TRENDS IN URBAN HOUSING DEVELOPMENT:
A CASE STUDY OF LUSAKA CITY,
ZAMBIA.

BY
JEFF KANYENSE

A dissertation submitted to the University of Zambia in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Administration (MPA).

THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA
LUSAKA

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DECLARATION

I hereby certify that this dissertation represents my own independent investigation. It has not previously been submitted for a degree, diploma or other qualification at this or another University.

Signed:..............................................
This dissertation of Jeff Kanyense has been approved as fulfilling the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Public Administration (MPA) of the University of Zambia.

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ABSTRACT

Given the increase in the population of Lusaka City from 266,245 in 1969 to 1,138,460 in 2000, there had been pressure on the government to provide adequate and decent housing to the growing population, especially the people in the low-income group. This prompted policy makers and programme planners to formulate and implement relevant responses to the urban housing deficit. However, despite the efforts made in this regard, it was apparent that the government failed to resolve the urban housing crisis.

The main purpose of this study was to explain why the problem of urban housing persisted in Lusaka City despite the formulation and implementation of various policies and related programmes. The study employed qualitative, quantitative and content analysis methods of investigation. Purposive sampling was adopted to select key informants concerned with housing development while systematic random sampling was used to select respondents for whom the urban housing initiatives were intended. Secondary data was collected from official documents of the institutions visited while primary data was collected through interviews with key informants and through household survey of the sample randomly selected. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse data collected from the survey.

An examination of housing policies, programmes and strategies revealed that, from the institution framework point of view, the main organ of government charged with the responsibility of promoting shelter improvement was the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH). The Lusaka City Council (LCC) was responsible for the management and provision of council-owned housing and unplanned settlements. The National Housing Authority (NHA) advised government on housing matters and taking an active role in the housing development by constructing houses for outright purchase and for rent. These institutions together with the private housing sector developers, the Zambia National Building Society (ZNBS), the Pan African Building Society (PABS), the Finance Building Society (FBS), international agencies and individual home developers had been implementing activities aimed at increasing decent housing stock. On the question of housing
development programmes, the research findings showed that the government was involved in conventional housing, the site and service and the squatter upgrading programmes. The site and service and the squatter upgrading programmes were implemented in collaboration with international agencies. The private sector housing development involved the private formal and private informal sector housing developers.

An assessment of the impact of the urban housing policies, programmes and strategies that were implemented over the years indicated that Lusaka City had approximately 267,000 households and 245,443 housing units. Analytically, if all households were to be housed with each household occupying one housing unit, there would be 21,557 (267,000 minus 245,443) households without being accommodated. It was therefore concluded that there was an imbalance in the demand and supply of urban housing. This was a clear indication of housing deficit. Other than the non-availability of sufficient houses, the majority of the houses were of poor quality.

In explaining why there was a housing deficit in Lusaka City, institutional linkages were examined. This examination revealed that there was no clear allocation of responsibilities among various institutional players involved in housing development. The findings were that it was mainly MLGH, LCC and NHA who were at the centre stage. The role of the private sector and individual developers was not considered in the overall development process. Therefore, there was no common strategy to harmonise the inputs of various key players in the industry. Firstly, even though there were ‘housing policies’ under which various housing programmes were implemented, there was no comprehensive housing policy from 1964 to 1996 that should have clearly stated the dimensions of housing problems and the priority that should have been given to housing provision in the overall economic development. Due to the non-availability of a comprehensive housing policy, the technical, financial and administrative framework needed to carry out housing programmes was not defined. In the same vein, some agents, both public and private who should have been responsible for implementation were not identified, especially those from the private sector.
Secondly, investment in housing development was inadequate, both public and private. From the point of view of public sector housing investment, over the years, there had been a reduction in government expenditure on housing from K100 million during the First National Development Plan (FNDP) to K95 million during the Third National Development Plan (TNDP). Similarly, over the years, investment in housing as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated to have fallen from around 3 percent in 1969 to less than 0.5 percent by 1992. This investment was not adequate when compared to other countries with an investment in housing representing 3.6 percent of GDP. In the same vein, Zambia’s investment was well below the United Nations (UN) and World Bank minimum requirement of investment in housing representing 5 percent of GDP. From this discovery, it was concluded that there had not been a progressive increase in public housing investment. In this respect, there was no meaningful increase in houses to match the rate of population growth.

The findings also showed that the private sector equally failed to provide adequate housing finance to fill up the gap left by the public sector. An assessment of the impact of building societies revealed that only a small number of people managed to access mortgages for outright purchase and construction of houses. This means that the contribution of the private sector to housing did not make any impact at all.

The other notable bottleneck to housing development was found to have been non-availability of land for private individual developers. LCC had failed to meet the number of plots applied for by the majority of the applicants. This made it difficult for individuals to build their own houses. The research also established that the cost and supply of building materials proved to be a major constraint. As a result, the people in the low-income group, therefore, could not afford to build houses. The non-availability of housing finance also proved to be another problem as many potential developers could not access the funds needed for housing construction. Finally, the housing legislation equally contributed to housing development problems. The National Housing Authority (NHA) Act Chapter 426 of the Laws of Zambia gives NHA the sole responsibility for the management of the housing portfolio, and the housing policy. This does not provide for the participation of other
agencies in housing development. The Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act Chapter 441 of the Laws of Zambia also precludes other laws from applying to areas of its jurisdiction. This situation makes it difficult for other stakeholders to effectively contribute to housing development. The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act Chapter 289 of the Laws of Zambia is another piece of legislation that has created problems with regard to land delivery for housing development. The problem with this Act is that land alienation and deed processing procedures have remained centralised and cumbersome thereby making it difficult to access land for housing development as alluded to above. The reasons given above explain why Lusaka has had problems in housing development.
To My Wife Emily and our Son Kondwani.
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### TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate of Approval</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations and Acronyms</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction...............................................1

1.1 Statement of the Problem.................................2

1.2 Rationale..................................................3

1.3 Objectives................................................3

1.4 Conceptual Framework....................................4

1.5 Limitations of the Study.................................6

### CHAPTER TWO

2.0 Methodology................................................8

2.1 Sampling Design...........................................8

2.2 Data Collection Techniques.............................8

2.3 Sample Size.................................................9

2.4 Sample Area................................................10

2.5 Data Analysis Techniques...............................11
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 Assessment of the Impact of Urban Housing Policies, Programmes and Strategies. 53

5.1 Population Size and Density................................................................. 53
5.2 Current Housing Situation................................................................. 53
5.3 Demand versus Urban Housing supply............................................. 54
5.4 Cost of Housing................................................................................. 54
5.5 Quality of Housing............................................................................ 56

CHAPTER SIX

6.0 Impact of Housing Policies and Programmes in Lusaka...................... 64

6.1 Institutional Linkages................................................................. 64
6.2 Housing Policy Implementation.................................................... 65
6.3 Investment in Housing................................................................. 66
  6.3.1 Public Sector Housing Investment.............................................. 66
  6.3.2 Private Sector Housing Investment............................................. 69
  6.3.3 Low-level Participation in Investment by Building Societies..... 69
6.4 Land Delivery............................................................................... 76
6.5 Cost and Supply of Building Materials.......................................... 79
6.6 Housing Legislation....................................................................... 80
6.7 Assessment of the Impact of NHP: 1996 to Date............................. 81

CHAPTER SEVEN

7.0 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations................................. 84

7.1 Summary....................................................................................... 84
7.2 Conclusion..................................................................................... 87
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 Literature Review.................................................................12

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 Examination of Housing Policies, Programmes and Strategies........31

4.1 Institutional Framework..........................................................31

4.2 Public Sector Housing Development Programmes..........................32

4.2.1 Conventional Housing.........................................................32

4.2.2 Strategies for Conventional Housing......................................33

4.3 Private Sector Housing Development.........................................38

4.3.1 Private Formal Sector Conventional Housing..........................38

4.3.2 Private Informal Sector Housing...........................................39

4.4 Site and Service Programmes..................................................40

4.4.1 Strategies for Site and Service Schemes.................................41

4.4.2 New Site and Service Areas.................................................42

4.4.2.1 Housing Project Unit (HPU) 1........................................43

4.4.2.2 Housing Project Unit (HPU) 2........................................43

4.4.2.3 Housing Project Unit (HPU) 10...........................................43

4.4.3 Implementation Strategy.....................................................43

4.4.4 The Role of NHA in Site and Service Schemes........................44

4.5 Squatter Upgrading Programmes..............................................45

4.5.1 Overview of the Development of Squatter Settlements...............45

4.5.2 Strategies for Squatter Settlement Upgrading..........................46
LIST OF TABLES

4.1 Number of housing units by status
4.2 Percentage distribution of housing units
4.3 Housing units built by NHA in Lusaka since 1971
4.4 The first site and service areas
4.5 NHA serviced plots since 1971
5.1 Cost of pre-construction houses offered by the public sector (NHA)
5.2 Average cost of real estate offered by the private sector for outright purchase and for rent.
5.3 Housing units by type of construction material of walls
5.4 Housing units by type of construction material of roofs
5.5 Occupancy standard for public housing
5.6 Households’ by size of housing unit occupied
5.7 Housing unit by household size
5.8 Households’ view of the quality of housing in their area of residence
5.9 Households’ indication of the biggest problem experienced in their area of residence
5.10 Households’ indication of the type of service wanted improved
5.11 Households’ indication of who had undertaken housing development in their area of residence
5.12 Households’ views on whether the government was doing enough in providing housing to the public or not
5.13 Households’ views on whether the private sector was doing enough in providing housing to the public or not
5.14 Households’ views on whether the environment in which they lived was of high standard
6.1 Loans by Zambia Housing Boards
6.2 Application for mortgage by taken to be paid
6.3 Housing unit by mode of acquisition
6.4 Interest rates for mortgages at FBS: 1996-2004
6.5 FBS’ performance measured by number of successful applicants for mortgages to purchase houses in Lusaka
6.6 FBS’ performance measured by number of successful applicants for mortgages to construct houses in Lusaka
6.7 ZNBS’ performance measured by number of successful applicants for mortgages to purchase houses in Lusaka
6.8 ZNBS’ performance measured by number of successful applicants for mortgages to construct houses in Lusaka
6.9 Occupation of land by mode of acquisition
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BFSA  Banking and Financial Services Act
BSA  Building Societies Act
CIMA  Chartered Institute of Management Accountants
CSO  Central Statistical Office
DfID  Department of International Development (British Aid)
ECA  Economic Commission for Africa
FBS  Finance Building Society
FNDP  First National Development Plan
FOHP  First Official Housing Programme
GRZ  Government of the Republic of Zambia
GTZ  Germany Technical Assistance
HPU  Housing Projects Unit
HPZ  Housing People of Zimbabwe
INDECO  Industrial Development Corporation
JICA  Japanese International Corporation
LCC  Lusaka City Council
MLGH  Ministry of Local Government and Housing
NAPSA  National Pensions Scheme Authority
NCC  National Council for Construction
NCDP  National Commission for Development Planning
NGO  Non Governmental Organisation
NHA  National Housing Authority
NHP  National Housing Policy
PABS  Pan African Building Society
PHI  Presidential Housing Initiative
PROSPECT  Programme of Support for Poverty Elimination
RDC  Resident Development Committee
SLP  Sustainable Lusaka Programme
SNDP  Second National Development Plan
SOHP  Second Official Housing Policy
SPSS  Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TNNDP  Third National Development Plan
UNCHS  United Nations Conference on Human Settlements
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID  United States Aid for International Development
ZIMCO  Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation
ZNBS  Zambia National Building Society
ZNPF  Zambia National Provident Fund
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The attainment of political independence, in all developing countries, entailed the realization of rapid political, social and economic development. New governments were therefore expected to provide reality to these anticipated 'fruits' of independence to the citizenry.

In Zambia, the government had taken decisive measures by formulating policies with the ultimate objectives of achieving socio-economic development. Despite these efforts, many areas of national socio-economic development have not been adequately addressed to meet the expectations of the people, thereby having a severe impact on the general well being of communities.

One such area that has lagged behind in national development has been the provision of adequate and decent housing to the growing population, especially the people in the low-income group, constituting the majority of the country's population. The problem of housing is more pronounced in urban areas where the need for new houses is very great both in absolute terms and in its proportion of current supply.

According to Pasteur (1979: 4), before 1964, the rate of urbanisation in Zambia, then Northern Rhodesia, was moderate partly due to the restrictions on entry into towns imposed by the colonial government. This was so because the colonial government's original concept of the urban worker was that of a single man with his real home in the village, who was only temporarily living in town. After independence, the combined effects of the lifting of restrictions on permanent urban settlement by rural migrants and the high copper sales from late 1960s and the early 1970s, led to exceptionally rapid population growth in most urban areas and Lusaka in particular.

As a result, the population of Lusaka increased from 266,245 in 1969 to 1,138,460 in 2000 (CSO: 1995; CSO: 2003). This situation had put pressure on the government to provide adequate and decent housing to the growing population, mainly those in the
low-income group. The government’s response to the increasing demand for housing involved the formulation and implementation of various housing policies and programmes. In line with the government’s policy of providing improved social welfare and educational services in the post-independence Zambia, surveys were carried out in 1964 to identify development policy areas that included housing development.

It was in this context that the First and Second Official Housing Programmes were implemented in 1965 and 1968 respectively. Housing development programmes were also reflected in the First, Second, Third and Fourth National Development Plans. The Interim ‘Housing Policy’ covering the period between the First and the Second National Development Plans was also implemented. In 1996, the first comprehensive National Housing Policy was officially launched. This is the document that currently provides guidelines on housing development in Zambia.

Arising from the policies that had been formulated, attempts had been made to implement programmes, through both the public and private initiatives to address housing problems in Lusaka. Specifically, public housing programmes involved conventional housing, site and service and squatter upgrading projects in addressing the housing crisis. The private sector’s involvement was mainly concerned with providing housing finance to the informal housing sector, that is, individual home developers. However, from the prevailing situation, it is evident that Lusaka has failed to meet the demand for new housing

1.1 Statement of the Problem

With the growth in population in Lusaka, a tremendous demand had been placed on the housing sector. The government had been unable to provide for the construction of a sufficient number of dwellings for city inhabitants. For example, as early as 1969, the Lusaka city council had a waiting list for housing for 16,343 families and 3,636 single persons, but completed only 668 housing units during the year (Mason, 1980:
21). This situation had worsened over the years as more and more people migrated to the city.

In the light of the above problem, policy makers and programme planners were challenged to formulate and implement relevant responses to the urban housing deficiency. Given the fact that previous policies and programmes had failed, there was need to find out why the housing problem persisted. The apparent failure to resolve the housing crisis raised questions, including the following: Why did the urban housing crisis persist? What urban housing policies were adopted and what programmes and strategies were followed? What was the impact of these programmes in urban housing development? This study focused on establishing the underlying factors for the failure, by the government to alleviate the housing crisis in Lusaka.

1.2 Rationale

The results of this study were expected to give some insight into the factors, which inhibit or make it difficult to address the problem of urban housing in Lusaka city. In this regard, the findings of the study could provide critical information, which may be used in adjusting existing or developing other approaches and strategies that may enhance housing programmes’ success.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

A. General Objective

The general objective was to explain why the problem of urban housing persisted despite the formulation and implementation of various policies and related programmes.

B. Specific Objectives

Specific objectives were:

Objective 1:

To examine the policies, programmes and strategies employed in addressing the housing problem.

Objective 2:

- To assess the impact of the housing policies, programmes and strategies
which were adopted to resolve the housing crisis.

**Objective 3:**
- To examine the institutional linkages in the housing programmes in order to establish the underlying strengths and weaknesses.

**Objective 4:**
- To suggest housing policy alternatives and programme changes for the improvement of the housing initiatives.

### 1.4 Conceptual Framework

The issue of urban housing is a global concern, which affects the entire world. Given the fact that large sections of the world’s urban population live in inadequate conditions where they are confronted with serious problems ranging from environmental problems which are exacerbated by inadequate planning and managerial capacities to lack of investment, technology and inappropriate allocation of financial resources, the Global Strategy for Shelter to the year 2000 was adopted in 1988 under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (UNCHS). This global strategy emphasized, ‘the need for improved production and delivery of shelter, revised national housing policies and an enabling strategy’ (UNCHS, 1999: 2) and offered useful guidelines for the realization of adequate shelter for all. The purpose of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) was to address two themes of equal importance, namely, ‘adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlements development in an urbanizing world’ (Ibid).

With regard to the theme of adequate shelter for all, the main objectives, inter alia, were to increase the supply of affordable housing by encouraging and promoting affordable home ownership and increasing the supply of affordable rental, communal, cooperative and other housing approaches through partnerships among public, private and community initiatives, creating and promoting market based incentives while giving due respect to the rights and obligations of both tenants and owners. The theme also encouraged the upgrading of existing housing stock through rehabilitation, maintenance and the adequate supply of basic services, facilities and amenities.
The theme of sustainable human settlements development in an urbanizing world had the objectives, among others, of promoting, where appropriate, the upgrading of informal settlements and urban slums as an expedient measure and pragmatic solution to the urban shelter deficit. It was therefore within this Global approach to urban housing that most Third World countries, Zambia included, tried to address the urban housing problem.

The conceptual framework in this dissertation centres around the relationship between government policies, programmes and strategies one the one hand and the housing problem on the other. The policies, programmes and strategies formulated and implemented by the government should resolve the housing problem in the community.

There are many models and theories that can be adopted in resolving the housing problem. One such model is the Housing Stock Model (HSM). The Housing Stock Model states that, the Type/Age/Condition/Rent structure of the housing stock in one city can be replicated to other cities (Chadwick; 1987: 211). According to Chadwick, this model focuses firstly on ‘age’ over future periods and down graded in condition to show future states of the housing situation. These future housing stocks can be compared with the future hold or family structure projections derived from population census to give a picture of housing needs at various times and that such needs can be converted to land requirements for housing using a range of varying housing density assumptions reflecting various standards of housing provision.

Secondly, the Housing Stock Model shows the forecast sizes of unfit or unsatisfactory housing components of the total stock at various times. The adoption of this model ensures the formulation of policies that reflect requirements such that the size of the programmes and strategies are in line with the requirements for upgrading or replacing unsatisfactory or unfit housing (Ibid).

In this study, assessment referred to the process of determining the value or amount of success in achieving a pre-determined objective. It included the formulation of the
objective, identification of the proper criteria to the explanation of the degree of success, recommendations for further programme activity. Strategies referred to the process of planning and carrying out plans of housing in skilful way. Achievements referred to the successes of the housing projects and programmes.

Urban Area was used to refer to an area with a minimum size of 5,000 people whose main economic activity was non-agriculture such as wage employment. In addition, the area should have had basic modern facilities such as piped water, tarred roads, post office, police station, health facilities and other related infrastructure.

Household referred to a group of persons who normally lived and ate together. These people may or may not have been related by blood, but made common provision for food or essentials for living, and they had only one person whom they regarded as the head of the household (CSO, 2003: 5).

Urban housing was used to refer to houses, flats or apartments in which the inhabitants of urban areas resided. Dwelling referred to a house, flat or apartment where a person lived.

Informal settlements, squatter or shanty compounds were used to refer to all settlements with no basic essential services and infrastructure such as roads, piped water, and sewerage and refuse collection services.

Squatter upgrading referred to a phased development programme in which the living conditions of a previously unauthorised settlement often devoid of the essential infrastructure and services was improved through the provision of the facilities and services such as road network, piped water, sanitary facilities and refuse collection services.

1.5 Limitations of the Study

It is a generally held view that an assessment rarely took place in an environment of complacency and satisfaction. The call for an assessment was a result of dissatisfaction somewhere. Some people interviewed did not want to be associated with failure. Therefore, they hid information on areas of weakness especially those in top
management and who were more interested in promoting corporate image. In this respect, there had to be some cross checking with secondary data to determine the validity of the information collected. The other major problem was poor record keeping, more especially at LCC. The record keeping system was not computerised and therefore, it took long to retrieve information from the archives, some of which was in tatters. The same was the case at ZNBS where the only information that could be accessed was from 1999 to date. The reasons advanced for this shortcoming was that once the mortgages had been redeemed, the files were closed and taken to the archives. The issue of non-availability of computers in the past was the main reason for this problem.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 METHODOLOGY

This study employed qualitative, quantitative and content analysis approaches. An analysis was done to examine the programmes and strategies employed in housing development by looking at the programmes design, internal consistencies and adequacy of resources committed to the programmes and how realistic the programmes were in relation to the real situation. To assess the impact of the housing policies, programmes and strategies that were adopted, the study looked at the demand for housing in relation to housing supply as well as the quality of housing. Examining the linkages among the participating agencies revealed the gaps in the roles of what these institutions were expected to play in the implementation of the policies. Content analysis of the advertisements in the Times of Zambia from 1st May 2004 to 30th June 2004 was done in order to establish the prevailing cost of real estate for outright purchase and for rent offered by the private sector in Lusaka.

2.1 Sampling Design:

Purposive and systematic random sampling was used to identify research participants. Purposive sampling was adopted because the study was concerned with a specialized field of housing and it was therefore concerned with key informants who dealt with and who were specialized in housing. Systematic random sampling was adopted to select respondents from whom views of the people affected by the housing initiatives were sought.

2.2 Data Collection Techniques:

Secondary data was extensively collected from official documents. For public or government housing initiatives, data was collected from the Ministry of Local Government and Housing, the Lusaka City Council and the National Housing Authority (NHA). With regard to private sector initiatives, secondary data was collected from official documents from the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the National Council for Construction (NCC), the
Japanese, International Co-operation Agency (JICA), CARE International, the Zambia National Building Society (ZNBS), Pan African Building Society (PABS), Finance Building Society (FBS), the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) and INDECO Estates. Accessibility to these documents enabled the researcher to have an overview and to identify the programmes to be examined. Data from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) was also examined in order to establish the magnitude of the housing crisis.

With regard to primary data, interviews were conducted using structured and semi-structured interview schedules in order to supplement secondary data and to obtain qualifying statements with regard to the strategies adopted in the process of addressing the housing crisis. Questionnaires with closed-ended questions were administered to the people affected by the housing initiatives in order to get their views.

Questionnaires and questions for the interviews were prepared in advance before commencing with the exercise of data collection. Qualitative data was collected from the key informants while quantitative data was collected from the people affected by the housing initiatives through the use of questionnaires with closed-ended questions. Data collection was done between 1st June 2004 and 24th September 2004.

2.3 Sample Size

A sample of 41 key informants and 100 respondents was adopted due to time, financial and other resource constraints as well as the approach adopted for data collection. The researcher was convinced that in addition to the secondary data already collected, this sample was adequate for the research findings to provide convincing information from which conclusions could be made. The 41 key informants interviewed were the officials who dealt with housing at the Ministry of Local Government and Housing, the Lusaka City Council (LCC), the National Housing Authority (NHA). Others were the officials in the top management at ZNBS, FBS, PABS, and INDECO Estates. In order to ensure availability of participants during data collection, the managements of all institutions visited were requested to assist in identifying those to be interviewed. One hundred systematically randomly selected
participants had questionnaires administered to them in order to get views on the impact of the housing initiatives. Before selecting the sample, a total of 43 residential areas were identified and categorised as conventional, site and service, declared squatter and undeclared squatter residential areas as per World Bank Classification Scheme (World Bank; 2002: 24-31). Thereafter, the 43 residential areas were put in alphabetical order (sequential list). Four residential areas were then randomly selected from which samples were drawn. To arrive at this, the 43 areas were divided by 4 so that every 11th residential area was part of the sample. The residential areas selected using this method were Garden, Chipata, Frank and Chazanga. In selecting actual households surveyed, the total number of households in each residential area was established. According to data from CSO, the total numbers of households were Garden 6,789; Chipata 9,417; Frank 720 and Chazanga 4,159. These figures were divided by 25 being the number determined by the researcher to be the total number of house holds to be surveyed in each residential area. By dividing 25 into the totals of the households in the areas selected, in Garden, every 272nd household was sampled, in Chipata, it was every 377th household, in Frank, it was every 29th and in Chazanga, it was every 166th household until 25 households in selected areas were sampled. Resident Development Committees (RDCs) assisted in locating the households.

