UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF SWANSEA

CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
AND
ITS ADVENT IN ZAMBIA

BY: DAVID MAMBWE KATEBE
(ZAMBIA)
1979-80.

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement of the course leading to the Postgraduate Diploma in Social Policy and Administration.

June, 1980
CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Page iii

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER I: THE EMERGENCE OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (WORKERS PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING) 2
   a) The background
   b) Extent of involvement of workers in decision-making
   c) Definition

CHAPTER II: PROBLEMS OF COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ZAMBIA'S INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 6

CHAPTER III: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTING INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 14

CHAPTER IV: THE GROWTH OF TRADE UNIONISM IN ZAMBIA 18

CHAPTER V: THE BACKGROUND OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA 34

CHAPTER VI: ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIAN INDUSTRIES 44
   1. Departmental Works Committees
   2. Works Councils

CHAPTER VII: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 61

APPENDICES 67

BIBLIOGRAPHY 80
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

In the preparation of this dissertation I am deeply indebted to many people whose guidance and criticism made my task much easier than it might otherwise have been.

In the first place securing a scholarship to study outside one's own country is not an easy matter. Even when this is achieved, problems of family commitments usually arise - as was the case with me. Hence I must thank my employers, The Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Limited, through the Director of Personnel, Mr. Joseph Chileshe, and at Division level, Messrs. F.I. Thomas, then General Manager of Rokana Division, B. Eastwood (his successor), A. Malama, Manager Administration, and W. M Chikwanda, the Personnel Manager, who granted me study leave with full benefits. In short, they undertook a heavy responsibility of looking after my family while I am away.

While on the sponsorship I would also like to thank the Zambian Government Civil Service Directorate for having accepted my nomination and keeping it for the British Technical Aid Scholarship for one year while necessary formalities were being completed.

Although any programme lasting months inevitably involves far too many people to permit individual thanks, several groups of principals deserve recognition. Impetus for the dissertation topic was set by Mr. Severn Njelesani (currently Training Office
at Chingola Division of N.C.C.M. Ltd.), and when I arrived at Swansea University my personal supervisor, Miss Angela Reidy took over very helpfully. It was further amazing how I was allowed to write a dissertation by the Centre for Development Studies Staff of Management, as an exceptional case! This placed on the other hand, a heavy responsibility on me to prove my worth; which I cannot claim to have fulfilled. However, I can only thank individual members of the staff like Professor Charles Elliott, Lecturers Jim Whetton, Dr. Marcos Palacios, N.S. Carey Jones, Dr. Suranjit Saha, Andrew Creese, David Marsden, Mike Shepperdson, Chris Barrow for their assistance.

Others who merit warm gratitude are Mrs. D.M. Slater, Administrative Secretary, who typed the dissertation and organised my research visits to "The Miners Library, Swansea University, and The National Coal Board at Cardiff. At the Miners Library, Mr. W.E. Jenkins and Mrs. K.N. Campbell gave me a lot of light on the thinking of unions on industrial democracy and exposed me to relevant literature respectively. And at Cardiff's National Coal Board, Messrs. Michael Meredith, the Public Relations Officer and Idris Davies, Area Manpower Officer, were most helpful on the attitude of management towards industrial democracy. This helped me to have a balanced view of the whole topic.

My acknowledgements would be incomplete if I did not thank The British Council, through their Area Representative at Swansea, Mrs. Jean Johns for the sponsorship and for making my stay in the United Kingdom worthwhile.
I would also like to acknowledge the benefits I got from the University of Swansea staff in general, and my fellow students during my interaction with them, either socially or through seminars and tutorials without themselves realising how much use they were being to me.

Finally, special thanks are extended to my family, particularly my wife Josephine, for tolerating my absence and at all times encouraging me to endure in my studies.

D.M.K.

Centre for Development Studies
University College of Swansea
Singleton Park
Swansea SA2 8PP
Wales, United Kingdom

June 1980
INTRODUCTION

Industrial democracy is admittedly complicated in definition just as it is complicated in implementation. In this paper I have attempted to examine the concept of industrial democracy as viewed by various authors, and how it has found its implementation in some countries before finally discussing its adoption in Zambia.

In so doing I have tried, in passing, to refer to few countries, such as Yugoslavia, Sweden, West Germany and Britain to create a trail for eventual focus on Zambia.

Conscious of the fact that the extent of industrial democracy implementation depends on the system of government of a particular country, its laws and social structure, I have included Appendix I (Zambia in perspective). This is intended to help those who are not very familiar with Zambia. This appendix is significant in appreciating Chapters IV, V and VI.

This paper covers three main areas, viz:

a) Conceptual nature of industrial democracy, its evolution in the developed countries, and its spill in the developing countries, e.g. Zambia;

b) Historical background of trade unionism in Zambia;

c) Actual establishment of industrial democracy in Zambia by consensus.

Industrial democracy and workers' participation have been used interchangeably. In an industrial setting the two concepts usually mean more or less the same thing.
CHAPTER I
THE EMERGENCE OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (WORKERS PARTICIPATION) IN DECISION MAKING

The Background

Soon after the Second World War many countries started searching their way towards more participation by workers in industry, and the extent of workers' participation and decision-making varies from country to country; (thus the introduction of the Yugoslavian self-management system by the 1950 Act, the West German system of Mitbestimmung and joint consultation bodies (Betriebsrat; Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 1952 and 1972); Labour Management consultations in Holland (Ondernemingsraad), Acts of 1950 and 1971); France (Comites d'entreprise, Acts of 1945 and 1966); Norway (Bedriftsutvalg, Acts of 1945 and 1973); and Sweden (Foretagsnamnder, negotiation agreements of 1946; 1958 and 1966), 1) and Works Councils of Zambia (Part VII of Industrial Relations Act No.36 of 1971, Statutory Instrument No. 76 of 1976). 2

Extent of Involvement of Workers in Decision-making

Variations in the involvement of workers in decision-making are usually denoted by bodies established in different countries, e.g. Works Councils in Zambia and Sweden, and Workers Councils in Yugoslavia.

While these terms appear to be different, they all mean workers' participation in decision-making or industrial democracy.


The Concept of Industrial Democracy

No generally accepted definition has yet been found for the concept of Industrial Democracy or Workers' Participation (as it is sometimes referred to) and this was admitted by the International Labour Organisation Committee of Experts in 1969. During the discussions the experts referred repeatedly to the law and practice of their respective countries and the problems arising within their particular national context. Finally, they had to recognise that there might be different ways and means equally effective to handle a given problem, depending on the historical evolution, the political structure, degree of economic and social development, values and general frame of labour relations in the country concerned. As such internationally agreed definition was usually not easy to find. However, there was agreement that 'participation of workers in decisions' within the undertaking was distinct from and therefore wider than the concept of "workers participation in management". But before that writers like H. Clegg had defined industrial democracy as a system of complete workers' management, administered by trade unions or by other forms of elected workers representatives. In so defining he believed that the key elements in any industrial democracy setting were the existence of a trade union strong enough to oppose management, and a management which accepts trade unionism as a loyal opposition. The trade unionism which is willing to compromise and come to terms with management in the interest of industrial harmony and unity. He summed up this by saying that:

"Industrial democracy consists in part, of the employer and in part, of the attempt of the employer to build his employees into a team working together towards a common purpose". 1

The definition of industrial democracy by Clegg was not generally accepted by many. For example, people like Paul Blumberg considered his argument of a trade union as an opposition to be both logically and empirically weak and in need of correction. Blumberg contended that Clegg's definition of democracy as being synonymous with the existence of organised opposition, and the analogy he made from politics to industry (political democracy to industrial democracy) do not stand. Clegg argued that in government the essence of democracy is organised opposition and that in industry the same was true; so that the existence of trade union opposition is sufficient to guarantee industrial democracy. 2

According to Blumberg democracy could not be exclusively defined in terms of opposition but could be appropriately defined as the accountability of leadership to an electorate which has the power to remove that leadership. 3

Differences of opinion between Clegg and Blumberg on the definition of democracy and its off-shoot industrial democracy just goes to confirm the difficulties inherent with discussing a concept which is gathering international examination and implementation in diverse political systems.

Reflecting on the current laws, ideology and social structure of Zambia, it could be observed that the International Labour Organisation definition of industrial democracy as workers' participation in decision-making, is most appropriate; and my next chapters will refer to industrial democracy in this context where not qualified.

** Other references:


CHAPTER II
PROBLEMS OF COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ZAMBIA'S INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

The study of the emergence of Zambia's industrial democracy and the direction it was taking would be better portrayed through comparison with other nations which have been making attempts towards making industrial democracy a reality. But "differences in political ideologies are likely to make it difficult".¹ For instance, Sweden which is a social democracy with a capitalist stance would be considered parallel with Zambia's socialist principles which determine the direction of industrial democracy. But even then there are bound to be many areas of divergence. Yugoslavia as the current model of industrial democracy, and workers involvement in decision-making (including self-management) in undertakings, and in a really noticeable form would also pose problems of comparison in a small document like this, because of its detailed and complex structure as compared to Zambia which realised industrial democracy recently.²

On the other hand, an association with the two countries during the struggle for independence and after has had some influence on our social and political system. For example, Zambia's talk of workers representation on the Boards of Directors during Labour Management Conference of 1972 in Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, appeared to coincide with "Sweden's experiment of having workers on the Boards of Directors in 1971 which was found unworkable and had to be dropped in 1976".³ Apparently up till

now Zambia has not implemented the resolution. In terms of Zambia’s association with other countries, Britain as a coloniser would stand out most prominently. But even then problems of comparative study would arise because of "the elusive nature and capitalistic tendencies of the British political system with its tentacles spreading into industrial democracy as well, as indicated by Clark and Clements."¹ In their criticism of British political democracy with reference to industrial democracy, Clark and Clements said that;

"the limitations of parliamentary democracy are scarcely surprising when it is realised that the whole edifice is permeated with what is in essence an elitist theory of democracy, which is grounded upon a profound distrust of the majority of the ordinary men and women, and reliance upon the established elites.....democracy is defined out of the existence of the active......involvement of people in political decision-making.....no active participation is expected or encouraged within the policies of the government". ²

And further elusive because of changing political ideologies according to the party in power. For instance, when the Labour Party is in power workers participation is usually annointed as Hugh Gaitskell showed when he said, "It may be said that nationalisation has not so far lived up to expectations in this matter (particularly in decision-making) precisely because too much power is left in the hands of the management and not enough given to the workers. Certainly most of us would like to see a greater degree of 'workers control' and there will be a general agreement on the desirability of creating a greater sense of partnership and participation. But the very hesitation and doubts


