

CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF NGOs AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Introduction

There is a growing consensus, worldwide, that Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a very important role to play as partners, with their respective governments, in national development. It has, for example, been noted that activities of civil society have attracted the interest of analysts and donors not only for their potential to make the state more accountable, but also for their roles as development institutions (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993: 12).

Perceived comparative advantages of NGOs over government in social, economic and political development of any given nation are many and constitute the rationale for the support of the involvement of such organizations in national development. It has been noted, for example, that the institutional structure of most NGOs gives them an advantage in responding to the needs of the rural poor. In this regard Martinez (1990: 75-108) observed that: 'the effectiveness of NGOs emanates mainly from their small scale, their flexibility and their project orientation; ... their legitimacy at the grassroots level is well established'. Martinez (1990: *ibid*) further noted that as compared to government that has to serve a heterogeneous clientele and has a complex structure, NGOs have the advantages of having a more homogeneous clientele, and a more clearly defined internal structure. The characteristics of having a small size and being flexible can facilitate creativity within the organization, since they generally present fewer obstacles to change. The small size and local orientation also allows these institutions to effectively respond to the challenge of adapting technical support to particular circumstances compared to centralized structures (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993: 36-37). With these characteristics it may be argued that the delivery of services by these institutions is most likely to be more efficient and effective than by local authorities that have the responsibility of providing a variety of services to different kinds of recipients. Except for

Special Districts in the United States of America and similar entities elsewhere in the world, 'traditional' local authorities are generally multi-purpose bodies that do not specialise in the provision of a single service. It is this diversity of service delivery functions that sometimes make the work of local authorities, compared to that of NGOs, more difficult. It is also important to note that generally NGOs carry on their work at the very lowest level of social order, the rural village and city neighbourhood. Their highly participatory system of decision-making and programme management, while time-consuming and laborious, does tend to engage the energy and commitment of the community. This approach to development creates loyalty and trust between NGOs and the communities in which they work.

Business enterprises, both public and private, provide goods and services to their clients nearly always at a price that will enable the continuation of such a provision while leaving a "reasonable" profit margin for the owners of the enterprise. Private investors normally make an assessment of the environment in which they wish to invest with a view to ascertaining the feasibility of the investment with regard, among other things, to sustainability and the assurance of reasonable profits.

In the process of public service delivery, interaction is expected between local Councils and the business community. Local Councils provide an environment which enhances local enterprise, which in turn, acts as a source of local revenue for the local Councils through the payment of various charges and fees. The two entities, therefore, depend on each other in their operations. Irish local authorities, for example, rely heavily on the business community to fund their operations. Over 2 billion pounds of local government funding is sourced from commercial rates alone and businesses are also subject to a host of other local authority charges including those of water, waste, development levies, signage and street furniture. It follows that, the business community has a deep interest in the efficiency and management of local government structures - Chambers Ireland (<http://www.chambers.ie/index.php?id=20>).⁸⁶

In this chapter we examine the role being played by NGOs and the Business community in the process of public service delivery by the three local Council areas in

⁸⁶ Chambers Ireland is the country's largest business organisation, with 60 member chambers representing over 12,000 businesses throughout the island of Ireland.

our study. In the case of NGOs we examine the extent to which these organisations are co-opted into the development activities of the local authorities. Our main focus with regard to the Business community is on the extent to which these institutions are sub-contracted to do work of the local authorities.

The Local Authorities and the Role of the NGOs in Public Service Delivery

The 1991 to 2001 decade is the period in which many NGOs and other civil society organizations were formed and registered in Zambia. To a large extent the proliferation of these organizations is associated with the country's return to multiparty politics in 1990. Prior to the calls for the return to multiparty politics there were very few NGOs and other civil society organizations with Christian churches and the trade unions being the most prominent. These institutions were very critical allies to many interest groups during the campaigns for the return to multiparty politics in Zambia. The Union Movement, for example, was used very effectively by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in its mobilization and community sensitization campaigns. The activities of NGOs in Zambia cut across all areas of human development and do provide opportunities for the citizenry to get involved in civic work that has great potential to enhance the well being of the society. In this respect NGO activity in Zambia include the provision of health care; distribution of relief food; public awareness on a wide range of governance issues; election monitoring; and poverty alleviation to mention but a few. Most NGOs are registered under the Societies Act Cap 105 of the Laws of Zambia and others under the Companies Act Cap 686 of the Laws of Zambia as Limited Companies. Some government Ministries such as the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, and the Ministry of Youth and Child Development also register NGOs. The creation of local authorities by central government, and the duties assigned to them, is intended to enhance human development through the provision of various services. The roles played by NGOs in Zambia, itemised above, also variously affect human development with respect to enhanced livelihoods and community enlightenment on matters related to decision making and governance. The promotion of human development in its various forms, therefore, constitutes an inextricable link between the

work and responsibilities of local authorities on the one hand and that of the NGOs, on the other.

In this section, therefore, we examine some of the activities of NGOs vis-à-vis service delivery during the study period (1991-2001) in the respective Council areas. In doing this we also analyse the views of the various stakeholders, in the three Council areas, about the efficacy of these institutions in service delivery. We consider such insights very critical to the assessment. It is important to note, however, that our assessment is not on whether or not NGOs can or should provide services but rather on the services that NGOs provide, whether or not such provision is backed by effective linkages with the operations of the local authority, and whether or not the services NGOs provide are within the mandate of the Councils. This is the general position we also embrace in the assessment of NGO activity in all the three local Council areas of our study.

Choma Municipal Council

The six (6) NGOs and CBOs represented include the local offices for Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ), World Vision, Red Cross, Africare, and the Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM), the Farmers' Association. A total of 9 representatives from these institutions were interviewed. The District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC), created through Cabinet Circular number 1 of 1995 and chaired by the District Commissioner, provides the formalised forum of interaction between NGOs and the local authority. Other members of the DDCC include representatives of parastatal organisations and heads of government line ministries in the district. Besides the DDCC there are no other institutions created to facilitate NGO-Council interactions.

In Choma, the view that NGOs have a role in service delivery and the recognition that some NGOs do in fact provide various services that are useful to the community is well appreciated by most people from all the stakeholder groups represented in our study including the local residents, Councillors and Council officials, the business community, and traditional authorities. This view and recognition is supported, among other considerations, by the formal inclusion of NGOs, through Cabinet circular number 1 of

1995, as members to the DDCC which is a coordinating body for planning and development activities at the District level.

All NGO representatives spoken to held the view that their organisations have a role to play in service delivery and noted that because NGOs in most cases focus on a specific clientele, with a well thought-out programme or project, the impact of their assistance on the target communities is visible, beneficial and well appreciated. However, there is dissatisfaction among some members of the NGO community that the attitude of a few Council officials, who do not seem to recognise NGOs as partners in development, is adversely affecting the potential for effective collaboration between NGOs and the local authority. In this respect one of the NGO representatives observed that:⁸⁷

“....Some people are pre-occupied with the misconception that people form NGOs with the sole purpose of enhancing their personal well-being financially and/or materially. This is not correct as can be evidenced by the actual work of these institutions and the tangible benefits local communities receive from NGO activities. It is clear that such people are either not well-informed or deliberately choose to distort facts”.

In recognising the role NGOs can play and are playing in service delivery the majority view, among residents, Council officials, and other stakeholders, is that the provision of public services to the communities in Choma is a very challenging task for the local authority. The local Council, therefore, needs all the help it can get from individuals as well as organisations. In this respect it is recognised that Non-governmental organisations, including other community based organisations, are in many respects well placed to assist the local authority in the area of service delivery. In recognising the skills and efforts of NGOs the Town clerk noted the importance of exploring ways which would help to consolidate the interaction between the local authority and the NGO community in a manner that would ensure a coordinated effort in the delivery of some services.

However, there are those that have a negative view about the role of NGOs in public service delivery. The views of this group mainly hinge on NGOs' dependency on

⁸⁷ Interview with the District Programme officer for the Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM) – November 8, 2004

donor funding, perceived lack of accountability and transparency, and the narrow coverage of beneficiaries associated with services provided by NGOs. The perceived inability of NGOs to operate in a transparent manner was noted as one of the major weaknesses and disqualification for being considered as genuine partners in development. The general argument, according to this view, is that those running NGOs are doing so in order to make a living out of donor funding. It is just what is left over that is used to the benefit of the community or their target groups. In this respect NGOs that sensitise communities on issues of governance, such as elections, health matters and so on, as opposed to those who deliver tangible benefits, are considered more useful because of the lasting effect their messages have on the people. There is also a strong desire, among Choma residents, to see improvements with regard to accountability and transparency in NGO operations. Communities stand to benefit more if the operations of NGOs were above board and characterised by integrity. With accountability and transparency NGOs would be in a position to fully utilise donor funding, as intended, and the impact of their efforts on the communities would be more significant. Residents concerned about the NGOs' lack of transparency and accountability argue that the desire to serve should come before the desire to get personal benefits. According to this view, transparency and accountability would encourage other stakeholders, including the Council, to appreciate their efforts and seek to promote effective collaboration with them.

Out of the 250 residents subjected to a structured questionnaire, for example, 4 of them (1.6 percent) were "not sure" whether or not NGOs have a role to play in service delivery while the remaining 246 (98.4 percent) were equally divided on this issue. In other words, while 123 residents (49.2 percent) held the view that NGOs have a role to play in service delivery the remaining 123, another 49.2 percent, did not (Figure 4.1).⁸⁸ Arising from the focus group discussions⁸⁹, held with some residents, are two explanatory factors for this division namely, inadequate information about the work of NGOs in the district among some residents, and the fact that NGOs to a large extent target

⁸⁸ This figure is located almost towards the end of the chapter because it illustrates the same information for all the three Council areas.

⁸⁹ Two separate focus group discussions were held in Mwapona (High density) and Sha compound (Medium density). Each discussion group comprised of 10 residents randomly selected from the respondents who were subjected to the structured questionnaire in the respective areas – November 13, 2004

communities in the peri-urban and rural areas. Their visibility in the residential *locations* surrounding the central business district (CBD) is, therefore, somewhat inadequate or completely absent in the case of some NGOs.

The comparative advantage with regard to the availability of capacity among NGOs, in terms of knowledge, skills and readily available finances to do certain things for the benefit of local communities, compared to the local Council is well appreciated. However, we have found no concrete initiatives, on the part of the local authority, to formally co-opt NGOs in its operations with a view to ensuring a well coordinated and effective service delivery process in the district. Many reasons may account for this seeming anomaly but three factors clearly stand out. First, the ineffectiveness of the DDCC, as a planning and coordinating body for local development, has an adverse impact on the opportunities for a well-thought-out plan of action to superintend a service delivery process which reflects effective and complementary efforts of the local authority and the NGOs in the district. Second, NGOs at a district level are basically extensions of mother bodies based mainly in the capital city, Lusaka. Major decisions are, therefore, made at their Head Quarters in Lusaka and such decisions may not necessarily reflect local priorities. This factor can be well appreciated given the ineffectiveness of the DDCC. If the DDCC was operating effectively the co-optation of NGOs in the operations of the local authority, whenever possible, would be part of the agenda for coordinated service delivery in particular and district development in general. And third, the NGOs do not have their own income but depend on financial disbursements from various donors. It is difficult, under such circumstances, to guarantee a financial plan of action that can be factored into the on-going expenditure activities of the local authority with a view to ensuring a semblance of permanency in their (NGOs') complementary efforts toward service delivery. Consequently, service delivery activities by NGOs in Choma, although very beneficial to the local communities, have largely remained outside the realm of effective co-optation by and collaboration with the local authority.

In spite of the aforementioned pitfalls, however, NGOs in Choma have over the years made and continue to make contributions to the well being of local communities in various ways. The World Vision is an international NGO whose main objective is poverty reduction. In Choma the World vision has helped to identify needy children in

various localities and provided, among other things, medical and education fees; uniforms; and other school requirements. In this respect the involvement of area Councillors and relevant Council staff in providing, among other things, logistical information to facilitate such identification, provides the link between the local authority and the activities of the World Vision. The organisation's involvement in community development includes the rehabilitation of schools, clinics, provision of clean drinking water, and skills training to community members. World Vision is involved in this kind of work in all the five chiefdoms in the district. Section 61 of the Local Government Act No. 21 of 1991 confers power to local authorities to discharge 63 functions which are listed on the Second Schedule of the Act. A Council may discharge all or any of these functions. Responsibilities of Councils relating to medical care and education are provided for under the broad category of *education and public health* in which there are 6 specific functions. Specific functions numbers 39 and 40 relate to the establishment and maintenance of educational and health services. The intervention by World Vision, therefore, complements the work of the local authority in this area. Similarly, within the broad category of *community development*, as a function of local authorities, there are 16 specific functions that local authorities are expected to undertake. Function number 20 urges Councils to prepare and administer schemes for the encouragement of and participation in community development. The rehabilitation of schools, clinics, and so on being undertaken by World Vision are not only within the jurisdiction of local authorities but are anchored on and thrive through community participation.

Red Cross, is another international NGO with an office operating in Choma. The organization, whose main objective is to teach first aid to its members to equip them with the knowledge to respond to various emergencies, works very closely with the District Water Sanitation Health Education programme (DWASHE), an Irish Aid funded programme, to enhance effective sanitation and the provision of clean water to the communities within the district. The organisation is also involved in the distribution of relief food organised by government and other donor agencies. Response to emergencies, good sanitation and clean water, and the distribution of relief food are community safety and developmental issues that are covered under the Local Government Act as responsibilities of local authorities. *Sanitation and drainage* is one of the broad

categories of local authority functions in the Second Schedule. Function number 22 of the Second Schedule, among other things, relates to fire fighting and prevention, and the protection of life, while function number 6 (a) requires local authorities to take measures for the storage, marketing and preservation of agricultural produce. The involvement of Red Cross in these activities, including the distribution of relief food, is a clear testimony of government trust in the abilities of some NGOs and an illustration of Red Cross' strategic position to render certain services that have a complementary effect on the work of local Councils. Food relief activities by Red Cross in Choma, including those that were undertaken following the 1995 draught, have almost been a permanent feature with regard to government response to calls for assistance during draught periods or whenever poor crop harvest is recorded in the district.

Africare is another NGO operating in Choma. It is generally involved in developmental work related to, among other things, agriculture; humanitarian aid; environment; and health. It does not have its own resources per se but is usually contracted by different donor agencies to carry out various programmes. Notably, Africare has put up 7.5 hectares of the Cassava crop to enhance food security in the Choma district. Involvement of the local authority in this programme was basically at two levels. First, the local authority is the Secretariat to the DDCC, the forum at which this programme was brought to the attention of the District administration. And second, area Councillors were also instrumental in ensuring that affected local communities perceived the project as an intervention with great potential to improve their livelihood. Ordinarily cassava is not a food crop in these areas but Africare has embarked on training villagers on how to utilise this crop as a staple food for cooking Nshima (thick porridge) and/or just being consumed as a tuber. The issue of food security is covered under the broad category of *agriculture* in the Local Government Act. The Africare programme, therefore, may be considered as a complimentary effort to the legitimate functions of the local authority.

For illustrative purposes, however, we cite in a little more detail the 1995 Draught Rehabilitation Programme executed by the Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM) and

coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries in Choma⁹⁰. This programme was supported by the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), World Bank and the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ). Through this support several seed types (maize, millet, cowpeas, sunflower and groundnuts) as well as cassava and sweet potato planting materials, amounting to 3,500 metric tons, were procured and distributed to small-scale farm families who were assessed to be in a vulnerable condition caused to a large extent by draught. The objectives were to provide each benefiting household with a cereal, cash crop and/or legume. These were small scale farmers that were unable to secure seed on their own but who were prepared to pay back. Interest farmers were required to fill in application forms before they receive the seed loan. The successful applicants were required to pay a commitment fee of K2,500. After receiving the seed loan the farmer was expected to pay back at harvest time in the form of produce as indicated in the table below.

Table 4.1: Repayment of the Seed Loan

SEED	QUANTITY IN KGs	BENEFICIARY CONTRIBUTION
Maize	10	2 x 50 kg bags
Sorghum	5	1 x 50 kg bag
Cowpeas	2	1 x 12 kg bag
Sunflower	5	2 x 50 kg bags
Groundnuts	10	2 x 50 kg bags (unshelled)
Millet	2	1 x 25 kg bag

Source: GTZ Manual for Soliciting Funds for Community Level Self Help Projects - 2000

In this programme PAM was very instrumental, among other things, in assisting farmers in the application processes, the distribution of the seed loan, monitoring the farming activities of the loan recipients from field preparation, planting, harvesting to the actual repayment of the loan as described in the table above. For purposes of disseminating necessary information about the programme PAM organised workshops with groups of applicants at designated places. Through such workshops PAM, farmers received appropriate technical advice, especially for those that were planting a given seed

⁹⁰ GTZ Manual for Soliciting Funds for Community Level Self Help Projects (2000: 86-87); Confirmed by Fieldwork interviews with the Programme officer on November 8, 2004

variety for the first time. Like in the Africare programme local authority involvement was at the DDCC level, and affected area Councillors were expected to be part of the sensitisation process regarding the importance of the project to the beneficiaries, the need to pay the commitment fee, and ensure prompt repayment of the loans after harvest time. From the discussion with the PAM representative, the programme was a success. Beneficiaries enhanced their food security and duly repaid the seed loans. Some of the Council officials and Councillors interviewed variously recounted the difficulties people went through because of the draught and clearly appreciated the programme. The Council chairman, for example, recalled and greatly appreciated the work PAM did during the programme noting that: “Our people faced serious food shortages because of the draught and were also not able to prepare themselves for the next season because whatever income they should have got from the previous farming season to enable them buy seed was not realised. The availability of donor funding coupled with the excellent work done by PAM, through the execution of the programme, helped to uplift the people from an otherwise very hopeless situation”.

Activities of NGOs in Choma are well appreciated by many stakeholders in the district. However, the lack of effective coordination between the local authority and the NGOs is perceived to be detrimental to the potential for improve service delivery through coordinated efforts of the two parties. Effective interaction between the two parties would enhance the chances for coordinated service delivery in appropriate areas. A resident from Kamunza,⁹¹ a high density residential area, observed that donors give a lot of money to NGOs to do many things for communities. Effective collaboration between the two parties would, therefore, result in project proposals which can be funded by a donor or group of donors to facilitate the provision of some services on a somewhat permanent arrangement. The collaboration between World Vision and the German Technical Co-operation to Zambia (GTZ) on projects related to the provision of water and sanitation in various communities in the district is noted as a successful initiative which should be emulated.

⁹¹ Discussion with Mr. Bernard Silungwe, a Kamunza resident – November 25, 2004

Commenting on the organisation and the resource mobilisation capacity of NGOs and consequently the need to ensure effective collaboration one of the Councillors conceded that:

“...These NGOs are mainly composed of enlightened young men and women who are capable of coming up with good ideas that are beneficial to the communities. Experience so far has shown that they are able to source funding from donors with relative ease to carry out various programmes and projects. A lot of our people have in one way or another benefited from NGO programmes and received a service or information that has helped to improve their lives or way of understanding various issues in their local communities or the country. This cannot be taken away from the NGOs. It is a challenge for us in the Council to work towards embracing the NGO community, more than we have done so far, and find ways through which the efforts of both the Council and NGOs in service delivery can be effectively complemented”.

All Council officials, Councillors, and the NGO representatives interviewed in our study described the working relations between the two parties as either “good” or “very good”. Not a single interviewee described the relations as “poor” or “very poor”. This state of affairs provides a conducive environment capable of supporting ideas aimed at effective cooperation between the two groups. Under these conditions it should be possible for the two groups to focus on the strengths of each other rather than on the weaknesses and be able to interact in ways that can effectively complement their efforts in service delivery.

Lusaka City Council

The city of Lusaka is the Head Quarters of most local NGOs and it is also where the main branch offices for most International NGOs are located. Major decisions relating to the administration of and funding for the NGOs, therefore, are made by officials located in Lusaka. A total of 12 representatives from 9 NGOs/CBOs namely, FODEP, Women for Change, Transparency International-Zambia (TIZ), AVAP, Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD), Care International, Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR), Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP),

the Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM) were interviewed. Apart from the District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC) there are no other formal and regular interactions between these institutions and the Lusaka City Council.

Like in Choma, the work of NGOs in Lusaka district is appreciated by Council management, Councillors, residents and other stakeholders who also consider these organisations as partners, especially of public institutions, in national development. There is a strong belief among the 'city fathers' that NGOs have resources and most of them have demonstrated that such resources can be beneficial to the local communities in various ways. The Town clerk noted that NGOs are contributing to the development of the communities in areas such as health; poverty alleviation; human rights; and the appreciation of good governance. There are NGOs such as the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Transparency International-Zambia (TIZ), and Anti-Voter Apathy (AVAP) whose activities do not necessarily result in tangible benefits. However, the activities of such NGOs, which include the sensitisation of communities on issues of governance including the importance of elections and electing good leaders, are appreciated because they help to create an environment in which public services can be delivered in a transparent and accountable manner.

Out of the 600 residents subjected to the structured questionnaire, 379 (63.2 percent) of them were of the view that NGOs have a role to play in service delivery, 206 (34.3 percent) did not ascribe to this view while the remaining 15 were "not sure" (Figure 4.1). Those holding the 'positive' view appreciated the work of NGOs in areas such as the sensitisation of communities on governance issues; provision of oversight on government operations; promoting community health; and poverty alleviation. NGOs such as the Planned Parenthood Association (PPAZ), Care International; Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM); Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP); Transparency International-Zambia (TIZ); Women's Lobby Group; and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) were persistently cited by residents as organisations that are making 'a difference' to community development economically, socially and politically. We have noted in the Choma analysis that the work of NGOs such as PPAZ and PAM coincides with the functions of local authorities as provided for in the Second Schedule of the Local Government Act. We have also observed that

although the activities of NGOs such as FODEP and TIZ do not result in tangible benefits, their impact on communities lays a foundation upon which the provision of public services, by local authorities, in a transparent and accountable manner, can be achieved. A resident of Kabulonga observed that the inability, and sometimes unwillingness, of government to do everything underscores the justification for NGO intervention. Matters of community sensitisation on elections, for example, are best done by NGOs who are expected to be more impartial than government agencies. There is a majority view, however, that where possible, the provision of selected services by the local authority can be executed through a collaborated effort with appropriate NGOs. This view is based on the recognition that there are NGOs that, on an *ah-hoc* basis, provide certain services to local communities, services which are clearly within the jurisdiction of the local authority. It is acknowledged that such collaboration is only possible if the two parties devise formal ways that can ensure their regular and effective interaction. Like in Choma, there is also a concern that in order for NGOs to enhance their credibility they should embrace accountability and transparency in their operations. Another respondent⁹² in the study observed that the lack of accountability and transparency, whether real or perceived, can and is being used by some people including some government officials to discredit the work of NGOs. Consequently there are sometimes unnecessary suspicions about the conduct of NGOs that only serve to prohibit the potential for effective cooperation between these institutions and government agencies including local Councils. It is appreciated that in some cases these concerns may be somewhat exaggerated. However, it is entirely up to the NGOs to demonstrate, through their actions, that such concerns are baseless and only meant to unjustifiably tarnish their image.

NGOs consider themselves as partners with government institutions in the development process. In addition to providing various services to the communities some NGOs also perceive themselves as ‘watch dog’ institutions providing oversight on government operations with a view to enhancing good governance. NGO representatives in our study acknowledge receiving significant financial and material support from

⁹² A participant of a focus group discussion comprising 8 participants randomly the respondents of structured questionnaire in Kalundu (April 16, 2005)

donors which compares them favourably with most government departments and agencies. There is a majority view within the NGO community in Lusaka that this support is making a positive impact on the communities economically, socially, and politically. In his call for effective interaction between the Council and the NGO community one of the NGO officials spoken to noted that such interaction would result in the coordination of efforts in some areas of service delivery and the residents would be served better in the process. According to the official the accusations that the operations of NGOs are characterised by the lack of accountability and transparency are baseless and noted, among other things, that:⁹³

“...NGOs and other Civil Society organisations are assisting our people to uplift the quality of their lives through, for example, poverty alleviation programmes; assisting people to lead healthy lives and participate in the governance of the country, through information dissemination and programmes; and generally providing oversight on government operations in order to enhance good governance.....The truth of the matter is that NGOs are partners in development that are helping to fill-in the gaps left by government institutions, whether at the national or local level and they need to be recognised and supported”.

From our analysis, it is clear that the work of NGOs is well appreciated by the local community including the local Council, save for the concerns relating to the lack of accountability and transparency. The resources and skills that NGOs can and do bring to the delivery of some services are greatly acknowledged. In spite of this appreciation, however, NGOs are not formally co-opted in the activities of the Lusaka City Council. The Town clerk noted that the DDCC meetings are mainly concerned with the ‘broader’ district development plans and encompass the operations of government line ministries. What is needed is a different forum, with a much broader representation of the NGO community and one whose main agenda is to enhance collaboration between the two parties. Such a forum would enhance the knowledge of the local authority, among other things, about which NGOs are involved in, for example, poverty alleviation or health matters etc., and the nature of the programmes or projects being proposed for implementation in these areas. Such knowledge can provide valuable insights on how the two parties can cooperate and possibly coordinate their efforts. Other than meeting in the

⁹³ Interview with Programme Officer for Transparency International –Zambia (TIZ) – April 13, 2005

DDCC meetings, which are not as regular as they should be, Councillors, Council officials, and people, in the NGO 'world', interact informally and more at the individual level. Although the Head Quarters of the NGOs represented in our study are based in Lusaka, this strategic position is not used to build effective collaboration between the Council and the NGO community. There is no deliberate effort, on the part of the local authority and the NGO community to initiate a collaborative process that can attract donor assistance to execute the 'joint' delivery of certain services by NGOs and the local Council. The DDCCs in the country were created to coordinate the planning and implementation of development activities at this level. However, these committees, including the one in Lusaka, have not been effective because their operations are not backed by law and they also lack adequate resources. Like in the case of Choma there are no interactions, between the local authority and NGOs, outside the DDCC meetings. Any such interactions are not only rare but also *ad hoc* in nature. There is no other forum or formal arrangement through the Council and NGOs interact. Consequently, the weaknesses, with regard to the nature of collaboration between the local authority and the NGO community, observed in Choma are equally applicable to Lusaka.

The good working relations existing between the two parties, as acknowledged by council officials and NGO representatives, have not been turned into a collaborative effort to enhance effective service delivery. NGOs expect the initiative to enhance effective collaboration between the two parties to originate from the local authority which has the clear mandate, emanating from the Constitution, to provide public services on behalf of central government. The question of whether or not donors can fund service delivery activities arising from collaborative agreements between NGOs and the Council may depend on the level of commitment to and the 'nature' of the collaboration. In the absence of effective collaboration between the two parties, the exact answer to this question may only be a matter of conjecture.

The above constraints notwithstanding, we have noted the recognition by many stakeholders that NGOs do provide various services that are beneficial to communities in Lusaka. For illustration purposes we describe the CARE Peri-Urban Lusaka Small Enterprise (CARE PULSE) Project. In January 1992, at the invitation of the Zambian Government, CARE International commenced operations in Zambia and set up a local

branch named CARE Zambia. Two years after its inauguration, CARE Zambia launched the Peri-Urban Lusaka Small Enterprise (PULSE) Project. The overall goal was to increase household income, economic security and employment opportunities among the families of poor micro-entrepreneurs in peri-urban areas of Zambia, through the provision of sustainable savings and credit services. The program provided working capital to micro and small-scale entrepreneurs, mostly women, who reside in the peri-urban areas including Mtendere, George, Mandevu, and Chawama.

CARE PULSE provided short-term loans to individuals through mutually liable groups. The borrowers had to accept joint liability and be willing to make a compulsory minimum savings of 10% of the proposed loan amount. This contribution went into a Loan Insurance Fund (LIF) which served as the group's collateral for subsequent loans. The loan amounts ranged between K50,000 and K250,000 to first applicants and up to K500,000 to second applicants. The participants used the loans as working capital in street vending, small manufacturing and food processing. Loans were repayable in twenty-five weeks for first loans and fifty weeks for the second. The repayment frequency was weekly for first loans and bi-weekly for the second.

CARE PULSE's targeted participants were principally women who were the sole income earners in their households. Besides this core group, the project allowed the participation of men. Out of an overall membership of 3,011, a total of 2,018 loans had been disbursed by December 31st, 1996. The total amount disbursed reached K421 million, of which K54 million was for repeat loans to 128 participants. A total of K170 million was still outstanding. The on-time repayment rate stood at 91 percent and savings in the Loan Insurance Fund had accumulated to K122 million.

The loans had a positive impact in terms of increased employment and strengthened businesses. An initial survey carried out by the project in September 1995 found that at least 112 full-time jobs and 127 part-time jobs had been created after receiving the loans. A further survey carried out in March 1996 showed that at least 180 permanent jobs (a 60 percent increase in six months) and 150 seasonal jobs (an 18 percent increase in six months) had been created. The project also indirectly generated at least 1,751 jobs. The average income and turnover for the businesses had also increased by as much as 75 percent in some cases. As a result of the loans, some participants were

able to change businesses and others had diversified their business holdings. Loans had also enabled female participants to become less dependent on their spouses, enabling them to play a more significant role in their homes. This had raised their status and increased their sense of achievement (Africa Region (Findings), No. 147, The World Bank Group, 1999)⁹⁴.

The CARE project illustrated above was considerably appreciated by all stakeholders, including some Council officials, who cited it as a progressive example of what NGOs have to offer in the development of local communities. The project, among other things, increased household incomes and created jobs. The creation of markets by local authorities, among other things, is not only a response to the need for increased local revenue sources. It is also a social responsibility to create opportunities for enhancing the livelihood of the residents within their jurisdiction. Interventions by other organisations in this very important area, therefore, complement the efforts of the local authority. It is also important to note that the opportunities for the Lusaka City Council to collect revenue from the affected residents of the peri-urban areas covered by the project were enhanced by the CARE project.

