THE COLONIAL STATE, THE MISSION AND PEASANT FARMING IN NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCE OF ZAMBIA: A CASE STUDY OF ZAMBEZI DISTRICT, 1907-1964

BY

MEBBIENS CHEWE CHARATAMA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY

THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

* LUSAKA

DECEMBER, 1990.
DECLARATION

I, MELBIEN CHWECH CHABATAMA, hereby declare that this dissertation, implement by my own work, and that it has not been previously submitted for a degree at this or any other University.

Signature

Date: 11/12/90

(C) COPYRIGHT BY M.C. CHABATAMA 1990

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
DECLARATION

I, MBIIENS CHEWE CHABATAMA, hereby declare that this dissertation represents my own work, and that it has not been previously submitted for a degree at this or any other University.

Signed: ................................

Date: ........... 11:12:90 ............
APPROVAL

This dissertation of MERIENS CHEWE CHABATAMA is approved as fulfilling part of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Arts in History at the University of Zambia.

EXAMINERS

1. Sheriff Date: 28/3/1991

2. H. W. N. Date: 8/8/91

3. Mc Menambanje Date: 01/01/92

4. Balala Myelo Date: 09/01/92

CHAPTER 1: Geographical and Historical Background

CHAPTER 2: The Rise of the Peasantry, 1907-1931

CHAPTER 3: Legislation and Resistance, 1921-1960

Conclusion

Bibliography
List of Maps

CONTENTS

Map 1: Location of North-Western Province, 1953-1964
Map 2: Zambezi (Balovale) District, 1950-1964

List of Maps
List of Tables
Preface
Abstract
Abbreviations
Dedication

Introduction

CHAPTER 1: Geographical and Historical Background

CHAPTER 2: The Rise of the Peasantry, 1907-1951

CHAPTER 3: Legislation and Resilience, 1951-1965

Conclusion

Bibliography
List of Maps

Map 1: Location of North-Western Province, 1953-1964

Map 2: Zambezi (Balovale) District, 1950-1964

Table 2: Quantity of Agricultural Produce Purchased in Zambezi District, 1947-1964

Table 3: Maize Intake, Sales, and Prices: 1935/36 - 1960/61

Table 4: Origin of African Labour Employed on Northern Rhodesian Mines by August 1936

Table 5: Native Tax, Licences and Fees, 1932-1957

Table 6: Distribution of Cattle in Zambezi district

Table 7: The Kasenzi Peasant Farming Scheme
List of Tables

This dissertation is a historical study of the Luvala-Lunda
Table 1: Some Prominent European Traders Dealing in indigenous
"marginal" peasants producing minor or supplementary crops in the
Produce in Zambezi District, 1907-1964 33
North-Western Province of Zambia. Unlike most existing works on the
Table 2: Quantity of Agricultural Produce Purchased in Zambezi
Zambian peasantry, this study focuses on the subject of neglect of
District, 1947-1964 38
certain remotely situated peasant farmers living in rural areas, like
Table 3: Maize Intake, Sales, and Prices: 1935/36 - 1960/61 40
Zambezi (Belovale) district in this case, whose critical role in the
Table 4: Origin of African Labour Employed on Northern Rhodesian
colonial political economy of northern Rhodesia (Zambia) has not been
adequately appreciated.
Mines by August 1938 47
Table 5: Native Tax, Licences and Fees, 1952-1957 62
In the process, the study illuminates the Luvala-Lunda peasants
Table 6: Distribution of Cattle in Zambezi district 70
traditional economic enterprise and capacity to respond favourably to
Table 7: The Kasenzi Peasant Farming Scheme 73
market forces. It also illustrates that these so-called marginal
peasants successfully and consistently produced both use-values and
exchange-values between 1936 and 1964 and hence qualify to be called
peasant farmers.

Data collection for this study was done in the University of
Zambia Library, National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), Zambezi District
Department of Agriculture offices, at Zambezi Farmer Training Centre
and in villages around Zambezi district between August and December,
1989.

This dissertation has largely been shaped by the inspiring works,
methods, insights and criticisms of fellow post-graduate students and
lecturers in the Department of History at the University of Zambia like
Professor Kaniki, Dr. Chipungu, Dr. Seleti, Dr. Zilombo, Dr.
Musambachime, Dr. Gadsden and Dr. MacMillan. I thank them all for
their individual contributions.
Preface

This dissertation is a historical study of the Luvale-Lunda "marginal" peasants producing minor or supplementary crops in the North-Western Province of Zambia. Unlike most existing works on the Zambian peasantry, this study focuses on the subject of neglect of certain remotely situated peasant farmers living in rural areas, like Zambezi (Balovale) district in this case, whose critical role in the colonial political economy of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) has not been adequately appreciated.

In the process, the study illuminates the Luvale-Lunda peasants' traditional economic enterprise and capacity to respond favourably to market forces. It also illustrates that these so-called marginal peasants successfully and consistently produced both use-values and exchange-values between 1936 and 1964 and hence qualify to be called peasant farmers.

Data collection for this study was done in the University of Zambia Library, National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), Zambezi District Department of Agriculture offices, at Zambezi Farmer Training Centre and in villages around Zambezi district between August and December, 1989.

This dissertation has largely been shaped by the inspiring works, methods, insights and criticisms of fellow post-graduate students and lecturers in the Department of History at the University of Zambia like Professor Kaniki, Dr. Chipungu, Dr. Seleti, Dr. Zilombo, Dr. Musambachime, Dr. Gadsden and Dr. MacMillan. I thank them all for their individual contributions.
Particularly, I want to thank my supervisor, Dr. Balam Nyeko of the University of Zambia, for his finesse, positive criticism and inspiration at every stage leading to the finality of this dissertation. I am also greatly indebted to G. Chitalu for helping me to type this dissertation on a computer.

Lastly, but in no way least, I want to thank the three interpreters: J. Kaputula, N. Kalyocha and B. Mukuma; E. Kaoma, C. Simuchembu, J. Bwalya, Senior Chief Ishindi Dawson Muhongo and all individuals who rendered valuable assistance in the course of my research and writing the dissertation.

Although the completion of this study largely hinges on other scholars and acquaintances' material and moral contributions, I bear full responsibility for the errors, final interpretation and conclusions reached in this piece of work.
Abstract

Contrary to widely held views among earlier scholars of the Zambian peasantry, this study has established that the Luvale-Lunda people living in Zambezi district became peasant farmers between 1936 and 1964 when they successfully and consistently produced both use-values and exchange-values. It has also argued that peasantisation in the district was largely due to local initiative and resourcefulness. Amidst monumental constraints, the Luval-Lunda food producers became innovative and successfully carved themselves a niche in the colonial market economy.

Largely, this dissertation focuses on the interrelated issues of proletarianisation and peasantisation, a combination that illuminates the inherent struggle between the colonial state/capitalist network and indigenous food producers in the colonial political economy of Northern Rhodesia. It has argued that despite being a prominent supplier of cheap African labour to the industrial centres of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa between 1907 and 1964, Zambezi district saw the rise of peasant farming between 1936 and 1964, predominantly independent of the hostile colonial state and contrary to Arrighi's model of the theory of proletarianisation which emphasises the elimination of a peasantry by the process of proletarianisation.
Abbreviations

BSACO  British South Africa Company
CMML  Christian Missions in Many Lands
KPFS  Kasenzi Peasant Farming Scheme
MBE  Member of the British Empire
NAZ  National Archives of Zambia
NRG  Northern Rhodesia government
ODS  Order of Distinguished Service
RNLB  Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau
TTFS  Turkish Tobacco Farming Scheme
WNLA  Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
To the instrumental trio: mother Emeliya, late uncle Bulembe and twin-brother Christopher for giving so much for nothing.
THE COLONIAL STATE, THE MISSION AND PEASANT FARMING
IN NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCE OF ZAMBIA: A CASE STUDY OF
ZAMBEZI DISTRICT, 1907-1964

INTRODUCTION

According to the policy of the British South Africa company (BSACO), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) was envisaged to remain undeveloped and a labour reservoir for the richer and more promising Southern Rhodesian and South African Investments. Many scholars like Gann, Van Horn, Beveridge and Oberschall have demonstrated that the Chartered company was initially interested in developing the territory as a labour reservoir. However, the emerging Katanga, Broken Hill (Kabwe) and Copperbelt mines in the early 1900s and the 1920s, respectively, and the supporting settler-farms along the line of rail compelled the colonial state to alter its priorities vis-a-vis Northern Rhodesia. As a result, the territory was divided into three zones: the mining areas; farming areas along the line of rail to supply the mining towns with food requirements and labour supplying areas for the mines and farms in which the rural Luapula, Northern, Barotse and North-Western Provinces fell. It was largely for this purpose that North-Western Province was to remain undeveloped and marginalised in the colonial period such that by the 1940s it became known as a "Cinderella" province. Ironically, the 1930s and 1940s marked the beginning of the marketing of food crops like cassava, groundnuts, bulrush millet, rice and beans from Zambezi district to Mulezi and the Copperbelt, respectively. In an attempt to understand and appreciate stalled agricultural development in the
North-Western Province of Northern Rhodesia, this study focuses on a case study of Zambezi (Balovale) district (See maps 1 and 2).

Generally, this dissertation appraises the Luvale-Lunda peasantry in the colonial political economy of Northern Rhodesia by examining the origin, nature, extent and consequences of the link between Zambezi district, the colonial government, the Christian Missions in Many Lands (CMML) or Plymouth Brethren and the wide mining capitalist network of the Katanga, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa between 1907 and 1964. Specifically, it considers the impact of colonial taxation, labour migration/recruitment, the CMML., western education, ecology and environment, the traditional land tenure and agricultural land use systems, transport infrastructure, marketing facilities, the experimental rice and peasant farming schemes and peasant differentiation on the rise of the Luvale-Lunda peasantry.

Literature Review

Although much research in peasant farming has been done, a historical study of the same in North-Western Province is lacking. The earliest scholarly works on Northern Rhodesia unfortunately concentrated on events along the line of rail, the Copperbelt and on selected large ethnic groups like the Bemba, Tonga, Lozi and Kazembe-Lunda. However, some of these works have remained useful sources in agricultural historical studies. For instance, whereas Gann's general and descriptive work dismissed the pre-colonial agricultural systems, Allan's study demonstrated that the traditional agricultural systems
were capable of producing enough within their given limitations.

Some scholars like Hellen and Dixon-Fyle\textsuperscript{10} have argued that, despite the constraints, the peasants benefited from colonial rule. Hellen's concise and descriptive geographical study has outlined the local peoples' negligible benefits from the colonial market economy. Dixon-Fyle has also argued that the Plateau Tonga peasants benefited from the government-sponsored Improved Farmers' Scheme and the African Farmers' Associations.

Scholars operating within the theory of underdevelopment have argued that the peasants did not benefit from colonial rule\textsuperscript{11}. The defect of this approach has been its tendency to overlook the critical internal factors in peasant farming like the traditional farming technology and the indigenous peoples' resourcefulness and resilience in the face of state-sponsored constraints. Van Horn has superficially demonstrated how the official categorisation of Barotseland as a labour reservoir and the resultant labour migration led to agricultural decline in the area after 1930. In her book, Dodge has illustrated how peasant farming in rural areas was frustrated through restrictive government policies that favoured European Farming along the line of rail until after the Second World War. Employing the theory of underdevelopment drawing on the Marxist theory, Muntembba has argued that "from the onset of capitalism in Zambia, there was a struggle over labour and the means to increase its productiveness. At every point of confrontation, the rural producers lost"\textsuperscript{12} until after the Second World War. Using Arrighi's model of the theory of proletarianisation "which argues a simple causal connection between the elimination of a
peasantry and the proletarianisation of African workers." Perrings has argued that it was the inability of the peasants to satisfy their local cash requirements through agriculture that forced them onto the labour market temporarily.

Vail and Mulongo have differently demonstrated how the disruptive impact of colonial policies on ecology adversely affected peasant farming activities in Eastern Province and Namwala/Bangweulu areas, respectively. Vail has dealt with how land alienation led to ecological degradation. Mulongo has also shown how the creation of game parks partly disrupted peasant farming in Namwala and failed to do so in Bangweulu. However, both studies have not considered how environments that were unaffected by colonial policies, like Zambezi district, responded to twentieth century changes.