** For more details see next page.
which assail the Labour movement on 'workers control', at the moment, show how much more complicated this issue of 'power' is than at first sight appears". 1

Apparently the above quote could not be tested through implementation because the Labour Party was replaced by the Conservative Party in the late fifties and Ken Coates and Tony Topham had this to say:

"And when a Conservative Government was returned, practical negotiators treated the issue as academic in the face of Ministerial attacks". 2

However, even in Britain some strides are being made in some industries towards what might be considered as genuine involvement of workers in decision-making. A good example of this would be the intent to replace the experiment of "Workers Director" by "Business Policy Councils" with equal representation from top management and the unions in the Posts and Telecommunications services. According to Sir William Barlow, "The Policy Councils would have access to full accounting information and policy documents...aim is for Policy Council to become main vehicle for staff participation in board level policy and broad national issues than is feasible in the National Joint Council; which is


2. Ibid, Ken Coates and Tony Topham.


the summit of joint consultative and negotiating machinery at present. Policy planning and performance matters requiring board attention would be included. 1

This arrangement hatched by Sir William Barlow conflicts with Clegg's views as stated and criticised by Blumberg. According to Clegg:

"The trade union cannot...become the organ of industrial management; there would be no-one to oppose the management and no hope of democracy. Nor can the union enter into an unholy alliance for the joint management of industry, for its opposition functions would then become subordinate and finally stifled". 2

On the other hand, Blumberg would support Sir William Barlow and the trade unions concerned by quoting West Germany's experience in "codetermination in which labour representatives are accorded one half of the seats on the Supervisory Boards in the steel and coal industries and one third of the seats on the Supervisory Boards in most other German industries. In the steel and coal industries both the union federation and the appropriate industrial union (Metal Workers or Mine Workers Union) directly select many of the labour members of the Supervisory Boards, and Blumberg supports the above with the data collected in 1950 from 35 mining and 12 enterprises which revealed that 63 or the 252 labour representatives on the supervisory boards were union functionaries from coal, industrial unions, and the federation. Further, 105 were plant workers, of which 99 were representatives of the

plants works council, a workers' defence organisation with collective bargaining functions. And in summing up he observed that codetermination has not weakened trade union independence and industrial democracy among the German unions as a whole; and Clegg concedes that "There is certainly no evidence that codetermination has weakened the metal workers and mine workers' unions in comparison with other unions in the Deutsche Gewenkschaftsbund. On the contrary, they are two of the strongest links in its armour".

Seen in a multi-party system of governments, Sweden had a more constant dominance of government by the Socialist Democratic Party for some time than Britain's Labour Party. And this gave her a near resemblance of the one party system of government prevailing in Zambia. The dominance of the Social Democratic Party in the Swedish politics for over 40 years (The conservatives are currently in power) as compared to the more intermittent Labour Party in Britain could be evidenced by the table below.

---


2. Paul Blumberg. Ibid. p. 141
Table 2:1 Dominance of Socialist Democratic Party in Sweden up till 1970 (Multi-Party System in Transition).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type of Election (a)</th>
<th>Electoral Participation</th>
<th>Cons+ Cent+ Libs</th>
<th>Cons+ Libs</th>
<th>Social-Democs</th>
<th>Communists</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: Cons = Conservatives; Libs = Liberals; Cent = Central Democratic Party

The Dryden Press. 1972 (p. 117)


N.B. Social Democratic Party dominance as a ruling Party started in 1932 and strong alignment exists between Labour organisation and the S.D. Party. Ibid, Hancock, pp. 154.
The dominance of the Social Democratic Party in Sweden as shown in the table could greatly be attributed to its alliance and popular support it commanded among the working mass because of its policies towards them as Donald Hancock wrote:

"Given the majority status of the Social Democratic Party in Riksdag (Parliament) and their long-term control of cabinet office, the Labour Organisation (LO) was able to utilise its extensive horizontal and vertical links with socialists to play an active part in formulating government economic and social policies. Important instances of Labour Organisation - Social Democratic policy collaboration include the supplementary pension programme of 1968". 1

In the light of the above, harmonious relationships between the labour movement and the ruling party, it was most likely that the process of industrial democracy and its direction in Sweden would not be so obscure to the parties concerned.

In spite of differences in ideologies from country to country, Zambia's industrial democracy which is still in its infancy and therefore undergoing adaptation to local social, economic and political exigencies, is a product of our leadership's interaction with other nationals in various countries as well as through international bodies such as the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations special agencies. Even then the reality is that Zambia's democracy in general and in many aspects is a brain child of the British model. It was only recently, and of course after independence, that socialism under the one party system of government proved more in line with our socio-political cultural and economic heritage. This heritage was found in the village headmen and chiefs who were guided by councils of elders.

1. Ibid, Hancock, M. Donald. pp. 154-155.
and production was on a co-operative basis, with land owned in trust by the village headman or the chief for the people.

However, still more fundamental institutions such as parliament and justice have not been radically changed to date.
CHAPTER III
INTEREST GROUPS AND THE PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTING INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

Industrial democracy or workers' participation in decision-making is a relatively new concept although it has already gained widespread support from many diverse organisations of industrialists, politicians and trade unionists in many countries as mentioned above. There is a lot of agreement among the conflicting parties about the necessity of industrial democracy just as there is, quite often, conflict on the nature of the case. This is usually reflected in the disagreement over the most suitable method by which to arrive at the goal of industrial democracy. The Zambian controversial 2-to-1 ratio of representation on the works councils (to be discussed later) in favour of workers would be a good example. 1

Under the heading of confusion and controversy, Kenneth F. Walker (quoted in part) said that "confusion arising from a variety of concepts of workers participation in management is reinforced by the wide range of institutions set up throughout the world to give effect to the basic idea that workers should have some influence on the decisions taken within the enterprise where they work. The perennial interest in workers' participation in management indicates that it concerns fundamental problem of

---
industrial organisation, which has been the subject of legislation in many countries, and of voluntary arrangements in others. In addition, the International Labour Organisation has adopted a number of international instruments expressing the desirability of consultation and co-operation between employers and workers within the undertakings..., and the need for effective internal communications and examination of workers' grievances; (and most important), the variety of concepts and practices throughout the world reflect great divergence of opinion, which extends across national and political boundaries, and finds both managers and workers divided within their own ranks.1

It is necessary at this point to refer to factors which entwine the labour movements with the political parties towards the recognition of workers' participation in decision-making. In the first place it must be appreciated that political systems have greater influence in determining the form of industrial democracy to exist in a country, because of indivisible nature of democracy. Democracy in its pursuit of freedom and equality entails looking at society as a whole. Life cannot be divided up into separate compartments. When people talk politics or trade unionism (industrial democracy, or workers' participation in decision-making, consultation, negotiations, etc.) it is always with reference to earnings (in terms of income tax, increments), social status, education and cultural life in general; in short, industrial democracy which encompasses social and economic justice cannot be obtained solely by the labour

movement action in any existing order without co-operating with other social institutions; and according to Richard J. Szal:

"the success of participation is critically dependent on the backing governments are willing to give it in the form of legal sanction or enforcement, political tolerance or encouragement and financial resources". 1

It is not therefore surprising that most trade union movements' constitutions have clauses such as "the union will co-operate with institutions which are turned towards the development of society based on political, social and economic democracy", 2 e.g. Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, Labour Organisation of Sweden (Confederation of Labour) etc. *

In other words, political and trade union activities must be based on the recognition of democracy, as one and indivisible; and it is in this light that political and trade union leadership should appreciate their interdependency. Because survival of authoritarian attitude or behaviour in any area would be an obstacle to any further progress towards democracy elsewhere. It therefore follows that laying down of objectives for either socio-economic or cultural democracy without reference to political and labour activities would be baseless. Thus, it is always essential that if reforms are to be made they are made in all areas where existing state of affairs stands in the way of progress towards economic and political equality. Briefly, it is impossible to think of an industrial democracy which is divorced from the rest of democratic pursuit. 3


Through co-operation with other institutions, trade unions have established some defences against the exercise of arbitrary power by some employers, but in the main workers are still in a position of political or economic subjection in many countries. They are exploited and deprived, including the restriction of their intellectual and social development. This is usually evidenced by the limitations to workers involvement or representation of their interests in industries in which they work. And quite often even the political support the workers appear to be receiving is aimed at controlling rather than supporting their activities. However, without government support the concept of industrial democracy tends to show that there is still unreal assumptions behind the idea, in that it tackles nothing of an independent objective for the working class. The power of management and the profit maximisation for which it is committed is usually under-estimated; workers still continue to show signs of a subject people when in contact with the employer either as a result of sheer fear or ignorance of their rights in the new proclaimed era of industrial democracy. This again just goes to emphasize the need for workers' education. For example, even in the Zambian Mining Industry where managements are co-operative through departmental works committees, disciplinary and appeals procedures, works councils, etc. most employees' representatives exhibit timidity which usually impairs their effectiveness.

Despite the above mentioned misconceptions and problems debates on industrial democracy have gathered momentum in many countries in recent years, and demands for greater democratisation of working life have become progressively a necessity, and the degree of influence being exerted on collective decisions is growing reward all the time.
CHAPTER IV

THE GROWTH OF TRADE UNIONISM IN ZAMBIA

As works councils are generally associated with trade unionism in many countries and Zambia being not an exception, it is pertinent that a reflection is made on the advent of trade unionism and its bearing on the industrial democracy, and in the final analysis on the works councils themselves in the country.

Trade unionism in Zambia came about as a result of industrialization, mainly on the Copper-belt where the Copper Mining Industry gave rise to other industries.

The first union to be formed in the country and in the Mining Industry in particular, in 1936, was solely for Europeans, and it was an extension of the South African Mine Workers' Union. "This was as a result of the visit paid to the Copper-belt by Mr. Charles Harris of the South African Mine Workers' Union who felt that African workers had already trespassed into skilled labour (European) jobs. Supported by the Railway Workers' Union (also a European union), a branch of the South African Mine Workers' Union was established on the Copper-belt. The aim for the extension of the South African Union into what was then known as Northern Rhodesia was to turn it into a White Workers country by the use of a closed shop". 1


For more information on the "closed shop" see Industrial Relations Act, Parts I and II, sections 4 and 5, of the Laws of Zambia.
The branch of the South African Mine Workers' Union became the autonomous Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union without change of objectives in 1937 when it was also recognised by the Mining Companies.