2.4 Sample Area

The study was done in Lusaka City and it was mainly concerned with the residents of low-cost housing. Therefore, households in low-cost houses were the main focus of this study. These households were targeted because most housing programmes undertaken mainly focused on this group and it constituted the biggest part of the population residing in inadequate housing. This city was chosen for this study mainly because it was the largest and fastest growing city in Zambia with the most pressing problem of urban housing. In addition to this, Lusaka has had the least record, among other urban areas, in meeting its housing needs because of the magnitude of the problem due to rapid population growth coupled with the apparent failure by the Central, Local Government, and other stakeholders, to address the ever growing problem.
2.5 Data Analysis Techniques

Computer software, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse data collected from the household survey.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

In their paper "Public Housing Programmes are not working", Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1982) sought to show that scarce financial, technical, and managerial resources could be far more effectively employed in increasing the supply of basic housing components such as building land, loans, building materials and services like piped water, than government building houses.

These authors held this view because according to their observations, despite the existence of housing ministries or national housing authorities in most Third World countries, government agencies actually played a very minor role in housing construction. They argued that the majority of urban houses and essentially all rural houses continued to be built by inhabitants with no support from any official agency. They further argued that the same situation was the case in major urban centres where government programmes were concentrated and where the inhabitants themselves were still building most houses with no building permits. They stated that in most cases, the structures built by these inhabitants were built on illegally sub-divided or occupied land. They observed that the illegal sub-division and occupation of land was the only way that many of the urban population and most of the increment in urban population were housed. As is the case with Lusaka city in Zambia, many Third World countries worldwide, including the Sub-Saharan Africa, have attempted to address the problem of urban housing in their cities using various approaches and strategies.

Following these developments, many studies have been conducted to try and find out how various cities approached this problem and how effective their Housing Projects and Programmes were. In the same vein, some studies were conducted in Lusaka with the sole purpose of assessing the effectiveness and achievements of the housing projects and programmes as well as establishing the problems encountered in addressing the housing problem in the city.
Martin, R. (1982), in his article “The Formulation of a Self – Help Project in Lusaka,” attempted to show how the needs of the residents of squatter settlements in Lusaka, Zambia could eventually be met by a Squatter Upgrading Programme. Martin’s article was based on the project that had been implemented against the background of the fact that although the Zambian Government was becoming more involved in addressing urban housing problems in Lusaka, government action was virtually always inadequate. The government’s response to mounting housing problems had been usually to concentrate their activities in trying to fund the construction of enough housing units to make up for a somewhat arbitrarily defined ‘housing deficit’.

The point of departure was that, to see the major housing problem, as a shortage of units in Lusaka was to misunderstand the problem. His argument was that, virtually, every resident had some sort of shelter regardless of the condition in which it was. The housing project advocates saw the problem to be the poor quality of the sites, houses and neighbourhoods that the poor were forced to live in coupled with their lack of basic services and community facilities.

Against this background, the Squatter Upgrading Project, which was initiated in 1974 with the assistance of the World Bank, which provided a loan of US $20 million to be matched by a further US $20 million from the Zambian government together with contributions from UNICEF and the American Friends Service Committee, was implemented. The project’s objective was to give the residents in the then existing settlements namely George, Chaisa and Chipata compounds security of tenure, piped water servicing one standpipe per 25 houses, adequate access roads and security lighting, and refuse removal services. The other objective of the project was to allow for the expansion of houses to a size, which eliminated overcrowding by encouraging some residents to be relocated thereby slightly reducing the overall densities to between 28 and 29 dwellings per hectare.

While the major concern of the project was the generation of physical improvement, it also aimed at sowing a seed of participation by the locals in the housing process in order to allow for development. To this end, the strategies employed in the project
implementation phase took into account the achievements and the existing leadership in the settlements in a way that respected than undermine the rules and systems that had already been developed. This initiative was made so as to make the project to be seen as a support system and not a corrective one. This was equally meant to make residents feel that they had an executive role in decision-making and to make them see the intervention by the government as a means of accelerating development.

In the light of the above factors, the project was designed in such a way as to permit the improvements to be undertaken by residents themselves without having to go to the authorities for money or expertise. The legal system of tenure and building regulations were made to be appropriate to the values and the expectations of the residents. Most importantly, the project aimed at supporting the existing tradition of Self – Help construction, a strategy that was meant to be affordable and within the culturally accepted norms for housing expenditure for that income group.

In making the evaluation of the project, the researcher compared the objectives of the project with what had actually happened. With regard to the question of giving residents what they had wanted most, that is, water and sewerage connections, the researcher found out that the project only managed to provide water. The provision of sewerage connections and other community services as was envisaged at the onset of the project had to be deferred to a later stage on account of cost. However, the foreseen need for an almost symbiotic relationship between the implementing agency and the residents was achieved. In addition, the evaluation of the project revealed that the vitality and independence of the leadership in the compounds had not been impaired by the project experiences, but that the residents felt that their role and abilities had been strengthened by it. The project evaluation also revealed that by most measures, there was active participation and that to a certain extent the acceptance of the solutions was derived from all the residents. The successes recorded were seen to have been due to the active participation of the residents.

However, the researcher did not establish why all of a sudden funds meant for the project could not suffice to provide all the community facilities and services that were
initially planned and budgeted for. In this case, it was difficult to suggest remedial measures that could ensure the success of future projects of a similar nature.

Keare, D. H. and S. Parris (1982), in their article “Evaluation of Shelter Programs for the Urban Poor: Principal Findings”, presented a summary of findings of a five – year evaluation study of four World Bank – financed urban shelter projects in El Salvador, the Philippines, Senegal and Zambia. The study, which was jointly sponsored by the International Development Research Centre of Canada and the World Bank had the sole purpose of providing an in – depth analysis of the basic assumptions of project design.

Keare and Parris stated that this study was conducted from a background of the fact that since 1972, a substantial portion of the Bank’s urban lending programme had been based on the proposition that meaningful urban housing development could be achieved through the use of strategies like the ‘Site and Service and Squatter area Upgrading Projects, providing secure tenure and a range of basic services’ because such strategies could enable and encourage low income households to improve their housing through Self – Help financing and, or construction. They further stated that the projects’ proponents argued that improvements in living environments were expected to lead to growth in productivity incomes over time. These projects were therefore integrated ‘urban’ projects as opposed to ‘housing’ projects and that they appeared to have had marked advantages in comparison with conventional strategies. They added that both project types were characterized, in 1972, as ‘Progressive Development’ implying that improvements were to be ‘made at a pace dependent on the incomes and preferences of project households’.

The field staff of Social Scientists and interviewers carried out the evaluation surveys in this study. The study had two principal objectives: the ‘assessment of major features of specific projects studied as a guide to the feasibility of such projects, drawing lessons where appropriate, for the Bank’s urban lending programmes; and testing the evaluation methods used’. The evaluation of the projects were concerned with testing the viability of the strategies ‘in actual practice in terms of project costs, efficiency of
the progressive development construction process, and affordability and accessibility of the projects to the urban poor’.

According to the evaluation outcomes, the projects’ impact on the housing stock indicated that there had been an increase in the national production of low-cost housing in all the countries covered, of up to 50 percent. In the case of Zambia, the authors stated that almost half of the population of Lusaka was affected by the project while in the secondary cities of El Salvador, up to 20 percent of the total population from the third to sixth income deciles were affected and that as a result of this development, the beneficiaries of the projects were stimulated to produce housing of a high quality than was expected.

An evaluation of the affordability of the projects by the urban poor indicated that in practice as well as in theory, plots in Sites and Services Projects and Sub-Projects were affordable to the families down to the twentieth income percentile, a development that was deemed to have been a more effective penetration to the low-income. For example, preliminary evidence from Philippines suggested that while the rental rates had increased 11 percent since the project initiation, this increase was less than the overall inflation rate. According to the researchers’ view, these findings and the general acceptable occupancy and building rates supported the conclusion that the Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Projects were affordable to the target population and that these projects had led to significant ‘improvements in the provision of water, sanitation and other basic services to a large number of the urban poor.’

On the question of accessibility of projects to the urban poor, the evaluation revealed that the projects were able to reach the low-income as opposed to most conventional public housing, which they said, could not even reach the two-thirds of income distribution, unless it was heavily subsidized.

In the same vein, an examination of the impacts of the projects on socio-economic conditions of the participants revealed that the process of house construction and upgrading had generated substantial amounts of employment and income. For
example, in El Salvador, evaluation results indicated that a Bank project of 7,000 units produced 'about 3,700 persons/years of employment and US $ 4.2 million (1978/79) in wage income.' The study also indicated that shelter projects also tended to produce significant increases in rental incomes and that they have not had negative effects on expenditures for food and other basic necessities.

The study also indicated that both Site and Service and Upgrading Projects were efficient in the sense that they used progressive development strategies whereby families assumed at least part of the responsibility for constructing or upgrading their houses. This strategy, according to the study findings, proved to be a relatively efficient construction method. For example, in El Salvador, it was estimated that families could reduce costs by as much as 30 per cent by building their own houses than hiring contractors. In this way, families were also able to regulate their expenditures in accordance with income fluctuations.

The major positive outcomes of these projects as they were reported by the evaluation teams were that they were successful in as much as they demonstrated that progressive development strategies enabled substantially cheaper housing to be produced as opposed to that produced by conventional processes. For example, in Zambia, 'a complete new house in one of the overspill areas cost less than one-fifth as much as the cheapest government housing.' Similarly, in El Salvador, the better quality project houses cost less than half as much as the cheapest conventional house.

However, although the progressive development model had generally operated well, the evaluation of the projects revealed a number of problems associated with project implementation. Much as the loans or materials had been instrumental in enabling families to complete house constructions, there had been some problems in the administration of the loans. The study indicated that the provision of materials through 'on site' stores had often resulted in considerable delays or this arrangement did not produce the expected price reductions. For this reason, the evaluation teams of the respective projects suggested that, except in countries with acute shortages of building materials, families should be able to use the loans to purchase materials wherever they
wished and that they should be allowed to use the loans to hire labour if they wished, this was especially important for families with little time available outside paid occupations and who could not, therefore, make use of Self-Help labour. The recovery of loans was also found to be a problem. For example, in the early stages of the Zambian project, more than 50 percent of the families were in arrears with many having made no payments at all.

From the point of view of the researchers, the findings of these studies were a significant step towards Urban Housing Project Design. They held the view that the evidence from the study suggested areas for further improvements such as in the design of credit programmes, the administration of construction loans and in the approaches to loans recovery.

However, the flaw of this study was that the evaluation concerned itself with the aspect of improving the quality of the Site and Service and Squatter Upgrading Projects. It looked at what was already in existence and not what was done in terms of increasing the quantity of the housing stock in the relation to the rapid population growth. In this case, from the point of view of the housing needs, the housing problem still existed. This aspect should have been examined in order to come up with suggestions for housing improvement in this regard as well.

Lacey, L. in his article “Squatter Settlement in Liberia: Towards the Integration of Housing and Population Policies” in 1988, looked at the problem of urban housing in selected urban centres given the urban population growth. His point of departure was that many urban centres were doubling in size every ten years. He observed that many of the new urban dwellers were poor and that the visible aspect of the new urban dwellers was in the communities where the poor resided. He added that over-crowding in substandard housing and lack of basic services and amenities characterized these communities, which were often called slums, squatter settlements or shantytowns.

Lacey’s article explored the relationship between population growth and the growth of squatter settlements in Monrovia, Liberia. He also explored the government’s response to the housing problem that mainly involved Public Housing Projects with an
emphasis on the Site and Service and Settlement Upgrading Programmes. In examining the relationship between population growth and urban housing problems in Liberia, the article gave an overview of the relationship between population and housing in general followed by an in-depth examination of the relationship in Monrovia.

Lacey noted that Monrovia, like many national capitals, was experiencing rapid urban population growth and that while government policies had been implemented to provide housing for its growing population, the services only met a small percentage of the city’s housing needs.

He established that the government’s response during the past twenty years involved meeting housing and related needs of the urban poor through such initiatives as Public Housing Projects, Site and Service Schemes and Settlement Upgrading Programmes. Lacey’s view on this government strategy was that although few success stories existed, the rapid population growth far exceeded the ability of the government of Liberia to provide adequate shelter for the majority of the urban poor in Monrovia.

The weakness in this article lies in fact that it did not state the strategies employed in the housing programmes. In addition, it did not indicate what was achieved. Most importantly, the article did not give an evaluation with regard to the objectives of government programmes to solve the housing problems in relation to the expected outcomes. As a result, it was difficult to account for the success or failure of the housing strategies.

Akinbode, A., in his study on the “Provision of Housing in a newly Urbanizing area: A Case Study of Ekpoma, Bendel State, Nigeria” in 1989, sought to examine both the quality and quantity of housing in Ekpoma, to analyse the inadequacies in housing provision and to propose housing schemes that would rectify the existing deficiencies in housing in Ekpoma, Bendel State, Nigeria.

The main objective of this study was to give a critical analysis of the housing provision in Ekpoma micropolitan area of Bendel State, Nigeria. This area was chosen
for research because it was a rapidly urbanizing area where demand for modern housing units was expanding phenomenally every year. The phenomenal expansion in the demand for housing was attributable to a large number of government establishments which had a large concentration of high-income people.

This study, therefore, sought to unfold multifarious problems limiting the provision of adequate housing for the inhabitants in Ekpoma. Precisely, the study pursued a three-fold objective namely to undertake a survey of both quality and quantity of housing in Ekpoma micropolitan area, an analysis of the inadequacies in housing provision for the welfare of the inhabitants and a proposal of the housing schemes capable of rectifying housing deficiencies in the area of the study. Emphasis was equally put on the influence of basic factors such as transport development, urbanization and the establishment of educational institutions on quality of houses.

The study area consisted of 22 spatially segregated, but socio-culturally and politically unified settlements. 985 housing units constituting about 13.45 percent of housing units in the area were selected for close study. About 85.20 percent of the owners were men and 14.80 percent were women. With regard to age, 815 of the house owners were at least 40 years old while 19 percent were below 40 years of age. 99 percent of the landlords and landladies were indigenous of Ishanland. 93 percent of house-owners were married while 74 percent of were farmers. The average size of the buildings in the area was between 5 and 8 rooms. The buildings in this area were predominantly mud-walled although a number of concrete block-wall buildings were steadily being constructed. 40 percent of the buildings had kitchens, bath and toilet facilities.

With regard to research methodology, the study derived data from two major sources, that is, documentary and primary data from field surveys. The secondary data included mainly books and journals. The field surveys involved a detailed study of a sample of 985 housing units selected from 22 settlements making up Ekpoma micropolitan area. The researcher was satisfied that by concentrating on 13.45 percent of the housing units in each settlement, reliable data was going to be obtained to permit a meaningful analysis of housing problems and prospects.
With specific reference to the study area, the findings were that the major constraints on housing supply were high cost of building materials, cost of land and cost of maintenance. He equally observed that although supply of housing had been rising steadily within the same period, the demand continued to exceed supply mainly because of the presence of a large number of people in the professional fields, among others, who were in need of high-cost housing that they considered being decent accommodation.

Arising from his findings, his proposals for housing schemes were that the government should reduce the price of building materials, land should be allocated freely or at reduced cost, and to have more model houses made available to people at moderate rentals. He finally advocated for the formation of co-operative societies on housing.

The critique of this study lies in his findings where the researcher only concentrated on the cost of building materials as being the main hindrance to the supply of housing. He did not establish as to whether there were other strategies employed by the government to try and address the problem such as the provision of housing finance to individual home developers. In so doing, he failed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the problems associated with the provision of adequate housing. The other factor is that he only looked at housing in terms of quantity. The study did not come up with suggestions as to how the quality of housing could be ensured and how affordable housing finance could be accessed.

Syagga, P. M. and J. M. Kiamba, in their study “Housing the Urban Poor: A Case Study of Pumwani, Kibera and Dandora Estates in the City of Nairobi, Kenya,” in 1992, examined the expansion of the urban poor and the housing shortage which they experienced. They also examined the socio-economic status of the city of Nairobi’s urban poor and related this to the nature of the housing problem. In making these examinations, they used Pumwani, Kibera and Dandora housing areas in the city of Nairobi, Kenya as case studies where they examined Public Housing Policies and Programmes such as the Site and Service Schemes and the Conventional Housing
Construction Programmes with a view to making policy suggestions as to how they could be made more successful.

This study was conducted from a background of their findings that in 1980, the World’s population was 4.4 billion with an average growth of 1.7 percent and that of these, 3.3 billion or 74 percent lived in inadequate housing characterized, both qualitatively and quantitatively by an utter inadequacy. They noted that the housing problem was more pronounced in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) where the provision of new houses was not kept pace with the increasing population growth. As a result of the deficit in the housing stock, the majority of people lived in sub-standard housing characterized by overcrowding and poor sanitation coupled with malnutrition, unemployment and low levels of living. From the researchers’ observation, the housing problem was more pronounced in urban areas that had experienced very rapid population growth. This was the case in Nairobi, Kenya. The increase in population created a strain in the urban services with housing being the worst hit.

The researchers’ paper therefore examined the housing conditions against backcloth of what attempts had been made to improve the housing situation. They examined policy and programme failures so as to make policy suggestions for the provision of decent housing for the urban poor. The study targeted the urban poor residing in Pumwani, Kibera and Dandora Estates in the city of Nairobi, Kenya. This comprised 69 percent of the urban population. With regard to the formal sector employees, the sample included drivers, clerks and typists. The informal sector included street hawkers, metal artisans and shoe shiners, among others, who spent more than 56 percent of their income on food leaving a small portion for rent, transport and house utilities and therefore, could not afford to pay very much for housing.

The findings of this study were that Settlement Upgrading would most appropriately answer the problems of the low-income households. The justification for this conclusion was that since the majority of the poor lived in these areas, it was a plausible proposition to concentrate on Settlement Upgrading. The researchers admitted that Settlement Upgrading was not a new idea nor was it a conclusive
solution to housing problems. They, however, based their suggestions on the weaknesses identified in the implementation of the many housing programmes undertaken in Kenya.

The gap in their study lies in the fact that they did not thoroughly examine the many programmes undertaken in Kenya for them to identify the weaknesses. In this respect, they did not address the issues of what could have caused the weaknesses in the many housing programmes that were undertaken. Establishing the causes of the weaknesses could have provided the starting point for redefining the housing policies with a view of making an impact in this regard.

Ondiege, P. O., (1992) in his paper “Public Sector and Housing Development in the City of Nairobi, Kenya: Affordability and Implicit Subsidy and Possible Alternatives” took an economic approach in analysing public sector involvement in urban housing development. He analyzed the affordability and implicit subsidy of the National Housing Corporation in Nairobi city.

This study was prompted by urban housing problems experienced in Kenya as a result of high urban population, a lag in the development of urban infrastructure that supported housing, a low purchasing power of the majority of the urban households and the lack of appropriate building standards due to restrictive By – Laws.

Having analysed some of the National Housing Corporation housing programmes through an empirical analysis using data from the National Housing Corporation annual report of 1983 – 84 and the Government of Kenya Statistical Abstract of 1987, the researcher’s findings indicated that some of the low-income households could not afford conventional housing such as tenant purchase and mortgage housing. He also found out that the low-income households could afford Site and Service Schemes even at the market interest rates assuming they spend 30 % of their income on housing services. He therefore concluded that for low-income households to spend below 20 % of their income on housing there was need for interest subsidization. He argued that this would ensure that the Site and Service Schemes were within the low-income household’s affordability range.
The flaw in this paper was that the research was mainly concerned with affordability and implicit subsidies of the National Housing Corporation projects in Nairobi. The research did not explore other approaches to urban housing such as provision of land, basic infrastructure such as electricity, water, sewerage systems and roads to enable the poor to construct their own structures in decent residential areas. He should have evaluated such approaches in order to establish whether there could have been successes or failures in adopting such approaches to urban housing.

Brown, J. and G. Gallant (1999) in their report “Evaluation on the Sustainability of HPZ”, a Housing People of Zimbabwe (HPZ) Project that was initiated to address the housing needs of the people in the low-income group in Zimbabwe, presented the major achievements of the said project. Zimbabwe, like many other developing countries, was faced with a great demand for new housing for the urban population and most seriously, the people in low-income bracket. Conventional approaches to housing could not suffice given the fact that the number of dwellings constructed was very few and that the cost of these houses was beyond the reach of the majority of the people.

It was in regard that a housing cooperative called Housing People of Zimbabwe (HPZ) was initiated in 1997 with the assistance of donor funds from Canada. Zimbabwe addressed the housing problem through the cooperative movement because it was envisaged that this was one way in which the local leadership could be enabled through the promotion of democratic rule, transparency, responsibility and accountability which would in turn enhance effective and efficient management of housing projects.

The objectives of Housing People of Zimbabwe, among others, were to provide ‘viable and sustainable cooperative housing projects responding to the needs of low income and moderate income households’; to provide ‘primary housing cooperatives as stronger, more credible, democratic organizations’; to have Housing People of Zimbabwe move ‘towards becoming a self - sufficient cooperative housing support organization’; to have ‘policies and programmes necessary to the development of
housing adopted by government and other external agencies’ and to promote the provision of ‘technical assistance and sharing of experience between Zimbabwean, African Regional and Canadian Cooperative organizations.’

Housing People of Zimbabwe was organized in such a way there was the Cooperative National formations committee with regional task forces in Harare, Gweru, Bulawayo, the Midlands, Masvingo, Marondera, Bvumba, Gwanda, Kadoma and Chinoye. This arrangement ensured the coordination of the projects in the respective areas. In evaluating Housing People of Zimbabwe, Brown and Gallant looked at the programme effectiveness and efficiency and programme sustainability. With regard to programme effectiveness and efficiency, the researchers looked at internal and external factors, which impacted on the programme’s effectiveness and efficiency.

In as far as the internal factors were concerned, they analysed the connection between the financial, administrative and project parts of the organization. The researchers’ findings were that the programme had in place the position of Financial and Administrative and that of the Project Section Manager, which, according to the researchers, improved efficiency in decision making as more decisions were being made at the Project Management level, a development they said enhanced closer supervision.

On the aspect of the monitoring system, the researchers noted that the programme had few monitoring systems. As a result, the Programme Managers could not establish how many houses were being built, the time frame over which they were built and the number of houses that Housing People of Zimbabwe needed to produce in order to be sustainable. They therefore suggested that the programme needed to have set performance indicators for each unit; to develop work plans, which included indicators for all sections of the organization; to develop job descriptions and job evaluation procedures as well as establishing a simple method for record keeping and monitoring the above suggestions. They also noted that staff complement from the local authorities; good and sound financial planning as well as sound organizational procedures enhanced the programme effectiveness and efficiency.
In the case of the impact of external relationships on programme efficiency, the researchers found that the relations between the programme and Municipal authorities and Building Societies were not sound. The reason for this was that the Building Society and Municipal authorities that did not want to use the expertise of HPZ did not understand the intermediary role of Housing People of Zimbabwe.

