THE GEOGRAPHY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND ITS
RELEVANCE TO ZAMBIA: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

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INTRODUCTION:

This paper, will attempt to give a clear understanding of the meaning of the concepts "development", which has positive connotations — suggesting forward and progressive motion or movement and "underdevelopment" which suggests retrogression, retarded or stunted growth or being put in reverse gear perpetually (see, Forbes, 1984, p. 68), and show their relevance to recent changes in Zambia.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

There is need to define these terms and suggest criteria with which to "measure" whether a country/continent is experiencing "development" or "underdevelopment". For instance, is development just a matter of growth of the economy (e.g. through market forces) or does it involve the evolution of new ethical values, equity, change in the structure of society and the creation of a new man/woman (especially through state planning?). (see Goulet, 1971).

It is necessary to have a good grasp of the meanings of these terms because Zambia, African and other Third World Countries are currently pre-occupied with how to develop their economies and uplift the living standards of the majority of their people. As a logical corollary, it also follows that concerted efforts to development our economies also/
imply fighting against the negative forces which retard or prevent such "development" efforts from achieving positive results - be it internal or external obstacles (see, de Souza and Foust, 1979, p. 19).

This means that there is need to combat the process of "under-development", because this is not a separate process which is unrelated to that same process which brings about "development" for some countries while poverty for the Third World (Buchanan in Forbes, 1984, p. 68).

The concepts of "development" and "underdevelopment" do not just belong to economics, political economy and other social sciences (see, Wilber, 1973), they are also very relevant in economic geography. In our attempts to comprehend and describe the content of space, we have to study economic activity especially concerning production, distribution, exchange and consumption (Alexander, 1963). This leads us to discussion of economic structures such as the state of industry, commerce and agriculture, and the associated ownership patterns and relations of production. In addition we need to examine economic processes such as internal circulation/distribution, trade and other international economic linkages including the role of Aid, investments, the debt crisis etc. and see how they relate to the accumulation or decapitalization of the social/economic surplus - i.e., the "actual economic surplus" which the society accumulates as capital for development, and the "potential economic surplus", whose realization "presupposes a more or less drastic reorganization of the production and distribution and distribution of social output, and implies for reaching changes in the structure of society". (Barasa, 1957, p. 23-24).

It is argued in this paper that the international linkages ensure the exploitation of the Third World by the Western capitalist countries and are the major cause of underdevelopment which results from the exploitation of raw materials, cheap labour, unequal exchange and
decapitalization (see, Pierre Jalee, 1968, p. 53; Rodney, 1972; Adeddeji, 1985). In this regard de Souza and Foust (1979) do point out that the radical approach which has emerged since the 1950s in economic geography recognizes contemporary reality as constituting a situation in which most people are disadvantaged with respect to the control and use of resources; and attempts to reveal/expose "the structure of relations in the world's political economy which preserves and intensifies that disadvantageous situation" (de Souza and Foust, 1979, p. 3). Thus this approach is historical, critical of the status quo and the international linkages in the context of world economy. Reference will therefore be made to value systems especially with respect to the meaning of "development" and the creation of a new society.

In applying the radical Marxist conceptual framework to geographical investigation and analysis, Milton Santos (1977) takes the position that geographers should examine both form and formation of phenomena in space which evolves historically in relation to the dominant mode of production. Whereas form refers to things already crystalized (such as colonial and post colonial economies) formation requires the study of social dynamics, which in the main are locked up in/or are based on the ownership patterns and the relations of production which exist in a given society at a particular historical juncture; and "from this point of view, spatial forms would constitute a language of the modes of production" (Santos, 1977, p. 3).

