Constraints on the Commercialization of Sukuma Livestock, 1919 - 1961

By

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This being a dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History, University of Zambia

June 1981
To old Jean, my mother
I, Samuel Nyangu Chipungu solemnly declare that this dissertation has never before been submitted for a degree at any University.

[Signature]
Signed
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At the University of Dar es Salaam, I was fortunate in getting the necessary cooperation from a number of members of staff of the History Department, particularly Prof. B. Swai.

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ABSTRACT

Market participation of African livestock-keepers is one subject that has generated a lot of interest and controversy among authors. This study, which investigates the constraints on market participation of the Sukuma livestock-keepers during the British colonial period, largely emanates from the desire to contribute to the increasing spate of academic books and articles on the subject. Sukumaland, with its districts of Geita, Mwanza, Kwimba, Maswa and Shinyanga is a good choice for such an investigation. A mixed economy of crop production and livestock (mainly cattle, sheep and goats) keeping has been a prominent feature of this region of Tanzania inhabited by the Sukuma, the largest ethnic group in the country. In fact Sukumaland has been one of the leading cash crop (cotton) producing and livestock keeping areas of Tanzania for the past several decades.

In this study, I argue that the apparent low market integration of the Sukuma was not the result of their inate refusal to sell some of their beasts. Rather, I suggest that several factors which have often been ignored or under-rated by many authors were important in influencing the market off-take rates. Among the several factors discussed include the impact of government policies, of the Great Depression, the Second World War and the compulsory destocking exercise introduced in 1952. The impact of veterinary restrictions and alternative sources of cash income (especially cotton) on the livestock trade has also been discussed.
This study relies heavily on government publications, archival materials and some published literature. The utilization of these sources involved research in the University of Zambia Library, the University of Dar es Salaam Library and the Tanzania National Archives. I had initially intended to undertake field research in rural Sukumaland but I was unable to do so as I secured research clearance from the Tanzania Government when the time I had allocated for this research had elapsed. However, I was able to obtain limited oral information on the subject through discussions with some Sukuma in Dar es Salaam, Shinyanga and Mwanza towns.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Definition of the Problem

For most of the colonial era, the Sukuma, like other African livestock-keeping communities both inside and outside Tanganyika (now Tanzania) were constantly under pressure to increase livestock sales. This pressure often came from Government officials, private traders, natural calamities which threatened to decimate the herds, and the African drive for cash income. Increased market integration of African livestock-owners was a matter of urgency for several reasons. One reason was the development of towns and other centres of employment where the demand for meat increased. In Tanganyika, large numbers of labourers were to be found in the plantation areas in Tanga Province and parts of Central Province, and in towns, especially in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and Arusha. These centres of employment became important markets for slaughter stock as the workers required protein to avoid malnutrition. Indeed, while amino-acids are sometimes found in small quantities in some vegetable protein, most animal protein contain all essential amino-acids in well balanced quantities. It is for this reason that government encouraged large employers to supply their workers with meat rations. Government endeavours in this respect were particu-
larly directed at employers using compound labour. To ensure a continuous exploitation of the resources, government introduced legislation which stipulated the provision of minimum food rations (including some meat per week).

In Tanganyika, for instance, the Master and Native Servants Ordinance (Cap. 51 of the Lawa), which directed employers to provide food rations, was in the 1930s enforced by the Department of Labour. During the Second World War, the feeding of labourers in essential war industries became a priority in Tanzania, and the government passed the Master and Native Servant (Proper Feeding) Regulations of 1941 to ensure the supply of sufficient food to these labourers. Although employers tended to avoid following the Government-sponsored 'menus', many realized their importance and included some meat in the rations. Some employers realized that their labourers could be more efficient if fed above starving level. Besides, many employers were aware that those who had the reputation for 'milking the cow without feeding it' usually experienced problems in securing the required numbers of labourers. Some employers who attempted to withdraw the provision of meat rations were often forced to rescind such action following workers' disturbances which were triggered off by deplorable working conditions.

The other reason for pressurizing African livestock-owners to increase sales was the apparent increase in numbers of beasts which was seen as causing or threatening to cause
overgrazing and shortage of grazing land in livestock-keeping areas. Here, the concern was to reduce the animal pressure on the land to subsequently reduce or, if possible, prevent the deterioration of the conditions of the pastures and soil. This concern, though widespread in African colonies, was particularly elaborately expressed in British East Africa. In Tanganyika, at least three ways of reducing animal pressure on the land were introduced. One method was to stimulate increased auctioning. Another method was to induce livestock-owners living in densely settled areas to emigrate to less densely populated areas. The third method involved stimulating increased home consumption of meat in rural areas. These measures were begun as early as the 1920s, but were hardly rigorously enforced until after the Second World War. Sukumaland was one of the focal areas of destocking in the post-Second World War period. The Sukumaland Development Scheme was, among other things, introduced to reduce the animal population in certain parts of Sukumaland in a bid to ensure peasant prosperity for a long time. Another area which was subjected to forced destocking was Mbulu District in Northern Province where the Iraqw were keeping thousands of animals.

The other reason for integrating livestock-owners in the colonial market system was the desire to induce colonial subjects to contribute viably to the territorial economies, and subsequently to the metropolitan economies, either directly
or indirectly. As direct contributors the subjects were induced to produce profitable agricultural products for the market. This was, for instance, the role of the Chagga and Haya coffee growers and Sukuma cotton producers in Tanganyika, cocoa producers in Ghana and groundnut growers in Northern Nigeria. Those who could not produce cash crops for various reasons were expected to contribute indirectly to the economies by taking up wage employment. African livestock-owners fell within the category of direct contributors. Colonial officials often emphasized the need for the livestock-owners to increase their sales as their contribution to the territorial 'economic efforts'.

In Tanganyika, determined efforts to induce African livestock-owners to contribute significantly to the territorial economy were made by the government in the post-Second World War period. Governor Sir Edward Twining was very open on the role the livestock-owners were to play in the 1950s. At the meetings with the Maasai headmen and elders held at Monduli and Ngorongoro (Northern Province) in October 1954, the Governor blatantly reminded his audiences that:

It is important for you to realise that your contribution to the Territorial economy lies in raising (and selling) of stock.3

The Maasai were by this time already performing what the Governor was reminding them, much to his delight. He told them during the same meetings that he was 'gratified to learn
that you succeeded last year in exceeding the target of cattle sold by selling in the markets no less than 29,000 head and the sales this year are almost as good. The Iraqw in Mbulu District and the Sukuma in the Lake Province were also targets of the official 'sell more cattle' propaganda.

However, the pressures to stimulate increased livestock sales were often not very successful. Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain this apparent failure. One explanation, mainly propaganda by anthropologists, has emphasized the conservatism of African livestock-owners. Central to this explanation is the belief that Africans could not sell their beasts (particularly cattle) because of their deep emotional attachments to their livestock; that they built up their herds for prestigious purposes; that livestock were kept mainly for slaughter at funerals, for mystical and ritual purposes and for the payment of bridewealth for son's wives. The 'cattle complex' may have influenced some communities (especially the pastoral ones) which depended heavily on livestock against increased market participation during the colonial rule. But even in some pastoral communities where 'complex' was supposedly rampant, like among the Maasai, it has been established that the willingness to sell beasts existed. On the basis of available data of cattle sales from Maasailand between 1936 and 1959, Jacobs has concluded:

One of the many myths commonly attributed to the Maasai is a reluctance to sell their cattle. Not only is this untrue but it disguises the fact that until recently, Maasai have been restricted from selling on the open market.
The 'complex' was even more of a myth among the Sukuma who practiced a mixed economy of agriculture and animal husbandry. Assertions by some colonial administrators like 'natives and chiefs hoard their cattle' were raised without a clear understanding of the realities and problems facing livestock producers.

Several factors determined the level of market participation of Sukuma livestock-owners. One of these factors was the price offered by buyers. Higher prices tended to stimulate supply. This response to price was not unique to the Sukuma. Among the Maasai in Tanganyika, for instance, price fluctuations during colonial rule tended to affect supply of cattle to the government-controlled markets. As Jacobs observed:

Like keen businessmen everywhere, the only reason which has prevented them from selling more than they do has been the lack of what they consider fair prices. Maasai have been selling cattle to individual African buyers (illegally) for over fifty years now and have a shrewd knowledge of what the market will bear. 8

The price factor was equally important in influencing African supply of cattle to the markets in Southern Rhodesia and South East Africa in general. As Mtetwa has concluded:

Africans have always been willing and ready to sell their cattle provided the prices are good. Their prevailing reluctance to sell their cattle in the capitalist market is based on knowledge that they are being exploited: that prices are far below what their cattle are worth. 9

However, the price offered was not always the determining factor. When drought or depression (like the Great Depression
of the 1930s) occurred, the Sukuma, like many African livestock-keepers, increased their sale of livestock at low prices. During a year of drought, high mortality was expected and often registered. Many livestock-owners were willing to sell some of their half-starved animals even at relatively low prices rather than lose them through death. A year of depression stimulated increased off-take from the African herds for several reasons. One reason was that the livestock-owners had the drive for cash income at a time when both agricultural and livestock prices were depressed, and employment opportunities dwindled. In order to offset the effects of depressed prices, the peasants had to increase the sale of their products.

The size of herds was another stumbling-block to increased market sales in Sukumaland. Those who had larger herds were always in a position to sell some beasts while those with smaller herds often resisted pressure to sell. As Hille has concluded:

Differentiation shaped the pattern of cattle sales. In normal years a steady supply of surplus male animals reached the market from large owners who obtained their cash needs in this manner while poorer men sold crops or labour and tried to earn sufficient to build a herd. 9

Many Sukuma thought of selling regularly when they owned more than twenty head of cattle. 10 This number took into account the domestic needs as well as the possibility of decimation from natural calamities.

Another factor which has often been cited as an impediment to the development of livestock trade in many parts of colonial Africa was the frequent outbreak of livestock diseases. Barber and Dyson-Hudson have argued that frequent outbreaks of livestock diseases in Karamoja District of Uganda ruined the cattle trade
there as the British Administration was often forced to quarantine the area in a bid to control the spreading of the diseases. The quarantine exercise was often introduced when the Karamojong were eager to sell their cattle. As Dyson-Hudson concluded:

Stock export was spasmodic for some twenty years. Only 21,000 head of cattle left the District between 1921 and the end of 1940 because tribal willingness to part with stock seldom coincided with Government's willingness to declare the area free of quarantine.

The quarantine exercise was equally responsible for the demise of cattle trade in Barotseland region of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) after 1914 when pleuro-pneumonia was identified. In Sukumaland, outbreaks of livestock diseases were also an important factor affecting the development of trade, especially during the inter-war period (1919-1939). Several parts of Sukumaland were frequently quarantined, thereby restricting the movement of cattle. Punishment which included paying fines and imprisonment was often imposed on those who tried to ignore the quarantine orders.

**Aims of Study**

With Sukumaland taken as a case study, this study discusses the responses of African livestock-owners to market demands under colonialism. The study attempts to show that livestock-owners were willing to sell their beasts but their willingness was often frustrated by several factors, most of them beyond their influence. Among the factors discussed in this dissertation are those related to marketing, drought and diseases, government policies and availability of alternative sources of cash income.
These factors affected livestock trade either concurrently or at different times. This study will proceed as follows: Chapter 2 covers the inter-war period and argues that although the government talked much about the importance of increasing livestock sales from Sukumaland, little was done to this effect. In practice the government was defeated by its own policies expressed in the quarantine measures and 'grow more crops' campaigns. Outbreaks of diseases and droughts and the livestock buyers' tendency to offer low prices during this period tended to prohibit higher market off-take rates from Sukumaland herds. Chapter 3 covers the Second World War period. Central in this chapter is the examination of the impact of the war on livestock trade in Sukumaland. In this chapter it is argued that the war stimulated the Tanganyika Government to adopt a more active role in the territorial livestock trade. As a result, Sukumaland as well as other livestock-rearing areas of Tanganyika increased their supply of livestock to the markets. Chapter 4 focuses on the period between 1951 and 1961, the last decade of colonialism in Tanganyika. In this chapter particular attention is paid to the impact of compulsory destocking measures on livestock trade. Here, it is argued that these measures had limited success for several reasons which included their unpopularity among livestock-owners, and the expansion of crop (particularly cotton) production which provided alternative sources of cash income. Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on general conclusions. Throughout this study the focus will be on cattle, sheep and goats. These were, and still are the most important domestic animals kept by the Sukuma. The major emphasis however, is on cattle rather than on sheep or goats because both the
Sukuma and the Tanganyika Government attached greater importance to the former than to the latter.

**Sukumaland and its People**

By 1961, Sukumaland comprised five districts of Mwanza, Gaita, Maswa, Kwimba and Shinyanga and an area of 17,000 square miles. This region supported a population estimated at 1.4 million together with some 3.5 million head of cattle and three million sheep and goats. Sukumaland, located in the Lake Province, was roughly surrounded by Lake Victoria to the north and Nyamwezi country to the south; the Serengeti National Park to the east and the coffee-producing Bukoba District to the west. During the last decade of colonialism, Sukumaland districts formed the Sukumaland Federation, a rural union of ethnic chiefdoms which functioned as an administrative unit. The Sukuma formed the largest ethnic group in the territory. For many decades the Sukuma inhabited Shinyanga, Kwimba and Maswa Districts and a large part of Mwanza District, but between 1950 and 1961, the Sukuma emigrated in large numbers into Gaita District which was originally inhabited by the Zinza. This emigration was so large that the Sukuma subsequently outnumbered the indigenous Zinza.

The Sukuma contributed viably to the territorial and metropolitan economies between 1919 and 1961, much to the delight of most colonial officials. In the eyes of these officials, the Sukuma were 'tractable and docile' and 'capable of prodigious efforts in the clearance of tsetse bush or in the destruction of locusts or in afforestation or, in the intensive cultivation of economic crops'. Others saw the Sukuma as 'assiduous and
Skilled agriculturalists on holdings, and as porters and on plantations and estates and on railway and road construction or whatever heavy hard tasks are the rule, they are probably the best workers in the Territory. 16

As agriculturalists, the Sukuma produced both food and cash crops. The British Administration encouraged the production of rice, maize and cassava as food crops, and cotton as a cash crop. Rice production was encouraged along the Lake Victoria shores while maize almost replaced millet and sorghum in Southern Sukumaland. Cassava growing was encouraged in many parts of Sukumaland as a famine crop. The Sukuma became the most important growers of cotton in Tanganyika between 1919 and 1961. After the Second World War many Sukuma tended to sell cotton for cash incomes instead of selling livestock, especially when prices offered for livestock were lower than they anticipated.

Animal husbandry was restricted to areas free from tsetse fly which causes a fatal disease known as trypanosomiasis. The movement of livestock in general tended to be restricted to areas known to be free from animal diseases. Valleys provided grazing pastures as these areas contained springs which served as sources of permanent water supplies. However, the plains were not the only grazing areas. The bush usually provided dry season grazing. In sparsely populated areas, significant portions of the country were turned into grazing land. Most of the grazing areas were accessible to livestock-owners as collective ngitiri (grazing areas). These ngitiri were utilized by inhabitants of particular villages or areas. Boundaries of these grazing areas were demarcated by natural features; by stones, trees, hills or
Livestock performs many functions among the Sukuma for a long time before the colonial era. During the colonial period, livestock could be sold to earn cash income. Cattle and small
streams. Reservation of certain grazing areas as private ngitiri was practiced in some parts of Sukumaland especially in Kwimba District. Private grazing areas included njingo (areas surrounding a dwelling), corn-fields after harvest and any other area that was privately owned for various purposes. The right to graze in such areas was the prerogative of the owner. Any other stock-owner wishing to graze there had thus to seek permission.

Several methods of livestock management were employed. The first and widely employed was the use of child labour. Boys of about ten to fifteen years old tended their family herds, taking the animals to grazing areas and water spots. The use of boys as herdsmen enabled the adult males to concentrate on other economic activities like crop cultivation. The second method was the use of the system whereby livestock-owners distributed some of their beasts among neighbours, friends, and relatives for herding purposes. This system was used for a number of reasons. Firstly, individuals who had accumulated large sizes of herds but had insufficient male children to herd the animals resorted to this system as a way of solving the herding problems. Secondly, those who owned too few animals to warrant a family herder distributed their animals among friends and relatives who had bigger herds for tending. Thirdly, livestock from some villages threatened with water shortage and many other natural calamities which would subsequently decimate the animals were sent to tother villages free from such calamities.

