THE IMPACT OF RAILWAY RATES AND CUSTOMS AGREEMENTS ON SETTLER FARMING IN NORTHERN RHODESIA/ZAMBIA, 1910-1939: THE CASE OF MAIZE AND CATTLE FARMING

by

ACKSON M. KANDUZA

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History, University of Zambia, 1979

To

my grandfather
who showed the way;

my sister

who provided the means;

And my mother
who is the link.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to the University of Zambia and the Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas who funded my research.

I express my greatest gratitude to Dr. L.H. Vail who inspired and interested me in the subject of this research and also supervised the greater part of the research; and Dr. M.S. Muntemba who supervised the last stages after Dr. Vail left the University of Zambia. To Mrs. L. Mpala and Dr. J.K. Rennie who translated French sources into English; Dr. R.H. Palmer for inspiration and Mr. John Fweta who drew the maps, I give my special thanks.

I am indebted to Dr. A.D. Roberts of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, who supervised my research in Britain from January to June, 1978. His hospitality also greatly facilitated my research and stay in London. Many thanks to Dr. B. Fetter of the University of Wisconsin-Milwauke, Dr. I.R. Phimister, University of Cape Town, Dr. B. Jewsiewicki, University College de St. Boniface, Dr. R. Gravil, formerly of the University of Zambia who kindly gave their valuable works and all people who helped me during the course of preparing this dissertation.

Finally, I should thank my wife, Esta, who gave me warm and encouraging company all the time and my children, Nyasi, Chikalipo and Mulape Mutule whose interruptions gave me time to relax.

SUMMARY

In this dissertation, I argue that the rating system of the Rhodesia Railways and the customs agreements concluded by Northern Rhodesia contributed to the failure of settler maize and cattle farming along the line of rail in Northern Rhodesia.

Settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia developed between 1910 and 1918 largely by supplying the local and Katanga markets with maize and beef cattle. The prices for these commodities were high and competition from Southern Rhodesia was weak. However, the high demand for these commodities created by the development of mining in Northern Rhodesia and Katanga between 1918 and 1931 did not sustain settler agricultural development because of cheap imports from Southern Rhodesia which depressed prices and had first call on Northern Rhodesian main markets. Northern Rhodesia could neither protect its producers nor alter the rating system of the Rhodesia Railways as both matters were dominated by Southern Rhodesia. Settler agriculture remained severely dislocated in the 1930s despite attempts by the Northern Rhodesia Government to restore the development that had been experienced before 1918.

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

B.F.P.	Bruce Fetter Papers
B.S.A.C.	British South Africa Company
H.C.T.	High Commission Territories
L.C.S.N.R.	Livestock Co-operative Society of Northern Rhodesia
L.N.M.	Livingstone National Museum
N.A.Z.	National Archives of Zambia
N.R.	Northern Rhodesia
N.W.R.	North-Western Rhodesia
N.W.R.F.C.S.	North-Western Rhodesia Farmers' Co-operative Society
P.R.O.	Public Record Office
S.R.	Southern Rhodesia
TANKS	Tanganyika Concessions Ltd.

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Research

In this dissertation I attempt to explore the extent to which customs agreements and railway rates contributed to the failure of settler maize and cattle farming along the line of rail in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia since 24/10/64). My thesis is that customs agreements and railway rates encouraged Southern Rhodesia to dump maize, maize meal, beef and beef cattle on the Northern Rhodesian and Congolese markets. (The Congo became Zaire in 1965). These commodities which Southern Rhodesia dumped in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo depressed and fluctuated the prices in these markets and prevented Northern Rhodesian settler producers in the railwaybelt farming area from raising sufficient capital with which to improve their farming.

This dissertation will fill a gap in Zambia's historiography because the role of customs agreements and railway rates in the development of settler agriculture has received brief and insufficient examination by scholars who have stressed the positive role of the railway since it reached the Congo in 1910. For example, it has been argued that the completion of the railway from Livingstone to the Congo and the development of the mining industry in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo stimulated food production in Northern Rhodesia[1].

Yet, the Department of Agriculture noted in its Annual Report in 1933 that 'Unhappily, the development of the mining industry, invaluable as it has been and will be, has failed to open up that farmer's Eldorado so eagerly anticipated'[2].

In this dissertation I elaborate and support this assertion by examining the role of customs agreements and railway rates in the development of settler agriculture.

I have considered customs agreements and railway rates together because the customs agreements regulated trade between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana since 1966), and the Congo while the cost of railway transport was one of the factors which influenced consumers to select where to buy their food. The transport cost of maize, maize meal, beef and beef cattle from Southern Rhodesia to Northern Rhodesia and the Congo was low and enabled Southern Rhodesian settler producers to compete effectively with producers close to the consumers. Additionally, I have taken customs agreements and railway rates together because the customs tariffs were based on the price of the commodities which included the cost of railway transportation. Lastly, the Rhodesia Railways imposed higher railway rates on imports than on exports in order to add to the protection provided by the customs agreements[3].

However, this protection did not affect the trade between the Rhodesias or their exports to the Congo. The Rhodesia Railways reduced rates for maize and cattle consigned to Northern Rhodesia partly for the purpose of reducing the cost of living in Northern Rhodesia at the time Northern Rhodesia was not self-supporting in food production[4]. On the other hand, unrestricted trade and the policy of low railage were deliberately adopted to promote export production in Southern Rhodesia[5]. The introduction of rate reduction between 1918 and 1922 for maize and cattle exports to Northern Rhodesia and the Congo enabled Southern Rhodesian farmers to undersell Northern Rhodesian settler farmers in their main and nearby external market in Katanga (Shaba since 1967).

I chose settler maize and cattle farming along the line of rail as a case study for three reasons. First, the completion of the railway attracted settler farmers who engaged in market oriented production mainly for the Katanga market and later for the Northern Rhodesia copperbelt. Second, it was these farmers who felt the most deleterious effects as they competed for the same markets with Southern Rhodesian farmers[6]. Third, maize and cattle and their by-products were the only commodities which were protected in the 1930s[7].

Several studies have correctly attributed the failure of a viable settler farming economy in Northern Rhodesia to a combination of factors: a small and unstable local market, high freight rates for agricultural inputs, the high cost of production, settler ignorance about pest and disease control, lack of capital and expertise and the government's funding policy which discriminated against small scale settler producers in favour of large scale and low cost producers[8]. However, in this dissertation I hope to show that customs agreements and railway rates also contributed to the failure of settler agricultre in Northern Rhodesia.

Low railage on exports from Southern Rhodesia and customs agreements affected settler agriculture more than African agriculture. African farming was frustrated more by the need to protect settler agriculture. Settler agriculture was encouraged to supply the Copperbelt and Katanga markets in direct competition with settler agricultural exports from Southern Rhodesia. African farming was frustrated by the pricing system which discriminated in favour of settler produce, the provision of marketing facilities only for settler produce, the creation of Native Reserves and the drawing of labour from the African farming sector[9]. These measures were taken to protect settler farming from African competition.

Before the 1930s existing marketing and farmers' associations catered only for settler farming. Although the Maize Control Ordinance of 1935 and the Cattle Marketing Board which was formed in 1937 catered for African produce, they were primarily introduced by the Administration to check growing African competition as well as to promote settler farming[10]. A study of African farming in the Mazabuka District between 1900 and 1953, whose findings can be validly generalised for African agriculture along the line of rail, concluded that the 'main trend of change was towards subordination of African production to European agricultural enterprise'[11]. In view of the fact that African agriculture was undermined by internal measures which were also aimed at protecting settler agriculture, my study focuses on settler agriculture which competed

Rhodesia in an attempt to solve problems facing settler farming.

Newspapers were another important source of what the settler farmers perceived as problems of the agricultural industry caused by the customs agreements and railway rates. I found the Livingstone Mail, the only local paper in Northern Rhodesia during the period covered by my research, a particularly important source of information on settler opinion. The paper carried reports of the settler farmers' meetings and 'Letters to the Editor'. 'Letters to the Editor' which I used specifically reacted to railage reduction on Southern Rhodesia's maize and cattle exports to the Congo and Northern Rhodesia and also called for protection. There is no doubt that some of the letters contained exaggerations. I attempted to overcome this problem by cross-checking with other contemporary publications and in many cases I found that the claims made by the farmers were correct. I also consulted the Bulawayo Chronicle and the Rhodesia Herald.

The main thesis of this study was to be demonstrated by quoting official and settler statements pertaining to farming; and also by presenting figures to show the rise and fall in demand, exports or imports. Most of the sources have been reliable in describing changes and problems facing settler agriculture. However, the sources' major weakness has been the unreliability of the statistics. This was because there were no trained statisticians in the various departments of Agriculture, Veterinary and Customs and Excise. It seems there was no proper system of recording statistics. For example, there are no records which explicitly state levels of demand for maize and cattle in Northern Rhodesia before 1918. Sources or destinations of maize, maize meal, cattle and beef were not usually indicated and most administrators found it easy to present overall totals of exports and imports.

I also obtained some useful information through personal communication with farmers who began farming in Northern Rhodesia in the 1920s. I intended personal communication to replace field research but its success was limited in that out of five letters which I wrote I got only two replies. Both replies agreed with my thesis. Although field interviews with some of the farmers was desirable, I was unable to do this on account of a number of constraints.

Finally, I read secondary published and unpublished historical works in the form of books, articles, theses and dissertations which discusse various aspects of settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia during the period covered by my research.

My research covers a period of about thirty years, 1910 to 1939. I divided this period into three phases in order to make an intelligible presentation since the main characteristics of the development of settler agriculture changed over time. The first phase covers the period 1910 to 1918. During this period Northern Rhodesian settler agriculture dominated the supply of maize and cattle products to the domestic and Congolese markets. The prices were high and settler farmers were encouraged to improve their farming. The Second phase, from 1918 to 1931, is characterised by keen competition from Southern Rhodesia for what had become to be Northern Rhodesia's only and natural markets. The Rhodesia Railways initiated rate reduction for maize exports to the Congo in 1918 in order to lower the price and make Southern Rhodesian exports attractive[13]. These reductions were made annually up to 1931. Competition from Southern Rhodesia was keen, prices fluctuated and were depressed and settler farming in Northern Rhodesia was adversely affected because farm incomes were low inspite of a huge increase in demand for maize and cattle. The third phase from 1931 to 1939 represents a reverse of the period 1918 to 1931. Northern Rhodesia adopted a protective customs tariff and imported maize and cattle could not sell below the price of Northern Rhodesian produce. Prices were stable and rose steadily. Settler agriculture hoped for yet another bright future.

The Southern African Economic setting

Northern Rhodesia was linked to the Southern African economic region through international capital which had originally invested in the South African diamond and gold mines. The profitable exploitation of these minerals encouraged Cecil John Rhodes and his associates to expand their economic empire into the northern territories. To achieve this purpose they obtained a Royal Charter from the British Government and formed the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1889. The company built a railway and established political control over Northern and Southern Rhodesia in order to facilitate and safeguard the economic exploitation of these territories. The railway which was started at Vryburg in South Africa reached Bulawayo in 1897 and crossed the Zambezi into Northern Rhodesia in 1904. The railway increased trade dependence of the BSAC and the emergent settler communities in Northern and Southern Rhodesia on South Africa. For the purpose of the trade, the BSAC concluded a trade agreement on behalf of its chartered territories with the Cape Colony Government and the Bechuanaland Administration in 1899.[14]

The BSAC approached Northern Rhodesia through Southern Rhodesia, which later became its main seat of power because of the huge capital invested there. The company turned to farming and serious land speculation when it realized between 1903 and 1907 that there was no Second Rand in Southern Rhodesia[15]. In Northern Rhodesia the company was reluctant to invest in a programme of European settlement as the company did not see Northern Rhodesia to be an economic asset. As a result of this policy, agricultural services, technical and financial institutions were seriously underdeveloped at the end of company rule in 1924. It is in the light of this discriminatory policy used by the company in its two territories that Northern Rhodesia 'remained a territory marginal to the main areas of agricultural settlement in the South'[16].

After the 1914-1918 war, maize and cattle production in Southern Rhodesia increased to a level where the domestic market and the main external market in South Africa could not absorb the growing surplus. South Africa restricted imports in order to protect its primary producers and because its production exceeded internal demand[17].

On account of the Congo treaties, the free trade tariff with Northern Rhodesia and restrictions in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia easily found markets in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo[18]. The Rhodesia Railways reduced rates in response to settler pressure in Southern Rhodesia in order to attract consumers north of the Zambezi as rate reduction also lowered the price.

Railways and Railway Companies

The Rhodesia Railways system is the line from the port of Beira in the east and Vryburg in the South. (See map 1 for the railway network and appendix I for the railway mileage owned by various companies which were owned and controlled by the BSAC). For easy reference, I have called this railway system the Rhodesia Railways, a name which was adopted in 1937 for the line in Northern and Southern Rhodesia. This was the largest section of the railway which the BSAC owned until 1946 when the Rhodesias appropriated it[19].

The line from Beira to Umtali was started in 1892. The Mozambique Company contracted with H.T. Van Laun to build the railway. The intention to build this railway in order to provide an outlet to the sea for the Rhodesias had been present in the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891. The construction of the railway consolidated

British imperial interests in the Portuguese colony[20]. Van Laun transferred the concession to the BSAC through Otto Beit, who was one of the BSAC Directors. The BSAC formed the Beira Railway Company to build the railway to Pungwe Bay. The voting power in respect of 305, 000 ordinary shares out of 600,000 was vested in the BSAC until 1st July 1942. The extension to Umtali was completed in 1897 by the Beira Junction Railway Company. The Company had 250,000 ordinary shares of 5s. 0d each at 6 per cent and held by the BSAC. There were also 423,583 cumulative preference shares of 5s. 0d each at 6 per cent held by the BSAC. The BSAC guaranteed the share capital and thus owned and controlled the Eastern outlet to the sea. This railway reached Salisbury in 1899[21].

In May 1893 railway construction began at Vryburg as an extension of the South African Railway system and reached Mafeking seventeen months later. The railway reached Bulawayo in 1897 and in 1902 Bulawayo and Salisbury were linked. The Bechuanaland Railway Company which became the Rhodesia Railways Company in 1899, built the line from Vryburg to Kalomo in Northern Rhodesia. The BSAC owned 7,989 of the 8,000 £1 sterling shares in the Rhodesia Railways Company and 6,250,000 debentures at 5 per cent interest for fifty years. The Mashonaland Railways Company extended the line from Kalomo to Broken Hill (became Kabwe in 1968) and also owned considerable mileage of the railway in Southern Rhodesia. This Company had 450,000 £1 sterling shares of

RAILWAYS AND THE CONGO BASIN SOUTHERN BOUNDARY



MAP 1

which 449,000 were held by the BSAC. The debenture Capital of the Mashonaland Railways Company totalled £5,060,000. This was wholly subscribed by the BSAC which also guaranteed the interest at 5 per cent[22].

The line stalled at Broken Hill for nearly two years. The extension to Katanga stalled because the BSAC had not entrenched itself in the Katanga Copper Mines. Robert Williams explained in an address to the African Society in 1921 that 'had Rhodes been alive, it would not have been allowed to stop there for so long[23]'. Rhodes' death in 1902 might have been one of the factors for the delay in extending the railway from Broken Hill to Katanga but certainly not the prime factor. Rhodes' condition for extending the line to Katanga was rejected by King Leopold and Christopher J. Leyland, the main financial support of Williams[24]. Throughout the 1890s Rhodes had made unsuccessful attempts to get Leopold's support for the Cape to Cairo railway and a share of the Katanga mineral concessions for the BSAC. Upon arrangements made in 1901 that Williams should continue with the negotiations, Rhodes admitted his failure and remarked:'I thought I was clever Williams, but I was no match for King Leopold'[25].

Rhodes was 'no match' for the King because Rhodes' demands were extra-ordinary. His condition for extending the railway from Broken Hill to Katanga, arranged in 1900 and continued by Beit in 1903, was that the BSAC be granted 50 per cent of the mineral concessions of Katanga and a further 50 per cent of the mineral rights for fifty miles on each side of the railway when extended beyond Katanga. Rhodes had also instructed Williams to ensure that 'no special fares should be placed on the mining industry or its producers as its development could be seriously damaged by burdensome Government charges'[26]. The BSAC and Rhodes had never been convinced that they had completely lost Katanga. However, the position of Leopold and other financial interests in Katanga was undermined by lack of coal in the area and the high cost of transporting this commodity from Europe.

The Rhodesia-Katanga Junction Railway and Mineral Company was formed in 1908 to build the railway from Broken Hill to Katanga. Baron Emile D'Erlanger raised debenture shares which totalled 800,000 and were guaranteed at 5 per cent for twenty years by the Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. (TANKS)[27]. The BSAC subscribed £150,000 of the debentures and had the right to purchase the line on 4th November, 1918 or at the end of every five years on six months' notice after 1918. The price was to be the actual cost of construction plus 10 per cent. This right was exercised in 1928[28]. The shares and debentures of the BSAC in all these companies were held by the Rhodesia Railways Trust Limited. The Trust held 85 per cent of the shares and debentures in the Mashonaland and Rhodesia Railways, which were the main companies[29].

The construction of the Broken Hill-Katanga railway gave the BSAC a chance to compensate for its lack of direct interest in the Katanga mines. The mines were tied to importing all their coal from Wankie and exporting a large proportion of their copper through the Rhodesia Railways. These arrangements also prevented the Congo from building any railway that might compete with the Rhodesia Railways. In 1923 the BSAC convinced the British Government not to allow any railway to be built in the Rhodesias which may compete with the BSAC's railways or to assist any external railway project that might have the same effect[30]. These arrangements explain Williams' failure to get the British Government's guarantee for the Benguela Railway before 1925. Williams' interests were not identified with any British economic, political and strategic interests as had been the activities of the BSAC, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in Portuguese East Africa. However, general economic and unemployment problems facing Britain immediately after the 1914-1918 war forced the British Government to over-rule the BSAC's objection and guaranteed the railway in order to assist British industries 'where unemployment was at its worst'[31].

Four features in the above discussion should be underlined. First, the BSAC was extensively involved in all the railways from Beira to Katanga down to Vryburg in the South. This was because the company was the dominant financier. Second, the railways were owned and controlled by the BSAC through the Rhodesia Railways Trust Ltd., as the holding company. The Mashonaland Railways Company managed the whole system except the line from Bulawayo to Vryburg which was managed by the South African Railways. Third, the rates of the railways from Beira to Katanga, and Vryburg to Bulawayo were determined by the Trust through the Mashonaland Railways Company to 1918. A Commission of five directors, three from the Mashonaland Railways Company and one each from the Beira companies, fixed the rates[32]. Between 1918 and 1926 the Commission was advised by the Rates Advisory Committee of the Southern Rhodesia Railways Conference which had been set up in 1918[33]. Fourth, there was an in-built system which lasted until 1946 where the financially strong companies assisted the weak ones. For example, the Rhodesia Railways Company gave the Beira Salisbury line 20 per cent more than its proportion of the mileage and the Mashonaland Company received special terminal benefits from Kalomo to Broken Hill.

Rates and Rate-making

The Rhodesia Railways had thirteen classes of rates for goods which they carried. Maize, Maize meal, cattle and beef were carried at class rates eleven to thirteen which were the lowest. The rates for local goods were known as Country Produce Rates and were fixed on the basis of despatches from distribution centres[34]. Bulawayo and Salisbury were the distribution centres of these commodities for the Congo and Northern Rhodesia markets. Bulawayo was the main and regularly used distribution station for cattle and Salisbury for maize and maize meal. Goods from distribution centres paid less railage for similar distances than goods from non-distribution centres. This rating system was disadvantageous to non-distribution centres located in Northern Rhodesia in the matter of sending maize, maize meal, cattle and beef to Katanga and the copperbelt.

Between 1922 and 1930 the above rating system was affected by three rating principles. First, the taper principle was adopted for the whole Rhodesia Railways between 1922 and 1924[35]. The taper reduced the total terminal rate per ton per mile as the haul increased. The Hammond Commission which was appointed in 1924 to advise the Southern Rhodesia Government on whether it was desirable for the colony to appropriate the rialways within its borders, explained that the taper from Beira decreased sharply for every 100 miles up to 680 miles from an initial rate of 11.2d to 6.712d per ton. The rate for goods unloaded before 680 miles was 11.2d per ton per mile while at 680 miles the rate was 6.712d per ton per mile[36]. The reduction in rate over a short haul did not decrease as fast as for goods carried over a long haul. The taper rating principle was more advantageous to Southern Rhodesia than to Northern Rhodesia. This principle reduced the cost of carrying Southern Rhodesian commodities to the copperbelt and the Congo. It thus narrowed the difference in price between Northern and Southern Rhodesia's commodities. The principle of tapering rates increased Southern Rhodesia's ability to compete against producers in Northern Rhodesia who were located closer to the market.

The second principle was the charge per truck which was also introduced in 1922 and was annually reduced up to 1930[37]. Third, a flat rate was introduced in 1930 from major maize producing areas in Southern Rhodesia to the Congo[38]. Maize from Northern and Southern Rhodesia consigned to the copperbelt and the Congo paid the same rate per ton. The flat rate completely eliminated the difference in the cost of carrying maize from Northern and Southern Rhodesia to the copperbelt and the Congo.

The Zambezi and Congo Customs Basins

Southern Rhodesia's competition in the copperbelt and Katanga markets was also made possible by the fact that the markets did not have a protective tariff. For customs purposes, Northern Rhodesia was divided into the Zambezi and Congo customs basins[39]. The Zambezi customs basin trade was regulated by customs agreements concluded with other British colonies in Southern Africa. These agreements were based on Imperial Preference and the Rhodes Clause inaugurated in 1899. In this year the BSAC concluded a customs agreement with the Cape Colony and Bechuanaland Protectorate for North-Western-Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia[40].

Imperial Preference provided for low duties on commodities coming from within the British Empire and stipulated a tariff ranging from 5 to 9 per cent for empire goods and 9 to 15 per cent for non-empire goods[41]. Imperial Preference was adopted by Southern African British colonies in order to create strong economic links amongst themselves and the British Empire.

In the case of customs relations between the Rhodesias and Britain, Cecil John Rhodes defined Imperial Preference in 1894 as intended to give 'a fair return by the colonies to the mother country for the heavy expenditure she had incurred in founding their settlements, and at the same time would have a salutary check against the introduction of the principles of extreme protection'[42]. Low customs tariff was also intended to keep down the cost of living in the newly founded colonies.

The Rhodes Clause exclusively applied to British Southern Africa . It allowed the imposition of even lower duties than the Imperial Preference tariff on trade between the Rhodesias and the South African Customs Union. Under the clause most of the commodities such as food and primary materials were exchanged without duty while the same had duty imposed if they came from outside the region. Until 1930 the duty in Northern Rhodesia was not to exceed that imposed by Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The conditions laid by the Imperial Preference and the Rhodes Clause prevented Northern Rhodesia from protecting its primary settler producers when the need arose in the 1920s.

The trade in the Zambezi basin was subjected to the customs agreements between Northern Rhodesia and British colonies south of the Zambezi whose tariff had four scales[43]. The markets in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo were affected by tariffs 'B', 'D' and the Rhodes Clause. Under tariff 'B' preferential duty was granted on reciprocal arrangements to goods grown, produced and manufactured within the British Empire. Tariff 'D' dealt with trade in the Congo basin. As Northern Rhodesia was an integral part of the Southern African economic region, the tariffs deprived her of freedom to protect her producers and she was bound to be affected by restrictions between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa which were the main actors in the region.

In 1915 and 1916, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa respectively altered the customs arrangements which the BSAC concluded in 1910 with the Union of South Africa[44]. In August 1915 the Southern Rhodesia Government notice 414 made provision that Northern Rhodesia was to have separate agreements with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa as from October 1922. The 1922 agreement gave Northern Rhodesia an autonomous status in her tariff relations with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Nevertheless, Northern Rhodesia's position was undermined by a condition that she had to comply with the tariff in Southern Rhodesia as the Rhodesia's had complied with the tariff in force in South Africa. In 1916 South Africa imposed a weight embargo on live cattle imports in order to prevent the scrub class of cattle from competing with her own in the domestic market. In part, this restriction forced Southern Rhodesia to consign the scrub class of cattle to the markets north of the Zambezi in competition with Northern Rhodesia. As the 1922 agreement clearly spelled Northern Rhodesia's subordinate position, Northern Rhodesia had also to adopt or support any retaliatory action by Southern Rhodesia against South Africa.

The agreements which Northern Rhodesia concluded in 1924 and 1930 with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia confirm Northern Rhodesia's subordinate position in her relations with Southern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesia adopted a duty of 12 per cent in 1924 on food imports from South Africa and a free exchange tariff with Southern Rhodesia[45]. In 1930 Northern Rhodesia continued with 12 per cent duty against South Africa, albeit on reciprocal terms, and each party was allowed to frame its own tariff. On the strength of this clause, Northern Rhodesia imposed a special duty in 1931 amounting to one-tenth of the price of a 200-lb bag of maize and 2s. 0d per 100-lb maize meal against South Africa in order to protect primary producers[46]. South Africa also agreed to limit its beef exports to Northern Rhodesia. However, between 1927 and 1931, Southern Rhodesia persistently persuaded Northern Rhodesia to support Southern Rhodesia's protective intentions against South Africa which had violated Imperial Preference and the Rhodes Clause by adopting a protective tariff[47].

In 1924 and 1930 Northern Rhodesia adopted a uniform tariff, free exchange and a non-discriminatory tariff with Southern Rhodesia. Between 1922 and 1933 Northern Rhodesia's tariff with Southern Rhodesia remained essentially non-protective while that with South Africa increasingly became protective. However, between 1930 and 1933 Northern Rhodesia resented Southern Rhodesia's dominance and in December, 1932 adopted a Gentleman's

Agreement to protect its primary producers[48]. Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland agreed to export maize and cattle to Northern Rhodesia only when local demand was not fully met and at prices not lower than for Northern Rhodesian commodities. Southern Rhodesia insisted that this had to be a temporary measure to be reviewed after every two years. However, in 1935 the agreement was extended indefinitely as the colonial Office also supported that Northern Rhodesia should protect its primary producers.

The Congo Basin Treaties are relevant to my thesis because they affected Northern Rhodesia in several ways. The Congo Basin Treaty Area included one-third of Northern Rhodesia[49]. (See map 1). Part of the Copperbelt was located in this area and the Copperbelt constituted about 80 per cent of the internal market for maize and beef cattle between 1927 and 1939. Slaughter cattle, maize and maize meal removed from the Zambezi basin of Northern Rhodesia to the Congo basin paid the same duty as those removed from Southern Rhodesia or the South African Customs Union[50]. Producers in Northern Rhodesia were thus deprived of the advantage which could have reduced the price of their commodities had they been exempted from duty when selling in their own country. This weakened them in competing in their own markets against imported food commodities. Northern Rhodesia lost the advantage of position in selling in the Katanga market which was a free trade zone because of railage reduction on exports to these markets.

