia but did not allow the ANC to mount raids into South Africa from Zambian territory. Shaw (1976b) attributes such restrictions to Zambia's dependence on international capitalism.

A trend towards ambivalence over, or even repression of the liberation movements is one result of Zambia's continuing dependence on external trade and support

(Shaw 1976d: 9).

However, other academics have noted that dependency does not stop an African state from supporting liberation movements.

As Khapoya writes:

Perhaps the most surprising finding of the research undertaken here is that close economic relationships between African states and former colonial powers were not negatively related to liberation support as hypothesized (Khapoya 1976: 488).

Mazrui and Gordon (1980) support this view.¹²

Other studies suggest that the restrictions the Zambian government put on operations of liberation movements like the ANCSA stemmed from the need to preserve state security. Grundy (1970) lists the ways in which organised guerrilla armies become problems to their host states.

1. They might make demands on the host state which it might find inimical to its interests.
2. Factional fighting might erupt in the guerrilla armies on the territory of the host state.
3. The guerrilla army might become a source of arms to citizens of the host government who wish to subvert it.
4. The liberation movement might provoke the target state into invading the host country thereby causing a war between them.

In terms of the elements of national power such as those advanced by Morgenthau (1973) or in terms of asymmetries in dependence as discussed by Torstensen (1982), South Africa enjoys an overwhelming superiority over Zambia. Indeed

Nolutshungu (1975) points out that Zambia could not withstand any confrontation with South Africa. Hence Zambia's restrictions on the operations of the ANCSA and SWAPO should be attributed to the most vital of all state interests: the protection of territorial integrity (Watson 1982)., rather than to dependency (Khapoya 1976). Zambia is an economically dependent country, but in an anarrhic world order, where there are no effective means to enforce international law and morality (Waltz, 1959), the security of the Zambian state depends on the Zambian government's ability to manage conflict with more powerful countries like South Africa rather than on the amount of aid it receives from the West.

6.7 Zambia and South African Perspectives on the roles of the West and East in Southern Africa.

Some exponents of the political economy approach argue that South African and Zambian regional policies ultimately serve the interests of the West by their common advocacy of neo-colonial solutions in the region (Shaw and Mugomba 1977). As we have seen such a conclusion is accurate up to a certain point but it obscures the sharp distinctions that exist in the two countries' regional policies as they apply to the West and the East.

South Africa has sought to maintain its position in the region as the most effective and reliable ally of the West and the guardian of its interests. In return it has

expected the West to desist from pressurising it into dismantling Apartheid (Barber 1973, Nolutshungu 1975, Turok and Maxey 1976, Mugomba 1979, Price 1984). Despite the West's condemnation of Apartheid, it has not taken decisive steps to make the South African government dismantle Apartheid (Barber 1973, Bowman 1982, Nicol 1982).

Zambia has strived diplomatically to persuade the Western powers that it is in their interest to help the black Southern Africans in their efforts to bring an end to Apartheid. As Barber observes:

Leading opponents of South Africa attempted to translate the general disapproval into precise issues that would directly involve state interests, for example, President Kaunda tried to persuade the Western States that a major racial conflict involving all Southern Africa was imminent (Barber 1973: 306).

Hence Zambia has expended considerable diplomatic efforts in persuading the West that it is not in its interest to continue supporting Apartheid South Africa (Pettman 1974, Eriksen 1978).

Where the Eastern powers are concerned, South Africa has exhibited relentless hostility towards communism. It has portrayed its fight against the ANC as a struggle against communism deserving the support of the Western powers. After the Angolan Civil War, South Africa has sought to exploit the presence of Cuban and Russian military personnel to maintain its close ties with the West and thus prolong the life of white rule (Price 1984).