It was against this background that the researchers suggested that HPZ's services should be aggressively marketed to Municipal authorities and Building Societies by highlighting the achievements and to continue with 'lobbying efforts to have Municipalities recognize that they are dealing with communities and communities need to be planned.' They also suggested having education forums for Building Society staff organized to address the issue of cooperatives and community mortgages.

On the question of the impact of the changing donor climate on the programme, the evaluators noted that in the international community, the funding available for international aid was decreasing. Since HPZ’s existence was dependent on donor funding, there was need to consider various strategies for subsidizing the low-income cooperatives when needed while charging a service fee to middle income cooperatives.

In assessing the programme’s sustainability, the researchers examined sustainability from a number of vantage points namely political sustainability, sustainability of the housing movement, economic sustainability and the financial situation at the time. The findings of Brown and Gallant on the political sustainability were that over the years, HPZ had worked hard to raise the profile of housing cooperatives in Zimbabwe which they said had resulted in an increase in the political support for cooperatives at both the municipal and national level. This development, they believed, would influence policy change to enable cooperatives to become registered and obtain land and mortgages more expeditiously.

From the findings after the assessment of sustainability of the housing movement, Brown and Gallant held the view that for the cooperative movement to continue to build and for the existing cooperatives to maintain or increase their membership, there
was need for the public to perceive that cooperatives offered an accessible and viable route to home ownership. The advantages that they said could be provided by the cooperative movement were the financial advantage of having a number of people building at the same time and the possibility of acquiring land with minimum delay as the cooperatives were usually able to ‘jump the queue’ on the waiting list.

An examination of the economic sustainability revealed that although government was supportive in theory, nothing practical had been put in place in the area of cooperative housing. The government of Zimbabwe expected cooperatives to operate on a dichotomous model in that, on the one hand, the cooperative movement was expected to operate on equal footing with the private sector in order to survive in a competitive environment and to be financially sustainable. On the other hand, the cooperative movement was expected to address the needs of the disadvantaged. Given the worsening economic climate, the researchers found that more of the middle-income people were now approaching HPZ at the expense of the low-income group. It was for this reason that the researchers suggested having a particular outreach initiative to meet more low-income groups and to have considerations given to a staggered fee.

On the question of the financial situation at the time, the researchers established that HPZ had a very good financial position, which was attributed to the fact that the movement was donor funded and during that time, the local currency had been devalued. The researchers’ view was that this situation was not expected to last and that HPZ’s income was likely to drop drastically with the stabilization of the local currency coupled with the withdrawal of donor aid. They therefore suggested to expand the operations of HPZ and to increase efficiency in the project sector.

From their evaluation, Brown and Gallant concluded that HPZ had achieved many of its objectives in the sense that cooperative housing projects had been developed and built and that primary housing cooperatives had become stronger coupled with the growth of the cooperative housing movement. They also noted that considerable work had been done with municipalities and organizations like USAID to ensure their
cooperation and support. They equally noted that with the development of the programme, the staff team had equally become strong and that the full complement of all the staff was in place.

They, however, noted that the programme had not built houses up to the number predicted. At the time of the evaluation, the researchers established that only 224 houses were under construction as opposed to the 1,620 targeted in the proposal. The reasons for this discrepancy were economic conditions in Zimbabwe, unprofessional competition from outside players, internal cooperative issues, poor soil conditions and the reluctance of some cooperatives to accept mortgages. Despite the setbacks, the researchers were of the view that it was the ability to build housing which would ultimately determine the sustainability the cooperative movement. They also observed that the programme had some missed opportunities, as the organization had been unable to respond quickly and efficiently to development opportunities. They stated that decision-making was sometimes slow and inefficient as the organization focused on day-to-day operations instead of balancing this with strategic planning for the future.

The shortcoming of this study lies in the fact that the researchers only concentrated on evaluating the cooperative to address ‘new’ urban housing. They did not examine how the problem of squatter settlements could be addressed. This is so because it could be beneficial to upgrade the existing settlements alongside the construction of new units.

The lessons to be derived from the literature review outlined above, is that urban population growth in the Third World countries had been phenomenal and this had placed a lot of demand on housing, more especially, housing for people in the low-income group.

Third World governments’ efforts to provide conventional housing had been far from being satisfactory. The reasons for this situation had been the dearth of resources to enable governments to provide decent housing to the urban population. This, therefore, entailed that governments could only construct very few dwellings, which were far
from meeting the demand. The other reason was that the houses constructed through conventional means had been above the means of the low-income people.

The researchers agree that it had been the inability by governments to provide affordable conventional housing to the low-income urban inhabitants that led to the mushrooming of informal settlements, slums, shanty or squatter compounds which emerged on illegally acquired land without approved building standards and which were characterized by lack of clean water supply, drainage, access roads, sewerage and refuse disposal facilities.

Given the magnitude of the housing problem, the researchers observed that the only plausible approach to urban housing was squatter upgrading and the site and service schemes that were adopted by many Third World governments. Some governments used the strategies of Self–Help and Housing Cooperatives to tackle this problem.

However, despite the efforts made in this respect, the issue of providing adequate shelter to the majority of the urban population was still a matter of serious concern that required establishing the underlying factors inhibiting progressive development in this area.

The main gaps in the researchers’ studies pertaining to the efforts by various governments to address the urban housing problem was that most of them did not study in detail what programmes and strategies to urban housing were employed prior to the ones they studied. They could not, therefore, provide a justification for the methods adopted in facing the problem. The researchers also took a one-dimensional approach to studying the ways in which national governments tackled the housing crisis. They either looked at the provision of new housing through the cooperative movement, conventional means, the site and service schemes or the improvement of the quality of housing through squatter upgrading programmes. In this respect, they only attributed the question of success or failure of governmental projects and programmes to single factors, mainly, lack of financial resources. They should have taken multi-dimensional approaches in order to exploit other avenues to housing development such as private sector involvement, provision of housing finance and
land for housing development. This could have provided exhaustive assessments of the overall factors affecting the housing crisis. This situation explains the reason why the researchers did not offer meaningful suggestions as to how the housing stock could be improved in both quantity and quality. It is for this reason that this case study was undertaken in order to have a comprehensive study of housing policies, programmes and strategies for Lusaka city, Zambia in order to explain why the problem of urban housing persisted despite the formulation and implementation of related housing policies and programmes.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 EXAMINATION OF HOUSING POLICIES, PROGRAMMES AND STRATEGIES

By examining housing policies, programmes and strategies, the study established that public sector involvement was specifically in the conventional housing, site and service and squatter upgrading programmes. The private sector was mainly involved in the provision of housing finance with the informal sector being involved in housing construction.

4.1 Institutional Framework

There were various institutions responsible for providing, operating, and maintaining infrastructure in Lusaka city. The main organs of the Central Government charged with the responsibility of promoting shelter improvement were the MLGH, which, through the Department of Physical Planning and Housing, was responsible for identifying housing improvement areas. The MLGH’s Department of Infrastructure Support Services was responsible for the management of donor projects that support infrastructure development, improvement and rehabilitation.

The Lusaka City Council was responsible for the management and provision of council-owned housing and unplanned settlements. According to the Lusaka City Council’s establishment, there were two directorates under the council’s Public Health and Social Services Department, one for conventional housing and the other for Peri-Urban housing. All informal or unplanned settlements fell under the Peri-Urban Housing Directorate. The city council was responsible for local planning, development control, provision of local roads, drainage and solid waste management, including other environmental health functions (Mushota and Lewanika, 1997: 2; World Bank, 2002: 10-11). The Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company was responsible for the provision of water, sewerage and sewerage treatment.

The National Housing Authority which was created through an Act of Parliament, the National Housing Authority (NHA) Act Chapter 426 of the Laws of Zambia in 1971
advised the Central Government on housing matters as well as taking an active role in the housing development industry by constructing houses for outright purchase and for rent. The Zambia National Building Society, the Pan African Building Society, the Finance Building Society and other financial institutions had been providing housing finance for housing development. These institutions together with other home developers had been implementing activities aimed at increasing decent housing stock and related infrastructure from own generated resources or with the assistance of donor support.

4.2 Public Sector Housing Development Programmes

4.2.1 Conventional Housing

An overview of the housing situation prior to independence showed that Lusaka was planned to be a spacious ‘garden city’ for British and South-African settlers. For this reason, the Africans’ housing needs were not adequately addressed as they were supposed to need only temporary houses which were attached to their employment (Schlyter and Schlyter, 1979: 13). The original plan for Lusaka did not provide for any housing areas for Africans except for servants in the backyard of the ‘colonial masters’ houses. This plan was however modified in 1933 to make a provision for African housing areas and hence Kabwata and Kamwala were built in 1935 and 1936 in the southern outskirts of the city, respectively. In 1945, Chilenje was built in the southeast and in 1947, Chinika, far from the city in westerly direction, was also built. Chinika, was, however, demolished in the early 1970s because it was built upon limestone ground with the rock lying close to the surface that caused drainage problems (Ibid: 14).

A policy of stabilisation of the working class was followed in the 1950s and some African townships were planned. This resulted into the erection and management of Lusaka city housing areas. The largest township was Matero. The houses in these areas were mainly let to employers who sublet them to their employees. These houses were mainly for the people in the low-income groups. Some private developers also built housing estates for the middle-income groups. One example is Lilanda, west of Matero.
that was built in the early 1960s by a private firm called Richard Costein Company Limited (Ibid).

One important feature to note is that Lusaka city was developed along segregated settlements with the British and South-African settlers living in spacious areas with high quality services and infrastructure. The Africans were settled in the outskirts of the city where a small number of houses were built at a cost that made housing available only for the working class. Housing development efforts were therefore aimed at the provision of dwellings for the growing administration. It was in this respect that the houses for civil servants were heavily subsidised. Against this background, most of the high-cost and medium-cost houses built in the colonial era were meant for high-ranking officials in government. These housing units were referred to as institutional houses and they were administered by the Ministry of Works and Supply until recently when they were sold to sitting tenants. An examination of official records at the Ministry of Works and Supply revealed that 4,175 were the houses that were government owned in Lusaka. In the same vein, many of the Lusaka City Council’s high-cost, medium-cost and low-cost housing units were also built in the colonial period. However, there were some conventional housing development programmes that were implemented after independence.

4.2.2. Strategies for Conventional Housing

The main aim of conventional housing development in the early 1960s was to provide low-cost housing to cater for the people in the low-income groups who had been neglected in the colonial housing development programmes. The other factor was that these people were in majority and constituted the bigger part of the population that was growing rapidly. It was in this regard that the First Official Housing Programme (FOHP) of 1965 aimed at constructing many low-cost houses.

The first conventional approach to housing development after independence aimed at providing modern toilet facilities to low-cost houses that had been constructed during the colonial era. This programme aimed at improving sanitation by providing private flush toilets as opposed to communal ones that had been in existence in townships
meant for Africans. This programme was implemented in Matero compound.

In line with the FOHP, the Interim Housing Policy of 1970 required of local authorities to submit schemes confined to low-cost housing. However, many local authorities, including Lusaka City Council were unwilling to build low-cost housing which they thought were of low standard. They were more attached to high-cost houses that they considered to be of high quality. Despite this desire for quality housing, the local authority did not have the resources to undertake this programme. In addition, high quality housing entailed high cost that meant the people for whom the houses were intended were not going to afford them. Therefore, nothing came out of the implementation of this policy.

The official records at the LCC indicated that the institution participated in housing development, not by constructing conventional houses per se, instead, LCC contracted other companies to construct most housing units and related infrastructure that were constructed after independence. A typical example of such housing projects was the MERZAF housing project in which in the early 1990s, LCC entered into a contract with a firm called MERZAF to construct blocks of flats for rent in Chilenje and Kamwala. This housing project only contributed 184 units to the council’s total housing stock as indicated in Table 4.1.

An examination of council records also indicated that from the supply side, LCC only provided 13,160 housing units (Table 4.1) mainly for its workers, those in other government departments and workers in other sectors of the economy. As of now, the majority of the housing units had been sold to sitting tenants and the council’s involvement in conventional housing development was almost non-existent. The breakdown of the housing units that were owned by LCC is as indicated in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Number of Housing Units by status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence/Township</th>
<th>High-cost</th>
<th>Medium-cost</th>
<th>Low-cost</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ascort</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelstone</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>1,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibolya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilenje South</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>1,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chunga</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epson</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibex Hill</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajemba</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalunda</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamwala</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaunda Square</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libala/Kabwata</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>1,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matero</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>1,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merzaf</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Chilenje</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>1,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northmead</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nsunzu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympia Park</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodes Park</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAP Houses</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thorn Park</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Centre</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodlands</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>112</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,943</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,160</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mr. A. Hadongwe, Chief Housing Officer, LCC – Interview.

Table 4.2 shows that the majority of the housing units that were owned by LCC were low-cost. It shows that 98.3 percent of the houses were low-cost with 0.85 percent and 0.80 percent being high-cost and medium-cost respectively.

Table 4.2: Percentage Distribution of Housing Units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of housing units</th>
<th>Status of housing units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High-cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.160</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mr. A. Hadongwe, Chief Housing Officer, LCC – Interview.

In 1971, Parliament passed the National Housing Authority (NHA) Act Chapter 426 of Laws of Zambia. This Act was the culmination of all previous efforts put into the implementation of a feasible housing programme. It was realised that the attempts
made to provide decent and adequate housing were fragmented and did not aim at providing a long-term solution to the growing housing problem at the time. This was so because prior to the enactment of the said Act, very little effort had been made to seek for better shelter delivery systems and therefore, much of the housing development for the general public was inadequate and in a poor state. The poor or low-income groups lived in poor quality housing conditions as was seen by the quality of materials used for construction coupled with poor water supply, lack of electricity, poor road networks and overcrowding. In essence the Act was to make a better provision for the development and control of housing throughout Zambia and to allow for the establishment of a body corporate known as the National Housing Authority (NHA).

Prior to the establishment of NHA, there was no government institution whose sole responsibility was housing development. The local authorities that were in existence were, apart from providing housing, required to provide other basic services to the communities. It was therefore felt that the local authorities were unable to satisfy the demand with regard to housing delivery. For this reason, NHA was created through which the government was to provide adequate housing to the growing population.

The functions of NHA were wide and deep rooted in the provision of shelter as a basic need and the ideal of providing better living standards of the people. Under this Act, NHA was to keep housing conditions under review through periodical housing surveys. It was expected to advise government and local authorities on the need for further housing developments. NHA was also mandated to take over, manage and control on efficient and economic basis, houses belonging to the government and to promote home ownership by the introduction of house purchase schemes (Ng’andu, 2002: 10). NHA also had powers to approve or disapprove local authority housing schemes as well as to go into partnership with other housing developers. Other provisions included functions with regard to the development of housing estates and the establishment of housing purchase schemes. Against this background, from inception, NHA built mostly low-cost and medium-cost houses and flats in Lusaka for
rent and sale, mainly in Kabwata, Woodlands Extension and Nyumba Yanga, as indicated in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Housing Units built by NHA in Lusaka since 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>6,316</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mr. M. Chitondo, Chief Architect, NHA – Interview.

NHA also constructed over 500 low, medium and high-cost housing units for sale at the Bennie Mwiinga housing complex. This programme that was implemented in 1998 through the Presidential Housing Initiative (PHI) and initiated by the Republican President was another housing programme whose objective was to empower the majority of Zambians with decent and affordable housing in an equitable and efficient manner and in so doing, to be responsible for the housing needs of the low-income
group in the country. PHI was loosely related to NHA, but led directly by the President and his Press Secretary with an advisory group of ten men. In reality, PHI became a public housing programme but outside government rules and regulations (Schlyter, 2004: 5). The Bennie Mwiinga housing complex was expected to accommodate over 1,000 housing units including social amenities. Currently, the NHA offers completed low, medium and high cost houses for sale to prospective buyers. It also provides a facility for arranged housing or pre-construction houses. In this project, NHA has sectioned away selected land lots in Nyumba Yanga, Ibex Hill and Bennie Mwiinga sites for such housing. Under this facility, each client selects a suitable plot and house plan from the available list, and upon payment of the appropriate deposit, construction of the houses follows. NHA equally provides services such as internal roads and drainage, water and sewers, and puts such serviced plots on sale to the general public (NHA, 2003:4).

4.3 Private Sector Housing Development

4.3.1 Private Formal Sector Conventional Housing

The private formal sector conventional housing developers comprised of corporate investors and individuals who used their institutional and self-centred efforts to provide housing. The role of the parastatal organisations in housing development was also different. The efforts by ZIMCO properties, Zambia National Provident Fund (now NAPSA), Zambia State Insurance Corporation and INDECO Estates, for example, were not aimed at achieving national housing aims and objectives, neither were they meant to address the national housing, nor provision of shelter to the under privileged citizens. The same was the case with individual home developers. The goals of the private and parastatal companies with regard to housing development were distinctly different from those of the public sector, that is, the government and NHA (Ng’andu, 2002: 57). The private and parastatal formal housing sector was mainly concerned with providing housing to its employees, which was, in most cases tied to employment. This was in compliance with Section 41 (2) of the Employment Act Chapter 268 of the Laws of Zambia which provides for an employer to cause every employee in his service to be adequately housed at all times and at his own expense.
Therefore, this sector could only provide housing needed by the firms without having to consider the housing needs of the rest of the city. Although it could be argued that the private sector somehow implemented the housing programmes through the Employment Act, its contribution to housing development had limitations in the sense that the provision of housing could not go beyond the housing needs of the organisations. It was in this respect that the private formal sector’s contribution to housing development was very minimal.

4.3.2 Private Informal Sector Housing

Given the minimal contribution of the private formal sector in the area of housing development in Lusaka City, it was the informal sector that played a major and very active role. Housing in this sector was unplanned with quality that was not guaranteed. In this sector, essential services were not provided because of the status of the areas in which housing development took place, that of being in informal settlements. For example Table 5.3 shows that 66 percent of the households surveyed had no access to proper toilet facilities because they used pit latrines. This means that many of the housing units surveyed were not connected to the main sewer line. Similarly, information in Table 5.4 indicates that although 94 percent of the households surveyed had access to safe water, 54 percent of them used communal taps meaning that many housing units were still not connected to the main water supply line. In the same vein, Table 5.11 presents information that shows that 66 percent of respondents indicated that the erratic supply of water was the biggest problem in their areas of residence. With regard to garbage disposal, Table 5.5 indicates that 49 percent of the households surveyed disposed of their garbage by burying while 33 percent of them dumped the garbage by the roadside. This is yet another indication of non-provision of garbage disposal services by the local authority. The owners of the housing units in this sector were illegal settlers without title deeds to the land they build their houses on. The houses in these areas were mostly informal, not made from approved plans and generally built by residents themselves. The most significant aspect of housing development activities in the informal sector was that these individual developers continued to meet the greater part of the current demand for housing as well as
catering for the old, poor and under privileged in Lusaka City (Ibid). This finding was consistent with the Word Bank’s (2002: 6) research that established that of the total of 300,000 housing units in Lusaka city, 10 percent or 30,000 were formal dwellings on individual stands, in blocks of flats or on agricultural holdings accommodating 30 percent (340,000) of the city’s population on about 80 percent of the residential land. The study also established that the remaining 90 percent (270,000) of housing units consisted of squatter units, accommodating about 70 percent (793,000) of the population on about 20 percent of its residential land. The fact that there were 37 informal settlements (Ibid) around Lusaka was an indication that much of housing development was left to the informal sector.

Given the fact that there was no common approach to conventional housing development between the public and private sector housing developers, there were internal inconsistencies in the Housing Programme Design. For example, while the public sector’s approach to housing development was to look at the housing problem from the point of view of the total housing need in the City, the private formal sector looked at what was needed for their employees and the private informal sector looked at their individual needs. Therefore, the contribution of the private formal and private informal sector housing was not meant to complement the efforts of finding a solution to the overall housing problem in the City. As such, concerted efforts could not be realised in this respect.

4.4 Site and Service Programmes

An overview of the conventional approach to housing showed that the efforts made in this regard were far from meeting the housing demand, especially low-cost housing. The First National Development Programme (FNDP) (1966-1970) recognised the fact that the limited resources allocated to housing contributed to the shortfall. Against this background, in 1967, the LCC engaged a consultancy firm called Doxiadis Associates that worked out the Lusaka Development Plan (Schlyter and Schlyetr, 1974: 35). Among other priority areas, housing development was also given prominence in this plan. This plan received additional support when the Zambian government adopted the Second Official Housing Programme (SOHP) in 1968. This programme provided
guidelines for the development of low-cost housing through the site and service schemes. The trend therefore shifted from conventional to site and service housing development.

4.4.1 Strategies for Site and Service Schemes

The Site and Service programme emphasised self-help in housing development. The strategy adopted was to make it possible for individuals to get loans for self-help low-cost housing. In order to implement this programme, some money was set aside for loans to persons building their own houses under the site and service scheme. It was in this respect that during the FNDO up to June1970, the Zambian Housing Board advanced loans to individuals. The central government also provided capital grants for the development of site and service schemes (Mushota and Lewanika, 1997: 11). With regard to the overall planning, 71 percent of all units proposed for construction, during this period, were to be on serviced plots.

Site and service schemes involved the demarcation of house plots, provision of roads, storm water drainage, piped water supply, security lighting and other basic services. In addition, building materials such as doors, window frames, roofing sheets and others were provided to participants in form of loans. LCC was mandated to undertake the implementation of the site and service schemes. LCC therefore provided house designs and plans from which individual developers selected plans for their units. Following this development, the site and service schemes were started in Mandevu, Marapodi, New Kanyama and Chunga in 1969. In 1972, Kaunda Square and Mtendere were also demarcated into site and service plots. This programme aimed at providing 2,000 serviced plots in these areas.

At the time, two types of site and service schemes were implemented. These were the basic and standard site and service areas. In the basic site and service areas, four plots were to share one piped water supply stand and they were to use pit latrines. The residents of the basic site and service areas were to be provided with Occupancy Licences for 90 years for which they were required to renew every 30 years. As for standard site and service areas, there was a provision for piped water for each plot. The
plots in these areas were serviced with sewer lines and were provided with flush toilets. The residents of standard site and service areas were entitled to certificates of title for 99 years. Table 4.4 shows the first site and service areas that were initiated by the central government through the LCC.

Table 4.4: The first site and service areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Site</th>
<th>Year created</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Lease period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chunga</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>99 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandevu</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>90 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Kanyama</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>90 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaunda Square</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>99 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtebere</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>90 Years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mr. K. Mbungo, Principal Peri – Urban Development Officer, LCC – Interview.*

However, the reduction in budget allocation caused a decline in implementation. The ability of LCC to carry out the responsibility of servicing plots declined and the number of serviced plots available became fewer each year.