The Congo basin derived its tariff from the Berlin Act of

1886 and the St. Germain-En-Laye Convention of September 1919. The original Act was ratified by the Brussels Act and Declaration of 20th July 1890 which was due for review twenty-five years later. The 1914-18 War delayed the review until 1919. The Congo Treaties dealt with trade matters in the Congo river basin and its tributaries and thus affected non-Belgian colonies in Central, Eastern and Southern Africa[51]. Their main purpose was to provide for freedom and enquality of trade to all nations in the Congo and its tributaries. However, a maximum of 10 per cent <u>ad valorem</u> duty on imports by the Congo basin was imposed in 1890 in order to raise revenue for administering the treaties. This was further altered by the St. Germain-En-Laye Convention which allowed each affected administration to impose any <u>ad valorem</u> duty it considered suitable so long as freedom and equality of trade to all nations were guaranteed. From 1919, Northern Rhodesia applied the Imperial Preference on goods imported into areas affected by the Congo Treaties, including those from the Zambezi basin within Northern Rhodesia.

In the foregoing pages, I have sketched out the background to the developments which support my thesis that customs agreements and railway rates between 1918 and 1931 contributed to the difficulties encountered by settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesia could not use customs agreements to restrict imports from Southern Rhodesia between 1918 and 1931 when such action was necessary so as to afford settler farming greater benefits from the expanding local markets. Northern Rhodesia also lost its geographical advantage in respect to the Katanga market as Southern Rhodesia exported cheap maize, maize meal, beef and cattle because of the low cost of transport. As in the case of customs agreements, Northern Rhodesia failed to stop the Rhodesia Railways from using rating principles which were only favourable to producers in Southern Rhodesia.

Customs agreements and railway rates did not hinder settler farming in Northern Rhodesia between 1910 and 1918. Northern Rhodesia enjoyed a near monopoly of supplying the domestic and the Katanga market and settler farming seemed destined for a brighter future. In the next chapter I shall attempt to demonstrate this.

FOOTNOTES

1. L.H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, Early Days to 1953 (London. 1964) p. 212;

A.D. Roberts, A History of Zambia (London. 1977) p.177;

R.E. Baldwin, Economic Development and Export Growth: A study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960 (Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1966) pp.140-50.

2. Northern Rhodesia, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report (Hereafter N.R. Department of Africulture) (Livingstone. 1933) p.4.

3. F.D. Hammond, Report on the Railway System of Southern Rhodesia, Vol I. (Salisbury. 1925) p. 1. (Hereafter Hammond Report).

4. N.R., Agricultural Advisory Board, Second Report by R.C. Lockhart. (Lusaka. 1936) p.6.

5. General Manager, Rhodesia Railways Annual Reports, (Bulawayo, 1918-31) (Hereafter General Manager's Report).

6. N.R., Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Future of European Farming Industry in Northern Rhodesia on the Tenure of Agricultural Lands by G.L. Troup. (Lusaka. 1954) p.4. Baldwin, Economic Development, p.140.

7. N.R., Second Report, p.2.

8. See for example, F. Carpenter, 'The Introduction of Commercial Farming into Zambia and its Effects to 1940',

R. Palmer, (ed.), Zambian Land and Labour Studies, Vol I, National Archives Occasional Paper, no. 1. (Lusaka. 1973) pp. 4-11;

R. Palmer, 'Land in Zambia', R. Palmer (ed.), Zambian land, p.57;

M.Y. Jones, 'The Politics of White Agrarian Settlement in Northern Rhodesia, 1898-1928'. (M.A. Thesis. University of Sussex. 1974) pp.79-81.

9. See for example, M.S. Muntemba, 'Rural Underdevelopment in Zambia: Kabwe Rural District, 1850-1970' (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. 1977) pp.217-23.

10. N.A.Z., Sec/1/50, Africultural Maize Control Board, 1932-35, Director of Agriculture to Acting Chief Secretary, No. 267/AD/13, 11/4/34; N.A.Z. Sec/1/69, Report on Maize Control by the Secretary of Maize Board, Contract for supply of maize, memorandum by the Financial Secretary, Maize Control Board, 14/4/39; Frank Ayer, General Manager, Roan Antelope Copper Mine, to Chairman, Maize Control Board, 9/5/39.

11. S.C. Nyangu, 'African Production in Mazabuka District: The Development of Subordination, 1900-53', unpaginated H410 Research Paper, 1977-78, History Department Collection, Unza.

12. See Bibliography.

13. N.A.Z., BS/3/ 263, Railway Rates, S.M. Rose, General Manager, Rhodesia Railways, to L.A. Wallace, Governor, NR, 27/3/18.

14. S.R., Official Year book of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia (Salisbury. 1924) p.268.

15. B.A.S.C., Annual Reports of the Directors, 1903-1907.

16. Jones, 'The Politics', p.81.

17. N.A.Z., Shelf 12, S.R., *Customs Annual Reports*, (1924) p.2., S.R., *Report of the Secretary of Agriculture*, 1930. (Salisbury. 1931) pp.2-3.

18. S.R. *Official Year book*, pp.268-72.

19. For the official history of the Rhodesia Railways up to 1946, See E. Horwitt, *Report on state ownership of the Rhodesia Railways*, Dominion No. 3 (London. 1947)

20. L.H. Vail, 'The Making of an Imperial Slum: Nyasaland and it's Railways, 1895-1935', *Journal of African History*, XVI, 1, (1975) pp.94-6.

21. Hammond Report, Vol. I, p.22.

22. Hammond Report, Vol. I, p.23.

23. N.A.Z.,Hl/26, R. Williams, 'The Cape to Cairo Railway', Speech delivered to the African Society 21/4/21 (London. 1921) p.4.

24. S.E. Katzenellenbegen, *Railways and the Copper Mines of Katanga* (London. 1973) pp.34-5.

25. N.A.Z.,Hl/26, R. Williams, 'The Cape to Cairo Railway', p.9.

26. N.A.Z.,G/9/9, C.J. Rhodes to R. Williams, 19/10/01.

27. R.E. D'Erlanger, *History of the construction and finance of the Rhodesia Railway System*. n.p., n.d. (London. 1938) p.29.

28. D'Erlanger, *History of the construction*, p.29.

29. Hammond Report, Vol. I, p.21.

30. G.P. Haefele and E.B. Steinberg, *Government Controls on Transport: An African Case*. (Washington. 1965) p.12-14.

31. Katzenellenbogen, <u>Railways</u>, pp.132-4.

32. Hammond Report, Vol. I, p.21.

33. A.J. Acworth, <u>Report of the Commissioner Appointed to Inquire into Railway Questions in Southern Rhodesia.</u> (Bulawayo. 1918).

34. Hammond Report, Vol. II, p.59.

35. General Manager's Report (1922) p.9; (1924) p.5.

36. Hammond Report, Vol. II, p.59.

37. General Manager's Reports, 1922-31.

38. N.R. Department of Agriculture (1930) p.7.

39. N.A.Z. Shelf 12, N.R. <u>Customs Annual Report</u> (1924) p.1.

40. S.R. <u>Official Year Book</u>, No. 1, p.268.

41. N.A.Z. Shelf 12, N.R. <u>Customs Annual Report</u> (1924) pp.1-2.

42. B.S.A.C., <u>Matebeleland and Mashonaland Settlement</u> (London. 1894) p.4.

43. The tariff scales were 'A' - applicable to goods without preferential treatment; 'B' - applicable to goods from parts of the British Empire which reciprocated; 'C' - applicable to goods from parts of the British Empire which did not reciprocate; 'D' - applicable to the Congo Basin Treaty areas.

44. S.R., <u>Official Year Book</u>, No. 1. p.272.

45. N.A.Z.,RC/976, Northern Rhodesia Annual Report (1926) p.4.

46. N.R.,Department of Agriculture (1935) p.5.

47. M. Chanock, <u>Unconsummated Union: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1900-1945</u> (Manchester. 1977) pp.197-8.

48. N.A.Z., Sec/1/284, Minutes of Southern Rhodesia Customs Conference on revision of Customs tariff, Conversation between Chief Secretary to the Administration and the Controller of Customs and Excise, 19/7/30;

P.R.O. CO795/70, file No. 25587, Customs Agreement, 1934, A.B. Cohen, Colonial Office, Internal Minutes, 30/4/34; A. Cooke, 30/4/34; J.A. Calder, 1/5/34.

49. F.V. Meyer, Britain's Colonies in World Trade (London. 1948) p.35.

50. N.A.Z.,Sec/1/289, Customs Treaties and Agreements, Congo Basin Treaty: Revision of Convention of St. Germain-En-Laye, 1927-36, Maxwell, Governor, N.R., to L.S. Amery, Colonial Secretary, 17/9/27.

N.A.Z.,RC/106, Congo Basin Customs Tariff, 1927, H.C. Parking, Controller of Customs, to Major H. Tudor Trevor, Secretary for Public Works, 15/8/27.

51. N.A.Z., Sec/1/289, Customs Treaties and Agreements, Congo Basin Treaty: Revision of Convention of St. Germain-En-Laye, 1927-36, Treaty series No. 18, 10/9/19.

The countries affected by the Congo Basin Treaties included Belgian Congo (Zaire), Congo Brazaville (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Portuguese West Africa, (Angola), Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), Nyasaland (Malawi), Tanganyika, (Mainland Tanzania), Kenya and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).

CHAPTER ONE

SETTLER FARMING ECONOMY, 1910-1918

Introduction

White settler farmers in the railwaybelt were attracted by the rail line which reached Livingstone in 1904 and Broken Hill in 1906. They occupied the land around Kalomo, Choma, Mazabuka, Lusaka, Chisamba and Broken Hill. In the 1900s land was cheap. It was sold at between 3d and 8d per acre[1]. After 1910 the price of land beyond twenty miles from the line of rail cost 1s. 0d per acre and that within twenty miles from the railway cost 2s. 6d per acre[2]. Cheap land and the settlers' occupation of more productive land in terms of fertility and easy access to the markets were assets to settler agriculture. However, settlers were handicapped in that they had little capital and lacked agricultural expertise suited to farming conditions in Northern Rhodesia. In this chapter, I shall discuss how high prices, share-cropping, 'kaffir-farming' (African-farming) and their domination of the Northern Rhodesian and Congolese markets minimised the constraints caused by lack of capital and agricultural expertise.

Maize Farming

Along the line of rail maize farming was stimulated by high prices. In 1913-14, the price was 14s. 0d - £1. 1s. 0d per 200-lb bag. The price fell to between

17s. 3d - 18s. 6d in 1916-17[3]. However, maize farming remained profitable as the cost of production was about 4s. 6d between 1913 and 1916[4]. This gave settler farmers a large margin of profit as the prices were high. The low cost of production was due to the fact that the virgin soils did not need much and regular fertilization. In any case, fertilizer was not regularly used or imported as it was expensive because of high freight charges[5]. In 1918, the price rose again to between 17s. 3d - £1. 2s. 0d[6]. These prices also applied to the maize exported to the Congo as the Congolese agents came to buy from Northern Rhodesia at the local prices. Because of these high prices, maize farming was not adversely affected by the cost of production which rose to 7s. 0d in 1918 and the price of an empty sack rose from 1s. 0d in 1914 to 2s. 0d in 1918[7].

An abundant supply of cheap labour was crucial to the production and profitability of settler agriculture. However, labour was difficult to obtain. The need for labour by settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia coincided with mining and farming interests in Katanga, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa which also recruited from Northern Rhodesia. Most Africans were unwilling to work on settler farms as wages and working conditions were poor. Africans met their tax and other cash needs through the sale of agricultural produce, and were thus able to avoid wage employment on settler farms. During this period, settlers had little success in getting the Administration to limit external recruitment and to undermine African production in order to ensure adequate local labour supplies for settler agriculture.

As their appeals for labour were unsuccessful, the settlers adopted an agricultural system involving share-cropping and kaffir-farming in addition to their own direct cultivation of the land. Share-cropping was a system where settlers who did not own land farmed on other settler's farms and paid the owner of the land a share of the produce. Share-cropping was most common around Kafue, Chilanga, and Lusaka where the Afrikaners settled in 1910[8]. The owner of the land benefitted since the share-croppers or byowners had their own implements, seeds and labour.

Kaffir-farming took two forms. The first form was where settlers became middlemen or farmer-traders. They bought maize from Africans which they later sold to consumers. This practice was first reported in Ndola in 1908[9]. Fear, Colebrook and Company of Southampton, England, organised markets to buy African produced maize. Later the company set up stores at Kabwe and Livingstone. The firm did not usually deal directly with Africans. The company set up stores near white farming areas. Settler farmer-traders who became clients owned one to five stores, each covering a radius of about ten miles depending on the productivity of the area[10]. The stores which were stocked with blankets, cloth and salt opened from May to November. The timing for the opening of the store coincided with the harvest and marketing season, when Africans also raised money to pay taxes. The farmer-traders toured their stores twice a month to collect maize[11].

This aspect of settler agriculture was a vital source of capital. Maize bought from Africans at low prices was resold at extremely high prices. In 1912-13 maize which was bought from Africans at prices varying from 7s. 6d - 15s. 0d and between 5s. 0d - 10s. 6d in 1915 was sold at more than double the original price[12]. This exploitative relationship has been illustrated vividly by Muntemba[13]:

RATES OF PAYMENTS

4 gallons of maize	1s. 0d
4 gallons of maize	2 yards of cloth
6 gallons of maize	3 yards of cloth
20 gallons of maize	1 blanket

She further indicated that a piece of cloth was usually sold at 6d per yard. Kaffir-farming was therefore an important base for settler agriculture.

The second form of kaffir-farming was constituted by settlers[14]. The Africans who were removed from settler land were given compensation which ranged from £1 - £2. 6s. 0d per house and 8s. 0d to 10s. 0d per acre of cultivated land. This was commonly practised in Chilanga and Chisamba. In 1914 only twenty-six people had moved at Chilanga and thirty-four in 1916. The areas to which they were moved were poorer than the ones they had previously occupied. These areas were also situated near the settler farms. It thus became easy for settler agriculture to secure African labour since measures undermined African productivity. However, many Africans were persuaded to stay as tenants. The tenants worked the landlord's farm and in addition, paid one bag of maize from their own plots. The plots of the tenants were worked by women as the landlords called for their tenants' labour during the seasons the tenants should have tilled their own fields. These practices serviced settler agriculture at the expense of African farming.

Cattle Ranching

Cattle ranching was also stimulated by the low cost of production. The cost of production was low because ranching was extensive. The animals were largely fed on natural pasture. When serious outbreaks of animal diseases occurred such as the intermittent spread of bovine pleuro-pneumonia from Bulozi after 1914, the Administration effectively handled them at no cost to the ranchers. The Veterinary Department concentrated its efforts on settler ranching. Ranching was also not capital intensive. The settlers built up their stock by buying cattle from Africans in kind or at low prices as they had done in the case of maize.

The prices varied from 15s. Od to £2. Os. Od before 1910 and between £2.10s. Od to £8. Os. Od after 1910[15].

Before the outbreak of pleuro-pneumonia in 1914, several settlers had engaged in the cattle export trade from Bulozi and the Tonga Plateau to Southern Rhodesia. These traders, notably Harry Susman, Tom King, Geoffrey Horton and Barnett Bongolo Smith, travelled extensivelly to buy cattle from Africans or settlers and sold to other settlers or exported them[16]. After 1914, cattle exports to Katanga increased partly because of the ban on imports from Northern Rhodesia imposed in 1914 by Southern Rhodesia. This extensive internal and external trade network gave the settlers a regular source of income. Cattle which had been bought from Africans were sold in the local market and to Congolese buyers at prices ranging from £18. Os. Od - £35. Os. Od.

Congolese Market

The Congolese food market was originally created by mining in Katanga. This market was opened to settler farmers in Northern Rhodesia when the railway reached Elizabethville (Lubumbashi since 1967) in 1910. Later, the construction of railways in the Congo in order to facilitate mining in Katanga increased the food market. In 1915 the Kabalo - Albertville and Bukama - Port Francqui (Ilebo since 1967) lines were completed and had employed large numbers of workers who largely depended on imported food[18].

Katanga relied on Northern Rhodesian food sources because Congolese settler agriculture was unsuccessful. Limited Congolese supplies to Katanga were evidenced by a meagre supply of 4,906 bags of maize and maize meal in 1915 when Katanga's recorded consumption was over 39,000 bags. In 1916 local supplies to Katanga fell to 2,027 bags[19]. As Katanga was poorly linked to the main food producing areas within the Congo, it depended on imported food from Northern Rhodesia[20]. The Rhodesia Railways provided the main external outlet for Katanga during this period.

The failure of settler farming in Katanga and the interests of British capital forced Katanga to rely on Northern Rhodesian food sources. Jewsiewicki explained that 'European Agricaulture did not match the hopes placed in it, at the same time the lack of transport and the links with British capital directed an important part of labour recruitment towards Northern Rhodesia' on condition that Katanga also obtained food from the Rhodesias[21]. Settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia was greatly stimulated by these developments.

Statistical documentation of maize and cattle produced and bought by settlers from Africans does not fully indicate the amounts exported to the Congo between 1910 and 1918. However, official reports attest to the fact that the Congo was the main and most profitable market because the local market was small and scattered. The labour force was also smaller than in the Congo. Commenting on settler agriculture in general in 1914, the Secretary of

Agriculture explained that the development that had been experienced was 'chiefly on account of the good markets locally and especially the Congo'[22]. The high prices in the local market made it important although it was small and fragmented.

A few available figures confirm that the Congo was the main market for Northern Rhodesian maize and cattle. Out of a total production of 64,000 bags in 1913-14, the Congo absorbed about 36,000 bags which represented over three quarters of Katanga's recorded consumption. In contrast, Northern Rhodesia bought about 13,345 bags in 1913-14[23]. The maize trade clearly shows that the Congo was the main market for Northern Rhodesia. In 1913, maize worth £21,520 was exported to the Congo compared to £449 for maize exported to Wankie in Southern Rhodesia[24]. Recorded consumption of marketed maize within Northern Rhodesia suggests that the market was smaller than in the Congo. The absence of serious competition from Southern Rhodesia for the Northern Rhodesian and Congolese markets (See tables I-II) also helped settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia. Tables IA and II show that South Africa was the main external market for Southern Rhodesian maize in the sub-continent.

The Congo was also the main market for Northern Rhodesia settler cattle. Since recorded beef consumption in Northern Rhodesia was estimated at about 1,000 head of cattle in 1920[25], it was certainly much lower before 1918. Northern Rhodesia used to export cattle to Southern Rhodesia but in 1914 this ceased when bovine pleuro-pneumonia broke out in Bulozi which was the main source. On account of this it is reasonable to conclude that cattle and beef exports after 1914 shownin table IB were exports to the Congo. Southern Rhodesia hardly exported any cattle to Northern Rhodesia and the Congo during this period.

TABLE IA

NORTHERN RHODESIA: IMPORTS FROM SOUTHERN RHODESIA

	Maize (in 200lb bags)	Maize meal (in 200lb bags)	Beef (in lbs)
1911	3	n.a.	n.a.
1912	1,840	3,819	n.a.
1913	2,397	4,868	1,957
1914	1,466	4,381	10,983
1915	n.a.	2,879	1,431
1916	12,503	4,699	5,141
1917	8,145	9,449	11,006
1918	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

TABLE IB

NORTHERN RHODESIA: EXPORTS

	Maize (200lb bags)	Maize meal (200lb bags)	No. of Cattle	Beef (in lbs).
1911	9,572	2,345	2,076	n.a.
1912	8,985	9,129	n.a.	n.a.
1913	28,006	13,486	3,835	43,913
1914	20,442	16,896	7,610	23,764
1915	24,366	13,393	6,847	143,557
1916	12,503	6,778	5,141	1,329
1917	8,145	9,449	11,006	3,282
1918	28,234	8,740	8,374	6,473

Source: Northern Rhodesia, Department of Customs and Excise, Annual Reports, 1912-24

TABLE II

SOUTHERN RHODESIA: MAIZE EXPORTS

	THE CONGO	SOUTH AFRICA
1913	1,065	23,982
1914	26	36,003
1915	11	8,184
1916	15,000	18,008
1917	22,044	34,881
1918	28,643	40,887

Sources: (1) General Manager, Rhodesia Railways Annual Report.

Signs of Improvement

Although the statistics I have given in the foregoing pages on prices, local demand and exports are incomplete, official comments confirm signs of improvement in settler agriculture. The future was considered bright. In 1912, the Administrator noted that 'the condition of European settler farming is distinctly promising'[26]. In a more specific reference to cattle ranching, the Department of Agriculture reported in 1916 that 'farmers generally recognise the importance of selecting their breeding cows, and there are extremely fine troops of graded cattle now in the territory'[27]. Many of them imported special breeding stock from South Africa and Britain, built dips and regularly dipped their cattle as they realized that improved quality of stock would increase their incomes and farming capital.

Both ranching and maize farming demonstrated hope for a bright future. A more revealing reference to settler agriculture was made in 1917. It was noted that 'nearly all put the money back in the farms for improvements such as the building of cattle dips, making use of company water-boring plants, the erection of windmills, building of better homesteads and the purchase of agricultural machinery'[28]. The settlers afforded these ventures because of good incomes which they realised. Deliberate attempts to provide an agricultural infrastructure from their independent resources reflected confidence that there was a bright future for settler agriculture.

Conclusion

By 1918, settler agriculture had been stimulated by a combination of easy access to the local and Congolese markets, low cost of production, rising demand and prices, undermining of African production in order to procure labour, buying maize and cattle from Africans at low prices and the absence of strong competition in the local and Congolese markets. However, alongside the initial stimulation provided by the local and Congolese markets was laid the foundation for later stagnation. Producing primarily for the local and Congolese markets was in itself a serious limitation, notwithstanding the high prices between 1910 and 1918. The limitation lay in the fact that Northern Rhodesia and the Congo were free markets. There existed by 1918 the potential danger that Northern Rhodesia would lose what had become to be accepted as her natural markets. In the next chapter, I shall discuss how strong competition from Southern Rhodesia frustrated what by 1918 seemed a promising industry in Northern Rhodesia.

~~FOOT~~NOTES

1. R. Palmer, 'Land in Zambia', R. Palmer (ed), Zambian Land and Labour Studies, Vol. I (Lusaka. 1973) p.57.

2. F. Carpenter, 'The Introduction of Commercial Farming into Zambia and its Effects, to 1940', R. Palmer (ed), Zambian Land, p.3.

3. N.A.Z., Box 8, N.R., Department of Agriculture, Annual Report (1916-17) p.3. (Hereafter N.R., Department of Agriculture).

4. N.A.Z., Box,8, N.R., Department of Agriculture (1918-19) p.13.

5. N.A.Z., Box 8, N.R., Department of Agriculture (1914-15) p.3; (1915-16) p.2.

6. N.A.Z., Box 8, N.R., Department of Agriculture (1917-18) p.2.

7. N.A.Z., Box 8, N.R., Department of Agriculture (1918-19) p.13.

8. Carpenter, 'The Introduction of Commercial Farming', p.3.

9. M.S. Muntemba, 'Rural nderdevelopment in Zambia: Kabwe Rural District, 1850-1970' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. 1977) p.120.

10. Muntemba, 'Rural Underdevelopment in Zambia', p.121.

11. Muntemba, 'Rural Underdevelopment in Zambia', p.121.

12. N.A.Z. Box 8, N.R., Department of Agriculture (1912-13) pp.17-19; (1914-15).

13. Muntemba, 'Rural Underdevelopment in Zambia', p.121.

14. N.A.Z., BS/3/127, Returns of Tenancy Agreements, 1915-23; Muntemba, 'Rural Underdevelopment in Zambia', pp.122-24.

15. M. Gelfand, Northern Rhodesia in the Days of the charter (London. 1961) p.127; L. Van Horn, 'The Agricultural History of Barotseland, 1840-1964', R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds), The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (London. 1977) p.153.

16. Livingstone Mail, 2/11/11; 14/1/20; 17/6/20; Bruce Fetter Papers (Hereafter BFP) Comptes Redus du Congrès Scientifique 1900-1950, IV, by Comité Special du Katanga (Bruxelles. 1950) pp.323-25.

I did not use the actual official sources on the Congo. My information is based on notes which Dr. B. Fetter lent me and it is for this reason that I have referred to them as Bruce Fetter Papers (BFP).

17. Van Horn, 'The Agricultural History'; p.153; N.A.Z. Box 162, N.R. Department of veterinary, Annual Report (1915) p.13. (Hereafter N.R., Department of veterinary).

18. Livingstone Mail, 22/1/20, 2/3/20; B. Jewsiewicki, 'Shifting Agriculture and the Capitalist Economy', (Lubumbashi. 1975) p.4.

19. B.F.P., Bulletin Agricole (Elizabethville. 1918) p.91.

20. B.F.P., Rapports Annuels sur l'Administration de la Colonie du Congo Belgie, XIV, 1 (Bruxelles. 1933) pp.679-80; Aparcu sur l'Economie Agricole de la Province du Katanga (Bruxelles. 1915) pp.88-9, (1918) p.91.

21. Jewsiewicki, 'Shifting Agriculture', p.14.

22. N.A.Z., Box 8, N.R. Department of Agriculture (1913-14) p.2.

23. N.A.Z., Box 8, N.R. Department of Agriculture (1913-14) p.2, (1916-17) p.18.

24. N.A.Z., Box 8, N.R. Department of Agriculture (1914-15) p.3.

25. Livingstone Mail, 22/1/20

26. Administrator, B.S.A.C., Northern Rhodesia Annual Report (1912) p.7.

27. N.A.Z., Box 8, N.R. Department of Agriculture (1915-16) p.2.

28. N.A.Z., Box 8, N.R. Department of Agriculture (1916-17) p.7.

CHAPTER TWO

THE RUIN OF SETTLER AGRICULTURE, 1918-1931

Introduction

The settler farmers were optimistic that their farming would improve beyond the levels which had been reached by 1918. The optimism was inspired by large-scale economic development, rising demand and high food prices in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo. However, this hope for a brighter future lasted for a short period in spite of the fact that markets continued to expand. The prices began to fall after 1922 and the costs of production continued to rise. There was also keen competition from Southern Rhodesia for the Northern Rhodesian and Congolese markets. These developments hindered settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia. In what follows I examine these developments.

Market Expansion and Food Supply Problems in Katanga, 1918-1931.