Luwingu District Council

In spite of its rural status Luwingu district has a rich experience with NGO activities and the contacts between residents and such organisations seem to be much stronger perhaps owing to its relative small size compared to Choma and Lusaka. The Civic Education Programme, sponsored by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), one of Zambia's cooperating partners, between 1992 and 1997, seems to have stimulated the residents' interest and subsequent faith in voluntary organisations including NGOs.

In Luwingu, representatives from nine NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) namely the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP); Women for Change; Ant-Voter Apathy (AVAP); Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ); Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR); National Women's Lobby Group; Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP); Shamumanga Farmers' Association' and the

⁹⁴ Project confirmed by Fieldwork interviews

Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM) were interviewed. Like in the other two districts the District Development Coordinating Committee is the only forum that provides formal interaction between NGOs and the local authority.

All representatives of Non Governmental Organisations and Community Based Organisations spoken to expressed a clear conviction to the effect that their institutions had a role to play in development whether at the national or local level. Developmental interventions by NGOs in Luwingu, like in the other two districts, can be seen at the economic, social, or political levels. NGOs in the district consider themselves 'indispensable' to the district's development and ultimately the country's governance process. It is acknowledged, within the NGO community in the district that while NGOs cannot replace local authorities in the delivery of public services, their capacity to contribute to the welfare of the local communities cannot and should not be underestimated. An official from the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) noted that local authorities do not have adequate capacity to effectively undertake the more than 50 functions prescribed by the Local Government Act given their inadequacies in qualified personnel, finances and equipment. Local authorities also do not have an explicit mandate to sensitise communities on issues that are sometimes considered "controversial", and yet very important to the governance of the country, such as those relating to the electoral process. In this respect NGOs are perceived to be neutral and appropriate institutions to sensitise communities on such issues in spite of contrary views held by some people including some government and Council officials.⁹⁵

Compared to the other two districts, Council management officials and Councillors in Luwingu were more emphatic on observing that NGOs are partners in development and that consequently they have a role to play in service delivery. Both groups expressed similar views regarding the usefulness of NGOs in the development of the district. The majority view is that NGOs have the knowledge, skills, and financial resources that are being used to complement government efforts, whether at the local or national levels, in many areas of human development. It was also acknowledged, by many respondents in our study, that because NGO activities are usually preceded by a needs assessment or a clear and obvious need for intervention the impact of their programmes and projects on

⁹⁵ Interview with Pastor Joseph Chishimba, District Coordinator for CSPR (October 6, 2004)

the targeted communities or groups is not only appropriate but quite significant. The Council Secretary acknowledged the benefits local communities are accruing from NGO activity in the district. Being a rural district, Luwingu does not have adequate and reliable communication facilities. The district does not have access to newspapers, television, and telephones rarely function. Information about what is going on within the district, and more so in the country, is very problematic. It is recognised that an enlightened community is more likely to take responsibility of its own existence, for example, in the area of food security; less likely to vandalise public property; and is generally more likely to make decisions that have a positive value on good governance such as participating in national and local elections. NGOs in the district are acknowledged to be filling the gaps left by public institutions including the local Council.

Out of the 150 residents subjected to a structured questionnaire, 101 (67.3 percent) of them held the view that NGOs have a role to play in service delivery, 47 (31.3 percent) did not ascribe to this view, and the remaining 2 residents (1.3 percent) were “not sure” (Figure 4.1). Those acknowledging the role of NGOs in service delivery cited examples of NGO activities that have benefited the communities in Luwingu including sensitisation exercises on governance issues especially relating to elections. In this respect the activities of various NGOs, for example, PPAZ, CSPR, FODEP, and AVAP were mentioned to in support of this recognition. It is interesting to note that during group discussions those holding the opposite view were not able to advance any reasons to support their stance. Their position might a clear case of sheer indifference and/or inadequate knowledge of NGO activity.

Unlike in Choma and Lusaka, the question of transparency and accountability in NGO operations was not an issue among Luwingu residents and was only alluded to by one or two people. There seems to be a significant level of satisfaction that these institutions are sufficiently transparent and accountable in their dealings. What Luwingu residents would like to see, however, is effective collaboration between and among the various NGOs on the one hand, and between the NGOs and the local authority on the other. It is appreciated that effective levels of collaboration between and among these institutions would avoid the duplication of efforts and lead to the prudent utilisation of

resources. In his contributions to a focus group discussion one of the discussants, who seemed to be knowledgeable about the work of NGOs in the district, observed that:⁹⁶

“The objectives and subsequent activities of some NGOs and CBOs are sometimes similar. Take the responsibilities of Farmers’ Associations and those of the CSPR for example. One can see something common in their objectives. This is also applicable to FODEP and AVAP. They have common areas of operations. If such organisations interacted and coordinated their efforts properly they would make a much bigger impact on the communities. The impact would even be more if such effective interaction and coordination was extended to the local authority in appropriate areas of service delivery”.

Like in the other two districts, however, there are a few individuals, among Council officials, Councillors, and the residents, who do not recognise NGOs and CBOs as partners in development. Such individuals generally see NGOs institutions as arising from the need of some individuals to better their own lives. According to this view the projects and programmes implemented by NGOs are only good to the extent that they provided individual benefits as evidenced by the ‘good life’ which most NGO representatives seem to be enjoying.

In spite of the support for and the recognition of what NGOs are doing in the district, these institutions, like in the other two districts, are not co-opted into the work of the local authority. Like in Choma and Lusaka, the DDCC is the main interactive forum for the local Council officials and the NGO community. Because of its ineffectiveness, however, the DDCC is not an effective vehicle through which serious discussions, aimed at charting a way for effective collaboration between NGOs and the local authority can be realised. Like in Choma and Lusaka, activities of NGOs in Luwingu have remained largely outside the operations of the local authority. The local authority has not gone beyond the usual broad discussions relating to district development during the few times the DDCC has met. There has been no effort, on the part of the local authority to initiate a specific agenda intended for deeper and collaborative action with the NGO community with regard to service delivery. NGOs, on their part, have also not initiated such an agenda. As noted in the Choma case, this may be due to the fact that since NGO officials

⁹⁶ The focus group discussion consisted of 10 participants comprising 3 business entrepreneurs; 4 market stall operators; and 4 marketers – October 7, 2004

at that level look up to their Head Quarters in Lusaka for direction and funding, they may not be in the position to initiate such an agenda. Similarly, NGOs in the district also feel that a collaborative effort, between the local authority and NGOs, intended for the delivery of services in a 'joint' manner is a subject matter that should be initiated by the local authority. This position acknowledges the possible need for central government attention and even approval for such collaboration in view of the implications on the funding mechanisms and continuity of such an effort. It is also a reflection of the view that NGOs at the district level would feel more comfortable to communicate such an agenda to their Head Quarters if it were initiated by the local authority which has a clear mandate for public service provision as provided for in the Local Government Act.

However, the problems cited above have not deterred NGOs to engage in activities that are helping to enhance the well being of local communities in Luwingu district. Organisations like FODEP, AVAP, women's Lobby, and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace are engaged in activities aimed at promoting democracy and good governance. Such organisations carry out programmes to sensitise communities on issues related to human rights; gender equity; the importance of and participation in elections; the need to choose representatives of integrity that are accountable to their communities; and the importance of communing for purposes of enhancing local development. The Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ) is involved in activities aimed at promoting a health community through information and education on safe motherhood, prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, and family planning. The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), PAM and Farmers' Associations, on the other hand, are concerned about the promotion of decision-making processes that have an impact of reducing poverty among the people. Specifically these institutions are, among other things, involved in sensitising communities on the use of modern farming methods; encouraging communities to adopt sustainable self-help activities; and the distribution of farming inputs. The main objective is to ensure increased household incomes and food security among the communities through increased agricultural yields.

In the discussion on Choma and Lusaka we have noted that the activities of NGOs like FODEP, AVAP, CCJP and the Women's Lobby help to ensure the knowledge of and adherence to the principles good governance on the part of the governors and the

governed. This knowledge and adherence is the basis upon which an environment for an effective, transparent, and accountable service delivery process can be established and sustained. The contributions of such organisations, therefore, may be intangible but are 'indirectly' very critical to the ultimate provision of tangible services by public institutions including local authorities. The activities of the PPAZ, CSPR, PAM and Farmers' Associations, as noted above, clearly encompass the legitimate functions of local authorities. These activities relate to functions of local authorities as itemised in the Second Schedule of the Local Government Act of 1991 within the broad categories of responsibility covering health, agriculture, and community development. Pursuing a collaborative agenda between the local authority and the NGO community in these areas of service provision, therefore, is a subject matter of mutual interest.

For illustration purposes we discuss some of the activities of the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ) in Luwingu during the period under review.⁹⁷ The PPAZ in Luwingu is mainly funded through fundraising drama performances; donations from Ireland Aid; and grants from the main PPAZ in Lusaka. The PPAZ is largely concerned about providing Sexual and Reproductive Health Services to local communities. A full sexual and reproductive health package includes:

- Family planning/birth spacing services,
- Antenatal care, skilled attendance at delivery, and postnatal care,
- Management of obstetric and neonatal complications and emergencies,
- Prevention of abortion, management of complications and provision of post-abortion care,
- Prevention and treatment of reproductive tract infections and sexually transmitted infections including HIV/AIDS,
- Early diagnosis and treatment of breast and cervical cancer,
- Promotion, education and support for exclusive breast-feeding,
- Prevention and appropriate treatment of sub-fertility and infertility,
- Active discouragement of harmful practices such as female genital cutting,
- Adolescent sexual and reproductive health, and
- Prevention and management of gender-based violence.

⁹⁷ Interviews with District Director of Health and PPAZ representative (October 4, 2004); Council officials (October 5-7, 2004), and contributions from some residents who were members of a focus group discussion comprising 10 participants randomly selected from those that were subjected to the structured questionnaire (October 9, 2004)

During the period under review, particularly between 1998 and 2001, PPAZ instituted various programmes aimed at improving access to services related to family planning, safe motherhood, and community-based prevention of sexually transmitted infections (STIs). To facilitate these activities PAAZ trained Community-Based Distributors (CBDs), Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs), and Youth Peer Educators. The CBDs were responsible for screening potential clients with a view of providing free oral contraceptives and condoms at the household level or at various outreach gatherings taking place in the community. The CBDs provided advice on the importance of using contraceptives to protect themselves against unwanted pregnancies and STIs. It was also the duty of the CBDs to discuss the various myths and misconceptions related to the use of contraceptives so that communities are better informed. The CBDs and youth peer educators distribute condoms to high risk areas such as guest houses and fishing camps. The responsibilities of the TBAs included providing antenatal and post-natal care, community education, and delivering babies for mothers who are either unable or not willing to travel to a nearest health centre for delivery. TBAs are normally provided with delivery kits to facilitate home deliveries. Since there are very few health centres in Luwingu the services of the TBAs are greatly valued by the local communities. The long distance to the nearest clinic, travel costs, and the lack of reliable transport makes it very difficult and sometimes even risky for mothers to travel and access health services at a clinic.

The intervention by PPAZ is, therefore, a gesture that is appreciated by many Luwingu residents. In his contribution to the discussion on health care services in the district Headman Lubemba Kaunda of Lubemba village in senior chief Chungu's area, for example, noted that:⁹⁸

“The people who live near clinics are lucky. In this district we have very few clinics and they are far apart. In some cases the nearest clinic can even be more than 30 kilometres away. This is not good and can even be dangerous especially for expectant mothers. Fortunately PPAZ has trained Traditional Birth Attendants who are doing a good job in all our chiefdoms. We are now experiencing very few deaths associated with giving birth because of the good work PPAZ is doing”.

⁹⁸ Interview with Village Headman Lubemba Kaunda in Senior Chief Chungu's chiefdom (October 11, 2004)

The CBDs, TBAs, youth peer educators, and drama groups organised by PPAZ carry out Community-based education for the prevention of STIs. Education information is related to preventing STIs and HIV, and the identification of symptoms for STIs. The youth peer educators also reach out to their fellow youths to teach and counsel them about sex, STIs and HIV/AIDS, and unwanted pregnancies. These out reach sessions are normally conducted at places where the youths are gathered in large numbers such as schools, clubs, and entertainment events that draw large gatherings. PPAZ also established “Friendly Corners” in some schools within the district to facilitate discussions on issues of health in general and HIV/AIDS in particular. There is also an Information Centre at Luwingu High School where communities can access information on sex and reproductive health.


It is important to note that the programmes and initiatives described above are on-going and it is the objective of PPAZ to ensure that these programmes reach as many communities as possible throughout the district. From the discussions with the PPAZ representative and other stakeholders in the district is clear that these programmes are having a positive impact on the communities in terms of enhancing public health. The District Director of Health, for example, observed that:⁹⁹

“As a District hospital, PPAZ is our closet partner in the struggle to ensure that as many people as possible access health services and information. The road network in Luwingu is not only inadequate but is also in a very poor state. The district is not covered by reliable public transport and there are very few health centres or clinics. This means that most of the people cannot easily access health services. The activities of PPAZ are helping to fill the gap by complementing the work of the District Health Board. Many communities are appreciating the work of PPAZ”.

The appreciation of NGO activity in Luwingu may be illustrated by the perceptions of residents on whether or not NGOs have a role to play in service delivery as shown in Figure 4.1 below.

⁹⁹ Interview with the District Director of Health – October 4, 2004


Figure 4.1: NGOs and Service Delivery



Source: Fieldwork data analysis

To gauge the usefulness of teamwork in district development in general and service delivery in particular residents were also asked whether it was important for NGOs to work closely with the local Council. The level of responses shown in Figure 4.2 below illustrates the residents' desire for the two parties to cultivate an *esprit de corps* with a view of enhancing effective service delivery. Affirmative responses range from 70 percent in Choma to 89 percent in Luwingu.

Figure 4.2: Relations between NGOs and Council management



Source: Fieldwork data analysis

Most Councillors, like Council management staff in the three local authorities, also ascribe to the recognition that NGOs are useful partners in district development. The level of responses in Table 4.2 below illustrates this point when Councillors were asked to assess the usefulness of NGOs in the development of their districts. Because of the small sample sizes tabular, rather than graphical, presentation seems to be more appropriate.

Table 4.2: Councillors' assessment of the usefulness of NGOs

	LUWINGU	LUSAKA	CHOMA
Very Useful	6 (85.7%)	7 (70%)	6 (75%)
Useful	1 (14.3%)	3 (30%)	2 (25%)
Not at all Useful	-	-	-
Not sure	-	-	-
Total %	7 (100%)	10 (100%)	8 (100%)

Source: Fieldwork data analysis

We wish to reiterate that the NGOs, whose activities do not necessarily result in tangible benefits to the recipients, are, however, very critical to the overall development of the community. Such NGOs mainly function as watchdog institutions to sensitise communities on various governance issues with a view of checking the excesses of government. They are part of the National Integrity System (NIS), to use the Transparency International parlance. Specifically, the activities of these NGOs include, but not limited to, election monitoring and sensitisation, advocacy for gender equity, sensitisation on the dangers of corruption, and generally sensitisation on the need to uphold the rule of law, and the building of democratic institutions for purposes of enhancing good governance. In this respect, most participants of focus group discussions (FGDs) in the three districts observed that community sensitisation, by such NGOs, on various governance issues not only inspires the citizens to take a keen interest in how government institutions are administered but also enhances their capacity to participate in the public decision-making processes. Such interest and popular participation provides checks and balances on the operations of government, promotes good governance, and consequently improves the opportunities for the provision of adequate and quality services by public institutions including local Councils. A somewhat deep analysis of what such NGOs have specifically done in Choma, Lusaka and Luwingu during the period under review is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, suffice to state that there is a strong appreciation, among the residents and other stakeholders in the study, of the role these NGOs are playing on enlightening citizens and keeping government in check.

In this section we have noted that NGOs, in the three Council areas, are serving communities in various ways which were acknowledged and appreciated by many respondents in our study including Council officials and the local residents. NGOs in the local authority areas of our study play similar roles related to advocacy and sensitisation on governance issues, and/or provide tangible services related to health, education, and poverty reduction. These are topical issues or problems affecting local communities countrywide. It is, therefore, not surprising that NGO efforts in the three districts converge on these same issues. There is a recognition that NGOs have resources and skills that can benefit local communities more if deliberate efforts were instituted with a view to exploring ways in which effective collaboration and coordination of NGO and

local authority activity can result in the 'joint' delivery of some services. This position is in recognition of the fact that most of the services that NGOs provide are within the jurisdiction of a local authority's responsibility as provided for in the Local Government Act No. 22 of 1991. However, our analysis has shown that NGOs are not co-opted in the operations of the local authorities. These organisations provide services to targeted local communities on their own accord, as and when the need arises, and subject to the availability of funding mainly from various donor agencies. Interaction between NGOs and local authorities is *ad-hoc* in nature and more at the personal rather than the institutional level. The only formal forum for interaction between NGOs and local authorities is through the ineffective District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) which rarely meet. We have noted earlier in this section that the DDCCs are not backed by explicit legislation apart from Cabinet Circular number 1 of 1995, and that these institutions are not availed with the necessary resources to operate effectively. Consequently, operations of the DDCCs are, among other things, face with two major problems. First, the DDCC chairman does not have authority to discipline erring members of the Committee. In effect it means, for example, that members of the Committee who choose to absent themselves from DDCC meetings cannot be disciplined. This has an adverse effect on the quality of decisions that emanate from the deliberations especially when an individual expected to provide technical guidance on a specialised agenda is absent. And second, because of insufficient resources, DDCCs are not able to meet as often as they should. Because of these challenges, formal and in-depth interactions, aimed at the collaboration and coordination of efforts, with a view to ensuring a 'joint' service delivery process for some services, has not been a characteristic feature of NGO-Council relations.

NGO officials in Choma and Luwingu are less likely to initiate this kind of collaboration since such officials and their offices are just extensions of their mother bodies located in Lusaka. It is, therefore, the Lusaka based NGO officials, who are at the Head Quarters, and in close proximity and directly dealing with donor agencies, that can initiate such collaborative efforts. However, we have found no such initiatives. Although the possibility of donors funding such coordinated efforts is well appreciated by NGOs and Council officials, there is a general feeling, among the NGO community, that local

authorities are key to the initiation of such initiatives. Admittedly, the selection, funding procedures, and the subsequent delivery of some services on a joint basis is a big challenge for NGOs and local authorities. However, in the absence of any collaborative efforts meant for this purpose, the extent of and the benefits arising from such a challenge will remain a matter of conjecture. However, literature suggests that collaborative relationships between NGOs and government institutions have considerable merit in some instances. Not only can it increase the effectiveness of the actions of the institutions involved – it can also be an important means for NGOs to scale up their impacts. Although NGOs can take the lead in such collaborations the state is often proactive in initiating linkages (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993: 156-167). While this may often be with the larger goal of using or controlling NGOs (Montgomery’s (1988) ‘bureaucratic populism’) this is not always so. Turner and Hulme (1997: 212-213) have noted that one of the reasons for the government’s concern with NGO activities is to try to ensure that different NGOs coordinate their activities with government agencies. This requirement may lead to conflict with some NGOs claiming that coordination actually means control and greatly reduces their efficiency. Government, however, points out that failures in coordination lead to people receiving different messages from different agencies. This causes confusion and leads to unnecessary duplication of services in some areas when other areas have no services at all.

We have also noted that working relations between NGOs and Council officials in Luwingu are comparatively better than in Choma and Lusaka. These relations were described by the representatives of both parties as either “good” or “very good”. Not a single representative described them as either “poor” or “very poor”. Out of the eight Council management officials interviewed six of them described the relations as “very good” with five of the seven Councillors ascribing to the same view. Similarly, out of the ten NGO representatives eight of them described their relations with the Council as “very good”. The need for cooperation between the two parties seems to be much stronger in Luwingu. Sentiments in support of good working relations between the two parties, on the part of the Council, can be summarised by the contribution of the Councillor for Namukolo Ward who, among other things, observed that:¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Mr. G. M. Kambone, Councillor for Namukolo Ward – October 7, 2004.

“We are a small Council struggling to serve our communities with very inadequate resources. NGOs are also serving the same community in various ways using their own resources. As a Council, therefore, we cannot afford to antagonise institutions whose activities are complementing our work. We need stronger ties and more coordination so that our communities can benefit more from the resulting prudent use of the resources by the Council and the NGOs”.

However, the local authority has not capitalised on the good working relations to work towards co-opting the NGO community in its work. Government legislation is also silent on whether or not local authorities can engage in such collaborative efforts. Although the ‘interpretation’ of this legislative silence may differ, the local authorities in our study seem to have responded to it in a similar fashion. In view of the supporting literature for NGO-government agency collaboration, and the expectation by NGOs in the three districts that the local authorities are supposed to initiate the collaboration, it is plausible to argue that the lack of direction, legislative or otherwise, from the *principal* (central government) to the *agents* (local authorities) is the main explanatory factor for the observed lack of collaboration between NGOs and local authorities.

NGOs are not the only other players in the service delivery process at the local level. We also recognise the owners of business enterprises as very critical players to the service delivery process. The business community owns substantial property in a Council area and conducts various transactions from which local authorities charge rates and fees. There is also a likelihood that in addition to paying the rates, fees and charges the business community is in a position to assist local authorities in other ways with regard to the delivery of services. However, we argue that the extent of the business community’s involvement in matters of service delivery, other than paying what is due to the local authority, depends on the nature of interactions between the two parties. Low levels of interaction and poor working relations between the two parties may lead to unwillingness, on the part of the business community, to fulfil its obligations to the local authority resulting in the loss of local income. Such interactions and relations may also result in the underestimation of what these institutions can do for the local community. It is in view of these observations that we examine, in the next section, the experiences of the local authorities vis-à-vis the role of the business community in service delivery.

The Local Authorities and the Role of the Business Community in Service Delivery

Not all goods and services which contribute to the welfare of a community can be provided by local authorities. There are goods and services which communities receive from other institutions including the business community. It is important to note that some of these goods and/or services constitute the factors of production that enhance the financial capacity of residents to pay for the various rents, charges and fees for services that are provided by local authorities. It is, therefore, incumbent upon local authorities to provide an enabling environment in which private business enterprises can be able to provide a wide range of goods and services in an efficient and effective manner. It is, in fact, important to note that the various charges including property taxes that business enterprises pay to local authorities constitute a significant source of local revenue. It is in this respect, among other things, that local authorities and the business community can be perceived as partners in the public service delivery process.

In this section, therefore, we attempt to examine the role that the business community is playing in public service delivery in the three local authority areas of our study. It is a normal business trend in the world to day for service deliverers, including local authorities, to sub-contract other institutions to provide services on their behalf. The contracting out of some services is a response to many factors including the need to enhance efficiency and effectiveness, and also to utilise skills that may be absent. Specifically, therefore, we examine the extent to which the business community is actually involved in services delivery by way of being sub-contracted by the local authorities. Like in the case of the NGO analysis, we do not provide an exhaustive catalogue of what the business community has done during the period under review (1991-2001). Rather, the views of the residents and other stakeholders, including Councillors, Council management officials, business entrepreneurs, and examples of any service delivery activities undertaken by the business community constitute the basis for our analysis.

Choma

For the purpose of our study we visited and interviewed representatives from seven business enterprises namely, Standard Sales Company, Arupee Service Station Limited, Choma Garage, Crystal Lodge, Star Butchery, Choma Milling, and Southern Water and Sewerage Company Limited (SWSC). These enterprises are among the notable business concerns in the district.

In spite of the poor services rendered by the local authority, as variously noted in chapter two and three, there is willingness among the business entrepreneurs not only to their rents and other charges to the local authority but to assist in the delivery of some services whenever requested. The local authority's lack of capacity to provide adequate services in an efficient and effective manner is well appreciated by the business community. The dedication, on the part of the business community, to ensure prompt payments to the Council is a response to this realisation. It is acknowledged, however, that the revenue raised by the local authority is not adequate to procure the necessary equipment to facilitate effective service delivery. The need for adequate central government support in this matter is recognised by the business community. The inadequacies of public policy and inappropriateness of various government pronouncements, with regard to the financing of local authorities, are well known by the business community. It is appreciated that the poor financial position of the local authority is a reflection of these inadequacies. The business community in Choma is fully aware that most of the problems their local authority is facing are a characteristic feature of most, if not all, local authorities in the country. This realisation seems to enhance the sympathy of the business entrepreneurs and acts as a motivating factor for the assistance they provide to the local authority.

Comparatively, most business houses are better equipped than the local authority and are in a much better position to provide some of the services that are normally a responsibility of the local authority. The local authority's Town clerk disclosed that companies like Aruppe, Standard Sales, Choma Garage, and Choma milling sometimes provide trucks and the Council provides the fuel to facilitate the collection and disposal of garbage. There are other times the local authority has no money to purchase fuel and Arupee Service Station has provided fuel either free of charge or on credit to facilitate

garbage collection and disposal and/or some emergency Council operations. Since these companies are involved in transportation and/or retailing activities, they own different types of motorised vehicles including small saloon cars, tractors, and big ordinary and tipper trucks. These companies are also financially better than the local authority. In terms of equipment, therefore, local authority service delivery activities, such as the collection and disposal of garbage requiring the use of trucks, benefit from assistance rendered by these companies. The business houses are motivated by the need to exercise *social* responsibility through giving back to the community in the form of assistance to the local authority which has the mandate to, among other things, keep the environment clean. Some of the roads within the residences, especially in the low density area of Mochipapa, are maintained by the local businessmen who live there because the Council does not have the capacity to do that regularly. Notably, this kind of assistance is associated with business owners of Standard Sales, Arupee and Choma Garage. In addition these business houses also contribute to other service delivery areas, including the cleaning of streets within the CBD, and the collection and disposal of garbage especially within the CBD and the Makalanguzu market. Choma milling, like most business enterprises, collects and disposes its own garbage and sometimes assists the local authority to do the same within the CBD. These kinds of assistance also come from other local companies including the Southern Water and Sewerage Company, and Star butchery. The Town clerk conceded that the business community within the Central Business District literally maintains the cleanliness of the streets and immediate surroundings. Assistance from the business community is well appreciated by the local authority. In this respect six out of the eight Council officials interviewed held the view that the business community does not only have the potential to render but actually renders assistance to the Council with regard to the delivery of services in areas such as road maintenance and garbage collection. Councillors and Council officials acknowledged that most of the business houses have the financial capacity and/or equipment necessary to assist the local authority in various ways.

Emanating from the discussions with Council officials, especially the Town clerk and the Director of Engineering, and acknowledged by the respective business houses, we summarise the areas of assistance by the business community below:

- Maintenance of roads within the central business district (CBD) and some residential areas (Standard Sales, Arupee, and Choma Garage),
- Cleaning streets especially those within the shopping area and immediate surroundings (Star butchery, Choma Garage and Arupee),
- Collection and disposal of garbage from markets especially the Makalanguzu market within the CBD (SWSC, Choma Garage, and Arupee)
- The cutting of tall grass in the Mochipapa Low density residential area where most of the business entrepreneurs reside (Standard Sales, Arupee, and Choma Garage),
- Providing fuel either free of charge or on credit basis to the local authority (Arupee and Choma Garage), and
- Providing trucks and/or trailers for use by the local authority (Arupee, Choma Garage, and National Milling).

It is important to note that the services that the business community is providing on behalf of the local authority are a responsibility of local authorities as provided for under the Second Schedule of the Local Government ACT of 1991. The involvement of the business community in providing such services, therefore, not only underscores the importance of these services but also demonstrates the availability of capacity, other than that of the local authority, at the local level to provide such services.

In order to assess their level of confidence in the business community residents were asked whether they knew of business houses in their district that have the capacity to contribute, in various ways, to the efficient and effective delivery of services by the Council. Out of the 250 residents interviewed 175 (70 percent) of them either held the view that “all” or “most” of the business houses have the capacity to make a contribution to services delivery. Through focus¹⁰¹ group discussions residents acknowledged the support their local authority was receiving from business houses citing especially the collection and disposal of garbage and the maintenance of roads in some of the compounds. Choma Garage and Arupee were the most cited companies that were assisting the local authority in ensuring the collection of garbage and maintenance of roads. The focus group participants observed that the local communities owe a lot to the business community in Choma. Instead of Council trucks residents, on many occasions, see vehicles belonging to business houses, with Council workers, collecting garbage.

¹⁰¹The focus group discussion comprised 9 of the 10 residents that were randomly sampled from those that were subjected to the structures questionnaire in Kamunza compound – November 20, 2004.

Without this intervention most of the compounds would be very filthy and consequently pose a serious danger to community health. Residents highly commend the attitude of the business enterprises with regard to helping the Council to do its work in spite of paying the rates, fees and charges to the local authority as required by law. Other stakeholders equally appreciate the interventions being made by the business community in trying to fill the gap left by the local authority. An official from the Zambia Red Cross office¹⁰², for example, observed that a lot of garbage is generated by marketers trading at the illegal Makalanguzu market within the central business district. Without the assistance from business houses such as Choma Garage and Arupee there would be an outbreak of diseases because of uncollected garbage from this market.

The capacity of the business community to assist the local authority in delivering some of the services, as noted above, has been adequately demonstrated and is recognised and appreciated by all stakeholders in the district. However, an attempt has not been made by the Council to sub-contract these business entities to provide some services on behalf of the local authority. During the period under review (1991-2001) the local authority has not considered sub-contracting as an alternative mode of service provision. Although Council officials spoken to are aware of sub-contracting as an alternative mode of service delivery by the local authority none of them provided a tangible reason for not having utilised this method during the period under review. It is true that business houses may not have some of the 'sophisticated' equipment especially for road construction and maintenance. We note, however, that if the local authority took steps to discuss this service delivery option an interest among the business community would have been generated to facilitate the purchase of lacking equipment. The local authority has not taken initiative to tap and incorporate the capacities of business houses in ways that would be of mutual benefit to both parties and the residents.