While Zambia has strived to keep out super power rivalry from regional conflicts, the intransigence of the white minority regimes and the constant refusal of the Western powers to act decisively against them, has forced Zambia to turn to the communist powers. Hence Zambia asked China to build the Tanzania-Zambia Railway after the West refused to assist in its construction (Mutukwa 1977). In addition Zambia has received a sizeable amount of financial aid from Russia (Burdette 1984a) and has obtained arms from the East in her efforts to defend herself from attacks by the white minority regimes and she has supported Chinese and Russian armed guerrilla movements such as ZAPU, the MPLA and the ANC of South Africa (Shaw 1982). However, in Zambian perceptions, the aim of these liberation wars fought with communist arms is not to bring about socialist revolution, but to make the white regimes agree to majority rule at the negotiating table (Utete 1982). In regional and global terms, it can be seen that the aims of South Africa and Zambia's diplomatic efforts are conflicting: South Africa's aim is the maintenance of Apartheid while Zambia seeks its abolition.

6.8 Conclusion

In order to assess the impact of ideology and interest on Zambia's relations with South Africa, reference will be made to the broad aims of a state's foreign policy. These have been identified by Barber (1973) as the following:-

the state's survival, the perservation and promotion of particular values, wealth maximization and the ability to influence other states.

- (a) The state's survival: The aim of the South African Government is to maintain the existence of the white state (Barber 1973, Arnold 1976, Johnson 1977, Price 1984). While Zambia is opposed to the white state in South Africa, she realises that the balance of power is in favour of the white government, so in order to safeguard the survival of the Zambian state, the Zambian leadership operates within self-imposed limits (Gibson 1972, Nolutshungu 1975, Anglin 1979).
- (b) The perservation and promotion of particular values: the values and privileges that the South African government has sought to protect are those of the white minority in South Africa (Barber 1973, Rogers 1976). Zambia, on the other hand, preaches and practices non-racialism in her domestic and external policies (McKay 1971). Hence there is a clash of values between the two countries.
- (c) Wealth maximization: South Africa has sought to bring Zambia into its sphere of influence for political as well as economic advantages (Hambote 1980). Zambia has collaborated with South African and Western Multinationals and governments¹³ and did not manage

to stop using South African goods and transit facilities. However, despite Zambia's economic problems after 1974, the government refused to accept forms of economic aid from South Africa that would have forced the Zambian leadership to exhibit gratitude, goodwill and approval towards the white minority government in Pretoria (Eriksen 1978, Anglin and Shaw 1979a).

In so doing, Zambia deprived herself of a substantial amount of aid. As Maxey notes:

Undoubtedly, it is in Zambia's short term interests to stop supporting the nationalists, and Malawi has shown that money can be obtained from South Africa in return for diplomatic support (Maxey 1972: 32).

- (d) The ability to influence other states. Although South African political values have been condemned by the World community, it possesses enough economic and military power to influence the behaviour of other states towards her. To the West, South Africa's military power is an asset in any regional confrontation where its interests would be threatened (Mugomba 1979). To the African states, South African economic and military might is a factor that has to be taken into consideration in any moves against her (Petersen 1972, Clough and Ravenhill 1982).

Zambia, on the other hand, lacks the military and

economic power to influence other states (Petersen 1972). Its ability to influence other states on regional affairs depends on its faithful adherence to certain ideological principles such as non-racism, pan-Africanism and anti-colonialism. If these ideological principles are compromised, then its ability to influence other states both in Africa and abroad against the Republic of South Africa would be diminished.¹⁴ This was manifested by the acrimonious debate on the detente exercise at the OAU in 1975 (Mwaanga 1980). So in the case of Zambia, the preservation and promotion of particular values is tied very closely to its ability to influence other states because it lacked the conventional elements of national power. In this regard, Zartman observed of the new states of Africa:

Ideology is power. Just as it legitimizes authority and creates solidarity inside states, it creates solidarity among states and gives international influence to the ideologues. Employed this way, it helps the new African states to overcome their powerlessness by using symbols and values as a more readily available and more rapidly constructed power base than material elements of national power (Zartman 1966: 43).

In Zambia's regional policies, therefore, there was a constant interplay between interest and ideology. This prevented her from having normal relations with white minority regimes such as South Africa.