It can be argued for instance that the imbalance which exists internationally with respect to development which is characterized by over accumulation in the metropolitan centres of London, New York, Bonn, Paris etc) and decapitalization in the Third World, is also reproduced within each Third World country. Here, the urban centres are relatively more developed than the rest of the hinterland or rural areas.
This state of spatial uneven development tends to be endemic to the capitalist mode of production in which those classes which own the means of production; control the state apparatus and control the use of the socio-economic surplus, allocate scarce resources for their benefit within the context of market forces at the expense of coherent national and regional plans which would benefit the majority of the people (see Buchanan in Forbes, 1984, p. 68-69).

It is equally worth noting that these spatial inbalances have evolved historically and have been carried over into the Post colonial period. In the case of black Africa Amin (1972) showed that the process of underdevelopment had roots in the colonial incorporation of the continent through processes involving the creation of the colonial economy and concession companies in West and Central Africa. In the case of Zambia and Southern Africa, the country and region were incorporated especially as a labour reservoir for South Africa within the global capitalist mode of production. Rodney (1972) demonstrates that the incorporation of Africa by Western Europe through merchant trade and slavery dates to the pre-colonial period as far back as the fifteenth century.

In Latin America Gunder Frank and others (see, Cockcroft, et al. 1971) have persuasively contended that the incorporation of that continent (the same is true for Africa and
Asia) ushered in a situation in which the metropolitan capitalist powers of Europe were accumulating at the centres whereas peripheral countries experienced dependent-satellite-capitalist development—in which decapitalization of socio-economic surplus was taking place. This process prevented genuine growth and development which could eliminate poverty, unemployment and inequality.

Thus de Souza and Foust (1979) do indicate that radical scholars "insist that the world has been one at least since the fifteenth century; and all that time the European trading powers have been transferring the surpluses of the countries with whom they have traded back to Europe to invest in development there. Their trading activities enriched Europe, but impoverished the underdeveloped world."

(de Souza and Foust, 1979, p. 487-488).

The above approach to the understanding of the concepts of "development" and "underdevelopment" is in sharp contrast to what Rostow's study of modernisation based on his work The Stages of Economic Growth. Rostow's thesis published in 1960 has had a pervasive influence on the West concerning the study of processes of change which include "development". He presented a model which states among other things that the development history of the West will be repeated in the underdeveloped world. He sees the economic development of all societies as lying within one of five levels on a development continuum: the traditional society; the pre-conditions for take-off; the take-off stage; the drive to maturity; and the age of high mass consumption.

Rostow contended that the present traditional state of underdevelopment in the third world was a natural stage of growth which every country except Britain had or has to undergo. He argued that colonialism had a "positive demonstration effect" as it led to the penetration of ideas and diffusion of new technologies into Third World traditional societies, and that further diffusion remains the basis for economic growth (see, de Souza and Foust, 1979, pp. 483-486).
Radical scholars reject Rostow's thesis. They disagree with his claim that the present state of "backwardness" of underdeveloped countries is an original state. They further reject/refute Rostow's claim that the now developed (capitalist) countries were once underdeveloped. They argue that Rostow ignores historical facts concerning such processes as slavery and colonial exploitation. For instance Gunter Frank argues that Rostow disregards the historical fact that "the economic and political expansion of Europe since the fifteenth century has come to incorporate the now underdeveloped countries into a single stream of world history, which has given rise simultaneously to the present development of some countries and the present underdevelopment of others" (Gunter Frank, quoted in de Souza and Foust, 1979, p. 48).

Furthermore, radical scholars argue that Africa, Asia and Latin America will not follow the same "development path"- of a development continuum of stages as outlined by Rostow. For these continents to experience genuine development, it will require making "a discontinuous jump from one type of society to another", under conditions requiring "a profound social and political transformation". (Robert Heilbroner, quoted in de Souza and Foust, 1979 p. 489).

It is also worth underscoring that although some aspects of the industrial Revolution have diffused to the Third World, the transfer of technology has proved to be inadequate and inappropriate (in that it is capital intensive rather than labour intensive) and has fuelled further integration with and dependence on the former colonial masters under conditions of neo-colonialism.

