Chapter One

Introduction and Historical Background

On 11 November 1965, Prime Minister of Rhodesia Ian Douglas Smith announced that Rhodesia was independent and sovereign, not subject to the laws of any other country. It was the first rebellion against the Crown since the American Revolution of 1776. The declaration, couched in the same style as its American precursor, ended with ‘God Save the Queen.’ Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) constituted a major challenge to Zambia’s economic and socio-political stability. This was primarily because at the time UDI was proclaimed, Zambia’s economy was inextricably intertwined with Rhodesia’s economy, a legacy of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. More crucially, at the time of UDI, the Zambian government had dedicated itself to supporting, upholding and implementing the Pan-African ideology of total liberation of Africa from white minority rule. Rhodesia’s UDI had far-reaching consequences for the country’s economic and socio-political developments. This introductory chapter provides the background to the study. It traces the political developments which culminated in a UDI. It also sets out the statement of the problem and research methodology, and reports on the literature review.

UDI was proclaimed following the breakdown of an intense series of negotiations between the governments of Southern Rhodesia and Britain lasting three

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years prior to 1965. But the processes which triggered it began long before and can scarcely be understood without examining Southern Rhodesia’s early history and particularly her unusual constitutional position vis-à-vis Britain.³

The first colonial government in the area known as Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was provided by John Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company under a royal charter granted to it in 1889. The British High Commissioner for South Africa was charged with overseeing the rule of the company which was responsible for the legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the territory.⁴ In 1898, a Legislative Council was formed in which the settlers and the company shared the legislative function. By 1913, the representatives of the settlers gained a majority in the Council and agitation for an end to company rule accelerated. Three options were possible: Rhodesia could become a British crown colony, be annexed by South Africa as its fifth province, or acquire the status of a self-governing colony of Britain. In a referendum held in 1922, out of a European population of 35,000 (the black population was nearly 900,000 of which a mere sixty had the vote), 8,774 opted for ‘responsible government’ and 5,989 chose South Africa.⁵ Thus, Southern Rhodesia acquired the status of a self-governing colony. Unlike the other British colonies at the time, Southern Rhodesia was neither ruled by the Colonial Office nor administered by British government officials. Rather, responsibility was vested in the Dominion’s office.⁶

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In 1923, the British government formulated a constitution for Southern Rhodesia which provided for an elected legislative assembly. It also provided for a franchise to all who had property qualification, whether African or European. The executive authority was vested in the Governor, the Queen’s representative. Furthermore, the constitution enforced a number of restraints on the legislature, safeguards designed to prevent discriminatory legislation against Africans and to stop passing laws incompatible with the more general interest of the imperial connexion. The constitutional position was that Southern Rhodesia was ultimately subject to the legislation of the British Parliament. Legally, the British government had power to legislate for Southern Rhodesia by Act or Order in Council. However, in the course of time, a convention was gradually evolved and accepted that Britain would not legislate for Southern Rhodesia on matters within the competence of the legislative assembly except with the agreement of the Southern Rhodesian government. Despite relinquishing some of its theoretical powers to interfere in Southern Rhodesian affairs in the years after 1923, the British government still retained powers which were perceived to be negative in character by the Southern Rhodesian settlers. These included among others; to veto discriminatory legislation, to veto amendments to the constitution and changes in the apportionment of land between the races.

Clearly, some clauses in the 1923 constitution, particularly those dealing with the retention of reserve powers by the British government, limited the settlers’ freedom of action from passing certain legislation perceived to be in the best interest of their country. This was to become a source of conflict between the governments of Britain

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7 Young, Rhodesia and Independence, p.29.
8 Strack, Sanctions, p.2.
and Southern Rhodesia. The settlers sought to secure freedom to direct the future course of their country without unnecessary legal interference from the British government. From 1923 onwards, Southern Rhodesian settlers consolidated their political dominance in the colony. As years progressed, they became more confident in self-government and this reinforced their demand for the British government to grant the colony greater autonomy, if not full independence. This demand for independence constituted the goal of successive Prime Ministers of Southern Rhodesia until Smith finally secured it by illegitimate means on 11 November 1965.

Against opposition from Africans, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, comprising the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, the British crown colony of Northern Rhodesia, and the British protectorate of Nyasaland was created by the British conservative government in April 1953. The supporters of the federal scheme in both central Africa and Britain advanced the theory that it would make the economies of these territories more viable. Southern Rhodesia turned out to be the nerve centre of the federation. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became markets for Southern Rhodesian manufactured products and sources of cheap labour for her agriculture and mining.

Undoubtedly, Southern Rhodesia’s membership of the federation accrued immense economic benefit to the colony, yet the settlers were determined to secure as much independence as the framework of the federation would permit. Sir Godfrey Martin Huggins, the first Federal Prime Minister spoke of “racial partnership” which

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10 The federal scheme was subject to intense negotiations between the Southern Rhodesian settlers and the British government. For details of these negotiations, see B. V. Mtshali, *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict* (London: Leslie Frewin Publishers, 1967), chapter six.

meant, in settlers’ view, “a device for throwing off the detested Colonial Office yoke in order to enable the settlers to rule central Africa for the foreseeable future.”

Huggins’ policy of partnership antagonized certain sections of the settler community who, as Mtshali noted, saw partnership as “a step in a dangerous direction.” Foreseeing African majority rule over their children, they formed the Dominion Party (the forerunner to the Rhodesian Front, a party which eventually proclaimed UDI), to strive for the implementation in central Africa of Malan’s apartheid policy.

The federation was doomed from the outset due to the political dominance of the Europeans of Southern Rhodesia in the federal government. This dominance could not be reconciled with the growing African nationalism. Many politically conscious blacks distrusted the ‘partnership’ between the territories. They feared that it was all a cover up for a take-over by Southern Rhodesian mini-imperialism. With independence sweeping down from the north, Africans wanted the same status, not permanent junior partnership in the white-dominated federation. Mtshali concluded that the federation failed because:

It stood on a shaky foundation of force. Imposed on the majority of the people of central Africa, it lacked that most important prerequisite for stable and lasting political institutions: consent of the governed. Whatever its economic merits, the federation failed because partnership failed.

In the meantime, before the federation broke up, the Southern Rhodesian settlers continued to press the British government for independence. Particularly, when Sir Edgar Whitehead succeeded Garfield Todd as leader of the United Federal Party (UFP)

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12 Mtshali, *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict*, p.100.
13 Mtshali, *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict*, p.100.
and Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia in 1958, he began negotiations with the British government for a revision of the Southern Rhodesian constitution of 1923. His objective was to remove the extensive powers of the British government over certain clauses of the legislation. Yet, as Young contended, Edgar’s broader aim was in fact to secure independence for Southern Rhodesia and talks between the two governments led to a series of Constitutional Conferences beginning in December 1960.16 During the conference in 1960 in London, Whitehead emphasized his determination to gain greater independence for his country, an ambition shared by all Southern Rhodesian Europeans regardless of their political party. Whitehead’s basis for demanding Southern Rhodesia’s independence was justified by “her long and good record of responsible government” and that “she could not stand still while less developed and sophisticated African states were progressing to independence.”17 Evidently, the rising tide of African nationalism gave way to independence under majority rule in north and west Africa, and imminently in southern Africa. Such developments unsettled white settlers in Southern Rhodesia. They began to demand for independence from Britain with renewed dynamism and fortitude.

While the settlers’ claim for independence gathered pace, the British government objected to their demand on grounds that the Southern Rhodesian constitution could not offer an acceptable basis for working towards majority rule. Consequently, when the British government suggested a full Constitutional Conference in Salisbury (now Harare) early in 1961, they insisted that a wide range of opinion

16 Young, *Rhodesia and Independence*, p.52.
17 Barber, *Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion*, p.68.
should be represented at it.\footnote{Barber, \textit{Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion}, p.69.} Held in Salisbury in February 1961 and chaired by Whitehead, the Constitutional Conference was highly representative as it drew together all the political parties in Southern Rhodesia. The provisions of the constitution were detailed.\footnote{For a detailed discussion of the 1961 constitution, see Young, \textit{Rhodesia and Independence}, pp.52-71., Mtshali, \textit{Rhodesia: Background to Conflict}, pp.111-117.} However in summary, it dealt with three major aspects; Britain’s reserved powers, the question of franchise and representation. Under the new constitution, Britain relinquished reserve powers which mainly affected laws held to be discriminatory against Africans. However, Britain still retained some reserve powers dealing with certain aspects. For instance, Southern Rhodesia could not abolish the formal powers of the Governor nor could she have a free hand, in her international relations if these clashed with Britain’s interests.\footnote{Mtshali, \textit{Rhodesia: Background to Conflict}, p.112.}

On the question of the franchise, the constitutional provision was such that voters were divided into two categories, the A roll and the B roll. Young explained that the right to vote was extended to persons of all races registered on one of the two rolls. In addition, franchise was given to all citizens aged twenty one years or over, men and women, resident in the country for more than two years and able to fulfill certain property, income or educational qualifications. He added that, of the legislative assembly of sixty-five members, fifty were to be elected to represent constituencies by the more highly qualified voters of the A roll while fifteen representing electoral districts, were to be elected by the voters with lower qualifications on the B roll.\footnote{Young, \textit{Rhodesia and Independence}, p.58.} He concluded that the practical effect was to give a B roll vote to a large number of people, mainly Africans, who had not qualified to enroll as voters under the former single roll
system. Nothing prevented Africans with the necessary qualifications of income, property or education from enrolling as A roll voters. While the new constitution had liberal provisions to Africans as Young suggests, his arguments overlook the huge disparities that existed between Africans and Europeans in terms of property, income and educational qualifications. Given the economic power of Europeans and the fact that they possessed comparatively higher educational qualifications than Africans, it was inevitable that they had to dominate the A roll.

Apparently, the new constitution did not change the political status of Southern Rhodesia. The territory still remained a self-governing colony. Although the new constitution of 1961 succeeded the 1923 constitution, Britain still retained reserve powers. The only reforms in the new constitution dealt with some changes which brought about some improvements in terms of African franchise, though such amendments did not go far enough to guarantee majority rule.

Mtshali noted that the 1961 constitution was perceived from different perspectives by the British government, the Southern Rhodesian settlers and the African nationalists alike. In the British government’s view, the constitution was designed to phase the process over many years before independence could be granted to Southern Rhodesia. On the other hand, while the settlers within the UFP conceived it as an independence constitution, the African nationalists felt the constitution did not envisage quick African majority rule. Inevitably, on 17 February 1961, Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole announced their total rejection of the constitution. The constitutional provisions of the 1961 did not only antagonize African nationalists.

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22 Young, *Rhodesia and Independence*, p.58.
Ardent racialists within the UFP such as Ian Douglas Smith were also infuriated by the liberal provisions contained in the constitution. In protest against such provisions, Smith resigned from the UFP as Chief Whip and formed the Rhodesian Front (RF) party in March 1962 out of members of the old Dominion Party and influential farmers and businessmen who had disagreed with the UFP. The RF was subsequently to lead Southern Rhodesia to a UDI.

By the time December elections of 1962 were approaching, Whitehead’s popularity had began waning for adopting, as a campaign strategy, a soft stance towards certain policies that affected Africans. For instance, he announced that he would take measures to bring about a gradual abolition of the Land Apportionment Act, a major cause of racial strife in Southern Rhodesia. He also promised to outlaw racial discrimination in public places. By relaxing such repressive measures, Whitehead hoped it would be possible for the British government to grant independence to the colony and preserve white leadership. However, the RF viewed such proposed changes as unacceptable and they accused the UFP of “opening the way to an African take-over.” They decided to campaign against UFP’s proposals which “were going too far and too fast to appease world opinion and the Africans.”

Inevitably, by the time elections were held, the Rhodesian Front led by Winston Field emerged victorious. African nationalists under the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) boycotted the polls.

The assumption of office by the RF set the Southern Rhodesian government on a collision course with the British government. The RF was determined to preserve white

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24 Mtshali, *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict*, p.120.
25 Mtshali, *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict*, p.121.
control of the predominantly black nation forever. Immediately he assumed office as Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Winston Field intensified his government’s demand for independence. He justified his demand on the basis that the break up of the federation would eventually pave way for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to become independent. Thus, he argued, Southern Rhodesia had to claim for the same right to independence. Field’s demand for independence was met by the British government’s request that he provides impeccable proof that all races in the country supported his demand. Field was clearly supported by a majority of Europeans, the problem as Kapungu noted, was to demonstrate that Africans, the Asians and the coloureds (the racially mixed) supported his demands. Kapungu contended further that Field’s attempt to consult African chiefs on the question of independence was rejected by the British government on grounds that it did not consider the chiefs to be representatives of the Africans. Britain recognized the two African parties- the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and ZAPU as the true representatives of the African people. The position taken by the British government led to a deadlock on the question of independence and the RF began thinking of declaring independence unilaterally, that is without Britain’s consent.

While it was a collective view of the RF party that the government should obtain independence for Southern Rhodesia at all cost, Winston Field felt such a course of action would be suicidal and hoped to continue negotiations with the British government. Eventually, the RF Members of Parliament (MPs) replaced Field with Ian

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Douglas Smith in 1964 as Prime Minister because they were disgruntled with the manner he was handling the independence issue. Stubborn, ruthless, fearless, combative and politically cunning, Smith’s assumption of office as Prime Minister practically erased any chances for negotiated settlement and greatly increased the likelihood of UDI.\textsuperscript{29}

At the helm of RF, Smith was given the task to lead Southern Rhodesia to independence at any price and by any means. To achieve this, Smith had two objectives; firstly, he hoped to build a popular base in the RF and eliminate European opposition in parliament by using the instrument of elections and referendum. The second objective was to wipe out African opposition by use of repressive measures.\textsuperscript{30} Inevitably, during the fiercely contested by-elections of May 1963 and October 1964, the RF emerged victorious over the UFP. Equally, in a referendum held on 5 November 1964, Smith obtained an overwhelming ‘yes’ from the white voters. On 7 May 1965, Smith held an election in which the RF secured all 50 white seats, effectively retaining power with an increased comfortable majority in parliament.\textsuperscript{31} The electoral victory in the elections as well as the positive results in the referendum increased the confidence and boosted the morale of the RF government. The RF government sought to demonstrate to the British government and the world at large that the people of Southern Rhodesia were behind it in its demand for independence.

