EMERGING CONFLICT THEMES IN THE TRANSKEI

by

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ABSTRACT

Racial conflict in South Africa stems from whites' determination to perpetuate their monopoly of land and cheap labour resources, by means of political supremacy, and African opposition to this control. This African opposition stems from the common values which industrial and urban society has created in the country and which lead Africans to assert their right to equality and to share in economic wealth. The escalation of conflict in the fifties and early sixties was due to intensified white efforts to entrench their position and intensified black efforts to resist and challenge this hegemony. The aspirations for the common society dominated African thinking in these years. Whites became increasingly dependent on coercion as a means of conflict resolution. The policy of territorial balkanization of the country, called separate development, is a white attempt to expel this conflict from the urban areas of white privilege by granting Africans autonomy in rural "Homelands" or "Bantustans" while retaining white control of economic wealth. The policy rejects racial integration which would end white privilege and instead seeks "political independence with economic interdependence". Africans living in the cities who are not employed by whites are expelled to the rural areas. Bantu Education is used to ensure that Africans will continue to remain a low-paid proletariat. Border industries, created near the Bantustans ensure that capital resources remain in white hands while black labour is located nearby. And the Bantustans themselves aim to give Africans citizenship of these rural, tribally defined areas while denying them such citizenship in the rest of the country. But
conflict in South Africa shows a distinct causal relationship between African aspirations and perceptions of deprivation on the one hand, and conflict, on the other. Whether or not such a relationship exists in the Bantustans as well, will determine whether or not such a policy of conflict externalization can succeed.

The Transkei is the prototype Bantustan. Here the chiefs have been given power and electoral representation has been confined to a minority of the seats in the Legislative Assembly. In 1963, when the elected seats went overwhelmingly to candidates opposing apartheid, the chiefs were able to ensure that their pro-apartheid leader formed the first Transkei government. Yet the Transkei Legislative Assembly has provided a platform for anti-apartheid criticism of the government and the small electoral mechanism has required the chiefs to seek a popular mandate for their policies. The result has been that the black version of apartheid has been expressed as a policy seeking an end to white domination and calling for a racially exclusive society free of white exploitation of blacks. In the 1968 election such racial symbols appear to have helped the chiefs win a majority of the elected seats. And their victory has led to a further intensification of grievance articulation against the white government. In the name of apartheid, the Transkei has demanded more land, greater economic development and independence for the region.

Poverty has also resulted in a renewal of populist agitation and violence (there was a populist revolt in 1960 against apartheid land policies) and this resurgence is likely to further intensify demands from the Transkei as chiefs attempt to maintain their new political support. Increasingly the
demands are being made in terms of African poverty and are inclusive of African life in the rest of South Africa as well as the Transkei. The relationship between persisting deprivation and conflict appears to hold for the Transkei as well.

The conflict externalization policy would thus appear to be misconceived. Events indicate that the urban African is likely to increase in numbers and thus the Transkei appears to be an additional source of conflict rather than a means of perpetuating white privilege.
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2  **The 1968 Transkei Election – Distribution of votes by winner.**
The Transkei occupies 16,330 square miles of the north-eastern Cape Province of South Africa. It is bounded by Natal in the north, the Indian Ocean in the east, the Kei River in the south and Lesotho in the north-west. Its people are predominantly Xhosa-speaking, although a minority speak Sesotho and there were, in 1963, some 20,000 whites (predominantly traders and farmers). The Transkei represents the last line of resistance of the Xhosas against the white settlers after a century of wars which began in the 1770's. The Xhosas had occupied the eastern Cape as far south as the Fish River, but were driven back over the Kei during these wars.

In the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the Cape Colony gradually and systematically annexed the Transkei until in 1894, the entire area was brought under white rule. In 1903 the region was divided into 27 magisterial districts under a Chief Magistrate who had his seat in Umtata.

The wars had stopped the process of centralisation through which Xhosa political life was going, so that the tribe never achieved the political cohesion which characterised their fellow Nguni, the Zulu of Natal. In fact, the Xhosa wars helped to divide the tribe by arresting this process and by dividing the Xhosa land into two main regions - the Ciskei and the Transkei - which resulted in the Transkei alone developing nine tribal regions: Eastern Pondoland (Qakeni), Western Pondoland (Nyanda) Gcaleka, Tembulpland (Dalindyebo) Emigrant Tembuland, Pingseland, Eboland, Umzimkulu.
and Maluti with four Paramount Chiefs over them. The Ciskei, in addition, boasted one Paramount Chief, but was fragmented into a patchwork of African occupied land surrounded by white farms and towns.

After the annexation of 1894, the Transkeian Territories General Council was formed for the four districts of Butterworth, Idutywa, Tsomo and Nqamakwe, over which the magistracy presided. In addition, another magistracy controlled Tembuland from Umtata, and a third ruled Pondoland from Kokstad. In 1931, the TTGC was expanded into the United Transkeian General Council (UTTGC) whose president was the Chief Magistrate of the region and on which sat the magistrates of 26 of the districts (the 27th, Mount Currie, was entirely white owned, remains so today, and did not participate in Transkeian Native Administration). Each district provided three African Councillors while the four Paramount Chiefs were represented ex officio. Control by the magistrates was tight, the UTTGC (or Bunga as it was called) never had more than advisory powers on purely local matters, and the general emphasis was on direct rule by white officials. None-the-less, although a part of the Cape Province, Transkeian Native Administration had, to some extent, a separate identity in Union government administration. In 1936 this was given emphasis when the Native Land and Trust Act, froze African rights in land to what were called the Native Reserves, including the Transkei.

The Nationalist Party government which came to power in 1948 was dedicated to entrenching racial segregation in South Africa in all regions of social intercourse. As opposition to this government's policies
developed, both internally and internationally, the policy developed into an attempt to balkanise the country into black and white regions; apartheid (separation) became separate development. The first attempt to implement this policy — The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 — moved Native Administration from direct to indirect rule, vesting powers of local administration in the hands of the chiefs. This resulted in the chiefs being identified by their subjects as agents of white rule and culminated in the 1960 rebellion of the peasants in the Transkei. This revolt, allied to urban unrest and international anger, led to the rapid implementation of the second phase of the policy of separate development, represented by the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 which envisaged self-government or local autonomy for the Reserves, now officially renamed Homelands. The Verwoerd government, in response to all the pressures stated above, passed the Transkei Constitution Act in 1963, making the Transkei the pilot project in the local autonomy policy. The Transkei thus became the first Pontustan — a name bestowed sardonically on the project by a government opponent, and one that has achieved almost official usage. The Transkei was the best equipped reserve for such an experiment. It was the only one which had a legacy of local government by Africans and the only one which had not become a patchwork of small pieces of African land broken up by white settlement. In addition, it had felt the impact of mission education which had given its people an educated elite capable of running a small, local bureaucracy. But the region was also overstocked, overpopulated, and almost totally dependent on its labour force migrating to the
towns for work while its women and children subsidised low urban wages with subsistence agriculture.