The solution to financial constraints in urban housing in Lusaka was found in the World Bank’s first decade of urban sector lending (1972-1982), in which one of the primary areas of intervention was the provision and improvement of housing for the urban poor (World Bank, 2002: 44). Through successful negotiations in 1974, the Zambian government managed to obtain a loan No. ZA1057 worth $ 20 million (Martin, 1982: 257). This loan was meant to cater for the development of low-cost housing through the site and service schemes as well as the upgrading of squatter settlements throughout the country. This enabled the government to have a second attempt at low-cost housing development through these schemes. A total of K5,180,000 was allocated for site and service development in Lusaka (Lusaka Squatter Upgrading, Site and Service Project Report: 1980). The key player in the site and service housing development in Lusaka was the LCC that, through the Housing Project Units (HPUs), implemented the programme from 1975 to 1980 (Ibid).

**4.4.2 New Site and Service Areas**

Arising from the successful sourcing of external aid, LCC identified seven sites for housing development. The council implemented this programme by contracting various consultants and contractors who undertook the activities. The council’s role
was to provide Housing Project Units that coordinated and supervised the works. The selected sites, consultants and contractors were as follows:

4.4.2.1 Housing Project Unit (HPU) 1
This unit was in charge of sites 1 (Matero East and Emmasdale) and 6 (Kabwata and Kamwala). The consultants for these sites were the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the contractor was Terrazzo Paviors of Dar-es-laam, Tanzania. The contract sum was K2,160,000. The target for this contract was to demarcate and service 1,571 plots in these sites. The infrastructure to be provided included the construction access roads, laying of water pipes and sewer lines for each plot. The works on the sites commenced on 01.12.1975 and the work took 18 months (Lusaka Squatter Upgrading, Site and Service Project Reports: 1977, 1978 and 1980).

4.4.2.2 Housing Project Unit (HPU) 2
This unit coordinated developments in sites 3, 4 (Garden) and 5 (Lilanda). The consultants and contractor for these sites were Doxiadis Associates and Terrazzo Paviors respectively. The contract sum was K1,225,450. The contractor was to demarcate and service 1,750 plots. This firm was also to lay water and sewer pipes and to provide road network in these sites. Implementation of this project commenced on 03.12.1975 for 18 months (Ibid).

4.4.2.3 Housing Project Unit (HPU) 10
This unit supervised the works at 7 (Kabanana). The consultants were Doxiadis Associates and the contractor was Allied Contractors (Kitchener) Limited of Ontario, Canada. This firm had a task of demarcating and servicing 1,270 plots for a period of 15 months. The infrastructure to be provided was road network, water and sewer pipes. The works, which cost K1,035,274.10, commenced on 10.09.1976. Site 6 was not developed because it was earmarked for a cemetery (Chingwere).

4.4.3 Implementation Strategy
The strategy adopted by this programme was to provide individual applicants with serviced plots on which a concrete slab and a core house made up of two rooms were constructed. Mr. A. Handongwe, the Chief Housing Officer in the Department of
Public Health and Social Services of LCC stated that at the time, individual applicants for serviced plots were provided with housing loans in form of building materials with which they were to complete building their houses. He added that in order to ensure conformity with required standards, ‘all building plans were scrutinised and examined in relation to plot size by the council.’ He explained that the council provided plans for different housing units from which the individual developers selected the ones they preferred. He further added that all plot owners consulted with the council officials who regularly visited the sites in order to ensure that correct measurements of housing units were followed. This was one way in which the council enforced building standards.

With regard to the provision of building materials, stores offices were built in all the sites. This is where all building materials were stocked. Mr. Handongwe confirmed that in order to ensure control and curb abuse, all those who were provided with loans were given loan cards on which all building materials issued to them were indicated. Subsequent building materials were only issued after LCC officials verified that the materials collected previously had been exhausted and put to good use. The level of development of the building also served as a means of determining what building materials the developer required at a given time.

4.4.4 The Role of NHA in Site and Service Schemes

Upon passing the NHA Act, the first important task that the newly formed institution embarked on was the preparation of a revised housing programme for its implementation. One of the policy recommendations was the introduction of partially completed houses in order to meet the financial status of the greater majority of the people who needed accommodation, but could not afford the full cost of the houses. In this regard, in addition to providing consultancy, NHA complemented the efforts made by LCC through the same World Bank sponsored site and service schemes programme in the construction of ‘core houses’ that were partially constructed and sold to the public. The buyers of these houses were expected to complete and enlarge their houses as financial ability permitted. To this effect, NHA provided serviced plots in Lusaka as indicated in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: NHA serviced plots since 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of plots serviced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>31,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>32,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>35,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75,509</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mr. M. Chitondo, Chief Architect, NHA – Interview.

Even though the Site and Service Programmes seemed to have been well designed as all the participating agencies were identified and tasks allocated to them, this programme equally had problems of internal inconsistencies and financial resources. One main problem of internal inconsistency was in the area of land delivery. Little progress was achieved in the delivery of suitable land for housing development. This was partly due to administrative constraints in the existing structure of land delivery (FNDP, 1989: 289). This contributed to the failure to reach the target as less land than was required was made available. With regard to the financial resources, there were discrepancies between what was planned and what was actually spent. For example, the planned investment on the Site and Service Programmes during the Third National Development Plan was K20.3 million and yet what was spent was K10.6 million (Ibid). This was the trend during all the National Development Plan periods. This situation created problems as the implementation of the Site and Service Programmes could not be done successfully.

4.5 Squatter Upgrading Programmes

4.5.1 Overview of the Development of Squatter Settlements

An overview of the housing situation in Lusaka showed that since the city was not intended to be a permanent home for the majority of the workers as already alluded to, the provision for adequate shelter for future migrants was not given priority. As a result, employers arranged with landowners for their workers to be allowed to build
huts themselves in what were called compounds. Such compounds became the nuclei around which squatters later developed (Schlyter and Schlyter, 1974: 13).

As was the case with other local housing areas for Africans, the growth of squatter settlements in the outskirts of Lusaka city, beyond the industrial area and city council housing areas was a result of colonial town planning ideas which maintained the concept of segregation and long distances. One factor that facilitated the fast growth of squatter settlements was that, in most cases, the landowners did not protect their land. This was the case concerning the pieces of land belonging to absentee landlords who were often British citizens not living in Zambia, whose land was then called ‘crown land’. It was for this reason that the local authority had no control over such pieces of land and as a result, many squatter settlements developed outside the city boundaries on such land. The areas where the first squatter settlements emerged were Chawama, George, Chaia, Chipata, John Howard, John Laing, Jack and others bringing the total number of squatter compounds in Lusaka to 37 by the year 2000 (World Bank, 2002: 6).

After the travel restrictions were abolished with the attainment of independence, rapid immigration into Lusaka caused severe housing problems. Large squatter settlements developed around Lusaka beyond the control of the authorities. In addition, the attainment of independence forced many landowners to leave the country leaving their property unsupervised thereby allowing the problem of illegal settlers to get out of hand.

4.5.2 Strategies for Squatter Settlement Upgrading

Given the fact that squatter settlements developed in unauthorised areas and without any conformity to housing development standards, these areas were seen to be an ‘eye sore’ to the beauty of the city. At the time, it was considered costly and impractical to install satisfactory services in the existing areas. There was very little that the local authority could do because these settlements were in areas that were not under the council’s jurisdiction.
The first programme to address the problem of informal settlements was contained in a government circular number 29 of 1968 that instructed LCC, including other local authorities in the country, to demolish all informal settlements. This was, however, not implemented because the programme did not provide the strategy to be adopted in addressing the matter. However, the SNDP (1972-1976), for the first time, brought about a change of attitude towards squatter settlements that became to be thought of as a necessary adaptation to the backlog in housing production. It was in the SNDP that the government realised that although squatter areas were unplanned, they represented assets, both in social and economic terms. It was thus stated that these areas required planning and the provision of services and that the wholesale demolition of the good and bad houses was not a practical solution. It was in this regard that the trend to housing development now shifted to squatter upgrading programmes. These programmes were therefore initiated by allocating K5 million for this purpose. This money was meant to cater for the upgrading of all informal settlements in the country. Given the magnitude of the problem, very little was achieved. Therefore, there was need to source for more funds.

Since the 1970s, Lusaka has had a long history of initiatives aimed at improving infrastructure, services, the environment and the general quality of life in unplanned settlements. Various international donors and NGOs, together with LCC have attempted to address some of the problems related to upgrading of squatter settlements.

The 1974 World Bank-financed Lusaka squatter upgrading programme that was implemented alongside the site and service scheme development programme was the first major upgrading initiative. The implementation of the Squatter Upgrading Programme amounted to accepting the existence of squatter settlements. What was not allowed was the establishment of new illegal settlements that were not in existence prior to the implementation of the programme. The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975 made it an offence to occupy land or erect any building in an area to which the Act applied without lawful authority. The said Act stated that no person was to occupy or continue to occupy any vacant land without lawful authority. However, authority
for upgrading of Squatter Settlements was provided for in the Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act that was approved in 1974 and that made it possible to legally recognise the Squatter Settlement areas. Under this Act, the squatter house owners were eligible for occupancy licences that were renewable every after thirty years (Rakodi and Schlyter, 1981: 10).

As was the case with the site and service schemes, the first squatter upgrading programme was administered by LCC through its Housing Projects Units. This programme involved the provision of services to approximately 17,000 dwellings in the major squatter settlements and the preparation and servicing of 7,600 plots in adjacent overspill areas to accommodate households that would be relocated to pave way for the provision of roads that were non existent in these areas (Lusaka Squatter Upgrading, Site and Service Project Report: 1977). The first unplanned settlements to be upgraded were Chawama, George, Chaisa and Chipata compounds. In these areas, squatter upgrading involved, the provision of roads, rainwater drainage and water supply standpipes. This was an integrated programme that included, among other things, the provision, supply and installation of security light as was the case in Chawama compound.

The Chawama Squatter Upgrading Programme was supervised by Housing Project Unit 9 and the contractor was Lewis Construction Limited of Lusaka. The contract sum was K898,247.00 and the contract period was 15 months. The implementation of this programme commenced on 4th June, 1975. Housing Project Unit 19 was in charge of the upgrading of George compound. It supervised the works undertaken by the contractor, Lewis Construction following the payment of the contract sum of K978,890.00. The work that took 15 months commenced on 20th September, 1976. Allied Contractors (Kitchener) Limited of Canada undertook the upgrading of Chaisa and Chipata compounds. The commencement date for the works was 11th October, 1977, and the contract period was 15 months for the contract sum of K1,298,564.70. This project was supervised by Housing Project Unit 26 (Squatter Upgrading, Site and Service Project Report: 1977).
Other than the World Bank programme, another early programme to be implemented was the Kalingalinga compound-upgrading scheme that was funded by the Germany Technical Assistance (GTZ) and implemented in collaboration with LCC. This was a comprehensive project that integrated the physical, social as well as economic improvement efforts. This project was launched in 1980 and completed in 1987. It also had follow up support continuing until 1992. The programme encouraged community participation by involving people in decision-making, planning, and execution process of upgrading. It aimed at integrating social and economic improvements along with upgrading houses and infrastructure. The upgrading programme included the provision of a school, clinic, market, community centre, installation of water supply standpipes to groups of families, roads, street lighting, house improvement and ‘core house’ material loans through the community revolving fund. Other activities included in the programme were the promotion of economic activities and income generation through micro-loans, experimentation with low-cost housing construction materials and techniques, alternative sanitation methods and securing of title to land. The programme implementation involved the re-alignment of dwellings and lots to lower density areas and to allow widening of streets. Priority for building material loans was given to families who had to be relocated into an adjacent overspill area (World Bank, 2002: 12).

The next attempt to upgrading informal settlements was made in the mid 1980s when a working group was established. With the assistance of Irish Aid, the group comprising the National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka City Council and CARE Zambia, aimed at providing proposals for policy guidelines for urban upgrading schemes based on a study of interventions employed in upgrading programmes that had been implemented up to that time. In 1994, this working group produced an urban upgrading policy guidelines paper. In 1998, an NGO-donor forum was established to help coordinate and guide the efforts of donors, the government, local authorities and NGOs in supporting housing development, particularly affecting the urban poor (Ibid).

Thus in 1994, a needs assessment involving communities indicated that water was a top priority, more from a cost viewpoint than a health viewpoint. The assessment
indicated that people were most concerned about the time required to collect water and the fact that it often had to be drawn by the poor at night when it was available. In this regard, a new programme focusing on water and micro-finance commenced. The Programme of Support for Poverty Elimination and Community Transformation (PROSPECT) that was driven by CARE Zambia, with support from the Department for International Development (British Aid) was implemented in collaboration with LCC. Working with the Resident Development Committee in Chipata compound, a community-managed water supply scheme was successfully accomplished (Ibid).

Parallel with the Chipata compound programme, from 1994, CARE Zambia had been involved in the upgrading of George compound where both the Department for International Development (British Aid) and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) had also supported informal settlement upgrading, mainly in the area of water supply, with some environmental health initiatives. They had also been involved in the upgrading of Jack, Chibolya and Kanyama compounds where a sectoral approach, mainly water supply and a micro-finance programme were implemented.

The Sustainable Lusaka Programme (SLP) was yet another informal settlement upgrading programme that was commenced under the UNDP’s sustainable cities programme in 1997. The programme’s development efforts focused on the provision, through an environmental planning and management approach, opportunities for poor communities to initiate activities for poverty alleviation through environmental improvement activities and build capacity at the community level for participation in environmental projects. The programme was supported by Irish Aid, International Labour Organisation, Danish International Development Agency and the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat). Demonstration projects were carried out in N’gombe, Kamanga, Mandevu and Marapodi compounds. SLP was also assisting with water projects in Linda and Bauleni compounds, along with a solid waste project in Kalingalinga compound and a housing material project in Kamanga compound.
In 1998, GRZ and JICA signed an agreement for the latter to support improvements in eight unplanned urban settlements in Lusaka namely Bauleni, Chainda, Chazanga, Chibolya, Freedom, Kalikiliki, N’gome and Old Kanyama compounds. The support for upgrading was to include the formulation of action plans, guidelines for living environment improvement, and priority projects for short-term development.

Currently, no new upgrading projects were envisaged. However, a community-enabling fund supported by Irish Aid and UNDP had been established. It is through this fund that new community upgrading programmes might be channelled. CARE Zambia had equally established a similar community fund. Guidelines for accessing the funds are that communities would be required to contribute cash and or labour and to manage infrastructure. This management and maintenance of infrastructure was expected to continue as long as the project existed.

In analysing the effectiveness of the Squatter Upgrading Programmes in Lusaka City, one has to look at the process of regularising informal settlements, financial aspects of the programmes and the profile of low-income community residents. There are 37 informal settlements in Lusaka of which 13 have not been regularised or declared as ‘improvement areas’ under the terms of the Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act Chapter 441 of the Laws of Zambia (World Bank, 2002: 6). It should be noted that a key feature of upgrading squatter settlements is that land tenure issues should be addressed in accordance with the Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act in order to enable occupiers secure a 30 year occupancy right. The fact that 13 informal settlements have not been declared or regularised means that they are considered to be illegal and therefore, the provision of amenities in these settlements cannot be done. This means that the programme did not have internal consistencies to ensure that all matters pertaining to programme implementation were addressed. This is an indication that these programmes have not been a total success.

On the financial aspects, the upgrading of declared or regularised informal settlements on a sustainable basis required continued provision of money. There was a requirement for communities to contribute towards the sustainability of programmes
and the maintenance of the amenities that were provided in these informal settlements. However, the attempts that were made to recover the capital costs of infrastructure provision from residents did not succeed. For this reason, the Squatter Upgrading Programmes tended to follow a government ‘subsidy’ approach. This approach contributed to the breakdown of the infrastructure in the informal settlements because the reduction of, or the stoppage of government subsidy as is the case now entailed non-maintenance of the infrastructure.

The non-maintenance of infrastructure meant that the programmes could not be sustained as can be seen from the profile of the residents of informal settlements with regard to the availability of sanitary services, garbage disposal arrangements and water supply. From the point of view of sanitation as already alluded to, Table 5.3 indicates that 66 percent of the respondents use pit latrines. This could possibly point to the breakdown of the sewer system due to lack of maintenance. The other point is that there is no systematic arrangement for garbage collection. According to information in Table 5.5, 49 percent of respondents use burying/ pit to dispose of garbage. 33 percent of respondents use roadside dumping while 10 percent of them have their garbage irregularly collected by LCC. Only 3 percent of the respondents have their garbage regularly collected by the private sector. With regard to water supply, even though 54 percent of respondents (Table 5.4) indicated that they obtain water for domestic use from communal taps, the information in Table 5.11 shows that 66 percent of respondents indicated erratic supply of water as the biggest problem in their area of residence. From the above situation, it can be concluded that even though the Squatter Upgrading Programmes were meant to improve the quality of life of the people in informal settlements, it is evident that these programmes have not satisfied the needs of the residents of these settlements.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE URBAN HOUSING POLICIES, PROGRAMMES AND STRATEGIES

The assessment of the urban housing policies programmes and strategies that were employed over the years in the provision of housing to the growing population in Lusaka City established that the city has an urban housing deficit. In order to assess the impact of the urban housing Policies, Programmes and Strategies, firstly, the study looked at demand versus housing supply so as to establish whether the intended objectives of providing adequate housing was achieved. Secondly, the research looked at the cost of housing in order to establish whether the intended beneficiaries were able to afford the cost of houses for outright purchase or rent. In addition to the housing deficit alluded to above, the cost of housing for outright purchase and for rent was also found to have been beyond the reach of the majority of the city residents. The quality of housing was also poor.

5.1 Population Size and Density

The population of Lusaka city is approximately 1.3 million people with a population density of approximately 150 persons per hectare. The population of people in unplanned settlements is approximately 800,000 (World Bank, 2002: 5).

5.2 Current Housing Situation

The current housing situation can be seen from the question of numbers, that is to say, there are very few houses compared to the demand for the same. As already alluded to, the city’s housing stock stands at 245,443 units (CSO, 2003: 44) representing 19,476 houses constructed by the Public Sector, that is, 13,160 and 6,316 by LCC and NHA respectively on the one hand and 225,967 houses constructed by the Private Sector on the other. Of the 245,443 housing units, 10 percent or approximately 25,000 housing units are formal on individual plots, stands, in blocks of flats or on agriculture holdings, accommodating 30 percent (340,000) of the city’s population on about 80 percent of residential land. The remaining 90 percent of housing units consists of
squatter units, accommodating about 70 percent of the city’s population on less than 20 percent of its residential land (World Bank, 2002: 6).

5.3 Demand versus Urban Housing Supply
Housing demand has been determined by looking at the total number of households given an assumption that all households have to be housed with each household occupying one housing unit. Housing supply has been determined by establishing the total number of housing units available in Lusaka. Since Lusaka city has approximately 267,000 households (Ibid: 5) and 245,443 housing units, one could safely conclude that the city has an urban housing deficit of 21,557 (267,000 minus 245,443) units. This means that if all households were to be housed with each household occupying one housing unit, there would be 21,557 households left out without being accommodated. This analysis is consistent with the data from LCC that indicated that by 2002, there were 38,339 applicants for housing on the waiting list and yet the council only had 13,160 housing units (Table 4.1). Information in Table 4.3 also reveals that over the years, the supply of housing units by NHA has been dwindling, an indication that things have not been well in the housing development sector. This points to an imbalance in the demand and supply of urban housing.

5.4 Cost of Housing
The possible consequence of the housing shortage in Lusaka has been an exaggeration of the cost of housing for outright purchase and for rent. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present information on pre-construction sale of houses by the public sector and the offer of housing units for outright purchase and for rent by the private formal sector.
Table 5.1: Cost of Pre-construction houses offered by the Public Sector (NHA).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-B/175.17</td>
<td>K272,000,000</td>
<td>3-B/93.32</td>
<td>K124,000,000</td>
<td>2-B/46.62</td>
<td>K59,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sq.m</td>
<td>K246,000,000</td>
<td>sq.m</td>
<td>K127,000,000</td>
<td>sq.m</td>
<td>K76,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-B/148.0</td>
<td>K261,000,000</td>
<td>3-B/103.0</td>
<td>K137,000,000</td>
<td>3-B/83.2</td>
<td>K94,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sq.m</td>
<td>K215,000,000</td>
<td>sq.m</td>
<td>K130,000,000</td>
<td>sq.m</td>
<td>K80,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-B/135.0</td>
<td>K293,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sq.m</td>
<td>K315,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>K267,000,000</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>K129,000,000</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>K77,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cost</td>
<td>cost</td>
<td>cost</td>
<td>cost</td>
<td>cost</td>
<td>cost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the information presented in Table 5.1, the cheapest pre-construction housing unit in the high-cost category cost K272,000,000 while the most expensive house cost K315,000,000. The average cost of high-cost pre-construction house was K267,000,000. In the case of medium-cost houses, the cheapest house cost K124,000,000 while the most expensive house cost K137,000,000 with an average cost of medium-cost houses being K129,000,000. The cheapest low-cost house was pegged at K59,000,000 with the most expensive house going at K80,000,000. The average cost of pre-construction houses in this category was K77, 250,000.

Table 5.2: Average cost of real estate for outright purchase and for rent offered by the private formal housing Sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average cost of real estate for outright purchase</th>
<th>Average cost of house rentals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-cost</td>
<td>Medium-cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K432,520,000</td>
<td>K148,475,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K2,574,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K605,517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own content analysis of advertisements from the print media.

In the case of private sector real estate for outright purchase and for rent, information in Table 5.2 revealed that the average cost of high-cost, medium-cost and low-cost
houses for outright purchase were K432,520,000; K148,475,000 and K60,030,000 respectively. The same information showed that average rental charges for high-cost, medium-cost and low-cost houses were K2,574,000, K1,090,206 and K605,515 respectively.

Given the average household income of K150,000 per month and considering that many residents in the low-income groups spend approximately 45 percent of household expenditure on food and only 12 percent on housing (Word Bank, 2002: 7), the majority of the households do not have any savings and, therefore, they would not afford these high costs. As a result, many households of Lusaka find accommodation in informal settlements where they pay rent of about K50,000.00 per room (Mashamba, 2004: 6). This explains why many households find themselves in multi-family dwellings where they share accommodation, with each household renting an average of two rooms as shown in Table 5.8. This is yet another indicator of urban housing deficit.

5.5 Quality of Housing

Another factor that points to the housing crisis in Lusaka is the quality of many houses. Quality of housing in this study was defined in terms of the physical features of housing units, including the available amenities and the living environment. The following tables analyse the quality of housing in terms of materials used for constructing walls and roofs as well as occupancy status, and household size in relation to the size of housing unit occupied.

The durability of housing units may be enhanced by the use of good quality building materials. Table 5.6 presents data on housing units by construction material of walls. The table shows that concrete blocks (89 percent) were the most commonly material in constructing walls for houses in Lusaka. 09 percent had walls constructed from burnt bricks while 02 percent were made of burnt bricks.
Table 5.3: Housing Unit by Type of Construction Materials of Walls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of housing units</th>
<th>Construction material of walls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burnt Bricks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own housing units survey.

Information pertaining to material used for construction of roofs is presented in Table 5.7. The commonly used type of roofing materials for housing units in Lusaka were asbestos (72 percent) and Iron sheets with 24 percent. Only 04 percent of the housing units used grass/thatch.

Table 5.4: Housing Units by Type of Construction Materials of Roofs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of housing units</th>
<th>Construction material of roof</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asbestos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own housing units survey.

