TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN
PROMOTING CREDIBLE ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA: A FOCUS
ON KAFUE AND LUSAKA DISTRICTS

By

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A Dissertation Submitted to the University of Zambia in partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the Award of the Degree of Master of Education in Civic Education

The University of Zambia

October, 2016
DECLARATION

I, MCDONALD G. CHIPENZI, do hereby declare that this dissertation is my own work and that other works cited or used herein has been duly acknowledged. I further, declare that this work, to the best of my knowledge, has never been previously presented or submitted to this or any other university or colleague for any academic award or other similar purpose.

Signature……………………………..
Date……………………………………

Supervisor: Dr. Gift Masaiti

Signature………………………………
Date…………………………………………


This dissertation of McDonald G. Chipenzi has been approved for the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of Master of Education in Civic Education by the University of Zambia.

Examiners:

Signature………………………………….Date……………………

Signature………………………………….Date……………………

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ABSTRACT

Many countries have embraced electoral democracy globally and are serving as inspirational and beacons for the rising tide of electoral democracy throughout the world (EIU, 2010; Mbeki, 2016). In some countries, credible elections have been held while in others not, instead troubled electoral processes have been witnessed. Regular democratic elections have been described as bedrocks for rising tide of electoral democratic systems across the world (EIU, 2010; Mwanakatwe, 1994). This global spread of electoral democracy has ignited a battle cry for transparency and accountability of electoral processes so as to improve acceptability levels of electoral outcomes (Kadima & Booysen, 2009; Strand, 2005). Since 1964, Zambia has managed, rather, a haze electoral process that has facilitated citizens to make electoral choices on political leadership through competitive elections organised at national, district, constituency and ward levels (Mwanakatwe, 1994). In some cases, electoral outcomes of these elections have been controversial due to perceived electoral irregularities and malpractices (Sakala, 2016; Chitala, 2002). The pointing finger has always been largely attributed to lack of electoral transparency and accountability of the electoral process (Bams, 2015; Annan, 2012).

This research’s objective was to investigate the extent to which the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts of Lusaka Province in Zambia is transparent and accountable in promoting credible electoral democracy. It had four (4) specific objectives among them (i) to ascertain the extent to which the current electoral process is transparent and accountable in Kafue and Lusaka districts; (ii) assess the extent to which the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts promote credible electoral democracy; (iii) establish whether civic education has a bearing on the citizens’ electoral perception regarding transparency and accountability of the electoral process; and lastly (iv) to identify areas which require improvement in the management and administration of electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts. The research also made recommendations and suggested areas for further interrogations.

An embedded research design was used to investigate the research objectives and questions and both qualitative and quantitative data analysis approaches were employed. The research population comprised largely registered male and female residents of rural and urban areas in Kafue and Lusaka districts respectively and totalled to 196 respondents. Using purposive and convenient sampling methods, 196 respondents were reached and opinions solicited using a
structured questionnaire and an interview guide. A questionnaire was tailored in a Likert Scale of 1-5 from which respondents marked their responses. The target population was varied ranging from government, NGOs, media and private citizens. The data collected was coded, edited and analysed using statistical packages and excel sheets and presented using bar graphs, pie charts, frequencies and tables.

Research findings implied that 87% of respondents agreed that electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka Districts was transparent and accountable and further established that transparency and accountability of the electoral process promoted credible electoral democracy. When subjected to variance of analysis tests, the research revealed an associated p-values of 0.734 and 0.637 respectively which suggested a no statistical differences based on respondents’ socio background characteristics regarding transparency and accountability of the electoral process. The research established that current electoral process promoted credible electoral democracy though areas of contestation still remained. Civic education had also been established as a key component of the electoral process as it made citizens well-informed and have the courage to question electoral decisions made by electoral, political and state authorities. The research identified areas of improvement such as the review in the appointment modalities of electoral commissioners among others and further recommended areas for further research.

The research further recommended the provision of continuous civic education by the electoral body, civil society and media to address the low electoral information flows between the electoral body and stakeholders, players and citizens and lastly addressing identified electoral challenges to improve electoral administration and management. Therefore, law reforms are required to be done by the electoral body and government through the Ministry of Justice. Areas for further research have been suggested such as investigation in the causes of post electoral controversies despite the presence of electoral observers and monitors and the extent to which the weaknesses in the electoral law and constitution are impeding transparency and accountability of the electoral process to promote credible electoral democracy and realisation of a credible electoral body that manages the electoral process to the satisfaction of stakeholders.
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to all electoral enthusiasts across Zambia and beyond who have dedicated their efforts and lives to protecting democracy and for being agents of change in the electoral process management and administration with a view to promoting sustainable electoral democracy that is anchored on credibility, transparency and accountability.

Lastly, special thanks go to my children Busiku, Banji, Masiku and Chileleko, nephews and nieces, Mario and Doricah respectively, whose understanding and support was evident and exhibited through their tolerance, love and patience as I spent long hours glued on my computer away from them during the writing of this dissertation.

You may have felt neglected and abandoned, just like myself, as this was the most frustrating part of this academic journey. Your patience and understanding made all the difference to the successful completion of this dissertation. It was such a great honour and pleasure undertaking this academic cross together with you.

Your patience and support has reached us this far.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Profound gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Gift Masaiti, for his unwavering support, guidance and availability whenever I needed him for guidance on how to improve this academic work. My lecturers such as Mr. C. Kandondo, Dr. Gistered Muleya and Dr. Mweemba for the knowledge imparted during the first part of this academic. Allow me to also acknowledge my examiners for the incredible and valuable comments made on the dissertation which helped me in perfect this piece of work.

Further, I wish also to thank all my colleagues such as, Danniel Mulemena, Lackson Lungu, Adam Daka, among others for their helpful comments and encouragement when the body became fatigued and frustrated to move on, their reviews on previous drafts of this dissertation and their availability to run around printing the drafts when called upon. I am deeply grateful for their incredible and priceless help and advice rendered to me.

This academic journey to the completion of this dissertation has been a long, expensive and tedious one, which I could not have walked and achieved alone. Along the way, I got invaluable help from many a people like Miniver Kashenda, Margaret Mukelabai and others too many to mention who worked tirelessly to ensure that this academic undertaking was embarked on and came to conclusive fruition. I am indebted to all respondents and interviewees for providing the valuable information required for this research. To you all, I owe you more than a thank you.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOVA</td>
<td>Analysis of Variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVAP</td>
<td>Anti Voter Apathy Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECF</td>
<td>Electoral Commission Forum</td>
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<td>ECZ</td>
<td>Electoral Commission of Zambia</td>
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<td>EMBs</td>
<td>Electoral Management Bodies</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERTC</td>
<td>Electoral Reform Technical Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economist Intelligent Unit</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUEOM</td>
<td>European Union Election Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
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<td>FODEP</td>
<td>Foundation for Democratic Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>First Past The Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRZ</td>
<td>Government Republic of Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
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<td>IEA</td>
<td>Institute of Economic Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multi-Party Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMPR</td>
<td>Mixed Member Proportional Representation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEMMO</td>
<td>Principles for Elections Management, Monitoring and Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>POA</td>
<td>Public Order Act</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACCORD</td>
<td>Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for Social Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZEMCC</td>
<td>Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZESN</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZPS</td>
<td>Zambia Police Service</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.0 Chapter Overview

The purpose of this Chapter is to discuss the background and the theoretical foundation of the research. It serves to state and define the problem statement the research is attempting to address, state the objectives and signal how the research is to progress. To this end, the Chapter is arranged in such a way that it discusses the background to the research, problem statement of the research, purpose of the research, its significance, clarifications of terms, theoretical and conceptual frameworks and finally an outlines of the dissertation. In its background, the Chapter appreciates the fact that electoral democracy is “still work in progress.” Bams (2015:64) puts it aptly “electoral democracy is always work in progress and never a finished perfect product and is not achieved or upheld without sacrifice, setbacks and navigation of ethically grey waters. A country does not have to be deemed fit for electoral democracy rather, it has to become fit through electoral democracy,” (Bams, 2015:20).

1.1 Background Information

With the floodgates of electoral democratic reforms opening up and a plethora of demands for credible elections from citizens and international communities throughout the global and the African continent in particular mount, the experience so far is that the pursuit for transparent and accountable electoral processes in most countries has not yet been fully realised but progressively and positively moving towards that direction. This is so because some countries have not yet appreciated the need to introduce and support all elements of truly transparent and accountable electoral processes that culminate into the holding of genuine free and fair elections (Legum, 1992; EIU, 2010; Strand, 2005). Elections when conducted properly can be cornerstones for any electoral democracy as it would empower citizens to participate in the selection of their political representatives (International IDEA, 2012). Johari (2013:360) defines elections as the “recruitment of the representatives by choice of the voters”. Therefore, their perceived freeness, fairness and openness potentially increase the prospects of consolidating electoral democracy which consequently ensures stability, peace and development of any country (Annan, 2012).

In modern societies, with their sizes and complexity, recruitment of leaders has been through elections hence the embracing of electoral democracy in which citizens are allowed to exercise their right to vote (United States Information Agency (USIA), (1991); Johari, 2013).
This right to vote is exercised in most countries by citizens aged 18 years and above. As a result, voting has become a right that is recognized by international instruments and national laws across the global (Johari, 2013). Bams (2015) observes that flourishing electoral democracies are dependent on the full participation of all citizens through the exercise of their right to a secret vote. Stressing the historic importance of the right to a vote and how countries fought for it in the past, Legum (1992) warns against abuse this right stating that the right to a secret vote was one of the rights Africa’s forefathers fought for during the first liberation struggle against aliens, the powerful and the colonial rule on the African continent. The recognition and the exercise of the right to vote by citizens is what have given birth to electoral democracy today which the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA, 2008:15) defines as “a regular political competition done through meaningful elections, civic participation and respect of civil and political liberties”.

Due to contestations that ensue before, during and after an election which has been witnessed in many elections in different countries, there has been an emergence of election monitors and observers (Mwanakatwe, 1994) with the aim of promoting electoral credibility and integrity through advocacy on free and fair, accountable and transparent electoral processes. This resultantly is envisaged to make electoral outcomes reflect the true will of the people (GRZ, 2016, ECZ, 2016). The appearances of monitors and observers in the electoral process has been necessitated by the increasing incidences of alleged electoral corruption and other malpractices (Sakala, 2016) leading to electoral disputes and petitions. This has validated the need to undertake this study to investigate the extent to which transparency and accountability of the electoral process contribute to promotion of electoral democracy in the two districts and Zambia at large. It is clear from the background information that, for the sake of cementing the present and the future, strengthening transparency and accountability of the electoral process remain the only possible viable options for the present and future. Therefore, this study investigates the extent to which the current the electoral process is transparency and accountability and how it has contributed to promotion credible electoral democracy in Kafue and Lusaka districts. The research also investigates the extent to which civic education plays a key role in increasing citizens’ effective participation in the electoral process.
1.2 **Problem Statement**

The subject of transparency and an accountable of the electoral process is of public and international interest in the present day world in which elections have become a regular and contested event in most electoral democratic processes. With the dawn of multiparty politics which have been characterized by competitive elections, there has been a strong desire to demand for transparency and accountability of the electoral process to validate the electoral outcomes and consider them credible. Although many stakeholders have misgivings on the transparency and accountability of the electoral process, the electoral bodies have vehemently purported to pursue principles of transparency and accountability in the management and administration of the electoral processes. In Zambia, it is clear that the electoral process has been riddled with pre, during and post-election controversies (Mwanakatwe, 1994; Mbita, 2011; Sakala, 2016) due to perceived lack of transparency and accountability. As such, the election monitoring and observation business with the purpose of providing an independent opinion on the conduct and management of elections (Mwanakatwe, 1994) has boomed. The interest by stakeholders to take interest in the management and administration of the electoral process has helped in instilling public confidence in the process and further increased the levels of electoral acceptability of electoral outcomes by majority losing contestants (Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), 2015). Despite this positive electoral development, electoral stakeholders like monitors and political players have consistently reported malpractices and irregularities as a result of what they term lack of transparency and accountability of the electoral process and such conclusions have undermined public confidence in the process since 1996 to date (EUEOM, 2001, 2016).

From the foregoing, it is clear that electoral outcomes have been characterised by numerous controversies and petitions due to dissatisfaction by political players, stakeholders and citizens in the management of the electoral process. If nothing is done, these electoral irregularities and malpractices will continue to undermine the credibility of electoral democracy in Zambia particularly in Kafue and Lusaka districts which may consequently result into political instability and reduced donor aid to the country. Since, the extent to which citizens consider the transparency and accountability of the electoral process in the two districts is unclear and unknown as available studies have focused more on national elections, it is the desire of this research to investigate the extent to which this issue in the two districts is perceived to be present by citizens. It is envisaged that the research findings may help in contributing to achieving the Revised Seventh National Development Plan (R-SNDP) and
Vision 2030 whose goals are a politically stable Zambia anchored on democratic principles. The findings may further contribute to meeting the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) #16 on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

1.3 Overviewing Objectives

To investigate the extent to which the electoral process is accountable and transparent in promoting credible electoral democracy in Kafue and Lusaka districts of Lusaka Province in Zambia.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

i. To ascertain the extent to which the current electoral process is transparent and accountable in Kafue and Lusaka districts;

ii. To assess the extent to which the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts promotes credible electoral democracy;

iii. To establish whether civic education is a key component in the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts; and

iv. To identify areas which require improvement in the management and administration of the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts.

1.4 Research Questions

i. To what extent is the current electoral process transparent and accountable?

ii. Have the practices in the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts been promoting credible electoral democracy?

iii. Does civic education have a bearing on citizens’ electoral participation and perception on transparency and accountability?

iv. Can there be electoral areas that require improvement to effectively manage and administer the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts?

1.5 Purpose of the Research

The research was designed to investigate the extent to which transparency and accountability and the key role civic education play in the electoral process in promoting credible electoral democracy in Kafue and Lusaka districts.
1.6 Significance of the Research

The research findings may be of use to the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), policy makers, political parties institutions of governance such as police, Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), political parties and other stakeholders such as civil society organisations, international agencies, researchers, students and academia as they may help these stakeholders devise and advocate effective electoral strategies on how to enhance transparency and accountability of the electoral process in promoting credible electoral democracy while researchers, academia and students may use the identified gaps in the research for conducting further research and better also for teaching and learning purposes respectively.

1.7 Scope of the Research

The research confined itself to investigating the extent to which transparency and accountability of the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is perceived to be present by citizens although references are also made to the national electoral processes since there is no defined electoral process specifically designed for the two districts. It further interrogates the key role civic education play for effective electoral participation in the electoral process.

1.8 Theoretical Foundation

The theoretical foundation is aimed at exploring the process of adopting and utilising the appropriate tested theories and views on how to achieve transparency and accountability of the electoral process and how an accountable and transparent electoral process can promote electoral democracy. The theoretical foundation for this research is anchored on Jaharis’ pluralist theory of democracy. Kombo and Tromp (2014:57) define theory as a “reasoned statement or group of statements, which are supported by evidence, meant to explain phenomenon”. The duo explain further that theories are a systematic explanation of the relationship among phenomena. Further, the duo define a theoretical framework as a “general set of assumptions about the nature of phenomenon”. Kombo and Tromp also stress that theoretical framework is a “collection of interrelated ideas based on theories and reasoned set of prepositions, which are derived from and supported by data or evidence”. The duo guide that, to understand the theoretical framework, an analysis of theories has to be made. For the purpose of this research, the theory analysed and employed is the pluralist theory of democracy advanced by Laski, HJ in 1960.
The most common approach to analysing electoral democracy has been the comparison between the established democracies in the post-war period and new democracies. This is done through the analysis of the impact of electoral institutions on the electoral systems on which the political systems are anchored. McGee and Gaventa, (2010) identify some of these approaches as the proportionality of votes to seats, levels of party competition, executive stability, the social composition of legislatures, and voter turn-out and the role of monitoring and observer groups in the electoral process. Under this theory, transparency and accountability have emerged as key concepts and means of addressing electoral democratic deficits. In the electoral context, the explanation has been that greater accountability and transparency of the electoral process helps repair “electoral leaky pipes” of corruption and inefficiency and electoral result outcomes acceptable by the large majority of the players and electorates (Jean-Pierrie, 2001:117). McGee and Gaventa further observe that the 20th Century wave of democratisation has seen electoral democracy deliver the electoral goods and services. They duo contend that the new forms of democratic accountability emerges as players and citizens demanding for the delivery of these electoral services and goods efficiently. This made the tradition forms of state-led accountability to be increasingly inadequate.

The pluralist theory of democracy, as advanced by Laski, has been used to formulate a theoretical framework. This is so because democratic theories are “moving objects, always evolving” and effectively elucidating contemporary political practices and constructively contributing to finding solutions to contemporary political and electoral challenges (Johari, 2013). As per definition of electoral democracy above, most countries hold regular elections based on egalitarian principles. However, the aspect of allowing all citizens to determine public policy, laws and actions of their state together has been farfetched, as no country has ever granted all its citizens the right to vote on every critical national issues. In Keane (2009)’s argument, he contends that ideally, electoral democracy is supposed to be a self-government of equals and is both a form of government and a way of life which must uphold liberty and equality as its core values. Theoretically, Aristotle brings out emerging democratic trend and cautions stakeholders to look out the varieties of democratic rules that are currently emerging. He identifies the rule of the many with the rule of the few and with the rule of a single person and wondered how these types of rules support, promotes and fits in modern electoral democracies.
1.8.1 Pluralist Theory of Democracy

Laski (1960) in his writings in *The State in Theory and Practice* believes that a plural society should and is an “open society” which argument is supported by Strand and others (2005); Mahajan (1988) among other writers. Mahajan explains that this theory is expounded by political scientists mainly to support the contention that socialist political systems with one party and the centralisation of all political power are undemocratic. He argues that the main objective of the theory is to contrast the liberal political systems which are pluralists and democratic to the socialist political systems which are not pluralist and not democratic. Mahajan, (1988: 748) observes that:

> the pluralist theory of democracy emphasizes the role of multiparty system and pressure groups in a political system…the main contention of pluralist democracies is that power should be shared by all the groups of society and all organised groups must have a share in policy-making…whenever the state makes a policy, the groups interested in it must be consulted. A belief of pluralism is that most citizens are wise enough to make judgments about public affairs and to help manage them.

Laski (1960), the promoter of this theory, assumes that different interests groups that exist in a plural democracies are expected to play their part in the struggle for electoral power. The theory recognises further recognises the existence of variety of interests among people and groups formed for the sake of protecting and promoting specific interests albeit electoral or political which, he says should be allowed to take part in the political and electoral processes.

Laski further justifies his argument with an explanation that pluralist democracies means political systems in which policies are made by mutual consultations and exchange of opinions between the varied groups. The contention is that the sovereign of the state should be distributed in a manner that ensures that interest groups have a share in it and that all important decisions on electoral matters are to be taken by the officials of the state after consulting with groups whose interests are involved in them or who may be affected by the implementation of such decisions. Kariel (1972:276-280) contends that electoral democracy is a socio-political system that promotes shared power with varied groups and recognises the roles of various interest groups and organisations in promoting credible electoral democracy. He observes:
Thus, electoral democracy, apart from being a rule of the people, or of the majority, is a socio-political system in which the power of the state is shared with a large number of private groups, interest organisations and individuals represented by such organisations…Pluralism is a system in which political power is fragmented among the branches of government; it is, moreover, shared between the state and a multitude of private groups and individuals.

In a related argument, Mahajan (1988) stresses that electoral democracy is a political method with electoral process as its centre and that, through the electoral process, leaders are chosen by non-leaders. However, Johari (2013:391) explains his conviction that: “elections are not meant for the recruitment of the elites, or for the circulation of power among the elites, rather they are the vital instruments of mass participation in political and electoral decisions. If democracy means the rule of the consensus, it must not be a narrower consensus of the elites; it must be the wider consensus of the group. In this way, government is kept close to the people, and decisions benefit from the skill and interest which such groups provide (Johari, 2013).

The major thrust of this theory is however, the recognition that the state must recognise the personality and autonomy of social groups and allow them to take part in the political and electoral processes of any country. In addition, it is the recognition that the involvement of various stakeholders in an electoral process promotes the spirit of transparency and accountability which, consequently, leads to promotion of credible electoral democracy. The assumption being made is that the state should only play the role and function of dealing with social conflicts in a way that the competitive struggle for power is regulated. Johari’s view is supported by International IDEA (2010) which even cautions stakeholders and players of the dangers of not allowing various interest groups to play their part in the electoral process. It contends that, in the absence of broad-based participation of the people in democratic processes, it would be difficult to sustain electoral democracy. “Furthermore, unless you make the broad constituencies of the people into stakeholders in the electoral democratic process, you are in fact going to face serious difficulties in the sustainability of electoral democracy,” (International IDEA, 2010:101) From the foregoing arguments, one is made to agree with the pluralist theory’s central theme-that of premising the struggle for power on openness and with full participation of all interests groups to avoid controversies.

However, Laski’s theory is not without challenge. It has been criticised by some scholars that the theory undermines the sovereign position of the state by laying too much stress on the personality and autonomy of social groups such as civil society, political parties among
others ignoring the salient fact that the state alone and its associated institutions can deal with
the conditions of anarchy in which the hands of some rebellious and irresponsible groups may be traced. Agreeing with the critics of this theory, Johari (2013) contends that, though it is true that the role of many groups act as a check on the abuse of power by the government and its institutions and more importantly ensured transparency and accountability, more liberty and power to the groups can create many serious problems of law and order. “It is a pity that, while the pluralists say so much about the necessity of the role of these groups in an open society, they hardly say anything, in so forceful terms, about the legitimate control of the state over them,” (Johari, 2013:393). Some theorists such as those propagating for the elitist theory have argued that the operation of ‘mass democracy’ is no longer possible in modern times and suggest that the new awareness be centred on the arguments that not all groups, but only a few groups, count and that, even there, the elites take part in the struggle for power and not the commoners. This defeats that argument that electoral democracy is the rule of the majority, who in this case, are poor and the commoners. The elitist theorists further insist and argue that power, in fact, had been monopolised by a few groups and the elite since time immemorial.

Nonetheless, other electoral democracy theorists still argue that popular participation should be checked by powerful elites because citizens do not rule themselves unless they directly decide laws and policies for themselves, which they argue is not the case and possible. However, International IDEA (2010) parries these opinions and views from the elitist theorists which it says are aimed at curtailing the growth of mass democracy. It argues that, in fact, non-state actors-civil society, private sector, critical citizens or activists among others, though regarded as opponents of the ruling elites and their policies, strategies, the exclusion of this important group to play its part in the electoral democratic processes can be detrimental to achieving transparency and accountability of the electoral process and thereby undermining the promotion of credible electoral democracy. International IDEA (2010:56) observes that “this situation can impede effective, inclusive and sustained electoral democracy building and also can prevent the mainstreaming of democratisation in development policies and strategies.” Concisely saying, this theory has highlighted the extent to which electorates, social and interest groups’ participation can promote an open, transparency and accountability electoral process which can subsequently promote credible electoral democracy.
Direct democracy theorists have contended that citizens should effectively and directly participate in making laws, policies instead of through their representatives. This view supports the collaborative approaches to electoral democracy building. To this end, International IDEA seems to hold a view that support Johari’s thinking by arguing that electoral democracy building is an inclusive and holistic process that requires the active involvement of citizens and all actors, including non-state actors because these are, ideally, direct vectors for the promotion of this type of democracy in any country. Bams (2015) to some extent puts the above argument in perspective thus:

An active citizen is actively engaged in matters of society before, during and after elections. S/he is concerned with affairs of the country enough to think carefully before voting, such a citizen understands elections and electoral bodies as much more significant than elections of one group of politicians over others (Bams, 2015:92)

The figure below is a presentation of the pluralist theory of democracy and is trying to explain the interactions among variables in the electoral process that promotes openness. The openness of the electoral process, born out of the involvement of various interest groups, is a prerequisites for the promotion of credible electoral democracy anywhere in the world. According to the figure below, regular elections that are managed through an open electoral process, are inclusive as they give allowance to various interest groups-political parties, civil society or NGOs, media, private sector, activists-to participate effectively in the process. These interest groups help curtail individuals who may want to engage in electoral illegality in the electoral process. These interest groups may engage in offering civic education on the electoral process and its associated stages and thereby creating a cadre of critical mass of citizens and stakeholders able to question the management of the electoral process without fear. With civic education being offered, citizens get armed with necessary information of the electoral process and its stages. Citizens become critical and make the managers of the elections to sit up and do things correctly knowing that they are under electoral microscopic watch from citizens.
1.9 Conceptual Framework

This is defined as a “set of broad ideas and principles taken from relevant fields of enquiry and used to structure a subsequent presentation. It is a tool intended to assist a researcher to develop awareness and understanding of the situation under scrutiny and to communicate this” (Kombo and Tromp, 2014:49). The duo explain that when clearly articulated, a conceptual framework has potential usefulness as a tool to assist a researcher to make meaning of subsequent findings and further helps a researcher to have organised thinking and complete an investigation successfully. Achola and Bless (1988:34) stress the need to also define the concepts in clear, precise, non-ambiguous and agreed upon way. “They argue that concepts were the building blocks theories.” Kombo and Tromp (2014:49) defined concept as an abstract or general idea inferred or derived from specific instances while conceptualization as inventing or contriving an idea or explanation and formulating it internally. It is an abstract, simplified view of the world that we wish to represent for some purpose.”

The figure below depicts conceptual framework used for this research which elucidates the interaction of various variables of electoral process in an effort to promote transparency and accountability. The emphasis is on the need for the participation of various interest groups in the electoral process. It is also argued that interest groups participating in the process are supposed to carry out awareness activities among citizens and other stakeholders by
conducting civic education done through a maximal viewpoint (McLaughlin, 1992). It is further envisaged that once citizens are awakened through education, they become critical, alert and creative thinkers thereby enabling them to participate in the process with informed minds. In fear of alert and critical citizens, the electoral management officials become embracive of the principles of transparency and accountability.

Once transparency and accountability are embraced by the electoral officials, openness in the process is promoted and enhanced. This reduces electoral suspicions, corruption and electoral irregularities and malpractices thereby promoting credible electoral democracy whose electoral outcomes would largely reflect the will of the electorates, players and stakeholders. The promotion of transparency and accountability further leads to public electoral confidence. Therefore, the involvement of interest groups in the management of an electoral process is key to ensuring transparency and accountability of that electoral process. As McLaughlin (1992) notes that civic education helps in making people well informed, critical and active citizens who are confident and convinced of working collaboratively to make a difference in their communities and the wider world.

**Figure 1.2: Conceptual Framework**

1.10. Clarifications of Terms

Although Achola and Bless (1988) explains the meaning operational definition as a precise indications as to what are the fundamental characteristics of a concept and to observe or even
measure the characteristics under study, and further observe characteristics of an object or phenomenon. This research will focus on clarifying the following key terms in the research;

i. **Democracy**: Nguyen (2014) defines democracy as “an egalitarian form of government in which all the citizens of a nation determine public policy, the laws and the actions of their state together.” For the purpose of study, democracy will be defined as the effective participation of citizens and institutions in determining public policy, laws and actions in the electoral process.

ii. **Transparency**: It signifies an openness of the governance system through clear processes and procedures and easy access to public information for citizens ethical awareness in public service through information sharing, which ultimately ensures accountability for the performance of the individual and organizations handling resources or holding public office,” (McGee and Gaventa, 2010: 13). Transparency International (2009: 44) defines transparency as a characteristic of governments, companies, organizations and individuals of being open in the clear disclosure of information rules, plans, processes and actions.” To this end, this research adopts Transparency International definition of transparency.

iii. **Accountability**: Tisne (2010:2) defines accountability as a process of holding actors responsible for their actions…it is a concept that individuals, agencies and organizations are held responsible for executing their powers according to a certain standard.” United Nations Development Programmes, (UNDP), (2010:8) defines accountability as “the obligation of power-holders to take responsibility for their actions and describes the rights and responsibilities that exist between the people and the institutions that have an impact on their lives.” Beetham and others (2008:24) defines accountability as involving office holders being required to account for actions they have taken after they have taken them (ex post), with the realistic prospect of appropriate sanctions being applied in the event of misconduct, negligence or failure.” Further, Beetham and others (2008) stresses that accountability should go hand in hand with responsiveness, which they define as involving having systematic procedures for consulting public opinion and relevant interests before policy or legislation is decided (ex-ante) so that its content will reflect the views of those affected by it. In summary, accountability operates on board principles of answerability and enforceability. Bams (2015:47) defines accountability to mean that “no one is beyond scrutiny and that everyone must account for one’s actions which is cornerstone of electoral democracy.
For the purpose of this study, wherever accountability appears, it will have the meaning as defined by Beetham and others (2008) while accountability adopts the definition by Bams (2015).

iv. **Electoral Democracy:** This refers to a means for the people to choose their political leaders in a regular, meaningful, free and fair election. A Law Dictionary defines electoral democracy as a form of government where the powers of the sovereignty are delegated to a body of men, elected from time to time who exercise them for the benefit of the whole nation. For the purpose of this study, electoral democracy will connote the process by which eligible citizens exercise franchise effectively and exercise this franchise to reflect their will. It is a process reflecting the “will of the people” through their votes. “a political system with a meaningful and extensive political competition among individuals and organized groups [political parties] and which competition should occur at regular intervals; and the existence of an inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies through regular free and fair elections coupled with existence of a level of civil and political liberties sufficient to ensure the integrity of meaningful competition and political participation” (Institute of Economic Affairs-IEA, 2008:15).

v. **Civic Education** is defined as the type of education that makes citizen participation in a democratic society to be based on informed, critical reflection, and on the understanding and acceptance of the rights and responsibilities that go with that membership. In an electoral democratic society, civic education needs to be concerned with promoting understanding of the ideals of democracy and a reasoned commitment to the values and principles of democracy such as transparency and accountability. It is not about “knowledge transmission but understanding and awareness” of rights, processes and responsibility to enable them critically and creatively question the operations within a democracy (Davids and Wogbid, 2013:1). McLaughlin (1992) explains the two types of civic education namely one which emphasizes conformity he referred to as minimal and one that encourages citizens to critically and creatively deal with the system which he referred to as maximal. For the purpose of this research, wherever civic education is referred to, it will have the maximal view of civic education.

vi. **Electoral Process/Cycle** is defined as procedures, rules and regulations of managing and conducting an election. FODEP (2008:17) defines electoral process as “procedures or stages followed in enabling citizens choose their leaders through voting. It refers to a
series of events leading up to the selection of one person among many candidates to occupy a public position.” Chirambo (2008) explains that the electoral process necessitates rules for the electoral formulae, constituency demarcation, electorate definition, candidate nomination, political party registration and electoral campaigns. “It is long as it starts from the finalization of the last elections, with the polling date itself only forming the eighth step of the process,” (Chirambo, 2008:68).