Meanwhile, besides scoring an electoral victory, Smith mounted a vigorous campaign of repressive measures designed to eliminate domestic opposition from the

\textsuperscript{29} DeRoche, \textit{Black, White, Chrome}, p.100.
\textsuperscript{31} Kapungu, \textit{Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom}, p.52. See also Moorcraft, \textit{A Short Thousand Years}, p.12.
Africans. His government managed to restrict without trial, nationalist leaders such as Nkomo, Sithole and Robert Mugabe, and many of their followers by enacting draconian laws. For instance by April 1963, the House had passed the Preservation of Constitutional Government Act, whose section II imposed a penalty of up to twenty years on conviction for any subversive activities carried on outside the country against Southern Rhodesia. By the end of 1964, an estimated 1,980 Africans were in detention or restrictions.32

By 8 May 1965, Smith had effectively dealt with domestic opposition and the road to independence was clear. The only obstacle was Britain. From July 1965 onwards, a series of talks between Southern Rhodesia and Britain were held in search of a compromise on the question of independence. During the talks held in London and Salisbury in October 1965, the British government insisted it would not grant independence to Southern Rhodesia until a more liberal political franchise for Africans was established. The British government contended that independence could only be granted to Southern Rhodesia if the RF government satisfied the following five principles:

Firstly, the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 constitution would have to be maintained and guaranteed; secondly, there would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendments of the constitution; thirdly, there would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; fourthly, there would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination and fifthly, the British government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.33

32 Mtshali, Rhodesia: The Background to Conflict, p.128. See also DeRoche, Black, White, Chrome, p.100.
33 Barber, Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion, p.301. See also Moorcraft, A Short Thousand Years, p.14 and Mtshali, Rhodesia: Background to Conflict, pp.131-132.
The terms set out in the above principles were unacceptable to Smith. Although Smith aspired to a compromise, he adopted an increasingly inflexible attitude towards British proposals. Predictably, the talks in London and subsequently in Salisbury reached a deadlock. Smith and his colleagues had already made plans for action in case talks failed. Consequently in November 1965, import and export regulations were tightened. On 5 November 1965, a state of emergency was declared for the whole country. Then on 11 November 1965, with police and armed forces on alert, Smith and his colleagues announced that they were unilaterally declaring the independence of Rhodesia from Britain. The illegal deed was done.\textsuperscript{34}

**Statement of the Problem**

Rhodesia’s UDI represented an unprecedented confrontation between whites and blacks posing a major challenge for peaceful transition from colonial rule to majority rule in southern Africa. Yet scholars have spent little time analysing the impact of this political development in Zambia. This study examined how UDI in Rhodesia affected the economic and socio-political developments in Zambia.

**Objectives of the Study**

The objectives of the study were three fold;

i. The study examined the political developments that culminated in a UDI in Southern Rhodesia.

ii. The study examined the impact of UDI in Rhodesia on Zambia’s economy.

iii. The study investigated the effects of Rhodesia’s UDI on the socio-political processes in Zambia.

\textsuperscript{34} Mtshali, *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict*, p.132.
Significance of the Study

The study will contribute to the limited literature on the impact of UDI on Zambia. It is also hoped that the study will stimulate further research interest on the subject.

Literature Review

There is an abundance of literature on UDI. This is largely because following Smith’s illegal seizure of independence from the British government, the event immediately became one of the world’s political flash points. Subsequently, the Rhodesian act of rebellion became a theme of intense scholarly attention. While much has been written on UDI, scholars have been preoccupied with the analysis of the causes of this political development. They have spent little time investigating the effects of UDI on Zambia.

There seems to be consensus among scholars that while the immediate cause of UDI was the failure in negotiations between Southern Rhodesian and British governments a few years prior to 1965, the origins of UDI should be sought in the early history of Southern Rhodesia and particularly her political status and constitutional position in relation to Britain. The Rhodesian settlers longed to assert full authority and this could only be achieved by removing Britain’s reserve powers over the self-governing colony. Thus, most studies done specifically on UDI have focused on tracing these political and constitutional developments that culminated in a UDI. While this is critical in providing information on the historical background, this study focused on the impact of this political development on economic and socio-political processes in
Zambia. The purpose was to identify, explain and analyse how UDI affected Zambia’s economy and became integrated into the country’s domestic socio-political processes.

The works of Barber, Mtshali, Skeen, Clements and Perham35 are critical to our study. These works provide comprehensive account of the circumstances which gave rise to UDI. Writing in the late 1960s, Mtshali concluded that Rhodesia was “born in anger, maintained by force and surrounded by crisis.” In Mtshali’s view, Rhodesia was born in anger because Ian Smith and his colleagues in the Rhodesian Front became frustrated at Britain’s refusal to grant Southern Rhodesia independence while Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland emerged as independent states of Zambia and Malawi, respectively. He notes that since the “dreaded African rule was at their door steps” the settlers proclaimed UDI in order to cope with the rise of a similar danger within their borders.

Similarly, in his analysis of the negotiations between the Rhodesian and British governments over the independence issue, Barber noted that they were centred on the 1961 constitution, though the two governments viewed this constitution from conflicting angles. He contended that to the Southern Rhodesian government, the 1961 constitution represented a dangerous and over-liberal concession to African extremists’ claim while to the British government; it represented the first but not the last step to increased African participation in government.36

36 Barber, Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion, p.303.
What clearly emerges from the foregoing arguments is that the two governments had widely different objectives over the question of African political rights. While the British government wanted a speed-up in African political advancement, the Southern Rhodesian government insisted on slow, unforced evolution upon retaining control in responsible hands, which effectively implied a slow down in the pace of African political advancement. Failure to reach a compromise culminated in a UDI. This study acknowledges Mtshali and Barber’s contribution to our understanding of the complex political and constitutional developments which triggered UDI. Their works are useful in providing background information to our study.

The works of Young and Blake\textsuperscript{37}, Bowman and Loney\textsuperscript{38} are also significant to our study. Young traces the constitutional developments in Southern Rhodesia from its establishment as a self governing colony up to the announcement of UDI. He notes that the circumstances which gave rise to UDI should be examined from the standpoint of Southern Rhodesian “unusual constitutional position \textit{vis-à-vis} the United Kingdom.” On the other hand, Blake, though not specifically dealing with UDI, provides a description of the early history of Southern Rhodesia from the years of the Monomutapa to the dramatic course of events leading to UDI. He analysed in considerable detail the political, social and commercial pressures which led first to the establishment in Southern Rhodesia of ‘responsible government’, then to its joining the federation and finally to the collapse of the federation and proclamation of UDI in 1965. Taken


together, Young and Blake’s works are a major contribution to our understanding of the Southern Rhodesian history. They are relevant to our study as they provide valuable background information.

Bowman and Loney’s studies generally deal with the Rhodesian society and the development of the power of white rulers. Bowman in particular argues that the settlers proclaimed UDI because they increasingly became preoccupied with an aspiration to preserve white rule. He concludes that Ian Smith “perceived the continued ties with Britain as an unbearable threat to white survival in Southern Rhodesia.”

On the other hand, rather than looking at Rhodesian internal factors for the reasons that influenced Smith’s government to declare UDI, Loney attributes it to external causes, particularly the failure of British policy. He contends that British failure to use military force was critical in compelling Smith’s government to ‘get away’ with the UDI. The focus of this study is necessarily not an assessment of the different arguments dealing with ‘why’ Smith declared UDI. While this is important, this study simply traces the developments which culminated in a UDI, and more significantly, examines the economic and socio-political impact of this development on a neighbouring country, Zambia.

While there is substantial literature on the origins of UDI, studies dealing with the effects of UDI on Zambia’s economy and socio-political processes are rare. Except for Sklar’s article dealing with Zambia’s response to UDI, to date no major study has been produced on the nature, character and extent of the impact of UDI in Rhodesia on Zambia’s economic and socio-political developments. Sklar’s study represents an

earliest attempt undertaken on Zambia’s engagement with Southern Rhodesia *vis-à-vis* UDI. He notes that “of the various confrontations which have occurred between white regimes and the independent African states that between Rhodesia and Zambia has been the most complex and has called for the most imaginative exercise of state-craft.” What clearly emerges from Sklar’s argument is that, in her response to UDI, Zambia was sturdily opposed to white minority rule; yet, she took a cautious approach. She refrained from taking extreme measures that would have spelt disaster to her economy without producing the desired effects in Rhodesia. This dilemma, he contends, emanated from strong economic ties Zambia shared with Southern Rhodesia. Certainly, Sklar’s study is significant as it shows in great analytical details the development of the conflict between Zambia and Rhodesia *vis-à-vis* UDI and the power positions of the two parties. Zambia emerges as the weaker side.

This study acknowledges Sklar’s contribution to our understanding of the impact of UDI on Zambia’s economy. However, it is important to note that Sklar’s study was constrained in terms of the scope of research. The result is that his article was not extensively researched as has been done in this dissertation. While Sklar’s work terminates at 1968, this study distinguishes itself in that it spurns the period up to 1979 when UDI was resolved. The result is that a comprehensive account of the impact of UDI on Zambia’s economy has been provided.

Anglin’s study40 is another work which is significant to our study. Anglin notes that the development of UDI constituted the first major crisis situation faced by the Zambian government in its continuing struggle for survival in southern Africa.

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Acknowledging that Rhodesia had been the central foreign policy preoccupation of the Zambian government since independence in 1964, he argues that the basic conflict stemmed from the fact that the two neighbours north and south of the Zambezi were each seeking to upset the status quo in Rhodesia, though in opposing directions. While the Salisbury regime was pressing for the removal of the residual legal impediments to its unfettered exercise of white power, Lusaka was committed to eradicating continuing minority rule there.  

Furthermore, in his analysis of the development of the Zambian response to the crisis by phases, he notes that UDI translated a hypothetical situation into a concrete challenge and injected a sense of urgency and realism into discussions on contingent planning. In short, in Anglin’s view, Zambia’s response to the Rhodesian crisis reflected a clear shift in diplomatic statements from an initial warning of a crisis prior to UDI, through the crisis when an international rescue operation was mounted to the post crisis period when focus shifted to gearing Zambia for the crucial “quick kill.” Anglin adopts a theoretical approach in his analysis of Zambian crisis behavior in the wake of UDI. Though he does not show in practical terms the impact of UDI on Zambia’s economy, his work is relevant to our study as it provides a theoretical basis upon which to further investigate the effects of UDI on the Zambian economy.

Additionally, the works of Fray, Seidman and Tangri are critical to our study.

Rather than seeing the impact of UDI on Zambia’s economy from negative

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perspectives, these works suggest that UDI stimulated economic development in Zambia. In particular, Fray acknowledges the distortions created in the Zambian economy as a result of UDI, the subsequent campaign of economic sanctions and the closure of the Rhodesian border to Zambian foreign trade. Yet he notes that on the other hand, UDI, by excluding Rhodesian products from the Zambian market, granted in fact Zambian industries some protection from their main rivals.

Similarly, Seidman identifies UDI as one of the principal factors that contributed towards stimulating a rapid expansion of Zambia’s manufacturing industry after independence. He notes that UDI “brought a new sense of urgency to the development of the local manufacturing industry” in Zambia to an extent that the “manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP in money terms had almost quadrupled by 1972.” Tangri shares similar views. He notes that UDI gave a powerful stimulus to manufacturing industries in Zambia through the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO). The above works are pertinent to this study as they give us insights into the role of UDI in stimulating import substitution industries in Zambia. This study builds on these insights.

The works of Martin and Chileshe are also essential to our study as they clearly show the enormous burden UDI placed on the shoulders of the Zambian economy and how the Zambian government attempted to disengage the country’s economy from dependence on southern Africa. While Martin notes that UDI “plunged the Zambian government into a welter of emergency and contingency plans”, Chileshe observed that the “economic challenge resulting from UDI was to find alternative transit

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routes comparable in terms of reliability and low per unit cost to traditional southern
routes through Rhodesia and South Africa." The conclusion is that Zambia managed
to disengage from the southern routes though at a considerable high cost to the
economy. This study acknowledges Martin and Chileshe’s contribution to our
understanding of the impact of UDI on the Zambian economy in general and
particularly, Zambia’s efforts to extricate its economy from the south. This study not
only builds on these insights, but goes further to examine the impact of UDI on the
socio-political processes in Zambia.

Recently, an attempt has been made to assess and review the impact of UDI on
domestic socio-political developments in Zambia. DeRoche and Kanduza’s studies
provide useful insights on the impact of UDI on internal socio-political processes in
Zambia. DeRoche argues that Zambia’s response to UDI which involved strategies such
as advocating British military intervention, participation in the economic sanctions
against Rhodesia and seeking international help for defence and transportation was
subjected to stern political denigration from Members of Parliament.

On the other hand, Kanduza’s study captures the popular and grassroots
reaction against UDI in Zambia. He argues that despite huge economic challenges
posed by UDI to the Zambian government, the majority of Zambians trusted and readily
supported their government in its confrontational stance against UDI since it kept and
continued with some of its domestic policies and programs for the people. While this is

45 Chileshe, Third World Countries and Development Options: Zambia, p.44.
46 See A.M. Kanduza, ‘Zambians Against UDI in Rhodesia’ Paper presented to a Conference on UDI
Forty Years On: Liberation, Confrontation and Cooperation, University of Cambridge, Centre of
International Studies, 21-22 September, 2005., A. DeRoche, ‘Some Zambian Response to UDI, 1965-
1973’ Paper presented to a Conference on UDI Forty Years On: Liberation, Confrontation and
Cooperation, University of Cambridge, Centre of International Studies, 21-22 September, 2005.
true to some extent, the weakness with Kanduza’s argument is that he adopts a general approach in his analysis of the popular reaction to UDI in Zambia. What his argument overlooks is the varied nature, character, and extent of opposition the government faced from diverse sectors of the society. Contrary to Kanduza’s argument, this study contends that domestic reaction to the Zambian government’s response to UDI was not only diverse in terms of social groups, but reflected a shift in character and attitude from the early years when UDI was announced to the mid 1970’s when the country began to be engulfed with economic problems.

Good’s study\textsuperscript{47} is another relevant work to our study. Drawing from his experience as a diplomat, Good clearly shows the difficult position that the Zambian government found itself in the wake of the crisis. Of the many salient issues he examines, reference can be made to only four; Britain’s failure to use force, the impact of sanctions on Zambia, the role of South Africa and the personality of the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. He notes that British reluctance and ultimately her failure to use force against Smith wounded relations with Zambia and it was a prelude to a confrontation which almost dissolved the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{48} Good’s work is vital to this study as it provides considerable insights into and forms the basis for further investigation on the political impact of UDI on Zambia’s foreign policy in relation to Britain.


\textsuperscript{48} Good, \textit{U.D.I}, p.150.
Finally, the works of Mtshali, Songiso, Pettman, Anglin and Shaw, and Shaw dealing with Zambia’s foreign policy are critical to this study. They provide a comprehensive analysis of Zambia’s foreign policy in southern Africa and point to the factors that determined or shaped its formulation. All the authors point to the philosophy of Zambian humanism, racial equality and harmony, non-alignment and support for international organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and United Nations (UN) as the principal elements on which Zambia’s foreign policy was firmly based. Despite different interpretations concerning the motive behind Zambia’s policy in southern Africa, Songiso concluded that Zambia’s regional behaviour consistently and simultaneously reflected elements of ideology and interest. This study is not essentially about the different interpretation of Zambia’s foreign policy in southern Africa as the above works suggests. Rather, it deals with the penalty of Zambia’s adoption of a confrontational stance against UDI on her economic and socio-political developments.

In conclusion, Rhodesia’s UDI had an enormous impact on Zambia’s economic and socio-political developments. Yet to date, there has never been, as evidenced in the above works, an integrated study to assess and review the nature and extent of this impact. This assessment is important because UDI occurred in a neighbouring country which the Zambian government not only opposed ideologically, but had strong economic and social ties.

Research Methodology

This study used qualitative methods in which research on the impact of Rhodesia’s UDI on Zambia’s economic and socio-political developments from 1965 to 1979 was investigated. This approach was chosen because this researcher was able to analyse economic, social and political issues that manifested themselves during the period under review. This method also enabled the researcher to conduct interviews with key role players who served in the Zambian government at the height of UDI.

