PROPERTY CRIME AND POLICE EFFORTS TO CONTROL IT: THE CASE OF LUSAKA, 1932-1990
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By

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The fight against crime is one of the tasks undertaken by governments. The spread of crime in any country breeds insecurity among the citizens. This study investigates the strategies the Police employed to curb property crime in Lusaka. The subject is pursued from 1932 when the Police force was separated from the military up to 1990. Analysis of Police efforts to curb property crime is preceded by a discussion on the changing patterns of property crime. We argue that property crime notably robbery and theft of motor vehicles assumed violent forms after independence. This led to the introduction of severe penalties, which, however, proved ineffective. After independence, the increase in incidence of property crime and shortage of manpower in the Police force contributed to the integration of the community in crime control. This strategy was also a corrective measure towards Police public relations which were poor both in the colonial and post colonial periods.

Our conclusion is that there was an attempt to keep Police strategies for the control of property crime in line with the changing patterns of property crime. However, this did not significantly reduce incidence of crime. Although Police strategies vis-a-vis crime control were dynamic, Police training was not influenced by trends of property crime.
Many more people than I can enumerate were of great assistance to me during the course of my research and writing of this dissertation. I am grateful to all of them. I would, however, like to record special gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. F. Gadsden, for patiently reading several drafts of this dissertation. Her seasoned observations and advice were invaluable. Dr. K.T. Mwansa, read some drafts of this dissertation and commented on them. I thank him too. Notwithstanding the best advice, any shortcomings in this dissertation are solely mine.

I am also indebted to Dr. J.D. Chileshe, Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, without whose assistance I would not have consulted personnel records at Police Headquarters in Lusaka. It was through his personal efforts that I was granted permission by Inspector General of Police to consult these records, an opportunity initially denied me.

I should also acknowledge with thanks, the timely assistance of the members of staff in the University of Zambia Library, at the National Archives of Zambia, at the Office of the Registrar of Societies, the Criminal Investigation Department at Lusaka Division Headquarters, Criminal Registries at both Lusaka Magistrates’ and Lusaka High Courts. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the excellent cooperation of detective Constable O.K. Musonda of Lusaka Division Headquarters, who was assigned to provide me with records. At Police Headquarters, the
then Public Relations Officer, B. Jere, assisted me to go through an almost endless bureaucracy of getting records. At Lusaka High Court, Miss Hazuza allowed me to use the tranquil Judges' Library.

Above all, I must register my sincere appreciation to the Directorate of Manpower Development and Training (DMDT) for the Scholarship which enabled me to pursue my graduate programme. Dr. B.J. Phiri deserves special thanks for typing the dissertation diligently.
DECLARATION

I, Sylvester Habeenzu, hereby declare that this dissertation represents my own work, and that it has not been previously submitted for a degree at this or another university.

[Signature]

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APPROVAL

This dissertation of Sylvester Habeenzu is approved as fulfilling part of the requirements of the award of the degree of Master of Arts in History at the University of Zambia.

EXAMINERS

1. [Signature] DATE: 23 July 1993
2. [Signature] DATE: 31 August 1994
3. [Signature] DATE: 26 August 1999
DEDICATION

Faithfully dedicated to my father and mother.

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 35/171 of December 1980 noted that significant increase in crime 'undermines people's spiritual and material well being, compromises human dignity and creates a climate of fear that erodes the quality of life.'\(^1\) Therefore, response to crime as Hatchard rightly observed becomes of utmost importance.\(^2\) Available literature on crime in Zambia has shown that property crime has been a problem. This study investigates police efforts to curb property crime in Lusaka in the period 1932-1990.

In this study, property crime refers to any criminal behaviour by which possession of property is transferred.\(^3\) This includes burglary, housebreaking, theft, theft of postal matter, theft of motor vehicles, robbery, illegal possession of diamonds and stealing by servant, clerk or agent. Not all these forms of property crime are dealt with in this dissertation. Examining all the categories of property crime is not possible in view of limited space. Therefore, this study only deals with housebreaking, burglary, robbery and theft of motor vehicles.

Property crime was on the increase both in the colonial and post colonial period. After independence, some categories of property crime, notably robbery and theft of motor vehicles assumed violent forms. This attracted parliamentary legislation such as the Firearms Act of 1969 and the Penal Code Amendment Act (No. 2) of 1974. The former tightened control on ownership and use of firearms\(^4\) while the latter sanctioned the death penalty against aggravated robbery.\(^5\) This study investigates the changing trends of property crime in Lusaka.

One of the agencies of social control in Zambia is the police force, and one of its duties is to prevent and detect crime.\(^6\) After independence, the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) registered its concern at the rising crime rate at its fourth National Council in 1974. It extended the responsibility of crime prevention to its sections, branches and wards. Escalation of
property crime in the 1980s and the shortage of manpower in the police force contributed to the introduction of vigilante and neighbourhood watch schemes in Lusaka. This study investigates the strategies Police used to curb property crime in Lusaka. It further looks at how the Police in alliance with party organs, vigilante and neighbourhood watch schemes attempted to control property crime. The study also addresses police training and attempts to establish whether police curriculum, for both basic and post basic training was influenced by trends in property crime.

In his study of the Police and the public in Nigeria, Okonkwo asserted that the arbitrary use of police powers and other irregular behaviour damaged their relationship with the public. In Northern Rhodesia, the 1947 Police Commission of Enquiry learnt that police public relations were poor. Small has also argued that as independence drew nearer in the 1960s, police public relations deteriorated further. Although the Northern Rhodesia Police became a 'peoples' force after 1964, the 1985 national symposium on the prevention of crime observed that there was 'antagonism and resentment by the public towards the police.' This study investigates poor police public relations and the measures the police undertook to redress the situation.

Lusaka was taken as our case study because it is the capital of Zambia, and has been undergoing rapid growth. United Nations sponsored studies on Zambia, India and Egypt have concluded that there is a correlation between crime rates and urbanisation. Therefore, Lusaka provides an interesting case study. The choice of Lusaka was also dictated by financial constraints. Inadequate funding could have presented difficulties in doing research in an area far away from the university.

Lusaka began as a railway siding in 1905. The town acquired its name, from a Lenje headman, Lusaka. Initially, the town did not attract large scale settlement. It began developing in 1912 when a number of stores and the Lusaka Hotel (formerly known as Counsells Hotel) were built. The growth of the town stagnated following the
outbreak of the First World War in 1914. In 1929, Lusaka was proposed for the new capital of Northern Rhodesia because it offered a more central site than Livingstone which had been the capital since 1907.\textsuperscript{13} A building programme began in the same year. In 1935, it was declared the capital of Northern Rhodesia.

From 1936, the population of Lusaka began growing following the transfer of government departments and their workers from Livingstone. With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the population increased further because of the Polish refugees who fled from German and Russian armies in Europe. The allies settled some of them in Northern Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{14}

In 1960 Lusaka was awarded city status. After independence, the population of the city grew rapidly following the removal of legal barriers to rural-urban drift.\textsuperscript{15} In 1963, the population of the capital was 123,146. By 1974 and 1980, it had grown to 421,000 and 535,830 respectively.\textsuperscript{16}

The year 1932 was chosen as the beginning point for this study because in that year Northern Rhodesia Police and the army were separated. The year 1990 is the terminal point of the study because police crime returns published in that year were the latest at the time of research.

Review of Literature

A number of studies have been done on crime in Zambia. Muna Ndulo, John Hatchard and Kalombo Mwansa, among others have undertaken studies on the subject. Most of them, including those done by scholars cited above, are from a legal perspective. The role of the Police in the prevention of crime has attracted less scholarly attention than crime per se.

The first study on crime in Zambia was done by a sociologist William Clifford in 1960. It is a comparative study of crime between Northern Rhodesia and England and Wales, in the period 1930-1960. Using Police and court statistics, he examined crime among four races, namely
Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Europeans. He concluded that criminal convictions in Northern Rhodesia increased three times between 1930 and 1960. He further demonstrated that property crime was more prevalent among the four races than other forms of crime. He argued that economic factors such as unemployment were instrumental in causing crime. His study is, however, silent on Police efforts to curb crime.

Clifford published another study in 1969. Its focus is on the development of the prison system in Northern Rhodesia. He examines various forms of punishment such as the death penalty, imprisonment, deportation and fine.

The study by Ndulo on crime is from a legal point of view. It has no specific time dimension. He argued that crime is caused by economic, social and political factors. These factors are merely enumerated but not explained in detail. In our study, we attempt to explain how some of these factors influenced trends in property crime in Lusaka during our period of study. Ndulo further outlines, though briefly, some of the problems Police experience in crime control. This provided a beginning point in our discussion of the constraints on Police operations.

Kalombo Mwansa is the only scholar whose studies focus specifically on property crime in Lusaka. His 1983 article is a general study of property crime in urban areas. Based on field work, primary and secondary sources, his study sets out to measure the magnitude of property crime in Zambia between 1964 and 1982. He found that unemployment is one of the major causes of property crime in Zambia. He asserted that the increase in property crime particularly aggravated robbery after independence led to the introduction of the death penalty.

Mwansa's second study focuses on property crime in Lusaka after independence. At the time our study was conceived, his study had not been produced. This is a very detailed study on various aspects of property crime in Lusaka. It examines the characteristics of the offenders such as age, sex, education and residence. It further
deals with prosecution of criminals in Lusaka Magistrates’ courts. This study briefly discusses Police efforts to control property crime but no particular Police strategy is dealt with in detail.

Our study differs from Mwansa’s in a number of respects. First, Mwansa looked at crime in Lusaka from a legal perspective while the current study is historical. It covers both the colonial and post colonial periods. Second, the focus of this study is the role of the Police in the prevention of property crime. Therefore, it deals with crime control strategies in greater detail than Mwansa’s. Third, it goes further by addressing community participation in curbing crime. Furthermore, it traces trends in Police training. This aspect is not covered in Mwansa’s study.

Hatchard has written on crime in the post independence period. He examined legislative and judicial responses to crime after independence. He argued that severe sentences failed to reduce crime. Therefore, he suggested that crime prevention must be linked to transformation of the socio-economic establishment. His discussion on legislative response to crime after independence provided relevant material to our study.

Scholars have written on crime in other countries too. In Uganda, Clinard and Abbot carried out a detailed study of crime. Their study is based on data collected from the whole of Uganda. They compared this data with findings from developed and developing countries. They argued that unemployment and housing problems are some of the factors responsible for crime in urban areas of developing countries. Leger has written on crime in Southern Rhodesia, covering the period 1901-1963. He argued that offenses against property crime such as theft and housebreaking increased during this period. He compared crime in Southern Rhodesia with that in Northern Rhodesia, South Africa, England and Wales. However, he offered very little explanation on the increase in property crimes cited above in his period of study.
There are very few studies on the Police. Brelsford wrote on the subject in 1954. The focus of his study is on the origins of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, with emphasis on the 1914-1918 war campaign. Nevertheless, in the first chapter he explains the evolution of the Police as part of the army. His discussion of the Police goes up to 1912 when North Eastern Rhodesia Constabulary and the Barotse Native Police were amalgamated to form the Northern Rhodesia Police. His study provided us with the history of the Police force during the early period of colonial rule.

The study by Nick Small on the Police covers the period 1932-1964. He examined the changing roles of the Police in Northern Rhodesia. He argued that Police activities in Northern Rhodesia were confined to the line of rail during the colonial period. It was after independence that the whole country was policed. He also addresses Police-public relations in the colonial period. This, and his discussion on Police training were relevant to our study.

The theme on the Police vis-a-vis crime control has not attracted much scholarly attention. Only Zulu and Nyirenda have written specifically on the subject. The work by Zulu is a general and brief study of Police efforts to control crime at national level after independence. He argued that Police efforts to control crime in Zambia were handicapped by shortage of manpower in the Police force and inadequate transport. He asserted that police strength has not kept pace with population growth. This study attempts to apply this argument to Lusaka. Nyirenda was mainly concerned with the role of the Police in the prosecution process, an area outside the province of this study. He concentrated on the process a detected offence undergoes from the time it is committed until it is brought before the court of law.

Data Collection

Research for this dissertation was carried out between December 1991 and July 1992. The data on which the study is
based was derived from various sources. The first stage of data collection was done in the University of Zambia Library. The sources consulted here included books, published and unpublished articles, dissertations, Police Annual Reports, Police Commissions of Inquiry, parliamentary debates, newspapers covering the post independence period, recurrent estimates reports and Government Gazettes. This literature formed the foundation of this study.

The second stage involved archival research at four archival centres. The first part of archival research was in the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ) where Secretarial and Ministry of Home Affairs files dealing with the Police were consulted. Consulted there too were colonial newspapers and some covering the post independence period, Police Annual Reports and Police Commissions of Inquiry not found in the University of Zambia Library.

The second part of archival research was at the Zambia Police Force Headquarters Archives in Lusaka. Three sources were consulted namely Lusaka Division Nominal Roll Registers, Police Force Orders and Nkhwazhi Magazines. Nominal Roll Registers have valuable information on staffing in Lusaka Police Stations. Force Orders provided us with an insight on the components post basic training while Nkhwazhi Magazines have information on various aspects of the Police. At Lusaka Division Headquarters we consulted annual police returns for the individual police stations.

The third part of archival research was conducted at Lusaka Magistrate and Lusaka High Court archives where numerous court case files for the period late 1970-1990 were consulted. Records before this period have been destroyed. Court cases shed light on who the criminals were and the methods they employed in the commission of crime. The final part of archival research was done at the office of the Registrar of Societies in Lusaka where files of neighbourhood watch schemes were consulted.

The above sources were supplemented by oral research. Oral interviews were conducted in Lusaka police stations.
with police officers of various ranks. It proved problematic locating retired policemen who served in the colonial period. Many left the city after retirement. Consequently, only one was interviewed. Oral interviews were also conducted with former UNIP officials who served at grassroot level. These assisted in providing information on vigilante schemes and party militants.

Ideally, members of the vigilante and neighbourhood watch schemes should have been interviewed too. This was not possible because of inadequate research grant. However, it is our belief that UNIP officials who were leaders of vigilante schemes gave adequate information about the schemes while policemen who worked closely with neighbourhood watch schemes provided an insight on the operations of these schemes. Oral research was important in supplementing and counter-checking written sources.

This study has limitations. It relies on crime figures reported to the Police to measure property crime in Lusaka. Criminal statistics published by the Police have limitations throughout the world. Some criminal cases are not reported to the Police for various reasons. These include the distance to the Police station, indifference towards the Police on the part of the victims, and personal embarrassment which accrues to the victim as in rape cases, among other factors. Criminal statistics not reported to the Police constitute what are known as dark figures. Because of these short comings, criminal statistics do not represent a very accurate picture of crime, and therefore should be regarded with caution. However, they remain the only comprehensive sources through which incidence of crime can be estimated.

This study recognises the view that the degree of urbanisation in a particular area influences the amount of crime committed and reported to the Police. Ideally, therefore, criminal statistics recorded by Lusaka police stations should be viewed against population data of the areas policed. This proved problematic owing to lack of specific population figures for individual police districts.
It should further be pointed out that annual police crime returns for Lusaka have gaps in years. It was not possible to get annual police crime returns for all the years after independence. None covering the colonial period could be traced. The Police destroy these records after some years. Similarly, court case records at both Magistrate and High Court for the period before late 1970s could not be consulted. They, too, were destroyed by the judicial department.

The Lusaka Division Nominal Roll Registers also have gaps in years. Furthermore, the earliest registers that could be traced in Police archives were those of 1982. Therefore, the study is devoid of systematic tables on staffing in Lusaka before 1982. In addition, the researcher was denied access to police reserve nominal roll registers because, in the words of one Assistant Commissioner, 'the Police can never expose everything to researchers'.

This dissertation is divided into three chapters. Chapter one examines the changing trends of property crime in Lusaka. Chapter two addresses Police crime control strategies and the constraints Police encountered. This chapter also looks at Police training. Chapter three discusses community participation in crime control. This subject is preceded by an assessment of police-public relations.
NOTES


2. Ibid.


6. See Zambia Police Act, Cap. 133 Section.


10. See M.B. Clinard and D.J. Abbot, Crime in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), 82.


14. R. Sampson, So This Was Lusaaka's (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1982), 64.


20. Ibid., 333.


24. Small, 'Northern Rhodesia Police', 525.


26. Ibid., 9; See also H.M. Shulman, 'The Measurement of Crime in the United States', *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, 57 (1966), 484. Shulman estimated that the crimes committed by the public but not reported to the police numbered in the tens of millions and outweighed in volume and monetary loss the offenses reported to the police.


CHAPTER ONE

THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF PROPERTY CRIME IN LUSAKA, 1932-1990

Theories on the Causes of Crime

There are a number of sociological theories that have been advanced to explain the origins of crime. One such theory is known as biological theory. This theory asserts that criminals are born and have certain physical characteristics.\(^1\) It is argued that atavistic criminals can be identified by a number of features such as 'eye defects, and peculiarities, ears of unusual size, extremely long arms and other physical peculiarities'.\(^2\)

Another theory of crime is known as classic view of crime. This view asserts that human behaviour is based on free will. Those who steal, likewise decide to break the law. In the words of Gibbons criminals make 'a deliberate, rational ... decision to engage in law breaking.'\(^3\) The classical conception of justice was that punishment should be commensurate with the type of crime committed.\(^4\) Thus, like the biological theory, the classical view of crime perceived crime as emanating from an individual.

A different explanation on the origins of crime has been advanced by the theory of differential opportunity.\(^5\) According to this theory, successful economic status in developing countries is obtained through education.\(^6\) Education assists in acquiring skills and knowledge which warrant advancement in modern society. However, people in low socio-economic groups have limited access to education by virtue of their low income and inadequate facilities. These factors narrow their chances of getting a better paying occupation which is critical in the attainment of wealth and status. In order to overcome these restrictions of opportunity, some people from low socio-economic brackets take to illegitimate means such as crime to achieve these goals.\(^6\) This view is in line with Ndulo and Hatchard's explanation of crime.
There is also what is known as the theory of differential contacts, sometimes referred to as the theory of differential association. The emphasis of this theory is the process through which criminal behaviour develops. It asserts that criminal behaviour is learned. The learning involves acquiring of techniques in committing crime. Thus, the theory perceives crime as rooted in social organisation.

Another theory of crime seeks to explain crime from the material conditions of society. It is known as Marxian theory. The theory asserts that the exploitation of the workers and unemployment found in the capitalist order bring about poverty and misery. Frederick Engels, one of the proponents of the theory argued that crime emanates from the desperate economic situation of the poor and unemployed. To him, crime is an open revolt against the middle class, the perpetrators of exploitation. In his own words he stated that crime is an 'open warfare against the middle class.'

This chapter is devoted to the discussion of the changing trends of property crime in Lusaka. An attempt will be made to consider how far sociological theories can be applied to property crime during our period of study.

**HOUSEBREAKING AND BURGLARY**

These two forms of property crime are very similar, hence the need to combine them in our discussion. The Penal Code defines housebreaking as breaking 'in any part, whether external or internal, of a building or unlocking, pulling, pushing, lifting, or any means whatever, any door, window, shutter, cellar flap or other thing intended to close or cover of an opening in a building' with the aim to steal. If the offence described above is committed at night (between 7 P.M. and 6 A.M.) it is referred to as burglary. It is clear from the definitions that the only distinguishing factor between the two forms of property crime is the time of the day each is committed.
In the early 1930s, one of the contributing factors to the incidence of housebreaking and burglary was unemployment created by retrenchment of both Europeans and Africans in various employment sectors owing to the 1929 world depression. During the depression, thousands of people from other parts of Northern Rhodesia came to Lusaka seeking employment in the building industry which had begun in 1929. However, Lusaka already had a large unemployed labour force. A large number of African job seekers flocked to squatter compounds where life was worse than in the village because of lack of food. The critical unemployment situation in the town prompted the Lusaka District Commissioner to advise the Provincial Commissioner to control the migration of people to Lusaka.

Some of the unemployed would not go back to rural areas because they had become accustomed to town life. One of the unemployed in Livingstone remarked: 'I have been without a job for eighteen months. People like me cannot go back home. We have settled in town, adopted European ways and no longer know village life.' The unemployed in this predicament faced great temptation and some of them earned their living through illegitimate means. Some of them took to housebreaking and burglary. As a result, the incidence of the two forms of property crime were high in Lusaka and other towns on the line of rail.