Livestock performed many functions among the Sukuma for a long time before the colonial era. During the colonial period livestock could be sold to earn cash incomes. Cattle and small
stock supplied milk and meat. Milk (mainly from cows) and meat were often served with *ugali*, thick porridge made from grain flour which was the staple food of the Sukuma. In most cases milk was taken daily either as a drink 'to wash down the food' after a meal or as part of the main dish by mixing it with *ugali*. Meat was frequently served with *ugali* as relish. Clarified butter, a product obtained by heating milk, was used as cooking fat. Sometimes animal fat was preserved for cooking. Skins and hides were often sold to itinerant traders and to markets controlled by the Department of Veterinary Services.

Livestock was also used as traditional currency to enable stock-owners obtain the required supplies. Cattle and small stock enabled the Sukuma affected by famines to acquire grain from their fortunate neighbours through exchange. Due to the frequency of crop failures in some parts of Sukumaland during colonial era, local traders known as *bagaragara* or *batundaya* exchanged their livestock for grain in areas where grain was plentiful. These traders then transported the grain on donkeys into areas of scarcity, where they exchanged the grain for stock at profits, as high as 100 per cent. 18 In areas where peasant crop production expanded and ploughs became widely employed, several animals were always reserved for ploughing. The adoption of a plough during the colonial period was not unique to Sukumaland. The plough was used in many parts of Africa. In Angola, for example, cattle were by the 1950s increasingly being used to pull ploughs in Central Highlands, the habitat of the Ovimbundu, the largest African group in Angola. 19 The use of a plough also became popular among the Tonga of Northern Rhodesia. 20
Climate and Topography

The greater part of Sukumaland is one of undulating country interspersed with low ridges, hills and ranges. The soils are generally deep and permeable and of moderate fertility. The soils not only have a low water-retaining capacity but are also easily eroded. The valley or mbuga soils are partly alluvial with heavier texture and less permeable. The mbuga soils are largely unsuitable for crop growing as they are difficult to cultivate.

Rainfall in Sukumaland has historically been erratic. Rainfall has varied from month to month and year to year. However, the usual annual average has been 750 millimetres, with a rather higher precipitation towards Lake Victoria coast where it averages about 1,000 millimetres per annum. The greater part of the rain falls between February and the middle of April or early May, although the rainy season stretches from November to early May. The dry season begins around May and ends towards the end of October or early November. During the dry season, livestock have historically been known to lose much weight and in many cases die due to insufficient grazing and water.

Impact of German Rule on Livestock Trade Up to 1914

Before we embark on a discussion of livestock-owners' responses to market demand in Sukumaland between 1919 and 1961, it would be helpful to examine briefly their response during the German period. Such an examination would provide a basis for discussion of the development of livestock trade during the British period.
Between 1890 and 1914, the German Administration had embarked upon a policy of stimulating economic development in German East Africa (Tanganyika). European settlers were encouraged to settle in the territory especially in the Tanga Province. It was realized that railways were needed for economic development as well as improved military security. By 1914 two railways had been constructed. The Tanga line was begun in 1891 and completed in 1905. The construction of the Central line was completed in 1914. These railways did not, however, have any impact on Sukumaland as they did not serve the region.

A notable characteristic of German Administration in Sukumaland, and indeed in other parts of German East Africa, was its neglect of the livestock sector as a source of slaughter stock for both national and international markets. The main German economic interest in Sukumaland lay in enforcing the Volkskultur policy after 1900. This policy, which the Germans had earlier introduced in Togo, centred on inducing Africans to increase the production of certain tropical cash crops that could profitably be grown under local conditions. The Volkskultur crops or 'people's crops' were those crops that were in high demand in Germany and Europe in general but would not be grown there because of climatic limitations. Thus the encouragement of Volkskultur policy was a common imperialist strategy of securing raw materials in the colonies to strengthen the industrial base in the metropolitan countries.
In Sukumaland the Volkskultur crop was cotton, a crop that has grown well in the sandy soils and erratic rainfall of the region. Cotton was first introduced in Nera chiefdom in the early 1900s by a German planter named Wiegand. Between 1905 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the cultivation of the American Upland variety of cotton was introduced and encouraged in many other chiefdoms of Sukumaland by German officials. In some chiefdoms, the production of cotton was undertaken by peasants who saw its profitability in other chiefdoms. In some areas peasants were forced to grow the crop. Through such methods, Sukumaland became an important cotton producing region of German East Africa. By 1910, cotton production had doubled 'as it did again in 1911 when Mwanza exported 163,334 pounds of raw cotton'.

The Sukuma were increasingly selling animal products rather than live beasts during the German period. Hides and skins were the most important products sold. These products were purchased from livestock-owners by Asian and European merchants in Mwanza who exported them to Europe where they were tanned into leather for making shoes, bags, belts, etc. Table I shows the tons of hides and skins exported from Mwanza port for selected years between 1900 and 1914.

**TABLE I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1904</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>22,364</td>
<td>52,941</td>
<td>80,721</td>
<td>97,000</td>
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The above table shows an upward trend in exportation of hides and skins through Mwanza port. However, these hides and skins were not all from Sukumaland. Some came from the Tabora region, others from the Eastern region of Lake Victoria, but most came from Sukumaland.

Between 1900 and 1914, therefore, hides and skins acquired an important monetary value which had not existed before. In the pre-colonial era, these products had been used mainly within Sukumaland as clothes, blankets, mats, bellows etc. But during the German era, textiles were imported into Sukumaland. Many Sukuma bought these items, thereby stimulating increased sale of hides and skins. Many Sukuma who lost their animals through death from drought and disease could now sell their hides and skins instead of keeping them.

Effects of First World War

The First World War, which came at the time when German East Africa was visibly prospering economically, subsequently reversed the trend. Several thousands of peasants were conscripted as soldiers and porters. By March 1916 the German Administration recruited about 45,000 carriers and auxiliaries. It has been estimated that as many as a million Africans in Tanganyika were conscripted by both the Germans and British by 1918. As a result of this conscription, agricultural production fell in many parts of Tanganyika as these areas were denuded of productive labour. In some areas, however, peasants were encouraged to increase food production for the military forces. But in many areas, especially those near the battle fronts,
military forces obtained food by looting. In such areas
peasant production subsequently fell because peasants lived
in fear, and famines became frequent. 25

Sukumaland was one of the regions which felt the pinch
of the war through having to supply provisions. In this region,
peasants were called upon to increase the production of food
crops especially rice and groundnuts instead of cotton. Livestock
owners were also directed to increase the sale of their beasts,
Sometimes, these products were forcibly requisitioned. As
Iliffe records:

During 1917 a German column broke northwards
in search of food and created appalling
problems for civilians who had accepted
British rule. In the Ututwa chiefdom of
Usukuma, for example, the chief welcomed the
party and then had to leave with it, while
Asian traders accused by a headman of refusing
to sell goods for worthless German banknotes
were forced to do so at gunpoint. 26

Through looting and coercion, both the German and Allied forces
were able to acquire some supplied which enabled them to continue
the war. The aim of coercion and looting was to reduce as much
as possible the dependence upon Europe for supplies during the
war. As part of the strategy to rely less on Germany for
supplies, the German Administration in Tanganyika also turned
to the local manufacture of cloth, dyes, rubber tyres, benzene,
soap, ropes, bags, boots and several other items necessary
during the war. The last German Governor of Tanganyika boasted
during the war that:

We get all we require from the country. We
find all our food supplies, materials and
necesities in our German East Africa.....
We find we have an adequate supply of such
things as previously we have thought it
necessary to import. 27
The war not only gave a fillip to industrialization and created looting but it also contributed to the expansion of tsetse fly in several parts of Tanganyika. Tsetse fly expanded in North-east, North-west and the Kondoa-Irangi and Singida regions of the territory. In Sukumaland, the fly expanded into Mwanza, Kwimba and Maswa Districts. This expansion was largely because bush, the habitat of the fly, regenerated during the war due to reduced human settlement. Tsetse fly transmitted trypanosomiasis which killed many humans and cattle. By the end of the war, therefore, Tanganyika experienced many problems. The economy was dislocated. Agricultural production in particular fell in many parts of the territory, thereby creating famines. The ravages of tsetse fly were so severe that they killed many humans and reduced herds. The British Administration which replaced the German Administration in 1919 had thus to gird for the economic reconstruction in the post-war period.
FOOTNOTES

1. Tanzania National Archives (hereafter TNA) 23544, F. Longland, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province, to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 9 May 1936.

2. TNA 25535, Meat Supplies to Sisal Areas, 1949.


4. Ibid.


8. Jacobs, 'Economic Irrationality', 221.

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23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid, 250.


CHAPTER 2

INCREASED SUPPLY AND UNREALIZED EXPECTATIONS
AT THE MARKETS, 1919 - 1939

This chapter looks at the performance of the Sukuma livestock-owners in the colonial market system during the inter-war period. Although the Sukuma often increased their supply of livestock to the established auction markets, few beasts were actually bought there. Several factors are advanced in this chapter to explain this apparent low market participation of the Sukuma livestock-owners. First, there is a cluster of problems arising from the First World War which required immediate attention of the new British Administration. During the first decade of the Mandate (or reconstruction period, 1919 - 1930) the British were more eager to attend to problems created by the war than to embark upon a programme directly aimed at increasing livestock sales. The British approach to livestock trade was rather indirect: they wished to lay the infrastructure necessary not only for subsequent development of this trade, but also for the development of the economy in general. The second explanation for the low market participation of the Sukuma livestock-owners was connected with the problem of the market. For example, the Mwanza-based Meat Rations Company was unable to absorb most of the cattle offered for sale. Thirdly, the chapter examines the impact of the Great Depression on the livestock-trade.
Period of Reconstruction, 1919 - 1930

Tanganyika emerged from the first World War as a British Mandate with a dislocated economy. Trade had virtually ceased in many parts of rural Tanganyika because of looting by military forces. Agricultural production (particularly food-crop production) had fallen to a low ebb because of military conscription and drought. The size of herds had been reduced through confiscation by military forces and ravages of trypanosomiasis, rinderpest, foot-and-mouth and several other diseases. The immediate task of the new British Administration was thus to revitalize the economy, and the best way to do this, it was argued, was to follow the Nigerian model of development which emphasized peasant initiative. For the Nigerian model to succeed, it was argued, Tanganyika needed the necessary infrastructure. Several projects were undertaken in many parts of the territory during the first ten years of the mandate. Among the notable ones were the construction of two railway lines and some roads in potentially rich agricultural areas. In the field of railways, an extension from the Central Line at Tabora to Mwanza was completed in 1928 despite the
resistance from the Kenya-Uganda Railway Management who were afraid of competition for the traffic of the Lake Region that had so far been exclusively carried via Kenya to Mombasa. Another extension from Moshi to Arusha was completed between 1927 and 1930. In the field of roads, the British Colonial Administration set aside some funds for the construction of new roads and up-grading of already existing ones in many parts of the Territory in the 1920s. Elaborate efforts were concentrated in the main areas of economic activities. This is especially true for the region between Sukumaland and Tabera, the hinterland of Tanga up to Kerewe and the Usambara area, and for the area around Arusha and Moshi. In these areas, feeder roads were connected to railways at several points. Both roads and railways were expected to stimulate economic development in the areas they served as they linked these areas with the markets for the products both within and outside Tanganyika.

However, this infrastructure failed to stimulate economic development in Sukumaland as had been anticipated. Railways and roads were hardly used by livestock traders because trekking, the dominant method of transporting beasts to markets appeared to be much cheaper. Traders supplying slaughter stock to Shinyanga and Mwanza towns and the communities around Mabuki Diamond Mine and Geita Gold Mine, for instance, trekked their animals. The few missionaries and technical
experts in rural Sukumaland also tended to buy their slaughter stock directly from nearby livestock owners. Even the traders who purchased livestock in Sukumaland for external markets, trekked their animals. Among such traders were those who supplied livestock to Tabora and Tanga Province, especially to the sisal estates. Another active group of traders purchased slaughter stock in Sukumaland and trekked them to Bukeba where the Haya provided a profitable market because of their annual rewards from the sale of coffee.

Trekking of livestock to markets contributed to the underutilization of roads and railways during most of the interwar period. Railways incurred chronic deficits during this period. As Hofmeier states:

During most of the inter-war period the Tanyanyika Railways operated with great deficits. In the beginning [1920s] revenue was not even enough to cover all running expenditures, let alone depreciation and interest on capital. Traffic volume was much too low due to the low general level of economic development. The railways and roads could have handled larger volume of traffic had the colonial Administration been successful in stimulating peasant agriculture in the 1920s. The Administration failed to do so mainly because of its approach.

As Hyden argues:

In the 1920s... it was primarily a matter of introducing new crops this was often done in a haphazard manner with little consideration of the effects on the existing farming systems.
Moreover, no effort was made in those days to improve the production techniques. This approach was, to a large extent, responsible for/low production of cotton in Sukumaland in the 1920s.

The British Colonial Administration also established in the early 1920s the Department of Veterinary Services and Animal Husbandry with headquarters at Mwapwa in Central Province, and with sub-stations in various parts of the territory. The department was charged with numerous responsibilities: it had to control the outbreak and spread of animal diseases, check the deterioration of the environment, encourage Africans to sell some of their beasts, central livestock auctions where they existed and attend to numerous other rural problems. But the major concern of the department was to combat animal diseases, especially trypanosomiasis. Tsetse fly abounded in many parts of Tanganyika. In Sukumaland, the fly was found in Eastern and Western parts of Shinyanga, Kwimba and Maswa Districts. In some parts of Shinyanga District, tsetse was by 1921 such a menace to both human and cattle populations that many people were emigrating to other areas.

Several suggestions on how to deal with the tsetse fly were forwarded and debated by medical experts and administrative officials. One suggestion, mainly from medical experts, called for uninterfered game-hunting by peasants. It was argued that game should be killed because it harboured trypanosomes. This suggestion was made in view of the fact that drugs
against trypanosomiasis were not yet available. But the strategy of killing wildlife was criticized mainly by administrative officials who wished to protect it for future development of tourist industry. The other suggestion advanced was that peasants be moved into areas already infested with tsetse fly so that they could, through increased settlement, destroy the bush, the habitat of the fly. This strategy was opposed on several grounds. Some people argued that many peasants and beasts would die from tsetse in the process of recolonizing the land. Others argued that this strategy would not be acceptable to peasants who were already leaving areas where the tsetse fly abounded. Other critics complained that concentrating people and livestock in small areas would inevitably create soil erosion which they feared would be an impediment to development of agriculture as well as animal husbandry. ⁹

The predominant approach to the problem of the tsetse fly during the 1920s was to destroy the habitat of the fly before the land was given to peasants. Teams of villagers were mobilized to cut trees and burn grass and shrubs. It is estimated that 25,000 men from Maswa District and 20,000 from Kwimba turned out for bush clearing work in 1928. ¹⁰ Some success was achieved in destroying the tsetse fly habitat in these districts. By 1930, some thousands of acres of land had been
reclaimed in Kwimba and Maswa Districts, and the land given to local peasants in the form of family plots. This celebrated success against tsetse fly was a minor one as thousands of acres were still unreclaimed in these districts by 1930. In fact between 1925 and 1946, only 39.8 per cent of tsetse fly infested area of Sukumaland was reclaimed.\textsuperscript{11}

Attempts to combat other livestock diseases like pleuropneumonia, rinderpest, East Coast fever and foot-and-mouth were also undertaken in many parts of Tanganyika. In Sukumaland, outbreaks of these diseases were wide-spread. The Veterinary Department attempted to control the outbreak and spreading of the diseases in several ways. One method involved quarantining affected areas and subsequently administering serum to reduce mortality in infested beasts. The quarantine measures were enforced mainly by Veterinary Quarantine Guards who formed the African intelligence system of trained and salaried personnel who inter alia performed the functions of agents for the detection of stock diseases, breaches of quarantine regulations and illicit movements of livestock. The guards, usually distinctively uniformed, at times disguised themselves by wearing plain clothes while carrying out certain duties. Wherever these guards operated, their performance was appreciated by the Veterinary Department. Culprits were dealt with in local courts. The Veterinary Department relied heavily on these
guards in its quarantine exercise especially in the perennially quarantined areas. Between 1926 and 1931, the numbers of guards were increased from twenty-two in Mwanza District and nine in Shinyanga District to forty-one and sixteen respectively. The quarantine exercise, however, proved less effective than had been anticipated. The guards were insufficient to man the whole of Sukumaland.