Data Collection

Data for this study was collected from both primary as well as secondary sources. The bulk of primary sources included materials obtained from the United National Independence Party (UNIP) Political Archives, the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ) and the University of Zambia (UNZA) library’s Special Collection section in Lusaka. Primary sources included documents such as party and government memoranda, letters, reports, presidential speeches, ministerial statements and press releases, National Development Plans covering the period 1965 to 1983, Ministry of Finance economic reports, correspondence related to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs. Other primary sources included periodicals such as *Africa Confidential* and newspapers, mainly the *Times of Zambia*. The parliamentary motions and debates related to UDI, tabled and discussed in the National Assembly by cabinet ministers and Members of Parliament, and printed in the Parliamentary Hansards during sessions between 1965 and 1979, also constitute an important resource material for this study. Secondary sources included books, journals, theses and dissertations, periodicals
such as *Africa Research Bulletin, Africa Digest* and *Africa Contemporary Record*. Other secondary sources included unpublished documents such as conference papers.

**Interview Process**

This study adopted an open-ended interview method in which informants were allowed to comment freely on government’s decisions in terms of its response to UDI and how it affected the country. Interviews were conducted with three former Zambian government officials who served during the First and/or the Second Republics at the height of UDI. The interviews were conducted both in the homes and offices of the interviewees without distraction. Hand-written notes and a tape recorder were used to capture responses. Written consents for participation in the study and permission to record the interviews were obtained from the informants beforehand. The recordings were transcribed and used as primary data. Finally, qualitative methods were used to organize, interpret and analyze data collected from primary and secondary sources as well as the interviews.

**Organisation of the Study**

This study is organized chronologically. The dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter one comprises an introduction which sets the background to the study. It also contains the statement of the problem, the literature review and sets out the research methodology. Chapter two examines the impact of Rhodesia’s UDI on the Zambian economy. Chapter three investigates the impact of Rhodesia’s UDI on the socio-political developments in Zambia. Chapter four concludes the study.
Chapter Two
The Impact of Rhodesia’s UDI on the Zambian Economy

Introduction

Rhodesia’s UDI had serious immediate and long-term implications for Zambia’s economic stability. Not only did it immeasurably compromise Zambia’s development efforts and brutally expose the limitations and vulnerability of Zambia’s economy. It served to induce state intervention in the economy. This chapter contends that UDI’s immediate impact on the Zambian economy was negative in nature. The long-term implications constituted in laying the foundation for economic development. The crisis served the Zambian government with an opportunity to advance the country’s development agenda, through its policies of disengagement from economic dependence on Rhodesia and promotion of import substitution industries. This chapter explores the nature, character and extent of the impact of UDI on the Zambian economy.

Zambia’s Economic Reliance on Southern Rhodesia: A Brief Overview

The impact of the Rhodesian act of rebellion on the Zambian economy cannot be fully appreciated without making reference to the historical, political and economic relationships created among members of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed in 1953. It comprised of three British territories of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. During the Federation, Northern Rhodesia was developed as an appendage of Southern Rhodesia’s economic system. Northern Rhodesia exported labour for Southern Rhodesia’s agriculture and mining industries. She also provided a large market for Southern
Rhodesia’s manufactured products. Northern Rhodesia depended on Southern Rhodesia in almost all the key sectors of the economy—railway, air transportation and energy supplies. Copper, the chief export of Northern Rhodesia, was dispatched by the Rhodesia Railways through Southern Rhodesia to the sea port of Beira in Mozambique. The great bulk of Northern Rhodesia’s imports came through the same route. Northern Rhodesia obtained coal needed for both industrial and power production from Southern Rhodesia. Petroleum products were shipped north by rail from a refinery near Umtali in Southern Rhodesia. Electricity was supplied by the Kariba South Bank Power Station. Although jointly owned by both Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, the generating facilities and control centres of the interconnected system were wholly located in Southern Rhodesia.

The Federation was dissolved in 1963 and the following year, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland attained independence and became Zambia and Malawi, respectively. Southern Rhodesia became known as Rhodesia. Despite securing political control on 24 October 1964, the new Zambian government did not have effective control over the management and operation of the economy. Zambia had become so much an integral part of Rhodesia’s economic matrix that her economic survival depended on Rhodesia. The Zambezi River, the boundary between Zambia and Rhodesia became a battle line of two conflicting political ideologies: the RF the governing party of Rhodesia believed in white supremacy, while Zambia’s governing party of Rhodesia believed in white supremacy, while Zambia’s governing party of Rhodesia believed in white supremacy.

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50 For instance, a year after the Federation was dissolved in 1964, imports from Rhodesia alone accounted for 39 per cent of Zambia’s total import bill. See Republic of Zambia Economic Report 1965 (Lusaka: Ministry of Finance, 1966), p.33. See also R. B Sutcliffe, “Rhodesian Trade since UDI” The World Today 23, 10 (1967), pp.418-422.

United National Independence Party (UNIP) believed in Pan Africanism and the right of the majority to self-determination.\textsuperscript{52}

The full extent of Zambia’s economic dependence on Rhodesia was clearly revealed in 1965 when UDI was proclaimed, a development which polarized the political positions of the two countries. In 1965, 1,075,647 tonnes of imports and exports, representing practically the whole of Zambia’s trade, through the ports of Beira, Lourenco Marques, Lobito and South African ports was carried over the Rhodesia Railways. Rhodesia itself supplied 33 per cent of Zambia’s merchandise imports, and took 93 per cent of its exports. Nearly all this trade also went by Rhodesia railways.\textsuperscript{53} At the time of UDI, Zambia obtained 1 million tonnes of coal annually, representing more than 95 per cent of Zambia’s coal requirements from Wankie Colliery in Rhodesia. Sixty-eight thousand tonnes of coal was required to produce 58,000 tonnes of copper on a monthly basis.\textsuperscript{54} Zambia imported 200,000 tonnes annually or 90 per cent of its oil and petroleum products from the Central African Petroleum Refinery Limited in Umtali, Rhodesia while the Kariba South Bank hydro electric power station supplied Zambia with most of its power requirements.\textsuperscript{55} At the time of UDI, Zambia’s economic dependence was well established.

\textsuperscript{52} Kapungu, *Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom*, p.66.


\textsuperscript{54} See *Africa Confidential* 23, November 25, (1966), p.6 and *Africa Confidential* 20, October 15, (1965), p.3.

UDI and the Zambian Economy

In anticipation of UDI, Zambia expressed worry about the potential harm the rebellion would inflict on the economy. Such worry and anxiety rested on the leadership’s awareness of the extent to which the economy was tied to that of Rhodesia. The Zambian government was compelled to request for British armed invasion of Rhodesia to prevent Smith’s government from usurping power through unconstitutional means. UDI presented the Zambian government with the problem of deciding the public attitude against the possible consequences on the economic future of Zambia. Against the backdrop of worry and anxiety due to the impending crisis, Zambia’s attitude on the eve of UDI was one of appealing for international support and of presenting the question domestically as a matter transcending party interests and affecting national survival.

On the other hand, Rhodesia’s response to Zambia’s moves pertaining to a possible UDI operated on two levels. Publicly, Smith announced that he wanted to maintain good neighbourly relations between the two countries while in practice, his actions reflected inconsistency with his public statements. For instance, in a personal letter addressed to President Kaunda on 21 October 1965, Smith assured the Zambian leader that his government would never take a move calculated to destabilize the Zambian economy. While acknowledging Zambia’s concerns, he reiterated that “… the importance to Zambia of the copper mining industry is well recognized here, and we have no desire to impede it by interfering in any way neither with the normal supplies of

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56NAZCO17/1/5 Loc 6920 General Papers prior to 1st May 1966, see His Excellency President address at the National Rally, Lusaka Saturday 23 October 1965. See also Zambia Information Services Press Release, no. 1720 October 22, 1965.
57NAZCO17/1/5 Loc 6920 General Papers prior to 1st May 1966, see ‘Unilateral Declaration of Independence: The Political and Security Implications’. 

coal and petroleum nor with the other services of this vital industry ....”

Despite assurances to “honour its obligations towards Zambia and to maintain existing trade relations”, in practice the actions of Ian Smith contradicted the friendly words contained in the letter. For example, a month before UDI, Rhodesian authorities seized 232 cases of arms and ammunition which were in transit and destined to the then ill-equipped Zambia Army.59

UDI was finally proclaimed on 11 November 1965. The move was considered an act of rebellion by the British government and the international community in general. On the same day, the British government imposed economic and financial sanctions on Rhodesia.60 At the United Nations (UN), the Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/216) which condemned UDI and called upon all states not to recognize “this illegal racist minority regime” and to “refrain from giving it any assistance.” On 20 November, the Security Council (France abstained) passed another resolution (S/RES/217) which noted the gravity of the situation caused by UDI. Terming the declaration “an act of rebellion” the continuance of which “constitutes a threat to international peace and security”, the Council called on all states to refrain from recognizing the illegal regime, to avoid any action assisting and encouraging it and

58 NAZCO17/1/5 Loc 6920 General Papers prior to 1st May 1966, see Personal Message from the Hon I. D. Smith, M.P., Prime Minister of Rhodesia to His Excellency Dr. K.D Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia, 21 October 1965.


60 For details of these sanctions, Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia, p.7. Strack contends that when economic measures are used as sanctions, the object is to deter or dissuade states from pursuing policies which do not conform to acceptable norms of international conduct. Sanctions are penalties which relate specifically to acts which the international body condemns.
“in particular to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products.”

The resolution also called upon Britain to quell the rebellion and called upon the OAU to assist in the implementation of the resolution. The action against Rhodesia rested on a continuing recognition of British sovereignty and legal authority over the territory.

The imposition of economic and financial sanctions on Rhodesia by the British government rested on its firm belief that “on the expert advise” available to the Prime Minister, the “cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions would bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months.” Although Britain refused to use force in preference to economic sanctions, the Zambian government was utterly skeptical of the effectiveness of the latter policy to resolve UDI. In Zambia’s view, the application of economic sanctions would not only prove ineffective but would damage Zambia’s economy. This view was expressed in a memorandum at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in Lagos in 1966. It stated in part:

Zambia considers the establishment of a rebel regime across the borders as a permanent threat to our [economic] security and we will do everything possible to remove this threat from the start … Zambia … is extremely doubtful whether economic sanctions will have the effect of bringing down the Smith regime within a time limit that will avoid serious damage to the Zambian economy including a severe if not complete curtailment of copper production and delivery. 

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Zambia’s failure to persuade Britain to quell the rebellion through military intervention and to secure a specific British commitment to aid to cover the cost of sanctions placed her in an invidious position which Sklar described as follows:

If Zambia endeavoured to support sanctions faithfully and to the best of its ability, it was bound to incur economic reprisals and pay dearly in shortages of supply without securing its political objectives [of overthrowing Smith]…. If Zambia did not support sanctions, it could hardly escape a measure of blame for their failure. Moreover, Zambia’s dereliction would make it much easier for Britain to reconcile with the Rhodesian regime.64

Despite her misgivings regarding the effectiveness of sanctions, on 13 November 1965, the Zambian government, though reluctantly, but in pursuance of its moral obligation towards the decision taken by the UN Security Council, joined the international sanctions policy against Rhodesia. Zambia declared economic war against Rhodesia, a decision which, given her dependence on Rhodesia, had serious implications on her economy.

In retaliation to Zambia’s participation in the UN sponsored trade embargo on Rhodesia, on 18 December 1965 the Rhodesian government banned the transiting of oil and petroleum products to Zambia by preventing any movement of rail tanks. Ian Smith took this action in an apparent move to create his country’s oil reserves in the wake of sanctions. On 19 December 1965, the Rhodesian government announced a hundred fold increase in taxes on coal exported to Zambia. In a further development of the conflict,

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Smith’s government demanded an advance payment of railway revenue in convertible currency.\textsuperscript{65}

The question of advance payment should be seen in the context of the machinery created to implement the UN Security Council’s Resolution on Rhodesia. Prior to UDI, Zambia maintained a trade and payments system that was virtually free of restrictions. All imported goods originating from the Sterling Area (Rhodesia, South Africa and Britain) were free from restrictions, that is, they were not subjected to any form of licensing. But when UDI was proclaimed, Zambia adopted a full system of licensing for all imported goods from all countries. Exchange control regulations were introduced to restrict payments to Rhodesia, and payments to the jointly owned services, the Central African Airways, Central African Road Services, Central African Power Corporation and Rhodesia Railways.\textsuperscript{66} As part of her contribution towards the UN economic and financial sanction measures, the Zambian government blocked the transfer of surplus railway revenue from Zambia to Rhodesia. For several months, the payments had accumulated in the Lusaka account while the current account for the Railways in Salisbury reached a point of virtual bankruptcy. Hence, the Rhodesian authorities demanded for advance payment of Rhodesia Railway revenue from the Zambian government.\textsuperscript{67}


Contingency Operations

The crisis precipitated by the oil embargo, disruptions in coal supply and demand for pre-payment of freight charges for copper exports had grave repercussions for Zambia’s economy. It spurred contingency operations whose impact on the national economy was far-reaching. The resulting petroleum shortage in the country led to a severe reduction in essential services, and also retarded the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan.\(^68\) It also gave rise to the introduction of a petrol and fuel rationing scheme throughout the country. The scheme was introduced to ensure that everyone got a fair allocation of fuel and for the general maintenance of the economy.\(^69\) The fuel crisis was so critical that at the beginning, the fuel ration for an average private motorist was less than a gallon per week. Some thirteen commercial passenger flights were cancelled to save fuel, bicycle sales increased fourfold; diplomats parked their cars and began cycling while some people resorted to ridding on horse backs as they reported for work.\(^70\)

The fuel shortage severely strained the economy and inflicted untold misery on the general citizenry. This prompted the government to initiate weekly radio and television addresses to the nation in order to keep the general citizenry abreast with emergency measures government was putting in place in response to the crisis.\(^71\) These radio and television addresses served not only to inform and update the nation. But they

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\(^{68}\) Interview with Bautis Frank Kapulu, Makeni, Lusaka, Zambia, 4 April 2007.
\(^{69}\) Times of Zambia December 20 1965.
\(^{71}\) Zambia Information Services, Press Release no. 313/66 see speech by the Hon. the Vice President on Television Zambia and Radio on Thursday February 17, 1966 at 7. P.M, Zambia Information Services, Press Release no. 378/66, speech by the Hon. the Vice President on Television Zambia and Radio at 7 P.M on Thursday February 24, 1966, Zambia Information Services Release no. 476/66 Address by the Hon. the Vice President on Television Zambia and Radio on Thursday March 10, 1966.
were also designed to instill a sense of confidence in the government and possibly abate panic among the general populace.

