PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM PROGRAMME AS A MECHANISM FOR IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE: A CASE STUDY OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF ZAMBIA

BY

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A dissertation submitted to the University of Zambia in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Administration

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APPROVAL
This dissertation of Mr. Jericho Michelo is approved as fulfilling part of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Public Administration by the University of Zambia.

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I, Jericho Michel do hereby declare that the work presented in this dissertation for the degree of Master of Public Administration (M.P.A.) has not been presented nor is it being presented either wholly or in part at any other University for any other degree.

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Date 4th October 2007
Abstract

Many other countries including Zambia, have been trying to improve the delivery of service to its citizens. In the year 1993, Zambia implemented the Public Service Reform Programme. This was not the first Zambia had tried to reform the Public Service. Zambia had instituted a number of reform programmes, with the latest being the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP). The PSRP aimed at transforming the public service into an efficient and effective organ for delivery of services to the people of Zambia.

The research aimed at evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency in performance of the Ministry of Education following implementation of the PSRP. Changes in performance were measured using both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection.

The findings of the study were that service delivery did not improve significantly because efficiency and effectiveness in performance of the Ministry of Education had not improved despite the restructuring programme. This is shown from the fact that the respondents still spent long time their problems were solved. It was clear from the responses that the still had to make return journeys to the office irrespective of where they were coming from.

As regards the policy of decentralisation, the school/college education boards that were introduced under it were not autonomous in their operations. They continued to receive administrative instructions from the offices above making it difficult for them to make decisions that could improve the operations of the schools/colleges.

The study found that salary structures in the Ministry of Education were not adequate to motivate or retain staff.
DEDICATION

Firstly, this work is dedicated to my late father Mr. Cosmas Michelo, my late aunt Rachel Mudenda Chinyama, my late cousin Dominic Himwiinga Himaani Haanamwitala and my late Brother-in-law Samuel Shamu Shahuluma Miyanda, who did not live to see the fulfilment of their dream in having me educated to this level. May their souls rest in peace.

Secondly, to my mother Jane Ntengwa Kaniini who did not have the chance to see me grow up as a child because of her desire to have me educated. Thirdly, to my dear wife, Esther, and children- Bruno, Rachel, Elizabeth and Gabriel- who missed the chance to have fatherly affection as I was always away to school most times.

Fourthly, to all those Zambian civil servants who share the dream of improving delivery of service to the Zambian people at large.
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Abbreviations

APAS- Annual Performance and Appraisal System
A.N.C- African National Congress
BSAC- British South Africa Company
CSRA- Civil Service Reform Act
CSR- Civil Service Reform
DEBS- District Education Board Secretary
DDC- District Development Committee
FLRA- Federal Labour Relations Authority
GRZ- Government of the Republic of Zambia
MBO- Management by Objectives
MMD- Movement for Multi Party Democracy
MOE- Ministry of Education
MPA- Master of Public Administration
MSPB- Merit System Protection Board
NER- North Eastern Rhodesia
NPM- New Public Management
OECD- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPM- Office of Personnel
OSC- Official of Special Counsel
PEO- Provincial Education Office (r)
PMS- Performance Management System
PSCAP- Public Service Capacity Building Project
PCIBP- Permanent Corrupt Practices Investigations Bureau
PSCBP- Public Service Capacity Building Project
PSRP- Public Service Reform Program
PPB- Programme and Performance Budgeting
SES- Senior Executive Officer
SAPs- Structural Adjustment Programmes
UNIP- United National Independence Party
UNZA- University of Zambia
UNDP- United Nations Development Programme
UPP- United Progressive Party
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of the study was to find out the extent to which the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) had improved the performance of the Ministry of Education.

This chapter tries to trace the historical developments of the Zambian civil service since the year 1890 when the country was being administered by the British South African Company up to the time that the present reform was instituted.

The British South African Company (BSA-Company) administered Northern Rhodesia from 1896 to 1924 after securing a charter to exploit resources in Southern Africa as a whole, and Northern Rhodesia in particular. (Mulford, 1967). Having got this charter, Cecil Rhodes- the company director- sent representatives to North- Eastern Rhodesia to secure similar treaties, but the Ngoni and Bemba rulers refused to sign; this led to their defeat in 1897. The B.S.A. Company started to administer N.E.R. itself. The coun was thus divided in two- North- Eastern Rhodesia and North- Western Rhodesia. This was the start of colonial administration in North-Western Rhodesia and North- Eastern Rhodesia.

In 1911, the two parts of Northern Rhodesia were brought together under one colonial administration. By the early 1920s, the British South African Company had become satisfied that Northern Rhodesia was too costly to administer; the British Crown in turn was satisfied that the B.S.A. Company could be improved on. Thus in February 1924, the British government took over responsibility of administering the territory. A governor was appointed for the territory to administer it as a British protectorate.

Colonial administration in Northern Rhodesia, exhibited a dual system- one catered for indigenous peoples (or natives) while the other catered for the white minority groups that were settled along the line of rail.
For administrative purposes, Northern Rhodesia was divided into eight provinces, and each province was subdivided into districts. A Provincial Commissioner headed each province. The Provincial Commissioner was responsible to the minister in charge of African Affairs for the ‘good administration’ of his province, and for the preservation of law and order in it. The Provincial Commissioner had powers under the Native Authorities Ordinance to appoint any African to be the ‘Native Authority’ for an area for a period of six months. He also had certain judicial powers and duties; he held a court with powers equivalent to those of a resident magistrate. In turn, a District Commissioner who was assisted by administrative staff, technical and clerical staff, administered each district. The District Commissioner was responsible to the Provincial Commissioner for the ‘good administration’ of his district and for preservation of law and order in it (Mitchell, 1963).

This type of rule was referred to as ‘direct rule’ or ‘pre-fectoral system. It was based on the use of European colonial administrators in local administration. These administrators dealt directly with the people. This system was identified with the French, though the British also used it in some parts of its territories. In this system, a large number of administrators had to be brought from Europe.

Running side by side with the European colonial administration, was a type of rule, which was known as ‘indirect rule.’ This was a type of rule which was instituted by either incorporating existing chiefs into the administration; removing uncooperative chiefs in favour of others who might or might not be their legitimate successors; or creating chiefs where there were no chiefs as in Southern Zambia and then putting them under the Native Affairs department to administer the affairs of the natives. It was organised by taking traditional structures and changing them into Native Authorities. Chiefs were given power and jurisdiction over traditional affairs.

The sovereign Republic of Zambia came into existence on the 24\textsuperscript{th} October 1964 by operation of the Zambian Independence Act of 1964, an Act of the British government. The Act provided that the territory known as Northern Rhodesia would cease to be a British protectorate and become an independent Republic of Zambia.
As Tordoff (1980) observed, ‘one of the Zambian government’s most urgent tasks in 1964 was to transform the inherited structure of provincial administration- the focal point of the colonial system of government- into an instrument of economic development.’ Thus, in July 1964 the old system of provincial and district government was abolished and, the following month, was replaced by a new, more limited structure of provincial and district government. The reformed provincial and district government arrangement was intended to coordinate and implement government policies and provide a link between government and the new structure of party power. It was stripped of most of its predecessor’s functions, which were distributed among central government ministries and their agencies. For example, the Local Courts Department of the Ministry of Justice took over the reorganisation and running of the old native authority courts (Zambia, 1966a); the responsibility for law and order was devolved to the police... The Ministry of Local Government became responsible for supervising the rural local authorities through its own cadre of local government officers (Tordoff). Further, many important functions of the native authorities were not inherited by the new rural councils but by central government instead. These included responsibility for agriculture, conservation and primary education (Mukwena, 2001).

Between 1964 and 1968, the United National Independence Party government made several attempts to reform the administrative structures. The obvious targets of the reform were the Native Authorities and the pre-fectoral system in provinces and districts. The former were abolished, while the latter were reformed and given the status of civil service, excluding political functions. Instead of Provincial Commissioners (P. Cs) and District Commissioners (D. Cs), there were now Resident Secretaries (R. Ss) and District Secretaries (D. Ss). Provinces were assigned under the Under-Ministers, with power over Ministries and Departments, and charged with the responsibility of the chairmanship of the Provincial Development Committee, consultation with pressure groups such as political parties and trade unions, extensive touring and contact with workers and citizens at the grass roots level (Heissler 1965).

These reforms became a prelude to for political control of provincial and district government. Indeed, Heisler’s view was correct that ‘as the name [resident] secretary
suggested, they became more directly subject to political control, namely that of Under-
Ministers' (Heisler, 1965).

But these changes were undermined by the conflict between Resident Secretaries and
Under Secretaries, and between District Secretaries and Party officials at district level.
Party officials generally tended to interfere in civil service matters, often ignoring
statutory powers of Resident Secretaries and District Secretaries.

As already noted, provincial and district government had been stripped of most its
former functions, which had been distributed to central government and departments.
The district secretary, who was supposed to play a coordinating role at district level, had
thus lost most of his responsibilities- including his power over local authorities.
According to a subsequent report, there were several consequences of this loss some of
which were that, the standing of the district secretary fell drastically. The district
secretary was no longer the most powerful civil servant in the district or the highest paid
or the most educated or the most experienced. As a result other civil servants in the
district stopped respecting him above other civil servants, or to look to him for
leadership; the district secretary ceased to be an effective coordinator of the different
portions of the government machinery- in particular he could not ensure that the local
authorities acted in harmony with the civil service departments. Because of the loss of
status, civil servants in the district became more reluctant to listen to his advice and
directives. The existence of a new political authority in the name of the UNIP Regional
Secretary and his party machine further weakened the district secretary... (Zambia
1979). This reduction in his role created a potential for conflict between him and the
new district-level local government officers.

Because of these and other factors, coordination at district level increasingly broke
down. The situation was aggravated by the proliferation of parastatal bodies, whose
local staff fell entirely outside the authority of the District Secretary. To redress the
situation, the 1968 Working Party's report put forward the following proposals among
others: employment of more provincial and district staff; a higher quality of staff, to be
achieved by channelling most of the new graduates entering the public service into
provincial and district government; giving more power to the District Secretary, especially over rural councils; and freedom from political control (Zambia 1979). The president refused to accept most of these proposals in the package of administrative reforms, which he announced in November of 1968 as he saw them to have been advocating for a return to the colonial system of local government.

In 1969, another wave of reform whose overall goal in the words of the then President Kaunda was ‘to ensure that the influence of government is felt at all levels of society right down to the village and to make doubly sure that government policies and intentions are clearly explained to and understood by all the people …’ began.

This reform had the following strategies, among others:

(i) to revive the pre-fectorial system in the provinces and districts. This saw the appointment of a Cabinet Minister, assisted by a Deputy Minister with a Permanent Secretary appointed in each province. At district level, a District Governor who was to be the Chief political and administrative representative of the President was appointed. A District Secretary who acted as his permanent secretary assisted the District Governor.

(ii) to redesign roles of chiefs and headmen- after this reform, chiefs and headmen were to play roles similar to those they played during the colonial era, but without collection of tax and police responsibilities. The chief’s role was to be that of mobilising peasant participation in development.

(iii) creating participatory structures-participation was to be effected through Development Committees at provincial, district, ward, and village levels (Zambia, 1972).

The 1969 reforms were introduced against a background of events that followed the fateful UNIP general conference at Mulungushi in August 1967, where in the elections to the UNIP Central Committee at the conference, UNIP was split into two main groups: a Bemba-Tonga alliance under Simon Kapwepwe and a Lozi-Nyanja alliance led by Reuben Kamanga. This was very destructive to both the Party and government, and by
February 1968 the internal differences within UNIP had become so severe that President Kaunda briefly resigned both as UNIP and Republican president (Tordoff 1970). Although President Kaunda withdrew his resignation, he was now more anxious than before to strengthen national unity. It is in the light of these events that President Kaunda announced in November 1968 his ‘decentralisation within centralism’ reforms which he defined as a ‘measure whereby through the Party and government machinery, we will decentralise most of the Party and government activities while retaining effective control of the Party and government machinery at the centre in the interest of unity’ (Kaunda 1968). The President went further to state that ‘in short, we decentralise to avoid regionalism...’ (Kaunda 1968).

The 1969 reforms were on a balance unsuccessful. Although the provincial and district government was merged with the Ministry of Local Government, this did not alter the nature of the relationship between central government and local government units, because the latter were left intact as a separate subsystem, and continued to operate independently. Administration at local levels continued to fail to provide an adequate level of coordination. Among the reasons for this was the fact that the District Governor was not explicitly empowered to give firm orders to local civil servants and that he had no formal powers over parastatal staff operating in his district. With regard to the District Governor’s position as chairman of the DDC, the major problem was that D.D.Cs themselves lacked formal or statutory powers; they had no authority to take decisions binding on all committee members answerable to them (Zambia 1979).

President Kaunda did not stop at the 1969 reforms in his quest to strengthen political control over the administration. On December 13 1972, Zambia was proclaimed a one-Party state, thereby granting UNIP constitutional paramountcy over the administrative machinery.

Apart from being a tool for political control, the one-Party state in Zambia came about as a result of various factors with the following being prominent: the need for national integration (already alluded to above); the need for institutional stability; and economic mobilisation. If national unity and government stability were considered in Zambia, they
were mainly so to the population at large if they served as the pre-conditions for substantial rises in their standard of living. For that, economic mobilisation of the population was also required. And this UNIP failed to do, due to the following reasons among others: most of the party activists were absorbed in the civil and foreign service; the party had no trained agricultural cadre- i.e. a political activist living in the village, but knowing government’s agricultural policy and trained in new agricultural techniques and mobilisation methods; shortage of funds to enable the party support an adequate central staff to manage a mobilisation machine; and, economic mobilisation was more difficult than political mobilisation since the latter required so much less effort on the part of those being mobilised, and required far less knowledge than the skills of modern farming (UNZA,1994)

Since independence, the State took on a wider role and greater authority. In the face of wide spread poverty and socio- economic inequality, the State became responsible for re-distributing wealth and providing social welfare programmes. Economic scarcity, lack of infrastructure and an undeveloped private sector caused the State to assume directive economic functions and become a major, if not the major, entrepreneur and investor. And as professional and middle classes grew, the State developed into one of the most important sources of their employment and patronage. As a result, the size and cost of State activities increased rapidly between 1960 and 1979, public consumption as a percentage of gross domestic product rose from 11% and 27% in the country. This led to a phenomenal growth of the Zambian civil service as more people sought employment in State Owned Enterprises. (Mulikita 2000).

With the introduction of a One Party State in 1973 (intra), there was a proliferation of bureaucratic posts as the Party bureaucracy expanded in order to tighten grip over government’s administrative machinery. This led to a bloated wage bill of up to K215 billion on government side (GRZ, 2002). But since the ruling Party (the United National Independence Party or U.N.I.P.) was a non-profit making organization, the cost of paying for the expanded political bureaucracy was inevitably borne by the Ministry of Finance (Mulikita 2000).
Apart from the above reforms, two other political reforms were introduced in 1991 and 1999. The first was the making of members of parliament to become automatic councillors in their districts (Zambia 1992). This reform was meant to make it easy for the Member of Parliament to easily ensure that the council efficiently and effectively served the residents in their constituencies. The second one was the introduction of the position of District Administrator. District Administrators had supposedly been appointed to co-ordinate activities at the district level as the most senior civil servant at that level. They had, among other duties, taken over the District Development Coordinating Committees from the Council Secretaries or Town Clerks. The appointments of these officials coming from the ranks of the ruling Party cadres, coupled with the lack of specified educational minimum and professional qualification for the position lends weight to the argument that the District Administrators were merely the ruling party’s watchdogs strategically placed to increase the party’s chances of winning elections.

Such appointments tended to increase the number of the civil servants. For example, the number of civil servants by 1993, was estimated to be 180,000 (GRZ, 1993) with 65,333 being in the Ministry of Education, and 21,019 (GRZ, 2002) Classified Employees. With this number of employees, the Ministry of Education used a staggering K166 billion on personal emoluments alone (GRZ 2002).

The above mentioned factors made it difficult for government to sustain the continually rising number of public servants. This resulted in dissatisfaction with the performance of the public service. With the ever-growing wage bill, government was unable to meet its balance of payments obligations. As a result, the Briton Woods institutions mounted pressure for government to reform as a condition for balance of payments support (GRZ, 2002).