Some cases of housebreaking and burglary were done by a well established group of criminals in the town. This group comprised ex-convicts and deportees from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa where they had been criminals. These were citizens of Northern Rhodesia who had gone away to seek employment in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. A similar group of criminals terrorised Nyasaland in the late 1920s. McCracken argued that this group comprised experienced criminals of Nyasaland origin who had been repatriated from South Africa. Housebreaking and burglary in Lusaka were further facilitated by carelessness on the part of householders. The public was lax and left their property unguarded.
The telling effects of the depression began subsiding in 1937. Earlier in 1933, Mufulira Mine had begun operating, and Northern Rhodesian copper had an assured market in Britain. Copper was important in that country’s rapidly expanding electrical, automobile and aircraft industries. When rearment began in Europe in 1937, Northern Rhodesian copper had an expanded market, and this also assisted towards economic recovery. In Lusaka economic recovery manifested itself in the expansion of the building industry. Sampson argued that 1934 marked the beginning of the ‘New’ capital proper. Building programmes of the Government House, the Secretariat and the B.S.A. Co. offices, among others were instituted. Between 1934 and 1939, Lusaka registered reduced cases of housebreaking and burglary. It is not very clear what happened to the group of experienced criminals. It may be argued that some of them were absorbed in the labour market following economic recovery.

Following the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, however, Lusaka experienced indiscriminate housebreaking and burglary particularly in African compounds. This steady increase was brought about by shortage of goods during the war and Police commitment in the war.

During the war, goods such as blankets, clothes, cooking utensils, food, salt and sugar became scarce. In December 1942 shopkeepers in Lusaka expressed fears that they would be out of business because the supply of goods was erratic. When goods were available, they were dear. The Central Province Commissioner remarked that ‘the necessities of life are getting scarcer and more and more expensive’. For example, a new pot before the war cost 7s 6d, but during the war, a second hand one sold for 20s. The high prices of goods increased the cost of living among the people. Africans in Lusaka complained continuously about the high prices of goods.

The high prices of goods were aggravated by rationing, sanctioned by the Emergency Powers Regulation. This law was abused by some shopkeepers. Africans and Europeans
complained that some Lusaka shopkeepers discriminated in the manner they sold their goods. They favoured people with permanent accounts at their shops. Furthermore, some of the goods Africans had been using prior to the war such as razor blades and soap were made a preserve of Europeans in the capital. Most shopkeepers in the town would only serve an African if he had a written note from a European stating that the goods were meant for the personal use of the European in question. These economic difficulties made some people to take to crime. Some criminals pleaded in court that they committed crime due to strained circumstances. This is further supported by the fact that there were numerous first offenders during the war.

Police commitment in the war contributed to the upswing in housebreaking and burglary during the war in Lusaka. Lusaka policemen, like their counterparts in other parts of Northern Rhodesia were directed to join active service with Northern Rhodesia Regiment during the war. The battalions of the regiment were formed in Lusaka. The Europeans and African police who joined the regiment were assigned to guard vital points such as bridges, and pontoons. The shortage of police personnel brought about by enlistment in the regiment reduced police effectiveness against crime. The situation was worsened by continued enlistment of policemen in the regiment in order to substitute for casualties in the war.

However, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Lusaka registered reduced cases of housebreaking and burglary. This period saw an improvement in the economy of Northern Rhodesia. This prosperity, especially in the early 1950s was associated with minerals boom during the Korean War of 1950-1953. The growth of mining output benefited other sectors of the economy, and there was rapid creation of job opportunities in urban areas. In Lusaka, the copper boom manifested itself in the growth of institutions like insurance companies, building societies, expansion of manufacturing enterprises and construction firms. Employment opportunities were created. African employment
in Lusaka's manufacturing enterprises increased five times in the period 1946-1956 while construction catered for 25 per cent of all Africans in employment in the post war period.35

The period of breathing space in housebreaking and burglary was short lived. In the late 1950s, the frequency of housebreaking and burglary became a public concern in Lusaka. Following twelve burglaries in 48 hours in Lusaka's residential areas in November 1958, a Lusaka resident complained that 'the Criminal Investigation Department in Lusaka is impotent in the matter of housebreaking and burglary, and one wonders what effect this is going to have upon would be investors in the town.'36

Some Lusaka residents took to insuring their houses under the householders comprehensive policy against burglary. The consequences of the increase in burglary was registered by the manager of a Lusaka Insurance firm in 1958:

We have noticed an increase in burglary over the past year and also the value of the amount of property stolen.... I would say that the majority of the houses in Lusaka are now insured against burglary and we have particularly noticed an increase in the number of people taking out insurance ... many of them are people who have not had insurance before.37

One of the worst hit residential areas of Lusaka was Rhodes Park. It was known as 'black spot' by the Police as far as housebreaking was concerned. Part of the residential area had overgrown elephant grass which provided good cover for criminals.

Some of the criminals involved in housebreaking and burglary stole to sell the property. Sentencing an African to two years imprisonment after breaking into five houses in Lusaka, the magistrate remarked that: 'You have an appalling record.... You stole to sell and make profit.'38 In December 1958, Lusaka Police arrested five criminals as they were disposing of stolen property. The incidence of housebreaking and burglary remained high in the early 1960s. In January and February 1963, Lusaka registered 102
burglaries. In all these cases, property valued at approximately £2,000 was stolen.

The spate of housebreaking and burglaries beginning in the late 1950s can be explained by three main factors. A significant number of property crimes in the capital were committed by hard core criminals who had escaped from Lusaka Central Prison. Answering questions on crime in the Legislative Council in December 1958, the Chief Secretary Evelyn Hone disclosed that in the period June to November 1958, Lusaka recorded 284 burglaries. More than 100 of these were done by one escapee criminal.

Part of the rise in housebreaking and burglary was due to the rising number of the unemployed in the town. Beginning in 1956, the capital registered a considerable number of unemployed. The post war boom slowed down following the end of the Korean War. When copper prices fell, mining profits likewise declined. One of the results was that employment went down and it remained so until independence. For example, construction was the largest employment sector in Lusaka with a total of 5,708 African workers in 1956. In 1961, this figure had dropped to 3,671. Similarly, the number of European employees in the sector declined. In 1956 the sector employed 584 Europeans compared to 411 in 1961. Investment by the government and the private sector, particularly beginning late 1950s declined due to uncertainty surrounding the break up of the Federation.

The victims of housebreaking and burglary had their share of the blame. In November 1958, Lusaka Police indicated that owners of homes did very little to safeguard their homes from criminals. Similar sentiments were registered by the manager of a Lusaka Insurance firm when he said, 'in many cases the burglary is due to carelessness on the part of householders who leave their windows undone, having flimsy locks on doors or giving the houseboy duplicate keys.'

The above views were supported by statistics. In January and February 1963, Lusaka recorded 102 incidence of housebreaking and burglary. Out of these, it was only 17
cases in which force was used to gain entry into the house. Eighteen of the people whose houses were entered had left the window open. The rest were 'hooker'. Thieves hooked property through an open window. A Lusaka Policeman commented that, 'these are typical of the kind of burglaries we get and prove that far more than half could have been avoided if the house owners had taken the bother to lock properly.'

Incidence of housebreaking and burglary continued to be one of the leading forms of property crime in Lusaka after independence. Housebreaking and burglary recorded the second highest figures after theft between 1968-1990 at Chelstone Police Station. The prevalence of housebreaking and burglary after independence prompted Lusaka Police in January 1965 to request Lusaka City Council to extend hours of street lighting beyond midnight. Burglary seems to have been a serious problem at national level too. A Copperbelt member of parliament suggested the problem required a special cabinet meeting.

Beginning in the 1970s, there was a shift in target property among criminals. During the colonial period, the target goods for criminals were predominantly clothes, bed sheets, blankets and kitchen utensils as we have indicated above. After 1970, electrical goods began increasing on the market. Inevitably, target property among criminals included electrical goods like television sets and radios.

Besides a shift in the type of goods stolen, burglary took another form in the 1980s. In site and service residential areas like Lusaka's Chawama and in shanty compounds where the majority of houses had no wall fences, criminals knocked at the door of their victims, pretending to be high ranking party cadres or police on duty. When the owner of the home opened, the home could be ransacked.

In circumstances where the owner of the home did not open, the house was broken into by force and property stolen. In March 1989, a victim of burglary arising from such trickery recounted: 'we were awakened by noise made by some people. My husband asked who they were. They answered that they were police officers on duty. My
husband demanded identity cards ... they did not answer but began forcing their way into the house. 52

Although some of the property acquired through housebreaking and burglary was used by criminals, some of it was sold on the 'open market' in the city or to specific individuals who were 'customers' of the criminals. 53 Most of the property was sold very cheaply, presumably to get rid of it quickly. In October 1989, twelve trousers all valued at K1, 500 were sold for as little as K30. 54 In another incident in 1990, a stove worth K1,180 was sold for K80. 55

The increase in burglary and housebreaking after independence was due to unemployment which arose out of rural-urban migration and the poor performance of the economy. Rural-urban migration accelerated after independence because the post colonial government relaxed restrictions on movement to towns. 56 It was also a product of imbalance in development between rural and urban areas. This imbalance had its origins in the colonial period, and was carried over after independence. In 1964, there were only 7 manufacturing and construction firms away from the line of rail. By 1975, this figure had risen to 22 against 1,260 enterprises along the line of rail. 57

The imbalance was further reinforced by income disparities between rural and urban areas. In the early 1970s, income disparities were so acute that JASPA Employment Advisory Mission observed that 'few countries in the world would display a comparative degree of income inequality.' 58 These factors accelerated rural-urban migration. In 1963, Lusaka had a population of 123,146. In 1974 and 1980, this figure had risen to 421,000 and 535,000 respectively. 59

The rapid population growth of the city did not match with employment opportunities. In 1963, Lusaka had 3,426 registered unemployed persons. In 1969, this figure had risen to 9,375. 60 Poor economic performance, especially after the mid 1970s when the price of copper declined, led to reduction in economic activity in the nation. In 1980, 4,032 workers were declared redundant in the country. 61
The employment situation did not improve, and in 1986 Zambia had 2.5 million registered unemployed persons.\textsuperscript{62} The poor performance of the economy was characterised by a general rise in the prices of consumer goods. In 1972 and 1973, prices of consumer goods rose by an annual rate of approximately 6 to 6.6 per cent. In 1976, annual price increase of consumer goods for low income group recorded a sharp rise of 19.3 per cent.\textsuperscript{63} The rate of inflation has remained high. The unemployment situation and the general rise in the cost of living created a conducive environment for property crime. The majority of the reports of property crime at Lusaka magistrate Courts for the period 1979-1990 indicate that most of the criminals were unemployed at the time of committing the offenses.\textsuperscript{64} Some criminals in their mitigation alluded to the rising cost of living as a contributing factor to their committing crime.\textsuperscript{65} The public recognised unemployment and high cost of living as a contributing factor to crime. In a property crime survey Kalelemba carried out in Lusaka in 1986, he found that 74.1 per cent of his respondents indicated that unemployment and the cost of living were among the major contributing factors to escalation of property crime in the city after independence.\textsuperscript{66}

Increase in population in Lusaka also put a strain on housing. Between 1964 and 1974 an annual average of 3,000 new households were established in Lusaka. The Lusaka City Council could only provide 1,000 houses per annum.\textsuperscript{67} This discrepancy contributed to the proliferation of shanty compounds in the city. In 1969, 36 per cent of Lusaka's population lived in shanty compounds. By 1974, this percentage had increased to 42. Poor street lighting contributed to property crime in these compounds. In his study of crime in Lusaka, Hatchard found that 95 per cent of those convicted of property offences between 1979 and 1981 had their residential address in shanty compounds.\textsuperscript{68}

The increase in property crime in the capital after independence can further be explained by shortage of manpower in Lusaka Police Stations. This issue is addressed in chapter two. The factors we have explained
above vis-a-vis escalation of housebreaking and burglary in Lusaka after independence had an influence on other forms of property crime we discuss below.

**ROBBERY**

The Penal Code defines robbery as an act where a person 'steals anything, and at or immediately before or immediately after the time of stealing uses or threatens to use actual violence to any person in order to retain the thing stolen'. Incidence of robbery were quite low in colonial Northern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, they were steadily rising towards the end of the colonial period. By 1958, incidents of some individuals getting beaten up and robbed were reported in Lusaka. The unemployment situation which obtained after the Korean War contributed to an increase in cases of robbery. However, it is not very clear why criminals become violent. Perhaps people had become violent owing to the struggle for independence which had gained momentum by this time.

After independence, there was a sharp rise in robbery in Lusaka. Lusaka's Matero Police Station registered 7 cases of robbery in 1966. By 1968 and 1972, this figure had risen to 104 and 169 respectively. Woodlands Police Station had no case of robbery in 1966. In 1972 it had 22; Kabwata Police Station recorded 3 cases of robbery in 1966, but the figure rose to 45 in 1972. The few figures of robbery cited above indicate that figures at one police station were higher than what obtained at national level in the colonial period. The increase in the annual rate of robbery was faster than the rate of population increase in the city.

After independence, incidence of robbery did not only increase but they progressively assumed aggravated forms. Assorted weapons, including firearms, were used by criminals to terrorise their victims. Aggravated robbery raised concern among the members of the public and the judiciary. The Chief Justice in 1969 asserted that 'it should be born in mind by everyone charged with the
administration of justice that aggravated robbery is common in Zambia and that it is an offence which must be stamped out ... it calls for severe sentences'.

The sharp rise in aggravated robbery in Lusaka and elsewhere in the country prompted the Zambia Traders Association to protest to the Minister of Home Affairs, Grey Zulu in March 1969. Businessmen complained of lack of police protection from armed bandits. The businessmen suggested a number of measures in an attempt to control armed robbery. Among others, they called for stiffer penalties such as hanging criminals convicted of armed robbery. They also proposed that the government should use the army to bring aggravated robbery under control. Desperate businessmen in Lusaka, particularly shopkeepers equipped themselves with bows and arrows. They trained their security guards to use them against armed bandits.

In 1969, the National Assembly amended the Penal Code. It passed the Firearms Act and Penal Code Amendment Act. The Act had two objectives. Firstly, it tightened control on the ownership and use of firearms. The legislation increased the penalty for illegal possession of firearms from two years and/or a K400 fine to 15 years imprisonment and/or a fine of K7,500. Secondly, the Act introduced a minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment for aggravated robbery where a firearm was used and 10 years for aggravated assault executed in order to steal. The National Assembly reminded the judiciary to pass longer sentences so that aggravated robbery could be wiped out.

In spite of the Firearms Act and the Penal Code Amendment Act of 1969, available statistics for Lusaka Police stations indicate that robbery figures continued rising. Although 1970 and 1971 robbery figures could not be found during our research, available evidence demonstrates that it is unlikely that robbery could have gone down in these years. In April 1970, the Commissioner of Police registered his concern over the increase of crime in urban areas. In his view, the situation required immediate attention. He made far reaching proposals such as withdrawing the mobile unit personnel from guarding the
Tanzania-Zambia oil pipeline and ministerial houses so that they could be deployed for crime control programmes in urban areas. The observation by the Commissioner of Police was consistent with the robbery situation in Lusaka. The capital continued experiencing a wave of aggravated robbery in the early 1970s.

We have argued that robbery was on the increase in Lusaka in spite of the Firearms Act. This also held true at the national level. The increase in robbery and particularly aggravated robbery precipitated indignation among members of the public and within the ranks of UNIP. Robbery and crime in general became a subject of discussion in UNIP Central Committee meetings in 1974. Diverse views were advanced in search of a solution. Three schools of thought can be identified.

One called for capital punishment. Exponents of this view argued that there was a growing number of innocent citizens who were victims of aggravated robbery. In their view, the only effective way to put an end to aggravated robbery was to introduce the death penalty. Another school of thought disapproved of capital punishment. It argued that the penalty was not only inhuman, but that it would not reduce aggravated robbery. One member of this school of thought remarked that 'the record of every civilization makes it quite clear that punishment, no matter how severe has had little effect on the crime rates.'

The third school of thought asserted that aggravated robbery could only be reduced by improving the efficiency of the police. It indicated that the death penalty against aggravated robbery was irrelevant unless perpetrators knew they would be arrested. In these circles, it was held that 'too many people in Zambia, including armed bandits simply ignore the law because they know they can get away with it.' Improved facilities and conditions of service would raise the efficiency and morale of policemen.

The call for the death penalty prevailed over others. In 1974, the UNIP National Council observed that the law dealing with aggravated robbery required strengthening in order to establish a provision for capital punishment for
those convicted of the crime. In the same year, the bill on the death penalty was introduced in the National Assembly and the Penal Code Amendment Act (No. 2) of 1974 was passed. The Act sanctioned the death penalty where a firearm was used or grievous bodily harm was done with the use of an offensive weapon. The death penalty was introduced as a deterrent against aggravated robbery. Its introduction brought Zambia in line with other countries like Cameroon and Kenya. It must be indicated that the death penalty was not being introduced for the first time in Zambia. Before 1974, murder and treason were punishable by death.

In the same year that the death penalty was passed into law, some convicts were sentenced to death. In 1974 and 1975, eight criminals were sentenced to death for aggravated robbery in Zambia. In spite of this, however, available statistics indicate that Lusaka police stations registered an increase in incidents of robbery. Although some police stations registered a reduction in 1976, this can not be attributed to the 1974 Act as the town recorded high incidents of robbery in 1974 and 1975. In fact, incidents of robbery in the capital continued rising in 1977 and 1978. The increase in robbery after 1974 demonstrates that the death penalty was not an effective deterrent against aggravated robbery.

In any case the death penalty was not effectively carried out. Firstly, although the death penalty was imposed on those convicted of robbery, it was rarely effected. Between 1984 and 1988, 257 criminals in Lusaka were convicted of robbery. None of them was sentenced to death. Secondly, even where the death penalty was passed on criminals, there was a discrepancy between mandatory and actual policy implementation. Prisons Department Annual Reports do not indicate executions from individual towns, but for the whole country. In 1974 and 1975 a total of 49 prisoners were condemned to death for various offenses, including aggravated robbery. Only six were executed. In 1980, 21 prisoners were earmarked for death penalty but none of
them was executed.\textsuperscript{91} The death penalty for those who were
not executed was either commuted to imprisonment for life
or the convicts were acquitted after appealing. The death
penalty could be reduced to the above categories due to
technicalities in the administration of justice. Some of
these technicalities included lack of convincing evidence,
inadequate number of witnesses, misrepresentation and/or
contradictions in the evidence presented by the prosecution
and/or the witness.\textsuperscript{92}

Robbery continued to be a serious problem in Lusaka in
the 1980s. Highway gunmen terrorised residents of the
town. One of the outstanding incidents of aggravated
robbery was the gunning down of a member of parliament in
Lusaka’s Libala Stage Two in August 1984 and the theft of
his vehicle.\textsuperscript{93} Furthermore, armed bandits adopted a new
method of robbing their victims. Some of them wore masks
in order to avoid identification. One victim of such
criminals narrated his ordeal as follows: ‘I parked my
car.... I suddenly saw three men all of them masked. One
of them had a long gun which I took to be a rifle. They
grabbed my car keys, harassed me and drove off. I cannot
identify them’.\textsuperscript{94}

On the outskirts of the city, aggravated robbery took
the form of waylaying victims in the plantations. This was
particularly prevalent in the industrial plantations
between Lusaka’s Marrapodi and Chipata Townships. The
victims were violently robbed of their property. Some were
killed. In 1987, a couple from Chipata Township was
attacked, robbed and the wife abducted by the criminals
into the plantations. By 1990, aggravated robbery in this
area had escalated. In that year alone, eight people were
robbed and killed. The magnitude of the problem prompted
a resident of Chipata Township to assert that ‘since 1984,
there has been no peace here’.\textsuperscript{95} The plantations were also
a dumping ground for stolen property especially goods not
considered worth selling.
Factors Responsible For Escalation of Aggravated Robbery in Lusaka After Independence

One of the factors that contributed to escalation of aggravated robbery in Lusaka was widespread ownership of firearms. The firearms used in aggravated robbery came from three main sources, namely freedom fighters, the Zambia security forces and through housebreaking and aggravated robbery itself.

When Zambia attained independence in 1964, some of her neighbours namely Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were still involved in violent struggles for independence. Zambia offered asylum to both freedom fighters and refugees from these countries, including those from South Africa. Some of the freedom fighters gave away, sold or abandoned their firearms. Between 1976 and 1980, Emmasdale Police found abandoned three AK 47 rifles on different occasions at various points of Emmasdale residential area which were left by freedom fighters. In 1984, a Lusaka resident appeared in court for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition acquired from freedom fighters. The ammunition in his possession was of assorted types and capable of being fired from a variety of firearms. Some of the firearms acquired from freedom fighters were used in aggravated robbery. In fact, some freedom fighters were directly involved in aggravated robbery. In June 1987, three South African freedom fighters were involved in aggravated robbery in Lusaka’s Kaunda Square Township.