The Transkei Africans who have co-operated with the government in the application of separate development to the region have been condemned by many observers as the stooges of the government. In particular, Chief Kaiser Matanzima, their leader, has incurred deep hatred from many Africans, liberals and leftists as a government lackey. In this thesis I set out to examine the debates of the Transkei Legislative Assembly (which replaced the Bunga in 1963 and was dominated by the chiefs) to see what Africans were saying in this region of the country. I found that among all the expressions of faith in separate development, there was a growing series of demands being made of the South African government, and that after the 1968 election, these demands became increasingly militant and were expressed in the language of African nationalism - albeit with a strongly racial flavour. I was then forced to go beyond a mere examination of expressed attitudes, to seek the cause of such attitudes (articulated after all by supposed stooges of the white administration) in the nature of conflict in South Africa during the three centuries of white settlement and government.

In the first chapter I have endeavoured first to analyse the nature of this conflict between the races in the overall social structure of South Africa. I have contended that a colonial pattern of relationships has persisted in the country even after independence in 1910, that this created African perceptions of deprivation as a result of the white monopoly of economic resources and resulted in conflict. This conflict was determined,
in scope, by the rapid process of urbanisation and proletarianisation of the African. The increasing conflict of the fifties and sixties left the whites with only coercion as a means of conflict resolution. The Bantu-
stans were thus inaugurated as an alternative means of conflict resolution, to provide political placebos for Africans while the economic basis of white exploitation was perpetuated. The rest of the thesis examines African attitudes in the Transkei to determine whether or not such a policy, which I have conceptualised as conflict externalization, can succeed.

In the second chapter I have examined the emergence of issues in The Transkei up until the 1968 Transkeian election. The debates between the two main parties indicated that demands were made of the South African government not only by the Democratic Party which opposes separate development, but also by the party of the chiefs, the TNIP, which began to preach an exclusivist, racial message of escape from white rule.

In the third chapter, which examines the 1968 Transkei election, this racial ethic crystallized and a new coalition between chiefs and the educated elite began to emerge, advocating that separation through the impoverished Transkei was preferable to continued white control. This theme developed further after the election and, by 1970, Matanzima and his allies were employing nationalist and racial symbols to create local support for their demands for complete independence from South Africa, greater economic development of the region, and more land.

My concluding chapter seeks to relate these issues to the general nature of conflict in South Africa, holding that the persistence of depri-
vation does not allow African leaders to remain government stooges; poverty leads to conflict even in the Transkei. This is exacerbated by what appears to be a process of social change, particularly class change, in terms of social roles, intensified by the very externalization strategy which seeks to obviate conflict. This process of social change is only tentatively drawn; it requires far more study than I have been able to undertake and raises many questions for further examination. Nevertheless, conflict externalization would appear to be transforming itself, at the African end of the relationship, into conflict extension.

* * * * * *

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contributed many important ideas in the interpretation of conflict in South Africa; his interest in the Republic's foreign policy also proved indirectly useful (regrettably, the application of the externalization strategy to South Africa's foreign policy does not form part of this thesis).

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Finally I must thank a number of people, within South Africa and outside, who very kindly provided me with material and with information based on their own knowledge of the Transkei. Much of this information has been attributed to "Informants" in this work. They remain nameless, not because my gratitude is any the less, but because disclosure would possibly endanger them.
CHAPTER I

THE FUNCTION OF BANTUSTANS: CONFLICT 'EXTERNALIZATION'.

South Africa's Bantustan policy flows from its history of racial conflict. It is intended as a strategy of conflict resolution through the expulsion, or "externalization" of conflict from the areas of white privilege and wealth. The elaboration of these propositions rests on the basic premise that the pattern of race relations and the control of vast privilege by white South Africans is essentially a form of colonial social structure in which white exploitation of the black population operates through the control of land and cheap labour resources. This structure manifests social conflict between the races and is hence inextricably bound up with, and responsive to, the anti-colonial movement which has been a distinctive feature of recent world history. It is precisely the tension between privileged and underprivileged generated by this colonial structure in South African society that the Bantustan policy seeks to resolve at the political level, while maintaining the economic nature of white affluence and privilege. To understand this strategy of what I have termed conflict externalization, we must first understand the cause and nature of conflict in South African society. The first century of conflict, to 1870, was based on African resistance to white colonization (which was largely accomplished by force of arms). After the discovery of minerals, first at
Kimberley in 1867 and then at Johannesburg in 1886, South Africa's social structure rapidly changed from that of a rural economy to one with an urban, industrial base. While social change proceeded at an increasingly rapid pace, the basically exploitative nature of the relationship of whites with blacks remained the same. African opposition changed from tribal exclusivism to demands for equality within the context of a common society. The rapid pace of industrialization increased African perceptions of their deprived position and the aspirations which the urban society created among them led to the steady escalation of their demands for equality. The election to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948, led to an aggravation of African deprivation which in turn resulted in the escalation of conflict. After the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, the white government found itself under severe international pressure and increasingly reliant on coercion to maintain order at home. Bantustans, the creation of "homelands" for different African tribes in return for the denial of citizenship rights to Africans in the white-owned parts of South Africa, was hastily removed from the theoretical tenets of apartheid policy and applied in practice. By creating such homelands, in alliance with the traditional African chiefs, it was hoped that the political aspirations of the Africans would be satisfied, while the economic basis of white affluence would remain unchallenged in its control of land and African migrant labour resources.

The history of conflict in South Africa during the process of coloniza- tion shows two strong and persistent lines of cleavage. The first is the division between its black and white citizens, which we can term the major
line of cleavage. This has largely dominated the three centuries since
Van Riebeeck landed at the Cape in 1652. The other is the struggle between
what are called Boer and Briton. It began as the conflict between Dutch
authority and Dutch settler, changed to the dislike of the frontiersman for
the new British administration, was complicated by the arrival of settlers
of British stock who tended to see their interests as closer to the imperial
power than their fellow settlers and rigidified into Afrikaner — Anglo
(really non-Afrikaner) hostility with the Boer war — a hostility which has
been muted, but not extinguished, by time. Because the warring white groups
were always ready to combine against the black man, and because their
squabbles have always depended on the absence of colour conflict as a pre-
condition for feeling that they are safe enough to fight, this can be termed
the minor line of conflict.