The figure below illustrates the stages of the electoral process of which requires participation and monitoring by various groups to maintain some levels of transparency and accountability in the management and administration by the electoral management body. It is adopted from the Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections, (BRIDGE) Project Training Manuals (2014). It outlines some of the stages of the electoral process, which Chirambo (2008) refers to as “series of events”. These series of events, according to the BRIDGE, starts with the legal framework, election planning and implementation, training and education, voter registration, electoral campaigns, voting operations and election day, verification of results and ends with the post-election stage.

**Figure 1.3: The Electoral Process Cycle**

![The Electoral Cycle](image)

*Source: BRIDGE Project (2012)*
1.11 Dissertation Outline

The research is organised in six Chapters. Chapter one gives the background to the research, the problem statement, theoretical foundation, conceptual framework and the justification of the research. Literature review is in Chapter two while Chapter three presents the methodology of the research. The research findings which are presented after analyses are in Chapter four. Lastly, Chapter five discusses the research findings interpreting what the findings established in relations to the objectives of the research while Chapter six presents research conclusions, recommendations and areas for further research. References used in the research and appendices are also presented.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Chapter Overview

This Chapter introduces a thorough analysis of works of other writers, authors and experts consulted in order for the researcher to understand and investigate the research problem at hand and also identify literature gaps. This Chapter is dedicated to the review of literature relating to transparency and accountability of the electoral process and how the two concepts can promote credible electoral democracy in Kafue and Lusaka districts. It gives an account of what has been published on the topic by accredited scholars and researchers and also critical examination of documents such as books, magazines, journals and dissertations that have a bearing on the research topic, comparing and contrasting the thinking, arguments and opinions of various authors, experts and scholars. This is with a view to assess the deep rootedness of the research problem and the spot possible gaps in literature. It endeavors to link and relate the research work undertaken and the literature gathered.

2.1 Evolution of Electoral Democracy

Electoral democracy became an engraved electoral phenomenon in many countries’ democratic processes and has since been embraced by newly independent countries as a means for legitimate and genuine leadership recruitment in the post-independence period of many decolonised countries. During the post-independence period in Africa, Cowan (1992) describes this era as being marked with the emergence of a struggle mainly by African citizens against the one party political party systems which he refers to as a “second liberation”. Cowan explains that this struggle was for the freedom from a “homegrown undemocratic rules” by the newly elected African leaders who had promoted and embraced an oppressive and autocratic systems. This was channeled through the abolition of multipartyism which provided checks and balances to the ruling elites in preference to a one party governance system which lacked these virtues. During this period, elections were a matter of marshaling popular support for policy decisions already made by nationalist party leaders rather than a representation of meaningful electoral choices to the voters (Legume, 1992: Cowan, 1992). Supporting Cowan’s observations, Cayne (1992:252) accounts that electoral environments and practices during the post-independence era in most African countries evolved and revolved around:
the success of the leadership in rallying popular support for independence had brought the party to power with widespread electoral strength. However, despite their popularity showing signs of declining, the leaders refused to risk the possibility of being turned out of office through open elections by an opposition party and where it attempted to appear, was repressed.

The increased repression, oppression, economic meltdown and self-styled type of leadership culminated into increased political dissent among citizens and ultimately gave birth to pressure groups and military coups in certain instances (Legume, 1992; Cayne, 1992; Cowan, 1992; Mwanakatwe, 1994; Chileshe, 1988). Bowing to political pressure and as a precondition to international eligibility to development aid, multipartyism reluctantly embraced and reintroduced by most African countries by the early 1990s though it was punctuated with periodic elections which were not competitive but just as a routine electoral practice (Mwanakatwe, 1994). As years moved and multipartyism cementing, the holding of regular elections brought about electoral competition and contestation in the democratic growth of those countries. This led to electoral contestation becoming the order of the day. Electoral results, in most cases, were rejected by losing candidates, and violence ensued due to alleged electoral manipulation mostly by those in leadership in alleged collusion with electoral management institutions (International IDEA, 2012). It is now an arguable fact that manipulated electoral processes by those in power in collusion with institutions managing elections through churning out and announcing electoral results contrary to the “will of the people”, have caused mayhem in some countries.

As a result, another citizens’ liberation struggle in pursuit of well-functioning electoral democracy, referred to as the “Electoral Manipulation Liberation Struggle” has been birthed. To this end, citizens reorganise themselves through the formation of non-governmental organisations to independently monitor the electoral process by placing trained individuals with a view of reducing electoral suspicions, irregularities in the process and further enhance the acceptability of the electoral outcomes (FODEP, 1991). International IDEA (2012) argues that the advent of independent observers and monitors underscored the need to “protecting and promoting” electoral integrity. International IDEA believes that electoral integrity in any electoral democracy should be a top policy priority to any country interested in promoting this type of democracy and in respecting the will of the people and for the “will of the people” to prevail in an electoral process. Bams (2015) observes that this demands for citizens’ education, participation and vigilance. Further, she argues that such a view is
supposed to be complemented by an electoral system that prioritises transparency and accountability especially at the tallying and election result announcement stages. Meanwhile, Wilson and Dilulio (2004) contends that electoral democracy works well when there is an opportunity for genuine leadership competition coupled with positive voter’s perception that a meaningful choice exist as the only way to ensure the “will of the people” prevailed.

The above arguments seem to have been preoccupied Mwaanga (2016) who also expresses his concern at the likelihood of electoral manipulation being done at tallying stage of the electoral process thereby denying their will and right to an electoral choice. Mwaanga justifies his fears by explaining that electoral manipulations and electoral abuses usually happens at tallying stage of the electoral process and urges electoral stakeholders to always strictly monitor and scrutinise the vote tallying processes. Mwaanga recalls that in the past, the vote totaling process had been subjected to “manipulation and abuse” by electoral managers. He further stresses that, in the interest of holding free, fair, transparent and credible democratic elections, transparency and accountability in the electoral process, particularly, at tallying stage must be safeguarded for losing candidates to easily and peacefully accept electoral outcomes. The International Peace Institute-IPI, (2010) agrees with others scholars cited in this study that elections are supposed to be instruments of legitimation for a body politic and facilitator of change in leadership in a way that is structured, competitive, and transparent and within a legal framework. IPI acknowledges that the existence of electoral contestation is supposed to be helpful tool to bring out the best out of the contestant.

However, this has, instead, generated post-election activities in some African states with undesirable electoral results leading to political and electoral upheavals in some jurisdictions. This phenomenon has been common in third world countries and Africa is the most hit continent. As Chileshe (1988:1) wonders:

> Things go wrong everywhere. In Africa, however, it is the extent and speed with which things have gone dangerously wrong which is startling in comparison with other areas. As a matter of course, everything and every action in Africa has tended to go away with the result that it is questioned whether this is a peculiarly an African phenomenon!”

Zambia, which is not spared from the perceived manipulation of the electoral process, saw in, around 1991 during the watershed 1991 elections, the emergence of local and international
election observers and monitors in the electoral process and thereon increased interests by citizens to safeguard the vote from perceived manipulations and abuses and avoid post elections conflict (Zambia Election Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC), 1991) have been difficult to ignore. This led to government and the electoral body to appreciate the role these monitors and observers play in the electoral process. In 2006 for instance, the revised electoral law recognised the role of observers and monitors in helping conduct transparent and accountable, free and fair elections. Further, the Government Republic of Zambia (GRZ), (2016) in the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016 under Article 45 (2) recognises the need for a transparent and accountable electoral process in order to promote electoral democracy. The above cited constitutional article instructs the country to promote a fair and free, independent, accountable, efficiency and transparent electoral process. Therefore, if non-state actors and political players were to unite, the Third Wave of Citizen’s Liberation Struggle against Electoral Manipulation due to inadequate transparency and accountability is likely to be fought head-on and successfully by the citizens themselves using the legal provisions.

This will help avoid nurturing troubled electoral processes. As rightly observed by International IDEA (2012:15);

Troubled electoral processes and their fall-out have challenged the credibility of electoral democracy...elections that are recognized as free and fair result in peaceful transitions of power while electoral processes that are deemed fraudulent or violent or to have been manipulated, can either lead to or exacerbate political instability. Therefore, protecting and promoting the integrity of elections is, therefore, a top policy priority.

To win the struggle against manipulated electoral processes in countries where they exist, there is need to consistently undertake monitoring and observation missions, carry out civic education and preach vigilance among stakeholders including ordinary citizens. Bams, (2015) concludes that electoral manipulation has become the greatest threat to the promotion of credible electoral democracy and stability of many states in the world, Africa being the worst hit. In her argument, Bams (2015: 60) observes that “the biggest threat to electoral democracy isn’t terrorism even though scoundrels use the fear of terrorists to extend the power of the state at the expense of individual liberty; instead, it’s becoming all too clear that the biggest threat to electoral democracy is actually electoral manipulation.” Therefore, evolution of electoral democracy has been bumpy with the beginning being saturated with electoral
manipulations leading to electoral outcome acceptability problems. From the arguments above, there is a ray of hope that, with the advent of election observers and monitors coupled with the vigilance of citizens, transparency and accountability of electoral process is achievable.

2.2 Transparency and Accountability in Promoting Credible Electoral Democracy

Although there is no a plethora of information readily available on the topic of transparency and accountability of the electoral process specifically for the target districts of Kafue and Lusaka and Zambia in general, the reviewed literature is more to the general writings of various scholars on the electoral processes in general mostly about other countries. The richness of the literature is supported by a few local authors who have done some studies in the country like Chitala (2002), Mwanakatwe (1994) and local Election Monitoring Groups election reports from organisations such as Anti-Voter Apathy (AVAP), Southern African Centre Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) and FODEP; Chileshe (1988); Sakala (2016) among others and international observer missions’ elections reports. This, therefore, entails that a careful review and examination of public records, periodicals, electoral journals, election reports and books to solicit other writers’ views on the subject both in support and against and further identify gaps in literature on the subject will be the focus of this section. It will examine the literature to ascertain the extent to which the current electoral process is accountable and transparent and can promote credible electoral democracy.

Young (2009:3, 18-20) explains that what constitutes a transparent electoral process is “when each step is open to scrutiny, and stakeholders can independently verify whether the process is conducted honestly and accurately.” Young further notes that the principles of transparency and accountability are “linked to the fundamental right of citizens to seek, receive and impart information which are elements of the freedom of expression, as well as the right to take part in government and public affairs.” In Bams’ opinion, transparent and accountable of the electoral process means that “decisions and actions of electoral officials are being opened up to public scrutiny and that citizenry and stakeholders have a right to access information when need arises” (Bams, 2015:64). This, therefore, means that transparent and accountable electoral process means that electoral decision making processes must be open to scrutiny coupled with reasonable opportunities for public input. This entails that information relating to all stages of the electoral cycle as presented above must be made available and accessible.
to citizens, including voters and candidates and observers both non-partisan and partisan be accredited to observe all phases of the election process and be able to comment publicly on the process free from unreasonable restriction (Young, 2009).

An electoral process is described to constitute accountability and transparency when citizens’ rights, the conduct of other electoral stakeholders, including the government, election management bodies (EMBs), political parties, candidates and security forces are respected (Young, 2009). Diamond, (2003:3) argues that:

In an electoral democracy, the principle of accountability holds that government officials—whether elected or appointed by those who have been elected—are responsible to the citizenry for their decisions and actions. Transparency requires that the decisions and actions of those in government are open to public scrutiny and that the public has a right to access such information. Both concepts are central to the very idea of democratic governance. Without accountability and transparency, electoral democracy is impossible. In their absence, elections and the notion of the will of the people have no meaning, and government has the potential to become arbitrary and self-serving.

From the above arguments, scholars in the electoral process are united in considering elections as a key mechanism through which citizens can hold their governments and other institutions accountable, but there must also be accountability within election processes themselves. Young (2009) argues that as to measure the presence of accountability of the electoral process, effective remedies should be in place against violators of citizens’ election-related rights. “There must also be administrative accountability for those organising elections and those conducting governmental activities related to elections. In addition, there must be timely procedures to bring to account those who conduct criminal acts that affect electoral-related rights,” (Young, 2009: 20)

The practices of promoting and demanding transparency and accountability of the electoral process make elections the primary means for the promotion of credible electoral democracy as citizens are able to hold their electoral officials accountable for their actions in office, especially, when they have behaved illegally, corruptly, or ineptly while carrying out the work on behalf of the general public (Fukuyama, 2014; Bams, 2015). When there is transparent and accountable practices in the electoral processes, issues of electoral
administration across the breadth of the electoral spectrum will be done under public spotlight. This will also reduce incidences of contested electoral outcomes on allegations of electoral irregularities and management flaws. This management flaws usually occur in the electoral process. As attested by Patel and Wahman (2015:104), Malawi electoral body, after the 1999 elections, boldly admitted that “the electoral commission did not perform very well in the management of elections, as transparency, accountability, trust and efficiency were under question.”

To enhance transparency and accountability of the electoral process in the promotion of credible electoral democracy, International IDEA (2012) emphasise the need for a clear and strong electoral and constitutional legal framework. The institute observes that any legal framework that seeks to facilitate credible electoral democracy must promote an electoral process that is conducted transparently and accountably as they are fundamental norms and practices of any electoral democracy. Therefore, a transparent and accountable electoral process becomes a key cornerstone to the growth of electoral democracy as it empowers citizens to participate in the selection of their political representatives and also provide avenues for political accountability and transparency (International IDEA, 2012). Strand and others (2005) stresses that given the centrality of the electoral process in electoral democracies and its critical role in consolidating a unified democratic society, there is obviously a need to correctly understand that any development that poses a threat to its legitimacy and institutionalised effectiveness must be nipped out of the bud before it blossoms. Strand argues that it is in these contexties that lack of transparency and accountability in the electoral process is such a blatant threat to credible electoral democracy since an electoral process is a mechanism through which citizens choose their national, constituency and local political representatives.

While presence of elections is not sufficient for calling a governance system an electoral democracy, the absence of elections, however, is sufficient for calling it an authoritarian system of one sort or another (Strand and others, 2005). When an electoral process is transparent and accountable, it can be used to enable citizens participate in re-electing or replacing political leaders or their political parties who perform and underperform respectively thereby holding them and their political parties accountable. This is also one sure peaceful mechanism for self-settling of electoral disputes about power based on electoral fraud and other malpractices. This is the reasons electoral scholars are agreeing to the fact that all electoral democracies are supposed to have institutionalised transparent and
accountable procedures of one form or another that seek to ensure that an electoral process is truly transparent and accountable. This, consequently, assist citizens, players and stakeholders to accept the electoral outcomes. Fukuyama (2014) argues that in practice, elections are just procedural aspect of electoral democracy because, according to him, holding of elections does not, in itself, mean the will of the people has been reflected or has been followed. According to him, this is so because electoral democracy is deeper than elections, themselves.

Some arguments have been advanced that to achieve electoral democracy with integrity, a genuine democratic process which is anchored on transparency and accountability in the administration and management of national elections by officials in electoral institutions must be pursued. Fukuyama (2014) further contends that accountability, which means “responsiveness to the interests of the whole society—that is to the common good—rather than to just its own narrow self-interest”, must be a cornerstone to any sound electoral process. However, he argues that from an electoral and democratic view point, accountability is understood to be typically procedural only associated with the holding of periodic democratic, free and fair multiparty elections that allow citizens to choose and discipline their elected leaders during the vote. United States Information Agency-USIA, (1991) explains that democratic elections should not be mere symbolic but must consider issues of openness and accountability seriously as the main door to acceptable outcomes by the players and stakeholders. USIA (1991:16-17) stresses:

Democratic elections are not merely symbolic… Electoral democracies thrive on openness and accountability with one very important exception: the act of voting itself. To cast a free ballot…voters in a democracy must be permitted to cast their ballots in secret. At the same time, the protection of the ballot box and tallying of vote totals must be conducted as openly as possible, so that citizens are confident that the results are an accurate and the government does not, indeed, rest upon their “consent”.

The above sentiments tallies well with the South African Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)’s motto of, “your vote is secret…everything else should be transparent,” (Bams, 2015:100). This illustrates the strong desire by most citizens and some electoral institutions to establish transparent, trusted and accountable electoral processes that command, not only public confidence, but electorate and stakeholders’ respectability and acceptability of the electoral outcomes respectively. As Mahajan (2014:719) explains that “an electoral
democratic political system is one which makes government responsive and accountable and its effectiveness depends, first and foremost, on the efficiency and skills of its leadership.”

Supporting other electoral scholars’ observation on the importance of transparency and accountability of electoral process in promoting electoral democracy, Bams (2015:80) aptly puts it thus;

Electoral democracy is the commitment to accountability and transparency and unless the electoral management body is also committed to accountability and transparency, there could be distrust and lack of confidence among electoral stakeholders, either in the manner we count votes or the manner we expend public resources.

From the above excerpt, Bams suggests that there is need for electoral bodies to be stronger believer in the promotion of transparency and accountability in their operations as a good virtue and practice in promoting credible electoral democracy. She seems to communicate a message that during her tenure at the South Africa electoral body she promoted transparency and accountability which resulted into improved public confidence and trust, not only in the operations of the electoral body, but in the entire electoral process also in South Africa. She explains that promotion of transparency and accountability in the operations of the electoral body further improved South Africa’s international rating. She expresses this in an excerpt below:

We therefore keep our books, as it were, open for public scrutiny, we always involve stakeholders, like political parties and even civil society in the planning and implementation of key electoral activities…through facilities such as the election result verification and announcement centres, and the [political] party liaison committees. We have introduced unprecedented openness and accountability in the way we manage elections…South Africa is one of the few countries in the world to embark on this route of transparent and accountable management of elections (Bams, 2015:80).

Validating Bams’ observation above, International IDEA (2012) and Jean-Pierre (2001) explain that the manner elections are conducted by various electoral managers play a major role in how the international community, national stakeholders and ordinary citizens will perceive the country’s electoral democracy. International IDEA further connects transparent and accountable of the electoral processes as triggers to development as well as it helps increase investor and donor confidence in the resultant governments. It further explains that if
countries hold elections that are free and fair, investors and other states will believe that the government born out of such an election can be trusted, a goodwill which can be translated into increased “trade and more donor aid”. This is the reason some electoral scholars like Fukuyama (2014), Bams (2015) among others have strongly stressed the need to embrace the concepts of accountability and transparency as a central ideal to electoral democratic governance. They have warned that without embracing the two concepts, electoral democracy is impossible to attain. Further arguments are that in the absence of accountability and transparency in the electoral process, elections which are an expression of people’s will, may have no meaning and elected leaders and resultant government, in general, will develop a potential to become arbitrary and self-serving thereby undermining electoral democracy.

Patel and Wahman, (2015:158) acknowledge the role of election observers and monitors in supporting transparency and accountability in the electoral process. The duo have this to say: “There are several benefits to election observation. Primarily, it is considered a deterrent for electoral fraud, as leaders and electoral managers fear the repercussions of being caught by observers.”

### 2.3 The General Electoral Situation Analysis

This section gives a synopsis of the electoral environment in Africa, the Southern African region and Zambia in particular. EIU (2010) and Patel and Wahman (2015) disclose that in the last two decades, a number of countries in Africa held elections and 80% of those countries are from the “non-established electoral democracies” compared to 30% in 1990 and that all of them attracted election observers and monitors of various shape and shades aimed at safeguarding the integrity of the elections and associated processes. International IDEA (2012), too, argues that over the years, many states which have held elections have also adopted peer learning in experiences from other states which may have either managed elections well or not by adopting good and discarding bad electoral practices. These experiences have resulted into the adoption of electoral processes that have helped many states to move towards greater levels of electoral openness and accountability to their own people. Consequently, the acceptability levels of electoral outcomes have increased among stakeholders which has led to peaceful transitions of power and increased public and international confidence and trust in the birthed governments a sign of existence of credible electoral democracy.
International IDEA further argues that clean, transparent and accountable electoral processes are precursors to the development of a commitment to credible electoral democracy in any country. “Therefore, the daunting challenge is ensuring that elections are fair and free” (International IDEA, 2012:43). The example of the Philippines has been cited as a country which conducted regular elections that were tainted with news of violence, allegations of electoral cheating and fraud especially in rural and other far lung areas but when it opened up its electoral process to international observers, peaceful transitions have been recorded. There has also been an increase in the levels of interest in election observations and monitoring aimed at providing the eyes and ears in the electoral process. Patel and Wahman (2015:158) describe electoral observation and monitoring as fraud-moderating tools. The duo further argue that “in addition, election observers are seen as “helping with the evaluation of the level of compliance with norms, which legitimizes and increases support for the process…and helps reassure voters that their ballot is protected.”

2.4 The African Electoral Scenario

As alluded in the preceding sections, Africa is legitimately proud of the electoral gains she has so far made in the recent years with regards the recovery and consolidation of electoral democracy on the continent but admittedly, there still remains some intrinsic electoral shortcomings and fragilities which are as real as the electoral progress so far scored. The persistence of these electoral shortcomings and fragilities have potential to undermine the construction of genuine foundations of electoral democratic systems on the continent (International IDEA, 2010). Worried with the intrinsic shortcomings and fragilities manifesting themselves from sporadic incidents of post-election violence in some African countries purportedly caused by electoral manipulation perceptions and the negativity elections seemingly creates on the African electoral democracy, the Institute for Peace Initiative (IPI) (2010) stresses the paramountcy of stakeholders’ vigilance in the electoral process. Reflecting back in the past, Kadima and Booysen (2009) recall that the electoral democratic order disrupted in the 1960s through the 1980s in most African states was later restored around the year 1989. Legum (1992:350) remembers that “by the end of 1980s, the popular revolt against single party rule had spread throughout Africa with the single battle cry of “Multiparty Democracy now.”

The electoral disruption mentioned above, Kadima and Booysen recollect that it is as a result of post-independence leaders who promoted and embraced non-competitive electoral
democratic governance systems they coined as “one party participatory democratic system”. Under this system, they argue, the existence of other political groupings save for the ruling party was an outlaw. This was complemented by the fact that most citizens were still in their independence euphoria and minded less the need for nurturing a competitive electoral democracy. Some scholars observe that most electoral processes of the time were compromised and suffered from what the term “credibility deficit”. Legum (1992) notes that ever since 1989, elections became visible and credible indicators of any country’s level of electoral democracy despite suffering from credibility deficits. During the same period, he reveals, most states endeavored to establish autonomous or independent electoral institutions, at least on paper, to manage elections based on existing electoral laws, rules and regulations which did not support practices of transparency and accountability in the electoral process. This undermined electoral democracy in many newly independent states.

However, the steady citizens’ realization that sustainable electoral democracy is dependent on their vigilance coupled with a competitive and transparent electoral market place and political ideas where citizens are free to shop and choose leaders who will represent their aspirations (Bams, 2015) slowly narrowed the electoral credibility deficits in the electoral processes. This was through the introduction of the component of electoral observation and monitoring in the process. It has been observed that, to a large extent, electoral credibility deficit is a result of inadequate electoral laws, rules and regulations and electoral systems coupled with the failure to comply with the rules of the electoral game by the electoral players. This is because these rules and regulations are, in most cases, either imposed by the respective governments and or are arrived at with limited consultations with electoral stakeholders, citizens and players. This is further coupled with the fact that most countries in Africa adopted electoral systems their former colonial masters left (Legum, 1992). The mostly used systems are the First Past the Post (FPTP), Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMPR) and the Proportional Representation (PR).

It goes without saying that any electoral process is held and dictated by the electoral system adopted by each country which differ in procedure and form from country to country thereby impacting on the levels of transparency and accountability in the electoral process and the degree it promote credible electoral democracy. Defining an electoral system, Wall and Salih, (2007:6) state that an electoral system is commonly understood as “the rules that govern how votes obtained by a political party or candidates are translated into representative (seats) in a representative body (council or parliament) and the interaction between these and party
“stakeholders’ behavior,” However, all the electoral systems fall within the four major types namely plurality or majority, proportional representation, mixed member proportional representation (MMPR) and others (Wall and Salih, 2007). However, the duo argue that the choice of an appropriate electoral system is a difficult undertaking for any country due to its demand to take into account country specifics such as social, economic, cultural, historical and political values in existence. The duo further argue that electoral system being used affects the level of citizen participation, transparency and accountability in the electoral process. Strand and others (2005) allude that electoral system in an electoral democracy is the crucial institutional device through which opinions among the electorate are translated into seats and power, hence they need to adopt an electoral system that is simple and open.

The levels of transparency and accountability of these electoral systems and promotion of effective representation by the elected leaders differ from system to system. For this reason, some countries have their citizens advocating for change of electoral systems from the adopted from the colonial masters to one that suits the new electoral realities existing in respective countries. One example of the country whose citizens have been calling for the change of the electoral systems is Zambia. This is evident in many constitutional and electoral review documents which have been produced over the years (Electoral Reforms Technical Committee Report-ERTC, 2007). Zambians have called for an electoral system that enhances citizen participation, electoral transparency, gender equality and accountability of the institutions managing elections and elected leaders. This led, in 2016, to a successful, though controversially, partial amendment of the constitution and the consequent revision in the electoral law which changed its electoral system from First Past the Post (FTPT) to majoritarian system of 50% +1 for the winning presidential candidate though maintained the FTPT at parliamentary and local government levels respectively.

The revised constitution and electoral laws further provide for the promotion of credible, transparent, accountable and efficient electoral process. To this end, Wall and Salih (2007:5) observe that: “for a successful and sustainable electoral system development or reform process, it is crucial to involve the broadest section of society possible, rather than the ruling elites alone.” Alexander and Kaboyakgosi (2012) nod Wall and Salih (2007)’s argument and stress the need for a call for popular dialogue on electoral system in a democratic spirit as means to fostering inclusive political participation and fairer electoral competition devoid of post-election violence or controversies. Notwithstanding, Bams (2015) argues that post-election controversies and violence are as a result of the fact that electoral democracy abhors
any imposition of leaders and lack of transparency and accountability in the management of elections. She cautions that an Electoral Process that was limited in transparency and accountability translated to imposition of leadership on the people which consequently undermined electoral democracy and legitimacy of the resultant leadership. This is so because it is assumed that there can be no electoral democracy without credible elections but most probable, elections can occur in the absence of electoral democracy (Bams, 2015).

Legum (1992) contends that some elected leaders and rulers remain in power by manipulating the electoral process through change of electoral rules, regulations and the republican constitutions for them to stand in perpetuity. Legum’s observation has been manifested in countries such as Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo (Brazzaville), Burundi and Uganda among others. These countries are a classic example in manipulating the electoral processes and state constitutions with a view to cement and suit their firm grip to power which has resulted into loss of lives, in some case, of those defending the credibility of electoral democracy. The leaders of these countries have been perceived to have been elected in secret in elections highly susceptible to manipulation and rigging and let alone riddled with corruption, intimidation, fear and harassment (Bams, 2015). However, history is full of such examples where the masses show a clear disdain for authoritarian leaders when those committed to democracy fail to deliver. Mass actions or responses to electoral manipulation have helped in constraining the abuse of institutional and state power. It also defeats the argument by Fukuyama (2014) who contends that the ordinary voters cannot inevitably demand pragmatic public policy in line with the democratic theory even if they are aware of limited levels of accountability and transparency in either the process or the institution managing the process.

Consequently, this has led to electoral institutions in many instances finding a balance between being strong and capable institutions and being accountable which has restrained such institutions from bypassing the watchful eye of the people to acting in broader interest of citizens. It has been argued that any devoid of citizen’s participation creates democratic gap. For example, the dangers of allowing elections to create an electoral democratic gap wide open is best illustrated by Kenya’s elections of 2008 and Burundi’s elections in 2015. The resultant effects of allowing an electoral democratic gap is the contagious nature of such ripple effects as other countries emulate manipulation of their constitutions, electoral laws, rules, regulations and codes to allow their leaders contest elections in perpetuity. For instance, after the Zimbabwean and Kenyan experiences in the first decade of 2000, new
countries that have emulated the manipulation of the electoral process included Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo (Brazzaville) among others. These countries have also experienced pre and post-election political and electoral conflict, controversies, violence, injuries, arrests, imprisonments and deaths. Instead of such electoral and political controversies and violence serving as an early warning signs in electoral democracy’s rear-view mirror in these countries, these countries ruled by greed leaders have intentionally ignored the warnings and perused the controversial path of manipulating the electoral process thereby undermining their electoral democracy.