Armed bandits in Lusaka also acquired firearms from dishonest security men in the Zambia Police and the Zambia Army. There was a notorious army officer in the 1970s who used to sell firearms to criminals in the capital. Lusaka Police confirmed that on several occasions, they arrested soldiers who had stolen firearms. This problem prevailed in the Zambia Police Force too. In January 1979, the Police Public Relations Officer indicated that some of the Police Officers in Lusaka and elsewhere had stolen guns and sold them away. In fact, some security men were involved in aggravated robbery. In 1986, a Lusaka High
Court Judge registered his concern over the increasing number of soldiers convicted of armed robbery. Elsewhere in the country, there is also evidence that security men were involved in aggravated robbery.\textsuperscript{100}

The security forces were a potential source of firearms because of lack of accountability in these institutions. In 1983, the annual report of the Auditor General revealed that 4,033 rounds of ammunition of various sizes and 37 guns were missing at quartermaster's store at police headquarters in Lusaka.\textsuperscript{101} Although the regulations stated that the armoury should be inspected once per year, the last inspection was done in 1977. The inspection of the police armoury was irregular and no proper records were kept. Similarly, the case of the army officer referred to above who used to sell firearms to criminals is an indication of lack of accountability of firearms in the army.

The view that security forces were a source of firearms used in aggravated robbery was not accepted by the government. In May 1983, the Minister of Home Affairs, Wilson Chakulya reacted sharply to the 'accusation' by firearms and ammunition dealers who had asserted that firearms used in aggravated robbery were obtained from security forces.\textsuperscript{102} It is, however, interesting to note that the denial by the Minister was a contradiction of the statement he issued at Zambia Airforce passing out parade in Livingstone in May 1982. On that occasion, he registered his concern over thefts and sale of military hardware by army officers.\textsuperscript{103}

The firearms and ammunition dealers were an unlikely source of firearms used in aggravated robbery because they only sold sporting guns like shot guns.\textsuperscript{104} Exonerating firearms dealers, a spokesperson for Lusaka's Standby Gerry (one of the firearms dealers in Lusaka) remarked that 'the abuse of firearms was not from the source of sale. I can assure you that there is no way people without licences for their guns can get ammunition from us.'\textsuperscript{105}

Firearms used in aggravated robbery were also acquired through housebreaking, although such cases were rare. On
two occasions in the 1970s, criminals broke into Matero homes and stole, among other things, registered firearms and ammunition. The criminals responsible for one of the burglaries were arrested months later after they had terrorised other Lusaka residents.\textsuperscript{106} Some firearms were acquired through aggravated robbery. In April 1985 and July 1986, criminals stole firearms from their victims.\textsuperscript{107}

It has been demonstrated elsewhere that widespread ownership of firearms contributes to an increase in aggravated robbery. Mohemed argued that the western region in the Sudan had the highest incidence of aggravated robbery between 1985 and 1988 because of the trafficking of firearms there.\textsuperscript{108} The countries with very strict firearms regulations rarely had cases in which firearms were used in aggravated robbery. Research in Japan in 1983 revealed that there were very few cases in which firearms were used in committing crimes because it was very difficult to obtain them.\textsuperscript{109} Ownership of firearms was strictly monitored by the Prefectural Public Safety Commission. These restrictions made it almost impossible for ordinary citizens to own firearms.\textsuperscript{110}

Another explanation which has been advanced for the increase in aggravated robbery has to do with the development process. Clinard and Abbot argued that the spread and growth of industrial and business enterprises involved the transportation of large sums of money from one organisation to another. They asserted that the reward of stealing the money as perceived by criminals more than compensates for the risk of capture and imprisonment.\textsuperscript{111} This explanation is consistent with an incident of aggravated robbery in July 1985. In that case, criminals set out to steal money from mini bus operators in Lusaka's Kaunda Square Township knowing too well that they carried along large sums of money without adequate security. One of the criminals narrated that:

On 25 July 1985 at 17.30 hours, Joseph Chilanda and I left Mandevu for Kaunda Square on foot. I was armed with a pistol and Chilanda had an AK 47 rifle. We went to Kaunda Square to steal money
from mini bus operators. At 20.00 hours, we stopped a mini bus and Chilanda opened fire.\textsuperscript{112} Although the mini bus that was fired at turned out to be the property of Zambia Air Force, and the crew had no money on them, the initial motive of the act had been clearly spelt out by the criminals.

THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLES

Theft of motor vehicles in the country and in Lusaka were quite low in the colonial period as there were very few vehicles then.\textsuperscript{113} It is even difficult to measure the few incidence of theft of motor vehicles which occurred because Police Annual Reports and Judiciary and Magistracy Annual Reports covering the colonial period do not indicate theft of motor vehicle statistics.\textsuperscript{114}

Towards independence, however, colonial newspapers reported scattered cases of theft of motor vehicles in Lusaka. By then, their number in Lusaka had begun increasing. In 1962, Lusaka licensing office issued 2,000 new car licences. The increase in the number of vehicles correspondingly led to an increase in the theft of motor vehicles. In December 1963, seven vehicles were stolen in Lusaka. Theft of motor vehicles at this time did not involve use of violence, and this continued to hold true for a few years after independence.\textsuperscript{115} Furthermore, the few incidence of theft of motor vehicle which took place in the colonial period were less sophisticated. Most of the vehicles stolen had little security on them.\textsuperscript{116}

After independence, theft of motor vehicles in Lusaka increased. Before the 1970s, criminals undertook theft of motor vehicles indiscriminately. They did not have a target vehicle. In the 1970s, there was a change. Peugeot became one of their target vehicles. Some of the stolen peugeot cars were stripped of their parts which were sold to taxis operators.\textsuperscript{117} Later, the Fiat too became a target vehicle following its appearance on the market in the early 1970s. Criminals nicknamed it the ‘get away car’.\textsuperscript{118} In
1979, a highly organised gang of criminals rocked the capital. In a ten day period in September 1979, six Fiat cars were stolen in Lusaka.

There was also an increase in the theft of motor vehicles at national level too. The mode of stealing vehicles had changed by the 1970s. criminals now grabbed vehicles from owners at gun point. This state of affairs was due to widespread ownership of firearms which we have discussed above.

The steady rise in the theft of motor vehicles and the violent form it assumed led the National Assembly to include a section in the 1974 Penal Code Amendment Act which specifically dealt with theft of motor vehicles. The section slapped a 15 year imprisonment for first offence. The second and subsequent offence attracted a sentence of not less than seven years and not exceeding fifteen years. The 1974 section, therefore, demonstrates how the National Assembly perceived the magnitude of theft of motor vehicles. Prior to 1974, there was no legal provision in the Penal code which was specifically earmarked to deal with theft of motor vehicles.

After enactment of the section referred to above, some police stations in Lusaka registered an increase while others recorded a decline in motor vehicle thefts. At the national level, motor vehicle thefts kept rising. The uneven decline of the incidence of motor vehicle thefts in Lusaka on the one hand and the continued rise at national level on the other, is an indication that the legislation had no impact. The country registered the lowest incidence of motor vehicle thefts in 1968. According to 1980 Police Annual Reports, this reduction was due to police efficiency and in particular the reduction of routes out of the country, especially the Zaire one which was often used by car thieves.

In the 1980s car thieves devised a new system of stealing motor vehicles. The owner of the vehicle was persuaded to assist people who pretended to be interested in 'booking' the vehicle, but later grabbed it from the owner. A victim of such trickery recounted:
I was hired ... as I was driving, he demanded the keys, but I refused to give him. When I looked behind, I saw a pistol ... and thereafter, I heard a gunshot. Due to the fear I had, there was no alternative but to hand over the key to the gentleman."\(^{124}\)

This incident was confirmed by the criminal when he was arrested. "I opened fire from inside the vehicle and chased the driver.... I took the vehicle and drove to my uncle's home."\(^{125}\)

In other cases, criminals engaged women who pretended they were in labour and needed assistance after which accomplices would steal the vehicle from the owner. Some of these women were further engaged to drive stolen vehicles to neighbouring countries for sale. In January 1989, a woman was arrested as she was driving a stolen car from Lusaka to Zaire.\(^{126}\)

**Reasons For The Increase In Theft of Motor Vehicles in Lusaka After Independence**

A number of factors can be advanced to explain the escalation of theft of motor vehicles in Lusaka after independence. First, following the increase in the number of vehicles after independence, there was a growing desire among people to own one. However, not everyone could afford to buy a vehicle. Some opted to meet their desire by stealing.\(^{127}\)

Second, stolen vehicles sold in Zaire fetched high prices.\(^{128}\) In March 1985, a vehicle stolen from Lusaka's Kaunda Square was recovered at Kasumbalesa border post as it was being driven to Zaire.\(^{129}\) Some criminals acknowledged that they sold vehicles in Zaire. One asserted that; "I used the firearm of Elliot Abdul of Chawama to steal the motor vehicle. We sell the vehicles to Zaire."\(^{130}\)

Some of the stolen vehicles were sold to Zairians who illegally or otherwise found their way to Lusaka. One criminal narrated that:

I then drove the Land Rover to Kapoche Motel in Chawama to sell it to a Zairian man known as

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Katumba. When I reached ... I went in and found that he was not in the room. I checked in the bar and found him.\textsuperscript{131}

Not all the stolen vehicles were sold in Zaire. Some of them were sold within Lusaka or elsewhere in the country.

Third, criminals made a lucrative business from the spare parts stripped from stolen vehicles.\textsuperscript{132} By 1980, some of the stolen motor vehicles spares were publicly sold at Lusaka’s City centre. After a police clamp down in 1985, criminals shifted their illegal business to Soweto Market, southwest of Lusaka City Centre.\textsuperscript{133} The business has continued to date, and with the knowledge of Lusaka police. Stolen spare parts were sometimes tampered with so that they could not easily be recognised by the owners and the police.\textsuperscript{134}

Fourth, the increase in theft of motor vehicles can be explained by proliferation of mechanics who had adequate knowledge about vehicles. Some of them opted to acquire vehicles through unauthorised means such as stealing. A Police Inspector remarked that ‘in 1966 when I joined the force, there were very few mechanics, but their number has kept increasing. Some of them have contributed to the prevalence of motor vehicle thefts in the town because they are even capable of stealing a locked car.’\textsuperscript{135} His observation is reflected in both Lusaka magistrates’ and High courts criminal trials where vehicles were stolen although the owners had locked them at the time of parking.\textsuperscript{136} The increase in self-styled mechanics was a result of the steady increase of private institutions offering tuition in mechanics in the country after independence. Some of them learnt the trade from various garages which equally came on the scene after independence.

The proliferation of garages contributed to escalation of theft of motor vehicles in another way. It was not uncommon for keys of vehicles to be duplicated in these garages when vehicles were taken for repairs and then passed over to criminals.\textsuperscript{137} Between September and December 1988, an average of one car was stolen in Lusaka per day. Some of these vehicles were stolen by using
duplicate keys. In 1990, the researcher attended a court session in Lusaka magistrate court where an agent engaged by a Senegalese had the car key duplicated and passed it to criminals who in turn got away with the vehicle.

**SUMMARY**

The common denominator to theories of crime, except for biological and classical theories is that they trace the origins of crime from the socio-economic structure of society. The central themes of biological and classical theories were not reflected in this study. Research elsewhere has demonstrated that there are no physical differences between criminals and non-criminals, neither is there evidence to ascertain that criminals derived pleasure from crime as the classical theory asserts.

The socio-economic explanation of crime advanced by theories of differential opportunity, differential contact and Marxist theories is consistent with the explanations advanced for property crime in this study during our period of study. Unemployment, criminal groups, shortage of goods and the general economic situation had a bearing on the trends of property crime in Lusaka.

However, there is little evidence to confirm the Marxist assertion that crime was directed at the middle class. For example, indiscriminate housebreaking and burglary in African compounds in Lusaka during the Second World War on one hand and the prevalence of the same forms of property crime in the low density area of Rhodes Park in the late 1950s, on the other dilutes Marxist class conceptions of the victims of crime. The court cases which should have been one of the reliable sources to determine the victims of crime do not highlight particulars of the victims of crime, although they document the name, sex, occupation and residential address of criminals. However, the information victims of crime gave during criminal case proceedings indicate that criminals stole across class barriers. In addition to socio-economic explanation of
crime, the weakness of the law enforcement agency, the Police, also had an impact on trends of property crime.

Incidence of housebreaking and burglary were more prevalent than robbery and theft of motor vehicles both in the colonial and post colonial periods. Robbery and theft of motor vehicles were rare crimes during the colonial period in Lusaka. After independence, incidence of robbery and theft of motor vehicles increased sharply, and they assumed violent forms due to widespread ownership of firearms. The violent form these categories of crime assumed attracted parliamentary legislation, exclusively passed to act as deterrent measures. The available evidence, however, demonstrates that legislation was ineffective. The incidence of property crime against which legislation was passed kept increasing.
NOTES


2. Ibid., 17.

3. Ibid., 23.


6. Ibid., Clinard and Abbot argue that the same society that sets the goals does not provide means for members of the socio-economic group to achieve these goals. This discrepancy between what society emphasises and the narrow opportunities to achieve the goals leads some people to deviant behaviour like crime. See also K.M.M. Likando, 'Rehabilitation and Recidivism in the Zambian Prison System', M.A. Dissertation, University of Zambia (1983), 19.


10. Ibid., 100.

11. Penal Code Cap. 146, Section 300 (1).

12. Penal Code Cap. 146, Section 301 (b).


14. NAZ, KOC, 2/224, Lusaka District Commissioner to the Provincial Commissioner, 4 August, 1932.


16. Ibid.,


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22. Ibid.


25. NAZ, SEC 1/1770, File No. 1, Central Province Commissioner to the Chief Secretary, 3 August 1942.


27. NAZ, SEC 1/1770, File No. 8, Central Province Commissioner to the Chief Secretary, 4 January 1943.

28. NAZ, SEC 1/1770, File No. 125, Central Province Commissioner to the Chief Secretary, 12 January 1943.

29. NAZ, SEC 1/1770 File No.132, Central Province Commissioner to the Chief Secretary, 6 April 1943.


32. Ibid.


35. Ibid.


41. Fry, Employment, 41.


43. Ibid.


47. See Appendix A.


50. Lusaka Magistrate Court Case No. 2P 213 of 1982. Giving a statement at Kabwata Police Station on 12 May 1982, the proprietor of the electrical shop in Libala Stage 4 (A) disclosed that his shop had been a target of criminals on several occasions.


52. Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP 1541, 1989. This is part of the statement given by Mary C. Makukutzi at Matero Police Station, 2 March 1989.

53. Lusaka Magistrate Court Case No. 2P 213 of 1982. In this case the accused were arrested two days later after the burglary selling some of the stolen radios at Lusaka's Kamwala Market. See also Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/168/1987. At Makeni Police Post on 13 January 1987, a criminal revealed that after breaking into a house in Makeni, he and his colleagues took the television set and other stolen items to their usual 'customer' Mama Hassein in Kanyama Compound. See also Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/5/1989.


55. Lusaka Magistrate Court Case No. 2P 19 of 1990.


64. This deduction was drawn after consulting criminal cases at Lusaka Magistrates Courts.

65. Lusaka Magistrates Court Case No. 3P 31 of 1986. In this case, the accused, Jack Mumba confessed that 'I stole due to hard economic time. My father died in 1985. He was the one supporting the family. I am now the one supporting them.... The cost of living is too high.' See also Lusaka Magistrates Court Case No. 3P 14 of 1986 and Lusaka Magistrates Court Cases No. SP 40 of 1990.


68. These findings were quoted from M.P. Myunga, 'Legal Constraints in the Prevention of Crime and Rehabilitation of Offenders', National Symposium on the Prevention of Crime and Rehabilitation of Offenders (Kabwe: 1985), 57.

69. Penal Code Cap. 146, Section 292.

70. Other criminal cases such as arson in late 1950s were politically influenced. See Northern Rhodesia Annual Report Upon Native Affairs, 1958 (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1959).
71. For comparison, see Appendix D.

72. The population of Lusaka only increased threefold between 1963 and 1974, while robbery figures in police stations increased more than this margin in an apparently shorter time span. The population of Lusaka was 123,146 in 1963 and 410,000 in 1974.

73. Aggravated robbery involved use of offensive weapons such as firearms. Annual Police crime returns do not differentiate robbery and aggravated robbery. Both crimes are merely recorded as robbery.

74. Selected Judgements of Zambia, 1969, 98.


78. See Appendix B Table A.


81. See Appendix C.

82. Times of Zambia, 23 April 1974.


86. Ibid.

87. See Appendix B Table A.

88. See Appendix B Table A.


92. Personal impression from court cases.


94. Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/87/1986. This statement was given by W.K. Mkandawire at Lusaka Central Police Station, 13 March 1986. See also Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/54/1989.


96. Interview, Detective Constable G. Mpundu, Emmasdale Police Station, 16 April 1992.


98. Lusaka High Court Trial No. HP/182/1987. In this case, the AK 47 rifle used was acquired from the house of one of the South Africans, Michael Nduli.


100. See for example, Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/65/1988 and Livingstone High Court Criminal Trial No. 61/1988. In the latter case, a Livingstone Police Officer was convicted of stealing a motor vehicle at gun point in Choma using a police revolver .38 No. A51590.


103. Ibid.

104. A survey conducted by Sunday Times of Zambia in May 1983 in Lusaka, Ndola and Chingola confirmed this. The survey team found that the firearms dealers in these towns did not stock automatic weapons used by armed bandits.


110. Ibid.

111. Clinard and Abbot, *Crime in Developing Countries*, 39.

112. *Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/28/1986*. The statement was given by Christopher Mwansa at Lusaka Central Police Station, 28 July 1985.


114. See Police, Judiciary and Magistracy Annual Reports for the period 1932-1964.

115. Interview, Mweemba.


118. Interview, Detective Constable I. Banda, Emmasdale Police Station, 16 April 1992.

119. See Appendix E.

120. See Appendix B, Table B.

121. See Appendix E.


123. See for example *Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/37/1985* and *Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/107/1986*.


125. Ibid. The statement was given by the accused, P. Chola at Lusaka Central Police Station, December 1985.


127. Interview, Supreintendant Nyambe.

128. Interview, Superintendt Nyambe; Mweemba.

129. *Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/31/1986*.

131. Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/54/1989. This was part of police statement by Besa Kafwimbi at Emmasdale Police Station, 11 February 1989.

132. See for example, Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/87/1987. In this case a Fiat car was stolen from Lusaka’s Lilanda Township in March 1986. The battery, two headlamps, doors, windscreens and fender were missing when it was recovered in Mungule area, Kabwe rural. See also Lusaka Magistrate Court Case No. 2P2 92 of 1990. The Bank of Zambia peugeot stolen in June had assorted spare parts missing when it was recovered. The missing parts included the engine, four wheels, air cleaner, the radiator, windscreens, car radio cassette and the cloak.

133. Interview, Detective Constable S. Zimba, Chelstone Police Station, 3 April 1992.

134. Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/165/1987. In February, the Meridien Motors in Lusaka was robbed of assorted motor spares. Later, some of the spare parts among which were batteries were recovered. A number of batteries had their serial numbers rubbed off.


136. See Lusaka Magistrate Court Case No. 2P 159 of 1980; Lusaka Magistrate Court Case No. 3P 450 of 1984; Lusaka Magistrate Court Case No. 2P 119 of 1990; and Lusaka Magistrate Court Case No. SP 2-191 of 1990. In case SP 2-191 of 1990, when the vehicle was recovered, a copper wire connected to the positive terminal of the battery and cut out was found in the bonnet of the vehicle. The criminal gave his occupation as a mechanic. See also Clinard and Abbot, Crime in Developing Countries, 42. Clinard and Abbot argued that in the 1960s, vehicles in India were relatively safe from criminals because few people could operate them.


139. See M.A. Elliot, Crime in Modern Society (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1952), 313. Elliot argued that many people including the affluent have committed crime at one time or another which, therefore, gives us little reason to believe that there are physical, mental or emotional differences between criminals and non criminals.
CHAPTER TWO

POLICE STRATEGIES FOR THE CONTROL OF PROPERTY CRIME, 1932-1990

This chapter examines the strategies Lusaka Police employed in curbing property crime and their effectiveness. It begins with a brief history of Northern Rhodesia Police before addressing crime control strategies. The discussion is divided into colonial and post colonial periods. Although each strategy is discussed separately, there was an overlap in their application. The chapter further attempts to establish whether police training was influenced by trends of property crime.