The minor line of conflict is our concern here only insofar as it shows
that, regardless of which white group emerged successful from any encounter,
the black man was an almost inevitable victim. Indeed, the dispute between
the white groups was often predicated on interpretations of treatment of the
Africans. Thus in the early Cape settlement, the early settlers rapidly left
the colonial boundaries and began to settle on land in the interior. They
confiscated land and cattle from the Nama and slaughtered the Khoi. These
frontier trekkers moved eastwards into the eastern Cape, acquiring land and
livestock, killing off the local inhabitants or turning them into forced
labourers, and asserting a growing independence of the colonial authority.
Their treatment of their labourers (and also of their imported slaves) led to
an assertion of their claim to be a law unto themselves. "It is significant of white attitudes that when the colonists first revolted against the government, they rose not in defence of their own liberties but to deprive Africans of land and stock".3

The same attitude manifests itself in the Great Trek of 1834 when Boers trekked to rid themselves of British restraints on their use and abuse of Africans.4 "... the Boers did not know anything about native administration but they knew what they disliked - and that was the British conception of it".5 The British were too powerful to need to tolerate revolts like those of 1795, and their policy of conciliating the Nama to use them against the Xhosa, was bitterly resented by the Boers. The nature of this inter-white conflict as dependent to a large degree on attitudes to the black man is illustrated time and again in South African history. The 1922 strike on the Rand by white miners was a direct result of white working class opposition to the mine owners' desire to use cheaper black labour.

Hertzog's Pact Government of Afrikaner nationalists and white labour, which won the 1924 election (after the mine strike) was intent on removing Africans from the common roll in the Cape. He was unable to alter the constitution without the support of the Smuts opposition. Since Africans voted against Hertzog, such support was not forthcoming. However, after the coalition between the two in 1934, Smuts' supporters enjoyed a share in government, the "liberal" wing no longer needed the black vote, and in 1936 the Africans were removed from the common roll. The parallel with the 1892 situation in the Cape is obvious.
The major line of conflict, between black and white South Africans, is our primary focus. The history of South Africa demonstrates the persistence of this race conflict as well as the persisting nature of the deprivation of African rights. In the 1770s the first contact between the colonists, moving north and east, was made with a Bantu-speaking people. The first major clash with the Xhosa occurred in 1779 when the advance of the colonists was checked. The Xhosa proved an equal match for the settlers and "left to themselves, the colonists might have been forced to negotiate on terms favourable to the Xhosa." But the British took over the Cape, subdued the Boers and then turned their attention to the Xhosa. The Xhosa Wars lasted a century, to 1879. During this time they were driven further back from the Fish River until the sixth Xhosa War of 1834 saw them driven over the Kei River. Their last resistance came in 1877; after this the British progressively annexed the Transkei area into the Cape Colony, from 1879 to 1894. The Transkei represented, not the area of historical settlement of the Xhosa (as apartheid propaganda claims today) but the line of last resistance of the Xhosa.

Meanwhile, other tribes in South Africa were also suffering colonial conquest and the loss of their land. The Zulu were finally defeated in 1879 Zululand being annexed in 1887. The Sotho lost the entire territory of the Orange Free State and were saved from greater loss by the British annexation of Basutoland in 1868. In the Transvaal, the Boers set up the South African Republic, took vast tracts of land and legislated that there would be no equality in church or state for people of colour. South Africa was thus
colonised in more than a century of bloody colonial wars in which settlers more often than not led the way.

The discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1867 intensified the coloni-
(zation process. It is interesting to note that the British finally defeated the African tribes in the 25 years which followed this discovery - as well as annexing the Boer Republics for a short time. The resistance of the tribes was over; only momentarily in 1906 and 1922 was resistance to take a traditional form. The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand resulted in a vast influx of non-Boer whites to mine the metal. The focus of conflict relations shifted for more than two decades to the struggle of the Boers to resist the expansion of British imperialism. The defeat of the Boers after the South African War made them the epitome of the victims of imperialism. They became the darlings of anti-colonial sentiment, the basis of Hobson's denunciation of financier-motivated imperialism. In the wave of indignation over the suffering of the Boers, the black man was completely forgotten. By the Act of Union, South Africa became a dominion under white hegemony in 1910.

Independence had been achieved without the relationship between black and white, based as it was on conquest and expropriation of land, being altered.

The discovery of gold changed the nature of African deprivation by ushering in a modern process of industrialism, dependent as it was on vast labour requirements.
"Wars, conquest and annexations provided one of the primary requisites of industrialism - an uprooted peasantry available at low cost for rough manual work. Peasant communities lost their self-sufficiency under the pressures resulting from confisca-
tion of their land and cattle, the imposition of taxes, the substitution of traders' merchandise for domestic products, the spread of education and Christianity. Wage earning became unavoidable for increasing numbers of men and women. Members of small agrarian societies had to acquire the dis-
cipline and skills of the industrial worker, accustom them-
selves to urban society, learn the laws and language of the conqueror". (11)

The industrial and urban process of social change achieved an inexora-
bility in South African unmatched in any other African territory. Today
over 40% of the country's population live in the urban, industrial areas
of the country; few people have a life perspective which is devoid of an
urban experience. The future nature of conflict was manifested in the
integrated society. White and black, colonist and colonised, became South
Africans in 1910. The economy brought them into an increasingly intimate
contact from then on. But the social relations which were established in
the colonial period remained the same: Africans lost all rights to acquire
land in 1913 and 1936, they continued to be politically powerless
(increasingly so from 1913 onwards) economically impoverished and exploited
through a long succession of Industrial Conciliation legislation and
confined to low status relationships vis-a-vis whites.
In a colonial society in which people of one colour conquer those of another, the basic exploitative motivation of colonialism is merged with and strengthened by, the racial nature of the exploitation. The fact that people of one culture and colour overcome people of another culture and colour, enables the exploitative process to be justified through a web of status relationships which claim racial and cultural superiority for the exploiter. The exploitation of labour is the primary manifestation of this process. The native's (in the sense of indigeneity) labour is exploited doubly: first as labour and secondly because he is a native and so it is claimed that he needs less to satisfy his inherently lower standard of living. The process perpetuates deprivation: the native earns less because he is a native and his low earnings set for him a standard of living which is used to justify his low wage.

The native is also debarred from political power. Again racial inferiority is used to rationalize this deprivation. He is not ready for such responsibility until he is civilized. Government must remain in responsible hands; the "civilizing mission" imposes on the colonialis the responsibility to see that Christian civilization is preserved. Yet it is precisely at the point when an educated Westernized element emerges among Africans that this cry becomes strongest. Faced with the new elite which is the product of the very acculturation process which industrialization creates, the colonial authority falls back on the traditional leadership as South Africa has in the Transkei; the educated native becomes "cheeky".
CONFLICT AND COHESION.

South Africa's history demonstrates, therefore, the utility of a conflict approach to a study of its political process and problems. In terms of South Africa's peculiar international position, as the contemporary epitome of racial discrimination, exploitation and repression, the need for such an approach might at first seem pointless. But an examination of the literature on South Africa reveals that very few studies have ever approached their subject from the sociological viewpoint of conflict. And only one of these has successfully produced a picture of the nature and growth of the conflict between black and white in a dynamic soci-historical form. For the most part, studies of South Africa have been historical or descriptive. Much of the work has been based on moral values examining social costs, or on economic rationality, analysing opportunity costs.