The demonstrated capacity of the business houses to deliver some services has not prompted local Council officials to enter into sub-contracting agreements. From the point of view of the business community, local authority officials lack entrepreneurial skills and are consequently afraid of experimenting with new ways of doing business. This view is shared by other stakeholders including residents who believe that the local

¹⁰² Interview with the Acting District Officer for Red Cross – November 22, 2004

authority is not doing much to enhance its capacity to deliver services. According to this view, sub-contracting is one way of enhancing local capacity for service delivery especially considering that the business community has satisfactorily demonstrated its ability to render some services on behalf of the local authority. The local authority is not making full use of the capacity demonstrated by business houses. Most importantly, there is a perception among the local entrepreneurs and residents that the local authority is a 'closed shop'. The Manager for Standard Sales Company Limited noted that business houses have a social responsibility to enhance the living standards of the local community and observed that:¹⁰³

"...As business people we would like our clients, the residents, to lead better lives and in a clean environment so we feel it is our obligation to do whatever is possible to help them. But the Council is operating like a closed shop. There is no effective interaction between business houses and Council officials except when they need assistance or following up on payments. It is also necessary that the Council should manage its finances properly. The Council should be accountable and transparent in its dealings. In this way the business community can get inspired to help them in times of need".

We have noted that the assistance rendered to the local authority by the business community does not preclude their obligations to pay the various rates and charges to the Council. In addition to paying these dues the business community is using its resources to do the work of the local authority. Under the circumstances, it is plausible to argue that arrangements, such as sub-contracting, that would result in the mutual benefit of the two parties, would inspire the business community to do more than it is already doing in the area of service delivery. Councillors and Council management officials admitted not doing enough to 'win the confidence of the business community in order for the local authority to receive more assistance'. In spite of this admittance the local authority does not have plans of how this status quo can be changed. Specifically, there is no talk about moving towards sub-contracting as a way of enhancing the local authority's capacity to deliver services. Although business entrepreneurs and the local authority recognise that they are partners in the service delivery process the lack of effective interaction between the two parties, and the 'lukewarm' approach to this partnership is undermining the

¹⁰³ Interview with the Manger for Standard Sales Company Limited – November 9, 2004

potential for effective collaborations that can result in sub-contracting agreements. The local authority, being the mandated agency of central government for the provision of public services, is not innovative to adequately engage the business community in ways that are mutually beneficial.

In spite of the good working relations reported between the two parties, there is limited formal interaction between the local authority and the business community. Out of the 8 appointed Council officials interviewed 5 of them described their working relations with the business community as either “good” or “very good”. The business community is not represented on the District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC). Although ineffective, as noted in the previous section, the DDCC would have provided an official forum through which interaction between the two parties can be nurtured. This is especially important given that thus far no initiatives have been made by either party to create a forum that can regularly bring representatives from the two parties to discuss issues affecting district development in general and the problems affecting service delivery in particular. The *cordial* relations reported between the two parties seem to thrive on *ad-hoc* contacts between some chief officers of the local authority, and owners and managers of some business enterprises. The relations are not institutionalised but based on individual contacts. This type of relationship is less likely to result into very effective collaborative efforts which can be translated into increased local authority capacity to deliver services.

From our analysis the business community in Choma is playing an appreciable role in helping to provide some of the services that are a responsibility of the local authority. Business houses are demonstrating their social responsibility to the communities by taking on these functions without any remuneration from the local authority. In spite of the Council’s poor performance the business Community is demonstrating its partnership with the local authority in the area of service delivery by spending its own resources. These efforts by the business community, as noted, are well appreciated by the residents and other stakeholders including the local authority. However, the local authority is not reciprocating in ways that can enhance service delivery through the complementary efforts of the business community. The failure to enter into sub-contracting arrangements with these enterprising institutions is, therefore, a

clear demonstration of insufficient entrepreneurial spirit and the dearth of local initiative among Council officials.

Lusaka

As the capital city of the country, Lusaka cannot be compared to Choma or Luwingu in terms of industrial and business activity, and property development. In addition to the business enterprises located within the central business district (CBD) the city, especially on the Northern, Western, and Southern parts, is surrounded by industrial concerns and other business houses dealing in the manufacturing and retailing of various goods and services. Over the years some residential dwellings, especially in the low density areas of Kabulonga, Woodlands, Olympia, Northmead, and Rhodes Park, have also been turned into business houses. In this study we spoke to representatives and/or managers of seven business houses namely, J. J. Lowe (Zambia Limited), Toyota Zambia Limited, Shoprite Checkers, Mumana Pleasure Resort, Zambia National Commercial Bank Limited, Saro Agricultural Equipment, and Family 24. Given the numerous business houses in Lusaka, an attempt was made to have some kind of a representation from the different 'business lines'. Consequently the selected business houses represent Road and Civil Engineering Contractors, Motor vehicle dealers, General trading, Food and beverage services, Banking, and Agricultural equipment and supplies.

Although relatively more active, compared to their counterparts in Choma and Luwingu given the size of the city, the activities of the business community in Lusaka, with regard to the provision of services, are also mainly restricted to voluntary assistance especially in terms of garbage collection and disposal. Business enterprises that are located in close proximity to markets and other trading areas, where the generation of solid waste is relatively high, have the tendency to exercise corporate social responsibility through helping the local authority to collect and dispose such garbage. This is purely in response to the local authority's inability to perform this function in an effective and efficient manner. The business community appreciates the inadequate capacity of the Council with regard to its ability to provide services in an efficient and effective manner. However, during discussions with the business representatives there was a general sense of 'aloofness' with regard to the willingness to assist the Council without getting anything in return. Although some of them admitted doing that, at one

time or another, the prospect of doing it again seems to be remote. This sense of ‘aloofness’ was especially captured in the interview with the representatives of Saro Agri-Equipment and J. J. Lowe who, among other things, emphasised on the local’s authority’s inability to effectively manage the scarce financial resources at its disposal. In this regard, the problems the local authority is facing are considered to be of their ‘own making’ to some extent and consequently the authority does not deserve the little assistance it sometimes receives from the business community. This position, in part, stems from what seems to be a deep-seated realisation of and dissatisfaction with the poor performance of the local authority amidst the perception that with prudent financial management coupled with transparency and accountability in its operations the Council can do better even with the limited resources at its disposal. Commenting on the lack of transparency and accountability of the Council the representative from J. J. Lowe, like his counterpart from Saro Agri-Equipment, noted that.¹⁰⁴

“The Council has limited resources but it is also unable to effectively account for the use of these resources especially finances. This is why it is failing to provide services to the satisfaction of the city’s residents. There are many business houses and individuals paying all sorts of fees and rates to the Council but where are they taking this money? It is true that the government is not doing enough to help the Council, but this is common to all the Councils in the country. This Council has opportunities to make more money than other Councils but the officials are simply not innovative enough”.

The view that the business community is a partner, with the local authority, in public service delivery is also appreciated by the Lusaka business community. However, the contracting out the provision of services to private business houses is a new concept which the local authority, like its counterparts in Choma and Luwingu, has not utilised during the period under review (1991-2001). As noted above, business houses in our study that have volunteered their services with regard to the collection and disposal of solid waste, by virtue of their close proximity to high solid waste ‘generators’ include Saro Agri-Equipment and J. J. Lowe. Saro Agri-Equipment, located along Los Angeles road opposite the Soweto market (a very high generator of solid waste), collects and

¹⁰⁴ Interview with the Contracting Manager of J. J. Lowe (Zambia Limited) – April 21, 2005; and General Manager for Saro Agri-Equipment (May 19, 2005)

disposes its own garbage and sometimes assists the local authority on voluntary basis to dispose garbage generated from the market. And J. J. Lowe, whose Head quarters is located along Chandwe Musonda road in a light industrial area, sometimes also collects and disposes its own waste and that generated by street vendors operating within the vicinity of the company. These voluntary initiatives, by some business houses, are acknowledged by the local authority which has recognised that without such initiatives from some business houses the problem of garbage collection and disposal would be extremely hard to deal with.

The local authority has also depended on the assistance of companies like the Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ) for fire services and the use of hired equipment from International Aeradio Zambia Limited to facilitate the installation and/or maintenance of street lighting equipment. Zambia National Commercial Bank has also adopted some portions of the Cairo road which have been planted with some beautiful flowers and provided litter bins in an effort to keep the city clean. Generally, however, voluntary assistance to deliver public services, by business houses in Lusaka is rare and far apart. The capacity of and the services rendered by the business community is greatly appreciated by the Council management. Out of the fourteen management officials interviewed twelve of them held the view that the business community in Lusaka has the capacity to assist the local authority in its quest for quality service delivery. The Town clerk noted that it is an oversight, on the part of the Council, that there are no strong links with the business community, links that are based on formalised structures aimed at facilitating the regular interaction of the two parties to the benefit of the local community.

It is important to note that the services that some business houses provide on voluntary are within the broad categories of the functions of the local authority as provided under the Second Schedule of Section 61 of the Local Government Act No. 22 of 1991. Many business houses in Lusaka, especially contracting companies, own equipment that is very useful to the delivery of various public services. Some of the equipment that these companies have is clearly beyond the ability of the city Council in terms of procurement. This is especially the case with road construction and maintenance equipment, and other machinery required for hoisting and scaffolding purposes. Lusaka city Council, compared to the Choma and Luwingu Councils is, therefore, operating in an

environment which provides better opportunities for the effective delivery of services through sub-contraction. However, the efficacy of sub-contracting, although appreciated by both elected and appointed officials of the local authority is not utilised. Sub-contracting services, as noted earlier, is a new concept which the local authority is yet to embrace.

In 2001, however, Ramboll of Denmark was awarded a contract to assist the local authority in many areas associated with solid waste management including the development of a waste management strategy and plan of action, capacity building in the council, environmental awareness campaigns, social-economic surveys, establishment of a waste information system, closure of existing dumpsite, and the selection of new landfill site. This contract is what may be considered the first major step, by the local authority, towards the implementation of Public and Private Partnerships in service delivery. The contract, and its scope of services, constitutes the basis upon which the management of solid waste in the City of Lusaka will be dealt with through contracting out of garbage collection and disposal to private business enterprises. In addition other specific contracts that were being contemplated include the redevelopment of the Luburma market by China Hinan; the redevelopment of the Chachacha (Town centre) market by United Engineering Group; the development of Lumumba Road bus stop by Agro-fuel; and the rehabilitation of various roads within the CBD and beyond by Shimizu.

Out of the 600 Lusaka residents interviewed 432 (72 percent) of them noted that business houses in Lusaka have the capacity to contribute to the efficient and effective delivery of services in the city. The residents observed that the City Council is very lucky to be surrounded by so many companies and that with a little more initiative, on the part of Council officials, the Council should not be having serious problems in the area of service delivery. The general view among residents is that if the Council is more open in its dealings there would be less problems related to service delivery because many business houses would assist the Council even free of charge. According to this perception the Council is operating like a closed shop that is why it is attracting so many accusations and allegations that are reducing its chances of getting more help from the business community. There are no effective formalise interactions between the two

parties except for the *impersonal* and usually non-interactive transactions related to the billing and payments of the various rates, fees, and charges. Under the circumstances it is difficult to cultivate and nurture relations that are anchored on the clear understanding of the needs and/or abilities of each party. Interaction between the two parties is mainly through the Council's Building and Health Inspectorates. The business community, like in the other two districts, is not represented on the District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC) which, in any case is also ineffective. This perception was especially well articulated during a focus group discussion¹⁰⁵ held in Kalundu where one of the participants, among other things, observed that the Council is not taking full advantage of the sound financial position within and among the business community. Many business houses are aware of the problems the local authority is facing given the inadequate funding from central government. They would be very willing to assist the local authority to deliver some services without demanding for payment but it is important for the Council to operate in a transparent and accountable manner in order to inspire the business community to render such assistance. Transparency especially in the awarding of contracts would enhance the confidence of the business community and motivate them to work closely with the local authority in times of need. This view is also shared by officials from government line ministries as well as civil society organisations that were represented in our study. A line ministry official, for example, noted the need for the Council to realise and accept its weaknesses and strive to forge effective links with business houses with a view to enhancing the opportunities for some of its work to be done by business houses through sub-contracting.¹⁰⁶ The local authority is not capitalising on its reported good working relations with the business community to enhance deeper and mutually beneficial interactions between the two parties. Out of the 14 appointed officials interviewed 10 of them described their working relations with the business community either as "good" or "very good". However, formal interactions are limited mainly to transactions that are facilitated through the Council's Building and

¹⁰⁵ Focus group discussion comprising 8 participants randomly selected from the respondents of the structured questionnaire in Kalundu – April 16, 2004

¹⁰⁶ Interview with the Director for the Department of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (May 3, 2005)

Health Inspectorates since the business community, like in the other two districts, is not represented on the District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC).

Our analysis has shown that although the Lusaka City Council is operating in an environment in which there are many business houses with the capacity to delivery public services, through being sub-contracted, the local authority has not used this mode of service delivery during the period under review (1991-2001). Voluntary assistance from business houses, although sometimes available, is constrained by the view that the local authority is not prudent in the use of scarce resources and is not sufficiently transparent and accountable in its operations to deserve such assistance. The low level of interaction between the business community and the local authority is adversely affecting effective coordination of the capacities of the two parties. Consequently opportunities for enhanced service delivery through complementary efforts are being greatly undermined.

Luwingu

Luwingu district, like most rural districts in the country, has no manufacturing industries but only very few business houses mostly in retailing. For the purpose of our study owners or representatives of six business enterprises namely, Prominent Holdings, Salome Guest House, V. H. Kalebwe and Brothers, Lwenge Farms Limited, Zambia Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO) Ltd., and Skyline Carpentry were interviewed. Apart from the ZESCO representative, who emphasised on the inability of the district office to make decisions relating to service delivery other than those related to ZESCO's mandate, all the representatives from the other business houses feel that they have an obligation to support the Council's efforts in serving the local community. Based on their shared belief that the local authority is not adequately supported by government in terms of finances and equipments, all the business representatives feel duty bound to support their local authority in enhancing development in the district. The business community is convinced that the Council's performance with regard to the provision of services is far below the expectations of the community. Other than inadequate government support and equipment, business people are concerned about the lack of adequate skills among most of the Council staff, financial mismanagement, and the lack of integrity and entrepreneurial initiative in the local authority. These factors, according to the

businessmen, are inhibiting the Council's potential to utilise the scarce resources effectively as well as denying it the opportunity to raise income from untapped sources.

In spite of these observations, the business community is committed to raising the quality of life in the community by complementing the local authority's efforts wherever possible. However, their capacity to do this is hampered by the poor state of the Kasama-Luwingu road and the lack of a fuel pumping station in the district that have an adverse effect on the growth of their businesses and consequently inhibiting their potential to make a significant contribution to service delivery. The business people complained of constant breakdowns of their vehicles because of the bad road to Kasama where they order their merchandise and expensive fuel from illegal dealers. Unreliable telecommunication service is yet another constraint on the growth of business in Luwingu. Because of these factors, among other reasons, their operating costs are rather too high adversely affecting their profit margins. In spite of these setbacks, however, the business community in Luwingu is making use of the few resources at its disposal to assist the local authority to enhance effectiveness in the service delivery process. From the discussions with the Council Secretary and the Director of Works, and also acknowledged by the business community itself, we summarise below the areas of assistance rendered to the local authority during the period under review (1991-2001):

- Rehabilitation of roads within the CBD and connecting the CBD to the *location* and to Ipusukilo (Salome Guest House, and V. H. Kalebwe and Brothers),
- Collection and disposal of garbage (Prominent Holdings, and V. H. Kalebwe and Brothers),
- Cleaning the surrounding of the *location* market and cutting tall grass within the CBD and the *location* area (Lwenge Farms Limited and Salome Guest House), and
- Minor carpentry repair works to Isandulula Council Rest House situated in the *location* area (Skyline Carpentry).

It is important to note that none of the business houses in Luwingu has what may be considered proper road construction and maintenance equipment. Business houses involved in the rehabilitation of roads hire some boys who use picks, hoes and shovels. The local authority does not have a grass mower but uses hired casual labour to do this job. However, business houses who assist the Council in this area also hire some boys

using their own resources. Business houses that assist the Council in the collection and disposal of garbage use their own trucks and hire casual labour for the purpose. Sometimes such businessmen offer their trucks for use by the local authority provided the local authority can afford to purchase the necessary fuels and lubricants. The business community in Luwingu, like in Choma and Lusaka, is equally concerned about the lack of entrepreneurial initiative and imprudent use of the scarce financial resources. One of the businessmen, among other things, observed that:¹⁰⁷

“...We try our best, under the circumstances to help the Council to do some of these things, especially garbage collection, cutting tall grass, and maintaining some of the roads. This is a small community and every Council official is known by every businessman. We enjoy good working relations in spite of these problems. We are a family so we help each other but there is need for the Council to improve on their financial management and also to come up with ideas to raise income from local sources in order to reduce their dependence on central government funding”.

The areas of intervention by the business community, in terms of service delivery, cover local authority functions which are itemised under Section 61 of the Local Government Act within the broad categories of public health, sanitation and drainage, public amenities, and community development. The efforts of the business community are recognised and appreciated by officials from government line ministries, Council management, Councillors, and residents. All Councillors and seven of the 8 Council management staff interviewed subscribed to the view that the business community has a role to play in service delivery and noted that in spite of the difficulties business houses were facing they are usually on hand to help the Council in its efforts to serve the community better. All the Councillors spoken to praised the business community for their gesture and generally hoped that some day, when the Kasama-Luwingu road is tar-marked, there will be more business activity so that the community's living standards can be improved. When conceding to the local authority's failure to meet the demand for services, the Council Secretary observed that without the help of the business community the responsibility of providing services to the community would be very difficult to accomplish.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with the Manager of Prominent Holdings (October 8, 2004)

Like in the other two districts, there is very little formal interaction between the local authority and the business community. However, since Luwingu is a small rural place, where ‘every person knows every other person’, the insufficient formal interaction does not have a significant negative impact on the business community’s commitment and willingness to participate in service delivery. It is, however, appreciated by both parties that regular and formalised interaction can lead to a much more coordinated approach to the “shared” responsibility of delivering services. The good working relations between the two parties have not resulted into a formalised mechanism for enhanced interactions between the two parties. The Business Association is not very active and does not effectively engage the local authority in its activities. This is one avenue which the business community hopes to use in the future to enhance its interaction with the Council.

Out of the 150 residents interviewed 102 (68 percent) of them either felt that “all” or “most” of the business houses in Luwingu have the capacity to assist the Council in delivering some services. It should be noted that the assessment of Luwingu residents regarding the business community’s capacity and consequently its role in service delivery is comparatively lower than that of their colleagues in Choma and Lusaka. This is not to state that the residents do not recognise and appreciate what the business community is doing for the community. Rather it is more a reflection of the residents’ understanding of the difficulties these business houses are going through vis-à-vis the business environment. In any case, given the amount and nature of business activities in the three Council areas it is logical to expect that business houses in Lusaka followed by those in Choma have more ‘capacity’ than those in Luwingu. This is the expectation which is in fact reflected by the respective residents in their assessment of the business community in their Council areas. It is not surprising, therefore, that during group discussions Luwingu residents echoed the sentiments of the Councillors and Council management officials in their appreciation of the services rendered by the business community. A representative view came from one resident from the *location* who, among other things, observed that:

“Although the businessmen are struggling to keep their businesses running they still have the ‘heart’ to share some of their wealth with the community in addition to paying whatever is due to the Council. They are helping the Council to work on the

roads, clean the market, and also clean their own surroundings and yet this is Council's work. It is just a pity that there is not much business in Luwingu other wise as a community we can benefit more from the businessmen since our Council is failing to perform to the community's expectation and it looks like government assistance to the Council is very inadequate".


There is no record of sub-contracting the delivery of services to business houses during the period under review (1991-2001) except the hiring of casual labour as and whenever necessary. Such labour is usually hired for cutting tall grass especially after each rain season and also for way leave clearance under the ZESCO transmission lines passing through the district. In spite of the efforts shown by the business community to assist the local authority in delivering services, it does not have adequate capacity to warrant full fledged sub-contracting agreements. Two or three business houses, such as Kalebwe and Brothers, Salome Guest House, and Prominent Holdings, may contribute some money to pay hired labour to mend roads using their own picks, hoes and shovels or sweep the markets. The maintenance of the roads connecting the CBD and the *location*, the *location and Ipusukilo* mission, and from the Ipusukilo mission junction to the Lufubu river bridge is an exercise that the local authority once in a while benefits from the combined efforts of the these business houses. However, sub-contracting procedures are competitive and require individual business houses to bid for the execution of works and/or the provision of services. Such individual bidding needs to be backed by sufficient capacity of the individual bidders and this is what is lacking among the business community in Luwingu. According to the contract procedures, for District Councils like Luwingu, any contract exceeding the value of K1,000,000 require the contractor, at their own expense, to provide two good and sufficient sureties or obtain the guarantee of an insurance company or bank to be jointly and severally bound together with him to the Council in the sum provided in the tender documents for the due performance of the contract.¹⁰⁸ According to the Council Secretary, works related to the construction and/or proper maintenance of roads, or the collection and disposal of garbage on 'permanent' basis fall in this category of the contracting procedures. The local authority is convinced that local business houses do not have sufficient capacity,

¹⁰⁸ Contracts - Section 45 of the Standing Orders for Local Authorities as provided for by Section 64 of the Local Government Act No. 22 of 1991.

individually, to enter into such contracts and the Standing Orders, in as far as they relate to Contracts, do not provide for two or more bidders to put their resources together and bid as one. Even if this was allowed, it would pose a serious challenge with regard to ensuring competitive bids given that there are very few and ill-equipped business houses in the district.

It is ironic that Luwingu residents, where the business community is not only small but ill-equipped compared to that of Choma and Lusaka, are more emphatic on the view that the business community has potential to contribute to service delivery. More Luwingu residents (89 percent), compared to 83 percent (Lusaka) and 71 percent in Choma, hold this view (Figure 4.3). This high level of confidence, among the Luwingu residents, in the ability of the business community to provide services, could be a reflection of the local authority's failure to ensure the regular execution of basic services such as the collection and disposal of garbage, and may also be due to their (residents') lack of knowledge about the contracting requirements in local authorities.

Figure 4.3: Business community and service delivery



Source: Fieldwork data analysis

In this section we have noted the interest among the business community and the actual rendering of services to complement the efforts of their local authorities even without receiving any payment. This is especially the case in Choma and Luwingu districts. Both elected and appointed officials of the local authorities in the three districts greatly appreciate the assistance being extended to them by their respective business communities. However, the three local authorities have not formally engaged the business community into sub-contracting agreements to provide some services on its behalf during the period under review (1991-2001). Contracting out the provision of services is a new concept which the local authorities are yet to embrace. In spite of the notable capacity for service provision among the business houses in Choma and Lusaka, the concept of contracting out has not been utilised. The business community in Luwingu does not have adequate capacity to facilitate sub-contracting agreements with the local authority. The assistance rendered to the local authority is normally a result of one or more business houses putting their money together to hire casual labour to provide services such as the cutting of tall grass and mending of roads using their own elementary tools like slashers, hoes, pickaxes and shovels. Casual labour hired in this manner is also used to collect and dispose garbage using small pick-up trucks. It is because of such inadequacies that the local authority has not engaged into sub-contracting arrangements with the local business houses. The role and activities of the business community in complementing the work of local authorities are, however, appreciated by other stakeholders in the three districts including the local residents. The appreciation is in recognition of the fact that local authorities get the bulk of their local revenue from business houses in addition to receiving assistance sometimes free of charge.

Conclusion

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the business community in the three local authority areas recognise that they have a role to play with regard to complementing the efforts of the local authorities in delivering services to the local community. The complementary nature of the services these institutions provide, in the respective districts, is exemplified by its conformity to the mandated functions of the local authorities as provided for in the Local Government Act No. 22 of 1991. The lack of

effective interaction between local authorities and the NGOs is undermining the chances for comprehensive collaborative efforts for enhanced service delivery. In spite of the recognition that some NGOs have demonstrated the availability of skills and finances and that they would make effective partners in service delivery, local authorities have not taken serious steps to co-opt these institutions in their service delivery processes.

Similarly, the business community has demonstrated its resolve to assist the local authorities in most of the basic areas of service delivery. This assistance is rendered free of charge, especially in Choma and Luwingu, mainly in recognition of the financial difficulties the local authorities are facing. The perceived lack of transparency and accountability, in the operations of local authorities, is a constraining factor on the possibilities for enhanced assistance. This perception, and its accompanying repercussion, is especially more pronounced among the business community in Lusaka. Although most business houses, in Choma and Lusaka, have adequate capacity to support sub-contracting arrangements with the local authorities, such arrangements have not been entered into. The growth of activities in Luwingu district is being constrained by many factors including the poor road network, poor communication systems, and the lack of a fuel filling station in the district. Consequently, business houses in Luwingu have not been able to acquire adequate capacity to sub-contract for the delivery of local services.

The availability of adequate financial and skilled personnel as well as equipment, may not guarantee the delivery of adequate quality services by local authorities. Adherence to governance procedures that promote transparency and accountability is very critical to enhancing the capacity of local authorities to deliver services effectively. The effectiveness of the decision making body at the local level, the Council, and the nature of the Councillor-official relations are equally critical to the service delivery process. It is in view of these observations that we examine, in the next chapter, the experiences of the local authorities with regard to democratic decision making, the impact of multiparty politics and the electoral provisions for the election of local Councillors on the quality of the Councillors, as well as councillor-official relations.

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Interviews with the Various NGO representatives

CHAPTER 5

LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS, AND PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

Introduction

In Zambia, an elected local authority is the institution of government at the local level with the Council being the legislature and employer of the authority. The nature of democracy and politics at the local level is, therefore, mainly shaped by the quality as well as the conduct of the elected Councillors. With effect from 1991, when Zambia reverted to the multiparty political system, legislation provides for the election of Councillors every three years. In effect this means that a given local authority can have a Council composed of Councillors elected from different political parties. The nature of the relations among the Councillors, between the Councillors and appointed officials of the local authority, and between the Councillors and the electorate (residents) is very critical to the existence of a democratic government at the local level. Local democratic government, among other things, entails effective consultations among and between the various stakeholders, and the willingness to promote popular participation in the decision-making process at the local level. The peoples' representatives, the Councillors, have a critical role to play in the promotion of local democracy. The Councillors have the responsibility of ensuring that the problems and aspirations of their electorate, the residents, are brought to and discussed in the Council Chamber to facilitate policy-making and implementation. It is through such interaction that effective priority setting, aimed at delivering services which adequately reflect community needs, can be achieved. They also have the responsibility to create awareness among the electorate with regard to the various legislative provisions relating to the administration of local authorities. It is also incumbent upon the Councillors and Council officials to promote an *esprit de corps* with a view to ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in the local authority's operations based on decision-making processes that are accountable and transparent. At the sub-district level, Councillors are subjects of traditional authorities (chiefs) and as such they are expected to effectively interact with the chiefs to ensure that issues related to traditional leadership are duly taken into account in the decision-making processes of the

local authorities. Such interaction also offers traditional authorities an opportunity to comprehend aspects of local authority administration from individuals (Councillors) that have a legal mandate to represent the interests of local communities in the governance of institutions that are responsible for public service delivery.

In Zambia, the institution of Chieftaincy exists in accordance with culture, customs, traditions, wishes and aspirations of the people in the chieftdom. These traditional authorities are regarded as the supreme natural rulers of their respective ethnic communities and reign for life. Article 130 of the Zambian Constitution, as amended in 1996, provided that: “there shall be a House of Chiefs for the Republic which shall be an advisory body to the government on traditional, customary and any other matters referred to it by the President”. Article 129 of the Constitution prohibits chiefs from joining partisan politics in order to promote harmony between these authorities and their subjects. Although not formally part of the local authorities, legislation provides for traditional authorities (chiefs) to be represented on the Councils by eminent subjects nominated by all the chiefs in the district. Generally the traditional functions of a Chief include safeguarding traditional values and customs, prescribing rules and regulations governing social behaviour, administration of land, arrangement of customary marriage and preserving public peace in his/her area. The traditional functions of chiefs such as, “prescribing rules and regulations governing social behaviour” and “administration of land” have, among other things, implications for service delivery. Local authorities, as institutions created to deliver public services, have a role to play in promoting the welfare of local communities. These authorities have the task of planning and implementing development programmes with a view to uplifting the social and economic standards of communities within their jurisdiction. Similarly, traditional authorities, as community leaders in their respective chieftdoms, have a duty to ensure the well being of their subjects. In this respect it is plausible to argue that traditional authorities, as community leaders, may be expected to engage in activities that promote the delivery of some services at the local level.

In this chapter, therefore, we examine the extent of democratic governance at the local level in as far as it relates to effective representation. In doing so, we analyse the impact of the local elections conducted during the period under review (1991-2001) with

regard to political representation, and the legislative and supervisory capacity of the Councillors and its impact on service delivery. With regard to traditional authorities we examine the role, if any, these authorities play in public service delivery within their chiefdoms and districts.

Democracy and Governance

The Local Government Act number 22 of 1991 provides guidelines with regard to the promotion of democratic decision-making and the promotion of good governance in the administration of local authorities. Besides providing for Councils elected through adult universal suffrage, Section 29 of the Act provides for public attendance of full Council meetings while Section 43 provides that “the accounts of a Council, together with all books, deeds, contracts, vouchers, receipts and other documents relating thereto, shall at all reasonable times be open to the inspection of any Councillor and of any interested person”. A local authority has the power to make subordinate legislation, called by-laws, for the good rule and government of its area. Such by-laws are subject to confirmation by the Minister responsible for local government before being effected. However, for purposes of enhancing democratic decision-making and good governance, Section 81 of the Act provides that the intention to apply for the confirmation of a by-law to the Minister be publicised and a copy of the proposed by-law be deposited at the offices of the Council to facilitate its inspection by any interested person. In this respect, any person may, at any time before the application is made for confirmation of the by-law, lodge an objection in writing to the by-law with the Principal Officer of the Council (Town clerk or Council Secretary) and furnish a copy of the objection to the Minister. These provisions are aimed at enhancing community participation with a view to ensuring transparency, accountability, and consequently good governance at the local level.