The question of "modes of production" is further relevant in economic geography since we need to examine comparative models of development showing the role of the state and the private sectors with respect to the control of the "commanding heights of the economy" and the level of socialization of relations of production or worker participation and control (see, John Gurley, in Wilber, 1973, pp. 307-315).
THE INTERNAL DIMENSION

The above exposition of dependency theory does not suggest that socio-economic and political processes in the Third World and especially in the case of Zambia are only determined by external forces to the exclusion of the dynamics created by indigenous social forces (see, Bernstein and Campell, 1985, p. 9; Mudenda, 1984). To the contrary, this conceptual framework attempts to show that Zambia like most African countries is still on the path of neo-colonialism in which there is a strategic alliance between the internal class forces led by the petty and the comprador bourgeoisie, with imperialism.

The neo-colonial state facilitated internal accumulation of capital and other wealth by those who control the state apparatus including top party and government officials, bureaucrats; military and police chiefs, and managers in both public and the private sector; and at the same time acts as a facilitator for continued decapitalization of the nation through the activities of the trans-national corporations, private capital and other instruments of imperialist domination and exploitation such as the IMF and the World Banks who exact huge interest on loaned capital.

In this process, both external and internal class interests merge especially under the IMF/World Bank rapprochment and restructuring programme (see, Zambia Daily Mail, October, 16, 1989) based on the Policy Framework Paper (PFP), which has imposed harsh conditions on the working peoples in Zambia-involving decontrol of prices (which is bound to facilitate rapid capital accumulation by the business community through inflated prices), and massive devaluations of the local currency (which have contributed to type inflation and the pauperization of the people).

By imposing harsh conditionalities on the Zambian population, the neo-colonial state in alliance with imperialism is avoiding that drastic reorganization of production and distribution of social output and the radical reordering of the structure of society which Baran (1957) advocates as
the basis for genuine national capital accumulation and economic growth and development.

With respect to the role of the state in Zambia as to "whether the state is actively oriented towards promoting industry; and whether it is capable of implementing such a programme", (Singh, 1982, p. 34), the experience of Zambia goes to show that although efforts have been made at import substitution through parastatal organizations like the Industrial Development organization (INDECO), the industries including those which were inherited at independence have continued to depend on imported inputs such as chemicals, fertilizers, malt for brewing etc.

Furthermore, the industries have not only continued to be concentrated along the old line of rail, but they have not been able to significantly absorb the large labour force graduating from schools and from the rural areas. Because most industries run below capacity, there are shortages of essential commodities like sugar, cooking oil, bathing soap etc which end up on the black market. In addition, because these industries such as the copper mines are not expanding but are shrinking, many workers have been pruned under early retirement.

As a result President Kaunda has now threatened to pass legislation through the National Council and Parliament for compulsory "deportation" of the unemployed to the rural areas by June 30, 1990 if such redundant labour in urban areas does not accept to be repatriated voluntarily under the current Land Resettlement Programme (see, Zambia Daily Mail, November 23, 1989).

In other words, although it is true that rapid industrialization is essential for raising the standard of living of the people (Singh, 1982, p. 24), the experience of Zambia is that no genuine internally based industrialization is taking place; and as such the living standards of the people are declining in view of what has been discussed below with respect to the restructuring of the economy.
The Zambian state through the import substitution strategy, as is the case in most subsaharan countries has failed to alleviate the balance of payments constraint. Furthermore, it has fostered further dependence on the outside world and has failed to create "extensive employment opportunities or indigenous technological development", and "it has led to what many would regard as an undesirable redistribution of income and in general it has failed to generate a sustained process of economic growth". (Nixson, 1982, p. 49).