In fact, it has been claimed that social cohesion is a more important variable in the study of South Africa's history than social conflict; that the society is held together by bonds greater than the elements which tend it towards fragmentation. The notion of "linked utilities" posits that the races are held together by a subjective perception that for one to prosper the other must also (thus causing blacks to remain largely apathetic to African nationalist exhortations) and an objective experience that wages tend to rise faster than expected creating a feeling that while whites prosper to a greater extent than blacks, blacks rely on this to prosper themselves. "Should economic progress slow down, the situation will change". The linked utilities thesis is employed by Edward Feit to account for the failure of the
1952 - 1956 ANC Programme of Action, when civil disobedience and boycotts of
government institutions were attempted by Africans, Asians and some whites.

"Linked utilities" can at best be seen as regulating the level or inten-
sity of conflict rather than the conflict itself. Indeed, an analysis of the
years on which it is based (1952-6) indicates that, far from being apathetic,
Africans were in fact highly responsive to nationalist appeals. In the case
of the Defiance Campaign of 1952, volunteers far exceeded the number of
resisters who could be accommodated in the defiance plans. The campaign
failed because of new legislation which increased the levels of police re-
pression against resisters. In the case of the school boycott of Bantu
Education under the ANC Programme of Action, countless families responded to
the party's call to keep their children at home. The campaign was broken by
the government's decision to expel all children who did not immediately return
to school, not by apathy. Africans could not afford to deny their children
education, whatever the type.

At the outset, it is necessary to examine what we mean by conflict, so
that we shall be able to understand why it is considered here a more useful
approach than linked utilities. Social conflict refers to all social inter-
action which is of antagonistic nature. It is thus a process of human
relations requiring, at least, two parties. We are not concerned here with
psychological notions of conflict within the individual. Simmel describes
conflict emanating from several factors (love, hate, aggression and, in
passing, clashing interests).

But, by focusing on the clash of material interests between the two
races, we will be able to confine our discussion to the most rational motives of conflict, since the irrational or emotional roots of conflict in South Africa such as culture and feelings of aggression, hostility and physical or racial repugnance, flow from the cleavage formed on lines of material interest.

Such an approach also focuses on the realistic aspects of conflict:

"Social conflicts that arise from frustrations of specific demands within a relationship and from estimates of gains of the participants, and that are directed at the presumed frustrating object, can be called realistic conflicts.

... Non-realistic conflicts, on the other hand, are not occasioned by the rival ends of the antagonists, but by the need for tension release of one or both of them".(25)

While non-realistic aspects of conflict are also manifest in South Africa, they do not appear at the centre of tensions between white and black. It might be claimed that an incident like the anti-Asian riots by Africans in Durban in 1949 was an instance of non-realistic conflict though this is arguable; but it cannot be held that the basic nature of the dispute between white overlordship and black claims for equality were based on anything other than the most realistic claims for political and economic redefinition of the social structure.

We have used the term "antagonistic" to describe conflict relationships. The term denotes a continuum of human action ranging from verbal protestation to physical violence. Various degrees or levels of disagreement are covered by the term. This implies that we are less concerned with the success or failure of a conflict action in terms of change, than with its cause and nature. The predictive value of the conflict relationship is outside the
scope of this examination; the literature of South Africa is already littered with prophecies of disaster which have proved wrong because, necessarily, they assume a given set of variables interacting in a given way.26

Unfortunately, the notion of antagonism raises with it a psychological problem, that of motivation. Is a speech made by an African in the Transkei which, unconsciously, challenges some tenet of apartheid, still a manifestation of conflict? One must argue that it is. To prove motivation or intent in our examination of expressed attitudes would make study of these attitudes impossible. The fact that our hypothetical statement issues a challenge to the pattern of privilege and exploitation by white over black, must be held to be sufficient of itself; it serves a function independent of its motivation. The social cohesion approach to South Africa is based on the acceptance of the fact that South Africa is an integrated society in which the races share a broad range of common values and aspirations. The conflict approach does not however reject the notion of the integrated society. Rather, conflict is seen as emerging from the intimacy of the interaction between races. Simmel has noted that conflict is itself a form of sociation and the creator of new relationships where none existed before.27 Conflict has been ignored largely because it is inevitably seen as a symptom of social fragmentation. Yet it usually expresses an integrative social momentum: the redress of social inequalities, the resolution of clashing interests, and the creation or restoration of harmony by ending dissatisfaction. Conflict is thus not the antithesis of social cohesion, but an integral part of it.

The history of conflict which has characterised race relations in South
Africa since Union has stemmed directly from the growing integration of the races, which is manifest in the urban, industrial process. The paradox or contradiction of the South African situation is that the colonial rigidity of race relations is retained politically while, at the same time, economic integration in the urban areas creates a web of shared values and life aspirations which the Africans seek to assert but the privileged whites reject and rationalise away.

This development of a common society is illustrated by population movements and living patterns. Just as South Africa's population increased from a total of 5 million at Union to some 19 million today, so too did the social characteristics of that population change dramatically in the 70 years from 1890 to 1960. The discovery of gold, the resultant process of urbanization and industrialization, and the concentration of this change in four large conurbations of the Witwatersrand, the Western Cape, Durban - Pinetown, and Port Elizabeth - Uitenhage, plus a number of subsidiary areas like Pretoria, East London and the Northern Free State, brought the races into an increasingly intimate interdependence. The beginning of the state owned steel industry in 1926 marked the watershed or accelerator of this integration process. In 1921 (as Table I shows) whites formed almost half the urban population and Africans only 38%; by 1960 the whites formed only just over a third of that population while the Africans had become 46% of the city dwellers of South Africa. These official figures are also likely to underestimate African numbers; illegal dwellers, without passes, would have been likely to evade census takers.
### TABLE I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>URBAN TOTAL (millions)</th>
<th>WHITES (millions)</th>
<th>%TOTAL</th>
<th>AFRICANS (millions)</th>
<th>%TOTAL</th>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The physical nature of this mixing of the races is even more strongly established when we consider the working populations in manufacturing industry. (Table II). Here the black labour basis of the economy is more strongly marked, despite periodic fluctuations.

### TABLE II

**WHITE AND AFRICAN WORKERS EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA**

1924-5 to 1963-4 (Bureau of Statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>ALL RACES</th>
<th>WHITES</th>
<th>%TOTAL</th>
<th>AFRICANS</th>
<th>%TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924-5</td>
<td>130,051</td>
<td>45,638</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>54,019</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-7</td>
<td>245,526</td>
<td>98,433</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>107,071</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-5</td>
<td>384,147</td>
<td>120,466</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>194,517</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-9</td>
<td>496,647</td>
<td>160,650</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>248,595</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-7</td>
<td>627,110</td>
<td>163,733</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>344,461</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-4</td>
<td>823,103</td>
<td>207,512</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>439,459</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The greater the degree of industrialization, the greater is the degree of racial integration at the economic level. Indeed, a fatalistic concern with numbers is apparent in all the writing and thinking of Nationalist Party intellectuals. Rhoodie sees the weightiest causal factor in the whole racial problem as "the Bantu's extensive involvement in white South Africa's economy." If the white man does not dominate in his "own area" - numerically at least - then he feels the threat to his own privileged position increasingly sharply.