There are two periods of market expansion in the Congo during this period. The first period was between 1918 and the beginning of 1921. This rise in demand was a result of immediate post-war economic developments. One indication of the rise in demand is the number of workers in Katanga which stood at 35,825 in 1920 and rose to 38,098 in 1921[1]. This was inspite of the economic crisis which hit Katanga at the end of 1920. About 12,000 workers were also employed on road and railway building[2]. There were about 9,000 porters because truck roads in the Congo were not suited to motorised transport and the tsetse prevented the use of ox-drawn waggons. Porterage accounted for 2,000,000 work days annually[3]. This was an important addition to the food market. These developments confirmed settler farmers' optimism for accelerated agricultural development in Northern Rhodesia.

The large numbers of workers was closely connected with the quantity of food consumed. The consumption of maize rose from about 39,000 bags in 1916-17 to 48,000 bags in 1919-1920[4]. Increase in demand also raised maize prices. For example, between 1919 and 1921 maize prices varied from 15s. 0d - £1. 5s. 0d per bag[5]. However, the prices crashed to 6s. 6d per bag during the 1920-23 economic crisis[6]. The adverse impact of this fall in price was aggravated by keen competition for the Katanga market from Southern Rhodesia which had began in 1918[7].

The loss of income to farmers caused by the crash in maize prices was alleviated by high cattle prices. In 1921 cattle prices ranged from £14. 0s. 0d - £16. 0s. 0d[9]. The cattle trade does not seem to have been seriously affected by the 1920-23 economic crisis in Katanga. The demand was sustained by a scheme launched during this period in the Congo to build up local supplied close to Katanga for breeding, dairy and slaughter purposes[10]. Northern Rhodesia settler agriculture benefitted as it was still the only source of supply for the Congo. The monopoly of supplying the Katanga market and the high cattle prices alleviated the adverse impact of the fall in maize price and the competition from Southern Rhodesia for the Katanga maize market.

The second period of market expansion in Katanga was from 1923 to 1931. The increase in demand for food after the war and the desire to make Katanga less dependent on Rhodesian food supplies forced the Congo to open up local food sources by building roads and railways. Maize consumption rose from 48,000 bags in 1920 to 70,000 bags in 1925[11]. These roads and railways linked Katanga to major food producing areas within the Congo. Between 1923 and 1931, road and railway construction in the Congo occurred on a larger scale than in the previous period. The railways under construction during this period were Bukama-Port Francqui (completed 1928), Tenke-Dilolo (completed 1931) and the Benguela Railway (completed 1931)[12]. The development of extensive road and railway network necessitated the abolition of head porterage in 1925. Porterage was uneconomic as it usually attracted 'expenses which were disproportionate to the results'[13]. However, the use of porters still remained widespread and thus continued to contribute to the demand for food. Mining in Katanga also expanded after the 1920-23 economic crisis and employed large numbers of people who were fed largely on imported food from the South.

The expansion of the food market in Katanga is by itself inadequate to account for her reliance on Rhodesian food supplies. Katanga's reliance on the Rhodesias was largely due to severe structural limitations in the whole economy of the Congo before 1931[14]. The large scale, diversified and extensive infrastructural developments after the 1914-18 war caused markets to expand more rapidly than internal food production. In fact these schemes at times diverted food to themselves from Katanga. In 1923, for example, the absorption by these schemes of 26,268 bags of cassava meal raised the quantity of imported maize meal in Katanga[15]. This situation continued throughout the 1920s.

The carrying capacity of the poorly laid truck roads and head porterage throughout the 1920s was low and costly compared to the Rhodesia Railways which carried food cheaply and in bulk for Katanga. Transportation demanded more time from the producers than the cultivation of crops. The cost of transport made the business uneconomic to the producers and increased mining costs through food rations. Communication links between Katanga and the major food producing areas within the Congo were poor. Jewsiewicki has summed it thus:

> If transport had been well organised, if many roads had criss-crossed the districts of Lomani and Lulua, one could more easily have imported into upper Katanga manioc flour from Tanganyika-Mweru (Lake Kisale), Palm oil from Tanganyika-Mweru, and the Lomani, rice, beans and groundnuts from Lualaba district[16].

Katanga had also to rely on the Rhodesias because transport links with the Congo's neighbours to the South-West, North and North-East were poorly developed.

Food production in the Congo was also discouraged by supplies of cheap maize and beef cattle from the Rhodesias. Prices for locally produced maize and other food crops in the Congo tended to be low when importation was large. The prices in Southern Rhodesia ruled in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo as the producers in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo feared that they could not sell if they insisted on high prices since the mines could get cheaper food from Southern Rhodesia[17]. Immediately after the war, the Administrator for Katanga Province wrote, 'we still record as before the war, the disordered rise in the prices. If the harvest is good in Rhodesia, no one buys from Africans since importation is cheaper. The Africans the following year only plant for their own personal consumption. When there is a bad harvest in Rhodesia or even when importation is less paying, the prices rise and the local harvest being deficient, one raises the prices to the great loss of the general economy'[18].

The 'disordered' prices after 1918 were largely caused by Southern Rhodesian exports and which also frustrated capital formation and settler farming in Northern Rhodesia. Up to 1931, Katanga remained heavily dependent on the British-ruled states in the South for both imports of food, labour and coal, and for the exportation of copper since the Congo's extensive transport system did not improve internal transport and the food supply system to the main markets located in the Katanga mining area.

The completion of several railways and roads between 1928 and

1931 improved Katanga's chances of relying on Congolese grown food. The Congolese railways introduced low railway rates in order to encourage Katanga to buy local food. Availability of food was ensured through the vigorous implementation of compulsory food production and the policy of self-sufficiency adopted in the mid 1920s. This policy divided the Congo into economic zones and compulsory food production was ruthlessly enforced in order to attain self-suffieciency. The Congo had also built up its own sources of cattle for beef and dairy purposes since 1918. A combination of measures adopted since the early 1920s increased the Congo's internal food production, reduced transport costs and the Congo was able to reduce food importation. However, the expansion in the demand for food in Katanga after 1918 had helped Southern Rhodesia to overcome critical marketing problems.

The completion of the Benguela Railway in 1931 and the improvement in the Congo's internal communication system were particularly important because the development of the Northern Rhodesian copperbelt diverted food supplies from the Congo. The Congo began to obtain food from Angola as the Portuguese insisted that the Congo had to buy from Angola as a condition for recruiting Angolan labour[19]. Inspite of this condition, the Benguela Railway had opened up alternative food supplies for the Congo. Increased opportunities for alternative food sources for Katanga were important also because the outbreak of cattle disease in Southern Rhodesia in April 1931 necessitated a ban on agricultural imports from Southern Rhodesia. In view of these developments the Congo increasingly looked elsewhere for alternative food sources.

The second period of market expansion in the Congo after 1923 coincided with a similar development in Northern Rhodesia. In that year, the BSAC granted prospecting rights to large mining companies. These companies undertook extensive exploration work for copper between 1923 and 1929. The activities of these companies and the construction of railway branch lines between 1927 and 1931 on the Copperbelt created a huge local food market in Northern Rhodesia. In an attempt to improve working conditions for the African labour force, the mining companies deliberately increased food rations and thus increased the food market[20].

The growth of the local market in Northern Rhodesia was a welcome development to settler farmers who engaged in commercial food production and had access to the mines. The market was expanded by non-mining activities such as government administration and charcoal burning which followed the development of mining. The expansion of the local market was a welcome substitute to the Congolese market. The Department of Agriculture acknowledged in 1920 that the Congolese market was potentially unreliable as its domestic production of maize had increased to 9,000 bags in 1920 and cassava was increasingly used to substitute maize meal[21]. However, this observation did not take note of the imminent competition from Southern Rhodesia for both the Congolese and Northern Rhodesian markets.

South African Pressures on Southern Rhodesia

The development of commercial maize and cattle farming in Southern Africa depended on the consumer market largely constituted by mineral development, mainly in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and the Congo. The largest market in the region was the diamond and gold mines of South Africa.

South Africa restricted maize imports from Southern Rhodesia. In 1920 the price of imported maize was fixed at a maximum of 15s Od per bag[22]. Southern Rhodesia, which was the main exporter of maize to South Africa, was compelled to accept that price in order to sell her maize in South African markets. This discouraged maize exports from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa because Southern Rhodesia's own domestic prices were higher than in South Africa, ranging between £1. 1s. Od to £1. 5. Od in 1920[23]. The prices in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo were higher than in Southern Rhodesia and thus attracted Southern Rhodesian producers to increase their exports north of the Zambezi. As a result of increased maize production in South Africa throughout the 1920s, the South African government made it compulsory to export maize and to reduce imports in 1929[24].

The restrictions adopted by South Africa between 1916 and 1929 were disadvantageous to Southern Rhodesia because Southern Rhodesian marketable surplus surpassed the local and external outlets in Southern Africa. Maize production rose from 1,220,768 bags in 1921 to 1,394,654 in 1924 and 1,826,345 in 1929. The magnitude of the problem facing Southern Rhodesia in the 1920s becomes clear when it is considered that local consumption was 300,000 bags in 1921 and rose to 846,000 bags ten years later[25].

Owing partly to restrictions in the South African market, Southern Rhodesia's overall maize exports fell from 774,449 bags in 1923 to 383,338 bags in 1925[26]. Southern Rhodesia had to look elsewhere for a market. The increase of Southern Rhodesian maize and maize meal exports to Northern Rhodesia's markets was steady and substantial after 1918 compared to the period before the war. The customs agreements between the Rhodesias concluded in 1922 and 1925 and the reduction of rates since 1918 for maize from Southern Rhodesia to Northern Rhodesia and the Congo facilitated Southern Rhodesian maize and cattle exports north of the Zambezi. There were no duties which would have raised the price and make Southern Rhodesian exports less competitive as was the case in the South African markets. As a result, Southern Rhodesia's exports to Northern Rhodesia and the Congo increased (See Tables V and XI). It is in this light that Southern Rhodesia's exports to the markets which had previously been dominated by Northern Rhodesia adversely affected the latter's settler farming. Similar exports to South Africa had opposite results on South African farming because of tariff and railage protection in the Union.

Since the turn of this century, the South African meat market was largely supplied by domestic meat producers who were dominated by the Imperial Cold Storage Company and its subsidiaries which were created by the mining companies during the Anglo-Boer war[27]. The South African meat companies also controlled meat production in the High Commission Territories and South West Africa. South Africa's importation of meat and maize from neighbouring countries increased when she increased her exports to overseas markets but after 1918 the supply usually exceeded existing outlets[28].

Since the South African meat companies had no links with Southern Rhodesia before 1923, it was difficult for Southern Rhodesia to compete in the South African meat market[29]. Southern Rhodesian cattle exports only began in 1916 and were restricted in the South African meat market by the weight embargo which South Africa introduced in 1916. For purposes of preventing imported scrub class of cattle from competing against local cattle of the same class, South Africa allowed cattle imports above the weight of 750-lbs liveweight in the case of cows and 1,000lbs liveweight in the case of oxen on arrival in South Africa[30]. It was difficult for Southern Rhodesia to compete in the South African market under these conditions because the majority of her cattle weighed between 250 to 450-lbs liveweight[31]. Partly on account of the weight embargo restriction, exports to South Africa fell from 10,215 to 4,750 heads in 1919 and 1922 respectively[32]. As the High Commission Territories and South-West Africa were in the South African customs Union and their meat industries were controlled by South African meat companies, they were not as severely affected as Southern Rhodesia.

The Hertzog Government which was put in power by a predominantly agricultural electorate in 1924, strongly opposed the policy of 'free entry of cattle and farm produce from the surrounding countries'[33]. These restrictions adversely affected Southern Rhodesia more than the High Commission Territories and South West Africa which were in the South African customs Union. Southern Rhodesian maize and cattle exports were also restricted by high railage on the South African Railways which was higher than on internal traffic[34]. However, as the critical problems lay with the disposal of cattle rather than maize, I shall focus on problems affecting the cattle industry and the measures which Southern Rhodesia adopted to solve these problems.

Solutions to market Problems in Southern Rhodesia

When Southern Rhodesia started to export cattle in 1916, her markets were local, in South Africa and Portuguese East Africa where the 1914-18 war had created a temporary market. South Africa was by far the largest external market, taking an average of 15,000 head annually between 1916 and 1923 with Mozambique taking about 2,000[35]. The problem with the South African market was recognised in 1923: 'with increasing supplies nearer to the Rand which is the Chief centre of consumption, the demand for cattle from Southern Rhodesia is more likely to diminish than to increase'[36]. A related problem was that 'our surplus is now so great that this outlet no longer suffices'[37]. Restrictions in

South Africa put Southern Rhodesia at a further disadvantage.

The overseas markets had even more serious obstacles as it was explained in 1923 that "with regard to markets, Rhodesia is in the same position as other cattle rearing countries, but Rhodesia is further handicapped by the fact that most of her cattle are unfit for the overseas trade, and cannot enter into competition on the English markets, with meat from Argentina"[38]. However, the growing cattle population worried Southern Rhodesia. The cattle population rose from 1,759,000 in 1921 to 2,582,000 in 1931 yet domestic consumption stood at 75,000 head in 1921 and 110,000 in 1933[39]. The piling up of surplus marketable cattle beyond existing internal and external outlets was a serious problem which concerned many. One possible palliative for the difficulty was for the Northern Rhodesia Administration to revoke the 'repressive' regulations prohibiting the transit of cattle through Northern Rhodesia to the Congo.

Southern Rhodesia recognised immediately after the 1914-18 war that the Rand was an important market for beef cattle which could ease her market problems. The Rand market alone needed about 500 cattle daily in 1920; and this was supplied by twenty-seven firms of auctioneers, fourty firms of wholesalers and 300 retail shops. Southern Rhodesia convened a meeting in March 1921 in Johannesburg for major cattle producing countries in Southern Africa, namely, South-west Africa, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland to discuss measures for effective participation in the Rand market. The main outcome of this meeting was the formation of the Meat Producers' Exchange with a share capital of £1,000 subscribed by sixteen shareholders. The Exchange resolved to eliminate middlemen, receive 'fair' prices, control supply and avoid competition with the 'big buyers'. The Rand Cold Storage company distributed meat for the Exchange[40]. The Exchange also established close relations with the Imperial Cold Storage Company and its subsidiaries which had dominated the South African meat market since 1902. With a Southern Rhodesian as one of the Managing Directors, the Exchange appeared to be the kind of organisation which would secure Southern Rhodesia's effective participation in the South African markets and thus resolve marketing problems. This hope was short-lived as the South African companies wrecked the Exchange two years after its formation.

The organizations which had dominated the South African market were hostile to the Exchange for a number of factors. The Exchange was accused of being 'multinational' and that it favoured one country over another. These organisations told their farmer clients that the exchange depressed the market. Hostility was specifically directed against Southern Rhodesia as South African firms objected to the number of cattle from Southern Rhodesia handled by the Exchange. The South African firms supplying meat to the Rand and other consumers in South Africa had interest only in South-west Africa and the High Commission Territories which were members of the South African customs union. These firms had no direct interest in the Southern Rhodesian cattle industry.

These South Africa-Australian firms which failed to compete on the world market objected to strong competition from Southern Rhodesia in the South African market. Thus, they deliberately subverted Southern Rhodesian cattle exports to South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia's only meat processing plant at Odzi which failed to compete against Australian and South African meat in Southern Rhodesia[41]. In addition to wrecking the Exchange, South Africa frustrated competition from Southern Rhodesia through low prices for scrub cattle and this angered Southern Rhodesian ranchers. In 1921 the majority of the cattle were the scrub type weighing 250-500 lbs or less and a few weighed 500-600 lbs. 'Farmer George' who wrote a fortnightly column on agriculture in the Bulawayo Chronicle and several farmers such as B. Gwynn who was President of the Agricultural union in 1924, argued between 1918 and 1922 that the surplus of marketable cattle was not sufficient reason for exporting graded cattle to South Africa where they sold at low prices[42]. The problem of surplus cattle and scrub beasts plagued Southern Rhodesia throughout the 1920s and 1930s and the 'abnormal surplus' and limited markets were usually cited as factors causing low prices[43].

Phimister has critically analysed Southern Rhodesia's failure to break in on the South African and overseas markets[44]. The Southern Rhodesian cattle industry had severe structural constraints which successful competitors on the world market had overcome at the turn of this century. In Argentina it took twenty to twenty-four months to raise a bull weighing 600-650 lbs which was suitable for the chilled beef trade compared to five to six years of raising a bull weighing 400-500 lbs in Southern Rhodesia. The cost of raising a suitable beast was higher in Southern Rhodesia than in South Africa or South America as the former was less capitalised than the latter. It took Southern Rhodesia a longer time and spending larger sums of money than South Africa or South America to raise a bull for chilling whose quality was lower than South African or South American beef. In 1935, a British cattle expert explained why Southern Rhodesia was severely handicapped to compete in the world beef market. He noted: "a raiser has to keep his bullocks until they are six years; I am afraid that the prospects of continuing as a serious competitor in the chilled beef business could be rather small"[45]. What the South African and world markets rejected in the 1920s was exported to Northern Rhodesia and the Congo at low cost because of the duty free tariff and cheap railway transportation.

The Southern Rhodesian cattle industry also lacked vertical integration which had been achieved in South America and to a lesser extent in South Africa. The British firms operating in the Argentine beef industry controlled all stages in preparing beef from ranching to retail distribution[46]. These firms owned and controlled ranches, ships, depots and retail outlets in Britain. As these firms co-operated, they were able to control prices, minimise price fluctuations and keep out other competitors from the world beef markets. The South African cattle industry was more vertically integrated and organised than that of Southern Rhodesia. However, Southern Rhodesia's effective participation in the meat markets north of the Zambezi did not require these attributes. It is against the background of Southern Rhodesia's failure to break on the South African and world meat markets and her growing cattle surplus that those concerned with the cattle industry structured her customs agreements with Northern Rhodesia and reduced railway rates to enable cattle producers to sustain their exports to the Congo and Northern Rhodesia.

Increased exports to the Congo and Northern Rhodesia was one of the solutions to Southern Rhodesia's marketing problems. Between 1919 and 1921 Southern Rhodesian officials made several tours to the Congo to scout for markets[47]. After concluding informal agreements both parties separately approached Northern Rhodesia to lift the ban on transit cattle from Southern Rhodesia. The Congo Authorities advanced three arguments for their intention to buy cattle from Southern Rhodesia despite the fact that Northern Rhodesia had supplied all the Congo's requirements up to 1921[48]. In fact the Congo's requirements of beef cattle were moderate up to 1923; being 2,000 in 1916 and 5,000 in 1923 out of the total importation which varied from 4,000 to 13,000 between 1916 and 1923. (See tables IA, B and VIII).

The Congo argued that Northern Rhodesia cattle were inadequate both in quality and quantity yet very costly. The Congo's cattle requirements increased from a monthly average of 400-500 herd between 1913 and 1922 to at least 1,000-1,500 herd after 1922 and Northern Rhodesia lacked the sources to meet the new level of demand. The last argument pertained to the Zambezi basin and the Congo basin tariffs. The Congo argued that as she was a free market, she deserved the right to buy from as many producer markets as possible and was apprehensive of Northern Rhodesia's strict sanitary regulations which kept out Southern Rhodesian cattle from the Congo market. While it was true that Northern Rhodesia could not meet Katanga's growing demand for beef after 1922, Katanga's arguments primarily questioned the rationale of the Congo Basin Treaties. She wanted to buy cattle cheaply and from any source, in keeping with the spirit of the Congo Basin Treaties, the treaties which Northern Rhodesia claimed to have hindered her farming industry.

The Northern Rhodesia settler farmers counteracted all these arguments in the hope of retaining the better part of the cattle market. They argued that they sold their cattle cheaply and the Congolese butchers and contractors made a profit of about 60 per cent[49]. The Northern Rhodesia Government also dismissed the Congolese claims about the quality of Northern Rhodesian cattle being inferior because the Congolese veterinary officer had indicated in 1920 that cattle from Bulozi were of good quality. In fact the cattle which Southern Rhodesia exported to the Congo were of similar and at times poorer quality than what Northern Rhodesia failed to sell after 1922. Northern Rhodesia was also not convinced that Katanga's needs would rise drastically, particulary that at the end of 1920 the economic depression of 1920-23 reduced the labour force from 12,000 to 6,000. Northern Rhodesia firmly refused to grant any transit rights on the grounds of avoiding the importation of East Coast fever. Southern Rhodesia was quick to point out that the danger of introducing cattle disease among the settler owned cattle remained a possibility while Lozi cattle were allowed through to Katanga[50]. Bulozi cattle exports to the South ceased in 1915 following an outbreak of pleuro-pneunonia but continued to be exported to the Congo as shown below:-

TABLE III

LOZI CATTLE EXPORTS TO THE CONGO

1919	-	1920	4,774
1920	-	1921	3,606
1921	-	1922	1,485
Up to NO.		1922	612

Source: N.A.Z., BS/3/183 Importation and Exportation of Cattle, 1918-24. Chief veterinary Officer to the Secretary to the Administration NR. 28/11/22.

Northern Rhodesia banned cattle exports from Bulozi in November 1922 in order to disguise the fact that her refusal to grant transit rights to Southern Rhodesia earlier was intended to keep the Congo market for Northern Rhodesian farmers.

When the BSAC intervened, Northern Rhodesia knew that the forces ranged against her constituted a formidable opposition[51]. The BSAC repudiated Northern Rhodesia's arguments on the ground that Northern Rhodesia violated the Zambezi customs agreements and the Congo Treaties. Northern Rhodesia submitted albeit under vigorous regulations insisting that it was in her interest to prevent the importation of East Coast fever, particularly that the veterinary Department was understaffed. It was also not insignificant that these negotiations took place during part of the time that the Administrator of Southern Rhodesia (1914-23), Drummond Chaplin, acted as the Administrator in Northern Rhodesia (1921-24)[52].

Northern and Southern Rhodesia agreed that the latter should export only slaughter cattle starting in 1922, from the 1st July to 31st December, every year. This had to be the balance between the number of cattle supplied by Northern Rhodesia and the actual needs of Katanga. This condition was significant for two reasons. First, Northern Rhodesia wanted to keep the trade in breeding and dairy stock for herself and thus delay Katanga to build up her own domestic sources. Second, it was an attempt to limit Southern Rhodesia's exports, particularly as breeding and dairy stock paid lower duty and railage than slaughter cattle when removed into the Congo basin[53].

The arrangement gave Northern Rhodesia priority in supplying the Katanga market. This did not materialise because of the growing demand in Katanga and the large marketable surplus in Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia was expected to supply cattle only from disease free areas. The animals were to travel in closed and clean waggons without any food because agricultural produce facilitated the transmission of cattle disease. None of these conditions, which Northern Rhodesia insisted on, was observed. However, Southern Rhodesia, which dominated relations with her Northern neighbour, insisted that cattle from Bechuanaland also had to be restricted to the period July-December. Northern Rhodesia accepted the condition so as to avoid customs discrimination which the Zambezi basin customs agreements guaranteed. This condition was observed in 1922 but eventually became a dead letter.

In summing up this section, I should underline the factors which forced Southern Rhodesia into the Congolese and Northern Rhodesian markets. First, Southern Rhodesia had considerable amounts of marketable cattle and maize immediately after the 1914-18 war. Second, Southern Rhodesia had failed to compete on the South African and world markets of both maize and cattle. Third, the Congo and Northern Rhodesia were able to take some of the marketable maize and cattle from Southern Rhodesia. In the context of these constraints, Southern Rhodesia attracted consumers in the Congo and Northern Rhodesia by offering her maize and cattle exports at low prices. The structure of the customs agreements and the policy of charging low railway rates facilitated Southern Rhodesian exports to the Northern markets, much to the detriment of producers there.

Rate Reductions

The policy of low railage is important in understanding how Southern Rhodesian maize and cattle exports to Northern Rhodesia and the Congo undermined maize and cattle farming in Northern Rhodesia. This policy was adopted by the Rhodesia Railways with the full knowledge that it would harm railwaybelt settler farming in Northern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the policy had to be adopted because the Rhodesia Railways had more in common with Southern Rhodesia than Northern Rhodesia and were thus more susceptible to pressures from Southern Rhodesia than Northern Rhodesia.

Rate reduction for maize and cattle consigned to Northern markets was initiated in March 1918 by E.M. Rose, Manager of the Rhodesia Railways[54]. This was partly influenced by the publication of the Acworth Report in 1918 whose conclusions were bitterly disputed and rejected by the settlers in Southern Rhodesia. W.M. Acworth had been appointed in 1916 to investigate the impact of railway rates on the general development of Southern Rhodesia following a resolution on the matter by the Legislature in 1914[55]. Acworth's main conclusion was that the railway rates did not 'throttle progress' of the country as they were 'moderate'.

Rose wrote in a private letter to the Administrator of Northern Rhodesia (Lawrence A. Wallace):

> There are indications that Northern Rhodesia will not retain much longer the monopoly of agricultural food supplies to the Congo. We have, as you probably know, long refrained from

> quoting rates for grain from Salisbury and the South which would in any way be harmful to the Northern Rhodesia farmers, although we have probably lost a great deal of money by doing so. I hardly see how this position can continue much longer especially in view of the growing production of maize in Southern Rhodesia[56].

Several obvious conclusions flow from this quotation. First, it reveals that Northern Rhodesia's farming could be harmed and indeed this was later confirmed, by reducing railage on Southern Rhodesia's agricultural exports to the Congo. Second, in view of increased production of maize and other agricultural products in Southern Rhodesia, nothing would prevent the Rhodesia Railways from reducing rates if that facilitated exports and helped the Southern Rhodesian farming industry. Third, it was necessary for the Railways to reduce rates in order to encourage traffic from which the Railways would recoup the financial loss suffered during the war.

Wallace rejected Rose's suggestion because the Rhodesias had to refrain from direct competition in order to avoid one from harming the other. Northern Rhodesia was bound to suffer when the competition obtained but maintaining the 'status quo' on railway rates was unacceptable to the Railways as it neither assisted them nor Southern Rhodesia's farming. The prosperity of the Railways was seen as interlinked with that of Southern Rhodesia since Rose further argued in his letter that 'I do not want to do any harm to the Northern Rhodesia farmer but at the same time I do not want to lose traffic altogether'[57]. Wallace rejected Rose's proposal and hoped to defeat both objectives. He minuted:

"Whatever rate is given, even if it eliminates all advantages to Northern Rhodesia, the Northern Rhodesian market must be the Congo, and most of their produce must at any rate go there, so that whilst Northern Rhodesia can afford to produce at all, the railway would not carry more from Southern Rhodesia than the balance required above that Northern Rhodesia could send'[58].

This view was a product of the period 1910 to 1918 in which Northern Rhodesia dominated exports to the Congo and during which Wallace was Administrator of Northern Rhodesia. The rate reduction suggested was ½d per ton per mile up to Sakania or Elizabethville and this would reduce Northern Rhodesia's advantage of position from 6s. 3d to 1s. 6d per bag[59].