This disjunction of Zambia-South African relation shows that although Zambia preferred peaceful 'neocolonial' solutions to liberation issues in the region, this did not amount to an accommodationist stance towards the white minority

regimes as Burdette (1984b) states. This was because the white minority government regarded such solutions as a threat to their interests and they took steps to punish Zambia for advocating neocolonial majority governments in the region. Hence Zambia had to live with the threat of a military attack from the South until such a time when the white minority regimes could no longer resist black majority rule or deemed it to be in their best interests as the problem of Rhodesia illustrated. From 1965 Rhodesia and South Africa attacked Zambia in various ways until 1980 when the Smith regime was forced to accept black majority rule and the South African government perceived a black government in Rhodesia to be in its best interests. To sustain a policy that supported the establishment of non-revolutionary, black majority governments, then, Zambia had to resist considerable economic and military pressures. As Shaw himself admits:

Despite popular misgivings inside the country and radical reservations outside, over the last two decades, Zambia's leadership was in the vanguard in providing support and facilities for regional liberation movements, especially for those in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe... The traumas of interventions from Rhodesia into Zambian territory, intrusions of guerrillas into Zambian affairs and negotiations over transitional arrangements in all three neighbours imposed a series of strains on Zambian society (Shaw 1982:54).

This shows that although Zambia advocated non-revolutionary solutions in the region, she was prepared to suffer considerably in economic and military terms because of her

ideological opposition to racial domination in the region. This discussion of Zambia's relations with South Africa supports the first hypothesis in that it has shown that it was mainly the perceptions of President Kaunda rather than the interests of the emergent bourgeoisie that shaped Zambia's relations with South Africa.

In regard to the second hypothesis, Zambia's dealings and contacts with South Africa were based on pragmatic considerations but the discussion has also shown that in her dealings with South Africa, ideology and interest operated interactively to the detriment of normal relations between the two countries.

NOTES ON CHAPTER SIX

1. The Frontline Presidents were: Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (Chairman), Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Seretse Khama of Botswana and Augustino Neto of Angola (Legum 1977).
2. Mr. Mwaanga stated that the cohesion among the Frontline States was made possible by the fact that every African leader, whatever his other ideological inclinations might be, is opposed to racial domination. Interview 13.03.87.
3. For example while Shaw and Mugomba (1977) Eriksen (1978) and Burdette (1984a, b) argue that Zambia was increasingly adopting an accommodationist stance towards the white minority government because of economic imperatives, Woldring (1975) asserts that, despite their economic problems, African states are unlikely to come to an accommodation with South Africa as long Apartheid is in force.
4. This tacit bargaining assumed written form in the secret correspondence between President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster in 1968 in which both of them hinted at conditions that would improve relations between them (Anglin and Shaw 1979a). Zambia also used summit conferences as a form of tacit bargaining with the white minority regimes. The most famous example is the Lusaka Manifesto on southern African produced at the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States held in Lusaka in 1969. This Manifesto stated that African countries were willing to engage in negotiations with the white minority regimes on the subject of ending racial domination if these regimes showed a genuine desire to do so. However, should the white regimes prove intransigent, then African countries would give support to liberation movements in their armed struggle against minority rule (Grundy 1973).
5. Ikle defines negotiation as:

a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of common interest where conflicting interests are present (Ikle 1964: 4).

The changeover from tacit bargaining to negotiations represented a significant shift in Zambia's regional diplomacy. Burdette (1984a) attributes these shifts

not only to Zambia's economic problems but also to factions within the Zambian political class more especially to the preferences of the more ideological-oriented national politicians as against those of the more pragmatic technocrats, civil servants and businessmen.

These various factions of the political class had different attitudes about the appropriate kind of foreign policy for the Zambian state. At various times, under differing internal and external pressures, one faction seemed to have sway or greater power than the others concerning policies at the regional and global level (Burdette 1984: 327).

However, other scholars remark the dominance of President Kaunda over decision-making in domestic and external affairs in opposition to the preferences of any other individual or faction (Mtshali 1975, Baylies 1978).