In a desperate attempt to salvage the economy from total collapse, the Zambian government in collaboration with and assistance of the British, United States of America (USA) and the Canadian governments, launched an international rescue operation involving airlifting of fuel and petroleum products into the country. The operation started on 19 December 1965, a day after Smith’s government terminated the flow of oil into Zambia when the first British Royal Air Force planes carrying petroleum landed in Lusaka. Within the same month, the Canadian government joined the exercise using four Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Hercules transport aircraft. The United States of America joined the rescue operation on 4 January 1966 when they dispatched a Pan-American Airline 707 which landed in Elizabethville, Katanga province and unloaded 120 barrels holding 55 gallons of oil. The oil was transported into Zambia by road. Ten days later, another American Trans-world Airlines 707 joined the exercise. In an operation that lasted until 30 April 1966, the two American Boeing 707s flew fuel into Katanga, hauling a total of 68,921 barrels containing 3.6 million gallons of oil. The transport costs alone for the oil topped $1 per gallon.73


73 De Roche, Black, White, Chrome, pp.123-128., see also UNIP 14/1/14 Press Release 1967 ‘Southern Rhodesia and the United Nations: The US Position’, reprint from the Department of State Bulletin, p.5. Mark Chona recalled that with the benefit of hindsight, unlike the Canadian government, the government of the United States of America did not contribute as much as expected towards the rescue operation. He added that the Finnish government also dispatched an aircraft which greatly contributed towards an airlift of Zambia’s import cargo through Botswana. Interview with Mark Chona, Makeni, Lusaka, 16 March 2009.
Besides the assistance provided by the international community towards airlifting of fuel and other imports into the country, the Roan Select Trust (RST) Group of companies in cooperation with the Zambian government established an airline in 1965, the Zambian Air Cargo (ZAC) as an emergency measure designed to deal with the crisis precipitated by UDI. During an operation that lasted for three years ZAC carried 150,000 tonnes of freight—about half copper and half essential supplies between Copperbelt and the port of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania. Announcing its closure in 1968, the spokesman for the Zambian government noted that “the airline played a vital part in ensuring Zambia’s economic survival at a difficult time when the country was virtually under siege and the government wishes to express its gratitude to all those who helped to make this emergency venture a success.”

Admittedly, the oil airlifts contributed immensely towards the maintenance of the Zambian economy during the critical period of fuel shortage. The exercise served as a short-term measure intended to maintain the economy while alternative sources of energy supply and surface routes were being developed. In this regard, in May 1965, the National Coal Supply Commission (NCSC) was established with the twin objects of planning against UDI crisis and the development of Zambian domestic coal resources to replace to the maximum possible extent coal imports from Wankie in Rhodesia. Although it was known that coal deposits existed in Zambia at Nkandabwe, previous reports on its quality had been adverse. These and the availability of Wankie coal had led to the Zambian deposits being ignored. The investigations carried by Chartered

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74 See speech by Sir Ronald L. Prain OBE Chairman of the RST Group of Companies to the informal meeting of the shareholders in New York, April 21, 1969.
Explorations Limited suggested that these old reports were unduly pessimistic and a bold decision was taken to undertake open cast mining operations at Nkandabwe, initially with the object of creating a stock of 300,000 tonnes of coal. Actual mining started in February 1966 with a total production capacity of 1,600,000 tonnes.\textsuperscript{76}

Another aspect of contingency operations involved primarily the development of alternative routes through Tanzania to Dar-es-Salaam and Mtwara, through Malawi to Beira, and through the Democratic Republic of Congo to Lobito. The Great North Road (popularly known as the Hell Run due to frequent accidents that occurred over the gravel road) was developed to tarmac level in order to increase traffic capacity between Zambia and Tanzania. This was associated with the building up of port facilities in 1966 at Mbulungu on the south of Lake Tanganyika and the establishment of a transit depot at Isoka to which goods were transported from Tanzania by Tanzanian sub-contractors, and from which goods were transported by Zambian contractors to the line of rail. Equally, the Great East Road was tarred in order to efficiently handle Zambia’s export and import traffic to the east through Malaw to the Mozambican ports.\textsuperscript{77}

On 12 May 1966, a transport corporation known as the Zambia-Tanzania Road Services Limited (Z-T.R.S) was established jointly with the government of Tanzania and the Fiat Corporation of Italy. Operations began in June 1966 on the 1,200 mile (1,930.8 km) route from Dar-es-salaam to Lusaka and the Copperbelt, without depots or staging posts and with minimum administrative personnel. By December the fleet had increased to 239 Fiat truck-and-trailer units, each of 30-tonne capacity. Traffic included 7,154 tonnes of outward cargo, nearly all copper and 4,648 tonnes of inward cargo.

\textsuperscript{76} Republic of Zambia Economic Report 1966, p.20.  
mostly fuel. Initially fuel was carried in drums or sealed rubber tanks, but both proved unsatisfactory and forced vehicles to operate at about half capacity. By the end of 1967, the transport organisation operated at its planned capacity of 450 units, including a 100 of the steel tanker type, which eliminated use of drums and rubber tanks. At its full capacity, the company carried 20,000 tonnes of cargo in either direction on a monthly basis. The foregoing contingency operations were initiated as interim measures designed to deal with the emergency precipitated by the oil crisis and disruptions in coal supplies in the country. However, long-term development projects such as Maamba Colliery, Tanzania-Zambia Mafuta (TAZAMA) Pipeline, Indeni Oil Refinery, Kariba North Bank and Kafue Gorge hydro electric power stations, and Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) were established later. They did not only mitigate the country’s energy and transportation problems, but laid a solid foundation for self-sufficiency in these sectors. These shall be discussed at a latter section of this chapter.

Clearly, the Zambian economy suffered heavy financial losses due to the crisis induced by UDI. The immediate post UDI crisis necessitated the diversion of some financial resources from normal development projects to contingency planning related projects and operations. The exact financial costs incurred due to contingency operations were not revealed. The available statistics were based on estimates. They reflected an enormous expenditure. For instance, by August 1966, the Zambian

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79 Evidence from parliamentary debates suggests that issues related to government’s response to UDI were regarded as “matters of Government policy” which could not be subjected to detailed discussion for “reasons of national security.” See Zambia Hansard no.7m Daily Hansard Friday, August 12, 1966, p.667.
government had spent K10,400,000 on contingency operations. The Minister of Finance gave the following expenditure as indicated in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Zambia’s Expenditure on UDI in 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Amount (K)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies</td>
<td>4,648,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft:</td>
<td>1,880,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hercules C-130</td>
<td>487,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC 1-11 Ferry Flights</td>
<td>68,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Transport:</td>
<td>542,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Fiat tenders for tobacco,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Fiat trucks, 161 Leyland trucks,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800 Rubber-seal tanks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia-Tanzania Road Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel:</td>
<td>85,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage at Isoka</td>
<td>96,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel-oil drums</td>
<td>17,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Planning Organisation</td>
<td>599,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Coal Supply Commission</td>
<td>3,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpiles of 33,000 tonnes</td>
<td>498,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Stockpiles:</td>
<td>596,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel- 6,000 tonnes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra customs facilities</td>
<td>1,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Planning Organisation</td>
<td>42,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry, including security guards</td>
<td>6,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,400,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The immediate post UDI crisis also confirmed Zambia’s vulnerability as a landlocked state and unreliability of Rhodesia as a transit state for Zambia’s export and import trade. The expression ‘landlocked state’ refers to a country that is totally dependent on access to the sea through other states. A ‘transit state’ is any state with or without a sea or ocean coast but situated between a landlocked country and the sea or ocean and through which traffic of the landlocked state must pass to the outside world.\textsuperscript{81} Given the landlocked nature of the country and the hostility generated by UDI, Zambia adopted a vigorous approach in an effort to progressively extricate itself from economic reliance on Rhodesia and establish alternative trade routes through friendly countries. Evidence suggests that by 1968, the Zambian government had significantly reduced its trade with Rhodesia. For instance, Rhodesia’s share in Zambia’s imports dropped from 35 per cent in 1965 to 19 per cent in 1966. It fell further down from 11 per cent in 1967 to a bare 6 per cent in the first half of 1968.\textsuperscript{82} The foregoing statistics clearly show the extent to which Zambia’s trade with Rhodesia declined. Furthermore, the above figures reflected the Zambian government’s effort to divert its trade from the traditional southern route through Rhodesia.

It is significant to note that the exercise designed to find alternative trade routes was extremely expensive. It required huge financial resources which dislocated some development plans. Scarce resources were diverted from naturally priority areas to developing and improving alternative trade routes. As a poor and developing country, Zambia lacked basic human needs so much so that priority should have been given to


\textsuperscript{82} UNIP1/3/3 See Budget Address by His Honour the Vice President, Mr. S. M Kapwepwe., delivered to the National Assembly, 30\textsuperscript{th} January 1969, p.3. See also \textit{Republic of Zambia Economic Report 1968} (Lusaka: Finance Division, 1969), p.53 and Africa \textit{Confidential} no.12 June 14 (1968), p.7.
these sectors. However, due to the emergency precipitated by UDI, the Zambian government accorded a high degree of importance to the development of the alternative transport and communication networks. The First National Development Plan (FNDP) for instance, allocated K165,034,000 to transport and communications alone out of total government capital investment spending of K563,620,000 with Local Government and Housing coming out as a very poor second with only K84,666,000.\(^8\) This undoubtedly constituted a fairly high proportion of expenditure for a developing country where the immediate and basic needs for the majority still remained unmet.

UDI’s impact on the economy was wide spread. It affected every sector of the economy. In particular, the mining sector incurred huge production costs and drastic reduction in the levels of production. The disruptive effects to the industry were noticeable given the importance of the sector to the Zambian economy. For instance in 1965, copper which constituted the principle foreign exchange earner (over 90 per cent) not only accounted for, on average, about 60 per cent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but contributed on average 40 per cent of the total government revenue and accounted for about 17 per cent of the total number of people in paid employment.\(^8\) In 1966, copper production costs rose by K19 million with the result that government lost revenue worth K13.4 million. Shortage of coal resulted in the reduction of copper

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production by 75 per cent. This meant a loss of 500 tonnes a day worth K400,000. In the first half of 1966, the impact of the oil shortage gave rise to a drastic cut in copper production initially by 25 per cent and by the end of the year; production had dropped by almost 34 per cent. Between 1965 and 1969, the production cost of copper had increased from K342 to K620 per tonne, an 81 per cent increase. The increase was largely attributed to surcharge on the Zambian imports and exports, and also on higher port charges. From the foregoing, it can be noted that due to UDI, the copper mining industry suffered huge financial losses as reflected in the increased cost of production accompanied by a drastic reduction in the levels of production.

The rise in the cost of living was another of UDI’s disruptive effects on the Zambian economy. This was largely reflected in increased domestic consumer prices of essential commodities. Available evidence suggests that after UDI, the Consumer Price Index for all items showed a continued rise in the cost of living of all income groups, with the lower income groups being the most affected. Between 1966 and 1970, prices of consumer goods for high and low income groups rose at an average annual rate of 5.5 per cent and 6.5 per cent respectively. Consumer prices for both income groups increased at an annual rate of around 6 to 6.5 per cent in 1972 and 1973. The rise in the general level of domestic prices was a reflection of the increasing costs of imports, accentuated by excess demand due to shortages of essential commodities. In order to compensate for the increase in prices so as to protect the poorer sections of the

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community from the effects of inflation, the Zambian government spent huge amounts of money on subsidies. For example, expenditure on subsidies increased sharply from K4 million in 1965 to K16 million in 1966 and to K35 million in 1968. The estimated figure for subsidies stood at K70 million in 1975.88

The policy of disengagement adopted by the Zambian government following the Rhodesian act of rebellion was given further impetus in 1973 when in an attempt to maintain UDI, Smith closed the border with Zambia. This development further disrupted the Zambian economy.

The 1973 Border Closure

On 9 January 1973, Smith closed Rhodesia’s border with Zambia. This move meant that all movements of peoples and goods between the two countries were to stop from that date.89 Smith’s action was based on his conviction that Zambia was allowing its territory to be used as a “terrorists’” launch pad for military attacks on Rhodesia. In his view, the decision to close the border was “not a deliberate effort to impose a boycott against Zambia but an effort to get them [Zambia’s leaders] to their senses.”90 On the same day, a spokesman for the Rhodesian government announced that Zambia would still be allowed to export her copper through Rhodesia. But the Zambian government decided to close its side of the border and permanently abandon the

89 However, the Zambian government still facilitated through special administrative arrangements, the crossing of the border by people whose children were attending schools in Rhodesia. See UNIP/23/44 Cabinet Circulars 1973-1974, ‘Secret’ Cabinet Office Circular no.15 of 1973 from A.M. Milner, Secretary General to the Government to all Permanent Secretaries, 9th March, 1973. Circular Caption: Border Closure: Permission to Cross into and from Rhodesia on Compassionate Grounds.
southern route despite the reopening of the border on 3 February 1973 by Ian Smith’s government. Zambia’s action rested on its firm conviction that until a political solution was found in Rhodesia, that is until UDI was resolved, the southern route would remain unreliable. Zambia’s decision to permanently close the border was largely consistent with her support of the United Nations Security Council’s sanctions policy imposed on Rhodesia after UDI was proclaimed in 1965.91

The border closure affected the entire structure of the Zambian economy. The blockade entailed complete diversion of Zambia’s export and import traffic from the southern route to other routes. It is important to emphasize this in this context because at the time of the border closure, Zambia still heavily relied on southern routes despite embarking on efforts to develop alternative routes after UDI. The alternative routes through Tanzania to the north and through Malawi to Mozambique in the east had not been sufficiently developed to efficiently handle increased capacity of Zambia’s export and import traffic.92 At the time of the border closure, Zambia’s import and export trade constituted 900,000 tonnes and 400,000 tonnes, respectively through the southern route.93

The complete diversion of export and import traffic of such magnitude from the traditional southern route required increasing capacity on the alternative routes. This

92 Chona interview cited.
prompted the Zambian government to successfully negotiate with the Malawian government on the continued use of and increasing capacity through Malawi as a transit route for Zambia’s foreign trade while the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) project was being developed.\footnote{UNIP/7/2/25 Record of the Meeting Between Hon A.M. Milner, M.P, Secretary-General to the Government and his delegation and Hon. A. K. Banda, M.P, Malawian Minister of Transport and Communication and Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, Blantyre, Thursday February 22, 1973. See also UNIP7/2/25 Report of a Zambian Delegation to Malawi, issued by the Cabinet Office, February 1973.} Undeniably, the border closure presented a huge challenge to the Zambian government as it required huge financial resources to entirely divert export and import traffic. The UN Security Council team of experts estimated the cost of rerouting at K90 million while the Zambian government placed the figure at K112 million.\footnote{UNIP7/2/26 Report on International Assistance to Zambia by Mr. M. C. Chona and Mr. L. M. Lishomwa, March 26, 1973. See also UNIP7/1/15 State House Papers, 1972-1973, Dr K.D Kaunda, ‘Zambia Shall Beat the Blockade: A Challenge to the Nation, March 1973.’} The costs were broken down as indicated in Table 2 below.

**Table 2: Estimated Cost of the Border Closure in 1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost (K)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,200 heavy vehicles (various)</td>
<td>27,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>4,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other manpower costs</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing for additional manpower</td>
<td>1,484,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training costs</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop installations-Dar-es-Salaam route</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Malawi route</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- other</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage facilities</td>
<td>1,428,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling equipment</td>
<td>626,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia Railways</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 200 wagons</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 4 locomotives</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47,138,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional costs of handling normal traffic</td>
<td>35,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements of telecommunications</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An airlift operation for seven months</td>
<td>28,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>112,738,020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is evident from the above table that the blockade placed an extra financial burden on the Zambian government.