Authors of Christian missionary history in Zambia have variously considered the contribution of missionaries to peasant farming. Dixon-Fyle has argued that the Plateau Tonga peasants learnt better agricultural methods from the Jesuit and Seventh Day Adventist missionaries. However, he has not considered the significance of local farming practices and tools and the urgent need for both use-values and exchange-values at given historical periods. Wilkin has shown how the poorly financed and ill-equipped conservative CMMI provided a feeble educational programme in North-Western Province before 1945. However, he has not examined the impact of missionary work on the local peasantry. Morrow has illustrated how the London Missionary Society failed to facilitate peasant farming in the Luapula area due to the society's emphasis on social issues and its conflicting
interests with those of the colonial administration and the mining companies.\textsuperscript{15}

Recent peasant studies have emphasised peasant differentiation and resilience in the face of constraining colonial policies\textsuperscript{16}. These works have argued that "the peasantry's place has not ... been eliminated by capitalist development"\textsuperscript{17} but simply undergone change at given historical periods. Like Momba and Chipungu, Vickery has argued that "economic change [is] the key to understanding the transformation of life that occurred"\textsuperscript{18} in the colonial period. According to them, the Plateau Tonga adjusted rapidly to the colonial economy by responding favourably to market forces and persisting with "primitive" farming practices. Contrary to Vickery's argument that apart from the Plateau Tonga and the Lozi (partly) other Zambian groups "did not know a peasantry phase, early or late,"\textsuperscript{19} this dissertation argues that the Luvale-Lunda became peasant farmers between 1936 and 1964 since they produced both use-values and exchange-values. Momba's political study is helpful on the theoretical debates about the peasantry, peasantisation\textsuperscript{20}, peasant-differentiation and the role of the state in differentiation and class-formation. Unlike these works, this dissertation focuses on the ignored remotely based non-maize producing peasants.

On the local scene, only White \textsuperscript{21} studied the economy of Zambezi district in 1959. The result was a general and descriptive micro-social anthropological survey devoid of significant historical analysis.
Rationale

Apart from the author's personal interest in the subject of neglect of rural areas in Zambia like North-Western Province, the ultimate justification of this study is that very little scholarly work has been done in the province by historians. This piece of work is envisaged to fill a glaring gap in the existing literature on the history of peasant farming in Zambia by contributing a chapter on North-Western Province.

By exploring peasant farming of Zambezi district from a historical perspective, the dissertation hopes to provide a better understanding and appreciation of the origin and nature of the region's backwardness in agriculture. The agricultural sector of the district/province has only been studied by non-historians.

This study reveals both the positive and negative agricultural aspects of the district unlike the existing literature much of which has outrightly condemned the entire province as an unproductive area. There is need to redress the negative picture painted about the province and contribute to the debate on the re-discovery and re-interpretation of the Zambian past.

The choice of Zambezi district as an area of study is significant in the sense that the area possesses many of the attributes of remote and neglected distant rural areas of Zambia despite its enormous agricultural and economic potential. Moreover, it is worth noting that the district had one of the two highest district rates of labour migration to the Northern Rhodesia mines and yet had surplus food production especially between 1936 and 1964.
Methodology

Data for this study was collected in four ways between August and December, 1989. Firstly, I consulted both published and unpublished primary and secondary source materials from the University of Zambia Library, namely books, dissertations, journals and colonial government publications and reports. Secondly, I consulted unpublished primary sources in NAZ like colonial government proclamations, Zambezi District Notebook, Zambezi District Tour and Annual Reports and Annual Reports for Barotse, Western and North-Western Provinces. Thirdly, I collected data from unpublished primary sources such as official Monthly Reports, Agricultural Officers' Provincial Conference Reports, General correspondence and Ministry of Agriculture Circulars belonging to the colonial period at the Zambezi District Department of Agriculture offices and Zambezi Farmer Training Centre.

Finally, I collected data by conducting personal oral interviews in Zambezi district with peasants, local traders, CMML members, an agriculturalist, retired colonial government workers, ex-labour migrants, an ex-Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) recruiting clerk, Local Government workers and Senior Chief Ishindi Dawson Muhongo. I was unable to interview the late Senior Chief Ndungu of the Luvale since he was then admitted to Chavuma Mission Hospital. Responses from the interviewees were written down in the course of the interview. Only four of my interviewees could not speak English. Since I am not proficient in either Luvale or Lunda languages, I had to rely on three interpreters who did a superb job except in the case of one interviewee whom I interviewed in Bemba which we both spoke fluently.
Organisation of the Study

This dissertation comprises three chronological chapters. Chapter one deals with the geographical and historical background. Chapter two focuses on the rise of the Luvale-Lunda peasantry between 1907 and 1951. Chapter three focuses on the 1951-1965 period when the Luvale-Lunda peasants remained resilient amidst repressive state legislation. The conclusion follows chapter three.

NOTES


4. The North-Western Province referred to in this study is the modern one that took its present form in 1954: See J.A. Hellen, Rural Economic Development in Zambia, 1890-1964 (Munchen: Welt


7. Until 1971, Balovale was the name used to refer to the present day Zambezi district. We have employed the name "Zambezi" in this study.

8. Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*.


12. Muntemba, "Rural Underdevelopment," p. XIV.


20. Peasantisation refers to the process of subsistence food producers becoming peasant farmers. See White, A Preliminary Survey.
22. See D.S. Johnson (ed.), *North-Western Province*, No. 8, (Lusaka: Zambia Geographical Association, 1980). The editor has argued, in the introduction, that North-Western Province is not as unproductive as assumed by earlier agriculturists, geographers and ecologists.

23. During the colonial period, Zambezi district was under four provincial administrations thus: Between 1907 and 1941, it was under Barotse Province; between 1942 and 1945, it was transferred to Kaonde-Lunda Province; between 1946 and 1953, the district was transferred to Western Province (Now called Copperbelt Province); and between 1953 and 1964, it became part of the newly constituted North-Western Province. In addition, it is worth noting that before 1950, the area covered by the present day Kabompo district was part of Zambezi district.
CHAPTER ONE: GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Geographical Background

Area of Study

This study focuses on Zambezi district which was one of the five administrative districts in North-Western Province by 1964 (See Map 1). Other districts were Kabompo, Mwinilunga, Solwezi (Provincial Headquarters) and Kasempa. Zambezi was the most highly populated district in the province despite its low birth, high mortality and labour migration/recruitment rates. The district covered 18,300 square kilometres of the total 125,800 for North-Western Province. It lay in the western part of the province at an altitude of 1085M above sea level and at latitude 13°34'S and longitude 23°60'E. It shared a wide boundary with Angola in the West and in the North. It also shared administrative boundaries with Kalabo and Mongu districts in the South and Kabompo district in the East. It was linked to Chingola district by a 690 Kilometre stretch of gravel road.

The Zambezi river splits the district into the East and West bank (See Map 2). Before independence, the East bank was crownland while the West bank was part of the Barotse Reserve/Native Trustland. While the Lunda, Chavuma and Manyinga Native Authorities administered the East bank, the Luvale Native Authority took care of the
West bank after the excision of Zambezi district from Barotse Province in 1941.

Zambezi district was inhabited by the Luvale-Lunda speaking peoples who had migrated from Mwantayamva's Kingdom under independent chieftaincies after 1600 A.D. While the Lunda group lived exclusively on the East bank, Luvale speaking groups like the Luvale, Mbunda, Lukolwe, Liuwa, Nkoya and Mbuma were on the West bank. Only the Chokwe and the Luchazi lived on the East bank. Apart from Senior Chief Ishindi, other Lunda chiefs were Ishima, Mpidi, Kakeki, Kutoha, Nyakulenga, Chavuma and Chisamba. Luvale chiefs included Senior Chief Ndungu, Chinyama Litapi, Kucheka, Nguvu, Mandalo, Chaize Salipako, Sefu and Ngongola. However, some of these chieftaincies only existed briefly before 1964.

Environment and Ecology

Zambezi district is largely flat terrain overlaid with Kalahari soils which are characterised by rounded and deep loose sand grains which are chemically poor and acidic. The soils lack clay particles and are well drained. The district is part of the Upper Zambezi watershed. The West bank is characterised by sandy plains and various fish-rich tributaries of the Zambezi. The plains are waterless during the hot dry season but flood during the rainy season. Short grass and belts of light bush make up the main vegetation. The East bank is on a higher level and predominantly woodland.

The soils on the East bank are richer than those on the West. This largely explains why the East bank was a more successful agricultural area than the West. Limited cattle-keeping characterised the West bank. Human settlements were concentrated along the few
available water courses with large areas remaining uninhabited. By 1964, the district had more cattle than any other district in the province largely due to its being the only tsetse fly free district in the province.

Climate

Zambezi district has had three seasons: the rainy, cold and hot dry. The rains occur between late October and April. It is cold between May and early August and hot dry between late August and late October. Rains average 1070 Mean mm such that by January, the Zambezi and other rivers often reach flood level with much of the West bank inundated. The average maximum and minimum temperatures for the district are twenty-nine and fifteen degrees centigrade, respectively. The hot dry season is extremely hot and reaches thirty-six degrees centigrade.

Historical Background, 1795-1907

Traditional Land Tenure

Land tenure is the possession or holding of land over a given period of time. According to Kostrowicky's classification of land tenure systems the Luvale-Lunda practised the common or traditional land tenure system in which land was owned and regulated by the ethnic group, clan or family.

As among other Bantu groups, the Chief was the ultimate custodian of land. He gave it to village headmen who later divided it among village members according to their requirements. While the individual holder had full utility rights for as long as he required a given piece of land, he had no right to sell it. Under certain conditions, land was transferred by the user to relatives or close friends as a gift or
loan. Land previously used by a deceased or deserting member of a
village was either inherited by relatives, given to another resident or
became part of village-land12.

During the colonial period, land tenure arrangements did not
change significantly in the district. The categorisation of East and
West banks as Crownland and Barotse Reserve/Native Trust land,
respectively, had no real impact on customary land tenure partly due to
the abundance of land and lack of settler-interest in the district and
province. Africans acquired utility rights over land by simply clearing
and cultivating unoccupied or virgin land. Only on Crownland were
Africans legally forbidden to venture into the few demarcated Forest
Reserves. The unofficial sale of land for cash among Africans became
widespread mainly in areas of dense population13.

Pre-Colonial Agricultural Land Use

Land use "is the application of human controls, in a relatively
systematic manner, to the key elements within an ecosystem, in order to
derive benefit from it"14. According to Trapnell and Clothier, the
Luvale speaking groups living in Zambezi and Kabompo districts
practised the "Northern Kalahari Woodland System" of farming while the
Lunda group living in the Northern part of Zambezi district and
Mwinilunga district practised the "Northern Kalahari Contact System."
Cassava was the staple food crop in both systems15. However, Shultz
simply categorised the local land use practices as the "Luval system"
of agriculture16 due to inherent similarities between the Luval and
Lunda agricultural systems.
The Luval-e-Lunda successfully substituted their staple food crop, bulrush millet, for the nutritionally deficient\textsuperscript{17} cassava (Manioc or Manihot utilissima) about the eighteenth century. Cassava spread to Zambia from Angola where the Portuguese had introduced it about 1600 A.D. from South America. Thereafter, bulrush millet was largely grown for beer-brewing. Other local supplementary crops were sweet potatoes (Ipomoea batatas), yams (Dioscorea), groundnuts (Arachis hypogaeae), beans (Phaseolus vulgaris), cow peas (Vigna unguiculata), pumpkins (Cucumbita maxima), edible gourds, tobacco, sweet sorghum, (Sorghum bicolor), Kidney cotton, castor and pulza oil. This diversified agricultural set up gave the people an adequate diet and commercial leverage. The Luval-e-Lunda readily took to cassava due to its consistent and greater availability throughout the year and its higher survival value during pestilences and drought. In addition, the crop required less land and attention and did not easily exhaust soils.

The Luval-e-Lunda are not cattle-keepers by tradition but by adoption\textsuperscript{18}. This accounted for the negligible role cattle played in the socio-economic set up of the ethnic groups.