History of the Police Force

Before 1911, Northern Rhodesia was administered as two separate entities—North Eastern and North Western Rhodesia. Each of the two entities had its own police force. The first police force was established in 1891 in North Eastern Rhodesia. It was known as North Eastern Rhodesia Constabulary.¹ North Western Rhodesia had the Barotse Native Police formed in 1899. These forces were under the jurisdiction of the Northern Rhodesia army. The Commander of the Northern Rhodesia army was also the Chief Commissioner of Police.

The main duty of the early police force was to combat the slave trade in order to create a conducive environment for commerce and missionary work in Northern Rhodesia.² Northern Rhodesia was a source of slaves for traders from Angola and Nyasaland. Other duties of the police force included arresting Africans who committed offenses, guarding native prisons and accompanying British South Africa Company (BSACo) tax collectors.

Although Northern Rhodesia was brought under colonial rule by the dawn of the 20th century, and the BSACo had established itself as the governing authority, a peaceful environment was necessary to sustain company rule. Therefore, the police force was maintained with the view to
suppress and prevent the outbreak of disorder in the territory. In 1911, North Eastern Rhodesia and North Western Rhodesia were amalgamated to form Northern Rhodesia. Likewise, the Barotse Native Police and the North Eastern Rhodesia Constabulary were consolidated in 1912 to form the Northern Rhodesia Police. In that same year, the Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.) was created in the force.

After the First World War, an important development took place in the force. Although Africans continued receiving military training at Livingstone Depot, there was a shift to direct recruitment into the force rather than secondment from the military section. By this time, police responsibilities had increased. They controlled immigration and supervised aerodromes. In 1929, the position of commissioner was established in the force, and Captain G.C. Wardroper was appointed to the post. However, the police remained under the authority of the Military Commander.

On 1 April 1932, the army and the Police were separated into Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Northern Rhodesia Police. The police was put under the direct authority of the governor of Northern Rhodesia. The first Commissioner of Police was Captain Wardroper. He was assisted by two Assistant Commissioners.

There were three reasons that led to the separation of the police from the military. Firstly, the Police had expanded and therefore could no longer be regarded as an offshoot of the military. By 1932, the strength of the police force exceeded that of the military. Secondly, the objectives and routine duties of the two branches had become dissimilar. Thirdly, each had begun recruiting its own personnel. Although police recruits underwent initial training with members of Northern Rhodesia army, their association with the military later ceased.
This section discusses the crime control strategies the Police used in the colonial period. The point of departure is a brief outline of police stations in Lusaka.

In the 1930s and 1940s, Lusaka was policed from Lusaka Central Police Station. In the early 1950s two new police stations, Kabwata and Woodlands, and two police posts, Chinika and Matero, were established. On 1 August 1952, the above mentioned stations, including Lusaka Rural stations at Kafue, Chirundu, Ngwerere, Chalimbana, Mwembezi and Chilanga formed Lusaka Division. Prior to that date, Lusaka Police Stations were part of Central Division whose headquarters was at Broken Hill (Kabwe). In November 1954 Lusaka Urban District Police was established. It comprised Lusaka Central, Woodlands, Kabwata, Chinika and Matero. To this list was added Emmasdale Police Station and Chilenje Police Post in 1956.

After independence, Matero and Chilenje were upgraded to the status of police stations while Chinika was closed. In 1966, a new police station was established at Chelstone. After 1980, the city saw the proliferation of police posts namely Kanyama, Makeni, Mtendere, Natural Resources Development College, Roma and Chawama.

The Beat System

One of the strategies the Lusaka police used to control crime was the beat system. A beat was an area which a particular constable or group of constables were detailed to patrol. This system was introduced in Northern Rhodesia in 1920, and 'the main objective was to prevent crime particularly offenses against property.'

The size of the beat depended on the density of the population in the area, the rate of crime and the economic and administrative importance of the buildings in the area. These factors and also the staffing situation in police stations influenced the number of constables assigned to beats. In 1945, Lusaka had 36 beats which were manned by
56 European and African police. In November 1956, the town had 49 beats. A total of ten European and 138 African police were supposed to man the beats during day time; 4 Europeans and 33 Africans were earmarked for beats at night. In practice, the number of constables assigned to beats was smaller than recommended. This was due to shortage of staff in Lusaka Police Stations. This problem is addressed later in the chapter.

The beat system was so organised that there were always constables on beats. Constables worked in shifts. Before 1947 each shift lasted eight hours. The 1947 Police Commission of Inquiry recommended that African Police had to attend weekly lectures and parades. Therefore, beat duty hours were reduced to six.

Beats had a number of chosen points in various parts of Lusaka. These included call boxes and street corners. These were known as check points. Each constable had a beat card on which was indicated check points and fixed times to be at check points. A master card of all the beats of a particular station was kept by the policeman in charge of beats. This arrangement facilitated early location of constables in times of emergency.

Constables on beats were under strict instructions to watch over possible occurrences of crime in their area and to interrogate suspects. Other duties assigned to them included investigation of traffic accidents and, if need arose, rendering first aid to injured persons. During their shifts, constables were not allowed to leave their beats. Those who absconded were charged with absence from the beat. This was a very serious offence. Each constable was responsible for crime committed on his beat. At the end of each shift, constables submitted reports to the shift supervisor, who was normally a sub-inspector or assistant inspector.

Beat supervisors used either bicycles or motor vehicles to oversee constables on beats. Patrol vehicles supplemented the efforts of constables on beats. The role of patrol cars was registered by a Lusaka Policeman when he said 'Lusaka is extensively patrolled at night ... and
constables are not only visited by patrol cars but have various means of contacting the stations.'15 The other means through which constables got in touch with their stations was by way of telephones placed in strategic points of the city.

The beat system assisted in reducing the occurrence of property crime in the capital. The presence of policemen on patrol had a deterrent effect on criminals because it created a strong likelihood of apprehension of potential offenders. This reduced the rate of property crime being committed. One policemen described the beat system as 'one of the most reliable strategies in curbing property crime.'16 Elsewhere, the beat system was successful in curbing crime. Writing on Canada, Kelly asserted that 'the Police constable on the beat, patrolling the highways, city streets ... is a major deterrent to crime.'17

In September 1956, a Dog Section was introduced in Northern Rhodesia Police, and Lusaka Police began using patrol dogs on their beats. Prior to this date the main weapon of constables on beat was a short baton. In 1961, a Dog Section was introduced at Lilayi Police Training School and training of alsatian dogs and their handlers commenced in September of that year. The dogs were trained for two purposes: guarding restricted areas and police patrols. By 1963, the areas of Lusaka that were prone to housebreaking and burglary were thoroughly covered by patrol dogs. 'Commenting on the role of patrol dogs in crime control, a Lusaka policeman observed that 'patrol dogs which work during the hours of darkness ... have proved to be one of the finest deterrents to crime in Lusaka.'18

When there was increase in crime in the capital, uniformed police with their patrol dogs were supplemented by plain clothes officers. This strategy manifested itself in 1958 when plain clothes officers were deployed to counteract waves of housebreaking and burglary in the capital and to patrol what were known as 'danger areas.' 'Danger areas' were places where theft of property from parked motor vehicles was very common.
It must be indicated that beats in Lusaka were confined to commercial, European\(^9\) and Indian\(^{20}\) residential areas. The justification for excluding African residential areas was that there was shortage of manpower in Lusaka Police Stations.\(^{21}\) Although shortage of manpower obtained in the police force as we shall argue later in the chapter, this may not have been the main reason for excluding African residential areas from the beat system. The basic reason was that the privileges of Europeans prevailed over those of the Africans and this was reflected in police coverage.

**Police Reserves**

The Police efforts to control property crime in Lusaka were supplemented by the police reserve. The police reserve was established by Northern Rhodesia Reserve Ordinance Number 45 of 1950.\(^{22}\) The Ordinance came into force in 1951.\(^{23}\) Police reserve was a part time job. This was meant to reduce government expenditure on the Police. The reservists were engaged to assist Northern Rhodesia regular police in the maintenance of law and order, and in apprehending offenders. They could be called out during emergencies and would remain on duty until released by the Commissioner of Police.\(^{24}\)

Entry into the police reserve was open to both Europeans and Africans. Prospective candidates had to be resident in Northern Rhodesia, eighteen years old and in employment.\(^{25}\) Candidates were engaged with the knowledge of their respective heads of departments. During the early years of police reserve, Lusaka registered low recruitment due to poor publicity.\(^{26}\) Low recruitment was a result of reluctance on the part of some government departments to allow their employees to join. In 1951, the head of Transport, Trade and Industry put his reluctance on record when he wrote:

This department is clearly concerned with maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community. It is inevitable that its officers will be more than usually occupied
in the event of a disturbance necessitating calling out police reserve. It follows, therefore, that this department can not spare the services of its officers.\textsuperscript{27}

Other government departments expressed similar sentiments.\textsuperscript{28} It would appear that recruitment of police reserve was confined to the civil service.

Although some departments were reluctant to release their employees to join the reserve, others were cooperative. For example, the Public Works Department earmarked 26 of its employees to join the police reserve in the capital in 1951.\textsuperscript{29} By 1954, the staffing situation had improved. In that year, Lusaka had 248 police reservists.

The police reserve assisted regular police in curbing property crime in the capital by participating in beat patrols and carrying out daily duties in police stations such as opening dockets for suspects handed to the police stations. Furthermore, they assisted the regular police in the detection and investigation of property crime in the capital. Detection and investigation of crime entailed identifying offenders through interrogating the victims of crime, the suspects and witnesses; through photographs, fingerprint analysis in the laboratory or examination of evidence found at the scene of crime. The contribution of police reserves in investigations, particularly acquiring information about crime from the public was valuable. Police reserves were better placed to acquire information about property crime than the regular police because they lived among members of the public.

The valuable assistance police reserves accorded to the regular police is one of the factors that led to an increase in their number in the capital in the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{30} The increase can further be explained by temporary suspension of police recruitment during the first half 1961. This was part of a general economy campaign by the colonial government in that year.\textsuperscript{31} Although the ban was lifted in August that year police force establishment remained affected because South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth in the same year. South Africa had been a source of European police officers to Northern Rhodesia
since the inception of the police force. Police recruitment there ceased following her withdrawal from the Commonwealth.32

The increase in the reservists in the capital was also influenced by the prevalence of political strife in the country. In 1960 alone, 122 cases of political violence were reported throughout the country. Nineteen of these took place in Lusaka.33 One of the major incidents happened in March 1960 when the Secretary of State for the colonies visited Northern Rhodesia. Seventeen cars were stoned between the airport and Government House.34 In addition, trains were being stoned in various parts of Lusaka. It can, therefore, be argued that the temporary suspension of police recruitment and the end of police recruitment from South Africa in 1961 inevitably reduced police strength at a time when there was civil strife in the country. This warranted an increase in the number of police reservists.

Although the police reserve assisted the regular police in various duties, they at times displayed poor performance due to inadequate training. The four hours training every month in law, police procedure, riot drill and musketry, police communication and first aid was rudimentary. The poor performance arising out of inadequate training was asserted by a member of Northern Rhodesia African Representative Council when he said:

It has been realised during recent years when the reserve had been doing police work that in many instances, these people display what I may call ignorance in police duties ... many are just picked, coming along and doing police work ... they do not have got that training a policeman is supposed to have (sic).35

Police reserve training was done at various police stations in Lusaka and elsewhere in the country. It was administered by the regular police. Inadequate training of the reservists emanated from the poor training of the regular police under whom they served. This issue is addressed later in the chapter.
Conditions of Service and Police Training

This section sets out to examine the difficulties encountered by Lusaka police in their operations. In our discussion of the beat system, we have argued that one of the problems that affected Lusaka Police was shortage of manpower. This was a long standing problem and it affected the police force as a whole. It prevailed both among European and African policemen. 36

One of the factors which led to the shortage of manpower was labour turnover arising from poor pay among both European and African policemen. The 1937 Police Commission of Inquiry noted that salaries of African policemen was inadequate. 37 This observation was made by another Police Commission of Inquiry ten years later, in 1947. The 1947 Commission indicated that revision of African police salaries was long overdue. 38 In view of low pay in the government, many African policemen left the force to join mine police on the Copperbelt. On the mines, the starting salary of a constable in the 1950s was 295 Shillings per month, including cost of living allowance and cash bonus while the starting salary of a constable in the government was 141 Shillings and 6 pence. 39 The Commissioner of Police confirmed that poor pay was a factor in labour turnover among African police when he said 'I have no hesitation in saying that the main factor leading to the resignation of Africans from the force is dissatisfaction with the scale of pay.' 40

Pay was also poor for European police, especially inspectors. This, among things, led to discontent among European inspectors in 1946 41 and culminated into the appointment of the 1947 Police Commission of Inquiry. During the hearings of the Commission, inspectors indicated that they were inadequately paid and that this led to frustration. 42 Between 1954 and August 1957, 88 European inspectors resigned from the police force and 57 of these resigned due to poor pay. 43

The shortage of manpower in Lusaka Police Stations was also caused by shortage of accommodation in police camps.
In 1948, Lusaka Police made requests for houses to Lusaka Housing Committee. The request was not considered because of shortage of accommodation in the capital. The shortage of accommodation led to sharing of houses among unmarried European and African constables. This problem prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s too. The 1952, 1953 and 1956 Police Annual Reports even stated that lack of accommodation in the police force was one of the major causes of the shortage of manpower in police stations.

Inadequate accommodation at Lilayi Police Training School had a bearing on shortage of manpower too. In February 1956, the Commissioner of Police indicated that it was difficult to increase recruitment of both European and African trainees because the School had a serious shortage of accommodation. Among African recruits, this problem was aggravated by the lack of a thoroughly worked out recruitment procedure. Recruits were enrolled erratically. There were three main sources of African police recruits: mission and government schools, through district commissioners and unemployed Africans who failed to obtain employment elsewhere and therefore joined the police force. However, it often took between one and one and a half months before a required number of trainees was reached and training commenced. Inevitably, this delayed the passing out of recruits from the Training School, thereby reinforcing shortage of manpower.

In the section above, we have also argued that another problem in the police force concerned training. Inadequate training of the police reserve emanated from poor training of the regular police under whom they served. Since the Police was separated from the military in 1932, little effort was made to initiate a fully fledged training scheme for the civil police. A large part of police training was dominated by military oriented forms of instructions such as musketry. Only a few European and African detectives 'received some kind of professional training in civil police' at Livingstone depot.

In 1940 police training syllabus was revised. However, there was still emphasis on drill and musketry
which had very little to do with civil police duties. Post basic training which was supposed to supplement initial training was described by the 1947 Police Commission of Inquiry as ineffective because some of the European instructors were untrained. After the Second World War, Europeans were recruited from England and enrolled in the Northern Rhodesia Police without training. They were expected to learn on the job. Although some of them had the opportunity to undergo six months training in Britain later, and their knowledge should have benefited both the regular police and recruits they taught at their stations, this form of training had flaws. The arrangement was such that officers could only attend these courses when they coincided with their vacation leave. Vacation leave was granted so that officers could attend to family problems. Inevitably, these problems interfered with the courses.

In addition to lack of fully fledged training policy in the civil police, little attempt was made to orient police training in such a way as to enable policemen acquire necessary skills in crime control. In this regard, the 1947 Police Commission of Inquiry advised the inclusion in the police syllabus of detailed instructions on crime investigation. The criminal investigation department did not have specialist graduates from the Police Training School earmarked for them.

The departments obtained their personnel from the rank and file of the regular police on secondment. The seconded personnel were taken on as ‘aids’ to the criminal investigation officers for a probationary period of one year, after which they were either confirmed or redirected. This arrangement remained in force throughout the colonial period. Therefore, there was no follow up made to the recommendation of the 1947 Commission of Inquiry.

Ten years later, in 1957, another Police Commission of Inquiry made its own recommendations on police training. The Commission recommended increasing time for three forms of instructions in the syllabus for Europeans, viz law, police practice and procedure; force standing orders,
anthropology, local languages and principles of native administration. Regarding African recruits, the Commission recommended a more advanced administrative training particularly in office work. As for post basic training for African police, there was more emphasis on promotion courses particularly after 1960. In 1961, there were eight; in 1962 four; and in 1963 five post basic promotion courses organised at Lilayi Police Training School. In each of these years, promotion courses outnumbered other types of courses. For example in 1961, there was only one criminal investigation course, one bugler’s course, three drivers’ course and one equitation course.

In view of what has been discussed above, it can be safely deduced that there was no clearly defined training policy for the civil police. At worst, police training did not seem to be influenced by trends of property crime discussed in chapter one. It can be argued that the lack of clearly spelt out training policy for regular police made it difficult for them to orient police reserves in the mainstream of police duties, and hence reservists’ inefficiency in their work.

This argument is reinforced by the findings of the 1957 Commission of Inquiry. During the hearings of the Commission, complaints were raised among reservists that they were instructed to do too many drill and parades and very little practical police work. Furthermore, reserve training lacked clearly defined objectives. This was manifested in vacillation in emphasis during training. The emphasis changed ‘from practical police work to weapon training to lectures to drill for no apparent reason.’

The poor performance among police reserves was also a result of lack of careful selection of candidates at the time of recruitment. There were candidates who joined police reserve because of the social position it accorded them or the monetary gain they acquired from it. It was out of this realisation that the 1957 Police Commission of Inquiry recommended that the selection process for police reserve required careful examination.
The Beat System

In this section, the study examined the strategies Lusaka Police used to control property crime between 1964 and 1990. After independence, the beat system and patrol dogs were maintained as police measures to control property crime in Lusaka. In 1964, Lusaka had eight patrol dogs. This was the largest number when compared with other towns. Kitwe had 3, Ndola 3, Chingola 3 and Livingstone 3. In 1968, the Dog Section began experiencing scarcity of dogs. This was because the Zambia Army and the Mining Companies began using patrol dogs and they paid members of the public for the dogs unlike the police who acquired them free.

Faced with this competition, the Police began buying dogs too. They purchased the first set of dogs in 1970. In that year, the number of patrol dogs in Lusaka had risen to 14. The use of patrol dogs in crime control in the capital ceased after the decline of the beat system in the mid 1970s, and it would appear that shortly after, the Dog Section in Zambia Police was abolished. The Police Annual Reports published after 1980 are silent on the establishment of patrol dogs, their training and distribution in major towns.

Constables on beats after independence were reinforced by patrol cars as in the colonial period. Occasionally, they were supplemented by plain clothes policemen. For example, in 1968, they were supplemented by what the Minister of Home Affairs, S.C. Mbilishi, termed an observation team. This team was deployed to keep watch on motor vehicle thieves in the capital. The team was effective and made an average of twelve arrests per month. A year later, another team of special plain clothes and uniformed police was deployed in Lusaka to detect armed bandits who had become a source of concern to Lusaka residents. This team scored some successes too. Between January and June 1969, it arrested 16 armed bandits in the capital. Simultaneously, the team undertook vigorous investigations in order to obtain information on the
composition of the armed gangs and their modes of operation.

The beat system was short lived after independence. It was abolished in the mid 1970s owing to rapid population growth of the city, shortage of manpower in the Police and increased responsibilities for the Police. The rapid population growth in the city referred to in the introduction led to extension of residential and commercial areas of Lusaka. Both old and new areas required adequate policing, but there was no corresponding increase in the number of policemen. The following figures in brackets represent the number of constables assigned to beats in Lusaka police stations in 1963 with those outside indicating constables on beats in 1974. Lusaka Central (118) 48; Kabwata (46) 27; Woodlands (36) 28; Emmasdale (36) 20; and Matero (68) 25. The figures indicate that there were fewer police officers deployed on beats in 1974 than in 1963. This was due to shortage of manpower in the force. In August 1970 the Minister of Home Affairs stated that the police force was understaffed, and he recommended the creation of 600 posts in the force. The manpower constraints in Lusaka Police Stations continued even after the decline of the beat system. In 1985, the cabinet, acting on recommendations from the Zambia Police Force endorsed the creation of an additional 1,000 posts in order to improve the staffing situation. This and the 1970 recommendation were not effected due to lack of funds.

The shortage of manpower in Lusaka Police Stations was caused by a number of factors. At independence, many European police officers retired to take advantage of compensation scheme for European expatriates while some had no desire to serve under an African government. The desire by European officers to retire was further precipitated by pre-independence political turmoil which we address in chapter three. The police were used to suppress the African struggle for independence. This put them in an awkward position at independence. At independence, more than 400 European police officers retired while 237 left the force in 1965. This created a difficult task of
recruiting and training men to bring the establishment to strength. The struggle to improve staffing in the force was not only frustrated by lack of funds, but it was further made difficult by shortage of accommodation in police camps. This issue is tackled later in the chapter when we discuss conditions of service in the force.