Like in the immediate post UDI period, the border closure equally affected the mining industry in terms of increased cost of production and delayed investments in capital projects which translated in loss of colossal amounts of revenue. For instance, due to the blockade, the Zambian government estimated an increase of 5 per cent to the capital expenditure of K90 million for the mining industry in 1974. Additionally, as a result of investment delays in major capital projects, it was estimated that in 1973/1974 planned increase in copper production of about 65,000 tonnes would be deferred, representing a loss of about K55 million in foreign exchange earnings at a copper price of £500 per tonne. Furthermore, the blockade necessitated the reallocation of financial resources in the Second National Development Plan from the previously planned projects to other emergency needs caused by the border closure.

Zambia’s participation in the UN sponsored sanctions against UDI and its offshoots expressed in the border closure drained huge financial resources from the Zambian economy. Between 1965 and 1976, it was estimated that Zambia lost a total of K478 million due to its participation in the UN mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. During this period, Zambia received only K64 million from the international sources.

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97 For instance in 1973, the budgetary allocation for SNDP projects and program were reduced by K20 to K25 million from K180 million previously envisaged in 1972. This was against the total five year outlay of K1,029 million projected budget for the entire period of the SNDP (1972-1976). See UNIP7/23/40 ‘Top Secret’ ‘The Effect of the Rhodesian Blockade on the SNDP Projects and Programs and on the Zambian Economy, see also UNIP7/2/25 DRAFT, Request for United Nations Assistance, Annexure VIII.
community as contribution towards defraying Zambia’s costs.\textsuperscript{98} The rerouting exercise alone during this period cost Zambia over K520 million. The continued closure of the border cost Zambia a total of K288 million between January 1973 and December 1976. The international assistance to Zambia in this connection was a paltry K40 million.\textsuperscript{99}

Equally depressing in the economy was a growing rise in the cost of living due to escalating domestic prices of basic commodities. This phenomenon was a function of increased cost of imports for consumer goods arising from increased transport costs. For example, between 1971 and 1976, consumer prices for both low and high income groups registered significant increases, with an annual average increase of 9.6 percent for low income groups and 9.4 per cent for high income groups. There was a further acceleration in the increase of prices of essential commodities in 1977 when consumer prices rose by 22.7 per cent for low income groups and by 18.5 per cent for the high income group over the previous year’s level.\textsuperscript{100} During 1978, domestic prices of basic goods increased further. The average index of consumer prices for the first nine months of 1978 reflected an increase of over 20 per cent for low income groups as compared with the price levels that prevailed in the corresponding periods of the preceding years. The factors responsible for pushing up the domestic level of consumer prices were largely attributed to the costs of re-routing of imports and exports, congestion at the port

\textsuperscript{98} Times of Zambia December 7, 1976.
\textsuperscript{99} Times of Zambia December 7, 1976.
of Dar-es-salaam and generally transport problems that engulfed the country during this period.\textsuperscript{101}

The economic problems that bedeviled the Zambian economy following the border closure should also be seen in the wider context of waning global economic fortunes engendered by an oil crisis and sharp fluctuations of copper prices on the world market. The period after the border closure witnessed a drastic and prolonged fall in copper prices, the lowest since UDI. This phenomenon considerably reduced the government revenue base from K339.2 million in 1974 to zero in 1977.\textsuperscript{102} This created serious budgetary and balance of payments problems for the Zambian government. Thus, the economic problems precipitated by the border closure were compounded by the global economic recession.

**UDI: Stimulus to Economic Development**

Despite the disruptive effect of UDI on the Zambian economy, the crisis helped the Zambian government to lay the foundation for economic development. The new economic challenges imposed by UDI compelled the Zambian government to pursue, with renewed determination and vigour, an industrial policy aimed at promoting import substitution industries. UDI galvanized Zambia’s development effort at a breathtaking


\textsuperscript{102} For example, in 1973, the average price of copper was K1, 156 per tonne, K1, 328 in 1974 and then registered a big drop to K794 per tonne in 1975. In 1976, it rose to K1, 007 per tonne and it fell back to about K950 per tonne in 1977, see Mwanakatwe, ‘Budget Address’ Zambia Hansard no.48i, p.637. See further Ministerial Statement by J. Mwanakatwe, Minister of Finance, ‘Budget Deficit, Balance of Payments and the Mining Industry’ Republic of Zambia no.48kk Daily Parliamentary Debates Friday 17th March, 1978 Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Fifth Session of the Third National Assembly, p.3298.
pace. The government’s pursuit of the policy of disengagement concomitantly with promotion of import substitution industries and diversification not only created employment for the local people but transformed the economy from reliance on Rhodesia to a state of self-sufficiency in key sectors such as energy, transport and communication. Underlying these processes was an increased government participation in the economy.

The government’s industrial policy of promoting import substitution industries was executed by enacting customs legislation (tariff protection) and through the operations of a wholly government owned organization, the Industrial Development Corporation (Indeco). The Zambian government secured control of Indeco in August 1964 when arrangements were concluded for the purchase of shares held by the Anglo-American Group, the British South African Company, the Commonwealth Development Corporation and the RST Group. Indeco’s objectives at this stage were specific and included the promotion of Zambian businesses, issuing loans; liaison between government and the private sector; the promotion of investment; the holding, management, and financing of government investment in industry; and the holding of shares in and/or management of certain industries (iron and steel, fertilizers, bags and sacks, cement, sugar, textiles, copper processing, leather processing and building materials). In short, it was government’s policy during this early stage to develop state

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enterprise the hard way by confining the role of Indeco to that of promotion of joint ventures in many sectors, rather than that of forced participation.\textsuperscript{104}

At the time of UDI, Indeco had been transformed into an important instrument of government’s industrial policy in Zambia. Indeco was required to establish a major road transport organization to link the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-salaam to the Zambian rail line and to construct an oil pipeline from Dar-es salaam to Ndola. On 12 May 1966, Zambia-Tanzania Road Services Limited was set up (with Indeco and the Tanzanian government each holding 35 per cent equity and the balance held by Italian interests) to transport copper to the port of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania and to bring in vital petroleum products on its homeward run. The TAZAMA Pipelines Limited (Indeco 67 per cent, Tanzanian government 33 per cent) was established on 8 December 1966 as a result of intensive negotiations to construct a 1069 mile (1,720km) pipeline for the transportation of petroleum products from Dar-es-Salaam to Ndola. The line, which is of 8” diameter buried throughout its length to a depth of several feet, was completed in September 1968. It put a final end to the petrol supply problems which had bedeviled Zambia since Rhodesia’s UDI.\textsuperscript{105}

Other notable projects that were established as part of the government’s effort to extricate itself from economic dependence on Rhodesia included the Maamba Colliery, Indeni Refinery, Kafue Gorge and Kariba North Bank hydro electric power stations, and TAZARA. The need to develop domestic sources of coal supply began in May


\textsuperscript{105} Zambia Industrial Bulletin 1, 16 (1967), p.3.
1965 following the establishment of the National Coal Supply Commission. Through this organisation, Nkandabwe coal mines were opened in 1966. Meanwhile, the search for other better deposits of coal continued. In 1966, the National Coal Board (NCB) was created to further develop and establish an independent coal mining industry in Zambia. Following the dissolution of NCB, the coal industry was transferred to the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO) which established its subsidiary, Maamba Collieries Limited as an agency responsible for the production of coal. The development of Maamba Colliery witnessed an increase in coal production such that by 1971 coal imports from Rhodesia had been replaced by local supplies.\(^{106}\)

In 1973, Indeco commissioned the first national petroleum refinery at Ndola called the Indeni Oil Refinery. It was established with a total refinery capacity of 650,000 tonnes of crude oil per annum. Together with the strategic TAZAMA Oil Pipeline which was completed earlier in 1968, the Indeni Oil Refinery contributed significantly towards eliminating the problem of rampant fuel shortages that engulfed the Zambian economy following UDI. It assisted immensely in making Zambia become self-reliant in the production of petroleum products. Other diversification efforts involved the construction of Kafue Gorge and Kariba North Bank hydro electric power stations in 1972 and 1976 by a Yugoslav firm and by the Italians, respectively.\(^{107}\) These projects did not only contribute hugely towards meeting Zambia’s energy needs but also laid a strong base for the country to become self-sufficient in the energy sector.

Furthermore, TAZARA was established in June 1975 through a tripartite arrangement involving the governments of Republic of Zambia, the United Republic of

Tanzania and the People’s Republic of China. Earlier attempts by the Zambian government to engage Britain and the USA to help build the rail line proved futile. The railway line stretches from Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia’s Central Province through the Northern Province to the Tanzanian town of Dar-es-Salaam covering a distance of 1,860 km (1,156 miles). The establishment of the railway line made a significant contribution towards mitigation of Zambia’s transport problems.  

In addition to the above major projects, the Zambian government established numerous manufacturing industries as part of its policy of promoting import substitution industries and diversification. They were designed to utilize local raw materials in the production process in order to meet local demand. The idea was to substitute imported goods for locally manufactured goods. The associated industries in which Indeco took a controlling interest included related industries such as textiles, fertilizers, explosives, beer, building materials, cement, sugar, tyres, wire and cable, bags, clay pipes as well as rural industries such as canning and cotton ginnery.

The policy of import substitution was not only unique to Zambia. It was a common feature of newly independent states in Africa. Most newly independent African countries adopted policies of import substitution as part of their wider industrial development strategies designed to protect and promote local industries. In the case

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109 During a speech at Mulungushi, President Kaunda listed these industries in which Indeco had a major stake. See UNIP1/3/3 speeches by his Excellency, the president Dr K.D Kaunda, ‘Guidance for the Next Decade.’ His Excellency the President, Dr. Kaunda’s Address to the UNIP National Council at Mulungushi, November 9 1968, see also Second Development Plan 1972-1976, pp.19-21.

of Zambia, although it was government’s policy to promote import substitution industries after independence, the strategy of establish import substitution industries was given further impetus by UDI. In other words, in the wake of UDI, the Zambian government pursued the policy of promoting import substitution industries with renewed vitality and determination. Not only did the Zambian government pursue a policy of establishing new industries after independence, it also took over some of the already existing industries from private ownership through major economic reforms announced in the late 1960’s.\textsuperscript{111}

Increased state participation in the Zambian economy engendered by the economic reforms consequently raised Indeco’s investment portfolio from one company in 1965 to a total of fifty-nine in 1968.\textsuperscript{112} The foregoing statistics suggesting a growing number of state investments in industries held by Indeco clearly reflected the Zambian government’s determination to advance the country’s development agenda despite economic challenges imposed by UDI.\textsuperscript{113}

Underlying this process of state investment in both new and old manufacturing industries was the creation of employment for the local people within the Indeco group. For instance, in 1965 employment within the Indeco group formed less than twenty but by 1969, the number swelled to 20,000. In 1971, it was estimated that a total of 38,200

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\textsuperscript{112} UNIP1/3/3 His Excellency’s address to the UNIP National Council at Mulungushi, p. 8, See also UNIP1/3/3 Budget Address by his honour the vice President, Mr. Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe delivered to the National Assembly, January 30, 1969. He noted that following the Mulungushi Economic Reforms, Indeco increased its activities such that at the end of 1968, the corporation held investments of roughly K30m in equities and K10m in loans, together K40m, compared with K15m at the end of 1967.
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\textsuperscript{113} See UNIP1/3/3 Address by His Excellency the president, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda to parliament on the Dissolution of the First National Assembly and Achievements over the Past Five Years 2\textsuperscript{nd} November, 1968.
persons were employed in the manufacturing sector. By 1976, the manufacturing sector accounted for 13.3 per cent of total wage employment in the country as against 9.2 per cent in 1970, the largest in any sector and indicative of the rate of industrialization.\textsuperscript{114}

Thus, far from seeing UDI entirely as a tragic episode, Zambian decision makers perceived in UDI an opportunity that could be turned to the county’s advantage. This view was confirmed from statements of Zambian leaders. As early as 1966 President Kaunda expressed optimism and determination to change the misfortune of UDI into a blessing.\textsuperscript{115} John Hatch noted that far from fearing Rhodesia, Zambian ministers claimed that the UDI crisis had stimulated them into finding new channels of trade routes “which otherwise would have taken them much longer to develop.”\textsuperscript{116} In August 1968, Justin Chimba, the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Foreign Trade pointed to the remarkable progress in industrial development which had been made urgently by UDI. In October, the Minister of Local Government, Sikota Wina said in parliament that through UDI, Zambia had entered maturity while the Minister of Works and Housing, Peter Matoka stated that UDI had provided the impulse to already existing plans for the diversification of imports and exports. In July 1969, Vice President Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe noted that the completion of the maintenance base at Lusaka’s International Airport marked “one more stage in our national progress toward self sufficiency in the vital sector of aviation.”\textsuperscript{117} The foregoing statements clearly

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[114] UNIP1/3/3 His Excellency’s address to the UNIP National Council Mulungushi November 9, 1968, see also Second National Development Plan 1972-1976, p.94.
\item[115] Times of Zambia, December 17, 1966.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
demonstrated that the Zambian government fully exploited the crisis induced by UDI to advance the country’s development agenda.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, we have endeavoured to discuss the impact of Rhodesia’s UDI on the Zambian economy. We have noted that as a result of UDI, the subsequent border closure and application of economic sanctions against Rhodesia, the Zambian economy incurred huge financial costs. Given the landlocked nature of the country, there was considerable diversion of resources from long-term development to meeting the exigencies of the diversion of the import and export trade through various alternative routes. In this connection, the Zambian government incurred the costs related to constructing reliable and efficient access routes to the sea, transit costs such as customs, insurance and several other miscellaneous charges. Taken together, these greatly contributed to raising import costs of essential goods, translating into increased prices and subsequently, the escalation of the cost of living for the general citizenry in Zambia. Apart from raising the costs of production and drastically reducing production levels in the mining sector, UDI also necessitated distortions in resource allocation priorities whereby the basic human needs gave way to the country’s need for an improved transport and communication system.

We have also noted that despite the enormous strain UDI placed on the Zambian economy, in the long run, it stimulated economic development. The Zambian government took advantage of the challenges imposed by UDI to lay the foundation for the country’s economic development concurrently through its policies of disengagement, diversification and promotion of import substitution industries. Thus
UDI served a dual purpose. While the immediate post UDI crisis effects were adverse in nature the long term implications were positive in character.
Chapter Three

The Impact of Rhodesia’s UDI on Zambia’s Socio-Political Developments

Introduction

The proclamation of Rhodesia’s UDI on 11 November 1965 provoked stern opposition from the Zambian government primarily because it perceived the development as a threat to the country’s national security. In this regard, the Zambian government called upon the British government to immediately quell the rebellion by use of force. Zambia’s unwavering opposition of UDI severely strained the country’s domestic political processes. Opposition political parties, the members of parliament and the business community in Zambia maintained that the Zambian government’s hostile policy on UDI was inimical to the country’s economic interest. Consequently, they urged the Zambian government to reconsider its foreign policy on Rhodesia’s UDI.

In view of the foregoing, this chapter investigates the impact of UDI in Rhodesia on socio-political developments in Zambia. This analysis is based on the assumption that foreign and domestic policies and actions are related, especially for states characterized by a high level of dependence.\(^\text{118}\) The chapter is subdivided into four sections. The first section deals with race relations as constituting one aspect of the social effects of UDI in Zambia. The second part examines strained relations between Zambia and British over UDI. The third section investigates the correlation between UDI and internal politics in Zambia while the last segment discusses the link between the business community and the Zambian government vis-à-vis UDI.