To illustrate the dangers of ignoring the electoral warning signs by some countries, UNECA Report (2012:143) gives statistics in the period from 1990 to 2008 where about 20% of the elections in Africa involved levels of violence” due to dissatisfaction in the management and administration of these elections by the electoral management institutions. The UNECA Report further reveals that since 2007, conflict-ridden elections in Cote D’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe shows the distance that Africa still has to cover in improving its elections and electoral democracy. It further alludes to the fact that electoral conflicts undermine the legitimacy of elections and their outcomes, and devalue the electoral democratic processes. Fukuyama (2014) observes that electorates are the only ones to increase the transparency of electoral institutions by holding these institutions strictly accountable to people’s wishes. Although marginal improvement in election management has been recorded in some states in Africa, partly due to increased levels of transparency and accountability as a result of an alert citizenry leading to increased enthusiasm to participate in the electoral process activities, UNECA (2013) report reveals that, to some extent, people’s participation have reshaped the past stereotype that the African elections and associated processes to have had been known to be anchored on such a manipulation and rigging.

In those days, elections in Africa were considered perverse and conflict based by observers and losing candidates respectively. Allegations of electoral manipulation were unavoidable and a common phenomenon every after an election though mostly strongly dispelled by the winners. With such post-election dissatisfactions which continued to be raised in most countries holding elections today, Bams (2015) warns that such concerns put electoral democracy at a crossroad. To this end, Bams (2015) ‘s contention is that free and effective exercise of franchise by citizens and their effective participation is the supreme public good in any electoral democracy and should be supplied adequately at public cost and without
hindrance which must be consensual path electoral stakeholders must follow. This is so because it has a tendency to renew or sanction elected leaders by the holding of regular, and in most instances, inclusive and competitive elections under different electoral systems. Resultantly, this will continue to be a regular feature of Africa’s electoral politics (Alexander and Kaboyakgosi, 2012; Kadima and Booysen, 2009).

This has already been demonstrated by the fact that barely a year passes without major elections being held in one of the African countries. Electoral players are also made restless when electoral outcomes are always disputed through litigation, protests and demonstrations by aggrieved players. Disputed electoral results have, for many years in most African countries, led to erosion of public confidence. The lack of public confidence in the process has potentially undermined and led to the emergence of anti-democratic trends like voter apathy, electoral suspicions and speculations (Tonchi and Kadima, 2003) and a general public mistrust and loss of confidence in the electoral democracy and institutions associated with elections. But Bams (2015) argues that it is not only voter apathy which is a challenge facing electoral democracy today or a signaling erosion of public confidence in most countries pursuing electoral democracy but that additional electoral challenges such as public disillusionment to party politics, lethargy and failures of elections, in the public eye, to deliver desired results such as public service delivery and addressing underdevelopment, poverty and inequality have emerged and further undermined the credibility and growth of electoral democracy in many countries.

However, the dawn of competitive plural politics in Africa, to a certain level and due to its nature of promoting competitiveness, has provided and promoted some degree of checks and balances in the electoral process as opposed in the days of the one party governance systems. As correctly observed by Bams (2015), these checks and balances, in some instances, have provided and promoted an enjoyable, credible and legitimate electoral process and its outcome to which electorates are able to trust that every ballot is counted and counted properly. Electoral managers and administrators have been put under intense scrutiny by stakeholders in respect to observance of the rules of the electoral game. Though the strict scrutiny an electoral body is a good electoral approach, Fukuyama (2014), however, cautions against the idea arguing that electoral institutions should not be constrained by strict adherence to electoral rules and strip them of their administrative discretion. He noted that this is because such an approach runs contrary to the most common held public view that public institutions are too rule bound, rigid and lacking in common sense.
Fukuyama (2014) and Jean-Pierre (2001) argue that electoral managers must have the necessary knowledge, competence and technical ability and exhibit neutrality in carrying out their duties diligently without the need to be strictly scrutinised. Fukuyama and Jean-Pierre further argue that this need for technocratic competence has potential to put good governance on a collision course with electoral democracy. Further observations are that electoral democracy is undermined when the culture of openness, accountability and tolerance is absent among the managers of the electoral process and also players. Concurring with Fukuyama’s argument on the need for the electoral management bodies to be stocked with experienced and competent staff, Strand and others (2005) emphasise the need for the electoral management bodies to have both qualified and experienced staff to curtail the risk of electoral fraud but instead put stamp of approval of legitimacy to the resultant elected regime.

Therefore, in a competitive electoral dispensation, electoral institutions should embrace principles of accountability and transparency and facilitate an electoral environment where all citizens and stakeholders capable of exercising good political judgment ought to have the right to political participation. Once that is done regardless of how hotly contested the electoral contest is, the will of the people is ever reflected and the electoral results win public and stakeholders’ trust and acceptability.

Bams (2015) cites Mexico as one good example where after the emergence of electoral competition, elections, ever since, have been hotly contested but the results have been reflecting the “public will” due to fact that the country has embraced and promoted openness in the electoral process. Kadima and Booysen (2009) argue that this has been the essence of electoral competition in electoral processes as it requires that, as political parties compete for power through an open public vote, all players are expected to comply with the rules of the electoral game. In this regard, increased popular public participation in the electoral process is cardinal for a strengthened electoral democracy especially when the public develops vigilance that consequently promotes public confidence in the electoral process. Some scholars and experts have nodded Africa’s stead progress towards credible electoral democracy. In reference to the Ghanaian 2016 general and parliamentary elections, Mbeki (2016) observes that successful conclusion of an electoral process in Africa serves as an inspiration and beacon for the rising tide of electoral democracy throughout the Commonwealth. Recognising the positive electoral strides the continent has scored so far in its journey towards credible electoral democracy, IPI (2010:13) notes that:
Almost twenty years after the inauguration of political pluralism, Africa has made remarkable progress in instituting the core principles and practices of [electoral] democratic governance, with regular elections becoming routine and widespread, and leadership successions and rotations occurring more frequently than before. Although elections and leadership changes signify the steady growth of electoral democracy, obstacles to consolidation remain.

2.5 The SADC Region Electoral Scenario

With African elections showing some marginal improvements and positive electoral trends as attested by the UNECA Report (2012) and International IDEA (2010, 2012) stress that protecting and promoting the integrity of elections is ultimately the responsibility of all national stakeholders. The IPI (2010:8) nods that though holding elections is important, there is a need for these elections to be underpinned by a “culture of transparency and credibility”.

The above observation settles well with the dictates of the 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa which emphasises transparent and credible elections to achieve democratic and participatory governments. To this end, the commitment of the African countries to electoral democracy, peace and security are well articulated in the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance in which member states tried to institutionalise the practice of holding regular and credible elections and electoral processes.

Statistically, the UNECA Report notes that from 1989 to 2006, the region held about 33 multiparty national elections while from 2006 to 2009, a further 20 national elections were conducted, a sign that the democratic routine of holding regular elections in the region is not reversing but getting entrenched and becoming a regular electoral practice in the SADC region (Kadima and Booysen (2009). It is worth noting that some of these elections were characterised by electoral controversies like those in Zimbabwe in 2008, Kenya in 2008, Zambia in 2001, 2016 (ZESN, 2013; FODEP, 2001-2008; EUEOM, 2016; IPI, 2010) among others. Other countries whose elections have been riddled with controversies and violence were Senegal, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique among others. The accusing finger has always been resting on leaders’ alleged connivance with the electoral management bodies to manipulate the electoral process. This electoral manipulation of rules and procedures has negatively affected the outcomes and public confidence in the electoral process. International IDEA (2010:85) attests “there is extremely low levels of
public confidence across the region and the traumas left by the regular and widespread electoral fraud and abuses of power of several decades ago have not healed entirely in some countries.” This explains the low levels of citizens’ confidence and trust towards electoral institutions in some countries and the ease with which “ghost of electoral fraud” resurrect at every time there is a close election.

It is for this reason that Bams (2015:87) calls on EMBs to improve the quality of electoral management by being transparent and accountable to stakeholders if credible electoral democracy that inspires public electoral confidence is to be entrenched in the SADC region in conformity to the entrenchment of the electoral democratic process in the region. She also called on the electoral management bodies to be committed to virtues and principles of transparency and accountability. Further Bam proposes the setting up of credible electoral institutions to manage elections. Bams (2015:87) observes that:

There is no doubt that in any country, the running of a modern democratic electoral process is a complicated matter depending upon a wide range of variables and the assistance of a large group of people. Building credible electoral democracy presupposes the setting up of electoral institutions that have full capacity to execute their duties in a manner that creates confidence in the electorate, in the process and deepens public trust. It is important that all systems in the electoral process including individuals responsible for the management of elections are independent, impartial, transparent and accountable.

Bam’s views on setting up credible institutions have been echoed by International IDEA (2012:15) which notes that “to this end, states not only pass legislation, set up institutions or draw up codes of conduct and other enforcement mechanisms at the national level but also commit themselves to regional and international principles of electoral democracy.” With the foregoing, Kadima and Booysen (2009) contend that given that, not all the elections being held are of democratic substance partly due to partiality and limited accountability and transparency in the management of electoral processes in many countries, the current and future focus should be gradually on shifting from focusing on the “quantity of elections” to focusing on the “quality of elections.” Supporting the shift in focus from quantity to quality, International IDEA (2010) suggests the possible solutions to identified combination of factors that have contributed to erosion of the legitimacy of electoral democracy in most countries in the region. The argument is that low quality of and limited access to electoral transparency
and accountability, poor administration of electoral justice as well as widespread electoral corruption and de facto impunity for those involved meant that electoral democracy seldomly mirrored the diversity of the population and also the will of the electorates. Bams (2015) also agrees with Kadima and Booyse, (2009) and International IDEA, (2010)’s arguments by asserting that African EMBs owes Africa a huge favour of enhancing the meaning of electoral democracy by moving away from “regularity” (quantity) of elections to “quality” of the electoral democratic moment.

Further observations are that focus on regularity alone at the expense of quality elections have resulted into troubled electoral process whose credibility have been challenged and doubted by stakeholders and players. International IDEA (2012:15) observes:

Troubled electoral processes and their fall-out have challenged the credibility of electoral democracy in recent years. Elections that are recognised as free and fair result in a peaceful transition of power, while electoral processes that are deemed fraudulent or violent or to have been manipulated, can either lead to or exacerbate political instability.

Admittedly, Bams (2015) stresses that some African EMBs still have a huge task ahead in deepening electoral democracy in their respective countries if they are to contribute to citizens’ electoral well-being. International IDEA (2010) advises that these electoral material deficits in democratic governance in the region must become correction centres and points of action to promote electoral democracy building. However, the challenge has been the dilemma which arise on how to preserve and consolidate electoral democracy while at the same time moving towards a better electoral democracy in the material sense in SADC region. To address this dilemma, the SADC region adopted revised electoral observation framework referred to as the 2015 Revised SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections with the potential to improve election observation as well as strengthen electoral governance in the region. In Chirambo and Motsamai (2015)’s asserts that SADC is prompted to revise its electoral principles and guidelines so as to improve assessments of the region’s electoral processes and as a means to identify the root causes and drivers of electoral related conflicts, that so often, engulf the region.

This is buttressed by the belief that election observation is regarded as key in fostering transparency and accountability in highly competitive electoral situations. Therefore, this section has clearly highlighted SADC’s standing on electoral democracy and has identified
factors that have promoted the growth or consolidation of electoral democracy in the region. Some of the claw back factors which are militating in undermining this consolidation have also been noted among them weakness in electoral institutions leading to negative electoral perceptions among citizens and low levels of acceptability of electoral outcomes. The next section will narrow its discussion on Zambia’s electoral democratic consolidation. It first gives the country’s electoral history since its independence in 1964.

2.6 Transparency and Accountability of the Electoral Process in Zambia

Zambia got its independence in 1964 from Britain and adopted an electoral system left by its colonial masters—the First Past the Post (FTPT) where the winner of elections “takes it all”. However, the independence Constitution provided for mixed elements of “Westminster Parliamentary System” and the American Presidential System. The Presidential system provided for the president to be elected directly by universal suffrage whose term of tenure was never dependent on the continued enjoyment of public support or National Assembly (Mohammed and Salih, 2006) but on use of anti-democratic tactics. In 1973, Zambia adopted a “one party participatory democracy” by abandoning multipartyism. Under the one party system, parliamentarians were democratically elected using competitive electoral processes that required aspirants to first pass through primary elections while the president was elected without any competition from human beings but rather animals such as frogs were made to compete with the president and always appeared on the presidential ballot paper (Mwanakatwe, 1994). This era lasted for 17 years—1973-1990 without citizens meaningfully expressing their will at presidential level. Mohammed and Salih (2006: 109) recounts:

One distinct advantage that [the one party] electoral system had over the ensuing multiparty electoral system was that contesting elections at parliamentary level were more open and democratic by any standards than was the case in either the First or Third Republics…Parliamentary elections were very competitive in which all qualified voters participated.

Notwithstanding, since independence from Britain in 1964, the country has held 10 national elections—those of 1968, 1973, 1978, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2011 and 2015 (Kadima and Booysen, 2009; Mwanakatwe, 1994). This means that from 1991 when Zambia reverted to multiparty politics, the country has held seven (7) presidential and a number of parliamentary and local government elections and by-elections which have been mostly contested by losing candidates. The country has also held two referenda in 1969 and 2016
respectively with the 2016 referendum on the expanded Bill of Rights failing to meet the constitutional threshold of 50% participation of eligible voters. The country has had six presidents; all democratically elected through national elections with smooth and peaceful transitions being witnessed. The electoral turnout for most presidential elections has been above 50% save for the 2008 and 2015 presidential elections (FODEP, 2008; 2015). These elections have had controversies and challenges caused by largely by the electoral system being used which has raised the issues of credibility of the process. The narrowing electoral winning margins have exacerbated rigging allegations among the losing candidates which has resulted into some of them petitioning the outcomes.

These electoral controversies have consequently undermined and continued to undermine the credibility of the electoral outcomes and the general credibility of electoral democracy in the country. The legitimacy of the resultant governments, for instance, in 2001 and 2016 have been doubted by observers, monitors, citizens and political parties. The argument, among electoral and political analysts such as Mbewe (2009) and Chitala (2002) has been that the country's electoral process is perceived to be warped with corruption, irregularities due to limited accountability and transparency both in its management and administration. Sakala (2016) confirms by citing the court rulings on the presidential election petitions of 1996 and 2001 in which the Courts established the existence of electoral irregularities and fraud in the electoral process. Accordingly, the 2001 presidential petition judgement which saw the judges split 3-2, established that the elections though being held in a free and fair atmosphere, they had some irregularities while other two ruled that the elections were fraudulently held. Sakala explains:

In February 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that despite the corruption allegations, the use of government vehicles, provision of cheap mealie-meal to residents of Copperbelt, Northern, Luapula, the abuse of the public media by the ruling party, the MMD, the election was upheld and that the president was properly elected (Sakala, 2016:148).

This judgement did not settle well with the petitioners who accused the judges of being compromised especially that Sakala (2016) does confirm that the head of the Supreme Court bench which presided over the presidential electoral petition against the newly elected president was considered to that position by the elected President because of a purported “small favour”. Sakala further discloses that the new occupant of the position of Chief Justice was recognised because he passed a minority judgement against late President Mwanawasa’s
predecessor in the presidential election petition of 1996 in which petitioners questioned late President Fredrick Chiluba’s illegibility to contest the 1996 elections and also that the electoral commission had neglected its statutory duty by conducting “a fraudulent election devoid of principles of a free and fair poll”. It must be noted here that presidential election petitions at the time were only filed, heard and decided after the elected president was inaugurated and given the instruments of power. This raised issues of to what extent the country’s electoral process was transparent and accountable and how far the judiciary would go in adjudicating petitions judiciously and impartially.

Recounting the management of the 1996 electoral process, Chitala (2011:167-168) laments:

Arising from Chiluba’s 1996 Constitutional Amendments, the playing field in the electoral process was also compromised. Chiluba manipulated the electoral Act. He did not stop at manipulating the Constitution and the Electoral law; he went ahead to cheat on the whole electoral process…voters’ registration itself was chaotic. Our Judiciary refused to live up to the public expectation as a just arbiter but came out clearly as accomplices to the MMD in rigging the elections.

The scenario above created an electoral controversy in the country’s electoral process which raged on for close to the end of the entire electoral cycle with losing political parties’ leadership vowing to fight what they termed “fraudulent electoral” arrangement but could not succeed. Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s founding president, when announcing the boycott of his party- United National Independence Party (UNIP)-from participating in the 1996 presidential elections due to new constitutional clauses which barred him and his vice from contesting, admitted that the 1996 electoral process was the most contentious both in nature of the electoral system and the manner it was conducted and managed by the Electoral Commission and government. It is worth noting that during that time, the Electoral Commission Office was under the Office of the Vice-President, fully controlled by the state. As a result, the 1996 elections saw President Dr. Kaunda, who had intention of contesting under UNIP expressing reservation in the transparency and accountability of the electoral process. He cited the secret award and signing of a contract to an Israeli company known as NIKUV Computers (Israel) Limited perceived to be an intelligence organisation under Mossad to carry out voter registration despite the law mandating the Electoral Commission Office to do so.
Kabwe (1997) puts Dr. Kaunda’s reservations in the 1996 electoral process succinctly in the excerpts below:

The electoral process designed by the MMD and NIKUV would never ensure that the secret ballot was respected and yet the secret ballot was sacred. It alone secured the individual’s most fundamental right of free and unlimited choice. It was a right which was so basic and sacred that no government had the right to exercise any form of limitation over it (Kabwe, 1997:161).

Therefore, from the foregoing, the pre-and post-election controversies and public dissatisfaction which usually manifest itself are partly caused by mistrust in the electoral body and the conduct of the judiciary. The end results is voter apathy, electoral petitions and non-acceptance of the electoral outcomes by losing candidates. This has greatly undermined the credibility of the electoral process. Resultantly, serious questions pertaining to the credibility of the electoral process and its capability to help attain the benchmark of a democratic free, fair and transparent and accountable electoral democracy have been raised. The ills in the electoral process are well reaffirmed by Mbewe (2009:1) who points out that: “it has been claimed by some observers that elections in Zambia have been characterized by controversy, election petitions, frequent and costly by-elections including boycotts as was during the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections” a view which has been strongly shared and confirmed by Chitala (2011) also.

In his view, Chitala’s describes the 1996 electoral process as not being credible, free and fair a view which is attested by both international and local election monitors (FODEP, 1996). This perception has continued to be a perpetual electoral tag in Zambia. In this vein, this research is trying to establish the extent to which transparency and accountability of the electoral process promote credible electoral democracy and clearly, literature reviewed so far has not been kind and has reviewed that the past elections in Zambia have not been conducted and managed in a transparent and accountable manner. It has been punctuated by electoral controversies such as boycotts, petitions and non-acceptability of the electoral outcomes. However, literature has also confirmed partiality of the judiciary in adjudicating electoral petitions especially presidential partly due to the appointment modalities of the judges (Sakala, 2016). Further, greater involved of citizens and international observers in the electoral process has also been recognised since the advent of multiparty politics. This has greatly improved the levels of transparency and accountability of the electoral process over the years. The next subsection deals with electoral legal frameworks.
2.7 Electoral Legal Framework

Zambia acclaims to a number of continental and regional conventions or instruments on elections. Continentally, Zambia in 2011, signed the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007) which among other commitments, expects member states to “promote the holding of regular free and fair elections to institutionalise legitimate authority of representative government as well as democratic change of governments.” The Charter, as a matter of principle, expects member states to hold “regular, transparent, free and fair elections” and further entrench, in the continent, a political culture of change of power based on holding transparent elections conducted by competent, independent and impartial national electoral bodies. Through this Charter, member states pledge determination to promote and strengthen good governance by institutionalising transparency, accountability and participatory democracy in their electoral processes. Zambia also attests to the Principles for Elections Management, Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO) in the SADC region adopted in 2003 whose aim is to “define a set of criteria to guide electoral practice and foster a sound enabling environment in which elections can take place.”

Another regional instrument which Zambia subscribes to is the SADC Principles Governing Democratic Elections which also expect member states to promote electoral environment for the holding of free, fair and transparent elections. In addition, Zambia’s electoral commission subscribe to the SADC-Electoral Commission Forum (ECF) (2010), an organisation for Electoral Commissions in SADC region. In the preamble of the SADC-ECF constitution, it courts member state commissions to “promote conditions conducive to free, fair and transparent election in the region,” while Part II Article 5.4 of the Forum’s constitution further mandates election management bodies to “promote conducive relationships between electoral commissions and stakeholders through open and transparent electoral practices.” In Zambia, elections are conducted and managed by the Electoral Commission of Zambia established by the Constitution in Article 76 of the previous 1996 Constitution and Article 229 of the 2016 amended Constitution. It is operationalised by the Electoral Commission of Zambia Act No. 24 of 1996 as revised in 2016 (GRZ, 1996, 2016). Therefore, the major legal frameworks that guide the holding of elections in Zambia are the republican Constitution, the electoral process Act No. 35 of 2016, electoral code of Conduct Statutory Instrument No. 52 of 2011 and the Public Order (Amendment) Act No. 1 of 1996 Cap 113 of the Laws of Zambia and Local Government Elections Act (GRZ, 1996).
The previous constitution in Article 76 establishes an “autonomous electoral commission to supervise the registration of voters, to conduct presidential and parliamentary elections”. There are no provisions that compels the commission to be accountable to stakeholders and no provisions to promote transparency and accountability in its operations. Transparency and accountability seem to be at the discretion of the managers of elections. This entails why transparency and accountability in the elections that ensued after the assent of the 1996 constitution were at the discretionary will of those who managed the process. The 2016 amended constitution assented to on January 5, 2016 recognises, under Article 45, the principles of “transparency and accountability” and further demands “efficiency, independence and timely resolution of electoral disputes” when managing the electoral process. It further abhors corruption, intimidation and harassment of electoral players, which is a positive electoral development towards achieving transparency and accountability of electoral process. This if adhered to by players and stakeholders, will help achieve credible electoral democracy in the country. However, the discretionary powers invested in the electoral managers to hire printers of ballot papers, procurements of electoral materials and development of electoral regulations with or without consulting stakeholders undermines transparency and accountability of the electoral process. As agents in the electoral process, such exclusive powers can be detrimental to achieving credible electoral democracy.

In addition, although the law does recognise the role played by various interest groups, the law does not in categorical terms value effective consultations. Article 229 that establishes the electoral body is mute on such matters when spelling out the functions of the electoral body. The effectiveness of the new electoral provisions in the amended constitution was tested in the August 11, 2016 General Elections and National Referendum which, after elections, it was clear that more time was required to assimilate the provisions of the revised constitution and electoral laws by the players, administrators and other stakeholders. The review of the subsidiary legislation such as the electoral commission of Zambia Act and electoral process Act were done in haste and had little impact on improving transparency and accountability of the electoral process, instead, created more post elections controversies. The public order Act, and Criminal Penal Code remain unattended to and unchanged which contrasts the provisions of the amended constitution, revised electoral process Act No 35 of 2016 and the Electoral Commission of Zambia Act of 2016. This has had an impacted on the electoral process (EUEOM, 2016). The revised electoral commission of Zambia Act 2016 still dictates that the commission makes its “own procedures and regulations” in the
management and administration of elections in any part of the country as provided for under section 3 of the electoral process Act No. 35 of 2016. This is the maintenance of the status quo as the old electoral Act No. 12 of 2006 also stated the same. The Act states: “provided in the exercise of its functions, under the constitution and this Act, the commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority” (GRZ, 2006)

Although this provision could have been made to save the electoral body from political interference, it defeats and undermines the principles of accountability and transparency of the electoral process as alluded to in the previous discussions. This further contrasts the constitutional committal in the preamble of the Constitution that demands the upholding of the principles of democracy and good governance. This makes the realisation of accountability and transparency of the electoral process a very difficult task. It also negates the provisions of the amended constitution as provided for under Article 45 which expects the electoral body, by law in its operation, to be accountable and transparent, efficient, credible and timely. It implies that the electoral body, which is a public institution, is supposed to be accountable to the public. Unfortunately, by law it is not mandated to be subjected to, controlled by and/or accountable to any authority or person. This clearly exposes the inconsistencies and lack of clarity in the electoral law when it comes to issues of transparency and accountability of the electoral process and how they can effectively be enforced and promoted. It is worth noting that a defective legal framework coupled with unsuitable electoral system has created inherent electoral deficits which are detrimental to the realisation of a transparent and accountable electoral process and later on promote credible electoral democracy in the country.

Therefore, regardless of the existence of clear electoral procedures, regulations and rules in an election process and the presence of monitors and observers to witness the electoral process, a defective legal framework governing electoral process erodes public confidence and consequently undermines the emergence, existence and growth of a credible electoral democracy in any country (Strand, 2009; Bams, 2015). With the inadequacies in the law, transparency and accountability of the electoral process, under the current legal provisions, is at the discretion of the electoral body itself and its managers. In this regard, basing on the legal provisions cited above, it is very clear that there is an electoral legal deficit to effectively promote transparency and accountability of the electoral process which is an important prerequisite for credible electoral democracy. For this reason, the need for surgery to the electoral law to effectively and efficiently promote transparency and accountability of
the electoral process in line with Article 45 of the amended constitution cannot be
overemphasised. This is only possible when constant reviews of the electoral and
costitutional legal framework are conducted exhaustively through consultations with
stakeholders and in line with the provisions of Article 10 of the African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance. The review will also help respond to emerging
electoral demands in the modern day management of elections.

As European Union Electoral Observation Mission (EUEOM) (2016:2-3) acknowledges in its
final election report on August 11, 2016 that Zambian general elections and national
referendum had shortfalls contributed by the gaps in the electoral laws and the rushed manner
the legal revisions was done. This undermined transparency and accountability of the
electoral process and the promotion of electoral democracy. The legal framework for the
2016 general elections and national referendum substantially changed in January and June
2016 respectively shortly before the 2016 elections. The rushed drafting and passing of new
laws resulted in a number of unclear provisions, gaps, and contradictions between the new
acts and the constitution and due to time, there was limited time to harmonise them. The late
introduction of these revisions, contrary to best international practices, meant that the legal
framework was unfamiliar to many electoral stakeholders, players and citizens.

As a result and interestingly, the electoral body continued to adopt new procedures,
regulations and rules without consulting stakeholders in the midst of the electoral campaigns
and the entire election process, with the regulations on polling and counting only affirmed on
the 9 August, two days before the general elections and national referendum. Some
legislation foreseen by the new constitution such as a law on campaign finance were not
implemented to date. The subsidiary law is not yet in place. To this end there is no specific
law regulating political parties financing and the general financing of the electoral process
which is an important aspect in the promotion of transparency and accountability of the
electoral process (Jean-Pierre, 2001). This is a clear case of how unclear and weak legal
provision can weaken transparency and accountability of the electoral process and further
undermine the promotion of electoral democracy. Having discussed the legal framework, the
next section reviews what constitutes an ideal electoral body that can manage and administers
a credible electoral process that is transparent and accountable in the spirit and letter in
promotion of credible electoral democracy.
2.8 An Ideal Electoral Management Body (EMB)

This section serves to discuss an ideal electoral management body that is able to promote and uphold electoral transparency and accountability in the electoral process and consequently support the nurturing of credible electoral democracy. It examines how an electoral body can build and win public confidence in its work and what other authors have noted and described as an ideal EMB. Emphasis on confidence and trust in the work of the EMB has been underscored by many electoral experts in the electoral process. Confidence and trust are the most important foundations for an electoral commission. The client of an election commission is said to be the entire country hence the requirement that the commission tends its duties carefully because any mistake may have national ramifications (International IDEA, 1996:10). Patel and Wahman (2015) notes that in most countries, the EMBs claim independence and autonomy with national laws indicating that indeed they are not directly under any authority or person’s direction or control. However, institutional set-ups gives an allowance for the executive arm of government to control these institutions. This is due to the manner they are appointed.

Reinforcing the above argument, one of the ECZ official interviewed is aptly admits the inadequacies in the appointment of the electoral commissioners which is believed to be cause for electoral suspicions and erosion of public confidence in the independence of the commission to run a transparent and accountable in the electoral process and suggests the following:

The ideal in terms of appointment of commissioners for me would be, and this is based on the aspirations of the people and what people want to see, that parliament or a select committee or something along those line were perhaps to be not only ratify the chairperson and the like but for the sake of just building confidence in the public, we say that the commission in terms of appointments is done through a parliamentary select committee or indeed some other body other than the presidency both in either appointment or oversight to be exercised by the select committee or indeed the parliament itself. Then, maybe, it will help in the long run to show some kind of delinkage from mainstream government, I think this may help (Interview with ECZ Official, January, 2016).

It has been observed that in most instances, EMBs flex their institutional muscle against the opposition, the public and other players but fail most times fail to do so when dealing with
the ruling political parties and their agents. Fukuyama (2014) argues that though it is true and acceptable that an effective electoral institution requires high degree of autonomy, it must be understood that democratic practice dictated that such institutions did not have their own goals but only operating goals set by the principal who are the citizens and other stakeholders such as political parties for whom they work for.

Fukuyama further cautions that “the agent who is the electoral body should have enough autonomy to do its job well, it should also remain ultimately accountable to the principal—the citizens and other electoral stakeholders” (Fukuyama, 2014: 24-76). Notwithstanding, Fukuyama’s argument, such institutions like the electoral bodies must be under the close scrutiny of stakeholders or citizens who, Fukuyama, referred to as the sovereign. In agreeing with Fukuyama (2014)’s argument on the need for some degree of autonomy for an electoral body, Bams (2015) went further explain what an autonomous and independent EMB is. According to her, an autonomous and independent electoral body is one “insulated from control by the government or any external body; and one which is “guaranteed access to adequate resources to be able to carry out its mandate”. She notes that denial of adequate funding to an electoral body is one sure way of eroding its independence and autonomy and thereby undermining its ability and capacity to manage an electoral process transparently and accountably. Therefore, Bams’ observation is that one of ways to make an EMB fail to deliver credible, transparent and accountable electoral services to the public is by the government cutting off its funding to it though she further reveals that there are still exists differences on what constitutes a sufficient budget to an EMB to smoothly manage an electoral process.