If integration is physically a fact of economic life it creates also shared perspectives in terms of values, life patterns and aspirations. The major differential is poverty; where custom survives it does so in syncretic union with urban mores. Africans dress in "white" styles, play "white" sports, aspire to a Western education, and attempt white consumer habits. Studies of urban African living habits undertaken by Market Research Africa Ltd., show that Africans prefer to shop at supermarkets rather than at small African location grocery stores, and that most of them (in the Johannesburg area at least) are paying for household appliances on hire purchase terms. An earlier Market Research survey of 500 African housewives in Soweto showed that the average length of residence in Soweto had risen from 5.8 years in 1962 to 8.2 years in 1967, 72% had improved or altered their house as opposed to only 26% in 1962, and 49% owned radios as against 15% in 1962. Asked if they preferred life in Johannesburg to life in the reserves, 63% agreed in 1962 and 74% in 1967. The later survey found that 13% of the sample owned a car.
In fact, only poverty seems to prevent the urban African in South Africa from going further along the acculturation road. The 1969 Market Research report noted that 45% of urban Africans owned none of the stock household possessions, and only 31% had electricity in their homes. The average monthly income for a household was only R58 about 15% of the average white household's income. An indication that real African incomes do not rise, even though their monetary earnings may, is seen in the earlier Market Research report: While the average monthly wage in Soweto was R70.10 in 1967 as against R58.79 in 1962, 53% of the housewives reported a child who had died before maturity as compared with 41% in 1962. The biggest single factor in child mortality in South Africa is malnutrition. Acculturation thus creates aspirations which poverty denies to Africans, and we must seek to understand conflict in South Africa in terms of African deprivation, aspirations and social immobility.

**RELATIVE DEPRIVATION, AFRICAN ASPIRATIONS AND SOCIAL IMMOBILITY.**

Conflict in South Africa since Union in 1910, has been based on the urban African's perceptions of his disadvantaged position in relation to white privilege. As we have seen, the common society creates aspirations through a process of acculturation to urban values; the denial of these aspirations by white vested interests which enforce African poverty, ensures that dissatisfaction is articulated on racial lines. The conflict of interests is thus based on African deprivation, relative to levels of white affluence and privilege. Relative deprivation, as a cause of conflict, implies not only inequalities in the allocation of social resources and
rights, but also perceptions of such inequalities and, further, a system of social immobility which denies the individual or group the ability or right to overcome such inequalities through the satisfaction of personal ends.

A quantitative causal analysis of the relationship between relative deprivation and the "level of civil strife" has been made by Ted Gurr. While this relates relative deprivation only to the most intense form of conflict, civil strife, typified as "turmoil", "conspiracy" and "internal war"; it will nevertheless enable us to understand conflict based on interests in South Africa, and will also help us to explain the failure of protest against white privilege on more substantitive grounds than "linked utilities". We are concerned with relative deprivation. If there is no relational dimension or interaction between black and white, there will obviously be no conflict. Conflict will only arise when deprivation is perceived in relative or associational terms. When such relative deprivation is institutionalized on class and/or colour lines, conflict will become institutionalized on those lines too.

Gurr set out to measure the relationship between relative deprivation and strife, given four control variables; coercive potential of the government, the level of institutionalization, (the extent to which societal structures command substantial resources and are stable and persisting) facilitation (the social conditions which facilitate the outbreak of strife and its persistence) and legitimacy (the basic popularity of the regime and the recognition of its authoritative processes as valid). Because his analysis rests only on the most extreme outbreaks of civil strife, he
presents us with causal explanations of the most intense forms of conflict. and because he, within this framework, correlates levels of conflict intensity with the intensity (or persistence) of deprivation, we can infer that lesser forms of conflict will be produced by lesser forms of deprivation.

He soon found that relative deprivation could not be treated as one simple concept. Quantitative differences accounted for variations in the intensity of civil strife. Persisting relative deprivation was distinguished from Short-term relative deprivation. The former was measured in terms of six correlates of which three are relevant here: economic discrimination, political discrimination, and lack of educational opportunity. Economic discrimination was measured by Gurr on an intensity continuum ranging from the denial of most higher economic value positions or specific classes of activity to one group at the most moderate end, to the closing of almost all higher, medium and a few lower economic positions to one group, at the most extreme end.

How well off are the Africans compared with the whites? Professor Hobart Houghton paints a very gloomy picture:

"Income in South Africa is not evenly distributed. It was estimated that in 1952 the average income of the whites was ten times that of the Africans, eight times that of the coloureds, and five times that of the Asians. F. P. Spooner estimated that in 1954 the average annual family income of whites was R3,232, of coloureds and Indians R616, and of Africans R290. He further breaks down that of the Africans into: reserves R194, (white) farms R240, and cities R426. He also estimates the income per head at R752 for whites and R54 for Africans, and claims that between 1949 and 1954 there was a decline in the real incomes of Africans of 6.5 per cent, while that of the whites rose by 46 per cent. In a recent article Stephen Enke has taken average non-white earnings in 1960 at one-fifth of white earnings but he is presumably excluding the subsistence sector."
Hobart Houghton goes on to note that urban Africans earn five times as much as rural Africans; we shall return to this "affluent African" presently. African earnings have risen steadily since these figures were produced, but the gap between their incomes and those of whites have also increased. The vast majority still live below the poverty datum line.

Further, Africans have no right to acquire title to land outside the Reserves, where tenure is communal. They have no automatic "right" to live with their families in the "white" areas, no right to seek work where they wish or remain in an urban area for more than 72 hours without work, no right to certain jobs (most skilled posts) no right of assembly, no freedom of speech, no entry to the constitutional forms of government, the military or any but the lowest bureaucratic levels. Their trade unions are not recognised, they are not allowed to strike and their wage aspirations are handled by whites.

In economic terms, they are denied almost all higher, most medium and even a few lower economic value positions. If one discounts the propaganda value of a few wealthy black businessmen who, lacking any political power, are totally at the mercy of government Group Areas decrees which can ruin them at any moment by ending their right to profit in any area, it can be said that Africans have all higher value positions closed to them. The gap between the two races does not decline; rather, it increases as white affluence grows faster than African. Relative deprivation remains economically entrenched in the system and is politically reinforced through labour legislation which gives Africans no source of redress other than the hope of
magnanimity on the part of the group which determines their poverty. Even if their wages are rising rapidly in the boom which has been a feature of South Africa since 1964, they remain relatively deprived. Linked utilities under conditions of rising wages would be tenable only if one assumed a labour force secure in its tenure. Yet a large part of the African labour force is migratory and apartheid policy, has aimed at placing the entire urban labour force on a migratory basis. The growing rigour of pass enforcement, influx control and "endorsing out" creates an insecurity not matched by the chance benefits of growing white affluence.\textsuperscript{40} We shall return to this point when describing the externalization strategy. In other words, the conflict system remains, irrespective of short-term fluctuations which govern its intensity but not its existence. For Africans, the primary concern is still the provision of food.\textsuperscript{41}

The political continuum posited by Gurr, similarly ranged from the denial of some elite positions or some participatory activities to the closure of almost all elite positions and almost all participatory activities.