In the sphere of politics, although the state contends that it has not abandoned the interests of the masses of the working people, it becomes more and more difficult to justify this claim. Activities of government officials with respect to agriculture go to show that they have neglected the poor. The National newspapers frequently carry numerous articles stating that thousands of bags of Maize will go to waste because the Provincial cooperative unions have not collected the produce in view of the coming rainy season. This discourages the small peasant farmers who feel let down by state officials. In addition, inputs like seeds, fertilizers, empty grain bags etc are delivered late year after year.

Mudenda (1988) argues that in the sphere of politics, the crush of the copper-based economy (see below), has led to public and private inertia. He argues that "the political vibrancy sown during the struggle for independence and the militancy inherited from the trade union movement which characterized the politics of the late 60s and early 70s is no longer part of the dominant political culture in Zambia" (Mudenda, 1988, p. 5). He is of the view that this is due to the "marginalisation of the people from the political arena; and the centralization and bureaucratization of power and decision making in the apex organ of the party". (Mudenda, 1988, p. 5).

Whereas the poor are getting poorer and the free social services like medical care and education have been eroded leading to student protests due to inadequate food allowances, which necessitated the premature closure of the University
of Zambia on November 24, 1989; the rich are getting richer, driving more posh cars and are increasingly taking care of their interests. For instance the recent expenditure of scarce foreign exchange amounting to 28 million U.S. dollars for the importation of 1,595 luxury cars from Japan for top Party and Government Officials (see, Zambia Daily Mail, November 23, 1989), at the expense of public passenger transport, is a clear testimony that the petty bourgeoisie who control the state apparatus in Zambia, are accumulating more at the expense of the masses of the working people both in the rural and urban areas.

In other words, although it is largely true that external linkages discussed under dependency theory, with such institutions as the IMF and the World Bank are responsible for the suffering being experienced in Zambia as shown below, the internal class forces which continue to benefit from the status quo are largely responsible for the perpetration of institutions and capitalist relations of production which are exploitative, wasteful and oppressive.

Thus those who control the state apparatus are not completely powerless and are unable to resist the carrot and stick tactics of external agencies, but they are willing accomplices to the process of internal class marginalization, and oppression by both foreign and domestic capital-involving the suppression of strikes, demonstrations by students and other working class activity like go slow strikes, to repress the situation (see, Zambia Daily Mail, September, 11, 1989).

In this regard the Zambian state can be seen as "a register of the balance of class forces.....", and plays an active role in "the process of capital accumulation, class formation and class struggles...." (Leys, 1982, p. 228). Also, the state can be seen as a mechanism of domination by international capital in alliance with the internal comprador bourgeoisie. (Bernstein and Campell, 1988, p. 9).

As far as the process of economic democratization is concerned, not much has changed since 1964 when independence was attained.
With the exception of Choma Miling in Mazabuka District of the Southern Province, where the Party and its Government is carrying out an experiment in self-management—in which workers play a more significant role in decision making, twenty-five years of political independence have witnessed the entrenchment of capitalist relations of production vis a vis the workers.

The existence of Party committees at places of work has created a political illusion that workers have a say in decisions. In fact, they increase the hegemony of the Party, and it is still the management that makes the critical decisions on planning, production, wages etc. Such a state of affairs gives enormous power to the privileged managerial class to award themselves attractive salaries and numerous non-taxable allowances and other perks which facilitate rapid individual accumulation for members of their class.

It will be interesting to see the effect of this year's announcement by the Minister of Finance in this 1990 Budget speech that allowances in the Parastatal sector will now be taxable (see, Zambia Daily Mail November 16,). Otherwise it would be safe to contend that although the collapse of the copper-based economy in Zambia (as shown below) has pauperised large segments of the working classes, the comprador bourgeoisie continue to amass wealth and capital.

The proliferation of commercial banks in the 1980s with both foreign and domestic capital suggests that Zambia has "excess" capital that demands no less than ten different banks within Lusaka. It is most likely that much of this money is held by individuals who have accumulated it in one way or another and especially through trade including the much publicised unorthodox Mandrax trade in which even some
top Party and government officials were implicated and which necessitated the appointment of a government commission of inquiry around 1986-87.