When looking at the quality of housing, it is not just the physical condition of housing that is important. The living environment is important, too. The number of rooms occupied by one household has an important bearing on the state of health of occupants, and it is an indicator of household overcrowding. Overcrowding refers to the average number persons per room (CSO, 2003: 29). Going by the 1996 Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement (CSHA) to which Zambia is a member, the occupancy standard for public housing is as indicated in Table 5.8.
Table 5.5: Occupancy as a standard for public housing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household type</th>
<th>Household size</th>
<th>Dwelling size required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single adult</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 Bedrooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couple with no children</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 Bedrooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single parent or couple with one child</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2 Bedrooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single parent or couple with 2-3 children</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>3 Bedrooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single parent or couple with 4 or more children</td>
<td>More than 5</td>
<td>5 Bedrooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 single adults</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 Bedrooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 single adults</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 Bedrooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 single adults</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4 Bedrooms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Commonwealth public housing performance indicator.*

Table 5.9 shows that the largest proportion of households (34 percent) occupied two-roomed housing units and the next largest (18 percent) occupied four-roomed housing units. This is consistent with the 2000 Census of Population and Housing Analytical Report which indicated that 44.5 percent of households in Lusaka occupied two-roomed housing units, 17.8 percent occupied three-roomed units, 12.9 percent occupied four-roomed units, 3.9 percent occupied five-roomed units, 1.3 percent occupied six-roomed units, while 0.9 percent occupied housing units with more than seven rooms (CSO, 2003: 29). In the same vein, the 2000 Census (Ibid: 32) percentage distribution of households by number of bedrooms available for occupation in Lusaka indicated that 1.9 percent of the households had no bedrooms, 60.7 percent had one bed-roomed housing units, 19.3 percent had two bed-roomed units, 13.8 percent had three bed-roomed units, 3.5 percent had four bed-roomed units and 1.1 percent had housing units with five bed rooms and more. This means that 95.7 percent of households in Lusaka occupied three bedrooms or less. According to the study findings, the average household size of the total number of households surveyed is 5.36 persons per house. This is consistent with CSO (2004: 12) that indicated household size as being 5.4 and the World Bank research findings that showed that the household size was 6 persons per house (World Bank, 2002:8). When we compare the
average household sizes according to the various studies as indicated above with the information in Table 5.8, one can safely conclude that many households in Lusaka are overcrowded because they occupy fewer bedrooms in relation to the occupancy standard for public housing. Shortage of accommodation could therefore be a contributing factor to overcrowding.

Table 5.6: Households' by size of housing unit occupied.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of households</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>Two</th>
<th>Three</th>
<th>Four</th>
<th>Five</th>
<th>Six</th>
<th>Seven</th>
<th>More than Seven</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own household survey.

Table 5.10 shows the distribution of housing units by size of households. According to the findings, 53 percent of housing units were occupied by households with the size of more than 6 members, that is, households with 6, 7 and more than 7 members occupying 13 percent, 10 percent and 30 percent of the housing units respectively.

Table 5.7: Housing units by household size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of housing units</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>Two</th>
<th>Three</th>
<th>Four</th>
<th>Five</th>
<th>Six</th>
<th>Seven</th>
<th>More than Seven</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own household survey.

Respondents were asked to state how they viewed the quality of housing, that is, whether the quality of housing in their area of residence was high. Table 5.11 reveals that 26 percent of respondents disagreed while 38 percent of them completely disagreed. This means that 64 percent of respondents were of the view that the quality of housing in their area of residence was not high.
Table 5.8: Households’ view of the quality of housing in their area of residence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of households</th>
<th>Completely agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Completely Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own household survey.

On the question of the biggest problem experienced by the respondents in their areas of residence, Table 5.12 presents information that 66 percent of respondents indicated that erratic water supply was the major problem. 17 percent of them stated that poor road network was the most pressing problem.

Table 5.9: Households’ indication of the biggest problem experienced in their area of residence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of households</th>
<th>Biggest problem in area of residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non availability of water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own household survey.

Table 5.13 presents information with regard to the type of services that respondents wanted to be improved in their areas of residence. The findings were that 54 percent of the respondents wanted piped water supply to be improved while 26 percent and 12 percent wanted the sewer system and road maintenance to be improved respectively.

Table 5.10: Households’ indication of the type of service wanted to improved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of households</th>
<th>Services would like to improved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Piped water supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own household survey.
Table 5.14 presents information on the question of who had been undertaking housing development in the areas surveyed. Of the total number of respondents, 89 percent indicated that individuals were the ones that were undertaking the constructions of their personal houses. 08 percent of respondents indicated that the private sector was spearheading housing development while 02 percent stated that it was LCC that was providing housing to the people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of households</th>
<th>Who had undertaken housing development in area of residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own household survey.

The majority of the respondents stated that the government was not doing enough in housing development. Table 5.15 presents information that shows that 66 percent of respondents completely disagreed on the question of whether the government was doing enough in providing housing to the public. 24 percent of them also disagreed. This means that 90 percent (66 percent plus 24 percent) felt that there was little that the government was doing in ameliorating the housing crisis in Lusaka.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of Housing Units</th>
<th>Whether the government was doing enough in providing housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own household survey.

Similarly, most respondents stated that the private sector’s role in housing development in Lusaka was insignificant. Table 5.16 shows that 40 percent of
respondents disagreed while 39 percent of them completely disagreed to the question of whether the private sector was doing enough in providing housing to the public. This means that 79 percent (40 percent plus 39 percent) generally disagreed with this notion.

Table 5.13: Households’ views on whether the private sector was doing enough in providing housing to the public or not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of households</th>
<th>Whether the private sector was doing enough in providing housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Own household survey.*

The environment in which the housing units were found was also a matter of great concern as it equally had a bearing on the general well being of the people. When asked to state whether the environment in which they lived was of high standard, a bigger number of respondents indicated that they lived in poor environments. Table 5.17 shows that 43 percent disagreed while 28 percent completely disagreed. This means that 71 percent (43 percent plus 28 percent) of respondents believed that they lived in poor environments.

Table 5.14: Households’ views on whether the environment in which they lived was of high standard.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of households</th>
<th>Whether the environment in which they lived was of high standard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Completely agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Own household survey.*

Going by the non-availability of certain amenities resulting in poor service delivery such as improper toilet facilities, erratic piped water supply and non- collection of garbage as indicated in Tables 5.3 to 5.17, it was concluded that the quality of most of
houses in Lusaka city was poor. Although most houses were built using concrete blocks (Table 5.6), the quality of the housing units in most of these areas was a source of worry. This view was supported by Mashamba (2004: 1) who questioned the quality of most of the available housing stock by citing an example that this year’s (2003/2004) ‘heavy rains have exposed the poor quality of most of our houses especially in the informal sector housing areas’. He was making reference to the houses that had collapsed in Msisi compound as a result of a heavy down pour. In addition to this, the houses in these areas were mostly informal in that they were not made from approved plans and mostly built by the residents themselves.
CHAPTER SIX

6.0 IMPACT OF HOUSING POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES IN LUSAKA

In order to explain why the problem of urban housing persisted despite the formulation and implementation of various policies and related programmes, one has to examine the housing institutional linkages. The examination of the housing institutional linkages revealed that the roles and efforts of different participating institutions in housing development were uncoordinated in the sense that each agency was working in isolation with its own programme of action.

6.1 Institutional Linkages

In theory, one would like to see a clear allocation of responsibilities among various institutional players involved in housing development. There was need to have a common strategy to harmonise the inputs of the various key players in the industry. In the broadest of terms, from the public sector point of view, the central government should have been responsible for national policy and regulations, while the local authority should have been responsible for urban management and service delivery, with the private housing sector working in partnership with the local authority.

The objective of developing sustainable programme components was to maximise complementary and collaborating activities seeking to achieve similar objectives and to rationalise the utilisation of resources. This required the provision of a framework for sustainable housing development by providing a mechanism for ensuring that limited resources were put to their optimum use. This required the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive housing policy that should have clearly stated the dimensions of housing problems and the priority that should have been given to housing provision in the overall economic development. The housing policy document should have defined the technical, financial and administrative framework needed to carry out housing programmes. In so doing, the policy could have identified the agents, both public and private, to be responsible for implementation. The roles of all participating agencies and institutions should have been clearly stated. However, the
research findings were that in practice, such institutional delineations and boundary settings were not clear.

6.2 Housing Policy Implementation

As a way of providing a vision for the supply of urban housing for all income groups in Lusaka, there was need to have a comprehensive housing policy immediately after independence. This view was echoed by the chairman of the National Council for Construction Mr S Mashamba (2004: 3-4) who stated that ‘the need for a national housing policy document cannot be underestimated given that it is the policy document that sets government priorities and identifies the roles of government, private sector and other stakeholders in the housing market’. This study, however, revealed that even though there were ‘housing policies’ under which the housing programmes were implemented, the nature of these policies did not provide long term plans to address the housing problem in totality. They addressed specific programmes such as the Site and Service Schemes on the one hand, and the Squatter Upgrading Programmes, on the other. There had not been a detailed housing policy to spearhead housing development in Zambia for a long time. This was confirmed by Mashamba (Ibid), who said that although there had been insinuations about the availability of ‘housing policies’ during the implementation of various housing programmes, Zambia has had no comprehensive housing policy from 1964 to 1996.

This situation has had a negative impact on urban housing supply because there was no overall framework through which the housing industry could have had a common approach to housing development. Judging from the interviews I had with Mr K Chama, the Deputy Director of City Planning at LCC, this development meant that the streamlining of building standards, regulations and other controls in order to be in conformity to the capabilities of the needs and aspirations of various sections of the population could not be done. Similarly, Mr Wina, the Principal Housing Officer at MLGH held the view that the lack of a framework through which the programmes could have been undertaken entailed non-availability of a housing strategy that could have been the focal point of housing development. From this situation, one can deduce
that the lack of a good housing policy up to 1996 contributed to the fragmentation of institutional linkages leading to a housing crisis in Lusaka city.

This can be seen by the roles of different stakeholders whose contribution to housing development in Lusaka has had no significant impact on housing supply. This has been due to the fact that the efforts of the participating institutions have been uncoordinated because each agency was working in isolation with its own agenda. The main areas that had fragmented efforts were investment in housing, land delivery, cost and supply of building materials and housing legislation.

6.3 Investment in Housing

Investment in housing can be looked at from two angles, that is to say, public sector housing investment involving the allocation of funds for housing programmes by the government, on the one hand, and private sector housing investment involving the provision of housing finance by households and housing finance institutions, on the other.

6.3.1 Public Sector Housing Investment

In this sector, the government initiated a deliberate move by allocating funds, in the national budget, for housing development as provided for in the national development plans. Initially, during the First National Development Plan (FNDP) 1966-1970, the government’s strategy was to provide more housing in towns, particularly in the main urban centres like Lusaka. As already alluded to, this was essentially due to the high rate of urban population increase. As such, government housing programmes aimed at reducing the acute problems of overcrowding and uncontrolled settlements. In doing so, the government allocated about K100 million during the First National Development Plan period in housing for the whole country (Mushota and Lewanika, 1997: 10). An addition of K2.6 million was set aside for loans to persons building their own houses under the Site and Service Scheme (Ibid). During the same period (FNDP), up to June 1970, the government provided money for the Zambia Housing Board, an institution that was created in the 1960s to provide housing finance to persons building their own houses, to advance loans of up to K28 million. The
government also provided capital grants of up to K1.1 million up to 31st December 1969. An important point to note is that it was only in the first year of the FNDP that capital expenditure for loan advances kept pace with the planned rate of expenditure as shown in Table 6.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>K8.2 million</td>
<td>K8.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1968</td>
<td>K8.2 million</td>
<td>K6.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>K8.6 million</td>
<td>K7.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>K8.6 million</td>
<td>K6.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>K33.6 million</strong></td>
<td><strong>K28.0 million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mushota and Lewanika.*

The reduction in successive budget allocations (Table 6.1) caused a decline in the rate of public investment in housing development. In view of the limited funds available from budget allocation, the supply of housing did not keep pace with housing demand.

Mushota and Lewanika (1997: 12) noted that a critical area of concern as regards adequate housing provision had been the reduced percentage of investment to the housing sector stemming mainly from the considerable economic adjustment that, since 1975, had provided a difficult economic environment for the housing sector. They observed that as in other social sectors, the allocation of public funds to housing had been heading downwards after remaining constant between 1975 and 1980. They pointed out that from making up 2.3 percent of total expenditure, the percentage allocation fell to almost nothing in 1984, before rising slightly to one percent of the total expenditure in 1986.

The performance of the housing sector during the Second National Development Plan (SNDP) 1972-1976 was also far from being satisfactory. The primary goal of the SNDP was to meet housing needs of low-income earners in urban areas. A provision was made for housing development that included the upgrading of Squatter Settlements. However, interviews with Mr K Mbanga, the Principal Peri-Urban Development Officer at LCC, indicated that performance in this sector fell below
expectations due to factors identified as inadequate funding and technical and community development problems. This is consistent with the findings of Mushota and Lewanika (1997: 14) who established that although the SNDP had allocated another K100 million to government expenditure on housing, only K59.9 million was spent on housing programmes during the five-year period.

The Third National Development Plan (TNDP) 1979-1983 and the Interim National Development Plan (INDP) had prioritised the meeting of basic needs of the majority of the households and as such, the TNDP had envisaged that 90.3 percent of the national investment in housing was to be directed towards low-income housing development. However, performance in the housing sector in the TNDP was also unsatisfactory largely because investment in housing as a percentage of GDP was estimated to have fallen from 3 percent in 1969 to less than 0.5 percent by 1992. This figure was very small in comparison to other countries with an investment in housing representing 3.6 percent of GDP (Ibid).

It should also be noted that out of a total government budget of K1,439 million in the TNDP by sector, only K95 million was spent on housing and real estate. This represented a mere 6.6 percent that could not stimulate any widespread provision of good and affordable housing units (Ibid). This was consistent with the observation made, during interviews, with Mr A Hadongwe, the Chief Housing Officer at LCC that even the Squatter Upgrading Programme and the Site and Service Schemes that were designed in the early 1970s to improve housing conditions of the poor in urban areas had not been implemented on a sustainable basis due to insufficient funds. The Fourth National Development Plan (FNDP) 1989-1993 had envisaged implementing the general housing construction programme whose budget was K3,262 million and the land servicing for new housing construction programme that was expected to cost K1,228.5 million (FNDP, 1989: 294). However, the implementation that was scheduled to cover a period of five years from 1989 to 1993 was short lived due to change of government. From the above situation, it can be concluded that there had not been a proportional relationship between planned and actual investment in all the development plans so far implemented. In this regard, the Zambian government had
not been able to achieve any of its targets in public housing investment. This had an adverse effect on housing development in Lusaka.

6.3.2 Private Sector Housing Investment
With regard to private sector housing investment, this primarily involved the availability of housing finance through household savings and institutional housing finance. An overview of the housing development in Lusaka points to the fact that there has not been any meaningful housing finance to provide a strong base on which investment in housing could have developed. This is largely so because, as Kashita (2004: 1) pointed out, ‘the fiscal policies pursued by the Zambian government as a regulatory and monitoring authority have not addressed the problems in the construction industry since 1964’. He stated that even when there was an economic boom from early 1964 to the early 1970s, the progress in the industry was by chance rather than planned or regulated. In the absence of well-articulated fiscal policies, the traditions of commercial banks were based upon their perceived role as locations of and custodians of deposits and savings without venturing into any risky or uncertain investments (Ibid: 2). This is an indication of a breakdown of institutional linkages as the banks, seemingly, worked in isolation with their own agenda. They did not, therefore, work towards complementing the implementation of housing programmes.

6.3.3 Low-level participation in investment by Building Societies
Given the fact that commercial banks could not provide the much needed housing finance, the task of providing loans or mortgages for housing construction or purchase had to be confined mainly to building societies. Lusaka city has had three building societies namely the Zambia National Building Society (ZNBS), the Pan African Building Society (PABS) and the Finance Building Society (FBS). The research findings revealed that even with the availability of these institutions, the provision of housing finance had been a problem. This is according to the information in Table 6.2 that shows that 66 percent of the respondents who had applied for mortgage to purchase or construct houses did not succeed in accessing the funds.

The main problem was that there had not been complementary links between the NHP and the legal framework for housing finance. This is so because the current legal
framework has not deliberately worked to encourage housing finance in Zambia. For example, the existing legislation does not deliberately deal with finance related to housing but the general finance for all commercial activities in the country. This means that the special needs of the housing sector are not taken care of. This is consistent with the statement by Mr P C Kamoto, the Business Development Manager (PABS) who said that the building societies' industry had, since 2000, also come under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank thus subjecting the industry to two pieces of legislation at the same time. This was confirmed by Dr. C. Fundanga (2004: 4 and 5), the governor Bank of Zambia who said that the Building Societies were ‘still subject to the 1968 Building Societies Act (BSA)’ and also to the Banking and Financial Services Act (BFSA) that was amended in 2000 to include them as part of the financial institutions covered by the Act. According to Fundanga (Ibid), section 3 of the BFSA states that the Act applied to all banks and financial institutions, whether or not they were instituted by any Act. He pointed out that this overrides the Building Societies Act of 1968.

Both Fundanga and Kamoto agree that the application of the BFSA was a source of conflict purely because the BSA had provisions that were in direct conflict with BFSA. They both admitted that as a result of the amendments of 2000, the building societies now had a system of dual legislation. Kamoto was critical of this arrangement and argued that because of this inherent contradiction, building societies were expected to operate on profitable bases like commercial banks and yet their operations were only confined to the provision of real estate development finance whose investment takes too long to benefit from. More specifically, the BSA Act inhibits building societies from participating in the secondary mortgage market and therefore, limiting their latitude. This makes it difficult for these institutions to have a sound financial base from which to provide the much needed housing finance. This, therefore, is contrary to what the NHP aims to achieve, that is, the establishment of a ‘financial mechanism for mobilising relatively cheap housing finance from a wide variety of agencies and capital markets for funding building societies or similar finance institutions and generally to be the centre of a coordinated specialised housing finance system’ (NHP, 1996: 17). This partly explains why it was difficult to access
housing finance because it was virtually not available.

Table 6.2: Application for mortgage by time taken to be paid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of housing units</th>
<th>Time taken to be paid</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than 6 months</td>
<td>13-18 months</td>
<td>Did not succeed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own housing survey.

Table 6.2 shows that 22 percent of the respondents who had applied for mortgage managed to get the within 6 months from the date they applied for funds. 11 percent of the applicants got the money between 13-18 months from the time of application. Table 6.2 also indicates that 66 percent of the applicants did not succeed in obtaining the mortgages.

Table 6.3: Housing unit by mode of acquisition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of housing units</th>
<th>How the housing unit was acquired</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purchased with own funds</td>
<td>Purchased with mortgage</td>
<td>Constructed with own funds</td>
<td>Acquired through LCC Site and Service scheme</td>
<td>Inherited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own housing units survey.

The information in Table 6.3 indicates that 48 percent of the respondents who owned houses purchased the housing units with their own funds. 2 percent of the respondents purchased their units with mortgage from Building Societies, 10 percent of them constructed their units using their own funds and 21 percent of the respondents acquired their housing units through LCC Site and Service schemes.
The general view of the key informants interviewed from building societies indicated that housing finance required huge capitalisation because investment in this field was a long-term phenomenon. Mr C. S. Mutapulo, the Assistant Mortgage Manager-Debt at the Zambia National Building Society observed that in a competitive commercial banking environment, housing finance for an individual meant that one would be required to invest, in most cases, a multiple of his annual income to acquire a house, an amount he said could not be afforded by the majority of the people. He added that even at national level, investments had to be financed from savings consisting of private and the business or public sector. He added that one critical point was to appreciate the fact that the housing sector had to compete for the limited savings available with other investment requirements and necessities such as agriculture, industrial development and national infrastructure development. For this reason, there was need to deliberately provide incentives to Building societies if they were to deliver services to expected standards.

Similarly Mr P. C. Kamoto (PABS) added that the problem of providing housing finance, from the point of view of Building Societies were the conventional features of long-term (between 15-30 years) loans. He explained that this situation made housing a relatively unattractive form of investment. He further said that this was particularly true for low-income groups in which investment was regarded generally as insecure. Given the present situation in Zambia where, with the advent of privatisation and economic liberalisation, the allocation of financial resources was left to the market forces of demand, supply and price, low-income groups found it difficult to secure the required financial resources for housing development.

The other factor that inhibited growth in housing development was huge government borrowing from the banking system that resulted into a high interest regime in the economy. As a result of this, mortgage became unaffordable to a large extent. Table 6.4 shows the progression of the interest regime of FBS since its formation in 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Interest Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2000</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2004</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 2004</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mr. B. Mbewe, Mortgage Manager, FBS - Interview.*

Official records at PABS and ZNBS indicated that the interest rates were 39 and 36 percent respectively. Due to high interest rates, only a small number of people could access the funds because their eligibility depended on their ability to pay back the loans. Given the fragmentation of the housing sector with no sound institutional linkages, most applicants that were required to have collateral such as land to access the loans could not do so because the land delivery system was not well developed. This is consistent with the information in Table 6.9 that shows that 72 percent of the respondents who owned houses had their housing units built on illegally occupied land. In the end, building societies opted to provide short-term salary-backed loans or mortgages that required the applicant to service using one’s monthly income.

An examination of official records at the three building societies indicated that the maximum amount of mortgages provided were K5 million, K50 million and K500 million for PABS, ZNBS and FBS respectively. The repayment periods were 36 months for PABS, 5-10 years for ZNBS and 7 years for FBS.

Even though the impression created during interviews was that these loan facilities were aimed at assisting the majority of the low-income groups in accessing funds, an examination of the records at these institutions gave a different picture. Since inception in 1995/6, both PABS and FBS provided very few loans. PABS only managed to provide 1,000 loans of K5 million to each applicant. The people who qualified for this facility were those in the formal employment sector. This was to ensure the recovery of the loans that was done through the stop order arrangement with employers. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 present information on the performance of FBS in the provision of housing finance.
Table 6.5: FBS’ performance measured by number of successful applicants for mortgage to purchase houses in Lusaka.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of housing</th>
<th>Number of applicants</th>
<th>Category of housing</th>
<th>Number succeeded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-cost</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>High-cost</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-cost</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Medium-cost</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-cost</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>Low-cost</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>172</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>172</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mr. B. Mbewe, Mortgage Manager, FBS - Interview.*

Table 6.6: FBS’ performance measured by number of successful applicants for mortgage to construct houses in Lusaka.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of housing</th>
<th>Number of applicants</th>
<th>Category of housing</th>
<th>Number succeeded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-cost</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>High-cost</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-cost</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Medium-cost</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-cost</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Low-cost</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mr. B. Mbewe, Mortgage Manager, FBS - Interview.*

Both Tables 6.5 and 6.6 present information that indicates that the same number of applicants was the same number that was successful. This situation was so because according to Mr B Mbewe, the Mortgage Manager at FBS, all applicants attended interviews through which they were screened such that only those that had the ability to repay the loans were given application forms. Eligibility was therefore dependent on the ability to repay from one’s monthly income. The small number of applicants who in essence were successful applicants was indicative of the fact that the majority of the
people were disqualified on account of low salaries as offering them loans would have meant paying back more than the take home pay. Therefore, from 1995 to date, only 172 applicants succeeded in accessing mortgages to purchase houses while only 25 of them succeeded in accessing mortgages to construct houses. It was not possible to establish the total number of applicants who did not succeed in obtaining the mortgages due to the screening procedure for applicants as already alluded to.