Because of the pressure the MMD government wholesomely embraced the Structural Adjustment Programme, set up the Zambia Privatization Agency and mandated it to privatise the huge parastatal sector, which had experienced a frolic growth in the Single Party era (Mulikita, 9-11). In addition, the government also announced its determination
to drastically reduce the civil service in order to make it more client-driven as well as enhance basic needs delivery to the general population (ibid).

With the coming of the Third Republic in 1991, came the urgent need for the Government to provide a more enabling environment for the socio-economic development of the country. This necessitated the furtherance of steps already taken to define a Public Service Reform strategy that would transform the civil service and local authorities by implementing the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP).

The objectives of the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) were:

- To improve Government capacity to analyse and implement national policies, and perform its appropriate functions;
- To effectively manage public expenditure to meet fiscal stabilisation objectives;
- To make the public service more efficient and responsive to the needs of the country’s population (Main PSRP Report, 1993; M.O.E. Sensitisation Manual, 2000)

The PSRP had the following activity components:

**Component 1: Restructuring of the Public Service.**

Component 1 had the following objectives: to develop a leaner, more efficient Public Service through restructuring Ministries, Provincial Administrations and Government agencies; develop and implement an appropriate exit programme to assist retrenched officers find alternative livelihoods while instituting improved remunerations and conditions of service for those who will be retained; and, streamline and harmonise planning and budgeting activities in order to improve fiscal discipline.

The component would be achieved through: the restructuring of Ministries and Provinces; study of all laws pertaining to Public Service reform, including labour laws, with particular attention paid to the implications on retrenchment, working out mechanisms and logistics for hiving off Departments which have been identified as economically viable; setting up of Entrepreneurship Development Project and
Information Counselling Service; and carrying out a job evaluation and conditions of service of civil servants.

Component 2: Management and Human Resources Performance Improvement.
Component 2 of the PSRP had the following objectives: to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Public Service in the performance of its functions by establishing management systems of accountability and performance in the public service and developing skills which will enable senior managers to effectively manage the Public Service; and put in place an effective personnel evaluation instrument and management information system to enable the Government to compile and manage data useful in making vital decisions at the time of confirmation, promotion, discipline, transfer and retirement of the public servants.

The objectives of the component would be accomplished through the following activities: the installation of a results-oriented Performance Management System in the civil service; the development and implementation of a management training programme in the civil service; and, the developing and installing of an incentive system for the civil service.

Component 3: Decentralisation and Strengthening of Local Government.
Component 3 had the following main objective: to make Local Government in particular, and District Government in general, efficient, cost-effective and responsive to the needs of local communities in the delivery of high quality services and development. Its specific objectives were:

1. At the National Level- to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) to provide support to autonomous local government in policy formation, implementation, co-ordination and evaluation through better human resources management and training and improved organisational management.

2. At Provincial Level- to improve the co-ordination of strategic planning, implementation of projects and programmes, monitoring and reporting through Provincial Development Co-ordinating Committees (PDCCs) under the overall
direction of the Provincial Permanent Secretary; training and development of provincial personnel to enhance provincial administrative performance; and, strengthening the Provincial Local Government Officer post to co-ordinate the responsibilities of MLGH and to undertake necessary actions for the capacity building and support of Local Authorities.

3. At District Level- to institutionalise strategic and development planning and improve co-ordination between ministries, departments and local authorities at the district level through the district Development Co-ordinating Committees (DDCCs); training and development of district personnel to enhance management and administrative performance, especially in planning, financial, human resources and organisational management in local communities; protect the ideals of, and institutionalise, good governance and local participation in decision making and implementation; and to introduce machinery for financing local government incorporating a sound local revenue base (Main PSRP Report, 1993).

The three PSRP activity components did not differ very much from the main stream restructuring process when it came to restructuring the Ministry Of Education.

**Component 1: Restructuring of the Public Service.**

Under this component, all Ministries including that of Education were to be restructured in order to facilitate the realisation of a minimum but more efficient and effective Public Service which was result-oriented with improved capacity to implement policies and programmes.

This was going to be achieved in the Ministry of Education, through the following activities: restructuring the education system in order to decentralise education delivery; increasing access to schooling; rehabilitating the devastated infrastructure; supplying a sufficient number of teachers and setting standards of performance and achievement. Other activities included, provision of adequate education materials; increasing the education budget; developing records and vital statistics in education; providing nine years of basic education to every child; and enhancing the quality of education provision.
Component 2: Management and Human Resources Improvement.
In the area of management and human resources improvement, the Ministry of Education was to introduce a Performance Management System which was aimed at facilitating accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in education services delivery. This was to be achieved through the introduction of performance indicators and training, especially for senior managers, in such areas as strategic planning, budgeting, financial management and expenditure control and management of change.

The Ministry would put in place an effective Human Resource Management System, an integrated human resources information system, as well as an objective annual open appraisal system. In order to facilitate motivation and retention of qualified personnel, the Ministry would also strive to provide appropriate incentives and rewards which would be tied to the management performance system.

Component 3: Decentralisation and Strengthening of Local Government.
- In the initial stages the Ministry of Education would delegate a number of functions to the local authorities through Education Boards. However, decentralisation would take root later as democratic systems were established at the Local Authority level Report of the Restructuring of the Ministry of Education 2000:1-2).

Statement of the Problem
The main thrust of the PSRP was to transform the public service into an efficient and cost-effective organ for delivering quality services to the people of Zambia. In view of the mixed outcomes of these programmes in other countries, like Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, (Mutahaba and Kiragu 2000), it was necessary to assess the impact of the Public Service Reform Programme on the performance of the public service using the Ministry of Education as a case study.
Objectives of the Study

General Objective
The overall objective of the study was to find out the extent to which implementation of the Public Service Reform Programme in the Ministry of Education improved the performance of the Ministry.

Specific Objectives
- To assess the level of effectiveness in service delivery of the Ministry of Education;
- To determine the level of efficiency in service delivery of the Ministry of Education;
- To suggest ways and means of improving the effectiveness and efficiency in the performance of the Ministry of Education.

Theoretical Framework
In this study, effectiveness referred to the act of producing intended results. Effectiveness was measured by improvements in quality of service, decentralisation and improvement in salary.

Efficiency meant the timely provision of services to the clientele. Efficiency was measured by the length of time it the clientele to obtain services from any office of the Ministry of education.

There are different models used to reform public administration, among them, radical reform (or New Public Management), Incremental reform and Moderate Managerialism (Varheijein 1998). New Public Management is used as short-hand for many of the new trends or reforms in public administration. New Public Management is a strong intellectual paradigm based on Public Choice theory’ and ‘Agency theory’ and it has different reasons and elements.
The first reason that led to the use of NPM in reform efforts, were what was considered to be the short comings of public sector administration, and hence the need for wholesale adoption of private sector values such as ‘risk-taking’, customer focus’, and ‘bottom line orientation’ (Larson 1993).

The second reason seemed to be the need to overcome inefficiency and ineffectiveness caused by traditional monolithic bureaucracies, the functionally organised agencies and the central planning approach (Kaul 1997). The third reason evolved around the role of government. NPM proclaims that the preferred role of government should be changed from acting as the principal vehicle for economic development to that of facilitating development (Kaul 1997). It had also argued that government should move away from a concern “to do” to a concern to “ensure that things are being done.” The managerial focus is to be directed away from “formal process” towards “results.” Kaul pointed out that “the broad objectives of such reform had been to shift emphasis of government from developing plans, to developing key strategic areas, to shift emphasis from inward looking systems to developing partnerships, to shift emphasis from inputs and processes to outputs and outcomes, and to shift emphasis towards managing diversity within a unified public service.

The fourth reason for the use of NPM was the need to have a decentralised management. Here, the major area of emphasis was to break up the huge bureaucracies into more autonomous business units or executive agencies, and giving managers increased control over budgets for which they are accountable.

NPM involved deregulation of line management, conversion of civil agencies or enterprises, performance-based accountability through contracts, and competitive mechanisms such as out-sourcing (Aucoin 1990; Hood 1991). VARIOUS authors also included privatisation and down sizing as part of the package (Ingraham 1996: Minogue 1998).

The main aims of NPM were: result (output) oriented (performance management), customer driven (decentralisation, accountability) and efficiency focussed (competition,
outsourcing, cost benefit), (Jamiai 2000), and introduction of user fees and downsizing (Larbi 1999).

In addition, the behaviour of the reformers/ implementers also mattered. To this effect, the researcher endeavoured to argue his point from the point of view of public choice theory, as advanced by Downs, A (1967). Public theory argue that while public officials were supposed to work in the public interest, putting into practice the policies of government as efficiently and effectively as possible, they were just self-interested utility maximisers motivated by such factors as: salary, perquisites of office, public reputation, power, patronage…., and the ease f managing the bureau.’(Niskanen, 1973)

At the heart of this theory, was the notion that an official at any level be they in the public or private sector, “acts at least partly in his/her own self-interest, and some officials were motivated solely by their own self-interest.” (Downs, 1967) Self-interest was what the individual wanted,(http://forum.belmont.edu./cornwall/archives, 005544.html.) For Downs, broader motivations such as pride in performance, loyalty to a programme, department or government, and a wish to best serve his/her fellow citizens, also affected the official’s behaviour. Downs went on to argue that though in most parts of the public sector the profit motive is absent (as opposed to the private sector where the profit motive is present), the official still aimed to maximise his/her utility. He claimed that this utility maximisation was put into practice through distorting information, discriminatory responses to orders and analysis of policy options in terms of self-interest.

Therefore, this research adopted the NPM model and public choice theory to analyse the contents and processes of the reform programme in the Ministry of Education of Zambia. As could be noticed, Zambia, like many other countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, embraced elements of the NPM approach. This was evident from the reform programme which was in line with the NPM concept. As a model of reform, NPM was based on the current thinking on public sector reform which stipulated that the role of the State and the public sector should be market- oriented, and also on the behaviour of the officials, then it was possible to use it for analysis of the reform in the Ministry of Education. This thinking was also in line with International Monetary
Fund/World Bank supported Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which Zambia was embracing not long ago.

**Significance of the Study**
For a long time, service delivery in Zambia in general and the Ministry of Education in particular, had been a source of concern to the citizenry. The citizenry had been complaining that the services they were receiving were not up to expected standard as workers were not performing as expected. Most of the workers were engaged in one survival strategy or other.

This study would be of use to those involved in the management of learning institutions and also those manning personnel departments in the various ministries as the findings and recommendations of the study could help them institute strategies that could improve workers’ performance. This study would also give Ministry of Education officials insight in ways of retaining the needed human resource.

Furthermore, the study would be of help to those officers who would be involved in the implementation of reform activities in future if they compared the strategies discussed in this study and those that other writers had put forward.

**Literature Review**
In the late 1980s and 1990s, the objective of public administration reforms was to contain and control the costs of running government in response to citizens’ concerns that government was involved in too many activities, which were both unproductive and costly. In many countries (developed and developing), these efforts paid off, in that fiscal discipline was enhanced and deficits were eliminated or contained. However, in some countries, especially where government institutions were still in the process of formation and development, there was no fat to cut; so the reforms cut through to the bone and in some cases deformed the public administration system, which resulted in a serious erosion of government capacity and effectiveness. (Mutahaba and Kiragu 2002).
These public service reforms which were taking place in Africa during the last two decades were part of a global phenomenon that had touched all parts of the world-developed, developing and countries in transition. In developed/industrialised countries these reforms were, to a significant extent, linked to the neo-liberal ideology prevailing in many of those countries in the 1980s. The ideology postulated a diminished role for the public sector and a greater reliance on the private sector. It challenged state involvement in economic activity. In several Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) countries, notably Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, management of public activity shifted from 'public administration' to 'public management' with the accompanying belief that private sector management practices was what the public sector needed (Mutahaba and Kiragu).

In developing countries, including those in Africa, most of the post-1980 public service reforms were initially in the framework of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), and were mainly if not entirely externally generated (Mutahaba and Balogun 1989). The focus of the SAPs was to contain budget deficits. In relation to public service reform, this led to concentration on the need to reduce the cost of the public service, a major element of which related to personnel. Neo-liberalism also informed the external pressures which were being put on African governments to reform and meant the challenge of the virtual monopoly of power of the post-colonial state, and the creation of space for other actors in development. The African state, formerly the exclusive recipient, partner and rationale for international aid, lost its most favoured status, and other agents came in to do more (Israel1991). Privatisation, allowing for the hiving off of activities not seen to be central to the mission of governments, became an avenue of the reform programme. It was expected not only to reduce the overall size of the public service, but it could also reduce pressure on fragile administrations, free resources for essential tasks and allow for a better utilisation of scarce administrative skills (Ibid).

In Kenya, the reform programme was implemented to weed the civil service of people who were perceived to have been a liability to it. The reform programme aimed at achieving this in two ways: firstly, by laying off all those that had a bad medical or disciplinary record and secondly, laying off those who failed to upgrade themselves in
accordance with the schemes of the civil service or were not performing as expected (Samusungwa, 2001) and also through early retirement between 1994-1996 (Mutahaba and Kiragu) though this was reversed through the hiring of teachers during the same period. Fresh efforts were taken from 1999, as part of the revamped PRSP involving adopting targets of retrenching 42,329 (about 10% of the total public service payroll) employees and ‘restriction of the wage bill to an affordable level’ (Mutahaba). As a result, a total of between 25,000,783 and 42,329 officers were separated from the civil service (Samusungwa, 2001). In the education sector, cost sharing was introduced. Prior to the commencement of the policy of cost-sharing, gross enrolment in primary education was almost 100 per cent. Following the introduction of cost sharing, through the introduction of fees and other levies, enrolment by the end of the 1990s had dropped to about 70 per cent (Kiragu 2002).

Though the position of the study in implementation of reform was to lay off those workers with bad medical or disciplinary records and those that failed to upgrade themselves in accordance with civil service schemes, my position was that only those that were non-performers and were nearing retirement could be laid off because there is no more room for them to learn and also that they could not come back for re-employment after they had got the right qualifications. But those who were young and strong but had bad disciplinary records could still be re-trained to change their behaviour so that they could continue contributing to the benefit of the organisation. Therefore, my study differs in the methodology used.

In Uganda, the reforms were introduced as a result of political turmoil. The downsizing effort involved: (a) Rationalisation of government ministries which involved declaring some people redundant in these ministries; (b) Implementation of Personnel Management Information Systems, which were linked to the payroll; (c) Salary Enhancement was another aspect of the reform. This meant increasing some salaries and benefits extended to civil servants in a selected manner; (d) Results Oriented Management, which called for setting of targets and goals for improved service delivery; (e) Training- this was adopted in order to ensure the civil servants remained effective; (f) A Code of Conduct for the entire system was drawn; (g) Public Relations Programme
to inform the public service through the media about the progress of the programme. (g) Public Relations Programme- this was a programme aimed at informing the public through the media about the progress of the programme. Other reasons cited for poor performance were lack of discipline among civil servants, ineffective rules and regulations, obsolete procedures which could no longer be applicable to the civil service, lack of managerial skills among the civil servants, and poor attitudes among the civil servants towards work (Orech, 1995). This had affected the performance of the civil service, badly.

Peter Langseth (1995) followed up the study by Orech by looking at the achievements of the reform programme. He found out that the achievements were impressive. He cited the reduction of the civil service from 320,000 to 147,000 and the military establishment from 90,000 to 50,000 (Langseth) to have been some of the successes. In the same line, Mutahaba and Kiragu (2002) included the reduction of government ministries from 39 to 17 to be among the successes. Public service numbers had also been on the rise since 1998. At the time of the research by Kiragu (2002) the number of civil servants stood at 197 000. In addition the measures to improve transparency of the compensation package were being reversed by the introduction of non-salary allowances.

According to the study, the reform was introduced following a change of government by instituting a number of measures meant to jack up the civil service. In my view, reforms instituted on political grounds were usually not done in good faith. Usually they are targeted at some people who were perceived to be sympathetic of the previous regime. But may be the Ugandan case might have been different as the country was in a transition from turmoil to tranquillity. Even though the Zambian reform followed a change in government the Ugandan study differs with the present study I the methodology.