An assessment of Zambia’s response to UDI and an evaluation of how this political development affected socio-political processes in Zambia should be seen in the wider context of the anti-colonial struggle in Africa and southern Africa in particular. Zambia’s attainment of independence placed her in the vanguard of the struggle against white minority rule in southern Africa. The establishment of an illegal white supremacist regime in Rhodesia not only compromised the decolonization process in southern Africa, but also presented an enormous challenge for Zambia’s socio-political stability.

The announcement of Rhodesia’s UDI in 1965 roused worldwide public outrage and the international community expressed solidarity with the Zambian government. President Kaunda was among the first African leaders to denounce it as a perfidious act. While condemning it as a treasonable act, he did not indicate what his government would do in response. This hesitation reflected Zambia’s ambiguous position. Zambia was tied economically to a country which the leadership in Zambia felt bound to oppose. The Zambian authorities were concerned that the development of UDI south of its border would forestall the anti-colonial struggle and “perpetuate the rule of a tiny white settler minority in a preponderantly black neighbouring country.”

119 NAZ MFA 1/1/38 Loc 498 International Reaction to UDI, 1965.
More crucially, in Zambia’s view, Rhodesia’s UDI posed a serious threat to the country’s national security.

**UDI presented a real political, military and security threat to Zambia’s survival.** Politically, UDI constituted a threat because of the strong ideological stance Zambia adopted against the regime she had strong economic ties with. The illegal regime in Rhodesia presented a security threat essentially because it was militarily stronger than Zambia.\(^\text{122}\) Given UDI’s threats to Zambia’s national security, Mtshali noted that the Zambian government mobilized the citizenry in confronting the rebel regime in Rhodesia. It enlisted the support of the people in its response to UDI. It regarded UDI as a convenient opportunity for rallying domestic support behind its policy of disengagement.\(^\text{123}\)

Similarly, in his assessment of the Zambian government policy initiatives and the interface between these initiatives and the views of ordinary Zambians *vis-à-vis* UDI, Kanduza contended that Zambia’s leaders and the ruling party UNIP could be considered to have reacted to the illegal government in Rhodesia as an organic social movement. In his view, the UNIP government mobilized many diverse social groups and asserted its hegemony over a social movement or process which was strongly opposed to UDI. Furthermore, Kanduza argued that despite the threats posed by UDI, the UNIP government continued with its programmes to show that political independence was better than colonialism. He noted that in terms of the UNIP social

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and economic policies at independence, the government provided free education and free medical services from 1966 despite the fact that UDI had raised new priorities regarding peace and safeguarding national independence. Consequently, Kanduza concluded that many Zambians trusted and supported their government’s confrontational stance against UDI in Rhodesia.\(^{124}\)

However, Mtshali’s and Kanduza’s argument that the UNIP government rallied domestic support in its response to UDI and that diverse social groups supported the government’s confrontational stance against the illegal regime is not entirely true and needs a critical examination. While it is partly true that Zambians supported their government’s hostile policy on UDI, available evidence suggests that such domestic support was confined to the immediate post UDI period. While acting initially as a unifying factor among Zambians, the vexing economic problems unleashed by UDI matured into social and political discontent.\(^{125}\) As shall be discussed later in the chapter, the UNIP government faced mounting domestic opposition from various groups to its policy towards UDI.

**Race Relations**

One of the social effects of UDI in Zambia was the adverse repercussions it had on race relations. The question of black and white relations became a regular issue in Zambia’s political discourse after UDI was proclaimed. The underlying cause of heightened racial tension between Africans and whites was supposedly sympathetic attitude displayed by the white community in Zambia towards the Rhodesian act of

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\(^{125}\) R. Mushota, “Zambian Politics: Where are the Choices?” *The University Observer: For Unity and Truth* 1, 3 October 29 (1971), p.5.
rebellion. Europeans of Rhodesian, South African and British descent constituted a substantial part of the white community in Zambia. In 1966, the population of Zambia was 3.8 million of which nearly 70,000 were Europeans and 10,000 Asians. Over half of Europeans lived on the Copperbelt, 18% in Lusaka, and some 95% in all near the line of rail from the Copperbelt to the Victoria Falls.\textsuperscript{126}

Generally, the majority of whites resident in Zambia were not only irreconcilably opposed to African rule in Zambia but were widely and plausibly thought to favour the continuation of white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa. Such racial attitudes had roots in pre-independence days. The Copperbelt Europeans comprising mainly Afrikaner and Rhodesian miners were arguably among the most ardent racialists in Africa who threatened every form of resistance to African government. For instance in 1961, they sent two delegations to London to warn MPs in the British government of the consequences to be expected from a Northern Rhodesian black government. Their opposition to an African government was muted after independence, but UDI awakened them again.\textsuperscript{127}

The racial attitude exhibited by the white community, expressed through their active or passive support for and sympathy towards UDI directly challenged Zambia’s aspiration of building a colour-blind society. UDI immeasurably compromised Zambia’s attempt to build a non-racial society and threatened “racial accommodation and harmonious integrative development of Zambia’s social order.”\textsuperscript{128} In the wake of

\textsuperscript{126} R. L. Sklar, “Zambia’s Response to UDI” Mawazo 1, 3 (1968), p.29.
\textsuperscript{127} Africa Confidential 1 January 6 (1967), p.8.
\textsuperscript{128} UNIP 7/23/5 Foreign Affairs Statements 1966, see Speech by the Vice President of the Republic of Zambia at the Emergency Commonwealth Conference on Rhodesia at Lagos, January, 1966. See also His Excellency’s Address to Parliament, Zambia Hansard no. 5c, Daily Hansard Thursday 9\textsuperscript{th} December 1965 Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Second Session of the First National Assembly (Resumed) (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 91-100., Legum, Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda, p.244., Zambia
UDI, the Zambian government became preoccupied with security problems. Its leadership became acutely concerned with and curiously suspicious of the presence of whites in Zambia especially the expatriate workers who occupied senior positions in strategic institutions such as the police, state security and the military. Inevitably, the Zambian government became excessively conscious of its own vulnerability to subversion particularly because it increasingly became difficult to guard against the danger posed by expatriate personnel whose loyalty it was impossible to check.\textsuperscript{129} Evidence suggests that Zambia’s intelligence service was heavily penetrated by Smith’s agents. Among the white population sympathetic to UDI in Zambia, there were some collaborators of the Rhodesian spy network. Worse still, many key people in the Rhodesian military, state security and special branch had worked in Zambia before.\textsuperscript{130}

Potential threats to national security were not only confined to expatriate personnel in security institutions. The expatriate labour force in the mining industry, the backbone of the Zambia’s economy was equally suspected of subversive activities. At the end of 1965 in Zambia’s crucial mining industry, 40\% of the expatriate workers consisting of 6,500 employees were South Africans. Many more, in all branches of industry, professional and public employment were South Africans at heart intending to settle there at some future time.\textsuperscript{131} It was widely believed within the Zambian government that white miners on the Copperbelt were actively involved in subversive

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\textit{Information Services, Press Release no.1720} 22 October 1965, see His Excellency’s Address at the National Rally, Kitwe, Sunday 24 October, 1965.


\textsuperscript{131} Sklar, “Zambia’s Response to UDI”, p.29.
activities calculated to destabilize the Zambian economy.\textsuperscript{132} The industrial action taken by white miners in February 1966 fuelled government’s suspicion that expatriate workers were bent on destroying the country’s economy. On 7 and 8 February 1966, approximately one thousand four hundred European mineworkers stopped work at Nchanga and Nkana mines in protest against delays in negotiations between their unions (the Mine Workers’ Society and the Mines Officials and Salaried Staff Association) and the mining companies over new expatriate contracts. They were also concerned about lack of guarantees from the Zambian government that savings and pensions fund accumulations should be externalized from the country.\textsuperscript{133} The Zambian government interpreted the strike action by white miners on the Copperbelt as an act of sabotage instigated by the minority white government in Rhodesia. Addressing the nation on 22 and 26 February 1966, President Kaunda branded striking white mine workers as “the supporters of foreign interests” “working hand in hand with our enemies” with “no interests of the country at heart.”\textsuperscript{134} It is plausible to suggest that the strike action by expatriate miners was triggered by genuine demands. However, the fact that the industrial action was taken three months after UDI, it was construed by the Zambian government as a seditious act taken in sympathy with Ian Smith and calculated to destabilize Zambia’s economy.

Various incidents of sabotage which became rampant during the first few months after UDI lent credence to government’s suspicion about the potential threat to


\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Africa Confidential} no.6 March 18 (1966), p.7 and \textit{Africa Research Bulletin} 3, 2 (1966), p.479A.

\textsuperscript{134} See Zambia Information Services Press Release no.365/66 ‘President Warns Mining Workers’ Text of a broadcast to the nation by President Kaunda, Tuesday February 22, 1966 and Zambia Information Services Press Release no. 402/66 ‘President Extends Powers, Restricts Miners’ Union Leaders’. See also \textit{Africa Research Bulletin} 3, 3 (1966), p.484B.
national security posed by white residents in Zambia. For instance in November 1965, saboteurs blasted an electric pylon and crippled the Copperbelt’s vital power link with Kariba. The following year in August, a 44-gallon drum of diesel oil exploded in a line of fuel drums at Lusaka airport. In September 1966, an explosion tore a three-foot hole in the bottom of an oil storage tank at Lusaka’s industrial site. In addition, in October 1966, a fire broke out at a Kitwe oil depot destroying 400,000 gallons of fuel. Believing that saboteurs were responsible, Africans in Kitwe rioted and a European woman, Mrs. Myburgh was killed after being hit in the chest by a stone thrown through the windscreen of her vehicle. Just before the Kitwe fire, a plot to destroy Kafue Railway Bridge and other vital installations involving American, British and Israeli nationals was detected by the Israeli secret service and disclosed to the Zambian government. Such increasing incidents of sabotage and the general belief that the majority of Europeans sympathized with UDI created an atmosphere of insecurity in Zambia. It provoked the Zambian government to swing into action. It embarked on a series of arrests, detentions and deportation of whites suspected of involvement in racially instigated subversive activities.

For instance, on 14 July 1966, fifteen senior European special branch officers were dismissed from the Zambia Police and declared prohibited immigrants, and subsequently deported. In October, twenty-five whites consisting of Rhodesian, South African and British citizens were deported for promoting “racial or industrial


unrest to the detriment of Zambia’s national unity and security.” In April 1967, five Europeans were detained by order of the President under regulations in force for the preservation of public security. They were allegedly involved in “subversive or racial activities” and subsequently charged for being “agents of Rhodesian intelligence operating in Zambia.” The tribunal investigating the matter concluded that they had been a “very real threat to the security of Zambia”. Consequently, they were deported. In 1971, the Zambian government dismissed 17 expatriate army and two air force officers from the Zambian defence forces.

The crisis that occurred between the executive and the judiciary earlier in July 1969 was part of wider strained race relations which dominated Zambia’s domestic politics since UDI. The release of two Portuguese soldiers by the Zambian High Court, then exclusively European in composition, after they had crossed into Zambia from Angola, convinced some Zambians that white people could not be trusted. Feeling was particularly strong against the Chief Justice, James John Skinner for defending Justice Ifor Evans who had given a “political judgment” over the matter. Members of the Zambia Youth Service demonstrated against the Chief Justice at the High Court. The youths carried placards which read: “Revoke Skinner’s appointment now”, “The

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only good white man is a dead one”, “White men cannot become Zambians,” among others. Skinner and other High Court Judges subsequently resigned.

The foregoing developments reflected heightened racial tension in the country and Zambia’s preoccupation with wider security problems engendered by UDI. However, the dismissal of expatriate workers should also be seen in the wider context of the policy of Zambianization which had been a deliberate policy of the Zambian government since independence. After independence, it became inevitable to progressively replace Europeans with indigenous Zambian personnel. But the process was fraught with difficulties given the scarcity of skilled manpower at independence due to insufficient educational facilities provided for Africans by the colonial regime. Clearly, the Zambian government perceived the whole question of race relations in the broader context of security problems unleashed by the Rhodesian act of rebellion. The Zambian authorities were convinced that Britain’s weak approach to UDI was the underlying cause for many of the racial difficulties in the country. Hence, they repeatedly called on Britain to use force to quell the rebellion. Britain’s refusal to act decisively to resolve UDI became a dominant theme which governed Zambia’s strained relations with her former colonial power. In Zambia’s view, the British government was reluctant to use force to crush UDI because they sought to protect their ‘kith-and-kin’ in Rhodesia.

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UDI and the Zambia-British Relations

Strained relations between Zambia and Britain vis-à-vis UDI emerged from differences in approach to the question of resolving the crisis. When UDI was proclaimed, the three strategies proposed for ending the rebellion were military force, economic sanctions and political negotiations. The aspect of using force to quell UDI was the principle cause of misunderstandings and subsequently strained relations between Zambia and Britain. Controversy concerning the use of force in Rhodesia arose in three different contexts, corresponding to the three more or less distinct phases in the Rhodesian crisis: the period prior to UDI, the immediate aftermath of UDI and the years since, following the consolidation of settler support for Ian Smith’s regime, and the failure of economic sanctions to bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months.\footnote{Anglin and Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy, p.114.}

Prior to UDI, President Kaunda called on the British government to take pre-emptive military action to prevent UDI. In Zambia’s view, the use of force constituted the best strategy for the quick resolution of Rhodesia’s UDI. When UDI was finally proclaimed, it simply reinforced the view of the Zambian government that force was not only the best option but the only viable option. Zambia revived calls for British military intervention to crush UDI with greater intensity.\footnote{See His Excellency’s Address to Parliament, Zambia Hansard no.5c Daily Hansard Thursday 9\textsuperscript{th} December, 1965 Official Verbatim Report of the Second Session of the First National Assembly (Resumed) (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1965), pp.91-100.} However, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson rejected the use of force in preference to imposing economic sanctions as a strategy of resolving UDI. The Zambian government was skeptical with the use of economic sanctions as an instrument to “topple Smith’s regime in Rhodesia.
because of the help that the rebels were receiving from countries like South Africa.”

Despite expressing pessimism in British sanctions policy, the Zambian government agreed to cooperate with Britain in implementing the sanctions.

After attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference convened in Lagos to discuss the Rhodesian act of rebellion, Wilson arrived in Lusaka on 13 January 1966 for talks with President Kaunda. During the talks, he assured President Kaunda that Britain would impose new sanctions on Rhodesia. After the talks, Wilson noted that Zambia and Britain were “nearer to each other than ever before.” On the other hand, when President Kaunda was asked on whether he would attend the Commonwealth meeting agreed on at the Lagos Conference and slated for July 1966, he confidently stated that “I don’t for one moment think that Smith will be in power then.”

However, President Kaunda was profoundly incensed when he learnt about Wilson’s announcement in the House of Commons on 27 April 1966 that his government would hold informal talks with the Rhodesian government to see whether a basis for negotiations for Rhodesian’s return to constitutional rule “genuinely existed.”

Addressing the nation on radio and television on 24 May 1966, President Kaunda angrily stated that he was “utterly contemptuous” of Britain’s handling of the Rhodesian situation. He noted that the British government’s policy had been “shifty and evasive” and that by holding informal talks with Rhodesian officials, it had given de facto recognition to Mr. Ian Smith’s government.