While Europeans were activating themselves in trade unionism the African worker whose average wage was £1.3.0. per month as compared to the £40.0.0 of the lowest paid European, lacked proper means of having his voice heard in regard to his grievances, save for an unacceptable representation as follows:

"As early as 1930 the link between African workers and management (familiarly known in those days as African Personnel Managers or Compound Managers) was through "Kapasus" (Mine Police) who were later nicknamed as "Kanyangus" (lentils, because of their connection with feeding stores where lentils were given to African workers as part of their ration in lieu of part of their wages), in order to distinguish them from the Native Authorities, "Kapasus".

To supplement the above representation elders were nominated by the mine management to represent the African workers according to their tribes. The whole system of tribal nominee and the Mine Police representation (an extension of Lord Luggard's indirect rule which prevailed in the rural area, into the Mining industry), was completely unacceptable to the Africans of the new industrial enclave of Northern Rhodesia. The remoteness of this kind of representation to the aspirations of the African worker was evidenced during the 1935 series of strikes at Mfulira, Nkana,


and Roan which was a culmination of poor housing, physical ill-treatment by European supervisors, and an increase in tax on industrial workers in general. During these strikes a riot broke out at Roan which resulted in the killing of six Africans and the wounding of 23 by the army and police. 1

"From 1935 to 1939 African interests were looked after by the Native Industrial Labour Advisory Board until 1940 when a Labour Department was constituted". 2

According to Rasmussen in the same Politics in Zambia, at the Mine level industrial, social and family problems were dealt with by a committee of tribal elders under the general surveillance of the Compound Managers in line with the government's efforts to govern through the tribal control, as aforesaid; though unacceptable to the African workers. The government management sponsored system of representation existed only in name in as far as the African workers were concerned; instead they knew where they belonged as a work force. Unfortunately, the Mine managements had under-rated the strong forces (work environment and aspirations) which tend to unite workers in order to achieve their common needs, i.e. good conditions of service, better wages, welfare etc. Like other workers in other parts of the world, and of course the European workers who were just under their noses in the same mining industry, the African miners had discovered their new identity as workers; tribal affinity under which management


exercised surveillance had lost its immediate meaning and importance to them, and this was demonstrated in the strikes. The following statement by Rasmussen confirms this view:

"During the strikes African miners expressed several grievances...basic wage rates...inferior housing and food rations, and inadequate fringe benefits and poor working conditions. Their refusal to go to work and violence was the first expression of African political consciousness". 1.

The 1940 European strike which won them an increase in wages induced Africans to demand more pay too, "i.e. 5/- to 10/- per day", 2 and to demonstrate that they were worth the proposed increase they offered to produce more ore in a shift than a gang of Europeans working on a comparable face for which the companies offered them a flat 7% temporary cost of living bonus (an average of 2/6 per month). This offer was rejected and on 3rd April 1940 a riot broke out at Nkana which resulted in the army killing 17 and wounding 69 Africans". 3

The Foster Commission which was later appointed awarded 2/6 per month increase, free protective clothing, overtime rates and better housing for married workers. Later again, in 1946, soon after the second world war, the European Mine Workers Union won an agreement which effectively established a colour bar in the Copper Mining Industry. 4

It is important to note that while African Miners were consolidating their solidarity the commercial sector of the Copper

2. Ibid, C. Elliott, Constraints on the Economy of Zambia, p.64.
3. Ibid, C. Elliott, Constraints on the Economy of Zambia
4. Ibid, C. Elliott, Constraints on the Economy of Zambia
Belt urban area (shops and stores) was also expanding and giving rise to another kind of African labour force of shop assistants and tailors. This labour force of shop assistants and tailors was the first to form a workers' committee at Kitwe in 1943; and similar organisations were later set up at Mufulira, Ndola, Luanshiya and Chingola, which united in 1947 to form the first African union in the country known as the Northern Rhodesia Shop Assistants Trade Union.

As a result of the serious incidents which were becoming a commonplace in the Mining Industry, the "British Government got concerned and had to appoint Mr. William Comrie, a British trade union expert, as Labour Officer on the Copper Belt in 1947 to implement government policy on African trade unions".¹ Thus in 1948 small unions were set up on different mines which united in 1949 to form the Northern Rhodesia African Mine Workers' Union under the leadership of Mr. Lawrence Katilungu, which has turned out to be the strongest and largest single union in the country.²

Table 4.1 Statistical growth of mine workers union of Zambia (formerly known as N.R.African Mine Workers' Union) during the period 1966-1976.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of Data:

ii. Constraints on Zambia's Economy. C. Elliott 1971, p. 71
iii. Annual Report, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 1979 (Personnel and Industrial Relations Section)

1. Ibid. William Tordoff, 1974.

The early fifties saw the springing up of many African trade unions in Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia), e.g. General Workers Trade Union, Local Authority Workers Union, Commercial and Shop Assistant Workers Union (an amalgamation of Commercial and Shop Assistant workers unions, referred to earlier).

For the sake of pending examination of industrial democracy, particularly in the Mining Industry, I will confine myself to the growth of the Mine Workers Union of Zambia with special reference to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions which also went through an evolution characterised by leadership struggles and administrative ills as Gupta noted:

"For some time the Trade Union Congress leadership had been split into several factions due to mismanagement of the little finances which continued to flow from 'unions other than the African Mine Workers Union". 1.

The African Mine Workers Union could not contribute to the Trade Union Congress because of the leadership struggle which existed between Mr. Lawrence Katilungu and other leaders such as Messrs. J. Chivunga, J. Chimba, Kalyati, to mention a few, which culminated into splits and formation of 'counter trade union congresses.

In the circumstances it was just impossible for the Trade Union Congress to operate without outside assistance - hence as Gupta further said:

"The finances of the Trade Union Congress were so mismanaged that in 1965 the government had to extend a grant of £5,614.00 to wind up its business, so that the new constituted Zambia Congress of Trade Unions could begin functioning with a new slate". 2

2. Ibid. William Tordoff.
After a government grant an interim executive was appointed by the UNIP Government pending an election which took place later with Messrs. Jonathan Chivunga and Wilson Chakulya elected as President and General Secretary respectively. All the registered unions, including the Mine Workers' Union of Zambia, had to be affiliated and to contribute a fraction of their members' contributions to the new Zambia Congress of Trade Unions as a requirement by law.

Although the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions could literally be taken to have been sponsored by the Government through financial support it was initially given, it should be realised that it operates independently within the law of the land. This independence is usually seen through the differences that sometimes emerge between the Z.T.U.C. and the Government. For example, the recent differences on the implementation of the minimum wages recommendation of the 1975 Turner Report. The (Z.T.U.C.) thought that the report's recommendations have already been overtaken by new inflationary trends to be implemented in their original form. They argued with the Government for a total review of the report. Faced with economic constraints as a result of political tension in some countries surrounding Zambia, unpredictable copper prices on the world market, and its rural development policy, the government found it difficult to reconcile with the Congress. The feeling of the government was that "only a fraction of the population would benefit from the rise in wages while the rural population of about 70% would continue to lag behind; and further transferred the onus on the Congress by saying that productivity should first of all be seen to improve and give

*United National Independence Party
rise to more investment in the rural areas or agriculture before talk of increase in wages could be considered possible in the industrial sector above 5% of present rates. ¹

This government suggestion was not acceptable to the trade unions through the Congress and discussions had to continue.

This last part has been inserted deliberately in order to show how unionised works council members could find themselves at variance with management and government thinking in their representation if their objective is strictly rank and file oriented. Because on productivity the government is obviously supported by the employers. However, like in union management relations the unions through the Trade Union Congress on one hand and the Government on the other have agreed to disagree sometimes. Thus in a preamble to the Industrial Relations Act, President Kaunda accepted existence of differences in society when he said:

"Please do not misunderstand me. This is not intended as an invitation to ignore all differences and pretend that the interests of all groups are in perfect harmony. Such a state of affairs would be Utopia. It cannot be attained; and indeed there is no reason why it should be attained." ²

To come back to the main issue, in 1952 the African Mine Workers' Union went on the longest strike the country had ever experienced. This strike was followed by an even much longer


strike of 1955 which was not as successful as the first one due to certain factors; the prominent one being political.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was just two years old since it was imposed and African resistance to it was very well known. Therefore any form of pressure from African organisations, trade unions included, was viewed with suspicion as supporting African National Congress in its campaign against the Federation at that time. In fact, in 1954 the General Workers Trade Union had staged a strike for one month over a demand for a general increase of "2/- per day" for all its members in the building industry. This strike was successfully thwarted by the Master Builders' Association who were master minded by their General Secretary, Mr. Wenchester Gould, who was one of the strongest supporters of the Federal Party in Ndola. The strike was a disaster to the workers; many were discharged and later re-engaged with loss of service and seniority. Like the building industry, the mines had their own Wenchester Goulds, and the African Mine Workers Union's 1955 strike met the same fate. African miners were sacked and paid off, and then re-engaged with loss of service; and worse still, some individuals were singled out as ring leaders who could not be re-engaged. This was a period of great test for the union leadership. The workers were very demoralised and were even reluctant to pay their union monthly subscriptions. This affected the membership and financial position of the African Mine Workers Union, and the Bringan Commission had this to say:

1. My own association with the General Workers Trade Union as Secretary of Mufulira Branch.
"the internal organisation of African Mine Workers Union had seriously deteriorated since 1955 and that its finances were in a bad state". 1

But because of Mr. Lawrence Katibungu's charismatic and dynamic leadership and the respect he commanded amongst the many European General Managers on various mines negotiations with the Mining Companies opened and even some of those union leaders who were termed as ring leaders were re-engaged, and the union started to tick again with the chorus of African Advancement. The African Advancement demand was accepted in principle by the Mining Companies but rejected by the European Mine Workers Union until 1959 due to Sir Frederick Legget's recommendations.

Sir Frederick's recommendations included formation of "The Joint Industrial Council" in order to improve labour relations between the Copper Mining Companies and the European Union, and later the African Union. He evolved what is now known as "The Legget Plan" for the settling of disputes. 2

Although the main reason for creating the Joint Industrial Council was African Advancement and was aimed at the creation of a more congenial forum of discussion with the European Union it also served as a forum of discussion with African Mine Workers Union and in the same "panel" manner.