The Quarantine exercise could perhaps have been more effective had serum administration been intensively and efficiently carried out. There were both shortages of serum and trained personnel to administer it. Although Shinyanga, for instance, was opened up as a new veterinary district in 1923 with a resident officer, the Veterinary Department there was throughout the 1920s handicapped by an inadequate staff, a fact which was frequently evidenced by the departure on leave of a district veterinary officer. The 'loss' of such a member of staff frequently led to cessation of veterinary services to some parts of the district, at least temporarily until another officer became available. Indeed, many parts of the Lake Province faced serious shortages of veterinary personnel to tackle efficiently the rampant disease problems, especially that of rinderpest.

As McCall, Director of Veterinary Services, ruefully admitted in 1926:

The Mwanza Province had been the storm centre of rinderpest and hitherto lack of staff has precluded our tackling the problem in the manner in which we should have wished to do so.
The Veterinary Department failed to solve the problem of animal diseases in Sukumaland. The failure to do so meant failure to stimulate increased market off-take from the herds. The quarantine exercise proved to be inimical to the development of livestock trade. As the result of the application of quarantine measures, trade in affected areas either virtually came to a halt or fell to the lowest ebb since only those animals declared fit for trade by veterinary officials could be sold. As Buckley, Acting Provincial Commissioner for the Lake Province, noted in 1929:

"Strong propaganda has been and is being made to influence cattle owners to sell. As things stand, response can be expected only from Eastern Mwanza District. Maswa is locked and barred by Veterinary restrictions.

This trade 'ring' was still in force by 1930 in Maswa and Kwimba Districts due to the outbreak of rinderpest there. Indeed, the Animals (Disease) Ordinance of 1920 was still in force in Maswa, Shinyanga and Kwimba Districts in 1936."

The quarantine exercise enforced in certain areas outside Sukumaland also tended to adversely affect the cattle trade in Sukumaland. Among such areas were those through which Sukumaland cattle trekked to external markets. The frequent declaration of certain parts of Northern Province as diseased areas, for example, meant closing down the more direct route to Tanga Province from Sukumaland, thus making it difficult for Sukumaland cattle to reach the Tanga Province markets. As Hornby, Director of Veterinary Services, observed in 1930:
Although all the markets in the Territory are as freely open to these animals as to any others, yet actually it is impracticable for Mwanza cattle to enter Kereqwe as they would have to pass round much of Masailand to get there. This detour is due to the presence of pleuro-pneumonia quarantine areas in Northern Province lying across the direct stock route.

These trade 'rings' were at times applied on the basis of rumour of outbreak of disease in some areas. An interesting case was that which was reported in Mwanza in December 1929 in connection with livestock supposed to be exported to Bukoba. A rumour circulated that Bukoba was quarantined. The Uganda Marine Superintendent, without concrete evidence, cancelled the shipment of stock to Bukoba, only to learn later that the rumour was unfounded. But meanwhile the auctions in Mwanza District were wrecked as the Bukoba market was believed to be closed. 17

Livestock trade in Sukumaland, and indeed in several other parts of Tanganyika, would have become brisk had the government become actively involved in it. But the government could not commit itself to the trade for various reasons. One reason was that the government was not yet certain of its role in the livestock trade. The limited resources of the government obliged it to leave the trade to private enterprise (mainly itinerant traders) to develop it. This strategy seems to have been common in many colonies. Governments did not want to undertake such economic ventures. In Northern Rhodesia,
fer instance, the government was content to see private enterprise dominate the trade for much of the colonial period because private enterprise 'was of great assistance to government at a time when it was hard pressed to keep abreast of economic development'. But in most cases, private enterprises were undercapitalized and were thus unable to increase the volume of trade. In Sukumaland, traders could not purchase most of the beasts offered for sale because of insufficient funds. In 1930, for instance, Buckley, Acting Provincial Commissioner for the Lake Province, reported:

During the year 5,489 head of cattle were sold on the auction sales in Kwimba District. Many more were produced for sale but buyers' resources were too limited to absorb them.

In Sukumaland, the problem was not only under-capitalization but also inadequacy of livestock buyers. Fewer traders operated in this region during the 1920s despite the willingness of livestock-owners to dispose of their animals. This was revealed by the 'sell more livestock' propaganda mounted by colonial officials which was often not backed by the provision of buyers. The result of the propaganda was that stock-owners delivered their cattle to the auctions in large numbers only to be disappointed by the non-availability of buyers. Buckley observed in December 1929 how lack of buyers made the culling propaganda an absurdity. He reported:
During the last three months of the year, cattle auctions were organised in Maswa and Kwimba chiefly to test the people's response to our constant propaganda to call their heards and sell surplus and unproductive animals. Their response was far better than was expected but buyers hung off for a variety of reasons and half the stock offered for sale had to be taken back for lack of buyers.

Buckley went further as to provide statistics of traders available and beasts returned by disappointed owners. He wrote:

On 28 September, over 500 cattle were produced at Ndusuu, Maswa District. Only 91 head were sold. There were only two buyers. On 8 October, a second auction was held at Massa, Maswa District. 87 cattle were produced, only one buyer, a Somali trader appeared.

It is evident that the Sukuma were eager to auction some of their animals. Hyden's assertion that in the 1920s the 'British...tried to convince the Sukuma to sell some of their cattle' but 'this proposal met with immediate resistance from the local chiefs' as 'any scheme to control livestock was instantly rejected' is incorrect. The 'sell more cattle' campaign of the 1920s failed largely because the officials had not adequately prepared for it. The officials, for instance, did not provide adequate disposal outlets for the beasts when the livestock-owners responded favourably to the campaign.

The inability to purchase increased numbers of livestock in livestock-rearing areas inevitably resulted in widespread meat shortages. In its annual report for the year 1925, for example, the Department of Veterinary Services complained:
Meat shortage throughout the Territory is becoming more marked despite the increase in the number of herds and it is difficult to suggest a remedy.\textsuperscript{24}

Livestock-owners in Sukumaland, like many others in several parts of Tanganyika, were in the 1920s building up their herds partly due to the absence of market opportunities. By 1930, Sukumaland was a leading livestock-rearing region of Tanganyika. The Sukuma, who by this time numbered about 569,000, were keeping about 1,204,000 head of cattle and about 1,304,600 sheep and goats.\textsuperscript{25} The cattle population in Sukumaland constituted about one-quarter of the territorial herd.

Livestock distribution was uneven both among and within the Sukuma districts. Although livestock were found in all the districts, there was greater concentration in Shinyanga, Maswa, Kwimba and Mwanza Districts in that order. Within the districts, the concentration tended to be in areas reknown for crop production. Some parts of Sukumaland were by the late 1920s proclaimed overstocked. Among such areas were Nera and Buhungukira chiefdoms of Kwimba District which were both important livestock-rearing and cotton-producing areas. By 1929, these areas carried between themselves over 200,000 head of cattle out of the total District herd of 319,000 head and 266,000 sheep and goats.\textsuperscript{26}

Rise and Fall of the Meat Rations Company, 1928 - 1939

The Meat Rations Company (hereafter MERACO) was the first private firm to undertake organized cattle-buying in Sukumaland during the inter-war period. The results were, however, not
dramatic as the company experienced immense problems in its endeavours which finally led to its collapse. MERACO came into being in June 1928 following the establishment of a meat processing plant near Mwanza town by several Kenya-based investors. The setting up of this plant was welcomed by the Tanganyika Government because it was believed that the company would absorb the 'surplus' cattle in the Lake Province, thereby preventing the deterioration of the environment through overgrazing. It was partly for this reason that MERACO was allocated 10,000 acres for a ranch at Maliaruguru in Maswa District which was to be used as a holding ground as well. The company was also granted 'exclusive right for a period of 10 years to carry on the business of preparing meats and by-products derived from cattle purchased from natives within the Provinces of Tabora and Mwanza'.

These arrangements between the Tanganyika Government and MERACO should not be seen as having been made because of Government commitment to the industrialization of Tanganyika. The policy of non-industrialization of East Africa was pursued during the inter-war period for fear of creating competition for metropolitan manufacturers. A Japanese match-manufacturing firm, for instance, was not
allowed to establish a match factory in East Africa in 1928 because match companies in Britain objected.\textsuperscript{28} In Tanganyika, the manufacturing of binder twine was bitterly opposed in Britain, and the factory was closed in 1936 after operating for only two years.\textsuperscript{29} MacMichael, Governor of Tanganyika in the early 1930s, was particularly opposed to any move of establishing processing factories in East Africa. As far as he was concerned it was undesirable to accelerate the industrialization of East Africa which must, for many years to come, remain a country of primary produce.\textsuperscript{30} MacMichael saw MERAGO 'not as a commercial proposition but as a most valuable experimental plant in relation to the problem of overstocking and utilization of cattle products'.\textsuperscript{31} MERAGO was thus tolerated because it shared the same interests with the government. In many other colonies where governments were unable to set up necessary meat-processing works, private enterprises were attracted. In Southern Rhodesia, for instance, the South African-based Imperial Cold Storage Company was between 1924 and 1939 given the 'monopoly on the export of frozen and chilled meat, a grant of land of unspecified size for the erection of freezing works, \textsuperscript{32} a pledge by the Government to use its influence to secure low railway rates'.

MERAGO meat processing plant was capable of handling fifty head of cattle per day, but it hardly worked to capacity. The plant specialized in producing edibles like
canned beef, salted dry meat and cooking fat, and inedibles like blood meal, bone and meat meals for the fertilizer market. In addition to these products, the company irregularly supplied small quantities of frozen meat to Dar es Salaam. MERACO was, however, unable to operate smoothly. The company temporarily closed in 1930 before it finally collapsed by December 1935. All the company's property was either auctioned or taken by the government by 1939.

Several factors explain the inability of MERACO to realize the intended objective of absorbing most of the 'surplus' cattle in the Lake Province. One of the company's major problems was undercapitalization. This problem, which became evident by the beginning of 1930, was revealed by the company's inability to purchase required numbers of cattle for the plant. At a number of auctions in Kwimba District, for example, MERACO cattle buyers often ran short of money after buying only a few head of cattle. Page, Acting District Officer, Kwimba, who accompanied the MERACO buyer, reported several such cases whereby the company's buyers had to borrow money from local chiefs in order to continue buying more cattle. One such case took place at Bungulwa, Kwimba District, between 4 and 6 February 1930, on which Page reported:

Bungulwa, 4-6 February, 334 cattle sold of which number Meat Rations Limited bought 207. Top price Shs. 71/- Average price Shs. 31/46. Prices here were very much better than at recent sales. The
Buyers' individual traders and company's buyer who totalled twenty-seven funds lasted out the number of cattle offered through Meat Rations buyer had to wire for 2 further remittances of Shs. 2000/- each, the cash being meanwhile advanced by sub-chief Fumbuka en my personal guarantee, after I had spoken to Mr. Montgomery General Manager on the phone from Manthare Station. I did this in order to keep the sale going and to prevent, if possible, cattle being sent away unsold.33

This was not the only time that the MERACO buyer was let down by lack of funds at his command. Page reported yet another case, this time at Runere auction held on 18–19 February. This time not even the telephone message to Montgomery could save the situation. Page reported:

Runere, 18–19 February. 18 traders both individual and Company buyers. 229 cattle sold, 20 cattle bids refused. 220 cattle not offered. Meat Rations buyer bought 110 and exhausted his funds. He wired for further remittances, but no reply was received up to 3 p.m. on 19 February...prices were generally lower than at Bungulwa and when Meat Rations buyer dropped out prices fell considerably more.34

These two cases reveal at least two important things. First, we see the State as represented by administrative officials (particularly Page) aiding a private company in its endeavours to acquire raw materials (cattle). The use of the state power was necessary as the government was interested in the activities of MERACO. Second, the two cases reveal the ailing financial position of MERACO. By this time, the expenditure of the company almost equalled its revenue. Grazeboek, who succeeded
Montgomery as Director and General Manager of MERACO towards the end of 1930, gave a very depressing report on the financial position of the company in 1930, in which recapitulated revenue was put at £58,800 and expenditure, £57,582. This expenditure did not include depreciation on machinery, interest on borrowed money, stores, rent of grazing lands, cost of enamelling tins and expert charges on canned beef.

As the result of this poor financial position, MERACO confined its activities to a minimum by the middle of 1930, sufficient only to keep the machinery in order. This move to curtail cattle purchases reduced market off-take in Sukumaland. By August the same year, Buckley reported from Mwanza town to the Chief Secretary in Dar es Salaam:

I regret to report that during the last month (July) over 500 head of slaughter cattle in good condition were produced by natives at two places in Kwimba District, but had to be taken back because of lack of buyers. Messrs. Meat Rations Ltd. are not buying cattle now with the exception of a few head a day...The natives are eager to sell cattle in order to get cash, prices were not only moderate but actually low, cattle are in good condition, all the circumstances are decidedly in favour of the buyer, and if the Meat Rations Ltd. intend to enter the market again they should do so while these conditions exist.

Despite this appeal, MERACO could not immediately re-enter the market. Partly frustrated by the chronic poor financial state of the company, several directors resigned. Among those who resigned were Montgomery, Delamere and Calvile. In the absence
of these directors who had keen interest in the success of MERACO, the company experienced several administrative problems. It was not until Grazebook became general manager towards the end of 1930 that the administration of the company improved.

An attempt to improve the financial position of the company was made in 1931 by securing a £16,000 loan from the Colonial Development Fund in London through the Tanganjika Government. This loan was to be repaid in seven equal instalments beginning from September 1934. The initial conditions were that the loan be spent on recurrent expenditure, purchasing, handling and delivery of cattle, setting up a freezing plant and improving the factory, water supply and grazing. Another condition was that a government treasurer was to become a member of the board of directors and check the company's financial management. It is evident that the ailing financial position of MERACO stimulated greater government involvement in the activities of the company than had originally been anticipated. But despite this government involvement, the company hardly operated smoothly.

Undercapitalization of MERACO was also evidenced by the company's inability to compete with private traders who often offered higher prices. The Bukoba traders were the major competitors. By 1929, retail meat price was, for
instance, Shs 1/20 per kilogram in Bukoba while in Tanga Province (the most monetized province in the 1920s) the controlled price of beef varied from 40 cents to 80 cents per kilogram. This comparatively high retail price in Bukoba enabled the Bukoba traders to purchase slaughter cattle in Sukumaland at higher prices, much to the disadvantage of the company which insisted on offering 'factory prices'. By 1930, MERACO insisted on offering Shs. 25/- per head of cattle, a price it considered economic. In 1931, the 'factory price' offered by MERACO was even more ridiculously low. While Bukoba traders offered prices ranging from Shs. 15/- to Shs. 32/- because of the depression (to be discussed in detail later), MERACO had fixed its 'factory price' at Shs 7/- per head. As the result of these low prices offered by MERACO, the company experienced difficulties in purchasing slaughter cattle for the plant.

This response of cattle-owners to cattle prices was quite rational. As in any other capitalist society, the rise or fall of price of a commodity often influences the supply and demand for such a commodity. Prices in a capitalist society are links between consumers and producers, between demand and supply and they move in response to the relative strengths of demand and supply.

MERACO attempted to solve this problem of competition from Bukoba traders by using a number of methods which hardly improved
the situation. One such method was the company's decision to enter the Bukoba trade with the intention of lowering or 'stabilizing' cattle prices in Sukumaland. The reasoning here was that if the company flooded the Bukoba market, the retail price of meat there would go down, thereby inevitably lowering producer prices in Sukumaland. Towards the end of 1929, for instance, the company shipped 2,510 head of cattle to Bukoba and managed both to flood the market and lower retail price of meat to 50 cents per kilogram against Shs. 1/20 previously ruling there. This strategy is a well known capitalist manoeuvre to penetrate a market in order to gain a major market share, usually in a comparatively short time. The strategy, however, failed to achieve its intended objective. With its poor financial position, the company soon found that it could not continue to 'subsidize' the Bukoba beef consumers. The venture was thus abandoned by the middle of 1930.