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President Kaunda was infuriated with the fact that while he had made economic sacrifices by faithfully committing the country to British sponsored sanctions against Rhodesia, the British government did not enforce the sanctions to make them effective. The “quick kill” of the Rhodesian rebellion which the British government predicted at the Commonwealth Conference in Lagos had not been achieved. Worse still, the financial assistance which the British government promised the Zambian government to meet the cost of Zambia’s participation in the economic sanctions did not materialize. There was crisis of confidence in British intentions.

Furthermore, during a rally in Lusaka on 22 May 1966, President Kaunda stated that he would propose the expulsion of Britain from the Commonwealth unless she resolved UDI before the Commonwealth Heads of State Conference in July 1966. However the announcement by the British government of the postponement of the Conference from July to September deeply angered President Kaunda. The move further strained Anglo-Zambian relations in general and particularly President Kaunda’s confrontation with Wilson. President Kaunda had hoped to see a quick resolution of UDI before the conference. In his view, the postponement of the conference was a breach of faith for which he held Wilson personally accountable. Clearly, President Kaunda felt betrayed and in anger he threatened to pull out of the Commonwealth. On 13 July 1966, he reiterated that:

While the British government may have the ability to organise the calling of the Commonwealth Conference in September instead of July, when in fact the present problems calls for it, they have no ability to organise me to remain within that organisation. What I have worked for is my country to remain in a Commonwealth in which there lies sincerity and not cleverness of organisation- I repeat cleverness of

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organisation can be likened to a body without soul. I want to admit this has been and is still an agonizing period. But if leaving the Commonwealth is the only way Zambia can show that soulless cleverness wins rounds but not victories, then we must take this step.\textsuperscript{152}

The foregoing statement clearly revealed President Kaunda’s exasperation towards Britain’s disingenuous handling of the Rhodesian problem. It brought to the fore an often recurring problem in international relations, the limitation of weak countries to influence powerful countries to take decisions perceived inimical to their interest.

President Kaunda’s disappointment with Britain’s failure to act decisively to resolve UDI demonstrated that the issue had become deeply integrated in Zambia’s domestic politics. UDI assumed a dominant role in public statements by senior Zambian government officials. At various times during the period under review, Zambian ministers mounted diplomatic offensive against Britain, expressing disgust at her failure to crush UDI. Such statements were a clear expression of their frustration, bitterness and anger directed towards Britain for its failed policy on Rhodesia’s UDI. For instance, on 14 April 1967, Zambia’s High Commissioner to Britain designate, Ali Simbule said at a Conference in Dar-es Salaam that Britain was a “humbled, toothless bulldog which feared the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith and was wagging its tail in front of

\textsuperscript{152} Africa Research Bulletin 3, 4 (1966), p.515B.  
him.” In June, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe declared that:

The British government are a cowardly toothless hyenas … they are running away. They have upset our economy. They should not hide like cowardly hyenas. They should come out and tell us what they are going to do after the failure of sanctions.

What exasperated the Zambian government further was the realization that sanctions had failed because European oil companies which included British oil companies had been secretly supplying oil to Rhodesia. In February 1968, President Kaunda told a press conference that Britain had been “part and parcel of those gangster nations which have broken UN sanctions against the supply of petrol and oil to Rhodesia.” Additionally, in a ministerial statement to Parliament in March 1969, Zambia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Elijah Mudenda branded Harold Wilson as a “ruthless racialist” for his failure to use force to crush the rebellion in Rhodesia because Ian Smith presided over a white government in Rhodesia. In Zambia’s view, the British “gradual policy of sanctions” was a dismal and tragic failure because they were “applied selectively and enforced half-heartedly.” More crucially, South Africa’s strategic position

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**Notes:**


155 Times of Zambia February 16 1968. See also the publication of the Bingham Report in Africa Research Bulletin 15, 9 (1978), pp.4997-4998A. President Kaunda made reference to the same report; see UNIP/3/23 ‘Blue Print for Economic Development: A Guide on How to Clear Obstacles,’ Address by his Excellency the President Dr. K.D Kaunda at Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka October 8 1978. The report stated in part that successive British governments knew that the British oil companies Shell and British Petroleum (BP) and their subsidiaries in South Africa were taking part in arrangements designed to maintain Rhodesia’s oil supplies at various times in the past ten years.


157 UNIP/7/23/28 Foreign Affairs Correspondent 1971 see address by Hon. Elijah H. K. Mudenda, M.P Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zambia to the Twenty-Sixth Session of the United Nations
determined the effectiveness of economic sanctions. In defiance of the United Nations resolutions in 1965 calling on all countries to boycott Rhodesia after Smith proclaimed UDI, South Africa chose to assist Rhodesia by continuing to trade with the illegal regime. Hence Rhodesia was able to survive the sanctions.158

The Zambian government continued to attack Britain for its policy on UDI after she assumed the Chairmanship of the OAU in 1970. Speaking in 1970 in London while on a mission to persuade Western Powers, particularly members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to withdraw military support from South Africa, President Kaunda accused the British Prime Minister Edward Heath of giving South Africa a “badge of respectability” and called for the expulsion of Britain from the Commonwealth following Britain’s announcement of her intentions to sell arms to South Africa. Speaking later in Lusaka, President Kaunda, in an apparent reference to Edward Heath, called on the Zambian people not to hate the British people for the “stupidity of one man even if he is their leader.”159 The Zambian government construed the British government’s proposed resumption of arms sales to South Africa as an indirect way of strengthening Smith’s illegal regime since the British government was aware of South Africa’s declared support of Ian Smith.160


158 For details of the effects of economic sanctions on Rhodesia, see NAZCO17/1/17 Loc 6921 Intelligence Reports: Rhodesia and UDI, 1966. ‘Confidential Intelligence Reports no. 1-17, February 22-June 1966.’


160 UNIP7/19/3 Address by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. K. D. Kaunda on the occasion of the opening of the Third Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, 8th September, 1970., UNIP 7/23/28 Foreign Affairs Correspondence 1971, Address by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia and Chairman of the O.A.U to the Eighth Ordinary
The intensification of Rhodesian military attacks against Zambia, especially in the late 1970s further complicated relations between Zambia and Britain over Rhodesia’s UDI. In Zambia’s view, UDI was a brainchild of the British government and she had the legal authority to resolve the crisis. Thus, the Zambian government regarded the infrastructural damage caused by Rhodesia’s military attacks in the country as a British responsibility for which Zambia had a legal right to make legitimate claim for compensation. But the British government was not prepared to accept any responsibility for the damages caused by the Rhodesian bombings.161

For instance in November 1979, the British High Commissioner to Zambia Sir Leonard Allison was expelled from Zambia when he refused to accept British responsibility for Rhodesian military attacks against Zambia after President Kaunda demanded for compensation. Addressing University of Zambia (UNZA) students who had staged a demonstration at the British High Commission in Lusaka, President Kaunda said that “Sir Leonard Allison had become irrelevant” and that the “man cannot operate here anymore.” And in London it was reported that the High Commissioner had been recalled for “consultations in view of recent strains in Anglo-Zambian relations.”162 During the same month, in reference to Sir Allison, Foreign Affairs Minister Wilson Chakulya reiterated that:

I told him in no uncertain terms that he had committed a serious breach of diplomatic etiquette by replying soon after the president had spoken. The High Commissioner displayed utter cheek and

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arrogance parallel to the NAZI ambassadors in occupied Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{163}

Chakulya further branded Britain as “a spineless hyena without political morals when it comes to supporting the white race.” He contended that successive British governments lied that they were bent on destroying the rebels when they declared UDI but their intentions were to destroy Zambia. “They … supported those outlaws with oil, money and military hardware … and sustained the Rhodesian regime for 14 years. Zambia is determined to fight this in court.”\textsuperscript{164}

The foregoing developments reflected the extent to which Anglo-Zambian relations became strained over the question of resolving UDI. The Zambian government held the view that Britain could not act resolutely to quell UDI by using force because “Smith and his criminals in Rhodesia are of the same blood as the people in England.”\textsuperscript{165} However, in its response to the Rhodesian act of rebellion, the Zambian government also encountered domestic political opposition from the Members of Parliament.

**UDI and Internal Politics**

The first four years following the announcement of UDI, the Zambian government requested for British military intervention, participated in the economic sanctions against Rhodesia and sought international assistance for defence and transportation as part of its wider response to UDI. These government policies were subjected to criticism by opposition MPs. In response to government’s call for British intervention, African National Congress (ANC), Monze MP, Harry Mwaanga

\textsuperscript{163} Times of Zambia November 23 1979.
\textsuperscript{164} Times of Zambia November 23 1979.
\textsuperscript{165} Zambia Hansard no.7m, p.653.
Nkumbula warned that “if war was staged here and the British started fighting Smith, we will be the people who will suffer most.” He reiterated that “it is very unwise policy to quarrel with your neighbour ….” In August 1966, an ANC MP for Namwala, Edward Mungoni Liso expressed surprise that the government insisted on urging Britain to attack Rhodesia to resolve UDI because “Britain has plainly said that she will not fight Rhodesia … we go on crying like babies … we are just disgracing ourselves.” In a later session, Liso castigated the government’s call for use of force to crush UDI because such a policy amounted to “provocation” which could create a situation where the safety of our people would not be guaranteed “if the worst comes to the worst.”

In addition, Liso accused the government of trying to impress other African countries when the government went public in announcing that Zambia would be used as a base for British military intervention against Rhodesia. In his view, the negotiations to allow Britain to establish a base in Zambia to fight Rhodesia “should have been kept secret.”

During the mid-1966 debates, an independent M.P for Ndola, Cecil Denniston Burney expressed worry that in the stand against Smith, “no one is taking an open risk …. At this stage in our development we cannot afford to either … because no one is going to look after us except ourselves.” Nkumbula contended that Zambia was the “only country in the world that has thrown its strength in the liberation movements of Rhodesian Africans.” He feared that “in the shortest possible time Zambia would be left

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alone in the struggle. In conclusion, he asked, “who is going to pay? Zambians again!” In 1967, Burney expressed doubt as to whether Zambia’s confrontational stance against UDI in Rhodesia was in the best interest of the country. He urged the government to “defuse this situation so we could get back to a more normal form of life.” Another independent M.P for Midlands, Hugh Robert Merys Mitchley suggested to the Zambian government that “what is needed is a policy for all countries to stop arguing with their neighbours and get on with their development.” In 1968, an ANC MP for Mbabala, Edward Hachilapa Nyanga argued that government’s altercation attitude towards UDI made it difficult for the warring parties in Rhodesia to negotiate. He urged the Zambian government to negotiate with the Rhodesian government in a peaceful manner instead of threatening war. Similarly, Richard Evelyn Farmer, an Independent MP for Copperbelt Central advised the Zambian government to carryout a “reassessment” of its foreign policy on Rhodesia and see whether “the policy cannot be modified into a more conciliatory one.”

Evidently, the above mentioned MPs’ criticism of the Zambian government’s confrontational policy on Rhodesia reflected a common view shared by the majority of Zambians that opposing UDI was undermining the country’s economic stability. In short, by opposing UDI, the Zambian government was overstraining its resources and

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170 See Zambia Hansard no.11. p. 8 and 25.

incurring unnecessary expenses, a development which proved detrimental to the country’s economy.

Furthermore, opposition MPs adopted a critical approach to government’s strategies designed to beef up the country’s defence and transportation sectors in the wake of UDI. In December 1965, Liso questioned government’s practical wisdom by simultaneously sending high powered missions to “two opposing camps,” Washington and Moscow because “America will not work for the same purpose as Russia at the same time in one place.” In 1966 Burney questioned the feasibility of the proposed railway to Tanzania. A year later, his colleague ridiculed the railroad as a wanton extravagance and waste of public money.” During the October debates, Nkumbula derided the frequent overseas trip by government ministers as expensive and bad for Zambia.

The imposition of the state of emergency by the Zambian government was another aspect which evoked stern political denigration from opposition MPs. Every six months the government sought parliamentary approval to extend the emergency regulations. The basis for seeking parliamentary endorsement rested on government’s firm conviction that she needed to exercise a wide range of powers in order to deal with security problems created by UDI. Although the initial cause for imposition of the state of emergency was the Lenshina Uprising of 1964 and subsequently UDI in 1965, opposition MPs expressed concern that the government was seeking new justification

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172 Zambia Hansard no. 5f, p. 228.
174 The state of emergency was first imposed on 27 July 1964 initially to deal with the Lumpa Crisis. In the wake of UDI on 11 November 1965, the regulations were extended to cover the whole country. See Zambia Hansard no.6p Daily Hansard Tuesday 5th April 1966 Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Third Session of the First National Assembly (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), p.1028. see also Zambia Hansard no. 5c, p.93.
for its extension.\textsuperscript{175} MPs opposed the extension of the state of emergency because it was not serving its intended purpose, that is, to deal with security problems unleashed by UDI. They broadly interpreted government’s moves to extend emergency regulations as a tool designed to strengthen its coercive apparatus in order to crack down on dissent in the country.

Matoka and Kapulu contended that opposition MPs criticized the government in parliament because they were in opposition. They further noted that opposition MPs adopted a critical approach on government policy on Rhodesia’s UDI because they were not privy to the information in government’s custody regarding the security situation in the country caused by UDI.\textsuperscript{176} Contrary to Matoka and Kapulu’s assertion, criticism of the government by the opposition MPs reflected a general domestic discontent with government’s confrontational policy on Rhodesia’s UDI. The critical approach the MPs took against the government was serious enough to evoke government’s accusation that Zambia’s opposition political parties conspired with minority governments in Rhodesia and South Africa to undermine the authority of the Zambian government.

Between 1964 and 1972, the major political parties which dominated Zambia’s political scene were the United Party (UP), African National congress (ANC) and the United Progressive Party (UPP). The nature of these opposition political parties was such that they drew support from particular ethnic groups and established their power bases in certain regions. The UP and ANC were strongly associated with the Lozi in

\textsuperscript{175} See Zambia Hansard no 11, pp.9-10, 22. Zambia Hansard no. 17, p.2324 and 2341.
\textsuperscript{176} Matoka interview cited, Kapulu interview cited.
Western Province and Tonga in Southern Province, respectively. The UPP drew its support from the Bemba in Northern and Copperbelt Provinces.\textsuperscript{177}

UP’s existence was short-lived. It was formed in 1966 by Nalumino Mundia and two years later it was banned by the UNIP government on grounds that the party was prejudicial to public order. The consequences of proscribing UP were that during the general elections of 1968, most of the former UP members joined ANC (whose existence dated back to pre independence days) and were elected on the ANC ticket. The ANC became an effective opposition party between 1968 and 1973. The immediate result of UNIP’s relative poor performance was an increase in the virulence of government propaganda against the opposition.\textsuperscript{178} The Zambian government accused the ANC of receiving financial support from Rhodesian and South African white minority governments.\textsuperscript{179} Such accusations reflected UNIP’s grand strategy to silence domestic political opposition. Consequently ANC was banned from operating in certain regions of the country.\textsuperscript{180}

The formation of UPP in August 1971 by Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, a former Vice President ushered in a new phase in Zambia’s domestic political opposition to the UNIP government. Kapwepwe presented a real challenge to UNIP’s political dominance in general and in particular threatened Kaunda’s presidency. The Zambian government attributed the formation of UPP to minority governments in South Africa

\textsuperscript{178} The ANC defeated their UNIP opponents, including such major figures as Arthur Wina and Munukayumbu Sipalo. A. Martin, Minding Their Own Business: Zambia’s Struggle Against Western Control (London: Penguin Books, 1972), p.168.
\textsuperscript{179} UNIP16/3/15 Press Statements 1963-1970 see Press Release no 7u/press/2 issued at the UNIP Headquarters and Signed by the Election Strategy Committee, 4\textsuperscript{th} December, 1968.