Apart from shortage of manpower, the beat system also declined owing to mounting responsibilities of the police force after independence which included protection of Tanzam oil pipeline and guarding banks. Lusaka Police had an additional duty of guarding residences of government officials, heads of state and other important persons who visited the capital. The latter responsibility was clearly manifested during the Non-Aligned Summit Conference Zambia hosted in Lusaka in 1970. Assigned with the task of providing security to 42 heads of State in attendance, Lusaka police were overstretched. Police officers from outside Lusaka were brought in. This conference was the first of many gatherings which were attended by foreign dignitaries who required police protection.

In spite of the decline of the beat system in the mid 1970s, constables continued with sporadic foot patrols in the capital even up to 1990. These patrols were different from the beat system. The police patrol of post mid 1970s were mainly confined to Lusaka’s central business area. Even in Lusaka city proper, constables were not allocated beats. Instead they were assigned particular points such as banks, state shops and the town centre. Since constables were not assigned beats per se, they were not answerable for crime committed in the city. Unlike beat patrols, police foot patrols after mid 1970s were not undertaken at night. Night patrols became a preserve of motorised teams.

Motorised patrols had an advantage over foot patrols. The police covered the city in relatively shorter time and were able to reach scenes of crime faster than constables on foot. However, the system had bottlenecks. Motor vehicles were not always readily available. Each police station in Lusaka had a recommended establishment of six
vehicles. This establishment was only met for a few years after independence.\textsuperscript{71} The 1975 and 1976 Police Annual Reports stated that the police had shortage of transport.\textsuperscript{72} The shortage of transport was compounded by the fact that vehicles taken to police workshops for repairs took too long to be repaired due to lack of spare parts.

The money allocated to buy motor vehicle spares was inadequate.\textsuperscript{73} In 1976, K340,000 was allocated to purchase motor vehicle spares. In 1977, the allocation was reduced to K200,000.\textsuperscript{74} In the period 1980-1982, the funds allocated for the same was not changed in spite of the increase in the price of motor vehicle spares. In that period the amount remained at K500,000.\textsuperscript{75} Under funding was further complicated by the fact that the police force had assorted makes of vehicles and ‘this made it practically impossible to provide adequate spare parts’ for all broken-down vehicles.\textsuperscript{76} In 1969, the police force had thirteen different makes of vehicles. These problems reduced the number of vehicles in use.

A further difficulty of motorised teams was inadequate fuel and lubricant allocation to police stations, which was also a result of under funding. In 1978 and 1979 petrol and oil allocation to the Police stood at a static figure of K2,500,000.\textsuperscript{77} This was in spite of the fact that the price of petroleum products was reviewed during the same period.\textsuperscript{78} In 1982, the Lusaka Division was allocated K322,400 for fuel and lubricants and this figure was not changed in 1983. In 1990, the Minister of Home Affairs, General Kingsley Chinkuli acknowledged that fuel and lubricants allocations to police stations were inadequate.\textsuperscript{79} The shortage of fuel and lubricants undermined motorised teams’ coverage of their police districts.

The motorised teams had another problem. They could not penetrate some residential areas during their patrols particularly Lusaka’s shanty compounds, some of which had no central roads.
The police reserve was maintained after independence, serving similar functions as in the colonial period. However, there were some changes in regard to recruitment. During the colonial period there were no restrictions based on educational qualifications. After independence, prospective candidates had to have at least Grade Seven level of education. This was initiated in order to have literate personnel who could record statements of crime or accidents. Furthermore, reserve police recruitment was no longer confined to the civil service. Workers from outside the civil service could join.

After independence, there was a general decline in reservists in police stations. In 1974 Woodlands Police Station had an establishment of 15 reservists, but it only had 10 in post. Similarly, Emnassdale should have had 23 police reserves in 1989, but had only 12. The decline in public interest to join police reserve was due to the fact that allowances were not paid in time.

The delays in payment of allowances was caused by inconsistencies in the funding of the police reserve. In 1971, allocation to reserve allowances was K180,000. In the following year it was reduced to K70,000. Funding of the police reserve remained inconsistent in subsequent years. In 1979, government allocation to reserve allowances was K167,860. In 1980, the figure dropped to K160,000 and it remained at this level until 1983 when it was further reduced to K144,000.

Although the police reserve continued assisting the police in property crime control, some of the officers were dishonest. They overlooked crime committed in their neighbourhood. In 1979, many incidence of property crime occurred in Lusaka with full knowledge of reservists, but they did not report to the relevant authorities, neither did they arrest the criminals. Inefficiency of this nature led to some reservists being relieved of their duties. In December 1979 alone, ten reservists at Chilenje Police Station were dismissed over various cases of
inefficiency, including failing to arrest suspects.\textsuperscript{43} In spite of this, police reserves remained a supplementary for the regular police up to 1990 and there after.

**Special Constabulary**

The Special Constabulary was formed in 1972. However, a legal provision for its formation existed as far back as 1933.\textsuperscript{44} In 1947, a private individual proposed the ‘formation of a section of special constables for occasional performance of normal police work’\textsuperscript{45} during the hearing of the Police Commission of Inquiry in the same year. It is not clear why the idea was not effected in the colonial period and part of the post colonial period. It may be argued that the intention was to minimise expenditure on the force.

Nonetheless, the Special Constabulary was established to reinforce the regular police. Each Police Station in Lusaka recruited its own Special Constables. The responsibility for recruiting was a preserve of the officer-in-charge after obtaining permission from Lusaka Divisional Commander.\textsuperscript{46} Special Constables were recruited during emergencies and their appointment ceased after the emergency.

The functions of the Special Constables were similar to those of the regular police. They were assigned the responsibility of preserving peace, prevention and detection of crime, and apprehension of offenders.\textsuperscript{47} Special Constables were an important source of information regarding crime for the police because they lived among members of the public in Lusaka’s residential areas. This and the fact that they were not uniformed made it easier for them to acquire information about crime.

The Special Constables were provided with batons, whistles, handcuffs and other equipment necessary to perform police duties. Special Constables had an advantage over the uniformed police in regard to arresting suspects. The former could not easily be identified by suspects since they were not uniformed. In 1980, one arrested criminal
admitted in Lusaka Magistrate Court that he did not realise that there was an agent of law enforcement at the time of committing the offence because the Special Constable was in plain clothes. 88

Special Constables also undertook investigation of crime as was directed by the regular police. One of the outstanding criminal cases in which a Special Constable participated in investigation took place in 1985. 89 In this case, a Special Constable was instructed to investigate a suspect who had fled to Chipata after committing aggravated robbery in Lusaka. His successful investigation resulted in the arrest of the suspect in February 1986 at Nyimba, Eastern Province.

The success of Special Constables was also registered by a Lusaka resident when he asserted that:

Special Constables and Lusaka Police deserve congratulations for their untiring efforts in stamping out unwanted elements working to damage the well being of our society. A few weeks ago, I had an opportunity to witness an arrest of a pick pocket by one of the constables. The incident took place at the city's main bus terminal. The pick pocket pushed his hand in an old man's pocket ... he was spotted and arrested by the constable. 90

Special Constables were paid an allowance for the information given or a task undertaken.

Although Special Constables participated in controlling property crime in the capital, sometimes they had misunderstandings with the Police. There were instances when suspects taken to the Police were released without being charged. This dampened the morale of Special Constables. The Police released suspects because special constables at times handed over suspects without witnesses or exhibits to support their cases. 91 Indiscriminate arresting of suspects was a result of the inadequate training Special Constable were exposed to. The poor training of Special Constables was acknowledged by the Minister of Home Affairs, Wilted Phiri in 1980. 92

The training of Special Constables took place at their respective stations under the supervision of the regular police. The syllabus of the regular police, their
superiors, did not undergo any serious transformation in regard to crime control techniques after independence. This argument is addressed later in the chapter. Nonetheless, there were no police officers trained to supervise Special Constables. Throughout the thirteen years existence of the constabulary, only one three-weeks Special Constables' instructors course was organised in 1980. Ten police officers attended, and none of them was from Lusaka urban police stations. Therefore, it can be argued that instructors of Special Constables in Lusaka stations had no formal training.

The Special Constabulary had shortcomings which eventually led to its abolition. Three factors can be identified in this regard. Firstly, there were instances when allowances paid to constables were delayed due to lack of funds. Therefore, some constables became reluctant to render their services. Secondly, it was difficult to recruit and administer them by virtue of the fact that they were scattered in Lusaka’s residential areas. Not the same people were recruited every time there were emergencies. Replacement was required for constables who had left the city. Thirdly, some constables connived with criminals while others alerted criminals over impending Police operations. In 1981, two constables in Lusaka were convicted of burglary. The shortcomings enumerated above led to abolition of the Special Constabulary in 1985. It was replaced by the Vigilante schemes—one of the themes of chapter three.

Party Militants

Before the Special Constabulary was abolished in 1985, it co-existed with party militants. As indicated in the introduction, UNIP expressed concern over the wave of property crime in the country in 1974. The party declared what it called a militant action against crime. It extended the responsibility of crime control to its sections, branches and wards. A section was the smallest organ of the ruling party. It was made up of 25 houses.
Ten sections made up a branch and ten branches formed a ward.

The section committee which was the smallest and lowest party organisation was charged with the responsibility of curbing crime within its area. It was further assigned the responsibility of maintaining law and order. These responsibilities were extended to branches and wards. At all level, these responsibilities were undertaken by UNIP militants.

The appointment of party militants was done by UNIP officials at grass roots level. The most important consideration during recruitment was party membership. The party militants could apprehend criminals who committed crime in their areas. Lusaka residents had confidence in the militants especially during the early years of the scheme. The people reported cases of crime or suspicious persons in their neighbourhood, and militants made a follow up.97 Minor criminal cases were handled by a disciplinary committee at each level. The committees decided whether to dismiss a case, settle it locally or hand it to the Police.98 Serious criminal cases such as aggravated robbery were reported to the Police in their areas.

The party militants also participated in Operation Clean Up, together with Lusaka Police. The first major Operation Clean Up in Lusaka in which party militants participated occurred between 10 and 12 August 1978. It was launched in alliance with immigration officials, Zambia Police, Zambia Army and party militants. The Operation was meant to achieve two objectives.99 Firstly, it was meant to get rid of illegal immigrants in the country. Secondly, it was instituted ‘because of public outcry for protection against criminals.’100 It covered unauthorised compounds in Lusaka namely Chaisa, Marrapodi, Mandevu, Chipata, Garden, Kanyama, Antonio and Mutengo.

The operation was successful. On the first day several stolen goods were recovered. These included engine blocks, two television sets, a windscreen, 3 tins of paint, fencing wire, 32 tool boxes, fridges, toilet units, drill machines and several car seats. On 12 August 1978, more
stolen goods were recovered in Kanyama compound. These included car engines, gear boxes, ammunition and a vehicle full of stationary.

The party militants contributed to the success of the operation. They were instrumental in identifying houses of potential criminals in the compounds. In November 1986, party militants again participated in rounding up 90 aliens in Lusaka’s Mandevu compound, thirty of whom were found with stolen property. The property found on them included television sets, videos, fridges, tyres of motor vehicles and a sewing machine.

In spite of their activities in curbing crime, UNIP officials at section, branch and ward levels in Lusaka’s residential areas complained that sometimes criminals handed to the Police were released without Police giving an explanation. In other instances, Police ignored reports presented to them. The lack of cooperation from the Police was reiterated by Lusaka Urban District Political Youth Chairman in 1983. He indicated that party leaders at section, branch and ward levels and their party militants who reported criminals to the police had their names revealed to the suspects. Some of them were subjected to long hours of questioning by the Police. He argued that this Police attitude thwarted the militants’ efforts in property crime control in the city.

The party militants had a further problem of winning the support of the residents in some areas. This was particularly true of party militants in Lusaka’s Mtendere township in the late 1970s. Members of the Watch Tower Sect in Mtendere were not willing to cooperate with party militants in curbing crime and in general maintenance of law and order. Members of the Sect were not willing to offer their services because, according to their belief, compliance would have meant paying respect to an earthly government. This led to conflicts between party militants and members of the Sect. Subsequently, the sect was banned in Mtendere. It shifted to the adjacent squatter compound, Kalingalinga.
Party militants had their own weaknesses. They were not trained in police duties and, therefore, some of them harassed members of the public. Unlike police reserve and Special Constables who received at least some rudimentary instructions in police duties, party militants did not receive any form of instructions from the police, let alone guidelines from UNIP officials at grass roots level, who themselves were ignorant of police duties. Another weakness of party militants was that some of them fed the police with wrong information while others leaked information passed on to them by the Police to suspects. This made it difficult for the Police to track down suspects, since they were alerted well in advance.

Flying and Anti-Robbery Squad

This squad was established in the 1960s and it was then known as the Anti-Robbery Squad. Its purpose was to deal with armed bandits in the capital. In the 1970s, the operations of the squad seem to have been at low ebb as very little is put on record about it.

In 1981, the squad assumed a new name. It became known as the Flying and Anti-Robbery Squad. Furthermore, it adopted advanced methods of operation. The team was armed with weapons like Ak 47 rifles owing to aggravated robbery and murder which had become rife in the capital. In that year, Chelstone, Woodlands and Lusaka Central Police Stations recorded the highest incidence of robbery since independence. Chelstone recorded 95, Woodlands 100 and Lusaka Central 129 cases.

The members of the Flying and Anti-Robbery squad were picked from the rank and file of the regular police. Those picked had clean disciplinary records and were thoroughly knowledgeable in handling firearms. They served on the squad for three or four years. Permanent membership was discouraged for fear that members who became known to criminals could be eliminated. It must be indicated that the Flying Squad only existed at Lusaka Central Police Station.
The duty of the squad was to curb crime in the city through motorised patrols. The squad was highly mobile and used radio communication for easy contact with other police stations in the capital. The squad used ordinary vehicles during patrols. Ordinary vehicles minimised chances of being spotted by criminals. When there was escalation of crime in the city, the squad was supplemented by an ad hoc squad drawn from the rank and file of the regular police.¹⁰

Besides motorised patrols, the Flying Squad in conjunction with regular police mounted roadblocks on main roads of the city from time to time. This strategy was instituted to track down stolen motor vehicles. In March 1983, more than ten stolen motor vehicles were impounded at such roadblocks. In April 1990, a more systematic police crackdown of a similar nature was launched in the city. Heavily armed regular police and Flying Squad sealed off most roads leading into Lusaka’s Cairo Road. Several stolen vehicles were recovered.¹¹ Roadblocks as a strategy of controlling theft of motor vehicles had flaws. There were instances when stolen vehicles passed through roadblocks. This was because police were corrupted by criminals.¹² This issue is addressed later in the chapter.

The Flying Squad had a number of successes in crime control in the city. In March 1986, it was instrumental in recovering a stolen motor vehicle from Lusaka’s Lilanda township.¹³ In November the same year, it gunned down two criminals who had stolen a motor vehicle at Lusaka’s Makeni Filling Station.¹⁴ One of the dead was a notorious criminal, who had been evading the police for one year. The squad had other successes in tracking down criminals.¹⁵

The Zebra Forces

This was the latest strategy Lusaka Police introduced to control property crime during our period of study. It was introduced in mid 1990 to supplement regular police
whose strength was quite weak. The Zebra Forces were introduced as a response to escalation of property crime in the city. The increase was reflected in criminal statistics. At Chelstone Police Station, incidence of robbery rose from 22 in 1989 to 64 in 1990. Emmasdale Police Station registered 489 incidence of burglary in 1989 and 747 in 1990. Other forms of property crime were on the increase too. By April 1990, at least one or two vehicles were stolen in Lusaka per day.

The Zebra Forces were made up of paramilitary officers. Each of Lusaka’s seven major police stations had members of this force attached to it. The teams were assigned the responsibility of carrying out motorised patrols mainly at night in residential and commercial areas of Lusaka. Unlike the Flying Squad, the Zebra Forces used white vehicles with blue lines. These vehicles had numbers from 700 to 706, and had telephone facilities through which the public got in touch with the patrol teams.

Once contacted, and given adequate details regarding the scene of the crime, the patrol team rushed to any part of the city. Alternatively, victims of crime telephoned any police station and reported an on-going criminal attack. The police station in question contacted the Zebra Forces teams. The patrols teams reduced crime, especially in violence prone townships like Lusaka’s Garden and Mandevu compounds.

In addition to motorised patrols, Zebra Forces had other responsibilities. During the day, some of the members of were deployed to guard banks and state shops. Others provided supplementary labour force to the regular police at their stations. They assisted in registering statements of crime from complainants and opening dockets.

The Zebra Forces had difficulties in their operations. They experienced shortage of transport and inadequate fuel allocations like the regular police. Furthermore, it was not uncommon to fail to reach the scene of crime after being contacted. This was a result of inadequate details given by the victims of crime such as the location of the house, the street name and number.
Police Training

We have argued above that one of the shortcomings of the Special Constabulary was that it was poorly trained. We asserted that this was inevitable because the regular police under whom they served were themselves inadequately trained. This section sets out to examine trends in police training after independence.

At independence, the entry qualification in the police force was Standard VI. In 1971 and 1972, it was changed to Form II and Form III respectively. The latter qualification was maintained even by 1980. Recruit training period remained at six months. The recruits underwent four stages of training. In the first stage they undertook general police duties. Among other things they were taught drill, dressing and polishing boots in police tradition. The second stage comprised learning the constitution of the country, the rights of the criminal and self defence. In the third stage recruits learned how to uphold law and order. In the last stage they were oriented in the technical side of their job such as court procedures.

In 1968, more courses of instruction were integrated into the police syllabus. These included English language, humanism and civics. These additions, as reflected from their composition had very little to do with crime control. This drawback was recognised by the Lindquist Report of 1969. The report described police training as obsolete in its relevance to the responsibilities of the police force. It noted that components like crime detection, investigation and interrogation, among other things were marginalised in police training. Consequently, the report recommended that police syllabus should address itself to practical police problems like those mentioned above.

After 1970, the Ministry of Home Affairs began making efforts to improve the educational standard of its instructors at the Lilayi Police Training School by having some trained at the University of Zambia.
were also made to train police officers in law and administration at the University. A further significant development in police training was an attempt to establish a police college in Northern Province in the early 1970s. The college would offer specialised training programmes to police officers in view of the increase in crime after independence.\textsuperscript{125} This project was abandoned half way due to lack of funds.

In spite of these efforts, police did not depart from the tradition of recruiting low calibre candidates for the training school. Although the minimum educational qualification for entry into the force was theoretically Form III after 1973, the force still recruited candidates with Grade Seven level of education. Continued recruitment of lowly qualified candidates can be attributed to the fact that better qualified candidates looked down upon the force owing to poor conditions of service as we shall argue later in the chapter.

In 1976, there was a public outcry that policemen were inadequately trained. As a result, the duration of police training was extended to one year.\textsuperscript{127} Nevertheless, the subject matter did not undergo any transformation. The only significant change was the integration of paramilitary training in the syllabus.

Police orientation in paramilitary training groomed the police in methods of handling modern firearms such as G 3 and AK 47 rifle.\textsuperscript{128} This was in response to widespread use of firearms by criminals. Paramilitary training was also aimed at equipping policemen with techniques of how to quell riots.

The above development seems to be the only effort undertaken to orient basic recruit training towards crime control in the country. There was no follow up made to the recommendation of the Lindquist Report. The tradition of seconding officers from general duties to criminal investigation department continued after independence. For example, Lusaka police stations had the following ‘aids’ to C.I.D. in 1980: Lusaka Central 15; Woodlands 4; Chilenje 4; Chelstone 3; Makeni 3 and Chawama 1.\textsuperscript{77} As in the
colonial period, it was after 'aids' were confirmed in C.I.D. that they were exposed to post basic training programmes in various fields of crime control. However, very few Lusaka police officers had the opportunity to undergo these programmes. Furthermore, the C.I.D. post basic training programme done at Force Headquarters faced problems of inadequate facilities such as equipment.

The limited opportunities for further training was a result of shortage of staff in Lusaka police stations. The officers in charge of police stations were reluctant to recommend their staff for training for fear of worsening the staffing situation at their stations. The opportunities for post basic training were not only narrow, but the programmes were dominated by administrative courses of instruction such as promotion courses. Between 1985 and 1990, 219 police officers from various police stations in Lusaka went for administrative courses, while only 44 were trained in other courses such as crime, traffic control, drivers' refresher courses and vehicle maintenance.

Conditions of Service in the Police Force

We have argued above that police at roadblocks were corrupted due to poor conditions of service in the force. In our discussion of police training, we also noted that the poor conditions of service led the force to recruit candidates whose educational qualifications were below the prescribed entry requirement. This section sets out to assess conditions of service in the force after independence.