In Fukuyama’s opinion, an ideal electoral institution should always have the aspects of electoral accountability. He argues that in the modern electoral democracy, electoral procedures must be clear and transparent so as to make the electoral institutions responsible to their citizens while “taking into account that good procedures do not inevitably produce proper substantive electoral results” (Fukuyama, 2014:24, 76). in her argument, Bams (2015 advises all EMBs and electoral staff to aim at creating an ideal electoral body which must aim at-pursuing responsibility, accountability and transparency key essential ingredients for achieving an electoral process that promotes electoral democracy. She reminds electoral managers to take their sacred duty and obligation to embrace accountability and transparency in the electoral process for the sake of stakeholders’ confidence seriously. Accordingly, she concludes that responsibility, accountability and transparency on the part of the electoral
body are essential ingredients in the doctrine of electoral management and in the promotion of credible electoral democracy. The EMB and those who manage elections have a sacred duty and obligation to be accountable only to the stakeholders who are the electorate. Bams notes:

The achievement of high standards of ethical conduct by the people in the electoral process is central to the maintenance of public trust and confidence in the results and resultant government. The need for accountability and transparency is an essential prerequisite and, as such, voters participating in such a transparent and accountable process hope that their will, will be reflected in the elections and a better future achieved than the past and the present (Bams, 2015: 47-50).

As discussed above, further scholars have made arguments to effect that some electoral institutions get their autonomy compromised by various interest groups especially when the appointment criteria is compromised too. An example of South Africa Independent electoral commission was cited to which, in 2008, a group of political parties challenged the Commission’s independence on account that it was not autonomous contrary to its claims (Bams, 2015). This was because, in the eyes of electoral stakeholders, citizens and electoral players, neither of the two conditions for a resemblance of an independent nor an autonomous commission were fully met. This was so because the actual logistical implementation of the electoral process was particularly vulnerable to abuse since the people who were appointed in critical positions in the electoral process had party-political loyalties which affected their performance and could have been beholden for their employment to the continued meant electoral success for the ruling party. Additional arguments were that COSATU, whose members were part of the electoral staff, was openly campaigning for the ruling ANC and were party of the ANC executive. This is one of an example where the composition of the electoral body coupled with the appointment modalities undermines its effective functioning thereby affecting the promotion of electoral democracy.

Other factors key to arriving at an ideal electoral body are, as argued by Fukuyama (2014); Strand (2005); and Bam (2015), the need for knowledgeable, experienced, educated and competent human resource coupled with a constant flow of financial resources, along with organizational capital to do its work adequately. Fukuyama sums up this argument by stating that the key most words for the smooth operation of an electoral body is “capacity and autonomy”. To this end, the management of the electoral process under the current electoral
management system still suffers from negative public court perception regarding transparency and accountability and also suffers from limited public confidence regarding the competency of the staff recruited to manage the electoral process in the two districts. It must be noted that the electoral body in Zambia does not have its own staff at provincial, district and ward level and relies on hired staff from other jurisdiction who are, in most case ill-trained to appreciate the complexities and sensitivity associated with the electoral process. The next section deals specifically the management of the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts.

2.9 Election Management and Administration in Kafue and Lusaka Districts

It should be stated from the onset that during elections, every districts has got a district electoral officer in charge of electoral matters and the entire electoral process in that particular district. However, the country’s electoral process is still highly centralized and so its management is strictly controlled by the central administration. This section has been approached from a holistic approach because Zambia has no specific election management approaches tailored to any district but that all districts in the country use a national style of election management and administration. As a link to the above section and an affirmation of how non ideal electoral body can manage elections, this section has looked at the organisation of elections from the late 1980s to 1990s (International IDEA, 2009). It is a known fact that most countries had no established electoral management bodies but for Zambia, this was not a problem as the country organised a fully-fledged electoral commission established by law by 1996. Several countries, Zambian inclusive, organised multiparty elections after the political and democratic waves of the 1980s and 1990s. These elections were riddled with challenges as many electoral bodies were managing and conducting elections for the first time (Kadima and Booysen, 2009).

The managers and administrators of these elections had limited experience and knowledge on the management of the electoral process. Many established electoral management bodies (EMBs) were largely unprepared, inexperienced, had limited knowledge and resources to deliver and guarantee the delivery of credible, transparent electoral processes during the period under review. This compromised accountability and transparency of most electoral processes (International IDEA, 2009). As result, the elections managed under those circumstances created an electoral atmosphere which was filled with electoral controversies, which Chitala (2011), described as an “electoral joke”. With the passage of time, however,
most electoral bodies in the SADC region accumulated valuable experiences and competencies with the only challenge being how to ensure that stakeholders have confidence and trust in the electoral process and perceive these electoral bodies as credible institutions to manage and administer competitive electoral processes. It has been strongly argued that stakeholders’ confidence in the process is crucial, not only for the electoral exercise itself, but for the credibility of the government birthed out of such a process. As earlier discussed, the institutional set up in the management of an electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts falls under the general provision of the current constitution and electoral laws under which the national electoral body is established.

The Commission claims to operate under two principles in its management and administration of elections namely; “transparency and accuracy through its pursuit of an open and participatory electoral process” (ECZ, 1996). This is done through the involvement of stakeholders at every stage of the electoral process and establishment of systems and structures that are assisting it to ensure that electoral outcomes are always an accurate representation of the will of the people in the country especially after an election. This is vein that both the electoral Act and electoral code of Conduct recognize the cardinal role election monitoring and observation play as an important ingredient to ensuring accuracy, regularity, transparency and credibility of an electoral process and its outcomes. The intrinsic role that observers and monitors play is to attest to whether an election is free, fair and credible and gives assurance that a country has followed democratic tenets and international, regional and national electoral laws governing the electoral process. Further, the establishment of political party liaison committees, voter education and conflict management committees is supposed to enhance openness, transparency and accountability in electoral process management in Kafue and Lusaka districts. It is also envisage such an approach helps reduce incidences of electoral controversies, violence and mistrust especially that some of the committees, like voter education and conflict management, are decentralised to the district levels. The ensuing sections dedicates itself for reviewing counterarguments on transparency and accountability in the electoral process.

2.10 Counterargument on Transparency and Accountability

This section is sampling experts’ opinions on issues of accountability and transparency of the electoral process in promoting credible electoral democracy. Fukuyuma (2014) suggests for the development of a body of knowledge on electoral management that will pay special
attention and interest to the interface among state institutions, managers of elections, existing legal framework and the notion of democratic accountability and transparency in the electoral process as key to achieving credible electoral democracy. He, however, notes that too much demand for transparency and accountability of the electoral process can undermine the possibility of deliberations and can act as a weapon in partisan political combat which consequently may lead to non-achievement of the intended purposes of electoral process which is credible electoral democracy. His argument is that when there is trust in the electoral institutions, managers and the process, the over demand for transparency and accountability of the electoral process by citizens and stakeholders can be overcome. Fukuyama guides thus:

The solution to improving electoral democratic accountability and transparency does not lie in the proliferation of formal accountability mechanisms or absolute institutional transparency but trust. Citizens must trust the electoral institutions to be able to make good decisions reflecting their interests most of the time, while electoral institutions for their part must earn that trust by being responsive and delivering on their mandates (Fukuyuma, 2014:522).

He notes that an autonomous institution is not one that is walled off from citizens, stakeholders and players’ watch but rather one that is embedded in society and responsive to its demands.

2.11 Related Studies on Electoral Democracy, Transparency and Accountability

Several electoral experts have observed that elections give life to rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Katz, 1999; Diamond, 2003). These rights include freedom of opinion and expression, freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, the right to take part in the government of one’s country through freely elected representatives and recognition that the authority of government is derived from the will of the people, expressed in genuine periodic elections (EUEOM, 2016). Amplifying this fact, Annan (2012) observes that the spread of electoral democracy across the world has led to people risking their lives to call for free and open elections, democratic accountability and transparency, the rule of law and respect for human rights. It has come to many people’s recognition that elections are indispensable root of electoral democracy. One is tilted to agree with Annan’s observation as evidence is bound
of situations where lives have been lost in pursuit for electoral justice embedded in a transparent and accountable electoral process

Annan further observes that:

When the electorates believe that elections have been free and fair, accountable and transparent, they can be a powerful catalyst for better governance, greater security and human development but in the absence of credible elections, citizens have no recourse to peaceful political change (Annan, 2012:34).

Minnie (2006:52) agrees with Annan’s argument by observing that “not only does poor electoral practices constitute a threat to political and social life in a nation or state’s life but that elections held in a transparent and acceptable manner provide an important opportunity for the improvement of the governance climate in a given country.” A further affirmation of the diverse role of elections is an example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) where international mediation efforts are anchored on the need to hold elections in a transparent and accountable way because they are viewed as key instruments in pursuing objectives of enhancing peace, security and stability through the enabling environment for peace building, stability and democratisation (Kadima and Booysen, 2009). Klein and Merloe (2001) argue that experience around the world demonstrates that elections are successful and public confidence in resulting governments strongest when electoral processes are transparent, accountable and when the “rules of the game” are the result of both inclusive public discussion and broad political agreement.

Elaborating further, Bams explains:

When citizens are given a voice in government by means of the ballot managed in a transparent and accountable way, better and more equitable governments can emerge hence the kept faith in well-run elections because they lead to sustainable development and credible electoral democracy. To instill accountability and release people’s hopes, there is need to create formulas and systems where there is clear accountability and transparency to the people (Bams, 2015:60).

Manning and Antics (2003) buttress the point that electoral democracies can be evaluated primarily in terms of predictable electoral procedures which can lead to outcomes that cannot be definitively predetermined by any of the players. The duo explains that free and fair, transparent and accountable electoral processes, characterised by impartial and transparent
procedures in the voter registration exercises, candidate nominations and voting processes, the counting and processing of ballots are, in many ways, at the core of modern electoral democratic politics. Large and Sisk (2006:220) stressing the essentiality of transparency and accountability of the electoral process in promoting electoral democracy observe:

Registration process, if not properly done, risk excluding the very people whose return and participation in the elections would be a key indicator of a successful election…the process of getting registered to vote is as important as voting itself hence the need to be done in a transparent and accountable manner because voter registration can be open to abuse by political and state agents and can disadvantage many from participating in a vote (Large and Sisk, 2006:220).

This is so because elections are highly used as visible arenas under which there is restoration of some resemblance of legitimate governance and in some cases used by politicians to have unlimited access to national resources. The strongly held conventional wisdom, however, holds that the purpose of elections is for people to vote for a person or party who they think will furnish them with a better and brighter future.

However, some scholars have argued that free and fair elections are not a solution in and of themselves. They have proposed that the concept of electoral democracy must be broadened beyond elections reason being that the 21st century electoral challenges require the promotion of a broader definition of electoral democracy to include concerns on accountability, transparency and improving the electoral processes in general. However, Mwanakatwe (1994) insists that increasing reports of electoral results acceptance by stakeholders and players is evidential of how election processes have been improving in adhering to principles of free, fair, credible, transparency and accountability. He stresses that it is an attestation that elections have been held under electoral processes which assure absolute freedom to electorate in exercising their vote and absolute fairness among contestants in the electioneering game. This has made the winner and losers to be predictable because the electoral outcome will reflect the mood of the electorate. Large and Sisk (2006:220) still argue that:

The test of 21st century electoral democracy will not be limited to the cultivation of widespread free, fair elections or electoral processes, a challenge in its own right but will be determined equally by whether human rights
standards are reclaimed as universal, inequalities reduced and social justice furthered. It will be determined and measured, from the viewpoint of delivery.

The cautious is that there is need to understand that every electoral process is characterised by accidents, mistakes and low trust and without transparency and accountable of the process and the institutions that manage the process, elections get disowned, disputed and violence erupts as aggrieved parties press for their interests. This further erodes electoral confidence in the electoral outcomes (Large and Sisk, 2006). Minnie (2006: 93) gives an example of the DRC where “those who need electoral democracy do not know what it is. Those who know what it is do not want it since it brings with it responsibility, accountability and transparency as such, it undermines the very root of their power, positions and profits.” Blatantly put, Annan (2012) reveals that though since 2000, all but 11 countries in the world had held national elections, credibility of these elections have been dependent on the high standards that have been set by the election administrators and ruling political elites before, during and after the votes were cast. These standards, according to him, include freedom of the opposition organisations to organise and campaign without fear and the establishment of a level playing field among candidates coupled with voters’ trust and safety and conviction in the secrecy and integrity of the ballot on polling day.

Annan describes an electoral process that is transparent and accountable and which is most likely able to promote credible electoral democracy as one when the votes have been counted, the result must be accepted no matter how disappointed the defeated candidates feel.” In agreeing with Annan’s observation, Blais and others (2014:2) say that elections’ integrity is an “inalienable principle of democratic governance and constitutes an integral part of transparent, free and fair elections. Without integrity, they argue, there is no guarantee that the people’s choices through the ballot will be reflected in the election results and consequently in government structures” birthed thereafter. It is why Mandaza and Sachikonye (1991) argue that a contestant’s success or failure in an electoral contest must be a result of his or her own shortcomings rather than a result of the environmental conditions which predetermine the outcomes. This is why Large and Sisk (2006: 177) explain the risks of a non-transparent and unaccountable electoral process in their arguments. They have posited that “the quest for power makes electoral environment vulnerable leading to the emergence of wily political elites who will and can mobilise on divisive nationalists, ethnic or racial themes to justify the hold to power or grab power from incumbents leading to electoral conflict and
violence, increased unchecked corruption, intimidation and fraud rotting the entire political system.”

The duo propose for possible factors anticipated to influence the successfulness of elections for peace instead of stimulating electoral fears, provocation of electoral violence. The identified factors such as the inculcation of trust among protagonists for power and the realisation that any misbehavior after an electoral loss can endanger economic fortunes of that particular country. It has been strongly argued that flawed elections, such as those held in Kenya in 2008, lead to uncontrollable violence, killings and displacement of people and reversal of political, economic and democratic progress (Annan, 2012). Comparatively, the Ghanaian presidential elections of 2008 are strikingly similar to the Kenya 2008 elections as both featured a hotly contested electoral race with ethnic undertones. Whereas the Kenyan electoral situation was characterised with manipulation of electoral institutions precipitating widespread violence, a history of sound electoral management and transparency allowed Ghana to navigate a tense political situation with relatively little violence culminating to a legitimate transfer of power and continued stability in that country (Annan, 2012). Perhaps, this is why Mandaza and Sachikonye (1991) argue that for anyone to appreciate the need for transparency and accountability of the electoral process and its implication on electoral democracy, one has to assess the transparency of activities at each of the three (3) levels of the electoral process namely; pre-elections, the campaigning and actual voting, and post-election level to ensure that there are no attempts for electoral manipulation by the managers in collusion with government or state agents. “These are closely related and necessarily interdependent.” (Mandaza and Sachikonye, 1991:180)

Further arguments in support of a transparent and accountable electoral process have been advanced by scholars who have stressed on the need for elections to embody democracy, further development and promote security. This is only possible when the elections are conducted with integrity. In cases where elections have integrity, the bedrock democratic principle of political equality is honoured; citizens select their leaders and hold them accountable. Inversely, “when elections lack integrity, public confidence in elections becomes weak, governments lack legitimacy and democratic institutions become empty shells, deprived of the ethos and spirit of democracy,” (Annan, 2012:5). It is important to mention that key to a transparent and accountable electoral process is an independent, professional and impartial electoral management body or commission (EMBs) and staff. Strand and others aptly put it:
“The legitimacy of the electoral democratic system depends largely on the freeness and fairness of the elections brought about by transparency and accountability. If for whatever reasons, they are seen not to be legitimate, not free and not fair, this will affect the sustainability of the whole electoral democratic system” (Strand and others, 2005:60).

The EMBs must build and command confidence in their operations and performance and in the integrity of the electoral results they announce. In reference to Ghana, Annan argues that the ability by Ghana’s electoral commission to manage a close election successfully in 2008 was due to years of respect and political independence created within the commission in the watchful eyes of stakeholders and players thereby establishing a track record of competence, professionalism and independence from improper influence resulting into building political capital among stakeholders.

In Zambia for instance, the impartiality and independence of the electoral commission, a body mandated by law to conduct and manage all elections in the country, have been always under question largely due to the current criteria of appointing members of the commission raising perceptions that the commission is biased towards the government and the party in power. Legally, the commissioners are appointed by the republican president and ratified by the National Assembly while staffs at secretariat are appointed by the commissioners. Chipenzi and others (2011:30) observe that: “although the republican constitution provides for an autonomous electoral commission, members of the commission, including its chairperson, are appointed by sitting presidents who is an interested party in the outcomes of the elections…making the ECZ not free because of the potential to manipulate elections in favour of the ruling party and can easily be intimidated by the appointing authority.” In their opinions, Chipenzi and others buttress the observations made by the European Union (EU) Election Observer Mission (EUEOM) in its report of the 2001 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in which the mission questioned the impartiality of the ECZ (EUEOM, 2001). Kadima and Booysen (2009:615) commenting on the 2001 Zambian presidential elections explain that “controversy arose regarding the manner in which the results were tabulated and compiled at district level and their transmission to the national result centre in Lusaka. The controversy was compounded by the narrow margin between the two leading presidential candidates”.

From the above observation from Kadima and Booysen, it is clear that there remains mistrust and perceived lack of confidence in the ECZ among stakeholders, players and citizens which
seems to suggest why there are post-election petitions every after an election either at presidential, parliamentary or local government level questioning the manner in which the electoral process is managed. Most of the election petitions lodged get strengthen from the alleged corruption, irregularities and general uneven electoral playing grounds in the electoral process. These issues arise when accountability and transparency lacks in the process. As it has been mentioned in the previous arguments, these two principles of the electoral process are key in any institution handling sensitive matters like elections. The presence of transparency and accountability in the electoral process breeds trust and confidence in the hearts of stakeholders, players and the general citizenry. This is why Fukuyama (2014) cautions that when transparency, accountability and trust is treated as an electoral by-product by electoral bodies, openness, honesty and reliability in such institutions is lost completely. He further advises that such institutions should learn to strike a balance between power and accountability to ensure respect of the broader citizens’ interests in the electoral process.

Additionally, Fukuyama (2014: 123; 506) posits that “electoral trust as a result of transparency and accountability of the electoral process only becomes a valuable commodity when it exists as a by-product of a society whose members practices social virtues like honesty, reliability and openness…an effective modern democratic institution finds the appropriate balance between a strong and capable institutions and accountability that restrains the institution which consequently forces it to act in broad interest of citizens”. Since the 1996 through to date, Zambia’s electoral process has been characterised by electoral shortcomings mainly bordering on perceived lack of transparency and accountability of the electoral process. This has provided reasonable grounds for stakeholders, players and citizens to believe that the electoral authorities are falsifying the electoral outcomes using their powers and immunities under the law to favour ruling parties. These perceptions are reinforced by legal provisions in the previous and current electoral Acts which contain sections that empowers the electoral body to perform and conduct its operations without being subjected to any authority (GRZ, 2016).

The above scenario has tended to vindicate the public view over the mistrust existing in the operations and conduct of the electoral body in managing the electoral process. Although the law cited above dictates that the electoral body is independent and not answerable to anybody or authority, in practice and in line with electoral commission of Zambia Act, the electoral body is guided that its reportage is to the republican president. The president has even powers to hire and fire electoral commissioners. The electoral body is also mandated to report its
annual activities and finances to the president who is also the head of the ruling party. There is seem to be contradictions even in the legal provisions, on account that though the 1996 electoral commission of Zambia Act introduces an independent electoral commission, the commission is appointed by a sitting president and ratified by the National Assembly only as a formality. This is so because in the history of the existence of the current electoral body, there has been no recorded incidence where the National Assembly has rejected the presidential nominees to the position of the ECZ commissioner. This is, particularly so, because the country’s National Assembly has been a one party dominated house since independence where a ruling party, using arrogance of numbers, can ratify anyone the president recommends for appointment.

The above legal jargon has raised questionable electoral practices perceived to be committed by the electoral body in the electoral process and the executive arm of government have strengthened this public view and suspicions that the electoral body’s behavior and conduct is dictated by the executive because that where it is answerable to. This is so because these men and women are expected to loyal to the finger that feeds them. To this end, Jean-Pierre argues that elections should be conducted by an objective authority and wondered whether an authority appointed by an interested party can be objective. Jean-Pierre (2001:117) guides:

“Elections should be conducted by an objective authority. Neutrality is essential for a number of reasons. It ensures that the performance of electoral tasks is not affected, consciously or unconsciously by an election official’s commitment to a particular party, candidate or issue. It allows candidates and other electoral participants to have confidence that their relations with elections staff, and the service and advice rendered by that staff, is free from bias. Also, it allows the public to have confidence that the electoral process is conducted in a fair and unbiased manner.”

Fukuyama (2014) though agreeing with the principle of autonomous, objective and neutral electoral bodies, argues that ideally, these bodies should be agents of their masters who are the general public. Fukuyama provides further guidance that electoral bodies should operate using the principal-agent theoretical approach. He explains that this theory operates on premise of effective checks between the principal and agents through a belief in transparency and accountability as factors for good governance. Fukuyama says all institutions need to have high degree of autonomy but that in plural democracies, such institutions do not have absolute autonomy and their own goals, rather, their goals are set by the principal for whom
they work for. Any indication of such an institution to disrespect the wishes of the principal and act self-interestedly results into organisational dysfunction. The agent, ECZ in this case, should have enough autonomy to do its job well, but should also remain ultimately accountable to the principal, the citizens which is not the case as it reports to the president on its operations., Fukuyama explains that in an electoral democracy, the principal is the whole people, not the president or the executive arm of government, who through elections delegate authority to elected leaders and institutions of the state. “These elected leaders, in turn, carry out their wishes. The principals need to increase the transparency and accountability of the agent’s behavior in order to be able to monitor them better and then to also create uncertainties that allow them to be held strictly accountable to their wishes” (Fukuyama, 2014: 76, 507)

Because of the negative perceptions among citizens, players and stakeholders towards the electoral process, the process continues to be seen to be prone to manipulation by the managers and ruling parties, a view that has been rejected in some quarters and also denied by the electoral body. Mbewe (2009), however, confirms public sentiments over the electoral process when he argues that the electoral process in Zambia continues to be an area of contention since competitive elections re-emerged in 1991. Sakala (2016) further cites the presidential elections of 1996 and 2001 which were challenged in the courts of law after the losing opposition leaders lodged petitions alleging electoral irregularities, corruption and the general unfair and uneven electoral playing ground. This is despite some international and local election observers and monitors respectively endorsing the elections as being free and fair. In 2006 and 2008 presidential elections, for instance, the losing presidential candidates attempted to challenge the electoral outcomes on the same account as for the 1996 and 2001. However, due to partial electoral justice system existed in the country then, the court proceedings prolonged and when judgement was passed, the petitioners described it as biased and unsatisfactory and accused the court of siding their judgement to preserve the elected president and also the ruling party (Sakala, 2016). In 2006 and 2008, the aggrieved political parties and candidates decided to abandon the idea of challenging the electoral results in court based on their previous experiences (IPI, 2010; FODEP, 2008).

Notwithstanding, some sections of society especially the ruling elites and their proxies have continued to argue that it is impossible to manipulate the electoral process because its management and administration in Zambia is quite transparent and accountable. They further cite situations where the electoral result counting processes and management system are done
openly in the presence of election monitors, observers and political party agents and later pasted on the doors of polling centres for everyone to see. However, this view is strengthened by the outcome of 2011 general elections when the opposition won the elections. Kadima and Booysen (2009:624) confirms: “the ECZ has made concerted effort to improve communication with stakeholders…there has, however, been an increase in confidence in the ECZ in both the 2006 and 2008 elections.” Kadima and Booysen’s views are echoed by Bams when she argues that electoral bodies have started generating regular information to stakeholders in an effort to manage a transparent and accountable electoral process anchored on broad consultations with stakeholders, citizens and players. She explains that “we must realise that we have information that can be the insight that improves the quality of the electoral democratic experience for millions of our citizens who have diligently voted and are still not feeling this democratic experience in a meaningful way” (Bams, 2015:92)

Evidently, the 2011 electoral results which enabled the opposition grab power from the ruling party that had ruled the country for 20 years, instilled a ray of public confidence and trust in the operations of the electoral body and the entire electoral process. Stakeholders, citizens and players felt the 2011 electoral outcomes reflected how an independent electoral body should be operating. However, this excitement among citizens was short-lived when the same electoral delivered disputed electoral results for 2015 and 2016 presidential and general elections respectively (EUEOM, 2016). Kadima and Booysen (2009) confirms that an electoral body that churns out acceptable electoral outcomes, guarantees electorate and stakeholders’ confidence in the electoral outcomes, electoral management, operations and the electoral process in general. The duo guide that it is imperative that the electoral body’s autonomy and impartiality is legally protected and guaranteed both in word and practice. The duo further add that this is one of the ways to cure the syndrome of post elections contentions partly caused by alleged lack of transparency and accountability in the management and administration of the electoral process by those charged with the responsibility to do so.

Though this scenario is currently perceived to be changing for the better in many countries, there remains a lot of work to perfect it. Kadima and Booysen’s arguments have been parried by Bams (2015:60) who contends that electoral democracies, in many countries, are currently suffering from what she terms “low citizens participatory levels, decaying civic and political involvement, citizens’ ignorance, distorted participatory democracy and arrogance of those who are installed to represent the people” which views are also reflected in the Economist Intelligent Unit (EIU) report of 2010 that cited political culture and participation as the main
democratic deficits affecting most electoral democracies in the world, Zambia inclusive (EIU, 2010). This view has also been echoed by the IPI (2010) that observes that some elections have built democratic governance and prosperity of citizens while some, due to ill-timed and ill-preparations, have tended to undermine electoral democracy, generating political instability that reverses developmental gains. Bams (2015:60) posits that “to breathe life in electoral democracy, two fundamentals such as accountability and transparency of the systems and processes must be observed.”

From the above argument, some scholars have argued that electoral credibility goes with the suitability of the electoral system a country adopts. In the case of Zambia, it adopted and applies the first past the post (FPTP) electoral systems which fall under the majoritarian electoral system category. This system has consistently been condemned by stakeholders and citizens due to its exclusivity and that it is highly prone to greater manipulations. This has triggered demands for constitutional and electoral law reforms. The ultimate goal of these stakeholders’ calls is to adopt a mixed member proportional Representation (MMPR) electoral systems which is said not to be very much susceptible to manipulation and also tends to be inclusive. As a result, attempts have been made in 2005 and 2016 electoral and constitutional reforms push for a new electoral system but has not yielded any tangible results. Electoral reforms of 2005 undertaken under the auspice of Electoral Reform Technical Committee (ERTC) though brought out some progressive recommendations on the best way to manage and promote a transparent and accountable electoral process that delivers credible electoral outcomes (ERTC, 2005), failed to conclusively meet the expectation of the stakeholders as the executive rejected or shelved most of the recommendations.

Subsequent constitution review processes the country has undertaken have also underscored the need for genuine and broad based electoral reforms. The challenge has been political will because the current electoral process and system set up favors those in power but ironically, once they are also pushed out of power, they join the calls for reforms. Stressing the importance of credible elections, Kadima and Booysen, (2009:3) observe that “with such number of competitive national elections held regularly and generally in a credible manner, the holding of elections is no longer seen as exceptionalism”. This is because in an electoral democracy, elections are the primary means by which citizens hold leaders in office against their actions when they have behaved illegally, corruptly and ineptly while carrying on with their official work (Diamond, 2003). Therefore, the argument has been made that if an electoral system does not allow effective participation of citizens, it will be difficult for them
to perform their role of holding elected leaders to account. This contrasts the definition of an
election as an effective “electoral mechanism for calling politicians to account and forcing
them out of office when they fail to introduce policies that serve the public good or improve
the quality of life for citizens. Citizens must be effective participants in the electoral process
by providing the necessary checks and balances” (UNECA, 2013:145).

Comparing the FPTP electoral systems with others, Alexander and Kaboyakgosi (2012)
explain that FPTP, which Zambia adopted at independence, does not provide for an effective
political representation and that electoral outcomes out of this system do not reflect the
broader interests represented in society. The duo argue that FPTP promotes ideals of the
winner take-all and allegedly excludes some interests in society. This system, they argue, has
caused apprehension among stakeholders especially with regards the electoral outcomes
which have raised issues of electoral rigging, manipulation and electoral engineering in the
electoral process. These allegations have been heaped on the election managers and
administrators and the ruling political elites. Consequently, some significant but varying
levels of post electoral violence in some countries, including Zambia, have been recording
allegations of electoral malpractices and electoral result manipulation ignited mainly by
suspected secrecy in the management of the electoral process. One widely account of
electoral suspicion has centered on electoral rigging. In some countries, such perceptions
have caused serious electoral post-election conflicts, violence and in worst case scenario civil
war.

The Institute for Peace Initiative (IPI) (2010: xi) explains that electoral conflicts and political
violence signals “weaknesses in the governance of elections, the rules of orderly political
competition and lack of impartial judiciaries to interpret and adjudicate electoral disputes
judiciously and expeditiously.” The institute cites some countries such as Zimbabwe (2008),
Lesotho (2008), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2010), and Kenya (2008) as examples
where violence ensued after disputed elections. Pointing out her electoral observations on the
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region, Minnie (2006:52) posits that
“post elections in SADC went through a series of less inspiring episodes resulting in loss of
lives in the course of contesting these elections by citizens. The contesting parties were
energised by allegations of rigging and vote stealing.” In Zambia, for instance, the most
interesting episodes that have characterised her electoral process, have been the perennial
allegations of electoral rigging and manipulation. Ironically, though the country has not
experienced widespread electoral discontents leading to widespread unrests, the 2011
tripartite elections depicts a serious development that should not be glossed over by electoral enthusiasts. This so because despite the elections being declared free and fair by most local and foreign observer missions, the country witnessed unprecedented number of elections petitions at parliamentary level standing at 68 and close to 20 seats were nullified (FODEP, 2015). Further, the 2016 general also left observers and stakeholders divided on how to describe the outcome of the electoral process.