The principle of reducing rates also applied to cattle when Southern Rhodesia started exporting cattle to the Congo in 1922. The Railways realized that by reducing rates on exports they would pull Southern Rhodesia's farming industry out of the doldrums. This realization was one of the factors which influenced the adoption of the taper system which the Seventh Southern Rhodesia Railways Conference recommended[60]. The taper was applied to the whole railway system in 1926[61]. The Railway Management was forthright in stating its commitment to the Southern Rhodesia farming industry as it noted in 1922 that 'the railage even though considerably reduced, is too heavy a proportion of the landed cost at the abattoirs and freezing works'[62]. Having taken note of this, the Odzi Meat Factory was enabled to open in May 1922 with the assistance of 'extremely low rates' but finally closed two months later as it failed to compete against imported frozen and chilled beef from South Africa and Australia.

The reductions were made annually and thus had a lasting effect. In 1923 the Railways pointed out that 'in order to stimulate further the cattle industry and to assist exporters, reductions in rates averaging 13 per cent were granted for cattle consigned to South Africa, Europe and the Congo[63]. At the end of 1924, the Railways sustained a loss of £10,835 in rate reduction for cattle and maize which was 'evidence of the desire of these railways to assist cattle dealers in disposing of their stock at a critical time'. This desire further materialised when the loss rose to £170,000 in 1927 and £205,000 in 1930[64]. These reductions demonstrated the railways' central position in the agricultural economy of Southern Rhodesia.

The exportation of maize from Southern Rhodesia was also stimulated by rate reduction. In 1921 local rates were increased both in Southern and Northern Rhodesia by 25 per cent in order to encourage exports[65]. This increase was also designed to increase the Railways' revenue from local traffic which showed considerable scope to increase. Railway revenue was bound to increase especially from Southern Rhodesia whose farming area was served by several branch lines (See Map 2). This encouraged Southern Rhodesia to increase her exports to the Congo and actively compete against Northern Rhodesia. Rate reduction was also made for long distance traffic. Rates to Beira were reduced from £1.2s.11d to 17s.6d per ton and a further 2s.6d when the overseas price was £1.15s. per quarter. In 1924 the reduction was repeated and raised to 25 per cent for distances exceeding 600 miles[66].

The expansion of the market in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo between 1926 and 1930 was matched with constant railage reduction which helped farming in Southern Rhodesia more than in Northern Rhodesia. The reduction of 25 per cent made in 1924 for maize and maize meal was further reduced by 20 per cent over an increased distance of 800 miles in 1926. The introduction of the flat rate in 1930 had the most disastrous effects as it made commodities sent from Southern and Northern Rhodesia to the Copper-belt and the Congo pay the same rate per ton. The justification for this by the railways was 'to enable farmers in Mashonaland to obtain a share in the expanding markets in Northern Rhodesia, a maximum of 360d per ton was introduced for maize and maize meal consigned from Southern Rhodesia and all points north of'[67]. Northern Rhodesia was enticed to import 177,000 bags of low priced maize and maize meal from Southern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesia accumulated a big surplus of about [illegible]9,000 bags after a consumption of about 300,000 bags of maize had been met[68]. The surplus was exported overseas or was carried over to the following



MAP 2 RAILWAYS AND PRODUCTIVE FARMING AREAS

year at a great loss to the farmers who were gripped with the fear of overproduction which lasted well into the 1930s.

In the absence of Country Produce distribution rates that compare the cost of carrying goods in class rates eleven to thirteen, from towns in Northern Rhodesia with towns in Southern Rhodesia to the Congo and the Copperbelt markets, I shall illustrate the favourable disposition of this system to Southern Rhodesia by comparing the rates from Bulawayo (Distribution Centre) and Gwelo (non-distribution Centre) in 1935.[69]

TABLE IV

COMPARISON OF RATES FOR DISTRIBUTION AND NON-DISTRIBUTION CENTRES

FROM	TO	DISTANCE (MILES)	RATE CHARGED
Gwelo	Insiza	56	8d
Bulawayo	Insiza	55	3d
Gwelo	Umvuma	54	7d
Gwelo	Gado	37	4d
Bulawayo	Essexvale	37	2d
Gwelo	Hartley	111	14d
Bulawayo	Gwelo	111	7d

Source: PRO, CO 795/74. File No. 45027/1, Railway Commission, Midlands Milling Company, Gwelo, to Railway Commission, 15/10/35.

Table IV clearly shows that Country Produce Distribution rates were more favourable to distribution centres than they were to non-distribution centres. The disparity applied with even greater force in terms of goods moving from the Rhodesias to the Copperbelt and the Congo. Southern Rhodesian maize and cattle farmers gained more from the differential rating system than their counterparts in Northern Rhodesia as the former had a widespread railway network.

Long distance rate reduction greatly helped exports and was strongly supported by constant reductions on internal traffic from distribution centres. Local rates on cattle were reduced from 2s. 0d per short truck at sixty miles to £1. 7s. 6d at 550 miles in 1924. In 1926 local rates were reduced by a further £1. 0s. 0d for distances exceeding sixty miles. The local rates for maize and maize meal were reduced from 2s. 6d per mile to 1s. 0d, representing a reduction of 60 per cent and 33 to 60 per cent respectively and these were repeated in 1927[70]. Reduction of transport cost for Southern Rhodesian produce reduced their price considerably and were able to compete effectively against those produced near the markets. The Railways acknowledged this fact in 1924 as it was noted that 'the Improvement in prices was, no doubt, helped in no small degree by further reductions in the railway rates'[71].

There are six factors which show that the BSAC's extensive control of the Rhodesia Railways and the composition of the Railways Conference and Rates Advisory Committee up to 1931 facilitated a railage policy favourable to Southern Rhodesia. First, a number of interest groups in Southern Rhodesia, including the Railway

Companies and the BSAC realized the danger of losing traffic once the planned railways in the Congo had been built. In view of this danger, for example, the Southern Rhodesia Agricultural Union submitted to the Hammond Commission in 1924 that 'profits on the splended volume of highly paying traffic from the great copper mines in the Katanga should be used in this country. They can be wisely invested by creating increased traffic here as an insurance against diminishing Congo tonnage[72]. The Chamber of Mines supported this view and noted that 'the more traffic to and from the Congo and Northern Rhodesia the better able will the railways be to charge low rates in Southern Rhodesia through the more economic working which the additional traffic should ensure'[73]. This proposition was also of benefit to the farmers and the railways. The BSAC was aware of the situation as evidenced by the safeguard provided by the British Government in 1923 that no railway which would compete with the Rhodesia Railways was to be built within the Rhodesias. Justifications by the Rhodesia Railways for rate reductions given elsewhere above attest to this view. Traffic to and from the Congo and Northern Rhodesia enabled low rates to be imposed on Southern Rhodesian agricultural exports[74].

Second, the composition of the rate-making committee up to 1931 facilitated the adoption of low railage for Southern Rhodesian cattle and maize. Up to 1918 the rates were fixed by the Directors of the Rhodesia Railways with their headquarters within Southern Rhodesia where the settlers exerted pressure on the BSAC for railage reduction[75]. In 1918 the Southern Rhodesia Railways Conference was instituted whose representation was almost all by Southern Rhodesian institutions (See appendix II). The Conference had a Rates Advisory Committee which also was entirely composed of Southern Rhodesian institutions. A further change in this Committee was made by the 1926/27 Railways Act[76]. The main purpose of the Act was to provide for joint Government Control of the railways and to restrict their revenue to a minimum so that surplus was set aside for rate reduction. A Railway Commission of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland was empowered to determine railway rates. The reduction of rates was only allowed when the railways had made a 'standard revenue' and the Reserve Account had reached two and a half times the value of the loan Capital of the railways. The standard revenue was the income of the railways after covering the expenditure for a particular year. The predominance of Southern Rhodesian interests continued as the pattern of rate reduction after 1926 was similar to that before 1926.

Third, the view of the Agricultural Union was bound to be warmly received by the Railways Conference and the Rate Committee because the settler farmers were well represented on these institutions and in the legislature. The farmers' representatives on these bodies were very influential and powerful farmers and politicians. W.M. Leggate who represented farmers between 1919-20 as President of the Farmers' Union became the first Minister of

Lands and Agriculture in the Responsible Government, 1923-25. This was the period when a definite decision to reduce rates was taken. C.S. Jobling who sat on the Rates Committee in 1923-24 was later elected to the Legislature. R.A. Fletcher who had strongly supported the creation of the Native Reserves since the 1910s, and had been President of the Farmers' Union (1910-14) became the Minister of Agriculture in 1928[77]. Farmers in Southern Rhodesia easily secured favourable railway rates because they were represented by powerful personalities in key positions. The continuity in this strong representation partly accounts for the constant railage reduction between 1922 and 1930.

The fourth reason why I consider that the BSAC's control of the Rhodesia Railways favoured Southern Rhodesia is that the taper rating system was adopted for maize and cattle consigned to the Congo in 1925 when increased exports north of the Zambezi from Southern Rhodesia were certain. Fifth, a flat rate was introduced in 1930 from all major maize producing areas in Southern Rhodesia to the Northern Rhodesia and Katanga mines. All maize from Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia to these markets paid the same rate per ton. This was one of the factors which caused Northern Rhodesia to over import maize from Southern Rhodesia in 1930. Sixth, the Reports of the Rhodesia Railways between 1922 and 1930 explicitly show that the rates were reduced for maize and cattle exports in order to assist the farming industry in Southern Rhodesia. The reports were also highly critical of Northern Rhodesia, 'which to protect its own interests, still imposes very drastic regulations in respect of the passage through its territory of animals from outside its borders[78]. In the light of these 'drastic regulations', and the pressure from the Southern Rhodesia farmers for promotional rates, the railways likened their position in 1925 to that 'between the devil and the deep sea'[79]. It is in the context of these institutional pressures and the response to these pressures that a policy of low railage favourable to Southern Rhodesia should be explained.

A few remarks on the position of the railways in the economy of Southern Rhodesia are necessary in order to show the importance of low railway rate policy to that country. The railway was attracted by the prospects of finding minerals. Mining emerged from an experimental stage when railways were constructed to carry machinery, fuel, ore and food to and from the mining areas. These activities in Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and the Congo, helped the economy in Southern Rhodesia. The railway preceded commercial farming and since the railway network was widespread in Southern Rhodesia's most productive arable areas (See map 2), agriculture was greatly stimulated by low cost and bulk carrying railway transport. Low railage was one of the attractions offered to private companies made by the BSAC and the Responsible Government[80].

The substantial traffic to and from Northern Rhodesia and the Congo enabled Southern Rhodesia to have low railage. The Hammond Commission admitted in 1925 that if the 'idea of assistance from wealthier sections of the system (was) ruled out, it would mean that the Southern Rhodesian maize grower must always carry a heavier burden than his rivals and the development must always be checked to that extent'[81]. Since 1923, Southern Rhodesia's taxation of railway revenue was the highest; being 10s. 6d in the £, 10s. 0d for Britain, 6s. 0d for Northern Rhodesia and 4s. 0d for Bechuanaland. Bechuanaland and Northern Rhodesia levied the revenue earned both within and outside its borders[82]. This arrangement was particularly important because the considerable reductions in railway rates given to Southern Rhodesia were out of the money earned outside Southern Rhodesia.

The BSAC's large investments in Southern Rhodesian Agricultural Industry also made it an interested party in traffic and railage matters which encouraged Southern Rhodesian exports to Northern Rhodesia and the Congo. Although a thorough study of the Company's economic activities does not yet exist[83], many scholars have shown that its investments were concentrated in Southern Rhodesia. About its economic activities in Northern Rhodesia, Kessel has stated that 'the British South Africa Company itself did not engage in any commercial undertakings although it had originally vigorously pursued mineral concessions from customary rulers'[84]. The Company's large investments in Southern Rhodesian agriculture was one of the factors which induced the adoption of free trade customs agreements and low railage which ensured Southern Rhodesia's agricultural exports to Northern Rhodesia and the Congo. After the 1914-18 War South Africa severely restricted cattle, beef, maize and maize meal from Southern Rhodesia. It was also after the war that customs agreements and railage reduction facilitated Southern Rhodesia's exports to the Congo and Northern Rhodesia. As this was the period in which investments in agriculture started to yield profits, the Company's desire to earn a return on its investments in agriculture influenced the adoption of customs agreements and railage which were favourable to Southern Rhodesia.

The BSAC's Central Farms at Umtali, Sinoia, Gwelo, Bulawayo and Marandellas were used for many purposes. They were used to familiarise the new immigrants with farming conditions in Southern Rhodesia. The farms were also research and experimental stations for grading cattle and finding out the most yielding maize seeds. For example, the maize types grown in Northern Rhodesia bore Southern Rhodesian imprints such as the SR52. The Company also used the farms to produce marketable products[85]. For example the Company's herd of cattle stood at 35,849 in 1915 and more than trebled to 108,178 in 1922[86]. In 1922 this was second only to the BSAC's railway interests on its list of commercial undertakings[87].

The policy of economic diversification which the BSAC adopted in 1908 materialised in various ways. For example, land prices were reduced to 8d per acre and 3s. 9d for agricultural lands. As infrastructural investments such as railways appreciated the value of land, this indicates the Company's larger investments in Southern Rhodesia than Northern Rhodesia. By 1914 only 8.8 million out of 33 million acres situated within twenty-five miles of the railway remained unsold in Southern Rhodesia and this was located in the inhospitable and remote Wankie District[88]. The railwaybelt arable land in Northern Rhodesia still remains unoccupied even in independent Zambia. The Company and its railways were thus obliged to find markets for Southern Rhodesianagricultural produce in order to enable the railway to pay for itself.

At the end of company rule Northern Rhodesia had two badly equipped experimental stations at Mazabuka and Chilanga compared to at least six in Southern Rhodesia. As a result, settlers were dissatisfied with the Department of Agriculture and in 1920

they passed a vote of 'no confidence' in the Department for failing to visit and assist farmers regularly. Another piece of evidence of the BSAC's neglect of Northern Rhodesia is that early in 1921 A.J. Lane, the Chief Veterinary Officer (1907-1921), informed the Administrator that the colony urgently needed a research laboratory for 'investigating the Kalomo disease'[89]. Pluero-pneumonia had intermittently spread from Bulozi to the railway line since 1914 and up to 1924 Northern Rhodesia had no research station to investigate the origin, transmission and treatment of animal diseases. The Veterinary Department tested blood in South Africa through personal arrangements as Southern Rhodesia's research laboratory usually claimed to be too busy to help[90]. The legacy of the BSAC's negligence was that in 1931 the Mazabuka station was 'a little more than a convenient residential site' whose closure three years later was regretted by the Colonial Office[91]. The wide range of interests the BSAC had in the Southern Rhodesian agricultural industry compelled the railways to promote farming by reducing rates on maize and cattle exports.

Maize Farming in Northern Rhodesia

By 1921 a feeling prevailed amongst the settler farming community in Northern Rhodesia that the Rhodesia Railways were responsible for the high cost of production and that competition from Southern Rhodesia would inevitably ruin settler farming. The Railways had refused to reduce rates on Northern Rhodesian farming inputs and her maize for overseas markets because the railways incurred a substantial financial loss during the war which had to be made good. On the other hand rates were reduced in 1918 for Southern Rhodesian maize consigned to the Congo and Northern Rhodesia. A.J. Lane, summed up the anxiety of the farming community about the railways in 1920: 'The only people I fear are the railways; they treat us as if we were nobody. I fear that the wretched Railway Company will not wake up to these conditions'[92]. The settler community in Northern Rhodesia held the Railways responsible for the high cost of production and competition from Southern Rhodesia for the markets which Northern Rhodesia had dominated. By 1930, there were several aspects of settler agriculture which confirmed the anxiety of the settler farmers.

Northern Rhodesian produce was usually forced out of the local and nearby Congolese markets by cheaper maize from Southern Rhodesia (See Table V). In 1924 when the local recorded consumption was between 40,000 - 50,000, 26,000 bags were imported from Southern Rhodesia, representing about 69 per cent of the recorded consumption of Northern Rhodesia[93]. Northern Rhodesia produced 129,000 bags in that year. Gann asserted that Northern Rhodesia's growing importation of maize, maize meal and beef cattle was a direct result of the growth of the mining industry and reflected the failure to produce all her food requirements[94]. On the contrary maize production was frustrated by the mining companies, and the government which accepted contracts from middlemen who supplied cheap maize which they imported from Southern Rhodesia.

This was clearly explained by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1932. He explained that 'from information which I have received, farmers feel very much that the government contracts have gone to a man who imported cheap grain and ignored local stocks up to the time of the embargo and the imposition of duty'[95]. The lack of or limited markets for Northern Rhodesian maize was noted annually between 1922 and 1931. It was observed that 'although it is certain that everything that is produced can be absorbed, it is not certain that everything that is produced can be sold'[96]. J.M.E Landless, who farmed in the Chisamba area since 1924 and sat on the Maize Control Board and Cattle Marketing Board in the 1930s has confirmed this observation. This observation was also shared by many farmers during that period[97].

TABLE V

NORTHERN RHODESIA: MAIZE PRODUCTION, SURPLUS AND IMPORTATION

			Maize Imports (In 200lb bags		Maize Meal Imports (In 200lb bags)	
	TOTAL PRODUCTION (In Thousands	SURPLUS (In Thousands)	SOUTHERN RHODESIA	SOUTH AFRICA	SOUTHERN RHODESIA	SOUTH AFRICA
1924	129	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1925	95	18	7,456	n.a.	18,454	n.a.
1926	177	24	9,228	286	15,990	510
1927	250	6	702	6	6	Nil
1928	184	7	5,045	23	2,058	43
1929	201	43	21,739	90	15,996	Nil
1930	201	79	55,008	4	121,794	9

The activities of the middlemen were contributory in effect to the competition from Southern Rhodesia. The data on private maize dealers is not as well documented as that of the speculators in cattle. The names usually mentioned are those of Sam Hanslett, R.C. Marston and the Werner and Company Ltd. For these dealers to sell, they had to lower their prices below Southern Rhodesian maize and maize meal. The Chief Secretary to the Administration noted that 'the mining authorities will be informed of the prices, become suspicious of the Society and again favour the speculators who supplied them with cheap imported grain before the embargo'. Certain members of the Society and farmer-traders relied on the middlemen who gave 'advances either in cash or kind', although they were 'forced to accept such prices as is given'. As a result 'certain growers deliberately refrain from joining the Society in order that they may take advantage in short years'[98]. These practices wrecked the marketing system for settler produce. It was easier for individual contractors to lower their prices below the Southern Rhodesian prices than it was for the co-operative Society which took decisions after receiving approval from the farmer - members. Middlemen were a more popular outlet for settler produce than the co-operative Society because the former did not delay to pay the farmers. However, low prices paid out by middlemen lowered incomes.

The settler farmers faced a dilemma.

> The Congo merchants play off Southern Rhodesia against ourselves. Southern Rhodesia supplies the produce very possibly at a loss to the merchant, until we panic and drop our prices to suit the merchant, she then recoups the loss on the original importation at our expense. There is constant agitation in Southern Rhodesia for reduced rates to enable farmers to compete in the Congo Maize Market, where as never a bag goes through for years at a turn and the Congo merchant merely wants a lever for our upsetting. They know we cannot export overseas, that our prices are regulated by Southern quotation and want to push these as low as possible[99].

The Southern Rhodesia Agricultural Report of 1931 held the same view and noted that 'it is evident that a large proportion of the crop has been marketed at a loss' in the past[100]. Thus Northern Rhodesia was squeezed by the Congo, Southern Rhodesia and the middlemen. They took advantage of the free trade tariff and low railage on maize from Southern Rhodesia.

Local produce accumulated as maize imported from Southern Rhodesia displaced local produce in Northern Rhodesia. The continual recurrence of this artificial surplus caused a crisis of confidence among the farmers who considered their failure to sell maize in the local market as reflecting over-production

(The term over-production was used in the 1920s to refer to the artificial surplus created by the consumers' preference for cheaper maize imported from Southern Rhodesia.) Maize production increased in the 1920s. It was stimulated by the development of the mining industry and the construction of railway branch lines on the Copperbelt. However, a free customs tariff and the discriminatory distribution of transport costs enabled Southern Rhodesia to weaken the stable development of the settler farming industry in Northern Rhodesia when conditions were favourable. The consumers in both Northern Rhodesia and the Congo preferred cheaper maize and maize meal from Southern Rhodesia in order to reduce production costs. Northern Rhodesian settlers lost the dominant position in the Northern Rhodesian and Congolese market. One farmer noted in 1926 that 'unless we have an outside market to absorb the surplus without loss, we shall always be knocked with the pendulum of over-production'[100b].

Artificial overproduction was also created in Northern Rhodesia because railway waggons were usually first loaded in Southern Rhodesia during the construction stage of the Copperbelt. After collecting building material from seaports, the railways filled all or much of the available space with maize and maize meal in Southern Rhodesia in order to work at full capacity. This was economic to the railways and beneficial to farmers in Southern Rhodesia. The arrangement reduced transport service available to settler farmers in Northern Rhodesia. In turn this limited the effective participation of Northern Rhodesia railwaybelt maize producers in the market as the railway was the only form of transport available to them. The discriminatory rating system worsened matters. This is why the farmers lost the incentive to improve their farming methods since they were not certain of getting markets or commensurate rewards.

The differential rating system was another factor which deprived Northern Rhodesia of her geographical proximity to the market. This was illustrated in 1929 by the Department of Agriculture which explained that 'Some years ago, our producers enjoyed an advantage over their competitors in the Salisbury area of Southern Rhodesia of about three shillings and six pence per bag. The latest reduction in railage, lowers that advantage to about one shilling and nine pence per bag and there are those who declare that it is not possible to meet the competition which is now certain'[101]. The net advantage was 9d as the Southern Rhodesia Government gave a bounty of 1s. 6d on each bag that was exported[102]. By the late 1920s farmers were uncertain about whether they would sell what they produced and whether the prices would be commensurate with the cost of production. The farmers lacked encouragement to improve their farming.

Table VIII shows the price fluctuation between 1919 and 1931 partly as a result of annual reductions of rates.

TABLE VI

PRICE VARIATIONS

	£.	s.	d		£.	s.	d.
1919		15.	0	-	1.	10.	0
1920		10.	0	-		12.	6
1921		9.	0	-	1.	5.	0
1922-25		6.	6	-		16.	3
1925-29		12.	0	-			
1929-30		12.	0	-			
1930-31		9.	10	-			

Source: I. N.R. Department of Agriculture, Annual Reports, 1913-35.
II. N.R. Maize Agricultural Advisory Board, 1937.

Sam Hanlett who was a Mazabuka farmer and private trader explained one cause of price fluctuations and their impact in 1930;

> The bulk and quality bears little relation to the reward the producer gets for it. When the harvest is bountiful, the market is glutted and the price falls. When the yield is less than the market demand, price is high. Now the economic situation is complicated by competition and if a bad season produces a poor crop the price remains stationary because imported produce can compete in local markets on almost equal terms[103].

Bateson, a farmer who settled in Mazabuka before 1914, explained the fluctuations more plainly as a reflection of competition from Southern Rhodesia.

> Prices of maize are depressed by undercutting to procure a tender by a country at its wits and to find a market for its exportable surplus, and the Northern Rhodesia farmers have suffered in consequence[104].

This comment was prompted by the introduction of the flat rate in 1930 and the importation of 177,000 bags in 1930 from Southern Rhodesia.

Sam Hanslett painted a grimmer picture in 1930 when he noted that 'many farmers view the future with despondence and alarm. Everything at present points to the worst period of depression suffered by Northern Rhodesia farmers for many years'[105]. Hanslett reacted to the artificially created surplus of maize during this period and this was an admission that the farmers would not again be the main suppliers of the local and the Congolese markets. Before the depression of 1929-33 was felt in Northern Rhodesia during the second half of 1931, settler agriculture was severely constrained by supplies from Southern Rhodesia. These supplies were 'below the cost of production'[106] partly because of the free trade tariff between the Rhodesias and low railage on Southern Rhodesian maize exports. The Milligan report of 1931 noted that the yield per acre since 1921 tended to be low and below the margin of production in Northern Rhodesia except in years preceded by good prices[107]. This suggested quantitative and qualitative decline. Northern Rhodesian settler producers lowered prices deliberately in order to find markets in the face of cheaper maize from Southern Rhodesia which both Northern Rhodesia and the Congo preferred.

The high cost of inputs for Northern Rhodesia's farming accentuated the adverse effects of the customs agreements and railage reduction. In discussing the problems facing settler agriculture up to 1931, the Agricultural Advisory Board noted that

> 'the Northern Rhodesia farmer has no compensating advantage in freight on any of the goods he has to purchase. Where these maximum rates have hindered the development of crop production in Northern Rhodesia, their effect on the cost of living is debatable'[108].

However, it was not 'debatable' that production was hindered in Northern Rhodesia by external competition. The combination of high cost farming inputs in Northern Rhodesia and the reduced transport cost for maize and maize meal from Southern Rhodesia made it impossible for Northern Rhodesia to fix her own prices. Low prices reduced farm incomes and capital investment in land. H. Isley, a farmer in the Mazabuka area expressed a view shared by many other farmers in the 1920s. In 1930, he wrote to the Livingstone Mail that 'as far as the selling of our produce to our mines is concerned, we should be infinitely better off if our farms were say at Mafeking. But when it comes to purchasing farming requirements and ordinary necessities of life, I claim that our geographical position has been maintained'[109].

The cost of production was higher in Northern Rhodesia than in Southern Rhodesia. The cost of transporting agricultural machinery and other inputs was higher for Northern Rhodesia than for Southern Rhodesia:

> It is true that the landed cost of implements, fertilizers, commercial petrol, oil and other commodities is much lower at Salisbury and no compensating decrease in the freightage of these articles has been granted to our farmers by the railway companies. It is also true that the recent reductions have all been in favour of the Southern Rhodesia farmers, that is as regards transport to our mining areas[110].

Settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia was clearly hindered because of competition from Southern Rhodesia in supplying Northern Rhodesia's main markets. According to Landless, the cost of producing a bag of maize in the 1920s and 1930s varied between 7s. Od and 10s. 10d[111]. On the other hand, the price of a bag of maize fell from a price range of 15s. Od to £1.10s. Od. in 1919 to about 12s. Od between 1925 and 1930 (See Table VI). The decline and fluctuations were largely caused by the maize dumped in Northern Rhodesia and Katanga whose cost of transport varied from year to year because of annual reductions in railage. The high transport cost for agricultural inputs , fluctuating maize prices and the high cost of production greatly weakened farming in Northern Rhodesia.