In Ethiopia the reform was undertaken in order to strengthen the civil service (Chanie, P 2001). The researcher analysed the contents of the reform measures and their relevance and feasibility in the Ethiopian environment. The research took as its sample different members of the civil service and other knowledgeable persons in the field. The study
came up with the following observations: the rationale for initiating the reform programme was weakly articulated; the necessary conditions for reform were either lacking or undeveloped; the reform was donor driven and that it was implemented as a pre-condition for economic assistance; and that the reform measures were merely transplantations. In the conclusion, the researcher argued that the basic reasons behind the weaknesses of the civil service seemed not to have been properly articulated as they were introduced without giving due attention to the country’s administrative history; existing political reality; administrative capacity and economic structure. The researcher used discussions, own observations and secondary sources- books, journals and unpublished reports.

This study does not differ very much with my study as it informed the present study especially on the theoretical framework of analysis and methodology. The study used New Public Management (NPM) as its theoretical framework in analysing the reform programme, which the present study also utilised. It used as its sample different members of the civil service and other knowledgeable persons and collected data through discussions and own observations. This data was supplemented by the other data from secondary sources like books, journals and reports. This study therefore benefited my study in terms of the methodology used.

In Equatorial Guinea (Nnandongo 2000), the reasons were twofold: firstly, the policy of full employment which led to the swelling up of the civil service, and secondly, the politicisation of the civil service. This led into the promulgation of two-decree laws no.2/80 and 22 of April 1980, which led to reduction in number of government ministries from 13 to 11 and the number of civil servants from 4000 to 3000. However, at the time of Nnondongo’s study, the reform was still in its embryonic stage. As such, the results as to the success or failure of the reforms could not be given.

The Equatorial Guinea study was elaborate on the reasons that led to the implementation of the reform programme. The reasons identify somewhat with those that led to the Zambian reform, but differ greatly on the methodology used. The position of the study was that reform could be done through decrees, but my position was that the reform
would only be successful when there was involvement of those who were going to be affected by the reform - the civil servants.

In the Sudan, (Fadllala Ali Fadilala, 1997) reported that the reform efforts were necessitated by the existence of ‘old guards’ in government agencies who seemed to have become stumbling blocks in the path of development by subverting the chain of command in the running of government agencies. According to Fadllala, the reform efforts had the task of identifying these ‘old guards’ and single them out for reform.

The Sudanese study differs with my study I that it gave no framework of analysis except for the reason for instituting the reform effort. But the study gave the methodology of the reform, that of identifying ‘old guards’. Though this methodology worked well in Sudan, it failed to do so in the Ministry of Education. ‘Old guards’ still got positions despite the close that those who had three years more and below before retirement should not apply for positions. Though this methodology worked well in the Sudanese reform, my position to the implementation of the reform was that not all ‘old guards’ should be laid off as this might deprive the organisation of valuable knowledge and skills.

In Ghana, various reasons led to the implementation of the reform. Among the reasons given were: the objective of fostering national objectives of good governance; economic growth and equitable enhancement in the social and political fields; the subjective recruitment system where friends of politicians were appointed; low remuneration; and high wage bill in a state of low productivity and the suspect loyalty of the civil service, among others. The reform was introduced in form of a structural adjustment policy called ‘Programme for Economic Recovery and Structural adjustment’ which was launched in 1983. Under this programme, the number of central government employees was reduced from 301 000 in 1986 to 260 000 in 1990. (Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002).
Despite these positive gains, a wage hike in 1992 cancelled out the previous gain of controlling the wage bill, which as a percentage of GDP nearly doubled from to eight per cent (Kiragu 2002:3). Further, by 1996, the size of the public service had risen to 330 000, about a quarter above the level achieved in the late 1980s.

Even though the position of the study was that reform could come as a result of prescriptions from outside, my position to the study of reform was that this should be a voluntary or home-grown effort at improving service delivery. The indigenous people might not view it to be of benefit to them when it is implemented as a prescription, but rather as a form of employment to those providing technical assistance. But when the effort if home-grown, there would be ownership of the programme on the part of workers. Though the Zambian reform was somewhat a prescription, the indigenous people were allowed to drive it. From the above observation, my study would be said to be different from the Ghanaian study in methodology.

In Britain, the main focus of the reform was on outdated skills, values and methods among generalist civil servants, which impeded both economic modernization and effective implementation of government programmes. This led to the setting up of the Fulton Commission of Enquiry (Chartuverdi 1993). The ensuing Fulton Report in 1968 brought out lack of management skills as a cause of poor performance in the civil service. The reform efforts reduced the civil service from 700, 000 to 500,000 (Kate, J. 1995). Other measures of the reform were the disbanding of several ‘quangos’ or quasi and non-governmental agencies and the abolishing of the Civil Service Department in a bid to reduce the huge bill on public expenditure (Dhubhashi, P. R. 1983). The reform programme produced a smaller civil service as some of the government agencies were privatised while others were contracted out. The reform brought in new styles of working such as result oriented performance and, openness in service delivery resulting from introducing the citizen’s charter (Kate). Consequently, total civil service employment had fallen by 10 percent (ibid).
These results came about because of political will among political leadership, constant support from government, emphasis on results and establishment of agencies that were working well. In addition, real success came about because the civil servants were internally driving the change by following principles that could be used by everyone like clear lines of budgeting, accountability, responsibility, and good management of information. Finally, by using tools like review process, information and financial management (ibid).

The position of the above study that a commission of enquiry be set up to identify shortcomings in the civil service, tied with my own. My belief is that it is better to carry out a skills audit first before a reform was implemented. This would help reformers to identify who to retrench and also what to bring in to improve service delivery. This particular aspect of the reform was of much benefit to Zambian reform as it formed part of the implementation methods.

In Nigeria the reform was necessitated by the uncontrollable size and scope of the public administration as a result of the increasing involvement of the government in social and development programmes of, and the poor level of, productivity. Other causes included the creation of new institutions-central government, local government, etc. in an effort to decentralize governmental operations and provide greater opportunities for citizen participation, political centralism and intergovernmental confrontation and competition; inadequate public sector administrative structures which led to low public sector productivity, lack of national integration, political cohesion and absence of national consciousness, and lastly, shortage of resources- human and materials.

To solve these problems, government introduced modern management techniques such as management by objectives (MBO), project management, and Programme and Performance Budgeting (PPB); encouraging early retirements; re-grading of administrative structures to integrate the public service both laterally and horizontally; increased monetary incentives to motivate public officials. Apart from the above strategies, others strategies like the Public Service Purge of 1975, were promulgated. Under this strategy, 11, 000 officials were summarily dismissed. In addition, a
Permanent Corrupt Practices Investigations Bureau (PCIPB) to deal with corruption in the public service was created.

The study on the Nigerian reform provided the reasons why a reform could be started. It also gave the strategies of how this could be done. The position of the study that training was very cardinal in improving performance was in line with my position that those given positions during reform be trained to sharpen their skills. It would not do to appoint someone to a position and they continue working without being trained in the requirements of that position. The study was of benefit to mine in that it informed it on the strategies to be used on improving performance in the civil service other than putting workers on redundancy.

In Botswana the reform experience did not follow the usual style of reform as the country did not pass through the initial stages of reform but straight went into Public Service Capacity Building Project (PSCBP), leaving rightsizing of ministries and departments to natural attrition, normal wastage and retirements (Chishala, 2001). Instead the government had concentrated on building the necessary capacity in the officers and institutions to improve performance in the public service through setting up of work teams (Hope, 1995). Prior to the launch of PSCAP in 1997, the Botswana government had taken other measures such as, training programmes, prudent financial management, job evaluation and organization and method review which helped to keep in check the growth of the public service and ensured prudent utilization of financial resources.

Despite the continuous improvement, the government decided to introduce four other reform packages: Decentralisation; Performance Management System (PMS); Computerisation; and Human Resource Management (ibid).

Training, re-training and further training was another factor of reform in Human Resource Development, in particular, and in the Public Service in general. For example. UNDP’s project BOT/87/009 provided support, along with the Netherlands Trust Fund, to build capacity at the Botswana University to run an MPA programme, the Institute of
Development Management for training in inventory management, and the Botswana Institute of Public Administration and Commerce for training of accountancy supervisors. Commenting on this point, Harvey and Lewis stated that "the political system allowed real influence for all the population; and the government showed a genuine capacity to analyse and act on its problems as they changed.

The position of this study on reform was that people should not be laid off, but rather should be re-trained to improve their performance. While the study took this view, mine differs from it in that my position is that not all people could be trainable. Because of this some could be laid off to allow for the appointment of others that had the relevant skills and qualifications.

In Haiti the reform aimed at fostering awareness among government officials in order for the public sector to guide effectively Haitian development, whether through a centralized or a de-concentrated or decentralized set of structures, substantial modification of the ways in which human, financial and physical resources were managed, must be changed. In order to achieve this, a three-pronged programme of change in the country's public administration was begun. The programme included firstly, fiscal and budgetary reform to consolidate revenue gathering systems and to rationalize ministries operating budgets; secondly, installation of uniform personnel practices, pre-service and in-service training; and thirdly, modification of organizational structures at national, regional and local levels and the creation of a de-concentrated planning system that would establish vertical linkages that fed local-level planning initiatives into national development planning, and horizontal linkages that permitted multi-sectoral integration and co-ordination of public and private investment (Garcia, J. 1983).

The study gave the aim of the reform to have the guidance of the country's development. According to the study, the reform effort put emphasis on changing the management systems of the country, training of human resources and planning. No worker was laid off in this reform pre-supposing that all workers were efficient in the way they did their jobs, which could not be the case. Just like in other reform efforts in different countries
so far reviewed, retrenchment of workers form part of the reform effort so that only those that had a contribution to make to the organisation, remained.

In the U.S.A, the reform was launched as a form of legislation, the 1978 Civil Service Reform Legislation together with various other measures, such as, ‘the Carter Proposals’. The reform aimed at producing a more highly motivated, productive and efficient federal workforce.

The major provisions of the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and the accompanying Re-Organisation Plans (Numbers 1 and 2) were as follows: codification of the merit system principles; disciplining of personnel who committed prohibited personnel practices; provision of protection for employees who disclosed illegal or improper government conduct; establishment of a new appraisal system, as well as new standards for dismissal based on unacceptable performance; and creation of a Senior Executive Service Scale (SES) which embodied a new structure for selecting, developing and managing top-level federal executives. Other s were provision of a new ‘merit pay’ system which linked pay to the quality of employees’ job performance; abolishing of the Civil Service Commission and creation of new agencies- the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and an independent Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB); establishment of an independent Office of Special Counsel (OSC), with powers to investigate charges of prohibited personnel practices; creation of a statutory base for labour-management relations, which included the establishment of the Federal Labour Relations Authority (FLRA), etc. (Coaldrake, 102-103)

According to Coaldrake, the reform had the character of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ for senior managers. While the CSRA contained a host of provisions covering a wide range of personnel matters, a considerable part of these provisions focused upon, and were specifically designed to upgrade the performance of the more senior managerial and supervisory levels of the federal service. The CSRA provisions covering individuals in these groups- SES and merit pay- looked at security of tenure, bonuses, and merit pay.
Under security of tenure, SES members were to forfeit some of their job security if they were to qualify for bonus payments. On merit pay, individuals in the category were to forfeit their almost automatic annual pay increments, as well as, half of the calculated wage comparability adjustment (cost of living) to which they previously were entitled, so that they could become eligible for salary bonuses which were to be based, as with SES, on the job performance appraisals.

The SES concept embraced a private sector-style rewards-sanctions approach to personnel matters. Superior performance would be encouraged and rewarded with both salary and other incentives, while inefficient or unproductive workers would be penalized. CSRA extended this ‘Carrot’ and ‘Stick’ approach also to managers and supervisors in the sub-executive, GS 13-15 grades immediately below the SES cut-off. As mentioned earlier, this latter group was to become eligible for ‘merit pay’. However, the SES concept had its own problems: one of which was the issue of pay. While the scheme was to result in salary and bonus incentives for superior SES members, such did not happen. Instead of SES members receiving a pay-rise, a ‘pay-cap’ was slapped on them, meaning their salaries were frozen. The result was that most SES members regardless of their position on the six- step executive ladder received identical remuneration. Moreover, in many instances SES members earned the same amount, as did individuals under them who were situated in the upper range of the merit pay category and whose salaries had been adjusted gradually upward by cost-of living increases.

The ‘pay cap’ issue perhaps would not have been so irksome to SES members if the bonus system, as originally devised, had remained intact. Instead the provisions had been considerably diluted. Congress also intervened seeing that a large number of career civil servants were effectively salaried at a higher level than they, the legislators.

The merit pay group (GS 13-15) was similarly disenchanted with the new pay arrangements, which did not provide them with equivalent incentive opportunities despite the fact that it also contains managers and supervisors. In addition, the merit pay group was made to earn their merit pay from the ‘comparability pay’ fund that formerly
had been distributed automatically. In other words, the new arrangements contained a lack of real incentives for job performance but placed an onus to 'earn' increments on the worker.

The provisions of the 1978 Act resulted into conflicts between political appointees and the career officials. The reasons for the tension between the two groups were not difficulty to find. Career officials usually were experts in their fields. They knew the 'territory' - the laws, the interested power centres, and what in the past worked or failed. As a result, these individuals often found themselves in the lonely position of having to identify 'negatives' in the proposals of the political appointees with whom they had to work. For their part, the political appointees tended to interpret such input as obstructive, even in those circumstances where that may no have been the case.

Because SES members' job tenure and benefits were directly dependent upon the outcome of regularly performed job appraisals, there was a growing concern about possible manipulation by the non-career (political) appointees in order to remove career civil servants from SES, as they depended on their political chiefs for both their salary and their job security.

Coldrake concluded that it was apparent that over the years the United States political system had attempted to blame 'government bureaucracy', in particular the 'Washington establishment', for the public's general disenchantment with the performance of government. Such an observation should not, however, suggest that civil service practices were above reproach or that civil service reform was unnecessary; in both cases the contrary was the case. The Nixon years, in particular, had necessitated measures to protect the career civil service from politicization, and indeed the whole realm of government activities from abuse. There was the long-held perception that the operations of the civil service should be pursued along the lines of private sector practice.
The study showed that implementation of the USA reform hinged on two techniques—legislation and creation of new institutions. These techniques usually worked well in countries that had a stable and grown civil service. Legislation and new institutions were important in making the desired changes take root. Though this study does not give the methodology used to study the reform, it however benefits my study on a number of techniques to be used to make implementation of a reform, a success.

In Australia the efforts at reform started in the 1970s and went up to 1984. All efforts were aimed at creating a civil service that was responsive improve public management and make the public sector as effective as the private sector (Wilenski, 1986). Four things made the reforms a success— the passing of legislation addressing the three aspects of reform: democracy, efficiency, equity; creation of new institutions to promote the change, (e.g. the Ombudsman, the administrative Appeals Tribunal); recruitment of new people to foster the change, and introduction of changes in formal processes which were aimed at coming up with flat organizational structures.

The reform package, which included a number of administrative changes as well as the new legislation, concentrated on the improvement of the public service and by-passed what had been described as the primary emphasis of reform activities in other countries, namely, reducing the size of the government and the shift of some functions from government to private sector (New Directions in Administrative Reform, 1983). The reforms provided equitable access to management positions to women and aborigines. In order to make ministers be more close to people, ministerial offices were created; and vacant senior offices were from that time to be thrown to public competition.

The study of the Australian reform provided a classical methodology of reform. This was where the research approximates with mine. But it differed on the aspect where it started looking at the equitability of access to management positions by minority groups like women and aborigines.

In Asia, reform agents were found to have been crucial variables in reform, and that dominant influence of the environment, and the absence of favourable environmental
conditions, e.g. political leadership and timing of reform, hindered the success of the reform programmes (Mario, 1971). While Mario Neeves talked about these, Dr. Jose Abueva, stressed the importance of cultural background, that is, the behaviour of the reform participants in the bureaucracy and the clientele. He charged that the undeclared objectives of reformers-personal advancement, empire-building and elimination of rivals-often served as cultural barriers to administrative reform. The infusion of western influences, he warned, usually, got through in the form of ‘technical cooperation’.

This was the pitfall committed by the change agents in the Philippine case. The assistance of foreign consultants was enlisted in the formulation of personnel specifications and compensation systems. These got as far as being approved by congress and partially implemented by Presidential decrees. However, complaints were lodged against the plans. The classification system was criticised as containing job descriptions inconsistent with actual functions; the pay system was inequitable. Soon top officials of the government started asking for exemption from such personnel specifications and compensation systems. Congress, obviously on the side of the bureaucrats, enacted legislations inconsistent with the proposed salary scales. Thus the project was a failure. The culprits: reliance on foreign models and consultants, lack of support for implementation, limited financial resources, and lack of concurrent political will.