The performance of democratically elected Councils may be judged, among other things, by the effectiveness with which elected representatives (Councillors) are able to deliver on their election promises, and the extent to which they can be held accountable to the people they represent. Representative Councils, of necessity, thrive on the effective interaction between the Councillors and local communities. Ineffective interaction

between these two parties may adversely affect the local authority's responsiveness to the community in as far as service delivery is concerned.


In this section, therefore, we examine the experiences of the local authority areas in our study with regard to democracy and good governance. Specifically we examine the extent to which the Councillors, are accessible to the public and the level of the public's knowledge about critical legislative provisions that are meant to enhance democracy and good government at the local level, and the impact of these aspects on service delivery.

Choma Municipal Council

Following the local government elections of 1992 and 1998 the Choma Council was dominated by the ruling Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). In other words between 1993 and November 2001, when the third local government elections were conducted, a big majority of the Choma Councillors were from MMD. The 1998 elections, for example, produced 21 (84 percent) from the MMD, out of the 25 elected to the Council. However, following the 2001 elections the Council became 100 percent dominated by an opposition political party, the United Party for National Development (UPND). Councillors that were interviewed in this study were those that were elected in 2001. However, 6 of these Councillors had also served on the previous Council on the MMD ticket but re-contested their positions and won on the UPND ticket during the 2001 elections. Most management officials (5 out of 8) and Councillors (5 out of 8) admitted that there were good working relations between the two parties. The maintenance of good working relations between these parties is very critical to the promotion of effective administration.

In order to gauge the potential for interaction between communities and their Councillors the 250 residents that were subjected to a structured questionnaire were asked whether or not they knew their local Councillor. However, 50 percent of the 250 residents interviewed admitted knowing their Councillor while the remaining 125, another 50 percent, did not know him or her (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: Choma residents' knowledge of their local Councillor



Effective prioritising of service delivery efforts, by the local authority, need to be based on the needs of the community. The local Councillor, as the community's representative, is very critical in ensuring that priorities of the community are brought to the attention of the local authority. In order to do this, there is need for regular and effective interaction between the Councillor and the community. However, only 3 (2.4 percent) of the 125 residents that knew their Councillor noted that the Councillor visited the Ward to interact with the electorate "very often" while 23 (18.4 percent) admitted that their Councillor visited them "often". The remaining 99 residents (79.2 percent) observed that their Councillor did not visit them at all.

In order to enhance effective administration, characterised by accountability and transparency, public oversight is very critical to the operations of the local authority. The provisions of the Local Government Act relating to the public attendance of Council meetings [Section 29 subsection (1)] and the inspection of local Council accounts by any interested person [Section 43 subsection (2)] are among the provisions that are intended to promote public oversight and participation in local authority affairs. However, only two (20 percent) in every ten residents interviewed have ever attended a Council meeting. In other words only 50 (20 percent) out of the 250 residents interviewed agreed to having attended a Council meeting. The lack of knowledge about this provision was advanced as the reason for not attending such meetings by 182 (91 percent) of the remaining 200

residents while 18 (9 percent) of this group cited either the lack of time or knowledge about the schedule for these meetings. The attendance of Council meetings would afford the electorate the opportunity to know how the local authority operates, its constraints, and how decisions which affect their well being, in terms of service delivery, are arrived at. It also offers the electorate the opportunity to assess the effectiveness of their elected Councillors with regard to how their (electorate's) problems and aspirations are presented in the Council. Without effective interaction the general public's opportunities for understanding local authority issues is greatly undermined. Under such conditions the electorate may not have the basis for pushing their Councillor with a view to enhance performance. Effective public oversight on the activities of the local authority, of necessity, requires a community that is knowledgeable about the affairs of the local authority. Such knowledge is essential for the public to devise strategies of how pressure can be applied to the representative in particular and the local authority in general to ensure relevant and effective responses towards their demands for services.

With regard to the public inspection of local authority accounts, not a single resident interviewed knew about this provision. Generally, Choma residents are not adequately informed about the activities of their local authority. Out of the 250 residents that responded to the structured questionnaire, only 7 (2.8 percent) held the view that Choma residents were properly informed about Council decisions and activities; 193 (77.2 percent) did not think so; and the remaining 50 (20 percent) were not sure. In effect, this means that community potentials have not been adequately tapped to enhance good governance anchored on popular participation in the most critical areas of local authority operations. Without effective interaction between Councillors and the electorate, it is difficult for Councillors to adequately articulate developmental concerns of the people they serve. Apart from enabling Councillors to articulate issues effectively, effective interaction between the two parties can be beneficial in other ways. For example, the problems of poor revenue collection associated dishonest transactions between some revenue collectors and marketers, noted in Chapter three, could be avoided or at least minimised. Marketers, including the general public, have a moral responsibility to avoid engaging in dishonest activities that have the effect of reducing the local authority's revenue. However, the intervention of Councillors, as civic leaders, has the potential to

enhance the public's rejection of dishonest dealings. It is the Councillor who is well informed about the financial status of and any other constraints facing the local authority. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Councillor, as the people's representative, to take any measures that assist to reduce the possible loss of local revenue.

There are no official (legislative) guidelines as to the nature and regularity of interaction between Councillors and their constituents. This responsibility is left to the 'good' judgement of the individual Councillors. In effect, it means that there is no incentive for an incompetent Councillor to maintain regular contact with the electorate. From the Councillors' point of view, however, the poor state of roads especially during the rainy season, lack of financial resources, and the inadequate coverage of the various Wards by public transport is making it difficult for Councillors to maintain regular contact with the constituents. The Councillor for Mapanza Ward¹⁰⁹, for example, noted that although Councillors have the responsibility to meet their constituents to share ideas and appraise them on the operations of their local authority it is very difficult to discharge this function noting that most Councillors cannot even afford to buy and/or ensure that their bicycles are kept in a roadworthy condition.

However, from the Council management's point of view Councillors are trying the best they can, under the circumstances, to articulate the concerns of their constituents but could do much better if their mobility is enhanced. Most management officials interviewed observed that articulating the development concerns of communities is one thing and resolving those concerns is yet a different thing all together. We have noted, especially in chapters two and three, the various constraints the Choma local authority is facing with regard to ensuring the delivery of services. With such constraints, it is the view of management officials as well as the Councillors that effective articulation of the constituents' problems, though important, should be backed by the capacity to resolve such problems. In this respect, it may be argued that in addition to the logistical problems Councillors have in ensuring regular contact with their constituents, and to facilitate effective articulation of their (constituents') problems, the local authority's lack of capacity to resolve such problems is undermining the Councillors' potential to exhibit competence as the people's representatives.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Mr. E. Hamayuwa, Councillor for Mapanza Ward (November 22, 2004)

As noted earlier in the section, the composition of the Choma Council has been dominated by one political party, MMD (1992-2001) and UPND (2001-2006). This one-party domination is perceived by some people to be detrimental to objective decision-making because of the propensity for members of such a Council to practice partisanship in their deliberations. The view that a Council Chamber dominated by Councillors from one political party is less likely to make rational decisions was ascribed to by 215 (86 percent) of the 250 residents that were subjected to the structured questionnaire. The manager for Standard Sales Company, among other things, observed that:¹¹⁰

“...Birds of the same feathers flock together. A vibrant Council Chamber is needed for the local authority to make relevant and responsible decisions. You cannot get this vibrancy and correct decisions if Councillors agree with each other on everything most of the time. It is not possible that all proposals and pronouncements will always be correct, acceptable to all Councillors, feasible, and in the interest of district development. In any case once you have nearly all the Councillors belonging to one political party you can expect that the views of one, two or three vocal and enlightened Councillors will predominate and the rest will just follow. This is not good for such important institutions charged with the responsibility of providing public services”.

In order for their service delivery needs to be attended to, the electorate expect that their representatives, the Councillors, will articulate their (electorate's) views in the Council chamber in a manner that will enable the local authority to respond appropriately. This expectation has nothing to do with the emergence of a Council dominated by one political party or one that is composed of Councillors from several political parties. Although the possibility of partisan politics influencing Council decisions cannot completely be dismissed, it is important to guard against misinterpretation of the Councillors' motivation for making certain decisions when assessing the efficacy of the deliberations of a one-party dominated Council. The Director of Finance for Choma Municipal Council, for example, noted that over the years, especially during the period under review (1991-2001) the impact of this negative 'consensus' has had an adverse impact on the local authority's ability to raise revenue from local sources such as grain levies. According to the Director, as long as the Council is not raising enough revenue it is difficult to improve the level and quality of services

¹¹⁰ Interview with the Manager for Standard Sales Company (November 8, 2004)

provided by the local authority. These observations were literally echoed by all his counterparts that were interviewed with the Director of Administration noting that the Council would greatly benefit from decisions arising from a Council composed of Councillors from different political parties as such decisions would more often than not be a result of constructive debate and not tainted by political party considerations. The official noted that Councillors in 1999, for example, unanimously rejected the proposed introduction of cotton, maize and tobacco levies arguing that the introduction of such levies would be counter-productive. Although Councillors had also observed that the proposal needed to be re-advertised since it had been made sometime back under the District Council status, management was convinced that Councillors simply did not want the proposal to go through.¹¹¹

One business representative noted that there is no use in Councillors ‘protecting’ their constituents from paying high but realistic local taxes if doing so actually denies the residents more and better services. According to the businessman, such a populist strategy amounts to ineffective representation.¹¹²

The above observations and arguments may be valid. However, peasant farming is the main preoccupation of most Choma residents. Raising grain levies has the effect of reducing the people’s income from agricultural produce given that such increases may not necessarily be accompanied by an upward revision of the government’s ceiling on the selling price for such produce. Councillors, therefore, would be unwilling to approve such increases to avoid unnecessary hardships on the people they represent. It is important to note, therefore, that such a rejection, whether by a one-party dominated Council or resulting from the unanimous rejection by Councillors from one political party in a multi-party Council, may in fact be based on ‘realistic’ considerations. In most, if not all instances, there is no *quid pro quo* with regard to increases in local levies and the provision of public services by a local authority. In other words it is not easy for a local authority to promise or demonstrate that increased levies will result in public service delivery improvements. Consequently, a local authority whose performance is considered poor may face community resistance to proposed increments in levies. Councillors,

¹¹¹ Interview with the Director of Administration (November 18, 2004); Also see Times of Zambia, July 23 1999.

¹¹² Interview with the Manager of Crystal Lodge (November 9, 2004)


whose chances of winning the next election depends on the community's assessment, may be more likely to reject such increases.

Lusaka City Council

The Lusaka Council, like its Choma counterpart, was dominated by Councillors from the ruling MMD following the elections held in 1992 and 1998. Following the 1998 elections, for example, 27 (90 percent) out of the 30 Councillors were elected on the MMD ticket. Unlike Choma, however, the 2001 elections brought into the Council representatives from two opposition political parties. Out of the 30 Councillors, 18 (60 percent) were from the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), while the remaining 12 (40 percent) were from the United Party for Democracy and Development (UPND). However, following by-elections a little later the ruling MMD managed to get 2 seats on the Council, for Muchinga Ward 14 and Munkolo Ward 20. The by-elections were a result of the death of one FDD Councillor and a court ruling on the disputed election of another FDD Councillor. Most management officials (8 out of 14) and Councillors (6 out of 10) interviewed held the view that there are good working relation between the two parties.

In spite of the potholes found on most roads especially during and immediately after the rain season, residential areas in the city of Lusaka are well connected and there is adequate public transport to ensure effective commuting. Despite the existence of transport, most residents seem not to know their local Councillors. Out of the 600 residents interviewed only 165 (27.5 percent) of them admitted knowing their local Councillor while the remaining 435 (72.5 percent) did not know him or her (Figure 5.2). Only 25 (15.2 percent) of those that knew the Councillor noted that their Councillor visited the Ward to interact with the electorate "very often" while 49 (29.7 percent) admitted that their Councillor visited them "often". The remaining 91 residents (55.2 percent) observed that their Councillor did not visit them at all.

Figure 5.2: Lusaka residents' knowledge of their local Councillor



Like their Choma counterparts, Lusaka residents are not well informed about many important issues relating to the administration of the local authority. Only seventy-two (12 percent) of the 600 residents interviewed agreed to have ever attended a Council meeting. This is equivalent to 'almost two' in every seventeen people having ever attended a Council meeting. The lack of knowledge about the legislation which provides for the public attendance of Council meetings was advanced as the reason for not attending such meetings by 490 (92.8 percent) of the remaining 528 residents while 38 (7.2 percent) of this group cited either the lack of time or knowledge about the schedule for these meetings. Coincidentally, none of the participants of focus group discussions has ever attended a Council meeting or inspected the local authority's accounts as provided for by legislation. The participants were not aware about these legislative provisions. Other stakeholders, including some senior government officials, also expressed similar levels of ignorance relating to the identity of the local Councillor and the legislative provisions concerning Council meetings and the public inspection of a local authority's accounts.

As noted in the previous section on Choma, this inadequate interaction between Councillors and their constituents, and the electorate's lack of participation in and

knowledge about Council affairs has an adverse impact on the local authority's ability to provide services which adequately reflect the priorities of local communities. Most Lusaka residents, like their counterparts in Choma, are not well informed about what is going on in their local authority. Out of the 600 residents that responded to the structured questionnaire only 84 (14 percent) held the view that Lusaka residents are properly informed about Council decisions and activities; 413 (68.8 percent) did not think so; and the remaining 103 (17.2 percent) were not sure.

In spite of the availability of reliable public transport and the relatively easier accessibility of the Wards, Lusaka Councillors are not any different from their counterparts in Choma with regard to interaction with their constituents. Except for isolated praises from some residents in Chakunkula Ward 5, Roma Ward 7, and Chawama Ward 22, Councillors are said to 'go on a holiday' after being elected into office with no indication of 'coming back to resume duties'. A Kamwala resident wondered how Councillors are able to move in the various Wards during the campaign period and fail to do so once elected into office. The resident noted that Wards in Lusaka are not as big as those found in most rural districts of the country and that there is no good excuse, therefore, for a Lusaka Councillor to fail to visit his or her Ward on a regular basis. In addition, the resident observed that:¹¹³

"We have representatives but we do not know how the Council works and why the Council is not delivering services as expected....They do not visit us so we cannot know in what ways we can participate in the affairs of the Council. It is like we have nothing to offer as residents apart from paying fees, levies and so on and of course electing them into office.... They simply do not care at all. They are in this thing for themselves".

All Councillors spoken to noted that they try their best to ensure regular contact with their constituencies. However, it is also observed that being a voluntary job, Councillors use their own resources and that since most of them were not in formal employment it is difficult to adequately cover costs associated with regular and effective interaction. Assistance to communities in terms of funeral expenses and other emergencies were cited, by Councillors, to have a negative impact on their financial

¹¹³ Interview with a Mr. Allan Siwakwi, a Kamwala resident – April 12, 2005

capacity with regard to ensuring regular contact with their constituents. It is important to observe that Resident Development Committees (RDCs) and other community associations are relatively strong in Lusaka. Besides the Councillor, RDCs act as the link between the community and the local authority with regard to information flow between the two parties. The Councillor, however, is the most direct connection of the RDC to the local authority. However, Councillors do not seem to be making effective use of these institutions to enhance opportunities for interaction and the dissemination of important information to their constituents.

Given the above analysis, we note that the electorate is not well informed about the activities of the local authority and is not aware of the legislative avenues meant for its participation in the affairs of the Council. There is, therefore, no effective basis for the electorate to hold the Councillors accountable and to ensure that they (Councillors) perform according to the community's expectations. Residents need various services but there are priority areas that residents would want their local authority to concentrate on. The Councillors, as the people's representatives, are the channels through which such priorities can be brought to the knowledge of the local authority. In other words, the local authority's service delivery strategy should be based on the priorities of the community. Under the circumstances, however, the local authority's service provision initiatives do not adequately benefit from a well informed view of the communities for whom such initiatives are meant to serve. In effect, therefore, opportunities for the prudent use of the local authority's scarce resources, on service delivery, are placed in jeopardy.

Like in the Choma case, we have also noted that the Lusaka Council had been dominated by the ruling MMD during the period between 1992 and 2001 and that from the end of 2001 to 2006, however, the Council had been dominated by two opposition political parties, the FDD and UPND. The sentiments of stakeholders in Choma are literally replicated in Lusaka especially with regard to the period when only one political party, the MMD, dominated the Council. The view that a Council Chamber dominated by Councillors from one political party is less likely to make realistic decisions was ascribed to by 522 (87 percent) of the 600 residents in Lusaka and supported by other stakeholders including Council management officials. Out of the 72 Lusaka residents that claimed to

have attended a Council meeting, 50 (69 percent) supported the view and cited the short comings of a *de facto* one-party assembly as discussed in the Choma case.

In his comments regarding the importance of elected local Councils a senior official, from a government line Ministry observed that representative Councils are expected to make decisions that satisfy the expectations of local communities in terms of service delivery. Such a decision making process should never be tainted by expediency bordering on partisanship and/or self-preservation. In reference to a *de facto* one-party assembly the official, among other things, noted that:¹¹⁴

“Serious and objective debate is not associated with a group of people that are similar in many respects especially in their political orientation. Such groups are too quick to arrive at decisions, and dislike being seen to contradict what seems to be a popular view even when doing so is actually correct. This behaviour is counterproductive, undermines opportunities to make constructive decisions, and seriously impairs the local authority’s potential to provide public services in an efficient, effective, transparent and accountable manner. This problem I think is exacerbated by the poor quality of Councillors over the years”.

As persuasive as this argument may sound, we have not found very concrete examples which explicitly associate the poor performance of the Lusaka City Council to the partisan orientation of the Councillors. It may be possible that in the course of their deliberations Councillors may sometimes take what may seem to be a partisan stance. However, a close scrutiny may in fact show that the stance is a product of objective debate and the perceived partisan orientation is purely a matter of coincidence. We would argue that differences in work orientation may sometimes wrongly influence the perception of some appointed officials as to the motive behind certain decisions made by Councillors. Insufficient interaction between Councillors and the general public may also lead to misinterpretations about the driving force behind some of the decisions made by Councillors. The local authority’s failure to remove street vendors from the streets, for the most part of the period under review, for example, may be construed to mean that the Council is not capable of enforcing rules and/or that Councillors do not want to be unpopular to their constituents, the street vendors. But it should be noted, however, that sometimes a local authority may be hesitant to enforce rules that may seem to be

¹¹⁴ Interview with Director-Planning and Information in the Ministry of Education (May 5, 2005)

“politically” incorrect. In such a situation the local authority requires the support of the highest political leadership to enforce such rules. This observation may be illustrated by the Lusaka City Council’s action to remove street vendors during the time when Patricia Nawa served as the local authority’s Mayor between 1998 and 2000. It was widely perceived that the local authority had the blessing of the Republican President, Dr. F. J. T. Chiluba, who was believed to have supported the nomination and subsequent election of Nawa as mayor. The candidature of Nawa, as Lusaka mayor, was not well received by some sections of the community, which felt that she (Nawa) did not have mayoral qualities. The ‘ability’ of her (Nawa’s) Council, with the perceived support from the President, to control street vending, therefore, was seen as a deliberate strategy to vindicate the President’s faith in Nawa’s abilities as mayor. However, following the end of Chiluba’s second term of office and the subsequent election of President Levy Mwanawasa, at the end of 2001 on the MMD ticket, street vendors were back on the streets.


Luwingu District Council

Like in Choma and Lusaka the Luwingu Council was also dominated by the MMD following the 1992 and 1998 local government elections. Out of the 20 Councillors that were elected during the 1998 elections, for example, 12 (60 percent) of them were voted on the MMD ticket. In Luwingu the MMD again maintained its dominance after the 2001 elections with 16 (80 percent) of the 20 Councillors being elected on the MMD ticket. It is this group of Councillors that were interviewed in our study with 8 of them having served on the previous Council on the MMD ticket. Like their counterparts in Choma and Lusaka, most of the management officials (5 out of 8) and Councillors (5 out of 7) interviewed reported good working relations between the two parties.

Luwingu Councillors seem to be more ‘visible’ to their constituents than their counterparts in Choma or Lusaka. Out of the 150 residents interviewed 140 (93.3 percent) of them admitted knowing their local Councillor while the remaining 10 (6.7 percent) did not know him or her (Figure 5.3). Out of the 140 that knew their local Councillor only 3 (2.2 percent) of them noted that their Councillor visited the Ward to interact with the electorate “very often” while 29 (20.7 percent) admitted that their

Councillor visited them “often”. The remaining 108 residents (77.1 percent) observed that their Councillor did not visit them at all.

Figure 5.3: Luwingu residents’ knowledge of their local Councillor



With regard to attending full Council meetings a sizeable minority, 53 (35 percent) of the 150 residents interviewed agreed to have ever attended a Council meeting. This is equivalent to eleven in every thirty-one residents interviewed have ever attended a Council meeting. This level of attendance is comparatively higher than that recorded in Choma and Lusaka. The lack of knowledge about this provision was advanced as the reason for not attending such meetings by 91 (93.8 percent) of the remaining 97 residents while 6 (6.2 percent) of this group cited either the lack of time or knowledge about the schedule for these meetings. Except for one businessman, who was a former Councillor, all the people who participated in focus group discussions were not aware of the legislative provision that allows for the inspection of local authority accounts by interested members of the general public.¹¹⁵ Compared to the other two districts, Luwingu residents are more knowledgeable about their local Councillor. However, this knowledge has not been interpreted into effective civic engagement for purposes of

¹¹⁵Focus group discussion consisting of 10 participants comprising 3 business entrepreneurs; 4 market stall operators; and 4 marketers held at the *location* (October 7, 2004) and another one consisting of 9 residents held at the market in Isandulula compound near Nsombo road station (October 9, 2004)

promoting appreciable levels of local democracy and good governance. In effect, it means that knowing the Councillor in itself does not guarantee access to important information relating to the administration of the local authority. It is just like knowing any other person in the community who, for one reason or another, is 'conspicuous'. Consequently and ironically, more Luwingu residents, compared to their counterparts in Choma and Lusaka, are not well informed about what is going on in their local authority. Out of the 150 residents subjected to the structured questionnaire only 6 (4 percent) held the view that residents are properly informed about Council decisions and activities, 132 (88 percent) did not think so, and the remaining 12 (8 percent) were not sure. In this respect, it may be argued that knowing the Councillor and knowing what goes on in a local authority are two different things. While the former may be explained, among other things, through the interaction that goes on during election campaigns and other appearances the Councillor may make once elected, the latter largely depends on the willingness and effectiveness of the Councillor to disseminate such information to the constituents. Results of the surveys conducted by the Zambia Opinion Research Organisation (ZORO), in Lusaka, Chipata, Chongwe and Petauke, in 2002 and Afrobarometer, with a national sample of 1,200 respondents, in 2005 tend to support this observation. The survey by ZORO noted that 89.9 percent of the respondents did not know the work of their local authority. And while 35 percent of the respondents of the Afrobarometer survey knew the name of their local Councillor, 80 percent of them had "never" been in contact with the Councillor during the past year prior to the survey.

Like their counterparts in Choma and Lusaka management officials see Councillors as the legitimate and most effective conduit for information dissemination to the communities. However, the officials note that Councillors generally are not as effective as they should be in discharging this responsibility. The vastness of the Wards, inadequate and poor road network, and the lack of reliable means of transport are seen to be the major contributing factors to this ineffectiveness. The view that because of the low levels of education among Councillors it is difficult for them (Councillors) to effectively discharge their duties with regard to information dissemination is appreciated by Council management but not recognised as one of the major factors. The Deputy Council Secretary noted that since the first group of Councillors, elected in 1992 when Zambia

reverted to multiparty politics, this problem has been there in spite of improvements in the education level of some Councillors that were elected in the 1998 and 2001 elections. Council management holds the view that Councillors are trying the best they can under the circumstances. Even residents of Ipusukilo and Namukolo Wards (among the four smallest Wards in the District) and Chulungoma Ward (in which the civic centre is located) also expressed similar negative sentiments relating to Councillor-Residents interaction. In fact, residents and other stakeholders think that Councillors do not understand their role, as elected representatives, that is why they are ineffective. Residents noted that even after the Ward Development Committees (WDCs) were re-introduced by the CDD project, information flow between the Councillors and their electorate has not significantly improved. Councillors, according to this view, are failing to utilise these institutions (WDCs) to enhance interaction. A resident from Ipusukilo Ward speaking in the local language (Bemba), for example, noted that (*English translation*):¹¹⁶

“Our Ward (Namukolo Ward), is not that big but how often do we see the Councillor organising meetings to meet the residents? Councillors are trying but they need to do better and stop giving lame excuses. Most Councillors in this district are not educated but they cannot admit that this is a major constraint. Instead they look for excuses. We elected them to do a job so they should just commit themselves and do what we elected them for”.

All Councillors interviewed basically echoed the factors cited by their management as being the hindrance to their capacity to interact effectively with their electorate. However, Councillors argued that some residents have a negative view of the Council and, therefore, use ‘the lack of information’ as an excuse to account for their lack of involvement in the affairs of the local authority. The Councillors noted that when the Cooperation for District Development (CDD) project bought bicycles for them in the year 2000 there was a slight improvement in their mobility. However, the vastness of the Wards makes it quite cumbersome to cycle long distances regularly and that because of the poor roads the bicycles constantly broke down. The Council chairman, for example,

¹¹⁶ Interview with Mr. Charles Longwani, a resident of Ipusukilo Ward (October 8, 2004)

noted that Wards such as Kampemba, Masonde, Mwelawamangu, Chifwile, and Lwata were so vast that traversing them regularly using a bicycle is a very challenging prospect.

The sentiments of Luwingu residents, Councillors and Council management officials, whose Council has been dominated by the MMD since the 1992 local government elections, regarding the efficacy of a one-party dominated Council, provide credibility to the views expressed by Councillors and other stakeholders in Choma and Lusaka. The view that a Council Chamber dominated by Councillors from one political party is less likely to make rational decisions was ascribed to by 133 (88.7 percent) of the 150 residents in Luwingu. This view was widely supported by participants of focus group discussions including 35 (66 percent) of the 53 residents that had also claimed to have attended a Council meeting. There is a strong view among Luwingu residents that the level of accountability and transparency with which matters of local authority administration and legislation are carried out has a bearing on the overall performance of the local authority. According to this view, accountability and transparency in Council affairs should be anchored on comprehensive debate and the willingness to accommodate divergent views during deliberations in Committee or full Council meetings. The residents' perception is that a one-party dominated Committee or Council does not adequately provide opportunities for this necessary anchorage. This is not to state that a one-party dominated Council will all the time fail to embrace objectivity in its deliberations. However, the potential for the deliberations of such a Council to be tainted by partisan considerations, which may adversely affect the quality of decisions, cannot be underestimated. Majority views of Luwingu residents on this subject may be summarised by the contributions of one resident from the *location* who, among other things noted that:

“...May be we need an electoral system that can ensure adequate representation of political parties on the Council. The current system cannot guarantee a properly balanced Council. The best we can hope for is a Council that is just somehow balanced. At least this would be better than one that has nearly all the Councillors coming from one political party. If too many Councillors are from one political party there would be very little debate and the quality of decisions is likely to be adversely affected. You cannot expect the Council to operate effectively based on poor decisions”.

The views of Council management officials, on the *de facto* one-party assembly, are exemplified by the observations made by the Deputy Council Secretary who, among other things, noted that many Councillors refuse to appreciate that reviewing, for example, levies upwards does not only have the effect of keeping up with changed economic conditions in the country but also increases local revenue. The officials observed that making sure residents pay whatever is due to the Council, at all costs including the discontinuation of a service or eviction from a Council house instills a sense of civic responsibility in the residents and guarantees revenue to the Council. The Councillors' 'negative' attitude, according to the officials has to a large extent been fueled by partisan considerations, although the problem of inadequate education, among the Councillors, is also responsible for this behaviour. The official noted, for example, that grain levy has only been reviewed upward once, because of resistance from Councillors, since its imposition and subsequent approval in 1995 and yet the selling price of grain and the cost of delivering services have increased over the years. Again, the issue of there being no *quid pro quo* between increases in levies and the level and/or the quality of services delivered by the local authority is very critical to understanding the reaction of communities and their representatives, the Councillors, to proposed increments. Because of the difficulty in ascertaining that proposed increments in levies will result in improved service delivery, and the possibility that such increases may financially inconvenience communities, the perceived 'negative' attitude of the Councillors, as the people's representatives, may be justified. We have also noted that Councillors may resist the approval of increases in levies and/or other taxes in order to improve their chances of securing another term in office. This sort of 'rationality' may be exercised by the majority of Councillors whether or not they are serving in a Council which is dominated by one political party or in a multi-party Council.

All Councillors interviewed also felt that there were more benefits to be derived from a 'politically' balanced Council although in practice such a Council may be difficult to achieve given the nature of the First-Past-the Post electoral system. One of the opposition Councillors interviewed was especially emphatic on this point noting that sometimes there are unnecessary disagreements in the Council purely based on partisanship and also that there are times when a *minority* proposition has been rejected

not because it lacks merit but simply because it has been advanced by a Councillor from a minority party in the chamber. The Councillor noted that such partisan attitude is not only demoralising but denies the local authority the benefit of objectivity in decision making.¹¹⁷ However, Councillors from the MMD seemed to *gloss-over* the issue of conflict emanating from partisan attitudes. Instead, they argued that whenever people debate on various issues there are bound to be differences and that where politics are concerned even valid differences may be unduly blamed on partisanship. From the point of view of the residents, as noted by the resident from the *location*, the poor performance of the local authority over the years is inextricably attached to poor decision making which, among other things, is perceived to be a product of partisan politics.