In 2016, close to 81 parliamentary seats were petitioned by losing candidates and at the time of writing this dissertation, four (4) parliament seats had been nullified on account of corruption, violence and racial based campaigns as reflected in the High Court of Zambia judgements delivered by various justices so far. This scenario cast doubt on the credibility of Zambia’s electoral process in particular and electoral democracy in general. It must be noted further that, in Zambia, electoral conflict resolution mechanisms are three pronged namely mere acceptance of the electoral outcomes despite dissatisfaction, use of ECZ managed conflict management committees to amicably resolve the contested issues or behavior and the use of the judiciary. However, due to slow pace of electoral petition disposal systems currently obtaining in the courts in the country, aggrieved parties reluctantly use the courts in preference to any of the other two options, save for the courts. One of the examples in which the losing candidates dropped their intentions to petition was in 2006, 2008 and 2015 presidential elections. In the 2008 and 2015 elections, the aggrieved parties realised that time was not enough to get justice despite what they called overwhelming evidence of rigging and manipulation. The main issues raised on these elections were allegations of electoral rigging and electoral results manipulation. This prompted the ECZ chairperson then during one of her media briefing to rebuff the allegations arguing that “those who are accusing the commission of electoral rigging should note that we did it together.”

Among the accusation advanced in post 2015 presidential election were that ECZ had a “secret room” which was only frequented by the electoral body officials and some ruling party confidants at the exclusion of the opposition and election monitor and observers. But if the experiences where close to half the National Assembly seats are petitioned in the courts of law in 2011 and 2016 are pointers to go by, there seem to be a renewed public confidence in the judiciary. This is because, in the past, very few cases were lodged before the courts of law due to low confidence levels which instilled hopelessness in the aggrieved parties. Giving his experience on the impact of limited electoral transparency and accountability of electoral processes during the one party state era in Zambia and its implication on electoral democracy,
Mwanakatwe (1994:101) noted a noticeable decline in voters’ participation in elections which was a signal enough that the system left them with little choices. “As a result, in 1988, about 44% of eligible voters stayed away from the elections, a demonstration of a popular retreat and protest from hollow electoral democracy at the time.

To this end, Mwanakatwe (1994) decried the tragedy that befell modern Africa’s multiparty elections which he described as being held under the veil of intimidation, violence and other inimicals. He further observes that contestants in an election together with their supporters become victims of their political rivals as a result of unexpected, unprovoked physical attacks which undermine the morale of the victim, candidates and their supporters. This adversely affected the credibility of the electoral process. In all the electoral processes, widespread intimidation and violence rendered the election results questionable and in some cases led to disqualifications of candidates since the results were considered as unfair and untrue reflection of the will of the electorate. Mwanakatwe (1994) described such malpractices that occurred that time due the adopted approaches that of winning an election at all costs. This triggered the emergence of election observation and monitoring groups with a gist of introducing an aspect of ensuring that the elections are held in a transparent and accountable manner. “Monitoring groups are there to ensure that elections under the multiparty politics are conducted fairly, transparently by ensuring that the party in power does not gain undue vantage over opponents” (Mwanakatwe, 1994:250).

Mwanakatwe further explains that another reasons for the existence of monitoring group was due to limited trust in government and electoral body to conduct open and accountable elections. This is so because of the perceived invested interests by political powers to want to remain in power thereby colluding with the electoral body to manipulate the electoral process to their favour. He remembers some incidences that occurred ahead of the 1991 elections where the MMD officials openly stated that they did not trust the UNIP government to organise transparent and accountable elections that can deliver credible outcomes. This was because MMD believed that the government was an interested party in the elections in which UNIP was expected to field candidates too. This led to doubts on government’s impartiality to conduct and manage a transparent and accountable electoral process when it would, out of desperation, try to remain in power and heighten speculations of election rigging. It must be noted that at that time, the electoral body was housed in the Office of the Vice President who was a presidential appointee and there was no independent electoral body until 1996.
As argued above, a transparent and accountable electoral process helps to confirm the long-held view that elections are the sole lawful, constitutional and legitimate method for peaceful and legal acquisition of political power exercised with the consent and by the will of the governed expressed through periodic, genuine, open, free and fair elections because the electoral results reflect the exercise of free choice (Carothers, 2002). To achieve this, electoral procedures and practices should not be disregarded or biased towards one stakeholder. This helps avoid public perceptions questioning the credibility of the electoral outcomes. As Chirambo (2008) explains legitimacy and credibility of any electoral process is anchored on the perceived public and stakeholders trust and confidence in the electoral process. He argues that electorates, candidates and stakeholders must be convinced that the electoral process will or has been conducted in a way that does not ensure a predictable outcome. Therefore, Chirambo (2008:68) stresses that “in a democracy, there should be certainty about the process but uncertainty about the results.”

2.12 Comment on Reviewed Literature

From the above discussion, it is clear that there are perennial electoral issues for further debate among democratic theorists and practitioners which require serious democratic theoretical and institutional arrangements and further attention. It has been alluded to above that electoral democracy is supposed to be a way of life. As a way of life, it entails a commitment to self-determination and equality and that members of the political communities commit to participate in the electoral democratic processes through voting. They also commit to determine the laws, leadership and policies that affect their lives in accordance with the pluralist theory of democracy. The goal and motivation of citizens’ political participation in electoral democracy is basically anchored on shared values of maintaining control over their own lives and refusing to leave issues that impact on their lives solely to the discretion of elected leaders, political leaders, bureaucrats and state institutions. From the literature reviewed so far, it is the considered opinion and view that key to credible electoral democracy is a transparent and accountable electoral process guarded by effective participation of various and relevant stakeholders who should be well informed.

To sustain credibility in the electoral democracy, there is need for the existence of a citizenry that is able to demand quality rather than quantity of elections. This can only be achieved when there is unlimited access to information and a citizenry sensitised enough to respect other people’s political equality, opinions and individual liberties and autonomy in their daily
interactions. This can only be possible through robust civic education (Bams, 2015) carried in maximal manner. Therefore, as Ngcaweni (2014: 402) surmises, “electoral democracy remains an unfinished story”. Since electoral democracy is unfinished story, this research adopts Keane (2009: xxix)’s conclusion that “our intellectual labour should continue to invent new ways of ensuring equal and open public access of citizens and their representatives to all sorts of institutions previously untouched by the hand of electoral democracy through the pursuit of an electoral process that is transparent and accountable.”

In as much as many scholars have tackled the issues of transparency and accountability of the electoral process and how it can promote credible electoral democracy, gaps in literature still remain on why some countries that do not adhere to principles of transparent and accountability still enjoy support from majority citizens and other friendly states (Fukuyama, 2014). Comprehensive literature still lacks on the impact of the electoral systems on the nature of electoral environment existing or almost being embraced by some countries (Salih, 2006). To this end, Salih proposes that more literature is required on the openness of electoral processes in some electoral systems some countries have adopted. Much has not been written about how electoral officers can effectively participate as managers of electoral processes when they also play the role of being voters. This duo role of electoral officers has contributed to shrinking electoral credibility in the management of the electoral processes.

Few scholars have written about electoral staff and their right to franchise (Jean-Pierre, 2001) and how they can effectively divorce themselves from performing their electoral work without favouring their preferred candidates during elections. Further, the role of money in the electoral process and electoral democracy has not been well articulated by scholars and yet, it is key to public confidence building. As Jean-Pierre (2001:5) observes that ensuring the transparency of election financing is a consistent challenge in an electoral democracy. “Financial transparency is a basic criterion for measuring the health of the entire electoral democracy. The public has the right to know who finances the electoral activities, who has given to whom and how much in order to eliminate any doubt about the role that money plays in politics and election management. Divulging the sources of financing can help restore confidence in the electoral process particularly in a period in which the public is looking more critically at its representative institutions.”
2.13 Chapter Summary

This Chapter has clearly revealed that many countries have continued to struggle in their pursuit for a credible electoral democratic consolidation, credibility and electoral justice. It has also been revealed by various writers cited in this research that elections have been used as a key benchmark to measuring the credibility of electoral democracy. However, one major obstacle to its consolidation has been limited levels of transparency and accountability of the electoral process. Some areas that lacked transparency and accountability are financing, recruitment of poll staff and overall electoral institutional set up and structure. Despite many countries holding regular elections, it has been argued throughout this research that their democratic institutions, such as the electoral body, continue to suffer a number of institutional inadequacies which have affected the achievement of electoral democracies in many countries. To this end, this section has highlighted how democratic theories have played an important role in promoting intellectual relevance of many of the arguments advanced so far. It has also been revealed that many countries have adopted electoral democracy as their type of the governance system because it is people centred. Gaps in literature especially in areas that can positively impact transparency and accountability of the electoral process still need to be explored.

The need for a transparent and accountable electoral process has been seen to be helpful to various society who are supposed to rethink productively that contemporary politics and its demand that electoral practices be conducted under a broad day light and not under the veil of darkness will be cry of many in the near future if not already has been that cry. Further, it has been argued in this study that electoral democracy cannot be discarded because it is neither realistic nor undesirable. Several writers cited in this research have argued that it would be unrealistic to discard electoral democracy because it has become both a widespread and wanted form of government and desirable because the core of the meaning of electoral democracy is people’s effective participation. The question that remains lingering in and to all of us is how electoral democracy is actually implemented and practiced in a particular electoral context and how to adapt it in different and changing electoral contexts and further how to achieve electoral democracy that stakeholders will appreciate and desirously want to participate. The next Chapter will deal with the methodology used in the study.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Chapter Overview

This Chapter discusses the research methodology applied in order to arrive at the research outcomes which are presented herein. This Chapter is organised under the following sections namely research design, population, sampling techniques, research instruments, data collection procedures, research sites, data analysis and presentations, ethical considerations and reliability and validity and chapter summary and introduction of the next Chapter.

3.1 Research Design

This section outlines the plan and structure of investigations on the research questions. By research design, it means the structure of research and glue that holds all elements in the research/study adhered. Kombo and Tromps (2014:71) defines a research design as “the scheme, outline or plan that is used to generate answers to research problems.” For this research, an embedded design, one of the mixed method research design, was used combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies for a deeper insight into the topic. It involved collecting, analysing and integrating qualitative and quantitative data into a single study. The reason for choosing this design was the desire to deeply investigate transparency and accountability of the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts in promoting credible electoral democracy. Both approaches were used because a single approach to this investigation would not have been adequate to capture and elucidate the study trends.

The qualitative approach assisted in the description of the state of affairs of the electoral process and electoral democracy as they exist and led not only to presenting the research findings but also formulation of important principles, knowledge and solutions (Kombo and Tromps, 2014). For the purpose of the qualitative approach, the researcher identified respondents perceived to be conversant with electoral issues. For the purpose of collecting quantitative data, the researcher administered questionnaires to 186 respondents and an interview guide was administered to 10 key informants before one-on-one interviews were held to solicit enriched knowledge on the subject under study. This brought the total number of respondents in the study to 196. Field notes were taken and recorded both in a note book and a voice recorder. Other data collection methods used such as desk research which involved the analysis of documents.
3.2 Population

The target population in the research were residents of Kafue and Lusaka districts who were identified using convenience sampling. These included both registered and non-registered voters who were of various backgrounds such as teaching, media, public workers, students and farmers.

3.3 Sample

Non-probability sampling techniques were preferred and employed and included purposive and convenience sampling techniques. Purposive sampling was preferred for research because it was appropriate to soliciting from 10 key informants their valuable and unique knowledge and experiences and characteristics, perceptions and attitudes on the topic under investigation. Convenience sampling techniques were employed to enable the researcher select any readily available individuals as respondents in the research from the research area of Kafue and Lusaka districts’ urban, peri-urban and rural wards. The six wards targeted were Kachenje (urban), Kabweza, and Chiawa (rural) in Kafue district located in Kafue constituency and Kanyama 10 (peri-urban) and Luwizya and Independence (urban) in Kanyama and Lusaka Central constituencies respectively in Lusaka Urban District. This sampling technique was preferred because it enabled a researcher to capture the appropriate research population. As a result, 186 respondents were administered with questionnaires and 10 key informants with interview guides. Therefore, the total sample size for the research was 196 respondents. In the sample, there were more males as compared to women and comprised working and non-working classes, registered and non-registered voters with registered voters being in majority.

3.4 Data Collection Procedure

Kombo and Tromp (2014:99) defined data collection as the “gathering of information to serve, prove or refute some facts.” The duo emphasised the vitality of data collection in a research as it helped clarify the facts. Since such a research involved a systematic process that focused on being objective and gathering information for analysis to come up with logical conclusions, the researcher made use of data from various sources to arrive at both primary and secondary information. For the purpose of this research, a structured questionnaire and an interview guide were respectively developed and pre-tested before being administered to respondents for the purpose of gathering primary data while document analysis was used to
collect secondary data. These were standardised tools (questionnaire and interview guide) implying that all respondents answered the same questions. The researcher targeted about 50 respondents in each of the three urban wards and 23 respondents in each of two rural wards. In order to effectively employ the convenient sampling method, public places such as markets, health centres, schools, bus stops and stations and civic centres, government offices and restaurants were targeted for sampling.

3.5 Study Site and Coverage

The research was carried out in two districts of Kafue and Lusaka Urban. The researcher considered the sampling convenient for the nature of study and the spread of the research. The research targeted a total of five wards of which three were urban from both Kafue and Lusaka districts and the remaining two rural in derived from Kafue district.

3.6 Data Analysis

Having collected the data using structured questionnaire and the interview guide, data was coded and checked for uniformity. The data collected was later analyzed objectively to reduce the accumulated data to manageable size, developing summaries, designing patterns and applying statistical techniques that assist in drawing research conclusions. In analysing this data, the use of both SPSS techniques and an excel sheet was made. Analysis of the data was done in two ways namely univariate and bivariate analysis. At univariate analysis stage, frequencies of the different categories of background characteristics such as age, sex and occupation among others were presented to show the percent distribution of respondents. Univariate analysis was also employed in the assessment of the accountability of electoral process as well as the transparency of practices in the electoral process.

Under bivariate analysis, cross tabulations were run to establish the association between people’s perception on transparency and accountability of the electoral process against a number of selected background characteristics. Specifically, these variables were expected to show differences in perceptions based on sex, age, educational qualification, residence as well as based on whether one was a registered voter or not. The individual associations of these variables with the intermediate variable of people’s perception of transparency and accountability of the electoral process in promoting credible electoral democracy were presented in tabular form. This association between the dependent and independent variables was analysed at this level. This was done using cross tabulation and contingency tables to
establish whether the independent variables had any significant statistical association with the dependent variables. The significance of the relationship between the variables was established by computing the probability values associated with chi-square values obtained. Variance of Analysis (ANOVA) was also applied.

3.7 Ethical Considerations

Research is a scientific human endeavor that is organized according to a range of protocols, methods, guidelines and legislation (Kombo and Tromp, 2014). To ensure that ethics are observed, all ethical issues are strictly considered and observed for the purpose of safeguarding the dignity, rights and interests, safety and well-being of the actual and potential respondents. As such, informed consent was the cornerstone of this research. A consent form was developed and respondents were requested to read and sign before an interview or answering a questionnaire. The respondents were free to withdraw from the research at any point when they felt uncomfortable. In relation to ensuring that respondents are shown fair treatment and justice, each individual was treated equally without judgment or prejudice. The principle of veracity or truth telling was inherently important and the researcher showed this by telling the subjects the aim of the research and the proposed outcomes which were fully explained in advance and respondents were debriefed after the interview. A brief write up on each of the questionnaire on each variable to be examined was done to simplify the subject under research. The respondents’ identity and responses were kept anonymous from public domain. Participant observation methods were also applied by the researcher through attendances of electoral commission briefings and political parties’ primary elections and other electoral stakeholders’ activities to observe the extent to which issues of transparency and accountability in the electoral process were being promoted and adhered to.

3.8 Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability which refer to trustworthiness or credibility of the research is ensured through the application of consistent checks. Reliability is the extent to which the observable measures that represent a theoretical concept are stable when used for the concept in several studies while validity is how accurately the observable measures of a theoretical concept stand for that concept (Achola and Bless, 1988:109). For qualitative data, independent codes were used to the sample raw data and categories are created to assess consistency of the data. Data from key informants was also used to evaluate the interpretation and explanation pulled from the data. The targeting of various individuals of varying biographical background
characteristics, who after being subjected to statistical tests, gave the same responses clearly indicated the validity and reliability of the research.

3.9 Limitation of the Research

Election being a political sensitive matter to some citizens, and since the research was conducted closer to a general election when the electoral mood was high, threatening and suspicious, getting respondents to respond to the questionnaires and agree to be interviewed especially females was a hustle, at times. This was the case for this research. For this reason, the researcher preferred convenience sampling so as to get whoever was willing to participate in the research to do so without exerting undue pressure. This impacted negative on the research methodology and to some extent on the findings as the research relied more on volunteers to solicit opinions. This was why there was more men than women in the research because they were more willing to answer the questionnaire and participate in the research than women. However, this limitation was diluted by the use of key informants.

When it came to literature availability, the research lacked localised literature and reports on the electoral process for Kafue and Lusaka districts specifically but relied more on a few pieces of literature and reports about Zambia and the SADC region which were used to generalise the electoral situation in the two districts. Lastly, experienced, knowledgeable and competent key informants on the electoral process who would have shared their opinions on the research objectives and questions were not readily available in the wards targeted to give a localised view on transparency and accountability and how it promotes credible electoral democracy in these two districts. The research relied heavily on people perceived to have national electoral and political knowledge, experiences and competencies to help give generalised views and had some track records of participating in the electoral and political processes of the country for some years. These included electoral officials, leaders of the NGOs and political parties, veteran politicians and political activists and media practitioners based in Lusaka.

3.10 Chapter Summary

This Chapter discussed approaches used in the research and explains how the research was conducted. Highlighted research design and why it was preferred, the sampling techniques and reasons for adopting them for this research, the target population and research sites and
how data was collected, analysed and explains how ethical and validity and reliability issues have been respected and assured. The next Chapter deals with findings of the research.
CHAPTER FOUR
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

4.0 Chapter Overview

This Chapter deals with the presentation of the findings of the research as displayed in the ensuing tables, graphs and charts selected socio-economic and demographic variables of respondents that participated in this research on accountable and transparent of the electoral process in promoting credible electoral democracy in Kafue and Lusaka districts. The chapter looks at the socio-demographic attributes of respondents that may have affected their electoral perception of the electoral process in terms of transparency and accountability. This Chapter is also trying to respond to research question one which attempts to ascertain the extent to which the current electoral process is transparent and accountable in promoting credible electoral democracy. These variables which include age, sex, institutional affiliation, position, and education level, and occupation, place of residence, district and voting qualification as regards possession of a voter’s card are independently analysed to assess their influence on an individual perception of transparency and accountability in the electoral process. Overly, the Chapter concludes with the presentation of information in charts, graphs, frequencies and tables.

4.1 Background Characteristics of Respondents

This section is attending to objective one and is attempting to ascertain the extent to which the current electoral process is transparent and accountable in Kafue and Lusaka districts. It also responds to research question one. To respond to the objective and research question stated above, the researcher asked respondents to state their socio-biographic background. The socio-biographical backgrounds were then used to investigate the extent to which respondents’ socio-background characteristics have a bearing on their perceptions of transparency and accountability of the electoral process in promoting credible electoral democracy. This section presents distributions of the socio-background characteristics and the findings on transparency and accountability associated to each characteristic tested. The main socio-background characteristics presented under this section for testing in the ensuing section are sex, age, institutional affiliation, education qualification background, franchise and residence.
4.1.1 Findings on Respondents’ Gender

Respondents were asked to state their age and the figure below presents the distribution of the sex (gender) of respondents in the research. The Figure 4.1 below shows the summary percentage distribution of respondents’ sex in the research. The figure below shows that 22% of the respondents were female while the majority of the respondents were male at 78%. As explained above, there were more males than females because males were more forthcoming and willing to participate in the research than their female counterparts.

Figure 4.1: Percentage Distribution of Sex Variable of Respondents

4.2 Findings on Respondents’ Ages

This subsection presents distribution of respondents’ ages in the research. This was after the respondents were asked to give their estimates of their ages. The ages were categorised in group ranges such as 20-24; 25-29; 30-34; 35-39; 40-44; 45-49 and 50 and above. Figure 4.2 below is a presentation of the percentage distribution of respondents’ ages who participated in the research. Majority of the respondents were in the age group range of 35-39 and accounts for 24% followed by those in age group range 30-34 while the least was age group range 50 and above. Figure 4.2 below gave a summarised percentage distribution of the respondents by age group ranges.
4.1.3 Findings on Respondents’ Institutional Affiliation

Under this section, respondents were asked to give their institutional affiliation with an aim to have as many people of various institutional background as possible to be part of the sample. The sampled population seemed to indicate that majority of the respondents were from government related ministries or departments at 43%. This was followed by the respondents from the private sector while the least was those from the local authorities. In total, there were seven (7) institutions captured from which respondents were drawn. These included councils (local authorities, government ministries/departments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs)/civil society organisations (CSOs). Others were the media, political parties and private sector or business and self-employed and the electoral body itself. The figure below is a summary presentation of the respondents’ responses when asked to state their affiliations. Figure 4.3 below presents percentage findings on distribution of respondents by institutional affiliations.
4.1.4 Findings Respondents’ Education Qualifications

This section looks at the percentage distribution of respondents based on education qualifications. Respondents were asked to state their education qualifications and a large number of the respondents of close to 51% were degree holders followed by certificate holders at 33%. The least was those who had no education qualifications standing at 4%. The summary presentation of these findings are presented in figure 4.4 below.

Figure 4.4 Percentage Findings on Distribution of Respondents by Education Qualifications

---

**Figure 3: Percentage Distribution of Respondents by their Institutional Affiliation.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Ministry</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Figure 4.3 Percentage Findings on Distribution of Respondents by Institutional Affiliations**

---

**Figure 3:** Percentage Distribution of Respondents by their Institutional Affiliation.

- None: 4.3%
- Certificate: 33.3%
- Diploma: 11.8%
- Degree and Above: 50.5%
4.1.5 Findings on Respondents’ Franchise Status Whether Registered Voter or Not

Under this subsection, respondents were asked to state whether they were registered voters or not. The findings which are presented below indicate that 95% of the respondents were registered voters while a paltry 5% were not registered. This indicate that majority of the respondents had a feel of some practices of the electoral process by virtue of being registered.

Figures 4.5: Presentation of Percentage Distribution of Respondents.

![Pie Chart](image)

4.1.6 Findings on Respondents’ Place of Residence

Under this section, respondents were asked to give their place of residence whether rural or urban. About 82% of the respondents lived in urban areas while only 18% were from the rural.
4.2 Findings Transparency of Electoral Process in Kafue and Lusaka Districts.

This section presents research findings on the respondents’ views after being subjected to various statistical tests based on their varied background characteristics to investigate how they perceived transparency of the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts and whether or not their background characteristics had a bearing on their perception. The research tested these variables to ascertain existence of any relationship on how people in the two districts perceived transparency of the electoral process based on their socio-background characteristics. Further, the section apart from presenting the quantitative views of the respondents, also captured, in some cases, the qualitative opinions of the key informants.

Table 4.1: Respondents’ Perception of Transparency based on their Background Characteristics of Sex, Residence and Franchise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Males (N=134)</th>
<th>Female (N=52)</th>
<th>t-test</th>
<th>sig.2-tailed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral process is transparent.</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.327</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>1.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>Urban (N=152)</td>
<td>Rural (N=34)</td>
<td>t-test</td>
<td>sig.2-tailed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral process is transparent.</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.415</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>1.522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In possession of voter’s card</td>
<td>Yes (N=176)</td>
<td>No (N=10)</td>
<td>t-test</td>
<td>sig.2-tailed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral process is transparent.</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>1.414</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Table 4.1 above shows the associated p-values 0.734 and 0.637 respectively as a result of a statistical test occasioned on the respondents’ selected background characteristics. The research findings suggested that there were no statistically perceptual differences between males and females as well as rural and urban dwellers regarding transparency of the electoral process in the two districts. This research finding was supported by the 5% level of significance. The research further revealed that there was no statistical difference in the mean numbers of registered voters and unregistered citizens in their perceptions of transparency of the electoral process as reflected in the 5% level of significance,

Table 4.2: Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA) on Interaction between Institutional Affiliation of Respondents and their views on Transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Electoral Process’ Procedure and Rules are Transparent</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>15.061</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.510</td>
<td>1.234</td>
<td>0.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>364.079</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>2.034</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>379.140</td>
<td>185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Table 4.2 above reveals that F-ratio of the test obtained was 1.234 and its associated probability value was 0.291 which was greater than the level of significance. This implies that there was no significant difference in transparency perception by different institutions to which participants belonged.

But a political activist in an interview argues that:

The biggest problem one may have with some individuals based on their institutional affiliations is for them to fully agree on a term. For instance, when you have two lawyers seated together, then you have a hell of a problem, in the sense that, to make them agree on the wording of one sentence or key term(s), it will become a monumental task thereby failing to agree on whether there is transparency or not in the electoral process (Interview with Political Activist, January, 2016)
Table 4.3 ANOVA on Age of Respondents and their Perception of Transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The electoral process’ procedure and rules are transparent</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>9.747</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.625</td>
<td>.787</td>
<td>.581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>369.392</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>2.064</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>379.140</td>
<td>185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results in the table above confirms that there was no significant differences on how respondents perceive transparency of the electoral process based their age as can be seen from a greater than 0.05 p-value of the F-statistic. Nonetheless, a veteran politician in an interview argues:

I have been in this game since 1952 and for 64 years, I have been around and still have my brains. Some of the boys and girls that occupy positions at the ECZ suffer from credibility problems or describing the electoral process as transparent cannot be trusted. Transparency can promote electoral democracy because when elections are administered properly those who fail, fail on their own and they don’t have to blame anybody. But if you allow or blind to the systems twisting of the electoral process, then there will be no transparency. This phase is one which will go with excited little brains…it will go and fear really for this beautiful country (Interview with veteran Politician, January, 2016).

4.2.5 Table 4.4: Findings on Education Qualifications of Respondents’ views on Transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Electoral Process’ Procedures and Rules are Transparent</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>11.348</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.783</td>
<td>1.872</td>
<td>.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>367.792</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>2.021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>379.140</td>
<td>185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An electoral official explains that though the commission has no staff capacity building policy, it believes in hiring highly qualified individuals with a view of enhancing transparency. The officials explains:

We don’t have a clear policy in terms of capacity building but the commission encourages people to do [trainings] privately because we believe that high education qualifications increase transparency in the electoral process. The public in the past used to get concerned that people elected to public office did have humble education. The council employees were more enlightened than those they reported to. Subtly, Zambians are saying there is need for some level of education in the election management process (Interview with ECZ Official, January, 2016).

This view is contrasted by a political activist though agreeing with views from the ECZ official further argues that:

ECZ has qualified human resources but they are not fully utilized that is a bone of contention currently. The allegiance is not to the people or to system but their allegiance is to the government that put them in the positions. This compromises them and fails to uphold principles of transparency in the electoral process (Interview with Political Activist, January, 2016).
Table 4.5: Percentage Distribution of Respondents’ Perception on Transparency based on Background Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor (variables)</th>
<th>The electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is transparent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>23.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>28.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>14.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>16.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>16.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education qualification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td>9.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree and above</td>
<td>14.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>11.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>17.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In possession of a voter’s card</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>40.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5 above presents the independent sample t-tests on the respondents’ perceptions on transparency in the electoral process based on selected background variables. The test gave associated p-values 0.734 and 0.637 respectively suggesting that there was no statistical differences between males and females as well as rural and urban dwellers regarding their perceptions on transparency of the electoral process in the two districts. This was further indicated by the 5% level of significance. In addition, the test revealed that there was no statistical differences in perception on the transparency of the electoral process based on
franchise between the registered and unregistered respondents. Agreeing with the findings above, one of the political party official stresses:

Yes, we have made attempts to enhance this transparency but we need to do more to ensure that all the players are satisfied. But surely every step and activity should be transparent to all the players to see and that will reduce questions at the end of the day. We are still less than transparent (Interview with political party official, February, 2016, Lusaka).

Some ECZ officials interviewed sum up the issue of transparency in the electoral process in this way:

We have been good in promoting transparency, like for example, if a presiding officer has not opened the polling station on time, there are remedial measures or if we open a secret polling station, someone can challenge those results and they will be disqualified by the courts, which are on transparency. To me, transparent and accountability is the only way an institution like ours can really earn its respect, credibility and the like because when you are transparent, it is a sign that you have nothing to hide and I think this is the key. The criticisms that come to the commission should be acting as building blocks to better the system because what people want to know is information. But an open door policy will help a lot (Interview with ECZ official, January, 2016).

4.3. Findings on Accountability in Electoral Process in Kafue and Lusaka Districts

This section responds the research objective one investigating the extent to which electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is transparent and accountable. Specifically, this sections looks the accountability variable. This is in realisation that every institutional setup requires accountability as a key element in winning public trust served as well as involved. In any process of choosing a leader in an electoral democratic process, the paramount importance of accountability, especially when things go wrong, cannot be overemphasised. In this section, an assessment of how accountable the electoral process using various variables such as financial accountability of the electoral body, education qualification of the permanent staff, commissioners and temporal poll staff in Kafue and Lusaka districts was investigated. The role of the media and collaborative approaches to accountability was interrogated. A number of factors were specifically concentrated on. Table 4.6 below shows
how respondents viewed accountability of the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts.