While the position of the study on reform was that assistance of foreign consultants or ‘technical assistance’ was required in reform, my position was that this should not be so. This was because such a reform tended to leave out the indigenous people on participation in implementation. As foreign assistance was actually sought in drawing of job descriptions, such descriptions usually don’t match with what obtained in the host country. My study would benefit on this from the research being reviewed.

In Korea, experience on a three-phase budgetary reform, confirmed the conception that a reform programme will succeed if it obtained the support and understanding of the political leadership. The first two phases- budgetary reclassification and business type accounting- were introduced through a stage-by-stage pilot study. New reclassification
schemes subsequently were adopted and a business type accounting system was instituted in enterprise-type agencies of the Korean government.

In India, the emphasis was on the value of strengthening the civil service and the planning machinery. An All-India Administrative Reforms Commission was created and enjoined to make recommendations to make public administration an instrument for carrying out the government's socio-economic policies and to achieve the goals of development. At the time of the study, government had approved recommendations for the creation of ombudsman-type institutions (offices to handle citizens' grievances) and for the reorganization of the planning machinery. However, those recommendations that tended to strip the bureaucracy of power and patronage were rejected. Thus, in India like elsewhere, the negative attitude of the bureaucracy could torpedo the implementation of basic administrative reforms.

In Malaysia, the reform exemplified a home grown experimentation in comprehensive administrative reform in accordance with a strong statement of government mission. The Malaysian civil service had played a significant role in the country's achievement of economic growth with equity. During the 1960s and 1970s, reforms were focused on transforming the country's law and order administration and development administration so as to make the civil servants the agents of change. Federal, state, and local officials interacted as they discussed development issues; ensuring planning that entailed both 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' inputs. During the 1980s and 1990s, as the economy was liberalized, the private sector began to lead the country's growth, and emphasis shifted to improving the quality of public sector management. The successive series of administrative reforms encompassed changes in structure, management techniques, skills and knowledge, attitudes, and systems and procedures. Structural changes, once established for initiating change, training of staff, administrative development, were seldom changed. This gave them continuity, consistency and legitimacy.

As in other countries, the Malaysian civil service and administrative structures were criticized for growing bureaucratization, increased red tape, and inefficient management. Thus the emphasis of the reform shifted to improving productivity of civil servants
through top management commitment and support; creation of a structure for managing productivity improvement; the involvement of all employees in reform efforts; and training and recognition. Other measures put in place to improve productivity were: reducing the size of the civil service. Measures which supported these aims included: clients' charter, total quality management, and performance indicators. As a result, the public service was also trimmed through privatization and the reduction in the number of civil servants. Some 150 public enterprises, which included airlines and shipping, the railways, and electricity, and communication services, were privatized. This resulted in an estimated 10 percent of the public service, some 90,000 employees being laid off (MDGD).

In order to improve the performance of individual civil servants, the Malaysian government, introduced a number of direct measures, which included, non-discrimination in employment, which gave women equal opportunity for employment in the civil service; practices to improve recruitment and retention; a new performance appraisal system, which encompassed a determination of annual work targets, a mid year review, an open process of performance appraisal, and the establishment of Coordination Panels on Performance Appraisal and Salary to ensure fairness. Other measures included a comprehensive remuneration system, which provided for performance incentives; enhancement of staff training and development; and the development of a public service code of conduct which aimed at: a highly disciplined civil service which was responsible and committed to their jobs; excellence in job performance, high productivity and quality in the delivery of service, and a clean service, which was free of any taint that could mar its image. The regulations stipulated not only a code of conduct, but disciplinary procedures as well.

The Malaysian reform experience provided various lessons. It provided a case of pragmatic, incremental and sustained administrative reform. Malaysia undertook its reformation in tandem with social, economic and political changes in the country as a whole under the pervasive guidance of a united party and leadership. CSR in Malaysia had been based on developing appropriate institutions, recruiting merit-oriented personnel who were well motivated and rewarded for performance, the coherence of
well-articulated policies and the close collaboration of the country’s public and private sectors within the framework of Malaysia Incorporated.

Above all, the national vision of growth with equity, had served as the keystone of reform, preserving civil service autonomy and providing equitable benefits to the civil society.

The Argentine the public sector exhibited all the classic symptoms of a bloated bureaucracy, coupled with chronic deficits by 1989. In addition, certain economic policies and legislation, a public sector environment in which corruption flourished, even to the point of looting. Increasing financial shortfalls beset the expansion of public enterprises that had begun during the 1950s. Public services had become more and more inefficient as personnel rolls grew. During the 1960s and 1970s, the state had become the major agent for alleviating deepening social crisis. Public employment seemed the only means of putting people back to work. By 1980, the national public payroll encompassed 780,000 people and increased to 900,000 by 1989. Similar developments had taken place at the provincial and municipal levels, whose workforce increased from 750,000, in 1983; to more than 1,000,000 in 1989 (MDGD). As fiscal crisis deepened, salaries dropped from 5.8 percent in 1973 to 3.1 percent in 1989. The public service salary structure was compressed dramatically- from a ratio of 10:1 during the 1960s to 4:1 by the end of the 1980s.

In the 1980s, two measures to reduce personnel levels were implemented: voluntary retirement and vacancy freeze. Nearly 10,000 public service employees retired and the vacancy freeze halted further growth of public employment. But the financial crisis remained. When President Menem came to power in 1989, economic reform and drastic restructuring of the public sector were unavoidable. The 1989 laws for Administrative Reform and Economic Emergency included: privatization of all state enterprises; decentralization of health and education services to the provinces; rationalization of personnel and pay structures in the central administration; elimination of superfluous state organizations; and overall strengthening of management to facilitate the development of smaller, ethical and more efficient public sector.
To support these objectives, the Menem government implemented a macroeconomic strategy to eradicate the prevailing hyperinflation and reform the civil service as it was downsized. Some of the strategies used included: transfer of public enterprises to private sector; and decentralization of health and education services to provinces. However, a lack of precise statistics on occupied and vacant posts created problems in this aspect of the reform; cutbacks in the central administration and its redesign; elimination of organization/ agencies at both central and provincial levels; cutbacks on political posts; abolishing temporary personnel, and instituting an early and voluntary retirement programme for the other category, of workers, except professionals with university degrees. Other measures included the redesign of administrative structures; a new human resource policy; and reform of provincial administration.

Lessons from the Argentine experience were that, profound changes could take place in the public sector, given the necessary political will, capacity and willingness to apply prior experiences; rationalization of the public sector was a complex, risky process which required the transformation of an overburdened economy with a low capacity for the absorption of labour; dismissals and retrenchments had high economic and social costs that required offsetting by complementary measures; an economic growth programme must accompany the state’s effort to rationalize public employment; and that, a modest but more efficient state could be achieved only through an integrated strategy for strengthening human resources in the public sector, which included the modernisation of management techniques, and improved methods of entry selection.

In Poland, the reforms focused exclusively on administrative arrangements at the central level. This was followed up with the creation of local self-governing institutions in 1999. New responsibilities were given to these institutions, such as secondary-school education, along with additional financial resources, which included a share of corporate and personal taxes collected by the central government, and the right of local governments to tax land and housing. These reforms led to significant devolution of power from the central government to the provincial governors, who oversaw specialized administrations, including school supervision bodies. They also became the
primary authorities for more than 1,300 state-owned enterprises which were earlier managed by ministries in Warsaw.

A new Civil Service Act, which ensured that non-political jobs in public administration went to career public servants and that they retained their jobs regardless of changes in the government of the day, was passed in 1996. One means of overseeing the workings of the civil service was the introduction of an ombudsman system, to investigate and report on claims of mal-administration. The Polish ombudsman was elected by parliament for a period of four years.

A number of legal measures had also been introduced to maintain high ethical standards and reduce corruption in Polish public administration, among these were the following: a ban on employment of married couples and persons tied by bonds of kinship where they were linked by reporting lines; restrictions on business activities by state employees, which included ownership of stocks in firms and serving on company boards; declarations by civil servants and parliamentarians of their assets and those of their closest family members; and barring offers of public tenders to relatives of state employees for public sector purchases.

In personnel practices, an open system of recruitment of administration staff was followed by press announcements, competitions and qualifying interviews before a commission. Results and missions stemming from inspections of public administration entities were made public. There was a continuous analysis of the results of various inspections carried out in state bodies, as well as information which was obtained from the general public, to determine which state bodies exhibited symptoms indicative of illegal activities. There was also a training programme for new civil servants, which included lectures on ethical and pragmatic aspects of service.

The lessons that could be learnt from the Polish reform experiences were that: while the task of such comprehensive change was difficult, it could be done slowly if sufficient awareness and commitment about the desired actions and results were widely shared by the citizens, priorities established and appropriate action taken.
The Polish experience also showed the significance of watchful eyes, assessment and guidance from regional organizations to countries that were reforming.

The MDGD study of the three countries- Malaysia, Argentina and Poland- was similar to my study on the following points, among others: first that it as important for civil servants to participate in the reform effort as they were the people to carry out the intentions of the reformers; second, the ‘non-subjectivity’ of the reform on recruitment as it laid emphasis on the merit oriented recruitment of personnel. But the study differed with mine on the point that civil servants could work together with the private sector in implementing a reform effort; and, on the point that regional bodies should watch, assess and guide the efforts of those countries, reforming.

Most of the literature so far reviewed did not help the researcher in the methodological aspect of the research as it did not provide any methods, with the exception of the literature on the Ethiopian reforms. Most of it seemed to provide information on the results of the reform leaving out the methodologies used to reach the results. In terms of frame works of analysis, it was only the literature on the Ethiopian reform which had a frame work of analysis while others did not have any.

The literature also showed that researchers concentrated on the reasons for reform, that is, to improve delivery of service. Most wrote that delivery of service had gone down in the countries they studied, hence the need for reform. A good number the researchers gave retrenchment of workers, creation of new institutions, enactment of new laws, and reduction in the number of ministries as some of the ways through which countries tried to improve on delivery. Though this seemed to have been the ‘raison de etre’ behind most reforms in most countries, some believed that behaviour change through retraining was the most important.

The lessons that could be learned from these reforms included the following, among others: firstly that prescriptive reform rarely worked because they never took into consideration the administration of the people as happened in Ethiopia. Secondly where foreign assistance was sought, the foreign consultants should be able to work side by
side with the local experts so that when they left, the local experts would be able to continue from where they would have left (ibid).

The other lessons were those of involving the public servants in the reform programme (William, Dodoo, Kate) to prevent any forms of resistance; unions could also be involved especially when it came to identifying those to be retrenched or laid off (Williams); and that political will must also be strong enough to go ahead with the reform programme as it happened in Argentina and Malaysia (MDGD).

Others were that reform should not be instituted because there was a change in the leadership of the country because if the regime that initiated the reform went out of power, the incoming one might not have the zeal to continue with the programme (MDGD; in addition, a heartless laying off of workers had been shown to have very negative effects on the economy (Nnandongo). The other lesson of significance was that regional bodies should keep an eye on all those countries under their umbrella, reforming (MDGD).
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY

Research Design
The main purpose of the study was to find out the extent to which the Public Service Reform Programme had improved performance of the Ministry of Education. In order to accomplish this task, the study used both qualitative and quantitative research designs in the selection of the sample for purposes of research.

A sample size of 185 respondents was taken out of a population of about 610 people using convenience sampling technique. Out of 185 respondents, four were principals of High School Colleges, 76 were High School teachers, and 70 were Basic School teachers. Directors, Assistant Directors and Chief Human Resources Management Officers were also included in the sample to provide informed views as they were involved in the implementation of the programme. Principals of High School Colleges and the teachers were important because they were going to benefit in terms of promotions during the restructuring process.

The sample was selected from the following categories of the population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Schoolteachers (Lusaka District)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Schoolteachers (Chongwe District)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Schoolteachers (Lusaka District)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Schoolteachers (Chongwe District)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal of High School Colleges</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors (Cabinet Offices)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors (Ministry of Education)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Directors (Cabinet Office)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Directors (Ministry of Education)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public stratum</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accessibility was used as the criterion for selection of the required number of High and Basic Schools from where respondents were drawn. Using this criterion, five High Schools out of thirteen in Lusaka and two out of three in Chongwe District were
selected; five Basic Schools out of 96 in Lusaka and three out of 58 in Chongwe districts were selected, and samples drawn from them.

**Population**
The study population included 206 High School and 209 Basic School teachers in Lusaka district and 71 High School and 102 Basic School teachers in Chongwe district. Others included the four Principals of High School colleges, Directors and their Assistants in the Human Resource and Administration departments at Cabinet Office and Ministry of Education headquarters, and members of the public. The two categories of teachers were involved instead of one to gauge whether the programme benefited one category and not the other.

**Research Setting**
The study was conducted in two districts of Zambia’s Lusaka Province, namely, Lusaka, and Chongwe districts. Lusaka district, being the capital city of the country was predominantly urban while Chongwe was predominantly rural. The population of Lusaka comprised mostly of people in formal employment and self-employment. Those in self-employment included marketers and street vendors. In contrast, that of Chongwe district was mixed. That of Chongwe consisted of people who were engaged in formal employment and self-employment but a large number is engaged in agriculture. Literacy levels of the two populations might be difficult to compare. Suffice to say that those in Lusaka were provided with more opportunities of advancing themselves academically than those in Chongwe.

**Data Collection Instruments**
A separate structured questionnaire with both close and open-ended questions was designed for each category of the population. The questionnaires were self-administered. The self-administered questionnaires were chosen for literate respondents. Some key questions were repeated in all the four questionnaires. The questionnaires did not require respondents to provide information that would lead to their identification. The actual number of questionnaires distributed to respondents was 185 and out of this number 152 questionnaires were responded to, while 33 were not.
Problems Encountered During Data Collection

The most serious problem concerned time and finances. Time became a problem as the researcher was working full time. Finances also became a problem in that when the researcher completed his part one of the programme, the sponsoring institution almost refused to fund his second part of the programme. This led to delay in the completion of the programme.

Data Analysis

Data was analysed using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The qualitative data was analysed using themes, while quantitative data were analysed using percentages, frequency tables, and other appropriate tables and figures. Cross tabulations for variables, though were done manually as data was not analysed using SPSS.

Pilot Study

The pilot study was carried out in Lusaka district at Munali Boys High and Munali Girls High Schools and in Chongwe district at Chongwe Basic School. The questionnaire designed for teaching staff was administered to 30 teachers with the aim of testing the suitability of the data collection tools, on how to use them, test their validity, length of time taken to administer them, and other possible problems. Based on the findings of the pilot study, the questionnaire was revised.

Characteristics of the Sample

Before looking at whether the reform programme had improved performance in the Ministry of Education or not, the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents were analysed. Among the factors considered were nationality of the respondents; age group; sex; marital status and educational qualification. Others were the type of institution a respondent worked in; post held by a given respondent; district where the respondent was based and the type of professional teachers’ certificate one had. Nationality was included among the socio-demographic characteristics with the assumption that non-Zambians would be treated differently by the officials, there by negating some of the responses the Zambians would give. With the emphasis on gender taking centre stage,
sex was included among the characteristics. Others characteristics included were marital status, level of education and professional qualification.

**Table 2.1: Distribution of the sample by nationality (percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Basic school teachers</th>
<th>High school teachers</th>
<th>Principals of High school college</th>
<th>Key informants</th>
<th>Respondents from the public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambian</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugandans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first characteristic researched on was nationality. This characteristic had some significance in influencing one’s being appointed during the restructuring programme. But because in our schools, we find teachers of different nationalities, four nationalities that seemed likely to be found in Zambian schools were put as possible responses—Zambian, British, Ghanaian and Nigerian. In case there was one who did not fit in the four suggested responses, another response—other was included. The research found that 100 percent of Basic school teacher respondents were Zambian. Among High school teachers 97 percent were Zambian nationals and 3 percent were of Ugandan origin. 100 percent of Principals of High school colleges and key informants were Zambian (see Table 2.1)

**Table 3.2: Distribution of sample by age group (percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Basic school teachers</th>
<th>High school teachers</th>
<th>Principals of High school colleges</th>
<th>Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 - 29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 – 39</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 49</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 – 59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The sample for Basic School teachers was composed of 23 percent of respondents in the age group 20 - 29; 46 percent of the age group 30 – 39; 24 percent of the age group 40 – 49 while 7 percent formed the age group 50 – 59. There was no respondent in this category of respondents who was aged 60 and above. The sample for High School teachers was composed of 20 percent of respondents aged between 21- 29; 37 percent of respondents were aged between 31 – 39 years; 34 percent of the respondents were aged between 40 – 49 years and nine percent between 50 – 59 years. Just like in the above category of respondents, there was no respondent aged 60 years and above. That of Principals of High School colleges comprised of 100 percent respondents aged between 40 and 49. Equally this sample did not have a member who was aged above 60 years. 70 percent of the public respondents were single and 30 percent of them were married. There was no divorced, widowed or separated respondent among them.