In both societies, a variation and limited form of the "Chitemene System" was practised. The bush was cut, dried and burnt. After a preliminary crop of bulrush millet, cassava was planted on mounds made in the cleared area. Sometimes, cassava was inter-planted with the supplementary crops. Usually, the harvesting of cassava began after two years. Gardens were expanded to seven acres over a period of four to seven years after which the village was moved to a new site\textsuperscript{19}. 
In agricultural work, men cleared the bush while both sexes tilled the land. Women subsequently planted, weeded and harvested gardens. Sometimes, working parties were organised from different villages in return for a token remuneration. Although a man and his wife had equal rights over crops, total male participation in agricultural work was negligible. On the other hand, a man or woman cultivating his or her own plot did not share out the produce with the spouse. On death or divorce, a spouse's relatives inherited the garden or produce. Locally made axes and hoes were the major farming implements.

In the early twentieth century, the Chokwe, Luchazi and Mbunda immigrants introduced more advanced agricultural methods among the Luvale-Lunda, like the complete abandonment of exhausted land for a longer period of time to allow full regeneration of vegetation. During the colonial period, cassava was planted without a preliminary crop of bulrush millet... Replanting is done as soon as a plant has been cleared out completely, and goes on continuously throughout the year. Gardens are cultivated year after year in this way, with an occasional short rest if the soil shows signs of exhaustion.

In fact, gardens were continuously cultivated for a period of over ten years without soil exhaustion and shifting cultivation occurring regularly. The traditional agricultural practices persisted until the 1960s when the use of fertiliser was introduced on a small scale by the Department of Agriculture.
The Pre-colonial Exchange-Economy

Barter trade, in which commodities were exchanged internally, was common among the Luvale-Lunda largely due to the peoples' high level of specialisation, innovation and enterprise in the production of goods and services and adaptability to market forces. By the eighteenth century, the Luvale-Lunda had trade contacts with the trade caravans from Angola.

A pattern of long distance caravan trade was well established between Luvaleland and the rest of Angola before 1795. The Chokwe controlled trade between the Ovimbundu of Bihe and Luvaleland. In addition, the Luvale traded with the Imbangala of Cassanje who had trade contacts with Mwantayamva's Kingdom which was the final link in the trade with the Portuguese in Angola.

After the abolition of slave trade in Angola by Portugal in the 1830s, wax, ivory, rubber and honey became dominant exports from Luvale-Lunda countries in return for Portuguese guns, gun-powder, beads, cloth and salt. After 1880, the value of rubber exports surpassed the combined total value of ivory and wax exports to Benguela. The 1902 Portuguese-Bailundu Ovimbundu war dislocated the caravan trade and rubber boom to such an extent that although trade in rubber continued up to 1916, it never reached its previous height. Despite the ban, slave trade persisted with the West until about 1910 when slave raids and caravans disappeared in Zambezi district.

A very important development had occurred in the nineteenth century when food crops acquired an exchange-value and ceased to be regarded merely as use-values. The trade caravans that had to be
rationed stimulated production and trade in food crops along trade routes dominated by the Ovimbundu, Imbangala, Chokwe, Luvale and the Portuguese in the West. It is worth noting, in conclusion, that the pre-colonial exchange-economy played a significant role in stimulating the production of cash crops and introducing the Luvala-Lunda to the intricacies of market prices. This pre-colonial exposure and orientation enabled the Luvala-Lunda to respond and adjust favourably to the forces of the colonial market structure. As a matter of fact, the Luvala-Lunda entered the colonial period with a relatively sound agricultural and economic base which enabled them to respond favourably to prevailing market opportunities, especially between 1936 and 1964. The next chapter deals with the proletarianisation of the Luvala-Lunda food producers and their eventual rise as peasants.

NOTES


3. NAZ, KTW1/1, Zambezi District Notebook, 1907-64.


5. The Lunda Native Authority administered the area lying between Lunkunyi river in the North and Mumbeji in the South. While the Chavuma Native Authority took care of the area between Lunkunyi
river and the boundary between Zambia and Angola in the West and North, the Manyinga Native Authority administered the present day area of Kabompo district until 1950 when Kabompo district was created.

6. See NAZ, KTW1/1, 1907-64.


CHAPTER TWO: THE RISE OF THE PEASANTRY, 1907-1951

This chapter discusses the rise of the Luvaile-Lunda peasantry between 1907 and 1951. It focuses on the policy and practice of the BSACO and the Crown government vis-a-vis peasantisation in Zambezi district. Specifically, it considers the impact of the CMML, labour migration, World economic depression, locust invasion, the Second World War, western education and ecology on peasant farming in the area.

BSACO Colonisation of Zambezi District

The Luvaile-Lunda speaking groups inhabiting Zambezi district came under Chartered company rule by virtue of a series of concessions signed by the Litunga, Lubosi Lewanika and his indunas with the agents of the company, namely the Ware Concession of 1889, Lochner concession of 1890, Lawley concession of 1898 and Lewanika concession of 1900. Lewanika's claim that the Luvaile-Lunda had been Lozi subjects since 1892 was outrightly dismissed by the 1905 Arbitration Commission, headed by the King of Italy, Emmanuel, that considered the boundaries of the Lozi Kingdom. Nevertheless, Zambezi was made part of Barotseland as a sub-district of Barotse district from September 1907 until 1941 when it was excised from Barotseland and attained full district status.

The primary interest of the BSACO in Northern Rhodesia was mineral-exploitation and profit-maximisation. Therefore, the function of the agricultural sector was simply to provide enough food supplies needed to feed the mine workers and the company sought to place this task in the hands of immigrant European farmers. By so doing, the company wanted to release the African food producers from land and
and convert them into migrant labour for its investments in South
Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In the process, the state became hostile
and introduced coercive measures in an attempt to compel the reluctant
Africans to become migrant workers. Chartered company rule is a
classical example of Lenin’s depiction of the state as a special
coercive force used by the owners of capital or an exploiting class for
the exploitation of the oppressed classes.5

The Imposition of Colonial Taxation and Labour Recruitment

It was in line with the Chartered company’s policy that no sooner
was Zambezi sub-district established by the company official, J.H.
Venning, in September 1907 than the Luvale-Lunda were subjected to
colonial or “native” taxation. By the North-Western Rhodesia
Proclamation Number 16 of 1905 a tax, of which Levanika and his
successor Yeti were to receive a percentage in lieu of tribute, was
imposed in the sub-district6. This tax was to be paid by every male
adult aged eighteen years and above in Sterling coin only. By refusing
payment in kind, the Company government sought to compel Africans to
engage in wage labour. Failure to pay colonial tax landed one in prison
for a term not exceeding three months or fine not exceeding five
pounds. However, imprisonment or the court fine did not exempt the
African defaulter from paying the tax7. Since colonial taxation was
designed specifically to generate administrative revenue and to
proletarianise the local food producers,6 the colonial administration
“...advocated a tax that would compel (the reluctant) natives to work
regularly for a few weeks in the year”5.
Before 1914, an African male adult living in North-Western Rhodesia was levied an annual poll tax of 10s and an additional 10s for each additional wife or concubine. Thereafter, the tax was pegged at 10s only in Zambezi sub-district. As per design, some Luvale-Lunda men resorted to labour migration in a desperate attempt to settle the hefty tax since local farming and wage earning activities could not suffice.

Due to reluctance to enter wage-employment by the local people, labour recruiters started operating extensively in the sub-district after 1911. For instance, Robert Williams and Company was officially sanctioned to recruit labour in the area in 1911. However, reluctance among recruits compelled the agency to abandon local labour recruitment in 1925. The Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) had a similar experience from 1917 onwards.

As illustrated, colonial taxation failed to elicit the desired response among the Luvale-Lunda food producers. Although the high mortality rate and long distances to Southern Rhodesia and the Katanga were contributing factors, the sound indigenous economic base played a major role. In fact, it was for this reason that a more intensified labour recruitment strategy or extra-compulsion was advocated as the only viable alternative to force the Luvale-Lunda young men into wage labour.
The CMML Vis-a-Vis Peasantisation, 1914-1924

The Brethren or CMML was a small egalitarian and dissenting evangelical group that was formed in Britain in the 1820s when men

...accepted the Bible as the divinely-inspired word of God and as a literal example for all to follow. They felt that Church and State should be separated and that even church organisations were non-biblical and unnecessary".

It was due to this that the Brethren had no formal missionary society,"... no headquarters, no central authority and no book of rules other than the Bible ... received no salary but were either supported by friends in Britain or supported themselves by running trading stores or farms,"15. However, the name "CMML" was arbitrarily adopted upon government insistence that the Brethren should be identified by a title"16.

After Frederick Arnot had set up a number of Brethren Mission stations in Angola and Congo (Zaire) in the 1890s, Walter Fisher opened up Kalene Hill Mission Station in Mwinilunga district in North-Western Rhodesia in 1906. Thereafter, CMML Mission Stations were opened up in Zambezi district at Chitokoloki in 1914, Chavuma in 1922, Kamapanda in 1923, Dipalata in 1946 and Loloma in 196017.

The cardinal purpose of the CMML was the uplifting of people through salvation"18. In an attempt to entice Africans to salvation, the CMML offered educational, health and general social services. However, the amount of work carried out by the mission stations depended on the interests, talents, number and financial resources of the missionaries19.
Between 1914 and 1924, the missionaries at Chitokoloki established the Arnot Memorial School and elementary village schools in an attempt to disseminate, establish and maintain the Christian faith and European values among the local communities. As a result, Africans were taught simple gospel texts, reading and writing in Luvale and Lunda languages. Only a few advanced pupils were taught enough English to enable them to read the Bible and help in spreading the Gospel. Basically, education served as a key that "... unlocked the Bible, gained converts, and kept them faithful... they firmly believed that providing education beyond this rudimentary stage was not their responsibility" and unnecessary.

Since Chitokoloki Mission Station was established just when the First World War broke out in 1914, it experienced difficulties in procuring food. As a result, the station relied on African food supplies and embarked on farming. During evangelisation, missionaries encouraged Africans to grow food crops like wheat, rice, fruits and groundnuts which they (missionaries) needed for consumption. By 1917, the station had 200 acres of land on which the missionaries grew rice, vegetables, groundnuts, fruits and cassava.

In 1920, several Brethren missionaries at Chitokoloki pooled their resources together and formed the Kabompo Trading Company Limited. The Company purchased agricultural produce from the local people on cash basis and in kind and sold it within the sub-district and in Barotseland. This enabled Africans living within easy reach of the station to generate some income and meet their tax obligations. However, the Company broke up due to personal conflicts between George
Suckling, the founder and leading evangelist at the station, and H. Rodgers from Johannesburg who managed the Company on behalf of the Brethren shareholders. Apparently, Suckling feared competition the new company posed to his stores at Chitokoloki.

Apart from serving as a market for indigenous food like cassava meal, bulrush millet, beef, fish, sweet potatoes, groundnuts and beans, the mission stations at Chitokoloki and Chavuma did not facilitate peasant farming in any other way by 1924. Moreover, the CMML had no desire and scope to ameliorate the socio-economic conditions of the Luvale-Lunda. The two mission stations had their own financial and administrative pre-occupations in this war and post-war period when funding from their overseas supporters gradually diminished.

The British Colonial Government, 1924-1953

The primary aim of the British colonial government with regard to African agriculture

... was to maintain the status quo. An effort was made to ensure Africans' access to sufficient land to meet their [subsistence] requirements, but not to provide them with enough land or access to the improved techniques required for achieving surplus production ²⁴.

However, the changing local and international trends brought about some degree of ambivalence in government policy vis-a-vis African farming ²⁵. While the state was anti-peasant farming, it unofficially encouraged peasant farming after 1938 due to a serious maize shortfall in the territory ²⁶.
The period after 1925 witnessed a proliferation of labour recruiters and intensified labour recruitment in Zambezi sub-district. Some of the competing labour recruiters in the area were the RNLB which recruited for Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, Ullman and Einstein, C.S. Parsons and J. Jacobs who recruited for various employers in Northern Rhodesia. Labour recruiters rushed to recruit from Barotse Province and Zambezi sub-district in particular due to the official designation of the province as a labour reservoir for the expanding mining industry and the supporting farms.