In South Africa, Africans are denied all access to the political elite and, outside of the Bantustans and a few even more powerless Urban Bantu Councils, to any participation in the political process.

Africans are totally deprived of all meaningful political rights. The small elite which had a vote in the Cape on the qualified franchise common roll (whites had automatic voting rights) lost this in 1936. They received, in return for this, four white representatives in the central Parliament and
a Native Representative Council. The white representatives often distinguished themselves in their defence of African rights, but were no more successful in defending them for all that. The NRC continued its existence until, in the aftermath of the 1946 miners strike, it went into permanent adjournment and was abrogated by the Nationalist Government in 1951. The NRC represented moderate African opinion but was finally moved to denounce itself as "a toy telephone". The four white representatives were abolished in 1959 under The Bantu Self-Government Act which ended all African rights in "white South Africa" and placed them in the (then) hypothetical Bantustans. Whatever local differences may be, Africans therefore remain without any voice in the central, provincial and local political process which determine their life-pattern. Their political disadvantage is thus more intense than the extreme of Gurr's continuum.

Economic and political discrimination form the basis of black-white conflict articulation in South Africa. The lack of educational opportunity is, however, a very real issue in the race conflict. The creation of educational facilities is one of the major features of the colonial society and the aspirations it arouses in the indigenous population. The inadequacy of the facilities provided forms, in turn, one of the major grievances articulated against the regime.

Educational facilities for Africans developed rapidly in South Africa, especially after the inception of urbanization, and particularly in the Cape where the early influence of the missionaries and of British liberalism created a network of schools, and two higher institutions which were to
produce a large number of African political leaders in Southern Africa: Fort Hare University College and Lovedale. But, while educational facilities produced an aspirant elite of larger dimensions than anywhere else in Southern Africa, this elite formed a small proportion of the total African population. For the vast majority education is a desired, but largely unfulfilled, end. And since whites control the provision of educational facilities frustration again becomes racially directed. The paradoxical relationship, in which Africans are both resentful of and totally dependent on, white educational policies, explains why the boycott campaign against "inferior" Bantu Education in 1956 was initially so successful, and finally, so hastily abandoned. Educational deprivation thus manifests itself in two ways: firstly, African are conscious of the inequalities between their facilities and those of the whites; and secondly, the education system produces an African elite conscious of political, economic and status inequalities between themselves and the whites.

Kuper has shown that Africans tend to assess status in terms of education and occupany of the medical, educational, legal, religious and commercial professions (ranking varying according to age, sex, and life-condition of the respondent). We have already seen that businessmen work in a condition of relative deprivation, vis-a-vis their white peers. This condition is even more pronounced in medicine, religion and education. In the first two great differentials of income exist as between black and white. In the case of teachers, earning differentials are probably still more pronounced, but perceptions of relative deprivation may, like businessmen, be
less acute because of greater isolation from their white fellows. In the case of lawyers, earning differentials are equally pronounced, and the profession brings them in to close contact with the legal and administrative machinery of discrimination and repression. The close relationship between the legal and political careers which characterises many Western politics, is as marked in African society in South Africa. Of 37 African leaders active at the national level from 1910 to 1960, lawyers formed the single largest group (almost a fifth) followed by medicine, education, journalism and labour. That only eight of 34 members of the sample tend to come from occupations outside the favoured status bracket would appear to indicate that economically, "linked utilities" is less important than persisting relative deprivation in the very class where it should be most strongly operative.

Gurr also delineates short-term relative deprivation indices. These help to account for fluctuations in the intensity of conflict. Of the seven indicators, only three are directly relevant to the nature of conflict between black and white: the creation of adverse economic factors either by the regime or some external variable (rising prices, drought); new restrictions on political participation and representation; and new policies which are seen as "value - depriving". In short, events which are deleterious to the economic and political situation of the group, or are seen as an attempt to undermine that situation (that is, challenge their aspirations) are likely, in the short term to heighten the intensity of that conflict or, indeed, to initiate such conflict. But for the conflict to continue, such relative
deprivation must remain persistent. The particular issue will not of itself sustain conflict beyond the short-term; a persistent structure of conditions objectively harmful to the group's interests (the aggravation of deprivation) must pertain.

"In the very long run men's expectations about the goods and conditions of life to which they are entitled tend to adjust to what they are capable of attaining". (47)

Thus the Native Land Bill, enacted in 1913, brought into being the South African Native Congress in 1912. The bill set aside some 10 million morgen of land for exclusive African occupation. Africans would not be allowed to buy or lease land from non-Africans outside those scheduled areas, except in the Cape. They were also debarred from owning land in most of the country and were confined, in effect, to those limited areas which were still held under tribal tenure. The Act also made it a crime for any but servants to reside on the 90% of the land which was now for whites only. Squatters were to be removed from this land with their belongings and cattle. Congress was formed to protest the passage of the bill; it united the embryonic African educated elite, bringing together many disparate groups in an organization which was to persist legally for 48 years and continue underground to the present day. The Land Act was the short-term impetus which changed the nature of African politics but on its own it could hardly have provided Africans with a 58 year grievance. The constant injection of other deprivation (and conflict) actions by the government formed a steady pattern of persistent deprivation which took African politics through the stage of elite petition to the stage of trade union protest, to protest
through demonstrations and mass rallies, to passive resistance, to sabotage, and, finally, to preparation for guerilla warfare. With the escalation in the conflict pattern went a change in the structure of African involvement: the ANC changed from a small elite group seeking equality on the basis of Western values, to a mass movement seeking redress on the basis of human rights. The human misery resulting from the 1913 Act (Sol Plaatje "found families bivouacked, their beasts dying of starvation, as they rested from going to and fro in the country in search of a place to live") not only forced these bourgeois leaders to notice their own people's problems, but formed a perpetual basis for discontent which continued long after the Act was passed.

On its own, the 1913 Act would not have provided a basis for half a century of African opposition to the government had it not been reinforced by constant irritations and frustrations. The pass laws, the privileged and protected position of white labour resulting from the 1922 miners' strike, the increase of costs of essential amenities for Africans (leading to bus strikes and beerhall boycotts) and the 1936 Land Act, all aggravated African perceptions of deprivation and perpetuated conflict. The 1936 Hertzog Acts one of which rigidified the 1913 Act while adding a little more land to the total finally to be made available for African, and the other of which deprived Cape Africans of the qualified franchise on the common voters roll; brought a new flurry of elite activity after a period in which the ANC had become moribund (though protest by labour and women had reached new heights). Even so, the issues of 1936 mainly affected only the elite; thus the decade
to 1946 saw a period of ANC organization building, rather than mass action.

