CHAPTER IV:

ADMINISTRATORS AND SETTLERS IN THE NWP COLONIAL SOCIETY

It is arguable that every public activity during the colonial period was performed against the backdrop of the ubiquitous colonial administration, so that the District Administrator took the role of producer or prompter where he was not already playing the lead, . . . . To missionaries and merchants, soldiers and settlers, to the professional and technical branches of the Colonial Service, and to all Africans--princes, peasants and politicians alike--the omnipresence of the DC constituted an ineluctable consideration in their every thought, word and move.

If the ratio of colonial administrators to the African population was proverbially slim, to the point of being miniscule under the system of indirect rule and scarcely generous even in instances of close administration . . . in the final analysis, like the Thin Red Line of the 93rd Regiment at Balaklava, the Thin White Line of colonial administrators was also tipped with steel.

The strength of the steel frame [lay] in coercion, collaborators, confidence, and competence.

A. H. M. Kirk-Greene{1}

The BSAC never made the quick profits that its directors and stockholders initially envisioned, despite its dual control over the politics and economy of the contorted geographic area known as Northern Rhodesia. In 1911 it tried to rectify the situation by combining North Eastern and North Western Rhodesia into Northern Rhodesia, but profits still proved elusive. Meanwhile, humanitarian

groups in Britain agitated against colonial rule administered by a business enterprise only nominally supervised by the imperial government. Consequently, as a result of stockholders' discontent because of no profits, the Company's desire to be rid of administrative responsibilities, and this humanitarian agitation, the British Colonial Office (CO) assumed direct control of the territory in 1924.

A new colonial society established itself in the territory during the BSAC period and consolidated itself under the Colonial Office's administration. As in Angola and the Congo, autochthonous Africans composed the vast majority of the population; yet a tiny number of whites--consisting of government administrators, European settlers, and missionaries--rigidly controlled Northern Rhodesia. As these social elements became increasingly fixed, the pattern of interaction among them was ever more distinct, especially during the interwar era.

The BSAC and the CO successively created and empowered loyal administrators to extend the government's control throughout the territory. Then, these administrators further exercised the Company's governmental powers by keeping the peace, collecting taxes, and organizing African labor. Consequently, they became the supreme element in the new society.

Like its predecessor, the Colonial Office believed that the colony's new economy required white settlers acquainted with western technology, who could exploit the
land and minerals quickly and efficiently. Accordingly, they offered these immigrants a variety of entrepreneurial and financial incentives. For example, the BSAC sited the rail line through the fertile farmland around Lusaka and the Tonga plateau of the Southern Province. Compared to miners in South Africa and Europe, the miners here received high salaries; farmers received cheap land and enjoyed cheap African labor; and storekeepers and other businessmen made large profits. Finally, the BSAC and the CO gave these settlers a disproportionately large role in government.

The missionaries comprised the third element of the new colonial society, but embodied a very different side of the motherland. As products of nineteenth century humanitarianism and religious revivalism that had helped ameliorate some of the excesses of industrial capitalism and imperialist expansion, they wanted to uplift the Africans by converting them to Christ. To fulfill this goal and satisfy their voluntary supporters back home, they always tried to convert the so-called heathen savage to Christ.

From the time of their arrival in Northern Rhodesia, these missionaries faced an enormous dilemma. The administrators and settlers refused to provide even basic health care and education to the African people. While most missionaries were eager to provide these needed social services in order to entice Africans to salvation, they often lacked the money and staff to do so. Education and health were only one part of salvational objectives, yet these could
easily become more important than evangelism.

Each mission society, and often each mission station, chose its own course in solving the dilemma. Neither government officials nor settlers nor other missionaries dictated policy. Hence in parts of the Northern Province the Church of Scotland provided excellent social services. Yet many small evangelical missions, such as the SAGM in the NWP, provided few and preferred to stress direct evangelism. This autonomy gave the missionaries a social power over the African people similar to the political and economic power of the administrators and settlers. For example, each mission determined the quality and quantity of the education provided. It could moreover either consult with the people or autocratically dictate policy. [2]

Although a microcosm of Northern Rhodesian society, NWP society had also distinct variations. They were created by formal and informal imperial policy, the lack of white settlers, an atypical mission situation, and atypical African ethnic groups that the European elite regarded as 'backward'. Ultimately, these variables made the NWP one of the territory's most isolated and provincial societies, at the bottom of the territorial heap.

NWP society illustrates some important social

[2] This extensive Church of Scotland work was connected with their comprehensive programs in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Nyasaland. For a thorough treatment of the latter, see Roderick J. Macdonald, "A History of African Education in Nyasaland, 1875-1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1969).

processes that took place in Northern Rhodesia. But to understand these processes and their short- and long-term consequences, at least four key questions must be raised and answered with regard to each of the NWP’s social groups: What characteristics distinguished each of them? How did each perceive itself and the others? What objectives motivated each to enter and remain in the region? And most importantly, what patterns of interaction contributed to the creation and maintenance of the new social order? Then satisfactory answers must be found for these questions.