Table 6.7: ZNBS’ performance measured by number of successful applicants for mortgage to purchase houses in Lusaka: 1999-2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of housing</th>
<th>Number of applicants</th>
<th>Category of housing</th>
<th>Number succeeded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-cost</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>High-cost</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-cost</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>Medium-cost</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-cost</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Low-cost</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mr. C. S. Mutapulo, Assistant Mortgage Manager – Debt, ZNBS - Interview.

Table 6.7 presents information that only 43 of the 483 applicants for mortgages to purchase houses succeeded in accessing the loans at ZNBS from 1999 to 2004. This figure represents 8.9 percent of the total number of applicants. This situation points to poor performance by the financial institutions.
Table 6.8: ZNBS’ performance measured by number of successful applicants for mortgage to construct houses in Lusaka: 1999-2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application for mortgage to construct houses</th>
<th>Number of successful applicants for mortgage to construct houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category of housing</td>
<td>Number of applicants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-cost</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-cost</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-cost</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category of housing</td>
<td>Number succeeded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-cost</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-cost</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-cost</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mr. C. S. Mutapulo, Assistant Mortgage Manager – Debt, ZNBS - Interview.

The situation was the same in as far as the provision of mortgages to construct houses was concerned. Of the 53 applicants for the same, only 6 (Table 6.8) representing 11.3 percent succeeded in accessing the funds. This was yet another area of concern. This study discovered that apart from the meagre finances available for housing finance, the failure to obtain loans was also due to the inability of the people to service the loans due to high interest rates coupled with low wages. Given the profile of low-income residents as alluded to earlier, who have household incomes (almost 70 percent of households) of less than K150,000 per month with about 45 percent of it spent on food leaving 12 percent to be spent on housing, they could not be eligible for mortgages. This was equally an indicator of high poverty levels in these areas. For this reason, the private informal housing sector could not participate positively in the housing sector.

6.4 Land Delivery

Stokes (1981: 21) held the view that the role land played in the housing market was defined by the fundamental imbalance between land demand and supply. He said that the supply of land well suited for housing was inherently inelastic and that unlike other commodities, land was a fixed asset that could not be transported from where it was in abundant supply to where it was scarce. He added that demand for land expanded as a result of population growth and rising affluence.
According to the World Bank report (2002: 5), the city of Lusaka covered an area of 360 square kilometres with the total municipal area covering approximately 423 kilometres. The report further indicated that much of this land was underutilised and that over 20 square kilometres had not yet been urbanised. This meant that there was room for expansion. However, in reality, not all land in Lusaka could be deemed to be available due to difficulties involved in making it accessible and capable of being titled or duly registered in the lands registry. According to Sichone (2004: 1), the concept of individual land ownership on leasehold tenure and land titling in Zambia was a foreign and alien phenomenon especially in the customary system of landholding. He explained that even though the current law provided for the conversion of land into leasehold tenure in order to encourage the securing of title, the leasehold tenure was not uniformly regulated in that institutions involved in the process did not coordinate well.

In order to understand how land was administered in Zambia either in customary areas or state land, it is important to note that all land is vested in the President who holds it in perpetuity on behalf of the people of Zambia. The state, therefore, plays a major role in the general land administration in that the President has delegated the day-to-day administration of land matters to the public officer currently holding or executing the duties of Commissioner of Lands.

From the institutional arrangements point of view and following the policy of decentralisation, District Councils were mandated to participate in the administration of land. It was in this regard that LCC was responsible, for and on behalf of the Commissioner of Lands, in the processing of applications, selecting of suitable candidates and making recommendations (Ibid: 2). Since LCC had the responsibility to allocate plots, all stands recommended for allocation to the Commissioner of Lands were assumed to have been fully serviced by the council.

However, the research findings as indicated in Table 6.9 shows that out of the total number of respondents who owned houses, only 12 percent of them acquired land on which they built their housing units through LCC. These findings are consistent with
official records at LCC for the latest land offers that showed that for Woodlands Extension plots (2004), of the 8,000 applicants, only 919 succeeded in getting plots for individual home development. These figures represent a performance rate of 11.4 in the area of land delivery by LCC. Other areas where plots were demarcated were Kamwala South (189) and Bauleni (263). This situation clearly shows that the local authority had not been able to satisfy the demand for serviced land on which individual land developers could have built their houses. There were more people in need of land than what was provided. The other notable feature observed during a visit to the site (Kamwala South) and through interviews held with some successful applicants for plots indicated that despite paying service charges of about K1.3 million each, the stands were not serviced by LCC, meaning that no road network, piped water or sewerage systems were provided and yet people were authorised to develop their stands.

Table 6.9: Occupation of land by mode of acquisition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of housing units</th>
<th>Where land was acquired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Own housing unit survey.*

Table 6.9 presents information the occupation of land by mode of acquisition. The most common mode of acquiring land is occupation without authority that accounts for 72 percent of the total number of respondents that own houses. The next mode of land acquisition is purchasing from individuals accounting for 16 percent of the respondents. Only 12 percent of the respondents acquired land for housing development through LCC.

From this situation, one can conclude that despite having the land delivery mechanism in place, land had not been made accessible or available to the people. This point to a break in the institutional framework. This conclusion is also consistent with the outcome of separate interviews with Mr. M Musonda, the Legal Officer (Estates) and Mr. J.M Zulu, the Assistant Director City Planning both of LCC who confirmed that
LCC lacked the capacity to acquire equipment to enable it provide services. They also said that LCC had insufficient qualified staff with the capacity to plan the areas. They both agreed that, in most cases, the procedures involved in land allocation were not clearly explained to the public and the institutions involved in housing development. They clearly stated that one of the major bottlenecks to housing development was the getting of permission, planning, process of acquiring land and securing title which they said took longer than expected. This, they said, resulted in situations whereby people constructed houses without bothering about title.

The above situation contributed greatly to the failure of the urban housing development in Lusaka because even though one could have accessed housing finance, there was no land on which to construct a house. Worse still, this made it extremely difficult for those individuals who could have harboured ideas of obtaining mortgages using land as collateral. This was therefore, another area of institutional linkage failure.

6.5 Cost and Supply of Building Materials

According to Stokes (1981: 21), people choose different materials for constructing their houses depending on the designs and plans of their houses. Most importantly, choice was more a question of affordability. In the case of Lusaka, the research findings indicated that, given the high cost of building materials, the majority of the people who were in the low-income group frequently relied on poor quality materials. Even though the findings of this study indicated that many houses were constructed from concrete blocks (Table 5.6), they were of poor quality and were made by the residents themselves. This was so because the cost of blocks and other building materials from renowned suppliers was beyond the reach of the people in the low-income group. A survey of the cost of blocks at Makeni Blocks revealed that 4”, 6” and 8” blocks being sold at K2,000.00; K2,600.00 and K3,000.00 respectively. A 50kg pocket of cement was going at K33,000.00. This was too expensive for the low-income group. In addition to this, the cost of crushed stone (Aggregate used for construction) from Lusaka West Quarries was being sold at K45,000.00 per ton. One other notable feature was that there was no organised system for the supply of river
and building sand. The fact that there were a lot of informal sector dealers in river and building sand, crushed stones, cement, door and window frames including concrete blocks along streets like Alick Nkhata in Kalingalinga and Old Mungwi road on the way to Lusaka West indicated that the supply of building materials was in disarray. This was another break in institutional linkages.

Given the factors inhibiting housing development in Lusaka, it became clear that the whole arrangement of housing provision had been ineffective such that the majority of the new housing units were being provided by the informal sector. For this reason, even though individuals could have acquired officially approved plans to construct houses, the seemingly absence of an effective monitoring system for public or formal private sector housing development encouraged these individuals to be in breach of planning and building controls. In most cases, these individuals ended up building structures in areas without water supply, sanitation, road network and organised rainwater drainage. This analysis is consistent with Tipple (1994: 595) who observed that individuals in informal settlements used any form of materials, engaged artisans and labourers and in some cases, they supervised or spent some time in the building work themselves. He added that the houses built by these people could be anything from a shack hastily erected with used materials ‘found on site’ or bought from a trader. It can therefore be concluded that the breakdown of the institutional linkages largely contributed to the mushrooming of illegal settlements.

6.6 Housing Legislation

In order to enforce the goals of the housing development programmes and strategies, there is need to have a good housing legislative base. Given the huge task of providing housing to the growing population in Zambia, there was need to have concerted efforts by having many companies involved in the industry. This has not been the case in Zambia. For example, the National Housing Authority (NHA) Act Chapter 426 of the Laws of Zambia gives NHA, a body corporate and player in the delivery of housing, the sole responsibility for the management of the housing portfolio, including the housing policy. This law does not provide for the participation of other interested companies in the housing development industry. This also means that whatever funds
the government sourced for housing development were legally channelled through this body corporate. For this reason, the performance of other companies in this regard was minimal.

The other piece of legislation regarding housing development that has inherent weaknesses is the Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act Chapter 441 of the Laws of Zambia. This Act provides for the control and improvement of housing in Statutory Housing Areas and in Improvement Areas. It also provides for the issuance of certificates of title and occupancy licences that give security of tenure. The weakness of this piece of legislation lies in its restrictive nature because it precludes other laws from applying to areas of its jurisdiction. This situation makes it difficult for other stakeholders to effectively contribute to housing development. The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act Chapter 289 of the Laws of Zambia is another piece of legislation connected to housing through land delivery that has a problem. Under this Act, land alienation and deed processing procedures have remained centralised and cumbersome thereby making it difficult to access land. These pieces of legislation, including the Building Societies Act already alluded to coupled with a lack of well planned housing programmes have impacted negatively on the development of a thriving housing industry. This is yet another indication of the breakdown of the institutional linkages.

6.7 Assessment of the impact of the National Housing Policy: 1996 to date

In 1996, the Zambian government officially launched the first comprehensive national housing policy. The main goal of the policy was to provide adequate and affordable housing for Zambians (NHP, 1996: 15). Among other important objectives, the policy was to provide for 15 percent of the national budget to be allocated for housing development every year (Ibid: 15). However, as the Minister of Local Government and Housing admitted, ‘the problem of house shortage would continue for some time because the rate of construction of houses in the country was far below the 110,000 units per annum projected by the housing policy... due to lack of money’ (Saturday Post, 27th March, 2004: 2). Judging from this statement, it is apparent that the
government was not making progress in the provision of the 15 percent of the national budget allocation to housing development. Interviews held with Mr. S Gumboh, the Principal Budget Analyst at the Ministry of Finance and National Planning confirmed that since the launching of the National Housing Policy in 1996, there has never been any allocation towards housing development in the national budget contrary to the provisions of the National Housing Policy.

The other point to note is that the government seemed to have shelved this important document in preference for housing policies by ‘Presidential decrees’. According to Mashamba (2004: 4), much as government officials talked highly about what the policy was intended to achieve, ironically, the government started to discard its own national housing policy in 1996 itself. This was when, from nowhere, the government announced that it was going to sell all council, government and parastatal houses to sitting tenants. He argued that this policy measure was not mentioned in the National Housing Policy document. Mashamba was critical of this decision and argued that although the idea of selling public housing units was in itself a very positive step, the mere fact that it was not planned for meant that no long-term effects on the Zambian, let alone, Lusaka city housing markets and economy had been carefully thought through. Worse still, instead of selling the housing units at economic prices so as to provide funds to the cash strapped councils and other public institutions with which to build more houses, most houses were literally given away freely. According to the Economic Commission for Africa study, the Zambian Government ‘decided by Presidential decree in 1996 that council houses be sold at the ridiculously low price of K10,500 per cement block house consisting of one bedroom, a living room, a kitchen and a toilet’ (ECA, 2001: 17). The study further revealed that the Government did not compensate LCC. This fact was also supported by Mr. H.J Kavimba, the Property Development Manager at INDECO Estates who was critical about the manner in which the home empowerment policy was implemented. He stated, during interviews, that even though the valuation of the housing units to be sold was professionally done, the actual selling was not done on commercial basis. He gave an example of some houses whose valuation reports, in 1999, indicated that their commercial value was
K80,000,000.00; but they were actually sold off for K20,000,000.00. He said that an analysis of the situation indicated that, in most cases, ‘the institution would require to sell ten housing units to in order to replace one housing unit sold to a sitting tenant’. This meant that the institution was literally incapacitated in as far as participation in the housing industry was concerned. The decision by government therefore deprived most institutions of the capacity to effectively participate in the housing industry.

The other housing policy by ‘Presidential decree’ was the Presidential Housing Initiative (PHI). An examination of the policy document revealed that this was another initiative that was not included in the 1996 National Housing Policy. This development raised questions on the effectiveness and overall place of PHI in the housing industry. For example, from the legal framework point of view, the relationship between PHI and NHA was not stated and yet from the NHP and NHA Act’s point of view, NHA was created to perform the tasks that PHI was being given. Fundamentally, the government failed to spell out the different roles to be played by both NHA and PHI in the provision of housing in Lusaka. It should be made clear that while NHA was created through an Act of Parliament as alluded to earlier, PHI was formed through a Presidential decree. In this regard, although PHI was also involved in housing construction, it did not take over the functions of NHA. It merely duplicated them. This analysis was consistent with the position of Mr M Chitondo, the Chief Architect at National Housing Authority (NHA) who mentioned that in the absence of the clarity alluded to above, PHI totally overshadowed the work of NHA and the private sector. This was contrary to the ideals of the NHP that stated that NHA was to take a leading role in the provision of housing. All in all, with or without a comprehensive National Housing Policy, there has not been an enabling environment for housing development in Lusaka.
CHAPTER SEVEN

7.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 SUMMARY

The point of departure of this study was that the population of Lusaka had increased tremendously from 266,245 in 1969 to 1,138,460 in 2000. This population increase resulted in increased demand for housing. In response, the government formulated and implemented various housing policies and programmes. The First and Second Official Housing Programmes were implemented in 1965 and 1968 respectively. Housing programmes were also included in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Development Plans. In 1996, the first comprehensive National Housing Policy (NHP) was launched. There were also private housing initiatives that were implemented parallel to the public efforts. In spite of these efforts, it was evident, from the prevailing situation that Lusaka had failed to meet the demand for housing. The intention of this study was therefore to explain why the problem of urban housing persisted despite the formulation and implementation of various policies and related programmes.

In examining the programmes and strategies employed in addressing the housing problem (Chapter Four), the study established, from the institutional framework point of view, that the Central Government, through the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), was responsible for promoting shelter improvement by identifying housing improvement areas. The Lusaka City Council (LCC) was responsible for the management and provision of council-owned housing and unplanned settlements, while the National Housing Authority (NHA) was responsible for advising government on housing matters as well as taking an active role in the housing industry by constructing houses for outright purchase and for rent. The Zambia National Building Society (ZNBS), Pan-African Building Society (PABS), Finance Building Society (FBS) and other financial institutions were responsible for providing housing finance housing development. These institutions, together with the private sector, Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and individual home developers had been
implementing activities aimed at increasing decent housing stock and related infrastructure from own generated resources or with the assistance of donor support.

With regard to housing development, the findings were that this was undertaken by the public sector through conventional, site and service and squatter upgrading programmes. The key institutions that implemented these programmes were LCC and NHA that worked in collaboration with some international agencies. The private formal sector was sidelined such that it was mainly confined to the provision of housing finance for individual home developers. As a result, it was the private informal sector that contributed greatly to housing development in Lusaka.

In Chapter Five, the study analysed the impact of the urban housing policies, programmes and strategies. On the question of demand versus urban housing supply, it was established that since the city had approximately 267,000 households against 245,443 housing units, Lusaka City had a housing deficit of 21,557 units. It was therefore concluded that there was an imbalance in the demand supply of urban housing. The quality of many housing units was also found to be low.

An examination of institutional linkages (Chapter Six) established that the institutional framework had inherent weaknesses. There was no clear allocation of responsibilities among the various institutional players involved in housing development. Firstly, even though there were ‘housing policies’ under which housing programmes were implemented, there was no comprehensive housing policy from 1964 to 1996 that should have clearly stated the dimensions of housing problems and the priority that should have been given to housing provision in the overall national economic development. Given the non-availability of a comprehensive housing policy, the technical, financial and administrative framework needed to carry out housing programmes was not defined. In the same vein, other than LCC and NHA, other public institutions, notably the Ministry of Lands and other stakeholders from the private sector such as the providers of building materials were not given prominence. For this reason, they were not identified and their roles not spelt out. Thus, there was no common strategy for harmonising the inputs of various key players in the industry.
This led to fragmented housing development with no common purpose. The consequence of this had been the mushrooming of unplanned, uncoordinated and most unfortunately, illegal settlements.

Secondly, the study further established that there had not been any meaningful investment in housing development by both the public and private sectors, which investment was needed to provide enough long-term housing finance for sustainable housing development. Non-availability of adequate land for housing was the third issue that was found to have been one of the bottlenecks in the industry. There were no clear arrangements between LCC and the Ministry of Lands with regard to how land was going to be made available to developers without unnecessary delays. In many cases, LCC failed to provide adequate land for development even where individuals raised their own funds for housing development. This was yet another case of the imbalance between the demand and supply of available land for development and it was another typical case of a break in institutional linkages. This explains why many houses in the city were being built without local council authority. The high cost of building materials was also a hindrance to this development, especially given the fact that there was no adequate housing finance that people could have accessed. This was a possible contributing factor to the poor quality of housing in Lusaka. Finally, the housing legislative base did not provide a firm foundation for housing development. The National Housing Authority Act Chapter 426 of the Laws of Zambia, the Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act Chapter 441 of the Laws of Zambia and the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act Chapter 289 of the Laws of Zambia did not adequately complement the efforts in housing development as they had inherent weaknesses and therefore, the full participation of other stakeholders could not be realised. This equally resulted into fragmentation of efforts in housing development.

Notwithstanding the fact that the government was and is still willing to ensure provision of adequate and decent housing to Lusaka residents, this research has identified the bottlenecks that need addressing as discussed in Chapter Six.
7.2 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, from the findings of this study, it is evident that the government’s housing policies, programmes and strategies employed in providing urban housing in Lusaka City had made little impression on improving people’s housing and living conditions. The study established that Public sector involvement was specifically in conventional, site and service and squatter upgrading programmes. The private sector was mainly involved in the provision of housing finance while the informal sector was involved in housing construction. An assessment of the impact of housing policies, programmes and strategies established that Lusaka City had a housing deficit. The cost of housing for outright purchase and for rent was found to be beyond the reach of the majority of the city residents. The quality of housing was also poor. The study also established that there was no clear allocation of responsibilities among various institutional players involved in housing development. As a result, there was no common strategy to harmonise the inputs of various players. Both the public and private housing initiatives had not delivered tangible services to the expectations of the residents. It should however, be noted that the question of housing development had recently been given attention by way of launching the NHP in 1996. The policy implementation failure in this regard points to a lack of support and political will to approach this problem in totality. Concerted effort in this developmental area that was required to pool resources was not there. This is so because the NHP provides for government’s direct construction of housing on a large scale in order to help increase the supply of housing. However, the poor performance of the government in direct construction of all housing programmes so far embarked on lends strong support to the view that government did not seriously consider providing an enabling environment for the full participation of other stakeholders in the housing industry. The continuing difficulty of land acquisition in Lusaka in spite of having a laid down legislative framework regarding the relationship between LCC and the Ministry of Lands was not ironed out. The escalating cost of building materials, even though most of them are manufactured locally pose serious problems for the realisation of policy objectives.
The search for methods of providing really low-cost housing by using subsidised local building materials was not vigorously pursued. A cooperative approach to low-cost housing could prove a good alternative to site and service schemes because by so doing, the people for whom the programmes are to be intended would ensure close supervision and proper utilisation of resources.

There was no efficient administrative and management framework for translating policy objectives into reality. Without such an efficient framework, the NHP, no matter how well conceived, failed in its objectives of improving the housing lot of the urban population in Zambia as a whole and Lusaka city in particular.

7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

i. The government should seriously consider implementing the NHP in totality. There is need to put in place a committee to strategise the implementation of the NHP. The strategy should provide specific growth targets in the construction industry that should be used to assess the degree of success or failure of the policy. There is also need for political on the part of the leadership so as to put the objectives of the NHP into reality.

ii. NHA should be re-capitalised, given the fact that it is a public institution that, through an Act of parliament, was mandated to design and construct houses for outright purchase and for rent by the general public. This institution should therefore be provided an annual budgetary allocation from the Central Government. NHA should also consider working in partnership with continental financial institutions such as the African Housing Fund (AHF), a Pan-African Organisation involved in assisting African nations with housing finance.

iii. Harmonise the principal pieces of legislation regulating Housing Finance Institutions in order to make them effective by:

- Amending the Banking and Financial Services Act (BFSA) to take account of Building Society peculiarities without compromising the principal objectives of the industry;
. Amending and updating the Building Societies Act (BSA) to make it more current by removing some of the inhibitions that are apparent in the current law; or
. Merging the two pieces of legislation into a single Act that will regulate the entire spectrum of banking and finance.

iv. The cost of building materials should be reduced through research and development or through a tax regime.

v. The government should promote locally available, appropriate, safe, efficient and environmentally sound construction methods and technologies at local levels.

vi. The government should increase the supply of affordable housing through encouraging and promoting affordable home ownership and increasing the supply of affordable rental, communal, cooperative and other housing through partnerships among public, private and community initiatives.

vii. The government should continue promoting the upgrading of the already existing housing stock through rehabilitation and maintenance and the adequate supply of basic services, facilities and amenities.
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APPENDIX A

Interview Schedule for Public and Private Professionals in Housing

Introduction for Respondents

Good morning/ afternoon.
I am J. Kanyense, a student from the University of Zambia pursuing a Masters of Public Administration degree. As part of my studies, I am conducting a research on Urban Housing.

You have been selected for interviews and I would appreciate your cooperation. The purpose of this study is to examine Urban Housing Development Trends. This is purely an academic exercise and therefore, all information that you will offer will be kept strictly confidential. The results from the data I am collecting will be used for the production of a Dissertation in partial fulfilment for the award of the Masters of Public Administration degree.

Pre-Interview Information:

Code number: .................
Name of person interviewed: ..........................
Organisation’s name: .............................
Sector of organisation: Public: ............Private: .............
Department’s name: .............................
Position in organisation: ..........................
How many years have you worked in the organisation? .........................
Date of interview: .............................
Day: ..............................................
Start Time: ............... End Time: ..........................
PART 1: PROFILE OF RESPONDENT.

1. (a) Age:........years.
   (b) Gender:....... 

2. (a) What is your highest level of education?
   1. Primary
   2. Secondary
   3. College
   4. University
   5. University Post- Graduate

   (b) In what year did you finish the education indicated above? ...........

3. What is your current position?
   1. Head of Organisation
   2. Deputy Head of Organisation
   3. Head of Department
   4. Deputy Head of Department
   5. Other senior Management/ Professional/ Technical
   6. Junior Management
   7. Supporting Staff
   8. Other, specify.................