Table 3.3: Distribution of respondents by gender (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High school teacher</td>
<td>Basic school</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Principals of High school colleges</td>
<td>High school teacher</td>
<td>Basic school teacher</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Principals of High colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third characteristic that was researched on was ‘sex’. The sample of Basic School teachers comprised of 43 percent male and 57 percent female respondents; that of High school teachers comprised 54 percent male respondents and 46 percent female respondents. 67 percent of the Principals of High School Colleges were male while 33 percent were female. The sample for key informants was comprised of 100 percent male only. 60 percent male and 40 percent female respondents comprised the sample for respondents from the public as shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.4: Distribution of respondents according to marital status (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Basic school teachers</th>
<th>High school teachers</th>
<th>Principals of High school teachers</th>
<th>Public respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marital status was the fourth characteristic of the sample to be looked at. Responses were as shown in figure 2.4. Among the Basic School teachers 23 percent were single, 68 percent were married, one percent was divorced, seven percent were widowed and one percent separated. The sample of High School teachers was composed of 11.26 percent single, 80 percent married, 5.63 percent divorced, and three percent widowed respondents. The sample had no separated respondents. All Principals were married while 70 percent and 30 percent of members of the public were single and married, respectively.

Table 3.5: Distribution of sample by Education Qualification (percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Qualification</th>
<th>Basic school teachers</th>
<th>High school teachers</th>
<th>Principals of High school colleges</th>
<th>Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 5/ Grade 12</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fifth characteristic was education qualification. This characteristic was measured using six levels- Form 3, Form 5/Grade 12, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, Doctorate degree and any other qualification other than those given that respondents might have attained. The characteristic was represented by three percent of Form 3s and 97 percent of Form 5/Grade 12 among Basic School teachers. There were no respondents with bachelor, masters and doctorate degrees or any other qualification not
listed among the responses. Among High School teachers and Principals of High School colleges, 100 percent of them were form 5/grade 12; while the other levels were not represented. 50 percent of public respondents were Form 3 while the other 50 percent were Form 5/Grade 12. (Table 2.5)

Table 2.6: Distribution of sample by district (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Basic school teacher respondents</th>
<th>High school respondents</th>
<th>Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongwe</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sixth characteristic of relevance was the district in which each of the respondents worked. The statistics were as in figure 2.6 above. 35 percent of the Basic School teachers were from Chongwe District, 65 percent from Lusaka, while 26 percent of High School teachers were from Chongwe District and 74 percent were from Lusaka District. 100 percent of the public respondents were from Chongwe.

Table 2.7: Distribution of sample by Professional Teacher’s Qualification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Teacher’s Qualification</th>
<th>Basic school teachers</th>
<th>High schools teachers</th>
<th>Principals of high school colleges</th>
<th>Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher’s certificate</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher’s diploma</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor of Arts with education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last characteristic of the sample researched was the professional qualification of the respondents. This characteristic was measured using four levels- teachers’ certificate, teachers’ diploma, Bachelor of Arts with education degree and other- where respondents
were supposed to indicate if they held any other professional teachers’ qualification than the ones suggested. As could be seen from figure 2.7, 53 percent of Basic School teachers held a teacher’s certificate, while 47 percent of them had a teacher’s diploma. Among High School teachers, 72 percent held a teachers’ diploma and 28 percent had a teachers’ degree. 100 percent of Principals of High School colleges held a Bachelor of Arts with education degree; while 100 percent of public respondents held other professional qualifications not listed among the options (see Table 2.7 above).
CHAPTER 3
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

The overall objective of restructuring Government Ministries was to improve performance. As previously stated, the overall objective of the PSRP was to improve performance. The overall objective of this study was to find out the extent to which implementation of the PSRP in the Ministry of Education improved the performance of the Ministry.

Effectiveness of Service Delivery System

Although implementing a programme concept may seem straightforward, in practice it is often difficult. Reform programmes contend with many adverse influences that may affect the effectiveness of service delivery. In this study, effectiveness was measured by quality of service, decentralisation and improvement in salaries as previously indicated.

As starting point respondents were asked whether they had sought to obtain service from any office of the Ministry of Education in the last three years. 93 percent of Basic School teachers said they had and seven percent said they had not. Among the High school teachers, 90 percent said they sought to obtain services but 10 percent said they did not (see figure 3.1).

![Figure 3.1: Respondents seeking to obtain service from any office of the Ministry of Education](image)

Public members were also asked a similar question as to whether they sought to obtain services at any of the various levels of the education system in the last three years. Their responses were as indicated below:
40 percent of them sought to obtain services at Ministry headquarters; 60 percent at the Provincial Education office; 10 percent at DEBS office, the Provincial and District Human Resources offices, respectively. 30 percent said they sought service at Principal’s office, 20 percent at the Vice Principal’s office and 40 percent at the Head teacher’s office, while 60 percent said they did not seek to obtain services at Ministry headquarters, 40 percent at Provincial Education Office, 50 percent at Provincial Human Resource office, the District Education Board Secretary and the District Human Resources office; 30 percent and 40 percent at Principal’s office and Vice Principal’s office respectively and 30 percent at head teacher’s offices. 40 percent did not respond to the question as whether they sought to obtain services at Provincial HR office, DEBS office, and District HR office Principal’s office and also at Vice Principal’s office respectively. The other 30 percent gave a ‘no response’ answer as to whether they sought to obtain services at the head teacher’s office.

A further question was asked to the public respondents as to whether they were referred to superiors to have their problem resolved at their visit to any of the offices of the Ministry, using the responses ‘never’, ‘often’, and ‘very often’. None of the respondents said they were ‘never’ referred to superiors but 80 percent indicated that they were ‘often’ referred to superiors during their visits to these offices; while 20 percent said they were ‘very often’ referred to superiors. A further question was put to them seeking to find out whether they had to ‘make a return trip’ to the offices for the resolution of
their problem. Again 80 percent responded that they had to, while 20 percent said they did not have to do so (see figures 3a and b). A conclusion could be drawn that when respondents visited the various Ministry of Education offices, they were either referred to superiors or asked to go back to the office in order to have their problems resolved.

As earlier stated, both Basic School and High School teachers went to Ministry of Education offices to seek service. 34 percent of Basic School teachers rated the quality of services they received during their recent visit to any of the office of Ministry of Education to be ‘very poor’ and 57 percent of them to be ‘poor’ giving an aggregate response for poor quality of services to be 91 percent. On the positive side, nine percent rated the services to have been ‘good’ while none rated them to be ‘very good’. High School teachers, rated the quality of services to have been ‘very poor’ at 27 percent and to have been ‘poor’ at 41 percent giving an aggregate percentage of 68 percent, yet some of them rated the services to have been ‘very good’ at two percent and ‘good’ at 30 percent giving an aggregate response of 32 percent. None of the public members rated the services they received to have been ‘poor’, but they rated them ‘very poor’ at 10 percent, ‘good’ at 30 percent and ‘the same’ at 60 percent (see figure 3.4)
A comparison of the aggregate negative responses of 91 percent and 62 percent for the two groups, against their positive ratings of nine percent and 38 percent, respectively, showed that the quality of services rendered to each of the respondents had not improved. From the responses, it could be concluded that when respondents sought to obtain services from the various offices of Ministry of Education, the services they received were not up to the expected standards.

Further, a question was put to the four groups of respondents to find out whether or not the restructuring programme had put the right people in the right positions. In response 45 or 78 percent of Basic School teachers, 45 or 63 percent of High School teachers and 67 percent of Principals of High School Colleges, said it did not put the right people in the right positions. But 13 or 22 percent and 26 or 37 percent of Basic School and High School teachers respectively, 100 percent of the key informants and 33 percent of High School College Principals argued that the programme had put the right people in the right positions. On being asked whether this had improved service delivery, the people who had said the programme had put the right people in right positions answered as follows: nine or 69 percent of Basic School teachers, 12 or 46 of High School teachers and 67 percent of Principals of High School Colleges responded that it had not. However, four or 31 percent of Basic School teachers, 14 or 54 percent of High School teachers, one Principal of High School Colleges and all key informants said the programme had put the right people in the right positions, thereby improving service delivery (see figures 3.5a and b, below).
A question was asked to the public members on whether there was an improvement in the number of schools. To this question, 80 percent of them said there was an improvement while 20 percent said there was no improvement. Another question was asked to find out whether they tried to get a school place for their child/ward or not. 80 percent said they had tried while 20 percent said they had not tried. In response to a follow up question as to how easier it had become to find a school place now that the Ministry of Education had been restructured than before the Ministry of Education was restructured, 60 percent said it had not become any ‘easier’ while 20 percent responded that it had become ‘easier’ and another 20 percent said it had become ‘much easier’. When the aggregate responses for ‘not easier’ (60 percent) and for ‘easier’ and ‘much easier’ (20 percent and 20 percent respectively) were compared, a conclusion that it was not ‘easier’ to get a school place now than before could be drawn (see figure 3.6 below).
A follow up question was asked on the easiness of finding a place at the different levels of learning, that is, Basic School, High School and College. 70 percent responded that it was easy to find a place at Basic and High School levels and only 20 percent said it was easy to do so in a College, but 30 percent and 80 percent said it was not easy to find a place at Basic and High School, and Colleges levels, respectively (see figure 3.7 below). The responses led to a conclusion that it was easier to get a place at basic and High School levels than at College level.

Following their answer to the question on improvement in easiness of finding a place at the different levels of learning, the public respondents were asked on the improvement in affordability of fees at those levels when a place was found. 65 percent and 50 percent said there was improvement in affordability fees at Basic and High School levels than at College and only 40 percent said there was improvement in affordability of fees at College level. Meanwhile, 35 percent, 50 percent, and 60 percent said there was no improvement in affordability of fees at Basic at all levels. From the responses, it was clear that there was improvement in affordability of fees at Basic and High School levels, respectively, than at College level, as figure 3.8 shows.
Respondents were asked to compare the quality of services rendered to them during their recent visit to any office of the Ministry of Education, to that they received three years ago. 24 percent of the Basic School teachers said the services were ‘worse’ while 53 percent said they were of ‘the same’ quality as those they received three years ago while 18 percent said the services were ‘better’ and five percent said they were ‘better’. (Diagram 3). The High School teachers on their part said the services were ‘worse’ at 19 percent and 62 percent for the ‘same’, respectively, while 19 percent said the quality had become ‘better’. Members of the public were also asked a question along similar lines and they gave similar responses like those of the Basic School and High School teachers. 60 percent of the public members said the quality of services had remained ‘the same’ and 10 percent of them said the quality had become ‘worse’ and only 30 percent said the quality had become ‘better’. Looking at the aggregates of the three groups on negative side (quality not improved) and those on the positive (quality improved) a conclusion that quality of service had not improved could be drawn (see diagram 3.9).
Key respondents and Principal of High School colleges were asked a question as to whether they agreed, strongly agreed, disagreed or strongly disagreed that the policy of cost sharing had improved the quality of services rendered in the Ministry of Education. 100 percent of Principals of High School Colleges disagreed that the policy of cost-sharing had improved quality of services rendered by the Ministry of education. Equally, 100 percent of key informants ‘disagreed’ that the policy of cost sharing had improved the quality of services rendered by the Ministry of Education. The responses showed that the policy had not improved quality of service rendered by Ministry of Education (see figure 3.10).

Further on quality of services, respondents were asked to choose from a list of suggested options the one they thought was the best in improving service delivery in the Ministry of Education, in the event that the right were not put in the right positions. The options suggested were: re-training of officers holding positions for which they qualify; giving
high salaries to officers holding positions for which they qualify; giving good accommodation to officers holding positions for which they qualify; and replacing officers who held positions for which they did not qualify. 100 percent of Basic School teachers and 38 percent of High School teachers chose re-training of officers holding positions for which they qualify to be the best option of improving service delivery. 38 percent of High School teachers chose the ‘giving of high salaries to officers holding positions for which they qualify to have been the best option to improve service delivery. 16 percent of High School teachers chose giving good accommodation to officers holding positions for which they qualify and eight percent respectively, chose replacing officers who held positions for which they did not qualify to have been the best options. Both groups of respondents thought retraining officers holding positions for which they qualify was the best option to improve performance in Ministry of Education, as in figure 3.11 below.

![Figure 3.11: Best option to improve service delivery in the Ministry of Education](image)

Decentralisation

Decentralisation formed one of the strategies of the restructuring programme in the Ministry of Education. This called for the decentralisation of certain functions like the running of schools and colleges from the centre to the field level offices. This was done through the creation of Education Boards in these institutions.
To assess the effect of decentralisation on service delivery, respondents were asked whether or not they agreed that the coming of Education Boards had improved performance in the Ministry of Education. 46 percent, 25 percent, and 33 percent of Basic School teachers, High School teachers and Principals of High School Colleges, respectively, indicated their agreement to the question; 46 percent, 43 percent and 67 percent of Basic School teachers, High School and Principals of High School Colleges respectively disagreed to the question, while eight percent and 32 percent of Basic School teachers and High School teachers could not tell whether the coming of Education Boards had improved service delivery or not. The aggregates as showed that the creation of Education Boards did not improve performance of the Ministry in terms of service delivery, as could be seen in diagram 3.12.

![Figure 3.12: Effect of creation of Education Boards on performance of the Ministry of Education](image)

Another question was asked to the respondents to rate the amount of discretion the Education Boards were allowed in making decisions that affected their operations, using the following responses: ‘no discretion’, ‘little’, and ‘a lot’. 18 percent and 19 percent of Basic School and High School teachers, respectively, said there was ‘no discretion’ allowed to the Boards. 74 percent and 62 percent of Basic School and High School teachers said ‘a little’ discretion was allowed to the Boards, while eight percent and 19 percent of Basic School and High School teachers, respectively, indicated that ‘a lot’ of discretion was allowed to the Boards in making decisions that affected their operations. 67 percent of Principals of High School Colleges responded that a ‘little’ discretion was allowed to the Education Boards, while 33 percent said a ‘lot’ of discretion was allowed.
to the Boards to make decisions that affected their operations. The aggregate for 'no discretion' and 'a little' discretion (92 percent) for Basic School, 81 percent for High School teachers and 67 percent for Principals of High School Colleges showed that Education Boards in schools and colleges where respondents were drawn from were not given enough discretion to make decisions that affected their operations as shown in figure 3.13 below.

![Figure 3.13: Amount of discretion allowed to Board members to make decisions that affect the operations of the Education Boards.](image)

Respondents were then asked to indicate the frequency at which the Education Boards received instructions from the District Education Board Secretary (DEBS) as a way of measuring 'lack of discretion' by the education boards. Basic School teachers indicated zero percent for 'never', 69 percent and 31 percent, for 'often' and 'very often, respectively. High School teachers indicated 19 percent for 'never', 56 percent for 'often and 25 percent for 'very often'. Principals of High School Colleges indicated 100 percent, for the response 'never; zero for 'often' and 'very often' respectively. The aggregates for 'often' and 'very often' were 100 percent and 81 percent for Basic and High School teachers, respectively. This showed that the frequency at which Basic and High Schools received administrative instructions from DEBS ranged from 'often' to 'very often; while colleges never received administrative instructions form DEBS office (see figure 3.14a below).
Respondents were again asked to indicate the frequency at which the Education Boards received instructions from the Provincial Education Office as a way of measuring 'lack of discretion' by the Education Boards. Basic School teachers' response to this question were 8 percent for 'never', 62 percent for 'often' and 30 percent for the response 'very often'. High School teachers gave the following responses for the same question: 32 percent for 'never' 20 percent for 'often' and 48 percent, for 'very often'. Principals of high school colleges gave zero percent for 'never', 100 percent for 'often' and zero percent for 'very often'. The aggregates showed that all three Education Boards- Basic School, High School and College- received administrative instructions from PEO at frequency of 92 percent, 58 percent and 100 percent, respectively (see figure 3.14b)
Respondents were further asked to indicate the frequency at which the Education Boards received instructions from the Ministry of Education headquarters as a way of measuring 'lack of discretion' by the Education Boards. Basic School teachers' responses to this question were eight percent 'never', 54 percent, 'often' and 38 percent, 'very often'. High School teachers gave the following responses, 38 percent for 'never', 49 percent for 'often' and 13 percent for 'very often'. The following responses were given by Principals of High School Colleges, zero percent for 'never', 33 percent for 'often' and 67 percent for 'very often' (see figure 3.14c). The aggregate responses (92 percent for Basic School teachers, 62 percent for High School teachers and 100 percent for Principals of High school Colleges) showed that all Education Boards 'often' received administrative instructions from Ministry of Education headquarters.