4.3.1 Findings on Accountability in the Electoral Process based on Collaborative Approaches and Media

Under this sub-section, respondents were asked state their opinions on accountability of the electoral process based on the investigated variables as presented below.

Table 4.6 Percentage Distribution of Respondents’ Perception on Accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor (Variable)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is accountability in the electoral process</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media helps promote accountability</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal framework is key to accountability</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECZ’s collaboration with other state agencies (ACC, Police, DEC, judiciary)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increase accountability in the electoral process</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opinion one of the political party officials interviewed on key role the variables play in promoting accountability in the electoral process laments:

Right, where do we go to complain if our EMB is not running and functioning well and all other institutions are not functioning well? When you go to the judiciary, you don’t get a fair hearing, when you go to ACC and Police among others, you don’t get fair hearing... If there is transparency and accountability, there is no question that people will have confidence in the electoral process. It will remove the belief that the ECZ has been favoring the government of the day in most instances. For me it is important that we see government detached from this important institution like the Electoral Commission and then we will
see peace and development in our country ((Interview with political party official, February, 2016).

4.3.2 Findings Electoral Law Promotes Accountability in the Electoral Process

Respondents were asked to give their views on whether the electoral law promoted accountability of the electoral process and whether they felt the current legal provisions provided independence of the electoral body which is a key element in achieving electoral accountability in electoral democracy. Other areas investigated were the current electoral policies whether they perpetuated lack of accountability and transparency and need to be reviewed. Further, respondents were asked to state whether they felt policy on recruitment of poll staff should be clearer. Their views are presented in the figure 4.7 below.

Figure 4.7: Percentage Distribution of Respondents’ Views on Electoral Law

One of the political activists agrees with the findings above on whether the electoral law guarantees the electoral independence of the electoral body and states that:

No, definitely no! ECZ needs to build confidence in the public and under the current electoral process and electoral laws where the government has an upper hand to appoint whoever, wherever and whenever, you always see…when such things happen, they put in doubt the credibility of the process. The electoral legal framework does not promote the principles of transparency and accountability. We have a problem there. This is so because the ECZ are
answerable only to one person -the president of the republic who is an interested. You can’t say they are transparent and accountable like that, no! They are not transparent and accountable (Interview political Activist, February, 2016).

4.3.3 Findings on Financing Law on the Electoral Body on Accountability

This subsection solicited respondents’ opinions on the financing electoral law on electoral activities. The gist of the investigation was to get respondents’ views on whether the laws on financing electoral body does affect its accountability responsibilities to the citizens, players and stakeholders. Respondents were asked to state whether there was need for the law on financing of the electoral body to be reviewed to improve accountability responsibilities to stakeholders and consequently of the electoral process. The figure 4.8 below presents the views of the respondents on the sub-question.

Figure 4.8: Percentage Distribution of People’s Perception on Financing and Auditing of ECZ

A Governance activist in an interview observes:

The electoral legal framework does not promote the principles of accountability in the financing of the Commission. This is so because the ECZ
are answerable only to one person the President. There is need to, indeed, revisit the law (Interview with governance activist, January, 2016).

4.3.4 Findings on Knowledge of Sources of Finances to ECZ and Impact on Accountability of The Electoral Process

This subquestion was used to assess the respondents’ knowledge of sources of fundings to the electoral body and whether these sources had negative impact on the operations of the electoral body to support an accountable electoral process that promotes credible electoral democracy. Respondents were to give their opinions on the sources of fundings they knew to the electoral body. The Figure below shows their responses. As reflected below, 31% of the respondents agreed that funding to electoral body should come from government to avoid compromising its independence, accountability and transparency of the electoral process.

Figure 4.9: Percentage Distribution of Respondents’ Perception on the Sources of Finance to ECZ

In supporting the view that substantial funding should come from government, one of the electoral official interviewed recounts an incident in the past when electoral activities were
almost put in jeopardy as a result of donors’ last minute withdraw of funding to the commission. The official explains:

There are other aspects cooperating partners, have come in, basically, to support mainly in capacity building of staff and development materials such as voter education and publicity, engagement and collaboration of community radio stations and those related media stuff, developing manuals, production regulations. However, the official explains how relying on donors almost disastrously jeopardised the elections at one point. So, the Commission after learning lessons, it was felt that the core business of elections, holding elections, recruitment, staff allowance and everything that will make an election work or not work will have to be funded by the national treasury and the treasury in 2006, 2008, 2011 and 2015 has been very forthcoming and they support core business of the elections,” (Interview with ECZ Official, January, 2016).

4.3.5 Findings on ECZ’s Financial Accountability

Below is a stacked bar chart showing results of perceptions of respondents on financial accountability of the electoral body selected aspects which included audits either to be done by Auditor General’s Office and or an independent auditor and it should be nonnegotiable that the electoral body must be audited by the Auditor General.
Although key informants felt that the electoral body was not financially accountable, a situation that has compromised the accountability of the electoral process, an electoral official argues to the contrary. The official explains:

We make the books of accounts public and then submit financial reports to Parliament and Auditor General’s Office that already a way of accounting to the public because the National Assembly of Zambia is also the people’s assembly. In terms of accountability, it is through our annual reports which are submitted to the National Assembly as a requirement and anyone is able to access the reports. For the future, we should post them on our website so that people can access them. May be, this is something we should be considering so that a wider public is able to access our audited accounts after all, all this is taxpayers’ money and we are accountable not only to the institution but to the Zambians.

Further, another electoral official argues that the institution strictly adheres to procurement procedures and guidelines from Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA).
4.3.6 Findings on Financial Audit Reports Submission

Under this section, respondents were asked to give their views on financial accountability of the electoral body and whether financial accountability had a bearing on the overall accountability of the electoral process in promoting credible electoral democracy. Respondents were further asked their knowledge on where the electoral body submitted its financial statements. Figure 4.11 below presents some responses from respondents.

Figure 4.11: Findings on the Submission of ECZ Audited Financial Reports.

An electoral official reveals that the commission’s audited financial reports were submitted to the treasury as a way of being accountable to the people. This view reflects well with the above presentation where 79% of the respondents wanted audited reports to be submitted to the Ministry of Finance. The official confirms:

We only submit to the treasury and in terms of accountability it is through our annual reports which are submitted to the National Assembly as a requirement and anyone is able to access the reports except that accountability is not topical because, say if we don’t appear before Public Accounts Committee (PAC) or we have so many audit queries or perhaps we failed to produce our annual reports, what happens, there is nothing! We haven’t been really so aggressive on the aspect of accountability. So, maybe, there is need to streamline accountability aspect in the electoral law (Interview with ECZ Officials, January, 2016)
4.3.7 Findings on Donor Funding to Electoral Commission of Zambia

Respondents were asked to give their views on whether the electoral body should not receive donor funding to avoid compromising itself and also accountability and transparency of the electoral process. This is taking into account that most funding agencies dictated the way things should be done or conducted once they fund an institution. From the figure below, 67% of respondents felt the electoral body should receive funding from the donors while 24% of the respondents were of the contrary view.

Table 4.8: Respondents’ Views on Donor Funding to the Electoral Body.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECZ should not receive money from donors as it compromises its independence</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An electoral official explains some of the disappointments that the institution suffers when it is solely depending on donor funding for managing the electoral process consequently affecting accountability to the public. The official has the following to share:

The point really is that election is national exercise and therefore funding should come from the treasury and nowhere else. The commission gets 100% funding from the treasury and we account using the financial act, we are regulated by the financial act. I think generally I would say from 2001, the commission would get some money from the treasury to run the elections after a last minutes pull out of the cooperating partners at one time and that election would have been a disaster. So, the Commission after learning lessons, it was felt that the core business of elections, holding elections, recruitment, staff allowance and everything that will make an election work or not work will
have to be funded by the national treasury and the treasury in 2006, 2008, 2011 and 2015 has been very forthcoming and it supports core business of the elections (Interview with ECZ Official, January, 2016).

4.3.8 Findings on Staff Qualifications of the Electoral Commission of Zambia

Respondents were asked to state whether education qualifications of electoral staffs and commission had a bearing on transparency and accountability of the electoral process in promoting electoral democracy. The respondents were further asked to state whether in the electoral law, there are specific minimum education qualifications to guide the recruitment of electoral staffs and commissioners. Further, respondents were asked whether education qualifications improved electoral staffs’ and commissioners’ competencies to efficiently and effectively manage the electoral process transparently and accountably. It was the desire of this section see how education qualifications of electoral staffs helped in confidence building in the electoral process. The members of staff were categorised as commissioners and secretariat staffs.
Table 4.9: Findings on Education Qualifications of Poll Staffs and Commissioners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>total</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education qualifications of staff and commissioners promote transparency and accountable of electoral process</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>1.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum education qualifications is prescribed for Staff at ECZ have</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>1.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only the top three senior staff at ECZ are meets minimum education qualification</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>1.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and policy only has minimum qualification for commissioners and not staff</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>1.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral competence, efficiency in management of the electoral process improves with education qualification</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>1.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poll staff are not qualified to manage the electoral process</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>1.387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An electoral official admits:

We don’t have a clear policy in terms of capacity building but the commission encourages people to do [trainings] privately. High education qualifications increase transparency and accountability. The public in the past used to get concerned that people elected to public office did have humble education. The council employees were more enlightened than those they reported to. Subtly, Zambians are saying there is need for some level of education. They will be able to defend bad laws (Interview with ECZ Official, January, 2016).

One of civil society official explains:
High qualification will promote competence in the manner people handle matters than someone who is just guessing. When one is guessing, that is dangerous because you cannot continue to be guessing on this very important process which cause for accountability. So you can see the level of incompetence in the electoral staff. They need to be brought to a certain level where people have certain qualifications so that at the end of the day people have confidence in the electoral process (Interview with civil society official, January, 2016).

4.4. Findings on Accountability and Transparency of the Electoral Process

This section investigated the extent to which the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts was transparent and accountable. The researcher used socio-background characteristics to investigate respondents’ views regarding the subject. Among the variables investigated included the gender (sex), age, education qualifications and location of their residences.

4.4.1. Findings on Accountability and Transparency from a Gender Perspective

After categorising the respondents according to their sex, the respondents were asked to state their opinions on transparency and accountability of the electoral process. Despite males being majority at 78% against 22% female in the sampled research population, more women agreed that the electoral process in the two districts was transparent and accountable. This was partly due to the fact that majority women were the majority voters in the area. The figure below is a presentation of the percentage distribution of respondents’ perceptions on transparency and accountability based on their gender.
4.4.1 Figure 4.12: Respondents’ Perception on Transparency and Accountability from Gender Perspective.

![Figure 4.4.1: Percentage Distribution of Respondents' Perceptions on Transparency and Accountability Based on Sex](image)

4.4.2 Findings on Transparency and Accountability of the current Electoral Process from Age Perspective

Respondents were categorised in their age ranges starting with the lowest age to the highest. Then respondents were asked to state their views on how they perceived the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts. The aim was to find out how one’s age affect the perception of the electoral process regarding transparency and accountability. The assumption was that the older the respondent, the more experienced and understanding s/he was and adequate to describe the transparency and accountability of the electoral process in the two districts. The figure below is a graphic presentation of the findings on the respondents’ perception on transparency and accountability based on one’s age range.
One of the veteran politicians interviewed expresses serious reservation on transparency and accountability of the electoral process. The veteran who has been in politics for 64 years explains:

> Transparency and accountability is dependent mostly on the attitude of the party in power and its government at the particular time, the party and its leadership as we say, we old timers of Kaunda days. I have been in this game since 1952, for 64 years and I have been around and still have my brains. Otherwise if you have a system and a greed person heading that particular system, you are in for trouble. I think during the pre-one party state, 1964-1971 to be precise, the system was transparent except people had no choice at presidential level. Currently, the electoral process and system continues to be awkward every day and every hour (Interview with veteran politician, January, 2016)

### 4.4.3 Findings on Transparency and Accountability of the current Electoral Process Based on Respondents’ Education Qualifications

This subsection investigated the perceptions of the respondents based on their education qualifications. The desire was to find out the extent to which education qualifications...
impacted on respondents’ views and perceptions on transparency and accountability of the electoral process.

Figure 4.14: Findings on Respondents’ Views on Transparency and Accountability based on Education Qualification.

One of political party official observes:

Education qualification can be help people describe the electoral process in a certain way because it gives them an understanding of certain ethics of how to go about issues that promote transparency and accountability rather than someone who did not go to school. However, I propose that wisdom and academic qualification are combined (Interview with a political official, January, 2016)

A civil society official also agrees that education qualification an effective on how people perceive transparency and accountability in the electoral process as reflected in the following statement:

High education qualification can really help in people appreciating transparency and accountability in the electoral process by people understanding the policies and laws that govern the electoral process, interpret and make a quick reflection on a problem (Interview with civil society official, January, 2016).
4.4.4 General Findings on Transparency and Accountability of current Electoral Process

Respondents were categorised according to location of their residences whether rural or urban. This was to find out whether one’s location or where one lived affected their perception on transparency and accountability of the electoral process. From the graphic presentation below as illustrated in Figure 4.15, it showed that majority of the rural residents were neutral on transparency and accountability of the electoral process while the urban residents agreed to assertion that the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts was transparent and accountable. The rural-urban divide could be attributed to the information gap usually existed between the urban and the rural residents. This was so because urban areas were well serviced with a variety of media outlets as compared to rural areas.

**Figure 4.15: Findings on Respondents’ View on Transparency and Accountability based on Respondents’ Location of Residence.**

4.4.5 Findings on Transparency and Accountability of Electoral Process from Registered Voters’ Views

This subsection investigated voters’ views on transparency and accountability of the electoral process. Respondents’ views on this subject were important. To this end, the respondents were asked to state their position on transparency and accountability of the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts respectively. The figure below gives graphic summary of voters’ views on transparency and accountability of the electoral process in the two districts as voters.
4.5 Findings on Civic Education in the Electoral Process

In this section, respondents were asked to state whether or not civic education had a bearing on their electoral perceptions on transparency and accountability of the electoral process. Admittedly, respondents regarded civic education as key to the realisation of an informed cadres of electoral players in the electoral process who could ably question some of the operations of the electoral managers. It was also argued, succinctly, that with citizens civically educated, they would demand certain standards that support a transparent and accountable electoral process. To this end, the research engaged respondents to assess their levels of civic knowledge and awareness of the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts and whether they were aware of some of avenues or tools that could be used to promote civic education.
Table 4.10: Percentage Distribution of Respondents’ Views on importance of Civic Education in Promoting Accountability and Transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor (Variable)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Education has bearing on how we see transparency and accountability in the electoral process</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of Media promotes to the provision of civic education</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic education empowers citizens to demand accountability and transparency in the electoral process</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ECZ official laments:

People feel cheated and misled in the absence of civic education as they follow wrong information. From my personal experience, I think there is definitely a negative perception of the Commission based on, not necessarily on prejudices, but mostly on ignorance if not little knowledge of the electoral process. A lot of people believe things that they have not even experienced or confirmed with the Commission. There is need for other stakeholders like civil society to have space to inform people, space to speak and space to correct situations in the electoral process. Give the people information about what is happening and going on and like that, there will be no problems. But if you look like you have something to hide, then you have challenges and the perceptions get reinforced to say, indeed, there is something to hide there. But an open door policy will help a lot (Interview with ECZ official, January, 2016)

4.6 Findings on Transparent and Accountable Electoral Process in Promotes Credible Electoral Democracy

This section investigated whether respondents supported the assertions that a transparent and accountable electoral process promoted credible electoral democracy in Kafue and Lusaka districts. It was also trying to answer objective two which was trying to assess the extent the
electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts promotes credible electoral democracy and also the research question on whether electoral practices in the electoral process in the two districts have promoted credible electoral democracy. Respondents were asked to state their views on the subject under investigation. The figure below presents the findings on respondents’ opinions on transparent and accountability in promoting credible electoral democracy.

**Figure 4.17: Findings on Respondents’ Opinions on Credible Electoral Democracy**

![Figure 4.17: Respondents' Opinions on Credible Electoral Democracy](image)

One of political party official says:

If you look at every stage of this electoral process, you can point some deficiencies in practices which make it less satisfactory. If the starting point of the electoral process is defined and the various steps it takes are identified up to the end of this electoral process, it is possible to say that at this stage, this is what is lacking. The government and ruling parties normally will want to draw these maps in a manner that advantages them electorally especially if these are done unilaterally without the process of consultation with stakeholders (Interview with political party official, January, 2016).

### 4.7 Findings on Areas of Improvements

Under this sections respondents were asked to suggest areas of improvement in the electoral process that might enhance transparency and accountability. These areas should to be
attended by the government, civil society and electoral body. Therefore, this section presented some of the suggested areas for improvement in the electoral process. Figure 4.18 below clearly gives graphic presentation of respondents’ responses.

**Figure 4.18 Percentage Distribution of Respondents’ Suggested Areas of Improvement**

![Figure 4.18: Suggested Areas of Improvements](image)

One of the political party officials’ comment on temporal recruitment of poll staffs from other ministries and departments in the electoral process explains:

> At this point of our level of development, I think to expect that the commission will have its own staff spread all over every district, very corner of this country, I think it is an untenable because a lot of staff are required. The system of relying on other ministries, for the time being, I think, should be satisfactory. Yes, having electoral body’s own staff is something that we should strive to have in future but now for the time being, I cannot see how they can employ all that staff. In any case, the work of the commission is periodic. When an election goes, then comes by-elections once in a while but to maintain its own staff in the field for these periodic exercise might pose a problem cost-wise. Yes the current structure could still be satisfactory (Interview with political party official, January, 2016).
4.8 Summary on Presentation of Findings

This Chapter has presented the background characteristics of the respondents and their perceptions on the electoral process in the two districts. The presentation has shown how many males and females, educated and the uneducated, employed and unemployed, rural and urban, and registered and non-registered respondents. The presentation further revealed respondents’ perceptions on accountability and transparency of the current electoral process and the institution that managed it and whether or not electoral perceptions changed with one’s socio-background characteristics. The presented findings also showed the key role civic education played in promoting transparency and accountability of the electoral process. The Chapter has further presented some avenues that promote civic education in the electoral process and respondents’ perceptions on whether or not transparency and accountability of the electoral process promote credible electoral democracy. The presentation of findings has also highlighted respondents’ views on possible areas of improvement which might be key to enhancing transparency and accountability of the electoral process and for further future interrogation.

4.9 Chapter Conclusion

This Chapter has presented a synopsis of the findings on the respondents’ perception based on various variables that were thought to have a bearing, both positively and negatively on transparency and accountability of the electoral process which consequently would have undermined or promoted credible electoral democracy in the two districts. The presentation of respondents’ perceptions in graphs, tables and figures helped in simplifying the understanding of the research findings too. The arguments which have been advanced by the respondents pointed out that more needed to be done in the electoral process to meet the expectations of the public. The Chapter concluded that the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts was transparent and accountable to promote credible electoral democracy. However, the Chapter also presented contrary opinions mostly expressed some respondents interviewed. Their general description of the current electoral process in the two districts was that it was still “work in progress” with great room for potential improvement. The next Chapter discusses the research findings based on major themes in details to give deep understanding and interpretation. It also brings on board arguments and views of other authors, experts and writers and further relate whether the research has been supported by the theoretical position as per theory adopted and used in the research.
CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

Chapter Overview

This Chapter discusses the findings of the research. The variables to be discussed include transparency, accountability, civic education, electoral process, credible electoral democracy and associated subsections. The discussion will ascertain whether or not the four specific research objectives which are: (i.) to ascertain the extent to which the current electoral Process is transparent and accountable in Kafue and Lusaka districts, (ii.) to assess the extent to which the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts promotes credible electoral democracy, (iii) to establish whether civic education has a bearing on people’s electoral perception regarding transparency and accountability in Kafue and Lusaka districts; and (iv.) to identify areas which require improvement in the management and administration of the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts have been met and research questions answered. Each objective will be discussed separately bringing out the research findings, what other scholars have written about the topic under study whether in favour or not and finally researcher’s personal views and also the theoretical significance of the research findings.

5.1 High Presence of Transparency and Accountability in the Electoral Process

The research has established that high support that the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is transparent and accountable. This has been reflected under the Chapter dealing with the presentation of study findings. Under this section, recognition is given to the fact that stakeholders in the electoral process are with different background characteristics and, because of that, may assess the extent to which the current electoral process is transparent and accountable differently. Specific attention in this research was given to sex, age, education qualification, residence and possession of a voter’s card to ascertain the extent to which these factors interacted with each other and explained how people of various characteristics perceived the electoral process in terms of transparency and accountability in the two districts. The two concepts of transparency and accountability will be discussed independently with the conclusion combining the summary findings on this subtopic. The research has further revealed that socio background characteristics such as sex, residence, institutional affiliation, education qualification and franchise have little bearing on the respondents’ perception on whether the process is transparent.
For instance, when tests were conducted to ascertain the relationship between the sex of the respondents and their perception of transparency in the electoral process, it was revealed that there was a significant association between the sex of respondents and how they perceived the level of transparency in the electoral process. This is evidenced by the probability value (p-value = 0.001) of the Chi-square distribution in table 1 under subsection 4.2. Disregarding the degree of agreement or disagreement, the results show that there are more of both males and females who agree that the electoral process in the two districts is transparent than those who perceive it as not being transparent. For those in favor, females agree more at 54% than their male counterparts 47.8% as presented under Table 5 above. In contrast, 35% of the females against 31% of the males are of the view that the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka district of Zambia is not transparent. This finding could be attributed to the fact that the country has had more women registered voters than men since 1996 to date (ECZ 2011 Voter’s Roll)

Further statistical tests were done on a relationship between age, residence, franchise, education qualification of the respondents and their perceptions on transparency and accountability of the electoral process. The statistical tests conducted suggest a strong association between age and perception of transparency of the electoral process in Lusaka and Kafue districts. The results show that the extent of agreement increases with age. For those aged between 20 and 29, it was discovered that they equally agreed that the process is transparent. However, those aged 30 and above agree more that the electoral process is transparent and the electoral body conducts elections in the two districts transparently. For example, the study reveals that the elderly, at least 50 years and above, agree more at 67 than those in the age group 45-49 at 50%. This may be attributed to the level of experience to which these respondents have been exposed to with the democratic processes as opposed to the youthful ones who may have only taken part in one or two elections. Across all education levels, it is apparent from the results presented that more are of the view that the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is transparent than those see it to the contrary.

For those without any level of formal education, they seem to have no conclusive response as can be reflected in the tables above since as many as 50% are saying that it is transparent as do those who it is not. Certificate holders have the highest proportion at 65% in regarding the electoral process to be transparent while holders of at least a degree have the least assertion to transparency of the electoral process. On the contrary, the uneducated have the highest
percentage of a group of respondents who view the electoral process of being not transparent while those with at least a degree as well as certificate holders are the least to have viewed the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts as not being transparent. In terms of residence and franchise through the possession of a voter’s card and Transparency, research reveals that almost all the respondents (95%) are in possession of the voter’s card and only 5% are not registered voters. One would have expected or inferred that the commitment or desire to register as a voter is out of the fact the people think that the electoral process is transparent as opposed to those that do not strive to register as voters. However, the results as presented in table 5 suggest otherwise. There are more people who are not registered voters at 60% with the view that the electoral process is transparent than those that are in possession of voters’ cards at 49%.

Of those that are registered voters, 19% could not say whether the process is transparent or not while no an unregistered respondent was indifferent. Furthermore, people from both urban and rural areas agreed more than they disagreed-disregarding the degree in both cases—that the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is transparent. There were more people in rural areas that are indifferent on this issue at 29% than they disagreed at 24% while in the urban case, the opposite is true. As can be seen, when statistical assessments were conducted, they reveal some association between respondents’ biographical background characteristics to their electoral perception on the transparency of the electoral process. However, minor perceptional differences emerged with the respondents’ ages. The research establishes that about 67% of the elderly people aged 50 years and above perceived the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts more transparent and accountable as compared to 50% of the respondents aged below 50 years. These perceptional differences due to age can be attributed to the vast understanding, exposure and experience the elderly have had in the electoral processes as a result of their repeated participation in the voting process over the years.

The research also revealed that sex plays a role on the respondents’ perception on transparency and accountable in the electoral proves as study shows that more female than male respondents disputed the transparency in the process. About 35% of the female respondents perceived the electoral process to be lacking in transparency and accountability against 31% of their male counterparts. The research findings attest that 87% of the respondents are in favor of accountability for credible elections against just 9% who do not
agree. Asked whether there are measures that ensured that accountability in the electoral process, 44% of the respondents ascertain the availability of measures and only 22% hold an opposite view. Despite this finding, 84% of the respondents are of the view that the electoral law must be strengthened to make the electoral process more accountable in eyes of various stakeholders in Kafue and Lusaka districts.

This research finding could be attributed to the fact that the country has had more women registered voters than men since 1996 to date as evidenced by the ECZ 2016 Final Voter’s Roll which reveal that out of the total number of registered voters of 6,698,372, female’s voters account for 3,372,935 while 3,325,437 are males. However, the two districts, Kafue and Lusaka, seem to have more males than females as registered voters. For example, Kafue District has 32,696 males voters as compared to 29,989 females while Lusaka District has 453,595 males and 385,432 females in the 2016 voter’s roll. This could be partly the reason the research population has more males than females. With regards to education qualification and transparency, the study attests that across all education levels, it is apparent that more are of the view that the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka is transparent and accountable than those that see it otherwise. However, those without any level of formal education have an equal divided opinion and this can be attributed to the low levels of civic education on the practices in the electoral process. This can be one of the reasons the research establishes that those without formal education have the highest percentage who view the electoral process in the two districts of being not transparent and accountable.

As Diamond (2003:4) contests that “if citizens are to govern their own affairs, either directly or through representative government, they must be informed about how best to determine their affairs and how best to represent and execute them.” In addition, almost all the people interviewed considered the electoral process as being transparent and affirmed that the higher education levels citizens have, the better the appreciation and understanding of transparency in the electoral process. As early as 1991, former United States President Jimmy Carter described the Zambian electoral process as having recorded “encouraging developments” in terms of transparency. To sum it up, there are encouraging developments in the electoral process towards transparency the reasons respondents in this study, regardless of their socio-demographic characteristic, seem to reaffirm this. However, taking into account Carter and Atwood (1992:101)’s observation that while strong differences remain among the electoral parties, citizens inclusive, on the transparency and accountability of electoral procedures, it
must be the feeling of everyone that the electoral prospects in Kafue and Lusaka districts are improving for “free and fair elections.”

The research further establishes that most respondents who are registered voters perceive the electoral process as not being transparent while those who are not registered thought it is transparent. This contrast can be attributed to the fact that majority of those participating in elections get disillusioned when electoral outcomes don’t go their way as they do often times. This is because the preferred leaders by the majority who feel they have voted for, do not get elected into office instead, somebody unwanted emerge winner. For instance, in 2001 Presidential and General Elections, the winning presidential candidate got 29% of the total valid votes cast meaning that 71% voted for the electorate who were the majority voted to the contrary (FODEP, 2001) and their candidate (s) never won. In addition, people from both urban and rural areas agree that the electoral process is transparent with the study establishing that more people in rural areas are indifferent on this issue. However, some key informants who include civil society officials, political commentors, activists and officials from political parties lament the lack of transparency in the electoral process in the two districts but agree that progress has been done towards a transparent electoral process. The reasons behind such views, arguably, from a knowledgeable sections of society, are the electoral contexties under which elections are held and the resultant electoral outcomes.

As the European Union Electoral Observation Mission (EUEOM) (2006:1) notes, in its Final Election Report on Zambia for the 2016 General Elections, numerous problems encountered in the counting, tabulation and transmission of results processes, complex documentation, inadequate guidelines and insufficient training slowed and that procedures were not always followed. “The subsequent abandonment of the system for the electronic transmission of results as well as the delay in the announcement of the presidential election results contributed to a decline in confidence among some stakeholders during the final stages of the elections.” This is why the International Peace Institute (IPI) (2010: xiii) suggests for change of the electoral contexties in which elections are being held. The Institute laments that, “the electoral context in which our elections are held must change by allowing transparency in their management, and only then can we hope for behavioral shift on the part of the participants. This challenge requires political courage and commitment of time and resources.”
However, the general finding is that the electoral process in the two districts is transparent which settles well with Kadima and Booysen (2009:624)’s observation that “the ECZ has made concerted effort to improving communication with stakeholders…there has, however, been an increase in confidence in the ECZ in both the 2006 and 2008 elections.” The EUEOM (2006) also remarks in its 2006 Tripartite Election Observation Report that “Overall, the elections were marked by increased transparency and confidence in the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) throughout most of the electoral process.” Another author, Annan (2012) stresses that “when the electorates believe that elections have been free and fair and transparent, they can be a powerful catalyst for better governance, greater security and human development but in the absence of credible elections, citizens have no recourse to peaceful political change.” Bams (2015:80) aptly argues that electoral democracy means commitment to transparency and emphasizes the need for the electoral management bodies to also commit themselves to the virtues of transparency. Short of transparency, she fears:

There could be distrust and lack of confidence among electoral stakeholders, either in the manner we count votes or the manner we expend public resources. From the above excerpt, Bams suggests that there is need for electoral bodies to be stronger believer in transparency in their work as a good virtue and practice in electoral democracies.