This chapter and the next attempt to answer the first three questions. Chapter VI tries to answer the last. Part Two then analyzes one of the many results: the development of the contemporary educational system.

BSAC Administrators Occupy the NWP, 1903-1924

Shortly after the beginning of the twentieth century, the BSAC officials who spread throughout the NWP typified what the British historian, A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, has called the “Thin White Line . . . tipped with steel.” These men tended to be ex-military officers or general adventurers, whose background, philosophy, and actions furthered the policies of the new territorial government. As elsewhere, they were expected to occupy the region, to establish ‘order’ by stopping the slave trade and ‘tribal
war', and to make the people 'respect' the new government. Then, they were to organize a rudimentary administrative system so that they could levy taxes. Although few in number, these men possessed both enormous power and the self-confidence needed to wield it. Knowing that they represented the world's strongest imperial power reinforced and enhanced both. Such strength did not need to be displayed often to be effective.[3]

These officers primarily occupied the last part of North West Rhodesia to be entered by BSAC administrators. They first designated it as "Kaonde-Lunda District." Although the boundaries changed many times, the area covered much of modern day Kasempa, Solwezi, and Mwinilunga Districts.

Occupation began in 1902 when Captain Stennet established a camp at Kasempa with the support of a regiment of Barotse Native Police. In the process, he seemingly encountered and drove out Mambari slave traders. In 1906-7 his colleagues completed this basic task for the territorial government. By that time the King of Italy had fixed the MWP's boundaries, enabling a Mr. Bellis and a Sergeant-Major Frykberg—both operating under the jurisdiction of Native Commissioner (NC) E. A. Copeman—to establish a camp in the center of the new Mwinilunga District, the last northwestern outpost of the BSAC. To do so, they crushed

the last of the slave trade and captured several European outlaws, who were hiding where the jurisdictions of the Portuguese, Belgians, and British was uncertain. [4] The occupation of Solwezi District followed a different pattern because it involved prospectors and miners as well as BSAC administrators. George Grey originally "discovered" copper at Kansanshi Mine in 1899 when Chief Kapijimpanqa took him to ancient mine workings. After mining began in 1901 under European supervision, the men in charge of the mine also functioned as ad hoc occupiers and representatives of the Company. In 1905, a government officer temporarily located a camp at Shilenda. Only in 1909 did administrators permanently open "Kansanshi District." In 1912 when he was restationed at Solwezi Boma, approximately sixteen kilometers away, the government per-

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manently renamed the district Solwezi.[5]

These BSAC officials also occupied Balovale District in Barotseland, which then included most of Kabompo District. They did so under a set of rules that differed, at least cosmetically, from those followed in Kaonde-Lunda Province.

Officially Balovale was included when the BSAC, in the name of Britain, superimposed its power over Barotseland's traditional hierarchy. It did not need to be occupied. Supposedly Lewanika, the Lozi king (litunga), already ruled it. Actually when J. H. Venning founded the Balovale boma in 1908, he established one joint and complex colonial presence comprising the Barotse, the BSAC, and the British. Although the pretense of Lozi suzerainty fooled no one, it was necessary in light of the 1905 British/Portuguese division of the upper Zambezi Valley. Until 1942 Venning's successors continued to operate under this fiction.[6]

After these individuals minimally occupied the area in the name of the King and the Company, they assumed that a government framework would be quickly established. In most districts--then called 'sub-districts'--it was. Kasempa

[5] For information on Grey and the Kansanshi Mine, see Chap. III. For these other details, see Clarke, "Kasempa," pp. 62-4.

provides an example of the process. The BSAC posted a minimal number of staff at the new boma. Within a few years, this staff consisted of a Native Commissioner who administered this large 'sub-district'; one or two other Europeans who assisted the Commissioner mainly by supervising clerical workers and African police; one or two African clerks; and the 'African Native Police', probably not more than twenty men most of the time.

As the forerunner of the District Commissioner (DC), the Native Commissioner headed everything. After establishing the Company's suzerainty and then an administration, he maintained the whole operation. He executed the Company's policy and in turn represented the district to superior officials. He served as the region's magistrate, judging those the BSAC regarded as disobedient or criminal. For instance in 1907 on Company instructions, Copeman imposed a poll tax of five shillings. In the normal course of duty, he toured the district taking a census of its occupants and collecting the tax money from them either in cash or in kind. Then he punished individuals who did not pay and who tried to flee from his entourage. [7]

The lack of initial resistance in Kasemba sub-district seemed to indicate that the Company had successfully occupied the area and established a satisfactory

[7] For Copeman and the poll tax, see Kakoma, "Mwinilunga." Macpherson (Anatomy, p. 192) aptly noted that such early BSAC "agents appear generally to have taken the law into their own hands."
government. But by 1911 the taxes were too high in relation to the money available in the region and dissatisfaction increased. The Native Commissioner, W. H. Hazell, tolerated no dissension. So when a white gold seeker was killed, he responded rapidly. P. C. D. Clarke chronicled the events.