The argument that customs tariff and low railage encouraged Southern Rhodesia to dump her maize in Northern Rhodesia which thus ruined maize farming should be illustrated further. As a result of the flat rate introduced in 1930, Southern Rhodesia dumped 89,780 bags of maize meal, an increase of 79,261 bags over 1929. 39,458 bags of maize were dumped in 1930[112]. This maize sold at lower prices in Northern Rhodesia than in Southern Rhodesia. For example, maize which sold at 10s. 0d to 11s. 0d at Salisbury was sold in Northern Rhodesia at 9s. 3d to 10s. 3d respectively. Maize meal which was sold at 12s. 0d at Salisbury was sold at 10s. 3d at Ndola. As these prices were below those offered in Northern Rhodesia between 1928-32 (See Table VII), Northern Rhodesia was 'being subjected to dumping'[113]. By the second half of 1931, the ruin of maize farming and the marketing system was, in part, because 'the markets for produce have been uncertain, prices fluctuating and there has been competition from the South for our limited market at uneconomic prices'[114]. Unreliable markets, low and fluctuating prices did not facilitate capital formation among the settler producers.

TABLE VII

PRICES OF ACCEPTED TENDERS, 1928-32

TOWN	MAIZE	MAIZE MEAL
Livingstone	11s. 3d	n.a.
Kalomo	11s. 6d	12s. 0d
Choma	10s. 0d	11s. 6d
Mazabuka	9s. 0d	10s. 0d
Lusaka	9s. 6d	10s. 0d
Chisamba	10s. 6d	10s. 6d
Broken Hill	10s. 5d	10s.11d
Bwana Mkubwa	11s. 0d	10s.11d
Ndola	10s. 9d	10s. 9d
Luanshya	11s. 1d	11s. 1d
Nkana	11s. 6d	11s. 6d

Source: P.R.O. CO 795/56, File No. 36453, Government Purchase of Grain, Smith to Maxwell, 26/6/32.

Cattle farming in Northern Rhodesia:

Tables IX and X show the estimated cattle population in the main ranching districts of Northern Rhodesia along the line of rail. Table X shows the estimated potential of what marketable surplus there was in Northern Rhodesia along the railwaybelt farming area. Given an estimated consumption of 5,000 cattle in 1926, these tables suggest that the Congo market was important to Northern Rhodesia. This is confirmed by Table VIII which shows that Northern Rhodesia's exports to the Congo were greater than the recorded local consumption of about 1,000 heads in 1920. Therefore, the reduction of railage which cheapened Southern Rhodesian exports to Northern Rhodesia's main market contributed in hindering settler cattle ranching to realize larger capital than before 1918. Northern Rhodesia had the potential to make a greater contribution to the local beef demand. In the light of all this, it is puzzling that between 1921 and 1932 the Livingstone market largely depended on supplies from Bechuanaland and in 1933 only 38 per cent of this market was supplied by local ranchers[115]. It becomes even more puzzling that between 1930 and 1931 Northern Rhodesia imported about 4,000 beef cattle (See Table XI) and large amounts of frozen and chilled beef from Southern Rhodesia.

Northern Rhodesia should not have exported any cattle to the Katanga mines after 1923 as the construction stage of the copperbelt created a demand for local marketable cattle. There are three possible explanations for Northern Rhodesia's continued exports to the Congo after 1923, which, however, were declining because of increasing supplies from Southern Rhodesia. First, as in the case of maize, Southern Rhodesian settlers had priority in loading waggons with beef and cattle for the Northern Rhodesian and Congolese markets which meant that Northern Rhodesia ranchers were forced to export to Katanga whenever they had the opportunity or their cattle accummulated. Second, many consumers in

Northern Rhodesia, and even the Congo, preferred to buy Southern Rhodesian cattle and beef which had been cheapened by rate reduction. Third, the involvement of the BSAC in the Northern Rhodesia mining industry and Southern Rhodesian ranching industry and the Company's ownership of the railways might have influenced importation from Southern Rhodesia at the expense of the local settler cattle. It is in this context that a Mazabuka farmer asked in 1925: 'Are you satisfied that there is no surplus of European and native cattle in this country?' She further asked 'Are you satisfied with the railway rates at present in force? or if not with the persistent efforts for their reduction?'[116] The evidence in this study suggests that neither consumers in Northern Rhodesia and Katanga nor the ranchers and the railways in Southern Rhodesia cared much about settler ranching in Northern Rhodesia. The questions posed underline this conclusion and indicate the plight of the settler ranchers in the face of increasing competition from Southern Rhodesia to the markets which Northern Rhodesia dominated before 1923.

TABLE VIII

COMPARISON OF CATTLE EXPORTS TO THE CONGO FROM

	Northern Rhodesia	Southern Rhodesia	Bechuanaland
1919	12,717	nil	nil
1920	13,417	nil	nil
1921	n.a.	nil	nil
1922	11,516	1,952	nil
1923	6,949	n.a.	nil
1924	n.a.	n.a.	nil
1925	5,645	12,724	6,637
1926	4,016	9,815	6,231
1927	2,056	21,129	5,086
1928	765	32,551	3,115
1929	2,123	31,947	965
1930	800	27,241	n.a.

Sources: I. Milligan Report, 1931, 18.

II. N.R. Veterinary Department, Annual Reports, 1919-1930.

III. General Manager, Rhodesia Railways Annual Reports, 1918-1931.

TABLE IX

TOTAL EUROPEAN OWNED CATTLE IN SELECTED DISTRICTS OF NORTHERN RHODESIA

	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932
Livingstone	3294	2928	3668	3844	4204
Choma	15449	15422	17944	18159	18033
Mazabuka	21449	22938	25366	25417	27013
Lusaka	39898	42170	45952	41510	39319
TOTALS	79657	83485	93030	88930	77569

TABLE X

TOTAL EUROPEAN OWNED OXEN AND COWS IN SELECTED DISTRICTS OF NORTHERN RHODESIA

	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932
Livingstone	3454	2097	2011	1926	1292	2530
Choma	5763	4941	5369	5460	5717	6115
Mazabuka	12972	9888	10584	11354	10868	11607
Lusaka	17495	17201	17731	18329	13372	15034
TOTALS	29684	34127	37069	31249	31249	35286

Sources: (For Tables IX and X)

N.R. Veterinary Department, Annual Reports, 1927-32.

TABLE XI

NORTHERN RHODESIA CATTLE AND BEEF
IMPORTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

	CATTLE (In numbers)		FRESH BEEF (In lbs.)	
FROM	SOUTHERN RHODESIA	SOUTH AFRICAN PRODUCE	SOUTHERN RHODESIA	SOUTH AFRICAN PRODUCE
1926	21	9,386	760	NIL
1927	NIL	9,800	5,718	NIL
1928	NIL	5,923	4,283	NIL
1929	NIL	4,923	13,737	NIL
1930	3,564	7,217	607,655	648
1931	1,169	9,805	208,219	165,016

Sources: (i) Northern Rhodesia, Blue Books, 1926 - 1942.

(ii) N.R. Department of Customs and Excise, Annual Reports, 1926 - 1946.

NOTE:

South African Produce referred to commodities from the South African Customs Union. Cross reference with the Annual Reports of the Departments of Veterinary and Agriculture shows that cattle came from Bechuanaland while, beef, maize and maize meal came from South Africa.

Table X shows that cows and oxen which were used for beef and breeding increased and the potential supply was in excess of the country's beef needs. Many ranchers retained the same stock because they could not sell and practised limited cross-breeding. The quality of cattle in the 1920s declined partly because only limited cross-breeding took place and most farmers could not afford it as their farm incomes were small. In-breeding also reduced resistance to disease. Grading of cattle in order to eliminate the 'scrub type' and cross-breeding improves the quality of stock. Both grading and cross-breeding were limited by uncertain markets, the low prices which did not correspond with the cost of production and the failure of the ranchers to raise capital from the sale of their stock. Although farmers knew that 'the elimination of scrub stock is the chief factor in establishing the cattle industry', they were handicapped by limited capital to which Southern Rhodesian competition contributed.

As state assistance was limited before the mid-1930s, low cattle sales or the failure to sell cattle and the low prices severely constrained the ranching industry. Between 1924 and 1931 the Colonial Office and the Northern Rhodesia Administration were concerned with the Northern Rhodesia's budgetary deficit and told the settler ranchers to take initiative in raising their own capital before seeking state support. However, as a result of the limited cattle markets between 1923 and 1931 there was 'a hesitation to spend further money in view of the menace which exists. This hesitation is understood and justified under present conditions. The position is equally serious as regards natives'[117]. Settler prosperity experienced before 1918 was reversed by competition from Southern Rhodesia which weakened the formation of farming capital in Northern Rhodesia.

Low capital formation, limited sales and the poor quality of cattle were caused by and reflected low prices when the cost of production had increased. Railway rates on fencing and other ranching requirements were high. Prices of cattle dips rose from 7s. 0d in 1916 to 11s. 4d in 1919 per gallon. The economic depressions of 1920-23 and 1929-33 worsened the situation. Landless put the cost of production per beast in the 1920s at £6. 8s. 0d[118]. In contrast, the cost of production was low in Southern Rhodesia where the cattle industry had been built cheaply on looted cattle, compulsory destocking of African herds, low wages, meagre rations and irregular or non-payment of wages to the African labour force[119]. Milligan showed that in 1931 bullocks in Northern Rhodesia cost between £6. 8s. 0d while in 1926 they were sold at about £12[120]. In 1921 the price was between £14.16s. 0d. The 1921 prices of £5. 8s. 0d for a heifer aged between one year to two years were equivalent to that of a fully grown bull in 1931 which had been raised in four to six years. In view of this it was constantly stated after 1923 that there was 'little encouragement for ranchers to put on the market a really good animal in the best condition.

Such an animal does command a relatively high price than the small, native bred stock but such price is not equivalent to the extra cost of production'[121]. Such comments reveal and confirm the damage done to the ranching industry in Northern Rhodesia by importation which was encouraged by free trade tariff and low railage.

Competition for Northern Rhodesia's limited markets created a situation where private cattle dealers benefited more than the settler ranchers who did not engage in cattle speculation. The private dealers depressed the prices as they were preferred by farmers who had lost confidence in the North-Western Rhodesia Farmers Co-operative society as a marketing agent. The farmers also paid their clients in advance or in kind and the prices were usually those of the previous season.

'Bongolo' Barnett Smith was the main cattle contractor for Katanga and bought cattle from both Rhodesias. In 1930 he handled about 30,000 cattle[122]. Werner, who owned the Werner Estate, had a contract with the Roan Selected Trust group of companies at Mufulira and Luanshya. Werner co-operated with the Copperfields Coldstorage Company which supplied the Anglo-American mines and the Lusaka Coldstorage Board. Sam Hanslett run the Helslops Butchery which had a contract for the Broken Hill mining area. Harry Susman who owned the Susman Brothers and Wulfsohn Ltd. supplied the Livingstone market. Thus, the principal traders had parcelled out 85 per cent of the market among themselves since the early 1920s[123].

They worked closely with each other. They bought cattle cheaply from settlers and Africans directly or through agents. They gave cash advances and paid promptly in contrast to the Cattle Owners Association or its maize counterpart which paid after selling to the consumers. They bought cattle at auction sales or by touring the farms and villages which meant that the capacity for collective bargaining by the ranchers was weakened. They accumulated cattle which they sold during critical times, and this was one of the factors for the fluctuations in the prices. They were highly mobile and covered extensive areas.

The private traders together with the competition from Southern Rhodesia undermined the co-operation among the ranchers. There were two instances in which the private dealers and Southern Rhodesia dealt severe blows to the organisation, co-operation and attempts to improve the marketing system among the settler ranchers. In 1922 the Northern Rhodesia Cattle Owners Association was formed in Livingstone on the understanding that the butchers in the Congo would form another association which would receive supplies from the Northern Rhodesian association. The Congolese Association was a non-starter because Southern Rhodesian officials who toured the Congo since 1919 convinced the Congolese that Southern Rhodesia would supply them with cheaper and better quality slaughter cattle than Northern Rhodesia[124].

In 1929 the mining companies sought the Administration's co-operation to get the local ranchers to guarantee a supply of

20,000 head annually. The speculators, particularly Bongolo Smith, sent telegrams to the Governor that Northern Rhodesia could not supply that number[125]. They also warned their farmer clients of the adverse consequences which would follow the centralisation of the marketing system, as it would keep out middlemen, particularly in the face of competition from Southern Rhodesia. These campaigns frustrated the guarantee.

The failure by local ranchers to guarantee meat supplies to the mining companies was paralleled by the failure of the Administration to nullify the Congo Treaties in the late 1920s. The Northern Rhodesia Administration started in 1927 to protect its primary producers by attempting to nullify the Congo Treaties which imposed duty on goods from the Zambezi basin to the Congo basin within Northern Rhodesia. The Administration regarded the Congo Treaties as an issue for Northern Rhodesia alone to tackle and wanted that the way in which it was handled should not conflict with the spirit of the Zambezi basin customs agreements. This, however, was mere wishful thinking because exempting Northern Rhodesian commodities from the Ad Valorem duties imposed under the Congo Treaties would unavoidably improve their chances of competing against Southern Rhodesian exports to the Congo basin.

One of the first tasks undertaken by the Second Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir James Crawford Maxwell, 1927-1932, was to seek the repeal of the Congo Basin Treaties[126]. Maxwell put forward two reasons for his proposal. He argued to the Colonial Office that since Portugal and Belgium had treated the treaties as a dead letter, Northern Rhodesia's compliance with the treaties was unnecessary. The treaties were unfavourable to Northern Rhodesia as goods removed from one part of the country to another paid duty at the same rate as those exported from British Central and Southern Africa. There was also the problem caused by the existence of many customs posts in the country when the customs Department was understaffed. This difficulty was clearly spelt out by the Controller of Customs in 1927. He minuted, 'Customs formalities are required for the removal of goods within the territory, a most unusual position and the cause of annoyance, additional labour and expense to trade'[127].

In January 1928, Maxwell attended a conference of the East African Governors which was convened to consider the impact of the Congo treaties on the East African territories[128]. The Conference suggested two ways in which to resolve the problems arising from the Congo Basin Treaties. The first was that the Congo Basin Treaties had to be abrogated on the grounds that all signitories had not complied with the provisions of the Treaties. The second suggestion was to extend either of the customs basins to the whole country in order to avoid duty on commodities produced within the same territory. Maxwell pressed for the first of the two suggestions.

In 1930, the Colonial Office strongly rejected Maxwell's suggestion on the ground that 'a world market as free as possible of all restrictions was of paramount importance to the exports of the dependencies'[129]. This was certainly not the case for Northern Rhodesian primary producers as the Colonial Office was to recognise in 1933. Northern Rhodesia was further advised not to be pre-occupied with the Congo Treaties as they were due for review in 1935.

The free trade customs tariff between the Rhodesias on the one hand and Northern Rhodesia's limited markets on the other seriously undermined settler agriculture during a period in which high demand could have sustained and consolidated the development experienced before 1918. Although the limitation of Northern Rhodesian domestic market was recognised, the non-discriminatory customs tariffs and the principles of Imperial Preference and the Rhodes clause prevented the Northern Rhodesia Administration in the 1920s to restrict competition from Southern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesia's problems were exacerbated by the differential rating system adopted by the Rhodesia Railways between 1918 and 1922. Low railage reduced the cost of transporting Southern Rhodesian maize and beef exports to Northern Rhodesia's limited domestic market and her only external market in Katanga which was the key to settler agricultural prosperity between 1910 and 1918. Northern Rhodesia lost its advantage of position in respect to supplying the Katanga market as rate reduction narrowed the price of the commodities from Southern Rhodesia to a level where Southern Rhodesia's distant location from the markets was not a disadvantage.

Conclusion.

After the 1914-18 war, markets for maize and cattle expanded considerably both in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo. Northern Rhodesian settler farmers had dominated these markets before 1918 but this situation was reversed in the 1920s. Northern Rhodesian settlers found it difficult to sell their produce and seldomly failed to sell all that they had intended to sell. Competition from Southern Rhodesia was keen. It lowered and fluctuated prices. The middlemen worsened this situation. Therefore, settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia did not benefit from the high demand which was created by the development of the mining industry. Consumers in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo preferred cheaper commodities from Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesian exports to Northern Rhodesia and the Congo were partly cheapened by the differential rating system of the Rhodesia Railways and the free trade customs tariff. These two factors nullified the advantages which Northern Rhodesian producers should have had over Southern Rhodesian producers who were located further from the markets.

Attempts to nullify the Congo Treaties since 1927 failed. However, between 1931 and 1933, Northern Rhodesia protected its primary producers and thus weakened competition from Southern Rhodesia. I shall show how this developed in the next chapter.

FOOTNOTES

1. B. Jewsiewicki, 'Unequal Development: Capitalism and the Katanga Economy, 1919-40', R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (London. 1977) p. 334, Figure 1.

2. C. Perrings, 'Black Labour in the Copper Mines of the Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia, 1911-41: Industrial Strategies and the Revolution of an African Proletariat', (Ph.D. Thesis. University of London. 1976) p. 118.

3. B. Jewsiewicki, 'Shifting Agriculture and the Capitalist Economy' (Lubumbashi. 1975) p. 4.

4. B.F.P, Commerce Exterieur,(1925) pp. 240-344.

5. N.A.Z., Box 8, N.R. Department of Agriculture, Annual Report (1919-20) p. 4. (Hereafter, N.R. Department of Agriculture).

6. L.H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, Early Days to 1953 (London. 1964) p. 122; N.A.Z., N.R. Department of Agriculture (1921) pp. 1-2.

7. N.A.Z., BS/3/263, Railway Rates, 1918-23, E.M. Rose to L.A. Wallace, 27/3/18.

8. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 122.

9. N.A.Z., Box 162, N.R. Department of Veterinary, Annual Report, (1921) p. 3.

10. Livingstone Mail, 22/1/20, 23/1/20.

11. Livingstone Mail, 9/3/25, B.F.P., Commerce Exterieur, 1925, pp. 240-344.

12. Jewsiewicki, 'Unequal Development', p. 319-20.

13. Jewsiewicki, 'Shifting Agriculture', p. 4.

14. Jewsiewicki, 'Unequal Development', pp. 318-22.

15. B.F.P., *Bulletin des Renseignments de l'Office Colonial* 1920 p. 1.

16. Jewsiewicki, 'Shifting Agriculture', p. 7.

17. Jewsiewicki, 'Shifting Agriculture', p. 4.

18. B.F.P.,G.Van der Kerken, *Les Societies Bantoues de Congo* Belge (Bruxelles. 1920) p. 278.

19. Jewsiewicki, 'Unequal Development', p. 321.

20. N.A.Z.,RC/967, Meat Supplies to Northern Rhodesia mines, 1928-29, D.D. Irwin, General Manager, Roan Antelope Copper Mine to Chief Secretary to the Administration, 18/3/29.

21. N.A.Z.,Box 8, N.R. Department of Agriculture (1920) p. 4. B.F.P., *Rapports annuels sur l'Administration de la Colonie du Congo Belgie* (Bruxelles. 1934) p. 16.

22. N.A.Z.,Box 8, N.R. Department of Agriculture (1920) p.4.

23. *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 7/5/20; 6/9/20; 16/10/20.

24. A.W. Pim and S. Milligan, *Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia*, Col. 145 (London. 1938) p. 226.

25. S.R.,*Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Economic Position of the Agricultural Industry* (Salisbury. 1933) p. 15; R. Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* (London. 1977) p. 146.

26. Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination*, p. 146.

27. I.R. Phimister, 'Meat and Monopolies: Beef cattle in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1938' (1977) pp. 7-11.

28. M. Hailey, An African Survey: A study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara (London. 1957) 1347-8.

29. E.A. Nobbs, 'The cattle Industry', Rhodesia Journal of Agriculture (Hereafter R.J.A.) Vol. 18, 1921, p. 506; Phimister, 'Meat and Monopolies', p. 11.

30. N.A.Z. ,Shelf No. 12, N.R. Department of Customs and Excise, Annual Report (1924) p. 4.

31. S.R.,Committee of Enquiry in Respect of the Cattle Industry of Southern Rhodesia (Salisbury. 1923) p. 3.

32. General Manager, Rhodesia Railways Annual Report (Bulawayo. 1922) p. 10. (Hereafter, General Manager's Report.

33. M. Chanock, Unconsummated Union, Britain, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa (Manchester. 1977) pp. 197-8.

34. S.H. Frankel, The Railway Policy of South Africa: An Analysis of the Effects of Railway Rates, Finance and Management on the Economic Development of the Union (Johannesburg. 1928) p. 296.

35. General Manager's Reports, 1918-23.

36. E.A. Nobbs, 'The Cattle Industry', p. 507.

37. E.A. Nobbs, 'The Cattle Industry', p. 507, S.R.,Report of the Cattle Inquiry Committee, p. 4.

38. Phimister, 'Meat and Monopolies', p. 11.

39. 'Memorandum on the Cattle Industry of Southern Rhodesia', R.J.A., Vol. 18, 1921, p. 282; S.R.,Report of the Cattle Inquiry Committee, p. 4; S.R.,Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Economic Position of the Agricultural Industry (Salisbury. 1934) p. 16.

40. Phimister, 'Meat and Monopolies', pp. 11-13.

41. General Manager's Report (1922) p. 30.

42. Bulawayo Chronicle, 10/3/16; 10/6/16; 12/1/18; 5/7/18.

43. S.R., Report of the Agricultural Industry Committee, p. 16.

44. Phimister, 'Meat and Monopolies', pp. 7-15.

45. Phimister, 'Meat and Monopolies', p. 11.

46. R. Grav il, The Anglo-Argentine Connection; 1900-1938: A study of Trading Relations (Forthcoming) pp. 76-80.

47. N.A.Z., BS/3/182, Cattle, Vol. II, 1919-23, D. Chaplin, Administrator, S.R., to L.A. Wallace, Administrator, N.R., 16/6/19; N.A.Z., BS/3/453, Farmers' Association: North-Western Rhodesia, Extract from Livingstone Mail, 17/6/20.

48. N.A.Z., BS/3/115, Cattle to the Congo, 1919-23, Chaplin to Malcom, 6/5/20; Chaplin to Wallace, 16/6/19.

49. D.G. Gray to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 25/2/26; N.A.Z. BS/3/115, Cattle to the Congo, 1919-23, Mazabuka Farmers' Association Meeting, 15/8/22.

50. N.A.Z., BS/3/182, Cattle, Vol. II, 1919-23, Secretary to Administrator, S.R. to Secretary, B.S.A.C., 28/1/19; N.A.Z., BS/3/115, Cattle to the Congo, 1919-23; J. Smith, Chief Veterinary Officer to the Chief Secretary to the Administrator, 8/4/23.

51. N.A.Z., BS/3/182, Cattle, Vol. II, 1919-23, Secretary, BSAC to Secretary to Administrator, S.R. 23/3/19; N.A.Z., BS/3/115, Cattle to the Congo, 1919-23, A. Frederick, High Commissioner to Administrator, S.R., 25/10/22; G.D. Clough, Deputy Administrator, N.R., to D. Chaplin, Administrator, N.R., 12/10/22.

52. L.N.M., Fl/4/2, Appointment of D. Chaplin as Administrator of Northern Rhodesia, 3/2/21.

53. N.A.Z., Sec/1/289, Northern Rhodesia Customs Agreement, 1925, Second Schedule, Ordinance No. 12 of 1925.

54. N.A.Z., Railway Rates, 1918-21, E.M. Rose to L.A. Wallace, 27/3/18.

55. A.W. Acworth, <u>Report of Commissioner Appointed to Inquire into Railway Questions in Southern Rhodesia</u> (Bulawayo. 1918) p. 30.

56. N.A.Z., BS/3/263, Railway Rates, 1918-21, Rose to Wallace, 27/3/18.

57. N.A.Z., BS/3/263, Railway Rates, 1919-21 Rose to Wallace, 27/3/18.

58. N.A.Z., BS/3/263, Railway Rates, 1918-21, Wallace to Rose, 5/4/18.

59. N.A.Z., BS/3/263, Railway Rates, 1919-21, Wallace to Rose, 5/4/18.

60. General Manager's Report (1922) p. 10.

61. General Manager's Report (1926) p. 13.

62. General Manager's Report (1922) p. 30.

63. General Manager's Report (1923) p. 18; p. 39.

64. General Manager's Report (1924) pp. 56-7; (1927) p. 16; (1930) p. 9.

65. General Manager's Report (1921) p. 13.

66. General Manager's Report (1924) p. 27.

67. General Manager's Report (1930) p. 11.

68. S.M. Milligan, Report on the Present Position of the Agricultural Industry and the necessity, or otherwise, of Encouraging Further European Settlement in Agricultural Areas (Livingstone. 1931) pp. 6-8. (Hereafter, Milligan Report).

69. P.R.O., CO795/74, file No. 45027/1, Railway Commission, Midlands Milling Company, Gwelo to Railway Commission, 15/10/35.

70. General Manager's Report (1926) p. 13; (1927) p. 27.

71. General Manager's Report (1924) p. 27.

72. F.D. Hammond, Report on the Railway System of Southern Rhodesia Vol. II (Salisbury. 1926) p. 8.

73. Hammond Report, Vol. II, p. 48.

74. Hammond Report, Vol. II, p. 48.

75. Hammond Report, Vol. I, p. 11.

76. S.R., Railways Act, 1926; N.R. Railways Act, 1927.

77. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p. 146.

78. General Manager's Report (1925) p. 15.

79. General Manager's Report (1925) p. 15.

80. Phimister, 'Meat and Monopolies', p. 6.

81. Hammond Report, Vol. II, p. 12.

82. H. Horwitt, Report on state Ownership of the Rhodesia Railways, Dominion No. 3 (London. 1947) pp. 12-13; Hammond Report, Vol. II, p. 59.

83. Mr. Victor Machingaidze is currently doing a Master of Philosophy on Capitalist Agriculture in Zimbabwe during the B.S.A.C. period for the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

84. N. Kessel, 'The Mineral Industry and its Effects on the Development of the Zambian Economy' (Ph.D. Thesis. University of Leeds, 1971) p. 3.

85. R. Reynolds, 'The British South Africa Company Central Farms: Marandellas 1907-1910, From the Papers of H.K. Scorror', Rhodesiana, No. 10, 1965, p. 22.

86. B.S.A.C., Annual Reports of the Directors, 1915-22.

87. B.S.A.C., Particulars of the Sub-division of the Rhodesdale Ranch: Hartley, Charter and Gwelo District (Salisbury. 1924) pp. 4-7.

88. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, pp. 82-83.

89. P.R.O., CO417/611, Chief Veterinary Officer to Administrator, N.R., 27/1/21, 11/2/21, H.C. Marshall to Secretary, B.S.A.C. 14/2/21.

90. P.R.O., CO417/611, Chief Veterinary Officer, to Administrator, N.R. 27/1/21.

91. P.R.O., CO795/71, file No. 25612, Agricultural Development Among the BaTonga of Reserve II: Report by M. Trapnell, F.A. Calder, Internal Minutes, Colonial Office, 22/6/34.