During this period, many young men became migrant workers through state coercion. Apart from denying the local people income-generating opportunities, the colonial state made effective use of colonial tax. Inadequate sources of "tax money" made life extremely difficult for many men, some of whom resorted to hiding in the bush whenever tax collectors went round the villages. Upon "appreciating" difficulties experienced by the local men in raising "tax money", the colonial state reduced tax in the sub-district from 10s to 5s in 1925. However, the tax rate was increased in 1930 to "7s 6d in [Zambezi] district, 10s in North-Eastern Rhodesia and 12s 6d in the North-Western districts other than [Zambezi]". As a result, many Luvale-Lunda men were unable to settle their taxes and some were imprisoned for defaulting. Fear compelled many would-be victims to enlist and migrate to industrial centres. For instance, about 4,500 men were recruited in the sub-district between 1925 and 1926.

Despite the high rate of labour migration from the sub-district, the Luvale-Lunda had surplus food that simply lacked a viable market.
Female labour successfully replaced the absent male labour. The realisation of surplus food production at the peak of labour migration in 1926[31] is a testimony to the argument that male labour played a relatively insignificant role in local farming.

Between 1924 and 1930, CMML missionaries devoted much of their time and energy to their personal business concerns. Since they even competed against each other, they spared very little time and patience to attend to the spiritual and material needs of the African for whom the mission was intended. At Chitokoloki, for instance, Suckling had three stores by the late 1920s. Another missionary named Hansen left Chitokoloki Mission Station and became a trader at Nguvu (See Table 1 below). Two other unnamed missionaries secured hawkers' licences[32]. These missionary-cum-traders bought and resold both European and African merchandise within and outside the sub-district.

Before 1933, the CMML at Chitokoloki, Chavuma and Kampsanda offered elementary and limited educational programmes that had very little impact on the Luvale-Lunda who had looked forward to material improvement from the missionaries[33]. It is worth noting that by 1929, Chavuma Mission had only 59 baptised African converts while Chitokoloki had 108[34]. The mission stations' influence remained negligible and had no direct bearing on peasant farming. The stations remained merely markets for indigenous food.

Impact of the Economic Depression, 1930s

The world-wide economic depression greatly depressed prices of primary products and the volume of wage-employment in most African
countries. Problems of labour recruitment disappeared as many African workers were discharged due to the closure of certain industrial establishments. In Northern Rhodesia, an international copper quota agreement led to the closure of Nchanga, Mufulira, Kansanshi, Chambishi and Bwana Mkubwa mines in 1931 with only Nkana and Luanshya mines remaining operational. The Katanga and Southern Rhodesian mines and settler-farms were also adversely affected. Labour recruitment for these centres suddenly stopped until 1934 when the closed mines reopened and mining operations expanded.
### Table 1

**SOME PROMINENT EUROPEAN TRADERS DEALING IN INDIGENOUS PRODUCE$^3$ IN ZAMBEZI DISTRICT, 1907-1964.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trader/Firm</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barron</td>
<td>Lukulu-Zambezi river junction</td>
<td>1910s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson B.</td>
<td>Lukulu</td>
<td>1920s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suckling G.</td>
<td>Chitokoloki</td>
<td>Early 1920s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabompo Trading Company</td>
<td>Chitokoloki</td>
<td>Early 1920s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lance</td>
<td><strong>Chitokoloki</strong></td>
<td>1924 - 1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howell N.W.</td>
<td>Boma</td>
<td>1920s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woods Mpidi</td>
<td>1930-1945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hansen</td>
<td>Nguvu</td>
<td>1930s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudge B.P. Ltd.</td>
<td><strong>Boma, Kakeki, Mpidi</strong></td>
<td>1930s-1950s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brice T.S.</td>
<td>Chavuma</td>
<td>1930s-1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutherland R.F.</td>
<td><strong>Boma</strong></td>
<td>1930s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woods P.</td>
<td>Mpidi</td>
<td>1945-1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bissett</td>
<td>Chikonkwelo</td>
<td>1940s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serrano A.F. Ltd.</td>
<td><strong>Boma, Tepa, Mpidi, Nyakulenga</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nchanga Trading Store</td>
<td><strong>Boma, Chavuma, Lukolwe</strong></td>
<td>1950s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Transport Ltd.</td>
<td>Dipalata</td>
<td>1950s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: NAZ, KTW1/1, Zambezi District Notebook, 1907-64; NAZ, Tour and Annual Reports for Zambezi district, Barotse, Western (Copperbelt) and North-Western Provinces.

$^3$These included cassava, bulrush millet, groundnuts, rice, maize, castor oil, bees wax and fish.
Consequently, tax obligations were met by a diminishing number of tax payers throughout the territory, especially between 1932 and 1934, as migrant workers, who were a source of "tax money" for relatives at home, were discharged en masse. In Zambezi sub-district, "... not more than a quarter of the population" paid the 1932 tax. Suffice it to say that labour migration was the main source of "tax money" for most inhabitants of Zambezi. It was due to this stark fact that the government decided to fix a lower tax in the sub-district at 7s 6d than elsewhere in the territory.

Fear of industrial unrest in urban areas compelled the colonial government, mining companies and the Native Labour Association to jointly persuade and force discharged Africans to return to their villages. However, most Africans remained in town. Among these were a large number of Luvale-Lunda male migrants who could not readily travel back to Zambezi largely due to the undeveloped transport infrastructure and long distances involved between the industrial centres and the sub-district.

Despite such limiting developments, the area recorded a good harvest of bulrush millet and cassava in 1932, much of which was sold to famine-hit Barotseland in return for cattle or cash. The Luvale-Lunda paddled their canoe-loads down the Zambezi river and walked back with cattle which they either slaughtered for sale or domesticated. In addition, European traders and CMM mission stations purchased indigenous food which they utilised and/or sold within and outside the district (See Table 1). The only limiting factor to this new trade was that the market was not big and promising enough.
As illustrated above, the absence of a large number of men had a negligible impact on the indigenous agricultural practices as female-labour easily took care of the necessary agricultural chores. However, the emerging peasant farming coincided with the locust invasion.

Impact of the Locust Invasion, 1932-1936

Zambezi sub-district experienced two major locust invasions in 1932 and 1934, respectively. Although the locusts devoured crops and caused considerable damage and hunger in many parts of the country including Zambezi, the Luvale-Lunda did not starve to death at all. They easily fell back on cassava and the supplementary collecting-hunting economy and fishing industry.

The Luvale-Lunda collected and fed on small animals, birds, fish, caterpillars, honey, flying termites, ground crickets, mushrooms (fungi), wild tubers, grasshoppers and even the invading locusts. They also relied on the abundant wild animals. Above all, cassava and sweet potatoes, which produce tubers under the ground, beyond the reach of the Red locust (Nomadacris septemfasciata) and migratory locust (Locusta migratoria) which had invaded the sub-district, saved the local people from chronic famine that tormented other groups like the Becha, Luni and Tonga, to mention a few, whose staple diet was based on maize (Zea mays) and bulrush millet. Commenting on measures taken to deal with the locust invasions in the district, Chikwananga had this to say:

The government encouraged us to kill the locusts by cutting down trees which had swarms (of locusts) and forcing them into trenches which we dug. Thereafter, we covered the locusts in the trenches with soil and piled dry tree branches on top which we then set
ablaze. We later collected and ate the dead locusts.*

Great impetus was given to peasantisation in the sub-district when the government responded to the country-wide locust invasions between 1929 and 1940 and drought by insisting on the planting of cassava and sweet potatoes, more resilient crops during pestilences, by each family in worst-hit areas like the Gwembe-Plateau Tonga region, Bembaland and Barotseland. This simply propelled the local people who extended their cassava and sweet potato fields to such an extent that the sub-district recorded an unprecedented cassava harvest from 1936 onwards and became "... probably the greatest producer of cassava in the whole of the Barotse Province." This surplus cassava yield enabled the Luvale-Lunda to start high and consistent sales of cassava meal within the district and to Barotseland. This marked the entry of the Luvale-Lunda into the colonial market economy and, therefore, their emergence as a peasantry.

Responding to Market Opportunities, 1936-1951

... a tropical farmer is unlikely to increase his production unless an increased demand is there, is seen to be there, and is easily accessible. Improved seed, fertilisers and better irrigation facilities: a tropical cultivator is unlikely to use these to increase his total production unless the market for his increased production is first seen to exist and is accessible.*

The rise of the Luvale-Lunda peasantry, like other peasancies, is well depicted in Hodder's argument above. Between 1936 and 1951, trade from Zambezi district fanned out to Barotseland, Angola and the Copperbelt in addition to the expanding local market. Cassava meal and bulrush
millet were exchanged for cattle and money in Barotseland. The Portuguese traders from Angola procured groundnuts, dried fish and beeswax in return for cloth (calico) and blankets. From 1942 onwards, cassava meal, rice, groundnuts, dried caterpillars, dried fish, beeswax, bulrush millet and beans were sold for cash on the Copperbelt (See Table 2 below). 42

Specifically, the major markets for food within Zambezi district were the labour recruitment agencies: RMLB and WNLA, Balovale Trades School, Balovale, Kavumbu, Mapachi and Sanjongo primary schools, Zambezi River Transport, Zambezi boma, CMML mission stations at Chitokoloki, Chavum, Dipalata and Kamapanda, Balovale hospital and Balovale prison. The Barotse markets included Mongu and Kalabo districts, Senanga Famine Relief Centre, the Paris Evangelical Mission Society and the Capuchin Friars Mission Station at Lukulu. Nchanga mine and Chingola district were the other markets.

Prior to 1938, maize was the most highly priced crop grown, sold and demanded in large quantities by the expanding industrial centres of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. This had largely been responsible for the marginalisation of other food crops such as cassava, bulrush millet, sorghum, rice and sweet potatoes. However, this trend was sharply reversed due to an acute maize shortage that had necessitated
not account for produce bought by African traders and that sold privately elsewhere.

Amounts of produce quoted reflect official figures from the returns of European traders and do

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Barley</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Beans</th>
<th>Millet</th>
<th>Groundnuts</th>
<th>Tobacco</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

Quantify of Agricultural Produce Purchased in Zambezi District, 1947-1964
### Table 3

**NATIVE INTAKE AND SALES: 1935/36-1960/61**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop Year</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Total Local Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935/36</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937/37</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937/38</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938/39</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939/40</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940/41</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941/42</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942/43</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943/44</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944/45</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945/46</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946/47</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947/48</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948/49</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949/50</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951/52</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>1,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952/53</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>1,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953/54</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>1,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954/55</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>1,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955/56</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>1,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956/57</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>1,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957/58</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>1,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958/59</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>1,537</td>
<td>1,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959/60</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>1,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>2,253</td>
<td>1,386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3

**NATIVE INTAKE AND SALES: 1935/36-1960/61**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop year</th>
<th>Actual Deliveries to Board (000 bags)</th>
<th>Sales (000 bags)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European</td>
<td>African</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935/36</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937/37</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937/38</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938/39</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939/40</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940/41</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941/42</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942/43</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943/44</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944/45</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945/46</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946/47</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947/48</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948/49</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949/50</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951/52</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952/53</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953/54</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954/55</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955/56</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956/57</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957/58</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958/59</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959/60</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1935, there were three African storekeepers and sixty-four hawkerst
in Zambezi sub-district. In 1938, "...most of the hawkers' licences issued in Barotseland were issued in Balovale district" such that by 1940, there were fifteen African storekeepers and 115 hawkers dealing in foodstuff, cloth and blankets. By 1949, there were 160 African storekeepers and seventy hawkers. The emergence of many African traders, in addition to European traders in the district, helped the indigenous food producers to overcome transport and market constraints. An African farmer-cum-trader owned a canoe while a European trader owned a lorry. The emergent African trader procured food from indigenous farmers in return for cloth which he also received from a European trader in return for food deliveries made. The European traders in turn sold the food within and outside the district at a high profit. The lucrative Barotse trade lured many African traders who paddled to and from. The inception of Zambezi River Transport that ferried food to Barotseland at a fee boosted trade further. Consequently, this trade played a pivotal role in the rise of the Luvale-Lunda peasantry.