Mr. Ohlund was murdered by three Kaonde at Shindamona gold workings, thirteen miles north of Kasempa. He was killed by shots fired through his dining room window while he sat at his typewriter after dinner, and there was no obvious motive. It became clear that the Kaonde were in a dangerous mood. A fort was constructed at Kasempa and police reinforcements arrived. Rigorous action was taken by Mr. W. H. Hazell to capture the murderers, and he received the loyal support of Kalusha Kasempa VIII [the Kaonde chief recognized by the officials] . . . . It is recorded that 'Mr. Hazell's methods of bringing home to the Kaonde the fact that the murder of white men was a matter not lightly to be considered were wonderfully efficient and are likely to have a lasting effect on the present generation'. . . . On 11th November, 1912, the three murderers were hanged in public at Kasempa . . . before all Kaonde chiefs and a number of headmen and tribesmen. It is recorded—'The execution had a sobering and restraining effect on the Bakonde for a considerable time'. [8]

Hazell decisively revealed the "tip of steel." After that, no notable activity hindered political consolidation. In this fashion a handful of men ruled Kasempa, an area as large as southern England, but with far fewer people.

The task of establishing and consolidating government was not always so easy. Mwinilunga proved especially difficult because the district was remote from territorial headquarters and the two new international

[8] Clarke, "Kasempa," pp. 64-5. Macpherson gives the events a territorial perspective. He indicates Hazell was a ruthless man; see Anatomy, pp. 116-7, 161-3.
boundaries were close, and finally because one administrator
had been particularly cruel and callous and some of the
Lunda had initially resisted.

In 1907 when Copeman attempted to impose a poll tax
in Mwinilunga, Kasanza, a prominent Lunda leader, and his
followers resisted. Bellis was killed and Copeman himself
only narrowly escaped an ambush. Kasanza then fled into
Angola. For the next few years, the situation worsened.
The BSAC appointed A. G. MacGregor who proceeded to burn
'huts' and to order other 'punishments'. Because of
Mwinilunga's isolation from Kasempa, Copeman neither noticed
nor checked MacGregor's actions for almost a year. In that
time a majority of the population fled into Angola or the
Congo and the district was severely depopulated. Copeman
lamented that the people's trust had been destroyed and
would be hard to restore. [9]

Only in 1912 after F. V. Bruce Miller took charge
did officials really establish a stable administration in
Mwinilunga District. But Bruce Miller could initiate
taxation only slowly after 1914. Even then, he could do so
only with the very reluctant intervention of Dr. Walter
Fisher at Kalene Mission. Many people trusted the
missionary and he, in turn, believed that paying taxes was

narrative of these events in Mwinilunga. In addition, for
these events in Mwinilunga, Solwezi, and Kasempa, Macpherson
used a source that, unfortunately, I did not: Rhodes House,
Diaries and Letters of Theodore Williams. See Macpherson,
preferable to the disruption caused by fleeing. [10]

After occupying the region and setting up a minimal government organization, officials carried out administrative changes in the NWP. In the BSAC period, the most significant changes occurred in 1916 and 1923. In the first, Frank H. Melland changed the headquarters of Kaonde-Lunda Province from Kasempa to Solwezi. When Melland left just before the Colonial Office took control of government, P. E. Hall reestablished Kasempa as the center of the province. Under Hall's supervision, Kasempa, Solwezi, and Mwinilunga became districts and together formed Kasempa Province. [11]

Over a period of time, a series of similar capricious changes led directly to the formation of the NWP. For approximately two years in the middle of the depression these districts lost their provincial status and became outposts of an enormous West Luangwa Province. In 1942 the present-day boundaries of the NWP were created. Balovale District was excised from Barotseland and joined to Kasempa, Solwezi, and Mwinilunga in the Kaonde-Lunda Province.

[10] His full name was Frederick Vernon Bruce Miller. 'Bruce Miller' was an unhyphenated surname. Like other officials, he inflicted many hardships on the people because the BSAC demanded that he do so. Like Melland, he later reflected on these early years. As noted in later chapters, he continued to serve the district. He spoke Lunda and married Dr. Fisher's daughter, Katolo. See the Bruce Miller Papers, Historical Manuscripts, HM 17 (M 1/5/1), NAZ.

Between 1946 and 1954 the area became part of the Western (now Copperbelt) Province. In 1946 Kabompo District was created. Finally, the Northwestern Province (NWP) assumed its modern form and name in 1954.