It is difficult to establish whether UPP and ANC sought the assistance of foreign governments to overthrow the Zambian government. It is true that some Zambians connived with foreign agents to carry out treasonable acts such as sabotage.\footnote{Africa Research Bulletin 10, 1 (1973), p.2735C.} However, it is reasonable to suggest that the Zambian government exaggerated the security threat posed by opposition political parties in the country. The Zambian government’s suspicion of Kapwepwe and Nkumbula’s alleged connection with minority governments in the south arose from its assessment of South Africa’s and Rhodesia’s media coverage of Zambia’s opposition political parties. For instance, following the formation of UPP, South African and Rhodesian media intensified their coverage of Zambia’s domestic political scene, predicting the imminent downfall of President Kaunda and the rise to power of Kapwepwe.\footnote{UNIP7/23/28 Foreign Affairs Correspondent 1971 see Southern Africa Press and Radio Review Part One (1) along with cover letter from President Kaunda to the Vice President and all members of the Foreign Affairs Committee 21st October 1971. See also articles “The Second Revolution”, “Kapwepwe Dominates the Copperbelt. Nkumbula has strong support in the South and West. So a Wedge has been Drawn Across Zambia” in Illustrated Life Rhodesia, September 1971.} Intensified coverage of Zambia’s opposition political parties by the Rhodesian and South African media showed that the minority governments became increasingly interested in Zambia’s internal political processes. Undoubtedly, Smith and Vorster (South Africa’s Prime Minister) preferred a change of government in Zambia and sought to exploit to their
advantage, any signs of domestic opposition to the UNIP government especially that Zambia’s leaders had adopted a hostile attitude towards white minority governments.

Furthermore, the Zambian government’s suspicion of UPP and ANC alleged connivance with minority governments was based on Kapwepwe’s and Nkumbula’s position on Zambia’s relations with the white south. Kapwepwe and Nkumbula adopted a pragmatic view of dealing with Rhodesia and South Africa. For instance, Kapwepwe’s political standpoint was more firmly based on what was good for the bulk of (rural) Zambians than that of many leading UNIP politicians. Although he opposed dialogue with the South African apartheid government, he was not against engaging in trade with the white south as long as it benefited the country. Nkumbula adopted a position which favoured dialogue and a return to normal relations with the white south in order to promote accelerated development in Zambia by ridding it of the costly burden of trade route diversification. His policy was similar to that of Malawian President, Hastings Kamuzu Banda.

The Zambian government’s decision to ban UPP should also be seen in the wider context of increased regional insecurity brought about by intensification of liberation struggles. Accusations that UPP plotted to organize a coup were not only symptoms of heightened tensions in the region. They were also as a result of the Zambian government’s frustration in the face of domestic discontent, and of dangers of forcing that discontent underground, tempting it to seek other allies, the army or foreign

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185 *Africa Confidential* 12, 18 (1971), p.3 see also Richard Goff interview with Simon Kapwepwe “Opposition Unwelcome” in *The Guardian* Tuesday November 2 1971. See also *Times of Zambia* December 5 1968. During the campaign for the 1968 general elections, Nkumbula announced that if successful in the election, his party would end all the sanctions because in his view, they had harmed Zambia more than any other member of the UN. He argued that Zambia should not concern herself with the Rhodesian question since it was “primarily a matter between the British government and the people of Rhodesia.”

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Available evidence from Rhodesian intelligence sources revealed that the UPP was actively backed by Rhodesian nationalist guerillas who had established bases in Zambia. The Rhodesian nationalist guerillas also allegedly took keen interest in the demonstrations in 1971 by UNZA students who had openly discredited President Kaunda and accused him of inconsistency with his dealings with the South African regime. The activities of Rhodesian nationalists in Zambia’s domestic politics forced President Kaunda to take precautionary measures against a possible coup d’état assisted by guerilla movements and ordered the ring leaders out of the country.

The political challenge posed by UPP and the increasing regional insecurity engendered by UDI were crucial background factors behind government’s justification for the introduction of the One Party State system. There were several reasons which constrained the Zambian government to introduce the One Party State. From the Zambian government official point of view, introducing the One Party State was necessary to stem both the internal and external threat to national unity. Internally, the mushrooming of political parties, all of which had been organised along sectional and tribal lines threatened national unity. Furthermore, the unity of ruling party UNIP became precarious as a result of intra-party conflicts which inclined towards the championing of tribal and sectional interests. The internal threat to national integration was compounded by the external threat from hostile neighbouring countries.

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189 Chona interview cited, Kapulu interview cited and Matoka interview cited. See also UNIP8/1/13 Reports, Historical Perspective on the One Party Participatory Democracy. see also UNIP7/19/4 Press
Thus the need to foster national development, the growing need for national unity and the fact that hostile neighbours surrounded Zambia were some of the reasons advanced by the UNIP leadership. It was argued that UNIP had always been a majority party and its dominance was merely being formalized. For instance, on 10 July 1972, President Kaunda attacked the critics of the One Party State describing them as “idiots and lost sheep.” He reaffirmed that “those who accuse us of wanting to become dictators must accept as a fact that since independence UNIP has dominated everything in the republic.”

On the other hand, critics of the One Party State contend that the reason for its introduction was based on an overriding desire by President Kaunda and UNIP to retain power. They insist that introducing the One Party State was a move taken to strengthen Kaunda’s own ability to overcome challenges from his political opponents.

However, this author argues that it is not totally justifiable for critics of the One Party State to attribute the reason for its introduction merely on grounds that Kaunda and UNIP sought to perpetuate themselves in power. Critics of One Party State trivialize the external and internal political realities that prevailed at the time. While it is true that President Kaunda had always entertained the idea of introducing the One Party State since independence, the general atmosphere of insecurity unleashed by UDI and escalating wars of liberation in the region were real and they presented an enormous

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challenge to Zambia’s political stability. Given the prevailing atmosphere of insecurity at the time, allowing the continuation and practise of plural politics would have seriously undermined the unity and stability of the country. Hence, it was indispensable to introduce One Party State.  

Arguably, the Zambian government introduced the One Party State system in order to strengthen its capacity to deal with external and internal threats to the country’s security. It is logical to suggest that while the One Party State strengthened the government’s aptitude to positively deal with external threats to its security, it equally strengthened it to eliminate domestic political opposition under the pretext of maintaining security.

**UDI, the Business Community and the Zambian Government**

While the immediate effect of introducing the One Party State was to leave UNIP as a sole political party, the economic problems unleashed by the border closure in 1973 ushered in a new phase of mounting domestic discontent with the UNIP government’s policy on Rhodesia’s UDI, albeit spearheaded by the business community. The expression “business community” is used here in reference to wealthy Zambians, especially those that had links with both local and international capital. It falls within the wider ‘political class’ which included ‘technocrats’, ‘entrepreneurs’, ‘national politicians’ and ‘civil servants.’

Opposition to the UNIP government’s policy on UDI by individuals had been building up for years since independence. But “a class conscious and active indigenous

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192 Chona interview cited, Matoka interview cited and Kapulu interview cited.
capitalist class emerged” in the early seventies which began exerting increasing pressure on the government’s policy on Rhodesia. Baylies and Szeftel noted that:

About 40 per cent of those who placed their names for nomination [for the general elections in 1973] had business interests and of those elected, about 44 per cent owned businesses or state land farms or had shares in local companies. But of all capital-owning MPs, about 40 per cent had large scale or multiple enterprises or commercial farms ….

The business community which constituted a dominant group in the National Assembly began to question the government’s practical wisdom of maintaining the border closure in view of the country’s declining economic fortunes. From the mid-1970’s, the MPs representing the business sector increasingly became vocal in urging the government to reopen the Rhodesian border which had remained closed since 1973. In spite of government's determination to keep the border closed, the MPs continued to pressure the government to reopen the border “in order to lessen the suffering of the masses.”

They contended that what they said was not necessarily a reflection of their own personal opinions but that of their constituents. “People in my constituency, who are my masters and employers, have requested me to ask the government to re-open the border because there is too much suffering.” Among the leading MPs who spearheaded calls for the reopening of the border included Valentine Kayope, the MP for Bahati, Arthur Nutuli Lubinda Wina, MP for Livingstone and Peter Chanshi, MP for Mwansabombwe. These MPs called for the “utilization of the southern route which was now closed for reasons … totally unrelated to the interests of the country” because “there is no sense in

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buying goods like farming tractors made in South Africa through Malawi. Why can’t we buy them directly from South Africa?”

Clearly, the basis of the parliamentary agitation was founded mainly on the effects of Zambia’s confrontational policy on Rhodesia’s UDI. The MPs refused to accept the objectives of the border closure as justifiable given the sacrifices the Zambian people had to make. Evidently, the MPs felt that the border closure caused too many economic problems, mainly because it restricted the scope of importing machinery and manufactured goods from the nearest and cheapest source, South Africa.

It is significant to note that in calling for the adjustment of government’s policy on Rhodesia, the MPs had two broad objectives. Firstly, they sought to protect their business interests. They were pushing for increasing the economic opportunities available to Zambian private businessmen. For example, Chanshi suggested in the National Assembly in March 1977 that government should abolish the parastatals and return them all to private hands. Secondly, they had wider political interests at stake. In view of the general elections in 1978, they used the border closure as a campaign tool to seek re-election as MPs. They capitalized on the prevalent mood of bitterness over food shortages to inform the public that such shortages were caused by the border closure. This strategy won them considerable public support.

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199 *Africa Confidential* 18, 10 (1977), Chona Interview cited.

200 *Africa Confidential* 18, 10 (1977), p.7 and *Africa Confidential* 18, 21 (1977), pp.3-5.
However, the economic problems which engulfed the country from the mid-1970s should not be solely attributed to the border closure. They should be seen in the wider context of global economic recession which characterized this period. The declining commodity prices of copper and a rise in oil prices on the international market largely contributed to Zambia’s economic problems from the mid 1970’s onwards.\textsuperscript{201}

As a result of mounting domestic social and political discontent and partly due to pressure from international financial institutions, on 6 October 1978, President Kaunda announced the reopening of the border with Rhodesia. Chona contended that the move to reopen the border was necessary to divert the cargo including the much needed fertilizers which was marooned at Dar-es Salaam port in Tanzania. In his view, if the border had not been opened to allow the in-flow of fertilizers, there would have been severe food shortages which could have possibly triggered serious food riots in the country. Ultimately, Ian Smith and the South African government would have exploited the situation. Chona concluded that the move to open the border was a tactical move dictated by concerns for national security. President Kaunda had an option of either to pay the price of food riots the following year or face criticism from members of the

Frontline States, especially President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Mozambican President, Samora Machel. He chose the latter.\textsuperscript{202}

Conclusion

In conclusion, in this chapter, we have examined the impact of the Rhodesian act of rebellion on socio-political developments in Zambia. We have noted that there is usually a relationship between foreign and domestic policies and actions. We have established that Zambia’s pursuance of a hostile policy on UDI as part of its wider foreign policy designed to advance the goals of the Pan Africanist ideal of continental liberation seriously affected the country’s internal socio-political stability. In this regard, one of the social effects of UDI on Zambia was the impact on race relations between whites and Africans in the country. The question of race relations constituted an underlying subject which governed strained relations between Zambia and Britain \textit{vis-à-vis} UDI. Furthermore, we have also noted that government’s confrontational policy on UDI had considerable effects on local politics. Opposition political parties adopted a critical approach towards government’s policy on Rhodesia. Domestic political opposition was muted following the introduction of the One Party State. However, the economic problems engendered by the border closure ushered in a new phase of mounting domestic discontent with government’s policy on Rhodesia, albeit spearheaded by the business community. This discontent was based on recognition that government’s pursuance of a hostile policy was inimical the economic interest of the country. One of the leading indicators of domestic political discontent with government’s strategy on UDI was manifested in parliamentary debates. The MPs within the ruling party UNIP, who had business interests, became the leading critics of

\textsuperscript{202} Chona interview cited.
government policy on UDI. They urged the government to take a non-confrontational posture towards Rhodesia’s UDI by reopening the border in order to reduce the effects on the country’s economy and the general citizenry.
Chapter Four
Conclusion

The focus of this study was to analyse the Impact of Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on Zambia’s economic and socio-political developments between 1965 and 1979. It began with a discussion of the political developments in Southern Rhodesia which culminated in a UDI on 11 November 1965. This set the background to the study. The analysis revealed that the immediate cause of UDI was the failure to reach a compromise between the British and Southern Rhodesian governments over the independence issue. It has been established that the processes which gave rise to UDI were deeply rooted in Southern Rhodesian history, particularly her unusual constitutional position in relation to Britain.

The study noted that UDI presented an enormous challenge to Zambia’s economic and socio-political stability largely because of Zambia’s adoption of a confrontational stance against the illegal regime. In this regard, this study advances several conclusions. One conclusion is that UDI altered the process of Zambia’s economic development. Given Zambia’s economic reliance on Rhodesia, a legacy of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the emergence of UDI considerably affected Zambia’s economic stability. In short, the immediate impact of UDI on Zambia’s economy was negative in nature. However, Zambia’s leaders took advantage of the challenges posed by UDI to embark on developmental projects in an attempt to extricate the economy from dependence on Rhodesia. The long-term implications were that UDI provided a powerful impetus for the Zambian government to further advance the
country’s development agenda. Thus the nature of the impact of UDI on the Zambian economic was both positive and negative in character.

Another conclusion of the study is that UDI had a considerable impact on domestic social processes in Zambia. An attempt by the Zambian government to deal with security problems unleashed by UDI had serious social repercussions as it strained race relations between Africans and whites in the country. UDI poisoned race relations in Zambia particularly because majority of white residents in Zambia displayed, either openly or secretly, sympathetic attitude towards the Rhodesian act of rebellion. Such attitudes fuelled the Zambian government’s suspicion that whites were supporting UDI. Thus, the Zambian government increasingly became conscious of its own vulnerability to threats of sabotage because majority of personnel who managed strategic institutions such as the police, state security and the army were whites. More importantly, Rhodesian secret agents had infiltrated in and collaborated with expatriate personnel who managed Zambia’s strategic institutions. Against the backdrop of security concerns, there emerged a growing strong feeling within the Zambian government circles and the wider general populace that whites could not be trusted. Thus, the Zambian government did not hesitate to arrest, detain and deport whites suspected of engaging in subversive activities.

This study has also shown that the question of race relations was the underlying cause of strained relations between the Zambian and the British governments. The Zambian government was firmly convinced that the British government adopted a lethargic attitude towards calls for use of force to quell UDI because they sought to protect their kith-and-kin in Rhodesia.
Another conclusion of the study is that the UDI had also a noticeable effect on local politics in Zambia. The Zambian government came under severe criticism from diverse groups, particularly, the Members of Parliament, the opposition political parties and the business community for adopting a hostile policy in her response to UDI. This study has established that the basis of this vilification was founded on their concern that the government’s determination to resolve UDI was overstraining the country’s resources and subsequently undermining the country’s economic stability. Therefore, they called for the Zambian government to adopt a conciliatory approach in its policy towards Ian Smith’s illegal regime in Rhodesia.
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