Role of the CMML 1930s-1945

The CMML enjoyed immense influence in the district until 1941 when the local peoples' faith in "...evangelism as an end in itself" started waning. Being materialist and practical, the Luvale-Lunda eventually realised the CMML had little or nothing tangible to offer.

The CMML mission stations failed to provide a more viable and realistic educational programme. The existing Teacher Training School
and Upper primary school classes at Chitokoloki, nine Middle schools and thirty-seven elementary schools in the district offered no instruction in improved farming and animal husbandry by 1947. Although elementary gardening was voluntarily taught at Chitokoloki, it was not part of missionary education. As a matter of fact, the CMML had little or no interest in educational matters except in the spiritual welfare of Africans.

In an effort to reduce their dependence on peasants, the missionaries had small gardens which gave them extra food especially fruits, vegetables, rice, groundnuts, maize, castor oil, cotton and Irish potatoes. Since mission stations needed large stocks of food if they were to adequately take care of the aged, orphans and patients, they continued to rely on peasants for cassava meal, bulrush millet, groundnuts and beans.

In relation to the local peasantry, there was connivance between the CMML, the colonial government and mining companies to a certain extent. According to C.M.N White, a former District Commissioner for Zambezi district, the CMML played an intermediary role between villagers and colonial officials. Africans had more trust in missionaries, as men of God, than in government officials. Despite being aware of difficulties the Luvale-Lunda experienced in raising "tax money", missionaries encouraged the Africans to pay the tax so as to enable the government to provide certain social services. Chikwamanga had this to say on taxation:

Missionaries used to lecture to African converts and pupils on the need to pay tax. As Christians, they expected us to obey the law. We started paying
tax when we were pupils at School. However, the missionaries at Chitokoloki, especially George Suckling, paid on our behalf since we were pupils. In addition, Suckling paid for tax-defaulting CMML converts. By so doing, the CMML demonstrated to the people that paying tax was one of their main moral responsibilities to the colonial government and that the government had no sinister motive in levying them. This demonstrates that the Church overtly connived with the colonial state apparatus in the proletarianisation of the Luvale-Lunda.

Impact of the Second World War

The desire to win the Second World War by the Allied powers and increased post-war industrialisation and reconstruction in Europe, which needed more base metals led to the liberalisation of the agricultural policy in Northern Rhodesia. The colonial government desperately sought possible ways and means of increasing both mineral and agricultural output. Increasing proletarianisation on the Copperbelt mines and failure by settler-farmers and along-the-line-of-rail peasantry to meet the local maize demand (See Table 3) compelled the government to become less hostile towards peasants producing both cash and non-cash or marginal crops. Consequently, the government began buying food from anyone, black and white. This greatly boosted peasant farming in Zambezi district.

In view of such developments, cassava assumed a high commercial value and government recognition as it successfully supplemented the maize diet and supply to the Copperbelt where maize meal rations to employees were even cut "...by as much as one quarter" from 1942
onwards. In Zambezi district, the Department of Agriculture established collection points along the main road from Chavuma to Mpidi (See Map 2) and started buying food directly from the indigenous farmers after 1940. In addition, European traders operating in the district established more buying stations in various parts of the district (See Table 1) as demand for food stepped up on the Copperbelt.\(^7\)

The Copperbelt-Zambezi road was finally completed in 1942 as the colonial government and mining companies sought easier access to labour and food in Zambezi district.\(^4\) This led to the proliferation of individual transporters, both European and African, who transported both agricultural produce and people between the district and the Copperbelt. The European-owned Northern Transport Company and Balovale Transport Services ran lorry transport between Zambezi and Chingola. African transporters like Kazunga and Duncan Sichula ran lorry transport too at even cheaper rates of 1/2d per lb for goods and 1p 3s 6d per passenger. In addition to lorry transport, Kanaji Chilanda and Sons Transport, James Mangwende Transport and Musangu and Brothers Transport offered bus services.\(^6\) These transporters also bought indigenous food which they sold on the Copperbelt markets. In response, the Luvale-Lunda cultivators stepped up the production of various kinds of food which were on high demand on the Copperbelt (See Table 2). In addition, Lozi-speaking people started paddling to Zambezi district to purchase the cassava meal and bulrush millet at two pounds per bag as much of the local agricultural produce found its way to the Copperbelt. In Barotseland, the same bag fetched three pounds.\(^7\) Due to flourishing peasant farming in Zambezi district and Barotseland’s heavy dependence
on the Luvale-Lunda peasantry for food, the district became known as the "Granary of Barotseland" by 1948\(^2\).

The 1947/48 season not only recorded surplus food production but the highest groundnut harvest in the district. Areas ruled by Chiefs Kucheka and Chinyama Litapi on the West bank and Mpidi on the East bank had bumper groundnut harvests but for transport and market constraints\(^3\).

The gradual transformation of the Luvale-Lunda food producers into a peasantry contributed immensely to the declining pace of labour migration as more taxable male adults became increasingly involved in peasant farming activities\(^2\). Increased agricultural sales helped many local people to settle their colonial tax without having to migrate to urban centres or waiting for remittances from their labour-migrant relatives.

This section has demonstrated that the Second World War greatly boosted trade in indigenous food between Zambezi district and the Copperbelt, in addition to the Barotse market. In addition, it has been highlighted that despite encouraging the production of both cash and non-cash crops, the colonial state did nothing tangible towards improving indigenous farming in the district\(^4\). The Luvale-Lunda simply became responsive and resourceful within the existing indigenous agricultural framework.

The Impact of Labour Migration, 1930-1951

By 1938, Zambezi sub-district had the highest number of labour migrants working on the Northern Rhodesian mines, as Table 4
illustrates. Despite remaining an important labour reservoir for the mining industry in Northern Rhodesia by 1951\textsuperscript{73}, the area produced and sold a considerable amount of food such that in 1953, even local representatives of the colonial government acknowledged the district’s agricultural viability\textsuperscript{76}. This suggests that proletarianisation failed to undermine peasant farming as envisaged by colonial authorities.

During this period, many Luvale-Lunda men made only single migratory journeys to centres of employment in Southern and Northern Rhodesia largely due to travel and work hardships experienced. In addition, most labour migrants were young men and unaccompanied by their wives and children. Some of these stayed away from Zambezi district for twenty to thirty years or permanently\textsuperscript{77}. Since the local cassava-based agricultural economy needed less work and attention, the remaining female labour sufficed\textsuperscript{78}. Moreover, the returning labour migrants did not invest their earnings in peasant farming at all. While the majority settled back to routine village life, a few became traders\textsuperscript{79}. Therefore, it could be safe to argue that although Luvale-Lunda men were proletarianised on a large scale, labour migration did not seriously dislocate peasant farming in Zambezi district.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Strike</th>
<th>Easting</th>
<th>Northing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Province</td>
<td>Ndola</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>2,412</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luangwa</td>
<td>3,47</td>
<td>68,16</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kitwe</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kasempa</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>2,204</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Province</td>
<td>Mapico</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>2,637</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lumangwa</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3,306</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kasempa</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>1,367</td>
<td>1,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chim solitary</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abercorn</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Province</td>
<td>Nkana Mulitira</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>2,85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mine Hill</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3,465</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,07</td>
<td>3,620</td>
<td>3,90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**By August 1938**

Origin of African Labour Employed on: Northern Rhodesia Mines

**Table 4**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.225</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>1.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>1,786</td>
<td>2093</td>
<td>2063</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1,079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Provincial Commission's Report dated October 14, 1983, NWA, KWM 2/1, MNLA Recruitment, 1938-40.
The Ecological Constraint, 1945-1951

The survival instinct enabled Luvale speaking groups living further inland on the West bank to overcome persistent floods and ravages caused by wild animals by concentrating more on fishing than agriculture\(^{60}\). The abundant fish was exchanged for bulrush millet and cassava meal brought from the East bank. To a certain extent, this boosted peasant farming in the district.

The agricultural efforts made by villagers living in the Lungwevungu-Lutembe area were frustrated by persistent floods and ravages caused by wild animals like the Water buck and Eland in their fields despite erected fences. The government played a key role in undermining farming in these areas by passing hunting restrictions under Sections 30 and 35 of Game Ordinance Number 47 of 1941 which forbade Africans from killing wild animals illegally and remaining indifferent to pleas for help by the affected villagers\(^{62}\). As a result, the villagers living on the West bank were compelled to turn to and intensify fishing and the bartering of fish for bulrush millet and cassava meal from the 1940s onwards.

In the 1940s and 1950s the growers of bulrush millet and cassava from the East bank exchanged their meal for fish at the Lutembe, Lungwevungu and Kasheji rivers. In turn, the fish was sold to African traders coming from the Copperbelt, mission stations, primary schools, labour recruiters, Balovale prison, Balovale hospital, individual consumers or taken to the Copperbelt markets. With the improvement of transport services to the Copperbelt, the fish trade started booming from 1945\(^{62}\). Consequently, the lucrative fish trade
boosted peasant farming on the East bank until about 1956 when stiff competition from the nearer Luapula Province and Kafue Fisheries gradually reduced the market for fish from Zambezi district. Average fish costs and profits were as follows:

1. Buying at Sefu 20 sacks at 11/- per sack = 11p:2s:0d
2. Carriers to Chavuma 20 sacks = 1p:0s:0d
3. Canoe and Paddlers to Zambezi 6/- per canoe load 10 sacks = 1p:12s:6d
4. Transport to Chingola return fare = 2p:7s:6d
5. 20 bags = 10p:0s:0d

Total 25p:1s:6d

After selling the fish at 3d/4oz on the Copperbelt markets, a trader realised a profit of about 16p on twenty sacks.

It was not until 1948 that the colonial government started establishing African primary schools in the district just when the CMML’s educational programme was fading out. Like the preceding CMML’s educational programme, that of the Crown government did not offer agricultural education and therefore had no bearing whatsoever on African agriculture.

In conclusion, it is worth emphasising that transport facilities to the Copperbelt were easily made available to those engaged in the fish trade by transporters like B.P. Rudge who offered to transport fish and traders on deferred payments. Payments were made upon selling the merchandise in Chingola. In addition, this section has demonstrated...
that the Luvale easily overcame ecological constraints on the West bank by intensifying fishing that brought in cassava and bulrush millet through barter trade. Older land tenure was preserved with traditional practices. Peasant Differentiation, 1936-1951

This period saw the emergence of a stratified or differentiated Luval-Lunda peasantry as the local food producers responded differently to transport and market facilities. While those who responded favourably became rich and middle peasants, those that failed to do so became poor peasants.

By 1951, prosperous Luvale-Lunda peasants were over a hundred in the district. They were located mainly in the more fertile areas of Mpidi, Makondu valley and Chavuma. The availability of transport facilities to the Copperbelt where demand for food was high after 1942 contributed immensely to the emergence of more rich peasants. These produced food regularly for the market using the hoe and axe technology and traditional methods of farming. The only rich peasant farmer who owned an ox-plough was Senior Chief Ishindi. In order to increase their agricultural output, the rich peasants hired extra labour in addition to family labour, which they paid in kind with such items as salt, fish and cloth. Consequently, some rich peasants became strictly traders as the Copperbelt market became more lucrative.

There were also middle level peasants in the area who were more numerous than the rich peasants. Their production of food for sale was irregular and low. When conditions became favourable, they achieved good yields. They also used traditional farming methods. As demand for
food increased within and outside the district, middle peasants organised village beer-parties in an effort to secure additional agricultural labour. Quite a good number were peasant-cum-traders.

Finally, there were the poor peasants too. These were small scale tillers who held small plots of land which enabled them to satisfy their immediate family needs only. However, they also sold small amounts of food to CMML missionaries and to both African and European traders. These mainly lived in the inaccessible parts of the district and were in the majority. A poor peasant family owned a traditional hoe and axe but occasionally borrowed extra ones from relatives.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that in spite of the hostile Company government and indifferent Crown government, the Luvale-Lunda, applying indigenous agricultural methods, produced adequately for the colonial market. Ox-ploughs started arriving in the district in small numbers and were expensive to hire. In 1947, the district had only one plough and it so happened that Zambezi was the only district in the whole of North-Western Province with a plough! In 1951, there were only two ploughs in the district. As labour migration started showing a downward trend in the late 1940s due to booming trade in agricultural produce and fish, colonial authorities became alarmed and decided to reverse the trend by legislation from 1951.