Melland was one of the most instrumental officers in initiating many of the changes prior to 1924. As the most outstanding BSAC officer, he was an experienced Native Commissioner and Magistrate near retirement. He undertook his duties seriously and vigorously. His letters, periodic reports, and perceptive and thorough ethnographic book on the Kaonde indicate a remarkable empathy for "his" people. Thus when Melland praised the Africans for their cooperation in World War I, his phrase "granted the work was 'compulsory'" can be easily glossed over. Yet the phrase tells why an overwhelming percentage of adult males assisted in the war. Voluntary and involuntary cooperation cannot be easily distinguished.[12]

Melland's words reveal serious, inherent flaws in the whole BSAC system. A few lonely and isolated representatives exerted almost absolute political and economic control over their subjects. Such power entrapped even men of the highest integrity and honor. Abuse was not only easy, but even necessary, as in Melland's case. Thus actions by MacGregor, the worst abuser of this power in the

NWP, do not seem extraordinary. Nor do MacGregor's actions compare with events taking place elsewhere, whether by BSAC officers in the territory at large, or by representatives of Leopold's Congo with its 'red rubber', or Portuguese officials of Angola with forced labor. Colonial representatives' actions served imperialism by forcing Africans to accept Europeans as overlords.

Melland's writings show that neglect of the NWP's Africans typified the BSAC period. In a remarkable prologue to his Annual Report in 1921, quoted in Appendix C, he described a "regrettable undercurrent which is difficult to analyse." He then explained why the people appeared to be "dissatisfied with the Administration--or rather, with white domination, . . . . even though they were powerless to change things." The causes centered on laws and regulations that often neglected the population and hence did not seem "reasonable" to them. Neglect involved low payment for labor and no real "freedom of contract" since the "ordinary native knows that he cannot really fix or bargain about, his rate of pay--which has decreased." It also focused on the paucity of visible returns for the taxes the Africans paid since there was a lack of medical assistance [and] education." Africans also deeply felt the "unreasonableness of our laws" that interfered with traditional customs.[13]

Melland eloquently argued, "The fact that we collect tax, keep order, suppress crime, is nothing in itself. It is essential as a start, but it is not a result; and surely it is not our 'aim?' If we proceed no further it appears to be the negation of our right to rule." Needless to say, such frank reports and defense of the people did not endear Melland to the central BSAC administration. His question was never answered. His statement becomes an appropriate condemnation of the regime.[14]

Most certainly, the BSAC callously disregarded all social services for Africans. Since later chapters detail the lack of educational provisions and their implications, the following examples make the point here. Except in Barotseland, where the Lozi lityanga maintained some power and the BSAC felt obligated to partially adhere to an initial agreement; and except for a small school in Livingstone township, the Company spent nothing on African education in the whole territory before 1924. When mission societies requested it "to accept responsibility for subsidizing mission school[s] the administration declined, pleading its administrative deficit as an excuse."[15]

Nor did the Company spend much money on medicine, let alone medical facilities, for the African. In 1917 Fisher's campaign against tropical ulcers illustrates the

lack of interest. Traveling great distances, he and his helpers vaccinated and treated thousands of the afflicted. But as he lamented in private correspondence to his brother-in-law, a physician in the United Kingdom, "the administration have offered us 50 [pounds], ... for 1915, but will allow nothing for 1916. Seeing [expenses] totalled 700 [pounds], they evidently do not think much of the lives of the people here." His basic health program had to be almost completely funded by contributions from overseas supporters. What these voluntary agencies did not do on their own initiative remained undone. [16]

Given these severe constraints, many local administrators like Melland governed their subjects as well as they could. These men not only urged voluntary agencies to operate worthy programs, but also started and maintained their own projects. Melland describes several of the latter at the end of his 1921 report (see Appendix C) such as Bruce Miller encouraging traditional blacksmithing in Mwinilunga and cotton growing in Kasemba. They did this work, however, with the clear understanding that the government would contribute only minimal sums of money.

In 1924 the demise of the BSAC administration and the institution of direct Colonial Office rule pleased all the divisions of the new colonial society. Although it expanded the empire cheaply by making the Africans passive

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[16] Fisher to Darling, 20 Feb. 1917 (folios 1684-91), Walter Fisher Papers, NAZ.
subjects who were malleable to the administration's demands, the Company rule had no positive impact on the NWP. The new administration could hardly be worse and might be better.

Administrators of Stagnation, 1924-1945.

The BSAC never pretended to develop areas like the NWP unless it benefited the Company as a business enterprise. The British Government through the Colonial Office promised more. As its cornerstone it promised and provided a more competent, albeit minimal, government. By the mid-1930s it sent a corps of well-trained, well-screened, and well-disciplined young administrators. This corps' efficiency, which made it cheap and effective, especially pleased the imperial government. It was, however, a two-edged sword, capable of both governing well and exploiting African labor, whichever and whenever the colonial government so desired.