2. From: African Advancement proposals (in the sphere of the N. Rhodesia Mine Workers Union) evolved by the Mining Joint Industrial Council and presented for consideration by members of the N. Rhodesia Mine Workers Union (European) Issued on 4th October 1960, by the N. Rhodesia Mine Workers Union.
African Advancement, which the African Mine Workers Union pursued, achieved some measure in some job categories which were previously, and by the standard of racial distance, in the European domain. With this achievement came the division of the African workers into classes, e.g. Boss Boys (as supervisors were abusively called), gangers, clerks, Mine Police Inspectors, etc. The new development resulted in companies introducing monthly rates to clerks, Boss Boys and gangers. This action automatically excluded such people from membership of the African Mine Workers Union which, by agreement, was only representing daily paid workers (or ticket to ticket workers, as they were sometimes referred to); and further caused the union to lose educated nucleus for future leadership, as most of the educated Africans were found in the new job categories.

In the second attempt to weaken the African Union Management encouraged the new set of African working class to form its own associations or unions. Hence the advent of MASA (Mine African Staff Association), MAPA (Mine African Police Association), which gave rise to the conflicts between the African Mine Workers Union members and those of the new associations.

Distribution of jobs under African Advancement agreement is given in Table 4:2:

---

   In this report it was mentioned that Mr. Harry Nkumbula complained against Mining Companies' tactics of weakening the African Union.
Table 4:2. Distribution of Jobs under African Advancement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Mine Workers Union</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine African Staff Association</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine African Police Association</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total jobs</strong></td>
<td><strong>75</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In order to frustrate the growth of the new associations, the African Mine Workers Union embarked on a smear campaign of discrediting all those who joined them by calling them unpopular and ridiculing names such as "Bamakobo" (a name of an unpopular fish with a wide mouth), and that such people had accepted new jobs by printing their buttocks instead of normal finger printing. When these stories reached home villages of individuals concerned they were a source of embarrassment to the relatives. These conflicts went on until after independence when "one union one industry" government policy was legislated for, with the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions as the sole highest institution in the trade union movement to which all the unions had to affiliate.

This evolutionary era of many unions in an industry until legislated against could be likened to "that of West Germany before 1933 when many unions were organised on political and religious basis until 1949 when a unified Trade Union Federation (D.G.B., Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) was founded and 'one plant one union' principle came into force".  

More problems to the African union came in 1956 when on 11th September a state of emergency was declared on the Copper Belt and senior union officials such as Messrs. Matthew Nkoloma, (General Secretary of the Union), Chapoloko, Mwendapole, Chindele, etc., were rounded up and detained. The timing of the arrest of the General Secretary of the Union with many other members of the Supreme Council during the absence of the Union President, Mr. Lawrence Katilungu who was outside the country, cast a lot of suspicion on the latter's relations with the Mine Management and the Government. However, the suspicion was forestalled by Mr. Katilungu's quick return and his agitation for the release of his fellow leaders.

After independence and with the dissolution of the European Union, which changed its name to Mine Workers Society before it finally went into oblivion, the African Mine Workers Union (now Mine Workers Union of Zambia) started to enjoy the unchallenged recognition from both management and the government. This new strong position of the union was reinforced by the check-off system and the introduction of "one industry one union" principle as already stated, which drove a death nail into MASA and MAPA, and their members were absorbed into MUZ.

However, this was not the end of the union's rough evolutionary history towards establishing effective communication with the mining companies and the government. The introduction of the National Provident Fund for all the workers in the country by the government also came into being with its own problems for the Mine Workers Union of Zambia, as it came to be known.
Towards the end of 1966 there was a complete breakdown in communication between the government and the union in the mining industry on the other hand, and between union leadership and the rank and file on the other. Early during the year the government announced its intention to introduce the National Provident Fund (which could be likened to the common National Superannuation Fund), which caused a lot of concern among the leaders of the union who thought that the amounts standing to the credit of their members in the Companies' Contributory Pension Fund (ZAMIDO) would be transferred to the proposed fund, and the members would not be able to withdraw when they retired, but would wait until they reached the age of 55 years.

This fear on the part of the union leadership and later their members, was attributed to their historical experience of how many African miners, particularly old timers (some of them were still in employment) lost their money in RAAPCO (Rhodesia African Assurance and Provident Corporation Limited) in the late fifties. The top leadership of the union at that time, was heavily associated with RAAPCO as Directors, i.e. Messrs. Lawrence Katilungu and Matthew D. Nkoloma, and they played a major role in encouraging the miners, through public meetings, to take up life assurance and endowment policies with the new company. Because the miners trusted their leaders and the man who hatched the idea Mr. William Comrie (adviser in the formation of African Unions referred to in the previous chapters) the response was tremendous. Mr. Comrie, aware of how unfamiliar Northern Rhodesian Africans were with insurance and their surrender values advised the Board

1. Ibid, Tordoff, pp. 303 and 304.
of Directors under the Chairmanship of Captain A.A. Smith (a prominent businessman in Kitwe at that time) to be flexible in the application of surrender values, depending on individual cases rather than according to international insurance approach.

After about three years the Assurance Company proved a success, particularly in the area of endowment policies and savings accounts. Influenced by the boom the Board of Directors decided to seek affiliation to more established insurance companies in South Africa in anticipation of heavy payments in life covers in the event of death or maturity of policies after ten years of RAAPCO's formation. That is, taking into consideration that the minimum contributory period on endowment policies was ten years. In this regard the Provident Corporation of South Africa proved to be a good bet. Incidentally, the Provident Corporation of South Africa were not prepared to allow affiliation unless management and administration of RAAPCO was vested in their hands as experts in insurances. This condition was accepted. But the new administration under Mr. Chapman, found flexibility on endowment and life policies incompatible with normal insurance companies practice, and within a few months many non-fully paid up policies were declared lapsed and subjected to surrender values, most of which were 'nil' payments. The new development caused a lot of embarrassment to the two African union leaders, the Supreme Council which approved their membership on the Board of Directors, and of course to Mr. W. Comrie as well. Later, when resigning as Director, Mr. Comrie confessed that if he knew that the venture would plunge the African miner into hardships he would not have sought outside expertise at such an early stage before educating the African about the risks involved in taking up
insurance policies. 1

Hence the idea of the National Provident Fund was resisted with good reasons which could not be communicated to the government who should have clarified its position if proper means of communication existed at that time.

Reasons like this and many others could only be communicated where forums of discussion were created. Thus in 1967 everybody was concerned about the causes of the spate of strikes on the mines and the Brown Commission of Enquiry had to be appointed. 2 One of the issues which came to the notice of the Commissioners and which courted their recommendation was communication.

The Brown Commission "was followed by two National Conferences attended by representatives of unions, and the employers (including Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and Zambia Federation of Employers) which were held at Kitwe and Livingstone in January and April of 1967 respectively". 3

These conferences and the second national convention which was again held at Kitwe in 1969 could rightly be considered as the watershed of industrial democracy in Zambia as will be seen later.

1. My own experience as RAAPCO Agent/Inspector (1955-57) and as a Trade Unionist 1954-55 (General Workers Trade Union Branch Secretary, Mufulira).


More problems to the African union came in 1956 when on 11th September a state of emergency was declared on the Copper Belt and senior union officials such as Messrs. Matthew Nkoloma, (General Secretary of the Union), Chapoloko, Mwendapole, Chindele, etc., were rounded up and detained. The timing of the arrest of the General Secretary of the Union with many other members of the Supreme Council during the absence of the Union President, Mr. Lawrence Katilungu who was outside the country, cast a lot of suspicion on the latter's relations with the Mine Management and the Government. However, the suspicion was forestalled by Mr. Katilungu's quick return and his agitation for the release of his fellow leaders.

After independence and with the dissolution of the European Union, which changed its name to Mine Workers Society before it finally went into oblivion, the African Mine Workers Union (now Mine Workers Union of Zambia) started to enjoy the unchallenged recognition from both management and the government. This new strong position of the union was reinforced by the check-off system and the introduction of "one industry one union" principle as already stated, which drove a death nail into MASA and MAPA, and their members were absorbed into MUZ.

However, this was not the end of the union's rough evolutionary history towards establishing effective communication with the mining companies and the government. The introduction of the National Provident Fund for all the workers in the country by the government also came into being with its own problems for the Mine Workers Union of Zambia, as it came to be known.
Towards the end of 1966 there was a complete breakdown in communication between the government and the union in the mining industry on the other hand, and between union leadership and the rank and file on the other. Early during the year the government announced its intention to introduce the National Provident Fund (which could be likened to the common National Superannuation Fund), which caused a lot of concern among the leaders of the union who thought that the amounts standing to the credit of their members in the Companies' Contributory Pension Fund (ZAMILDO) would be transferred to the proposed fund, and the members would not be able to withdraw when they retired, but would wait until they reached the age of 55 years.

This fear on the part of the union leadership and later their members, was attributed to their historical experience of how many African miners, particularly old timers (some of them were still in employment) lost their money in RAAPCO (Rhodesia African Assurance and Provident Corporation Limited) in the late fifties. The top leadership of the union at that time, was heavily associated with RAAPCO as Directors, i.e. Messrs. Lawrence Katilungu and Matthew D. Nkoloma, and they played a major role in encouraging the miners, through public meetings, to take up life assurance and endowment policies with the new company. Because the miners trusted their leaders and the man who hatched the idea Mr. William Comrie (adviser in the formation of African Unions referred to in the previous chapters) the response was tremendous. Mr. Comrie, aware of how unfamiliar Northern Rhodesian Africans were with insurance and their surrender values advised the Board

---

1. Ibid, Tordoff, pp. 303 and 304.
of Directors under the Chairmanship of Captain A.A. Smith (a prominent businessman in Kitwe at that time) to be flexible in the application of surrender values, depending on individual cases rather than according to international insurance approach.

After about three years the Assurance Company proved a success, particularly in the area of endowment policies and savings accounts. Influenced by the boom the Board of Directors decided to seek affiliation to more established insurance companies in South Africa in anticipation of heavy payments in life covers in the event of death or maturity of policies after ten years of RAAPCO's formation. That is, taking into consideration that the minimum contributory period on endowment policies was ten years. In this regard the Provident Corporation of South Africa proved to be a good bet. Incidentally, the Provident Corporation of South Africa were not prepared to allow affiliation unless management and administration of RAAPCO was vested in their hands as experts in insurances. This condition was accepted. But the new administration under Mr. Chapman, found flexibility on endowment and life policies incompatible with normal insurance companies practice, and within a few months many non-fully paid up policies were declared lapsed and subjected to surrender values, most of which were 'nil' payments. The new development caused a lot of embarrassment to the two African union leaders, the Supreme Council which approved their membership on the Board of Directors, and of course to Mr. W. Comrie as well. Later, when resigning as Director, Mr. Comrie confessed that if he knew that the venture would plunge the African miner into hardships he would not have sought outside expertise at such an early stage before educating the African about the risks involved in taking up
insurance policies.¹

Hence the idea of the National Provident Fund was resisted with good reasons which could not be communicated to the government who should have clarified its position if proper means of communication existed at that time.