NOTES


11. See NAZ, KDE8/1/8, Barotsje Province District Annual Reports, March 1911.


19. CMML Missionaries were professionals in medicine, education, agriculture and construction.


22. See NAZ, KDE8/1/8, 1916: NAZ, KDE8/1/10, 1918/19 and Annual Reports.


27. NAZ, KDE8/1/21, 1929.


30. NAZ, KDE8/2/1, Balovale District Tour Reports, 1926-29.

31. See Zambezi sub-district Assistant Magistrate’s Report dated December 3, 1926, NAZ, KDE8/1/18, 1926.

32. NAZ, KDE 8/1/21, 1929.

33. See Wilkin, "To the Bottom of the Heap", p. 304.

34. NAZ, KDE8/1/21, 1929.


38. See NAZ, SEC3/66, Repatriation of Unemployed Northern Rhodesia Natives to their Villages, 1933-47.


41. For more details on the impact of the locust invasion in different parts of Northern Rhodesia between 1929 and 1940, see Chipungu, "Locusts, Settlers, Peasants and the Colonial State", 54-80.


43. Interview, Chikwamanga. Chikwamanga's testimony was corroborated by evidence given in a separate interview by Nelson Chikomo and Kaputungu M Sangambo at Mize, December 13, 1989.

44. See Chipungu, "Locusts, Settlers, Peasants and the Colonial State", p.63; Chipungu, The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation, p.37. The author has stated that the colonial state had turned to cassava as a remedy between 1910 and 1930s when crop failure threatened many parts of Northern Rhodesia.


47. The Copperbelt-Zambezi road link was completed in 1942. An improved transport infrastructure boosted trade between Zambezi and the Copperbelt market. See NAZ, KTW1/1, 1907-64; Sangambo, The History of the Luvale, p. 69; White, A Preliminary Survey, p.28.


50. 5p was enough capital needed for an African to acquire a hawker's licence: See NAZ, SEC2/156, Western Province District Annual Report on African Affairs, 1949.


53. NAZ, SEC2/998, 1936.


56. NAZ, SEC2/154, Western Province District Annual Reports on Native Affairs, 1947.

57. Interviews, Chikwamanga; Jonas M. Kaselenga, Zambesi, December 11, 1980; Mbilishi; John Njolomba, Mushena, December 3, 1980. While Chikwamanga and Mbilishi are ex-Chitokoloki Mission pupils and teachers, Kaselenga and Njolomba are ex pupils of Chitokoloki Mission.


59. In most cases, patients were fed by their accompanying relatives.

60. White, Elements in Luvale Beliefs, p. 69.
61. Interview, Chikwamanga. Msawanamumi's evidence corroborated Chikwamanga's evidence in a separate interview.

62. See Wilkin, "To the Bottom of the Heap", p. 258.


64. Non-cash or marginal crops were cassava, beans, sorghum, rice, bulrush millet and sweet potatoes.


74. See NAZ, SEC3/460, Development Plans–Agricultural Department, 1945-47.


76. See Tour Report No. 8, NAZ, SEC2/995, 1953.

77. See NAZ, SEC2/988, 1938-40; White, A Preliminary Survey, p. 49.

78. See Tour Report No. 1, Minute D, NAZ, SEC2/989, 1940.

79. Interviews, Chizau; John R Ibwenku, Zambezi, December 9, 1989; Nsawanamumi.


82. For instance, 3,000 bundles/sacks of fish weighing one hundred pounds each officially left the district for the Copperbelt in 1950: See Tour Report No. 11, Annexure D, NAZ, SEC2/993, 1951.

83. See NAZ, SEC2/992, 1950.


Interview, Samahanda.


This chapter examines the relationship between state legislation and peasant resilience between 1931 and 1941. Specifically, it considers the shifting colonial policy towards marginal peasant farming and the response of the Luise-Lunda peasantry thereto. It also focuses on the factors that made it possible for the Luise-Lunda food producers to carve themselves a niche in the colonial market structure amidst hostile state policies.

A Hostile Colonial State, 1950-1963

The settler-dominated state deliberately sought the abandonment of rural development from 1941 onwards, apparently in response to reduced demand for food on the Copperbelt and rising demand for cheap African labour in South Africa. The state became hostile towards the flourishing Luise-Lunda peasants and sharply contradicted its post-Second World War policy as a means to resist peasant farming. However, this analysis argues that the Luise-Lunda defied the 1951 government-ban on price-control measures meant to ensure “excessive” sales of the cassava meal to Barotseland due to high production, high profits and sustained demand for the commodity.

In a desperate attempt to thwart peasant farming in the district and devote the reluctant young men to South Africa, the government banned cassava meal sales to Barotseland in 1951 and froze prices of “Native” crops in 1952, except that of maize. In addition, a higher tax rate and other fees were imposed on the Africans (see Table 5 below).
CHAPTER THREE: LEGISLATION AND RESILIENCE, 1951-1964

This chapter examines the relationship between state legislation and peasant resilience between 1951 and 1964. Specifically, it considers the changing colonial policy towards marginal peasant farming and the response of the Luvale-Lunda peasantry thereto. It also focuses on the factors that made it possible for the Luvale-Lunda food producers to carve themselves a niche in the colonial market structure amidst hostile state policies.

A Hostile Colonial State, 1950-1953

The settler-dominated state deliberately sought the abandonment of rural development from 1951 onwards, apparently in response to reduced demand for food on the Copperbelt and rising demand for cheap African labour in South Africa. The state became hostile towards the flourishing Luvale-Lunda peasants and sharply contradicted its post-Second World War policy vis-a-vis peasant farming. However, this section argues that the Luvale-Lunda defied the 1951 government-ban and price-control measure meant to abate "excessive" sales of the cassava meal to Barotseland due to high production, high profits and sustained demand for the commodity.

In a desperate attempt to thwart peasant farming in the district and deviate the reluctant young men to South Africa, the government banned cassava meal sales to Barotseland in 1951 and froze prices of "Native" crops in 1952, except that of maize. In addition, a higher tax rate and other fees were imposed on the Africans (See Table 5 below).
Table 5
NATIVE TAX, LICENCES AND FEES, 1952-1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poll tax</td>
<td>6/-</td>
<td>6/-</td>
<td>6/-</td>
<td>6/-</td>
<td>10/-</td>
<td>10/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levy</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>3/-</td>
<td>7/6</td>
<td>7/6</td>
<td>7/6</td>
<td>10/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms licence</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>5/-</td>
<td>5/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer permit</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>1/6</td>
<td>1/6</td>
<td>1/6</td>
<td>2/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing Fees</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>2/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summons</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>6d</td>
<td>2/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totala</td>
<td>16/6</td>
<td>17/6</td>
<td>22/6</td>
<td>24/-</td>
<td>30/-</td>
<td>39/6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tour report No. 1, NAZ, SEC.2/999, Zambezi District Tour Reports, 1957.

*Total refers to an average amount an African was expected to pay per annum.

To ensure that no bag left for Barotseland, a permanent messenger-patrol, although it proved ineffective, was stationed on the lower Zambezi river at Nyamboma. In response, the Luvale-Lunda not only stopped selling cassava meal locally, at a lower fixed price of 15s per bag, but resorted to smuggling it to Barotseland where a bag fetched three pounds or a cow. However, in an effort to abate smuggling that was becoming rife, the government decided, in December 1952, to allow cassava meal sales by Africans from the district, but upon securing an "export permit" at the boma and paying a levy of two shillings on each
bag. Nevertheless, only a trickle of cassava bags officially left the district while more continued to be smuggled out. While these hard measures elicited resentment among the peasants, they cheered colonial officials like D. B. Hall, the Officer-in-Charge of the North-Western area, who commended the District Commissioner for Zambezi district for "thwarting" cassava sales to Barotseland by 1952.

Despite state hostility, cassava, groundnuts and beans continued to be grown and traded extensively, although largely privately, in Mpindi and Chavuma became a flourishing peasant farming and trading area too. Overall, the peasants remained resilient and maintained their production levels to such an extent that even the District Commissioner for Zambezi, C. N. Lawrence, acknowledged the district's agricultural viability by 1953 in the following words: "Balovale is both actually and potentially a district of great importance to the economies of the territory in view of its considerable export of food...".

Impact of the Federal Government

The Federal government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland strove to promote Settler farming at the expense of African farming. However, the role of the government became contradictory in due course as conditions compelled it to try to secure social conditions necessary for the reproduction of both the dominant capitalist mode and the subservient pre-capitalist mode. The realisation of maize surplus from 1953 onwards led to the marginalisation, once again, of other crops from remote places like Zambezi district. In addition, the Rural Economic
Development Working Plan (1961-1965) emphasised that in the more remote areas like North-Western, Barotse, Northern, Luapula, northern parts of Central Province and western parts of Southern Province which had long and expensive lines of communication to national, regional and export markets ....... agricultural development [was to] be on cash crops which [had] a high value to weight ratio and on livestock providing disease considerations [permitted] live movements to national markets.

However, the major drawback of the Working Plan was its emphasis on the reinforcement of success in the already developed agricultural areas of Central, Southern and Eastern Provinces and its lukewarm attitude towards other areas.

It was not until June 1957 that the first Zambezi District Education Officer, J.M. Dunning, who was specifically concerned with the district, was appointed. This gave hope for local African education improvement and expansion. However, the new 1957 Primary School Syllabus removed gardening from standard three upwards. The teaching of agricultural science to the local people was not considered important by colonial authorities.

By 1959, Local Education Authority and mission schools at the boma, Mapachi, Chavuma, Kawumbu, Dipalata, Sanjongo, Chitokoloki Mission, Chavuma Mission and Chinyingi Mission had school gardens which were meant to supplement government feeding efforts. The idea was to reduce government expenditure on African affairs as much as possible. Unfortunately, this project failed despite being supervised by African agricultural assistants from the Department of Agriculture.
By 1962, local primary education had little to offer in terms of imparting and disseminating techniques of improved farming in the area. Gardening was simply an extra-curricular activity that was not even catered for in the normal school time-table.14

A major weakness of the education system offered to Africans in Zambezi district by 1964 vis-a-vis peasant farming was its failure to impart more meaningful methods of improved farming like the use of the plough and modern fertilisers. Pupils were only taught how to prepare compost manure and transplant seedlings. The Luvale-Lunda responded positively to market opportunities between 1953 and 1964 largely by the application of traditional agricultural know-how and local initiative, rather than through anything they had been taught at school.

Responding to Market Opportunities, 1953–1964

In 1954, Zambezi district recorded an increase in the production of cassava, rice, groundnuts and fairly good yields of other crops (See Table 2). Lowered and frozen producer prices of marginal crops failed to deter peasant-production. This overt peasant resilience did not miss the keen eye of colonial officials who noted that "the Africans in all parts of [North-Western] province show some interest in the possibilities of growing crops for sale, but they are handicapped by ignorance of methods and markets."15

Despite embarking on an ambitious self-sufficiency food programme, Barotseland received 5,000 bags of cassava meal from Zambezi in 1954."15 The Federal Grain Marketing Board's levy of 7s 6d per bag of groundnuts sold in urban areas and lower producer prices offered
compelled the Luvale-Lunda to resort to smuggling groundnuts, beeswax, rice and dried fish to Portuguese traders operating from across the border in Chavuma and Lungwevungu - Kashiji area in the 1950s. The Copperbelt continued receiving supplies of groundnuts, rice, Turkish tobacco and beeswax from the district. Flourishing peasant farming saw the emergence of about 240 African traders in the district who traded in both agricultural produce and European goods by 1955. At this juncture, White’s conclusion in 1959 that agricultural production for sale was about twice as important in the local economy as was generally supposed and that an average family derived about twenty-nine per cent of its income from agriculture will suffice.