In this section of the chapter we have noted that, the potential for members of the general public, in Choma, Lusaka and Luwingu, to exercise their civic responsibilities, with regard to the administration of local Councils, is not sufficiently exploited by the local authorities. This is mainly due to insufficient or the complete lack of information, on the part of the general public, relating to the available formal mechanisms for interaction with a local Council. Inadequate interaction between Councillors and their constituents is a major contributing factor to the scarcity of the necessary information among the general public. Such lapses in information dissemination and interaction inhibit the general public's input in the administration of the local authorities. Consequently, priority setting with regard to the provision of services, among other things, may be difficult to achieve. Given the various constraints local authorities are facing, as variously noted in the preceding chapters, service delivery efforts by local authorities need to respond to the priorities of local communities. The high levels of ignorance expressed by residents about their local Councillors and the lack of participation in Council affairs such as the attendance of full Council meetings is a danger to the building of local democracy and good governance. In effect residents, being the *principal* participants in the administration of the elective Councils, cannot effectively hold their *agents*, the Councillors, accountable for their actions. We argue that effective provision of public services would benefit from democratic local decisions which are

¹¹⁷ Interview with Mr. J. C. Musonda, Councillor for Ipusukilo Ward (October 8, 2004). This is a Councillor from the opposition Zambia Republican Party (ZRP)

tailored to ensure good governance at the local level. Such decisions, among other things, are more likely to enhance the opportunities for raising more revenue from local sources which can in turn impact positively on service delivery. The participation of local residents in the affairs of local authorities is very critical to the realisation of such a decision making process. However, it is important to observe that from the discussions held with focus groups this problem is perceived to characterise the administration of local Councils countrywide. In this case transparency and accountability in the operations of the Councils cannot be guaranteed and consequently opportunities for enhancing local democracy and good governance are greatly undermined.

We have also noted majority perceptions among Councillors and Council management officials about the existence of good working relations between the two parties in the three local authorities. But we have also argued that these good relations have not been effectively harnessed to enhance effective administration. In this respect, it may be possible that the prominent observations made by the few Councillors and Council management officials who hold the view that there are poor relations between the two parties in the three local authorities, as summarised in boxes 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, have a more significant influence on the operations of the Councils. These few Councillors and management officials maintain that these observations have characterised Council operations countrywide since the return to multiparty politics and the subsequent election of local Councillors in 1992 and beyond.

Box 5.1: Reasons for poor relations between Councillors and Management officials as perceived by some Councillors in Choma, Lusaka and Luwingu

- Management officials are selfish. They tend to hide important information, relating to the operations of the Council, from the Councillors;
- Management officials have a superiority complex. They look down upon Councillors as a bunch of illiterates incapable of making decisions that can enhance local development;
- Management officials are sceptical about what motivates Councillors. They think that Councillors are only interested in allowances and other benefits and not to represent their constituents and hence do not constitute 'genuine' partners in the administration of local Councils; and
- Management officials dislike the oversight provided by Councillors. The presence of Councillors is perceived, by most management staff, to be a hindrance to the use of underhand methods to accumulate personal gratification from Council resources.

Box 5.2: Reasons for poor relations between Councillors and Management officials as perceived by some Management officials in Choma, Lusaka and Luwingu

- Councillors are preoccupied with the fact that they are the Council employers. This preoccupation has made them 'big-headed' and consequently less willing to listen to technical advice;
- Councillors are more concerned about maintaining popularity among their constituents at the expense of promoting objectivity in the decision-making process. There is a tendency among Councillors to reject management proposals that have financial implications on the residents even when such measures would enhance the delivery of services;
- Councillors exert pressure on management with a view to accessing undue privileges. Councillors are especially more interested in getting as many plots as possible contrary to accepted Council procedures;
- Limited education levels, among Councillors, have a negative impact on effective communication. Councillors have difficulties in understanding financial and other critical management reports resulting in unnecessary suspicions; and
- Limited education levels, among Councillors, inhibit constructive, transparent, and fair debate in the Council chambers. There is a tendency for the few somewhat enlightened Councillors to hijack debate a situation that sometimes results in the implementation of poor decisions. Management advice in such situations is usually not heeded.

The perceptions of the few Councillors and management officials cannot be summarily dismissed. Zambian local government literature has persistently bemoaned the poor relations among Councillors and appointed officials as being detrimental to the operations of local Councils. Although in theory, the 1991 Local Government Act has separated political controls over the executive members from the day-to-day running and execution of council affairs, in practice the Mayors and chairmen and councillors have continued to act as political overseers of the Council executives, leading to friction and, in the case of some Councils to near paralysis (Mushota, 1994, p.162). Illiteracy and ignorance, suspicion, wrong perceptions about the role of Councillors, failure to comprehend levels of authority, and different party allegiances characterise the operational tensions at all levels of local authority (Mushota, 1994:162; Times of Zambia September 5, 2000).

We have also argued that although a one-party dominated Council may be vulnerable to making decisions tainted by partisanship, it is possible for such a Council to exhibit objectivity in its decision making process. Most importantly, we have noted that Councillors, as people's representatives, have a vested interest to protect the welfare of

their constituents. In the course of doing this, the decisions of Councillors may sometimes open to misinterpretation.

Although a 'politically' balanced Council may be preferable, we argue that the 'quality' of Councillors is very critical to the operations of local authorities with regard to political representation, effective administration, and legislation. It is in view of this observation that we examine, in the following section, the experiences of the three local authorities with regard to the capacity of Councillors to effectively legislate, and supervise the implementation of Council policies and decisions.

Legislative and supervisory capacity of Councillors

The Local Government Elections Act provides that, "a person shall be qualified for election as a Councillor of any Council if, and shall not be qualified to be so elected unless: (i) he is a citizen of Zambia; (ii) he has attained the age of twenty-one years; and (iii) he is ordinarily resident in the area of that Council". We have noted in chapter two that elected Councillors form local Councils that have the responsibility of making various decisions including the by-laws (subordinate legislation) for the good administration of the local Councils. The Councillors are also expected to play a 'managerial' role to the extent that they have the responsibility to ensure that appointed officials of the local Council implement the various decisions and 'laws' made in the Council Chambers. In effect, therefore, Councillors are legislators as well as supervisors. However, the Act does not provide for a minimum level of competence for people who aspire for election as Councillors. Unlike in the case of Members of Parliament where individuals are required to be conversant with the official language (English) the legislation does not provide similar guidelines for those wishing to become Councillors. Legislative and supervisory functions are very critical to the effective administration of any organisation including local authorities. The need for high calibre among those charged with such responsibilities, therefore, cannot be overemphasised. This view is underscored by a commission of enquiry recommendation that the Local Government Elections Act of 1991 be amended so that a person wishing to stand as Councillor should not only be conversant with the English language, but should have passed Grade 9 or Form 2. However, government rejected this recommendation (Zambia, 1994a).

The work of local authorities is carried out through Standing Committees as provided for by the Local Government Act. Section 32 of the Act provides that members of a committee shall be appointed by the Council from amongst persons who are Councillors, or qualified for election as Councillors provided that: (i) no person other than a Councillor shall be a member of the Finance committee, and (ii) not less than two thirds of the members of a committee, other than the Finance committee, shall be Councillors. The second proviso offers local authorities the opportunity to co-opt individuals with necessary expertise that may be lacking among the elected Councillors while preserving the *democratic representation* characteristic of elective Councils. We noted in chapter two that the Mayor/Chairman and the Deputy mayor/Vice Chairman are *ex-officio* members of every Standing committee appointed by the Council. Respective committees are responsible for superintending the administration of the local authority through the consideration and recommendation of and taking action on matters specific to the committee. In this respect, Councillors, through the committees, play an administrative and supervisory role in the operations of the local authority. The Establishment committee of a local authority, for example, is, among other things, responsible for receiving reports from the principal officer (Town clerk or Council Secretary) on staff matters; appointment of staff; disciplinary matters; annual review of the Council's fixed establishment and post entry, training and development schemes for staff; and general security. A Finance committee, on the other hand, is, among other things, responsible for the general regulation and control of the finances and accounts of the Council including matters referred to it by other committees; purchase, storage, control and disposal of surplus stores, and materials necessary to the conduct of the Council's business and services. It is important to note, however, that if and whenever necessary a local authority is empowered to appoint an *ad-hoc* committee for purposes of discharging functions that are definite in nature.

Local authorities are given power, under section 64 of the Act, to make Standing Orders for purposes or regulating the proceedings and business, and for preserving order, at the meetings of the Council, a committee or a sub-committee. Other than receiving, considering and taking action on reports from the proceedings of various committees, the full Council, chaired by the Mayor/Chairman, also considers and debates written motions

presented to it by individual Councillors or group of Councillors provided that such a motion/s is relevant to some question over which the Council has power or which affects the Council. Ordinarily the Council considers a motion that has been duly inserted, by the principal officer, in the Notice of the meeting during which such a motion will be raised. However, there are motions that may be moved without notice. Such motions, among others, include those relating to the accuracy of the minutes, closure, adjournment, order of business, or next business; adopting of minutes or reports and recommendations of committees or officers and any consequent resolutions; and extending the time limit for speeches. In addition, Councillors may ask the Mayor or the Chairperson of a committee any questions relating to the business of the Council, proceedings of a committee and/or on matters arising from the minutes of previous meetings. With regard to voting in the full Council meeting or committee meeting, every question is determined by the show of hands by a majority of the members present. The brief account given above illustrates the legislative role that Councillors play in the local authorities.

In this section, therefore, we examine the experiences of the three local Councils with regard to the legislative and supervisory capacity of the elected Councillors vis-à-vis the impact on local authority administration and service delivery. Specifically, we analyse the views of various stakeholders, including Council management officials and the residents, on the quality of the Councillors and how this has impacted on the delivery of services.

Choma

All Councillors interviewed held the view that they were suitably qualified to effectively execute their civic responsibilities. From the point of view of the Councillors, therefore, problems facing the local authority, with regard to the delivery of services, have nothing to do with their ability or inability to discharge their supervisory and/or legislative functions in the local authority. However, appointed officials hold the view that most Councillors are of low calibre and are consequently unable to effectively play their role as supervisors and legislators. According to the Council officials, the mediocrity of Councillors manifests itself through the incomprehensiveness of and poor language used in most of the committee Reports, and inadequate understanding of various concepts

especially those related to issues of finance and accounts. The Council Secretary noted that accounting officials usually face difficulties when trying to enlighten Councillors on matters of finance and accounts. It was also noted that proceedings of Council meetings were usually delayed due to time being ‘wasted’ on attending to clarifications sought by some Councillors who were unable to comprehend relatively simple contributions during the proceedings.

Participants of focus group discussions held in Zambia compound and Shapande compound also held the view that most Councillors were of low caliber and that it is, therefore, difficult to expect such Councillors to make effective policies that reflect the needs and aspirations of the people they represent and/or ensure the effective, transparent and accountable implementation of Council decisions by appointed officials.

The concerns of the Council management officials and focus group participants were also alluded to by a local government practitioner who, among other things, noted that the low calibre of most Councillors has a negative impact on the administration of most local authorities in the country. The practitioner noted that low caliber Councillors do not exhibit effective leadership and the quality of advice they render to appointed officials is usually poor. According to the practitioner, ineffective leadership adversely affects oversight and consequently undermines transparency and accountability in the operations of local authorities.¹¹⁸

From the discussions with Council management officials, the participants of focus group discussions, other stakeholders in our study, and the local government practitioner cited above, the issue of low calibre Councillors seems to be anchored on the low levels of education of most Councillors. This view may be supported by the fact that other than the Mayor, who had completed Grade 12, was a former primary school teacher, and had served as Councillors for a long time only 2 of the 8 Councillors interviewed had gone up to Junior Secondary School level of Grade 9 or the old Form 2. The local authority did not have a comprehensive record of the educational and/or professional qualifications of all the 25 elected Councillors. There is a possibility, therefore, that if all the Councillors

¹¹⁸ Interview with Mr. Dan Longwe, Programme Officer for the Local Government Association of Zambia (LGAZ) – December 14, 2004). Mr. Longwe served as Chief Administration Officer of Ndola City Council (1977-79); Township Secretary in Choma (1979-84); District Secretary in Sesheke (1985-1987); Council Administrative Secretary and latter Director of Administration at Ndola City Council (1987-1991); and Director of Administration at Kitwe City Council for 8 months (end of 1991 – 1992)

were interviewed, the picture with regard to educational attainments could change for the better. It is important to note, however, that none of the Councillors interviewed was in formal employment.

We have noted in the preceding section that only half of the 250 residents subjected to the structured questionnaire admitted knowing their Councillor and that only 26 of this group of residents noted that their Councillor visited them either “often” or “very often”. From these statistics it may be argued that most residents may not be adequately informed about the calibre of their local Councillors vis-à-vis their (Councillors’) educational and/or professional qualifications. It seems, therefore, that the poor performance of the local authority with regard to service delivery is what is being used to bolster the “poor calibre” perception, of Councillors, among the residents and other stakeholders.

Similarly, officials of the Choma Council management, who alluded to the poor calibre of Councillors, were unable to indicate how the incomprehensiveness of and poor language used in the committee Reports, and inadequate understanding of concepts related to issues of finance and accounts is undermining the general administration of the local authority and service delivery. We would argue, therefore, that although improved educational and/or professional qualities among Councillors may generally enhance local authority operations, there are other factors that need to be considered when analysing the performance of the Councillors in executing their supervisory and legislative responsibilities. First, because the position of Councillor is part-time and consequently does not attract a salary Councillors have to attend to other income generating activities to maintain their livelihood. This divided attention may adversely affect the level of commitment to affairs of the local authority. Second, because of their part-time status Councillors are not really anchored in the local government system and consequently the enthusiasm to learn about how local authorities are or should be administered, with a view to enhancing their understanding of their role as supervisors and legislators, is greatly undermined. And third, Councillors, like any other leaders, need to exercise integrity in the course of executing their responsibilities. Given their part-time status, however, Councillors may be vulnerable to pursuing strategies aimed at accruing undue rewards from the local authority, a situation which greatly compromises the ability to

perform their supervisory and legislative functions in an effective, transparent and accountable manner. We noted in chapter two the identification of corruption, selfishness and greed, and the general lack of accountability as factors adversely affecting the operations of local authorities. Similarly, we have also referred to financial mismanagement as an explanatory factor for the paucity of local finances. With high levels of integrity among Councillors, the negative impact of these factors on local authority administration and service delivery would be significantly reduced.

Lusaka

Like their counterparts in Choma, all the Councillors interviewed held the view that they were suitably qualified to effectively discharge their civic responsibilities. According to this view, problems encountering the local authority, with regard to the provision of services, have nothing to do with the Councillors' calibre with regard to education and/or professionalism qualifications. Instead, Councillors blamed what they termed as selfishness and superiority complex among some Council management officials for their (officials') perception that Councillors are ineffectiveness because of low calibre. The Councillors also relate the residents' perceptions about the poor quality of Councillors as a reflection of the residents' dissatisfaction with service delivery, a problem which, according to Councillors, is a result of other factors.

From the findings of our study, it may be true that Councillors in Lusaka are comparatively better in terms of educational qualifications than their counterparts in Choma and Luwingu. This observation is appreciated by some residents and other stakeholders. Out of the 10 Councillors interviewed one of them indicated having gone up to the University level; 3 indicated having gone up to Grade 12; and the remaining 6 had completed Junior Secondary level. This seemingly higher calibre of Councillors is not surprising because Lusaka has a comparative advantage over Choma and Luwingu with regard to the availability of people with high levels of education and/or professional qualifications. Like their counterparts in Choma, however, none of the Councillors interviewed was in formal employment.

However, most Council management officials interviewed hold the view that the local authority deserves better in terms of quality Councillors. The officials noted that

some Councillor-Official conflicts are a result of the failure by some Councillors to appreciate their roles, and suspicion resulting from their inability to comprehend management issues especially those related to finance. Generally, the views of management officials with regard to how the perceived low calibre of Councillors manifests itself are not different from those advanced by their colleagues in Choma. Similarly, no explicit and/or illustrative example of an incident, bordering on supervisory and/or legislative deficiencies of Councillors, which could have been avoided if the local authority had “better” qualified Councillors was advanced by any of the management officials interviewed. The views of Council management officials were shared by some respondents in our study. In acknowledging the importance of local Councils as agents of central government meant to deliver public services a senior official in a government line Ministry referred to the lack of policy on a minimum education level for Councillors as a *joke* which should be addressed as a matter of urgency. The official noted that the oversight of local authorities should not be entrusted in the hands of semi-illiterate individuals because most senior appointed officials of the Council are less likely to take such advice seriously.¹¹⁹

Like in Choma, the association of the local authority’s poor performance with the perception that Councillors are of low calibre seems to be a stereotype and one that, to a large extent, is based on the lack of information or even misinformation. We noted in the preceding section that only 165 (27.5 percent) of the 600 residents subjected to the structured questionnaire admitted knowing their local Councillor and that out of this group more than half (91) of them noted that their local Councillor did not visit them at all.

From the above statistics, and those relating to the education attainments of the Councillors interviewed in this study, it may be argued that the general view that most Councillors are of low calibre, on account of low education levels, could be an overstatement. Providing services to a large city like Lusaka can be a daunting task for a local authority. We have noted various factors that have adversely affected the administration of the local authorities in chapters two and three of the thesis. However, in spite of these factors Councillors, as legislators and supervisors of the Lusaka City

¹¹⁹ Interview with the Director for Distance Education in the Ministry of Education (May 12, 2005)

Council, have managed to maintain the delivery of some services and ensured that the local authority did not “collapse” during the period under review (1991-2001). This may indicate that Councillors during this period ‘rose to the occasion’ and discharged their responsibilities as provided for by the Local Government Act, the Local Government Service Regulations and their local authority’s Standing Orders. It is, of course, true to state that the local authority could have done better during this period. In this respect, and like noted in the sub-section on Choma, we argue that in addition to having Councillors of high calibre, in terms of educational and professional qualifications, other factors need to be taken into account when assessing the performance of a local authority. Comprehensive and supportive legislation is very critical to secure the commitment of Councillors as well as to build their capacity for effective performance. In addition to issues of personal integrity, and the fact that Councillors are part-time officials the position of Mayor, like that of Council Chairperson, according to the Local Government Act, is a honorary one. Such a Mayor does not have budget making powers, cannot take disciplinary action against a Councillor or appointed official in his individual capacity as mayor, and cannot exert policy leadership other than serving as the Chairman of full Council meetings. Even in cases of disorderly conduct by a Councillor during a full Council meeting, the mayor’s action depends on a motion moved by another Councillor requesting that the erring Councillor either not continue to be heard or suspended from the meeting. And such a motion needs to be approved by the majority of the Councillors present in that meeting for the mayor to take appropriate action. In this respect, therefore, we note that the position of mayor is not adequately anchored in the administration of the local authority, a situation that may have an adverse impact on the performance of some Councillors and subsequently that of some appointed officials. This observation has nothing to do with whether or not the mayor is a person of high calibre.

Luwingu

Like their counterparts in Choma and Lusaka, all the Councillors interviewed noted that they are suitably qualified to effectively discharge their responsibilities as elected representatives. The Councillors associated the poor performance of their local authority to other factors such as those discussed in chapters two and three of the thesis. Contrary

to this view, however, most Council management officials interviewed noted that most of the Councillors are of low calibre and are consequently not able to discharge their supervisory and legislative roles in an effective and efficient manner. Similar to their counterparts in Choma and Lusaka who held similar views about their own Councillors, the management officials cited incoherence during debates resulting from the poor ‘mastery’ of the officials language, English; the inability to grasp and effectively utilise relevant concepts in the course of discharging their responsibilities as supervisors and legislators; and the inability to adequately exert their authority on management staff with a view to enhancing commitment and integrity in local authority operations, as characteristics associated with the Councillors’ low calibre. Our experience during the interactions with the Councillors in the study, to a large extent, supports the management’s view.

The concerns of the management officials may be correct. Out of the 7 Councillors interviewed only 2 indicated having completed Junior Secondary School; 3 had gone up to Grade 7 or the old Standard 5; and the remaining 2 were below Grade 7. However, the Council has a record of well ‘qualified’ Council Chairmen with the current one, Mr. A. Chanda, having completed Grade 12 while the immediate past two Council Chairmen, Mr. S. Mwamba and Mr. E. Mwenya having pursued professional careers in the mining industry, and the Kafue Textiles factory, respectively, for several years. Being a rural district, Luwingu, unlike Choma and Lusaka, is less likely to have a pool of professionals to aspire for Councillorship. It may also be argued that what motivates the average person in Luwingu to become a Councillor could be different from what motivates his/her colleague in Lusaka. Some Luwingu residents argue that Councillors in rural places have a genuine interest to serve their constituents in spite of their low educational and professional levels. Amid approval from his colleagues, one of the focus group discussion participants at Mumba Basic School observed that (Bemba to English translation):¹²⁰

“Unlike Councillors in towns and cities, who might look to Councillorship as a means of securing plots of land, our Councillors live in the villages where land is

¹²⁰ Mr. Paul Mulindwa, participant of a focus group discussion held at Mumba Basic School (October 8, 2004)

not a problem. It is mainly the desire to represent their community which is a motivating factor rather than anything else. The allowances Councillors receive are not attractive enough to influence someone to become a Councillor. But unfortunately Luwingu is a rural district and the few young men and women who excel in schools and colleges prefer to settle and work in towns so we are left with the less educated to take up this very important job”.

Their education and/or professional qualifications notwithstanding, Councillors in Luwingu are committed to serving their communities diligently. During the period under review Councillors, among other things, were, for example, involved in the re-introduction of Ward development Committees (WDCs) to serve as sub-district structures for purposes of enhancing popular participation in district development as well as improving information flow between the local authority and local communities. These committees, under the chairmanship of the area Councillor, facilitate self-help projects aimed at improving the welfare of local communities, and are expected to act as mouth pieces for community in-put in the operations of the local authority. These were donor-supported initiatives as part of the Cooperation for District Development (CDD) project noted earlier in the thesis. However, given the pilot nature of this initiative and the lack of support from government the WDCs have failed to continue functioning as expected. Councillors also resolved to rehabilitate and extend the public library to enhance readership among members of the community, and resolved to renovate an old building into a rest house (Isandulula) with a view to increasing revenue collection for the local authority.¹²¹ The Luwingu Council, like its Choma and Lusaka counterparts has, during the period under review, managed to exercise its authority, as provided by the Local Government Act, to establish and/or revise its administrative structures as and whenever necessary, and has produced and when necessary revised its Standing Orders to enhance the operations of the local authority. These are very critical functions which Councillors are expected to execute in order to enhance effectiveness in the administration of a local authority. The execution of these functions constitutes the basis upon which supervisory and legislative responsibilities of the Councillors can be exercised.

It is important to note that Luwingu Councillors, unlike their colleagues in Lusaka, do not have the opportunity to work with many well-qualified appointed

¹²¹ Council Minutes LDC/Council: 351/04/99; and FCGPC.336/07/99

officials, as noted in chapters two and three. This means, therefore, that to a large extent the Councillors have to apply themselves a little harder in order to effectively operate within the guidelines of the various regulations including the Local Government Act, the Local Government Service Regulations, and the local authority's Standing Orders. Given the many factors that constrain the administration of the local authorities, it is plausible to argue that with regard to executing their supervisory and legislative roles, Luwingu Councillors are trying the best they can.

In this section we have noted that the perception that local authorities are not able to perform effectively because of low education levels among most Councillors may be an overstatement. We have also noted that although higher educational and professional qualifications among Councillors can enhance the administration of the local authorities, it is important to take into account other factors which may have an adverse impact on the effectiveness of the Councillors in general and the operations of local authorities in particular. Most importantly, we have observed that the local authorities have, during the period under review, not "collapsed" but have continued to render some services to their communities in spite of the many adverse factors cited especially in chapters two and three. This continuity underscores, among other things, a reasonable level of adherence and commitment to the administrative and supervisory 'norms', on the part of Councillors, as stipulated by regulatory mechanisms which include the Local Government Act, Local Government Service Regulations, and the Standing Orders.

However, administration and governance at the local level is not, in the strictest sense, a preserve for local Councils. There are *chiefs* (traditional authorities), within the jurisdictions of local Council areas, that have the responsibility to ensure the well being of the communities in their chiefdoms. These are authorities that are recognised by and in some ways work with government. In the next section, therefore, we attempt to examine the role, if any, which traditional authorities play in public service delivery at this level of government.

Traditional Authority and public service delivery

The traditional rulers, have an interest in the welfare of their subjects. It is in this respect that chiefs would not only be expected to superintend developmental activities in their

chiefdoms but also get involved, directly or indirectly, in the activities of public institutions, especially those entrusted with the responsibility of providing public services. We have noted, in the introduction to the chapter, that some functions of traditional authorities have implications for public service delivery. In this section, therefore, we attempt to examine the relevance of traditional authority in service delivery by analysing the views of various stakeholders in the study especially those of ordinary residents. The examination is restricted to Choma and Luwingu districts only as there are no traditional authorities in Lusaka district. For illustrative purposes we also provide some practical examples of traditional authority involvement in service delivery. The main aim is to provide insights of community perceptions and their own (chiefs) perceptions relating to the role of traditional authority in the provision of public services. The views of the various stakeholders and the few examples showing the involvement of traditional authority in service delivery, therefore, only help us to draw some 'conclusions' regarding the role of chiefs in public service delivery.

It is important to note at the outset that the study has revealed that the role of traditional authorities in public service delivery is limited to the mobilisation and sensitisation of their subjects to undertake self-help community projects and/or promoting community attitudes that have the effect of preserving public service delivery infrastructure. The absence of legislative recognition and support to the effect that these authorities do provide some services that are in fact a responsibility of local authorities, among other factors, constitutes the major explanatory factor for this limitation. This lack of legislative recognition and support means that traditional authorities do not receive government appropriations for the purpose of delivering public services within their chiefdoms. The extent to which these authorities can complement the efforts of local authorities in delivering services is, therefore, severely undermined.

The lack of sub-district structures that can provide a formal government forum in which traditional authorities can effectively engage in decision making related to local development also undermines the potential for enhanced service delivery by such authorities. The chiefs' representatives on the Council and the Councillors in the respective chiefdoms provide the link between local authorities and the traditional authorities. The effectiveness of these links is very critical to the traditional authorities'

knowledge about the activities and constraints of local authorities, a very essential component in determining the nature and extent of traditional authority intervention in public service delivery. The effectiveness, with regard to Councillors, may depend on several factors including the interest and willingness of the individual Councillors to ensure feedback to traditional authorities; the Councillor's understanding and appreciation of his/her role as an elected representative; and the nature of the personal relationship that may exist between the chief and the individual Councillor. Our study noted that in situations where a chief, as an indication of exhibiting authority, want Councillors to report to him or her, the relationship between such a chief and some Councillors is strained and usually results in a stand-off between the two parties. In such a situation, the opportunities for effective information flow between the local authority and a traditional authority is further undermined. Generally, however, there is a perception among some respondents of the study that the older the Councillor the better the relationship with traditional authorities.

Ordinarily, the two chiefs' representatives on the Council are expected to effectively communicate with traditional authorities about local authority operations and other developmental initiatives at the district level. First, these representatives, like the elected Councillors, are part of the Council which approves the proceedings of the District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC), the institution which has the responsibility for coordinating district development plans and implementation. Second, and most importantly, these representatives, unlike Councillors that are elected by the electorate in a given electoral Ward, are selected by all the chiefs in the district. Such representatives are, therefore, accountable to the chiefs and would be expected to provide feedback about local authority operations in particular and district development initiatives in general without the chiefs soliciting for it. However, the vastness of the chiefdoms coupled with poor road infrastructure and unreliable public transport makes it difficult for the representatives to ensure regular and effective feedback. It is also important to note that elected Councillors have a comparative advantage over the chiefs' representatives with regard to accessing appointed officials and critical documents of the local authority. Being the people's elected representatives elected Councillors are more likely to command respect among appointed officials and exert their authority over the general

administration of the local authority than the selected chiefs' representatives. Regular and effective interaction between traditional authorities and elected Councillors is, therefore, more critical to providing feedback vis-à-vis local authority activities and operations of the chiefdoms. Without such interaction traditional authorities may not know what their local authority is able or not able to do in their chiefdom with respect to service delivery. Such paucity of information may, among other things, account for the self-help initiatives spearheaded by traditional authorities with regard to providing some services within their chiefdoms.

Apart from elected Councillors and the chiefs' representatives, however, traditional authorities are linked to the operations of local authorities through the Planning department. Among other things, traditional authorities, through the department of Planning, are a very critical component in the compilation of the District Situation Analysis (DSA).¹²² The Planning department is expected to appraise as well as consult chiefs about activities of local authorities in the chiefdoms. The Principal Officer's (Town clerk or Council Secretary) disposition to such appraisal is of paramount importance to the nature and extent of traditional authority involvement in local authority operations. Our study noted that in situations where the Principal Officer has cultivated the habit of visiting traditional authorities such officers are recognised and well received by the chiefs. Consequently, an environment for the effective exchange of ideas is created and nurtured. Under such circumstances the intervention of traditional authorities in public service delivery is based on substantive information from the local authority.

In view of the above analysis we proceed in this section to examine the experiences of Choma and Luwingu districts with regard to the perceptions about and some illustrative intervention by traditional authorities in public service delivery.

Choma District


Two Chiefdoms were visited namely Mapanza and Singani. In chief Mapaza's chiefdom there are 56 villages and there are 137 villages in chief Singani's chiefdom. Each chief

¹²² DSA is a document that gives information about the District, describes sectors and analyses information. It compiles information on District status, its assets, opportunities, constraints and aspirations. It also includes an analysis of constraints and opportunities facing each sector.

has two Retainers (Kapasus) and village headmen equal to the number of villages for assisting him in the discharge of his functions.

In order to ascertain the relevance of traditional authority in service delivery the various stakeholders were asked whether or not chiefs have a role to play in the delivery of public services in particular. Out of the 250 residents interviewed 123 (49.2 percent) of them, a sizeable minority, held the view that chiefs have a role to play (Figure 5.4). This view was also held by 7 of the 9 NGO representatives; 5 of the 7 officials from government line Ministries interviewed; and 6 of the 8 Council management officials. The remaining 127 (50.8 percent) residents did not think that chiefs have a role to play in the delivery of public services.