The Great Depression whose effects were felt before MERACO had broken, was another factor which impeded the smooth operation of the company. The depression, which began in the United States of America in 1929, subsequently spread to Europe and finally to the colonies in the early 1930s, led to the collapse of prices and markets for
MERACO products. The prices of the products fell below production costs, thereby rendering continued production unprofitable. As the MERACO management maintained in 1932:

As the price of extract [beef extract] has steadily fallen due to the prevailing depression, we are unable to continue manufacturing this item at a profit and have therefore stepped working at maximum capacity until the price improves sufficiently to justify a resumption.43

The prices of canned beef in London during the depression dropped much to the disadvantage of MERACO which had been selling canned beef there. A six-pound tin of beef produced in Britain fetched about Shs. 4/- in London in the early 1930s while a MERACO tin of the same size fetched shs. 3/- despite transportation costs from Mwanza to London, costs of enamel imported from Britain for enamelling tins, and other expenses.44 MERACO beef fetched a lower price in London during the depression because of the existing tariff system which sought to protect manufacturers in Britain against competition from outside manufacturers. Apart from the problem posed by the tariff system, MERACO beef was declared coarse on the London market, and was considered 'unpalatable'.45

Finding markets for the other products of MERACO was an equally serious problem because of the collapse of markets during the depression. In his report on the activities of the company in April 1932, French,
a biochemist at the Veterinary Department headquarters, Mpwapwa, mentioned that large quantities of by-products accumulated due to lack of markets. By this time, about sixty tons of bone and meat meals for making fertilizer and feeding cattle could not find markets. Several attempts were made to popularize the company's by-products. Marketing propaganda through newspapers and other types of mass media was carried out in Tanganyika and Kenya. Advertisements like 'Buy best Tanganyika products from Meat Rations Ltd., Mwanza' and 'Beef Dripping, it is manufactured by modern machinery under hygienic conditions with European supervision', for instance, appeared in Tanganyika and Kenya newspapers.

MERACO also attempted to use the Tanganyika Government to promote the sales of their products. One of the products the company wanted the government to help in finding market for was salted dry meat. The company tried to induce the government to influence its various departments which provided food rations (including meat) to switch from providing fresh meat to dried meat bought from MERACO. The Health Department was induced to certify that dried meat was superior to fresh meat in terms of protein content. The other product MERACO wanted to popularize was its fertilizer. Samples were sent to Kenya for analysis with the hope of capturing the East African
fertilizer market, especially among the European farmers in the Kenyan Highlands if the analysis proved favourable.

Despite all these attempts to find markets for MERACO's by-products, little was achieved in alleviating the disposal problems. MERACO fertilizer could not sell in large quantities mainly because the depression affected the product's major consumers, the settler farmers. The depression caused the prices of crops to fall, thus reducing returns to the farmers. Many settlers stepped purchasing much fertilizer as a way of reducing production costs. Worse still, the fertilizer analysis in Kenya proved disastrous to MERACO as it was found out that the product was unsuitable for the acidic East African soils. The attempts to influence government departments to provide dried meat instead of fresh meat fell through mainly because public expenditure was reduced during the depression. The Tanganyika Government depended heavily on coffee, cotton and sisal exports for its revenue. But the depression led to the collapse of prices of these products, subsequently affecting government revenue which dropped by a quarter between 1929-1930 and 1931-1932.

Some departments looked for cheaper alternative sources of protein. The prisons, for example, found it cheaper to use game meat to a considerable extent. Game was killed for meat under the Governor's licences issued to Provincial Commissioners. It was thus uneconomic for such departments to
rely upon dried meat from MERACO. The Department of Education had mixed views on the subject, as officials at the headquarters in Dar es Salaam were not particularly keen on this suggestion for economic reasons. They often found fresh meat cheaper than dried meat. Browne, Headteacher at Mwanza Central School, made his stand clear over the dried meat issue when he wrote to the Director of Education in Dar es Salaam in 1932:

> Both the hospital and ourselves buy meat at the local market at a much cheaper rate. I don't therefore propose buying from Meat Rations, unless I receive definite instruction from you to do so.51

But definite instructions to this effect were not forthcoming as the government exercised maximum strictness over public expenditure as the depression progressed.

By 1934, it was evident that MERACO could not remain in business because of the numerous problems. When the time came to make the first payment of £2,205 towards the £16,000 lean, the company could not afford such a payment and asked for extension of time for the payment.52 The company pleaded that such a payment could mean closing business forthwith.

The financial position had become so critical that the company could no longer pay its insurance against fires.53 By December 1935, MERACO finally stopped operating, leaving the £16,000 lean outstanding, and a debate on how to deal with the company's liabilities and assets. The Government Treasurer was of the view that the 'only hope for the business [MERACO] as a purely commercial proposition is for it to be taken over
by one of the large companies interested in meat and meat products.\textsuperscript{54} The Treasurer was thus urging the government to attract big business concerns with bigger capital than MERACO. This was the strategy, for instance, adopted in Southern Rhodesia between 1924 and 1939 (e.g. attraction of Imperial Cold Storage Company) when small firms like the Rhodesia Meat Packing Company could not operate satisfactorily due to both undercapitalization and the effects of the depression.\textsuperscript{55} In Tanganyika attempts were made to attract Liebig's Meat Extract Company, a firm that owned ranches and processed meat in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, to buy MERACO. But the venture fell through as the Liebig's was not interested.\textsuperscript{56} It was finally decided that MERACO property be sold to interested parties. By the end of 1936, all the property at Mwanza was sold and £600 realized.\textsuperscript{57} The fate of the 10,000 acres intended for a ranch at Malaruguru was not known until 1939 when the government repossessed it and handed it over to the peasants in small family plots.\textsuperscript{58} As regards the outstanding loan, it was finally agreed that the Tanganyika Government would repay it.\textsuperscript{59} The repayment of the loan thus became the responsibility of the Tanganyika tax-payers who generated the territorial revenue either through the supply of labour or production of cash crops.

It is evident from the above discussion that MERACO experienced many problems in its endeavours. The company was not only undercapitalized but could also not easily find markets
for its products, MERACO did not only operate at the time when the British pursued the policy of non-industrialization of East Africa but also when the depression led to the collapse of markets for the company's products.

Depression and Recovery

In the previous section we have, among other things, dealt with the effects of the Great Depression on the operation of MERACO. In this section we discuss the responses of the Sukuma livestock-owners to the livestock trade during both the depression and the recovery period. During the depression (1929-1935), the Sukuma offered more cattle for sale than during the period of recovery (1936-1939). In Shinyanga District, for example, more cattle were sold during the last two years of the depression than during the recovery period as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Cattle Sales from Shinyanga, 1934-1938

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of cattle sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>18,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>10,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>7,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>5,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>8,563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Report of Department of Veterinary Services 1938 54.
This increase in cattle sales during the depression is interesting in that it occurred at the time when both supply and demand were expected to fall because of the accompanying economic crisis. Under normal capitalist circumstances producers tend to increase supply of commodities when prices are high, and reduce the supply when prices are low. The depression forced the prices of livestock to fall. In Mwanza District, for example, the average price fell from Shs. 41/50 per head in 1930 to below Shs. 30/- in 1931. 60 The producer prices offered by Bukoba traders in 1931 in many parts of Sukumaland ranged from Shs. 15/- to Shs. 32/- per head, this being a drop from the pre-depression range of Shs. 30/- to Shs. 100/-. 61 This collapse of prices was also experienced in many other cattle-rearing areas of Tanganyika. In Kondoa region of Central Province, for instance, cattle prices dropped from Shs. 49.00 per head before the depression to Shs. 10.84 in 1934'. 62

Several reasons explain the increase of cattle sales in Sukumaland during the depression despite the falling prices. One reason is that the collapse of prices forced the Sukuma to increase sales in order to realize sufficient cash income for their multifarious needs. Cash was particularly needed for paying hut and poll taxes demanded by the government. Sukumaland was by 1934 the leading revenue - generating region of Tanganyika.
The government was aware that 'it would be a matter of grave consequence to the territory if tax operations in the group Sukuma District went seriously awry'. Indeed, any event which threatened a reduction in tax revenue from Sukumaland often triggered concern among many government officials. The government was, for instance, at pains to reduce the tax in 1931-1932 season from Shs. 12/- to Shs. 10/- per annum following the ravages of rinderpest which decimated Sukumaland herds, and locusts which devoured crops.

The drop in cattle sales during the recovery period was partly due to availability of alternative sources of income which reduced the cattle-owners' dependence on the sale of their beasts. One such alternative was increased cotton production. The government had chosen the depression as the period conducive to launching of the 'grow more cotton' campaign despite the falling world prices for agricultural products. In fact the campaign was to a large extent a reaction to the depression. The Colonial Treasurer, R.W. Taylor, for instance, was very convinced that the depression was the best time to introduce the campaign because 'when the prices of cash crops are low natives of the country could be prodded to grow an increased area of crops'. The depression, Taylor insisted, provided the right time to emphasize the importance of increased efforts in agriculture since when prices were high as in Uganda, the 'natives get depressed and would not enter upon increased production because they did not get the same prices as before'.
The propaganda to increase cotton production did not pay significant dividends during the early years of the depression for several reasons. Firstly, many peasants did not immediately take up cotton production. Some peasants, especially the returning labour migrants who were forced out of employment by the depression, were just preparing themselves for cotton growing. Secondly, the locust invasion during the early 1930s destroyed the crops in many parts of Sukumaland. Thirdly, the low producer prices of cotton discouraged many peasants from taking up cotton production. But after the depression, prices improved and production of the crop subsequently increased. Output expanded from about 8000 bales in 1932 to a figure fluctuating between 20,000 and 40,000 bales between 1933 and 1939. This increase in cotton production enabled many Sukuma to raise money for their taxes.

Apart from selling cotton, the Sukuma produced and sold clarified butter in order to earn cash income. In many parts of Sukumaland, experts in preparation of these products were giving demonstrations in how to produce good butter and ghee. By 1939, Sukumaland was one of the important ghee-producing areas in Tanganyika. This industry became popular among the cattle-owners not only because of its lucrative returns, but also because the industry did not entail the disposal of beasts at ridiculously low prices. The mere the Sukuma earned from the alternative sources of cash income the mere reluctant they became in selling their beasts. By early 1939 the livestock trade had not improved as the Veterinary Department r
reported that 'throughout the year the livestock trade was marked by reluctance to sell'. By this time Sukumaland was still a leading livestock-rearing region in Tanganyika, grazing more than three-quarters of the total Lake Province population of 1,808,200 head of cattle, 790,200 sheep and 900,800 goats. However, the outbreak of the Second World War towards the end of 1939 marked a turning point in the market participation of the Sukuma livestock-owners. The Sukuma were called upon to increase their cattle sales.
FOOTNOTES


3. Ibid, 66.


8. Ibid.


14. TNA 18790, T.G. Buckley, Acting Provincial Commissioner, Mwanza Province, to Director of Veterinary Services, 30 August 1929.

16. TNA 18790, H.E. Hornby, Director of Veterinary Services to Chief Secretary, 24 September 1930.

17. TNA 18790, Buckley to Chief Secretary, 30 December 1929.


19. In Southern Rhodesia, for example, the Rhodesia Meat Packing Company which became operational in 1919 temporarily closed in 1920 before finally stopping operating in 1922. The major reason for its closing was undercapitalization. See I.R. Phimister, 'Meat and Monopolies: Beef Cattle in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1938,' Journal of African History, 19, 3 (1978), 402.


22. TNA 18790, Buckley to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 30 December 1929.

23. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa, 57.


26. Tanganyika Territory. Provincial Commissioners' Reports:

Mwanza Province Annual Report, 1929 (Dar es Salaam:


28. R.M.A. Van Zwanenberg and A. King, An Economic History of
125.

29. Ibid.

30. Cited in Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, 274.


33. TNA 18790, W.F. Page, Acting District Officer, Kwimba, to
Provincial Commissioner, Mwanza, 21 January 1930.

34. Ibid.

35. TNA 12452, Mr. Grazebrook's Report on Meat Rations, 1930.

36. Ibid.

37. TNA 12452, Buckley to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam,
8 August 1930.

38. TNA 12452, Meat Rations, 1930–1932.

Conditions of the Mwanza Province by E.C. Baker, District
Officer (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1934), 68.


41. TNA 12452, Treasurer in the Treasury Department,
Dar es Salaam, to Chief Secretary, 11 August 1931.

42. Annual Report of Department of Veterinary Services, 1929, 61.

43. TNA 12452, Meat Rations 1930–1932.
44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. TNA 12452, M.A. French, bio-chemist in Veterinary Department, Mwasa: Report on Products and Activities of Meat Rations Limited, Mwanza, 1 April 1932.

47. TNA 12452, Meat Rations, 1930-1932.

48. Ibid.

49. The price of Sisal, for example, dropped from £32 per ton in 1929 to £11 per ton in 1932. The price of Bukeba coffee fell from £59 to £20 per ton between 1929 and 1933. See J. Iliffe, Agricultural Change in Modern Tanyanya (Nairobi: African Publishing House, 1971), 28-29.

50. TNA 12452, Meat Rations, 1930-1932.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.


57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. TNA 18790, Cattle Sales in Mwanza District, 1930-1931.

61. Ibid.


63. Report by Kitching, 16.
64. Ibid.

65. TNA 13044, Tayler to Chief Secretary, 15 July 1931.

66. Ibid.


68. Annual Report of Department of Veterinary Services, 1939, 150.


The censuses were compiled by Veterinary Department Officers during inoculation campaigns.
CHAPTER 3

IMPACT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR ON LIVESTOCK MARKETING

This chapter discusses the market participation of Sukuma livestock-owners during the Second World War. It attempts to show that the Sukuma, like livestock-owners in other parts of Tanganyika, increased their livestock sales (particularly cattle) during this crisis period. It is argued that the increase in cattle sales was mainly because of government determined efforts to contribute to the 'War effort'. The government efforts included re-organising the purchasing system, controlling outbreaks of diseases, improving territorial stock routes and general mobilization of livestock-owners to contribute viably to the war revenue.

During 1940, 45,681 head of cattle were sold at the official markets in Sukumaland, this being nearly double the number sold during the previous year.\(^1\) The busiest markets during that year were Shinyanga markets which exported 24,000 head of cattle, followed by Maswa markets which exported over 13,000 of the total.\(^2\) Subsequent years witnessed even a higher off-take from the region. In 1943, for example, an all-time record of 140,660 head of cattle were exported from the Lake Province of which 44,100 came from Shinyanga District, 36,158 from Maswa District and 21,069 from Kwimba.\(^3\) During the following year, the region supplied about 71,000 head,\(^4\) and in 1945, the supply was 82,322 head of cattle.\(^5\) After all
these sales, Sukumaland was by the end of 1945 reported to be grazing an estimated 1,728,400 cattle units.\textsuperscript{5}

We can at this stage attempt to explore the reasons for this spectacular increase in the market off-take of cattle from this region. It is undoubtedly true that the outbreak of the war stimulated the British Government to mobilize both subjects in Britain and its colonial subjects in the British Empire towards winning the war. In Tanganyika, Bowles sees the war as having not only provided a 'justification for harsher measures to bring an increase in production' but also 'demanded a reassessment of the state's priorities and an attempt to plan production in accordance with these priorities'.\textsuperscript{7} Among the important war-time priorities emphasized by the colonial government was an increase in crop production of food and cash as a way of contributing to the war economy.

Among the important cash crops whose production was emphasized during the war were rubber, pyrethrum, sisal, coffee and cotton. Tanganyika had ceased to be a producer of rubber with the demise of German rule, but production was revived during the war by the government - controlled Jardine, Matheson and Company Limited.\textsuperscript{8} Cotton production was regulated by the government with the object of 'securing supplies for Home (British) Government and to stabilize prices as well as to prevent indiscriminate planting at the expense of food production'.\textsuperscript{9} The regulation of cotton production resulted in a steady production of the crop. The production in Sukumaland reached 32,468 bales in 1943 but dropped to 26,911 bales in 1945.\textsuperscript{10}
The sisal industry was also called on to readjust its organization at the end of 1941 and in early 1942, and by 1943 the output was expected to 'exceed by a very substantial percentage the results attained in the five years before the war'. Sisal was important as a source of twine. Tanganyika was directed to increase production of sisal following the capture of Indonesia and Philippines in 1941 by the Japanese. These areas had been important sources of ropes and their capture greatly reduced the supply of this commodity.