Between 1953 and 1964, the peasants had to put up with serious technical, transport and market constraints. For instance, in 1954 Luvale and Lunda Native Authorities had two ox-ploughs, respectively, which were only hired by a handful of elite villagers. The ploughs were not only inadequate but expensive to hire.

Speeches of welcome made by Chieftainess Luweji and Chief Ishindi on the occasion of the visit by Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Evelyn D. Hone on May 2, 1960 illustrate the transport and market constraints experienced by peasant farmers in the district. Part of chieftainess Luweji’s speech was:

We know we cannot do very much until there are good roads on which motor-trucks can pass easily, quickly and cheaply to take away our produce from the district to the markets and bring back the goods of the Europeans which we need for our development.
Part of Chief Ishindi's speech was:

We would like in this connection to ask the government to consider the possibility of subsidising the marketing of crops in this area, in order that growers of these commodities which are sold locally and abroad are encouraged to do so on a larger scale and help to improve the stabilisation of the economy in the area."

Despite being aware of and appreciating the constraints tabled before him, Sir Evelyn avoided committing the territorial government and the constraints remained unresolved. Due to the serious constraints the Luvale-Lunda peasants had to contend with, credit ought to be given to them for their resilience.

The Rice Scheme

The compulsory rice scheme marked the beginning of gradual government-involvement in peasant farming in Zambezi district. Upon realising that the West bank had a long tradition of rice-growing, colonial authorities decided to boost it in a desperate attempt to undermine the cassava agricultural economy and proletarianise the local young men. However, lack of a viable market for rice in the territory made the scheme fall into abeyance by 1960.

Due to rice-seed distribution on the West bank by the Department of Agriculture between 1948 and 1951, rice was grown and traded in almost every village. Prominent European traders operating in the district, especially Rudge and Serrano, bought large quantities from the peasants. Unfortunately, the market for rice in the territory was so limited that about 1956 European traders reduced their local purchases. Upon realising that rice lacked a viable market in the
territory, the Luvale-Lunda peasants became very reluctant to grow it.

Upon becoming aware of the inherent constraints of rice cash-cropping as early as 1952, colonial authorities resorted to compelling the Luvale living on the West bank to grow it both for subsistence and commercial purposes. Fear actually forced many to grow the rice. In reaction to numerous complaints by the Luvale-Lunda about lack of a market for rice, J.I. Alexander, the Agricultural Officer for Zambezi district, had this to say: "Letters have been written to the Lunda and Luvale Native Authorities stressing that this Department will not guarantee a market for rice and that the rice is intended as a dietary alternative to cassava." Compelling the inhabitants of the West bank to grow the marketless rice demonstrates the government's determination to thwart genuine peasant farming and proletarianise the young men. However, the rice scheme collapsed in 1960 and colonial authorities became pre-occupied with the maize issue and other developmental schemes.

Despite being aware of the district's deficiency as a maize-growing area, colonial authorities, in another attempt to proletarianise the reluctant local young men for the South African industries, started encouraging the consumption and production of maize at the expense of the staple food crop, cassava, in the 1950s. The maize meal was to be transported from the Copperbelt by the government and, therefore, could only be acquired on cash basis. However, the maize meal, selling at 51/2d per lb, was not only shunned by the local people but it failed to undermine cassava-growing as envisaged.
The colonial authorities also tried to take advantage of the mechanisation of the Copperbelt mines from the early 1950s that had rendered many Africans jobless and compelled some discharged Luvale-Lunda men to return to Zambezi district. Upon being convinced that many Luvale-Lunda men had limited income-generating sources in Zambezi district, WNLA was granted permission by the government, in 1957, to start recruiting labour in the district at the rate of 500 men per annum. The WNLA recruiting camp was even shifted from Nguvu to the boma in order to make use of air services in the transportation of recruits. However, few Luvale-Lunda men left for South Africa.

The Ecological Constraint

Between 1952 and 1960, famine had threatened the inhabitants of Mpidi, South Mize and Kucheka areas not necessarily due to excessive cassava sales to Barotseland as reported by colonial authorities but due to ravages caused by state-protected animals like the Eland, Waterbuck, Bush pig and Hippopotamus. It was becoming increasingly hopeless to cultivate big gardens when wild animals ravaged them at will. A children’s song common in Chief Mpidi's area in 1958 that succinctly portrayed the acuteness of hovering famine in the affected areas had these lyrics: "Kuli nzala, mama, nikwiya!" ("There’s, famine, mother, I'll steal!") Unfortunately, the government did nothing tangible to help the affected Africans who desperately sought its intervention.

It was not until 1955 that the Department of Agriculture, in an effort to combat famine, sent an African agricultural assistant to the
West bank for agricultural demonstrations and distribution of the vegetable-seed in addition to the on-going compulsory rice scheme. The Department also embarked on the improvement of cattle-breeding in Zambezi and Kabompo districts from 1955. To this effect, the government imported "country stock" from Bechuanaland and transported it to the two districts in 1956. Over 350 head of this breeding stock, which formed the basis of the district's "cattle bank", was loaned to the peasants of Mukandankunda, Chavuma, Mize and Kucheka between 1956 and 1961. The Capitaos-in-charge from the Department of Agriculture supervised the loans, upkeep and utilisation of cattle in the villages. The cattle loan scheme cheered up the local peasants since it defeated the 1952 Barotse Native Government's ban of cattle exports to Zambezi district. However, cattle was bred on a small scale and only for consumption within the district (See Table 6 below).

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>7,223</td>
<td>2,093</td>
<td>2,741</td>
<td>4,661</td>
<td>7,196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: NAZ, SEC2/71, Vol. 2, Annual Reports on Native Affairs of the Barotse Province, 1936; annexure II, NAZ, SEC2/154 Western Province District

While the cattle scheme thrived, the crop-growing sector, especially on the West bank, suffered from government-neglect. By not dealing with the devastating game issue, the government's efforts at ameliorating the lot of the affected peasants through seed-distribution and cattle loans were in vain. Although the government launched the Nyamonga Corridor Resettlement Scheme in another attempt to combat famine in Mpidi area, the onus was on the affected peasants to improve their own lot or perish.

The Nyamonga Corridor Resettlement Scheme was launched under the auspices of the Lunda Native Authority when a hundred new gardens were cleared, demarcated and allocated to villagers in the "Nyamonga corridor" of Chief Mpidi's area in May-June, 1960. The purpose of the scheme was to help combat hunger in the area by stabilising and improving subsistence farming through controlled shifting cultivation and systematic movement of villages to new areas. To this effect, only the cultivation of the local staple food crop, cassava and the much sought cash crop, groundnuts, was encouraged in the "corridor."

However, it became difficult for the Native Authority to alter and control customary land tenure and land use in the "corridor". As a result, the scheme collapsed by 1961. On the other hand, the Kasenzi Peasant Farming Scheme (KPFs) and the Turkish Tobacco Farming Scheme (TTFS), which had been established earlier than the Resettlement Scheme and which form our next subject, survived up to 1965 and 1964, respectively.
The Peasant Farming Schemes, 1958-1965

Since the government was aware of the Luvale-Lunda's suspicions and reluctance to undertake any more government-sponsored schemes on the grounds that the government "... was always making false promises to the people, that if they grew a certain crop they would make a good profit"\textsuperscript{37}, the Department of Agriculture vigorously advertised and established the KPFS and the TTFS in 1958 and 1959, respectively, ten years after the establishment of the first peasant scheme in the country\textsuperscript{38}. Taking off on a low note, both schemes consequently became popular among the local peasants due to certain overt benefits the participants accrued in due course.

The area chosen for the Peasant Farming Scheme by the Department was Kasenzi (Chikumina), a rich agricultural area lying in the Makondu Valley near Mukandankunda. The two pioneer rich peasant farmers were Senior Chief Ishindi Dawson Muhongo and Kabobola Masuwa who grew cassava, maize, groundnuts and Turkish tobacco\textsuperscript{39}. By 1960, the number of peasant farmers had reached the earmarked target of six (See Table 7 below) while North-Western Province had a total of thirty-two\textsuperscript{40}. 
Table 7
THE KASENZI PEASANT FARMING SCHEME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Joseph Chijingu</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6 bales</td>
<td>12 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Matias J. Mbundu</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7 bales</td>
<td>45 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mukvaka Dingamba</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9 bales</td>
<td>33 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Chief Ishindi</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8 bales</td>
<td>25 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Masuva Kabobola</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6 bales</td>
<td>36 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Chiyesu Kamangula</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5 bales</td>
<td>25 bags</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zambezi Department of Agriculture and Zambezi Farm Institute Reports, 1958-68.

's' refers to Turkish tobacco

Mbundu took over farm 2 from an ailing Samuel Kamboyi in Dec. 1958.

NB: Amounts of maize quoted were those officially sold to the Department of Agriculture and not those sold privately elsewhere and those retained for family consumption.

The KPFS was designed specifically for the purpose of getting additional food the territory required, laying the foundation for rural development and being a model to other food producers in the district. However, this section argues that the scheme was started merely to promote the production of certain cash crops required for export.

To ensure the success of the scheme, certain logistic considerations were taken care of. For instance, the Department of Agriculture sent two European agricultural officers and one livestock officer to Zambezi
district and organised agricultural tours outside the district/province for members of the Native Authorities and progressive Farmers. The Department also gave peasant farmers small loans to enable them to engage a minimum permanent workforce of six at the rate of 6d per day and temporary labour. It also undertook to buy and transport the peasant farmers' produce to markets. An African agricultural capitao and an agricultural assistant attended to the day to day affairs of the peasant farms in addition to performing advisory and extension work among the middle peasants.

No sooner had the KPFS been established than the first District Agricultural Show was held on July 26, 1958. Another Agricultural show, referred to as the Farmers' Day, was held at the Balovale Demonstration Farm in March 1962 and over one hundred peasant farmers attended. As intended, the annual agricultural show became an important meeting place where peasant farmers exchanged ideas and experiences on aspects of improved crop and animal husbandry.

The Balovale Demonstration Farm, supervised by an African agricultural assistant-in-charge, a senior agricultural capitao and three agricultural capitaos, was established in 1960/61 about one and a half Kilometres north of the boma for the purpose of awakening interest in new crops and improved farming. Despite having trial sections dealing with cattle and bee-keeping, fruit and tobacco-growing, fertilisers and a variety of crops, the Department never at all implemented the farm’s findings. This shows the colonial government did not cherish the idea of genuine peasant improvement and rural development.
Towards the end of 1963, the Department of Agriculture began training African agricultural staff at Kasenzi and Balovale Demonstration Farm in extension methods and commodity demonstration in crop and animal husbandry. At independence (1964), the Department had a trained African staff of five agricultural assistants, nine senior agricultural demonstrators and twenty-five Commodity demonstrators which worked with, advised and trained rich and middle peasants in improved farming in the district.

It was due to Chief Ishindi's success as a peasant farmer that the Department used him in hand-picking five other progressive farmers in his Chiefdom. To begin with, Chief Ishindi and Masuwa were given an ox-plough and four oxen each and were taught how to use them by an African Ox-trainer. At the end of 1958, the Chief's agricultural sales were 39p:3:3 while Masuwa's sales were 25p:11:10. By 1959, the five peasant farmers at Kasenzi were compelled to grow Turkish tobacco by the Department. In early 1960, the Department gave each one of the five peasant farmers six female breeding stock on loan and one Ngoni bull was entrusted with the Chief for use by the five peasant farmers. However, the stock loans disbursed in 1960 were withdrawn from four of the six peasant farmers in December 1961 as fluke infestation and Senkobo skin disease decimated a good number of cattle in the district in 1961. While the cattle industry thrived on the West bank, it failed on the East bank.

In view of the rising demand for groundnuts and Turkish tobacco in the territory, the colonial government sought ways and means of increasing local production of the two cash crops in the short term. As
a result, all necessary assistance was extended to a good number of middle peasants. For instance, ninety bags of the giant groundnut-seed were issued to over 1,000 middle peasants in 1963 by the Department. Modern fertilisers like 'D' and 'X' compound, Ammonium Sulphate and Ammonium Nitrate were loaned to both rich and middle peasants from the early 1960s. Generally, the agricultural yields of the two crops were good (See Table 2).