![Figure 3.14c: Frequency of receiving administrative instructions from Ministry of Education headquarters regarding the running of Education boards.](image)

**Salaries**

The salaries and conditions of service for public service employees, which included those in the Ministry of Education, had continued to be unattractive in comparison to those in the private sector. This had made it difficult for public service in general, and the Ministry of Education, in particular, to attract and retain the right calibre of personnel from within and from outside. Unattractive salaries and conditions of service had also led to the general de-motivation of Ministry of Education employees resulting into low productivity and poor service delivery. In order to evaluate the effect of salaries on service delivery a number of questions were asked.
The first question required respondents to indicate their salary scales. Basic schoolteachers who said they were in wrong salary scales included those who were in ESS08 (2), ESS09 (3), ESS10 (7), ESS12 (2). High school teachers said they were in ESS04 (2), ESS07 (2), ESS08 (5), ESS09 (3), ESS05 (5) and ESS11 (2)

Respondents were asked if they thought they were put in the right salary scale. Their responses were as shown in figure 3.15 below. 47 percent of Basic and 34 percent of High School teachers, respectively, said they were put in the right salary scales. 100 percent of Principals of High School Colleges, 66 percent of High School teachers and 53 percent of Basic School teachers, respectively, said they were not put in the right salary scales (see figure 3.15). It could be concluded from the responses that most respondents from the three groups, were not put in right scales.

![Figure 3.15: Respondent put in the right salary scale during restructuring](image)

Following their answers to the above question, the three groups of respondents were again asked to rate their degree of satisfaction with their salary and allowances. 49 percent of Basic School teachers and 70 percent of High School teachers said they were 'very unsatisfied' with their salaries. Basic School teachers and High School teachers gave an aggregate of 51 percent and 30 percent respectively, for 'very satisfied', 'satisfied' and 'fairly satisfied'; while 100 percent of principal of high school colleges said they were 'fairly satisfied'. On allowances, 21 percent of Basic School teachers and 4 percent of High School teachers indicated that they were satisfied while 79 percent of Basic School and 96 percent of High School teachers said they were not satisfied with
their allowances. These responses showed that the majority of Basic and High School teachers were ‘very unsatisfied’ with their salaries and allowances, while a small fraction of them, were satisfied. Principals of High School Colleges were fairly satisfied. Refer to figure 3.16

![Figure 3.16: Degree of satisfaction with one's salary/allowances](image)

It was expected that officers at the different levels of the Ministry of Education would be indulging themselves in corrupt practices, because of their low degree of satisfaction with their salary/allowances. To this end a question was put to the public respondents to find out whether or not they paid any gratification to the officers in order to receive a favourable response from them when they went to seek service. 60 percent of them said they did not, while 40 percent did not answer the question, as figure 3.4 showed. From their responses, it could be deduced that though these officers were not satisfied with their salaries/allowances, they did not involve themselves in corrupt practices (figure 3.17.)
A question to find out whether the Basic School and High School teachers engaged in other income generating activities was asked and their responses were as shown in figure 3.18. Among the teaching staff, 79 percent of those from Basic Schools, and 87 percent of them from High Schools, said they were engaged in other income generating activities, while 21 percent of Basic and 13 percent of High School teachers said they were not. Of the Principals of High school colleges, only 33 percent were engaged in other income generating activities against 67 percent who were not. From the responses, a conclusion could be drawn that most Basic and High School teachers were engaged in other income generating activities while few Principals of high School colleges engaged in the same activities.
A comparison of responses on degree of satisfaction with salary and allowances with those on engagement in other income generating activities revealed that 53 percent of those who were not satisfied with their salaries engaged in other income generating activities, and only 34 percent of those who were satisfied with their salaries/allowances engaged in similar activities, as could be seen in figures 3.19 below.

A question was asked to the four groups of respondents as to whether salaries and allowances were adequate to retain staff (see Table 19 for responses). The responses for ‘Yes’ salaries and allowances were adequate to retain staff were as follows: key informants zero percent, Principals of High School Colleges zero percent, Basic School teachers one percent and High School teachers three percent. Responses for ‘No’ salaries and allowances were not adequate to retain staff were: key informants 100 percent, Principals of High School Colleges 100 percent, Basic School teachers 99 percent and High School teachers 97 percent. When the responses for ‘Yes’ salaries and allowances were adequate to retain staff and those for ‘No’ they were not adequate, were compared, a conclusion was drawn that salaries and allowances were not adequate to retain staff in the ministry of Education, as shown in figure 3.20.
Following their responses on whether salary/allowances were adequate or not to retain staff, the respondents were asked for their level of agreement with the assertion that performance was appropriately rewarded in the Ministry of Education, following the restructuring process, using the scale, ‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’, strongly agree’, ‘agree’ and ‘partially agree’. Looking at the 41 percent and 33 percent as aggregates for responses ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ and 59 percent and 67 percent for ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’ and ‘partially agree’ for both Basic and High School teachers respectively, and the aggregates for Principals of high schools and key informants, one would conclude that performance was appropriately rewarded in the Ministry of Education (see figure 3.21).
Efficiency

As stated earlier efficiency was measured by the length of time it took the clientele to obtain services from the Ministry of Education.

Respondents were asked whether or not they had sought to obtain service from any office of the Ministry of Education in the last three years. 93 percent of Basic School teachers said they did, and seven said they did not. Among High School teachers, 90 percent said they sought to obtain services but 10 percent said they did not (see figure 3.22).

![Figure 3.22: Respondent seeking to obtain service from any office of the Ministry of Education](image)

Following their responses as to whether they had sought service from any office of the Ministry, respondents were asked to rate the length of time taken by officers to attend to them the last time they sought to obtain services from any office of the Ministry of Education. As indicated in figure 3.23, 50 percent of Basic School teachers said they waited for a ‘very long time’, while 47 percent said they waited for a ‘long time’. The two responses gave an aggregate percentage of 97 percent. On the contrary, three percent said they waited for a ‘short time’. High School teachers also rated their waiting time to have been ‘very long time’ at 33 percent, and to have been for a ‘long’ at 50 percent resulting into an aggregate response of 83 percent; while none rated their waiting time to have been ‘very short’. However, only 17 percent said they waited for a ‘short time’ (see figure 3.23 below).
Respondents were asked whether or not there was improvement in workers' efficiency. Five percent of Basic School teachers said they were 'not sure' whether or not workers' efficiency had improved. In addition, 20 percent of High School teachers also said they were 'not sure' about it either. But 45 percent and 25 percent of Basic School and High School teachers, respectively, indicated that workers' efficiency had 'not improved', while, 10 percent and 40 percent of Basic School teachers, and 20 percent and 35 percent of High School teachers indicated that workers' efficiency had 'improved' and 'only slightly improved' respectively. 67 percent of Principals of High School Colleges indicated that workers' efficiency, had 'fairly improved' and 33 percent said it had 'improved. The key informants on their part rated it to have 'only slightly improved' at 100 percent (see figure 3.24). The responses of Basic School teachers showed that efficiency of workers had not improved while those of key informants, Principals of High School Colleges and High School teachers showed that it had 'only slightly' improved.
Figure 3.24: Effect of restructuring on workers' efficiency

- Basic schoolteachers
- High schoolteachers
- Principals of high school colleges
- Key informants
CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The main objective of the dissertation was to find out the extent to which implementation of the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) improved performance in the Ministry of Education had.

**Effectiveness of Service Delivery**

Effectiveness was measured using three variables- quality of service, decentralisation and improvements in salaries.

**Quality of Service Delivery**

As stated earlier, the reform had as one of its principle objectives, the improvement of the quality of service rendered to the public. However, the majority of respondents that sought to obtain services at any Ministry of Education offices said that the quality of services rendered to them was generally poor. This was because at the time they went to seek the services; they were referred to superior officers, kept waiting or made to undertake several trips before they were attended to. According to the respondents this was compounded by the fact that the programme had not put the right people in right positions.

The second finding was that effectiveness in service delivery did not improve as a result of implementation of the reform programme. This was so because the restructuring programme did not put the right people in right positions. Ill-qualified people were appointed for lecturing jobs, as could be seen from the responses of Principals of High School Colleges. Some were appointed to wrong subject areas may be just to have them secure positions as lecturers in college.

The third finding was that the study established that there were improvements in the number of schools. Though this was the case, the study also found out that it was not easy to get a school place generally. But when it came to specific levels, the study established that places were easier to access at Basic School level, easy to do so at High School level and difficult at College level. This meant that there were improvements in
terms of access to school places at Basic and High School levels there by improving service delivery in this area.

The fourth finding that made service delivery by the Ministry of Education to the public not to improve concerned affordability of fees at the various levels of learning. The study found that the Basic School level provided more affordability than the other two levels. Accordingly, the study established that fees at High School level were somewhat affordable except for the other fees that were charged on parents of the pupils in the name of cost-sharing to purchase television sets, computers, school buses, to name but a few. At College level the study found that fees were not affordable, though no specific reason was given for this. With these ‘hidden’ costs in place it means access to education service would remain a preserve for the few, those who could afford these costs.

The fifth finding which made service delivery not improve was the type of people the restructuring programme put in some of the positions. According to some respondents, the programme had not put right people in right positions while to some it had. Despite the division in opinion, all the respondents were unanimous in saying that the quality of services offered now at the various levels of the Ministry of Education when compared to those which were offered three years ago, had not improved.

The sixth finding of the study under quality of service was that the best way service delivery could improve in the Ministry of Education was to re-train all the officers who were appointed to positions for which they did not qualify. This re-training would improve their skills in those positions thereby improving performance of the Ministry of Education in terms of service delivery.

Decentralisation

Decentralisation formed one of the strategies of the restructuring programme in the Ministry of Education. This called for the decentralisation of certain functions like the running of schools and colleges from the centre to the field level offices. This was done through the creation of Education Boards in these institutions.
The study established that the creation of Education Boards in these institutions, did not improve service delivery. This was due to the fact that Education Boards did not have enough discretion in making decisions that affected their schools/colleges instead they received administrative instructions either from the District Education Board Secretaries’, Provincial Education Officers’ offices or the headquarters as the case maybe, on how they should manage their school or college.

**Improvements in Salary**

Under this sub-head the first finding that affected service delivery negatively in Ministry of Education was the inadequacy of the salaries/allowances respondents received. This inadequacy, according to the study, made the respondents to start engaging in various survival strategies.

In addition, the research in established that High School teachers were dissatisfied with both their salaries and allowances, while Basic School teachers indicated dissatisfaction only with allowances. The study also established that, not only those who were not satisfied with their salary/allowances engaged in other income generating activities, but, that all respondents whether satisfied with one’s salary/allowance or not engaged in one form of survival strategy or other. This was a significant finding in that if teachers engaged in these survival strategies, it was doubtful how they could perform well in their work as their mind would be divided between their actual work of teaching and finding ways of improving their ‘businesses’. In the long run, this tended to affect productivity of the teacher. If this happened, then service delivery would not be effective.

With the services provided not being up to the expected standard, the common trend for people was usually to give gratification of one form or other to service providers in the hope that the service thus rendered would improve. With respondents saying the services provided by the Ministry of Education were not up to the standard they expected, expectations were that they give some gratification to receive better services from the officers. But the study established that respondents did not do so. This finding was amazing given the level of satisfaction among the officers. This might have been
because of the label that society attached to the teaching profession, that it was ‘noble’ and officers felt they needed to exhibit a high level of integrity while silently complaining.

The research also established that most of the respondents were getting wrong salaries as they were in wrong salary scales. For instance, some basic schoolteachers were in salary scales degree for holders or diploma holders and even in wrong salary scales which were meant for teachers with Form 3 certificates like ESS09. High School teachers were found in salary scales for District Education Board Secretaries, District Education Standards Officers and even for Basic School teachers.

The study further established that despite respondents saying they were not put in the right salary scales, they did not engage in corrupt practices. It was further established that though respondents were not satisfied with their salary/allowances, they were appropriately rewarded as a result of restructuring. Due to the appropriateness of the rewards respondents received, it was then expected that delivery of service would improve. But this was not the case because, even if performance was adequately rewarded, all four groups of respondents still felt that the salaries and allowances were not adequate enough to retain staff in the Ministry of education.

Despite respondents saying they were in wrong salary scales and that they were not satisfied with salaries/allowances, they agreed that performance was appropriately rewarded in the Ministry of Education. Even if performance was adequately rewarded, all the four groups of respondents still felt that the salaries and allowances were not adequate to retain staff in the Ministry of Education.

**Efficiency of the Ministry of Education**

Concerning the efficiency of the Ministry of Education, the study found out that workers’ efficiency had improved though only slightly. As is the case, if workers’ efficiency was not improved, even service delivery would be seen not to have improved since it depended on the workers’ efficiency. As indicated earlier, efficiency was measured by length of time clients spent in order to have their problem resolved. In the
event that workers’ efficiency had only slightly improved, to some any slight delay in resolving their problem meant there was no improvement in service delivery.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS.
The study aimed at assessing the impact of the PSRP on the performance of Ministry of Education. This was done by looking at effectiveness, and efficiency. Effectiveness was measured by improvement in quality of service, decentralisation and improvement in salary. Efficiency was measured by the length of time it took the clientele to obtain services from any office of the Ministry of Education.

The main conclusion of the study is that there have been no significant improvements in the performance of the Ministry of Education following the implementation of the Public Service Reform Programme in the Ministry.

Effectiveness of Service Delivery

Quality of Service Delivery
The evidence from this study leads to the conclusion that in some areas there has been no significant improvement in quality of services rendered to the clientele as negative findings outweighed positive ones. Both Basic School and High School teachers and members of the public sought to obtain services from any of the offices of Ministry of Education. During their visits, they were either referred to superiors instead of being served by the lower offices or were told to go back to the office some other time. Despite this, the quality of services they received was not up to date.

In the case of access to education there was an improvement but not in the quality of instruction as the improvement in access was not followed by an increase in the number of teachers. As a result this meant using untrained teachers to man these schools.

With the implementation of the reform effort in the Ministry of Education, fees had become affordable at Basic School level. This had become so because of the deliberate policy of ‘free’ education from Grades 1-7. As a result of this if one had a child at these levels of education and at the High School level, they could save some money for the child at High School level from the exemptions at Grades 1-7. This improvement was
negated by the finding that there were other ‘hidden’ costs that parents still had to pay in order to supplement government funding as cost sharing measure making access to education difficult.

**Decentralisation**

The findings from this study lead to the conclusion that decentralisation has not improved performance in the Ministry of Education. The study found that decentralisation was implemented in the Ministry of Education through creation of Education Boards in order to improve service delivery at the various levels of the Ministry- schools, colleges, district and province. The study further found that though these Boards were created at these various levels, they did not have discretion in making decisions that affected their day to day operations. They instead received administrative instructions from DEBS, PEO or headquarters. This defeated the notion of decentralisation.

Following the above finding, the conclusion above seemed to be true of the impact of the result of the implementation of the policy of decentralisation.

**Improvements in Salary**

Despite the envisaged change in salaries/allowances as a result of restructuring, the findings of this study lead to the conclusion that salaries/allowances were still at levels that were not attractive enough to motivate and retain workers. The study found that there was almost a general dissatisfaction with salary/allowances among the respondents. This could be noticed from the following responses from respondents: that most of them were in wrong salary scales which attracted wrong allowances as these were salary based; the exodus of trained staff from the Ministry to other ‘green pastures’ as the salary/allowances were inadequate to retain them; and lastly, the respondents’ engagement in other income generating activities.
EFFICIENCY OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
From the evidence from the study there were no noticeable improvements in the efficiency in performance of the Ministry of Education. Efficiency was measured by length of time clients spent in order to have their problem resolved. From the findings, respondents spent long times at the offices in order to have their problems resolved. The study also found that respondents wasted their time through the referrals to superiors and in the return trips they were made to under-take.