In 1969, the Minister of Home Affairs, Grey Zulu indicated that conditions of service such as pay were poor in the police force. The salary of a police constable then was K456 per annum. This rate was just slightly above that of a junior clerk in the government, whose annual salary was K408. The Lindquist Report of 1969 also noted that salaries in the police force were too low to
attract highly qualified candidates and that they also reduced the morale of the policemen. 134

The pay was not redressed in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1981, the annual salary of a police constable was even lower than that of a typist in the force. The salary of the former was K1,536 while that of the latter was K2,676. 135 A member of the National Assembly commented over the salaries; ‘most of the police officers are underpaid ... the conditions of service in all spheres are shocking.’ 136 Another one reiterated that poor pay, among other things, tempted policemen to receive bribes. 137

Allowances in the police force were equally meagre. Between 1964 and 1980, detective allowance was static at K4.00 per month. 138 By 1990, it had been raised to K50.00. This amount was too little to cover the purpose for which it was established. Plain clothes allowance was inadequate too. This allowance was paid to detectives to offset the cost of being required to wear plain clothes instead of the free uniform issued to other ranks. In the 1970s it was K10.00. In 1980 it was raised to K25.00 and was never reviewed even after 1990. By the inflation of the 1980s, the amount was too little to buy clothes.

Perhaps the most frustrating of all the allowances in the police force was money to subsist on when police officers were out of their stations on investigations. Before 1980, this money was paid ready to officers detailed to go on investigations. The money was kept by officers in charge of Lusaka police stations. After 1980, the issuing of this money was centralised. It was issued by Lusaka Urban district investigations officer at Lusaka Division headquarters. The procedure through which money was obtained was bureaucratic, and therefore money was not released on time. The delay in releasing the money had a dual impact. Firstly, it delayed police beginning their investigation, and evidence was not acquired as quickly as possible after a crime was committed. Secondly, it sometimes led to police officers going out on crime investigation without subsistence allowances. It was not
uncommon for police officers to sleep in their vehicles while out of their stations on investigative duties.\textsuperscript{139}

When the police claimed the money, it sometimes took long to be paid. In the interim, the same police officers were detailed to pursue other criminal cases. This problem was not confined to Lusaka stations. In August 1980, police force headquarters owed police officers half a million Kwacha in form of allowances.\textsuperscript{140} This problem prevailed due to inadequate funds allocated to the police force.

The meagre salaries and allowances discouraged prospective candidates with high educational qualifications from joining the police force. Furthermore, they frustrated serving officers, some of whom succumbed to bribes.\textsuperscript{141} The poor conditions of service elsewhere in the police have led to corruption.\textsuperscript{142} Biemel argued that corruption in the police force was a serious problem in Singapore during the colonial period owing to low salaries.\textsuperscript{142} A similar problem prevailed in Nigeria after independence. Police roadblocks were ineffective because Police used them as avenues to collect money from motorists due to poor conditions of service in the force.\textsuperscript{143}

We have also argued above that shortage of manpower in Lusaka was a result of shortage of accommodation in police camps. For example, Woodlands Police Station has no police camp, although it was established in the 1950s. Its officers are scattered in Chilenje and Sikanze police camps. This state of affairs also applied to Chelstone Police Station until 1981 when its officers took occupation of the police camp which the government had begun building in the 1970s.

The shortage of accommodation led to accommodating some police officers in Lusaka in drill halls and garage shelters.\textsuperscript{144} As an attempt to address the problem of accommodation, the government allocated K7 million in 1974 to the police force to be used to build houses.\textsuperscript{145} Part of this money was used to build houses at Emmabdale, Chilenje and Matero police camps. The houses built were however, not enough to accommodate all the policemen.
In the 1980s, sharing of houses among constables was prevalent. It was not uncommon in Lusaka police stations for three constables to share a three roomed house; an unmarried female constable sharing a house with an unmarried male constable and a married male constable sharing a house with an unmarried woman constable. This type of housing arrangement bred frustration among police officers. This was recognised by the Minister of Home Affairs in 1980 when he asserted that ‘for the force to perform its duties effectively and efficiently ... it should be properly housed.’

SUMMARY

Lusaka police instituted various strategies in an attempt to cope with the challenges of the changing trends of property crime during the period of this study. Most of these strategies scored some successes and criminals were arrested although incidents of property crime kept increasing. The strategies were beset with constraints ranging from shortage of manpower, shortage of transport, inadequate fuel and lubricants allocations to occasional lack of cooperation between the police and other groups which were involved in curbing property crime.

Although attempts were made to keep police operations in line with changing trends of property crime, initial and post basic police training was not influenced by these changes in the colonial period. After independence, the only significant development in basic police training vis-a-vis crime control was the integration of paramilitary training in police syllabus in 1976. A reasonable range of crime control post basic training programmes were available after independence, but very few police officers were exposed to them.


6. See Northern Rhodesia Police Ordinance No. 44 of 1933, Section 4.

7. NAZ SEC 1/1632, Vol. 1. File No. 18, Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary, 12 September 1931.


9. NAZ MHA 1/3/13, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs to The Permanent Secretary, Luapula Province, 15 May 1969.


12. NAZ NR 11/16, File No. 168, Commissioner of Police to the Chief Secretary, 10 December 1956.


25. Ibid., 186.


27. NAZ NR 11/132, File No. 108, Director of Trade, Transport and Industry to the Attorney General, 27 April 1951.


29. NAZ NR 11/132, File No. 87, Director of Public Works to the Attorney General, 4 April 1951.

30. Interview, Mweemba.


32. Ibid..


34. Ibid., 6.


36. See Appendix F for an illustration of shortage of manpower among both European and African policemen.


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40. Ibid.


45. See Appendix G.


47. NAZ SEC 11/61, File No. 97, Commissioner of Police to the Chief Secretary, 22 February 1956.


49. Police Commission, 1937, 47.

50. Small, 'The Northern Rhodesia Police', 426.


56. See the Northern Rhodesia Police Orders for the cited years.


59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., 61.

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66. For an illustration of shortage of manpower in Lusaka Stations see Appendix H.


68. Small, *'Northern Rhodesia Police'*, 536.


70. For example in 1980, Zambia hosted another big conference at Lusaka's Mulungushi Hall at which Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was formed.

71. Interview, Chief Inspector W. Kabwila, Lubwata Police Station, 2 April 1992.


76. NAZ MHA 1/35/8, Police Commission of Inquiry, 59.


78. *Budget Address by the Minister of Finance Delivered to the National Assembly on 27 January 1979*, 2. The price of super grade petrol, regular and diesel were all increased by 2 Ngwee per litre in the same period.

80. Zambia Police Reserve Quarterly Orders, No. 8/19, 1 June to 31 August 1974, 9.


82. Proceedings of Police Reserve Training Programme: Lusaka Division from January to June, 1980, 3.


84. Northern Rhodesia Police Ordinance No. 44 of 1933, Section 56 (1).


86. Zambia Police Act Cap. 133, Section 48.

87. Zambia Police Act, Cap. 133, Section 57.


89. Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP 123/1986. For other cases in which Special constables participated in investigations see, Lusaka Magistrate Court Case 3P 462 of 1986 and Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/65/1980.


95. Interview, Chief Inspector Kigoli.


97. Interview, N. Sitali, UNIP Sakubita Branch Publicity Secretary, Lusaka, 12 April 1992.

98. Ibid.


100. Ibid.

80. Zambia Police Reserve Quarterly Orders, 7/19, 1 June to 31 August 1974, 9.


82. Proceedings of Police Reserve Training Programme: Lusaka Division from January to June, 1980, 3.


84. Northern Rhodesia Police Ordinance No. 44 of 1933, Section 56 (1).


86. Zambia Police Act Cap. 133, Section 48

87. Zambia Police Act, Cap. 133, Section 57

88. Lusaka Magistrate Court Case No. 2P 160 of 1980.

89. Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP 123/1986. For other cases in which special constables participated in investigations see, Lusaka Magistrate Court Case 3P 462 of 1986 and Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/65/1980.


95. Interview, Chief Inspector Kigoli.


97. Interview, N. Sitali, UNIP Sakubita Branch Publicity Secretary, Lusaka, 12 April 1992.

98. Ibid.


100. Ibid.


108. See Annual Crime Returns for the cited police stations.

109. Interview, Detective Constable Musonda.


111. Times of Zambia, 6 April 1990.

112. Interview, Inspector Chanda.

113. Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. 87/1987.


115. For other incidents when the squad tracked down criminals, see Times of Zambia, 16 January 1987; Times of Zambia, 11 April 1990; Times of Zambia, 1 November 1990; and Zambia Daily Mail, 16 April 1990.

116. See Appendix H.

117. Interview, Detective Inspector B. Mashabe, Matero Police Station, 7 April 1992; Inspector Chirwa.

118. Interview, Detective Constable C. Zimba, Chelstone Police Station, 3 April 1992; Inspector Chirwa.


120. Ibid..

121. Interview, Senior Superintendent D. Shukoko, Lusaka Central Police Station, 24 March 1992.

141. Ibid.


143. Ibid.


146. Several police respondents indicated that these forms of housing arrangements were common in Lusaka police camps.

CHAPTER THREE

POLICE PUBLIC RELATIONS AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN CRIME CONTROL

Before looking at community participation in crime control in Lusaka, it is imperative that a general survey of Police public relations be undertaken. This is important as community participation was initiated, among other things, out of the realisation that Police public relations required improving. Therefore, the first part of this chapter examines Police public relations in the colonial and post colonial periods. The second part addresses community efforts to control crime.

Police Public Relations, 1932-1964

At the beginning of chapter two, it is argued that the Police force was an agent of colonial government, established and maintained in order to suppress and prevent any possible outbreak of disorder in Northern Rhodesia. This responsibility was evident throughout the colonial period, and was carried over after independence as we shall argue later in the chapter. This Police responsibility had an impact on the relationship between the Police and the public.

The earliest recorded incident during our period of study when Police were used to suppress disorder was during the 1935 miners' strike on the Copperbelt. The Police shot at striking workers. Six miners were killed and twenty-two others were wounded. Rotberg asserted that in the course of suppressing the strike, policemen 'evidently took the law into their own hands and without provocation attacked African bystanders.' This made members of the public, particularly Africans, develop bitter feelings towards the Police and violence ensued as a result. Police vehicles were stoned and several policemen were wounded.

The Police were also used in the 1940 miners strike. This incident seems to have been worse than the 1935 strike. Seventeen miners were killed and sixty-nine were
wounded when the Police opened fire.\textsuperscript{3} Clashes took place between the Police and the miners. Police behaviour during the strikes had an impact on the relationship between the Police and the public in Northern Rhodesia. It reinforced people's perception of the Police as an instrument of the colonial government used to oppress them. Prior to 1932, the Police with other colonial officials were used to effect unpopular policies such as tax collection.

The poor Police public relations were revealed to the Northern Rhodesia Police Commission of Inquiry in 1947. In a submission to the Commission, an administrative officer noted that the relationship between the Police and the public in Northern Rhodesia was poor.\textsuperscript{4} Similar sentiments were expressed by a Lusaka location superintendent, who noted that Police public relations in the capital were poor. The Commission took these observations into account and recognised that the relationship between the Police and the public required improving. It recommended comprehensive instruction on public relations to be given to the recruits joining the force.\textsuperscript{5} In spite of the recommendation by the Commission of Inquiry, there was no comprehensive programme of instruction implemented immediately to orient Police in public relations neither were there indications that Police public relations improved.

From the 1950s African nationalism gained momentum. Nationalism manifested itself in many ways such as demonstrations and boycotts of European and Asian shops, and Police were used to uphold law and order during these occasions. Between January and March 1954 a campaign was undertaken by the African National Congress (ANC) to boycott butcheries and European shops in Lusaka and other towns. Pickets were arrested and prosecution for intimidation and other offenses were effected by the Police.\textsuperscript{6} Two years later in 1956, Police again arrested pickets in Lusaka during a boycott of European and Asian shops organised by ANC. Some of those arrested were charged with threatening violence.\textsuperscript{7}
In the early 1960s, inter-party clashes between ANC and the United National Independence Party (UNIP), a splinter from the ANC, became a common phenomenon. In 1961, there were several clashes between ANC and UNIP supporters in Lusaka. Between July and October 1961, UNIP organised the Cha Cha Cha campaign. This was a civil disobedience campaign against the colonial government. The Cha Cha Cha campaign in Lusaka was characterised by boycotts of beer halls and sporadic cases of arson. Two houses in Chilenje and part of the offices of the Department of Lands and Survey were set on fire. Furthermore, electricity supply cables to Lusaka's Matero Township were cut twice in August 1961. There were also scattered incidents in which petrol bombs were used in various parts of the city.

During both the inter-party clashes and the Cha Cha Cha campaign, the Police were used to restore order. In 1961, Police arrested 200 persons in Lusaka during the inter-party clashes, and some of them were convicted in the urban native court. During the Cha Cha Cha campaign about 300 UNIP supporters were dispersed by Police at a beer-hall in Matero, and several pickets were arrested. Elsewhere in the country, the Police made numerous arrests of UNIP members. In Northern Province, 2,500 people were arrested.

Small asserted that 'the action taken against UNIP supporters tarnished the reputation of the Police among a large section of the public.' This general suppression sometimes prompted public reaction against the Police. In 1960, a Lusaka Police reservist was petrol bombed, and his assailant was imprisoned for five years. In 1961 Police patrol cars were stoned in Lusaka's Mandevu compound. Relations with the public deteriorated to the level that 'on several occasions, rioting started after Police officers made or were attempting to make an arrest.' In 1963 a Commission of Inquiry rightly observed that the relationship between the Police and public was poor.

Elsewhere, the Police were used as agents of law and order by colonial governments, and on that basis became unpopular with the public. In India, one of the problems
the Police had during the colonial period was poor public image. This stemmed from the notion that the Police were agents of oppression.\textsuperscript{14} A similar situation obtained in Malawi. Before independence, one of the functions of Nyasaland Police was to suppress independent churches and keep close watch over African political activities.\textsuperscript{15}

The Police further distanced itself from the public by being brutal.\textsuperscript{16} In 1935, a Commission of Inquiry asserted that the force used by the Police during the suppression of the strike was ‘unnecessary and provocative’ and this resulted into clashes between the Police and the public on the Copperbelt.\textsuperscript{17} Consequently, the Commission advised that handling of situations like a strike required highly disciplined policemen.

Police brutality manifested itself in subsequent years. In 1958, an individual accused of murder was subjected to harassment and continuous Police questioning ‘until he broke down under this questioning and made a statement.’\textsuperscript{18} Later, a high court judge refused to admit evidence given during this type of interrogation because it was given under duress.\textsuperscript{19}

During the 1961 Cha Cha Cha campaign, UNIP stated that some of its male members arrested by the Police had stones tied to their private parts as punishment.\textsuperscript{20} These incidents of Police brutality contributed to poor Police public relations. In 1963, a Commission of Inquiry noted that ‘harshness and vindictiveness on the part of some Police officers’ contributed towards the deterioration of the relationship between the Police and the public.\textsuperscript{21}

The above factors were reinforced by the fact that policemen lived in police camps, isolated from the general public. This housing arrangement made the public perceive the Police as a distinct community, and this too had an impact on Police public relations. In this regard, the 1963 Commission of Inquiry recommended that Police be housed with the community.\textsuperscript{22} A study of Nigeria also revealed that housing the Police in camps had an influence on Police public relations because camps made Police a class apart.\textsuperscript{23}
Police administration had a role to play in poor Police public relations too. It pursued a policy of stationing African policemen away from their home area, and often in regions of traditional enemies. This arrangement was deliberately 'calculated to bring about alienation between African Police and the African public.' This policy served another purpose. It was meant to reduce temptation of leniency so that in an event of disorder, the Police were not used to suppress their own kith and kin.

The poor Police public relations made it difficult for the Police to undertake crime investigations. A sight of a police vehicle sometimes sent some people into hiding. A retired policeman indicated that 'it was difficult to carry out criminal investigations because we were feared even in villages where we were born.' Owing to this difficulty, the colonial government introduced a wing within the force known as Special Branch. In Lusaka, the Special Branch was only at Police Force Headquarters. Members of the Special Branch in alliance with criminal investigation officers made secret investigations of crime. The Special Branch was also assigned the responsibility of preventing and detecting activities which were subversive to the security of the country. The Special Branch remained a wing of the Police force until early 1970s when it was transferred to the Office of the President.

Long before the above effort, Police administration had educated its members on public relations. In Northern Rhodesia Standing Orders of 1950, members of the Police force were advised to treat the public with the utmost civility, forbearance and good temper. It further warned against unnecessary interference with the public. This advice was reinforced in Northern Rhodesia Police Handbook of 1959. The handbook called for harmony between the Police and the public. It cautioned that the Police could not succeed in detection of crime without assistance from the public.
Police Public Relations, 1964-1990

At independence, UNIP, which was a victim of Police suppression during the colonial period, formed the government. It was obliged to employ the same policemen it condemned during the colonial period. Furthermore, the African government used the Police to uphold law and order, and the public mistrust of the Police continued.\textsuperscript{31} In 1964, the Police and army were used to suppress Lumpa Church followers. The Police were further used to maintain law and order in subsequent years. In March 1980, Police tear-gassed and shot at striking workers at Nakambala Sugar Estate in Mazabuka. Four workers were wounded. The action by the Police received the blessing of the Minister of Home Affairs, Wilted Phiri. He asserted that 'the force used by the Police was minimal and the intentions were noble.'\textsuperscript{32}

In 1986 and 1990, the Police suppressed public riots against prices of mealie meal in Lusaka and the Copperbelt. In 1986, fifteen people were killed on the Copperbelt and several were arrested in Lusaka's Chelstone, Kaunda Square and Mtendere townships. During the 1990 riots, twenty-four people were killed, fourteen of them in Lusaka.\textsuperscript{33} The situation was 'tense in the capital as running battles between Police and looters raged on in most townships.'\textsuperscript{34}

Another source of conflict between the Police and the public emanated from Police using illegal or questionable law enforcement procedures including the use of excessive force to effect arrests. The Criminal Procedure Code empowers policemen to arrest with or without a warrant provided there is enough evidence to ascertain that a person has committed an offence.\textsuperscript{35} The Police can also arrest without a warrant if a suspect declines to give his/her address or if a Police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect or offender has given inaccurate personal details and, therefore, would not be answerable to justice.

These legal powers were sometimes abused by policemen. Members of the public were sometimes arrested on flimsy grounds. In June 1983, some residents of Matero were
arrested for loitering at as early as 19.30 hours. A similar incident happened to a Kabwata resident in February 1985. He too, was arrested for loitering at 19.00 hours. Members of the public subjected to such arbitrary arrests could at times be released if they bribed policemen with money. Therefore, it would appear that the motive of some Police officers when effecting such arrests was to raise money from their victims. Police involvement in corruption, and sometimes crime reduced public confidence in the Police force.

Police image was also tarnished before the public because some policemen used violence when effecting arrest. The Criminal Procedure Code empowers the Police to use force when necessary in order to make an arrest, to preserve peace or to maintain public order. Nonetheless, the law has no provision on what and how much force policemen can use. It merely states that in circumstances where a suspect resists arrest, a policeman "may use all means reasonably necessary to effect the arrest." This ambiguity led some policemen to abuse their powers. In 1977, two constables at Emmasdale Police Station beat up a suspect while trying to arrest him so severely that he became deaf while another accused, Raphael Kamanga was assaulted in similar circumstances by Woodlands Police in 1989. During the beating, Kamanga sustained what a medical report described as "multiple bruises all over the body."

The Police were sometimes violent to suspects already arrested. In December 1968, a Lusaka Hotel employee was ill-treated by Kabwata Police, even after admitting stealing from his employers. In his own words he complained to the magistrate that 'I was beaten by the Police at Kabwata. They beat me with a long baton even when I admitted stealing the chicken and the towel.'