Pettman (1974) and Tordoff and Molteno (1974) point out that political office in Zambia is held by any individual or faction at the pleasure of the President. And in regard to the negotiations between South Africa and Zambia over Rhodesia these were conducted by Mr. Chona, a long time Presidential adviser (Grotpeter 1979) not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where there were frequent changes at the Ministerial level (Mwaanga 1982). Dolan et al (1980) state that foreign policy consists of behaviour and objectives. Events showed that there were changes in Zambia's regional behaviour. These changes have been regarded as a sign of flexibility (Mtshali 1972) or hypocrisy (Shaw and Mugomba 1977) depending on the paradigm of the analyst. But the record also shows that Zambia's regional objective: the eradication of white minority rule remained constant:

From 1964's Independence Statement by Kaunda of his willingness to cooperate economically with South Africa, through the well-publicised 1969 correspondence with Vorster, to the 1974 'dialogue' up to the latest manoeuvrings with Smith, Zambia's substantive attitude has not changed (Southal 1978: 119).

6. Interview with Mr. Chona on 6.04.87.
7. Interview with Mr. Mwaanga on 13.03.87.
8. Interview with Mr. Mwaanga on 13.03.87.

9. Frankel (1969) points out that in modern international relations lack of diplomatic ties is due to war, acute conflict or suspicion.
10. South Africa also uses rebel movements in Angola and Mozambique to sabotage railways in these countries so that countries like Zambia continue to depend on her economically (Price 1984).
11. For example Zimbabwe renewed its trade agreement with South Africa in 1982 and does not give operational facilities to the ANC and Mozambique collaborates in economic matters with South Africa (Barber 1981, Torstensen 1982).
12. Mtshali (1972) states that the Zambian government described the British request that it should not support armed incursions across the Zambezi as ludicrous, nonsensical and unhelpful.
13. It should be noted that according to the dependency paradigm such collaboration does not lead to wealth maximization but impoverishment in the Third World state especially for its masses (Shaw 1975).
14. One major aim of the constellation of states was to blunt the African State's diplomatic offensive against South Africa in the West (Geldenhuys 1982).

CHAPTER SEVEN

7.0. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This thesis sought to critically study the interpretations of Zambia's regional policies in the period 1964 to 1980. These interpretations were based on two approaches - the political economy and the idiosyncratic. The political economy approach emphasized economic interests and class formation as the central factors that shaped the country's regional policies while idiosyncratic factors played a secondary role. The idiosyncratic approach, on the other hand stressed that the personality and ideology of President Kaunda made a critical difference in Zambia's regional stance despite the country's economic vulnerability.

In order to assess the validity of these interpretations the central problem which this study endeavoured to answer was to determine the actual impact of economic interests and class formation, on the one hand, and personality and ideology, on the other, on Zambia's regional policies. In order to answer this question, two hypotheses were formulated as guidelines. These are:-

1. The formulation and conduct of foreign policy in Zambia originates at a central point (the Chief Executive) in the Zambian state as opposed to any discernible group or class in Zambian society.
2. Zambian foreign policy has been moral and ideological

in its foundation but pragmatic in its implementation.

This study has shown that the first hypothesis is correct in regard to Zambia's regional policies; that is it was dominated by President Kaunda. This confirms the findings of earlier analysts of either persuasion (political economy or idiosyncratic Hall 1969, Mtshali 1972, Shaw 1976c). Other domestic groups that sought to influence Zambia's regional policies were deliberately excluded from decision-making on this issue by State House. External state actors, such as the South African government, or transnational actors such as the Anglo-American Corporation sought to change the thinking of President Kaunda on regional issues rather than any other group in Zambian society. Hence President Kaunda mediated the domestic and external influence on Zambia's regional policies.

The second hypothesis implies a dichotomy between interest and ideology in Zambia's regional policies. This has been the position of analysts of either school of thought, the difference being that the political economy analysts have tended to emphasize interest at the expense of ideology while the exponents of the idiosyncratic approach have tended to stress ideology and personality (Mtshali 1970, 1972, Shaw 1976b, Burdette 1984a). However this study has shown that there has been a continuous and active interaction between personality, ideology and interest in Zambia's regional policies.

7.1. Personality and Ideology

At the declaratory level, Zambia has sought to project a national image of moral persuasion as embodied in a Humanist President who favours peaceful solutions to regional problems.