For much of the colonial era, Ralph Furse controlled the appointments of young men into the administrative corps. He molded the group according to his ideal of imperial leadership and imposed uniform imperial standards. While prizing a quick and analytic mind, he regarded a good character and personality as well as a suitable background and training as more important. To him, those who possessed the qualities of a good prefect and headboy in an elite
British public boarding school made good DCs. Under Purse’s supervision, young Oxbridge men continually left the United Kingdom for all corners of the empire. {17}

Purse’s young administrative proteges clearly shared common traditions and a similar vision. For them, the empire was, or could become, noble and glorious and its world-wide diversity could become a great asset. To achieve this ideal, however, each appointee had to play his part. In helping rule the empire, he had a dual duty to government and to its subjects, although government always came first if a conflict between the two arose. Since most were motivated by a positive vision of providing benevolent and fair government, their objective was to balance these dual duties for the good of all. One DC, reminiscing on Northern Rhodesia and the NWP, stated that the senior imperial administration eventually failed when it forgot that “the business of Government where two races are living together, is to govern without fear or favour to each of them.” {18}

By the 1930s most NWP officials possessed the


background that Purse desired and shared these qualities with officials in other parts of the empire. When appointed, the young men fulfilled minor duties as junior officers and during different periods were called Assistant District Commissioners (ADC), Assistant District Officers (ADO), Cadets, and Probationers. The best later became DCs and then senior territorial officials. Senior administrators transferred them constantly, either within a particular territory or to another part of the empire. Because of this relatively uniform set-up, generated and sustained under Purse, NWP administrators remained the most homogeneous body in NWP society and with their counterparts elsewhere. [19]

These local officers, especially the DCs, had enormous power. Short, a noteworthy DC who served after World War II, described this power as it existed until the end of the colonial era in 1964.

The District Commissioner was the captain of the ship; responsibility rested on him alone. Within the District he was supreme and enjoyed very great power and patronage; he had the means to make life uncomfortable for the dissenter or malcontent. Men from the town, even then, returned to the village with new and disturbing ideals. The necessity of living, the pressure of Headman and of Chief, and the very presence of the Boma, partially re-absorbed them within the framework of village life, and their ideas were heard no more. Dissent, . . . was unknown, unimaginable and unimagined.

Thus along with reasonable competence, Short and other administrators ruled with confidence bordering on

[19] For titles used by and levels of authority in the Overseas Civil Service, see Kirk-Greene, "Thin White Line," p. 32.
arrogance.\[20\]

Short's quotation confirms Kirk-Greene's concluding argument that tiny numbers of local administrators throughout the British Empire succeeded through "coercion, collaborators, confidence and competence." Short especially illustrates the increasingly sophisticated use of coercion and collaborators. By his time, the military-type coercion used by Copeman, Hazell, and MacGregor had been abandoned and relegated to local folklore. But a deep chasm lay even between these men's methods and those used late in the BSAC period by administrators like Melland and Bruce Miller. As the colonial government became more firmly entrenched and methods continued to evolve, Melland's successors no longer needed to recruit involuntary labor.\[21\]

Short clearly relied on the local colonial social structure and on the vague and amorphous threat of an all-encompassing, omnipresent and omnipotent world empire. His colleagues became so confident and competent as administrators that Short felt that the "British Empire was far too large an institution to descend to petty acts of persecution," even against an annoying group like the Jehovah's Witness. In fact dissident groups presented these administrators with a type of chess game challenge. The DC must keep them harmless without resorting to overt force and


without using government funds unnecessarily. [22]

Short shows that one of the most effective forms of control was the use of African collaborators, leaders who could minimize and suppress dissension cheaply and efficiently. These included a "subordinate bureaucracy," a new form of African leadership that evolved rapidly and encompassed clerks, teachers, and even mission evangelists. From 1924 until after World War II, however, the administrators successfully manipulated headmen and chiefs, traditional—or supposedly traditional—rulers, through the hazy policy of indirect rule. [23]

In the NWP, as in much of the empire and territory, indirect rule had considerable administrative significance and provided a wide appeal to all social elements. Supposedly, it had "intrinsic merit of its own [and would] preserve all that was best in traditional institutions, whilst enabling Africans gradually to learn the arts of civilization, blending the old with the new without compelling black men to discard ways prematurely." This mystique made indirect rule appealing to humanitarians, especially missionaries, and also to Africans because it gave the latter an official voice. Its real appeal to both territorial and imperial governments and to the white

[22] Short, Sunset, p. 31. For further comments on the Jehovah’s Witness, see Chap. X.

[23] The phrase "subordinate bureaucracy" is used by Kirk-Greene, "Thin White Line," p. 41. For further examples of this collaboration, see especially Chap. XII (A Conclusion).
settlers, however, was that it would save "both money and work." [24]

Consequently, after approximately two decades of direct administrative rule in the NWP, the territorial government initiated indirect rule with ordinances that were "models of paternal benevolence." Indirect rule encouraged chiefs to assume a slightly more formal, and supposedly more progressive, leadership in the new political order. But it never really worked as many of its believers envisioned and simply became another administrative tool. Government chiefs increasingly became puppets. Indirect rule did, however, provide occasions for a more frank exchange of views between the African population and the local colonial officials, as shown in Chapters IX-XI. [25]

A pragmatic imperial philosophy encouraged administrators to use such guidelines as indirect rule in running their districts. In his autobiography, Furse noted that "for most of my official career the Colonial Office did not appear to possess anything which you could call a general policy. At the time this may well have been wise, for it was then working in a field whose salient feature was a bewildering and kaleidoscopic variety." While territorial headquarters determined many specific policies, such