92. A.J. Lane, Chief Veterinary Officer, N.R., Address to the North-Western Rhodesia Farmers' Association Meeting held at Choma, Livingstone Mail, 7/5/20.

93. N.A.Z.,Box 6, N.R. Department of Agriculture (1924) p. 9.

94. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, pp. 212-14.

95. P.R.O., CO795/56, File No. 36453, Government Purchase of Grain, J. Smith to Governor, 24/6/32.

96. N.R.,Department of Agriculture, (1929) p. 2.

97. J.M.E. Landless to A.M. Kanduza, 30/4/78; H. Ilsley to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 18/6/30; Bon Jour to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 16/2/30; Jude to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 26/3/25.

98. P.R.O., CO795/56, File No. 36453, Government Purchase of Grain, J. Smith to Governor, 24/6/32.

99. J.M. Walker to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 9/4/26.

100. S.R., Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1931, (Salisbury. 1932) p. 5.

100b J.M. Walker to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 9/4/26.

101. N.R., Department of Agriculture (1929) p. 7.

102. H. Ilsley to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 18/6/30.

103. S. Hanslett to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 9/4/30.

104. J. Bateson to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 9/7/30.

105. S. Hanslett to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 16/7/30.

106. P.R.O., CO795/56, File No. 36453, Government Purchase of Grain, J. Smith to Governor, 24/6/32.

107. Milligan Report, 18.

108. N.R. Agricultural Advisory Board, Second Report (Lusaka. 1936) 6.

109. H. Ilsley to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 18/6/30.

110. N.R., Department of Agriculture (1929) 7.

111. J.M.E. Landless to A.M. Kanduza, 30/4/78.

112. P.R.O., CO852/66, file No. 15004/1, Economic Commodities, Maize, Northern Rhodesia, Treasury Memorandum, 1936-37, 22/9/37.

113. N.R., Department of Agriculture (1932) p. 7.

114. N.A.Z., Sec/1/72, Economic and Agricultural Matters, Vol. I, 1931-38, Midlands Farmers' Association Memorandum, 1932.

115. P.R.O., CO795/72, File No. 25670, Livestock Co-operative Society of Northern Rhodesia, Record of a Meeting held in the Governor's Office, 25/1/34.

116. Jude to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 23/3/25; None for Sale to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 11/11/31, 2/12/31.

117. N.A.Z., Sec/1/72, Economic and Agricultural Matters, Vol. I. 1931-38, Secretary for Agriculture to Chief Secretary, No. 316/E6/2/JS/MN, 18/12/31.

118. J.M.E. Landless to A.M. Kanduza, 30/4/78.

119. I.R. Phimister, 'A note on Labour Relations in Southern Rhodesian Agriculture before 1939' (Unpublished, UNZA, 1975) pp. 2-7.

120. Milligan Report, p. 27.

121. N.R. Department of Veterinary, (1929) p. 13.

122. B.F.P., De Formanoir de la Cazerie, El evages Katanga - Kasai (Elizabethville. 1950) pp. 323-25.

123. P.R.O., CO852/66, File No. 15003/1, Economic Commodities, Cattle Industry, Northern Rhodesia, Veterinary Department, Annual Report, 1936.

124. N.A.Z., BS/3/115, Cattle to the Congo, 1919-23 Minutes of the Promoters of the Northern Rhodesia Livestock Owners' Association and Dalmee of the Congo Belge and Mr. J.C. Josselin de Jong, Mazabuka, 23/6/22.

125. P.R.O. CO795/72, File No. 25670, Livestock Co-operative Society of Northern Rhodesia, Record of a Meeting held in the Governor's Office, 25/1/34.

126. N.A.Z., Sec/1/289, Customs Treaties and Agreements Congo Basin Treaty: Revision of St. Germain-En-Laye Convention (1927-37), J.C. Maxwell to L.S. Amery, 17/9/27.

127. P.R.O., CO795/21, File No. 21080, Congo Basin Customs Formalities, H.C. Parking to the Controller-General, 30/7/27.

128. N.A.Z., Sec/1/290, Congo Basin Rates of Duty, 1936-37, East African Governor's Conference on the Congo Basin Treaties, A.C.S. (A), No. CU/B/3/1(B), 1928.

129. N.A.Z., Sec/1/289, Convention Revising the General Act of Berlin, 1927-37, Passifield to Maxwell, 4/12/30.

CHAPTER THREE

SETTLER FARMING, 1931-1939

Introduction

In the last chapter we have seen how railage reduction and the free trade customs tariff contributed to the failure of settler farming in Northern Rhodesia. The Northern Rhodesia Government attempted to protect settler agriculture but failed essentially because of objection from the colonial office.

Between 1931 and 1933 the Colonial Office changed its position and supported Northern Rhodesia to alter the Zambezi basin customs tariff in order to protect primary producers[1]. Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and the High Commissioner in Pretoria strongly opposed protection of primary producers in Northern Rhodesia[2]. However, the Colonial Office persisted. As a result, Northern Rhodesia concluded a Gentleman's Agreement in December, 1932 with Bechuanaland and Southern Rhodesia. The agreement restricted imports, fixed prices of imports and local produce, and gave priority to local produce in the local market.

In this chapter, I shall examine the impact of these measures on the performance of settler agriculture between 1931 and 1939.

Northern Rhodesia and the Colonial Office

Settler farmers had called for protection since the mid-1920s but the Administration ignored these calls. The Administration wanted cheap food for the mining industry in order to help the industry to reduce the cost of production[3]. However, between 1931 and 1932 the Administration agreed to protect primary producers. This was because the outbreak of the foot and mouth disease in Southern Rhodesia in 1931 and the decline of the market in the wake of the depression confirmed that local producers could not rely on the domestic market to improve their food supplies. Although maize imports from Southern Rhodesia were banned following the outbreak of cattle disease there, there was a surplus in 1931 amounting to 79,000 bags carried over from 1930. There had been over-importation in 1930 when the Rhodesia Railways introduced the flat rate from Southern Rhodesia to the Congo[4]. The flat rate reduced the price and induced consumers to increase imports. The situation facing the cattle industry was as bad as for maize. There were 10,000 head of slaughter cattle in 1931 which had been imported by private dealers. The consumption had fallen to 8,000 head, from 26,000 between 1928 and 1930[5]. Thus,it was difficult for the settlers to sell maize and cattle as imported maize and cattle had imposed severe competition at a time the market had contracted.

The Northern Rhodesia Administration was also compelled to protect primary producers by the publication of two reports in 1931 and 1932. These reports confirmed the plight of settler farmers and advised the Administration to protect primary producers. In 1931, the Milligan Report categorically noted that settler producers in Northern Rhodesia could not hold their own under a free trade customs tariff[6]. Milligan had been asked to enquire into the position of settler agriculture and to consider the proposition of encouraging further European immigration into Northern Rhodesia. He disapproved of further immigration as the existing farmers were adequate to provide for the local market if they were protected and properly organised. With specific reference to the cattle industry, he informed the Administration that the industry had been built up by veterinary protection. He further noted that the cattle industry could not withstand the 'cold and blast of free imports' of beef cattle when the veterinary embargo on imports from Southern Rhodesia was lifted. The Finance Commission of 1932 endorsed Milligan's views[7]. In the face of the evidence from these commissions, which supplemented the calls for protection made by farmers, the Government had little option but to protect primary producers.

After protection had been adopted in 1931 and 1932, the Taxation Committee in 1934 echoed the views of Milligan and Dutton[8]. The Committee noted that it was reasonable for other parties to Northern Rhodesia's customs agreements to regulate their exports of maize and cattle to Northern Rhodesia so as to allow the first claim to the home market to local producers who proved themselves capable of meeting the demand on terms favourable to the consumer. Protection helped the Northern Rhodesia Government to retain within the country money which had been previously spent on imported food. Such money was vital in financing settler agriculture.

Financial consideration influenced the Colonial Office to support protection of primary producers in Northern Rhodesia. Since the 1920s the Imperial Treasury had directed Colonial Administrations to observe strict financial control and generate their own finance for development. Northern Rhodesia complied with this directive[9]. In the field of agriculture this meant lowering the cost of producing food, replacing imported food which could be produced locally and improving co-operation among the farmers and their marketing system. The measures to protect settler producers which were introduced in 1931 and 1932 helped to curb the outflow of finance. The impact of these measures was immediately demonstrated. For example, expenditure on imported maize from South Africa fell from £6,000 in 1931 to £600 in 1932 and £100 in 1933. The bill of imported maize meal from South Africa fell from £3,000 in 1931 to £200 in 1932 and nil in 1933. Expenditure on maize and maize meal from Southern Rhodesia fell from £20,000 in 1931 to £6,800 in 1932[10]. Table XIII suggests the same trend in the case of cattle and beef.

Protection contributed to this financial saving although there were other contributory factors such as the economic depression of 1929-33, foot and mouth disease in Southern Rhodesia and the small labour force between 1931 and 1933. These savings contributed to the Administration's expenditure on weight-bridges which were erected at Choma, Mazabuka, Lusaka and Kitwe; cattle dips and loans to farmers between 1933 and 1939[11]. The restrictions of food imports also lessened the detrimental effects of low railage on Southern Rhodesian exports to Northern Rhodesia. Imports were only allowed when local produce failed to meet local demand, a situation which occurred after 1937.

Internally, measures were also taken to reinforce those that had been taken to reduce the adverse impact of imports on settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia. Maxwell and his immediate successors, Ronald Storrs (1932-34) and Hubert Young (1934-38), simultaneously encouraged internal co-operation among maize and cattle producers, contractors, traders and the mining companies and limited exports of maize and cattle to Northern Rhodesia.

Internal organisation was carried out in two phases, 1931-33 and 1935-37[12]. During the first period , the mining companies were persuaded in 1931 to sign a three-year contract with the North-Western Rhodesia Farmers' Co-operative Society (NWRFCS) for the supply of maize and maize meal. The price was fixed at 9s. 6d per bag based on Milligan's calculation of the cost of producing an average of eight bags to an acre[13]. This implied that the Government did not intend to encourage high cost production. Farmers whose average yield per acre was below eight bags had to improve their farming methods and reduce the cost of production. In April 1932, the Government promoted the formation of the Livestock Co-operative Society of Northern Rhodesia (LCSNR). The Administration encouraged the mining companies and meat contractors for the mining areas to purchase at least 50 per cent of their beef requirements from the Society. The prices were fixed at 8s. 0d per 100 lbs for compounds , 12s. 6d per 100 lbs for mediums and 15s. 0d per 100 lbs for primes. The Government guaranteed the Society for £5,000 without interest[14]. It was thus instructive that the external competition had to be staved off lest the venture became a financial drain.

During the second phase, 1935-37, the Northern Rhodesia Government enacted the Maize Control Ordinance in 1935, to operate from April, 1936. In 1937, Cattle Marketing Board was established[15]. The law establishing Maize Control and the Cattle Marketing Board gave the NWRFCS and the LCSNR the monopoly of buying from local producers and selling to consumers in Northern Rhodesia. These organisations were also empowered to be the sole importers and exporters of maize and cattle. Maize Control was also intended to protect settler agriculture from African competition. Under the Ordinance, settlers were given 75 per cent of the local market and 25 per cent was left to Africans. The Northern Rhodesia Administration hoped to eliminate poor organisation, improve the marketing system of settler agricultural commodities and contain external competition. As a result of these measures, Northern Rhodesia largely relied on domestic maize and beef production between 1931 and 1939.

Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and the Colonial Office

Northern Rhodesia succeeded in erecting a protective tariff in 1932 partly because Southern Rhodesia was unable to confront South Africa without the support of Northern Rhodesia. In 1931 the Northern Rhodesia Treasury appointed a commission to review the customs agreements with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in order to advise the administration on a common action the Rhodesias could take against South Africa[16]. Northern Rhodesia was influenced by Southern Rhodesia to take this action. However, this appeared to be a mere gesture of willingness to co-operate on mutually contracted arrangements. I base this view on a minute to the Chief Secretary from the Director of Animal Health in Northern Rhodesia which noted that:-

> 'we have no interest in the Union markets for cattle for slaughter neither have we any interest in reduced rates for conveyance to Durban'[17]

This confirmed Maxwell's and colonial office's view that Northern Rhodesia should manage her affairs independently of Southern Rhodesia. This worried Southern Rhodesia whose minister of lands and Agriculture pleaded with Northern Rhodesia not to take any action which might adversely affect Southern Rhodesia's exports north of the Zambezi[18]. He further explained that the problems which faced Northern Rhodesia as a result of competition from Southern Rhodesia was partly because of competition from and restrictions in South Africa against Southern Rhodesia.

In 1933 the plea was repeated at a private meeting between Maxwell and Moffat. J.H. Smith who was in Moffat's delegation told the meeting that Southern Rhodesia wanted to know whether 'Northern Rhodesia would go as far as to join with Southern Rhodesia if we broke with the Union or at all events to see how far we could rely on Northern Rhodesia's support with regard to our retaining the portion of the Territory's trade that our merchants enjoyed'[19]. The customs agreements between the Rhodesieas 'were more favourable to Southern Rhodesia than to Northern Rhodesia in the matter of exchange of agricultural produce'[20]. Therefore, Southern Rhodesia had to make certain concessions to Northern Rhodesia in order to retain a market for cattle and maize in Northern Rhodesia and the customs agreements offered no logical evidence on which Northern Rhodesia would support Southern Rhodesia against South Africa.

Southern Rhodesia reached a critical and highly vulnerable position in April 1931 following the outbreak of foot and mouth disease and the prohibition by neighbouring countries of all maize and cattle imports from Southern Rhodesia. It therefore accepted that it was politic to assist Northern Rhodesia at that time in the hope of counting on Northern Rhodesia's markets and support against South Africa at a later date. Southern Rhodesia cautiously and conditionally supported Northern Rhodesia's protective measures by stating that she was prepared to 'make almost any arrangement so long as a duty was not imposed'[21]. The weak and limited protection of primary producers which Southern Rhodesia sought emphasized the extent to which Southern Rhodesia dominated the relations between the two Rhodesias. It is in the light of this that Northern Rhodesia only secured a Gentleman's Agreement, an agreement which lacked the force of law. While the embargo on Southern Rhodesia's agricultural exports remained in force, Bechuanaland supplied the extra cattle needed by Northern Rhodesia which local producers could not supply. This privilege was withdrawn and granted to Southern Rhodesia for the same period Bechuanaland had enjoyed it. The agreement was due for review after two years but was extended indefinitely in 1935[22].

Northern Rhodesia was subordinate to Southern Rhodesia in concluding the Zambezi basin customs agreements. This was evident in all customs agreements concluded before 1931 which affected the Zambezi Basin Tariff. Despite Governor Maxwell's instruction to his delegation for the 1930 Cape Town customs Conference that 'Our agreement should be made separately with the Union even if the Southern Rhodesian terms are identical'[23], Northern Rhodesia was 'dragged along by Southern Rhodesia'[24] to continue with the discriminatory tariff against South Africa which had been adopted in 1925[25]. Southern Rhodesia wanted revenge against South Africa and sought the support of Northern

Rhodesia because South Africa had adopted a protective tariff and had violated the principles of Imperial Preference and the Rhodes Clause by granting 'most favoured nation' status to Germany. Southern Rhodesia insisted on Northern Rhodesia's support because she wanted all territories outside the customs union to unite against South Africa so as 'to maintain Empire solidarity and to redress the foreign inclinations which seem to inspire union policy'[26]. Southern Rhodesia's insistence on getting support from Northern Rhodesia undermined the former's position to oppose the latter's attempts to frame its own tariff and to protect primary producers since 1930.

The Colonial Office further undermined Southern Rhodesia's opposition to protection in Northern Rhodesia by supporting Northern Rhodesia. Some Colonial Office officials who were sympathetic to Northern Rhodesia strongly condemned Southern Rhodesia's dictatorial attitude towards Northern Rhodesia. Green minuted: 'It would seem that Mr. Moffat (Premier of Southern Rhodesia in 1930) has hardly yet realised that Northern Rhodesia cannot be allowed to be treated as an apponage of Southern Rhodesia'[27]. This view was endorsed by E.G. Matching in the same minute who argued that Northern Rhodesia's interests should not be sacrificed as they were different from those of Southern Rhodesia and strongly urged Northern Rhodesia to strongly resist the 'domineering' influence of the Southern Rhodesia Administration. This view was in line with the Devonshire Declaration of 1923 and the Passfield Memorandum of 1930 which stated that Northern Rhodesia would develop as an African country[28]. The Colonial Office also felt that Southern Rhodesia's attitude towards Northern Rhodesia paved the way for self-government in Northern Rhodesia and the subsequent reduction of Imperial Control over Northern Rhodesia's resources.

Northern Rhodesia's adoption of a protective tariff in 1932 which discriminated against other British Colonies was an anomaly at a time Britain and the Empire committed themselves to increased intra-empire trade. The Ottawa Conference in 1932 encouraged 'increased and substantial right of entry into each others' home markets within the empire and severe restrictions on non-empire produce [29]. In a large measure, this policy was a culmination of the growing demand in Britain for Empire protection since the end of the 1914-19 war. Economic crisis and unemployment in the 1920s forced Britain to accept the principles that 'preference at Home' and 'Protection in the Empire markets' could effectively stimulate her economy[30]. The British Empire strongly supported increased and preferential intra-Empire trade and reducing competition from outside.

It was therefore anomalous that Northern Rhodesia was allowed to protect her primary producers through discrimination against other Empire producers. This view was recognised by some officials at the Colonial Office who did not support the protection of primary producers in Northern Rhodesia. Edward Harding, noted in 1933 that 'this view, I gather is based on the theory that any community has an absolute right to protect local markets, even under the same flag - a theory which is by no means universally accepted'[31]. Although Harding did not advocate protection in Northern Rhodesia, the Colonial Office recognised that 'Northern Rhodesia is open to very grave dangers of being swamped by imports from Southern Rhodesia and other territories, and it is very desirable that she should be in a position, if necessary, to protect itself within reasonable limits. Free entry as between two adjoining territories based on a different system of economy may create grave difficulties'[32]. As the Imperial Government wanted to continue administering Northern Rhodesia it was necessary to thwart any regional forces which weakened Northern Rhodesia's economic development. In this context, Protection of primary producers in Northern Rhodesia was not anomalous.

South Africa, Northern Rhodesia and the High Commissioner

South Africa did not raise any strong objection to Northern Rhodesia's proposals for protection as her interest in Northern Rhodesia's markets was limited (See Tables XII and XIII). Similarly, Northern Rhodesia did not endanger her exports to South Africa. However, South Africa strongly rejected the exclusion of the Bechuanaland cattle and beef from the Northern Rhodesian market which had proved dependable since 1918[33]. South Africa feared that she would be obliged to increase her cattle imports from Bechuanaland in accordance with the Customs Union agreements, a decision which would relax the Quota system which she had introduced in 1926 for the HCTS. Further more, South Africa did not feel inclined to help Bechuanaland whose incorporation into the Union was resisted by Britain. South Africa suggested two ways of solving Northern Rhodesia's problems. The first was the introduction of an anti-dumping clause where the duty would not exceed 50 per cent of the price of the commodity dumped in Northern Rhodesia. The second was the imposition of a higher duty on these commodities when they received an export subsidy in the country of origin.

Northern Rhodesia rejected the first proposal on three grounds[34]. Firstly, dumping was difficult to define particularly where state support to primary producers differed such as in Northern Rhodesia, South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. Secondly, the definition that dumping was selling commodities below the cost of production in the country of origin or when a foreign competitor obtains a subsidy was dangerous to Northern Rhodesia where the cost of production was higher than either in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia.

It was also feared that the cost of production was open to falsification where and when the marketable surplus exceeded effective demand. Thirdly, an anti-dumping clause was not sufficiently protective to Northern Rhodesia with only her domestic and possibly the Congolese markets for her cattle and maize. The Second proposal was rejected because it discriminated against Southern Rhodesia which gave an export bounty on maize and cattle and with which Northern Rhodesia had concluded a non-discriminating customs agreement.

The High Commissioner in Pretoria, Sir H.J. Stanley, supported South Africa's proposal[35]. Through Confidential contacts with some Colonial Office and South African Officials, Stanley lobbied for the support of his view in 1933 and 1934. A. Cooke and J.A. Calder at the Colonial Office supported Stanley[36]. They also suggested that Northern Rhodesia should introduce a Quota system for her neighbours and impose a higher duty on imports above the Quotas as South Africa had done in respect of cattle imports from the HCTS. They feared that South Africa would adopt protection against the HCTS. However, Northern Rhodesia's Governors throughout the 1930s disagreed with Stanley and strongly pressed their view. In 1934 Sir Hubert Young critically informed the Colonial Office that 'if this difficulty in fact exists, the question will arise as to what extent it is considered desirable that the interests of Northern Rhodesia should be subordinated to those of Imperial policy in respect of the relations between the Union and the High Commission Territories'[37]. Stanley and some officials at the Colonial Office pressed for a free entry of Bechuanaland cattle inte Northern Rhodesia so as to 'divert the Union from taking recourse to economic and veterinary pressures'[38] against the HCTS as a penalty for Britain's refusal to have them incorporated into South Africa. The Hertzog Government had made it clear to the British Government that South Africa would increase cattle imports from the HCTS only as a condition for their incorporation.

However, Northern Rhodesia was not without support at the Colonial Office. Cohen and Clauson made a strong case for Northern Rhodesia and their view prevailed. Cohen noted 'I think that Northern Rhodesia must press for a continuance of this arrangement without any relaxation as Sir H. Stanley would appear to suggest. If there is a largely increased demand for meat owing to the mining development, the arrangement will allow Bechuanaland to have its share'[39]. Clauson expressed surprise that while there was no free exchange of tobacco which was Northern Rhodesia's main and only agricultural export, other parties did not want Northern Rhodesia to protect her primary producers. Clauson and Cohen strongly argued that free exchange was anomalous and endorsed Northern Rhodesia's proposals for protection. Through the support of the Colonial Office, Northern Rhodesia overcome opposition from

Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and the High Commissioner.

Northern Rhodesia's protective tariff coincided with the Rhodesia Railways changing and hardening attitude towards Southern Rhodesia between 1933 and 1935. This was caused by its sale of most of the BSAC farms and mineral rights in Southern Rhodesia. The depression also hit the Railway companies badly as the working capital was reduced from £3,535,708 in 1931 to £2,255,369 in 1932[40]. Henry Birchenough, Director of railways in 1933, called for a conference which had to be held outside Southern Rhodesia to amend the 1926 Railways Act. He wanted Northern Rhodesia's views to be freely expressed at a neutral venue. He minuted the Colonial Office in 1933 that:-

> As a previous letter of mine told you, I am very anxious that Northern Rhodesia should make its full weight felt in connection with amendments to the Railways Act, 1926. It is to Northern Rhodesia that the railways must look for the future increase of their traffic and for their return to prosperity, and for that reason the needs and wishes of Northern Rhodesia should be powerfully represented at the proposed Railway Conference next year. At the Conference in London which preceded the passage of the 1926 Act, the predominant role was played by Southern Rhodesia and the influence of Northern

Rhodesia was hardly felt[41].

Birchenough stressed the subordinate position of Northern Rhodesia in the period before 1933 and underlines my argument that railage policy between 1918 and 1931 worked against the farming industry in Northern Rhodesia.

The amendment was made in 1935[42]. It increased and guaranteed the Railways' sources of revenue and curbed preferential rate reduction. A rate Stabilization Account was instituted whose maximum amount was £500,000. Rate reducation was to be made if the Reserve Account was not less than two and half times the amount of the annual debenture service. This was to be built and maintained out of service charges, including 10 per cent of the surplus after a minimum of £150,000 had been earned for the Reserve Account. No rate reduction was allowed for the purpose of absorbing the surplus if the Reserve Account was less than two and half times the debenture service.

In 1935 and 1937 Northern Rhodesia was able for the first time to take independent initiative in appointing the Chairman of the Railways Commission. However, 'secret and personal' manoeuvres between the Governor of the Bank of England, the High Commissioner in Pretoria, Edward Harding at the Colonial Office and Huggins, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia in 1937 led Northern Rhodesia into suggesting Lord Trenchard, whom they had discussed and agreed upon, for the job[43]. However, the

BSAC's weak position in Southern Rhodesia and the Colonial Office's support of the measures adopted by the Northern Rhodesia Administration in the 1930s helped to reduce external obstacles in the development of the farming industry. However, tariff protection remained the main guarantee of settler prosperity in Northern Rhodesia and gave local produce the first claim to the local markets, fixed prices of imported maize and cattle at higher levels than local produce and it was mandatory that all importation was to be done through marketing organisations which handled local settler produce.

Results of Protection

The measures adopted between 1931 and 1937 to protect primary producers and to improve the internal marketing system were more successful in the case of maize farming than in ranching. Between 1932 and 1937 Northern Rhodesia was virtually self-supporting in maize production because only 2,000 bags of maize and maize meal were imported in 1935 (See Table XII). In 1933, 70,000 bags or 30 per cent of total production was exported and 55 per cent of production was exported in 1936. In 1937 marketed maize reached an all time record of about 321,000 bags as against the consumption of about 250,000 bags[44]. In recognition of this success, it was decided to limit the acreage devoted to maize production after 1937 to about 37,000 acres, a reduction from an average of 44,000 acres in the period 1926-31[45]. The government took this decision in order to relate food production to domestic demand and thus avoided the difficulties of exporting low priced commodities to overseas markets. The farmers were encouraged to diversify into cash crops for export. It was also hoped that this action would facilitate price stabilization by limiting production.

The small amounts of imported maize and maize meal shown in Table XII between 1935 and 1937 indicate the relative success of agriculture which the Administration saw as the main source of food. The settlers had guaranteed markets through the Co-operative Society and the Maize Control Ordinance. Prices rose steadily. The price system was based on the production cost and yield of large scale farmers. This was a severe constraint to small scale farmers who formed the majority of the settler farmers. Small scale farmers ought to have sold their maize at prices ranging from 10s. 9d to 14s. 0d. Settler production as a whole declined between 1937 and 1939 largely as a result of bad weather and fell short of demand. The rains either started late or ended abruptly and usually not well distributed in the settler farming areas[46].

TABLE XII

NORTHERN RHODESIA: IMPORTS OF

	MAIZE (200LB BAGS) FROM		MAIZE MEAL (200LB BAGS) FROM	
	SOUTHERN RHODESIA	SOUTH AFRICA	SOUTHERN RHODESIA	SOUTH AFRICA
1935	19	Nil	1,637	1
1936	27	85	2,105	1
1937	28	14	31	80
1938	10,118	77,470	247	95
1939	5,094	3	819	11

Sources: 1. Northern Rhodesia, Blue Books, 1935-39.