Figure 5.4: Choma residents' responses on whether or not chiefs have a role to play in service delivery



Source: Fieldwork data analysis

Apart from being represented by two of their subjects on the Council there is no explicit legal provision on how chiefs can get involved in matters of local administration. Our study found that traditional authorities are not adequately informed about local authority operations because of the inability of the representatives to ensure regular feedback given the vastness of the Wards, the lack of reliable public transport, and inadequate financial resources needed to purchase and maintain a bicycle and/or to

facilitate regular travel by public transport when this option is available. This was noted by Mr. D. Hangwemu, one of the two chiefs' representatives on the Council. In addition the chiefs' representative observed that since Council meetings are held every month it is a big challenge to ensure that traditional authorities are up-dated on local authority affairs. This challenge may be appreciated when it is taken into account that these representatives, like elected Councillors, are working on voluntary basis and have other activities, associated with the sustenance of their livelihood, to attend to.¹²³

As noted in the introduction to the section, the disposition of the Planning department as well as the local authority's Principal Officer (Town clerk) is of paramount importance to the level of information flow and consequently the extent of traditional authority involvement in Council affairs vis-à-vis service delivery. However, the interaction between traditional authorities and the local authority could have been much better had it not been for the persistent personnel turnover, noted in chapter two of the thesis, at the Principal Officer (Town clerk) position during the period under review (1991-2001). This turnover, among other things, has tended to undermine the effectiveness and regularity with which the Planning department has interacted with traditional authorities. The net effect of these lapses, among other things, has been the paucity of information flow and linkages to traditional authorities with respect to local authority operations. Consequently, traditional authorities have sometimes tended to engage in service delivery activities that have not been initiated and sanctioned by and/or whose implementation may not have been reported to the local authority.

In spite of the weak linkages between the local authority and traditional authorities, and the absence of a legislative requirement for the involvement of chiefs in public service delivery, traditional authorities in Choma have utilised every opportunity at their disposal to either lobby for resources and/or mobilise their subjects to implement community programmes on self-help basis. Mobilisation of subjects to undertake self-help community projects and/or to provide labour for projects supported by donors and other well wishers is the major role that chiefs in the district play. With regard to *direct* service delivery, however, there are no central government appropriations for chiefdoms. Only appropriations for chiefs' allowances, and sometimes the rehabilitation chiefs'

¹²³ Interview with Mr. D. Hangwemu, a chiefs' representative on the Council (November 20, 2004)

palaces, are made through the Ministry of Local government and Housing (MLGH). In this regard, therefore, traditional authorities are not, in a strict sense, expected to deliver public services per se. This is the major reason why the role of community mobilisation is more pronounced with regard to public service delivery by traditional authorities.

Majority of the people in Choma earn their livelihood through agricultural activities. The Local authority, as noted in the previous chapters, does not have the capacity to ensure the regular maintenance of roads. Feeder roads and bridges within the chiefdoms need to be in a good state of repair to facilitate agricultural activity as well as facilitate people's movements from one place to another including the transportation of their produce to market places. These are responsibilities of the local authority as prescribed by the Local Government Act of 1991 under the Second Schedule of section 61 of the Act. However, because of the local authority's failure to effectively discharge its functions in this respect, feeder roads, bridges and sometimes community schools are regularly rehabilitated using voluntary community labour, spearheaded by traditional authorities in their respective chiefdoms.

Most donor supported projects in Choma usually use the local authority as their entry point to the target groups and communities they want to serve. In some cases, such as the District Development Programme (DDP), sponsored by the German government through the German Technical Assistance (GTZ), project offices have been set up within the premises of the local authority. With the technical assistance of the local authority, traditional authorities were the major link between the DDP project structures and the targeted communities in the various chiefdoms. It is important to note that the Planning department and the District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC) constitute the formal links between the DDP and the local authority. It is through the Planning department of the local authority that traditional authority intervention in the DPP project was actualised. In this respect traditional authorities were the mobilising forces to ensure community response to the DDP interventions in the respective chiefdoms. Rural communities were the ultimate beneficiaries of the DDP. With regard to the DDCC, any developmental plans and the subsequent implementation of such plans at the district level, whether initiated by government institutions or donors, have to be brought to the attention of the DDCC. As noted earlier, the local authority is the Secretariat to the

DDCC and the proceedings of the DDCC are approved by the Council (Councillors). This arrangement further provides the link between the intervention of traditional authorities in the DDP project and the role of the local authority in such an activity. The project supported communities in mobilising their own human, natural and financial resources prior to any external assistance from the DPP project. Traditional authorities were very critical ensuring that their targeted subjects were adequately sensitised on the importance of these interventions and the need to enhance ownership of the programmes through making an up-front commitment in cash or kind. The project's Community Development Fund (ddp-CDF) was availed to support community development projects mainly in areas of poverty alleviation.

Support for the involvement of traditional authorities in service delivery by Choma residents was especially captured during focus group discussions. The community leadership role of traditional authorities is well appreciated by Choma residents. As community leaders chiefs have the vested interest in ensuring that their subjects are well catered with regard to basic social services in areas such as education, health, water and sanitation. Directly or indirectly, through the chiefs' representatives on the Council, traditional authorities bring to the attention of the local authority problems affecting their chiefdoms in as far as service delivery is concerned. The views of one resident in a focus group discussion held at Shapande market typify the expressions of most residents who made comments on the role of traditional authority in service delivery. According to this resident:¹²⁴

“Chiefs are the heads of government in their chiefdoms. They innovative and inspire their subjects to get involved in activities that help to make their lives better. There seem to be no clear government structures through which chiefs can effectively provide leadership for development at the local level. Regardless of the various constraints, however, chiefs are doing a commendable job. Various community programmes in areas such as water and sanitation, health, and agriculture have either been initiated by or have benefited from the mobilisation of communities by the chiefs. The lack of financial resources and reliable transport, and poor road network are making it very difficult for chiefs to effectively coordinate development in their chiefdoms”.

¹²⁴ Sentiments of a Mr. Christopher Mushimbwa – participant of a focus group discussion held at Shapande market comprising 8 participants (November 13, 2004)

Other stakeholders including NGO representatives and officials from government line ministries hold similar views. In addition, however, there is recognition among these stakeholders of the need for the creation of sub-district structures, as administrative structures below the local authority level, to effectively coordinate developmental ideas from traditional authorities. The District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC) is the only structure that is responsible for the planning and coordination of development at the district level. Chiefs are represented on the DDCC by virtue of the chiefs' representatives being part of the 'Councillors' who approve the proceeding of the DDCC. However, we have noted in the previous chapters the ineffectiveness of the DDCC in discharging this responsibility. In spite of the ambiguity of the legislation, with regard to the involvement of traditional authorities in service delivery, chiefs in practice are making significant contributions in this area.

The Chiefs interviewed see the responsibilities of traditional authorities as extending beyond the 'formal' provisions of the Policy of Chiefs' Affairs. They see the provisions of the policy, in as far as they relate to the functions of the Chiefs, as narrow and inexplicit. The provisions, according to the Chiefs, do not reflect what traditional rulers actually do for their communities vis-à-vis national development and service delivery at the local level. According to this view there is no debate on whether or not Chiefs are involved in service delivery. The debate is rather on the extent to which traditional authorities are involved in service delivery, the type of services whose provision can or should be associated with traditional authority, and whether or not there are appropriate formal arrangements or structures for this purpose. Critical factors, noted by the Chiefs, that have a negative impact on the ability of traditional authorities to serve their communities better include insufficient information on Council operations, lack of resources and appropriate formal structures. We have noted earlier that there are no government appropriations intended for the delivery of services by traditional authorities. This lack of resources, therefore, seems to be 'by design' and not by coincidence or misfortune on the part of the chiefs. The sentiments of the two chiefs in our study, over the role of traditional authorities in services delivery can best be summarized by chief Singani who, among other things, noted that the survival of any given community depends on the level of organisation and the ability of community members to identify

their problems and agree on the best way to resolve such problems in their order of priority. This requires a leadership with vision and the ability to mobilize resources whether material or human. According to chief Singani traditional Chiefs are expected to provide such leadership and that in spite of the Chiefs' Policy emphasising on chiefs as being the custodians of community values and in charge of law and order in the chiefdoms, traditional rulers have over the years been involved in matters that are development-oriented, matters that ensure the availability of some services to the communities. The chief noted that traditional authorities have worked and continue to work with the local authorities, various donors and NGOs to provide services to the people. Traditional rulers are community 'mobilisers' and instruments of positive change. However, the chief conceded that the ability of traditional rulers to effectively deal with the problems of the communities is greatly compromised by the lack of resources and appropriate institutional structures at the local level.¹²⁵

The mobilisation of subjects for developmental activities has been a very critical function of traditional authorities in Choma over the years including the study period, 1991 to 2001. For illustration purposes, and in addition to the 'usual' mobilisation of communities for self-help projects, we cite three programmes in which traditional authorities played a key role. It is important to note that the services provided by these programmes cover functional areas of the local authority as provided for in the Second Schedule of the Local Government Act of 1991. In effect, these programmes supplemented the work of the local authority with the traditional authorities being very instrumental in ensuring community response. In 1995, for example, Chiefs were involved in the Draught Rehabilitation Programme executed by the Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM) in which various types of agricultural seed were distributed to small-scale farm families that were assessed to be vulnerable, mainly because of the draught. The implementation of the programme drew the attention of the local authority through its Planning department which consequently necessitated the involvement of traditional. The programme, which was coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, was supported by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the

¹²⁵ Interview with Chief Singani (November 15, 2004)

World Bank, and the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ). This program was effected in all the Chiefdoms. All the Chiefs, including those in the study (Singani and Mapanza) were instrumental in the identification of vulnerable families within their Chiefdoms and ensuring that beneficiaries were adequately sensitised to use the seeds effectively so that they are able to repay the loans as stipulated in the associated terms and conditions. Between 1996 and 1997 traditional authorities also took part in the program that was implemented by World Vision in the district. The program provided medical and educational support to needy children, and rehabilitated various schools and clinics within Choma. Traditional authorities were at the center of the activities relating to the identification of the needy children and the prioritisation of schools and clinics that needed to be rehabilitated.

Between 1998 and 1999 the District Water Health Education programme (DWASHE), funded by various cooperating partners including the Irish government, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), sunk several boreholes in many Chiefdoms including Chiefs Singani and Mapanza's areas. The Choma local authority, like any other local authority in the country, is expected to ensure the availability of clean drinking water as well as to promote sanitary conditions aimed at preventing the incidence of disease outbreaks. These are local authority responsibilities provided under the Local Government Act specifically under Public health, and Sanitation and drainage sections of section 61 of the Act. The intervention of the DWASHE programme, in various parts of the country, underscores the dismal performance of local authorities, including the Choma Council, in the area of water, sanitation and drainage. The DWASHE programme in Choma was a response to the concerns of traditional authorities regarding the water and sanitation problems their subjects were facing. These concerns reflect the inability of the Choma local authority to perform effectively in the area of water and sanitation. With the help of the traditional authorities strategic locations for the boreholes were identified and beneficiaries effectively sensitised to make good use and care of the boreholes. Outside these specific programmes Chiefs Singani and Mapanza, like other traditional rulers in the district, are involved in the maintenance of law and order; routine rehabilitation of roads through organised voluntary labour, and the sensitisation of their subjects, in


conjunction with relevant government officials from the Ministries of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, on matters related to the dipping of cattle and fish conservation.

Luwingu District

Three chiefdoms were visited namely Chipalo, Chungu and Tungati. There are 108 villages in Chipalo's chiefdom, 125 in Chungu, and 105 in Tungati's chiefdoms. Like their counterparts in Choma each chief has two Retainers (Kapasus) and the village headmen to assist in the discharge of their functions.

Out of the 150 residents interviewed 102 (68 percent) of them held the view that chiefs have a role to play in public service delivery (Figure 5.5) This view was also held by 7 of the 10 NGO representatives; 5 of the 7 officials from government line Ministries interviewed; and 6 of the 8 Council management officials. The remaining 48 (32 percent) residents did not think that chiefs have a role to play in public service delivery.

Figure 5.5: Luwingu residents' responses on whether or not chiefs have a role to play in service delivery



Like their counterparts in Choma, Luwingu residents look at traditional authorities as the entry points of developmental programmes and activities in the local communities especially communities that are far away from centres of local Council administration (CBD). There is a sense of realisation, among the residents, that central

government or the local authority cannot do everything for the communities. There are community needs that residents themselves not only have to identify and prioritise but also ensure their provision. A good leadership that commands respect among community members is very critical to this process of identifying and providing for such needs. Luwingu residents hold the view that traditional authorities do provide this kind of leadership. This view, and the importance of the contributions being made by traditional authorities towards the well being of local communities, was ascribed to and appreciated by all the participants of the focus group discussions that made comments on this matter.¹²⁶ The sentiments of one participant of a focus group discussion in Isandulula compound are typical of the views and expressions of Luwingu residents on the relevance of chiefs in service delivery. The resident, among other things, noted that:

“...Government has a lot of responsibilities and does not have enough resources, to effectively take care of all the needs of citizens. Many communities, especially those in remote parts of the country, depend on self-help initiatives to improve their way of life. The chiefs and their advisors, including the Indunas (village headmen) are the ones that have the responsibility to organise communities for such initiatives. Roads, bridges, schools, and health centers in many communities within Luwingu have been rehabilitated on self-help basis with the inspiration of chiefs. Through Chiefs organisations such as the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ) have provided health services sensitisation programmes on health related matters to communities...”.

The appreciation of the efforts of traditional authorities in service delivery, by residents is equally shared by other stakeholders including representatives of NGOs, government line ministries and Council management officials. From the local authority's point of view traditional authorities are complementing the Council's efforts in delivering some services to the communities either directly through the mobilisation of their own resources or indirectly through the mobilisation of their subjects for involvement in donor supported programmes. The Council Secretary noted that the jurisdiction of local authorities, with regard to their mandate to provide services, is so wide that literally any service provided through the involvement of traditional authorities constitutes a complementary effort. However, the lack of legislative recognition with regard to service

¹²⁶ Focus group discussions held at Isandulula compound (October 9, 2004); and Mumba basic school (October 8, 2004)

provision by traditional authorities and the absence of appropriate sub-district structures is a limiting factor to the extent to which these authorities can engage in the provision of public services. The Ward and Zone Development Committees, re-introduced by the Cooperation for District Development (CDD) Programme between 1997 and 2001 on pilot basis, are viewed as sub-district structures that have the potential to coordinate the developmental initiatives of traditional authorities. However, the CDD initiatives were not co-opted into the formal government administrative machinery in as far as district administration is concerned. Such co-optation would, among other things, have entailed the allocation of public resources to ensure the continued effective and efficient functioning of these structures. Consequently, the potential for these structures to contribute to improved district administration in general, and the enhanced involvement of traditional authorities in local administration in particular, was undermined. Clearly, government intervention to ensure the continued functioning of these Committees is very critical to enhancing effective decision making and the coordination of projects and programmes at the local level.

From the discussions held with the three Luwingu chiefs one gets the impression that these traditional authorities are 'engines of development' running at just a little below 50% of their 'designed' capacity because of the various constraints. The chiefs hold the view that as traditional leaders, they have the responsibility to ensure that the standard of living of their subjects is uplifted. The uplifting of living standards should occur in an environment of peace and tranquility, an environment in which community members recognise the need to carry a fair share of the burden associated with the maintenance of a 'progressive' community. It is in this light that Luwingu chiefs see themselves as institutions that should provide the inspiration and guidance to the communities in order to build a base for sustainable development. In spite of this recognition, however, the constraints that inhibit traditional authorities from exerting their full potential, as noted in the section on Choma, are also applicable to their Luwingu counterparts.

In spite of the constraints there is a conviction among the Luwingu chiefs that they have a responsibility to contribute to the development of the district and their subjects. Chief Tungati, speaking in Bemba, observed that a chiefdom is like a household

where the chief is head. The head is expected to provide for the household. Where the head is not capable of doing that as an individual, he or she must create conditions that will enable the household to provide for itself. The chief observed that chiefdoms are faced with difficulties related to resources and other logistics including poor roads, inadequate information on modern farming methods, and inadequate social infrastructure such as schools and health centers. As community leaders chiefs have a duty to organise and coordinate community efforts to alleviate some of these difficulties.¹²⁷

For illustration purposes we highlight a few activities in which the involvement of traditional authorities was instrumental. Between 1994 and 1997 a very ambitious *Civic Education Programme*, sponsored by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) was implemented under the headship of a Mr. Berg, a Norwegian volunteer with several years of experience on issues of democracy and education. The programme involved the organisation of a one-week workshop in each of the 20 electoral Wards in the district to disseminate information to all members of Ward and Zone Development committees on a variety of topics including principles of democratic governance and the Zambian Constitution, financial accountability, how to organise local public meetings, and how to establish fruitful relationships with traditional authorities. The topic on the establishment of fruitful relationships with traditional authorities was in recognition of the important role chiefs can play in national development including the delivery of various social services in their communities. All chiefs in the district, including the three chiefs in our study, were very instrumental in mobilising the Ward and Zone members to ensure that the programme succeeded. It is important to note that the programme's community sensitisation on democratic principles and good governance, among other things, enhanced the people's understanding of the role of the local authority in general and the role of the elected Councillors in particular. Discussions regarding the constraints and prospects of local authorities, as public service providers, were part of the sensitisation programme. People's understanding of these issues is very critical to their disposition with regard to their expectations of the local authority's performance in the area of service delivery. According to chief Chipalo, the Civic Education Programme constituted a foundation for inculcating a 'spirit for the demand and respect for good

¹²⁷ Interview with chief Tungati (October 12, 2004)

governance' among the local communities through their representatives, the Ward and Zone committee members. In view of this recognition the chief, speaking in the local language (Bemba), noted that for people's standards of living to be improved they need to understand how the public institutions which provide services, like the local Council, work. In this way it is possible for the people to make reasonable demands on these institutions. The chief observed that the Civic Education Programme brought out very important issues on accountability and good government. The chief, who could not hide his pride for having been involved in the programme, noted that the information gained by the participants, including officials from the Council, has somehow helped to change the way of thinking about the administration of public institutions and accounting for public resources.¹²⁸

In order to bring health services closer to his subjects senior chief Chungu, in 1997, held a series of meetings with village headmen and local communities with a view to building a health centre near Mumba Basic school, almost 40 kilometers away from the Boma (Luwingu CBD). Through voluntary labour and contributions enough bricks were made and materials including roofing sheets, door and window frames etc. were purchased to construct the center and three staff houses. This community initiative was brought to the attention of the DDCC and with the intervention of the Works, and Planning departments of the Luwingu local authority the citing and surveying of the clinic's location was made to facilitate its construction. The project was completed towards the end of 1998. The government was only required to provide medical staff, equipment and medicines. Speaking in the local language (Bemba) and with a lot of 'happiness in his voice', and referring to the health center, village headman Mumba observed that (English translation) with proper organisation, there is a lot communities can do for themselves. The headman noted that the chief was focused and appreciated the suffering of his subjects who were made to travel several kilometers to access health services at the hospital situated at the Boma (within the administrative of the District). Through his wisdom and the intervention of other stakeholders the community was able to organize itself and build the clinic. Senior chief Chungu noted that feeder roads and community schools need regular maintenance and the government resources are not

¹²⁸ Interview with chief Chipalo (October 11, 2004)

always readily available. The road which connects the chief's palace and the Boma, especially after crossing the Lufubu river is relatively a busy one and requires regular rehabilitation. The chief noted that through his intervention this road is kept in a very good condition through voluntary community labour. Periodic rehabilitation works at Chungu Basic School, and the maintenance of feeder roads within the chiefdom are self-help 'projects' that communities in the chiefdom have embraced as a matter of routine. It should be noted that these are voluntary community initiatives, spearheaded by the chief, aimed to address deficiencies of the local authority. The rehabilitation of existing road infrastructure, especially rural roads that do not require the use of materials with detailed specifications, does not necessarily need the formal approval of the local authority. It is for this reason that such initiatives are simply brought to the attention of the local authority for record purposes of what communities are doing for themselves. In fact, this reporting of community initiatives, among other things, helps to remind the local authority of its failure to execute its functions in an efficient and effective manner. The local authority, being the Secretariat of the DDCC, is also entitled to be appraised of developments taking place within the district.

In 1999, with the combined intervention of all the chiefs in the District, the Council Secretary received a total of 148 metric tons of maize from the Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM) which was distributed by various NGOs including Twatasha Women club, Christian Mission in Many Lands (CMML) church, Luwingu District Nutrition Group, Twafwane Youth club, and the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) in the district. Traditional authorities played a key role in the identification of the need families and ensuring that the distribution was done in a transparent and accountable manner.

During the period covering December to March fishing in Zambia is officially banned in order to give fish chance for breeding. The enforcement of this regulation is very challenging given that many people, in places such as Luwingu district, depend on fishing for their livelihood. Fish levy is one of the sources of local revenue of the Luwingu local authority. It is, therefore, in the interest of the local authority that government efforts aimed at allowing the fish to breed with a view of ensuring continued adequate fish stocks, are duly supported. The Local Government Act requires local

authorities to prohibit and control the carrying on of offensive trade. Fishing and trading in fresh fish is an offence once the fish ban has been effected by government in various areas. The local authority, therefore, has the duty to ensure compliance to this ban. However, the Luwingu local authority does not have the capacity to effectively superintend the implementation of the fish ban. Consequently, traditional authorities are viewed as very critical agents of information dissemination and lobbying among their subjects to adhere to the fish ban. In the three chiefdoms visited the role of traditional authority in ensuring this ban was well appreciated. A member of Isansa Ward Development Committee, in chief Tungati's area, for example, noted that, government alone, through the Department of Fisheries cannot achieve much when it comes to obeying the fish ban. Without the pressure and persistent wise counseling from traditional authorities very few people can obey the fish ban. People have respect for the chiefs and the chiefs are interested to ensure that communities do not deny themselves and their generations a source of income and good nutrition, provided by fish, because of ignoring government regulations. People are willing to listen to the chiefs as a result the incidence of flouting the fish ban regulation is greatly reduced.¹²⁹

Between 1998 and 2001, Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ) instituted various programmes aimed at improving access to services related to family planning, safe motherhood, and community-based prevention of sexually transmitted infections (STIs). To facilitate these activities PPAZ trained Community-Based Distributors (CBDs), Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs), and Youth Peer Educators. We have alluded to this project in our discussion in the previous chapter relating to NGO interventions. The responsibilities of the TBAs included providing antenatal and post-natal care, community education, and delivering babies for mothers who are either unable or not willing to travel to a nearest health centre for delivery. TBAs were provided with delivery kits to facilitate home deliveries. Since there are very few health centres in Luwingu the services of the TBAs were and still are greatly valued by the local communities. The long distance to the nearest clinic, travel costs, and the lack of reliable transport makes it very difficult and sometimes even risky for mothers to travel and

¹²⁹ Interview with Mr. Atanasho Chungu, Isansa Ward Development Committee member (October 12, 2004)

access health services at a clinic. Chiefs Chipalo, Chungu and Tungati, like their fellow chiefs in the district, and together with their village headmen were involved in sensitising communities on the need to take part in these initiatives which were designed to improve health services. In this respect traditional authorities were instrumental in ensuring the appropriate selection of individuals to be trained as Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) to, among other things, provide antenatal and post-natal care, and delivering babies for mothers who are either unable or not willing to travel to a nearest health centre for delivery. The chiefs with their village headmen ensured that only mature, passionate and credible individuals were selected for the training.

It is important to observe that the various programmes and projects noted above provided services in areas such as education, health, and nutrition (related to health). These areas of service delivery are 'traditional, areas of responsibility for local authorities. We, therefore, see the complementary nature of these interventions being augmented by the efforts of traditional authorities.

In this section we have noted that the role of traditional authorities in public service delivery is, to a large extent, limited to the mobilisation and sensitisation of their subjects to undertake self-help community projects and/or promoting community attitudes that have the effect of preserving public service delivery infrastructure. We have also noted that the capacity of traditional authorities to effectively contribute to public service delivery is hindered by factors that include ambiguous legislation vis-à-vis the functions of a Chief; the lack of sub-district structures that can provide a formal government forum in which Chiefs can effectively engage in decision making related to local development; ineffective representation by both Councillors and the chiefs' representatives; and the lack of resources including poor and/or inadequate logistical support such as roads and reliable transport. Most importantly and for purposes of public service delivery, traditional authorities are not included in the annual appropriation of central government financing. This is indicative of the indirect role that traditional authorities can play in public service delivery.

Generally, the analysis in this section has shown that although there are factors that support the involvement of traditional authorities in public service delivery there are

constraints that inhibit the actualisation of this involvement. This seeming ‘contradiction,’ is summarised in boxes 5.3 and 5.4 below.

Box 5.3: Prominent observations in support of the chiefs’ role in service delivery

Chiefs as traditional leaders in their communities have the responsibility of ensuring that their subjects receive the necessary social services related to education, health, agriculture and so on.

Because chiefs command a lot of respect among their subjects they are in a position to:

- Effectively mobilise people for development activities including voluntary contributions in kind and monetary terms,
- Ensure a conducive environment, with regard to law and order and a receptive attitude among the subjects in order to encourage investment and other developmental activities, and
- Sensitise their subjects with a view to making ‘wise’ economic, social and political choices for purposes of enhancing development.

As traditional rulers recognised by the State chiefs are better placed to lobby government for development in their fiefdoms. Such development would include social and economic infrastructure to facilitate the provision of education, health, and agricultural extension services,

Through the chiefs’ representatives on the Council, chiefs are in a position to ensure that the needs and aspirations of their subjects are brought to the attention of the local authority,

Chiefs are a legitimate entry point for external support aimed at uplifting rural livelihoods, and

Through the issuance of land chiefs constitute a very critical medium for local and foreign investment. Through such investments, employment is created for and various goods and services are made available to the subjects.

Source: Compilations from Fieldwork data

Box 5.4: Why chiefs have no role in service delivery - Prominent observations

The role of traditional authority in the administration of modern Zambia is not clearly spelt-out in the Constitution or any other legal document,

Because most chiefs are not educated their understanding of government administration is limited and consequently their ability to make meaningful contributions to national development in general and public service delivery in particular is greatly undermined,

Because of the weak linkages between traditional authority and local authorities chiefs are less likely to influence the deliberations of Councils vis-à-vis effective delivery of public services,

The lack of formalised sub-district structures of governance is a limiting factor for interaction between ‘modern’ and traditional authorities. Consequently traditional authorities are not able to comprehend the administration of government with a view to ensuring meaningful interventions, and

Most chiefs, like their subjects, live in poverty. They are pre-occupied with challenges of how to wake-up alive the following day. Under such conditions chiefs are less likely to burden themselves with complex matters of governing a modern State. Their contribution to and subsequent impact on the delivery of modern public services is, therefore, severely limited.

Source: Compilations from Fieldwork data

Conclusion

In this chapter we have noted the lack of community participation in the affairs of local authorities resulting mainly from very low levels of interaction with the Councillors. Because of the inadequate interaction, the *principal* (residents) parties, for whom local authorities are created, find it difficult to hold the Councillors (*agents*) accountable in the course of their duties as the people's representatives. Under the circumstances service delivery strategies of the local authorities may not adequately address community needs. We have also noted that although higher educational and professional qualifications among Councillors can enhance the operations of local authorities, it is important to take into account other factors which are also critical for accountable and transparent performance of the Councillors.

Many respondents in the study see Councils dominated by one political party as a hindrance to objectivity in the decision making process. Partisanship in the decision making process is seen to be a characteristic feature of such Councils. In this respect, decisions made by such Councils are generally viewed with suspicion. However, we have argued that Councillors have the responsibility to protect the interests of their constituents and consequently their decisions should be analysed more with that view in mind. Decisions that are seemingly influenced by partisanship may in fact be based on the reality of the situation at hand. There is, therefore, need to exercise caution when analysing the actions of Councillors vis-à-vis their political orientation.

Although traditional authorities have a role to play in public service delivery, this role is not explicitly supported by legislation. Traditional authorities in Choma and Luwingu have in various ways contributed to service delivery but mainly through the mobilisation of local communities for involvement in self-help projects or to ensure the required community response to sponsored projects. Traditional authorities do not benefit from central government appropriations for purposes of service delivery. Their 'insufficient' involvement in public service delivery, therefore, is more by design rather than anything else.

However, it is important to note that Luwingu chiefs, compared to their counterparts in Choma, have been more active with regard to mobilisation, and initiating and implementing projects. We argue that this difference may be explained, among other things, by the fact that the Bemba people of Northern and Luapula Provinces have a long history of traditional authority (chieftaincy) compared to the Tonga people of Southern Province where chieftainship was created by the British for administrative purposes. In his PhD thesis Roberts (1966) has traced a long history of migration of Bantu-speaking peoples from what is now Katanga who settled on the plateau east of Luapula. He has noted that groups of chiefs' descent from the Luba and Western Lunda states also moved eastwards and established larger-scale chieftainships among the earlier migrants. Of these larger polities on the plateau, the most important was that of the Bemba. Among them arose a number of contiguous territorial chieftainship, held by members of a single royal clan who competed for succession to a paramount chieftainship, the Chitimukulu. Roberts observed that a provisional estimate of 25 Chitimukulus up to 1896 is not excessive. We thus see the origins of strong institutionalised leadership among the Bemba dating back to several centuries.

On the contrary, practically nothing is known of the early history of the Tonga. Tongas themselves have no legends of migration nor any historical accounts which go back beyond the middle of the last century. Until British Administration introduced a Native Authority system, Tongas had no large-scale political organisation of their own....Among both Plateau and Valley Tonga, descent and succession are in the matrilineal line. Today, they are organized into chiefdoms under the Native Authorities instituted by the British Administration. Traditionally, Tongas had neither chiefs nor other forms of instituted authorities to bind them into a tribe or some organized political body (Colson, 1962). Even Wim (1981), who believes that Tonga colonial chieftainship appears as a restoration and partial re-interpretation of a much earlier pattern recognises that Tonga chieftainship was very different from the Luba political culture since it denied the ruler a socially and ritually exalted position. The comparatively weak organisational predisposition, among the Tonga chiefs, may, therefore, be a manifestation of the lack of a historical origin of strong institutionalised leadership.