Among the important food items the Tanganyika Government required in increasing quantities during the war were rice, groundnuts, maize and meat. Certain regions were forced to produce particular food crops. Lake Province, for instance, became the supplier of increasing quantities of groundnuts and rice. The chief areas of production of rice were Ukerewe and Ukara Islands, Mwanza and Central Kwimba Districts.

Table 3: Production in Tons of Clean Rice in Sukumaland 1939-1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mwanza District</th>
<th>Kwimba District</th>
<th>Shinyanga District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,560</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4,420</td>
<td>2,473</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>3,494</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>4,853</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Report of Department of Agriculture, 1945, 23.
Maize was produced by peasants in Western Tanganyika and by a number of settler farmers in the Northern area of Tanganyika. Slaughter stock (particularly cattle) were bought mainly from Northern, Central and Lake Provinces, the major livestock-keeping areas of the territory.

Hence the Sukuma did not only supply cotton and rice but also slaughter cattle. Meat was required together with grain as food rations of the British military forces stationed in Kenya, the Middle and Far East. Meat was also supplied to refugees, prisoners-of-war in camps and labourers employed in essential war industries such as sisal and rubber in Tanganyika. In order to rehabilitate the rubber plantations, for instance, the government trained a labour force of between 15,000 and 20,000 men hitherto unaccustomed to this form of work. 13

This labour force had to be fed. Similarly the re-organization of the sisal industry to augment production led to the recruitment of thousands of labourers who were fed in order to realize the objective of the government. The Master and Native Servants (Proper Feeding) Regulations stipulated clearly that labourers in essential war industries were to be adequately fed and failure to comply on the part of employers warranted punishment. 14

In order to ensure that food rations for these groups of people were available in the right quantities and at the
right times, the Tanganyika Government reorganized buying systems. The war-time Ministry of Food was charged with the responsibility of purchasing food crops including coffee. The government appointed Liebig's Extract of Meat Company as buyer of cattle in Tanganyika for the military forces. Liebig's established a meat-processing plant in 1939 on Athi River in Southern Kenya near the border with Tanganyika. One advantage of manufacturing tinned beef in Kenya during the war was that the product could be transported to the consuming centres (military forces in Kenya and Middle East) without much danger of the means of transport being destroyed by enemy forces as was the case with ships leaving Britain for various war-fronts. Indeed, the fear that ships would be attacked was so rampant among British officials that fewer ships were released to transport goods to far places like East Africa, thereby creating shortages of goods that had earlier been imported by sea from Britain. It is to a large extent because of this transport problem during the war that the British changed their policy of non-industrialization of the colonies pursued in the 1920s and 1930s. The new policy involved stimulating big companies (most of them based in Britain) to establish factories in the colonies to ensure a steady supply of goods. In East Africa, Kenya, which was seen as the white man's country, was chosen as the seat of
the regional manufacturing industries. The Kenya Industrial Management Board was set up in Nairobi in 1940 - 1941 specifically to encourage local manufacture of some goods formerly imported from Europe. In 1940, for instance, Bata Company which had been exporting shoes to East Africa since 1935, established a tannery and shoe factory in Limuru, Kenya.

The penetration of the Liebig's in Tanganyika was thus part of the British strategy to realize increased industrialization of East Africa as demanded by the war. By 1940, having been empowered by the Defence Regulations, Liebig's became a semi-monopoly in purchasing cattle not only in Kenya but also in all cattle-keeping areas of Tanganyika. The first object of the Tanganyika Government was to see to it that Liebig's was supplied with the cattle it required. To realize this the government introduced various 'control measures' which included fixing of quotas of cattle to be brought forward for auction in each of the main cattle-raising districts, and the fixing of maximum price at the resale markets. This in turn ensured that buyers offered almost uniformly low prices at the primary markets. The latter measure was particularly designed to deal with the Bukoba traders who were renowned for their tendency to offer prices above 'factory level'.

The low prices at primary markets often differed slightly from market to market, and from district to district. The prices in
1940, for instance, were Shs. 27/94 per head in Shinyanga District, Shs. 23/66 in Maswa District and Shs. 24/08 in Kwimba District. This difference was partly due to the fact that there was no laid down minimum price per head for the primary markets. The sellers were at the mercy of buyers who took advantage of the war to offer very low prices. Liebig's had war time buyers like Oscar Dahl (who became the first Chief Buyer for the Tanganyika Packers Limited when it became operational in 1950) who were renowned for their sharp bargaining with the Sukuma stock-owners. It was partly because of such advantages that Liebig's, for instance, able to buy over 23,000 head of cattle out of about 45,681 head brought for sale in Sukumaland in 1940. Most of these animals were sent to the company's canning plant on Athi River. By the end of 1943, Liebig's had increased its territorial purchases for its canning plant from an insignificant amount in 1939 to about 100,000 head of cattle. Liebig's' cattle exports to other provinces, especially to sisal growing Tanga Province and other territories was also significant. Out of the 140,660 head of cattle bought in Sukumaland in 1943, for example, 31,306 were exported to other provinces and 48,984 head to other territories, mainly to Zanzibar and Kenya.
Liebig's effectiveness as chief buyer of cattle in Sukumaland, and indeed in many other regions, cannot be fully understood without discussing the government's suspension of trade 'rings' which had adversely affected the cattle trade during the period 1919-1930 period. Due to the government's commitment to the war, the company was directed to buy most of the cattle brought for sale regardless of whether or not these animals came from 'diseased' areas. This was a remarkable departure from the purchasing policy followed before the war whereby certain areas were cordoned-off from traders for fear both of spreading animal diseases to 'disease-free' areas through cattle movements and of infecting people through the consumption of 'diseased' animals. With the establishment of a canning plant, even 'diseased' and low-grade animals were turned into palatable meat through processing. Under war arrangements, Liebig's was to be compensated by government for any cattle that died on trek routes to the consuming centres or the processing plant. This indiscriminate buying did result in a higher mortality rate within purchased herds. In 1943, for instance, a mortality rate of 15.7 per cent was registered out of 83,478 head of cattle purchased in Tanganyika.

However, this high mortality was not the result of disease alone. Drought also contributed significantly to mortality. Towards the end of 1943, much of Sukumaland 'presented
a pitiful picture of a barren waste with starving cattle reduced to browsing on bushes. Many cattle thus died on trek routes because of their poor physical condition. The drought may have also contributed to the marketing of 140,660 head of cattle in Sukumaland in 1943 (the largest number recorded during the whole war period) as many stock-owners feared to lose most of their animals if they retained them. However, the increased mortality did not deter Liebig's from buying more cattle as this was a numerical loss rather than an economic loss to the company.

This mortality would possibly have been higher had the government not undertaken an ambitious war-time inoculation campaign against some stock diseases in 1940. Before the war, the government sparsely rationed its efforts against livestock diseases. As a result, the ravages of certain diseases were on the increase rather than on the decreases. During the war, rinderpest was of particular concern to the government. This disease assumed a more serious character than usual owing to the abnormally large numbers of cattle on the move along stock-routes. The Veterinary Department responded to the increased threats of this disease by recruiting more qualified personnel to combat the disease. These veterinary officers formed the war-time 'special rinderpest campaign teams' which undertook intensive inoculations. These 'teams' were under obligation to issue monthly progress reports. Their unremitting effort
and energy to control the disease was evidenced by the large
number of cattle inoculated in the territory during the war.
Between 1939 and 1943, more than 5½ million head of cattle
were inoculated against rinderpest throughout the territory, a
figure never attained at any time before the war.

Major emphasis was also laid on improving territorial
stock routes in the bid to reduce the mortality rate among
purchased cattle while being trekked to consuming areas. By
1944, the main stock route from Sukumaland eastwards to Northern
Province or via Longido to the Liebig's canning plant, was
provided with a number of dips and night camps with facilities
like drinking water. By the end of the war, this stock route
was as good as any other territorial routes.

The discussion on increased cattle sales from Sukumaland
during the war would be seriously incomplete without paying
particular attention to how the setting up of various
War Funds in Tanganyika inevitably led to increased cattle
sales from stock-raising districts. These funds were set up
in order to boost the revenue for the war. One such fund
which affected the Sukuma cattle-owners was the 'cattle
auction market fund'. Every Sukuma who sold his cattle at
the auctions contributed to this fund through a levy (not
more than Shs 1/-) on every beast sold. This fund was given
a legal backing through the imposition of the War Revenue
(Cattle Tax) Ordinance of 1941 which stipulated this payment.
This Ordinance did not apply to Sukumaland only but also to other parts of Lake Province, Northern, Western and Southern Highlands Provinces where official primary markets were established. This particular fund contributed to the 'war effort' significantly considering that thousands of head of cattle passed through these markets during the war in conformity with government interests.

Local administrations or Native Authorities in Sukumaland are also reported to have 'willingly offered' their 'surplus' balances in their treasuries to the general war fund. Even more interesting is the revelation in 1940 that these institutions 'offered to His Majesty's Government interest free loans amounting to £15,000 to aid the prosecution of the War, repayment to be made after the cessation of hostilities'.

Such contributions to the general fund were not restricted to Sukumaland. The Masai, through their local administrations, are reported to have pledged in 1940 to supply annually some cattle until the end of the war whose proceeds were to be channelled to the local administrations' treasuries and the war fund. In its annual report for the year 1940, the Department of Veterinary Services and Animal Husbandry stated:

Mention must be made of the contribution of cattle made by the Masai tribesmen towards the war effort. These people agreed to supply annually for the duration of the war 6,000 cattle to be sold and the receipts credited to a central fund. One-third of the proceeds to go to the war fund, one-third to be leaned free of interest to Government and the remaining third to be utilized in connection with the development of water, medical and other badly needed supplies for Masailand.
One should not conclude that these monetary loans and offerings stemmed from genuine patriotism during this time of crisis. Native Authorities never worked independently of the central governments, but were instruments of these governments and enforced their exploitative policies. The Sukuma Native Authorities and, indeed, even those in other parts of Tanganyika, were not an exception in this respect.

During the war Native Authorities in Tanganyika enforced the Native Authority Ordinance of 1942, a device intended to work side by side with the Defence Regulations in stimulating increased production by Africans. What Malcolm observed in respect to Sukumaland could apply to other areas:

Another valid test of the efficiency of the native administrative machine is its capacity to convey and enforce its own enactments under the Native Authority Ordinance, and orders and instructions from Government. This we must judge by its capacity to carry out that which is unpopular but necessary, like the many measures in support of the war effort which had to be enforced in recent years.

The efficiency of the local authorities during the war was particularly demonstrated in the collection of hut and pell taxes on behalf of the central government which in turn granted rebate from the tax collected. In Sukumaland, this rebate was at the rate of a quarter of the tax collected. In this way the Authorities got their revenue. These Authorities made sure that most of the livestock-owners and crop producers paid their tax in time during the war as directed by the central government. The Native Authorities were empowered to use 'such compulsion as can legally and effectively be employed' to secure the tax.
Hence in 1940, for instance, Lake Province collected more tax than it had ever done in its past history. During this year, £218,203 was collected of which £211,355 was current year's tax.\(^{37}\) Such a collection was particularly gratifying in view of the fact that the prices of most African products (including cattle) were depressed between 1939 and 1942. The 'offers' to the war fund were thus made by over-burdening the peasants whose returns from their products were progressively dwindling.

The monetary contributions of Native Authorities to the war fund should be understood in the light of government priorities and not in terms of generation of 'surplus' in their treasuries. Several pressing problems in chiefdoms remained outstanding during the war. Livestock-keeping areas were, for instance, always experiencing water shortages especially during the dry season, and livestock diseases were still a major menace. Crop-growing areas were being threatened, among many other problems, by soil erosion as a result of increased production through more frequent use of farm land. The Native Authorities could have directed their efforts in solving these problems, but were expected to channel some of their revenue to the war fund for the purpose of 'defending the Empire to which they belonged' and unity 'in the struggle for freedom'.\(^{38}\) Most of the propaganda during the war was directed towards stimulating interest for the 'war effort'.

The fact that the war was the appropriate time for government-enforced increase in cattle sales from Sukumaland
is further evidenced by the drop in cattle sales at official markets during the few years following the conclusion of the war.

Table 4: Cattle sales in Sukumaland, 1945-1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of cattle sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>82,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>84,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>82,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>74,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>67,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>61,225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TNA, MF 52, Mwanza Regional Book (microfilm).

Widespread shortages of meat were again reported in many parts of the territory. The sisal estates which were well supplied with slaughter stock during the war were particularly threatened by the shortage of meat to the point that estate-owners began thinking of finding ways of improving the supply of fish as alternative to meat. By 1945, Tanga Province required between 2,800 and 3,000 head of cattle per month, but between 1947 and 1950, the Province was getting approximately 500 head less per month.

The post-war meat shortage was rather unjustifiably
attributed to unwillingness on the part of stock-owners to sell. It is clear that the Sukuma were prevented from selling more of their cattle by certain developments beyond their influence. One such impediment, and perhaps the most important, was the cessation in 1946 of indiscriminate buying strategy employed during the war. This does not mean that the strategy had been wholeheartedly welcomed by stock-owners during the war but that its cessation was not replaced by a viable peace-time marketing programme. The government adopted an almost laissez-faire attitude towards the livestock trade in Sukumaland as was the case in the rest of the territory.

The volume of trade of Liebig's declined as the market for its products declined following the conclusion of military operations in the Middle and Far East and the cessation of labour conscription for sisal and other war-time industries in Tanganyika. The losses Liebig's encountered through the death of cattle on trek routes to the canning plant were no longer off-set by the government. This meant that Liebig's had to adopt a selective strategy of purchasing its required cattle. The company thus bought only those animals that it was sure would reach its canning plant. This selective system of purchasing was strengthened by the outbreak of the 1949-1950 drought, one of the worst droughts in the history of Sukumaland. In the worst drought-stricken districts, like Shinyanga, Kwimba and Maswa, losses varied from 30 to 40 per cent between 1949 and the end of 1950.41
Most of the surviving animals lost much weight. At many auctions, many cattle could not be bought because of their poor condition. This woeful state of affairs was witnessed by a livestock marketing officer in Maswa District in 1949 who reported:

Fifty-two stock markets were held during the year. Trading was seriously hampered by the severe drought conditions and many cattle brought for sale had to return unsold as they were unfit for the long trek to the consuming centres and resale markets in other provinces.42

The increased supply of cattle during this period of drought confirms Iliffe's assertion that 'a year of drought often flooded the markets with half-starved beasts'. 43

Cattle were returned at the Maswa District primary markets during 1949 despite the cattle-owners' eagerness to part with them at the average price of Shs. 69/01, this being approximately Shs. 3/- less than the previous year.44 In Kwimba, the situation was even more saddening by the end of 1949. As the result of the advent of the drought and selective purchasing of cattle, Kwimba District sold a proportionately insignificant number of animals. W.G. Pevie, Provincial Veterinary Officer, stated that only 2,367 head of cattle were sold out of Kwimba District whose district herd was estimated at nearly 450,000 in 1949.45 As the drought progressed, a number of auction markets in the most affected areas closed down for lack of buyers.46

The trade in cattle might have remained brisk during the
drought years had the government provided holding grounds where animals would regain their normal condition before trekking them to resale centres. Although the idea of establishing holding grounds was debated and favoured by many officials, the government never implemented it on the grounds that financial resources were too limited.