At the implementation level, the national image has also been personified through the President's dominant role in all forms of regional diplomacy: tacit bargaining, actual negotiations and summitry with other Frontline Presidents, South African and Rhodesian leaders. State House also monopolised diplomatic exchanges and information on regional issues from other sources such as Western governments or multinational corporations.

7.2. Ideology, Interest and Class Formation

The ideological language of Zambia's political class decries racialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, capitalism, and imperialism and professes to favour socialism, pan-Africanism and non-alignment. However, this study has shown that Zambia is strongly committed to the eradication of racialism and colonialism but within the capitalist framework. In Zambian perceptions the West can bring about solutions to the Southern African problem while the East is circumscribed. Moreover, during the Angolan Civil War, Zambia favoured the pro-western UNITA and was estranged from the socialist MPLA.

Hence some political economy analysts are right in arguing that Zambia favoured neocolonial solutions in the region. However, subsequent events proved that these political economy analysts were mistaken in postulating that Zambia's advocacy of such solutions amounted to the acceptance of coexistence with the white minority regimes and the emergence of a Pretoria-Lusaka Axis in regional affairs (Shaw and Mugomba 1977, Burdette 1984b). Actual events diverged from the scenario painted by the political economy analysts which saw Zambia as an ally of South Africa against radical governments and movements in the region, because, Zambia's stand though pro-western, threatened the interests of the white settler minorities in the region and their governments took punitive measures against her. Hence Zambia identifies herself with the radical governments in the region rather than with South Africa despite class formation in Zambia and her troubled economy which could have benefited from South African assistance. The substantive issue is racial domination rather than class interests.

Zambia's preference for peaceful, negotiated, non-revolutionary solutions to regional issues can justifiably be attributed to the personality and beliefs of President Kaunda rather than to class formation and economic interests for two reasons:

1. President Kaunda started pursuing such solutions even before Zambia's Independence (Ranganathan 1985: 52) and before the advent of the political expression

of class formation and the onset of the economic recession.

2. Some elements of Zambia's emergent bourgeoisie have opposed Zambia's insistence that the minority regimes should accept majority rule before Zambia can normalise relations with them. They have argued that such a stand is inimical to the country's interests.

Economic interests played a major role in Zambia's regional policies but these interests cannot be narrowly defined as the interests of one particular class in Zambian society. The active interaction of interest and ideology in Zambia's regional policies has meant the Zambian leadership has defined the country's interests in the long term. The most outstanding example was the collapse of detente in 1976 that would have promoted interest at the expense of ideology. This meant economic hardships in the short-term which the government has sought to alleviate by resorting to expences such as the importation of maize from Rhodesia in 1971 and the reopening of the Zambia/Rhodesian border in 1978. The interaction between ideology and interest is also enhanced by the fact that Zambia's ability to maintain its valued image as an active member of the Frontline states depends on its faithful adherence to Pan-Africanist ideals.

This study has also shown that despite its pronounced dependent status, Zambia was not an agent of South African or Western policies in the region. Rather the study has shown that the Zambian government had room to manoeuvre on regional

issues. For example, it pursued policies like disengagement from the South, the closure of Zambia/Rhodesia border, support for armed incursions into white-ruled territories and the building of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway to which Zambia's emergent bourgeoisie, multinational corporations or Western governments expressed opposition. Hence a comprehensive analysis of Zambia's regional policy requires the ideological and personality insights provided by the idiosyncratic approach as well as the economic perspectives of the political economy approach. This study has demonstrated that an accurate, balanced treatment of the country's regional policies lies in the interactions of the factors identified by these two approaches. These two sets of factors are inextricably intertwined and therefore no fair justice can be given when one set (idiosyncratic or political economy) is given precedence over the other. The adoption of one or the other is based on the questionable assumption that foreign policy formulation in the Third World is a simple matter that can be attributed either to the perceptions of an authoritarian leader or to the country's place in the international economic system. Usually the impact of the latter over the former is taken for granted and not critically analysed. Such an approach ignores a cardinal point about modern international relations - that external political, economic, cultural and social influences are operative in both developed and developing countries. While such pressures are heavier on the dependent countries of the Third World, their responses depends on the characteristics of each national leadership, that is, these responses are not ready made by the international system as the case of Zambia has shown.

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