Short-term deprivation, therefore, forms an essential variable in the escalation of conflict. But if it acts in isolation of persisting deprivation, it results in accommodation to the situation and loses its force. It is also interesting to note that persisting deprivation enables us to employ a dynamic concept of conflict. The history of conflict in South Africa shows Africans responding to government actions which materially injure their interests. The African response to deprivation leads to further government action against them; this counter-response thus aggravates deprivation, and hence grievances, perpetuating conflict.

Of Gurr's four control variables, that of legitimacy is outside the scope of this introduction. Whether or not a government enjoys legitimacy is easier stated than established. Almond and Verba\textsuperscript{51} contend that the United States manifests strongly developed participant and loyalty patterns in the political culture. Yet recent events there would tend to bring this into question. Whether or not the South African government can be said to enjoy legitimacy, given the need for so large a coercive machinery, is an issue which it is not possible for us to explore here. Gurr, in any case, finds it to be an independent variable in its own right.\textsuperscript{52} Whether or not it intensifies the conflict based on deprivation would elaborate this thesis but is regrettably beyond its present scope. Of the other three controls he employed, Gurr found the level of institutionalization to be determinant of the coercive potential of the regime which in turn determines the "facilitation" of civil strife. We shall deal with coercion in
our examination of the escalation of conflict which resulted in the strategy of conflict externalization.

What is most important to our analysis in the Gurr model is that he finds *persisting* deprivation to cause civil strife *regardless* of the control variables. Civil strife will result from persisting relative deprivation, regardless of the coercive potential, legitimacy, or level of institutionalization, of the regime or system. These factors affect deprivation in the short term and hence determine the pattern of immediate conflict. The implication of this set of relationships between the variables is that, while the coercive and institutional mechanisms will facilitate and determine the pattern of conflict resulting from short-term aggravations of deprivation, and hence indirectly the pattern of conflict in the long-term, persisting relative deprivation will still nonetheless occasion conflict. Although Gurr believed that in the long run, aspirations are determined by expectations of what the individual thinks he can achieve, nevertheless, his analysis leads him to conclude that

"none of the mediating variables appear to affect the relationship between persisting deprivation and strife, i.e., there is a certain inevitability about the association between such deprivation and strife. Persisting deprivation is moreover equally potent as a source of conspiracy, internal war, and turmoil". (54)

It is the persistence of the aggravation of deprivation by the system which makes conflict inevitable. The success or failure of such strife is not at issue; the inevitability of strife itself is what we are concerned with. Its success or failure depends more on short-term deprivation precipitating the strife, and the control which coercion, institutionalization, and facilitation exercise on it.
This leads us to the proposition that while short-term factors will occasion strife and certain control variables will mediate its impact on the system, persisting relative deprivation will nevertheless make strife both inevitable and (if the interests in conflict are not resolved by the conflict) persistent. We have shown that South Africa is characterized by the deprivation, both absolute and relative, of its African population. The conclusion we must come to is that South Africa, given this deprivation through exploitation, given the persistent nature and aggravation (through official action) of this deprivation, and given the escalation of repression and exploitation, is a self-perpetuating conflict system. The history of South Africa (especially as chronicled by Roux and the Simons,55) would appear to verify this proposition. Curr does not account for societies in which relative deprivation is great but in which no strife occurs. This is because his analysis is ex post facto and hence does not require a study of perceptions. Nevertheless, although his figures show a high ability to account for variations, it would seem that we cannot usefully employ relative deprivation as an analytical concept unless we also employ perceptions or aspirations. Perceptions are, of course, an implicit part of any definition of relative deprivation and, in turn, they imply the persistence of aspirations for a greater share in the allocation of resources and rights. Nevertheless, we must note that the absence of perception will not allow deprivation to function as a cause of conflicts of interest.56

As we have seen, it is precisely because of the process of elite
creation and acculturation in the urban areas, that relative deprivation has become the motive force of African demands.

Gurr's indicators of persistent deprivation (exclusion from favoured status categories) imply the persistence of social immobility. Nevertheless, immobility also needs more than implicit attention; like aspirations, it is a variable without which deprivation cannot become a determinant of conflict.

South Africa has been termed a caste society. It has also been studied as a society in which race and class interact (in a fashion peculiar to colonial societies) to produce social immobility. The difference of approach, stemming from different academic traditions, is not resolved here. Aspects of caste, race and class conflict are present in South African society. It is sufficient that the inability of the African to escape his position of disadvantage in the country creates conflict. As Myrdal puts it: "What white people really want is to keep the Negroes in a lower status. 'Intermarriage' itself is resented because it would be a supreme indication of 'social equality', while the rationalization is that 'social equality' is opposed because it would bring about 'intermarriage'." This fusion of reality and rationalization is somewhat differently expressed by Fanon when he says that "in the colonies the economic substructure is also the superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich". In South Africa there are a few Africans who are rich, compared with their fellows and some whites. Fanon has simplified too much. But it is precisely this upwardly mobile individual, the new African bourgeois, who is most deeply resented. And it
is precisely this class which the apartheid policy, through techniques of police repression, the banning of grievance articulation and political meetings, the imposition of Bantu Education and the attempt to bolster the chiefs, seeks to destroy as a political and social presence. For the vast mass of Africans, the Fanon thesis holds in South Africa as strongly as it did in Algeria.  

CONFLICT ESCALATION AND COERCION

The growing integration of the races as industrialization progresses in South Africa, the changing aspirations and consequent grievances, is reflected in the changing nature of the racial conflict, its increasingly mass scale, and its intensity. The defeat of tribal opposition, which had been an exclusivist rejection of the presence of the white man, and the new urban developments since 1880, created a new political interaction between white and black in the post-Union period. Although there were still exclusivist manifestations in the form of separatist churches and black Zionism these would appear to have declined over time. Simultaneously African protest came increasingly from within the common society. More important, it aimed at redressing the imbalances of resource distribution within that common society; the permanence of all members of the society as South Africans was no longer at issue.

The first of the new African nationalists were very much the products of the new education. Their genesis as a movement began as much in England and America as it did in South Africa. In 1912 the South African Native
National Congress, later renamed the African National Congress, was formed in Bloemfontein. Its mentor was Pixley ka I. Seme, a lawyer trained at Columbia and Oxford. Its first president was the Reverend Dr. John Dube, a theologian educated in the United States. The Congress was dedicated to the unity of all Africans, regardless of tribe. Throughout its history, tribal differences played very little part in the ANC. Where cleavages occurred these were generally of an ideological or tactical nature, or reflected urban-rural, or educated-uneducated, cleavages.

Though not all the early leaders of Congress were formally educated (Solomon Plaatje, the Secretary-General was self-taught) the early leadership did in fact reflect the aspirations of the new middle class. It operated by petitioning the government to redress specific grievances, it embodied liberal goals more closely linked with the nature of the qualified franchise in the Cape than with mass needs. Consequently, the ANC persisted as a pastime of the educated elite rather than as the weapon of the African people.