Police violence obtained elsewhere in the country. In his study of Zambian prison systems, Likando found that offenders underwent various forms of ill treatment by Police at different stages of investigation. Seventy-five per cent of his prison respondents indicated that they were
either slapped, pushed, threatened or their bodies were injured during Police investigations.\textsuperscript{44}

Police brutality was acknowledged by the President in 1984. He expressed unhappiness and anger at what he termed disturbing reports of Police brutality and directed Police administration to study the reports thoroughly.\textsuperscript{45}

Police brutality was extended to members of the public through prolonged or false detention. The Criminal Procedure Code directs that persons arrested had to be handed to the magistrate or officer in charge of the Police station as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{46} In practice, however, this legal provision was not observed. In August 1968, a Lusaka magistrate criticised Lusaka Police for detaining a suspect for four days without taking him to court. Similar criticism was registered by a Lusaka Senior Resident Magistrate in July 1989 after Lusaka Central Police Station had subjected suspects to prolonged detention.\textsuperscript{47}

In addition to prolonged detention, some members of the public were subjected to false imprisonment. In a court case in 1979, the accused persons were detained in order to extract information from them concerning a criminal offence. The information was acquired from them under duress and they were released after providing the information.\textsuperscript{48} In another case in the same year, a plaintiff was arrested for disorderly behaviour at Kabwata Police Station and was detained for three days. She was later awarded damages for false imprisonment by the Lusaka High Court.\textsuperscript{49} In both cases cited above, the Police were warned by the judiciary against gross misuse of their powers by detaining persons on flimsy grounds. Delivering judgement in the second case cited above, a High Court judge advised that 'the detention of the plaintiff in remand prison without the plaintiff being taken to the officer in charge ... was unjustified and unlawful. The plaintiff's imprisonment ... was therefore false imprisonment.'\textsuperscript{50}

In the period 1979 to 1983 alone, the Attorney General was sued in 134 cases involving the Police and other security forces in their dealings with the public
throughout the country. Out of these cases, over 95 per cent concerned unlawful arrests, detention and assault by the Police. Police brutality of this nature discussed above inculcated the notion that Police are sadists. This contributed to the low esteem in which Police were held by the public.

Another factor which played a role in Police public relations was Police attitude towards victims of property crime. The Police were either slow to respond to complaints or they were indifferent. Lack of transport was one of the justifications used for failing to respond to calls for assistance from the Police. Shortage of transport was sometimes unrealistically given as an excuse for Police inability to curb crime. In July 1983, bandits stole a vehicle at Lusaka’s Northmead Shopping Centre, and a report by telephone was made immediately to Lusaka Police Station. Although Northmead Shopping Centre is within walking distance from Lusaka Central Police Station, no Police officer visited the scene of the crime, even by the end of the following day. Small asserted that ‘when policemen fail either to prevent crime or to convict criminals, they are bound to fall low in the public esteem.’

The Police indifference towards the victims of crime discussed above discouraged some people from reporting incidents of crime to the Police. In his property crime survey in Zambia’s urban areas (including Lusaka) in 1985, Kalombo Mwansa found that 58 per cent of his respondents did not report criminal cases to the Police. The majority of those who did not, registered their concern over the attitude of the Police towards victims of crime. They indicated that Police once contacted rarely visited the scenes of crime. One respondent remarked that:

When one reports to the Police about property crime, having been committed at one’s home, he or she is sometimes told to go and commit the same offence to compensate. Surely, this is a demoralising answer.
Poor Police public relations, whose history dates back to the colonial period, led to the formation of Police Public Relations Unit in 1973 as a means of trying to narrow the gulf between the Police and the public. The Unit began informally in 1972. In that year, the Chief Law Instructor at Lilayi Police Training School initiated an internal publication, the *Lawman* magazine. The magazine was an avenue through which the Police training school community aired their views on various issues.

With passage of time, the newsletter solicited views from serving policemen in stations on public relations. This was out of the realisation that public relations was an important aspect of Police training. The law section also embarked on television and radio programmes. These programmes served two purposes. Firstly, they were meant to solicit the cooperation of the public with the Police so that the latter could protect the former adequately. Secondly, the programmes were meant to orient recruits and serving policemen on the importance of public relations. It was from this initiative that the Police force headquarters established a Police Public Relations Unit in 1973, at Police headquarters in Lusaka.

The Unit had the following responsibilities: to inform and educate the public on the duties and responsibilities of the Police; to make follow ups to complaints received by the Police and try to provide solutions to them; to seek cooperation of the public who may have useful information or advice for the Police; to act as a go-between the press and the general public and to prepare press and radio reports affecting the Police.

In 1976, the Unit produced twenty-six pamphlets explaining the responsibilities of the Police. The pamphlets were also aimed at raising public awareness on crime prevention measures. The pamphlets covered various topics including robbery, crime prevention techniques, crime and development. In addition, thirty-six plays entitled 'Police and You' were screened on television,
twelve radio programmes were broadcast mainly in vernacular and eleven films were shown in Lusaka. The radio programmes continued in the 1980s. In 1985, the Unit assumed an added responsibility of advertising criminals who escaped from Police custody and were therefore wanted by the Police. It was also assigned the duty of assisting the public to locate their missing or dead relatives through mass media communication.57

Another medium through which the Unit communicated with the public on crime awareness and security in general were posters. Among other things, posters warned the public not to tamper with suspicious looking objects while some advised the public to report suspicious looking objects to the nearest Police station. Since the formation of the first neighbourhood watch scheme in Lusaka in 1988, posters were printed advising the public to establish the scheme in their areas.

In spite of the Unit’s efforts to harmonise the relationship between the Police and the public, there is evidence alluding to continued poor relations between the two parties. In February 1974, the Inspector General of Police and Minister of State for Home Affairs admitted in Parliament that the relationship between the Police and public was not good.58 Writing in the late 1970s, Simaluwani argued that in spite of the tremendous effort through its public relations campaign, the image of the Police before the public was still undesirable.59

The explanation for this state of affairs arose from the problem of policy implementation. Whereas posters, radio and television programmes urged members of the public to report acts of crime to the Police, the Police were sometimes insensitive to reports made to them as argued above. This created a contradiction between Police public relations campaign and actual Police behaviour.

The continued poor Police public relations necessitated Police reliance on paid informers for the necessary information to enable them investigate crime.60 Informers were members of the public who secretly provided information to criminal investigations officers over
committed crime or crime that was about to be committed. The responsibility of engaging an informer was largely left to individual criminal investigation officers. Informers were paid by the Police, normally in accordance with the importance of the information reported to the Police.

Public apathy towards the Police had an impact on property crime control in another way. Sometimes, criminals went about their activities knowing all too well that as long as policemen were not in the vicinity, they could not be apprehended. In July 1968, the Officer Commanding for Lusaka Division lashed out at the public for failing to assist victims of criminals in the city. His criticism came as a result of an incident in which a man was robbed by criminals in Lusaka while the public looked on. A similar incident happened in December 1990 when a white teenager was robbed of his money in full view of shoppers in the capital.

The public was sometimes reluctant to assist in property crime control or maintenance of law and order because an encounter with the Police could be inconveniencing and sometimes time consuming. A Police Inspector confirmed this view when he said that:

One reason the public disliked the Police was that the Police at times harassed members of the public who provided information to them or volunteered to be witnesses over cases of murder, theft or burglary.

Other Police officers expressed similar views.

Poor Police public relations also made it difficult for the Police to track down criminals because some of them were harboured by members of the public. In August 1974, the Minister of Home Affairs, Aaron Milner registered his concern over some members of the public giving refuge to criminals. This matter was echoed by Muna Ndulo when he asserted that 'one of the problems confronting the Police is lack of cooperation from the public. Some people ... accommodate criminals.' Some of our Police respondents cited incidence when they could not arrest criminals in various parts of the city because they were hidden by relatives and friends.

94
COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO CONTROL CRIME

It is generally held that community participation in crime control is a crucial element in crime prevention efforts. This section sets out to examine community based crime control strategies.

Community efforts to control crime can be divided into two categories namely offender oriented and opportunity oriented. The former is concerned with what are perceived as 'causes' of crime in the environment of high risk individuals or groups. This method constitutes provision of education, unemployment, family and psychological advice. The second method takes the form of pre-empting opportunities for the occurrence of crime. This system constitutes vigilante and neighbourhood watch schemes. These are the strategies this study will address beginning with the former.

The Vigilante Scheme

The term vigilante is derived from the word vigil, meaning staying awake to keep watch. The earliest vigilantes were established on the American frontier in Californian gold mines in 1849. Membership of vigilance committees as they were called was voluntary. The vigilance committees imposed severe sentences on offenders, including the death penalty.

The vigilante schemes in Lusaka were a successor to the Special Constabulary which was abolished in 1985. The schemes were established by Zambia Police Amendment Act No. 23 of 1985 which granted members of the schemes powers to arrest offenders. Like the earliest vigilance committees on the American frontier, membership of the vigilante schemes in Lusaka was voluntary.

The qualifications required of prospective members were residence in the section, branch and ward where the scheme existed; a minimum of eighteen years old; physical fitness; good character and no previous criminal record. The behaviour of the prospective members was difficult to
ascertain as candidates who were badly behaved were recruited into the schemes. Prospective members had to prove their membership of the ruling party, UNIP.72

The UNIP officials at section, branch and ward levels played an important role in screening prospective candidates at the lower stage of the selection process.73 From this stage, the applications were processed by the officer in charge of the Police Station under which the applicants resided. The final stage of selection was at Zambia Police force headquarters. The procedure of appointing vigilantes was highly bureaucratic. Sometimes it took four years before a candidate could be appointed.74 Owing to the long and cumbersome process, sometimes, it happened that by the time the application was considered, the candidate could have long changed residence thereby invalidating the appointment.

Although Mubanga asserted that the minimum number of vigilantes in each section was five, this study has found that there was no specific number of vigilantes recruited at section, branch and ward levels.75 As a result, there was no uniform number of vigilantes at these levels. It must be indicated that there was general apathy among members of the public to join the scheme because of several factors. Firstly, the law was silent on security in the schemes. In an event of injury while on duty, no compensation was guaranteed to the injured party. Secondly, at the time vigilante schemes were formed in 1985, UNIP had become unpopular among some citizens.76 Therefore, some Lusaka residents may have been reluctant to join the schemes, which in the eyes of many were perceived as a wing of UNIP.

Thirdly, it can be argued that some Lusaka residents did not find it worthwhile joining the schemes in which no renumeration was accorded to the job. Fourthly, the long and cumbersome recruitment procedures must have contributed to the low membership in the schemes.

The vigilante schemes were dominated by illiterates, semi-illiterates and other people from the low income brackets. The existence of the schemes clearly manifested
themselves in high density areas of Lusaka where the majority of the people in the categories enumerated above lived. The educated and privileged took a low profile in the scheme. This was because some members of the scheme displayed unpleasant behaviour (as we shall discuss later) which the educated did not want to be associated with.

Another possible explanation of the schemes confinement to high density areas was that the schemes were regarded as a wing of UNIP. Although UNIP had lost popularity, the high density areas of Lusaka comparatively speaking had stronger UNIP membership than low density areas. The low density areas of Lusaka were inhabited by people of various nationalities including members of the diplomatic corps accredited to Zambia, missionaries, volunteers and various categories of expatriate personnel, who by virtue of their nationalities could not commit themselves to party membership or organisation.

The vigilantes were assigned the responsibility of patrolling their areas of residence in order to curb crime. Vigilantes alternated in the execution of this duty. For each shift those on duty reported to the supervising Police station where there was a vigilante supervisor who oversaw the operations of the schemes.

Apart from undertaking patrols, vigilantes were informants to the Police. They reported information about crime in their areas to the Police. The vigilantes were given powers of arrest as indicated above. Sometimes they were instrumental in arresting dangerous criminals. In June 1987, vigilantes spearheaded the arrest of three South Africans and a Zambian who were involved in aggravated robbery in which an AK 47 rifle was used in Lusaka’s Kaunda Square Township.

The vigilantes were under instructions to hand over criminals to the Police station to which they were answerable, and here the details of the crime were registered. In practice, however, vigilantes could detain suspects. Giving a statement at Chelstone Police Station in 1987, a suspect said that ‘we were detained by vigilantes before we were brought here.’
The vigilante schemes acted as deterrents against crime in the capital. This was confirmed by the Lusaka Commanding officer. He pointed out that theft of motor vehicles in Lusaka reduced from an average of five thefts per day in 1985 to one in 1990. This reduction was because of the role the vigilante played in supplementing Police efforts in curbing crime.\textsuperscript{81}

The vigilantes also contributed to reduction of crime in crowded places like markets and bus stations. Before the deployment of vigilantes, areas like Lusaka’s Kamwala Inter-City Bus Terminus was infested with pick-pockets. The presence of vigilantes acted as a deterrent against this form of property crime. This was because vigilantes in Lusaka meted out severe punishment to criminals arrested. It was not uncommon for suspects and criminals to be beaten, sometimes severely, before they were handed to the Police. Those who were not beaten were subjected to ‘by air’ treatment.\textsuperscript{82} This method entailed roughly lifting a suspect high and dropping him down. This system was so common that the perpetrators were known as ‘by the air boys’.\textsuperscript{83}

The Relationship Between Police and Vigilantes

Vigilantes were a supplementary law enforcement agency to the Zambia Police. The Act which sanctioned their formation assigned them the responsibility of maintaining law and order, protecting persons and property as directed by the officer in charge of the Police Station under which a particular scheme operated. This meant that although vigilantes were UNIP stalwarts, they were answerable to the Police and not to the ruling party. In reality, however, vigilantes owed their allegiance to UNIP officials. As Mwansa rightly put it, ‘the vigilantes themselves claim that they are a direct creation of a powerful political party and are only answerable to it.’\textsuperscript{84}

The above mentioned tendency was consolidated by UNIP officials, whose pronouncements alluded to the notion that the party was supreme over other institutions and persons.
This made vigilantes believe that even matters which were purely for the Police could be addressed by UNIP officials. In 1988, vigilantes in Lusaka confiscated cooking oil from a trader who, they alleged, was hoarding the commodity with the view to selling it at a higher price. The trader was taken to UNIP Youth League Chairman to be charged instead of the Police. When the Police intervened, they were warned that they were not competent to deal with the matter. When they insisted on handling the case, the Lusaka Urban District Governor threatened to discipline the Police.\textsuperscript{85}

The allegiance the vigilante had to the ruling party even made it difficult for the Police to discipline them for fear that they would be reprimanded by senior UNIP official who had unquestioned authority over vigilantes. Commenting on this matter, a Chief Inspector pointed out that 'the vigilantes were puppets of the party. The word of the ward chairman was even stronger than that of the Police.'\textsuperscript{85} Vigilantes owed their allegiance to party officials because, in their view, it was UNIP officials who were instrumental in establishing vigilante schemes and recommending them into them. They considered it shortsightedness to overlook the recruiting authority.

Another area of difference between the Police and vigilantes was over suspects taken to the Police. It was not uncommon for the Police to release suspects handed to them by the vigilantes without charging them. Suspects were released on account of lack of evidence to warrant arrest. A detective constable made this point clear when he noted that 'If we could not establish an offence against a suspect brought to us by vigilantes, we used to set them free.'\textsuperscript{87}

A possible explanation for indiscriminate arresting of suspects is that the vigilantes received elementary training in Police duties. Theoretically, vigilantes were supposed to attend six weeks training at Lilayi Police Training School where they could be taught how to arrest, how to charge suspects and how to undertake patrols. The initial training should have been supplemented by monthly
seminars conducted at ward levels. In practice, however, neither happened because of lack of funds.88

Therefore, it would appear that there was no thorough training for the vigilantes apart from the rudimentary instructions given at Police stations by vigilante supervisors, who were themselves inadequately trained for the task. Between 1985 and 1990, there was only one brief vigilante supervisors' training programme (from 22 August to 6 September 1986) at Lilayi Police Training School.89 It was attended by twelve Police officers from the whole country. None of them were from Lusaka urban Police stations.90 Therefore, vigilante supervisors in Lusaka stations were assigned a responsibility for which they were not trained.

Besides misunderstandings with the Police, vigilantes had problems in carrying out their responsibilities. Upon recruitment, each vigilante should have been issued with a baton, a whistle, a torch and handcuffs.91 This equipment was not available for all of them. The few handcuffs available were given to vigilante leaders. The rank and file of the vigilantes had no equipment.

The problem of communication was another handicap in vigilante operations. The schemes had no transport nor was there radio or telephone network between their offices and the Police stations. As a result, there was no quick method of communicating with the Police. When there were suspects to hand over to the Police, vigilantes had to travel to the Police station to which they were answerable. Consequently, suspects were not taken to the Police as quickly as possible as the law directed.

**Weaknesses of the Vigilante Schemes**

Although the vigilante schemes played a role in crime control in Lusaka, they had shortcomings. Some members of the schemes displayed undesirable behaviour towards the public. Between 1985 and 1990, a Lusaka branch chairman was arrested by Police several times over misdemeanours (including harassing the public) of vigilantes over whom he
had authority. He recognised that on all occasions he was arrested, it was vigilantes who were at fault.\textsuperscript{92}

Harassment of the public took many forms. It was not uncommon to find some vigilantes sometimes molesting members of the travelling public at Lusaka bus stations under the pretext of maintaining law and order. In addition, there were also press reports of some vigilantes fixing prices of commodities at markets although they had no authority to do so. Sometimes they interfered with operations of institutions. In January 1990, a group of Lusaka vigilantes took to task the Assistant Registrar at the University of Zambia for allegedly denying a UNIP official and employee of the University permission to attend to party duties.\textsuperscript{93}

The undesirable behaviour of the vigilantes towards the public arose from the poor training in law and general Police duties which they received. It can further be argued that there was a long tradition of violence among some UNIP cadres, particularly against people who did not advocate the policies of the ruling party.\textsuperscript{94} Furthermore, the unruly behaviour also emanated from the misunderstanding of the purpose of the schemes among some vigilantes. They perceived it as an avenue to fully fledged employment. When this aspiration was not realised, they became frustrated and harassed the public.\textsuperscript{95}

Some vigilantes were also dishonest. They resorted to stealing property of the people whom they were engaged to protect or from the suspects they arrested.\textsuperscript{96} Furthermore, some of them did not report incidents of crime to the Police, especially in circumstances where the suspect was a relative, a friend or a UNIP official.\textsuperscript{97}

\textbf{Neighbourhood Watch Schemes}

A neighbourhood watch scheme is an arrangement among immediate neighbours to help protect themselves against criminals by looking after each other's homes.\textsuperscript{98} The idea of neighbourhood watch schemes in Zambia was copied from Britain. Research findings there in the early 1980s showed
that Police were incapable of reducing crime, but that a joint effort with the community could assist in reducing the crime rate.99

The first neighbourhood watch scheme in Lusaka was established in August 1988 in Roma Township.100 In 1989, two more were formed at Kabulonga and Avondale. Makeni, the Light Industrial Area and Northmead had theirs formed in 1990.

Throughout Zambia, neighbourhood watch schemes were confined to Lusaka and this continued to hold true at the time of writing this dissertation. The schemes were confined to Lusaka because it was one of the towns in the country which was critically hit by various forms of property crime. Secondly, the schemes were first set up in the capital on an experimental basis. The Police hoped that after they had proved successful, the schemes would then be implemented in other towns and cities in the country.

The neighbourhood watch schemes were formed by residents who were concerned with property crime control in their residential areas. The formation of schemes was done in consultation with the Police station under which the residential area fell. The officer in charge of the Police station advised prospective members of the requirements of the scheme.

Among other things, prospective members had to meet the following requirements. They had to ascertain that there were a minimum of ten members willing to join the scheme—the number necessary for registration as a society. In addition, the members had to draw a constitution stating the objectives of the scheme, and thereafter, seek the approval of the Registrar of Societies for their scheme to be registered. Membership of these schemes was voluntary.101

Neighbourhood watch schemes strove to ensure that law and order prevailed in their neighbourhood, to supplement Police efforts in curbing crime and to create awareness among residents on crime prevention measures. This was done through educational meetings with residents on how
best they could protect themselves from criminals. Some Police investigations had revealed that some criminal offenses could be avoided if the victims were more careful. Therefore, the schemes were launched to raise the consciousness of the residents and to win the understanding and cooperation of the public with the Police on crime control.

All the six neighbourhood watch schemes cited above were established in low density areas of Lusaka. The schemes first took root in these areas because residents of these townships were quicker to grasp the significance of the schemes than residents of high density areas. It can further be argued that residents in these areas had more valuable property to safeguard from criminals than their counterparts in high density areas.

Furthermore, the residents of low density areas had the financial capability to embark on the schemes right away. It must be emphasised that the schemes were self supporting. They were financed by members through membership fees and donations. Membership fees were determined by an executive committee elected at the inception of the scheme.

There were no fixed membership fees for the schemes. For example, Avondale Neighbourhood Watch Scheme membership fee was K50 and a monthly contribution of K20 at the time it was formed in September 1989 while Roma charged K100. Some of them received donations from companies in addition to the membership fees. For example, Kabulonga Neighbourhood Watch Scheme received donations from Barclay Earth Movers, Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Limited, Central Cigarette Manufacturers and Anglo-American Corporation between September 1989 and December 1990.

It was from such sources that the schemes were able to buy vehicles for patrol, fuel and finance general maintenance of the vehicles. Sometimes patrol vehicles were lent to the schemes by members. Lusaka Police only provided personnel to accompany watch scheme members on their patrols. It was mandatory that their patrols were undertaken in the company of a trained Police officer.
It was the responsibility of each scheme to provide transport to collect Police officers to work with watch schemes.