In conclusion, it would be worth noting that despite the limitations, the KPFS was generally a success until the independent Zambian government abolished it in 1965. The scheme became so popular in the district that by 1964 over forty-seven middle peasants in Chavuma and Chitokoloki had approached the Department of Agriculture with a view of wanting to become improved farmers.

Alongside the KPFS was the TTFS that functioned successfully until 1964 when it collapsed due to failure by the Department of Agriculture to buy all the tobacco produced in the district. To ensure that the scheme succeeded, the African tobacco growers, mostly middle peasants, were directly supervised by an African agricultural assistant-in-charge, agricultural assistants and agricultural capitaos. In addition, the Department loaned tobacco-seeds and pesticides to tobacco growers. Coupled with favourable climatic and ecological conditions, Turkish tobacco-growing became an immediate success. For instance, at the end of 1959, tobacco was grown by sixty-eight peasant farmers in the Makondu valley, Chitokoloki, Chinyingi, Lunkunyi and at Kasenzi. By 1964, the number of tobacco growers in the district had risen to 112.
The KPFS and the TTFS consequently led to sharp peasant differentiation in the district. Differential access to government assistance and market facilities largely contributed to the emergence of six peasant farmers and numerous middle peasant farmers while the majority remained in the so-called poor category. Due to lack of records, it is difficult to ascertain the actual numerical strength of the middle peasants in the district, although one could safely argue that they were over 1,000 by 1964.

While the district saw the emergence of six government-recognised rich peasants who enjoyed special government privileges, there were numerous middle peasants scattered all over the district, especially on the East bank. While some were granted small interest-free loans (in form of seeds and fertiliser only), on request, and free extension and advisory services, many declined to procure government-loans for fear of prosecution in case of failure to settle them. Although middle peasants relied heavily on family labour and indigenous farming methods and technology, they occasionally applied modern fertilisers and hired ox-ploughs from the Native Authorities and rich peasants. However, their market-production was lower than that for the rich peasants.

On the other hand, poor peasants formed the bulk of the population in the district. These relied solely on indigenous farming methods and technology and had no access to government assistance. Although bad seasons occasionally affected their agricultural production adversely, they had cassava to fall back on. As a matter of fact, they consistently sold small amounts of cassava meal to both African and European traders.
NOTES


3. See Tour Report No.11, Annexure G, NAZ, SEC2/994, 1952. A European trader was exempted from such measures.


9. See Lonsdale and Berman, "Coping with Contradictions", 487-505.


11. See NAZ, KTW1/1, 1907-64.


13. Chinyingi Catholic Mission Station was established by Irish Capuchin Fathers in 1955.


21. NAZ, KTW1/1, 1907-64.

22. NAZ, KTW1/1, 1907-64.

23. See District Commissioner's correspondence to the Provincial Commissioner, Tour/B/48, NAZ, SEC2/993, 1951.

24. Interview, Chikomo and Sangambo.


27. See March 1960 Monthly Report, Zambezi Department of Agriculture; Interview, Samahanda.


31. Interviews, Kaselenge; Mukuyu.


33. Tour Report No.6, Annexure 6, NAZ, SEC2/1000, 1958.


40. See NRG, Annual Reports of the Ministry of Agriculture.

41. See Dodge, Agricultural Policy and Performance, p. 26; Minutes of the North-Western Province Staff Conference held on September 12-14, 1960, BAH/COMM/5, 1959-67; NAZ, SEC2/336, 1948-49.

42. See NRG, Annual Reports of the Departments; NRG, Ministry of African Agriculture; Zambezi Department of Agriculture.

43. NAZ, KTW1/1, 1907-64.

44. NRG, Annual Reports of the Ministry of Agriculture, p. 9.

45. See NRG, Annual Reports of the Ministry of Agriculture, p. 9; BAH/STAFF//Z, Staff and General Correspondence, 1956-68.

46. See Hellen, Rural Economic Development, p.229; Zambezi Department of Agriculture.

47. December 1963 and 1964 Monthly Reports, Zambezi Department of Agriculture.

48. Chief Ishindi started peasant farming in 1946 at Mukandankunda. He became the first and only African farmer in the district to own a tractor before 1964.

49. See 1958-July 1959 Monthly Reports, Zambezi Department of Agriculture.


51. See November-December 1961 Monthly Reports, Zambezi Department of Agriculture.

52. See Minutes of the Staff Meeting held on November 13-14, 1964, BAH/COMM/5, 1959-67.

53. Interviews, Chief Ishindi; Moses M Madichi, Mukandankunda, December 17, 1989.

55. See Zambezi Department of Agriculture; Interview, Madichi.

56. See BAH/STAFF/Z, 1956-68.

57. Interview, Ibwenku; Madichi.

58. See September 1959 and August 1964 Monthly Reports, Zambezi Department of Agriculture.

59. Interviews, Madichi; Mwanangombi; Njolomba.

60. Interview, Madichi; Mukuyu.
CONCLUSION

Contrary to widely held views among many scholars of the Zambian peasantry, this case study has demonstrated that the Luvale-Lunda food producers attained peasantry qualities between 1936 and 1964 when they successfully and consistently produced both use-values and exchange-values. As a matter of fact, it was the indigenous agricultural set-up that produced and responded adequately to demands of the colonial market economy. Unlike areas like Southern and Eastern Provinces that benefited from modern agricultural methods and government-sponsored agricultural and rural development programmes, much of the agricultural success that was achieved in Zambezi district was largely due to indigenous farming methods, technology and initiative.

The study has also demonstrated that Zambezi district did not experience a distinct period of famine as it was a land of relative abundance in terms of use-values. The district’s "agricultural climate" has had the capacity to produce a variety of crops such as cassava, bulrush and finger millet, sorghum, beans, groundnuts, tobacco, sweet potatoes, rice, fruits and maize (in certain areas on the East bank). The diversified indigenous agricultural economy gave the Luvale-Lunda an adequate diet and a substantial surplus which they turned to considerable commercial use whenever market opportunities prevailed.

It has also been demonstrated that the male labour attrition rate from the district, in response to repressive colonial policies, was initially high but over the years it started subsiding as peasant farming became more lucrative. In fact, it was due to this development that the colonial government resorted to more stringent coercive
measures from the early 1950s in an attempt to secure the much needed but reluctant local African labour.

Moreover, male labour migration from Zambezi district to the industrial centres of employment on the Copperbelt, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa did not seriously affect agricultural work and production (positively or negatively). Peasantisation flourished alongside proletarianisation, contrary to Arrighi's model of the theory of proletarianisation which emphasises the elimination of a peasantry by the process of proletarianisation. Surplus food production at the height of labour recruitment/migration between 1936 and the late 1950s bears testimony to this argument. Sums of money sent or brought back to the district by labour migrants were not invested in farming at all but used in paying tax dues and in trade activities. Moreover, not only did female labour ably substitute the absent male labour but the nature and organisation of the Luvale-Lunda agricultural economy made it possible for local farming to withstand the pressures of prolonged proletarianisation.

Another conclusion reached by this study is that the agricultural sector of Zambezi district lagged behind at independence largely due to an undeveloped transport network, limited markets, undeveloped methods of agriculture and contradictions in the policy and practice of the colonial state. Colonial authorities simply neglected the local agricultural sector and only came in reluctantly after 1951 through the provision of limited logistic and extension facilities to a negligible number of selected successful peasant farmers and viable agricultural areas. While western education and the rice scheme failed to uplift the
lot of the Luvale-Lunda peasants, the KPFS failed to put the participant-peasants on a more sound and permanent modern agricultural footing as the scheme remained essentially experimental.

Finally, the dissertation has demonstrated that in spite of numerous technical, transport and market constraints, the indigenous Luvale-Lunda food producers remained resilient and successfully carved themselves a niche in the colonial market economy, especially between 1951 and 1964. The indigenous people's will to exist, the urgent need for material wealth and the viable traditional agricultural-economic set up triumphed over the prevailing impediments.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

SECONDARY SOURCES

(A) BOOKS AND ARTICLES


(B) DISSERTATIONS


PRIMARILY SOURCES

(A) OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS AND RECORDS

(I) NORTHERN RHODESIA GOVERNMENT (NRG)


(II) ZAMBEZI DISTRICT DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RECORDS

BAH/COMM/5, Agricultural Officers'/Staff Conferences, 1959-67.


BAH/STAFF/Z, Staff and General Correspondence, 1956-68.

ZA/DP/58, North-Western Province Development Plan, 1964-73.

Zambezi Department of Agriculture and Zambezi Farm Institute Monthly Reports, 1958-68.

(B) NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF ZAMBIA (NAZ)

(1) BS SERIES


BS2/150, Barotse Province District Annual Reports, March 1911.
BS3/65, RNLB Runners and Labour Recruitment in Balovale, December 1913-February 1914.

BS3/67, Barotse Province District Annual Reports, December 1913-February 1914.

(II) KDE SERIES

KDE2/3, Balovale-Barotse Dispute, 1936-41.

KDE8/1, Barotse Province District Annual Reports, 1907-29.

KDE8/2/1, Balovale District Tour Reports, 1926-29.

(III) KTW SERIES

KTW1/1, Zambezi District Notebook, 1907-64.

KTW2/1, WNLA Recruitment, 1938-40.

(IV) SEC SERIES

SEC2/67, Barotse Province Quarterly Reports, 1932.


SEC2/71, Vol. 9, Barotse Province Annual District Reports, 1940.

SEC2/137, North-Western Province Annual Reports, 1954-56.

SEC2/154, Western Province District Annual Reports on Native Affairs, 1947.


SEC2/159, Western Province District Annual Reports on African Affairs, 1950.

SEC2/279, Five Year Development Plan for Kaonde-Lunda Province, 1943.

SEC2/326, Vols. 1, 2 and 3, Native Land Tenure, 1938-48.
SEC2/336, Peasant Farm Blocks, 1948-49.


SEC2/1163, Peasant Farm Blocks, 1948.

SEC3/66, Repatriation of Unemployed Northern Rhodesia Natives to their Villages, 1933-47.

SEC3/460, Development Plans-Agricultural Department, 1945-47.

(V) ZP SERIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Date and Place of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kapomo L. Benson</td>
<td>June 17, 1960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalvocia J. Nervulu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bwambo M. Muhonoao</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Chief Ishindi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibemwau R. John</td>
<td>May 28, 1932</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chizau Silas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinyama William</td>
<td>March 2, 1916</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilenka V. Flick</td>
<td>May 1, 1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chikwamanga Paul Green</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chikwamanga Paul Green</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cooperative Union**

- December 9, 1989, Zambia
- December 12, 1989, Mwanda
- December 16, 1989, Mwanda

**Authority and Native Authority**

- December 17, 1989, Mwanda
- December 13, 1989, Mwanda
- December 14, 1989, Mwanda

**Local Government**

- December 1, 1989, Mwana
- December 18, 1989, Mwana
- December 19, 1989, Mwana
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sambanganu, Kapitngu</td>
<td>Authority, LuvaTe Naitve</td>
<td>December 13, 1999</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EX-Headmaster and Agricuild</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nsamanamwi, Edward</td>
<td>Surveyor, Local Court Justice and Ex-</td>
<td>August 1, 1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nsufu, Simion</td>
<td>Assistant Director of Works</td>
<td>October 20, 1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ncoloma, John</td>
<td>Carpenter, EX-Clerk/Clerk</td>
<td>September 19, 1925</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wmanganumo, Miller Elita</td>
<td>Authority, EX-Clerk/Secretary, LuvaTe Naitve</td>
<td>December 16, 1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wmukanuyo, Joseph</td>
<td>Accountant, Accounting Clerk and Shop</td>
<td>May 26, 1937</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbili, Samuel</td>
<td>Native Authority, Teacher and Treasurer, LuvaTe</td>
<td>December 16, 1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EX-Member of Central Committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madchi, Manuel Moses</td>
<td>Authority, Demonstration and Co-modity Demonstration</td>
<td>February 19, 1940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kukuy, Philipson</td>
<td>Director of Works</td>
<td>April 6, 1937</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaselenge, M. Jonas</td>
<td>Clerk Officer</td>
<td>December 9, 1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>