The twenties were dominated by the struggle of white workers to create for themselves a privileged position over their black fellows. The white miners strike of 1922 expressed white grievances against the mineowners who were seen as promoting Africans to jobs which should be reserved for whites. The strike was characterised by brutality against African workers; it precipitated the fall of the Smuts government and the coalition of Hertzog's Afrikaner Nationalists and white Labour Party. They began the long process of entrenching and refining the position of white workers as a labour
aristocracy.

African protest was strongly expressed by the Industrial and commercial Workers Union, led by the charismatic Clements Kadalie. From 1919 the union grew until it became a national organization in 1923. By 1928 it had a quarter of a million members and Kadalie was receiving press publicity for everything he said in a way no other African leader before or since was able to achieve. But poor organization, financial mismanagement and internal division led to schisms; By the end of the decade, the ICU was demoralised and disgraced.

Meanwhile, the white Labour Party split in 1915. The majority remained tied to the party which advocated white worker privilege and sheltered employment through job reservation and racially discriminatory wage structures. As the Afrikaner Nationalists became increasingly the party of white workers, it atrophied and died. The rump of the 1915 split became the International Socialist League and later the Communist Party, which rapidly moved, under the guidance of men like Sidney Bunting, to an espousal of African rights through a colour-blind class appeal. Government repression, as much as its own platform, identified it increasingly in African minds as the only white group which gave unqualified support to their demands.

While the ANC remained largely moribund through the twenties and thirties, those years were a time of debate on the nature of the African struggle. In that debate liberalism competed with socialism as an ideology (particularly while the party was led by Gumede) and cooperation with whites competed against "Africanism" as a tactic. In the 1940s the ANC still
remained a party of protest and petition, but Dr. Xuma, its President, created an organizational basis from which the Congress operated in the following decade.

The War years were characterized by vast industrial growth within the country. The urban influx brought to the towns a number of young men, more or less educated, but with strong roots still in the mass of their people. In 1943 the ANC Youth League was formed under Anton Lembede, who preached that Africans had to lead the struggle against the government since they were primarily affected by its policies. All the names which dominated African politics in the late fifties and early sixties found their way into the ANC through the ANCYL – Tambo, Mandela, Sisulu and Sobukwe among many others. The other great recruiting institution of new young activists was Fort Hare University, from which men like Joseph Matthews and Duma Nokwe came.

But it was the events of the late forties which really precipitated the changing mood and nature of African nationalism and introduced a new tone in the tactics of conflict. In 1946 African miners, led by J. B. Marks, went on strike. It was the largest, most dramatic action by labour yet: miners, strongly rooted in the reserves or recruited from neighbouring countries, "... here today and gone tomorrow, always preoccupied with cows and land," were persuaded to strike for better conditions (the cash element of their wages amounted to sixpence an hour). The strike was brutally repressed. Even the placid NRC was moved to dissolve itself in protest; a new member, Albert Luthuli, was initiated into the nature of the urban race conflict.

In 1946, too, Indians in Natal used passive resistance in the face of
white violence in protest against attempts by the Smuts government to curtail their land and property rights. They focused world attention on the nature of exploitation in South Africa, and made India the first country to bring the South African question to the United Nations. In persisting with their passive defiance, they gave a renewed vigour to the weapon of passive resistance which formed the basis of the African challenge in the fifties.

In 1948 the Nationalist Party was elected to power after campaigning on the platform of the "Black Danger", promising the whites a new rigour in controlling the non-whites who had so rapidly multiplied in and around the urban areas and were threatening to "swamp" the whites. The increased harshness of white rule under the Nationalists, the regimentation of non-whites in their daily lives, and the suppression of organised dissent characterised the apartheid policy of the party. The policy sharpened the determination of non-whites to resist, intensified the conflict, and drew together Africans, Asians and white and coloured radicals into what was to become in 1956 the Congress Alliance.

The changing nature of race relations after 1948 intensified black bitterness and enabled the Youth League to "capture" Congress. They elected a more militant leader, Moroka, and, when he retracted under pressure of prosecution, removed him and installed Albert Luthuli. In 1952, a campaign of Defiance Against Unjust Laws was instituted by the ANC and the Indian Congress. People voluntarily defied apartheid laws and suffered imprisonment. The campaign failed when the government increased the penalties for
defiance and included whipping among them. 65

The Defiance Campaign was followed by campaigns of boycott and defiance against the destruction of Sophiatown. This was followed in turn, by a boycott of schools to protest the new Bantu Education system; it failed when the minister, Verwoerd, warned that unless an immediate return to school was made, children would be permanently expelled. Africans could not afford the cost; the politics of exploitation imposes very limited means of action on the exploited.

The new mood of African militancy resulted in the Freedom Charter of 1956, issued by the Congress of the People. Protest was contained by increased government coercion - leaders were removed from active protest by the Treason Trial which lasted for four years. Those not charged or subsequently released, were confined by banning orders which curtailed their movements and prevented them from attending or addressing meetings. Sporadic conflict continued in the form of strikes, anti-pass protests and localised disorder. Both sides had put intense pressure on each other; it was the African nationalists who first showed signs of disintegration.

The split in the ANC which led to the defection of the Africanist element and the formation of the Pan-Africanist Congress under Sobukwe in 1958, appears, on the surface at any rate, to be the first major rejection of the common society in this century's history of conflict. In fact, the PAC aimed "to unite and rally Africans on the basis of nationalism and to fight for the overthrow of white domination, thus achieving an Africanist democratic society". 66 It was Pan-Africanist, accusing the ANC of espousing
"multi-racial liberalism" and of becoming a "union of exploiters and the exploited". It rejected the equality of the other races in the anti-apartheid movement; basically it was suspicious of the white radicals who were prominent in the decision-making process of the Congress Alliance. But PAC still maintained close links with whites and social reality finally forced them to define an "African" as anyone loyal to Africa and prepared to accept majority democratic African rule. The party thus limited and in reality abandoned its exclusivism in the face of the integrated society.

The emergence of PAC escalated conflict once again. Both parties resumed militant civil disobedience and anti-pass campaigns. In 1960, a crowd of 20,000 gathered at the Sharpeville police station to hand in their passes. The police fired on the crowd, killing a number of them. 1960 was "the year of Africa" and the height of international anti-colonial sentiment. World attention, which had been critical of South Africa throughout the fifties, now became still more so. Even the Western powers attacked South Africa's policies in the United Nations. At the same time, the internal situation was worsened by a flight of capital from the country. The banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960 forced these movements underground and a wave of sabotage began, lasting until 1964, when Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Kathrada, Goldberg and later Bram Fischer (all belonging to the ANC and/or the SACP) received life sentences; Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military arm of the ANC, had already started initial preparations for guerilla warfare. Poqo, which sprang from PAC, undertook a series of terrorist killings of whites. In 1960 police and army were ordered into Pondoland