The increased market off-take of cattle during the war and subsequent decline should be perceived in the light of the colonial state's reaction to economic crises. The war was an economic crisis in that it stimulated a sudden search for resources which strengthened the war economy. The advent of the war stimulated increased state intervention in production as a way of coping with the crisis. We have already seen that the war necessitated increased production of food and cash crops in Tanganyika which were vitally needed commodities in the actual operation of the war. The war was not the only economic crisis in the colonial history of Tanganyika that was accompanied by increased state intervention. The depression in the early 1930s, as discussed in chapter 2, triggered off several government-sponsored 'grow more crops' campaigns through which peasants were coerced to increase production. The Sukuma, for instance, were directed to increase their production of cotton. Even the Germans reacted in like manner to the economic crises during their period of rule in Tanganyika. As we noted in Chapter 1, the Germans emphasized food production in Sukumaland during the First World War. An economic crisis thus tended to draw
the peasant communities in the colonies more into the capitalist market although returns to the peasants were very low. And the return to a state of normality tended to reduce the participation of these communities in this market.
FOOTNOTES

1. Lake Province Annual Report, 1940, 19.
2. Ibid.
4. TNA MF52, Mwanza Regional Book (microfilm). This Regional Book covers all the Sukuma Districts.
5. Ibid.
6. This figure is arrived at by adding the 1944 totals of 'cattle units' of Kwimba, Mwanza, Shinyanga and Maswa Districts found in a table in Malcolm, *African People*, 63. Malcolm defines a 'cattle unit' as one head of cattle or five sheep or goats. Small stock represented some 14 per cent of the total number of 'cattle units'.
8. Tanganyika Territory: Address by His Excellency the Governor at the Opening of the Budget Meeting of the Nineteenth Session of the Legislative Council (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 7 December 1944), 3.
10. TNA MF52, Mwanza Regional Book.
11. Address by His Excellency the Governor, 3.
13. Address by His Excellency the Governor, 4.
22. *Address by His Excellency the Governor*, 5.
24. *Ibid., 15.*
25. *Ibid., 27.*
26. *Ibid., 42.*
27. *Address by His Excellency the Governor, 5.*
33. *Ibid., 7.*
34. *Malcolm, African People, 100.*
35. *Ibid., 85.*

40. TNA 25535, Secretary of Tanyanyika Sisal Growers Association, Tanga Branch, to member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, Dar es Salaam, 30 February, 1948.


42. Tanganyika Territory. Annual Report for Provincial Council of Veterinary Department, Lake Province, 1942, 10.

43. Iliffe, History of Tanganyika, 313.

44. Annual Report for Provincial Council, 15.

45. Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

IMPACT OF DESTOCKING ON LIVESTOCK TRADE, 1951-1961

This chapter discusses the purpose and effects of the destocking exercise enforced in Sukumaland during the last decade of colonial rule. The contention here is that the introduction of compulsory destocking in 1952 was as much a reaction to the apparent dwindling stock sales as to the apparent increase in numbers of livestock in the region. It is also argued that although compulsory measures increased stock sales in Sukumaland, the increase was often lower than anticipated. This was so mainly because of the unpopularity and evasion of the destocking measures among livestock-owners.

The Tanganyika Government had expected the 1949-1950 drought to have reduced the sizes of stock herds in Sukumaland to 'right land-carrying size'. But unfortunately for the government, although the drought killed many animals, more remained than anticipated. The 1950 official animal census put the total figures at 1,314,491 head of cattle, 725,602 sheep and 679,208 goats, showing a minor decrease from the 1947 census which recorded the presence of 1,747,860 head of cattle, 606,218 sheep and 720,322 goats. By 1952, the stock census revealed that Sukumaland had almost attained the 1947 cattle population figure and exceeded that year's figures of sheep and goats. The 1952 census revealed that Sukumaland was grazing a total of 1,632,866 head of cattle, 782,116 sheep and 752,993 goats.

On the basis of the 1952 census, Sukumaland was declared 'grossly overstocked in some parts' and 'suffering from severe soil erosion and lowering of the productivity of both arable
and pasture. This apparent increase in animal population was largely the result of dwindling sales of slaughter stock in the region. Cattle sales, for instance, had been dwindling after the Second World War from the normal 75,000 war-time annual average to 42,120 in 1951. Rather than accept that this drop in sales stemmed from lack of enthusiastic buyers, the government accused stock-owners of shunning established markets. The concern of the government now was how best to integrate the Sukuma cattle-owners into the capitalist market where they would sell their animals on commercial lines.

The only viable solution the government found was compulsion. Compulsion, it was argued, would not only increase the supply of meat to consuming centres but also reduce animal pressure on the land thereby arresting the deterioration of the environment. The destocking exercise was thus not only to fall within the wider post-Second World War Sukumaland Development Scheme, but also within the wider territorial "rehabilitation of all native lands". Sukumaland was the first region of Tanganyika to have been subjected to compulsory destocking. The exercise was first applied in Mbulu District of Northern Province in the late 1940s for the same purpose of increasing market off-take from local cattle herds, and preventing overgrazing, soil erosion and other related problems.

Three possible ways of destocking were discussed and finally introduced in Sukumaland in 1952. One of these methods was to encourage permanent removals of stock from
overstocked areas to areas with relatively fewer animals. This method involved resettling some stock-owners with 'surplus' animals in some new areas where they would begin life afresh. Those who were affected went mainly to Geita District. The second method emphasized increased home consumption of meat. This strategy, it was argued, would not only reduce the stock population but would also help to combat the alleged prevailing nutritional deficiencies in rural areas. The third method was to increase stock sales through auction markets.

Although all three methods were always mentioned in propaganda talks, in practice the government concentrated on the auctioning strategy as the result of increased demand for slaughter cattle. In this study, we are more concerned with the auctioning strategy as it had a direct bearing on market off-take from the Sukuma herds. However, the other strategies will be discussed insofar as they affected increased market off-take. The auctioning strategy was in two phases; the first phase was from 1952 to 1954 and the second one from 1955 to 1961. The first phase emphasized compulsory destocking aimed at attaining an annual 5 per cent off-take rate through auction markets in each of the Sukuma districts. The second phase was aimed at achieving an annual market off-take rate of between 10 and 11 per cent.

During both phases, basic destocking principles were the same. A stock-owner was liable for destocking if he possessed more than ten animals. The more he possessed the more he was expected to auction. Before 1956, lists of those to be destocked were compiled annually by the clerical staff of the
Native Authorities with the help of village headmen or bagamani and thereafter by district administrative clerks. These destocking lists, which were compiled on a house-to-house counting basis, were done between December and January in readiness for the next destocking season which began in January and ended in December. After compiling the destocking lists, written orders or destocking tickets were served to owners of the animals. Once this order was served, a stock-owner was expected to deliver his animals to the nearest auction market. To avoid marketing difficulties which would be caused if all stock owners took their animals to the auctions at the same time, those expected to auction their animals were supposed to deliver them in two phases. Most of the animals were expected to be auctioned before October and the balance before the end of December. Between October and December, officials of Native Authorities toured their respective areas to check on the progress of the destocking exercise and ensuring that all possible defaulters took their animals to the auctions.

Several other measures were undertaken to make the destocking exercise viable. The animals to be auctioned were, for instance, branded. This made it easier for the touring Native Authorities officials to identify possible defaulters. The failure to sell the branded animals meant violating an order under rule 6 of the destocking measures. A person convicted was liable to a fine not exceeding 500 shillings or to imprisonment with or without hard labour.
for a period not exceeding two months or to both fine and imprisonment. Since Native Authorities held the key to the success of the destocking exercise, chiefs and headmen were periodically sent to Mbulu District to familiarize themselves with the operation of the destocking programme there. In Mbulu District, Native Authorities were behind the success of the programme. The institutions threatened potential opponents of the programme with punishment. Hence by 1949, 'there were few who would subsequently raise their voices in public argument against the need for stock reduction' in this District. This is the type of aggression the colonial officials wanted the Sukuma chiefs to emulate from their counterparts in Mbulu District.

Compulsory destocking in Sukumaland, though not fully implemented, contributed significantly to the raising of livestock sales, particularly of cattle, in the region. Although Sukumaland had been exporting cattle for some decades before 1950, it was not until after this year that the government began to see Sukumaland as a permanent and steady source of slaughter stock for the consuming centres. During the decade 1951-1961, Sukumaland supplied more than three-quarters of the annual total market sales of the whole Lake Province. Out of the Provincial annual market off-take of 101,262 head of cattle in 1952, for instance, 59,386 head came from Sukumaland. During this year, Sukumaland sold more cattle than the whole Province in the previous year. In 1956, Maswa District alone supplied more than 40,000 head of cattle out of the total Provincial figure of 93,543 head.
The following year, the Province supplied 132,855 head of cattle of which over 80,729 head came from Shinyanga and Maswa Districts alone. 16 Thereafter, Sukumaland annually supplied not less than an average/over 75,000 head out of the Provincial annual average of 90,000 head. 17

Compulsory destocking alone would not have been meaningful had outlets or buyers been absent. The opening of a beef canning factory in Dar es Salaam in May 1950 by the Tanganyika Packers Limited (hereafter TPL) was a major stimulus to the development of cattle trade not only in Sukumaland but in the whole of Tanganyika between 1951 and 1961. The TPL was jointly owned by Liebig's (which ceased to operate as an independent cattle buying company in Tanganyika with the formation of TPL) and the Tanganyika government. The government was the major shareholder, owning 51 per cent of the capital. 18 TPL was run by a board of directors which consisted of a chairman who was agreed upon by the government and Liebig's, and six people evenly nominated by both shareholders. The three government nominees were, at relevant periods, the Member of Finance, Member of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Veterinary Services. 19

Several points are worth noting concerning the formation of TPL. First, the inception of the company was part of the post-Second World War British policy of encouraging the establishment of light manufacturing industries in the colonies as had been the case during the war. This policy was good for economic reasons. Labour in the colonies was cheaper than in Britain.
In East Africa, for instance, wages were not more than a quarter of wages offered in Britain after the War. The availability of raw materials in the colonies was another consideration. It was believed that it would be cheaper to process certain raw materials in the colonies than in Britain. The other reason for localizing industries was that colonies would be able to export certain finished products thereby earning foreign exchange. This policy of encouraging the development of territorial-based industries paid dividends in the post-Second World War period as many factories were established in Tanganyika, most of them as subsidiaries of overseas firms. A subsidiary of the Metal Box Company was established in Dar es Salaam in 1947, and a local licence for Coca-cola became operational in 1950. Factory textile production began in 1957. Banks were also increasingly investing in local enterprise. The East African Currency Board was equally stimulated to invest locally rather than in London. By 1958, manufacturing had become a significant sector of the territorial economy, contributing about 5 per cent of Tanganyika's gross domestic product.

The other point to note concerning the inception of TPL is that unlike most industries which were dominated by private capital, TPL was a joint venture of state and private capital. The state on its own was unable to provide capital for establishing a processing plant and for day-to-day running of the enterprise. Through partnership with Liebig's, the Tanganyika Government hoped to secure sufficient capital to enable TPL to avoid the dangers of undercapitalization, a factor which had
affected the operation of MERACO in the 1930s. In partnership with Liebig's, the government also hoped to utilize the experience skills of its junior partner in meat processing.

The functions of TPL were clearly defined by both Liebig's and the government. First and foremost, the company was expected to purchase slaughter cattle for both its Dar es Salaam factory and Arusha abattoir. The Dar es Salaam factory was capable of handling 100,000 head of cattle per annum and the Arusha abattoir 20,000 head. In Sukumaland, TPL purchased cattle on a per head basis. In other regions of Tanganyika, especially in Central and Northern Provinces, the company bought cattle on a price per unit of weight basis, commonly 100 pounds. The animals purchased by TPL were principally for the production of canned beef. Beef canning was seen as necessary for several reasons. One reason was that meat could be consumed even in areas where fresh meat was unavailable because of inadequate transportation and many other problems. Another reason was that the TPL canned beef could be exported thereby earning foreign exchange for Tanganyika. It was also believed that canning of beef would in the wider perspective contribute towards averting the apparent deterioration of the environment as the animal pressure on the land would be reduced. Beef canning was also welcome in a country like Tanganyika where droughts often led to loss of condition of cattle and traders subsequently refused to buy such animals. Canning provided market for such ill-conditioned beasts.

The government, being the major share-holder and force behind the 'save the environment' campaigns, was particularly
keen to see TPL succeed in its endeavours. The government openly declared that 'Tanganyika Packers Limited should be regarded as a government organisation and every assistance must be given to the firm's agents who were purchasing cattle for the factory'. In Sukumaland, these buying agents were actually the firm's own salaried buyers who visited the various auction markets. The company's chief buyer, in conjunction with the provincial veterinary officers, prepared quarterly buying programmes in advance, showing when the buyers would conduct business at various auctions. These schedules also showed how many cattle the company buyers would purchase from a particular market. One of the advantages of buying schedules was that competition with other private buyers was reduced as the local veterinary officers and Native Authorities auction officers worked towards satisfying the company's demand first. The programmes also helped to organize markets efficiently before buyers arrived, thus minimizing delays.

The government also drew the attention of the company to the importance of establishing its own holding grounds where immature and ill-conditioned animals purchased by the company were kept until they became mature or regained their condition before being moved to Dar es Salaam. The company responded by establishing several holding grounds, among them being Shishiyu at Malampaka and Chibe and Semu in Shinganya District. The idea of holding grounds stemmed from the desire to make this cattle trade in Sukumaland continuous as the company could buy cattle even during the dry season when animals lost much weight.
As a result of these favourable arrangements, TPL emerged the most important single buyer of slaughter cattle from the Lake Province, and Sukumaland in particular, between 1951 and 1961. In 1955, the Provincial Commissioner noted that cattle sold in the Lake Province were increasingly being consumed by TPL's factory in Dar es Salaam. In the following year, out of the total of 46,844 head of cattle sold in Lake Province between January and March, 31,065 head were exported by the company to its Dar es Salaam factory.

Several minor markets for Sukumaland cattle existed between 1951 and 1961. Towards the close of this decade, four newly registered cattle-owners' cooperatives were annually exporting some cattle to Bukoba and Dar es Salaam. The cooperatives sold members' cattle directly to larger butcheries in both Dar es Salaam and Bukoba, and to a lesser extent to the TPL under a weight-grade system. In 1960, these cooperatives sold 1,273 head of cattle to TPL. Cooperative marketing of cattle was not unique to Sukumaland. The method had for many years been used by many European cattle-owners in Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa before it was introduced in Sukumaland. The European cooperatives often signed contracts with institutions (especially the mines) to supply slaughter cattle. The Sukumaland cattle-owners' cooperatives did not, however, become as influential as their counterparts in Southern Africa where European cooperatives often became dominant buying and selling institutions owing to government intervention.

Exports to Bukoba through various traders seem to have
been significant during the 1951-1961 decade. A lighter, S.S. Ng'ombe, plied weekly between Mwanza port and Bukoba carrying cattle from Sukumaland. In 1955, it was reported that 'increasing demand for meat in Bukoba District caused total cattle resales in Lake Province to increase by over one-third to 20,848 head'. By 1956, the Sukuma were also supplying some slaughter cattle to the Belgian Congo through a European trader who was contracted to supply these animals to the mining employers in the Katanga. Within Sukumaland local butchers and various employment centres, especially those which provided food rations, provided markets for slaughter stock. Local butchers, whose efforts were directed at meeting local demand for meat both in towns and rural areas increased their purchases towards the end of the 1950s when increased cash incomes from cotton enabled many Sukuma to purchase more meat. In 1959, for instance, local butchers purchased about 35,000 head of cattle. The mining areas were the most important employment centres in Sukumaland where workers were provided with food (including some meat). By 1952, Mwanza District was reported to have had 8,020 people in wage employment, Shinyanga District had 4,741 and Geita, 3,242. The concentration of this labour force was in the mining sector.

In Shinyanga District, the Williamson Diamond Mine at Mwadui and Alamasi Mine employed approximately 70 per cent of the total district labour force. In Geita District, the major employer was the Geita Gold Mine which employed about 71 per cent. The mining labour forces were made up mainly of migrant
labourers who were entitled to receive ration food as recommended by the Labour Department and stipulated by the Master and Native Servants (General Care) Regulations of 1947. Although employers tended to pay little attention to this Notice, some meat was at least at times given to the labourers, though in small quantities. In 1960, for instance, the cattle-owners cooperatives supplied 263 head of cattle to the Williamson Diamond Mine. The labourers who were not entitled to receive some meat as part of food rations often bought their meat from local butcheries.

In spite this remarkable increase in cattle sales from Sukumaland, complaints of reluctance to sell from district officials were common. The District Commissioner of Maswa, for instance, complained in 1953:

The most urgent problem at the moment is the lack of desire to sell cattle on the markets exemplified by refusals which this month [August] average 50% of all beasts offered. In spite of constant explanation, argument and persuasion, the people do not show any signs of wanting to co-operate in the destocking campaign.

This reluctance, it was argued, was the main reason why the Dar es Salaam factory of TPL ran below its maximum capacity.