Reasons like this and many others could only be communicated where forums of discussion were created. Thus in 1967 everybody was concerned about the causes of the spate of strikes on the mines and the Brown Commission of Enquiry had to be appointed.² One of the issues which came to the notice of the Commissioners and which courted their recommendation was communication.

The Brown Commission "was followed by two National Conferences attended by representatives of unions, and the employers (including the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and Zambia Federation of Employers), which were held at Kitwe and Livingstone in January and April of 1967 respectively".³

These conferences and the second national convention which was again held at Kitwe in 1969 could rightly be considered as the watershed of industrial democracy in Zambia as will be seen later.

1. My own experience as RAAPCO Agent/Inspector (1955-57) and as a Trade Unionist 1954-55 (General Workers Trade Union Branch Secretary, Mufulira).


CHAPTER V

THE BACKGROUND OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA

It should be admitted here that industrial democracy as such, in Zambia, is a new concept with its trace from the time of independence, in a recognisable sense. This is so because of the type of socio-economic and political system which existed during the colonial era. Labour was split into racial groupings, i.e. Black and White, with Indians and Coloureds occupying the middle class strata. In this racial classification whites were considered superior to any other race, while the blacks were at the bottom, and treatment both in associations and involvement or participation on consultative basis was classified accordingly as the following indicates:

"In principle, joint consultation can be a considerable factor in increasing productivity by creating mutual confidence, ironing out grievances of employees and enabling management to put over its views to them, but evidence of practical experience considers the average African worker not yet sufficiently developed to understand properly the functions of joint consultation, because he has a complete lack of sense of responsibility. In both the Rhodesias efforts to establish a system of joint consultation have frequently failed despite the highest intentions of management and the efforts of Labour Departments, owing to lack of understanding and trust, and ignorance, on the part of the workers, and lack of patience on the part of the employers". 1

The above feeling of the Authorities of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland just confirms the prejudices based on

1. African Labour Survey, "Extract from Human Factors of Production in Africa", 1956. For more details on Africans who were generally considered in this light see: "The colour of class on the Copper Mines, Burawoy, 1972, p.37."
racial bias, particularly when efforts made by African workers of the Copper Mines to have their voices heard as early as the late thirties were answered with bullets at Mufulira and Kitwe's Rokana Mine. In fact, at the time (1956) when statements of this kind were being made great strides had already been made in the organisation of the African Mine Workers' Union which the employers vigorously tried to destroy by rendering support to induced splinter groups of enlightened Africans who formed organisations such as MASA and MAPA. If anything, one can only agree with the "distrust" African workers had for the employers and their intentions.

Educating workers in consultations and grievance procedures like it was done in many countries and later after independence in Zambia, would have been the answer.

The real industrial democracy in Zambia found its implement-
ation through the departmental works committees and works councils and the formation of works councils in particular could be attributed to the concern many interested parties had for consultation and effective communication between the workers and the employers in the industrial and commercial sectors, governmental and parastatal organisations included.

On the attainment of independence the main concern of the government was peace and stability in all the productive sectors in order to ensure accelerated development. The agitation for Zambianisation in the Mining Industry was just a reminding knock to the new government, while sporadic strikes of 1966 were

1. N.B. See appendix for geo-economic and socio-political features of Zambia which influence government policies.
an embarrassment. Hence measures were needed to harness the situation.

In response to the miners demands for higher wages and Zambianisation the Brown Commission (referred to in the previous chapter) was appointed in 1966¹ to look into the dual wage structure in the Mining Industry. The concern was expressed in the following terms:

"Different scales of pay for expatriates and African workers for similar jobs...introduced by the mining companies in 1964 ran counter to the way of thinking about wages shared by Africans and Europeans. It did so at the very point of racial division...thus became a focus for dissatisfaction amongst African workers at a time when cooperation with management was essential if the industry was to be successfully organised to meet the needs of an independent Zambia". ²

Among the issues which came to the attention of the Brown Commission was communication between the government, trade unions and employers. Thus in January 1967 a National Convention, which many considered to be the beginning of communication and participation in the Zambian society by people from all walks of life was held in Kitwe. The sources of delegation to the Convention was indicative of this thinking, as the chairman of the same Convention said:

"Zambia's first ever National Convention, attended by 800 delegates from all parts of the country...Cabinet Ministers Junior Ministers, Members of Parliament, top civil servants, District Secretaries, Mayors, Heads of Defence and Police Forces, representatives of political and social life, representatives of Mining Groups, the Federation of Employers the Zambia Industrial and Commercial Association, Trade unionists, Farmers, Asian traders, the Zambia Traders' Association and the Master Builders' Association". ³

---

¹ See appendix for geo-economic and socio-political features of Zambia which influence government policies.
² Ibid, Tordoff and C.Elliott.
³ Ibid, Labour Management Conference.
This Convention was important in the context of participation and industrial democracy in general in the sense that it touched on the problems of labour relations which had already been felt during the miners sporadic strikes of 1966, and the delegates were told that:

"With the Four Year Development Plan now at the stage of take-off, labour relations play a very significant part in the implementation of the plan. It is therefore important that parties that are closely involved should meet together and discuss how best some of the problems can be solved". 1

The above quotation underlines the importance consultations between parties in undertakings, and both employers and workers were wished to be strongly organised to make them effective as a means of communication whenever disputes arose; and briefly some of the most important and relevant observations were:

a) tendency by the trade union movement not to give employers enough time to look into employees' grievances;

b) lack of properly trained personnel among employers led to poor relations between workers and employers - employers needed to know political and economic aspirations of the country in which they had an undertaking;

c) neglecting of negotiations procedures by union leaders and lack of understanding of labour laws result in exploitation of workers, especially in the rural areas;

d) unnecessary friction between workers and employers

1. Ibid, Labour Management Conference.
sometimes was the result of uncalled for intervention in the disputes by outside bodies which have no direct interest;

e) employers' interest often misunderstood as priorities of employers do not often coincide with those of the workers.

These observations ended with a key sentence in the drive towards works councils' formation, thus: "There could be a mutual meeting point with good means of communication between parties concerned". ¹

Further reference to negotiation machinery during the same Convention was suggestive of Industrial Relations Act and its off-shoot "The Industrial Relations Court" at the apex.

The recommendation that workers should accept the responsibility of higher productivity could be linked with what came to be known as Departmental Works Committees to be discussed in the next chapter. Such responsibility can only be cultivated through good communication between workers and management, and to achieve this the National Convention further recommended and emphasized the need for supervisors, shop stewards, trade union officials, government officers associated with labour to be trained in communication techniques. This recommendation later led to the establishment of the President Citizenship College at Kabwe, where teaching of local politics, economics, labour relations and labour laws is being undertaken with the assistance of the International Labour Organisation experts.

¹. Ibid, Labour Management Conference Report.
The 1967 April follow up conference organised by the Ministry of Labour and Social Services was even much more positive on communication between employer and employee; it recommended that:

a) "Government should consider the formation of district consultative councils on the same principles as National Labour Consultative Council, to discuss matters of mutual interest at district level and to co-ordinate with National Labour Consultative Council.

b) Government should introduce a programme to educate workers in their responsibilities not only to their employers but to the nation as a whole (Ref. President Citizenship College curriculum mentioned above).

This conference led to the formation of the departmental works committees which could be likened to the 1941 Joint Production Committees in allied engineering industries of Britain.

The conference recommendation emphasized promotion of productivity just as the Joint Production Committees were there to provide production of more arms for the Second World War.

Equally important was the advice that workers must fully accept their responsibility in relation to themselves, their employers, the industries and the country, and that they must be prepared to contribute fully in their work.

During the Second National Convention which was again held at Kitwe in December 1969, President Kaunda in his opening address unequivocally directed that works councils be formed in undertakings when he said that:

"Time has now come to establish relations between the worker and the employer in keeping with the philosophy of "Humanism"...legislation should be conducive to the creation of a man-centred society, equitable distribution of national income". 1.

To achieve this the President invoked upon the co-operation of the employers, employees, government and the governed in the struggle against inequality and exploitation. He further questioned whether it was proper to exclude the employees from "participating" in the functions of "ownership" and "management". He told the Convention that the Party and government was intent at changing the whole system of "industrial relations" to allow workers to participate effectively in the decisions of management through the establishment of Works Councils in all undertakings of a certain size, (which later meant undertakings with a minimum of 100 workers).

For the first time "Works Councils" were referred to as a base for workers' participation in management decisions in areas traditionally regarded as management prerogatives, as the President put it.

To let everybody know that participation in management-decision-making, initially through the Works Councils, was not experimental but had come to stay, the President said:

"I would like to say that no one should be misled into thinking that we do not mean these changes seriously. We are not experimenting with a few liberalising measures which may or may not work, and which can be withdrawn at will...There will be no going back. Our commitment to the restructuring of our society is fundamental and we mean that Humanism will not only be discussed but lived".

The right of the people of Zambia to control their own destiny is not negotiable, he concluded.

Briefly, I would say that the December 1969 Convention gave birth to the Works Councils in Zambia.

As trade unionism is generally fundamental and highly associated with industrial democracy the need to re-define its scope and objectives within the context of the country's new social order was required. Thus, the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 (Act. No. 36 of 1971) which provided for the registration of all trade unions, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, the employers' associations and the Zambia Federation of Employers, as a prelude to the formation of works councils was enacted. The Act further provided for collective agreements, the settlement of collective disputes, and the establishment of an Industrial Relations Court; and to repeal certain enactments relating to trade unions and trade disputes and industrial conciliation, etc.

According to 'A Guide to the Industrial Relations Act', the Industrial Relations Act could be summed up as "providing a legal framework for the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and its constituent member unions, the Zambia Federation of Employers, and its constituent employers' associations, works councils, collective agreements, the settlement of collective disputes and the Industrial Relations Court.

The 1971 Industrial Relations Act which gave solace to the strengthening of trade unions and employers' associations resulted in.

in the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and the Zambia Federation of Employers to later sign an agreement providing for co-operation in creating harmony and stability which would improve productivity.