4. How many people do you supervise? ............... 

PART 2: HOUSING POLICIES, PROGRAMMES AND STRATEGIES

5. Which one of the following was your organization involved in?
   1. Construction of Low-Cost housing for sale to the public
   2. Construction of Low-Cost housing for rent
   3. Construction of Medium-Cost housing for sale to the public
   4. Construction of Medium-Cost housing for rent
   5. Construction of High-Cost housing for sale to the public
   6. Construction of High-Cost housing for rent
   7. Provision of mortgage for construction of personal houses
   8. Provision of mortgages for purchase of personal houses
   9. Site and service scheme
   10. Shanty compound upgrading scheme
6. To what extent do you think your organization provided adequate resources for housing in the following areas?
   1. Funding
   2. Qualified personnel
   3. Equipment
   4. Building Materials

7. What have been the implications of the following on programme implementation and coordination?
   1. Inadequate funding
   2. Inadequately qualified personnel
   3. Inadequate equipment
   4. Inadequate building materials

8. How well designed were the housing programmes and strategies in relation to the overall housing policies?
   1. Very well designed
   2. Well designed
   3. Not well designed

9. To what extent do you think the objectives and the outputs of housing programmes were clear?
   1. Very clear
   2. Partly clear
   3. Not clear

10. What have been the implications of this on programme implementation?
    1. The programmes were very adequately implemented
    2. The programmes were adequately implemented
    3. Indifferent
    4. The programmes were inadequately implemented
    5. The programmes were very inadequately implemented

11. How realistic were the objectives of the housing programmes in relation to the anticipated outputs?

12. To what extent do you think individuals and institutions were well equipped to undertake housing programmes effectively?

13. If not, what was done to enable them to improve their capacities?

14. Were the programmes’ targets specific and relevant to their respective objectives?
PART 3: INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES

15. Were the roles of participating institutions and agencies clearly stated?

16. Were the resources that the participating institutions and agencies were expected to contribute towards programme implementation and the purpose clearly stated?

17. If not, what were the implications of this on programme implementation?
   1. The programmes were not implemented
   2. The programmes were poorly implemented
   3. The programmes were partially implemented

18. How well organised were the various institutions or organisations from which cooperation was needed by your organisation?

19. In case there was joint effort, which organisation was responsible for coordination?

20. If the efforts in Q18 were not well organised, what were the implications of this on the following?
   1. Programme performance
   2. Availability of resources
   3. Time frame for the completion of programmes

21. Did the implementing institutions and their staff undertake their roles with the level of commitment required of them?

22. Was their mandate clearly stipulated and were they given sufficient resources and cooperation to enable them undertake their assignments?

23. What was done to ensure that the participating agencies fully understood and embraced the housing programmes?

24. Did the housing programmes have adequate monitoring and evaluating systems to ensure programme control at the level of quality, pace of implementation and to guarantee that expected outputs would be realised? How was this done, if at all it was done?

25. Which of the following monitoring tools did you put in place during housing programme implementation?

   1. Performance records
   2. Annual review meetings
   3. Annual audits
   4. Quarterly audits
26. Were there others you would like to indicate?

27. Were field visits to sites undertaken and how regular were they?

28. How well stocked was the generated data on the programme were and how did management use data from the monitoring and mid-term evaluations?

PART 4: PROGRAMME DESIGN

29. Were the finances for programme implementation made available to the implementing institutions in good time?

30. Was there consistency in the provision of finances for housing programmes?

31. Was the cost of building standards for housing programmes within reach of the intended beneficiaries financially?

32. Were the programmes' activities consistent with the objectives?

33. Did the implementing institutions and agencies have the capacity to undertake the programmes?
   1. Yes
   2. No

34. If yes in Q33, to what extent?
   1. Very efficient
   2. Partly efficient
   3. Not efficient

35. If not, what were the implications on housing programme implementation?
   1. The programmes were not adequately implemented
   2. The programmes were partially implemented
   3. The programmes were not implemented

36. How efficient were the implementing institutions and agencies in applying the resources to the programmes?
PART 5: OUTCOME OF HOUSING POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES

37. What are the achievements and/or failures of the housing policies and programmes?

38. What constraints/factors contributed to the failures, if any?

39. What could account for successes, if any?

40. To what extent have the housing programmes contributed to both the quantity and the quality of the housing stock?

41. In your view, what could be done to improve upon future housing programmes?

END OF INTERVIEW
THANK YOU.
APPENDIX B

Survey of People Affected by the Housing Initiatives

Introduction for Respondents

Good morning/ afternoon.

I am J. Kanyense, a student from the University of Zambia pursuing a Masters of Public Administration degree. As part of my studies, I am conducting a research on Urban Housing.

You have been selected to be interviewed and I would appreciate your cooperation. The purpose of this study is to examine Urban Housing Development Trends. This is purely an academic exercise and therefore, all information that you will offer will be kept strictly confidential. Let me assure you that your identity will not be revealed under any circumstances, nor will your name be printed or used in any documents. The results from the data I am collecting will be used for the production of a Dissertation in partial fulfillment for the award of the Masters of Public Administration degree.

Code number:..................

PART 1: PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

1. Gender
   1. Male
   2. Female

2. Age:.........years

3. Marital Status
   1. Single
   2. Married
   3. Widowed
   4. Separated
   5. Divorced

4. Highest level of education
   1. Primary School
   2. Junior Secondary School
   3. Senior Secondary School
   4. College
   5. University
   6. University Post- Graduate
   7. Never went to school
5. Are you employed?
   1. Yes
   2. No

6. If yes, what kind of employment are you in?
   1. Formal
   2. Self-employed
   3. Unemployed

7. If in formal employment, what is your basic monthly salary and allowances?
   1. Less than 150,000 kwacha
   2. 150,000-250,000 kwacha
   3. 250,001-500,000 kwacha
   4. 500,001-750,000 kwacha
   5. More than 750,000 kwacha

8. If self-employed, what is your monthly income?
   1. Less than 150,000 kwacha
   2. 150,000-250,000 kwacha
   3. 250,001-500,000 kwacha
   4. 500,001-750,000 kwacha
   5. More than 750,000 kwacha

9. In what sector of employment are you?
   1. Agriculture
   2. Manufacturing
   3. Construction
   4. Service

10. How long have you lived in Lusaka?
    1. Less than 5 years
    2. 6-10 years
    3. 11-15 years
    4. 16-20 years
    5. More than 20 years

11. What is the size of your household?
    1. One
    2. Two
    3. Three
    4. Four
    5. Five
    6. Six
    7. Seven
    8. More than Seven
12. In which District/ Town where you born? ..................

13. What is your nationality? ..................

PART 2: HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

14. Classification of housing unit
   1. Formal house
   2. Informal house

15. Township of residence (name) ................

16. Type of area of residence
   1. High cost
   2. Medium cost
   3. Low-cost
   4. Peri-urban

17. Status of area of residence
   1. Formal Settlement
   2. Unplanned Settlement

18. What are the walls of your housing unit mainly made of?
   1. Burnt bricks
   2. Mud bricks
   3. Concrete blocks/ slab
   4. Iron sheets
   5. Asbestos/ hard board/ wood
   6. Pole and dagga/ mud
   7. Other, specify

19. What is the main type of material used for the roof?
   1. Concrete/ cement
   2. Asbestos sheet
   3. Iron sheet
   4. Grass/ thatch/ straw
   5. Other

20. What is the floor of your housing unit mainly made of?
   1. Concrete
   2. Cement
   3. Brick
   4. Mud
   5. Other, specify
21. What is the main type of material used for door frames?
   1. Steel
   2. Wood

22. What is the main type of material used for window frames?
   1. Steel
   2. Wood

23. How many rooms does your housing unit have?
   1. One
   2. Two
   3. Three
   4. Four
   5. Five
   6. Six
   7. Seven
   8. More than Seven

24. In your view, is the quality of housing in your area of residence high?
   1. Completely agree
   2. Agree
   3. Indifferent
   4. Disagree
   5. Completely disagree
   6. Do not know

25. What is the main source of energy used for lighting by your household?
   1. Electricity
   2. Gas
   3. Candle
   4. Paraffin
   5. Solar
   6. Other, specify

26. What is the main source of energy used for cooking by your household?
   1. Electricity
   2. Gas
   3. Wood
   4. Paraffin
   5. Charcoal
   6. Solar
   7. Other, specify
PART 3: HOUSING OWNERSHIP STATUS

27. How was this housing unit acquired?
   1. Purchased with own funds
   2. Purchased with mortgage
   3. Acquired through local council site and service scheme
   4. Freely
   5. Inherited
   6. Other, specify

28. If you purchased the house, how much did it cost? .................

29. When was this housing unit acquired? .............

30. If you own this house, did you buy land on which it is built?
   1. Yes
   2. No

31. If yes in Q29, from whom did you buy it?
   1. Central Government
   2. City council
   3. Private company
   4. Individual
   5. Other, specify

32. If no in Q29, who owns the land on which your house is built?
   1. Central Government
   2. City council
   3. Private company
   4. Individual
   5. Other, specify

33. If you own the house, do you have title deeds?
   1. Yes
   2. No

34. If you applied for land from the city council, how long did it take to be allocated a plot?
   1. Less than 6 months
   2. 7-12 months
   3. 13-18 months
   4. 19-24 months
   5. More than 24 months
   6. Did not succeed
35. If you applied for mortgage, which agency did you apply to? ............... 

36. If you applied for mortgage, how long did it take to be given the money? 
   1. Less than 6 months 
   2. 7-12 months 
   3. 13-18 months 
   4. 19-24 months 
   5. More than 24 months 
   6. Did not succeed 

37. Have you at any time applied for housing? 
   1. Yes 
   2. No 

38. If yes in Q37, did you succeed? 
   1. Yes 
   2. No 

39. If yes in Q37, in which year did you apply? ............. 

40. If yes in Q37, what council or agency did you apply to? ................. 

41. If yes in Q38, in which year were you given housing? ................ 

42. If yes in Q38, how long did it take to be provided with accommodation? 
   1. Less than 6 months 
   2. 6-12 months 
   3. 13-18 months 
   4. 19-24 months 
   5. More than 24 months 

43. Do you rent a house? 
   1. Yes 
   2. No 

44. If yes in Q43, from whom do you rent? 
   1. Central Government 
   2. City council 
   3. Private company 
   4. Parastatal 
   5. Individual
45. If yes in Q43, how much rent are you charged per month?

1. Less than 50,000 kwacha
2. 51,000-100,000 kwacha
3. 101,000-150,000 kwacha
4. 151,000-200,000 kwacha
5. 201,000-250,000 kwacha
6. 251,000-300,000 kwacha
7. 301,000-350,000 kwacha
8. 351,000-400,000 kwacha
9. 401,000-450,000 kwacha
10. 451,000-500,000 kwacha
11. More than 500,000 kwacha

46. Do you rent a room(s)?

1. Yes
2. No

47. If yes in Q46, why don’t you rent a house? .................

48. If yes in Q46, how much rent are you charged per month?

1. Less than 50,000 kwacha
2. 51,000-100,000 kwacha
3. 101,000-150,000 kwacha
4. 151,000-200,000 kwacha
5. 201,000-250,000 kwacha
6. 251,000-300,000 kwacha
7. 301,000-350,000 kwacha
8. 351,000-400,000 kwacha
9. More than 400,000 kwacha

49. If you live in a rented house/ room(s), are you able to afford the rent?

1. Yes
2. No

50. If you live in a rented house/ room(s), are you required to pay rent in advance?

1. Yes
2. No

51. If yes in Q50, how many months in advance are you required to pay?

1. 1-3 months
2. 4-6 months
3. More than 6 months
52. Have you moved from one house to another before?

1. Yes
2. No

53. If yes in Q52, what was the reason?

1. To find a decent house
2. Due to high rentals
3. Transfer at work
4. To move to a better house
5. To move to a better area

54. State the type of accommodation arrangement you would prefer.

55.

1. Owner-occupier
2. Rented house
3. Rented room(s)

55. If you prefer own-occupier, what is your main reason?

1. Rentals are high
2. Security of tenure
3. Empowerment

56. If you prefer rented house, what is your reason? ..................

57. If you prefer rented room(s), what is your reason? ..................

58. Are you happy with the area you live in?

1. Yes
2. No

59. If not, which area would you prefer to live in? ...............Give reasons.
PART 4: HOUSING DEVELOPMENT

60. Since you have been staying in this locality, has any new housing development taken place in area your of residence?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Do not know

61. If yes in Q60, are the units constructed adequately kept up with demand?
   1. Very adequate
   2. Adequate
   3. Indifferent
   4. Inadequate
   5. Very inadequate
   6. Do not know

62. If yes in Q60, are the new housing units affordable for purchase?
   1. Completely agree
   2. Agree
   3. Indifferent
   4. Disagree
   5. Completely disagree
   6. Do not know

63. If yes in Q59, are the new housing units affordable for rent?
   1. Completely agree
   2. Agree
   3. Indifferent
   4. Disagree
   5. Completely disagree
   6. Do not know

64. Who has undertaken housing development since you have been living in your area of residence?

   1. Central Government
   2. Local council
   3. Parastatals
   4. Private companies
   5. Non-Governmental Organizations’
   6. International agencies
   7. Individuals
   8. Do not know
65. In your view, is the government doing enough in providing housing to the public?
   1. Completely agree
   2. Agree
   3. Indifferent
   4. Disagree
   5. Completely disagree
   6. Do not know

66. In your view, is the private sector doing enough in providing housing to the public?
   1. Completely agree
   2. Agree
   3. Indifferent
   4. Disagree
   5. Completely disagree
   6. Do not know

67. The environment in which I live is of high standard?
   1. Completely agree
   2. Agree
   3. Indifferent
   4. Disagree
   5. Completely disagree
   6. Do not know

PART 5: UTILITIES

68. How is the household refuse disposed of?
   1. Regularly collected by
      a. City council
      b. Private sector
   2. Irregularly collected by
      a. City council
      b. Private sector
   3. Burnt
   4. Roadside dumping
   5. Burying/ pit
   6. Other, specify
69. What is the main type of toilet used by members of your household?

1. Flush (private)
2. Flush (communal)
3. Pit Latrine
4. Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine
5. Bucket
6. No toilet facility
7. Other, specify

70. If the type of toilet is private flush, is it inside or outside the housing unit?

1. Inside
2. Outside

71. Is the toilet exclusively used by members of the household?

1. Yes
2. No

72. What is the main source of water supply for your house?

1. Piped water inside and outside the housing unit
2. Piped water outside the housing unit but within the plot/stand
3. Communal tap
4. Private Protected well
5. Communal Protected well
6. Private Protected bore hole
7. Communal Protected bore hole
8. Private unprotected well
9. Communal unprotected well
10. Private unprotected bore hole
11. Communal unprotected bore hole
12. Other, specify

PART 6: OVERALL VIEWS

73. What do you like most about living in your area of residence?
74. What is the biggest problem in your area of residence?
75. What services would you like to be provided in your area of residence?
76. What services would like to be improved in your area of residence?

END OF INTERVIEW
THANK YOU
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0 HOUSING AND MACRO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Economic Growth</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Income Distribution</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Employment</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Investment</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Savings</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Fiscal Deficit</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Inflation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 Policy Implication</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0 CURRENT HOUSING ISSUES AND CONSTRAINTS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Population</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Existing Housing Situation and Rate of Supply</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Access to Land and Tenure</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Infrastructure</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Legislation and Housing</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Housing Standards</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7 Building Materials</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8 Housing Finance</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9 Institutional Housing</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10 Informal Housing</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11 Housing for the Disadvantaged</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.12 Rural Housing</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.0 NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY GOALS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Policy Goal</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Objectives</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0 HOUSING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Housing Finance</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Land Delivery</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Home Ownership</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1 Rent Control</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.2 Withdrawal of Tied Housing</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.3 Site and Service</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Housing is a basic social need after food and clothing and, as with the other basic needs, adequate housing is a pre-requisite to national socio-economic development. Its inadequacy can have a severe impact on the environment, health and the general well being of communities. In Zambia, inadequate housing is more pronounced in the low income groups which constitute the majority of the country’s population.

The task facing Zambia in housing is mammoth. The country is not only faced with an enormous housing backlog, but it also lacks an effective housing delivery system. The imbalance in development between the rural and urban areas has also contributed to the housing problem by promoting migration into towns and cities at scales that cannot be sustained by the resources and infrastructure of the receiving centres. This trend has contributed to the creation of unplanned settlements, with their attendant poor living environment, and the poor and inadequate housing situation prevailing in the country.

Though several efforts have been made since independence in 1964 to draw up a housing policy, a comprehensive housing policy has not at any time been formulated. This document, therefore, provides a comprehensive assessment of the housing situation in Zambia and provides a vision for resolving the housing problem. It also spells out the roles of the various stake-holders in the housing matrix and their coordination for an effective housing delivery system, stressing private initiative whilst strengthening Government’s role as the provider of requisite enabling environment for sustainable housing delivery.

This policy is the culmination of work by the National Steering Committee on Housing Policy which worked through a series of meetings and consensus-seeking provincial workshops and a national conference to prepare this document.

Implementation of this housing policy is a starting point for Zambia’s sustainable march with the rest of the world towards “Shelter for All” by the year 2010. Implementation of this policy will also serve as a catalyst to the resuscitation of the currently moribund construction industry and the economy at large.
2.0 HOUSING AND MACRO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Because of the economic crises of the past decade, there is now in Zambia an increased urgency to correct economic distortions, created by years of economic mismanagement, and to improve long term prospects for economic growth. Although adjustment efforts started in the late eighties, it is only recent that the government has embarked on a more aggressive and comprehensive adjustment programme aimed at providing an enabling environment to stimulate private investment and improve productivity. To this end, government has taken macro-economic policy measures establishing parameters for national economic growth.

2.1 Economic Growth

Zambia is one of the African countries which have experienced declines in their per capital income over the last two decades. While its population growth rate has been recorded at 3.2 per cent during the 1980s and at 2.7 per cent in the 1990s, the Gross Domestic product (GDP) declined at an average of 4.0 per cent during the period 1990-94.

2.2 Income Distribution

The national average of the disposable income of the majority of the people of Zambia has been eroded with changes in the structure of the economy. Money supply has been reducing over time in government efforts to curb inflation.

The National Disposable Income has on average increased by 7.7 per cent in nominal terms. However, the national per capita income has only increased by 2.0 percent. In real terms, both the national disposable income and the per capita disposable income must have declined drastically.

The Gross Fixed Capita Formation (GFCF)\(^1\) increased by 6.1 per cent from K209.3 million in 1993 to K22.0 million in 1994 in real terms.

\(^1\) GFCF excludes stocks which are always negative.
The Gross Capita Formation (GCF)\textsuperscript{2} was K179.1 million in 1993 and K192.5 million in 1994, representing a decline of 12.6 per cent for 1993 and an increase of 7.5 per cent for 1994.

2.3 Employment

The economic reform programme has continued to have a negative impact on the employment situation. Formal sector employment has progressively declined since the inception of the structural adjustment programme. In June 1993, about 520,000 persons were employed in the formal sector. By June 1994 this figure had declined to 502,000 because of redundancies. In 1994 about 7,600 persons in about 250 companies were declared redundant (CSO, 1995 Quarterly Report).

The largest employer in the formal sector is the private sector. In June 1994 the private sector accounted for 202,000 jobs or 40.2 per cent of all formal sector employees. Although the share of formal employment in the private sector has been declining in absolute terms, the proportion of private sector employment vis-à-vis the entire formal employment sector has been steadily increasing.

The parastatal sector is the second largest formal employment sector. In June 1994 this sector accounted for 149,000 employees or 29.8 per cent of formal employees. This figure represents a 6.8 per cent drop in employment within the parastatal sector.

Central government is the next largest employer after parastatals. In June 1994 central government accounted for 133,600 jobs or 26.6 per cent of formal employment. This figure represented a 1.4 per cent increase over 1993. In local government the percentage of total employment has continued to decline from 4.2 per cent or 21,600 employees in June 1993 down to 3.5 per cent or 17,600 employees by June 1994. Local government is the smallest formal sector employer.

2.4 Investment

With low levels of real income among citizens, there is a corresponding low level local capital for investment. The position was worsened by government measures intended to curtail money supply in order to lower the rate of inflation.

\textsuperscript{2} GCF is GFCF plus stocks. It is basically Domestic Investment.
Various instruments were used to mop out excess money. However, although well-intended, some of the measures taken, such as the decontrol of interest and foreign exchange rates, resulted in high interest rates which adversely affected the economy. It is anticipated that the situation will change for the better with the stabilisation of the economy and the enhanced performance of the housing sector.

2.5 Savings

Presently, personal, corporate and Government savings have shown a continuous decline in GDP resulting in a high propensity to consume. This trend has resulted in low funds being available for investment from the financial sector, in spite of a proliferation of commercial banks.

2.6 Fiscal Deficit

In 1994, government committed itself to improving the management of the economy. A strict fiscal policy was pursued and a cash budget introduced. The cash budget approach was not without problems. Revenue inflows did not always match expenditure patterns. These short-comings in the economy manifested themselves in all sectors.

The fiscal measures taken minimised the printing of money which had been fuelling inflation. The creation of the Zambia Revenue Authority further improved the money supply situation. Nonetheless, a deficit of K26.7 billion in government domestic operations was registered in 1994 as against K11 billion anticipated at the beginning of the year. Both revenue and expenditure exceeded the budget levels for the year (GRZ, 1994 Economic Report).

2.7 Inflation

For the most part of 1994, there was a marked reduction in inflation indicating a price adjustment process in the economy. The composite Consumer Price Index (CPI) shows that annual inflation averaged 35.2 per cent in 1994 compared to an average of 138.13 per cent in 1993 and 191.2 per cent in 1992. The declining trend in the annual inflation rate continued such that by May 1995 it had fallen to 26.8 per cent.
On a monthly basis, the rate of inflation declined from double digits in 1993 to single digit rates and has maintained this trend for the most parts of 1994 and 1995. This trend is attributed to the tight fiscal and monetary policies that have been introduced.

2.8 Policy Implication

An unfavourable macro-economic environment in which inflation and interest rates are high, adversely affects the performance of the housing sector. Housing finance and building materials become expensive and unaffordable. Such a situation has a negative impact not only on the quality of housing but also on the rate of housing output which, in turn, adversely affects the construction industry and employment generation.

A favourable macro-economic environment engenders accelerated and sustainable housing delivery. Accelerated and sustained housing delivery has a positive impact on the construction industry and contributes to the economic growth of the country. Housing construction in particular has the potential to create employment for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled personnel.
3.0 CURRENT HOUSING ISSUES AND CONSTRAINTS.

3.1 Population

Good population management requires that population growth be well-matched to the available resources. It also requires that the spatial distributions of the population be well-related in location and concentration to areas with viable economic bases and employment opportunity. Such management is basic if the affected populations are to enjoy required levels of basic infrastructure such as housing and related social services.

In Zambia the demographic picture has been characterised by the following features:-

(a) a rapid population growth rate of over 3.0 per cent since the 1960s which has resulted in the doubling of the population in less than 30 years from 3.4 million in 1964 to an estimated 9.0 million in 1995. The population is projected to reach 16.2 million by the year 2010 and 18.8 million by the year 2015,

(b) a significant urban population of about 39 per cent concentrated in Copperbelt and Lusaka which is growing at a rate of 2.6 per cent per annum and rural population of about 61.0 per cent which is in settlements spread over the rest of the country.