Further, Bams demands for the opening of EMB’s books of accounts to public scrutiny and embrace inclusiveness in its activities, a virtues she argues, she promoted when she was head of the South African electoral body. She adds that when she was at the helm of the South African electoral body, the financial books of the commission were open to public scrutiny and that stakeholders were highly involved and consulted on policy decision the electoral body would want to advance in the management of the electoral process. Underpinning the importance of transparency in the electoral process, IPI (2010) contests that the culture of transparency and credibility is key in ensuring the fundamental and universal right to democratic and participatory governance. Fukuyama (2014) concludes by appealing to stakeholders and citizens to increase their demand for transparency on the agent-electoral body’s behavior. International IDEA (1996) cements the above point by Fukuyama through argument that an electoral process must absolutely be transparent for electoral democracy to thrive.
The EU EOM (2016) in its preliminary statement issued on August 13, 2016 after the conclusion of the voting process for the August 11, 2016 Zambian General Elections notes great improvement in transparency of the electoral process and the same time expressing dissatisfaction at the electoral body’s failure to allow observers to access a number of important activities. In statement excerpt below, the EUEOM states that despite issues of mistrust and accusations of bias from some political parties in the electoral process, many stakeholders at district and provincial levels still express a high degree of trust in the electoral process. “The ECZ made efforts to increase transparency in the electoral administration, but did not allow international nor domestic observers to access a number of important activities, thus missing opportunities to further enhance the transparency of, and trust in, the process,” (EU EOM, 2016:1). From experience, transparency in the electoral process has been a noticeable feature every after an election that passes due to interests being developed by citizens and other stakeholders in observing the process. Continuous engagement with the electoral body and other electoral stakeholders and unceasing advocacy for electoral reforms by civil society has also helped reduce suspicions and mistrusts in the conduct and management of the electoral process in the two districts. For instance, since 2001, all polling stations and streams have been manned by both stationery and mobile local election monitors which has contributed to the confidence building in the process.

In 2016 General Elections, for example, the EU EOM attests to this contention in its preliminary statement when it states that some 10,000 domestic observers were deployed by various local monitoring groups and the EU EOM found domestic observers present in 95 per cent of polling streams it observed. Further, the interests generated by international observers in the observation activities and the introduction of new observation and monitoring techniques such as parallel vote tabulation (PVT) has greatly helped in the promotion of a more open electoral process in the two districts. Therefore, it can be contested that the electoral process in the two districts has been progressively been moving towards greater transparency. In this regard, the Pluralist theory that bedrocks this study becomes relevant and adds credence to the study findings as it proves the assumption that transparency can only be achieved when various interest groups are allowed to play their roles in electoral process. The importance these various stakeholders play in ensuring an open and transparent electoral process is well acknowledged by the promoter of this theory, Laski (1960) who argues that “a plural society is an open society” and further contends that different interests
groups existing in a plural electoral democracy play their part in safeguarding their interest in the electoral contests.

To this end, Laski justifies the participation of various stakeholders who consequently promote transparency in the electoral process. This, he believes, further deepens the principles of pluralist electoral democracies which demand making public policies by mutual consultation and exchange of opinions between varied groups with main goal of protecting and promoting specific interests in the political processes and electoral process. In supporting the Laski’s theory, Kariel (1972:276-280) contends that electoral democracy, apart from being a rule of the people, or of the majority, is a socio-political system in which the power of the state is shared with a large number of private groups, interest organisations and individuals represented by such organisation. Proponents of direct democracy theories agree with the pluralist theorists in their contention that popular participation can check powerful elites in the management of elections thereby promoting openness in the electoral process. However, Johari (2013) criticizes the theory and ideas advanced by Laski (1960) and Kariel (1972).

Jahari (2013) adds that though it is true that the role of many groups in the electoral process act as a check on the abuse of power by the government and its institutions and more importantly ensures transparency and accountability, more liberty and power to the groups, it can create serious problems of law and order. Johari (2013: 393) stresses that it is a pity that while the pluralists say so much about the necessity of the role of these groups in an open society, “they hardly say anything in so forceful terms about the legitimate control of the state over them.” The pluralist theory’s central theme that the struggle for power through an electoral process should be open for all interest groups, is believed to have been “stolen” from the elitists whose interpretation has come to be accepted by the empirical social and political theorists. Therefore, the operation of ‘mass democracy’ is no longer possible in modern times. The new awareness is that, not all groups but only a few count and, even there, the elites take part in the struggle for power. Power, in fact, has been monopolised by a few groups and their elites (Johari, 2013). In terms of specific objectives, the study ascertains that the current electoral process is transparent and accountable in Kafue and Lusaka districts.

This is evidenced from the statistical tests conducted on respondents’ responses against their various socio-background characteristics and from the reviewed literature. For instance, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests conducted to ascertain whether social backgrounds of
the respondents have statistical difference on their views of transparency of the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts, the results are that, regardless of their socio background characteristic differences, the general conclusion is that they regard the electoral process as transparent in Kafue and Lusaka districts. Not only that, literature reviewed speaks to the recognition that transparency in the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts has been improving progressively (Kadima and Booysen, (2014), EUEOM, (2006). Affirming the level of transparency by the electoral body, an ECZ official boasts: “we are transparent because the auditors can come anytime to audit us, Ministry of Finance can come anytime and say bring the financial record, we give them,” (interview with an ECZ official, January, 2016). To this end, the research objective one has been achieved which is to ascertain the extent to which the current electoral process is transparent and accountable.

5.1.1 Strong belief on Accountability of the Electoral Process in Promoting Electoral Democracy

In every institutional setup, accountability has, since time immemorial, seen as a key element in winning the confidence and trust of majority stakeholders served as well as involved in the electoral process. In any process of choosing or selecting a leader in a democratic process, the paramount importance of accountability, especially when things go wrong, cannot be overemphasized. In this section, an assessment of how accountable the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts and how the ECZ embraces accountability in conducting elections is discussed. A number of factors have been specifically concentrated on. From the presented findings, this study has established that respondents are in favour of an accountable electoral process anchored on an electoral body that embraces principles of accountability in its operations. From the findings presented above, most of the respondents are agreeable to the fact that for any country to have credible elections there was need for accountability in the electoral process. The findings attest that 87% of the respondents are in favor of accountability for credible elections against just 9% who do not agree. Asked whether there are measures that ensured that accountability in the electoral process, 44% of the respondents ascertain the availability of measures and only 22% hold an opposite view. Despite this finding, 84% of the respondents are of the view that the electoral law must be strengthened to make the electoral process more accountable in eyes of various stakeholders in Kafue and Lusaka districts.

However, as many as 34% cannot tell whether measures are there or not and this may be attributed to lack of information and awareness of the electoral process and on the operations...
of the electoral body among most citizens in the two towns. On the key players in fostering the accountability in the electoral process, the study reveals that the media is one of the key players in promoting accountability in the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts. As shown in findings above, 72% of the respondents view the media as playing a critical role in promoting accountability in the electoral process. This is against the 11% who do not consider the media as a factor while 17% are undecided. In terms of collaborative efforts in the pursuit of accountability in the electoral process, the study shows that the Zambia Police (ZP) and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC)’s collaboration with the electoral body can ensure accountability in the electoral process. The findings in this study actually do confirm the expectations. This is reflected in about 45% of the respondents who thinks that the collaboration of the ZP and ACC with the electoral body has worked to ensuring accountability as opposed to 31% who disagree. It is worth noting that 24% of the respondents could neither agree nor disagree with the effectiveness of such a collaboration in ensuring an accountable electoral process.

As several authors have argued that like Patel and Wahman (2015), Bams (2015) and others, credible electoral democracy requires that the conduct of elections is credible, collaborative and the electoral body is accountable to various stakeholders in the electoral process. The study establishes that many respondents favour an accountable electoral process which can be attained by having an electoral body that is accountable in its operations be it financial, legally, personnel and otherwise. However, about 84 respondents note that weaknesses in the electoral laws has undermined the accountability of the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts. The respondents suggest for a strengthened law which will subsequently make the electoral body more accountable to various stakeholders. As EUEOM (2006) observes after the disputed 2001 presidential elections and subsequent loss of confidence in the political and electoral processes by stakeholders, the mission recommended for the review of the law and the 2001 elections triggered the review of the legal and electoral frameworks with a view to strengthen them. It has been established in this study further that negative perceptions against the ECZ and the electoral process is due to limited information and awareness on the operations of the ECZ, an assertion one ECZ officials admitted to during the interviews. The research also establishes that the media, law enforcement agencies like Zambia Police Service (ZPS) and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) are key to ensuring accountability in the electoral process.
Interestingly, though the research establishes that majority respondents at 84% are of the view that the law must be strengthened to make the electoral body more accountable to various stakeholders, the revised electoral law instead reinforces the insulation of the electoral body from being accountable to stakeholders. The provision of the electoral process Act No. 35 of 2016 promulgated just before the 2016 General Elections, insulates the electoral body from being held accountable by stakeholders. Section 4(1) states that: “the Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority in the exercise of its functions under the constitution and this Act.” Contrary to the provision of the electoral commission of Zambia Act No. 25 of 2016 which empowers the commission to solicit the services of the Office of Auditor General or an Independent Auditors to audit its financial books, the study establishes that public perception on financial accountability of the Electoral Commission of Zambia is unfavorable and suggests that the Commission should be audited by the Auditor General and not an independent auditors. The research reveals that 76% of the respondents are in support of the idea that the Office of the Auditor General must audit the electoral body as compared to 18% who are against it. But stakeholders’ views during interviews point to the fact that the general financial accountability in the electoral process is unimpressive which reflects badly on the overall accountability in the electoral process. This unimpressive levels of accountability range from the electoral body to the political parties and other electoral stakeholders. The wonder is how an institution like an electoral body which is failing to be financially accountable can promote accountability in the electoral process.

The need for the law on accountability specifically has been echoed by various electoral enthusiasts. Affirming the absence a strong legal framework to support accountability in the electoral process during the 2001 tripartite elections, EUEOM, (2006:1) observes and cautions, “elections takes place without legislation to regulate campaign funding and spending by political parties and candidates. Together with the advantages of incumbency, the absence of regulations governing campaign finance resulted in an uneven playing field for contestants.” Some key informants felt that limited financial information on the electoral body’s operations contribute to stakeholders’ negativity on the matter. An opposition political party official explains that utilization of the funds by the Commission is usually not known because there is lack of information flow and that many a time the nation has been informed that the Auditor General’s report is inconclusive due to missing information not submitted. The above argument is supported by another veteran politician interviewed who explains that
an ideal situation is for the electoral body should use the funds transparently and accountably and alleges the electoral body has become part of the oppressors of its own system and therefore suspiciously becoming part of the political bullies which cannot be trusted not only on financial matters but the entire management of the electoral process.

However, an electoral body officials defended body’s financial accountability and the general electoral process accountability by contending that the electoral body has been accountable in its dealing as can be reflected in it submission of its annual and financial reports to relevant authorities yearly. Going by the arguments above, it is clear that accountability in the electoral process is being contested between stakeholders and the electoral body. This contestation with regards accountability in the utilization of funds on electoral related activities by the electoral body, political parties, the government or indeed management of the electoral process in general puts the entire process in the eyes of stakeholders to mistrust. This is because, from the stakeholders view point, accountability is limited in the electoral process which bears negatively on electoral democracy as an uneven electoral playing field is created. This consequently leads to declining public confidence in the electoral process (EUEOM, 2006). This is in the sense that trust and confidence levels among stakeholders in the outcomes of an electoral process tend to be high when the management of the electoral process is perceived to be transparent consequently minimising electoral disputes and other contestation in the process.

The research findings on accountability in the electoral process have been supported by a number of previous writings by various authors and electoral experts. Underscoring the importance of accountability in the electoral process, International IDEA (2012) contends that an accountable electoral process tends not only to build public and electorate confidence but it also increase investor and donor confidence in the resultant government. The benefits and translation of such a goodwill among donors to the resultant government is increased “trade and more donor aid”. The IPI (2010) argues that accountability in elections are good not only for democracy building and enhancement public confidence in the electoral process but institutions that manage the process too. Fukuyama (2014) argues that though an electoral body which acts as an agent in the electoral process should have enough autonomy to do its job well, such an electoral body should also remain ultimately accountable to stakeholders who are its principals. He explains further that in an electoral democracy, the principal are the whole people, who through elections, delegate authority to elected leaders and institutions of
the state, who in turn carry out their wishes. With this in mind, it is expected that the principal who are the citizens and other stakeholders will be enabled to monitor the agents-electoral body-better and then create uncertainties among the personnel knowing that they are being observed and monitored consequently allowing them to be held strictly accountable to their work.

Fukuyaman (2014: 76; 507) adds that the “agent-electoral body- should have enough autonomy to do its job well, but should also remain ultimately accountable to the principal, the citizens.”

International IDEA (2012) stresses the important role various stakeholders play in ensuring that accountability is attained and signaled that protecting and promoting the integrity of elections is ultimately the responsibility of all national electoral stakeholders. Per Strand and others (2005:16) observes and argues: “an electoral democratic system may have an elaborate constitution and strong supporting institutions to uphold its letter and spirit, but without vibrant participation from individuals and organisations like civil society and media, electoral democracy is arguably an empty ritual for procedural power games between contending elites, which will be far removed from the ideal of participatory electoral democracy though they are differences in viewpoints on how much popular participation is ideal for electoral democracy.” This view is also shared by Mahajan (1988) who when expounding the pluralist theory of democracy, that electoral democracy introduces what he terms the “plurality of the centres of decision” and that whenever the state or electoral institution makes an electoral policy, electoral stakeholders interested in it must be consulted. Mahajan argues that electoral democracy in a pluralist society is where management of public affairs is shared by a number of groups having different values, sources and methods of influence. Therefore, “public policy in an electoral democracy is the outcome of the interaction of all groups who make claims upon or express interest in that particular issue,” (Mahajan, 1988:748-749)

Though Kafue district has not recorded an election petition, the researcher’s informed view is that accountability of the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts in the eyes of electoral players and stakeholders can be contested especially in the face of numerous electoral petitions lodged after an election in Lusaka District. It is seen to be favouring ruling elites due to their alleged collusion with the electoral body. For instance, all the laws, regulations and rules are there to insulate the institution managing the elections and also the appointing authorities from being accountable to stakeholders. As can be noted from the
various provisions cited from the law, many electoral legal provisions favour and insulate ruling and electoral elites from being accountable to other stakeholders. The provision under section 43 of the electoral Act of 2016 provides immunity to erring electoral officers when they make mistakes in their tour of duty. The Act states: “an election officer shall not be liable for any loss suffered by a person as a result of an act performed or omitted in good faith in the exercise of a power or the performance of a duty under this Act.” Not only the above cited provision, the electoral code of Conduct statutory instrument No. 52 of 2011 also allows the republican president and his/her vice president, who in most cases are senior party officials in their respective political parties and interested parties as contestants in the electoral process, to use government resources during campaigns to unspecified measure.

The public order Act further exempts ministers, the president and vice-president among others from getting police permits to convene a political assembly while the opposition and civil society organisations are required to do so. This compromises the electoral playground legally and violates the international and regional instruments cited earlier in this research. With the above legal provisions, where and how does one find the guts to say the electoral process is accountable and fair especially with the new revised electoral process Act further declaring that an electoral body is accountable only to itself? Section 4 (1) of the Act states: “this Act shall be administered and enforced by the commission and the commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority in the exercise of its functions under the constitution and this Act.” In addition, section 43 of the same Act immunises all electoral staff from liabilities over their mistakes committed or omitted. Therefore, the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka district remain vulnerable to manipulation as accountability remain at the discretion of the electoral managers who legally enjoy immunity. With such insulation mechanism promoted by the legal framework, accountability in the electoral process remains farfetched.

Therefore, the research finding on the need to strengthen the electoral law to promote accountability is extremely important to take note and act on it by embarking on constitutional and electoral reforms. Talking to the general inadequacies in the law that govern the electoral process which has raised eyebrows among stakeholders, an electoral body official explains that the current legal provisions does not compel political parties to respect the directions from the commission as they are given a choice either to respect or not and that the commission also just say stop it. In this regard, people resort to calling the
commission as a toothless bulldogs. The official agrees that enhanced and strengthened electoral law such as the electoral Act and the electoral code of conduct by giving the electoral body more powers may help arrest the situation especially on the part of the political parties. The official also points out another grey area in the electoral legal framework which is to do with the appointment modalities of the electoral commissioners and suggests that the ideal approach in appointing commissioners will be where an independent select committee is given the power to identify and appoint a commissioner and then ratified by the National Assembly.

Accordingly, the pluralist theory of democracy, therefore, reinforces the findings of the research by recognising the important roles various institutions play in the promotion of accountability and transparency of the electoral process. As alluded to in the findings, the participation of ACC, civil society, media and ZPS in the electoral process help refrain electoral officials and stakeholders from abusing their powers, privileges and rights accorded to them in the electoral process. A number of respondents in this research well acknowledged this fact. Mwanakatwe (2004), too, acknowledges the multi-stakeholders approach in ensuring transparency and accountability of the electoral process. Unlike the electoral legal provisions on accountability, the electoral process Act also underscores the collaborative role of the state agencies and non-state actors in the management and administration of the electoral process with a view to promote transparency and accountability. Section 4 (5) and (6) of the electoral process Act No. 35 of 2016 states that the ACC would investigate and prosecute any corrupt practices committed in the electoral process while ZPS would “enforce the law and order at polling stations and undertake criminal proceedings in respect of an offence committed by any person.” The same Act in section 77 recognises the role of individuals or group of individuals in electoral observation or monitoring of the elections aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability of the electoral process. It states: “a juristic person may apply to the commission, for accreditation to observe or monitor an election” while section 79 recognises the role of other stakeholders in the provision of voter education.

It states that any natural or juristic person may provide voter education for an election which should be done impartially and independently with an aim of promoting conditions conducive for the holding of free and fair elections (GRZ, 2016). This argument reaffirms the exponents of the theory used in this research who contends that electoral democracy is a “political and
electoral game” played by a great variety of interest groups. The theory agrees and emphasises the need for participation by people through their organisations only for better policies, democratic loyalty and obedience and above all for the promotion of an open democratic process. To this end, the participation of a variety of groups entails the promotion of an open society and confidence in the outcome of any process as all interest groups are expected to observe the electoral activities and get consulted on the matters of common demand. As noted by the EUEOM (2006) that pluralistic electoral campaign environment as well as active participation of various interest groups such as civil society, political parties, media, among others in the electoral process increases public electoral confidence and trust. Calimblin (2010) posits that stakeholders’ participation is key because their comments help to improve a state’s processes and ensures that the rights of its citizens are not violated but promoted and protected. Objective two which focuses on assessing the extent to which the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts promotes credible electoral democracy has been met.

This is confirmed by the research findings from the information gathered from respondents, statistical tests undertaken and literature reviewed which all attest to the fact that the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka indeed does promote electoral democracy. These views are further reinforced by citizens’ confidence and trust citizens seem to deposit in the electoral body because of transparent and accountable manner the electoral process has been managed in the recent past. This view may not hold after the experiences of the 2016 General Elections but what may hold is that public confidence, trust and support fluctuates and responds to each prevailing environment presented after every election. The seeming effective role of other oversight institutions such as media, CSOs, ACC and ZPS in the electoral process in promoting transparency and accountability have consequently helps cementing the view that the two districts are on right path in their pursuit for credible electoral democracy. This confirms the view that, to a large extent, the current electoral process promotes credible electoral democracy and the involvement of other players in the process further makes this view valid.

As Mahajan (1988) concludes that in electoral democracy, all important decisions in social, economic and political issues must be taken after due consultations with the groups whose interests can be affected by such decisions and that important societal problems should be faced by all organisations. Once this route is pursued, transparency and accountability of the
electoral process will be here to stay. An electoral official in an interview explains: “we are open to stakeholders and also we are accountable to government because in the performance of our duty, we are still accountable to Parliament which is people’s assembly through our annual report. Like when we are buying goods and services, we don’t say our own procurement committee will do everything, no! We are accountable to the Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA),” (Interview with ECZ Official, January, 2016). This research has met objective one which is ascertaining the extent to which the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is transparent and accountable and responded to research question one which desires to find out to what extent the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is transparent and accountable.

5.1.2 High Support for Transparency and Accountability of the Electoral Process

This section discusses research findings on transparency and accountability of the electoral process. As reflected above, close to 50% of the registered voters do agree that the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is transparent and accountable. When examined further from a gender perspective, female respondents account for 45% supporting the assertion against their male counterparts who were at 20%. This is so because majority voters in the two districts are mainly women despite being in minority in terms of registered voters. Another dimension assessed was the urban-rural electoral divide. Fifty percent of the respondents in the urban areas agree that the current electoral process is transparent and accountable while majority rural respondents were neutral and could not state whether the process was transparent and accountable or not. The findings show that 25% of the respondents in rural areas strongly disagree that the electoral process is transparent and accountable. This strong view from rural areas can be attributed to lack of information as compared to the urban areas that are well serviced with the media and other information sharing platforms. Interestingly, the findings have also brought up a trend where respondents who are 30 and above agree that the electoral process is transparent and accountable with the highest being those above 50 years accounting 50% of the respondents who agreed to the objective of the research.

From this research, it is clear that age plays a role in one’s electoral perception. It is like, as one grows up in years, one develops confidence and trust in the electoral process and finds it transparent and accountable. Lastly, the research findings have revealed that certificate holders who account for 45% of the respondents followed by degree holders at 26% agree
that the electoral process is transparent and accountable. Interestingly, those without formal education accounted for 50% in disagreeing with the assertions that the electoral process is transparent and accountable followed by the diploma holders who account for 36% of the respondents holding a contrary view to the overall research finding. This can be attributed to fact that most of the people who are handling elections at local levels are certificate holders such as teachers, council workers, media personnel among others. From the foregoing, it is clear that overly, the research has established that the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is transparent and accountable.

5.2 Strong Support of Transparency and Accountability of the Electoral Process in Promoting Credible Electoral Democracy

The research establishes that transparency and accountability are present in Kafue and Lusaka districts and as argued in preceding chapters, play central role in promoting electoral democracy. With some contestations visibly there among managers, players, stakeholders, citizens and writers that it is not, this study has affirmed that transparency and accountability of the electoral process promote credible electoral democracy. While respondents in this research seem to stamp the view that the process is transparent and accountable thus promoting electoral democracy, the contestation is anchored on the argument that the electoral body is not seen or acting credibly in its operations and activities. The research reveals that the electoral body seem not to act in a transparent and accountable way when handling electoral affairs and operations. As noted in the above arguments, once the operations in the electoral process are transparent, accountable and open, the ultimate end is increased public confidence and trust in the electoral outcomes and resultant government. In this case, the legal framework has been identified as one of the key anchorage for transparency and accountability of the electoral process and in promoting credible electoral democracy. As argued in preceding sections in this research, the electoral legal framework is not very much supportive of transparency and accountability in the management of the electoral process in the two districts, which to a large extent, has undermined the attainment of credible electoral democracy.

It has been established in this research that a strengthened legal framework can be an effective tool to sustainable credible electoral democracy. It can be seen from the findings that about 46% of the respondents agree with the idea and necessity of a strengthened electoral law to govern the operations of the electoral body though 54% still believe the law
is adequate in its current form for the promotion of transparency and accountability of the
electoral process and in promoting credible electoral democracy. However, it must be noted
that in an electoral process, due to its sensitivity, minority view of dissent can bring an
avalanche of discontent and mistrust in the whole electoral process and environment. This is
why the 46% who are discontented in the current electoral law cannot be glossed over but be
considered. It has also been established that adequate electoral measures should be put in
place to meet the credentials for a credible electoral democracy in Kafue and Lusaka districts.
To this end, regular reviews of the electoral law with a view to strengthen it has been
suggested as the right direction to take to achieve sustainable credible electoral democracy.
The research has also reflected this argument as can be seen by about 85% of the
respondents unanimously agreeing to the necessity of the reviewed electoral laws with a view
to seal up the current electoral legal leaky pipes and loopholes that have perpetuated electoral
discomfort among stakeholders leading to mistrust in the electoral process thereby
undermining credible electoral democracy.

The inadequacies in the electoral laws are echoed by some respondents, who in the various
interviews, lamented that for electoral democracy to take root, the law must be revised to
promote accountability and transparency of the electoral process. One of the political activist
interviewed also agreed with the observations that inadequacies in the electoral law
governing the electoral process need to be addressed urgently. Accordingly, the political
activist views the electoral process as having been never transparent and accountable to
promote electoral democracy because it has so many gray areas such as the late delivery of
electoral results. A civil society official laments that the current law does not promote
efficiency in, accountability and transparency of the electoral process which consequently has
undermined the attainment of a credible electoral democracy. However, an official from the
electoral body, while admitting the inadequacies in the law, expresses optimism that the
current constitutional and electoral reforms taking place are going to be a starting point to
addressing the loopholes in the law governing the electoral process. This can be already
reflected by the inclusion of the date of the general elections in the amended constitution
coupled with the adopted electoral system, which in the past formed part of the electoral
controversies. The official bays optimism on the fact that the past elections had challenges in
terms of voter turnout and the new electoral order birthed by the amended constitution may
address these mischiefs.
The views from some key informants confirm the literature reviewed that have emphasised that when transparency and accountability are realised in the electoral process, stakeholders and the public develop confidence in the process and its outcome. This tends to dispel beliefs that the electoral body favours the government of the day in the management and delivery of electoral services. To this end, it is clear that the research has established convergence of views and opinions among respondents and literature reviewed that transparency and accountability of the electoral process promote credible electoral democracy. To crown the above arguments, Bams (2015) admits complexities associated with the running of modern democratic electoral processes due to its dependence on a wide range of electoral variables and the participation of a large group of interested people. The arguments are that building sustainable and credible electoral democracies presupposes the setting up of credible electoral institutions that have the full capacity to execute their duties in a manner that create public confidence and trust in the electoral process and deepens public trust.

This research has also raised a particular emphasis on the recruitment of electoral staff, who respondents feel are not competent enough, to ensure an accountable and transparent electoral process. The discomfort is based on the fact that the electoral body hires majority electoral staff on part-time basis mainly from other government ministries and institutions, which practice, is perceived to have a compromising effect on the credibility electoral process as these individuals lack the necessary capacities, competencies and acumen to deliver an accountable and transparent and credible process and its outcome. Respondents also perceived these hired staff to have no allegiance to the electoral process but that their allegiance lies elsewhere. The respondents are of the view that these temporarily staff’s channels of communication may be more inclined to their permanent engagements in their respective ministries and institutions as opposed to the electoral body, a view also confirmed by an electoral officials. Further contentions are that all systems in the electoral process including individuals responsible for the management of elections are expected to be independent, impartial, transparent and accountable (Jean-Pierre, 2001; Bam, 2015). To large extent the above skepticism are true about the current electoral process in the two districts.

The duo’s observations augurs well with arguments raised by some respondents who questioned the impartiality of those managing the electoral matters. The some key informants argue that most of the staff managing the elections have their common loyalty not deposited in the electoral process and its managers but in monetary incentives that are associated with
such exercises and also to their substantive employers. However, Carothers (2002) notes that properly managed election breeds transparency and accountability of the election process and consequently delivers sustainable, trusted and credible electoral outcomes. With credible electoral outcomes and increased acceptability levels, the long held view that elections are the sole lawful, constitutional and legitimate method for peaceful and legal acquisition of political power exercised with the consent and by the will of the governed expressed through periodic, genuine, open, free and fair elections whose results reflect the exercise of free choice of the people will be upheld (Annan, 2012; Carother, 2002). Therefore, sustainable credible electoral democracy entails that elections become instruments that facilitate political leadership changes in a “structured, competitive, and transparent and within an existing legal framework” (IPI, 2010: x).

International IDEA (2012:15) observes that troubled electoral processes and their fall-out have been the main challenge in ensuring electoral credibility in recent years. This is because electoral processes have been deemed as fraudulent or violent or manipulated by stakeholders. This, in some jurisdiction, has either led to or exacerbated political instability which has scared away donor support. These sentiments have been echoed by IPI (2010) in an argument that elections can fuel violence in situations where contestants fail to follow the electoral rules or fail to accept election outcomes as the legitimate expression will of the citizenry. To this end, Mwanakatwe (1994) explains that election monitoring groups emerged as a solution to perceived warped electoral processes. The aim is to ensure that elections under the multiparty politics are conducted fairly and transparently under the restrict watch of independent observers and monitors. This ensures that the party in power does not gain undue vantage over opponents and that election outcomes are respected by the electoral players. He explains that the emergence of election monitoring and observation groups is due to mistrust in government and the electoral body who are accused of colluding not to conduct open and accountable elections. This is because of alleged invested electoral political interests in the elections themselves.

Mwanakatwe (1994) recalls the happenings ahead of the 1991 landmark elections in Zambia where the MMD officials openly stated that they did not trust the government because the MMD, then, believed that the government was an interested party in the elections in which the ruling party, then UNIP, was to participate. The above sentiments from various authors have built a case on why the pluralist theory of democracy is relevant to the research. The
theory contends that electoral and political power should be shared between the state and different interest groups that operate in a society. This is in order to build an open society and this argument has been well articulated by respondents and various authors cited in this research. The main contention of the pluralist democracy is that electoral democracy, which thrives on public trust and confidence. This public confidence and trust can only be assured when the electoral processes and practices are deemed transparent and accountable in the public eye. The participation of citizens and stakeholders in the process is part of the electoral power sharing mechanism in a democratic society. One of the analyst of the theory, Mahajan (1988) stresses that all important decisions in electoral and political matters must be made after due consultations with all groups whose interests are going to be affected by such decisions and assure that important societal problems would be faced by all interest groups.