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[25] For these quotations, see Rotberg, *Nationalism*, p. 50.
carefully picked administrators seemed to thrive on vaqueness. Local DCs, as the frontline for the imperial government and the foremost element of colonial society, found this philosophy an appropriate daily guide in realizing their dream of empire. This philosophy provided both a vision and the method: coercion, collaborators, confidence and competence. The philosophy expected them to 'get on with it' and also encouraged personal initiative. When problems arose, the local officers took responsibility for specific decisions, but always within the broad parameters of imperial guidelines and territorial policies. [26]

In the rural NWI society each DC became the honorary father and guide for his district. He viewed other segments of society from his lofty position, but also knew he must employ restraint. For him, settlers, traders, and missionaries, as well as the African population, had fixed places in the new society. Although traders and settlers were few, the DC regarded them as the businessmen who represented the economic interests of the new society. Likewise, he regarded the missionaries as 'do-gooders', obligated by their calling to provide religion and social services such as education and medicine. Finally, he regarded the African population as his children, firmly believing that they needed protection while they learned the rules of the society that he represented.

After 1924 the guidelines and policies that DCs followed simply continued the BSAC's neglect. Despite progressive pronouncements about helping 'backward' regions, the Northern Rhodesian Government largely maintained the status quo in the NWF. A sustained policy of nondevelopment and strict economy remained the by-words for this region. Extremely limited statistics are available, but between 1923 and 1932 the government seems to have allocated less than four hundred pounds sterling annually (recurrent and capital expenditures taken together) in support of all social programs. The government's determination to save money by only working through reluctant and poor missions minimized all social services. [27]

Furthermore in the NWF, the central government made few provincial administrative appointments and changes and paid little attention to the economic infrastructure. Several able BSAC men such as Bruce Miller had been retained. Other administrators entered and left in the normal rotation of government. The total establishment for the province, however, increased only slightly. Numbers probably never exceeded twenty in both Kaonde-Lunda Province and Balovale District of Barotseland. Likewise, government

[27] By 1932 the financial situation had improved slightly. Both Chitokoloki and Kalene had been given educational grants of between 200 and 300 pounds; Mutanda/Mukinge received a small boarding grant, and several missions received small grants for hospital supplies. Furthermore, in 1927-28, the Board governing the Barotse National Fund approved the building of and support for a hospital in Balovale. See "Barotse Trust Fund, 1925-1930," ZA 5/1/1, NAZ.
built a minimal road network that enabled lorries to travel
only between Elizabethville or the Northern Rhodesian
copperbelt and the main administrative centers of Solwezi,
Kasempa, and Mwinilunga.\[28\]

In this unstated and nondevelopment program for the
NWP, the local DCs and their assistants played a neutral
role. Occupying the base of the imperial pyramid, they
could not change the policy that relegated the NWP to the
bottom. They were expected, however, to share opinions and
make positive suggestions, and many faithfully reported the
NWP situation and offered a wide range of suggestions to
superiors in Livingstone or Lusaka. These DCs placed the
NWP in the wider perspective of the territory and Empire.
They knew that compared to many other regions, the NWP was
undeveloped or, as they preferred to say, 'backward'. They
also quickly learned that the local mission agencies were
not only reluctant, but also too internally handicapped to
substantially change the situation. Just like Melland, they
realized that the area urgently required basic social
services from some mission and/or government agency. In
1933 E. H. Cooke (DC, Mwinilunga) discussed education and
made these points.

Owing to the lack of schools the local is making no
progress whatsoever. The need for a really enterprising
mission, of the Livingstonia type, is imperative if
these people, acknowledged the most superstitious and
backward in Northern Rhodesia, are to make progress.
The alternative is a good Government school and several

\[28\]By 1926 a road was open between Elizabethville
and Solwezi and Kasempa.
out-schools under direct control of a Superintendent of Native Education. These Missions have no idea of what other institutions are doing and [are] content to drift along year after year making little or no progress. The annoying part, from an ADVANCEMENT OF THE NATIVE point of view is that they have the monopoly of education in the District and unless Government moves in the matter and establishes schools and hygienic centres the Lunda/Andembo remains the Cinderella of the Territory.[29]

Like Cooke, other administrators strongly and repeatedly advocated that government directly institute change. They believed Britain's imperial propaganda about progressive government. In fact in 1929 while commenting on education, R. B. Drapier, the Provincial Commissioner, anticipated Cooke's statements:

Some other Society with more experience, and the gift of making elementary learning sufficiently alluring, should be invited to have a try. Otherwise, ... one or two Government schools... could be opened, it would have the backing of the chiefs, able, through their influence which is going to increase, to encourage, ... youngsters to go to school and stay there... If indirect rule is to be a success there has to be a better knowledge and understanding of responsibilities this measure entails. It can only come through education of the rising generation.