The government reacted to this problem in a number of ways. The most notable one was its dependence on the coercive strategy. It was common for the Government officials to issue letters to Native Authorities, threatening them with possible punishment for their failure to force their people to increase sales at the auctions.
Despite this coercive approach, TPL continued to operate below capacity. Importers of fresh meat, bacon, ham, and slaughter stock (cattle, goats, sheep) from Kenya used the same argument to justify their ventures. In 1957, for example, in addition to 32,984 head of cattle, 17,642 sheep and goats valued at £300,000 and 'appreciable unrecorded imports on hoof' imported from Kenya, Tanganyika imported fresh meat, bacon, ham and sausages valued at £161,000. In 1959, the Arusha plant of TPL imported from Kenya 4,000 carcases of chilled beef to off-set the low market off-take from stock-owners in Tanganyika.

At this stage several questions should be asked. Were these imports of meat from Kenya really necessary? Was there a reluctance to sell cattle and small stock among Sukuma stock-owners? If there was, why was this the case? Looking at the livestock population figures between 1950 and 1961, it is clear that the destocking programme had limited success in Sukumaland. The animal population increased from 1,632,866 head of cattle, 782,117 sheep and 752,993 goats in 1952 to 3.5 million head of cattle and 3 million sheep and goats by 1961. The 5 percent market off-take rate each district was expected to attain between 1952 and 1955 was attained by all districts only in 1952, the year the programme was introduced. In 1953 for instance, only Mwanza (8.7 per cent), Kwimba (5.2) and Shinyanga (7.3) Districts exceeded the 5 per cent target. The following year, none reached the target as Mwanza registered 4.7 per cent; Shinyanga 3.1; Maswa 2.3; Kwimba 1.8 and Geita 2.0.
Several reasons can be advanced for the failure of the destocking exercise in Sukumaland to increase sales to the satisfaction of the government. One reason was the absence in Tanganyika of a factory to process sheep and goats as TPL was doing with cattle. In the absence of such a factory, the market for goats and sheep remained restricted to interested individuals and institutions whose demand was always small. The inability of the Tanganyika Government to set up a meat processing plant utilizing local sheep and goats was partly because of the dominance of the Kenya-based meat processing industries which supplied processed meat to Tanganyika. In the post-Second World War period, Tanganyika became dependent upon Kenyan bacon, ham and sausages. 47 Tanganyika was not only importing these consumer items from Kenya but also many other manufactured goods. Kenya was during this period expanding her export of manufactured goods with Tanganyika and Uganda 'faster than she was expanding her overseas export trade'. 48 The result was that these other two members of the East African common market became dependent upon Kenyan manufactured goods. Being members of the common market, Tanganyika and Uganda could not ban the importation of Kenyan manufactured products.

The other reason for the failure of the destocking exercise was the unpopularity of the programme itself among livestock-owners. The grievances against compulsory destocking were expressed in various ways. In many cases the grievances smouldered within rural areas for fear of repression if their reaction became overt through official institutions. As Hans Cory, Government Sociologist in Mwanza, pointed out in 1956:
The Sukuma themselves have not preferred serious complaints though they have much to say in private conversation about destocking which is not heard at official meetings.49

But in some parts of Sukumaland, stock-owners' grievances against compulsory destocking were initially channelled through the local branches of the Tanganyika African Association and subsequently through those of the Tanganyika African National Union (hereafter TANU) as from July 1954. In fact, the compulsory destocking issue was one of the major grievances articulated at the inaugural conference of TANU held in Dar es Salaam from 7 July to 10 July, 1954.50 At this conference, the Lake Province was represented by five delagates who became part of the seventeen founding members of TANU. The delegates from the Lake Province were the major complainants against the compulsory destocking exercise at the inaugural conference.51

One of the sources of unpopularity of the destocking programme was its subjection of stock-owners to the payment of a tax for each head of cattle sold at the auctions. By 1954, this tax, which was collected by market masters before stock-owners left the auctions, was Shs. 1 and was paid irrespective of the selling price the stock-owner got.52

The stock-owners whose animals fetched lower prices particularly detested the payment of this tax as it meant reducing the returns even more. Worse still, it was at these auctions that those cattle-owners who had evaded the payment of hut tax
were detected and had the outstanding tax deducted from the sales. Many stock-owners thus decided to evade auctions altogether when they intended to evade paying taxes.\footnote{53}

The other complaint against auctions was that prices were assessed by TPL which was the major buyer.\footnote{54} As the result of this TPL influence, the prices were always low. When compulsory destocking was introduced in Sukumaland in 1952, the average prices at the auctions for the year compared with 1951 were down by Shs. 15/63 (from Shs. 167/74 to Shs. 154/11) for a head of mature slaughter cattle and by Shs. 20/48 (from Shs. 125/60 to Shs. 105/12) for immatures.\footnote{55}

In Maswa District, the prices offered at the auctions for mature cattle in 1955 and 1956 between January and March showed a minor variation as shown in Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Prices of Mature Cattle in Maswa District</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
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<td>------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TNA 215/342, Regional Assistant Director of Veterinary Services, Mwanza, to Director of Veterinary Services, Dar es Salaam, April 20, 1956.
The fixing of prices was a necessary measure to enable TPL to pay 'factory price' for the cattle purchased. This was supposed to/a price which would enable the Company to realize higher profits. Cattle-owners interpreted the fixing of prices as deliberate action based on the knowledge that cattle-owners had no alternative but to auction their beasts in view of the existence of the destocking programme. In fact the prices of slaughter cattle were annually declining at the auctions during the 1951-1961 decade as shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Average Prices in Lake Province, 1951-1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mature Cattle</th>
<th>Immatures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>167/74</td>
<td>125/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>154/11</td>
<td>105/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>138/53</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>123/81</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>104/-</td>
<td>42/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lake Province Annual Reports, 1952-1957.

The other grievance against compulsory destocking was its major emphasis on cattle auctioning rather than on selling sheep and goats. This emphasis on destocking cattle was because the main business of TPL involved cattle. The result was that more cattle were bought than small stock.
The buying of small stock was relegated to local and a few external traders, especially the Bukoba traders. Even the Bukoba traders were more eager to purchase cattle than goats and sheep partly because of higher returns on cattle in the resale markets. In 1960 for instance, the Bukoba traders using the lighter, S.S. Ng'ombe, moved only 116 goats as compared to 12,450 head of cattle. The willingness of TPL to purchase cattle rather than small stock baffled many stockowners who had more use-value with cattle than with sheep and goats. During the last decade of colonialism, the use of oxen for agricultural work was increasingly becoming popular as the result of the introduction of draught implements, particularly the plough. Many Sukuma soldiers who had returned at the end of the Second World War from India and Burma where they had seen oxen pulling ploughs became pioneers in using ploughs in Sukumaland. The 'grow more cotton' campaigns of the 1950s (as will be discussed later) stimulated many Sukuma peasants to use ploughs in order to expand cotton production. Hence between 1952 and 1961 the number of ploughs employed in Sukumaland rose from some 5,000 to over 20,000. The use of the plough meant that a household now needed more cattle, at least six draught oxen. These animals had to be castrated in order to reduce their aggressiveness. But the consequence of castration was that these animals no longer performed breeding functions. This thus meant that a stock-owner had to keep aside a number of bulls for breeding purposes.

The introduction of the plough and increased crop production in Sukumaland tends to disprove the popular assertion that
livestock-owners are prepared to sell more if there are meaningful things to purchase with their earned incomes. Fielder has, for instance, observed that an Ila cattle-owner 'will sell on a large scale only for something that will last, or bring him good return—to build a good house, or to buy a grinding mill or a motor vehicle'. Anacleti holds a similar view in his justification for the low integration of pastoralists in the colonial money economy. He writes:

There is possibility that the capitalist might have integrated the pastoralists faster into their system if they had emphasized the conversion rather than the reduction of cattle. If the campaign had been aimed at encouraging them to sell in order to buy more durable and productive items like the plough, ghee separators or flour mills it would have been more logical to the pastoralist.

In Sukumaland, livestock were not the only (or major) sources of cash income during the post-Second World War era. Cotton, as will be discussed later, was the major source of cash income, especially among those with few animals. Ploughs, ghee separators and other machinery were often purchased from cotton incomes rather than from livestock sales.

The land rehabilitation strategy advocated by officials in the post-Second World War period meant adopting approved methods of land husbandry. Among the methods recommended was the use of dung to improve soil fertility where the soil was exhausted. Many stock-owners appreciated this method as increased cotton production exhausted the soils. The effective use of manure meant keeping more animals but this was again against the destocking rules which aimed at reducing individual herds to ten or less.

Milk was always an important product of cows among the Sukuma, and constituted an important part of the diet.
In order to ensure a sufficient supply of this product, a number of cows had to be kept. These animals would supply milk even during the dry season when milk production dropped, and people and calves competed for the milk available. These are some of the functions of cattle which were in conflict with the demands of compulsory destocking. A Sukuma stock-owner believed that he could think of auctioning when he owned at least twenty head of cattle but compulsory destocking rules expected him to auction when he owned just above ten. 

Fielder also observed that the Ila were eager to sell their cattle more regularly when they attained the level of self-sufficiency which was ideally between thirty and forty head. Fielder emphasized that 'when he [an Ila cattle-owner] has reached this point, and only then, can he think of selling regularly.' 

In Sukumaland, many cattle-owners suspected the government of deliberately trying to impoverish them through the destocking exercise. As one local politician in Mwanza complained in 1954: 'Destocking has taught every African that it is Government's purpose to make Africans beggars.' 

Cattle-owners also accused auctions of being conducted at a tempo too quick to be well comprehended by sellers. The bidding was quick and could be as quick as the buyers liked it. To the unsophisticated seller, quick bidding was the source of suspicion that buyers were cheating. Quick bidding also left the seller 'unconvinced' that he had received the best offer. Many sellers would have liked to bargain for the price, talk about why they were selling, and so on. But in quick bidding, there was no time for such discussions.
A seller was expected to agree to the final price.\textsuperscript{70} This was common in all areas where auctions existed. In Mbulo District, bidding was at 'a rapid pace, many bids \textsuperscript{being} made by esoteric signals, such as winks or ... by sticking out the tongue;\textsuperscript{71} Sellers found it difficult to follow the bidding in detail, and this resulted in many animals being withdrawn by unsatisfied sellers. A similar occurrence was experienced among the Ila and Tonga in the 1950s when auctions were introduced.\textsuperscript{72} But in Sukuma area, sellers had no choice but to leave their cattle at the auctions despite the low prices offered. Sukuma cattle-owners feared intimidation from Native Authorities if they withdrew their cattle for these institutions made unnecessary promises about quick destocking. Besides, tax levied at auctions was an important source of revenue for the local administrations besides court fees and fines, beer licences and rebates from direct hut and poll taxes. The Native Authorities needed this revenue to carry out certain projects and pay their salaried officials who included auction marketmasters, messengers, clerks, village headmen, sub-chiefs, chiefs and their deputies.\textsuperscript{73}

Faced with various problems stemming from compulsory destocking, stock-owners devised several ways to evade selling their cattle at the auctions. One of these ways was to 'sell' cattle to friends and relatives with fewer beasts within the districts and subsequently re-possessing them.\textsuperscript{74} This method was employed shortly before destocking clerks visited stock-owners to compile destocking lists. Stock-owners who would otherwise be liable for destocking were excluded on the basis of having 'fewer' animals to warrant auctioning.
This method evolved from the traditional method of distributing one's cattle when threatened by shortage of water or outbreak of disease. But in the 1950s, the practice was employed as a strategy to avoid regular auctioning.

Others opted for emigration to areas with low concentration of both human and animal populations instead of auctioning some of their beasts. Emigration was encouraged by the government through the Sukumaland Development Scheme which was implemented at the cost of £2,000,000. By 1961, this scheme had managed to move about 30,000 peoples mainly from Central and Northern Sukumaland to Geita District.

Local butchers were also used by stock-owners who wished to evade auctions. Here, cattle-owners 'sold' their animals to these licensed local butchers, and subsequently got them back after paying a 'service charge' to the butchers. Here, cattle-owners went through the necessary market formalities, much to the satisfaction of market officials. Stock-owners preferred to pay the 'service charges' to parting with their animals at almost pre-determined low prices. The method of paying 'service charges' was particularly popular among those who owned many breeding cows and heifers, and were eager to expand their herds. The 'service charges' varied from district to district and among butchers. In Shinyanga District, the charges were between 5 cents and Shs. 1/- per head. In Mwanza District, butchers charged as much as Shs. 1/50 per head.

Another common method of evasion involved circulating hides among friends thereby getting exempted from destocking through auctioning. In the destocking programme, there was a provision t
those who failed to auction their animals could either choose to emigrate to other areas with low animal concentration or slaughter their animals. Those who slaughtered their cattle had to show hides to Native Authorities as evidence of compliance with destocking orders. The loop-hole here was that these hides could still be kept by cattle-owners together with the tickets they were given as evidence of having slaughtered their animals. Many cattle-owners circulated the hides amongst friends and relatives who also got the tickets without actually slaughtering their animals. In the final analysis, a few hides enabled many cattle-owners to evade the auctions.

If the home slaughtering policy exposed the loop-hole in the destocking programme, increased cotton growing affected cattle sales in two ways. Firstly, it stimulated many livestock-owners to offer animals as payment for labour they contracted. As many Sukuma turned to cotton growing, gobe-gobe labour became popular. Gobe-gobe labour force comprised groups of young village men who under their agreed leaders (known as nsumba ntale) entered into contracts with anyone who requested their labour. At the time of planting or picking cotton, for instance, someone may require assistance. He informed the nsumba ntale that he had a sheep, a goat or an ox which he was willing to pay for the gobe-gobe labour upon the conclusion of the work. The nsumba ntale, upon consultation with his group, entered into contract. The animals paid belonged to the workers collectively. These animals were often slaughtered at the conclusion of the work for the consumption of the workers.
The popularity of this labour force was better observed by Cory who remarked in 1956: 'Never before has Sukumaland seen so many 'gobe-gobe' troupes who till a certain acreage for payment in kind, particularly a head of cattle'. The gobe-gobe labour forces were not only popular in agricultural work but also in performing other tasks like the construction of new houses and granaries. In the construction of these structures, the workers divided themselves into groups. Some brought poles, others fetched grass and others were responsible for the actual construction. Through this division of labour, the workers were able to conclude their tasks in time.

Secondly, cotton growing affected livestock sales in that by growing and selling cotton, producers were better rewarded than when they sold their cattle. Between 1951 and 1961, cotton became 'almost as central to the Sukuma economy as coffee [wag] to the Chagga or Haya.' In 1951, Sukumaland produced 40,669 bales of cotton; in 1954, 90,845; in 1957, 150,982. Iliffe maintains that cotton production in Sukumaland multiplied five times between 1951 and 1961. Cheaper motor transport, improved producer prices, improved seed, and the operation of cooperatives were some of the important factors that contributed to this dramatic expansion of cotton production.

The development of cooperatives in Sukumaland was perhaps the most important single factor that increased cotton production in the region. Before 1950, buying of cotton was largely in the hands of Asian ginners who usually bought their requirements through their Asian buyers or agents. These Asian buyers were usually unsalaried agents who received a commission of something like Shs.1/50 per hundred pounds of seed cotton they bought from
producers. In their buying endeavours, these buyers became unpopular with producers who accused them of cheating. These accusations were not unfounded as one government source estimated that 'growers were being defrauded at a consistent average of 15 per cent of the value of their crop'. Maguire records that these buyers were 'adept at such sharp practices as hiding the scale reading from the grower, short-weighting, taking the benefit of surplus fractions of a pound or deducting too much for the weight of the container'.

In the 1950s, the cooperative movement emerged to correct the malpractices of the Asian buyers. The growers were convinced that they would get fair prices if they weighed and sold their cotton. Between 1951 and 1961, many cotton marketing cooperative societies were established with thousands of members. In 1953, thirty-nine primary cooperative societies were formed and registered in the Lake Province. Of these twenty operated in Sukumaland outside Geita District and eleven in Geita District. These societies collected about 4,822 bales of cotton lint from about 20,000 members and sold the bales to ginneries at the price fixed by the Lint and Seed Marketing Board, the major buyer of cotton in Tanganyika. The following year (1954) a further twenty-one primary societies were formed in the Lake Province, bringing the total number to fifty-eight. These societies sold to the ginneries about 27,500 bales of Grade A cotton and more than 1,500 bales of Grade C cotton, this being six times as much cotton as was marketed by the societies
during the previous year. By the end of 1955, the cooperative societies in the Province were grouped into a number of unions. There was, for instance, the Mweli Farmers' Cooperative Union in Geita District with nineteen societies affiliated to it. The Kigunabahabi Growers' Cooperative in the Nassa Zone of Mwanza District had eleven affiliated to it. All the unions were affiliated to the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Union which was registered in July 1955 with Paul Bemani as its Chairman. The aim of the Victoria Federation was 'marketing lint produced by ginneries owned, or shared on a partnership basis with existing firms, by the unions affiliated to it as well as bulk purchase'. The cooperatives managed to raise the producer price much to the delight of the producers. In 1952, for instance, the minimum producer price of 50 cents per pound was offered as compared to 30 cents during the 1950-1951 season. The producer price never fell below 50 cents per pound thereafter.