Most importantly, we have shown that the problems the three local authorities are facing are perceived by many stakeholders as a characteristic feature of local authorities countrywide. In effect the analysis has noted that the *principal* (government) has not, in any way, whether through legislation or otherwise, engaged in strategies that have tended to favour a local authority or a group of local authorities (*agents*) on the basis of their position in the local government hierarchy.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The responsibilities of government, among other things, include the provision of public services to its citizenry. Because of the inherent political competition this responsibility is even more critical where a democratic system of government is practiced. A political party elected to form government is ordinarily expected to do everything to retain its power to govern in future elections. Clearly a government's performance with regard to its ability to deliver adequate quality services in an efficient and effective manner is a very important factor in influencing the decisions of the electorate during an election. Market failure, as noted in chapter one, is another explanatory factor for government intervention in the delivery of public services. However, government at the centre, does not have the time or the necessary human capacity to ensure the delivery of public services to each and every remote part of the country. In any case government officials at the centre cannot possibly know the priorities of all the regions and/or communities through out the country. The local communities themselves and government officials, located at the local level, are better placed to identify priority areas or needs and are in most cases able to suggest appropriate interventions. It is in view of the above observations that governments the world over deconcentrate (field administration) and devolve (usually elective Councils) responsibilities and powers to institutions located at the local level with a view to ensuring effective responsiveness to the needs of the citizenry.

Our study has demonstrated that Zambia, like many countries in the world has over the years, since attaining its political independence in 1964 from Britain, continued to institute policy reforms with a view, among other things, of ensuring the existence of a local government system (local Councils) capable of delivering the much needed services to its citizens (1965 Act; 1980 Act; 1991 Act). In this study three local authorities were picked to facilitate the examination of local government administration and service delivery during the period popularly known as the Third Republic (1991-2001). The aim was not to compare the three local authorities but rather to select local authorities that are

representative of the three levels of these authorities namely, City (Lusaka), Municipal (Choma), and District (Luwingu). Such a representation would enable us to understand whether or not there are problems and/or prospects that are peculiar to a given level or levels of local authorities. This is especially important with regard to public policy making for the administration of local authorities. The findings of the study have shown that there are many factors that have inhibited the ability of the local Councils to efficiently and effectively delivery adequate quality services. These factors are mainly related to internal problems within the local Councils themselves, such as inadequate supervision and poor financial management and external problems exemplified by inadequacies of the policies and other government directives. Generally the study has shown that a conducive environment capable of supporting a local government system that can deliver adequate quality services has not been created. In this respect, the local authorities are not able to ensure regular and effective road maintenance, and the collection and disposal of garbage; supply of adequate clean water and sanitation services; install and/or repair street lighting equipment; carry out the various inspections related to building construction and health; and ensure the availability of services to facilitate the development of land allocated by the local authorities upon the payment of service charges. In the rural districts of Choma and Luwingu, where agricultural activities constitute the main stay of local communities, the local authorities are not able to construct adequate feeder roads to open-up virgin land for farming purposes. The local authorities are also not able to provide adequate fire protection to the local communities because of inadequate or the lack of fire fighting equipment (Times of Zambia, September 25, 1997).

Local Councils in Zambia have the power to create appropriate departments and establish related administrative committees for the purpose of discharging their responsibilities (Local Government Act, 1991). The failure of the local authorities to efficiently and effectively deliver services, therefore, has nothing to do with the number of departments or other administrative structures and how authority and responsibilities have been allocated among such structures. Re-structuring the administrative units, for purposes of enhancing performance, is within the powers of the local Councils. This power and authority is acknowledged and appreciated by the local authorities.

The availability of qualified staff, and adequate serviceable plant and equipment is very critical to the provision of public services. However, the study has revealed that local Councils in Zambia face serious difficulties with regard to the attraction and retention of qualified and experienced manpower, and ensuring that they have adequate and serviceable plant and equipment. The local authorities do not have the capacity to effectively compete, with other institutions, for qualified and experience personnel on the open labour market. The problem of unqualified staff is exacerbated by the inability of local Councils to develop and train its own personnel. Councils do not have the financial capacity to institute meaningful training programmes that would help to fill-in the gap caused by their inability to compete effectively for personnel that is already trained and/or experienced on the open labour market. The study has revealed that the local Councils suffer from a 'chronic' shortage of plant and equipment that has adversely affected their ability to perform according to the expectations of their local communities. The procurement of plant and equipment is an expensive exercise that calls for huge financial outlays. Local authorities are not able to procure such equipment on their own. The plant and equipment, all the three local authorities have, is too inadequate to facilitate the execution of the service delivery effort in an efficient and effective manner. It is important to note that all these problems are largely due to serious financial constraints exacerbated by inadequate financing of the local authorities by central government. The centralising tendency of central government, as exemplified in its policies and pronouncements, has greatly undermined the ability of the local authorities to raise sufficient local revenue through local sources and consequently created high levels of dependency by local authorities on central government financing. Specifically, our study has noted (i) the lack of a meaningful policy for financing local authorities; (ii) narrow local revenue base; and (iii) the lack of entrepreneurial initiatives on the part of the Council administrators. Section 45 of the Local Government Act provides for the disbursement of specific government grants to enable local authorities provide services related to water and sanitation, health services, and fire services. This provision underscores the realisation, by central government, that local authorities on their own may not be able to ensure the provision of such services. These are the services that require sufficient and serviceable numbers of the expensive equipment which local

authorities are not able to acquire and maintain on their own. Local authorities, therefore, look towards central government to provide finances to purchase and maintain such equipment with a view to facilitating the delivery of these services. However, the Act's failure to explicitly state the value and regularity of such specific grants, and other general grants, has made this source of income inadequate, unpredictable and unreliable. Financial planning by the local authorities, under these circumstances, has been a very difficult and futile exercise. Because of the inexplicitness of the policy, local authorities do not really have a *legitimate* claim for central funding. Instead, the authorities depend more on the good *will* of the central government. Because this good *will* is not regularly and effectively exercised, the capacity of local authorities to deliver public services is severely constrained. In other words, central government, as the *principal* player in public service delivery, is failing to effectively facilitate the operations of its *agents*, the local authorities.

Although local government regulations provide for Councils to seek financial assistance for the purpose of manpower development and training from central government (Statutory Instrument No. 115 of 1996), Councils have found it very difficult to access such assistance. Because of the inability to finance training programmes, the Choma and Luwingu Councils do not have a full-fledged training policy. These Councils do not see the development of such a policy as a worthwhile exercise. The study has also revealed that the local Councils are sometimes not able to sponsor their own staff for further training because those that would otherwise been ear-marked for such training do not have the requisite qualifications required by the training institutions. Compared to the Lusaka Council, the Choma and Luwingu local authorities are the most adversely affected by this problem. The local authorities' lack of capacity to attract already qualified staff, coupled with their inability to train and develop their own staff, has made it very difficult for these authorities to adhere to the guidelines provided by the Local Government Service Regulations (Statutory Instrument No. 115 of 1996) with regard to the recommended qualifications for certain positions in the employment of these institutions. Consequently, some positions in local authorities have continued to be occupied by less qualified personnel against the requirements of the Service Regulations.

The statutory imposition of qualifications for various management positions has not allowed innovation by individual local authorities with regard to prescribing the necessary qualifications for such positions. If local authorities were given the power to determine the qualifications they would do so taking into account the prevailing competition on the open labour market vis-à-vis their ability to ensure reasonable personnel rewards. Most importantly, the recruited staff would be motivated to perform knowing that they hold the desired qualifications for the positions for which they have been engaged. Under such circumstances local authorities are better placed to build an organisation culture tailored for effective performance, and one that is anchored on *equity* in as far as personnel remuneration is concerned. As the situation stands, it can be argued that the few that meet the qualifications stipulated by the Service Regulations, and are employed by the local authorities, are not motivated enough to perform to the expectations of local communities given the low salaries and poor conditions of services. Such employees, compared to their counterparts in other organisations, are either moderately or even grossly under-rewarded (Fillippo, 1981). In this regard, therefore, central government has provided inclusive guidelines which local authorities are not able to follow and/or effectively implement given their financial constraints, a situation that has negative consequences for personnel motivation and ultimately on service delivery.

Although central government recognises the inability of local authorities to raise adequate finances to ensure effective and efficient performance, legislative weaknesses and its (government's) inappropriate directives have adversely impacted on the capacity of the local authorities to deliver public services. Local authorities are constantly reminded of their incompetence and yet government policies and actions make it difficult for these authorities to effectively manage their affairs without looking back to central government for assistance. The system of local government has created an environment where local authorities are continuously dependent on the centre for financial and other forms of support. We have noted that the transfer of some traditional sources of local revenue from Councils to central government has reduced the revenue base of these institutions. Government policies such as the sale of Council houses to sitting tenants, and the retirement of officers that have served in the local authorities for 22 years and above have worsened the financial woes of the Councils (Circular No. 2 of 1996; LASF

Amendment Act No. 27 of 1992). The sale of houses resulted in the loss of 'sure' local revenue for the Councils while the forced retirements of personnel negatively affected their operations in two ways. Local Councils not only lost some of their qualified and experienced staff but were also saddled with the burden of settling the retirement packages for the affected workers. Without adequate finances the local authorities were not able to pay off the retired workers on time. Consequently Councils were legally obliged to keep the unpaid retired workers on the payroll. Instead of channeling the finances towards service delivery and other recurrent expenditures the Councils had an added burden of budgeting for the retirement benefits. The policy of exempting some properties from paying rates to the local authorities on the understanding that government would instead disburse grants in lieu of such rates has further reduced the revenue base of the Councils. In practice the grants in lieu of rates are not paid regularly and the disbursements, whenever they are made, do not reflect the value of the exempted property in the Council area. In effect local authorities have lost this source of local revenue.

We have also noted that the Councils have, over the years, not been able to operate successful business ventures that are capable of making a significant contribution to their revenue. The lack of entrepreneurial skills among most officials has made it very difficult for the local authorities to establish and/or operate lucrative business investments. Over the years some developments in the form of infrastructure have taken place in the Council areas. Because of the inability to up-date their Valuation Rolls, however, the local authorities have always lagged behind these developments and consequently have not effectively benefited from the property rates that are due on these properties. The high levels of formal unemployment coupled with the emerging entrepreneurial skills among the population have resulted in the mushrooming of self-employment initiatives some of which are highly lucrative. However, the lack of capacity and initiative to capture the activities of the informal sector has robbed the local authorities of local income. In the same vein high unemployment levels mean that very few adults that are in the formal employment pay Personal levy to the local Councils. In short the Personal levy is a very inadequate source of local revenue. Although this observation is especially the case for rural-based local authorities like Luwingu it is

important to note that the contribution of this levy to the budget of even the Lusaka City Council (less than 3 percent) is not very significant given the low statutory threshold associated with the payment of the Personal levy. Local authorities do not have the power to revise Personal levy in response to changed economic circumstances and/or improved personal emoluments especially for those in formal employment. This is a responsibility of central government. Consequently, local authorities cannot enhance their revenue collection through this mechanism. In this respect, central government is not responding effectively to situations that have the potential to improve the revenue base of the local authorities with a view to enhancing their (local authorities') capacity to deliver services.

Because of the local authorities' poor performance some residents are also less willing to make timely payments of what they owe the authorities, further weakening the financial capacity of these institutions. From what has been stated above, the poor performance of the local authorities has more to do with the environment in which they operate, an environment in which the *principal* player (government) has not taken steps to enhance service delivery by the local authorities and/or has taken steps that have actually undermined the local authorities' performance.

The study has also noted that the financial problems of the local authorities are compounded by poor financial management. The collection of local revenue is characterised by dishonesty and the lack of integrity among some revenue collectors. This dishonesty and the lack of integrity can be associated with the local authorities' inability to adequately reward their employees, a situation that has its roots in the financial constraints that these authorities face as exemplified, among other things, by the lack of adequate support from central government. The lack of and/or fake receipting is a characteristic feature of the revenue collection process of the local authorities especially in the markets. Financial mismanagement is, among other things, also exemplified by inadequate adherence to financial regulations. Irregular production of accounting and other financial reports, delayed reconciliation of accounting documents, and unprofessional conduct associated with delayed retirement of imprests and retrospective authorisation of expenditure characterise the management of finances of the local authorities. Given the weak revenue base and inadequate financial support from central government, financial mismanagement has further reduced the capacity of the local

authorities to perform effectively. Internal and external auditing constitutes a fundamental aspect of sound financial management in local Councils. Through the office of respective Provincial Local Government Officers (PLGOs) central government is supposed to provide auditors to regularly audit Council accounts. However, the offices of PLGOs, countrywide, have failed to effectively perform their responsibilities due to several problems that include insufficient funding, the lack of transport and the lack of properly qualified staff especially in the audit section. Consequently accounts of local Councils are not audited for several years, a situation that has great potential to promote mediocrity and especially dishonest in financial matters in the Councils. Although government has centralised the external auditing of local authorities, it (government) has not been able to ensure the regular and effective implementation of this oversight. Consequently, government has, through its inability to ensure the proper functioning of the offices of the PLGOs, contributed to the financial mismanagement of the local authorities which it has created to deliver public services on its behalf. Weak internal financial control, especially in the Choma and Luwingu Councils, is exacerbating the problem of financial mismanagement. This is mainly due to the lack of adequately qualified personnel and effective supervision in the departments of finance. Again, this inadequacy can be explained mainly by the local authorities' inability to employ and adequately reward qualified and experienced personnel.

Local authority expenditure patterns have also tended to favour personnel emoluments as opposed to the principal function for which they are created, service delivery (Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure (2001): Choma, Lusaka; Luwingu). This is one area of local authority operations where legislative guidance would have a positive impact on the orientation of local authorities with regard to ensuring that a reasonable percentage of local revenue is spent on service delivery. In other words, central government has not taken action where such action is warranted but instead exhibited the propensity to take action which is unnecessary and particularly detrimental to the effective operations of the local authorities. Generally, however, it is clear from our analysis that the centralisation of critical local authority activities, including central approval of budgets, by-laws, external audits, and the disbursement of financial

assistance through the parent Ministry, has an adverse impact on the operations of local authorities.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other community based organisations (CBOs), the world over, provide different types of services to communities. This phenomenon is applicable to the activities of NGOs and CBOs located in Choma, Lusaka, and Luwingu districts. In spite of misgivings, by some people, about the lack of transparency and accountability in the operations of NGOs and CBOs, our study has revealed a high level of satisfaction and appreciation of the service delivery interventions by these institutions in the three districts. Even where some NGOs have provided services of an intangible nature, bordering on community sensitisation, such services have been appreciated as a major contribution to good governance which in turn has the potential to enhance the delivery of public services in a transparent and accountable manner. However, local authorities have not co-opted the activities of NGOs in their service delivery process. The efforts of these institutions have remained largely outside the operations of the local authorities in as far as the delivery of public services is concerned. Weak formal interactions between local authorities and NGOs have undermined opportunities for effective coordination which has the potential to enhance the delivery of some services on a joint basis. We have noted that a situation has been created where local authorities always look up to central government for guidance and support in the course of performing their duties. Dependency of local authorities on central government has been created and nurtured by legislation and government directives that, for the most part, has had an adverse impact on effective performance. It is clear that as long as there is no legislation that supports initiatives aimed at the delivery of services by local authorities and NGOs, as a joint effort, local authorities are not likely to take actions that have the effect of co-opting NGOs in public service delivery efforts. This orientation, in effect, undermines the initiatives of individual local authorities to experiment with *new* ways that may have the potential to enhance service delivery. The District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) are the only available formal forum for interaction. However, because of resource constraints and a weak legislative base the DDCCs are very ineffective and have consequently not provided the impetus for regular and meaningful interactions between NGOs and local authorities (Circular No.1 of 1995).

The impact of the *centralising tendency* also has an influence with regard to the extent to which the DDCCs can effectively engage NGOs and the local authorities with a view, among other things, to pursuing *novel* ideas regarding public service delivery. The key and majority members of the DDCCs comprise Heads of Departments of the government line Ministries at the district level. From late 1999 elected Mayors and Council chairmen surrendered the Chairmanship of the DDCC to political appointees, the District Administrators (DAS), who are the senior-most civil servants at the district level. Heads of government line Ministries and DAs are accountable to central government and not to local politicians, the people's elected representatives. Under the circumstances, these officials also look to central government for guidance. So the ineffectiveness of the DDCCs, with regard to their "failure" to enhance effective relations between NGOs and local authorities, should also be looked at from this point of view in addition to resource constraints. From the point of view of the NGOs, however, local authorities, being the *agents* of central government mandated to provide public services, are expected to lead the effort aimed at exploring possibilities for a joint service delivery for some services whenever appropriate.

Contracting out the provision of public services is an option a local authority can use in its efforts to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services. The study has noted the availability of capacity among some business houses in Choma and Lusaka. However, we have noted that over the period under review (1991-2001) contracting out has not been utilised by the local authorities as it was a relatively new concept. The involvement of the business community in public service delivery, therefore, has largely been on voluntary basis and mainly related to garbage collection and disposal, the mending of some roads, and other forms of assistance such as offering fuel on credit or free of charge (Choma) to facilitate the execution of local authority activities. The business community in Luwingu does not have the capacity to facilitate contracting out arrangements with the local authority. However, like in Choma and Lusaka, business houses in Luwingu, with their 'limited capacity' also render assistance to the local authority on voluntary basis. Section 63 of the Local Government Act provides for a local authority to enter into contracts for the necessary discharge of its functions. However, we argue that in addition to contracting out being a new concept

during the period under study, government has not done enough to build human resource capacity in the local authorities capable of identifying opportunities for effective engagement with private institutions to enhance service delivery.

The delivery of public services by democratically elected local authorities can benefit from the popular participation of the general public in the affairs of the authorities. One obvious channel of participation is through the people's representatives, the elected Ward Councillors. These representatives constitute a mechanism for providing feedback between the local authority and the communities they serve. Through this feedback, local policies and decisions are expected to reflect the aspirations and desires of the community. However, our study has revealed that the Councillors in fact constitute a weak link between the communities and the local authority. The culture of dependency on central government guidelines and support seems to undermine individual initiative, on the part of Councillors, to ensure effective interaction with their constituents. In other words, Councillors also look to central government guidelines for their actions even in situations where it is not necessary to do so. It may be argued that in a representative democracy government intervention with regard to how Councillors interact with their constituents is irregular. However, the entrenched culture of dependency alluded to above and the lack of effective orientation for Councillors seems to support such intervention. This seeming contradiction, with regard to government's role in representative Councils, has been created by the government's own *centralising tendency* over the years to which local authorities seem to have been conditioned. Because of the resultant little interaction between the two parties, the general public has not been involved in the local decision making process and consequently has very little knowledge regarding the operations of their local authorities. Legislative provisions designed to enhance public participation in local authority operations, such as the authority to attend full Council meetings and/or inspection of the accounts of the local authority, are not known by most members of the general public in the Council areas of our study. In effect, this means that there is no public oversight on the activities of the local authorities. Consequently, the potential for enhancing local democracy, transparency and accountability, with a view to promoting good governance is greatly undermined. If the general public was well informed and was able, among other things, to

attend Council meetings and request for the inspection of local authority accounts, local officials would be more accountable knowing that the general public has an interest in how the authorities in general and local resources in particular are managed. Without this public participation, prudent use of resources and the prioritising of service delivery efforts by local authorities may be difficult to achieve. Generally, however, the *isolation*, characteristic of Council administration in the three local authorities in our study, has tended to alienate local communities and greatly undermined their support for and confidence in local authorities as public service delivery institutions. Most importantly, the paucity of interaction between Councillors and the electorate means that the latter do not have the basis for effectively checking the activities of the former with a view to enhancing effective representation.

We have noted that the 1992 and 1998 local government elections, in Choma, Lusaka, and Luwingu produced local Councils that were dominated by the ruling MMD, and that the 2001 elections produced Councils that were dominated by one opposition political party (Choma), two opposition political parties (Lusaka), and the ruling MMD (Luwingu). In other words the Luwingu Council has maintained the MMD dominance during the period of our study, with 60 percent of the Councillors (1998 elections) and 75 percent, following the 2001 elections. Although many participants in the study perceive the *de facto* one-party assemblies to have a negative impact on the operations of the local authorities, the study has not found explicit evidence to the effect that the performance of the local authorities has been affected by partisan orientation of the Councillors resulting from one-party dominated Councils. No concrete examples of administrative problems were advanced by Council managements and/or residents in the three districts that can be attributed to decisions by Councillors that were made on account of one-party domination. In effect, it may be argued that because of the local authorities' poor performance residents and other concerned stakeholders, in their search for explanatory factors, may wrongly identify some factor as being one of the causes of poor performance. This is especially the case with residents given their lack of information about the activities of the local authorities. The study findings tend to suggest that it does not really matter whether the Council is dominated by the opposition or the ruling party. Although Councillors have and represent the interests of their constituents, they belong to

political parties and are answerable to their respective political party leadership. In this respect, the study has shown that the disposition of Councillors, on some issues, may reflect the position of their political party on such issues and not necessarily the expectations of the people they represent. From this point of view, Councillors are very constrained because they have to respond to guidelines and expectations of their political party leadership as well as central government.

It may be argued that objectivity in the policies and decisions of local authorities is dependent on the 'quality' of the Councillors vis-à-vis their academic and/or professional qualifications. However, the study has revealed that most of the local Councillors in the districts, especially in Choma and Luwingu, are of low calibre. Consequently, the execution of their policy making and supervisory responsibilities has posed a challenge on the general administration of the local authorities. In addition, the position of Councillor, unlike that of the Member of Parliament (MP), is part time and is seemingly considered by many people as of relatively less importance. The latter consideration seems to be a contributing factor for the observed lack of interest among individuals with higher levels of educational and/or professional qualifications for the position of Councillor. This situation may be a reflection of central government policy that does not specify any minimum competency for individuals wishing to aspire for Councillorship. In effect, it means that central government, as the *principal* player in public service delivery, is partly to blame for any conduct of Councillors that can reasonably be attributed to incompetence. Low calibre Councillors, among other deficiencies, may have difficulties to exert their supervisory function on appointed officials. Under these circumstances, financial discipline in particular and the need to maintain integrity among the appointed officials in general may be difficult to achieve. Because of the low education levels most Councillors do not seem to understand and appreciate their roles as representatives of the people that elected them. The low levels of interaction between the Councillors and the communities may also be a reflection of this lack of appreciation of the Councillors' role in democratically elected local authorities.

Although traditional authorities (chiefs), as custodians of culture, and law and order among local communities, have a vested interest in the welfare of the subjects, our study has revealed that these authorities only play a *mobilisation* role in the delivery of

some public services. This role is largely limited to the *mobilisation* of the communities to respond to self-help initiatives that require the use of voluntary contributions in cash or kind, including labour, to facilitate the realisation of a particular service or infrastructure development. The *mobilisation* strategy is also used to ensure the desired community response to projects that are sponsored by various donors. This role is not formally (legislative) recognised or co-opted in the administration of local authorities in as far as the delivery of public services is concerned although Council officials and residents do appreciate the importance and *inevitability* of this role.

On the overall, therefore, the study has found that although there are other factors that have contributed to the poor performance of the local authorities, the *centralising tendency* constitutes the major constraining factor on the ability of these authorities to deliver adequate quality services in a transparent and accountable manner. Even problems within local authorities, which constrain effective operations, are generally rooted in the *centralising tendency*, whether from the point of view of actions by the central government or from the dictates of partisan politics. Because of this *centralising tendency* the elective local authorities have not exhibited autonomy, in their decision-making processes, an important tenet of the *localist* theory which is oriented towards maximum decentralisation. The localist theory's support for maximum decentralisation entails effective transfer of power and decision-making authority with appropriate resources to local authorities with a view of enabling them to plan and implement service delivery programmes in an efficient and effective manner. Instead, central government has been inclined towards the centralisation of power and authority, in direct conflict with the tenets of the *localist* theory. This *centralising tendency*, as variously noted, has created institutions and officials that are dependent on the centre in their day-to-day operations, a situation which is not consistent with the *localist* theory. At the central government (principal) level, inappropriate legislation and other government directives have impacted on the local authorities (agent) in ways that have undermined administration and adversely affected efficiency and effectiveness in public service delivery. Specifically, deficiencies of the principal, among other things, include the inexplicit and consequently inappropriate legislation on local financing by central government; some weaknesses in legislation that is intended to promote transparency and accountability in local authority

operations; directives that have undermined the collection of adequate revenue from local sources; and the lack of a legislative provision aimed at attracting individuals that are sufficiently educated to contest for Councillorship. It is clear from the findings of the study that in practice the central-local relations that have existed over the period under study reflect more of a deconcentrated state rather than a devolved one. Devolution, although widely alluded to in political speeches and other government pronouncements has not really taken place. The absence of a full-fledged decentralisation policy has exacerbated this state of affairs. It is because of this, among other things, that government has over the years taken actions and embraced legislations that have a *centralising tendency* to the detriment of ensuring good administration and effective service delivery by local authorities.

In view of the findings of the study, we note that public service delivery, by local authorities, can be enhanced by a positive change in the central-local relations which, among other things, should promote autonomous decision-making at the local level, and ensure that adequate and regular financing of local authorities by government is mandatory. Esman (1991: 108-109) has observed that:

“In order to activate local initiative and responsibility, the political and administrative elites of the state will have to revise their basic orientation toward local government.....Greater latitude for local taxation and revenue enhancement need not threaten the fiscal powers of the state..... The adequacy of municipal services is affected by the revenue sources that local authorities are allowed to tap and by the capabilities and incentives of local managers. Both of these can be favourably influenced by the central government conceding reasonable sources of taxation and user fees and providing assistance in the training of municipal staff”.

Taking into account Esman’s observation, and the fact that Zambia’s local authorities are elective, the performance of these institutions (local authorities) can be greatly enhanced if central-local relations truly exhibit the tenets of democratic decentralisation (devolution) which, among other things, ensure the transfer of adequate resources as well as decision-making authority from the centre to the local level. In order to achieve this, it is important to enact a Decentralisation Policy which, among other things, clearly spells out the nature of the central-local relations, and a financing strategy aimed at ensuring a strong revenue base of the local authorities.

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APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR END USERS (RESIDENTS) OF SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE LOCAL AUTHORITY

PERSONAL DATA

Instruction: Please tick and/or fill in the appropriate response

Q01. Sex

- 1) Male
- 2) Female

Q02. Age: ----- years

Q03. What do you do to earn a living?

- I am in formal employment
- Self-employment
- Other -----→ *explain below*

Q04. For how long have you lived in this council area?

1. Less than 1 year
2. 1 to 4 years
3. 5 to 10 years
4. More than 10 years

Q05. Is the house/flat you are living in your personal property?

1. Yes
2. No -----→ *indicate below the ownership of the house/flat*

Q06. If your answer to question 5 above was a 'Yes', how fair are the council rates for the property?

1. Fair
2. Very fair
3. Not fair --→ *Kindly make your comments below*

Q07. Please list the type of services that are provided by the local authority in your area in the order of their importance to your well being.

Q08. Would you say that the local authority provides these services to your satisfaction?

1. Yes → *Proceed to Q11*
2. No

Q09. If your answer to question 8 above was a 'No', what do you think are the reasons?

3. Local authority lacks qualified man power
4. Local authority lacks financial resources
5. Local authority lacks the necessary equipment
6. The combination of all the above factors
7. Other ----→ *Kindly indicate below*

Q10. Do you think that the factors mentioned above only affect your council?

1. Yes --→ *Kindly indicate the reasons below*
2. No

Q11. Do you think it would be a good idea for the local authority to contract out the provision of some of the services?

1. Yes -----→ *give examples below of the services you would prefer to be contracted out*
2. No --→ *Give your reasons below*

Q12. Does your district have enough potential resources that can be tapped to improve the revenue base of the local authority?

1. Yes ---→ *Indicate below some examples of such resources*
2. No

Q13. Are these resources adequately exploited and managed to the advantage of the local authority and community?

1. Yes
2. No -----→ *indicate below what you perceive to be the constraints*

Q14. Do you know your local councillor?

1. Yes
2. No -----→ *Skip Q15*

Q15. If your answer to question 14 above was a 'Yes', how often does the councillor meet with his/her electorate in the Ward?

1. Often
2. Very often
3. No at all

Q16. Have you ever attended a full council meeting?

1. Yes
2. No --→ *Kindly explain below the reasons for not attending*

Q17. Do you think that local residents are properly informed about the decisions and activities of the council?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Not sure

Q18. What are the major issues/concerns of the people in your area?

Q19. Is your local authority making efforts to resolve these issues/concerns?

1. Yes
2. No ----→ *indicate below what you perceive to be the reason for this*

Q20. Do NGOs have a role to play in service delivery?

1. Yes -----→ *give reasons for this below*
2. No

Q21. Does the business community have capacity to assist the Council in service delivery?

1. Yes -----→ *elaborate a little bit below*
2. No

Q22. Do chiefs have a role to play in service delivery?

1. Yes ----→ elaborate a little bit below
2. No

Q23. What suggestions would you make to improve the performance of your local authority?

APPENDIX 2 (A)

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COUNCIL MANAGEMENT

PERSONAL DATA

Instruction: Please tick and/or fill in the appropriate response

Q01. Sex

1. Male
2. Female

Q02. Age ----- years

Q03. Highest level of education

1. Grade 9 or Form 2
2. Grade 12 or Form 5
3. College diploma
4. University degree
5. Other ---→ *indicate* -----

Q04. Position in the local authority -----

Q05. Are you in a substantive or acting capacity in the above position?

1. Substantive
2. Acting --→ *indicate the acting period to date* ----- years

Q06. To what extent would you say your council has been able to perform its mandated functions especially with regard to service delivery?