There was no specific number of Police officers who were assigned to neighbourhood watch schemes. The number was determined by the availability of manpower at the Police station under which the scheme operated. In Police stations where shortage of manpower was critical, the shortfall was overcome by getting Police officers from other Police stations. The Police officers who accompanied the watch scheme members were equipped with two way radio communication network. This provided a link between the patrol team and Lusaka Central Police Station.

The members of the schemes had a patrol roster to follow. Members unable to undertake their turns provided fuel or gave their personal vehicles for patrols. During patrols the schemes confined their operations to those areas which constituted their schemes. Members with licensed personal firearms used them during patrols. This was in addition to the firearms which the accompanying Police officers carried along. At some stations of the neighbourhood watch schemes such as Kabulonga and Roma, temporary Police camps were erected.

Neighbourhood watch schemes were effective in curbing property crime in their areas. The members who comprised the patrolling team knew their residential area and possible hide-outs for criminals. In 1989, a senior assistant commissioner of Police stated that Kabulonga Neighbourhood Watch Scheme was a useful instrument in assisting the Police in crime control. He reiterated that there was less property crime reported to the Police from Kabulonga than anywhere in the city. A Lusaka resident also wrote that ‘it is gratifying that ... residents of Lusaka have teamed up to form neighbourhood associations which are doing extremely well in checking the activities of criminals in residential areas.’ The significance of the schemes in supplementing Police efforts in curbing crime prompted the President in June 1990 to suggest that
there was need to spread the schemes widely in the nation.  

The effectiveness of the schemes is further confirmed by the rapid way in which the number of schemes increased. At the time of writing this dissertation, the number of neighbourhood watch schemes in Lusaka had reached twenty-five. By then, the idea had penetrated high density areas of the city.

**Difficulties Encountered By Neighbourhood Watch Schemes**

Although neighbourhood watch schemes assisted in curbing crime in their areas, some of them had difficulties in their operations. Membership fees were not sufficient to purchase vehicles for patrols and maintain them. The money raised from members was inadequate owing to low membership, which was yet another problem of the schemes. The population of areas covered by the schemes was far bigger than the number of people who were members of the schemes.

One consequence of low membership in the schemes was that it put a strain on the patrol roster because there were very few members alternating. This drawback led the chairman of Kabulonga scheme in 1989 to appeal earnestly to existing members to recruit more people in the scheme. The question of risks and compensation were two major issues which discouraged some Lusaka residents from joining the schemes. There was no provision for compensation if a member was injured or killed by criminals during operations.

There was also what one Police inspector called 'minor misunderstandings' between the Police and members of the schemes over the duties of Police officers assigned to the schemes. Some members of the schemes wanted to confine Police services to their areas. They wanted to restrict Police officers assigned to their schemes from addressing criminal cases in adjacent areas. This, the Police disapproved because, in their view, the services rendered by the force had to benefit all Lusaka residents.
SUMMARY

The Police had a difficult task of trying to win the faith and confidence of the public during the period of this study. Attempts to bridge the gulf between the Police and the public through education campaign in Police handbooks, standing orders and Police Public Relations Unit proved unsuccessful because the actual Police behaviour was at variance with what was propagated in the campaign.

Further attempts to improve public relations led to the formation of vigilante and neighbourhood watch schemes. The former achieved very little in this direction because of weaknesses displayed by its members while the latter provided warm working relationship between the Police and the public.

The vigilante and neighbourhood watch schemes were also launched out of the realisation that Lusaka Police alone could not contain property crime in the city. Available statistics show that the strength of Police manpower in most Lusaka Police stations was below the authorised establishments.
NOTES


3. Ibid., 175.


5. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


16. Police brutality covers a wide range of practices which include commands to move, threat to use force if their order is not followed and actual use of physical force. For detailed discussion on the subject see R.J. Lundman, Police Behaviour: A Sociological Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 278.


19. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


28. Ibid. The special branch was first mentioned in the Police Annual Report of 1950.


31. Small, 'Northern Rhodesia Police and Its Legacy', 535.


34. Ibid.

35. Criminal Procedure Code Cap. 160 Section 26 (d), see also Criminal Procedure Code Cap 160 section 29 (1).


38. For incidents when some police officers were involved in criminal activities see, *Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/65/1980; Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/72/1986; and Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/61/1988.*

40. Criminal Procedure Code, Cap. 160 Section 18 (2).


42. Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/5/1989. The details were given by a medical doctor at the University Teaching Hospital during the proceedings of the case.

43. Times of Zambia, 5 December 1968.


46. Criminal Procedure Code, Cap. 160 Section 33 (1).


50. Ibid.


60. Ibid.


67. Ibid.


70. Zambia Police (Amendment) Act No. 23 of 1985 Section 51 (1).

71. Zambia Police (Amendment) Act No. 23 of 1985 Section 49.

72. Interview, N. Sitali, UNIP Sakubita Branch Publicity Secretary, 12 April 1992.

73. Zambia Police (Amendment) Act No. 23 of 1985 Section 48 (2).

74. Interview, Sitali.

75. See Zambia Police (Amendment) Act No. 23 of 1985 Section 48 (1). The law directed that the number of vigilantes at these levels could 'be as necessary'.

Printer, 1972), 11. During the hearing of the Commission, the majority of the people who made submissions expressed dissatisfaction of one-party state.


78. Interview, W. Musulwe, UNIP Branch Chairman, Kapwepwe Branch, Lusaka, 6 April 1992.


80. Ibid. The statement was given by Michael Nduli, one of the accused at Chelstone Police Station, 7 June 1987.

81. Quoted from Mubanga, 'The Vigilante Schemes,' 41.


85. Mubanga, 'The Vigilante Scheme', 33.

86. Interview, Chief Inspector Kigoli.


88. Interview, Musulwe.


90. Ibid.

91. See Zambia Police (Amendment) Act No. 23 of 1985 Section 50.

92. Interview, Musulwe.

93. Times of Zambia, 10 January 1990.

94. In the 1980s, it was not uncommon for people without UNIP cards to be barred from markets in urban areas by UNIP stalwarts. For details of UNIP violence against its opponents see also Pettman 'Zambia's Second Republic', 235-239.

95. Interview, Sitali.

96. See for example, Lusaka High Court Criminal Trial No. HP/80/1986. In this case, a suspect arrested by the vigilantes in Lusaka had the money on him stolen by vigilantes. Interview, Detective Constable Mulenga. He
cited incidents when Kabwata police arrested vigilantes who stole from members of the public.

97. Interview, Detective Constable G. Mpundu, Emmasdale Police Station, 16 April 1992.


100. This came to light after consulting records for all neighbourhood watch schemes in Lusaka at the Offices of the Registrar of Societies.


102. ORS/102/35/511, Avondale Neighbourhood Watch Association, See the Constitution.

103. ORS/102/35/451, Roma Neighbourhood Watch Association, See the constitution.

104. ORS/102/35/49, Kabulonga Neighbourhood Watch Association.


108. See Appendix J.


112. ORS/102/35/496, Kabulonga Neighbourhood Watch Association.

113. Interview, Chief Inspector Kagoli.

CONCLUSION

Housebreaking and burglary were the most frequently committed crimes in Lusaka during the period of this study. In the colonial period, unemployment created by the 1929 depression and scarcity of goods caused by the Second World War were some of the major contributing factors to the escalation of the house breaking and burglary in Lusaka. However, there were also periods of reduction in these forms of property crime. For instance, incidents of housebreaking and burglary reduced when the effects of the depression began subsiding in the late 1930s. Similarly, there was also a reduction in these forms of crime after the war up to the early 1950s, especially during the 1950 - 53 Korean War which contributed to the growth of the Zambian economy due to high demand for Zambia's copper.

In the colonial period, the main strategies employed by Lusaka police to curb property crime were the police reservists, the beat system and patrol dogs. However, during this period, no significant step was taken to keep police training in line with changing trends of property crime. In 1940, the police training syllabus was reviewed. However, there was still emphasis on drill and musketry which had little relevance to civil police duties. The Criminal Investigation Departments which were the main organs dealing with crime control did not have officers specifically trained for them. They depended on the regular police seconded to the departments as 'aids'. The post basic training programmes were dominated by promotion courses.

After independence, there was a steady rise in incidents of housebreaking and burglary owing to unemployment which arose out of rural-urban migration and poor performance of the economy which began manifesting itself in the late 1970s. During this period, there was a shift in the type of goods stolen compared to the colonial period which was characterised by thefts involving small non durable household items such as blankets, bedsheets and clothes to durable items such as television sets, radios

113
and other electrical goods. The post independence period also experienced an increase in incidents of robbery and theft of motor vehicles. In addition, these forms of property crime progressively assumed a violent form. The major contributing factors were the availability of firearms from freedom fighters, the Zambian security forces and from housebreaking.

After independence, the Lusaka police continued using the beat system, patrol dogs and police reservists to curb property crime. The beat system and patrol dogs were only abolished in the early 1970s while the police reservists continued to be in use up to 1990 and beyond. In the 1980s, the Lusaka police introduced new crime control measures. These were the Special Constabulary, the Zebra Force, the Flying and Anti-Robbery Squad. The last two measures, were a direct response to the changing trends of property crime in Lusaka. During this period, there was a slight change in basic police training programmes. Paramilitary training was integrated into basic police training. This was the only manifestation of police training responding to changing patterns of property crime. Furthermore, there were numerous and diverse post basic training programmes for policemen. They included promotion courses and others related to crime control such as crime prevention, crime intelligence and fraud investigations. These courses were offered both locally and abroad. The only drawback was that very few police officers were exposed to them.

In the post independence period, police efforts to curb property crime were supplemented by parliamentary legislation and social control groups. The National Assembly enacted legislation through which severe penalties were introduced. These were the Firearms Act of 1969 and the Penal Code Amendment Act No. 2 of 1974. These pieces of legislation were introduced to act as deterrent measures against violent crimes. The 1969 one imposed a stiff penalty for illegal possession of fire arms while the 1974 one sanctioned the death penalty for aggravated robbery. However, criminal statistics reveal that incidents of property crime continued rising demonstrating that severe
penalties were not effective. The social control groups that participated in crime control were the party militants, vigilante and neighbourhood watch schemes. Besides serving as supplementary forces to the police, the last two schemes were corrective measures towards police public relations which were poor both in the colonial and post colonial periods. In spite of both police and community efforts, incidents of property crime kept increasing.

A number of difficulties beset crime control strategies, one of them being underfunding of the police both in the colonial and post colonial periods. This was manifested in shortage of manpower, poor pay and inadequate and poor accommodation. In the post colonial period, Lusaka police faced additional problems such as occasional misunderstandings with other social control groups, shortage of transport, inadequate fuel and lubricants allocation.
### APPENDICES

#### Appendix A

**CHELSTONE POLICE STATION CRIME RETURNS FOR THE YEARS 1968-1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Property Crime</th>
<th>'68</th>
<th>'76</th>
<th>'77</th>
<th>'78</th>
<th>'79</th>
<th>'81</th>
<th>'82</th>
<th>'83</th>
<th>'85</th>
<th>'86</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'90</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
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<td>249</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House-breaking</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtaining by false pretense</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of Motor Vehicle</td>
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<td>117</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycle Theft</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stealing by Agent, clerk or servant</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock Theft</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft from Person</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>Robbery</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>64</td>
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</table>

*Source: Compiled from Chelstone Police Station Crime Returns for the years 1968-1990.*
### Appendix B

#### Table A

**INCIDENCE OF ROBBERY IN LUSAKA POLICE STATIONS, 1966-1978**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Emmasdale</th>
<th>Kabwata</th>
<th>Lusaka Central</th>
<th>Matero</th>
<th>Woodlands</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>135</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>149</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>1978</td>
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<td></td>
<td>179</td>
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**Source:** Annual Police Crime Returns.

### Table B

**THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLES REPORTED TO LUSAKA POLICE STATIONS: 1966-1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Chelstone</th>
<th>Emmasdale</th>
<th>Kabwata</th>
<th>Lusaka Central</th>
<th>Matero</th>
<th>Woodlands</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>155</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
<td>794</td>
<td>109</td>
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**Source:** Annual Police Crime Returns.
APPENDIX C

INCIDENCE OF ROBBERY IN ZAMBIA: 1964-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CONVICTED ROBBERS</th>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>1,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,754</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,645</td>
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## APPENDIX D

CONVICTIONS FOR ROBBERY IN NORTHERN RHODESIA: 1932-1958.

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<tr>
<td>1932</td>
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<tr>
<td>1933</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>-</td>
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## APPENDIX E

REPORTED THEFTS OF MOTOR VEHICLES IN ZAMBIA: 1964-1980

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<th>YEAR</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>820</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
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<td>1967</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>1,657</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>2,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2,710</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
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<td>1975</td>
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<td>1976</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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APPENDIX F

STAFFING IN ZAMBIA POLICE, 1948-1960

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<th>YEAR</th>
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<th></th>
<th>AFRICANS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESTABLISHMENT</td>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
<td></td>
<td>ESTABLISHMENT</td>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>981</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
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<td>188</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>1,288</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>264</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,039</td>
<td>1,943</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>329</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,030</td>
<td>2,357</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>425</td>
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<td>3,030</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>448</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>629</td>
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<td>3,130</td>
<td>3,045</td>
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<td>1958</td>
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<td>1960</td>
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Source: Northern Rhodesia Police Annual Reports, 1948-1960.
APPENDIX G

TABLE A

SHORTAGE OF HOUSING AT LUSAKA POLICE STATIONS, 1956-1959

<table>
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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EUROPEANS</th>
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<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>19</td>
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Source: NAZ, NR/11/61, Commissioner of Police to the Chief Secretary, 10 December, 1960. See attachment 'A'.

TABLE B

SHORTAGE OF HOUSING AT SOME LUSAKA POLICE STATIONS, 1963.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATION</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>STD</th>
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Source: A Report of the Survey of Zambia Police by the Undersecretary (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1963), see Appendix G.
### APPENDIX H/1

**STAFFING AT SOME LUSAKA POLICE STATIONS, 1982-1990**

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### APPENDIX H/2

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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lusaka Division Nominal Roll Registers and Zambia Police Force Order 5/85 Attachment 'D'.

**KEY:**

- **YR** Year
- **EST** Establishment
- **SHR** Shortfall
- **EX** Excess Staff

**Notes:**

1. The figures reflect staffing as at 31 December of cited years.
2. The Zambia Police establishment was last reviewed in 1982. The establishment remained the same up to 1990.
## Appendix I

### Post Basic Training Programmes on Crime Control and Prevention: 1966-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Place Held</th>
<th>No. of Lusaka Urban Officers Attended</th>
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<tr>
<td>C.I.D Records and Documentation</td>
<td>18-23 July 1966</td>
<td>Central Division Headquarters</td>
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<td>Kabwe</td>
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<td>Advanced Combined C.I.D.</td>
<td>11 March-10 April 1968</td>
<td>Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>Combined C.I.D.</td>
<td>3 July-17 August 1968</td>
<td>Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>Crime Prevention</td>
<td>December 1974</td>
<td>Lilayi</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic C.I.D.</td>
<td>9 May-1 July 1977</td>
<td>Lilayi</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic C.I.D.</td>
<td>18 Feb.-11 March 1980</td>
<td>Lilayi</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminal Statistics Refresher Course</td>
<td>5-30 May 1980</td>
<td>Lilayi</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and Scientific aids in Photography, finger prints and forensic Science</td>
<td>18 August-17 October 1980</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advanced Criminology</td>
<td>17 Nov.-17 Dec. 1980</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud Investigations</td>
<td>5-30 Sept. 1983</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finger Print, Photography and Science of Crime</td>
<td>19 Sept.-9 Dec. 1983</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Criminology</td>
<td>1 Oct. 1985-9 Jan. 1987</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Crime Intelligence Orientation</td>
<td>23 June-4 July 1989</td>
<td>Lilayi</td>
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<td>Crime Investigations and Evidence</td>
<td>19 July-14 August 1986</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flying Squad Military Orientation</td>
<td>17 June-20 July 1989</td>
<td>Paramilitary Training School, Sondela.</td>
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<td>Crime Intelligence</td>
<td>31 July-12 August 1989</td>
<td>Co-operative College, Lusaka</td>
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<td>Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders</td>
<td>31 August-22 November 1989</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Scenes of Crime</td>
<td>28 May-27 July 1990</td>
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<td>6 June-27 July 1990</td>
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Source: Compiled from the Zambia Police Force Orders for the years 1966-1990.
# APPENDIX J

**NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH SCHEMES IN LUSAKA URBAN: 1988-1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Formed</th>
<th>Name of Neighbourhood Watch Scheme</th>
<th>No. of Members at the Time of Formation</th>
<th>Residential Areas Covered</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1988</td>
<td>Roma</td>
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<td>Roma Township</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1989</td>
<td>Avondale</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Avondale Township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1990</td>
<td>Northmead</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Residents of the following roads in Northmead: Chikuni, Mwalule, Munqule, and residents of west of Machinchi Road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1990</td>
<td>Makeni</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Makeni Residential Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1990</td>
<td>Light Industrial Area</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Residential areas within a kilometre radius of the offices of the scheme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Constitutions of the Neighbourhood Watch Schemes cited at the office of the Registrar of Sociéties, Lusaka.

**Note:** The constitution of the Roma Scheme does not indicate the number of members who comprised the scheme at the time of formation.
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1. UNPUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES

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KDC 2/24 Correspondence , Unemployment August 1932-October 1933.

MHA 1/3/1 Police Crime and Punishment statistics


MHA 1/3/13 Police Assumption of Full Territorial Responsibility of Law and Order.

MHA 1/3/17 Police Training.

MHA 1/3/37 National Development Plan (Police).

MHA 1/3/46 Zambia Police Annual Reports with a Brief History of the Police Force.


SEC 1/1632 Military Police Staff Reorganisation, Vol. 1 1931-1933.


SEC 2/78 Central Province Annual Reports, 1955.

SEC 2/79 Central Province Annual Reports, 1937.

SEC 2/83 Central Province Annual Reports, 1949.

SEC 3/176 Lusaka Province Housing Committee Reports.

1.2 Magistrates’ and High Court Archives, Lusaka.

1.2.1 Lusaka Magistrates’ Court

Court Case No. 2P-19 of 1980.

Court Case No. 2P-160 of 1980.

Court Case No. 2P-192 of 1980

Court Case No. 2P-627 of 1980.

Court Case No. 2P-213 of 1982.
Court Case No. 3P-450 of 1984.
Court Case No. 3P-14 of 1986.
Court Case No. P3-31 of 1986.
Court Case No. 3P-463 of 1986.
Court Case No. SP-40 of 1990.
Court Case No. SP2-92 of 1990.
Court Case No. 2P-119 of 1990.
Court Case No. SP2-191 of 1990.

1.2.2 Lusaka High Court

Criminal Trial HP/42/1979.
Criminal Trial HP/31/1986.
Criminal Trial HP/72/1986.
Criminal Trial HP/80/1986.
Criminal Trial HP/111/1986.
1.3 Office of the Registrar of Societies, Lusaka.

ORS 102/35/496 Kabulonga Neighbourhood Watch Association.
ORS 102/35/511 Avondale Neighbourhood Watch Association.
ORS 102/35/531 Northmead Neighbourhood Watch Association.
ORS 102/35/551 Makeni Neighbourhood Watch Association.
ORS 102/35/557 Light Industrial Area Neighbourhood Watch Association.

1.4 Zambia Police Headquarters Archives, Lusaka.

Force Orders for the period 1960-1990.
Lusaka Division Nominal Roll Registers for the period 1980-1990.
Zambia Police Reserve Quarterly Orders, F.O. 1/19.
Zambia Police Reserve Quarterly Orders, F.O. 1/30.
Zambia Police Reserve Quarterly Orders, F.O. 1/80.

1.5 Lusaka Division Headquarters Archives, Lusaka.


2. ORAL EVIDENCE

Note: I conducted 38 interviews. Only the most useful to this study are cited here.


Kaliyondo, K., Detective Constable, Emmasdale Police Station, 16/04/1992.


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Sitali, N., UNIP Sakubita Branch Publicity Secretary, Lusaka, 12/04/1992.

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3.1.1 Annual Reports.


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3.1.2 Reports of Commissions of Inquiry


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3.1.4 Other Government Documents


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3.2 City of Lusaka Council Meeting: Agenda and Reports of Committees and Town Clerk for the Month of May 1965, Lusaka: Civic Centre, 1965.

4. Newspapers and Periodicals


5. SECONDARY SOURCES

5.1 Books


5.2 Articles


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6. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES


'Proceedings of Police Reserve Training Programme: Lusaka Division from January to June, 1980'.