In the field of cattle marketing, the cooperative effort was not so successful. The cattle-owners cooperatives which surfaced in 1954 were poorly organised and were unable to secure higher producer prices for their beasts. By the end of 1960, for instance, the prices offered by the TPL for cattle marketed by the cooperatives 'were lower than those obtainable in the traditional markets and the societies stopped trading'. To many cattle-owners it was better to concentrate on cotton rather than on selling cattle for it was difficult 'to understand why they should get less for a head of cattle than for a bag of cotton'. Besides, whereas one could dispose of all the cotton harvest for the season and be able to grow even more the
following seasons, the same could not be done with cattle in the kraals. It is difficult to replace the animals sold through reproduction in a short period. G. Dahl and A. Hjort are of the view that:

Fertility and fecundity rates among cattle as well as the timing of the beginning and the end of their fertile period depend on nutritional status of their fodder, which is related to rainfall, soil quality, etc. Time of the first birth thus ranges from two to four or even five years.

The life span of cattle is also very much influenced by nutritional status of fodder. The normal life span for savannah cattle is, for instance, about nine to fifteen years whereas that of semi-arid Sukumaland cattle is about six to twelve years.

In semi-arid regions where Zebu stock are kept (like in Sukumaland), these animals may start breeding at the age of two to two-and-a half years. If we take it that the Zebu breeding cow in Sukumaland has a maximum life span of twelve years and begins breeding at the age of two, such a cow is able to give birth to about four to five calves in its life. But calf mortality for East Africa has been estimated at about 20 to 35 per cent. This means that about one to two calves for every cow are likely to die, thus leaving a balance of about three calves. Thus in twelve years a breeding cow may increase the herd by only three animals. Therefore it is not hard to understand the significance of alternative sources of cash incomes among livestock-owners.

It has become evident in this Chapter that during the decade 1951-1961, the Sukuma were integrated more into the
capitalist market as crop producers than as cattle sellers. Was this because government efforts were directed more at improving agriculture than increasing cattle sales? It seems government efforts were evenly distributed. Compulsion was applied in both agriculture and animal husbandry. The government believed that the success of peasant agriculture and animal husbandry depended upon the peasants' ability to utilize the land properly. Overconcentration of people and animals in limited areas could, for instance, produce erosion just like shifting cultivation, feckless burning of the bush and thrash and cultivation of slopes. The Sukumaland Development Scheme was supposed to provide solutions to the deteriorating rural areas. The scheme sought to redistribute Sukuma population from overpopulated Mwanza and Kwimba districts by clearing tsetse bush and providing water supplies in the peripheral Geita, Maswa and Shinyanga districts, while also requiring Sukuma to protect their land by adopting a balanced system of mixed farming. The second part which called for adopting a 'balanced system of mixed farming' failed as it called for increased cattle sales at low price. It is possible that the Sukumaland Development Scheme would have been a success if it had directed itself only at arresting soil erosion and opening up of new lands thereby increasing land available to cattle-owners and crop growers. This was, for instance, the aim of the Mbulu Development Scheme which was regarded as an outstanding success in the whole of Tanganyika between 1951 and 1961. In Sukumaland, the compulsory measures of the scheme aroused bitter hostility until they were abandoned amidst disorder in 1958. The withdrawal of compulsory measures
suggests that Government efforts in both peasant agriculture and animal husbandry were not always readily accepted by the Sukuma. The success of cotton production in Sukumaland should rather be seen in the context of peasant eagerness to take part in that sector of the economy because of apparent benefits.
FOOTNOTES

1. TNA 215/367, Sukumaland Development: Culling of cattle in Sukumaland, Mwanza, 1950-1953. Livestock censuses after 1950 were compiled mainly by destocking clerks who prepared destocking lists.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.


5. TNA/215/367, Culling in Sukumaland.

6. Iliffe, Agricultural Change, 34.

7. See Meek, 'Stock Reduction', 158-166.

8. A good discussion of this exercise can be found in some unpublished papers by Cory. See for instance Cory Papers File Number 77, Destocking in Sukumaland, Mwanza, 1956, University of Dar es Salaam Library.


13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.


17. These averages are compiled from Annual Reports of Lake Province for years between 1956 and 1961.

18. Tanganyika Territory. Report of a Committee of Enquiry into Tanganyika Packers Ltd. Arusha Abattor, 1957 (Dar es Salaam...
Ibid, 3.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.


The Arusha abattoir was established to purchase slaughter cattle mainly from Northern and Central Provinces.

25. Newlands, 'Trade in Livestock', 42. At the beginning of 1952, for instance, TPL offered Shs. 30/- per 100 pound at the markets in Central Province, but reduced the price to Shs. 25/- by May.


30. See Phimister, 'Meat and Monopolies', 403-404

31. See A.M. Kanduza, 'The Impact of Railway Rates and Customs Agreements on Settler Farming in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia' M.A. dissertation, University of Zambia, 1979, 123.


33. Lake Province Annual Report, 1956, 64.


35. Cory Papers, File 80.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.


40. TNA 215/2348, District Commissioner, Maswa, to Deputy Provincial Commissioner, Sukumaland, Malya, 5 August 1953.


43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. See de Wilde, Agricultural Development, 145

46. See Annual Reports of Lake Province for years between 1952 and 1954. See also TNA 215/2348, Veterinary: Culling of Cattle, Mwanza.

47. See Economic Development of Tanganyika, 145.


49. Cory Papers, File Number 77.


51. Ibid. Lake Province was represented at the conference by A.C. Iranga, L.M. Bagohe, S.A. Kandoro, K. Gabara and S.M. Kitwanza.

52. Ibid.

53. Interview: F. Shija, 18.5.80.

54. Ibid. See also Kaniki, 'Colonial Era', 350.

56. Interview: F. Shija, 18.5.80.

57. Lake Province Annual Report, 1960, 35.

58. Interview: L. Kusekwa, 11.5.80 See also Malcolm, African People, 126 - 130.

59. Iliffe, Modern History, 455.

60. Interview: L. Kusekwa, 11.5.80.

61. Ibid.


63. Anacleti, 'Pastoralism and Development',

64. Interview: Kusekwa, 11.5.80.

65. Interview; Shika, 18.5.80.

66. Interview; Kusekwa, 11.5.80.

67. Fielder, 'Role of Cattle', 338.

68. Ibid, 339.

69. TNA 215/1332, Isaac Bhole Munanka to Governor, 11 February 1954.

70. Interview; L. Guisotela, 11.5.80

71. Winter, 'Livestock Markets', 466.


73. Malcolm, African People, 40.

74. Interview: L. Guisotela, 11.5.80.

75. Iliffe, Agricultural Change, 35.

76. Ibid.

77. Interview: Gwisotela, 11.5.80.
78. Interview: Shija, 18.5.80.
79. Cory Papers, Number 77.
80. Interview: W. Mayalla, 15.3.80 Malcolm does not use the term gobe-gobe. Rather, he refers to the groups of workers as village societies. See Malcolm, African People, 33-40.
81. Cory Papers, number 77.
82. Iliffe, Modern History, 454.
83. Ibid.
84. Iliffe, Agricultural Change, 39.
85. Iliffe, Modern History, 454.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Cooperative Development, 1953, 12.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Bowles, 'Political Economy', 175.
98. Interview: W. Mayalla, 5.3.80.
99. G. Dahl and A. Hjort, Having Herds: Pastoral Herd Growth, and Household Economy (Stockholm: Department of Social
100. Ibid., 39.

101. Interview: F. Masanja, 18.5.80.


103. Ibid., 38.


105. Ibid., 473.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This study has examined the responses of the Sukuma to pressures to commercialize livestock between 1919 and 1961. Several conclusions have been reached. Firstly, it has been concluded that the Sukuma were interested, among other things, in selling their livestock and that they did sell from time to time. Secondly, we have observed that although the Sukuma sold their beasts at the auctions, the marketed animals were in most cases fewer than had been anticipated by colonial officials. Thirdly, attention has been drawn to several important factors, which have been ignored by many authors, and which were responsible for determining the levels of participation of livestock-owners at the auctions.

The willingness to sell among the Sukuma livestock-owners has been measured in a number ways. As has been noted in Chapter 4, most cattle-owners were willing to sell some of their cattle if they owned more than twenty. This number of cattle was considered a minimum requirement for various household needs which included milk and ghee production and ploughing. This number was also generally considered sufficient as a security against sudden losses from calamities like disease and drought. The fact that cattle-owners with large herds were eager to sell some of their animals was also witnessed by MERACO between 1928 and 1930. During this period, the company tended to purchase some of its required slaughter cattle in Sukumaland directly from cattle-owners with large herds in addition to buying from auction markets.
It has also been demonstrated in the study that cattle owners often supplied more cattle than the buyers could absorb. The failure of buyers to purchase all the animals offered for sale resulted in many animals being returned by disappointed owners. This was common especially between 1919 and 1930 and between 1945 and 1950.

During these periods, buyers often selected the type of animals they bought. They bought animals they were sure would reach the resale markets and enable them realize higher profits after several days on trek routes. This selective buying strategy affected the market off-take rates especially during years of drought. During years of drought, which were frequent, cattle lost much weight, in some cases so severely that many died, as was the case between 1949 and 1950. The problem of droughts aside, the low off-take was partly because few buyers often purchased cattle in Sukumaland. It has been noted in Chapter 2 that few Arab and Somali traders supplying slaughter cattle to the sisal estates in Tanga Province and Bukoba traders purchasing for the Bukoba market entered Sukumaland in the 1920s. The Somali and Arab traders tended to concentrate their activities in Shinyanga and Maswa Districts while the Bukoba traders mostly operated in Mwanza District.

The low off-take of cattle in Sukumaland in the 1920s was not only because few traders entered the region but also because of their meagre financial resources. The limited funds at their disposal often enabled the traders to purchase only a few animal
This situation only changed during the last decade of colonialism, when many Sukuma, enriched by expanded cotton production, reserved significant portions of their earnings for purchasing meat, and traders subsequently increased the volume of trade. The problem of inadequate finances was equally experienced by meat-processing companies, especially MERACO. Due to undercapitalization, MERACO could not afford to purchase slaughter cattle at the price determined by open market operations. It should, however, be noted that the problem of finance was more serious with MERACO than with individual traders. MERACO tended to purchase cattle at a more or less fixed price while individual traders were more flexible. In many cases these traders offered higher profits than MERACO, and this partly explains why the traders were more preferred to the Sukuma livestock-owners than the company.

The failure of MERACO to increase its purchases should also be understood within the context of British policy of non-industrialization in the colonies up to the outbreak of the Second World War. In Britain, manufacturers who formed pressure groups were opposed to the development of processing industries in the colonies which would compete with their products both in Britain and the colonies. Through the tariff system the market for MERACO beef in Britain was throttled while in Tanganyika the Great Depression led to the collapse of the market for the company's fertilizer and dried salted meat. MERACO subsequently collapsed partly due to the absence of markets for its products. However, the policy of non-industrialization was abandoned in East Africa during the Second World War and after the war. The war gave impetus to light industrialization mainly because of problems in importing different commodities for both local consumption and us
by the military forces in East Africa. The production of such commodities in East Africa was thus necessary to ensure a steady supply. After the war, the policy of localizing industries was continued partly because it was cheaper to manufacture certain consumer products in East Africa than in Britain.

It has also been argued in this study that availability of alternative sources of cash income often discouraged increased cattle sales in Sukumaland. One of such sources of cash income was agriculture. Cash crop production in Sukumaland, especially of cotton, expanded between 1919 and 1961. The 'grow more cotton' campaign which began during the Great Depression, resulted in increased production during the period of recovery. A more marked expansion was registered in the post-Second World War period when the cooperative movement took over the buying of the crop from Asians, and improved the producer prices. Furthermore, some Sukuma sold ghee and clarified butter and hides and skins. The cash incomes from these sources were often used to purchase more durable items like tractors, ploughs and ghee separators, to pay for taxes and to meet several short-term needs.

This study has also concluded that veterinary restrictions, especially quarantine measures, affected the development of cattle trade in Sukumaland between 1919 and 1939. By quarantining certain areas affected by disease, the Veterinary Department hoped to control the disease through intensive inoculations. But the effectiveness of these measures were limited partly because the government was unwilling to release sufficient funds to purchase the required amounts of serum. The failure was also partly due to
non-availability of adequate numbers of qualified veterinary officers to deal with the diseases. The end result was that certain parts of Sukumaland were annually quarantined. The quarantine measures subsequently affected the livestock trade as the animals could not be moved out of the quarantined areas without a permit from a veterinary officer. Quarantine guards and Native Authorities were directed to check the movement of animals in areas affected by the quarantine measures. Those caught breaking the quarantine rules were punished in the courts of law.

One rueful observation of this study has been the failure of the government to increase market off-take of goats and sheep from the Sukuma flocks. It has been shown that government efforts were directed more at increasing cattle sales through auctions than sheep and goats. Similarly, the interests of the major buyers of livestock in the region lay in purchasing cattle. MERACO, Liebigs and TPL directed their efforts at purchasing required numbers of slaughter cattle for their processing plants. The only significant buyers of goats and sheep were the Bukoba traders. But these traders also tended to be erratic in their endeavours.

The Government efforts to reduce herds were numerous, and often paid dividends especially during the last decade of colonialism. Coercion was visibly behind the campaign to reduce the size of herds. The government fixed prices and quotas of cattle to be auctioned in various districts of Sukumaland.
The Native Authorities were directed to ensure that all livestock-owners keeping more than ten beasts were compelled to auction at low prices. Failure to do so meant breaking the destocking order and punishment was often meted out. To make compulsory destocking meaningful, the government provided an outlet. TPL purchased most of the cattle at the auctions during the last decade of colonialism. The company paid little attention to the quality of beasts offered for sale at the auctions. TPL purchased immatures and sent them to its holding grounds where they were fattened before slaughtering them at the Dar-es Salaam factory. The establishment of the beef canning by TPL made it possible for all types of beasts to be purchased for consumption outside Sukumaland and Tanganyika. The Sukuma could now sell even old animals which became less useful in meeting household needs like ploughing and providing milk.

It has also been observed that cattle-owners were not completely at the mercy of the state machinery when it came to implementing the destocking policy. Where cattle-owners saw no sense in auctioning their animals, they devised several ways of avoiding the auctions. One method was to distribute some of their beasts among friends and relatives, thereby reducing the size of herds. Traditionally, this method was used to avoid possible decimation of herds in areas affected by natural calamities like disease and draught. The strategy was also traditionally used as a way of solving herding problems especially among those who owned many animals. Some livestock-owners avoided auctions by emigrating from densely populated areas to areas with less human livestock populations. Between 1950 and 1961,
several thousands of Sukuma emigrated especially from Central Sukumaland to Geita District in conformity with the stipulations of the Sukumaland Development Scheme. Some Sukuma slaughtered some of their animals instead of auctioning them. The meat was either consumed by the owners and their relatives or given to workers who performed communal work like cultivating cotton fields.

It is evident from the discussion in this study that the question of low market integration of the Sukuma livestock-owners (and indeed many others in Africa) is more complex than many people have assumed. This study has highlighted some of the factors which have often been ignored or under-rated by other authors. Rather than advance cultural explanations, some of which are difficult to test, efforts should be directed towards exploring economic factors which have proved to be more convincing.
APPENDIX 2

DESTOCKING SCHEDULE ANNUALLY FOLLOWED IN SUKUMALAND BETWEEN 1952 AND 1954.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Cattle Herd</th>
<th>Number of Cattle to be Auctioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to 10</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 to 40</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 to 50</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 to 60</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 to 70</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 to 80</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TNA 215/367, Culling in Sukumaland.
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Interview No. 2
Gwisotela, L. 11.5.80, Shinyanga. A peasant in Mwanza area. Personal experiences as well as experiences of other cattle owners in his locality.

Interview No. 3
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