Because of the above findings of the study, the above conclusion was drawn.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations of this research are by no means exhaustive. They are meant to bring out some of the pertinent issues and aspects of implementing the reform programme that have come out from the study.

- There should be strict adherence to job descriptions so that the right people are put in right positions.

- Drawing of person specifications should be done after an analysis of each job has been carried out to avoid appointment of ill-qualified people to positions.

- Job application guidelines should not be made restrictive so that there is a wide range of skills brought to the Ministry.

- If and when an ill-qualified person has been appointed to a position, let such a person be sent for re-training to orient him/her to the requirements of the job.

- There is need to institute behaviour/attitude modelling programmes in the Ministry of Education that can enhance change in workers' attitudes.
• If service delivery through decentralisation is to be improved, Education Boards should be allowed enough discretion in making those decisions that affect the daily running of their institutions.

• There is need to improve the way the policy of cost-sharing is implemented. All hidden costs that are being paid by parents must be removed, so that people only pay their actual share of the cost.

• Salaries/allowances given to workers in the Ministry of Education need to be adequate enough to attract and retain well qualified staff. There is therefore need to improve salaries to levels that can satisfy the workers, thereby making them stay on the job and also attract other qualified people.

• If service delivery through decentralisation is to be improved, Education boards should be allowed enough discretion in making decisions that affected their daily running of their institutions.
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# APPENDIX 1

## ANALYSIS TABLES

### Service Delivery

**TABLE 3.1: SOUGHT TO OBTAIN SERVICE FROM ANY OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION IN THE LAST THREE YEARS**

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**TABLE 3.2: RESPONDENTS SEEKING TO OBTAIN SERVICE AT MOE HQ., PEO’S OFFICE, PROVINCIAL HR OFFICE, DEBS’ OFFICE, DISTRICT HR OFFICE, PRINCIPAL’S OFFICE, VICE PRINCIPAL’S OFFICE, AND HEAD TEACHER’S OFFICE**

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<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head teacher’s office</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3.3A FREQUENCY OF BEING REFERRED TO SUPERIORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NEVER</th>
<th>OFTEN</th>
<th>VERY OFTEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC MEMBERS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3.3B NEED TO MAKE RETURN TRIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC MEMBERS</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3.4: QUALITY OF SERVICE OBTAINED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Very poor</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>SUM 1 Very poor</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>SUM 2 Very Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic School teachers</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School teachers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3.5A RIGHT PEOPLE PUT IN RIGHT POSITIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic School teachers</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School teachers</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of High School Colleges</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3.5B: IMPROVEMENTS IN SERVICE DELIVERY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic School teachers</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School teachers</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of High School Colleges</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 3.6: EASINESS OF GETTING SCHOOL PLACES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not Easier</th>
<th>Easier</th>
<th>Much Easier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public members</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.7: IMPROVEMENT IN EASINESS OF FINDING SCHOOL PLACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic school</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.8: IMPROVEMENT IN AFFORDABILITY OF SCHOOL FEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic school level</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school level</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College level</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.9: COMPARISON OF QUALITY OF SERVICES RENDERED TO YOU DURING YOUR RECENT VISIT TO ANY OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, TO THAT YOU WERE RECEIVING THREE YEARS AGO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>The same</th>
<th>SUM 1</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>SUM 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>The same</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic School teachers</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School teachers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.10: LEVEL OF AGREEMENT THAT POLICY OF COST-SHARING HAD IMPROVED QUALITY OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.11: BEST OPTION TO IMPROVE SERVICE DELIVERY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Best option to improve service delivery</th>
<th>Basic School teachers</th>
<th>High School teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-training officers holding positions for which they qualify</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving high salaries to officers holding jobs for which they qualify</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving good accommodation to officers holding jobs for which they qualify</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacing officers who hold positions for which they do not qualify</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DECENTRALISATION

### TABLE 3.12: EDUCATION BOARDS HAD IMPROVED SERVICE DELIVERY IN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>CAN'T TELL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic school teachers</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school teachers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of High school colleges</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 3.13: AMOUNT OF DISCRETION ALLOWED TO BOARD MEMBERS TO MAKE DECISIONS AFFECTING THE RUNNING OF THEIR SCHOOL/Colleges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>No discretion</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Sum 1</th>
<th>No discretion</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>SUM</th>
<th>A LOT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic school teachers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school teachers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of high school colleges</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.14 A, B AND C: FREQUENCY OF RECEIVING ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM DEBS, PEO AND MINISTRY HEADQUARTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASIC SCHOOL TEACHERS</th>
<th>SUM 1</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>SUM 2</th>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Often</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEBS Office</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Education Officer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS</td>
<td>SUM 1</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>SUM 2</td>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>Often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBS Office</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Education Officer</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE Headquarters</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IMPROVEMENTS IN SALARY/ALLOWANCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic school teachers</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school teachers</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of high school colleges</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.15: RESPONDENT PUT IN RIGHT SALARY SCALE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic school teachers</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school teachers</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of high school colleges</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.16A DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH SALARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Very unsatisfied</th>
<th>SUM 1</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Fairly satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>SUM 2</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Fairly satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic school teachers</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school teachers</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of high school colleges</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.16B: DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH ALLOWANCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic school teachers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school teachers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.17: PAYMENT OF GRATIFICATION FOR SERVICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public members</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

85
### TABLE 3.18: RESPONDENT ENGAGING IN OTHER INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic school teachers</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school teachers</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of high school colleges</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.19: SATISFACTION WITH SALARY/ALLOWANCES AND ENGAGEMENT IN OTHER INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Engagement in Other Income Generating Activities</th>
<th>Not Engaged in Other Income Generating Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Satisfied</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.20: ADEQUACY OF SALARY/ALLOWANCES TO RETAIN STAFF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic school teachers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school teachers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of High school colleges</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.21: DEGREE OF AGREEMENT THAT PERFORMANCE IS APPROPRIATELY REWARDED FOLLOWING RESTRUCTURING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>SUM 1 Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Partially agree</th>
<th>SUM 2 Strongly agree Agree Partially agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic school teachers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school teachers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of high school colleges</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### WORKERS' EFFICIENCY

### TABLE 3.22: RESPONDENT SEEKING TO OBTAIN SERVICES FROM ANY OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION IN THE LAST THREE YEARS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic School teacher</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School teacher</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.23: LENGTH OF TIME IT TOOK OFFICERS TO ATTEND TO RESPONDENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Very long time</th>
<th>Long time</th>
<th>SUM T Very long time Long time</th>
<th>Very short time</th>
<th>Short time</th>
<th>SUM 2 Very short time Short time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic School teachers</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school teachers</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>Not improved</td>
<td>SUM1</td>
<td>Much improved</td>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>Fairly Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic School teachers</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School teachers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of High school colleges</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONNAIRE NO. [ ]

UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TEACHING STAFF IN THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

Topic: Public service Reform as a Mechanism for Improving the Performance of the Public service: A Case Study of the Ministry of Education

INTRODUCTION
The aim of the questionnaire is to find out whether delivery of service in the Ministry of education has improved following the reform programme. In trying to find out whether or not there has been some improvement, you are cordially requested to answer the questions in the questionnaire. Please note that the responses you will give will be confidential.

INSTRUCTIONS
(1). Do not write anything on the questionnaire that might lead to your identity being revealed.
(2). For each question, a list of responses is given except where otherwise stated, put (X) against your answer.

Example 1:

What is your occupation?
(1). Teacher [ ] (2). Doctor [ X ]
(3). Lawyer [ ] (4). Farmer [ ]
(5). Other (Specify) [ ]

(4). Space has also been provided for open ended questions.

Example 2.

What is your occupation?
(1). Teacher [ ] (2). Doctor [ ]
(3). Lawyer [ ] (4). Farmer [ ]
(5). Other (Specify) Bricklayer [ ]
**Background Information**

1. What is your nationality?
   (1) Zambian [ ] (2) British [ ]
   (3) Nigerian [ ] (4) Ghanaian [ ]
   (5) Other (Specify) ____________________________

2. Age group.
   (1) 20-29 [ ] (2) 31-40 [ ]
   (3) 41-50 [ ] (4) 51-60 [ ]
   (5) Above 60 [ ]

3. Sex
   (1) Male [ ] (2) Female [ ]

4. Marital Status
   (1) Single [ ] (2) Married [ ]
   (3) Divorced [ ] (4) Widowed [ ]
   (5) Separated [ ]

5. Education Qualification
   (1) Form III [ ] (2) Form V/Grade 12 [ ]
   (3) Bachelor’s Degree [ ] (4) Master’s Degree [ ]
   (5) Doctorate Degree [ ] (6) Other (Specify) ____________________________

6. Type of Institution
   (i) High School [ ] (ii) Basic School

7. Post held.
   (1) Principal (2) Vice Principal (3) HOD- College (4) HOS- High School
   (5) Head teacher (6) Deputy Head teacher (7) Senior Lecturer
   (8) HOD- High School (9) HOS High School (10) Teacher High School
   (11) Teacher Basic School

8. District
   (1) Chongwe [ ] (2) Lusaka [ ]

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9. Professional Teacher’s Qualification
(1). Teachers’ Certificate [ ] (2). Teachers’ Diploma [ ]
(3). Teachers’ Degree [ ] (4). Other (Specify) ____________________

Service Delivery

10. Are you aware of the restructuring programme taking place in the Ministry of education?
(1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ]

11. Do you agree that restructuring the ministry is the best strategy of improving service delivery?
(1). Strongly Agree [ ] (2). Agree [ ]
(3). Partially agree [ ] (4). Disagree [ ]
(5). Strongly Disagree [ ]

12. If your answer to question 9 was ‘Disagree’ what in your view would be the best strategy to help improve service delivery in the Ministry?

13. Have you sought to obtain a service from any office of the Ministry of Education in the last three years?
(1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ]

14. If your answer to question 12 is ‘Yes’ on average what was the quality of service?
(1). Very poor [ ] (2). Poor [ ]
(3). Very Good [ ] (4). Good [ ]

15. On average, how long did it take officers to attend to you?
(1). Very short time [ ] (2). Short time [ ]
(3). Long time [ ] (4). Very long time [ ]

16. How do you compare the attitude of the officers in the Ministry of Education now and three years ago?
(1). Least Improved [ ] (2). Improved [ ]
(3). Much Improved [ ] (4). Most Improved [ ]

17. How does the quality of service rendered to you compare during your most recent visit to any of the offices in the Ministry of Education, to that you were receiving three years ago on average?
18. How do you characterize the restructuring process in the Ministry of Education that has been going on in the last four years?

(1). Very objective [ ] (2). Objective [ ]

(3). Very subjective [ ] (4). Subjective [ ]

19. On average in your view, has the process of restructuring put the right people in the right positions?

(1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ]

20. If your answer to question 19 is ‘Yes’, do you think this has improved service delivery?

(1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ]

21. From the list below, what do you think would be the best option to improve service delivery?

(1). Retraining the officers who are holding positions they are not qualified for. [ ]

(2). Giving high salaries to the officers high salaries to officers holding jobs for which they qualify [ ]

(3). Giving good accommodation to officers holding jobs for which they qualify [ ]

(4). Replacing officers who hold positions they do not qualify for. [ ]

Salaries

22. Do you think you were placed in the right salary scale?

(1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ]

23. What is your salary scale?

(1). ESS 02 [ ] (2). ESS03 [ ] (3). ESS04 [ ] (4). ESS05 [ ]

(5). ESS06 [ ] (6). ESS07 [ ] (7). ESS08 [ ]

(8). ESS09 [ ] (9). ESS10 [ ] (10). ESS11 [ ]

(11). Other (Specify) ____________________________

24. How satisfied are you with your pay?

(1). Very satisfied [ ] (2). Fairly Satisfied [ ]

(3). Satisfied [ ] (4). Very unsatisfied [ ]
Are you satisfied with your allowances?
(1) Yes [ ] (2) No [ ]

Do you engage in other income generating activities?
(1) Yes [ ] (2) No [ ]

From the list below which is the most important activities you do to supplement your salary?
- Petty trade
- Farming
- Teaching A.P.U classes
- Private Tuition
- Other (Specify)

Do you agree that performance is appropriately rewarded following restructuring?
(1) Strongly agree [ ] (2) Agree [ ] (3) Partially agree [ ]
(4) Disagree [ ] (5) Strongly disagree [ ]

In your view how effective is the APAS?
(1) Very effective [ ] (2) Effective [ ] (3) Fairly effective [ ]
(4) Fairly effective [ ] (5) Less effective [ ]

How do salaries in the Ministry of Education compare with those in the private sector?
(1) Very favourably [ ] (2) Favourably [ ] (3) Fairly favourably [ ]
(4) Very unfavourably [ ] (5) Unfavourably [ ]
(6) Fairly unfavourably [ ]

In your view, are the salaries/allowances adequate to retain staff?
(1) Yes [ ] (2) No [ ]

Cost sharing

Do you think the policy of free education have any implications on that of ‘cost sharing’ in the Ministry of Education?
(1) Yes [ ] (2) No [ ]

If ‘your answer is’ Yes’, give the most important reason.
34. If your answer is ‘No’, give the most important reason.


35. Has the policy of ‘cost sharing’ been of benefit to you as an employee of the Ministry of Education?
(1) Yes [ ] (2) No [ ]

36. If your answer was ‘Yes’ in which way has the policy been beneficial to you?
(1) Higher pay [ ] (2) Provision of accommodation [ ]
(3) Training [ ] (4) Supplementation of pay [ ]

Decentralisation
37. Is your school/college run by an Education Board?
(1) Yes [ ] (2) No [ ]

38. If your answer to question 35 was ‘Yes’, how much discretion do you think the Board is given in making decisions that affect its operations?
(1) A lot [ ] (2) Little [ ] (3) No discretion [ ]

39. If your answer is that a Board runs your school/college, how often does the Board receive instructions from each of the following offices?
(A) DEBS Office
(1) Never [ ] (2) Often [ ] (3) Very often [ ]
(B) Provincial Education Office
(1) Never [ ] (2) Often [ ] (3) Very often [ ]
(C) Headquarters
(1) Never [ ] (2) Often [ ] (3) Very often [ ]

39. Do you agree that the coming of Education Boards has improved provision of services by schools/colleges?
(1) Yes [ ] (2) No [ ] (3) Can’t tell [ ]

Workload
40. How do you assess your workload following the restructuring programme?
(1) Above normal [ ] (2) Normal [ ]
(3) Fairly normal [ ] (4) Below normal [ ]
(5) Not sure [ ]
Effects of restructuring on workers' responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency.

41. What do you think have been the effects of the restructuring programme on the following?

(A). Workers' responsiveness to clients' problems
   (1). Much improved [ ] (2). Improved [ ]
   (3). Only slightly improved [ ] (4). Not improved [ ]
   (5). Not sure [ ]

(B). Workers' effectiveness in the way they carry out their duties
   (1) Much improved [ ] (2). Improved [ ]
   (3). Only slightly improved [ ] (4). Not improved [ ]
   (5). Not sure [ ]

(C). Workers' efficiency?
   (1). Much improved [ ] (2). Improved [ ]
   (3). Only slightly improved [ ] (4). Not improved [ ]
   (5). Not sure [ ]

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE AND THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING.
UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PRINCIPALS OF HIGH SCHOOL COLLEGES

TOPIC: Public Service Reform Programme as a Mechanism for Improving the Performance of the Public Service: A Case Study of the Ministry of Education

INTRODUCTION
The aim of the questionnaire is to find out whether delivery of service in the Ministry of education has improved following the reform programme. In trying to find out whether or not there has been some improvement, you are cordially requested to answer the questions in the questionnaire. Please note that the responses you will give will be confidential.

INSTRUCTIONS
(1). Do not write anything on the questionnaire that might lead to your identity being revealed.
(2). For each question, a list of responses is given except where otherwise stated put (X) against your answer.

Example 1:
What is your occupation?

(1). Teacher [ ] (2). Doctor [ X ]
(3). Lawyer [ ] (4). Farmer [ ]
(5). Other (Specify)

(4). Space has also been provided for open ended questions.