2. N.R., Department of Customs, 1935-39.

The restriction on the importation of beef since 1933 slightly improved the performance of the ranching industry. The demand rose rapidly between 1934 and 1939 and was largely met from local sources (See Table XIII). Up to 1937 the Administration resisted calls for lifting the ban on the importation of beef cattle. Supplies from within Northern Rhodesia rose steadily from 11,714 in 1934 to 16,222 in 1936, 19,020 in 1937 and 22,364 in 1939[47]. Livingstone which never received more than fifty herd from local ranchers out of about three thousand cattle consumed annually between 1921 and 1931 received about 38 per cent of its consumption in 1933 from Northern Rhodesia and by 1939 imports for Livingstone alone had fallen to fifty herd of cattle[48].

Increased local sales had a salutary effect on ranching, co-operation among the settler farmers and the marketing system. The settlers started to improve their ranching. The membership of the Livestock Society rose from 48 per cent in 1932 to 60 per cent in 1934 and an increasing number of settlers sold their cattle through the Society and the cattle marketing Board[49]. Increases from the local sources can be explained by restricted imports, the indefinite extension of the Gentleman's Agreement and the stabilization of prices. Prices for mining contracts were stabilized at 15s. 0d for primes, 12s. 6d for mediums and 8s. 0d for compounds per 100lbs. in each case. There were signs of recovery and progress in contrast to the period 1922-31 when sales and prices were uncertain.

However, the measures for protection and reorganisation adopted between 1932 and 1937 were not without weaknesses. Largely owing to a combination of these weaknesses, the growing demand for beef due to the expansion of the mining industry after the depression, Northern Rhodesia began to import beef and slaughter cattle more regularly and in increasing amounts after 1937 (See Table XIII).

TABLE XIII

NORTHERN RHODESIA: IMPORTS OF

	CATTLE (NO. OF) FROM		FRESH BEEF (LBS) FROM	
	SOUTHERN RHODESIA	BECHUANALAND	SOUTHERN RHODESIA	SOUTH AFRICA
1932	Nil	6,391	Nil	915,309
1933	Nil	Nil	Nil	7,644
1934	Nil	1,800	3,984	Nil
1935	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1936	Nil	Nil	1,215	Nil
1937	936	4,357	161,380	42,042
1938	822	2,657	935,253	Nil
1939	Nil	4,357	523,583	484
1940	Nil	6,830	1,037,646	11,168
1941	Nil	8,518	1,822,272	1,911
1942	Nil	10,377	4,247,820	4,791

Sources:
1. P.R.O., CO795/18, Northern Rhodesia Administrative Report, 1939.
2. P.R.O., CO795/20, Northern Rhodesia Administrative Reports, 1939-45.
3. Northern Rhodesia Blue Books, 1932-42.
4. N.R. Department of Customs and Excise, Annual Reports, 1932-42.

In 1937 4,357 herd of cattle were imported from Bechuanaland, 936 from Southern Rhodesia and chilled and frozen beef amounting to 161,380 lbs or the equivalent of 323 herd of cattle and 42,042 lbs of chilled and frozen beef from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa respectively[50] (See Table XIII). Importation increased with the increase in the mining labour force notably after 1937. Although the prices were stabilized and local ranchers had first claim to the domestic market the increased production of cheap chilled and frozen beef in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa made Northern Rhodesian ranchers vulnerable in competing in their domestic market. The Administration did not set up factories to produce chilled and frozen beef from the majority of the cattle owned by most settlers which were of the same class as the chilled and frozen beef which Northern Rhodesia imported.

The contracts signed between the mining industry, which was the main beef market, and the Livestock Society for at least 50 per cent of the beef cattle required was a serious limitation. The mines were not legally or practically bound to buy all that the local ranchers offered while they had the alternative of buying low priced frozen beef outside the country. The mines insisted on receiving only 50 per cent of their beef requirements from local sources because they had other sources which they did not want 'unconditionally eliminated'[51]. The marketing of cattle, and thus the main supplies to the mines through the Livestock Society, was also weakened by the Government's failure to eliminate the middlemen. The middleman belonged to the Society and the Cattle Marketing and Control Board and continued to run butcheries and direct supplies to the mines. It seems the Government did not bother about middlemen as it saw agriculture essential for the mining industry which was its main source of revenue. Its role was essentially one of ensuring cheap supplies irrespective of the kind of impact such a policy had on the farming community.

The Government did not intend to eliminate the middlemen as it categorically stated in 1934 that such action 'ran the risk of committing a grave injustice towards certain men who had come to the assistance of this country at a time when this country required assistance'[52]. At best the Administration exculpated itself and was quick to put the blame on the settler ranchers. In 1937 Governor Hubert Young said very much what Maxwell and Storrs would have said between 1927 and 1934. He wrote to the Colonial Office that 'the real weakness of the Livestock Society is the absence of an outstanding personality who is capable of assuming the direction of affairs and the presence of individuals of divergent views and to some extent, divergent interests'[53]. Given the role of the middlemen and importation of cheap beef inspite of internal protection, it can be argued that Young demanded more than the Society's resources permitted. The Administration could easily have been the 'outstanding personality' as the Government of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa had become but the Northern Rhodesia Government decided on protecting primary Producers while lacking the resources of those who competed for the Northern Rhodesia beef market.

The Administration did not want to eliminate middlemen in 1934 inspite of the fact that middlemen countinued to weaken the measures aimed at stabilizing prices and strengthening the marketing system. In 1934 Harry Susman successfully sought the Administration's approval to import 1,800 herd of cattle from Bechuanaland for the Livingstone Market. He had bought the cattle before the Gentleman's Agreement and embargo. The Chief Secretary to the Administration explained to farmers that Susman was allowed 'not because there were not cattle in Northern Rhodesia suitable for the purpose but as an act of bare justice to men who did assist at a time when a shortage was feared'[54]. Throughout the 1920s the Northern Rhodesia Government imported beef and slaughter cattle partly because it feared a shortage but without seriously establishing the extent to which local farmers could meet local demand. The traders gained from the lack of co-operation among the farmers and a proper marketing system, which they partly caused, and which in turn weakened Northern Rhodesia in facing competition from Southern Rhodesia. Yet, the Government continued to countenance and turn a blind eye to a group of businessmen who weakened efforts to strengthen and improve settler agriculture and the marketing system. The settler farming community remained uncertain as to whether the Administration seriously meant to assist while allowing speculators who continued to undermine the marketing organisations by avoiding a levy which was one source of income.

Conclusion:

In this chapter I have demonstrated that between 1931 and 1939, the Northern Rhodesia Administration created conditions to improve settler agriculture. The Administration protected primary producers by controlling and limiting importation of maize, maize meal, beef cattle and beef. Local produce was allowed first claim to local markets. Prices were stabilized and the marketing system of settler agricultural commodities was re-organised. Although these measures were not effectively implemented, settler agriculture had a new lease of life because importation was controlled and restricted. Thus, the detrimental effects of the free trade tariff and railway rates experienced between 1918 and 1931 were weakened.

FOOTNOTES

1. P.R.O., CO795/37, File No. 35522, Customs Agreement, 1930, Matching, Internal Minutes, Colonial Office, 20/3/30; P.R.O., CO795/62, File No. 5569, Customs Agreements, 1933, Matching, Cooke, Green, Internal Minutes, Colonial Office, 9-10/3/33.

2. P.R.O., CO795/62, File No. 5569, Customs Agreements, 1933, Evans to Thomas, 7/11/33. Cooke and Matching, Internal Minutes, Colonial Office, 9/3/33, Harding, Internal Minutes, Colonial Office, 5/1/34.

3. Jude to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 26/3/25; J.M. Walker to Editor, Livingstone Mail, 9/4/26; P.R.O., CO795/38, File No. 35564, European Agricultural Settlement, Maxwell to Passfield, 23/3/30.

4. S.M. Milligan, Report on the Present Position of the Agricultural Industry and the Necessity, or otherwise, of Encouraging Further European Settlement in Agricultural Areas (Livingstone. 1931) pp.5-6. (Hereafter Milligan Report).

5. P.R.O., CO795/72, File No. 25670, Livestock Co-operative Society, 1934, Kennedy to Marston, 31/1/34.

6. Milligan Report, p. 28; See also P.R.O., CO795/10, Northern Rhodesia Report of the Proceedings of the Seventh Session of the Third Council, 10/2/32.

7. E.A.T. Dutton, Report of the Finance Commission (Livingstone. 1932) pp. 21-22.

8. P.R.O., CO795/70, File No. 25587, Customs Agreements, 1934, Extract from Report of the Taxation Committee, p. 8.

9. M.Y. Jones, 'The Politics of White Agrarian Settlement in Northern Rhodesia' (M.A. Thesis. University of Sussex. 1974) pp. 79-80.

10. P.R.O., CO795/70, File No. 25587, Customs Agreements, 1934, A.B. Cohen, Internal Minutes, Colonial Office, 30/4/34; P.R.O., CO795/13, Northern Rhodesia Customs Department, Annual Report, 1934.

11. N.R., Department of Agriculture, Annual Reports, 1936-39 (Hereafter, N.R., Department of Agriculture).

12. N.R., Department of Agriculture (1931) p. 6; (1933) p. 6; P.R.O., CO795/72, File No. 25670, Livestock Co-operative Society, 1934, Chairman's Report to the Third Annual General Meeting of the Livestock Co-operative Society of Northern Rhodesia, held at Mazabuka, 31/7/34; P.R.O., CO795/49, File No. 36268, Livestock Co-operative Society, 1932; P.R.O. CO852/66, File No. 15004/1, Economic Commodities, Maize, Northern Rhodesia, Treasury Memorandum, Maize Control, 1936/37, 22/9/37.

13. P.R.O., CO795/56, File No. 36453, Government Purchase of Grain, 1932, J. Smith to Governor, 24/6/32.

14. P.R.O., CO795/72, File No. 25670, Livestock Co-operative Society, 1934, Chairman's Report to the Third Annual General Meeting of the Livestock Co-operative Society of Northern Rhodesia, held at Mazabuka, 31/7/34; P.R.O., CO795/49, File No. 36268, Livestock Co-operative Society, 1932, F.B. Rowan, Internal Minutes, Colonial Office, 7/6/32.

15. P.R.O., CO795/66, File No. 15004/1, Economic Commodities, Maize, Northern Rhodesia, Treasury Memorandum, Maize Control, 1936-37, 22/9/37; Northern Rhodesia Ordinance No. 6 of 1937 to Amend Maize Control

Ordinance, 1935; Maize Control, Extract from Pim and Milligan Report, paragraphs 425-429; File No. 15003/1, Economic Commodities, Cattle Industry, Northern Rhodesia; Northern Rhodesia Ordinance No. 13 of 1937, Cattle Marketing and Control Ordinance.

16. N.A.Z., Sec/1/294, Memorandum re Customs Agreements with South Africa, 1933-47, Report of the Commission Appointed by Treasury Minute T. 24726, 26/4/31.

17. N.A.Z., Sec/1/294, Memorandum re Customs Agreements with South Africa, 1933-47, Director of Animal Health to Chief Secretary, N.R. 28/2/32.

18. N.A.Z., Sec/1/72, Economic Agricultural Matters, 1931-38, Minister of Lands and Agriculture, S.R. to Director of Animal Health, N.R., 14/12/31.

19. P.R.O., CO795/62, File No. 5569, Customs Agreements, Note of A meeting with Representatives of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, Held in the Office of the Governor, Northern Rhodesia, 8/12/33.

20. S.R., Ottawa Conference, Report of the Committee Appointed to investigate and Report to the Government on certain Matters Relating to the Natural Resources and Industries of Southern Rhodesia, their Relation to Empire and World Trade (Salisbury. 1932).

21. P.R.O., CO795/56, File No. 36453, Government Purchase of Grain, 1932, J. Smith to Governor, 24/6/32.

22. N.A.Z., Sec/1/316, Memorandum of meetings between the H.E. and Chisamba Farmers, Dumping of Agricultural produce, 1931-48, Controller of Customs to Chief Secretary, No. 336/37/257, 1/3/37.

23. P.R.O., CO795/37, File No. 35522, Customs Agreements, 1930, Maxwell to Passfield, 13/1/30.

24. N.A.Z., Sec/1/284, Minutes of Southern Rhodesia Conference on Revision of Customs Tariff, 1930, Conversation between Chief Secretary and Controller of Customs, N.R. 19/7/30.

25. P.R.O., CO795/37, File No. 35522, Customs Agreements, 1930, Maxwell to Passfield, 18/2/30, 2/4/30; Government Notice No. 30 of 1930; Customs and Excise Ordinance, 1925.

26. M. Chanock, Unconsummated Union, Britain, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa (Manchester. 1977) p. 195.

27. P.R.O., CO795/37, File No. 35522, Customs Agreements, 1930, Green, Internal Minutes, Colonial Office, 20/3/30.

28. Chanock, Unconsummated Union, pp. 179-80.

29. K.W. Hancock, A Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. II, Part I (London. 1942) p.199.

30. E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic change, 1919-1939 (London. 1974) pp.117-30; Hancock, A Survey, pp. 199-203.

31. P.R.O., CO795/62, File No. 5569, Customs Agreements, 1933, Harding, Internal Minutes, Colonial Office, 5/1/34.

32. P.R.O., CO795/62, File No. 5569, Customs Agreements, 1933, Harding, Internal Minutes, Colonial Office, 29/6/33.

33. P.R.O., CO795/70, File No. 25587, Customs Agreements, 1934, Stanley to Thomas, 3/10/34, Stanley to

Harding, 4/6/34.

34. N.A.Z., Sec/1/329, Customs Treaties and Agreements between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa, 1932, Director of Animal Health to Chief Secretary, 19/4/33.

35. P.R.O., CO795/70, File No. 25587, Customs Agreements, 1934, Stanley to Thomas, 7/4/34.

36. P.R.O., CO795/70, File No. 25587, Customs Agreements, 1934, Cooke and Calder, Internal Minutes, Colonial Office, 1/5/34.

37. P.R.O., CO795/70, File No. 25587, Customs Agreements, 1934, Young to Cunliffe-Lister, 17/4/34.

38. R. Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, (London. 1972) p. 131.

39. P.R.O., CO795/70, File No. 25587, Customs Agreements, 1934, Cohen and Clauson, International Minutes, Colonial Office, 30/4/34; 1/5/34.

40. P.R.O., CO795/74, File No. 5578/1, Rhodesia Railways Commission, 1935, Baird to Shareholders, 1/2/33.

41. P.R.O., CO795/62, File No. 5578, Railway Routes, 1933, Extract from H. Birchenough's letter, 24/10/33.

42. P.R.O., CO795/74, File No. 45027, Rhodesia Railways Commission, 1935, Railway Commission Ordinance, 1935, 18/7/35.

43. P.R.O., CO795/87, File No. 45702, Rhodesia Railways Commission, 1937, Young to Huggins, 18/8/37; Norman to Harding, 15/9/37; Harding to Stanley, 16/9/37.

44. P.R.O., CO795/70, File No. 25606, Agricultural Department Annual Report, 1934; P.R.O., CO852/66, File No. 15004/1, Economic Commodities, Maize, Northern Rhodesia, 1936-37, Treasury Memorandum, Maize Control, 1936/37, 22/9/37; Maize Control, Extract from Pim and Milligan Report, paragraphs 425-429.

45. P.R.O., CO795/14, File No. Administration Annual Report (1935).

46. P.R.O., CO795/56, File No. 36453, Purchase of Government Grain, 1933, Smith to Governor, 24/6/32; N.R. Department of Agriculture (1938) pp. 2-3, (1939) p. 3.

47. P.R.O., CO795/18, Administrative Annual Report, 1939.

48. Milligan Report, p. 28; P.R.O., CO795/72, File No. 25670, Livestock Society, 1934, Record of a Meeting Held in the Governor's Office, 25/1/34; P.R.O., CO795/18, Administrative Annual Report, 1939.

49. N.R., Veterinary Department, Annual Report (Livingstone. 1934) p. 6.

50. P.R.O., CO795/18, Administrative Annual Report, 1939.

51. P.R.O., CO795/49, File No. 36268, Livestock Co-operative Society, 1932, Maxwell to Cunliffe-Lister, 5/5/32.

52. P.R.O., CO795/72, File No. 25670, Livestock Co-operative Society, 1934, Kennedy to Marston, 31/1/34.

53. P.R.O., CO852/66, File No. 15003/1, Economic Commodities, Cattle Industry, Northern Rhodesia, 1936, Young to Ormsby Gore, 12/6/37.

54. P.R.O., CO795/72, File No. 25670, Livestock Co-operative Society, 1934, Kennedy to Marston, 31/1/34.

CONCLUSION

I have argued in this dissertation that railway rates and customs agreements contributed to the failure of settler agriculture along the line of rail in Northern Rhodesia. I set out to verify this hypothesis by showing that between 1910 and 1918 settler agriculture was optimistic about the future. This optimism arose from the fact that Northern Rhodesian settler producers dominated the supply of maize, maize meal, cattle and beef to the markets in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo. Southern Rhodesia was a weak competitor for these markets, except for a short period during the 1914-18 war. There were no reductions in railage for the purpose of encouraging Southern Rhodesian agricultural exports to these markets. In addition to the absence of keen competition from Southern Rhodesia, settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia was stimulated by high prices and the low cost of production. As a result of these favourable conditions, settlers invested in maize farming and cattle ranching in order to consolidate the improvements experienced during this period. They hoped that these investments would further promote the agricultural industry.

However, the hope for a brighter future was short-lived. Immediately after the 1914-18 war, there was keen competition from Southern Rhodesia. She found it increasingly difficult to export maize, maize meal, cattle and beef to South African markets because of tariff restrictions. Southern Rhodesia was also severely constrained to compete on the world market. The problems which Southern Rhodesia faced in marketing maize and cattle were exacerbated by her increased marketable surplus.

In 1918 the Rhodesia Railways initiated a policy of railway rate reduction to promote Southern Rhodesian maize and maize meal exports to Northern Rhodesia and the Congo. This policy also applied to cattle exports to the Congo which began in 1922. Rate reduction reduced the cost of carrying these commodities to the Northern Rhodesian and Congolese markets. In turn, the reduction of the cost of transport narrowed the price at which Northern Rhodesian and Southern Rhodesian commodities were sold. As a result of this, settler producers in Northern Rhodesia lost the advantage of being closer to the market than Southern Rhodesian producers. Rate reduction was introduced to attract consumers in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo to buy lowly priced commodities from Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia also had priority in loading railway waggons and selling in the Congolese markets. These factors continued to operate against Northern Rhodesia even when the development of the Copperbelt provided an internal market for Northern Rhodesian produce. Northern Rhodesia could not reverse the policy of low railage as railway matters were dominated by Southern Rhodesia.

Settler farmers in Northern Rhodesia sought tariff protection but without success until 1931. Before 1931, the Northern Rhodesia Administration was unwilling to protect its settler producers. In part, the Government was interested in cheap food as this reduced the cost of production in the mining industry. However, a more serious limitation was the free trade

customs agreements which Northern Rhodesia concluded with Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and the High Commission Territories. Northern Rhodesia was a subordinate party as she had to comply with the tariff in force in Southern Rhodesia.

These events had many adverse effects on settler agriculture in Northern Rhodesia. The markets were glutted and local farmers found it difficult to sell their maize and cattle. Maize producers were seldomly forced to export to overseas markets at a great loss or carry over to the following year. Cattle accumulated, with serious deterioration in the quality of the cattle industry. Artificial over-production existed and the farmers lost confidence in the ability of the farming industry to sustain itself. Both maize and cattle were sold at low and uneconomic prices. Further deterioration of settler agriculture was shown by poor co-operation among the farmers and their marketing system. Private dealers were active in marketing settler produce but to the disadvantage of settler agriculture as these middlemen depressed prices and did not create a proper marketing structure. This situation obtained inspite of the huge expansion in the market between 1923 and 1931.

The adverse conditions under which settler agriculture operated were alleviated after 1931. The Northern Rhodesian market had contracted in the wake of the 1929-33 world recession. The market was flooded by commodities which had been imported before Northern Rhodesia banned the importation of maize and cattle following the outbreak of foot and mouth disease. The Northern Rhodesia Government introduced measures to limit external competition. A Gentleman's Agreement was concluded in 1932 with Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland. This allowed importation only when local producers failed to meet domestic demand in Northern Rhodesia. The price for imported produce was fixed at a higher level than for local produce. A separate and similar arrangement was also concluded with South Africa.

Measures were also taken to improve local production, co-operation among the settler farmers and the marketing system. The Government persuaded the mining companies and private dealers to buy local produce before importing. Prices were stabilized. In 1935 and 1937 statutory bodies were created to handle the marketing of local and imported maize and cattle. These measures gave settler agriculture a new lease of life in spite of the fact that they were ineffectively implemented.

APPENDIX I

Railway Mileage, Distribution And Ownership 1925

Company	Total Mileage in Particular Country				
	Southern Rhodesia	Northern Rhodesia	South Africa	Mozambique	Bechuanaland
The Rhodesia Railways Co.	791	93	112	Nil	394
The Mashonaland Railways Co.	331	281	Nil	Nil	Nil
The Beira Railway Co.	Nil	Nil	Nil	35	Nil
The Beira Railway Co.	6	Nil	Nil	162	Nil
The Blinkwater Railway Co.	123	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
The Rhodesia-Katanga Junction Railway and Mineral Co.	Nil	132	Nil	Nil	Nil
Total mileage in each Country	1252	506	112	198	394

Source: Hammond, F.D. Report On the Railway System of Southern Rhodesia Vol. I, 1925 p4.

APPENDIX II

Representation on the Southern Rhodesia Railway Conference, 1919.

Body Represented.	Number of Representatives.
Municipality of Salisbury	1
Municipality of Bulawayo	1
Municipality of Umtali	1
Municipality of Gwelo	1
Municipality of Gatooma	1
Rhodesia Chamber of Mines	2
Salisbury Chamber of Mines	2
Rhodesia Small Workers and Distributors Association, Gatooma	1
Rhodesia Agricultural Union, Salisbury	5
Chamber of Commerce, Bulawayo	2
Chamber of Commerce, Salisbury	2
Chamber of Commerce, Umtali, Gwelo, Gatooma	1
Administrator's nominee to represent Africans	1
Commercial Branch of the BSAC	1
General Manager, Rhodesia Railways	1
TOTAL	23.

In 1920 one representative was admitted from each of the following:

Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council, North-Western Rhodesia Farmers, Farmers' Co-operative Society and the Port of Beira.

Source: General Manager, *Rhodesia Railways Annual Report*, 1919 and 1920.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources.

1. Zambia.

A National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka

i BS Series

a BS 2 North Western Rhodesia.

Agricultural Annual Reports (31/3/10-29/4/10) BS/2/151.
Cotton Growing and Maize Trade (1908) BS/2/20.
Cotton Growing: Problems and Appeal to Government for Transport, Seed and Labour Supplies by Broken and Kafue Farmers (1907-1910) BS/2/63.
Labour for Katanga (1911) BS/2/13.
Land Grants to Settlers: Native Rights (1905-1906) BS/2/196.
Land Settlement in N.W.R. (1907-09) BS/2/39.
Livestock (14/1/10-30/6/10) BS/2/10.
Reports by Bateson on Cotton Growing in N.W.R. (1910) BS/2/64.
Reports of the Controller of Customs (1908-11) BS/2/139.
Reports of the Mines and Lands Department (31/3/08-14/9/14) BS/2/141.
Reports on Districts and Sub-districts (1910-11) BS/2/157.

b BS 3 Northern Rhodesia, 1911-1924.

Agreements with High Commission Territories (20/10/15) BS/3/196.
Cattle from Ngamiland, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia to the Congo; Cattle Industry (3/8/23-3/12/23) BS/3/115.

Cattle Transit from Southern Rhodesia to Katanga; Committee of Enquiry into Cattle Industry Vol. II (22/3/19-15/12/23) BS/3/182.

Congo Basin Customs Agreements; Union of South Africa Customs Agreements (30/9/14-11/9/23) BS/3/197.

Customs Duties, Petition, Cattle Trade (8/8/18-13/12/18) BS/3/187.

Customs and Excise (26/11/21-30/6/21) BS/3/490.

Exportation and Importation Restrictions (4/1/21-30/6/21) BS/3/487.

Farmers' Association: N.W.R. (18/8/19-5/4/19 BS/3/453.

Imported Livestock and Farmers' Settlers' Concessions (28/8/18-23/11/23) BS/3/330.

Importation of Pedigree Stock and Exportation of Cattle (6/5/18-18/10/24) BS/3/183.

Katanga Farmers Association (27/9/20-8/11/20) BS/3/453.

Petition from Farmers' Association (5/2/24-18/2/24) BS/3/458.

Railway Construction and Proclamation Form, Management and Forms of Quit Rents (5/10/05-18/10/18) BS/3/329.

Railway Rates (27/3/18-25/5/21) BS/3/263.

Railway Regulations; Mashonaland Railways and Production; Rhodesia-Katanga Junction Railway and Mineral Company; Customs and Excise (1922-23) BS/3/491.

Rebate of Customs Duty: Proclamation and Government Notice (8/5 /13-27/6/13) BS/3/12.

Returns of Tenancy Agreements (1915-23) BS/3/127.

Report of Dutch Settlers at Lusaka (1913) BS/3/402.

Rhodesia-Katanga Junction and Minerals Company (15/6/18-12/2/19) BS/3/334.

Transit of Stock through Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia to Katanga (2/10/12-23/12/12) BS/3/9.

Zambezi and Congo Movements of Local Produce (17/3/20-6/4/20) BS/3/200.

ii RC Series.

Allocation of Northern Rhodesia Railway Farms (1911-26) RC/687.

Amendments of Customs and Excise Duty Ordinance (1926) RC/920.

Application for Loans by Farmers to Assist in Erecting Dipping Tanks; Grants of Loans by the BSAC (1924) RC/978.

Belgian Restrictions on Imports of Cattle into Katanga from Southern Rhodesia (1926-27) RC/853.

Congo Basin Customs Tariff Effect (1927) RC/106.

Congo Markets for Northern Rhodesia Produce (1922-23) RC/29.

Customs Agreements Between the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia (1924-25) RC/851.

Customs Agreement Between Northern and Southern Rhodesia (1928-29) RC/942.

Customs Agreements Between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa (1928) RC/947.

Customs Agreement Between Northern and Southern Rhodesia (1927-28) RC/971.

Customs Formalities on Goods in Transit Through the Belgian Congo (1927) RC/105.

Customs and Excise Duties Ordinance (1924) RC/616.

Customs Treaties and Agreements Between the Union of South Africa, Southern and Northern Rhodesia, (1929-1930) RC/943.

Customs Tripartite System (1928-29) RC/986.

Grants of Permits for Importation of Cattle From Ngamiland (1920-24) RC/854.

Grazing of Cattle on Crown Lands Between Livingstone and Katombora (1927) RC/268.