Thus Mundenda (1988) has commented that Zambians have learned some bad habits including "adventures in black marketeering and the virtues of the bazaar economy; above all the realization that graft may be the quickest and surest way of securing one's future...." (Mundenda, 1988, p. 5).

Beckman's argument of Nigeria is partly applicable to Zambia, in that "the operations of the state and of international capital are closely geared to the rise of a.....(Zambian) domestic bourgeoisie, state and private". (Beckman, 1985. p. 92). In addition, the present investment strategy of the neo-colonial state in Zambia would seem to be that of creating conditions of capitalist accumulation in general through the IMF and World Bank Restructuring Programmes, as a way of resuscitating the collapsed economy as is the case in other African countries (see, Beckman, 1985, p. 101). In Zambia this step means moving further from state capitalist to the unleashing of market forces as exemplified by complete decontrol of prices, the gradual reintroduction of fees in hospitals and institutions of learning such as the Universities etc.
SOME ZAMBIAN EXPERIENCES

Soon after the attainment of political independence in 1964 it was generally agreed and observed that "copper makes Zambia one of the richest states in tropical Africa" (Siddle, 1971, p. 330). The country produced more than 600,000 tonnes per annum and stood third in world ranking. The copper industry provided "60 per cent of the government's total revenue, 95 per cent of the domestic exports and 90 per cent of the net domestic product" (Siddle, 1971, p. 330).

Because of the crisis in the world economy which began to be felt in the 1970s especially due to the oil crisis and the instability in commodity prices produced by Third World countries, Zambia economic position has worsened since the 1970s. Whereas by 1970/72, the average price of copper on the London Metal Exchange was 148 U.S. cents per pound, the price fell to 87 U.S. cents per pound by 1979/81 and stood at 60 U.S. cents per pound by 1984 (Colclough, 1988, p. 52, Table 2).

Thus it is estimated that between 1974 and 1984, the price of copper fell in real terms by 60 per cent (Edwards and Muyoyeta, 1986, p. 1). During this period, the real domestic income has been drastically reduced and the country began to experience serious balance of payments problems by 1975.

In order to finance the deficit on both the current and capital accounts, the government had to borrow large sums from the international money markets. Between 1975-77, medium and long term loans increased from an annual average of 235 million U.S. dollars to 700 million U.S. dollars in 1979 and 1980. Accordingly, debt service payments also increased sharply. By 1974, debt service payments represented less than 8 per cent of export earning. This rose to 20 per cent by 1978-81; and by 1983, the debt service obligations due were estimated at 550 million U.S. dollars or 52 per cent of export earnings, excluding arrears of almost 1 billion U.S. dollars (Colclough, 1988, p. 57). By 1985 and 1986
it was estimated by the government that debt service payments which stood at 43 per cent in 1984 had risen to 74 per cent (G.R.Z.; 1989. NERP-FNDP. p. 5. para. 31) with an external debt which rose from 3.2 billion U.S. dollars in 1980 to about 5.6 billion U.S. dollars at the beginning of 1987 (G.R.Z., 1989. NERP-FNDP. p. 1)

Because of this serious economic situation which is a manifestation of the continuing process of underdevelopment which is the issue in this paper, Zambia began negotiations with major debtors - the IMF and the World Bank - on debt rescheduling; on new finance and on new conditions for such lending. The IMF began in 1983 a programme of economic restructuring which among other things included the following measures or conditionalities:-

(a) Foreign Exchange Auctioning: -
This involved the massive devaluation of the Kwacha which led to hyper-inflation. The Kwacha was devalued by a massive 900 per cent by the end of 1987). Inflation increased from 20 per cent in 1984 to 60 per cent in 1986, and the rate is still estimated at this high figure by 1989. This has led to loss of purchasing power especially among the middle class and low-income groups.