The commitment to establish industrial democracy in the country was further punctuated by the President during the November 1972 Labour Management Seminar that:

"We are committed to the establishment of industrial democracy, and to achieve this management must understand this commitment and work in co-operation with other national institutions on which industrial development depend. The establishment of industrial democracy is not a matter for debate. The Party and Government expect Labour and Management to work hand in hand to guarantee the success of participatory democracy in industry". 1

While the 1969 Convention referred to in the previous chapter gave full support to the establishment of Works Councils, the 1972 Labour Management Seminar demanded the acceleration of the establishment of Works Councils by effecting the Industrial Relations Act, and this same seminar made a number of recommendations to render the implementation of Works Councils effective; and went as far as recommending election of workers to the Boards of Directors and share participation schemes, whose actual details had to be left to the workers and management of undertakings to finalise.

Apparently the last recommendations have not taken off as yet.

The Works Councils proposal was given a legal seal in 1976 under Part VII of the Industrial Relations Act (No.36 of 1971).

It was initially exempted from operation until the Presidential decree. The main Industrial Relations Act became operative on 1st April 1974 but Part VII which governed the Works Councils was enacted later on 1st May 1976 under Statutory Instrument No. 76 of 1976, Part VII, to enforce formation of Works Councils by November 1976.  

---

CHAPTER VI

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIAN INDUSTRIES

Introduction of industrial democracy in the Zambian industries was carried out in two stages, i.e. Departmental Works Committees and Works Councils. Departmental Works Committees were born out of the same concern for communication and workers' participation in decision-making during the 1967 Livingstone Labour Conference as were the Works Councils later in 1976 through the Act of Parliament.

The Departmental Works Committees constituted shopfloor consultations in an undertaking, while the Works Councils provided consultation and participation in decision-making at higher level of management of the undertaking. Because of differences in the functions of the two means of workers participation in decision-making I will discuss them separately.

1) Departmental Works Committees

Departmental Works Committees, as the name implies, and by their immediate utility within a departmentalised structure of the undertaking, one would think that they were intended for much more complex industries or organisations such as the Mines, Government or parastatal organisations, etc. Therefore for the sake of better understanding of the Departmental Works Committees I will examine them in the context of the mining industry.

Of course, it would not be surprising if they were so examined because of the importance of the Copper Mining Industry in the Zambian economy; especially if the strikes of 1966 on the mines
are taken into account as influencing events towards thinking of the need for better labour relations and communications to enhance productivity.

Anyway for some time employers and employees in industries had been striving towards finding ways and means of establishing effective communication in order to achieve their common interests. But this was not possible until after independence when the Party and Government (United National Independence Party) announced their intentions to introduce industrial participatory democracy that the demand by the unions and other interested parties to be involved in decision-making in industries was realized. Participation by way of communication and involvement in decision-making took various forms according to the needs of particular industries.

In the Mining Industry, Departmental Works Committees proved to be initial effective instruments of communication and consultation.

Before going into explaining the role of the Departmental Works Committees in the Mining Industry* it is necessary to reflect on the reception they received from the affected parties, i.e. management, workers and the government.

The Departmental Works Committees were accepted by the Government as workers participatory stride in the running of

* Note that the Mining Industry in Zambia is composed of two Mining Groups, i.e. Roan Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. (RCM Ltd) and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd (NCCM Ltd) which in turn are run on divisions basis - and the divisions are run on departmental basis. See Appendix V - for Departments mostly involve Works Councils.
industries; and for this same reason employees reception was spontaneous. On management side, their good reception of Departmental Works Committees was confirmed by their willingness to allow meetings to be held during working hours and if held outside working hours overtime payment was made to the affected committee members.

Management rightly viewed Departmental Works Committees as participative schemes meant for a change from more traditional confrontation to an approach based on joint problem solving and the enhancing of common interest between themselves and the worker. Apart from being instruments of communication and problem solving Departmental Works Committees were also seen as intended for the development of attitudes of commitment to industry by all human resources concerned through sharing ideas to promote safety, efficiency and to achieve maximum productivity in a particular department of the industry.*

Membership to the Departmental Works Committees is drawn from workers (by union nomination) and line officials of the same department. This is fittingly so because they are the people who are more familiar with the operational needs of the section or department; experts may only be co-opted to advise the members. This view is also held by Huismann and Wallenburg who said that:

"The people in a production unit could jointly decide on measures to promote the efficient functioning of their unit from both an economic and social point of view. In such a form of direct democracy the management levels would have

* See last paragraph of Chapter Seven (summary and conclusion)
to delegate more and more decision-making authority to
the people performing the operational tasks". 1

Departmental Works Committee meetings are usually character-
ized with calmness, because all members accept each other as
having the same objectives, i.e. improvement of production, safety,
efficiency, etc. unlike negotiations or grievance forums which are
characterized by premeditated stands.

An average Departmental Works Committee in the Mining Industry
is usually composed of ten members in the ratio of 6:4 in favour of
workers. The numerical strength of the union nominated representa-
tives over the line officials does not normally worry management
because of the spirit in which meetings are held as required by
the constitution and as stated above. According to the constitu-
Departmental Works Committees are primarily there to provide
means of:

i) obtaining the views of the employees on matters which
affect them and their work other than those matters
which should be dealt with by negotiation or grievance
procedures.

ii) enabling management to consult with employees on
decisions which affect the interests of employees
and the operating efficiency of the department.

1. D. Wallenburg and W. Huisman. Labour and Society,
International Institute for Labour Studies Journal, April
1979. Volume 4/No.2. New forms of work organisation and the
quality of work place - A Dutch Trade Union View.
Industriebond NVV, Amsterdam and T. Van Toor, Industriebond
NKV, Utrecht. pp. 144 and 145.
In order to achieve the smooth running of the Departmental Works Committees (i.e. on the Mines) three agencies are actively involved, viz. Management, Personnel Department, and the Union. I have conveniently isolated Personnel Department from Management because of the independent advisory role it is, by design, supposed to play between the Management and the Union; although unions have a different view of its independence. The three agencies' roles could be listed as follows:

a) **Management**
Provides the chairman whose functions are calling meetings at prescribed intervals (every two months); production of items for discussion, approval of agenda, control of meetings, follow ups on any action arising from discussions and for prompt issue of minutes and bulletins.

b) **Local Mine Workers Union of Zambia Branch**
Nominates representatives of employees from the department concerned, normally shop stewards and other representative from various sections of the same department.

c) **Personnel Department** (through the Personnel Manager)
Established procedures for administration and monitoring of the activities of all the Departmental Works Committees and to ensure that the constitution is honoured by all parties concerned throughout the Division.

The Personnel Department further provides secretaries to these Committees. In fact, all the Senior Personnel Officers are secretaries in the departments of their jurisdiction, and they work in complete liaison with all the members concerned. They
represent the Personnel Manager in ensuring that the Departmental Works Committees' constitution is adhered to, and procedures are followed by all parties.

Only items falling under the following main headings may be discussed by the Departmental Works Committee:

i. **Safety**: First Aid - training and competitions.

ii. **Production**: Targets and achievements, productivity, improvements, production bosses, operational snags, delays, stores position, etc. This entails how operating snags and delays might be avoided and productivity improved.

iii. **Work arrangement (effects on employees)**. Changes in times, reporting times, cage schedules (e.g. for underground workers), etc. New equipment, new or changed methods and manning.

iv. **Education and Training**: Progress and development.

v. **Facilities**: Charge houses, car park - cocoa kitchen, canteens, etc.

vi. **Discipline**: Absenteeism, time keeping etc. (discussion on general terms, and not as individual cases as this would amount to questioning administration of disciplinary cases which is covered under disciplinary and appeals procedures in which the union represents).

Departmental Works Committees are not a bother to unions at all like the Works Councils, as will be discussed later in the chapter. However, workers themselves feel that Departmental Works Committees are not effective instruments of participation to champion their cause; they regard them to be management biased. But because of
the support the Departmental Works Committees enjoy from both management and the union they have withstood the otherwise possible adverse reaction from workers on the shopfloor.

2) Works Councils

The introduction of Works Councils in the Zambian industries could be discerned around the last half of 1976 as was required by Part VII of the Industrial Relations Act 1971, which became operative from 1st May 1976 by the Statutory Instrument No. 76 of 1976.

The principal objective of the Works Councils was the promotion and maintenance of effective participation by workers in the affairs of the undertaking, with particular reference to industrial relations, improved working conditions, greater efficiency and productivity.¹

Introduction of the Works Council in each undertaking of no less than one hundred workers was the responsibility of a Working Party of four members nominated by management and four by the trade union or by the employees if no union existed. The main function of the Working Party was to conduct the elections for the Works Council and to make all the necessary arrangements for its establishment.

Under the Act¹ a Works Council was to be of between 3 and 15 members, depending on the size of the undertaking; two thirds being elected by the workers and one third appointed by management - a ratio of 2:1 in favour of workers.

The Works Councils of Zambia are unionised and as such candidates for election have to be approved by the union unless there are no unions in that particular industry; and elections are held every two years. A member may be eligible for a second term of two years – four years being the maximum term of office of Works Council members.

Under Sections 71 to 79 of the Act the general functions of the Works Councils are further stated as to be "consulted upon and to participate fully and effectively", in all the schemes and programmes related to the health and welfare of the employees; e.g. medical facilities, housing, pension schemes, recreational facilities, canteens and any other amenities. Section 71 in particular, specifies the right of Works Councils to be informed forthwith in writing of all management decisions relating to investment policy, financial control, distribution of profits, economic planning, job evaluation, appointment of senior management executives and wages policy.

It should be noted that the Council is merely informed of management decisions in the above mentioned areas, but it has no legal entitlement to discuss the decisions, let alone to "veto" them subject to reference to a special Board of Review. The Board of Review consists of three members, one appointed by management and one appointed by the Works Council workers, and the third one agreed between themselves, or failing such agreement, appointed by a Government Labour Officer of the District.¹ And if either management or the Works Council (employees of the Council) is

¹. Sections 73-75 of the Industrial Relations Act, Zambian Laws.
grieved by the Board of Review decision they can appeal to the Industrial Relations Court, whose decisions are final and binding on both parties. 1 Below is a chart depicting the position of the Industrial Relations Court in the Executive and political hierarchies:

---

POLITICAL CHAIN OF COMMAND VS A VIS INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CHAIN OF COMMAND IN ZAMBIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT

GENERAL COUNCIL

President

Parliament

Party Secretary General

National Council

Central Committee

Prime Minister

Cabinet

Ministry of Labour and Social Services

Civil Service Commission

Provincial Central Committee

Provincial Political Secretary

Industrial Relations Court

Zambia Fed. of Employers

Employers Assoc. or Group Companies

District Governor

Industries or Divisions in Case of Mines

Regional Secretary

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions

National Unions

Union Branches

Constituency Officials

Branch Officer

Workers

Party Comm. in places of work

Depart. Works Committees

Works Councils

Shop Stewards

N.B. designed and drawn by D.M. Katebe
Key to chart on page 53

---

Interested to know what is happening - active participation when necessary (informal communication)

Constant liaison and involvement (formal communication)
The Industrial Relations Court which was also established by the same Act consists of:

The Chairman, deputy chairman, and at least two other members, all of which are appointed by the President of the Republic of Zambia. The Public Service Commission appoints the Registrar, an assistant registrar, a deputy assistant registrar, and other officers of the court. And the Minister of Labour also nominates a maximum of fourteen persons, half representing employees and the other half representing employers. Further, the Chairman selects two, i.e. one to represent employers and the other to represent employees, to sit as Assessors with the Court. The opinion of the Assessors is merely a recommendation to the Court and is therefore not binding on the Court. 1 See chart below:

Appointed by

- The President
- Civil Service Commission
- Minister of Labour and Soc. Services

Chairs and other officers

- Chairman appoints
- Deputy Chairman
- Registrar
- Assistant Registrar
- Deputy Asst. Registrar
- Other Officers of Court
- Seven to represent employees
- Seven to represent employers (1)

(N.B. Own design - D.M. Katebe)

1. Section 97 of the Act (Industrial Relations Act, Laws of Zambia)
The power of the Court could be summed up as:

"Examination and approving of collective agreements and to enquire into and making of awards and decisions in:

i) collective disputes

ii) any matters relating to industrial relations which may be referred to it, and to:

a) interpret the terms of awards and agreements

b) comment and punish for contempt any person who disobeys or unlawfully refuses to carry out or to be bound by any order made against him by the court.

c) generally enquire into and adjudicate upon any matter affecting the rights, obligations and privileges of employees, employers and representative organisations thereof.

d) summons witnesses, inspect books, documents and relevant records, and examine witnesses under oath.

The Court has also powers under the Act to declare the rightful holder of an office in a trade union, Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, employers associations or Zambia Federation of Employers. This section is important in view of leadership struggles which tended to arise in the past as highlighted in Chapter IV dealing with the growth of Trade Unions."¹

¹. Industrial Relations Act Guide - Published by the Zambia Federation of Employers, Zambia Printing Co., Lusaka.
APPEAL PROCEDURE CHART OF INDUSTRIAL COURT

Key:

------------- Formal Communication/appeal
--------- Informal communication

N B. Own design, D.M. Katebe
The power of veto of Works Councils on personnel matters already referred to in this chapter had to come into force after 12 months of the establishment of the Works Council in the industries because the workers had to be familiar and educated in the procedures and management's administrative and production priorities to avoid unnecessary friction right from the start. The veto power by the Councils applies in the following fields:

i. recruitment and transfer of employees in the undertaking and assessment of their salaries

ii. redundancy

iii. bonus and incentives

iv. safety

v. appointment or dismissal of personnel officers (referred to above as executives).

In other words, decisions by management on matters of policy in the areas of personnel management and industrial relations would only have effect after approval by the Works Council. If the Works Council refuses to approve a decision of management within the terms of section 72 of the Act it must communicate the reasons for such refusal in writing to the management. And if management disagrees with the Council then the Council is free to refer the matter in question to the Board of Review, and depending on the outcome the matter may even reach the Industrial Relations Court as mentioned before.

The other right of the Works Council which is defined, rather, as duty, is acting as a 'watchdog'. This right entails Council to inform management at once if it has reason to believe
that management has contravened by omission or commission this Act (Industrial Relations Act), any written law, a collective agreement, works agreement, or works rule in any way (Section 74 Clause I of the Act refers).

When informed the management must investigate the alleged contravention with a view to correcting the error; and should the Works Council not be satisfied it would report the matter to the trade union of the undertaking who would negotiate a settlement. This 'watchdog' clause is welcome to the unions and not to management who would even suspect the confidentiality of employee Council members on other secret matters as provided for under Section 76 of the Act.

If there is no trade union in the undertaking or should the trade union and management disagree on a settlement, the matter would go to the Industrial Relations Court, whose decision would be final and binding.

As mentioned above, Section 76 of the Act refers to secrecy of some information. Under this section any person who, as a result of powers or duties gets information on the financial affairs, manufacturing or commercial secrets or working processes of an undertaking should not divulge this information, except for the purpose of proceedings under the Act, to court or person duly authorised by law, to the Minister or any other person needing the information to administer the Act.

Works Council meetings are held during working hours at the employers' expense; councillors being paid normal earnings.
The legislation establishes minimum rights for the release of councillors for part-time council work when necessary, e.g. holding of public meetings to inform employees of some decisions made during council meetings and to explain company annual reports to other workers.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the first chapters of this paper attempts have been made to find an approach to industrial democracy from both definition and implementation angles. Out of diverse definitions "participation of workers in decision-making" was seen as appropriate in many respects. But the form of implementation remained a moot point dependent on the laws and ideology of individual countries.

It is a fact that the history of industrial democracy in many respects is a record of forward and backward movements. These movements have usually been characterised by progress, hesitancy, and sturdy courses on both sides, i.e. workers (trade unions included) and management. And these only go to symbolise the unstable compromises on the extent and degree of participation. The management-workers compromises areas vary considerably (as already stated) from country to country and depending on governmental and political systems which often legalise industrial democracy with reference to socio-political, economic, ethical and moral objectives of the society at large. And above all democratic principle of self-government is directly or indirectly extended in industries by law as a means of strengthening democratic institutions in the political sphere of the country as a whole. While the social aim of participation in decision-making is mainly to achieve closer integration of workers within

the undertaking, without necessarily interfering with taking's basic structure or organisation. In the Zambian Works Councils, Departmental Works Committees and Party Committees in places of work* have provided for the two aspects (political and social aspects).

Reference to economic aspirations in the introduction of industrial democracy are based on the importance of harnessing the co-operation of workers, reduction of conflict, and creation of an atmosphere in which improved productivity and profitability could be achieved as a result of participation by devising better methods of production and smoother introduction of technological changes.

In adopting participation recognition of ethnical, moral and cultural heritage of the society should be taken into account. Workers should be recognised as belonging to a community in decisions which affect them, be it at work or out of work. Participation which is usually dictated by the above outlined factors is implemented in various forms. The highest system of participation being "workers-self-management" practiced in Yugoslavia, and at the bottom of the scale of participation is "worker-supervisor participation" in decisions which refer to immediate duties of the worker. Between the two extremes lies a variety of forms of participation in decision-making, with the following being most common:

* Note. Soon after independence the main industries, particularly the Mines were targets of sabotage, pilfering and politically inspired stoppages of work. So, the Party and Government had to extend its wing in industries through Party Committees in Places of Work as a 'watchdog'.
a) Works Committees. This is a form of participation through statutory bodies solely or jointly elected by the workers or with the co-operation of the union and the employer, and areas of participation are stipulated.

b) Management membership/or supervisory boards, e.g. those found in coal mining and steel industries of the Federal Republic of Germany. Equality of membership has been recognised and extended to workers and shareholders in supervisory boards.

c) Voluntary consultation; these comprise of members elected by workers or appointed by the union (if the union exists) and representatives of employers or management, mostly in equal numbers, and are usually based on national agreements, on policies or schemes agreed at national and industrial levels. This kind of committee has generally no binding powers. They only form part of a more complex system of labour-management relations in an industry in which company level bargaining, direct negotiations at workshop level, grievance procedures and suggestion schemes feature.

d) Participation through the union: in principle unions are concerned with collective bargaining, but they do get involved in decision-making through unionised bodies such as Works Councils, Departmental Works Committees, joint production committees, etc. These bodies' rights and powers are statutorily defined, e.g. the right to be consulted in all matters affecting personnel, right to
advise or approve of certain management decisions before implementation.

The role of trade unionism in the implementation of industrial democracy in undertakings was observed as significant. And in some cases this was bound to lead to the classification of employees into two categories. Those represented by the union (usually lower grades) regarded as workers and the remaining higher grades regarded as supervisors belonging to management team.

Under this demarcation decision-making is automatically linked with the management team, and unionised workers are synonymous with non-involvement in decision-making. It is in this connection that the unions are seen to be in an agitation mood for their members to be involved in decision-making against management's feelings. The above classification is more easily said than seen in its practical sense. Because some employees are difficult to place in any of the two categories (i.e. unionised workers and management team). For example, when we take a Zambian Mining Industry situation the classification of employees as stated above would be wanting in terms of involvement in decision-making. Because an Assistant Foreman who is a member of the union could not find it easy to be involved in decision making. But this is not the case. On the contrary, he is practically a member of the management team and involved in decision-making from time to time by virtue of being a supervisor in charge of production and some personnel. Face to face with this stands the convenient agreement that the Assistant Foreman could not represent management on the Works Councils but unionised
members. In supervision he is a member of the hierarchical decision-making management team, but a member of the unionised workers in representation. Here is a situation which depends on the goodwill of the two parties concerned; otherwise, even the so-called secrecy of information and Clegg's notion of union to remain in strong opposition like in politics would be rendered futile. This illustration is indicative of how superficial certain management-workers demarcations could be.

An observation of divergence of opinion about the extent of trade unions' involvement in decision-making was also made in this paper. One would expect more drive from unions in the achievement of industrial democracy at various management levels; surprisingly the opposite happened to be the case. The reason for this being fear of a split of loyalty between management and workers' interests by the unionised representatives. On the other hand it was observed that preservation of prerogatives in the area of decision-making on the part of management tended to reduce the momentum towards industrial democracy in undertakings. This is in spite of the independence the unions and employers may be enjoying under the legal system of some countries, e.g. Sweden and Zambia. ¹

It would not be far from the truth to say that the problem of participation pivots, inter alia, on managements preference for a participation which is endowed with methods and skills able to react rapidly to changing circumstances while they apply a coherent policy in the light of long term interests of the undertaking in contrast with the unions' (workers) fear of losing their

credibility if their members accepted responsibility linked with management of the undertaking. ¹

Despite this gap both management and workers accept participation which in a broad sense means communication. And communication which is understood as a two way process is synonymous with "relations" which embraces all the various relationships between management and workers' representatives comprising such processes as information, the presentation of views, suggestions, claims, complaints, grievances, consultations, co-operation, co-decisions, discussion and negotiations for which industrial democracy is variously committed. ²

¹ and ². Labour-Management Relations, Series No. 25 (I.L.O.) 1965 (Certain Aspects of Labour-Management Relations within the undertaking).

APPENDIX I

ZAMBIA IN PERSPECTIVE.

As democracy is a dimensional issue which concerns everyday life of the individual it automatically encompasses his social, political and economic well-being. For this reason I am portray- ing Zambia's economic, socio-economic and geo-political features which influence the attitude of different interest groups and institutions towards industrial democracy in general as reflected in the preceding chapters, in an appendix form.1

a) Geography and Population

Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, was a British Colony until 21st October 1964 when she became an independent state within the Commonwealth and a member of the sterling area.

Zambia, which lies between latitude 10 degrees and 18 degrees south, and between longitude 22 degrees and 33 degrees east, is a landlocked country bounded by Zaire and Tanzania to the north, Zimbabwe and Botswana to the south, Mozambique and Malawi to the east and Angola and Namibia (Caprior Strip) to the west. This geographical position in Central Africa makes her foreign policy difficult to appreciate by many countries.

The major part of Zambia is characterized by a plateau of over 4,000 feet, which makes the climate in many areas favourable.

1. Labour Organisation (L.O.) and Labour Market Policy since Second World War by B. Ohman. Chs. 3, 4 and 5. The Growth Aspects; Welfare Considerations, and Continuity and Renewal: A Concluding Analysis - respectively; which refer to divergence in approach
and the three large river basins (i.e. Zambezi, Luapula and Kafue) add beauty to the landscape and provide game areas of high reputation in the tourism industry.

The 1969 and 1971 census of population revealed that there were 4 million and 4.3 million people respectively, in Zambia; a country whose size is 290,586 square miles or about three times the size of Britain which has a population of more than 50 million people. The density in the rural areas in 1969 was 10 persons per square mile, and in the urban areas it was 98 persons per square mile.

In 1971 the country's density per square mile was 15 persons.  

Population Statistics (Progressive): Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.5.1911</td>
<td>1497</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>820,000</td>
<td>821,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1921</td>
<td>3634</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>980,000</td>
<td>983,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1931</td>
<td>13,846</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>1,330,000</td>
<td>1,344,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.10.1946</td>
<td>21,907</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>1,660,000</td>
<td>1,683,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5.1951</td>
<td>37,221</td>
<td>2,529</td>
<td>1092</td>
<td>1,890,000</td>
<td>1,930,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5.1956</td>
<td>65,277</td>
<td>5450</td>
<td>1577</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>2,172,304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Population (mid-year estimates) in millions

Table 1.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>5.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the interim population estimates the total population in Zambia in mid 1977 was 5,302,000, which 2,033,000 represented the urban population, and 3,269,000 the rural. The urban population of Zambia has increased by 66% between 1969 and 1977, while during the same period the net increase in the rural areas has been only 12.7%. The increase for the whole country was 28.6%. The urban percentage of population has also increased from 29% to 38% during this period. The migration was mainly directed to the towns on the line of rail and the increase has been significant.²

The ratio of urban population total (1971) was 30.2% and its annual growth was 11%; and the literacy rate of total population was 27.9%.

1. International Union of Local Authority Report. Habitat Conference held in Lusaka, Zambia, 12th to 22nd December 1977. Volume II, page 2. Note: Population figures are estimates only, the last census was in 1969.

b) Employment and Production

Employment in the organized sectors in June 1971 was 360,910; the employment growth rate was (1967-1971) 4.7% per annum. The 1969 general distribution of labour force for the same year was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and related</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service sector</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above occupational distribution will prove useful in the examination of the formation of Works Councils. Agriculture and miscellaneous though account for a large percentage hardly have Works Councils because many individual units employ less than 100 employees to qualify for the establishment of Works Councils under the existing Industrial Relations Act.

This problem was also observed by the Lusaka Labour Management Seminar and under "Changes to the Industrial Relations Act Resolution", the seminar recommended that:

"Works Councils should be extended by law to companies employing 25 or more employees. It is clear that the agriculture sector presents special difficulties and these should be the subject of careful examination. The reduction from 100 to 25 should apply everywhere else in the commercial and industrial sectors". 1

Production and related sector and service sector account for more Works Councils.

---

c) Economy and Interest Parties

The structure of the economy is mixed with a growing public sector through acquisition of share equity in private industries - e.g. the Copper Mining Industry (and many others) and the recent acquisition of the share equity in petrol and gas oil undertakings as was reported in "The Daily Telegraph", that: "The Zambian Government has nationalised petrol and gas oil stocks jointly owned by six international oil companies, including Shell-B.P.". 1

The Gross Domestic Product in U.S. dollars in 1970 was $1,718 million at current prices, and Gross Domestic Product per capita in the same year was $412, also at current prices.

In 1977 the per capita income was K250.00, but in the rural areas it could be as low as K30.00. This gap between the urban worker and rural villager was confirmed by a report to the Community Development Conference of June 1963 as follows:

"In Zambia the gap between the rich and the poor was ever increasing. Over the whole period 1963-1968 money wages of Zambian workers rose by 147%, an average increase of 2 1/2% over that of 1963. Over the same period the consumer prices for low income group rose by 46%. The gap between the Zambian worker and that of his expatriate counterpart has been narrowed (through Zambianisation of certain jobs and training opportunities), to a greater extent. But the gap between the Zambian villager and that of the urban worker has been increasing every year. The average typical income of a villager is estimated at K120.00 per year and out of this only 10% is in cash". 2

---


2. From a report published by the department of Community Development to a Conference held in 1963 from 13th-15th June, with J.J. Keigwin, BME, as then, the Commissioner, Lusaka, Zambie (Govt. Printers).
It is this disparity in income between the urban worker and the rural villager which worries the Party and Government, and tends to be a source of differences with the trade unions in their demands for higher wages for their members who are concentrated in the urban areas.*

To stress the concern of the government for the imbalance in the income between the rural villager and the urban worker, I would further quote Zambia Draft Country Programme proposal to the United Nations:

"The priorities expressed in Zambia's Second National Development Plan (S.N.D.) take particular account of the need to improve conditions of rural life and increased productive employment in order to reduce the imbalance in relation to the towns; to make Zambia nearly self-sufficient in food; to diversify the economy away from excessive dependence on copper (95% of total exports in 1970); and to raise the low levels of education...."

The country's dependence on mining was further emphasised as follows:

"That the Mines constitute an extremely important part of the economy in Zambia. We noted....they employ over 30% of the total work force. The Mines also earn almost 97% (1977) of the total foreign exchange and a considerable proportion of the country's Gross National Product ($1,718 million in 1970), provide employment to large numbers of people in both private and parastatal support or service industries,.....copper mining industry difficulties reflects upon all industries and the nation".1

In other words, poor communication and lack of consultative machinery in the mining industry which might result in industrial unrest would affect the economy of the country as a whole. It is

* See Appendix I for rural-urban disparity in income distribution

in this light that organs like Works Councils were seen to be beneficial.

The differences in priorities between the Trade Unions who are there for the immediate interests of their members and the Government which is concerned with economic and social welfare of all the citizens of the country and the employers for maximisation of productivity and profit under the tripartite relationship, are vulnerable.

d) Party and Government.

The Constitution of Zambia provides for a one party participatory democracy, under United National Independence Party as the sole organ of political power.

The State is headed by a President, while the Prime Minister who is nominated by the President is the leader of the National Assembly and Government; the government is comprised of Central Ministries and Departments, as well as nine Provincial Ministries and their various Departments.

Parliament (National Assembly) has one hundred and twenty-five members, chosen in single member constituencies through universal adult suffrage, and up to ten members nominated by the President.

The Central Committee of the Party headed by the Secretary General, is elected by the General Council of the sole Party, and is the supreme policy-making body in the Republic. The nine provinces and 51 districts are each headed by a member of the Central Committee and a District Governor respectively.
The Central Government structure provides communication with unions through the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, while the Provincial Central Committee member acts as an on the spot political overseer in the province just as the District Governor is at the district level.

See Appendices II and III; maps of Zambia (formerly known as Northern Rhodesia) before and after Independence, respectively.
Extract from International Industrial Relations Association Second World Congress. Workers Participation in Management Concepts and Reality by Kenneth F. Walker. Senior Staff Associate, International Institute for Labour Studies.
APPENDIX V

MINE INDUSTRY DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE

Rokana Personnel Department Example (1979 set up)

- General Manager
  - Manager Metallurgical
  - Manager Engineering
  - Manager Administration
  - Manager Mining
  - Chief Medical Officer
  - Personnel Manager
  - Secretarial Superintendent
  - Training Officer

- Assistant Personnel Manager
  - Housing Admin.
  - Allocation of houses, maintenance (in Maison with Engin. Dept.)
  - Sanitation; housing forecasts; and resettlement

- Assistant Personnel Manager
  - Com. Dev.
  - Recreation/welfare; women, youth & adult programmes in general, literacy and formal educ. nutrition, casework; canteens/taverns
  - Change houses, (liquor undertakings) etc.

- Assistant Personnel Manager
  - Ind. Reis.
  - Grievances, meetings, safety, training, communication, Lab. Relations, interpretation of company rules, policy & labour laws, Inductions, secretarial services to committees (Works Councils referral; & Dept. Works Cttees)
  - Travel/leave
  - Disciplinary and Appeal procedures
  - Income tax clearance

- Assistant Personnel Manager
  - Manpower Serv.
  - Manning structure and maintenance of employees records; Employment/induction; Job evaluation, work study, placements/ transfers, assessments industrial diseases

Security Officer

Chief Community Development Officer, Senior Personnel Officers, (Industrial Relations), Chief Community Services Officer, equivalents.
The above chart illustrates areas in which Works Councils in the Mining Industry are generally involved as required by the Industrial Relations Act; further shows why the Act places executives who are directly responsible for personnel issues in the focus of Works Councils regarding their appointments and dismissals as referred to in this paper.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


CONGRESS OF SWEDISH TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION(1971) Industrial Democracy.


COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT Report to the Conference held in June 1963, Lusaka, Zambia (Chaired by J.J. Keigwin).


INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION. Workers Management in Yugoslavia. Students and Reports New Series No.64, 1962.


INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION. Labour Management Relations Series 33, Participation of workers in decision-making within undertakings, 1969.


TOPHAM, T. (see above)


THE DAILY TELEGRAPH NEWSPAPER, London, Tuesday 22nd January 1980. page 1, column 3, by Lusaká Correspondent


WALLENBERG, D. (see Huisman, above).