Importation of Cattle From Tati Concessions (1927) RC/333.

Inter-relationship of Mining Companies in Northern Rhodesia (1927) RC/522.

Meat Supplies to Northern Rhodesia Mines (1928-29) RC/967.

Meat Supply for Nchanga Mine (1926) RC/199.

Memoranda and Articles of Association of the Livestock Owners' Association Ltd. (1922) RC/343.

Ndola Cattle Quarantines Proclaimed (1927) RC/553.

Northern Rhodesia Agricultural Congress (1927) RC/34.

Northern Rhodesia Agricultural Union Resolutions; Foundation of Land Bank (1925-26) RC/193.

Northern Rhodesia Annual Report (1926) RC/976.

Notes on the Mining Industry of Northern Rhodesia (1927) RC/524.

Railway Connection with Portuguese East Africa, Extension of Railway From Sinoia to Kafue (1927) RC/523.

Report by Milligan on the Agricultural Department of Northern Rhodesia, Agricultural Specialists in East Luangwa (1926-27) RC/32.

Slaughter of Cattle for the Mining Areas (1926-27) RC/438.

Transfer of Rhodesia-Katanga Junction Railway and Mineral Company Ltd. to Mashonaland Railways Company (1928-1929) RC/1035.

iii Sec Series.

a Sec 1.

Advance to Farmers secured by Government Guarantee, Minutes of a Meeting of Agricultural Loan Board; Report of Select Committee Appointed to Consider the Position in Regard to Loans for Agricultural Development (1931-35) Sec/1/734.

Agricultural Maize Control Board (1932-35) Sec/1/50.

Congo Basin Rates of Duty (1936-47) Sec/1/290.

Customs Agreements and Treaties, Congo Basin Treaty, Convention Revising the General Act of Berlin, Revision of St. Germain-En-Laye Convention (1927-37) Sec/1/289.

Customs Agreements Between Bechuanaland Protectorate and Northern Rhodesia, Dairies and Creamaries, Meat (1930-36) Sec/1/296.

Customs Agreements Between Northern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa (1932-49) Sec/1/293.

Customs Agreements Between Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa (1929-32) Sec/1/295.

Customs List of Secretarial Files on Imports and Exports (1930-50) Sec/1/291.

Customs Procedure in Connection with New Customs Agreements with the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (1930) Sec/1/281.

Customs Treaties and Agreements Between Northern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa (1931-39) Sec/1/292.

Customs Treaties and Agreements Between Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia (1932) Sec/1/325.

Customs Treaties and Agreements Between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa (1932) Sec/1/329.

Customs Agreements with Southern Rhodesia (1929-49) Sec/1/326.

Customs Treaties and Agreements with Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa and Effect on Revenue (1931) Sec/1/322.

Dominion and Colonial Preference in Regard to Customs Duties, Governors' Conference of British East African Territories (1930-48) Sec/1/331.

Economic Agricultural Matters (1931-38) Sec/1/72.

Imports into the Congo Basin (1930) Sec/1/305.

Importation of Maize from the Congo (1934-41) Sec/1/53.

Maize Control: Statement of Objectives and Reasons; Minutes of Executive Council Meeting on Maize Control; Sale of Maize and Maize Meal (1937-38) Sec/1/85.

Maize Control: Statement of Objectives and Reasons, Comparative Table, Legal Report by Attorney-General (1938) Sec/1/87.

Meetings of Agricultural Advisory Board, Speeches by Governor and Correspondence Between Advisory Board and Private Sector (1935-39) Sec/1/2.

Memorandum on the Advantages and Disadvantages of Customs Agreements Between Northern Rhodesia and South Africa (1930-32) Sec/1/280.

Memorandum of Advantages and Disadvantages of Customs Agreements Between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa (1932) Sec/1/285.

Memorandum of Articles of Customs Agreements Between the Union of South Africa, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia (1929-33) Sec/1/282.

Memorandum of Meetings Between His Excellence and Chisamba Farmers, Dumping of Agricultural Produce into Northern Rhodesia (1931-48) Sec/1/316.

Memorandum re Customs Agreements with the Union of South Africa, Trade Agreement Between the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (1933-47) Sec/1/294.

Minutes of Executive Council of Maize Board on Guarantee of Participation Certificate value on Native Grown Maize (1936-49) Sec/1/49.

Minutes of Meeting of Maize Control Board of Northern Rhodesia (1938-49) Sec/1/79.

Minutes of Southern Rhodesia Customs Conference on Revision of Customs Tariff (1930) Sec/1/284.

Native Agriculture and Maize Control, Agricultural Development near Railway line in Mazabuka (1936-39) Sec/1/55.

Northern Rhodesia Customs Agreement (1925) Sec/1/289.

NWRFCS: Minutes of Annual General Meeting of Co-operative Farmers (1928-48) Sec/1/235.

Notes of Executive Council of Maize Control Board (1939-44) Sec/1/90.

Notes on the Customs Agreement Between Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, Minutes of Meetings of Government Officers and Governors (1929-49) Sec/1/302.

Policy of organisation of Agricultural Department (1933-38) Sec/1/58.

Position of Natives Under Control of Maize Act (1937) Sec/1/52.

Proposal for Forming a Marketing Board, Notes on Marketing Board Ordinance (1937-40) Sec/1/15.

Record of Meeting of Maize Control Board, Percentage of Native Share in Internal Pool (1935-45) Sec/1/82.

Record of Meetings of Maize Control Board, Percentage of Native Share in Internal Pool (1935-45) Sec/1/88.

Report on Maize Control by the Secretary of Maize Board, Contract for Supply of Maize (1939-45) Sec/1/69.

Report of Tour Inspection by Controller of Customs, Extracts From Resolutions of Governors' Conference (1929-49) Sec/1/299.

Reports on the Cost of Maize Production and Maize Control, Native Labour Rates and Rations (1941-43) Sec/1/68.

Reports of Maize Sub-Committee of Northern Rhodesia Agricultural Advisory Board on Maize Control, Pamphlet on Maize Control for Distribution to Europeans (1935-36) Sec/1/48.

Resolutions Passed During the Meeting Held by Central Farmers' Committee (1936-45) Sec/1/71.

Resolutions Regarding Control of Maize, Export of Maize, Surplus of Grain Crop, Financial Reports and Prices (1932-35) Sec/1/50.

Statements of Agricultural Policy During the War (1939-45) Sec/1/59.

Trade Conditions in Southern Rhodesia and Market Presentation, Customs Agreements Between Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia (1929-35) Sec/1/279.

b Sec 2

Industries and Trade: Agriculture, General Development and Improvement (1931-44) Sec/2/258.

Native Cattle - Improvement of Stock (1931-47) Sec/2/254.

Provincial Annual Report: Central Province (1933) Sec/2/73.

c Sec 3

Railways and Rates Distribution Committee (1937-44) Sec/3/282.

iv Material in Boxes.

N.R., Department of Agriculture, <u>Annual Bulletins</u>, 1-3 (1931-33) Box 9.

N.R., Department of Agriculture, <u>Annual Reports</u> (1911-20) Box 8.

N.R., Department of Agriculture, Annual Reports (1920-39) Box 6.

N.R., Department of Animal Health, Annual Bulletin (1932) Box 28.

N.R., Department of Animal Health, Annual Reports (1930-34) Box 162.

N.R., Customs and Excise Department, Annual Report (1924) Box 12.

B Livingstone National Museum.

C.J. Rhodes to R. Williams (1900-03) G/9/9.

The Cape To Cairo Railway, Speech delivered to the African Society by R. Williams, London. (21/4/21) H1/2b.

Appointment of D. Chaplin as Administrator of Northern Rhodesia (1921) F1/4/2.

England.

A Public Record Office, London.

i Original Correspondence, British South Africa Company.

BSAC Board Meetings (1917) CO417/598.

BSAC Board Meetings (1921) CO417/611.

ii Original Correspondence, Colonial Office.

a Administration Annual Reports (1931) CO795/9.

Administration Annual Reports (1932) CO795/11.

Administration Annual Reports (1933) CO795/12.

Administration Annual Reports (1934) CO795/13.

Administration Annual Reports (1935) CO795/14.

Administration Annual Reports (1936) CO795/15.

Administration Annual Reports (1937) CO795/16.

Administration Annual Reports (1938) CO795/17.
Administration Annual Reports (1939) CO795/18.
Administration Annual Reports (1940-45) CO795/21.
Agricultural Department Staff (1936) CO795/36.
Agriculture Among the Ba Tonga of Reserve II by
M. Trapnell, (1934) CO795/71.
Agricultural Department Annual Report, Customs
Agreements (1934) CO795/70.
Allocations From the Beit Trust Fund (1929) CO795/30.
Annual Report (1926) CO795/21.
Cattle Industry (1933) CO795/60.
Cattle and Maize Industry (1935) CO795/14.
Cattle and Maize Industry (1937) CO795/16.
Cattle and Maize Industry (1940-43) CO795/20.
Commercial and Railways Agreement between Southern
Rhodesia and Mozambique (1927) CO795/21.
Congo Basin Customs Formalities and Governor's
Conference (East Africa) (1927) CO795/21.
Copper Industry (1933) CO795/60.
Customs Agreements (1933) CO795/59.
Customs Agreements (1933) CO795/62.
Customs Agreements (1934) CO795/70.
Customs Department Annual Report (1934) CO795/13.
Customs Agreements, Railway Routes (1930) CO795/37.
Department of Animal Health Annual Report (1933)
CO795/62.
Establishment of Nkana Township (1932) CO795/50.
European Agricultural Settlement (1930) CO795/38.
Foot and Mouth Disease in Rhodesia (1933) CO795/49.
Government Purchase of Grain (1932) CO795/56.
Livestock Co-operative Society (1932) CO795/49.
Livestock Co-operative Society (1934) CO795/72.

Northern Rhodesia, Report of the Proceedings of the Seventh Session of the 3rd Council (1932) CO795/10.
Provincial Commissioners' Conference (1936) CO795/82.
Rhodesia Railway Commission (1935) CO795/74.
Rhodesia Railway Commission (1937) CO795/87.

b Economic Commodities.

Northern Rhodesia, Cattle and Maize Industries (1936-37) CO852/66.

B Tanganyika Concessions Holdings, London.

i Benguela Railway Company Ltd.

Benguela Railway Traffic Accounts (1936) BR72.
Benguela Railway Traffic Accounts (1937) BR73.
Benguela Railway Traffic Accounts (1938) BR74.
Benguela Railway Traffic Accounts (1939) BR75.
Benguela Railway Traffic Accounts (1940) BR76.
Benguela Railway Traffic Accounts (1941) BR77.
Benguela Railway Traffic Accounts (1942) BR78.
Benguela Railway Rates and Traffic (1931-34) BR136.
Benguela Railway Minutes (1931-36) BR143.
Benguela Railway Rates (1934) BR138.

ii Tanganyika Concessions Ltd.

U.M.H.K., Board Minutes (1936-38) TC165.
U.M.H.K., Board Minutes (1939) TC161.
U.M.H.K., Monthly Reports (1931-35) TC65.
U.M.H.K., Traffic Services (1934-38) TC85.
U.M.H.K., Traffic Services (1934-38) TC86.
U.M.H.K., Traffic Services (1916-34) TC138.
U.M.H.K., Traffic Services (1916-34) TC141.

iii Rhodesia - Katanga Company Ltd.

Correspondence and Accounts (1929-30) RK1.
Correspondence and Accounts (1931-32) RK2.
A/Z Miscellaneous (1928) RK3.
A/Z Miscellaneous (1929-32) RK4.

Unpublished Material.

Brown, M.C. 'The Growth of the Market Oriented Economy in Northern Rhodesia, 1945-1955'. Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1959.

Dixon-fyle, M. 'Agricultural Improvement and Political Protest on the Tonga Plateau of Northern Rhodesia'. Ph.D. Thesis. University of London. 1976.

Jewsiewicki, B. 'Shifting Agriculture and the Capitalist Economy'. Lumumbashi. 1975.

Jones, M.Y. 'The Politics of White Agrarian Settlement in Northern Rhodesia, 1898-1928'. M.A. Thesis. University of Sussex. 1974.

Kessel, N. 'The Mineral Industry and its Effects On the Development of the Zambian Economy, 1945-1970'. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Leeds. 1971.

Keyter, C.F. 'Maize Control in Southern Rhodesia, 1931-1939: The Contribution to White Survival'. M.A. dissertation. University of Rhodesia. 1974.

Muntemba, M.S. 'Rural Underdevelopment in Zambia; Kabwe Rural District, 1850-1970'. Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles. 1977.

Nyangu, S.C. 'African Production in Mazabuka District: The Development of Subordination, 1900-1953'. History Department Collection, University of Zambia. 1978.

Palmer, R.H. 'Thoughts on the Agricultural and Economic History of Zambia, c1900-1932'. Seminar Paper presented to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies Post-graduate Seminar Series, University of London. 1977.

Perrings, C. 'Black Labour in the Copper Mines of the Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia, 1911-1941: Industrial Strategies and the Evolution of an African Proletariat'. Ph.D. Thesis. University of London. 1976.

Phimister, I.R. 'Meat and Monopolies: Beef Cattle In Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939'. 1977.

__________ 'A Note on Labour Relations in Southern Rhodesian Agriculture before 1939'. 1975.

Grav il, R. 'The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1900-1939: A study of Trading Relations'. 1977.

Personal Communication.

J.M.E. Landless to A.M. Kanduza, 30/4/78.

R.W. Dean to A.M. Kanduza 20/9/77.

Published Material.

A Government and Institutional Publications.

i Northern Rhodesia Government Reports.

<u>Agricultural Advisory Board, Report of the Maize Sub-Committee</u> by C.R. Lockhart. Lusaka. 1935.

<u>Agricultural Advisory Board, Second Report, Replacement of Imported Food by Local Produce</u> by C.R. Lockhart. Lusaka. 1936.

Agricultural Advisory Board, Third Report by C.R. Lockhart. Lusaka. 1937.

Customs Tariff Handbook. Livingstone. 1931.

Department of Agriculture, Annual Reports. Livingstone. 1912-1934; Lusaka, 1935-42.

Department of Customs and Excise, Annual Reports, Livingstone. 1925-34; Lusaka. 1935-42.

Department of Veterinary, Annual Reports, Livingstone. 1924-34; Lusaka. 1935-42.

Further Memorandum on the Economics of the Cattle Industry in Northern Rhodesia, with Special Reference to the Native Cattle by R.A.S. Macdonald. Lusaka. 1937.

Memorandum on the Economics of the Cattle Industry in Northern Rhodesia by R.A.S. Macdonald. Lusaka. 1935.

Northern Rhodesia, A Handbook. Livingstone. 1923.

Northern Rhodesia Blue Books. Livingstone. 1926-24. Lusaka. 1935-42.

Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt Markets: A Social and Economic Study by W.V. Brelsford. Lusaka. 1947.

Railways Ordinace, 1927. Livingstone. 1927.

Report of Commission of Enquiry into the future of European Farming Industry by G.L. Troup. Lusaka. 1947.

Report of the Finance Commission by E.A.T. Dutton, Livingstone. 1932.

Report on the Present Position of the Agricultural Industry and the Necessity, or Otherwise, of Encouraging Further European Settlement in

Agricultural Areas by S.M. Milligan. Livingstone. 1931.

Report of the Taxation Committee by C.R. Lockhart. Livingstone. 1934.

The Agricultural Commission Report, 1930-32. Livingstone. 1933.

ii British Government Reports.

Agreement Between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the British South Africa Company for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relating to Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia. London. 1923.

Correspondence Relating to the Continuance of the Administrative Provisions of the Charter of the British South Africa Company. cd 7645. London, 1914.

First Report of a Committee Appointed by the Secretary for Colonies to Consider Questions Relating to Rhodesia. cmd 1273. London, 1921.

Labour Conditions in Northern Rhodesia by G. St. J. Orde-Browne. London, 1938.

Northern Rhodesia, Annual Reports, 1929-42.

Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia, Colonial No. 145, by A.W. Pim and S.M. Milligan. London. 1939.

Report on Trade and Economic Conditions in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland by J.N. Bridgen. Johannesburg. 1939.

Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report by
Bledisloe. London. 1939.

iii British South Africa Company and Rhodesia Railways Reports.

Annual Reports of the Directors. London. 1903-1922.

Annual Reports of the General Manager of the Beira, Mashonaland and Rhodesia Railways. Bulawayo. 1918-1939.

Annual Reports of the Railways Commission. Bulawayo. 1929-1939.

Extension of the Bechuanaland Railway. London. 1899.

Interim Report of the Directors. London. 1923.

Interim, Second and Final Report of Commission Appointed to Report Upon Disputes Between the Beira, Mashonaland and Rhodesia Railways. Salisbury. 1927.

Matebeleland and Mashonaland Settlement. London. 1894.

Memorandum Concerning the Development of Estates and Industries by the British South Africa Company. London. 1914.

Railway Statistics. Bulawayo. 1935.

Reports on the Administration of Northern Rhodesia. Livingstone. 1912-23.

Report of Commission Appointed to Enquire into Railway Questions in Southern Rhodesia by W.M.Acworth. Bulawayo. 1918.

Statement Made to the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines by H.W. Fox, BSAC Director. Bulawayo. 1914.

iv Southern Rhodesia Government Reports.

Cold Storage Commission, First Annual Report and Accounts. Salisbury. 1938.

Correspondence and Memorandum Relating to the Ministers' Negotiations in London in Connection with the Railway Bill, 1926. Salisbury. 1926.

European Cattle Industry, Economics and Statistics. Salisbury. 1933-39.

Legislative Council Debates, 26/6/23.

Maize Enquiry Commission Report. Salisbury, 1930.

Official Year Book of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia. Salisbury. No. 1, 1924; No. 2, 1930; No. 3, 1932; No. 4, 1952.

Ottawa Conference: Report of the Committee Appointed to investigate and Report to the Government On Certain Matters Relating to the Natural Resources and Industry of Southern Rhodesia, their Present Position and Future Prospects and their Relation to Empire and World Trade, 1932. Salisbury. 1933.

Report of the Committee of Enquiry on the Cattle Industry of Southern Rhodesia. Salisbury. 1923.

Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Economic Position of the Agricultural Industry of Southern Rhodesia. Salisbury. 1934.

Reports of the Department of Customs and Excise. Salisbury. 1913; 1914; 1930-39.

Report of Commission of Inquiry into the Beef Cattle Industry of Southern and Northern Rhodesia. Salisbury. 1963.

Reports of the Secretary for Agriculture. Salisbury. 1927-33.

Report of the Veterinary Conference Held at Bulawayo. Salisbury. 1924.

Second and Final Report of the Committee of Enquiry in Respect of the Cattle Industry of Southern Rhodesia, dealing with its Investigations in the Union of South Africa. Salisbury. 1924.

Sinoia-Kafue and Beit Bridge Railways Enquiry Commission. Salisbury. 1930.

v Belgian Congo Government Reports. Cited as Bruce Fetter Papers.

Bulletin Agricole. Elizabethville. 1915; 1918.

Bulletin des Renseignments de l'Office Colonial. Bruxelles. 1911-26.

Commerce Exterieur. Bruxelles. 1913; 1925.

Compagnie d'Elevage et d'alimentation du Katanga, Rapports du Conseil d'administration et College de Commissaires. Bruxelles. 1925, 1931.

Comptes Rendus du Congrès Scientifique, 1900-1950, IV by Comité Special du Katanga. Bruxelles. 1950.

Journal du Katanga. Elizabethville, 1911-1915; 1920-1922.

Les Troupes du Katanga et les Compagnes d'Afrique, 1914-1918 by E. Muller. Bruxelles. 1935.

Ministère des Colonies, Aparcu Sur l'Economie Agricole de la Province du Katanga. Bruxelles. 1956.

Rapports Annuels Sur l'Administration de la Colonie du Congo Belgie. Bruxelles. 1915-1946.

Rapport Annuel Economique du Katanga. Elizabethville. 1924.

B Books and Articles.

Baldwin, R.E. Economic Development and Export Growth: A Study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1966.

Berger, E.L. Labour, Race and Colonial Rule: The Copperbelt from 1924 to Independence. Oxford. 1974.

Birney, C.F. 'The Railway System of Rhodesia', Sun and Agricultural Journal of South Africa. 1927. pp. 59-69.

Brett, E.A. Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939. London. 1974.

Carpenter, F. 'The Introduction of Commercial Farming into Zambia and its Effects to 1940', Palmer, R.H. (ed.) Zambian Land and Labour Studies, Vol. I, Lusaka. 1973. pp. 1-13.

Chanock, M. Unconsummated Union: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa. Manchester. 1977.

Croxton, A.H. Railways of Rhodesia: The Story of the Beira, Mashonaland and Rhodesia Railways. Newton Abbot. 1973.

_____________ 'Rhodesia's Light Railways', Rhodesiana, No. 13. 1968. pp. 57-68.

Day, J.R. Railways of Southern Africa. London. 1963.

De Bauw, A. Le Katanga: Notes Sur Les Pays, Ses Resources et l'Avenier de la Colonisation Belgie. n.p.n.d. Bruxelles. 1920.

De Gaay Fortman, B. 'Zambia's Markets: Problems and Opportunities', Elliot, C. (ed.) Constraints on the Economic Development of Zambia. 1971. pp. 191-232.

De Laessue, U.H. 'Liebig's Extract of Meat Company: Rhodesia Enterprise'. Rhodesia Journal of Agriculture. Vol. 9. 1912. pp. 665-7.

D'Erlanger, B.E. History of the Construction and Finance of the Rhodesia Transport System. n.p.n.d. London. 1938.

Dixon-fyle, M. 'Agricultural Improvement and Protest on the Tonga Plateau of Northern Rhodesia', Journal of African History, XVIII, 4. 1977. pp. 579-96.

Fielder, R.H. 'The Role of Cattle in the Ila Economy: A Conflict of Views on the uses of Cattle by the Ila of Namwala'. African Social Research, No. 15. Lusaka. 1973. pp. 327-61.

Franck, L. Etudes de Colonisation Comparée. Bruxelles. 1931.

Frankel, S.H. Capital Investment in Africa: Its Course and Effects. London. 1938.

__________ The Railway Policy of South Africa: An Analysis of the Effects of Railway Rates, Finance and Management on the Economic Development of the Union. Johannesburg. 1928.

Gann, L.H. A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953. London. 1965.

__________ A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934. London. 1965.

Haefele, E.T. and Steinberge, E.B. Government Controls on Transport: An African Case. Washington. 1965.

Hailey, M. An African Survey: A study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara. London. 1957.

Hancock, W.K. Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs. Vol. II, Part I. London. 1964.

Hutchinson, R. and Martelli, G. Robert's People: The Life of Sir Robert Williams, 1860-1938. London. 1971.

Hyam, R. The Failure of the South African Expansion. London. 1972.

Jewsiewicki, B. 'Unequal Development: Capitalism and the Katanga Economy, 1919-1930', Palmer, R.H. and Parsons, N. (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. London. 1977. pp. 317-44.

Johnson, J. The Economics of Indian Rail Transport. Bombay. 1963.

Katzenellenbogen, S.E. Railways and the Copper Mines of Katanga. London. 1973.

Legassick, M. 'Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry in South Africa, 1885-1970: From Periphery to Sub-Metropole as a Forced Labour System', Palmer, R.H. and Parsons, N. (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. London. 1977. pp. 175-200.

Lombard, C.S. The Growth of Co-operatives in Zambia, 1914-71, Zambian Papers, No. 6. Lusaka. 1971.

Lutke-Entrup, J. Limitations and Possibilities of Increasing Market Production of Peasant African Cattle holders in Western Province of Zambia, Communication No. 7. Lusaka. 1971.

Meyer, F.V. British Colonies in World Trade. London. 1948.

Muntemba, M.S. 'Thwarted Development: A Case Study of Economic Change in the Kabwe Rural District of Zambia, 1902-1970', Palmer, R.H. and Parsons, N. (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. London. 1977. pp. 345-64.

Murray, D.J. The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia. Oxford. 1970.

Nobbs, E.A. 'The Cattle Industry', Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, Vol. 18. 1921. pp. 505-09.

__________ 'Maize Grading in Southern Rhodesia', Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, Vol. 16. 1919. pp. 5-17.

Nocks, O.S. Railways of Southern Africa. London. 1971.

Nolutshungu, S.C. South Africa in Africa: A Study of Ideology and Foreign Policy. Manchester. 1975.

O'Connor, A.M. Railways and Development in Uganda: A Study in Economic Geography. Nairobi. 1965.

Palmer, R.H. Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia. London. 1977.

__________ 'Land in Zambia', Palmer, R.H. (ed.) Zambian Land and Labour Studies, Vol. I, Lusaka. 1973.

_________ Zambian Land and Labour Studies, Vol. II, Lusaka. 1974.

Parsons, N. 'The Economic History of Khama's Country in Botswana, 1844-1930', Palmer, R.H. and Parsons, N. (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. London. 1977.

Perrings, C. 'Consciousness, Conflict and Proleterianization: An Assessment of the 1935 Mineworkers' Strike on the Copperbelt; Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 4. No. 1. October, 1977. pp. 31-51.

Reynolds, R. 'The British South Africa Company Central Farms: Marandellas, 1907-1910: From the Papers of H.K. Scorror', Rhodesiana, No. 10. 1964. pp. 1-16.

Roberts, A.D. A History of Zambia. London. 1977.

Roberts, R.A.J. and Ellion, C. 'Constraints in Agriculture', Elliot, C. (ed.) Constraints on the Economic Development of Zambia. London. 1971. pp. 269-97.

Romyn, A.E. 'The Cattle Industry', Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, Vol. 29. 1932. pp. 497-502.

Shaw, J.R. 'The First European Settlement on the Kafue and the First Copper Mine', Northern Rhodesia Journal, Vol. I. No. 6. 1952. pp. 49-51.

Vail, L.H. 'The Making of an Imperial Slum: Nyasaland and its Railways, 1895-1935', Journal of African History, XVI, 1, 1975 pp. 89-112.

Van der Kerken, G. Les Societies Bantoues du Congo Belge. n.p.n.d. Bruxelles. 1920.

Van Horn, L. 'The Agricultural History of Barotseland, 1840-1964', Palmer, R.H. and Parsons, N. (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. London. 1977. pp. 144-69.

Vellut, J. 'Rural Poverty in Western Shaba, c1890-1930', Palmer, R.H. and Parsons, (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. London. 1977. pp. 294-316.

Walsh, R. 'Rhodesia as a Cattle Country', Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, Vol. 12. 1916. pp. 761-5.

West, J.H. 'Railway Economics in Rhodesia', Rhodesia Journal of Economics, Vol. 2, No. 2. 1968. pp. 556-65.

News Papers.

Bulawayo Chronicle. 1913-40.

Livingstone Mail. 1910-39.

Rhodesia Herald. 1920-40.