Drapier, like Cooke, expressed the feelings and hopes of his fellow officers. Only more government intervention, assistance, and guidance would make indirect rule and other pro-

[29]Mwinilunga Tour Report, No 7/1933, Za 7/4/42, WAZ. Livingstone remained the territorial capital until 1935 when it moved to Lusaka.
pressive policies work.\[30\]

By the 1930s the optimism of the administrators dimmed because the NWP seemed in the process of permanently becoming an undeveloped 'reserve'. The territorial government made local administrators' tasks difficult by giving them a complex, unsolvable dilemma. If they accepted the government's lack of serious interest and concluded that the missions should not be held accountable when the central government refused to assist, they had to accept the status quo. If they did so, they either lost their dream of the empire becoming glorious or accepted the NWP and its people as an exceptionally 'poor lot'. Some came to believe the latter. For example, E. Sharpe, Provincial Commissioner in the early 1930s, stated that "very little progress has been made with Native Education because the natives of this Province do not appear to want it." The following year he also noted that "all three DCs again report apathy."\[31\]

Although after the mid-1920s, the government evolved a somewhat more progressive position toward social services in the NWP, little else happened. As later chapters on educational systems will show, social services improved

\[30\]Kasempa Prov. AR for the Year Ending 31 Dec. 1929, p. 9, ZA 7/1/12/6. These administrators did not see any contradiction between Indirect Rule and more government assistance and guidance. In their opinion, traditional methods needed refining and modernizing in order to be applicable.

\[31\]Sharpe, Kasempa Prov. AR for 1930, Annexure IV, ZA 7/1/13/6; Kasempa Prov. AR for 1931, ZA 7/1/14/6, NAZ.
because of administrative carrot-and-stick pressure on the mission agencies. The government did virtually nothing by itself. It certainly did little to improve the economy or the transportation and communication infrastructure. In this situation, even the best local administrators could do little to help. Like Bobin Short a decade later, many accepted the province's status quo as a positive thing—the NWP became a living museum outside the territory's mainstream. Consequently, the terms 'backward' and 'cinderella' became as applicable to the NWP during World War II, during Federation in 1953, and even subsequent to the colonial era in 1964 or 1979, as they had been in 1933. [32]

No Settlers, No Development

In twentieth century Africa, western-style democracy that functioned for Europeans often repressed and exploited Africans. Yet when Europeans and their democracy were absent, economic stagnation frequently occurred. This situation held true in the NWP, where few whites settled.

Rhodes and his multi-million pound BSAC begat many children, particularly petty white entrepreneurs seeking

[32] For further reference to the terms 'cinderella' and 'backward' vis-à-vis the NWP, see the Preface, fn. no. 4 and chapters following this one. Also, see "North-West Frontier: Cinderella Province," Central African Examiner, 9 Apr. 1960, pp. 31-4. (This useful article was kindly sent to me by Peter Letchford in 1979.)
wealth. These traders, miners, and farmers can properly be called settlers or colonists. After the BSAC extended its rail line north and large mines began to operate, these settlers entered the territory in increasingly large numbers. The modern transportation and communication system and the large mines enabled them, as small risk-takers, to maximize their chances of economic success. Consequently, they clustered either near the mines or along the north-south line of rail that connected the territory with the modern economic system. With their inside knowledge of the new colonial system, and especially of the new economic order, many achieved economic success.[33]

Half-brothers of the big concessionary companies, these entrepreneurs maintained a close relationship with, and became an extension of, the BSAC and its concessionary mining companies. Mining towns generated a market for farm produce, for retail goods, and for small consumer industries. Loud quarrels between these small white businessmen and the big mining companies and territorial officials were really minor family feuds, often centering on the best way to exploit African labor. The settlers often provided materials and supplies that the big mining companies needed.

They also provided a pool of white labor to fill the mining companies' supervisory positions and afforded alternative jobs for retiring miners.[34]

Although Nguqi's "Coin" attracted them, the settlers quickly acquired the desire for political power. When the Colonial Office assumed control of the colony in 1924, the number of settlers had increased to approximately four thousand. By then some concept of democracy, symbolized by universal suffrage for both men and women, had swept across Western Europe, especially Britain. Although Africans were placed in another category, white settlers felt they themselves deserved the right to vote and to control their own destinies in Africa. Consequently, they strove to share the administrators' power and sought government support for their endeavors.[35]

As they increasingly succeeded in Northern Rhodesia, white settlers became the most selfish members of the new elite. In the name of democracy and local autonomy, they allied themselves with big business and the government administration. Then they manipulated Africans to benefit the colonial elite. In areas that they coveted, the territorial

[34] Baldwin's work, *Economic Development*, shows the close relationship of copper production to other Northern Rhodesian industries, and also the domination of white settlers therein.

government systematically denied Africans their basic rights and privileges. Conversely, the areas that settlers did not want became ignored labor reserves. Thus, even in areas like the NWP, their influence cast a long shadow. [36]

These colonists presented themselves forcefully and effectively to sympathetic administrators. At first they did so informally through representatives in the Legislative Council (LegCo). Trevor Coombe described the effect of their enormous power on African education, particularly the colony’s failure to provide Africans with secondary education prior to World War II. Anticipating the solid opposition of the settlers to any progressive programs for Africans that did not benefit them even more, senior government officials formulated measures and interpreted Colonial Office directives so as to minimize the settlers' wrath. [37]

Haude Muntemba, a new Zambian historian, has described what happened in the desirable parts of Kabwe Rural District. In her economic history, she showed that the settlers made an unholy alliance with big Northern Rhodesian/Katangese mining interests and with Northern

[36] Ibid. Racial trade unionism on the copperbelt effectively blocked Africans from improving their skills and living standards.