(b) Decontrol Of Prices:-
This contributed to the high rate of inflation, loss of purchasing power and a sharp fall in demand. Many small enterprises closed down and thousands of employees were laid off. Although some price controls were reintroduced total decontrol (with the exception of only mealie meal) was re-imposed through a presidential address on June 30th, 1989.

(c) Upward adjustment of Interest Rates:
This affected agriculture adversely in that farmers found basis borrowing prohibitive. After the June 30th decontrol, interest on loans to peasant and small scale farmers for agro-purposes by commercial banks has been allowed to go up to 33 per cent (Kayoya, 1989 p. 4).
(d) **Wage Freezes:**
Because of high inflation due to price decontrol and high interest rates, wage freezes led to social unrest owing to the fall in real wages and the standard of living of people. Further social unrest flared on the Copperbelt after the June 30th 1985 presidential speech, in which public servants were awarded 30-50 per cent wage rises, and in which private companies would award similar increases depending on the ability to pay.

(e) **Restriction On Government Expenditure:**
Reduced government expenditure and especially an attempt to remove subsidies on breakfast mealie meal led to widespread rioting and looting along the line of rail in December 1986, in which fifteen people were killed by the security forces (GRZ, 1987, NERP, 1987-1988 p. 3).

It has been observed that Zambia, more than any other country in the Third World has witnessed such a drastic decline in real-income. Real GDP per caput by 1985 was 44 per cent lower than it was in 1976. Government recurrent expenditure fell from K401 million in 1975 to K290 million in 1982 in real terms. This decline for capital expenditure between 1975 and 1982 was 85 per cent (Edwards and Muyoyeta, 1986, p. 1). The government acknowledged that capital expenditure dropped from a high level of K558.5 million in 1980 to K140.1 million in 1981, a massive decline of 74.9 per cent in one financial year, and remained depressed up to 1986 (GRZ., 1988 NERP FNPD, p. 3).

Hence the collapse of the copper based economy led to the closure of seven mines in one week of February of 1986 with the loss of 3,000 jobs. Nationally, unemployment is estimated at just over 2 million - affecting mostly young school leavers (Edward and Muyoyeta, 1986, p. 1 and p. 8).

During the Third National Development Plan period, 1980-84 the GDP registered a negative decline of 2.8 per cent; 2.0 per cent and 0.4 per cent in 1982 and 1984 respectively GRZ. 1989. NERP-FNPD, p.2).
Thus the Oxfam report states that "these (and other) figures suffice to show that Zambia is under-developing rapidly. The country has entered a period of devastating economic decline". (Edwards and Muyoyeta, 1986, p. 1), characterized by the erosion of social services such as free education and medical care - thus leading to the partial introduction of school fees in institutions of higher learning, contrary to independence promises, and the situation prevailing in the past 25 years of political independence.

Food Production, Food Security And Hunger:-
From the point of view of Food Security, Food production and hunger, it can be argued that agricultural policy in Zambia is in general "bad" agricultural policy as it does not cater for the needs of the 80 per cent or so of Zambians in rural areas; and "exclusive reliance on Maize has increased people's vulnerability to food shortages by removing the security provided by mixed and drought resistant cropping" /Edwards and Muyoyeta, 1986, p. 5 and p. 6).

Thus malnutrition in the country has increased, Chikulo (1986) indicates that by 1980, food scarcity in rural areas was quite acute and at least 30 per cent of children suffered from severe malnutrition (Chikulo, 1986, p. 6). By 1980 nearly 7 per cent of total admissions of children in hospitals were due to malnutrition, and "contributed to 18 per cent of total deaths in children in hospitals" (G.R.Z./Country Profile, Zambia. 1984, p. 75).