Further, the implementation of the developed policies should be monitored by stakeholders to ensure transparency and accountability and yielding of intended results. IPI (2010) notes that electoral conflict and political violence in the electoral process are signals of weaknesses in its governance processes, weaknesses in the enforcement of rules for orderly political and electoral competition, weakness in the participation of various interest groups and partiality of the judiciaries and failure to interpret and adjudicate electoral disputes expeditiously and impartially (Mahajan, 1988). Keane (2009) guides electoral scholars to concentrate their intellectual labour on inventing ways of achieving open public access of citizens to electoral institutions. “In other words, our intellectual labor should continue to invent new ways of ensuring equal and open public access of citizens and their representatives to all sorts of institutions previously untouched by the hand of democracy” (Keane 2009:xxix) Therefore, electoral democracy is a collaborative effort of various groups at national, provincial and local levels as the EU EOM (2016) confirms that despite many stakeholders at national level having a contrary view in the process, those at district and provincial levels express a high degree of trust in the electoral process.

Therefore, the general electoral view expressed both by respondents and reviewed literature confirms that transparency and accountability of the electoral process can promote electoral democracy. Concisely put by one of the civil society official interviewed: “when there is accountability and transparency in the electoral process, people have confidence in the whole electoral process and when people have confidence in the electoral process, it means that our electoral democracy will be enhanced and there will be a realization that democracy is a good form of governing the country,” (Interview with civil society official, January, 2016). Despite
the contests on the levels of transparency and accountability of the electoral process in promoting credible electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts as reflected in the research, objective two which is assessing the extent to which the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts promotes credible electoral democracy has been achieved and the section has further responded to the research question which is trying to find out whether the electoral practices in the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts do promote electoral democracy.

5.3 Civic Education noted as key component to making citizens aware and think critically

The study has established that inadequate information flow in and about the electoral process can greatly contribute to negative electoral perceptions among stakeholders. About 87% of the respondents attests that civic education was a key component of the electoral process and a further 44% believed that civic education helped in making citizens aware of the operations, stages and practices in the electoral process while 34% were neutral. For instance, some civil society, political parties and electoral body officials interviewed and literature reviewed all converge in agreeing that civic education helps promote transparent and accountable electoral process which consequently promote credible electoral democracy since electoral outcomes from such a process are highly acceptable. Further, the role of the media has been established as also being key in resolving issues of low civic education among stakeholders in the electoral process which the research has clearly identified as among other that play a key role in fostering transparency and accountability of the electoral process. Other institutions recognised are the Zambia Police Service (ZPS) and Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC).

It has been the expectation of many citizens that law enforcement agencies can be good recipes in helping citizens appreciate the law, rules, regulations and codes of conduct which consequently leads to credible management and administration of any electoral process. The recognition other players in the electoral process as confirmed by research findings, is one way of promoting collaborative approach to election management. Citizens’ expectations are that collaborative efforts and approaches in providing civic education in the electoral process works to the advantage of citizens, themselves. However, the effectiveness of the collaboration does not only ensures the contribution to the creation of an informed citizenry but also ensures transparency and an accountable of the electoral process. This collaborative approach to managing an electoral process is well acknowledged and reflected in the electoral
process Act No. 35 of 2016 section 79 which permits, apart from the electoral body, other juristic organisations and stakeholders to participate in providing voter education for the purpose of promoting “fair and free elections”. Katz (1999) emphasises the key role civic knowledge play in an electoral democracy.

Further, Calimblin (2010) reinforces the cardinality of civic education in an electoral democracy by arguing that this type of education cultivates in citizens the love and desire to effectively participate in public life. Further, explanations are that armed with such civic education, electoral stakeholders can use their rights well and discharge their civic responsibilities rightfully due to the possession of necessary knowledge and skills. International IDEA (2010) argues, in the absence of civic education, electoral democracy, democratisation and democracy building in general, will still be considered as just elections among citizens without meaningful impact in their lives. The electoral process will be perceived by stakeholders with a lot of suspicions, mistrusts and to lack public confidence. These abnormal electoral views on the electoral process consequently undermines electoral democracy and can prevent its acceleration and its promotion of sustainable development in many respects. This is so because civic education offers the potential to develop in the citizens and a better understanding of democratization and electoral democracy building in general. A deficit of people’s power to hold leaders accountable, impedes democracy building (International IDEA, 2010:56)

From the foregoing, the research has achieved the overall objective of which targeted at ascertaining the extent to which the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is transparent and accountable in promoting democracy and further confirms in its response to a research question on whether civic education has a bearing on citizens’ electoral perception on transparency and accountability of the electoral process. This is evidenced by the average responses from respondents and from reviewed literature which points to the need for citizens to be empowered with necessary electoral knowledge and information. Collaborative approaches to civic and voter education have also been recognised. IPI (2010) stresses that alert and informed citizens in any election are good not only for enhancement of electoral democracy but also for the building accountable and transparent democratic institutions. As if IPI’s argument is not sufficient, Bams (2015) re-emphasises that citizens’ demand and commitment to accountability and transparency is a precursor to the promotion of electoral democracy in any country and that additionally, makes electoral bodies to be also committed
to principles of accountability and transparency as they will be aware that citizens are following and watching their operations. This consequently reduces mistrust and lack of confidence in the electoral process among electoral stakeholders, either in the manner the votes are counted or the manner public resources are being expended by the electoral body. As one of the ECZ officials interviewed admits in the quote below that the mistrust, misinformation and suspicions in the electoral process are as result of limited civic and voter education. International IDEA (2010) argues that inadequate civic education leads to a deficit of people’s power to hold institutions and governments to account and consequently impedes electoral democracy building. Further, the institute in 2010 advises that it is not regulations, supervision, or punishment but literacy that guarantees a good election (International IDEA, 1996). The research establishes that civic education is an important element in promoting electoral democracy and that inadequate of supply of it can lead to limited understanding of the electoral process and its associated virtues of transparency and accountability. Objective three seeking to establish whether civic education has a bearing on people’s electoral perception regarding transparency and accountability in the electoral process has been met and the research question seeking to find out whether civic education has a bearing on citizens’ electoral perception on transparency and accountability in the electoral process has also been answered.

5.4 Areas of Improvement

The research has identified six (6) main areas that were suggested for improvement namely the appointment modalities of commissioners to sit on the electoral body; manner of conducting civic education which is suggested to be continuous; the recruitment of temporary poll staff especially during an election; clarity on the qualification of electoral staff and commissioners financial accountability in the electoral process; and lastly but not the least legal framework. For the purpose of this section, only two areas of improvement have been discussed in details.

5.4.1 Review of Electoral and Constitutional Legal Framework

Eight-six percent of the respondents were of the opinion that the legal framework needs improvement in order to strengthen and ensure enhanced transparency and accountability of the electoral process in the two districts. This view is representative of FODEP (2006:58)’s recommendations that notes “electoral concerns of many stakeholders to see greater
transparency in the counting process” and further recommends that “issues relating to shortcomings in the electoral law and the constitutional be made a priority by the government” to achieve greater transparency and accountability in the electoral process. The EU-EOM (2016) in its preliminary election observation statement of the August 11, 2016 Zambian General Elections and National Referendum nods the great improvement in the revised constitution.

This is so because it provides progressive provisions that promote genuine free and fair elections which the EU EOM feels forms a good basis for the conduct of genuine elections. In this regard, the EU EOM further believes that the revised law supports fundamental freedoms of assembly, movement, expression and association which are key precursors for credible electoral democracy which is in line with regional and international commitments that the country has acceded to. However, EUEOM (2016) observes with dissatisfaction that the provisions and application of the Public Order Act, which unreasonably restrict freedom of assembly, benefits the ruling party. The regular demand from citizens for the review of the legal framework is triggered by continued existence of unclear provisions, gaps, and contradictions in the constitution.

5.4.2. Modalities of Recruitment of Temporary Poll Staff

The research findings indicate that 87% of the respondents were uncomfortable with the recruitment of temporary poll staffs to manage the electoral process and called for urgent attention to the practice. Perhaps with the constitution now instructing the electoral body to decentralise to provinces and progressively to the districts (GRZ, 2016), modalities in the recruitment of poll staff may change. This may also bring to an end to the practice of employing electoral staff on temporary basis which, for years, has compromised and undermined the electoral process. As Jean-Pierre (2001:117) explains, the principle of neutrality in the election service delivery is and must be deeply ingrained. He cited the Canadian Elections Act which, according to him deeply ingrained the principle of neutrality in the electoral process by instructing that “a person who is charged with the ultimate responsibility for the delivery of those electoral services, the Chief Electoral Officer, is denied his/her basic constitutional rights to vote.”

This is to ensure that s/he is not consciously affected in the performance of her/his statutory mandate by considerations and commitments s/he might undertake in exercising her/his
democratic rights” (Jean-Pierre (2001:118). Jean-Pierre further notes that an affective electoral process required an effective electoral machinery and that the effectiveness and efficiency of the electoral machinery was dependent on the perceived abilities, knowledge, operational skills and neutrality of electoral officers. This view is also reflected in the views advanced by an electoral official interviewed who admits: “I think, if there is a code of conduct or something like that will commit our staff to ensure that in all what we do, we know that at the end of the day we remain accountable to the people” (Interview with ECZ official, January, 2016). Some of these areas identified for improvement have also been among the recommendations advanced by both international and local observers and monitors respectively over the years (EU EOM, 2006).

5.4.3 Other Areas of Improvement

Apart from the two areas for improvement cited above, the research identified some further areas for improvement which include the need for increased and consistent provision of civic education to improve information flow in the electoral process between the electoral managers and citizens and also to raise citizens’ awareness on electoral practices, operations and rules. The need for financial accountability in the electoral process and also of the electoral body so as to act as a reflection of its overall commitment to the principles of transparency and accountability in the electoral process, which it claims it is pursues in its operations. On the recommendations regarding electoral body’s financial accountability and transparency, the research suggests that the electoral body should be accountable to parliament and that all audits must be done by the Office of the Auditor General. The review of appointment modalities for the commissioners at the electoral body; and clarity on the qualifications of the secretariat staff and commissioners has also been proposed. The suggestion is that an independent select committee should be in charge of selecting electoral commissioners and then ratified by the National Assembly. This is believed to be one way of making the electoral body independent and of wining and building public and stakeholders’ electoral confidence and trust in the electoral process. Objective four which aims at identifying areas for improvement in management and administration of the electoral process in order to promote transparency and accountability and thereby achieve credible electoral democracy in Kafue and Lusaka districts has been met.
5.5 Chapter Summary

It is worth noting that this Chapter has affirmed the fulfillment of all the research objectives. The Chapter has also established that the current electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka is transparent and accountable and that civic education is a key component in the electoral process and that a transparent and accountable electoral process promote electoral democracy. The research further observes conspicuous limited flow of information in the electoral process as a result of inadequate civic education. Sentiments of various authors, key informants and respondents have also been echoed in this Chapter. The theoretical standing of the research has also been confirmed. Areas of improvement have also been identified and discussed. The next Chapter presents conclusions, recommendations and potential areas for further research.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Chapter Overview

This chapter presents summary findings, conclusions and recommendations. Research findings are based on the analysis done in Chapter four and in reference to the objectives and research questions stated in Chapter one. Chapter one also introduces the research and establishes the difficulties associated with transparency and accountability of the electoral processes in promoting credible electoral democracy in many countries. It also gives the problems which scholars have encountered in understanding the electoral process and the challenges associated in achieving a transparent and accountable electoral processes that can eventually promote sustainable and credible electoral democracy in the two districts. Chapter two deals with literature review. It captures views from various electoral experts, commentors and authors on the subject and brings out the strength of the theory used whose major arguments is the emphasis on the participation of various stakeholders in the electoral processes. This is considered as key to promoting a transparent and accountable electoral process. Further, it argues that to achieve sustainable and credible electoral democracy, transparency and accountability of the electoral process cannot be divorced or underplayed.

Chapter three discusses the methodology used in the research. Chapter four presents the research findings and establishes that all research objectives and questions have been met and answered respectively. This Chapter, therefore, presents the conclusions, recommendations and areas of potential future research basing its strength from the preceding chapters.

6.1 Research Conclusion

As established by the research, tremendous progress has been made in making and ensuring that the electoral process is transparent and accountable. The research has clearly established that the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts is transparent and accountable enough to promote credible electoral democracy. The factors that militate against achieving credible electoral democracy have also been highlighted in the research and confirmation has been made that civic education is a key component in promoting credible electoral democracy. This has not only been confirmed by the respondents in the research but by various authors, experts and reports in the reviewed literature. Various authors and experts, as reflected in the research, have made it crystal clear that, for any election to be credible, the practices in the
electoral process as well as the body responsible for managing elections are required to treat transparency and accountability with the maximum possible attention. Further, the research has revealed that participation of various interest groups in the electoral process is important in achieving transparency and accountability of the electoral process. Overly, the research establishes that electoral process is transparent and accountable in promoting credible electoral democracy. It has further described the electoral body of being accountable to its stakeholders in its operations though contrary views have also been expressed that the electoral body is not accountable to stakeholders by to itself and ruling political elites. Those who have expressed concern over the electoral body’s accountability and transparency levels, however, converge in acknowledging the progressive improvements that have been made so far in the electoral process.

Therefore, the research has established that people, on average, have confidence in the electoral process in Kafue and Lusaka districts. The research also notes the fact that though majority respondents nod that there is transparency and accountability in the electoral process, the research also points to the fact that more needs to be done to improve and maintain electoral confidence and trust levels among the public and stakeholders. This should be done by diligently addressing identified electoral deficit areas and leaky pipes identified by the research such as adequacies in the electoral law on transparency and accountability, limited civic education among others. Limited information flow has also been established as largely the cause of negative citizens’ perceptions towards transparency and accountability of the electoral process evidenced by a sizeable number of respondents who cannot give categorical answers when asked. It is worrying to have discovered that, in almost all the cases of interest in which participants are expected to take a side in either supporting or not a particular notion, a good number of them are unsure and undecided and remain mute.

This scenario is an indication of limited information on the operations and practices of the electoral body and electoral process in general. In this regard, relevant authorities and stakeholders must be engaged to sensitise the citizenly, especially those in rural areas, on the electoral practices and the operations of the electoral body. This perceived limited electoral information among citizens, stakeholders and players can lead to low levels of public confidence in the electoral process and has potential to trigger voter apathy in an election. As argued in this research, once information is abundantly available, many citizens are likely to see the intrinsic electoral transparency and accountability of the electoral process in promoting credible electoral democracy. This will consequently improve people’s electoral
confidence in the electoral process and subsequently strengthen credible electoral democracy in Kafue and Lusaka. However, a significant proportion of the respondents view the current electoral process in the two districts as having electoral loopholes which detrimentally undermine the consolidation of electoral democracy because of the undermining effect such loopholes on the electoral process.

There has been convergence of opinions and views among scholars that the electoral law governing the operations of any electoral body must be adequate and any inadequacy does not promote transparency, accountability and credible electoral democracy. In this regard, it has been suggested that there is need to urgently review the electoral law. This is believed to eventually promote credible institutions of elections and the electoral process for the credibility of the future electoral democracy in line with the African Union and SADC desire of deepening electoral democracy in Africa and the SADC region. This is seen through the holding of regular credible elections by member states. After all, electoral democracy is for the people and by the people and their satisfaction in the electoral process is key to its sustainability. The identified democratic deficits by the research are undermining transparency and accountability of the electoral process which often times can lead to troubled relations, mutual mistrust, tension and hostilities between the electoral stakeholders, players, citizens and the electoral body. Therefore, in recognising the electoral progress so far made and in attempting to find solutions to identified electoral dilemmas and challenges, it can be concluded that credible electoral democracy and democratic culture in Kafue and Lusaka districts are yet to deepen firm roots. The research has also revealed that transparency and accountability of the electoral process promote credible electoral democracy and that civic education is an important electoral component in ensuring that people are equipped with the necessary information required for meaningful participation of citizens in an electoral democracy. To this end, the objectives of this research have been affirmed by the findings and by the writings of other authors.

6.2 Recommendations

To address the issues of transparency and accountability of the electoral process in promoting credible electoral democracy in Kafue and Lusaka districts, the following recommendations have been suggested:

1. There is need to continue effecting constitutional and electoral reforms, which is a responsibility of government through the Ministry of Justice. This is to ensure an
independent, impartial, accountable, transparent and efficient electoral process and electoral body and continue to build public electoral confidence and trust in the electoral process. Other stakeholders such as civil society, political parties and media should continue their advocacy work on the need for these reforms through the provision of civic education;

2. There is need to provide effective and continuous civic education by the electoral body, media, civil society and political parties to address the low information flow between the electoral body and citizens, stakeholders and players and further create cadre of citizens who are empowered knowledge-wise to hold managers and other stakeholders to account.

3. Government should attend to the identified challenges that militate against the realisation of a credible electoral process that is transparent and accountable. This should be done through improved electoral administration and management by the electoral body. This requires urgent electoral law reforms to be facilitated by the Ministry of Justice;

4. There is need for the electoral body to decentralise its functions and operations to lower levels in line with Article 229 of the Constitution to resolve the issue of hiring poll staffs on temporarily basis from other ministries and departments which practice, has in the past undermined the credibility of the electoral process due to limited experiences, competences and capacities of the hired staff;

5. There is need to improve financial accountability in the operations of electoral body and also in the financing electoral activities in the electoral process to instill public confidence and trust among stakeholders.

6.3 Areas for Further Research

Further research may be undertaken to investigate the causes of post electoral controversies every after elections despite the respondents affirming that there is high presence of transparency and accountability in the electoral process and this view is further buttressed by the reports of electoral observers and monitors who are usually monitoring the process. The extent to which partial electoral and constitutional reforms have improved transparency and accountability of electoral process must be further interrogated. Lastly, there is need for further research to investigate the level of transparency and accountability in the electoral management and conduct of elections by an electoral body at national level.
REFERENCES


APPENDIXES

I. RESEARCH INTERVIEW GUIDE-KEY INFORMANTS

Date --------------------------

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN
PROMOTING CREDIBLE ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA: A FOCUS
ON KAFUE AND LUSAKA DISTRICTS

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

I) Extent to which the current electoral process is accountable and transparent

1. Explain what is your understanding of the term electoral process?

2. In your view, what is constitute transparency and accountability in the electoral process?

3. Do you think the current electoral process is accountable and transparent in Zambia?

4. Are you conversant with the legal provisions governing the electoral process in Zambia?

5. Are you conversant with the laws governing the country’s electoral process?

6. Do you think the existing legal provision currently adequately promotes transparency and accountability in the electoral process?

7. In your own view, what attributes would you look for in the electoral process to describe it as transparent and accountable to promote credible electoral democracy?

8. Do think transparency in the electoral process promotes credible electoral democracy?

A. Accountability

1. Describe the extent the current electoral process is accountable?

2. What factors affect accountability in the electoral process?

3. Do you think funding modalities to the electoral body has an effect in the accountability of the electoral process?

4. Are you aware where the electoral body gets its funding from?

5. Do you think the electoral body is accountable and transparent in the usage of the acquired funds?
6. Do think the funding sources to the electoral body compromises its independence?

B. Transparency in the electoral process
1. What attributes would you look for in the electoral process to describe it as transparent?
2. How describe the electoral process in terms of transparency over the years?
3. Do think transparency in the electoral process promotes credible electoral democracy?
4. In your view, does the legal framework support transparent in the electoral process?

II.) Credible electoral democracy
1. What is your understanding of credible electoral democracy?
2. In your view, what factors can affect the credibility of electoral democracy?
3. Can education qualifications of electoral personnel at the electoral commission of Zambia help achieve credible electoral democracy?
4. Does the electoral law provides clear guidance on the minimum education qualifications for managers and commissioners?
5. Do you think the Electoral Commission of Zambia has the necessary qualified human resources to manage the electoral process that promote credible electoral democracy?
6. How do you think high education qualification can promote transparency and accountability in the electoral process and later credible electoral democracy?
7. To what extent does the hiring of temporarily poll staff from other ministries and departments to manage the electoral process compromises credible electoral democracy?

III.) Civic Education
1. What is your understanding of the civic education?
2. Do you think electorate are well aware of the electoral process and what is transparency and accountability in the electoral process?
3. In your own view, does the media one of the avenues civic education can be delivered to the citizens
4. Can civic education promote transparency and accountability in the electoral process consequently credible electoral democracy?
5. Do you know any other state and private institutions involvement in the management of the electoral process helps in enhancing citizens understanding of transparency in the electoral process?

6. Would you agree that this collaborative approach to civic education help promote transparency, accountability and credible electoral democracy in Zambia?

IV.) **Areas for possible improvement**

1. What electoral areas would suggest and propose for possible improvement to enhance transparency and accountability in the electoral process to promote credible electoral democracy?

*Thank you for your participation!!!!*
II. QUESTIONNAIRE

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN PROMOTING CREDIBLE ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA: A FOCUS ON KAFUE AND LUSAKA DISTRICTS

QUESTIONNAIRE ON TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS

SECTION A: SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Date-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Please answer the following questions. You are promised strict confidentiality. Thank you for your cooperation.

1. Your Age: ------
2. Your Sex: Male [ ] Female [ ] Transgender [ ]
3. Institutional affiliation: Council [ ] NGO [ ] Private [ ] University [ ] Government Ministry [ ] Political Party [ ] Media [ ]
4. Position: Senior Management [ ] middle management [ ] Lower management [ ] Ordinary Member [ ]
5. Education Qualification: None [ ] Certificate [ ] Diploma [ ] Degree & Above [ ]
6. Occupation: Unemployed [ ] Employed [ ] Business [ ] Farmer [ ]
7. Registered Voter: Yes [ ] No [ ]
8. Residence: Urban [ ] Rural [ ]
9. District: Kafue [ ] Lusaka [ ]

SECTION B: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN ZAMBIA

The transparency and accountability in the electoral process is key in the management of elections in any country and in promoting credible electoral democracy. This makes electoral
efforts to pursue an open and participatory electoral process that promotes credible electoral
democracy possible. Transparency and accountability in the electoral process is possible also
when there is effective involvement of stakeholders at every stage of the electoral process and
establishment of systems that are supposed to ensure that electoral outcomes are always the
accurate representation of the will of the people. Please read each statement carefully and
mark one appropriate number that suits your opinion. Use the following five point scale of
the agreement and disagreement with the statement. 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree,
3=Neutral, 4=Strongly Agree, 5=Agree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transparency in the Electoral Process</th>
<th>Five Point Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 The electoral process (procedure and rules of conducting an election) is transparent and accountable</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Current electoral laws promote transparency and accountability in the electoral process</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Transparency and accountability in the electoral process promotes credible electoral process</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Section B1: Accountability (i.e. to be answerable to stakeholders when required to) in the electoral process in Zambia**

The word accountability in simple terms means to be answerable. In this case, accountability
in the electoral process is the link between the Electoral Commission of Zambia and the
various stakeholders. The current laws indicate that the “Commission will not be subject to
any authority or person in the function of its duties”. But in a democracy, all state institution
that provides services and goods to the people must be answerable to them. Below are series
of statements regarding the answerability of the Commission to stakeholders (such as voters,
political parties, monitors). Kindly read through each of the statement carefully and circle one
that suits your opinion. Use the five point scale. 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree,
3=Neutral, 4=Strongly Agree, 5=Agree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Five Point Scale</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 The electoral process in Zambia is accountable</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 The law allows ECZ to be accountable to the president only</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 There are accountability measures for the electoral process to be</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is no clarity in the law on accountability
ECZ is accountable on financial matters to the public
There is need to make the ECZ accountable in the managing elections
ECZ’s collaboration with Zambia police and Anti-Corruption Commission has promoted accountability in election management
Electorates trust ECZ on issues of accountability in election management
Practices in the electoral process in Zambia promote credible electoral democracy
Credible electoral democracy demands that the electoral process is transparent and accountable

SECTION C: PRACTICES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS PROMOTE CREDIBLE ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY
By electoral democracy, it refers to the means by which people choose their political leaders in a regular, meaningful, free and fair election. It connotes the process by which eligible citizens exercise their franchise effectively and exercise this franchise to reflect their will during an election. It is “a political system with a meaningful and extensive political competition among individuals and organised groups such as political parties and which competition should occur at regular intervals; and the existence of an inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies through regular free and fair elections coupled with existence of a level of civil and political liberties sufficient to ensure the integrity of meaningful competition and political participation” Below are series of statements regarding the answerability of the Commission to stakeholders (such as voters, political parties, monitors). Kindly read through each of the statement carefully and circle one that suits your opinion. Use the five point scale. 1=strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=neutral, 4=Strong agree, 5=Agree.
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Education qualification of poll staff and commissioners enhances transparency and accountability in promoting credible electoral democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>The electoral body has sufficient qualified manpower to manage the electoral process in a transparent and accountable manner to promote credible electoral democracy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Education qualifications of electoral personnel at the electoral commission of Zambia help achieve credible electoral democracy</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Electoral law provides clear guidance on the minimum education qualifications for managers and commissioners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>The Electoral Commission of Zambia has the necessary qualified human resources to manage the electoral process that promote credible electoral process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>High education qualification can promote transparency and accountability in the electoral process and later credible electoral democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Hiring of temporarily poll staff from other ministries and departments to manage the electoral process compromises credible electoral democracy</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION E: CIVIC EDUCATION:** Civic Education is defined as the type of education that makes citizen participation in a democratic society to be based on informed, critical reflection, and on the understanding and acceptance of the rights and responsibilities that go with that membership. In an electoral democratic society, civic education needs to be concerned with promoting understanding of the ideals of democracy and a reasoned commitment to the values and principles of democracy such as transparency and accountability. It is not about “knowledge transmission but understanding and awareness” of rights, processes and responsibility to enable them critically and creatively question the operations within a democracy. Please read through each of the statement carefully and circle one that suits your opinion. Use the five point scale. **1=strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=neutral, 4=Strong agree, 5=Agree.**
44. The electorate are well aware of the electoral process and what is transparency and accountability in the electoral process.

45. The media one of the avenues civic education can be delivered to the citizens.

46. Civic education promote transparency and accountability in the electoral process consequently credible electoral democracy.

47. Other state institutions involvement in the management of the electoral process helps in enhancing citizens understanding of transparency in the electoral process.


### SECTION F: AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT:

This section suggests some areas of improvement in current electoral practices to enhance transparency and accountability in the electoral process to promote credible electoral democracy. Please read through each of the statement carefully and circle one that suits your opinion. Use the five point scale. 1=strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=neutral, 4=Strong agree, 5=Agree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Five Point Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>49. There is need to review the appointment modalities of the electoral commission of Zambia Commissioners</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. There is need for clear legal and policy guidance on the education qualifications of staff and Commissioners</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. There is need to improve the financial accountability of the electoral body to enhance electoral democracy</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Practice of engaging temporarily poll staff to manage electoral process must be reviewed</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. There is need to review the legal framework to make Electoral body independent to enhance transparency and accountability in the electoral process</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

End…..Thank you for participating
III. CONSENT FORM

CONSENT FORM

Name of Researcher: McDonald Chipenzi
Programme: Master of Education in Civic Education
School: Education-University of Zambia
Period of Study: 2014-2016

Questionnaire No:
Respondent Identification Number for this Study: -------------------------------

Title of Project: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN PROMOTING CREDIBLE ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA: A FOCUS ON KAFUE AND LUSAKA DISTRICTS.

Please initial all boxes

1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated............................... for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reasons, without my legal rights being affected.

3. I understand that relevant sections of data collected during the study, may be looked at by individuals from the University of Zambia (UNZA), where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission for these individuals to have access to my records.

4. I agree to the conditions of my participation in the study.

5. I agree to take part in the above study.

_________________________________  ______________________  _________________
Name of Participant       Date          Signature
Appendix IV:

RESEARCH BUDGET

POST GRADUATE RESEARCH

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN PROMOTING CREDIBLE
ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA: FOCUS ON KAFUE AND LUSAKA DISTRICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Description of Activity</th>
<th>No of Units</th>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Freq/day</th>
<th>Unit(ZMW)</th>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Unit total(K)</th>
<th>Unit Total(US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Development &amp; testing of Research tools (questionnaires,</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>1 questionnaire *3days @ a rate of K 200 per day</td>
<td>7,538.45</td>
<td>769.23</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interview guides, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Recruitment of Research Assistants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>150.00</td>
<td>1 research assistants <em>5 persons</em>10days @ a rate of</td>
<td>11,307.73</td>
<td>1,153.85</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>K250 per unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Field work (Administration of research tools)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>150.00</td>
<td>1 Research Assistant <em>5 persons</em>10days @ a rate of K</td>
<td>11,307.73</td>
<td>1,153.85</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150 per unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>1 unit of fuel<em>360 litres of fuel</em>2 days @ a rate of K</td>
<td>8,250.13</td>
<td>841.85</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.6 per litre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Stationery, Report writing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
<td>1 unit of stationery*1 unit lump sum @ a rate of K 150</td>
<td>2,261.56</td>
<td>230.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>300.00</td>
<td>1 unit of talk time*10 scratch cards @ a rate of K 100</td>
<td>452.27</td>
<td>46.15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>250.00</td>
<td>1 unit of Accommodation *20 people *2 days Accommodation @ a rate of K250</td>
<td>18,846.18</td>
<td>1,923.08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>incidence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,000.00</td>
<td>2 unit of Accommodation *20 people *3 days incidental @ a rate of K150</td>
<td>3,015.36</td>
<td>307.69</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL BUDGET</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62,979.30</td>
<td>6,426.46</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX V: TIME FRAMEWORK IN GART CHART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act #</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Recruitment of Research ass.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Administration of tools (field) i.e. data collection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Data analysis and packaging, coding, theming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Reporting writing, editing, corrections, presentation Examination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Report Submission Clearance and possible graduation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>