Rhodesian government officials. They then quarreled over the way to exploit the district's non-enfranchised and powerless Africans. In short, Muntemba described how settlers became the foremost element in underdeveloping that district. [38]

In Kabwe Rural District, the list of abuses resembles a long litany. Although Africans paid taxes as soon as an administration was set up, Europeans did not do so until after World War I. Government officials recruited labor for big business in South Africa and Katanga until the World War II period, by which time the voluntary flow of labor to the towns became large enough to supply the demand. These business firms in turn paid a commission for each recruit that went into government revenue. Along the line of rail, government 'alienated' African land and made it available for large European farms. Africans became tenants on what had been their land or were moved away. Moving away, they became isolated from the transportation facilities they needed to become part of the modern economy. Government forbade African farmers to grow the most profitable crops, such as maize, and allowed them only a few corridors through the new white lands to reach the railway.

[38] Maude Shimaayi Muntemba, "Rural Underdevelopment in Zambia: Kabwe Rural District, 1850-1970" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1977). Macpherson's new study in many ways provides the needed background and territorial supplement for her work, at least in the pre-1924 era. Macpherson (Anatomy, p. 151) reluctantly admits and Muntemba proclaims that Northern Rhodesia and Kabwe are variations of Rodney's How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
Serviceable roads were built in white farming areas but not in African reserves. Farming subsidies available for whites were unavailable for blacks.\[39\]

In contrast, few settlers entered the NWP. With its distance from the line of rail, prospects for profitable development remained slim. Government did not foster open exploitation of Africans in favor of small white entrepreneurs, and local NWP societies lacked some of the built-in tensions found in many other places. Conversely, without the settlers' agitation, the government found it easier to neglect economic, transportation and communication, and social services. Without settlers, the NWP's situation could more correctly be called nondevelopment rather than underdevelopment.

The total number of white settlers who lived in the NWP at any time was infinitesimally small, except when Kansanshi Mine multiplied their numbers. But after 1901-14, the initial years of limited activity, Kansanshi remained open only between 1927 and 1933 and again between 1952 and 1957. In August 1930 for example, it employed 94 Europeans and 1925 Africans. Freelance prospectors and miners remained scattered throughout the districts during the colonial era. They probably never totaled more than a dozen or so odd characters, like old man Severts with his small

\[39\]Muntamba, "Rural Underdevelopment," see especially Chaps. III-VI.
salt mining operation in Kasempa District. [40]

The number of farmers and traders were equally small. Although government deemed some of Mwinilunga's most fertile areas as crown land, thus making them available for European farmers, few whites found Mwinilunga appealing for reasons already given. At different times, European farmers lived at Caenby Farm in the northeast corner and at Matonchi to the west of Mwinilunga boma. The only permanent white farmer, however, was Dr. Fisher's son, ffolliott, who lived at Hillwood Farm near Kalene. Since he extended the missionary work at Kalene by helping to sustain a small school for the children of missionaries, he was an atypical white farmer-trader. A few other self-supporting Brethren businessmen-traders and/or transporters also settled near the Balovale and Mwinilunga government bomas. Before World War I, a few Swedes entered Kasempa District. By World War II, the Robinson family had become established between Solwezi Boma and Kansanshi Mine. In short these and other settlers provided minimal agricultural, trading, and transport functions as required by the new society. [41]

[40] Statistics on Kansanshi are scattered through Bancroft, Mining. For Kansanshi in the 1950s, see Coleman, Copperbelt, pp. 147-8. For Severt, see App. E.

[41] Much of this summary was obtained very informally in numerous conversations with both Europeans and Africans, past and present in the NUF, and from reading Echoes and government ARs for the era. For the Swedes in Kasempa, see S. Grimestvedt, "The 'Swedish Settlement' in the Kasempa District," Northern Rhodesia Journal, III (No. 1, 1956): 34-43.
Other facts about white settlers in the NWP are significant: a) none were Indian, Lebanese, or Greek as in many parts of Africa; b) most regarded themselves as self-supporting missionaries or adjuncts of the mission. Thus they were atypical of the white settler community in Northern Rhodesia. Having more affinity with the administrators in the boma and with the missions nearby than with the white settler community in the rest of the country, they did not agitate aggressively for any economic improvements in the province.

Without even selfish white interests to spur it on, the Northern Rhodesian Government could easily forget the NWP. And without white settlers, benevolent administrators could govern the NWP as they felt best within general imperial principles and neglectful territorial policy.