The situation could be said to have worsened after the impact of the ongoing restructuring programme which began in 1983. The Minister of State for Health, himself a medical doctor announced recently when he launched "Nutrition week" that in 1986, of all the children who died at the University Teaching Hospital (U. T.H.), 40 per cent were victims of malnutrition. He reported further that 342 per cent of cases of malnutrition recorded at U.T.H. in recent years, are from George Compound and the other 36 per cent are children from nearby Kanyama township - two of the upgraded squatter townships in which a
high proportion of the lower income groups reside (see Phiri, 1989, p. 6).

It should be noted that hunger in both urban and rural areas is not just a result of scarcity of food per se but is also greatly influenced by the price at which the food is bought. The shortage of essential commodities like sugar, cooking oil, wheat products (e.g. bread and local burns etc) resulting in black marketeering, inflates the price of food. The gradual introduction of economic prices as part of the IMF backed restructuring (despite the bumper harvest of maize in 1987/88 season when 15 million 90kg bags were marketed, and the introduction of meal coupons for the lower income groups), is bound to create a situation in which an increasing proportion of the Zambian population will fail to purchase food and other essentials - hence, undermining food security at the level of the household and contribution to undernourishment in both children and adults. In this regard, Funnell (1988) has aptly observed that "it is the real price of purchased food that can make the difference between hunger or satisfaction" (Funnell, 1988, p. 57).

THE RELEVANCE OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: A CONCLUSION

The decline of the copper based Zambian economy as shown above can best be understood within the framework of the concept of continuing "underdevelopment" of the country. The structures of dependence on the extraction of one mineral - copper within the worldwide capitalist system - in which the metropolitan powers determine the prices, have largely persisted since independence. The deepening debt burden shows that decapitalization of the Zambian economy still continues, especially in view of the increasing demands for debt servicing which stood at the 74 per cent of all export earnings by 1985 and 1986. Continued entanglement with the imperialist economic structures especially the
IMF/World Bank restructuring programmes, will continue to reinforce external dependence of the neo-colonial economy and will frustrate the true liberation of the productive forces of the Zambian economy.

Furthermore, this external dependency is bound to influence food policy in that the inherited structure of agriculture, in which there is dependency on the export of cash crops and the production of only major staple cereal at the expense of food crops and diversification, will persist to the disadvantage of the majority of both producers and consumers in rural and urban areas. These economic processes and structures which ensure such dependence, are historically determined and perpetuate the processes of internal and external exploitation and underdevelopment.

The liberalization of the economy characterized by price decontrols, suggests that although the parastatal sector is an important component of the Zambian mixed economy, the market forces play a significant role under conditions in which state capitalism and private with little control the commanding heights of the economy with little worker participation in social relations of production and ownership.

Thus, on the whole it can be argued that "the radical change in the distribution of income (in Zambia) imposed by the auction (and other IMF conditionalities) pauperized significant sections of the community and imposed strains on the (Zambian) political system which proved impossible to bear". (Colclough, 1988, p. 58). This state of affairs continues to the present day and is part of the continuing process of underdevelopment of the Zambia economy and its peoples.

Mudenda (1988) has pointed out that observers of the Zambian scene have remarked that "within a period of twenty four years Zambia has worked itself. From the position of relative wealth to that of dire poverty!" (Mudenda, 1988, p. 4), and the collapse of the externally dependent copper based
economy (as shown above) has led to "starvation, food riots, the breakdown of social order, and a creeping political instability". (Mudenda, 1988, p. 5).

Thus the neo-colonial regime is forced to create an illusion that the restructuring programme is not imposed by Imperialism but is a domestic package of reforms - being mindful of potential working class resistance such as that mentioned above of December 1986 and July 1989. Whereas the working class continues to resist through strikes for higher wages to redress the erosion of their living standards, the intellectuals especially those in institutions of higher learning such as the University of Zambia, are literary running away to the Universities down South in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and even Bantustans in South Africa, where salaries and other conditions of service are more attractive. So far between 70 to 80 senior Lecturers at Ph.D. level have fled to the South in the past two years (see, Mwale, 1989, p. 4).
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