Example 2.
What is your occupation?

(1). Teacher [ ] (2). Doctor [ ]
(3). Lawyer [ ] (4). Farmer [ ]
(5). Other (Specify) Bricklayer

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### Background Information

1. What is your nationality?
   (1). Zambian [ ] (2). British [ ]
   (3). Nigerian [ ] (4). Ghanaian [ ]
   (5). Other (Specify) ____________________________

2. Age group.
   (1). 20-29 [ ] (2). 31-40 [ ]
   (3). 41-50 [ ] (4). 51-60 [ ]
   (5). Above 60 [ ]

3. Sex
   (1). Male [ ] (2). Female [ ]

4. Marital Status
   (1). Single [ ] (2). Married [ ]
   (3). Divorced [ ] (4). Widowed [ ]
   (5). Separated [ ]

5. Education qualification
   (1). Form III [ ] (2). Form V/Grade 12 [ ]
   (3). Bachelor’s Degree [ ] (4). Master’s Degree [ ]
   (5). Doctorate Degree [ ] (6). Other (Specify) ____________________________

6. Post held.
   (1). Principal (2). Vice Principal

8. Professional Teacher’s Qualification
   (1). Teachers’ Certificate [ ] (2). Teachers’ Diploma [ ]
   (3). Teachers’ Degree [ ] (4). Other (Specify) ____________________________

### Staffing

9. Were new lecturers recruited for your college during the restructuring programme from 2002-2004?
   (1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ]
10. If 'yes', how many of these were
   (1) Diploma holders ______________________
   (2) Degree holders ______________________
   (3). Others (Specify) ______________________

11. How do you characterize the restructuring process in the Ministry of Education?
   (1). Very objective [ ] (2). Objective [ ]
   (3). Very objective [ ] (4). Subjective [ ]

12. On average in your view has the process of restructuring put the right people in the right positions?
   (1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ]
   (3). Not sure

13. In your view, has the restructuring exercise improved service delivery at your college?
   (1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ]

14. Give the most important reason for your answer 'Yes'.

15. Give the most important reason for your answer 'No'.

Salaries

16. Do you think you were placed in the right scale?
   (1) Yes [ ] (2) No [ ]

17. What is your salary scale?
   (1). ESS 02 [ ] (2). ESS03 [ ] (3). ESS04 [ ] (4). ESS05 [ ]
   (5). ESS06 [ ]

   (11). Other (Specify) ______________________

18. How satisfied are you with your pay?
   (1). Very satisfied [ ] (2). Fairly Satisfied [ ]
   (3). Satisfied [ ] (5). Very Unsatisfied [ ]

19. Do you engage in other income generating activities?

20. Do you agree that performance is appropriately rewarded following restructuring?
   (1). Strongly Agree [ ] (2). Agree [ ] (3) Partially Agree [ ]
   (4) Disagree [ ] (5). Strongly disagree [ ]
21. How do salaries in the Ministry of Education compare with those in the private sector?

(1). Very favourably [ ] (2). Favourably [ ] (3). Fairly favourably [ ]

(4). Very Unfavourable [ ] (5). Un favourably [ ]

(6) Fairly Un favourable

22. In your view are the salaries and allowances adequate to retain staff?

(1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ]

Cost sharing

23. Does the policy of free education have any implication on that of cost sharing in the Ministry of Education?

(1) Yes [ ] (2) No [ ]

24. If your answer to question 21 is ‘Yes’, give the most important reason.

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

25. If your answer to question 21 ‘No’, give the most important reason.

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

26. Has the policy of cost sharing affected the demand for places at your college?

(1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ]

27. To what extent do you agree that the policy of ‘cost sharing’ has improved the quality of service rendered to you by the Ministry of Education?

(1). Great [ ] (2). Greater [ ] (3). Greatest [ ] (4). Not sure [ ]
Decentralisation

29. Is your school/college run by an Education Board?

(1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ]

30. How much discretion do you think the Board is given in making decisions that affect its operations?

(1). A lot [ ] (2). Quite a lot [ ] (3). Less [ ]
(4). No [ ]

31. How often does the Board receive instructions from each of the following offices?

(A). DEBS Office

(1). More often [ ] (2). Often [ ] (3). Less often [ ]
(4). Never [ ]

(B). Provincial Education Office

(1). More often [ ] (2). Often [ ] (3). Less often [ ]
(4). Never [ ]

(C). Headquarters

(1). More often [ ] (2). Often [ ] (3). Less often [ ]
(4). Never [ ]

32. Do you agree that the coming of the Boards has improved provision of services by schools/colleges?

(1). Yes [ ] (2). No [ ] (3). Can’t tell [ ]

Effects of restructuring on workers’ responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency.

33. What do you think has been the effects of the restructuring programme on the following?

(A). Workers’ responsiveness to clients’ problems
(1). Much improved [ ] (2). Improved [ ]

(3). Only slightly improved [ ] (4). Not improved [ ]

(5). Not sure [ ]

(B). Workers’ effectiveness in the way they carry out their duties

(2) Much improved [ ] (2). Improved [ ]

(3). Only slightly improved [ ] (4). Not improved [ ]

(5). Not sure [ ]

(C). Workers’ efficiency?

(1). Much improved [ ] (2). Improved [ ]

(3). Only slightly improved [ ] (4). Not improved [ ]

(5). Not sure [ ]

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE AND THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING.
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. [    ]
UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE PUBLIC

TOPIC: Public Service Reform as a Mechanism for Improving the Performance of the Public Service: A Case Study of the Ministry of Education.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of the questionnaire is to find out whether delivery of service in the Ministry of education has improved following the reform programme. In trying to find out whether or not there has been some improvement, you are cordially requested to answer the questions in the questionnaire. Please note that the responses you give will be confidential.

INSTRUCTIONS

(1). Do not write anything on the questionnaire that might lead to your identity, being revealed.
(2). For each question, a list of responses is given, except where otherwise stated, put (X) against your answer.

Example 1:
What is your occupation?

(1). Teacher [        ]
(2). Doctor [  X  ]
(3). Lawyer [         ]
(4). Farmer [         ]
(5). Other (Specify)

(4). Space has also been provided for open ended questions.

Example 2.
What is your occupation?

(1). Teacher [        ]
(2). Doctor [         ]
(3). Lawyer [         ]
(4). Farmer [         ]
(5). Other (Specify) Bricklayer
**Background Information**

1. **Sex**
   - (1) Male [ ]
   - (2) Female [ ]

2. **Age group.**
   - (1) 20-29 [ ]
   - (2) 31-40 [ ]
   - (3) 41-50 [ ]
   - (4) 51-60 [ ]
   - (5) Above 60 [ ]

3. **Marital Status**
   - (1) Single [ ]
   - (2) Married [ ]

4. **Employment Status**
   - (1) Self Employed [ ]
   - (2) Unemployed [ ]
   - (3) Formal Employment [ ]

5. **Occupation**
   - (1) Teacher [ ]
   - (2) Commercial Farmer [ ]
   - (3) Marketer [ ]
   - (4) Bricklayer [ ]
   - (5) Other (Specify) 

6. **Level of Education**
   - (1) No Formal education [ ]
   - (2) Grade Seven certificate [ ]
   - (3) Grade 9/Form Three [ ]
   - (4) Form Five/Grade 12 [ ]

7. **Main Source of Income**
   - (1) Formal Employment in Government [ ]
   - (2) Formal Employment in Private Sector [ ]
   - (3) Self-employment (Farming) [ ]
   - (4) Self-employment (Trading) [ ]
   - (5) Other (Specify) 

**Service Delivery**

8. Have you compared the quality of service rendered to you by officers at the Ministry of Education headquarters now and three years ago?
   - (1) Worse [ ]
   - (2) The Same [ ]
   - (3) Better [ ]
   - (4) Much Better [ ]
9. Have do you compare the quality of service rendered to you by officers at the Provincial offices headquarters now and three years ago?

(1). Worse [ ]
(2). The Same [ ]
(3). Better [ ]
(4). Much Better [ ]

10. Have do you compare the quality of service rendered to you by officers at the District offices headquarters now and three years ago?

(1). Worse [ ]
(2). The Same [ ]
(3). Better [ ]
(4). Much Better [ ]

11. Which one of the following describes the change in workers’ attitudes following restructuring?

(1) Least Improved [ ]
(2) Improved [ ]
(3) Most Improved [ ]

12. Have you tried to get a school place for your child in the last three years?

(1). Yes [ ]
(2). No [ ]

13. If your answer number question ‘12’ above is ‘Yes’ how easy is it to get a school place now than before?

(1) Not Easier [ ]
(2) Easier [ ]
(3) Much Easier [ ]

14. Did you attempt to get services fro any of the following offices?

(1). Ministry of Education headquarters (1) Yes [ ]
(2). No [ ]

(2) Provincial Education Office
(1) Yes [ ]
(2) No [ ]

(3) Provincial Human Resource office
(1) Yes [ ]
(2) No [ ]

(4) District Education Board Secretary’s office (1) Yes [ ]
(2) No [ ]

(5). District Human Resources office
(1) Yes [ ]
(2) No [ ]

(6) College Principal’s office
(1) Yes [ ]
(2) No [ ]

(7) Vice Principal’s office
(1) Yes [ ]
(2) No [ ]
(8) Head teacher’s

15. If your answer is ‘Yes’ to any of the above questions, did you pay gratification to any of the above officers?

(1) Yes
(2) No

16. How do you compare the quality of service provided by government schools/colleges to that provided by private schools/colleges?

(1) Worse
(2) The Same
(3) Better
(4) Much Better

17. How do you characterize the restructuring process in the Ministry of Education?

(1) Very objective
(2) Objective
(3) Very subjective
(4) Subjective

18. To what extent has there been efficiency in the delivery of services in the Ministry of Education?

To a __________ extent

(1) Small
(2) Great
(3) Greater
(4) A Very Great...

19. How often have officers in Ministry of Education referred you to their superiors to have your problem solved?

(1) Never
(3) Often
(3) Very Often

20. How do you compare the waiting period to have your problem solved, now and three years ago?

(1) The Same
(2) Longer
(3) Much longer
(21). Has it ever been necessary for you to make a return trip to have your problem solved by officials in Ministry of Education?

(1). Yes [ ]
(2). No [ ]

22. If ‘Yes” in question 21, what is
(a) the smallest number of trips did you make to have your problem solved? ____________
(b) the largest number of trips did you make to have your problem solved? ____________

23. Has there been improvement in the following aspects of service delivery?
A. number of schools built
   (1) Yes [ ]
   (2) No [ ]

B. Easiness of finding places in
   (i) Basic school
      (1) Yes [ ]
      (2) No [ ]
   
   (ii) High School
      (1) Yes [ ]
      (2) No [ ]

   (iii) College
      (1) Yes [ ]
      (2) No [ ]

C. Affordability of paying fees
   (i) Basic school
      (1) Yes [ ]
      (2) No [ ]

   (ii) High School
      (1) Yes [ ]
      (2) No [ ]

   (iii) College
      (1) Yes [ ]
      (2) No [ ]

Cost sharing

24. Do you approve of the policy of ‘cost sharing’ at
A. Basic school level
   (1) Yes [ ]
   (2) No [ ]

B. High school level
   (1) Yes [ ]
   (2) No [ ]

C. College level
   (1) Yes [ ]
   (2) No [ ]

25. Under each give reasons for your ‘YES” answer
Basic school level ____________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

High school level ____________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

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26. Under each give reasons for your ‘NO’ answer
Basic school level

High school level

College level

27. From the following charges, place a tick against those you approve of.
i. Boarding fee
ii. P.T.A. fund
iii. Project fund
iv. Postage fund
v. Medical fee
vi. Transport fund
vii. Boarding Supplement
viii. Workers’ Salaries fund
ix. T.V/ Computer purchase fund

28. What would you like done to improve the quality of services in the Ministry of Education?

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING
UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR KEY INFORMANTS FROM MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CABINET OFFICE

TOPIC: Public Service Reform as a Mechanism for Improving the Performance of the Public Service: A Case Study of the Ministry of Education.

INTRODUCTION
The aim of the questionnaire is to find out whether delivery of service in the Ministry of education has improved following the reform programme. In trying to find out whether or not there has been some improvement, you are cordially requested to answer the questions in the questionnaire. Please note that the responses you give will be confidential.

INSTRUCTIONS
(1). Do not write anything on the questionnaire that might lead to your identity, being revealed.
(2). For each question, a list of responses is given, except where otherwise stated, put (X) against your answer.

Example 1:
What is your occupation?

(1). Teacher [ ]
(2). Doctor [ X ]
(3). Lawyer [ ]
(4). Farmer [ ]
(5). Other (Specify) [ ]

(4). Space has also been provided for open ended questions.

Example 2.

What is your occupation?

(1). Teacher [ ]
(2). Doctor [ ]
(3). Lawyer [ ]
(4). Farmer [ ]
(5). Other (Specify) Bricklayer [ ]
**Background Information**

1. **Position held**
   (1) Director [ ]
   (2) Assistant Director [ ]
   (3) Chief Human Resources Management Officer [ ]
   (4) Other (Specify) 

2. **Organisation**
   (1) Cabinet Office [ ]
   (2) Ministry of Education [ ]

3. **Sex**
   (1) Male [ ]
   (2) Female [ ]

4. **How do you characterize the restructuring process in the Ministry of Education that has been going on in the last six years?**
   (1) Very objective [ ]
   (2) Objective [ ]
   (3) Very subjective [ ]
   (4) Subjective [ ]

5. **On average in your view, has the process of restructuring put the right people in the right positions?**
   (1) Yes [ ]
   (2) No [ ]

6. **If your answer to question 6 is ‘Yes’ do you think this has improved service delivery?**
   (1) Yes [ ]
   (2) No [ ]

7. **What role did PSCAP play in the restructuring programme in the Ministry of Education?**

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**Salaries**

8. **How do salaries in the ministry of education compare with those in the private sector?**
   (1) Very favourably [ ]
   (2) Favourably [ ]
   (3) Fairly favourably [ ]
   (4) Very unfavourably [ ]
   (5) Unfavourably [ ]

9. **In your view are salaries/allowances adequate to retain staff?**
Job Performance
10. Do you agree that performance is appropriately rewarded following restructuring?
   (1). Strongly agree
   (2). Agree
   (3). Partially agree
   (4). Disagree
   (5). Strongly disagree

11. Which of the following best describes the change in workers' attitudes towards work following restructuring?
   (1). Least improved
   (2). Improved
   (3). Much improved
   (4). Most improved

Financial Discipline
12. Given the size and performance of the Ministry of Education, to what extent are budgetary allocations adequate?
   (1). Small
   (2). Great
   (3). Greater
   (4). A Very Great

13. How often does the Ministry of Education get the full allocation released by the end of the financial year?
   (1). Never
   (2). Often
   (3). Very Often

14. How stringent are the accounting procedures in the Ministry of Education?
   (1). Very Stringent
   (2). Stringent
   (3). Fairly Stringent
   (4). Porous
   (5). Fairly Porous
   (6). Very Porous

Staffing levels and Structure
15. How do you compare the number of officers in the Ministry now in 2001?
   (1). It is more than in 2001
   (2). It is less than in 2001
   (3). It is the same as in 2001
   (4). I don't know

16. How do you characterize the staffing levels in the Ministry of Education after restructuring?
17. What is the impact the policy of cost sharing to the public in general?

- (1). It has affected them positively
- (2). It has affected them negatively
- (3). It has not affected them at all

18. To what extent do you agree that the policy of cost sharing has improved the quality services rendered in the Ministry?

- (1). Strongly agree
- (2). Agree
- (3). Partially agree
- (4). Disagree
- (5). Strongly Disagree

**Effects of restructuring on workers’ responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency.**

19. What do you think have been the effects of the restructuring programme on the following?

**A. Workers’ responsiveness to clients’ problems**

- (1). Much improved
- (2). Improved
- (3). Only slightly improved
- (4). Not improved
- (5). Not sure

**B. Workers’ effectiveness in the way they carry out their duties**

- (1). Much improved
- (2). Improved
- (3). Only slightly improved
- (4). Not improved
- (5). Not sure

**C. Workers’ efficiency?**

- (1). Much improved
- (2). Improved
- (3). Only slightly improved
- (4). Not improved
(5). Not sure

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE AND THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING.