development strategy has been advocated by Friedmann and Douglass (1975) and Friedmann and Weaver (1979), while Stohr and Todtling (1977) have suggested "polaration reversal", which was earlier suggested by Hirschman (1958). Others still, have suggested investing in small urban centres which could act as foci for rural development (Taylor, 1978). Later we will consider the agropolitan development strategy.

Here below an assessment is made of the assertion by Lo and Salih, that the growth centre strategy has for long been implemented without being dignified by that specific name as such (1976:143). Regional development strategies which have been carried out in Zambia, receive particular attention.

1.3 Summary review of Zambia's regional development strategies

Regional development studies in Zambia have revealed increased polarised spatial development (see Baldwin, 1966; Siddle, 1970; Rothcild, 1972; Seidman, 1973, 1974; Young, 1973; Luhring, 1975; Marter and Honeybone, 1976; ILO/JASPA, 1977, 1881; Bhagavan, 1977; Ollawa, 1979; Chilczuk, 1980; Phiri, 1980).

In his major study on regional development planning in Zambia, Chilczuk revealed that the post-war colonial Ten Year Development Plan (TYDP, 1947-1957) employed what was called the development centre strategy for spatial development (1980:
61-69). Central to this strategy was the argument that focal points should be selected on the basis of their having the following: adequate population, high agricultural potential and development infrastructure. Following that selection, development resources and socio-economic activities would then be concentrated.

In the country, each province was to have a single development centre. The latter was to be selected and be located within a district, which would be called development district. Operationally then, every province in the country selected one district amongst several, and within such a selected district established a development centre.

During the TYDP, various government schemes and programmes, chief of which was the Peasant Farmers' Schemes (to which later), were implemented within the development centre.

As is evident, from an earlier elaboration of the growth centre strategy, the development centre strategy significantly resembled core tenets of the growth centre doctrine. Not only was a spatial point selected - on specifically desirable criteria - but, especially in the case of rural areas, a particular group or groups of farmers was chosen to receive most of developmental attention.
No distinct regional development planning strategy could be identified in the post-colonial First National Development Plan (FNDP, 1966-1970). Yet the spatial context the FNDP's national development planning strategy has been called a 'technocratic view' (Mwali, 1980:54).

The 'technocratic view' of development asserts that: "development must start from the centres of population and already industrialised areas and spill over to the rural areas (which) have the human and material neither to (pursue) nor sustain a development effort, and such development as is created has only temporary effects. (It is thus) not only expensive, but from the outset doomed to minimum return" (Mwali, ibid:54).

The practical expression of the above preposition was reflected in the FNDP's allocation of capital investment on rural development. Of the total capital investment to the rural sector, the FNDP allocated more than 15 per cent to three 'core' provinces of Zambia, while remaining five backward provinces received about 18 per cent (Ollawa, 1979:165,173).

In justification of this unequal resource distribution, the FNDP planners stated that: "while we must attempt to redress imbalances, we must at the same time invest in growth, and it would be foolish to exclude the areas of prosperity
which will themselves contribute directly or indirectly to raising the prosperity of neighbouring provinces" (FNDP:vi).

Quite clearly then, though no spatial strategy existed in the FNDP, the spatial expression of national development planning was firmly established within the familiar doctrine of the growth centre strategy.

Of particular significance in national development planning of the FNDP, is the glaring fact that little emphasis was paid to the radical transformation of basic features of the inherited colonial socio-economic structure.

Hence equitable spatial and social development was sacrificed in pursuit of economic growth, consistent to the advice given by Johnson (1962:153) to underdeveloped countries' regional development planning. Moreover, the immense task of fundamentally transforming the inherited colonial structure was relegated to secondary consideration to that of economic growth.

The result was that favoured regions and social groups or classes continued to appropriate the greatest portion of developmental resources and national income.

The foregoing inequitable spatial and social development
with all the implications they carried, provoked President Kaunda to express concern and alarm in 1972. In his preface to the Second National Development Plan (TNDP, 1972-1976), Dr Kaunda underlined that objectives of the SNDP were to: "correct the anomaly of lop-sided development that we inherited from pre-independence era" (1972:viii). Following that, he then declared that: "developing the rural areas is a matter of life and death" (ibid).

The SNDP adopted the Intensive Development Zones as the strategy of its regional development planning, with particular application to rural development. Essentially, the IDZ strategy was aimed at assisting a certain group of farmers in selected areas to adopt appropriate technology by using inputs provided on a package basis (Joint GRZ/ SIDA, 1981:25).

In the ensuing distribution of development resources, SNDP planners allocated about 69 per cent of total public capital investment to the core three provinces and the remaining 31 per cent to remaining backward rural provinces (Ollawa, 1979:165, 173).

SNDP planners defended the above unequal resource allocation by rationalising that: "in planning, there is need to apply scarce resources to areas and lines of investment which offer the best economic return" (SNDP, 1972:167).
The IDZ strategy has been identified as a variant of the growth centre strategy (Mwali et. al, 1981:67). Its distinction from the colonial development centre strategy, was that each province, rather than have one intensive development zone in a selected district, had a selected number of districts within a province having at least one development zone. It differed little with criteria of choosing both the location and a group for groups of individuals.

The IDZ strategy was swiftly withdrawn for being found to be promoting inequitable social and spatial development, which was inimical to the philosophy of Humanism.

The IDZ is alleged to have received modifications of its most objectionable aspects. This led it to be renamed as the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), with the hope that it would display the least: "absence of expected spread effects to other areas " (Joint GRZ/SIDA, 1981:25)

Several important elements distinguish the TNDP from almost all previous national development plans. These may be enumerated to include the following:

(i) the TNDP stated that development planning would be specifically used as: "an instrument for attaining socialism " (TNDP, 1979:21).
(ii) that itself, socialism is: "the instrument for building a humanistic and classless society" (TNDP, ibid:23);

(iii) that (i) and (ii) implied the following:

(a) "the creation of socialist economic relations" (ibid:21);
(b) "commanding role of the public sector" (ibid);
(c) "establishment of a solid foundation for a truly egalitarian state" (ibid:22);
(d) that though objective conditions dictate that the private sector exist for some time, its operation, however, will have to be: "within the overall social and economic framework of a humanistic society ... (the) principal thrust (of which) remains in the direction of consolidating and strengthening the commanding role of the public sector as the main instrument for building socialism" (ibid:23);
(e) the total mobilisation of the masses for active participation in their own development "(ibid); and

(iv) the TNDP created and operates regional structures and institutions which shoulder and implement regional development planning.
It is necessary at this point to propose, certainly among several, operational interpretations to above outlined elements of the TNDP, particularly with reference to rural development.

It is proposed here, as the TNDP puts it, that the "creation of socialist economic relations" for the "building of a humanistic and classless society" and the "establishment of a solid foundation for a truly egalitarian state" through the "commanding role of the public sector", means that rural development must at least strive for the following:

(i) less control, ownership and influence should be exercised by private farming, in contrast to more control, ownership and influence exercised by communal, co-operative and state farming;

(ii) less use of wage/hired farm labour;

(iii) less disparate income distribution within the farming community;

(iv) less disperate ownership of factors of farm produc- tion; and

(v) less disperate access to social amenities/infrastru- cture.
Analytic evidence from the regional development development strategy of the TNDP, suggests that little effort may actually be directed along the development process outlined by by preposition above.

What the TNDP's regional strategy seems to be doing, is to increase and extend the degree of decentralisation. The decentralisation of socio-economic and spatial hierarchical structures from the national centre.

Within the rural economy, socio-economic decentralisation has meant the consolidation and further extension of Zambia's plural rural development strategies (which are collapsed into Integrated Rural Development Programme apparently, though this is not so much the case). Each rural strategy is tailored to cover and meet specific needs and circumstances of existing rural social/economic categories. In general, there exist three dominant social/economic categories in rural Zambia: state farming (including rural reconstruction centres), private individual farming (consisting of so-called commercial and emergent farming), and peasant farming.

The government perhaps confirmed its adherence to state farms when it launched a K400 million ten year Operation Food Production in 1980. The enormous areal size, economies of scale, varied agricultural activities and nation-wide
distribution, hold promising prospects that - if successfully implemented - state farms will become influential production units. However, their current level of production, permit a safe observation that, given favourable conditions and successful implementation, state farms will only have their projected production impact in not less than five years henceforth.

The mainstay of market agricultural production in the country thus remains being private individual farming. The numerical weakness of this category has been more than adequately compensated for, by the strategic economic and social position which enables it to exert immense power and influence. A combined mix of fiscal and monetary policies are traditional government measures used to encourage agricultural development within this category.

Finally, the Lima Programme was launched in 1979 as a component of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (a revised version of the IDZ strategy). The LP was specially directed at answering specific needs and concrete circumstances within which peasant development had to and was taking place.

Spatial decentralisation is easily illustrated by fig 1.1. As earlier mentioned, colonial spatial development planning concentrated on the national centre and the sub-centre (regional centre). Whilst the SNDP's IDZ strategy extended
Fig 1.1  Hierarchy of Development Centres

Development Centre
1947 - 1957

Industrial Development Zones, 1972 - 1976

Growth Pole
1979 - 1983

National Growth Centre

Regions

Regional Centre (Provincial capital)

Development Sub-centre (District capital)

Village Development Centre
the colonial plan by the addition of some selected sub-regional (district) centres. But when the latter arbitrary selection of sub-regional centres sparked off strong socio-political protest, the TNDP came to the rescue of the discredited IDZ strategy. The growth centre strategy satisfied political interests by not only including all sub-regional centres in the country, but also including a significant number of what the TNDP calls village development centres.

One wonders however, whether TNDP planners still had the same socio-political objectives of regional economic development planning outlined in the same plan, when they argue that their adoption of the growth centre strategy would: "strike a compromise between a desire for economic efficiency on the one hand and socio-political equity on the other hand" (TNDP:81).

Because a pressing question demands that immediate attention be focused upon the formulation or search of a strategy which will ensure that objectives outlined in the TNDP become transformed into social reality.
A strategy which possesses unquestionable social, political and economic ingredients capable of transforming rural Zambia, negate inherent colonial socio-economic development, introduce socialist economic relations of production and set the course for the establishment of a classless humanist society.

The review conducted in section 1.2 above, present convincing evidence and sufficient ground to arguments which see the growth centre strategy as an inadequate vehicle for socialist regional development, and in particular rural transformation.

1.4 Conclusion

The above examination enables us the conclusion that the growth centre strategy - due mainly to its origin of unequal spatial and social development - can hardly be considered adequate an instrument to launch and fashion a new humanist society out of an inherited colonial socio-economic structure in Zambia.
Spatial and economic development planning has since 1948 employed several variant strategies of the growth centre strategy. With the consequence that more and more social disparities within the overall process of capitalist development occurred.

Post-independent regional development produced insignificant differences which suggest that essential features of inherited colonial socio-economic development have changed. Furthermore, what emerged was that Zambia's objectives of an egalitarian, classless and socialist society, have remained ever as distanced from implemented strategies and actual unfolding social development. Casting gloom and little hope that major rural reform and peasant transformation is underway.
Chapter Two

Polarized Regional Underdevelopment in Zambia

The development pole of Zambia, as suggested by Higgins (1978:235-236) with respect to Latin American countries, is located in Europe. This assertion is fully appreciated in the light of how almost the entire development process in the country becomes immediately affected when, among the most prominent factors, copper price changes occur in the London Market Exchange.

There exist still, a specific domestic spatial structure which, while maintaining an unbroken link with the external growth pole, has over the years produced a development process of extreme spatial and social inequalities. Regional polarization has resulted into what is regarded as core (line-of-rail) regions, the Copperbelt, Lusaka, Central and Southern, and periphery (off-line-of-rail) regions - namely, Luapula, Northern, North-Western, Western and Eastern (Map 2.1).

2.1 Evolution of core regions

The construction of the railway line from South Africa through what was then Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern
Rhodesia (Zambia) into the Congo (Zaire) by the colonial British South Africa Company, as well as the discovery of large reserves and processing methods of copper, triggered off development in what today is Zambia's core regions.

An export based economy which Zambia has ever since become, the growth of the mining sector and in particular copper industry, pulled along with it the entire economy. Transforming the economy from an agricultural to a mineral based economy. Directly deriving benefits from this export based economic growth was the commercial agriculture sector, which was dominated by settler farmers.

The division and distribution of productive activities within core regions - which were in the least altered by post-independent regional development - were as follows:

Table 2.1 **Major Division of Productive Activities per Core Region.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>Mining, manufacturing; mining, manufacturing, commercial agriculture;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Mining, manufacturing, commercial agriculture;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>Manufacturing, commercial agriculture;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>Commercial agriculture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Because of the greatest concentration of mining and the highest urban population settlement in the Copperbelt, coupled with the fact that manufacturing was dominantly mining-related manufacturing - the Copperbelt Region had emerged as the most prominent region in the country.

Fig 2.1 Core Regions and Population Movements, 1975


Migration to Copperbelt

The mining sector grew rapidly after 1930. From a negligible contribution in the GDP, which had hitherto been dominated
Because of the greatest concentration of mining and the highest urban population settlement in the Copperbelt, coupled with the fact that manufacturing was dominantly mining-related manufacturing - the Copperbelt region has emerged as the most prominent region in the country.

2.1.1 The Mining Sector

Primary interests of the British South Africa Company, which administered the territory and owned its mines, were neither to colonise nor to institute social and economic development in then Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).

Primary objectives of this company which was owned by Cecil Rhodes, then Britain's paramount imperialist agent in Southern Africa, were to exploit and realise optimum profits from the mineral wealth of Zambia.

To this end, the mining sector was developed - both to the exclusion and at the expense of other sectors and regions - to become the most single important sector to determine not only the status but also the development tempo of virtually the entire economy.

The mining sector grew rapidly after 1930. From a negligible contribution in the GDP, which had hitherto been dominated
by the agriculture sector, the mining sector rose to occupy more than half of the nation's generated income in 1938 (Pim Report, 1938). Between the 1930s and upto 1970s, the sector contributed more than 30 per cent in the GDP, it became the main source of Government revenue and contributed between 86 and 90 per cent to total export revenue earned in 1938-1965 and 1965-1980 (Ollawa, 1979:70, 110-114).

Price changes of copper at the London Market Exchange (LME) and those of (indispensable) imports - to isolate but two factors - illustrate the fragile nature of a foreign dominated and (primary goods) export based economy that Zambia is.

Between 1970 and 1980 the (market) price per ton of copper at the LME increased by an annual average of 9 per cent. Though there were sharp price drops as indicated by years 1971 and 1975 from their respective previous years, the general trend was upward (Table 2.2).

The real purchasing power of copper and that of imports (1970 the base year) disclose some main sources of problems which bedeviled the Zambian economy throughout the 70s. While the international purchasing power of copper declined by an annual average of 6.9 per cent, import prices maintained a steady increase of an annual average of 17.3 per cent between 1970 and 1980. The resulting adverse effect of the foregoing was noticed from the 4.9 per cent annual
Table 2.2  Zambia's External Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>L.M.E Market Price Kwacha per ton</th>
<th>International Purchasing Power of Copper 1970=100</th>
<th>Import Prices 1970=100</th>
<th>Terms of Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1 010</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1 156</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1 326</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1 007</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1 016</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1 084</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1 571</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1 719</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

average of deteriorating terms of trade.

These above developments understandably inflicted crippling constraints on the domestic economy which depends on copper earned foreign exchange income to procure essential essential goods such as foodstuffs, petroleum and petroleum products, transport equipment, machinery and spare parts. And for a dominantly public sector based economy like Zambia, falling copper contribution to Government Revenue sent multiple waveshocks which eventually spread far beyond the public sector.

Copper contribution to export revenue declined by an annual average of 1.2 per cent between 1970 and 1979, with the accompanying decline of an average of 0.4 per cent per year in the GDP. The impact of the decline of copper revenue was shattering on the Government Revenue. Copper contribution to Government Revenue had been declining by an annual average of 17.03 per cent between 1970 and 1976. Thereafter no copper contribution whatsoever was recorded on the Government Revenue (Table 2.3).

It is worth mentioning that land-locked Zambia was also, for close to twenty years, landlocked in an almost simultaneous series of national liberation struggles raging across her frontiers. National liberation revolutions of Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia (raging still), which undoubtedly compounded the country's socio-economic
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Copper</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Gdp</th>
<th>Share of Copper</th>
<th>Share of Exports</th>
<th>Share of Revenue</th>
<th>Share of Gdp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.566</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.259</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.024</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.941</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.941</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1.591</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1.591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1.348</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.348</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.180</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.278</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.278</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
development efforts severely.

Full human, material and financial costs which have been incurred by this land-locked country have yet to be determined. They will include:

(i) costs sustained through the loss, diversion and disruption of Zambia's outlets to the sea, through Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa, in addition to the construction and maintenance of TAzara rail line;

(ii) defence and security costs, which were borne by building and strengthening the country's defence capacity, thereby diverting development resources from pressing social and economic sectors;

(iii) costs of military and economic aggression from Rhodesian, South African and Portuguese regimes, which resulted in both material and human losses; and

(iv) costs of population settlement and resettlement and its accompanying disruption of especially agricultural activities.

The dominance of the mining industry over other domestic industries is explained by the Input-Output table of 1973.
Table 2. Input-Output Table of 1973 (Current Prices) (Kwacha Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture, Forestry &amp; Fishing</th>
<th>Total Industries</th>
<th>Private Consumption</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Total Demand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>710.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Manufacturing</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles &amp; Wearing Apparel</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber Products</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>127.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabricated Metal Products</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>111.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity and Water</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale &amp; Retail Trade</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road &amp; Rail Transport</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Service</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total @ Consumption</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>230.8</td>
<td>1254.5</td>
<td>474.4</td>
<td>775.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Includes Other

Source: Adapted from Input-Output table, 1973, C.S.O
Major industries which supplied goods and services to the mining industry were, in order of importance, chemicals sharing 24 per cent of mining's total consumption expenditure, fabricated metal products with 19.55 per cent, retail and trade with 12.52 per cent, and textile and wearing apparel with 8.76 per cent.

As to the importance of the mining industry into the activities of the above industries, mining consumed 45 per cent of the chemical industry's total output, 41.5 per cent of fabricated metal products' total output, 47 per cent of retail and trade total output, 64 per cent of electricity and water, 24 per cent of textiles and wearing apparel, and lastly 24 per cent of roads and rail.

The table conspicuously indicates little inter-industrial trade between mining and agricultural sectors. This is more apparent than real. An examination of agricultural production supplied to what the table refers to a "private final consumption" discloses something. Private final consumption consumed about 63 per cent of agriculture's total output. The greatest proportion of this output, it is suggested here, was consumed by major urban areas, of which the mining urban areas constitute about two thirds of the total urban population in the country.
The spatial location and development of other domestic industries, it stands to reason, have inevitably been determined by the mining industry. As early as 1945, colonial authorities had effectively ruled out the development of a strong manufacturing industry. A colonial Committee on Industrial Development concluded thus: "until the European population had increased to more than 35,000 and the standards of living of the African population raised, the internal market was too small to support manufacturing industry if a size to require financial assistance from the government" (Woodruff and Thomas, 1960:56).

A mere seven industries operated outside the line-of-rail regions when the country achieved political independence. By 1975, of the total 1,282 firms in the country, the Copperbelt region alone accounted for 58.7 per cent (Table 2.5). Core regions, altogether, accounted for 98.3 per cent of the total, with the remaining 1.7 per cent shared by peripheral rural regions (Population Census, 1981).

Parastatal industries were no less concentrated around core than private industries. Of the total parastatal industries in the country, 91 per cent were located on core line-of-rail regions. With the consequence that almost all industrial production in the country was undertaken in the Copperbelt, Lusaka and Kabwe areas (Bhagavan, 1978:32-34).
Table 2.5  **Regional Distribution of Manufacturing and Construction Enterprises, 1975.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Enterprises</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% share of Core and of periphery regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>58.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central (incl. Lusaka)</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>33.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Western</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luapula</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1282</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bhagavan, M.R : *Zambia, Impact of Industrial on Regional Imbalance and Social Inequalities, 1978:67*
Demographic and settlement patterns, equally, have been significantly influenced by the development of the mining industry. Colonial policies varied from employing hut and poll tax as well as other coercive measures designed to procure African labour to settler farms, mining and to the service sector, to concerted effort of preventing permanent African urban settlement. The combined result of which fatally crippled the socio-economic and political structure of African people.

In spite of the latter restrictive colonial policies against permanent African urban settlement, it has been estimated that between 1930 and 1960 up to 70 per cent of adult men in the Eastern, Luapula, Northern and Western provinces were almost permanently absent from their rural households (Ollawa, 1979:79-80).

After 1964, with all restrictions on movement and settlement set aside, rural-urban migration almost reached flood proportions. Between 1963 and 1969, Lusaka, Central and Copperbelt regions increased their combined population share from 30.1 per cent to 37.7 per cent respectively. This proportion was increased to 43.2 per cent between 1969 and 1980 (Table 2.6). During the 1963-1969 census period, 33 rural districts (33 per cent of total districts) experienced the decline of population growth (Lombard and Tweedie, 1972:4).
Table 2.6  Percentage Population Distribution Per Region,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luapula</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/Western</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is in this foregoing light that the mining industry, and in particular copper industry, has been regarded as constituting the very pillar of social and economic development in the country. No doubt with ultimate influence on the political direction and stability.

2.1.2 The Rural Sector

The emergence of the mining industry and growth of urban centres significantly changed the character of the rural economy. Large scale commercial agriculture grew with and in response to the growth of the mining industry.

The rural sector is divided in two major social categories. Firstly peasants (so-called subsistence and small-scale farmers), who today constitute about 60 per cent of the country's population, and about 85 per cent of the rural population. Secondly, and lastly, commercial farmers who account for about 15 per cent of all the farming community (ILO/JASPA, 1981:13-16).

Large scale commercial farmers number between 1,500 and 2,000 and produce about 60 per cent of all marketed agricultural production. They are almost all spatially located in the core regions of Lusaka, Central and Southern provinces. There is however, a trickle which is located on
the plateau areas of Eastern Province.

Commercial farmers are integrated and dependent on the market economy. They greatly rely on goods and services provided by industries such as: chemicals, petroleum and petroleum products, machinery and transport. They also depend of services provided by commercial banking, credit and other financial institutions, technical and specialised government agencies.

Peasant farmers exhibit contrasting features to those outlined above of commercial farmers. They number about 3.6 million, with more than 2 million of them located in the peripheral rural regions of the country.

Peasants are considerably crucial and strategic to rural and agricultural development. They produce about 85 per cent of all cereal produce, 90 per cent of slaughtered domestic cattle and account for 70 per cent of total agricultural output. However, a small proportion of their produce reach the market and they are not are not as closely connected to either capital goods or service industries. Hitherto, though government strategies and policies earmarked them as top priority, very few peasants have been actually involved (GRZ/SIDA, 1982:20).
Of 610,000 peasant households, about 200,000 have been described as very poor. These are households which the ILO/JASPA Mission described as: "weak, small and very poor" (ibid: 24, 47.36; GRZ/SIDA, 1980:20). These latter farmers constitute about 64 per cent of total households in the country, 80 per cent of which live well below an income capable of sustaining subsistence (ibid).

Rural income distribution and consequently social stratification is disparate. At the pinnacle are large scale private commercial farmers, mostly white with a trickle of black farmers, followed by an intermediate strata which is euphemistically called emergent farmers - who are mostly black. The base of the pyramid is made of peasant farmers.

In a Household Budget Survey of 1974/75 the Central Statistics Office disclosed that the bottom 50 per cent of rural households received about 20 per cent of total rural income (Table 2.7), while the top 5 per cent of rural households received close to a quarter of total rural income. The table further reveals that, in general, more than 98 per cent households received less than K125 per month and the remaining less than 2 per cent received more than K125 per month.

The picture which emerges then, is that there exist generalised poverty in the rural areas. Poverty which is so
Table 2.7 Income Distribution of Rural Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Income</th>
<th>% Distribution of Households</th>
<th>Cumulative % Distribution of Households</th>
<th>Cumulative Percentage Distribution of Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-74</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-99</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-124</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125 +</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean income = K29.20 per month
Gini Ration = 0.4668

widespread as to cover nearly seven eights of the total rural population in the country.

2.2 Conclusion

This chapter argued that social, economic and spatial problems which today stubbornly confront regional development planning - particularly peasant transformation - are inextricably bound to and are a product of the development of an inherited colonial structure.

This colonial structure imposed a monoculture and an export (primary product) based economy on Zambia, and integrated the country (to its detriment mostly) on an unequal relationship to the western economic market system. The consequences of which are that the internal process of economic and social development is today greatly dictated to and determined by external economic and social forces.

Internationally determined economic structure and social relations of Zambia have been symmetrically reproduced domestically, albeit with abounding distortions. Former colonial industrial and agricultural centres of economic growth and social domination have invariably continued their growth at the expense, and almost to the exclusion, of peripheral regions and the impoverished rural population.
Former colonial economic structures and social relations have naturally underwent Zambianisation, with the system remaining essentially intact notwithstanding minor adjustments.

Hence it is ultimately the transformation of the inherited colonial domestic and international economic structure and social relations upon which the realisation of Zambia's rural transformation depends. Anything less perpetuates and renders the Zambian economy feebly disposed to mobilise and mount an effective economic and social development effort against disruptive interventions of foreign forces.
Chapter Three

Peasant Farmers’ Scheme and the Lima Programme

Post-1945 colonial and post-colonial social and economic development (up till 1979) - we argued in chapter two - have been pursued with particularly unequal social and spatial consequences. Social and spatial consequences which have been expressed and accentuated by, what we termed, plural (social differentiated) agricultural strategies and regional strategies of decentralisation.

Notwithstanding popular remarks which have been heard, from both political and academic forums, concerning the desire to restructure the lop-sided inherited colonial socio-economic structure of Zambia, it was not until 1979 that development planners in the country produced a specific socio-economic model to be followed.

Hitherto - especially with respect to rural development - development planners contented themselves with issues which included the following: to increase gross per capita agricultural farmer output; to increase the involvement of peasant farmers in commodity production; to build co-operatives and state farms; institute rural settlement and resettlement, and; building rural social and economic
infrastructure. In a word, rural and agricultural development aimed at the general upliftment of living standards of the rural community.

The foregoing objectives - however noble they may be - provided this was possible, would have had to implemented and realised within the inherited colonial socio-economic structure, leaving it essentially intact, albeit with peripheral modifications.

The TNDP proclaimed in 1979 that it was adopting what it called socialist planning as an instrument for (national and regional) development planning, to established the foundation for the development of "socialist relations of production". Such an unprecedented declaration marked an apparently sobering realisation by the country's planners, that it was time - though belated - development planning seriously and effectively transformed national political and ideological aspirations into concrete social and economic objectivity.

The central argument in this chapter therefore, is that - concerning priority considerations - development planning must in an unambiguous, comprehensive and operational manner, define as primary social relations and economic structures of production which a given country expressly want established.
Closely interwoven with the primary consideration, which constitutes the general framework, is a myriad of specific social, economic, political and spatial strategies, the pursuit of whose objectives is not an end into themselves. But they themselves form part of a coordinated collective which is geared to give content and to materialise objectives of the primary consideration. It is therefore, an inextricable mutual and reinforcing relationship between form and content.

Given this perspective, a conceptual examination is made of the Peasant Farmers’ Scheme (PPS) and the Lima Programme (LP). The former which was conceived and undertaken within and to reinforce the general colonial social and economic structure. While the latter is undertaken in an inherited colonial structure of post-independent Zambia. The Lima Programme is allegedly aimed at contributing to the restructurisation of the inherited colonial system and to establish an alternative socialist social formation.

It is with respect to the latter objective that our examination will focus particular attention. As to whether the LM can and does effectively contribute in substance and to the development of the general framework for rural socialist transformation. That is negate the influence and development process engendered by the PPS and the colonial structure.
We propose to conduct this examination within confines of three guidelines, namely the:

i) land tenure system,

ii) organisation of peasant farming process, and

iii) distribution of peasant farmers' resources.

3.1 Peasant Farmers' Scheme

Accumulated deterioration of soil and vegetation, alarming rates of African migration to urban areas, frequent famines and starvation conditions in the "native reserves"—more than any other reasons—prompted colonial authorities to seek corrective measures. What is more, by the 40s rising African Nationalism and activities was increas- singly drawing anti-popular support from sources created by African misery in both urban and rural areas.

The PFS was introduced experimentally in the Eastern Province in 1948 (Kay, 1965:39-41). It followed a similar introduction of African Improved Farmer Scheme in the Southern Province (Dodge, 1977:26). These and other related schemes were almost exclusively introduced in the main and favoured regions along the line of rail, and on the plateau areas of the Eastern Province. Remaining regions, which located the majority of the country's pauperity, were largely neglected.
General objectives of the PFS were: "to establish permanent African farming communities on a tenant farming basis, the Native Authority being the landlord under the supervision of the Provincial Administration and the Agriculture Department" (Ibid). More specifically, the colonial regime emphasised soil conservation, adoption and utilisation of relatively advanced crop and stock farming management and technology. Peasant clients of the scheme were required to strictly adhere to set guidelines and regulations.

When the World Bank defined what it termed the improvement approach, it could be said that it was at the same time describing the basic tenets of the PFS. The Bank stated that the improvement approach is a: "progressive improvement in peasant methods of crop and animal husbandry by working on the peasant farmer on both the psychological and technical planes to induce an increase in his productivity without any radical changes in traditional social and legal systems" (Long, 1977:145).

3.1.1 The PFS on Land Tenure

The colonial regime stressed in its introduction that the scheme: "must do no violence to either traditional tribal social structure or to the accepted system of land tenure, though its establishment may well help in the
evolution of both " (Kay,1965:42).

The regime then separated its so-called progressive peasant farmers from their traditional tribal setting and located them in "block" farms distanced from their original villages. The rationale advanced for this move was explained as the concern (of the colonial regime) about undue social and economic burden which its "progressive" peasant farmers bore from their village society.

The extraction, displacement and location far from their village kith and kin would, argued the colonial regime, considerably relieve peasant farmers:" of the economic and social difficulties of village life " (Kay,ibid:41).

In their new "block" homesteads - which were cleared (of trees and shrubs) and stumped by the Department of Agriculture - "progressive" farmers entered into a tenant-landlord contract with the Department of Agriculture. For their part, they were to observe strict rules and regulations of farm management, failure to which they faced eviction from block farms (Kay,ibid:41;Dodge, op.cit:23).

It is ironic that colonial authorities should continue their attempts to create an impression that African people
were still living within their unviolated traditional and tribal social, economic and political structures in 1948. In effect, this colonial argument meant that the more than fifty years of indirect (British South Africa Company) and direct (British) colonial social and economic plunder and domination wrought little or no undesirable effects. It also sought to promote the notion that no colonial process of underdevelopment had long been set into motion.

The colonial regime's own "Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia" categorically dismissed the above argument, ten years earlier in 1938.

The Pim Report, as the Commission was known in short, disclosed that what it called tribal unity and organisation of African people had been broken and little remained of it when direct British colonisation resumed in 1925 (Pim Report, 1938:119).

Concerning the tribal traditional social structure, the Pim Report stated that; "the chiefs (were) being used as agencies of Government and their authorities and privileges upheld so far as these were not incompatible with the rule of the company. Attention was chiefly
concentrated on ... the collection of tax and the remo-
val of the administration of justice from the hands of
the chiefs. The forms of tribal government were mainta-
ined, but the authority of the chiefs was gradually
undermined by their dependence on Administrative Officers
... Administrative Officers were made responsible for the
general control of their districts and chiefs and head-
men could be punished for failing to carry out their
'lawful' orders " (Ibid:179).

For good measure, ancestral lands had been robbed from
their African owners. The latter who were herded into
centration camps called native reserves. And from where
a combination of taxation policies, bare coercion and
starvation - compelled African people to migrate and
seek employment in urban areas and white settler farms.

It is false and inconceivable then, to suppose that after
the invasion of the above colonial social, economic and
political process, an African political and socio-econo-
mic structure - both in form and essence - could remain
intact. The Pim Report testified that such a structure
had been fatally paralysed.

The conclusion which we arrive at is that when colonial
authorities spoke of the PFS doing no violence to the
traditional tribal structure and land tenure system,
they were in fact refering to what was - in all intents and purposes - colonialists' own "traditional tribal" structure and accepted (private property) land tenure.

The PFS was therefore nothing but a continued extension of colonial destructive onslaught to African traditional tribal structure and land tenure. It legitimised and consolidated the robbery of African lands and alien political domination. Furthermore, it attempted to spread colonial clouts of underdevelopment to encompass more peasants. The PFS can in no way be said to have directly or indirectly contributed to the restoration and development of African traditional tribal structure and land tenure.

3.1.2 The PFS on Organisation of Peasant Farming Process

We observed in section 3.1.1 above, that a selection of peasant farmers was extracted from their villages under the pretext of relieving them of unacceptable social and economic village obligations. They were located or resettled in family block farms, wherein they entered into a tenant-landlord contract with the Department of Agriculture.

The colonial regime was under the belief that its PFS should make it possible: "for an average African
family, using ox-drawn implements to cultivate the farms without requiring any labour outside the immediate family circle; (and) that the farm should provide the family with their subsistence requirements and cash income" (Kay, op. cit:43).

Peasant clients of the PFS further received incentives of being offered, what Baldwin (1966:165) called, price-support programme. It is also reasonable to suppose that - as more incentives to PFS farmers - a relaxation was effected of prohibitively high crop quality standardisation, inclusion and participation in marketing agencies and market entrance requirements. The latter which were all meant to exclude and discriminated against African peasant farmers. The colonial agricultural policy was clearly based: "upon the premise that European farmers were entitled to preferential treatment " (Baldwin, ibid:159).

The PFS was spiteful of and regarded as burdensome, communal village economic relations of peasant production. It presented as an alternative a social and economic production system of nuclearised private family farming. The latter which kept a peasant farmer constantly aware of drastic consequences following his failure to adhere to terms laid down in the tenancy contract.
The PFS informed its peasant client - through resettlement, through the contract with the Department of Agriculture and price-support programme - that his (peasant) ultimate survival was then no longer to be guaranteed by his membership to the village community, but by his dependence to the colonial regime. Similar to his chief and headman, who existed and operated as an agent of colonial administration, the PFS peasant became a client of and dependent on the colonial economic system.

It is not surprising therefore, that peasant farmers outside the PFS and related schemes viewed their PFS counterparts with suspicion, mistrust and hostility. For to them PFS peasant farmers represented and were part of an alien socio-economic and political system of domination.

In conclusion then, the PFS promoted (western-type) individual family private farming organisation and relations of production. A farming process and organisation diametrically different and incompatible with the African traditional tribal communal relations of economic production.
3.1.3 The FFS on Distribution of Peasant Resources

The FFS offered its client farmers technical means of production, by which they were to meet their subsistence requirements without the utilisation of outside labour (Kay, op. cit: 43). The technical equipment were the following:

- 1 plough,
- 1 yoke and chain,
- 1 shovel and fork,
- 1 harrow,
- 1 scotch cart,
- 2 oxen,
- 2 cows, and
- a loan of £120.

Having received the foregoing, each peasant farmer was further expected to purchase the following capital goods:

- a planter,
- a ridger,
- a wheel-burrow, and
- a small hand-grind machine.

Colonial authorities reckoned that the provision of the above-mentioned capital goods, coupled with between 10 to
25 acres of arable land, would facilitate sufficient material foundation for the development of small-scale commercial farming. The ultimate objective being that of a large-scale commercial African agricultural class.

It should be quite logical that given spatial displacement and social differentiation, the concentration of development resources on a trickle of selected "progressive" peasant farmers should follow. An opinion which is consistent and in accordance with the theory of unequal economic development discussed already in previous chapters.

To promote the development of inequitable resource distribution, as colonial authorities were evidently doing, under the expectation that the positive "trickle-down" impact of the "demonstration effect" would induce more non-PFS peasants to acquire improved production equipment and higher output was unrealistic. It did not and could not bear desirable results. Most: "especially under the conditions of concentrated economic and political power " (Dorner, 1973:129; also Huizer, 1980).

The selection criterion of the PFS itself, had ensured that after it had been exercised, both the "trickle-down" and "demonstration effect" would register minimum or no impact. Only the people who had already shown themselves
as capable in farming were selected. These farmers, as it turned to be, were (especially in the case of Southern Province) mostly "much better educated, possessed farms twice as large as the unimproved farms, used substantially more manure, and owned one and three fourths as many plows " (Baldwin, 1966:168).

Hired and hiring of labour relations in farming production directly derived from and grew with inequitable resource distribution. It should/recalled that the PFS was supposed to meet all its labour requirements within immediate family confines. But increasing seasonal labour demands rendered inadequate family labour resources (Kay, 1965:43). Consequently the hiring of external labour became associated with the PFS.

Viewed from a broader scale then, the PFS extended and deepened the stratification of the rural society. On the one hand, one section of society suffered from land deprivation, overcrowdedness in "reserves", crippling shortage of able-bodied manpower through the migrant labour system, and little or no government developmental attention and assistance.

On the other hand, another section of the African society was settled and resettled on ample arable land, had all
and virtually adequate family members to supply labour (while more hired labour could be utilised if need be), enjoyed concentrated government assistance and attention, and had preferential access and participation in the agriculture market. To say nothing about disparate resources' distribution and utilisation, and social relations of agricultural production - which existed between rural African people and settler farmers.

In summary then - as concerns the PFS on land tenure, organisation of peasant farming process and distribution of peasant resources - several observations can be made.

i) that the PFS consolidated and further broadened confines within which the African traditional socio-political and economic system was systematically undermined, paralysed and dominated by colonial economic exploitation;

ii) that the PFS carefully nurtured the development of a social process of private family peasant farming organisation diametrically distinct and inimical to the development of the social process of African communal farming organisation; and

iii) that the PFS effectively promoted rural stratifica-
tion and unequal social development, through its policy implementation of spatial displacement, social differentiation and resource discrimination and concentration on a selected "progressive" group of peasant farmers.

Thus, given the overall framework provided by an unequivocal definition, and forceful existence, of colonial-capitalist structures and processes for economic exploitation of natural and human resources of Zambia - a specific colonial policy such as rural development strategy could not but sponsor a development process harmonious with its interests.

3.2 The Lima Programme

In a statement which could perhaps qualify as a definition of the Lima Programme, Professor Evans of the University of Zambia stated that: "essentially the Lima Programme is a simplified set of recommendations and instructions on seed rates, plant spacing and fertilizer application, using simple standard measuring aids for one quarter of a hectare" (Evans, 1981:17).

Objectives and application of the LP are exclusively tailored to cover and attract the majority of hitherto
neglected peasant farmers into commodity agriculture production. In other words, the LP positively discriminated in favour of the poorest section of the rural agricultural farmers so long untouched by previous rural development strategies.

The LP – an important component of the (reconstituted IDZ strategy) Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) – should be properly placed within the present historical social and economic development context in which Zambia is. This will assist into obtaining not only a comprehensive and objective, but also correct assessment of both successes and shortcomings registered by the LP.

An assessment which, on the one hand, will analyse contributions or otherwise of the LP to the development of general social and economic structures and relations of production objectified in the TNDP; and, on the other hand, contributions or otherwise of the LP in its narrow and specific objectives as a programme of peasant transformation.

In a review of rural development in Zambia, an ILO/JASPA Mission remarked in its 1981 report that: "if creating new projects or new organisations alone could secure
rural development, Zambia would now stand in the forefront of African nations " (ILO/JASPA, 1981:51-52). Because, according to the Mission, the country had adopted a multiplicity of schemes: "peasant farmers' schemes, master farmers' schemes, family farm schemes, area development zones, intensive development zones, integrated rural development projects, communal producer co-operatives, multi-purpose co-operatives, consumer co-operatives, tenancy schemes, settlement and resettlement schemes, crop season and credit and minimum package of inputs schemes" (Ibid:51).

It is evident — noting from foregoing and other critical observations — that essential tenets of colonial social and economic structures and relations, which were subsequently promoted and consolidated by the PFS, had by and large remained intact and influential.

Post-colonial rural and agricultural development strategies of Zambia have been described as:"model(s) (of) accepted western ... conventional theories " (Wanji, 1979: 74; Dumont, 1979: 68); a "chosen path of capitalist rural development" (Klepper, 1979: 140-145); a "macro-socialist and micro-capitalist" approach (Quick, 1977: 390); a "no
partisan approach to rural development generally known as 'it pays to belong to UNIP" (Phiri, 1980:392).

Hence, the LP, as generally outlined in the TNDP, is expected to first, assist in laying foundations and development of socialist structures and relations of production. And second, meet and fulfil its narrow and specific production objectives aimed at raising peasants' material and cultural standards of living. In a word, counter current colonial inherited rural development process engendered by the PFS. Our main concern are with respect to the first expectation of the LP.

3.2.1 The LP on Land Tenure

From Prof Evans' definitional statement above, it is noticable that the LP neither proposes nor does it exhibit any direct land tenure system of itself. What seems to be the case however, is that the LP implicitly, if not explicitly, concede and utilizes the presently existing land tenure system. Which implies, in turn, that the LP assumes the present land tenure system as sufficient and an adequate foundation to meet requirements of peasant socialist transformation. But what is the present land tenure system. And can it be regarded as suitable a basis to launch a successful peasant socialist transformation.
A 1971 IMF Survey identified three systems as governing the utilization of agricultural land in Zambia. Namely:

i) private freehold,

ii) publicly granted leasehold, and

iii) state trust land.

The Survey noted that: "the freehold and the leasehold lands are mostly along the line of rail and comprise about 12 million acres of which about one fourth is freehold. The remaining arable land, nearly 140 million acres, is held in trust by the state for the benefit of indigenous population and its use is largely governed by tribal customs" (IMF, 1971:375-376).

In 1975 the Land Act cancelled and converted all private freehold lands into 100 years leasehold lands. All the land in the country was vested in the President.

Legal scholars have, however, expressed dissatisfaction with land tenure statutes. They contend that statutory instruments governing the application of land development and utilization are less than clear and often conflicting. The Land Act of 1975, they contend, simultaneously converted customary lands, as freehold lands were, into statutory land leaseholds of 100 years. Yet this is not
the interpretation given the Act officially. The Act is officially interpreted as specifically applicable to and having no legal force on any other but State lands (Mvunga, 1980:42-43).

If, on the other hand, as the case may be, the 1975 Land Act is construed as bearing no legal power on Trust lands, then a legal instrument remaining and which can be construed as having legal force on customary lands, is the colonial Act of 1925. Yet such a legal situation, argues Dr Mvunga: "would produce absurd results" (ibid:43).

Practical consequences flowing from application of foregoing legal confusion and conflicts have inflicted severe blows on customary lands and land tenure. The latter lost their magnitude and experienced a decline in prestige, particularly with respect to agricultural commodity development. The latter development process has occurred through the following manner:

1) the natural human and beast population growth pressure on land - especially in the line of rail and Eastern Provinces - resulted in peasants' seizure of communal lands for settlement and farming. In these areas no vacant or fallow lands exist which do not have individual claims laid on them.
Descernible evidence abounds that land is fast acquiring economic value. Peasants are reportedly engaged in monetary and kind illicit transfers and exchanges of land without the knowledge and approval of either their chiefs or District Authorities (Hedlund, 1980:28,38);

ii) most of so-called emergent and improved commercial farmers who include farmers such as those in the PFS and other numerous schemes and projects - are largely located on customary lands. With the increase of their economies of scale and deepening integration and participation in the agriculture commodity market - these farmers have found the customary land tenure system a fetter. They have consequently demanded and are switching into leasehold land tenure, which is commensurate with their commercial activities, without moving out of customary lands;

iii) the central government has itself - in its attempts to increase leasehold farms - realised that objective by acquisition of customary held lands, and by their transformation into leasehold lands. At times this has meant the removal or restriction of expansion of peasant communities located in customary lands;
Evidently, under both colonial and post-colonial land tenure systems, customary lands and land tenure fell victim in magnitude and prestige. Which cast understandable light to the persistent and consolidating derision that customary land tenure is an obstacle and a fetter of commodity agricultural development. Because though frequent official defence has been mounted on behalf of customary land tenure, the practical unfolding of official agricultural land development has, nonetheless, implicitly confirmed, promoted and approved the derison of customary land tenure.

Frequently heard statements that Zambia possesses abundant and vacant lands, viewed within the context of numerous objective factors, can hardly warrant to be seriously regarded as realistic. Since relative to: the availability, reliability and distribution of rain; the chemistry of soils with their subsequent crop-type possibilities; the existence of tsetse flies and other plagues' infestations; the existence of economic infrastructure, accessibility and distance to and from the market; the initial relative cost of employing alternative production techniques and improved inputs - given the consideration of the above realities, it is inconceivable to understand the honesty and reliability of the above assertion.
Thus, if we concede the assertion that the LP operates within and utilizes existing land tenure systems to effect socialist peasant transformation - then either with the LP is least concerned/and serious about promoting the development of socialist relations of peasant transformation; or, if it still pursues the same objectives, it is certainly bound to fail in its attempts. For it is improbable for the LP to realise socialist peasant transformation within and utilizing the existent structures and relations of production, which are largely neo-colonial in form and essence.

3.2.2 The LP on Organisation of Peasant Farming Process

The Economic Report stated that basically, the LP is: "targeted at the private small-holder sector" (1981: 61). At this level, the LP seems to be bent onto providing an answer to questions which relate to production techniques and organisation of peasant production.

It has been noted that a peasant farmer:

- possesses limited labour resources within his immediate family and village community;

- employs low level of technology and methods, and
- cultivates very low hectages of land.

The question was then posed as to what optimum factor combination would provide maximum output and facilitate peasants' participation in the commercial market. The recommended farm area was 0.25 ha, which was called a lima. A lima was considered manageable for a peasant farmer who—using a hoe and family labour as well as manure, fertilizer, improved seeds and planting techniques—would achieve both subsistence and marketed production.

From the very onset, the LP actively promotes a switch from hoe to ox-drawn technology. Where oxen have been prohibited by the existence of, for instance, the tsetse fly, the Department of Agriculture and the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) has hired out to peasants tractors. In the meantime vigorous research for a vaccine against the tsetse fly has come within a positive breakthrough. Because the LP target group is by far the most poor of all farmers, wage/hired labour is not considered within the programme.

Ideally, the LP peasant farmer is expected to gradually increase his cultivated area from a lima (0.25 ha) to 4 limas (1 ha). Then on, progressive encouragement is
made for the farmer to adopt ox-drawn technology and, it is hoped, as the farmer cultivates more and more hectares, he will become a large-scale commercial farmer. By then, would not only have ceased to be a peasant farmer, but would also be a wage/hired labour employer.

If, as concluded from section 3.2.1 that the LP is less troubled about its operation and utilization of the neo-colonial land tenure and relations of production, then equally, the LP is less trouble about using neo-colonial organisation of peasant farming process. Except for a few, scattered and uncoordinated examples, where the LP and other IRDP projects encouraged collective farming and marketing among peasants - a feature which is countered and cancels out viewed within the totality of the entire agriculture development process - the LP is effectively pursuing PFS objectives.

To that extent then, the LP pursues peasant transformation along PFS lines of organization and relations of production. That is neo-colonial organization of peasant relations of production. Therefore, if the PFS extended the influence of colonial commodity organization and relations of peasant production by selecting "progressive" peasants; then the LP completes the circle by enclosing
the most hinterland located and hitherto ignored poor peasant communities.

3.2.3 The LP on Distribution of Peasant Resources

The LP provides its target farmers with the following composite package factors: extension, training, inputs supply, credit and marketing. As it departs from the premises of the hoe and 0.25 ha, it may be observed that the LP hardly promotes unequal peasant resources' distribution and development.

The question, however, is much less whether the LP effectively promotes or does not promote unequal peasant resource distribution and development. Rather, the critical question is what effective position and role does the LP play towards existent and sharp disparate resource distribution within the peasantry. Indeed the question is how equipped is the LP to halt, reverse and eliminate the normal tendency of neo-colonial process to: "reproduce patterns of inequality" (Friedman and Weaver, 1979: 175).

Thus posed, the question is revealing. Because the LP pursues an approach of individual family farming in an already considerably differentiated peasant community.
Concerned with its target group, the LP has bypassed existing social differentiation and resource maldistribution. Even in this approach, however, the LP is less likely to meet with expected success. Because peasants less afflicted by factor resource shortages and other disabilities, will be the ones at the forefront of the LP, leaving behind the lagging majority.

3.3 Conclusion

Two major facts have emerged from our examination of the PFS and the LP. First, that given the definitive existence and function of a colonial system for economic exploitation of Zambia - the PFS benefited from and experienced little problems in fulfilling its specific sectoral colonial objectives. Both mutually and harmoniously worked to reinforce each other.

Secondly, given the feeble, ambiguous and conflicting general policies of post-colonial structures and relations of production - the LP has found it difficult, if not impossible, to fill in content into a framework with an indistinct form and no direction.

Which has meant that since the neo-colonial system has persistently continued to dominate post-colonial Zambia - specific sectoral programmes such as the LP, have
only perpertuated neo-colonial underdevelopment.
Chapter Four

Chipata District: A case study

This chapter examines the penetration and growth of the colonial and neo-colonial process within rural structures and relations of peasant production in the Chipata district. This will be done using the general framework provided by the growth centre or versions of the strategy, in particular, within the structural implementation of the Peasant Farmers' Scheme and the Lima Programme.

The aim of this investigation is to critically assess the structural capacity and strategic approach at the disposal of and utilized by the Lima Programme, to transform existing neo-colonial structures and relations, replacing them with socialist structures and relations. Guidelines for the enquiry remain the following terms of reference:

i) the land tenure systems;
ii) the organisation of peasant farming process; and
iii) the distribution of peasant resources.
4.1 Chipata District

The District is located almost in the centre of the Eastern Province. It covers some 12 000 square kilometres, with a population of 203 970 in 1981 (Preliminary Population Census, 1981). This about 31.3 per cent of the total provincial population, giving it a density of 16 persons per square kilometre. The district's main town, and the provincial capital, is Chipata; which is about 500 kilometre east of Lusaka (national capital), and had a population of 32 291. The District accounted for about 60 per cent of the province's total urban population.

Chipata district is divided into three physiographic regions, namely: the plateau, the escarpment and the valley. The plateau - a relatively more developed agricultural area within the district - accounts for some 45 per cent of the district's total area. It lies about 1 100 metres above sea level and forms a watershed to the Luagwa and Zambezi rivers.

The escarpment accounts for about 35 per cent of the total area of the district. It is characterised by steep, rugged and discontinous hills, which are covered by trees and shallow soils of very low agricultural value.
The valley takes the remaining 30 per cent of the district. It lies about 600 metres above sea level, hot, near inhospitable and with mainly poor soils. Numerous pockets of fertile alluvial soils are, nevertheless, scattered throughout the expanse of the valley. Almost the entire area of the valley and most of the escarpment is infested by the tsetse fly.

Chipata district is probably the most leading district of the Eastern Province. Just like the Province, the District is overwhelmingly agricultural economically. In 1980 the district accounted for about 37 per cent of the total farming households in the entire province. About 50 per cent of the district's farming households are - in varying degrees - marketing cash crops regularly. (Economic Report, 1982:74; Chipata Crop Husbandry Report, 1981:Appendices 2-15).

In 1980, of total Provincial agricultural output, the District accounted for some 31.3 per cent of marketed rice, 31.3 per cent of marketed groundnuts, 17.7 per cent of marketed sunflower, 98.2 per cent of marketed soysbeans, 75.7 per cent of marketed cotton, and finally, 30.1 per cent of marketed maize (Ibid).

Notwithstanding the significant proportion of peasant
integration and participation in the commercial agricultural market – wherein they in fact constitute the backbone of all the productive sectors in the district – their involvement, in terms of output per capita, is considerably low and on a small-scale level. It is their numerical power which makes them indispensable.

About 95 per cent of peasant households in the district cultivate less than 4 ha, with the bulk of 60 per cent cultivating between 0.2 and 1.4 ha. Chronic shortage of labour ranks as one of the main problems, and is directly connected with another main problem – outmigration of able-bodied labour. Reasons of, and disruptive consequences of, outmigration in the District, have been outlined ably by Hedlund and Lundahl (1981).

On the whole, however, the District is outstanding as the most favoured sub-region in the Province; if not in almost all sub-regions outside the line of rail provinces. It boosts of almost the highest indices of economic and social development. Yet the latter are so inequitably distributed within the District, so as to leave the valley and escarpment areas virtually backward and undeveloped.
4.2 Land Tenure Systems

The invasion, conquest and subjugation of African people in the country - as elsewhere on the continent - were initial and necessary bridge-heads to open and prepare the base process for colonial economic exploitation.

Colonial authorities, however, soon discovered that the realisation of their objectives confronted resistance from structures and relations of social and economic production of African people. As there existed no juridical, political and economic compulsion for Africans to sell their labour power to colonial economic institutions. Conditions of unrestricted access to, ownership and utilization of land by Africans for subsistence and their own enrichment - presented the most central obstacle.

It was in this light that artificial conditions and means of poverty for African people were deemed necessary and desirable (Marx, 1976:48,931-932,937). They were dispossessed and expropriated off their ancestral lands; restricted, resettled and concentrated into spatial units called native reserves. Therein, the growing rate of poverty and starvation coupled with a heartless programme of taxation and labour recruitment - expelled them to seek their subsistence in the mines and settler farms within and without the country. As early as 1903, the above colonial process
was already well full in motion in Chipata district (Gann, 1958; Kay, 1965).

By the 30s colonial objectives of African impoverishment came well-nigh to maturity. The process acquired prowess of self-generation. No longer did it require hitherto direct and overt pillars such as forcible labour recruitment to prop it up. The vicious circle of colonial under-development was established, in motion and almost irreversible.

Two major and notorious 'native reserves' - Msandile (for Chewas) and Ngoni (for Ngonis) - were extremely overcrowded. In 1924 the normal carrying capacity of the two reserves was established as 22 persons per square mile. Yet Msandile and Ngoni each had a population density of 57 and 55 persons per square mile respectively. This density index shot up to 85 and 81 persons per square mile for Msandile and Ngoni in 1942 respectively (Kay, 1965: 20-21).

Starting from 1903, proceeding to 1926 and 1929, successive dispossession of African lands was justified as making available arable lands for an expected influx of white settler farmers. Yet throughout the years none of such an influx of settlers ever took place.
Consequently vast tracks of land were laid vacant and to waiste for years, while at the same time African people suffered population overcrowdedness, exhaustion and erosion of "their" reserves. Lands which had hitherto been free of the infestation by tsetse flies, later bristled with this plague which made livestock rearing impossible and human habitation inhospitable.

It is estimated that in 1926 nearly 60 per cent of taxable men in the district were absent from their villages, having migrated out in search of means of subsistence. Thirty years later, in 1962, the migration rate had risen to about 64 per cent (Kay, op. cit: 12, 98).

Land shortage, soil exhaustion and erosion in Msandile and Ngoni progressively continued to worsen rapidly; in the process, fueling famine, starvation and out-migration in the 40s. The problem became so chronic that colonial authorities at one time considered implementing a programme of completely uprooting some of the Ngoni people in the district to Serenje, in the Central Province. (Kay, ibid: 33).

It was this background of continuing disintegration of African traditional social and economic structures and land tenure - which eventually compelled the colonial
regime, even tokenly, to initiate major post-1945 schemes and programmes such as the PFS. These projects were largely aimed at countering and reversing accumulated adverse consequences of 40 years of colonial underdevelopment policies.

Land shortage ranked among prominent causes of failure for such schemes and programmes as the PFS to have their desired impact and results. A side effect development of the PFS emerged, with significant implications on African customary land tenure. The growing process of individual African farming plots side by side with PFS block farms.

As we noticed earlier, PFS farmers were required to leave their village's surrounding, resettled into block farms, under a tenant contractual relationship with the Department of Agriculture - individual plots failed to meet some of the PFS requirements. High density areas such as Ngoni reserves ruled out the possibility of a farmer moving into a block farm, simply because of land shortage. Besides, individual farmers, while keen to be part of the PFS process, showed reluctance to abandon their already developed farms. They were weary of starting from scratch again in farming. Initially, the PFS excluded these individual plot farmers, but later in 1953 they were
accepted by the PFS.

Table 4.1 Individual and Block Farmers, 1950/51 - 1961/62

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Block Farmers</th>
<th>Individual Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951/52</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952/53</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953/54</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954/55</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955/56</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956/57</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957/58</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958/59</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959/60</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961/62</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kay, 1965:45

Individual peasant farmers grew rapidly from 4 in 1953 to 346 in 1957, where they outnumbered PFS block farmers by 153. Then on, while the number of block farmers grew
slowly, individual farmers, having observed certain laid-down recommendations of farm management and land conservation, grew rapidly.

An interesting feature emerges in this examination, the discernible feature of relationship between, on the one hand, an incipient process of privatisation landhold of peasant farming within customary land tenure and, on the other hand, land shortage. Hence, while the "trickle-effect" of the PFS is debatable with respect to output of non-PFS farmers; there is little doubt that the PFS did, within its immediate area of influence, exert the development process — individual land tenure — which was inimical to customary land tenure.

Political termination of colonial rule in October 1964 failed to arrest the process which subverted the prestige of traditional land tenure and magnitude of customary held lands. Quite the opposite occurred.

Southeast of Ngoni reserve was declared devastated areas. While lands which had been, throughout the colonial era, vacant or those immediately left by departing settler, were overrun by land-starved peasants. They split and divided large farms among themselves. Attempts by the new nationalist government to regulate and resettle
peasant "squatters" proved futile. Peasants continued to take "abandoned" and "vacant" settler farms, and turned down government orders to budge. For political reasons, the new government became reluctant to employ more than persuasive means.

Fig 4.1 Major Settlement Areas in Chipata district, 1940-1963

Major Settlements
1940-1946
1956-1963
European land
Native Reserves
Devasted Areas

Source: Kay, 1965:

So much for the process in State lands. Let us see how the process developed in former native reserves and tru-
stlands. A study by Hedlund (1980) of two Chiefs' areas - Sayiri and Chikuwe - ably showed the significant relation-
ship and effects of the shortage of land on privatisation of peasant farming on customary land tenure.

Sayiri is located in Southeast of Chipata district, which is within the former Ngoni reserve. It had a high population
density ratio of 38 persons per square kilometre in 1980. Chikuwe, on the other hand, is located in the west of the plateau, bordering the tsetse infested escarpment. It is within former Msandile reserve, and had a population index of 15 persons per square kilometre.

Due to the long-standing critical land shortage, the problems caused by high population densities, and changing settlement patterns – Hedlund noted that farming patterns of Ngoni peasants in Sayiri increasingly manifested a tendency of permanency. While the Chewa inside Chikuwe, in contrast, displayed relatively less permanency in both settlement and farming patterns. Where there was a high ratio of population density, however, Chikuwe peasants' behaviour was similar to that of Sayiri peasants.

Fig 4.2 Chikuwe and Sayiri in Chipata District

Source: Kay, 1965: Fig 4
Post-independence village regrouping attempts by the new nationalist government also bore some moderating changes on customary land tenure in Chikuwe. As villages were concentrated around spatial focal points, village boundary conflict emerged which increased social tensions between different village headmen and villagers. The result was that peasant farmers increasingly became insecure. They strove to obtain: "protection of right to fallow (land)" (Hedlund, 1980:28).

In Sayiri, village regrouping was not possible. On the contrary, quite the opposite was desirable. Village redivision, because of very large and densely populated villages. Sayiri peasants displayed a strong degree of individual land right. There hardly existed vacant or fallow land, reports Hedlund, without individual ownership claim over it (ibid:38). He further notes that it is no longer uncommon to witness - an erstwhile unknown and alien within the customary land tenure system - the exchange and transference of land between individuals, because of economic value which has been acquired by land within peasants' production process (Hedlund, ibid).

The PFS which was introduced during the 40s to early 60s, could only be implemented inside Chikuwe, and exerted significant changes on customary land tenure. Land
assumed an economic value as a commodity factor of production and an asset which: "could be inherited or compensated for" (Hedlund, ibid: 33). The land was no longer supervised by the headman, but by the Rural Councillor in consultation with the chief. Because of the PFS, relatively less densely populated Chikuwe experienced a rapid trend towards the establishment of private farming landhold system.

As may be expected, the PFS could not be introduced for implementation within Sayiri. This was due to land shortage and high population density. Instead, it was individual peasant farming plots which prospered. These plots, with an average of less than 2 ha, were allocated within households and close kinship, disregarding thereby the headmen and local chiefs. For good measure, illegal land selling was increasingly taking place among non-kinship relations (Hedlund, ibid: 38).

In summary, therefore, the analysis above corroborates the preposition that traditional alnd tenure has been considerably undermined by land shortage, high population density and changes in land use and settlement patterns. Evidence further suggests that, over the years, customary land tenure has weakened significantly, is outdated, unsuitable, and has lost both respect and the prestige - to meet and
provide guidance to present land development requirements of anti-neo-colonial rural, and specifically peasant, transformation.

4.3 **Organization of Peasant Farming Process**

Let us take into consideration that: i) more than 60 per cent of the population in the district is located on the plateau regions; ii) most of the plateau population has come into direct contact with, or under the influence of, either the PFS or individual peasant farming plots; and iii) land shortage and high population densities on plateau regions, were catalysts to the emergent process of private landhold farming. We are able to conclude then, that the organization and process of peasant farming which arose was that of individual family farming.

The government, in the 60s, made bold attempts to organize the peasant farming process away from, and in contrast to, the course charted by the PFS. It organized and promoted collective or communal co-operative farming among peasants, including those of the district. This noble venture, however, proved a costly failure. With unfortunate consequences that the government completely changed course. It returned to and accepted the PFS neo-colonial agricultural policy of individual family
farming organisation (Quick, 1977).

Quick's study, part of which covered the district, pinpointed some of the major reasons for the failure of the collectives as: poor structural organisation, lack of effective support from the central government, active opposition and resistance from local political and social interests.

What has remained of co-operatives, has largely been marketing co-operatives. Membership and participation into marketing co-operatives has been found to be very minimal in both Chikuwe and Sayiri.

Table 4.2  Co-operative Membership in Chikuwe and Sayiri

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1,755</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayiri</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chikuwe</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,871</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hedlund, 1980: Table 44.
What table 4.2 suggests is that the organisation of peasant farming along individual family lines, this has hardly supposed the increased membership into marketing co-operatives, or strong degree of commodity market integration. The overwhelming majority of peasant farmers, organized along individual farming family lines, are still engaged in agricultural production to meet their subsistence requirements.

The foregoing further suggest that - notwithstanding privatized land tenure growth within customary held lands, and family farming organisation - the degree of little integration and participation into the commodity market may be due to not only to the inability and differentiation of peasant households; but also suggests deepening impoverisation of scores of peasant households. Many of which have been relegated to depend/increasing proportions of non-agriculture earned income to miraculously remain at the threshold of starvation. While others have been converted into the force of rural labor.

4.4 Distribution of Peasant Resources

Apart from the land - to which we noted that the largest majority of peasant households cultivate an average of
less than 2 ha - labour, farming equipment and credit resources; constitute determining launching pads for peasant transformation.

labour

An examination into the sex and age distribution of population in Chikuwe and Sayiri, reveal the fragile existence if not absence of one of the most crucial factors in peasant production - able-bodied labour.

Table 4.3  Sex Distribution of Household Heads in Chikuwe and Sayiri

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Number in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1302</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hedlund and Lundahl, 1981:8

As can be seen in the table above, nearly a third of households were headed women in the two chiefs' areas. Which reiterates the, almost by now an axiomatic, assertion that women play a considerable role in peasant farming. The
above assertion should in no way be taken to imply that the said role of peasant women refers only to their production position as household heads. On the contrary, peasant women continue to be critical productive social forces specifically in agricultural production, even within male headed households.

Yet sadly enough, peasant women continue to this day to suffer under numerous traditional, cultural, socio-economic and official discrimination. In institutions such as farmers' training centres, for instance, peasant women continue to represent a proportion woefully less than the one they share as direct producers. The sexual bias proceeds and follow the few who are admitted in these farmers' training centres. Women trainees are largely confined to "home economics" courses. Which, however well-intended, are mostly irrelevant to peasant women, as producers, and not only as housewives.

Table 4.4 **Age Distribution of Household Heads in Chikuwe and Sayiri**;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>21-30</th>
<th>31-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hedlund and Lundahl, 1981:7
If we include, in addition to sex distribution, the age
distribution of peasant household heads; then, as table
4.4 indicates, over two thirds of peasant households are
headed by farmers of over the age of 40. Somewhere
Priestely (1978:56) has suggested that farming activit-
ies undertaken by this age group, especially the over
50 year age group, is "retirement farming". Priestely
reasons that both farming interest and the contribution
to total output made by this age group, is actually
declining (see also Hedlund and Lundahl, op.cit:7).

Priestely's assertion about retirement farming, is per-
haps illuminated when attention is focused onto time,
quantity and quality requirements of labour made by a
number of peasant production activities. Table 4.5
below clearly outlines the overal dominant role played
by what Lundahl and Hedlund call hand (labour). Oxen and
tractor utilisation by peasant farmers was at best
insignificant. Peasants could hardly hire, let alone
purchase and own either oxen or tractors.

Consequently more man-hours or more quantity of labour
units, is needed to cultivate a peasant's given area of
1 ha, using the "hand" and hoe than in the case where
either oxen or tractor is used. For instance, oxen plough
1 hectare using 60 man-hours, as compared to 240 man-hours expanded by a peasant using the hoe to cultivate the same area.

Table 4.5  Farming Techniques used by Peasants in Chikuwe and Sayiri.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Technique (% of Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Activity Hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploughing &amp; Hoeing</td>
<td>89.7 8.1 2.1 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrowing</td>
<td>15.6 81.5 2.6 0.3 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridging</td>
<td>1.5 92.3 5.9 0.2 0.1 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planting</td>
<td>0.6 98.7 0.6 0.1 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeding</td>
<td>6.7 92.2 1.1 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spraying</td>
<td>94.4 5.6 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvesting</td>
<td>3.1 96.0 0.8 0 0.1 -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lundahl and Hedlund, 1981:17
It is with the foregoing background that most peasant households in the district are ill-equipped to effectively and successfully confront qualitative and quantitative labour requirements to meet even their subsistence needs, let alone actively participate in the commodity market.

**non-agriculturally earned income**

Income earned by peasant households, apart from meagre subsistence farming "income", should come from non-agricultural sources. Yet the two areas of Sayiri and Chikuwe are said, by Hedlund and Lundahl (op.cit:15), to have up to 70 per cent of their total households not in receipt of any supplementary income at all.

From Table 4.6 below, it is evident that, relative to farming earned income - non-agricultural earned income played a very little role. Beer brewing scored the highest single non-agricultural source of income at nearly 15 per cent. It is not clear, however, as to exactly what role and proportion, if any, does income earned and remitted from urban areas constitute in the total peasant household's income.

A deduction which can be made from above is the following.
Table 4.6  **Regular Sources of Non-Agriculture Income in Chikuwe and Saviri.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>% of Total Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beer brewing</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual laboring</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop/Retailing</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capentry, pit, sawing &amp; charcoal burning</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricklaying and brickmaking</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basket making</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pot making</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacksmithing</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailoring</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Farming</strong></td>
<td><strong>69.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hedlund and Lundahl, 1981:15

That most peasant households in the district do not only produce at the margin of starvation; but that they are
equally lacking accessibility to any significant income from non-farming sources. Peasants' social and economic conditions of production are, however, far from being described as at a break-even point between subsistence and starvation. Indications abound, and strongly suggest, that there is in existence a powerful downward movement which far outweighs the upward movement in social and economic production life of the peasantry. This implies the deepening impoverishment of the peasantry which continues unabatedly, and is almost generalised in the district.

**Farming equipment**

It is now almost evident - from discussions above - that the hoe stands out as the most commonly owned and used farming equipment in the district's peasant community. Oxen, the ownership of which would render ownership of ox-drawn farming equipment a tangible possibility, are few and their spatial and social distribution is considerably unequal.

More than 93.3 per cent of 1,870 households in both Chikuwe and Sayiri, owned no pair of oxen whatsoever. Less than 1 per cent of total households owned between 2 and 5 pairs of oxen. Furthermore, of the 125 households which
owned trained oxen, 25 were located in Chikuwe. Sayiri had 117 pairs of trained oxen as compared to only 35 found in Chikuwe. Oxen hire was found to be common only among a trickle of "commercial oriented" peasant farmers (Table 4.7 and Hedlund and Lundahl, 1981:37).

Table 4.7 Number of Pairs of Oxen owned by Peasants in Chikuwe and Sayiri.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No of Pairs of oxen</th>
<th>No of Households</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 745</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 870</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hedlund, 1980: Table 40.

Ownership of other farm equipments other than oxen and the hoe, reflected the trend and picture obtained from above.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Bought</th>
<th>Self-Made</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxen Harness (%)</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(83.8)</td>
<td>(15.1)</td>
<td>(1.1)</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plough (%)</td>
<td>1,749</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(93.5)</td>
<td>(6.4)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrow (%)</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(99.1)</td>
<td>(0.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridger (%)</td>
<td>1,788</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(95.5)</td>
<td>(4.4)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox-Planter (%)</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(99.8)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand-Planter (%)</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(99.9)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivator (%)</td>
<td>1,856</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(99.2)</td>
<td>(0.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotch-Cart (%)</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(96.9)</td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize Sheller (%)</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(99.8)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnut Sheller (%)</td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (%)</td>
<td>1,857</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(99.3)</td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hedlund, 1980: Table 41
Demand elasticity of hired labour - notwithstanding the low level of its "wage", its high demand and unmistakable high marginal contribution to a peasant's total output - was effectively very insignificant, if not zero. The reason was evidently financial incapacity to hire labour even at that low level.

Table 4.9  Availability and Utilization of Hired Labour in both Chikuwe and Sayiri

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No of Households</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hired Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not Available</td>
<td>1 750</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available/Not</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normally Employed</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available/Normally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 869</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hedlund, 1980: Table 45
Consequently, about 94 per cent of all households in Chikuwe and Sayiri, could not employ hired labour to augment their critical labour shortage situation. About 3 per cent of households occasionally hired labour, while about 4 per cent normally or regularly hired labour. The last two peasant categories are clearly "commercial oriented" peasant farmers, whose active participation in the commodity market provides ample incentives and effective demand for hired labour.

Credit

Credit and financial institutions in the country, both private and public, are acknowledged as traditionally conservative and not forthcoming with credit to peasant farmers. They have either openly shunned or placed near-impossible requirements for peasants to obtain credit.

An example is cited, by Klepper (1979), of the so-called package scheme employed by the Agricultural Finance Company (AFC). Klepper contends that the scheme evolved a qualifying yardstick from a specific hectarage cultivated by its client. Below a certain minimum level, the scheme withheld granting financial support for hiring labour. Klepper notes that it so happened that most farmers
got deprived of this important facility of support to hire labour.

Besides the foregoing, Klepper found the credit coverage of the package scheme extremely limited. He observed that: "fewer than 5 per cent peasant households receive(d) loans from the Agriculture Finance Company" (1979:142).

Table 4.10 **Number of Households in Receipt of Loans**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No of Households</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Loan</td>
<td>1 815</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Received from AFC</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Received from Other</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 871</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hedlund, 1980: Table 53.

As can be seen from the table above, only 3 per cent of the total number of peasant households in the surveyed areas of the district received AFC and other institutions's loans. The vast majority of 97 per cent was excluded.
Cowie (1979) in a similar study conducted in Chinyanja Parish, ten kilometres from Chiapata town; confirms general observations about the impact of the PPS, and in particular about credit and financial institutions.

He states that the more a peasant household produced for the market — that is the increasing degree of integration and participation,— the more likely: "would it get assistance of a formal type" (Cowie, 1979:61). By formal assistance, Cowie meant services such: extension service, loans and training (see also Marter and Honeybone, 1975; 1976).

Conclusion

In our focused attention to Chipata district, we have observed that enforced penetration, spread and growth of colonial social and economic structures and relations of production; destroyed, undermined, modified and subjugated almost/political, economic and social spheres of African people's structures and relations of their material and cultural production.

We also noted that specific colonial-capitalist relations in the district set into motion a process of peasant
transformation which undermined, and in some areas eliminated altogether, customary land tenure and its dominant influence and prestige; brought into existence the emergence and growth of an alien organisation of peasant process of privatized family farming; and unleashed social and spatial differentiation, with its extreme material and cultural distribution of wealth consequences.

Within this colonial and neo-colonial historical process - political independence, it is now commonly acknowledged, effected minimum alterations to the fundamental nature and operation of colonial economic and social forces and structures - peasant transformation went, and is going, through two distinct and opposed conduits. The one, which has been widely described as proletarisation (Hyden, 1982:9-14); and the other one, which we may describe as bourgeoisification of the peasantry.

The latter route - through which very few peasants pass - leads "successful" peasants to the midst and company of so-called progressive, emergent and large-scale commercial capitalist farmers. The former route - through which the majority are unwillingly pushed, lead peasants to ultimately to relieve considerably on non-farming activities for subsistence. That is, being transformed into a social class of laborers.
Tasks and objectives as well as implementation of the LP, the IRDP and the growth centre strategy — given and within the concrete historical development process outlined above, as well as within broad objectives of the TNDP — is to launch an active and effective anti-colonial and anti-neo-colonial development process of structures and relations of production. As our examinations disclosed, it is a protracted, slow, fraught with set-backs and bitter process.

Previous chapters, as well this one, on the LP, growth centre strategy and Chipata district's objective socio-economic development processes; provide some weighty evidence: that the LP and IRDP as well as the growth centre strategy, are far from fully equipped to lead a successful socio-economic and political development process of peasant transformation, along desired socialist relations of production.
Chapter Five

Agropolitan Development: An Alternative Strategy?

The definition of agropolitan development is more difficult to do than to state what it entails. Some fragmentary statements suggest that agropolitan development is: "an approach to the development of large segments of the world periphery, the new regions of economic backwardness and dependency" (Friedman and Weaver, 1979:194).

Agropolitan development seeks, as its objective: "to facilitate a participation and more equal development which has a high priority the identification, production and equitable distribution of basic goods and services (the means of which are on) a territorial 'agropolitan' basis through an assembly of policies to devolve substantial political authority to agropolitan districts, to accelerate rural development to generate and retain local capital, to diversify production, and link rural and urban functions within single territorial units" (Douglass, 1979:34-35).

Assumptions upon which agropolitan development depart, are based on premises that:
i) development is essentially for man, around whom all its efforts and resources are to be directed;

ii) urban and rural elites have largely benefited from the conventional regional development approach of focusing on the increase in per capita national income, through investments in industrial and urban sectors;

iii) transformation into reality of the assumption that the distribution of wealth is automatically adjusted by the development process and fiscal policies, has worsened relative and absolute living standards of the majority of people;

iv) the hitherto treatment of regional development as a:"technical exercise in spatial economics and better co-ordination", while remaining tight-lipped on:"the nature of the state and the distribution of political and economic power", is nothing but a ploy designed to conceal the fact that the state has historically and objectively almost always served particular class interests (Douglass, ibid:4, 26; also Corraggio, 1972:39); and
v) regional development must predominantly concern itself with equal social development, rather its previous concern with spatial growth.

Basic units of agropolitan development are called 'agropolitan districts'. They are rural areas which possess relatively high population density, a town within the district of tens of thousand inhabitants, and a total district population (the majority of which are engaged in farming) of a few hundred thousands (Friedman and Douglass, 1975:43). Flexibility rather than blind adherence is advised regarding quantitative aspects of the model.

To successfully initiate and foster regional development, and to be able to 'symbiotically' integrate urban with rural development, an agropolitan district must be delegated substantial political powers for self-governance. So that the district will be able to check the core-periphery relationship of exploitation to the detriment of the latter. And also facilitate the encouragement of rural development directly accountable to the rural majority (Douglass, op. cit:24).
Conscious that autonomous agropolitan political power may be abused, guaranteeing safeguards and measures will necessarily have to be made to effectively distribute and decentralise political, economic and social bases of power - through legislative instruments and the creation of democratic structures which will, of necessity, have to be dominated and reflect the will of the majority. (Ibid:26). Power division between the national centre and the agropolitan district is supposed to be inseparable in linkage, mutual and reinforcing.

Douglass (Ibid:27) suggests that to prevent socio-economic leakages, an agropolitan district should have empowerment which include:

i) the control over local taxes and public expenditure;

ii) authority to devise and carry out development programmes;

iii) significant powers to effectively administer and implement the territorial and social distribution of capital held by banks and other financial institutions; and

iv) controls to prevent, if not completely eliminate, absence landlordism.
4.1 Critique of Agropolitan Development Strategy

It is perhaps explicit and implicit socialist elements contained in the agropolitan development strategy, which have drawn open and concealed criticism from some regional economic scholars.

Richardson (1978:137), by far one of the most defendant and promoter of the growth centre theory, outrightly rejected the notion of agropolitan development. He lays stress and questions the feasibility of implimenting the model. Yet the question of the model's feasibility, examined attentively, indicate that Richardson is concerned with issues of deeper and graver implications in the model. Because he holds that the implimentation of the model would, in his words: "require far reaching institutional and political reform". To which, it appears, Richardson would definitely not be happy about.

Hilhorst (1980) says that, notwithstanding all worthy and lofty objectives pursued by the model, he finds himself nonetheless inclined to agree with Richardson over the issue of the model's implimentation feasibility. Furthermore, he is at variance with, and queries, conditions which Friedman (1976) outlined for the implimenta-
tion of the model, as having not existed even in the pre-capitalist society (Hilhorst, 1980:36).

To Hansen (1981:35), the model has presented what he regards as two major difficulties. First, Hansen argues that the political structure of most underdeveloped countries are inimical to what he calls 'autarchic' development process proposed by the agropolitan strategy. In this respect, argues Hansen, the model requires what he terms a: "theory and programme of political revolution" (ibid). A revolution which would go far beyond the mere reshuffling of relative political and economic class positions. Second, he sounds a friendly note of caution, that while the idea may be correct, those who forecast the doom and downfall of, what he calls, the west; ought to be well advised that such prophecies have not materialised in the past.

The reference by Hansen to the west is, of course, made to the capitalist structures and relations of production. Respectable and learned, but nevertheless most dishonest a position adopted by 'disinterested' academics to conceal, at one and the same time promote, their ideological pursuits.
Friedman (1976:38) stated that necessary or prerequisite conditions for agropolitan development are found in two social formations - the pre-capitalist and socialist social formations. It is of interest to know precisely why Hilhorst conspicuously maintained his silence on the latter social formation, while he charged and challenged Friedman on the former.

Friedman further asserted that two conditions need to be met first, before the implemention of agropolitan development could be undertaken within a capitalist formation. First:" the communisation of productive wealth and "; second:" the equalisation of access to the use of social power ". Against sharp and persistent protestations as regards the difficulties, implemention feasibilities and revolutionary threat posed by agropolitan development on the 'west' or underdeveloped countries' so-called autarchic social formations - Friedman and Weaver's response was a calm statement that:" yet without them (conditions in a capitalist social formation), only limited progress can be made" (1979:195).

The agropolitan development model seems to cover and include - albeit in a comprehensive, integrated and particular socio-economic and ideological objectives - a number
of models and strategies. Stohr (1981:39) notes that agropolitan development strategy provides: "specific forms of social and economic organisation" to the approach of development from below or bottom-up development. The same goes for what he calls, basic needs as well as regional or selective spatial closure, approaches (ibid: 47; also Douglass, op.cit:18).

Major and common areas of agreement are evidently discernible between agropolitan development, on the one hand; and national socio-economic strategic objectives, most particularly the ones enunciated in the TNDP, on the other hand.

We strongly urge, for our part, that the model be rigorously given critical analysis. Its accepted should not be preceded by sentiments or some mass psychologicy, which may have been promoted by either organisation or individual or government. It should be preceded by thorough review of the model’s implications to concrete historical realities and aspirations of the country, to which it will be adopted and adapted.

The following points do not only present attributes which fuel and feed the discussion on the model, but also
earn the model as a worthy candidate of adoption by regional development planners: the model

First, unequivocally discloses its socialist orientation, as well as state specific preconditions for the implementation of socio-economic development;

Second, boldly confront, on a partisan stance, sensitive socio-political issues such as the role and functions of the state and class relations and conflicts; which do not only influence the content and direction of development policy, but also the distribution of development benefits accruing therfrom;

Third, draws a rather concrete framework within which a meaningful process of decentralisation and one party participatory democracy development activities can effectively be undertaken; and

Fourth, casts some critically important light to mutual and beneficial relationship between regions (districts), the national metropolitan and international system.
of models and strategies. Stohr (1981:39) notes that agro-
politan development strategy provides: "specific forms of social and economic organisation" to the approach of development from below or bottom-up development. The same applies to the basic needs as well as regional or selective spatial closure approaches (Ibid:47; also Douglass, op.cit:18).

Given national socio-economic strategic objectives - particularly objectives enunciated in the TNDP - its possible to discern and isolate major common areas in agreement with agropolitan development precepts. These areas of, potential, agreement include the following. The model:

First, unequivocally pronounces itself, and advocates, for socialist rural - and peasant-transformation and specifically outlines preconditions for the implementati-
on of such a programme;

Second, boldly confronts and adopts a clear partisan po-
sition to fundamental socio-political issues such as the active economic role and functions of the state in class relations and conflicts; which role influences both the content (substance), direction and pace of development policy implementation, and distribution of material and cultural wealth proceeding therefrom;
Third, draws a definite economic and social framework within which political processes and structures of decentralisation of popular one party participatory democracy development should effectively be undertaken by, and be directly beneficial to, the majority of rural masses; and

Fourth, casts crucial enlightenment to the existence of contradictory and exploitative relationships between and within, on the one hand, regions and, on the other hand, the national centre; the analogy proceeds and apply on an international plane between the national state, on the one hand, and the international exploitative economic system, on the other hand.

Emerging from the discussion above, is the notion that the implementation of agropolitan development carries with it social, economic and political implications of fundamental consequences; of both national and international scope.

Emerging also from the analysis, is that - within particular historical development realities of Zambia - the province rather than the district, suitably qualifies as the model's elementary unit.
The level of economic productive forces and their operating system may legitimately be questioned whether they have developed an adequate sensitivity capacity - or, which amounts to the same thing, the marginal propensity of response - to fiscal and monetary policy regulations at the provincial level. It is, however, unquestionable that some provinces have almost developed to that level. This questions helps to underscore the practical and applied aspect of agropolitan development to Zambian conditions. Each aspect of necessity requires undivided attention, indepth and critical analysis, careful modification and adaptation - to proceed adoption. Implementation considerations are themselves an involved and determining engagement. They can hardly be emphasised.

Most pertinent a question, however, a question which has been responsible for many regional and rural development strategies' failures - is the question of social and economic interests directly and indirectly involved. It is an established fact that regional and rural interests have employed their powerful political, social and economic influences and connections; to frustrate and eventually bring down development strategies which they perceived as an actual, or potential, threat to their vital interests.
To this regard therefore, the agropolitan strategy reiterates historical social reality so often overlooked by especially economists. That almost every economic (regional or sectoral) development strategy inevitably is selective and differentiates socially, in neo-colonial and capitalist formations. That particular social groups participate and derive benefits from specific development strategies at the exclusion and expense of other social groups.

Disregard, to overlook and to accord secondary consideration to the above fact, almost constitutes the original inroad for problems and failure to development strategies with aspirations such as those of the TNDP. It is our considered view that the growth centre strategy and, in particular, the LP have paid little attention (if any) to the above question. For that matter, they are structurally incapable to be and do otherwise.
Chapter Six

Conclusion

This study originally set out to critically examine the growth centre strategy and its rural component, the Lima Programme, as instruments of effecting a development process of peasant transformation, consistent with socialist objectives of Zambia for rural development. Such an examination proceeded within the confines of:

i) a critical theoretical analysis of the growth centre theory, both in general and with particular Zambian experiences;

ii) a comparative analysis of the LP and the PFS, with their specific impacts on:
- the land tenure,
- the organisation of peasant farming, and
- the distribution of peasant resources; and

iii) conduct a case study of the district of Chipata in Eastern Province.

Evidence emerging from our analysis point out that historical development conditions which gave rise to, and which
had to be defended and promoted by, the growth centre theory, could hardly equip regional development to launch a successful programme of peasant socialist transformation. Because such an unequivocal theory of unequal economic development - implemented within dominant colonial and neo-colonial socio-economic production and distribution relations of considerable disparity - could not but reproduce unequal distribution and exploitative relations of production.

Consequently, post-colonial socio-economic aspirations of an egalitarian and socialist society, have remained far removed and unrelated, if not in conflict, to concrete social and economic development processes unfurled in the country.

Zambia's neo-colonial social and economic development relations, are themselves inextricably linked to, and a product of international capitalist development.

A mono-culture and (primary product) export-based economy was enforced and imposed in Zambia, and subsequently integrated on an unequal and exploitative relationship to the "western" commodity system. With the result that almost every domestic process of economic and social deve-
Development today is greatly dependent on and determined by external economic development processes.

Within the domestic spatial and social planes, albeit with considerable defects and distortions, relations and structures of the "western" economic system have been reproduced. Industrial and large-scale agricultural centres' economic growth and social domination have invariably earned their growth at the expense, and to almost the exclusion, of backward peripheral regions and impoverished rural community.

To that extent, it is the transformation of the neo-colonial domestic formation as well as Zambia's position and participation in international economic relations - upon which rural and peasant transformation eventually depends.

Our analysis of Chipata district showed that the enforced penetration, spread and growth of colonial as well as neo-colonial social and economic structures, did not only subjugate, destroy, undermine and modify all political, economic and social spheres of African people's formation. But also set into motion a process of peasant transformation which continues to undercut and eliminate the
the hitherto productive influence and prestige of customary land and land tenure; nurtured an organisation process of privatised peasant production; and social as well as spatial differentiation.

The above process has, and continues, to proceed through two conduits. The one, described as proletarisation of the peasantry. Through which the majority of peasants pass. And the second, which we describe as bourgeoisieification of the peasantry; through which a trickle of peasants pass, and is the concrete, structural and implement- ation objective of the LP.

Effects of the above process have been the increasing acquisition for land of economic value and its exchange; landlessness, social impoverishment and out-migration from Chipata district for non-farming employment. To and throughout all this, the LP and growth centre strategy, does not seem to stand incapacitated of preventing the process. On the contrary, indications are that the LP and growth centre strategy are, perhaps surreptitiously or unwittingly, encouraging these developments.

The introduction of agropolitan development strategy as a possible alternative, was with the intentions of dra-
wing focus of research, academic and political discussion. Specific merits and demerits of dating and adopting agropolitan development, its implementation and implications within regions of the country, could only be raised and not given detailed analytic treatment. Such an exercise, we believe, constitute altogether a separate study. Suffice to state here that several common grounds of agreement between the TNDP and agropolitan development objectives, offer us reasonable grounds to urge attention towards the development strategy.
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