3.2 Existing Housing Situation and Rate of Supply

Pressure exerted on infrastructure and social services country-wide by rapid population growth (compounded in the case of urban areas by migration from the country side for the urban areas), has been most felt in the housing sector than in any other sector as shown by the following statistics:-

(a) out of the nation’s 1.3 million housing units, only 403,000 units, or 31.0 per cent of the total housing stock, were formal and fully approved in 1990. The remaining 897,000 or 69.0 per cent of the housing stock were informal and poorly serviced or not serviced at all. About 11,000 of these informal or poorly serviced housing stock were not meant for use as housing units;
approximately 36.0 per cent of the 1.3 million households in Zambia are supplied with piped water, about 38.0 per cent use wells or bore holes and about 26.0 per cent use rivers or streams. About 17.0 per cent of households use flush toilets, about 54.0 per cent use pit latrines and about 29.0 per cent do not have toilet facilities at all;

about 64.0 per cent of the nation’s housing stock is in rural areas where the dispersed settlement pattern makes it difficult to provide basic infrastructure and social services. Basic services are therefore generally poor or none existent. Of the remaining 36.0 per cent in urban areas, approximately 70.0 per cent of the dwelling units are equally poorly serviced;

about 80.0 per cent of the nation’s housing stock are owned by individuals; about 5.0 per cent by central government; 6.0 per cent by District Councils; about 6.0 per cent by parastatal organisations and 3.0 per cent by private organisations. Most formal housing, outside site and service schemes, is institutional and owned by councils parastatals or central government. The bulk of institutional housing is occupied at heavily subsidised rentals. Due to poor finance and lack of budgetary allocations for housing, institutional housing stocks have not increased significantly and existing structures have not been well maintained; and

taking into account all the homeless families and the need to replace substandard dwelling units, the current housing backlog stands at approximately 846,000 units. To clear the backlog over the next ten years requires a building rate of about 110,000 dwelling units per annum.

3.3 Access to Land and Land Tenure

Inappropriate laws relating to land tenure systems, inadequate budgetary allocations for provision of infrastructures and services and lack of affordable building materials are some of the constraints deterring housing delivery. Major constraints can be itemised as follows:-

(a) provisions of the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act 1975 retard housing development, especially with regard to land delivery

(b) land alienation and Deed Registry procedures are highly centralised and cumbersome;
(c) inadequacy of serviced land; and

(d) the Rating system is been inequitable and tends to discourage investment in housing.

3.4 Infrastructure

Decent housing cannot be achieved without the simultaneous development of infrastructure services such as water supply, sanitation, roads, storm water drainage, electricity and others.

The inadequacy of infrastructure services has bee caused by:-

(a) lack of adequate finances to develop and maintain these infrastructure services;

(b) lack of planning capacity and inability to implement land use plans;

(c) lack of co-ordination by local authorities and other service delivery companies to implement land-use plans; and

(d) inability of planning and local authorities to enforce planning and building regulations resulting in uncontrolled development. This trend has tended to produce sub-standard housing which has not included infrastructure services.

3.5 Legislation and Housing

The provision of housing has been hampered by the following legislative constraints.

(a) the Rent Act 1972 in its present form and content discourages investors to invest in housing due to the over protection of tenants against evictions for any of breach of covenants;

(b) the National Housing Authority was created by Cap 426 of the Laws of Zambia to advise government on housing policy and to take an active role in the industry. Owing to lack of funding by central government, the National Housing Authority could not perform some of their major functions;
all cities, municipalities and Provincial Planning Authorities have delegated powers to prepare development plans for their areas of jurisdiction every five years. A common feature of all the planning authorities is that they have out-dated development plans and if they have a recent one, it has neither been approved nor implemented. The effect of non-approval/implementation of development plans has been retarded housing development in the country,

A new form of land ownership known and referred to as "Sectional Title" did not exist in Zambia until late 1994. A sectional title makes it possible for any person to own a unit of accommodation such as a flat or house in a block of flats or in a housing scheme, respectively, thereby dispensing with the normal cadastral surveying; and

the Land Act of 1975 centralised, among other restrictive provisions, the allocation of land in the country. By this statute, all land transactions must invariably involve the Commissioner of Lands. This has created delays in the allocation system.

3.6 Housing Standards

Some public health regulations and building bye-laws and other regulations are inappropriate and do not serve the needs of the majority of the population. This situation has greatly reduced activity in the housing sector.

Standards set for both the formal and upgraded informal housing sectors are in part outdated and counter-productive due to the following reasons:-

(a) restrictive construction and public health requirements;

(b) restrictive minimum development clauses; and

(c) inappropriate standards that hamper the adoption of simplified designs and more widespread use of local materials and technologies.
3.7 Building Materials

The availability of appropriate and affordable building materials is paramount towards the achievement of adequate housing.

Current conventional construction materials are not readily affordable for the following reasons:-

(a) employment of capital intensive technology in materials production and inappropriate construction technologies;

(b) prohibitive prices of most building materials caused by high input costs and, in most cases, high transportation costs;

(c) inappropriate standards and bye-laws that reduce the range of approved materials and building technologies;

(d) inadequate and uncoordinated research, development and promotion of low cost and appropriate building materials; and

(e) lack of affordable finance for small scale building materials' production and procurement.

3.8 Housing Finance

In the past Government has failed to formulate a comprehensive and coherent national housing policy. As a result, there has been no framework for a consistent approach to housing finance. In fact, investment in housing dropped from about 3.0 per cent of GDP in 1969 to less than 0.5 per cent by 1992. This figure is well below the United Nations and World Bank minimum of 5.0 per cent of GDP. The problem of housing finance and its effect on housing can be summarised as follows:-

a) a large majority of the Zambian people cannot afford to pay the economic rent or price for a decent house;

b) building costs and finance charges have rocketed beyond the effective demand levels of market forces;
c) property rates on housing have grown totally out of step with peoples' incomes;

e) only a few employers have availed house loans at subsidised interest rates and only to their own employees (e.g., ZISC, ZNPF, ZCCM, GRZ, commercial banks, etc.);

f) low cost houses have been regarded as high risk business both in transferability and security of tenure;

g) public sector, local authority and employer housing has attracted relatively cheaper rentals which have discouraged private investment in this sector;

h) the slow land delivery system for housing has prevented private sector finance houses from releasing loans to this sector at acceptable rates;

i) the housing market in Zambia has become a disparate mix of unco-ordinated bodies and actors with no significant impact on the housing scene;

j) there is no housing finance capital market to ensure easy flow of key requisites for house building or home ownership, and

k) the Government has played an insignificant role in the mobilisation of housing finance.

3.9 Institutional Housing

The majority of the work force in the country are housed in institutional houses. The tying of housing to employment is viewed as an unnecessary burden on employers who are not in the business of providing housing for their employees. The following have been identified as major problems and constraints towards housing delivery caused by institutional housing:-

a) most institutional houses, particularly those belonging to the government and local authorities, are in a deplorable state of repair due to lack of proper maintenance and care,
b) institutionally provided housing is not only discriminatory but also creates a false sense of comfort and security to the employee which reduces the individual's propensity to build his own house. This creates a dependency syndrome which may ultimately lead to destitution;

c) subsidised rentals are disincentives to maintaining and increasing housing stock while the sale of such unproductive houses would free capital for more housing development; and

d) employer provided housing tends to distort the existing national housing market.

3.10 Informal Housing

Informal housing, i.e. houses built without formal guidelines and outside the context of comprehensively conceived layout plans, comprises three categories of houses, namely; squatter, upgraded squatter and traditional houses. At present informal housing constitutes 69 per cent of the nation's housing stock of 1.3 million dwelling units. In a situation where land delivery for formal housing development is slow, and where not much deliberate effort is put in place to facilitate housing development, informal housing has been the inevitable vacuum filler with perhaps a more positive than negative impact on the housing stock. The following are the main characteristics of informal housing:-

a) housing units are owner-built and may not conform with any standard in design, construction materials and workmanship;

b) lack of security of land tenure; and

c) low levels of infrastructure and social services provision.

3.11 Housing for the Disadvantaged

The extended family system in Zambia which allows or expects family members to take care of the disadvantaged groups has for decades tended to cushion and hide the problem of housing for the disadvantaged. However, specific problems related to housing the disadvantaged people have been identified as follows:-
a) existing housing institutions catering for the disabled and aged do not adequately meet the housing needs of this section of the population;
b) existing infrastructure has not been maintained due to lack of funds rendering such housing unfit for human habitation;
c) most buildings in the country were designed without due consideration for the disabled;
d) institutional housing for the disadvantaged groups are mostly located far from facilities and amenities; and
e) lack of data on the disadvantaged has hampered the development of housing for the disabled.

3.12 Rural Housing

Rural housing is not a particular type of housing. Rather, it is a location dimension referring to houses in a rural setting. Rural housing comprises the following three categories of houses:-

a) those built with conventional building materials to conventional housing standards,
b) those built with a mix of conventional and traditional building materials and not necessarily to any recognised standard; and
c) those built with traditional materials to individual norms.

Common problems shared by the three types of rural houses are:-

(i) lack of housing-related infrastructure (water supply, sanitation, electricity) and services (solid waste management) and supportive social services like health and education facilities;
(ii) dispersed settlement pattern which makes the provision of basic services very costly and unattainable.
(iii) lack of sustainable local economic bases to support infrastructure development;

(iv) virtual relegation by Government of rural areas to fend for themselves; and

(v) cultural beliefs and traditions which deter improvement to housing, such as witchcraft.
4.1 Policy Goal

The main goal of this housing policy is to provide adequate affordable housing for all income groups in Zambia.

4.2 Objectives

To achieve the above goal the following objectives must be attained:-

(a) an allocation of a minimum of 15 per cent of the national annual budget to housing to support a sustainable housing development programme;

(b) making serviced land available for housing development and streamlining the land allocation system;

(c) streamlining of building standards, regulations and other controls so that they accord with the capabilities, needs and aspirations of the various sections of the population;

(d) encouraging the production and use of local and affordable building materials;

(e) assisting the poor to acquire decent shelter through alleviation of their affordability problems;

(f) fostering housing areas that are functional, healthy aesthetically pleasant and environmentally friendly; and

(g) the preparation of a national housing implementation strategy.
The measures outlined below are intended to change the pattern of housing development in Zambia and restore growth of the housing sector. By providing a framework for sustainable housing development, this housing policy is also providing a mechanism for ensuring that limited resources are put to their optimum use and thus also address poverty alleviation.

This national housing policy emphasises the process of housing delivery by a clear understanding of the dimensions of housing problems and the priority that should be given to shelter in overall socio-economic development. It helps define the technical, financial and administrative framework needed to carry out housing programmes. It also identifies agents, both public and private, responsible for implementation.

5.1 Housing Finance

Progressive macro-economic policies should lead, all things being equal, to economic growth, job creation and greater affordability for rental housing and house purchase. The main principles to be followed will be:-

(a) to put housing in a central position in national policies alongside health and education;

(b) to mobilise housing finance from the public sector, the private sector and from international agencies;

(c) to give positive incentives to individuals and institutions to invest directly into housing or directly through an approved housing finance system;

(d) to develop mechanisms to assist vulnerable groups;

(e) to seek avenues for the creation of seed capital to assist private sector financial institutions involved with housing;

(f) to encourage individual home ownership; and

(g) to develop a secondary mortgage market.
To obviate and remove financial constraints and in order to realise the set of principles in this policy, the following measures will be taken:

(i) establish a financial mechanism for mobilising relatively cheap housing finance from a wide variety of agencies and capital markets for funding building societies or similar housing finance institutions and generally to be the centre of a co-ordinated specialised housing finance system;

(ii) encourage and support the establishment and funding of specialised housing finance institutions (building societies);

(iii) promote the establishment of savings co-operatives from household groups to create loan funds for home ownership;

(iv) direct or encourage statutory pension funds, commercial banks, insurance, houses and similar institutions through incentives to invest a percentage of their funds into housing development;

(v) direct employers and employees to subscribe prescribed amounts of money into a fund for housing development;

(vi) encourage all employers to channel their finance for staff housing loans through and for administration by specialised housing finance institutions like building societies;

(vii) provide appropriate bonds and guarantees as an incentive for housing finance institutions to lend for housing development to the lower income categories in less preferred areas;

(viii) establish a mechanism for regulating and supervising housing finance institutions to ensure adherence to laid down ratio requirements and security of members' funds;

(ix) review taxation on building materials and components with a view to bringing costs down; and

(x) review the system of fees, levies and duty between developers and mortgagees, on the one hand, and "first time home owners", on the other, with a view to minimising costs.
5.2 Land Delivery

The provisions of this section on land delivery will relate to the national policy on land, its tenure, distribution and infrastructure development. Priority will be to:

a) encourage the provision of adequately serviced land with secure tenure to all income groups, especially the poor and the vulnerable;

b) encourage the provision of serviced subdivisions for the development of housing estates for sale or rent;

c) encourage community effort in providing infrastructure facilities during upgrading programmes; and

d) encourage the preparation of township layouts that are functional and economical.

5.3 Home Ownership

Government strongly supports the principle of home ownership as a means of providing security, stability and economic power to the family unit and as a basis for the development of economically strong and motivated communities.

5.3.1 Rent Control

Investors in housing are strongly motivated by profit considerations. The development of rental housing may be stifled if it is not an economic proposition for entrepreneurs. Although the non-availability of rental housing may increase the demand for the development of housing for both owner-occupation and for rent, the net effect of rent control is to significantly slow down the rate of housing development.

Removal of rent control stimulates investment in housing. Rent control is not necessary in a free market economy.
5.3.2 Withdrawal of Tied Housing

Employers should not be obliged by law to provide housing to their employees. Notwithstanding the provisions of this clause, employers unable to provide their employees with accommodation or housing loans shall pay their employees an appropriate housing allowance.

Government will for the foreseeable future continue to provide employer housing for specific institutions, such as customs and immigration departments, hospitals, etc.

5.3.3 Site and Service

Given the high proportions of urban and rural population without adequate housing, support will be given to the principle of assembling and allocating land for making available site and services schemes. These schemes will include the provision of a minimum level of basic services like potable water, sanitation, drainage, street lighting, refuse disposal and community services appropriate in urban and rural areas.

5.3.4 Squatting and Settlement Upgrading

The principle of a discretionary approach to settlement upgrading is supported whereby settlement upgrading programmes adopt self-help and community participation approaches in the provision and maintenance of the infrastructure.

Communities will be encouraged to articulate their shelter needs through residents assemblies.

5.4 Building Standards and Bye-Laws

Building and construction standards will be revised so that they become functional and performance based rather than prescriptive. Their flexibility will reflect the affordable principle by all income groups.

To ensure that developers comply with minimum approved building standards, the principle of reinforcing building inspectorates in all local authorities will be supported through training and encouragement.
5.5 Local Building Materials

The development and use of local building materials for the manufacture of building components will be actively promoted. To this end the following measures will be taken:

a) encourage research in improving the quality of local materials presently in use so as to extend the projected life span of structures;

b) encourage the private sector to manufacture affordable building materials through tax incentives;

c) fund demonstration programmes aimed at popularising the use of local building materials;

d) encourage training programmes for the youth and the unemployed in the manufacture of local building materials;

e) encourage the setting up of small scale building manufacturing industries to serve local communities;

f) encourage the use of local materials on Government-funded construction programmes, and

g) prohibit the use of hazardous building materials.

5.6 Infrastructure Development

a) Government supports the principle that provision of infrastructure services, such as water, roads, street lights and sanitation, stimulates housing production by the public and private sectors;

b) Government will, for purpose of housing development, support the provision of infrastructure services operated on a sustainable basis with regard to both fixed investment, operation and maintenance. It shall be mandatory that all land within townships be provided with basic services prior to allocation; and

c) Government will create an enabling environment to enhance the provision of basic services in rural areas for housing development.
5.7 Rural Housing

Rural housing policy is aimed at improving living conditions in villages, agricultural schemes, commercial farming areas and rural centres.

Having regard to the distinguishing features of the rural landscape, the housing strategy will emphasise:-

a) skills development for upgrading house structures in villages;
b) provision of basic services like potable water, access roads and sanitation programmes;
c) demonstration housing programmes at village level to popularise the construction of durable but locally customised house structures; and
d) production of guidelines to commercial farmers for decent housing for their workers.

5.8 Impact on Building Industry

The building industry has played a vital role in the Zambian economy because of the large construction component in past development projects. The public and private-housing development programmes therefore will endeavour to ensure a steady stream of work to the private and popular sector.

The choice of technology in the construction of housing will be made on the basis of the following preference criteria:-

i) the use of locally manufactured or processed building materials, especially where their production process is high in labour content,

ii) building processes which encourage adoption of appropriate technologies and combine the use of semi-skilled and unskilled labour; and

iii) the use of mechanical plant and machinery where this is proved to provide a cheaper and efficient service without compromising job opportunities.
The award of contracts from the public sector will include small contractors with proven threshold levels of resources and technical skills necessary for the job at hand and with appropriate management and financial responsibility capacities.

5.9 Employment

Housing investment and its multiplier effect will make a significant contribution to the domestic economy particularly in the low income sector by:-

a) providing appropriate technology for low income housing which is labour intensive thereby creating employment for the unskilled, semi-skilled and the informal sector generally. With relatively low capital requirements low income housing will facilitate market participation by local small firms; and

b) providing housing investment linkages to other domestic industries in building materials, plant, electrical appliances and household furnishings thereby creating further employment opportunities.

5.10 Legislative Base

The legislative authority to enforce the goals and principles of the policy, and adopt housing development strategies and programmes, will involve changes to existing legislation. The following pieces of legislation will need to be reviewed and appropriate amendments made to facilitate the realisation of the goal of this policy:-

i) The National Housing Authority Act, Cap 426, gives the National Housing Authority, a body corporate and player in the delivery of housing, the sole responsibility for the management of the housing portfolio, including policy. There is a clear need to review this legislation for it to accord with the prevailing socio-economic structure which allows for competing actors in the supply of goods and services;

ii) The Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act, CAP 441. This Act provides for the control and improvement of housing in Statutory Housing Areas and in Improvement Areas. It also provides for the issuance of certificates of title and occupancy licences which give security of tenure. Major weaknesses to the legislation lie in its restrictions to individual and
private sector participation in housing schemes. In addition, this Act precludes other laws from applying to areas of its jurisdiction. Necessary amendments are required to bring the Act in line with market oriented housing delivery mechanisms.

iii) The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act, CAP 289 and subsequent amendments. This Act provides for administration and alienation of land. This piece of legislation requires immediate review for an efficient land administration system;


v) The Public Health Act providing for Building Regulations and standards; and


vii) The Land Survey Act (cadastre);

viii) The Land Acquisition Act (Compulsory Acquisition with Compensation or in the Public Interest);

ix) The Building Societies Act (Housing Finance);

x) The Employment Act (Tying housing to employment);

xi) The Rent Act (Rent Control); and

xii) The Rating Act.

Necessary reviews and amendments are needed to these pieces of legislation so that they may provide a conducive enabling legal environment for sustainable housing development.
5.11 Institutional Framework

Current institutional arrangements in the housing sector are fragmented, inconsistent and characterised by a lack of clearly defined roles and lines of accountability. Several administrative divisions of Government are responsible for housing. Parastatals, private developers and individuals also having prominent roles in the sector.

This policy aims at rationalising existing institutional arrangements and capacities in order to improve efficiency and ensure enhanced and sustainable housing delivery to cope with population needs and demands.

5.11.1 Ministry of Local Government and Housing

In order to provide the necessary institutional support for housing development, it is proposed that the housing portfolio receives the attention it deserves in the central government structure. For some time now the Ministry of Local Government and Housing has not paid due attention to housing in the country. The functions of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing will need to be reviewed to include the following:-

a) to determine, prepare, monitor and evaluate the performance of the national housing policy the national housing development strategy;

b) to facilitate a systematic and appropriate increase of the national apportionment of the State budget to housing;

c) to initiate the establishment of a funding framework for housing;

d) to be responsible for over-seeing and co-ordinating activities of national statutory and facilitating institutions (e.g. National Housing Authority, NGOs);

e) to monitor national, provincial and local performance of housing delivery;

f) to promote gender issues in shelter development; and

g) to account to Parliament for the performance of the housing sector against set targets and efficiency parameters.
5.11.2 **National Housing Authority**

The National Housing Authority (NHA) is a statutory body which was created by an Act of Parliament and has the mandate to advise Government on matters pertaining to housing. Currently, the National Housing Authority is the sole institution given power under the law to deal in housing matters, including housing policy. Obviously, there is need to amend the National Housing Authority Act to bring it in line with current reform thinking.

**Therefore,** the National Housing Authority will, among other functions, perform the following functions and roles:-

a) promote home ownership through provision of affordable shelter;

b) provide technical assistance to local authorities in the housing sector;

c) construct, manage and maintain housing estates; and

d) undertake research and development on low-cost housing.

5.11.3 **Local Authorities**

It is recognised that the process of physical planning and housing is very much a local government matter. The role of local authorities in enabling the provision of housing to all segments of the population in areas under their jurisdiction is of paramount importance. The following functions are envisaged to be performed by local authorities within the decentralised structure:-

a) to create capacity in order to provide the necessary services;

b) to set local housing delivery goals;

c) to create and allocating land for housing purposes;

d) to provide and maintain infrastructure services intended to open up land for housing development,
e) to enforce building standards;

f) to regulate land-use and control development;

g) to plan for development (physical planning) in areas under their jurisdiction for those councils with Planning Authority powers;

h) to set up and manage upgrading and site-and-service schemes;

i) to provide community and recreational facilities in residential areas;

j) to construct low-cost housing for sale and/or rent at economic rates; and

k) to allocate land.

5.11.4 Private Sector Developers

The role of the private sector in housing development will be as follows:-

a) to participate effectively in the construction of housing for all categories of the population either for sale or rent;

b) to participate effectively in the manufacturing and supply of building materials in the housing construction sector;

c) to participate effectively in infrastructure development for housing estates;

d) to positively encourage members of communities to improve their living environment through community participation in projects; and

e) to encourage joint ventures between the public and private sector, in housing development.
5.11.5 Financial Institutions

Given limited State resources, the mobilisation of private credit for housing purposes is a central aspect of Government approach to housing. Financial institutions will perform the following roles and functions:

a) establish mechanisms for the creation of seeding finance to assist private sector investors involved in housing;

b) provide mortgage finance for housing development and house purchase; and

c) develop a secondary mortgage market.

5.11.6 Community and Co-operative Housing Development

Community based and co-operative housing development have proved a viable option for delivery of cost-effective and affordable housing, while creating mixed income communities. Community based organisations should, therefore, perform the following roles and functions:

a) encourage community savings for housing needs of individual members;

b) help members acquire land for housing development;

c) acquire common land and prepare project design brief for members housing development;

d) establish proper book-keeping and accounting systems; and

e) encourage community participation in the development of neighbourhoods.

5.11.7 Local Planning Authorities

The role and functions of Planning Authorities are to ensure that land for housing is identified and planned for in good time and that appropriate planning standards are in place for a quick and efficient development of housing.
Shelter provision is a key sector in any economy and should therefore be viewed as an economic investment rather than being viewed solely as a social service. Any housing policy only serves to provide a planning mechanism for the establishment of housing development strategies that are appropriate to the prevailing socio-economic situation.

A good housing policy, therefore, is only as good as it is implementable. Thus, however noble the goals and objectives of the housing policy, it will remain an illusion as long as the necessary financial, institutional and human resources are not applied for its realisation.

It is imperative, therefore, that the political will which will be exercised to adopt this housing policy should be sustained so that the policy can be implemented.

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28