1. Very well
2. Well
3. Very poorly --→ *indicate the constraints below*
4. Poorly --→ *indicate the constraints below*

Q07. Generally what are the major problems facing your council? ---→ *list below*

Q08. Do you think that most of these problems only affect your council?

1. Yes ---→ *indicate your reason/s below*
2. No --→ *indicate your reason/s below*

Q09. What suggestions would you make to help resolve the above problems? --→ *list below*

Q10. Does your local authority have enough qualified and experienced staff to facilitate effective and efficient service delivery?

1. Yes
2. No ----→ *indicate below the most affected departments*

Q11. Does your local authority contract out the provision of various services and/or works?

1. Yes ----→ *indicate below the nature of services and/or works contracted out*
2. No ---→ *indicate below the reason/s for not contracting out*

Q12. Does your council have adequate local resources for raising revenue?

1. Yes
2. No

Q13. Does your council receive regular funding from central government?

1. Yes
2. No --→ *skip Q14*

Q14. Is this funding adequate enough to boost the local revenue to enable the council meet its financial obligations?

1. Yes
2. No

Q15. In general have council accounts been regularly audited in the past three years?

1. Internal audit

1. Yes
2. No ---→ *indicate below why accounts have not been regularly audited*

2. Independent (external) audit

- Yes
- No ---→ *indicate below why accounts have not been regularly audited*

Q16. Briefly what role would you like central government to play in order to enhance efficient and effective service delivery at the local level? --→ *indicate below*

Q17. Do you believe that local residents value the existence of local authorities?

1. Yes
2. No --→ *explain below why this is so*
3. Not sure

Q18. Are there adequate channels/mechanisms through which the local authority can be held accountable by the local community?

1. Yes
2. No

Q19. Would you honestly state that your council is accountable and transparent, in its activities, to the local community?

1. Yes
2. No ---→ *explain the reason/s for this below*

Q20. How useful is the District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC) in promoting coordinated development activities in the district?

1. Very useful
2. Useful
3. Not useful ----→ *indicate the reason/s below*
4. Not sure

Q21. What would you say about the capacity of the councillors in terms of making progressive policies?

1. Generally the councillors have the capacity to make progressive policies
2. Generally the councillors are not educated/experienced enough for the task
3. Other --→ *explain below*

Q22. How would you describe the working relations between the councillors and management officials?

- | | |
|--------------|-------------|
| 1. Excellent | 4. Fair |
| 2. Very good | 5. Bad |
| 3. Good | 6. Very bad |

Q23. If your answer to Q24 was *Fair, Bad or Very bad* explain below the main reason/s for such poor relations

Q24. Is the legislation (policy framework) for the administration of local authorities supportive of effective and efficient service delivery?

1. Yes
2. No --→ *explain the possible reason/s for this below*

Q25. In your opinion do you think that central government is committed to ensuring that local authorities are given power to make important decisions that affect district development?

1. Yes
2. No ----→ *explain below the reason/s for your opinion*

Q26. Would you say that government exercises excessive control on the operations of local authorities?

1. Yes ---→ *indicate below the main areas where this control is exercised and your views on whether or not such control is useful in the running of local authorities*
2. No

Q27. Does the business community have the capacity to assist the Council in service delivery

1. Yes ---→ *elaborate a little bit below*
2. No ---→ *elaborate a little bit below*

Q28. Do NGOs have a role to play in service delivery?

3. Yes -----→ *elaborate a little bit below*
4. No -----→ *elaborate a little bit below*

Q29. Do chiefs have a role to play in service delivery?

1. Yes ---→ *elaborate a little bit below*
2. No ---→ *elaborate a little bit below*

Q30. Do you think that it is only your Council that is facing some problems?

1. Yes ---→ *elaborate a little bit below*
2. No ---→ *elaborate a little bit below*

APPENDIX 2 (B)

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COUNCILLORS

PERSONAL DATA

Instruction: Please tick and/or fill in the appropriate response

Q01. Sex

5. Male
6. Female

Q02. Age: ----- years

Q03. Are you in formal employment?

3. Yes
4. No -----→ *explain below what you do to earn a living*

Q04. Highest level of education

2. Below Grade 7
3. Grade 7
4. Grade 9 or Form 2
5. Grade 12 or Form 5
6. University degree
7. Other -----→ *indicate* -----

Q05. To which political party do you belong?

3. MMD
4. UNIP
5. UPND
6. FDD
7. Other ---→ *indicate* -----

- *Now the survey will proceed to ask you questions with a view to gain an insight regarding the context within which your local authority is operating*

Q06. Do you think you are suitable qualified to efficiently and effectively discharge your duties as a councillors?

1. Yes
2. No -----→ *explain the reason/s below*

Q07. Are there good working relations between the councillors and management officials?

3. Yes
4. No -----→ *explain the reasons for poor working relations below*

Q08. What do you consider to be the major problems facing your council?

Q09. Do you think that these problems only affect your council?

3. Yes
4. No -----→ *kindly explain below*

Q10. Would you say there are adequate channels/mechanisms to enable the local community to participate in the affairs of the council?

4. Yes -----→ *give example below*
5. No

Q11. Is the legislation (policy framework) for the administration of local authorities supportive of efficient and effective service delivery?

3. Yes
4. No ----→ *give reason/s below*

Q12. In your opinion do you think that central government is committed to ensuring that local authorities are given power to make important decisions that affect district development?

3. Yes
4. No ----→ *explain below the reason/s for your opinion*

Q13. Would you say that government exercises excessive control on the operations of local authorities?

1. Yes ---→ *indicate below the main areas where this control is exercised and your views on whether or not such control is useful in the running of local authorities*
2. No

Q14. Does your council have adequate local resources for raising revenue?

2. Yes
3. No

Q15. Are the available local sources of revenue adequately exploited and managed to the advantage of the local authority and community?

4. Yes
5. No -----→ *indicate what you perceive to be the constraints below*

Q16. Does your local authority contract out the provision of various services and/or works?

1. Yes ----→ *indicate below the nature of services and/or works contracted out*
2. No ---→ *indicate below the reason/s for not contracting out*

Q17. Does your council receive regular funding from central government?

3. Yes
4. No ---→ *skip Q18*

Q18. Is this funding adequate enough to boost the local revenue to enable the council meet its financial obligations?

6. Yes
7. No

Q19. Do you have regular access to important council documents, for example council accounts, as provided for in the local government Act of 1991?

1. Yes
2. No -----→ *give reason/s below*

Q20. Do you have regular contact with the people in your Ward?

1. Yes
2. No -----→ *give reason/s below*

Q21. What are the major issues/concerns of the people in your Ward?

Q22. Is your local authority making efforts to resolve these issues/concerns?

3. Yes
4. No ----→ *give the reason/s below*

Q23. Is it important for the general public to attend full council meetings and/or comment on proposed council by-laws as provided for by the local government Act of 1991?

1. Yes ---→ *indicate why it is important below*
2. No --→ *indicate why it is not important below*

Q24. Do you think that a council whose membership is dominated by one political party cannot promote local democracy?

1. Yes ----→ *give reason/s below*
2. No
3. Not sure

Q25. Are there any specific problems you face, as a councillor, that you can attribute to the attitude of the council management officials?

1. Yes ----→ *explain some of the most important ones below*
2. No

Q27. How would you describe the relations between councillors and appointed officials?

- | | |
|--------------|-------------|
| 1. Excellent | 4. Fair |
| 2. Very good | 5. Bad |
| 3. Good | 6. Very bad |

Q28. If your answer to Q27 was *Fair, Bad or Very bad* explain below what could be the main reason/s for such poor relations.

Q29. To what extent would you say your council has been able to perform its mandated functions especially with respect to service delivery?

1. Very well
2. Well
3. Very poorly -----→ *give reason/s below*
4. Poorly -----→ *give reason/s below*

APPENDIX 3

GUIDING RESEARCH INSTRUMENT FOR KEY INFORMANTS

Ministry of Local Government and Housing officials

3. The structure and organization of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing
4. Policy matters relating to the administration of local Council
5. Constraints facing the Ministry
6. Perceptions regarding the suitability of the policy framework for the Ministry in general and the local authorities in particular

Officials from selected Line ministries

1. Working relations with the local authority and perceptions regarding the council management's and councillors' capacity to effectively and efficiently deliver services to the community
2. Extent and nature of their participation in the activities of the local authority
3. Perceptions regarding the legislation governing the administration of local authorities in general
4. Views about accountability and transparency in the operations of local authorities in general and their local authority in particular
5. Assessment of potential local resources that could be exploited to enhance the operations of the local authority
6. Impact of the District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) on district development activities
7. General perceptions about constraining factors on the smooth operations of the local authority and suggestions regarding what could possibly be done to address the situation

Representatives of selected NGOs

1. The organization's main objective; its relationship with major state institutions and the nature of its contribution to governance issues.
2. Working relations with the local authority and perceptions regarding the council management's and councillors' capacity to effectively and efficiently deliver services to the community
3. Extent and nature of the organization's participation in the activities of the local authority
4. Perceptions regarding the legislation governing the administration of local authorities in general

5. Views about accountability and transparency in the operations of local authorities in general and their local authority in particular
6. Assessment of potential local resources that could be exploited to enhance the operations of the local authority
7. Is the organization represented on the District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC)?
8. Perceptions regarding contracting out as an option mode of service delivery
9. General perceptions about constraining factors on the smooth operations of the local authority and suggestions regarding what could possibly be done to address the situation

Owners of selected local business houses

1. Perceptions about how conducive the social, economic and political environment is with regard to supporting profitable business activities. What are the problems and potential opportunities?
2. Views on the quantity and quality of services they receive from the local authority vis-à-vis the various rates and charges they pay to the authority
3. Perceptions regarding the council management's and councillors' capacity to effectively and efficiently deliver services to the community
4. General perceptions about what they perceive to be the constraining factors on the smooth operations of the local authority and suggestions regarding what could possibly be done to address the situation
5. The scope and nature of their involvement, if any, in the activities of the local authority

Traditional rulers

1. Their perception about the performance of the local authority vis-à-vis service delivery, accountability and transparency
2. What they perceive to be their role in the affairs of the local authority and to what extent are they able to play this role
3. Do they have a role to play in service delivery?
4. The extent of their awareness about local government legislation and their perception about the efficacy of legislation vis-à-vis the administration of an efficient and effective local government system
5. The chiefs' representatives on the council – views on this form of representation and the quality of information flow from their representatives
6. The councillors within their chiefdoms – how often are they in touch with them and generally do they believe that the issues discussed in the chamber reflect the concerns of their subjects?
7. Generally what are the major problems being faced by their subjects and do they think the council has a role to play in terms of addressing such problems?


APPENDIX 4 (A)

CHOMA LOCAL COUNCILLORS AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS

S/N o.	NAME	WARD/POSITION
1	G. Nyanga (Mayor)	Mbabala Ward
2	J. Munkombwe (Deputy Mayor)	Kalundana Ward
3	M. B. K. Munsanje	Pemba Ward
4	S. Tembo	Simacece Ward
5	S. Sikufweba	Sikalundu Ward
6	Z. Mweendo	Mubula Ward
7	M. Muchindu	Nachibanga Ward
8	F. Mpasela	Simambi Ward
9	G. Makaya	Chilantambo Ward
10	E. Hamayuwa	Mapanza Ward
11	F. Sichintu	Kasiya Ward
12	S. Mwaanga	Macha Ward
13	B. J. Maaka	Namuswa Ward
14	R. M. Handyabantu	Maambo Ward
15	M. M. Chiboya	Siasikabole Ward
16	E. Choonga	Singani Ward
17	D. C. Mukobela	Nakeempa Ward
18	F. Hachilili	Stateland Ward
19	R. Mboyonga	Kauba Ward
20	C. Mwaanga	Kabimba Ward
21	R. Mwiinzani	Simamvwa Ward
22	G. M. Namukola	Batoka Ward
23	M. Chiwala	Hambunkulu Ward
24	J. Hamisako	Mung'unza Ward
25	G. M. Hamateyo	Hamaundu Ward
26	C. Sindamu	Town Clerk
27	M. H. Namoya	Director of Administration
28	E. Kandingwa	Director of Finance
29	E. Kapaku	Director of Engineering Services
30	L. G. Zulu	Director of Planning

APPENDIC 4 (B)

CHOMA ELECTORAL WARDS



APPENDIX 5 (A)

LUSAKA LOCAL COUNCILLORS AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS

S/No.	NAME	WARD/POSITION
1	J. M. Mwiinga	Chainda Ward
2	B. Mumba	Mutendere Ward
3	A. A. Mwiimbi	Kabulonga Ward
4	R. C. Phiri	Kalingalinga Ward
5	W. Hamudulu	Chakunkula Ward
6	M. E. Mposha	Munali Ward
7	C. B. F. Chafilwa	Roma Ward
8	K. E. Simusamba	Mulungushi Ward
9	J. C. Kng'ongwe	Ngwerere Ward
10	M. M. Mate	Silwizya Ward
11	C Mulozi	Raphael Chola Ward
12	W. Muswema	Justine Kabwe Ward
13	G. Nyendwa	Chaisa Ward
14	S. Mbewe	Muchinga Ward
15	Col. J. C. B Kabungo (Rtd)	Kapwepwe Ward
16	R. Chikwelete	Matero Ward
17	M. Marebesa	Lima Ward
18	P. S. Himunzowa	Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula Ward
19	G. Chili	Kanyama Ward
20	B. K. P. Siasamba	Munkolo Ward
21	L. Mkandawire (Mayor)	Nkoloma Ward
22	E. E. Musonda	Chawama Ward
23	A. Tembo	Lilayi Ward
24	P. Chilala	Kamwala Ward
25	D. Kangwa	Independence Ward
26	J. Hankede	Kabwata Ward
27	J. Chileshe	Libala Ward
29	C. P. Veiga (Deputy Mayor)	Lubwa Ward
30	R. Chitundu	Mwembeshi Ward
31	F. Muwowo	Town Clerk
32	T. Hakuyu	Director of City Planning
33	P. N. Ng'wane	Director – Human Resource/ Administration
34	B. Lwanga	Director of Engineering Services
35	M. Mulenga	Director of Finance
36	M. M. Munasangu	Director of Legal Services
37	S. Mwansa	Director – Valuation & Real Estate Mgt.
38	W. Njovu	Director – Public Health/Social Services

APPENDIX 5 (B)


LUSAKA ELECTORAL WARDS


THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA
LUSAKA DISTRICT



POLLING DISTRICT BOUNDARIES 2008

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>CONSTITUENCY
 No. 75 CHAWAMA
 No. 76 KAMBATA
 No. 77 KANYAMA
 No. 78 LUSAKA CENTRAL
 No. 79 MANDEVU
 No. 80 MATERO
 No. 81 MUNALI</p> | <p>WARD BOUNDARIES
 1. NKULOMA
 2. CHAWAMA
 3. CHIRIHOVANGI
 4. ULALI
 5. KAMBATA
 6. KADWATA
 7. LILALA
 8. CHELENE
 9. KAMBALANGA
 10. KANYAMA
 11. HARRY MWAALANGA NKUMBULA
 12. MBELELO
 13. SILONG'YA
 14. INDEPENDENCE
 15. LUSAKA
 16. KASIKONGA
 17. RUMA
 18. SIKALWASHE
 19. HSAERERE
 20. CHANDA
 21. JUSTINE KABUVE
 22. RAPHAEL CHOTA
 23. SIBILONGI
 24. MACHINGA
 25. KAPOVWE
 26. LINE
 27. MANEBECHI
 28. MATERO
 29. CHANDA
 30. MATEKERE
 31. FALGELANGA
 32. CHAKI KAKILA
 33. MUNALI</p> |
|---|--|



Legend

Road

- Main Tared
- Regularly maintained
- Maintained
- Maintainable or Farm Roads
- Other Tracks
- Footway
- Power Line
- River

Boundaries

- Electoral Boundary
- Constituency Boundary
- Ward boundary
- Polling District Boundary
- Towns or areas with permanent buildings
- Other Populated Areas
- Reservoir
- Dump
- Quarry



Produced by IT GIS Unit of the Electoral Commission of Zambia


APPENDIX 6 (A)

LUWINGU LOCAL COUNCILLORS AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS

S/No.	NAME	WARD/POSITION
1	E. Chileshe	Chulungoma Ward
2	G. M. Kambone	Namukolo Ward
3	J. C. Musonda	Ipusukilo Ward
4	E. M. Mwamba	Masonde Ward
5	L. Chipoya	Chifwile Ward
6	O. M. Mwansa	Mushituwambooo Ward
7	T. Lunshanda	Lwata Ward
8	L. Witika	Isangano Ward
9	E. Kabaso	Itandashi Ward
10	C. M. Chishala	Kaela Ward
11	M. .Mwamba	Mushinga Ward
12	B. Chibwe	Katilye Ward
13	A. Chanda (Council Chairman)	Kafinsa Ward
14	L. Mwaba	Mufili Ward
15	E. Mwansa	Ilambo Ward
16	L. Mwamba	Mwelawamangu Ward
17	J. Chibwe	Ibale Ward
18	W. C. Kasunga	Bwalinde Ward
19	E. Mwape	Isansa Ward
20	F. Kaonga	Kapembwa Ward
21	M. Katemwe	Council Secretary
22	C. Ng'ambi	Treasurer
23	H. G. Bwalya	Director of Works
24	S. Shawa	Chief Administration Officer
25	C. C. Simusokwe	Planning Officer

APPENDIX 6 (B)

LUWINGU ELECTORAL WARDS



APPENDIX 7

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE REGULATIONS, 1996

POSTS AND QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT TO A POST IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE

(SELECTED POSTS)

POST	QUALIFICATIONS
Town clerk/Director of Admin. – City or Municipal Council	(a) Fellow or Associate member of the Institute of Local Government Administrators of Zambia (ILGAZ), with a Degree in any of the following, Law, Economics, Public Administration, Social Work, Sociology, or Business Administration. (b) Advocate of the High Court for Zambia with 5 years working experience in a senior management position in the administration or legal department of a Council.
Council Secretary or Deputy – District	(a) Fellow or Associate member of ILGAZ with at least 5 years working experience in a senior management position in the administration or legal department of a Council, or (b) University Degree in Public Administration with 5 years experience in a senior position in the administration or legal department of a Council
Director of Finance or Deputy – City or Municipal Council	(a) Director - Fellow or Associate member of the Zambia Institute of Certified Accountants (ZICA) or a holder of a qualification acceptable to ZICA as Associate member, with 3 years post qualification experience in local government or comparable service, (b) Deputy – As for Director but with 5 years professional finance experience in local government or comparable service.
Treasurer or Deputy – District Council	Registered member of ZICA or a holder of a qualification acceptable to ZICA as a registered member, with 2 years post qualification in professional finance experience in local government or comparable service.
Director of Engineering Services or Deputy – City or Municipal Council	(a) Member or Associate of the Institute of Civil Engineering, with 3 years working

	<p>experience in the Engineering Department of a City or Municipal Council or other comparable organisation;</p> <p>(b) Member or Associate of the Institute of Municipal Engineers, with at least 3 years working experience in the Engineering Department of a City Council or other comparable organisation; or</p> <p>(c) University Degree in Civil Engineering, with at least 5 years working experience in the Engineering Department of a City Council or other comparable organisation.</p>
<p>Director of Works or Deputy – Municipal Council</p>	<p>(a) University Degree in Civil Engineering, with at least 2 years working experience in the Works Department of a Council or other comparable organisation;</p> <p>(b) Final Certificate in City and Guilds, with at least 5 years working experience in the Works Department of a Council or other comparable organisation;</p> <p>(c) Diploma in Civil Engineering, with at least 3 years working experience in the Works Department of a Council or other comparable organisation; or</p> <p>(d) Technician or Craft Certificate with at least 5 years working experience in the Works Department of a Council or other comparable organisation.</p>
<p>Director of Development Planning or Deputy – City or Municipal Council</p>	<p>University Degree in: (i) development planning, or urban or regional planning, or (ii) geography, economics or social science, and a postgraduate qualification in urban and regional planning. In the case of the Director, an additional 10 years' working experience is required.</p>
<p>District Planning Officer or Deputy – District Council</p>	<p>University Degree in social studies, geography, agricultural economics, economics, or business administration. In the case of the District Planning Officer, an additional 5 years' post graduate working experience in the public or private sector is required and 3 years for the Deputy District Planning Officer.</p>

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- <http://www.chambers.ie/index.php>
- <http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/new-countrypaper/Srilanka/Srilanka.pdf>
- <http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/new-countrypaper/Pakistan/Pakistan.pdf>

LIST OF INDIVIDUALS THAT WERE INTERVIEWED ON A FACE-TO-FACE BASIS IN THE THREE COUNCIL AREAS.

Amin V. M., Manager, Saro Agri-Equipment, Lusaka	-	19/05/2005
Bjarnesen L., Coordinator of Country Programme, Danish Association for International Cooperation, Lusaka	-	22/12/2004
Bowasi D., Director HRA (Education), Lusaka	-	05/05/2005
Bwalya H. G., Director of Works, Luwingu Council	-	04/10/2004
Bwebya A., Administrative Officer, Transparency International, Zambia, Lusaka	-	11/04/2005
Chafilwa C. B. F., Lusaka Councillor – Roma Ward	-	02/06/2005
Chanda A., President, Foundation for Democratic Process, Lusaka	-	22/04/2005
Chanda A., Luwingu Council Chairman	-	07/10/2004
Changula M., Ag. Director Planning, Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), Lusaka	-	26/05/2005
Chaponda D. P., Former Local Government practitioner, now Programme Coordinator, Governance Development Project, Lusaka	-	24/05/2005
Chileshe E., Luwingu Councillor – Chulungoma Ward	-	07/10/2004
Chileshe W., Programme Officer, Women for Change, Luwingu	-	09/10/2004
Chilufya H., Anti-Voter Apathy Project, Luwingu	-	04/10/2004
Chipalo, a Luwingu chief	-	11/10/2004
Chipoya D., Programme Officer, Women for Change, Lusaka	-	02/05/2005
Chipulu E., District Chairperson, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Luwingu	-	07/10/2004
Chishimba J., Civil Society for Poverty Reduction, Luwingu	-	06/10/2004
Chisola C. M., Head of Procurement (Health), Lusaka	-	04/05/2005
Chitembwe B., Lusaka resident	-	15/04/2005
Choonga E., Choma Councillor – Singani Ward	-	26/11/2004
Chow L. S., Manager of Crystal Lodge, Choma	-	09/11/2004
Chungu, a Luwingu chief	-	11/10/2004
Chungu A., Ward Development Committee member, Luwingu	-	12/10/2004

Chungu A. M., Administrative Officer – Luwingu Council	-	06/10/2004
Cronje P., Contracts Manager, J. J. Lowe, Lusaka	-	21/04/2005
Eneke B., Mumana Pleasure Resort, Lusaka	-	16/05/2005
Haas A., Planning Advisor, German Technical Assistance, Lusaka	-	03/12/2004
Habasonda L., Executive Director, Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, Lusaka	-	02/05/2005
Hakuyu T., Director of City Planning – Lusaka Council	-	17/05/2005
Henriot P., Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection, Lusaka	-	24/04/2005
Hamayuwa E., Choma Councillor – Mampaza Ward	-	22/11/2004
Hamudulu W., Lusaka Councillor – Chakunkula Ward	-	19/04/2005
Hamusute A., Choma resident	-	13/11/2004
Hamgwemu D., Choma chiefs' representative	-	20/11/2004
Jere H., Shoprite Stores Manager – Manda hill, Lusaka	-	15/08/2005
Kabanda S., Board member, Foundation for Democratic Process,	-	22/04/2005
Kabulubulu F., District Director of Health, Choma	-	19/10/2004
Kabungo J. C. B., Lusaka Councillor – Kapwepwe Ward	-	02/06/2005
Kabungo M., Head of Waste Management Unit – Lusaka Council	-	31/05/2005
Kalebwe V. H., Proprietor – Kalebwe Brothers, Luwingu	-	05/10/2004
Kalinso F., Chairperson, National Women's Lobby Group, Luwingu	-	07/10/2004
Kalungwana A., Choma marketer	-	24/11/2004
Kambone G., Councillor and Chairman for Shamumanga : Farmers' Association, Luwingu	-	07/10/2004
Kandimba P., Programme Manager foe Africare, Choma	-	08/11/2004
Kandingwa E., Director of Finance, Choma Council	-	11/11/2004
Kanga T., Information Officer, Luwingu	-	05/10/2004
Kangwa A., Assistant Planner – Luwingu Council	-	06/10/2004
Kapaku E., Director of Engineering, Choma Council	-	05/11/2004
Kapongolo G. M., Head - Community Development, Luwingu	-	04/10/2004
Kapumpa B. K., former Council Secretary, Luwingu	-	02/09/2006
Kashiwa P., Assistant Director of Administration, Lusaka Council	-	05/04/2005
Kasonde M., Lusaka resident	-	07/05/2005

Kasunga W. C., Luwingu Councillor – Bwalinde Ward	-	09/10/2004
Katemwe M., Council Secretary, Luwingu	-	05/10/2004
Kamuhiza G., Programme Manager, World Vision, Choma	-	22/11/2004
Kaunda L., a Luwingu village headman	-	11/10/2004
Kawele B., Choma marketer	-	19/11/2004
Longwani C., Luwingu resident	-	08/10/2004
Longwe D., former Local government practitioner now Programme Officer for the Local Government Association of Zambia (LGAZ)	-	14/12/2004
Lushanda T., Luwingu Councillor – Lwata Ward	-	08/10/2004
Lwanga B., Director of Engineering, Lusaka Council	-	07/04/2005
Lwiimbo W., Deputy Director of Engineering, Choma Council	-	05/11/2004
Makambwe G. F., Director – Social Welfare, Lusaka	-	03/05/2005
Makanta C., Public Relations Manager – Lusaka Council	-	12/05/2005
Makaya G., Choma Councillor – Chilantambo Ward	-	22/11/2004
Mapanza, a Choma chief	-	16/11/2004
Markatos J., Director for Choma Milling Company, Choma	-	08/11/2004
Masumbu D., Lusaka resident	-	12/04/2005
Mbewe K., Director HRA, Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), Lusaka	-	26/05/2005
Mbewe S., Lusaka Councillor – Muchinga Ward	-	13/04/2005
Mbolela M., Former Local Government practitioner, now Executive Secretary, Local Government Association of Zambia (LGAZ)	-	14/12/2004
Minganja G., former Town Clerk, Choma	-	30/11/2004
Mkandawire L., Lusaka Mayor – Nkoloma Ward	-	14/07/2005
Moonga K., District officer for Red Cross, Choma	-	22/11/2004
Mukelabai S., Manager Planning (Health), Choma	-	19/10/2004
Mumba B., Lusaka Councillor – Mutendere Ward	-	19/04/2005
Mulenga E. District Vice Chairperson, Foundation for Democratic Process, Luwingu	-	05/10/2004
Mulenga L. C., Manager of Lwenge Farms, Luwingu	-	06/10/2004
Mulenga M., Acting Director of Finance, Lusaka Council	-	08/04/2005

Mulenga W., Programme Against Malnutrition, Choma	-	08/11/2004
Mulindwa P., Luwingu resident	-	08/10/2004
Munasangu M. M., Director of Legal Services – Lusaka Council	-	17/05/2005
Munalula C., Executive Director, Transparency International - Zambia, Lusaka	-	11/04/2005
Munkombwe C., Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia, Choma	-	12/11/2004
Munsanje M. B. K., Choma Councillor – Pemba Ward	-	26/11/2004
Mushimbwa C., Choma resident	-	13/11/2004
Musichili S., a retired Local Government practitioner, now doing private Consultancy on issues of governance in Ndola, on the Copperbelt Province of Zambia	-	26/05/2005
Musimuko H., Community Development Officer, Choma	-	17/11/2004
Musonda E. E., Lusaka Councillor – Chawama Ward	-	11/03/2005
Musonda J. C., Luwingu Councillor – Ipusukilo Ward	-	08/10/2004
Musonda J. L., Head of Forestry Department, Luwingu	-	06/10/2004
Musongo C., Lusaka marketer	-	14/04/2005
Muulu E., District Director of Health, Luwingu	-	04/10/2004
Muunyu L., District Education Standards Officer, Choma	-	19/11/2004
Muwowo F., Town Clerk, Lusaka Council	-	06/04/2005
Mwale L. J., Director, Field Services (Agriculture), Lusaka	-	10/05/2005
Mwale Z., Member, Tobacco Association, Choma	-	12/11/2004
Mwalweni D., District Agriculture Coordinating Officer, Choma	-	19/11/2004
Mwamba B. P., Foundation for Democratic Process, Luwingu	-	04/10/2004
Mwamba E. M., Luwingu Councillor – Masonde Ward	-	07/10/2004
Mwamba G. K., District Education Standards Officer, Luwingu	-	05/10/2004
Mwamba K., Proprietor – Salome Guest House, Luwingu	-	05/10/2005
Mwamba S., Programme Against Malnutrition, Luwingu	-	09/10/2004
Mwamba S. W., Proprietor – Prominent Holdings, Luwingu	-	08/10/2004
Mwansa S., Director of Valuation/Real Estate – Lusaka Council	-	13/05/2005
Mwansa Y. S., Director, Distance Education (Education), Lusaka	-	12/05/2005
Mwape L., Proprietor - Skyline Carpentry, Luwingu	-	05/10/2004

Mwasile F. B. A., Principal Local Government Officer, Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), Lusaka	-	10/05/2005
Mweene M., Choma marketer	-	24/11/2004
Mwiinga G., Assistant Accountant, Choma Council	-	05/11/2004
Mwiinga J. M., Lusaka Councillor – Chainda Ward	-	19/04/2005
Mwikisa A., Choma resident	-	26/11/2004
Naik D. S., Proprietor – Standard Sales Company, Choma	-	08/11/2004
Naik P. T., Manager of Arupee Service Station, Choma	-	08/11/2004
Nakasamu V., Manager of Star Butchery, Choma	-	09/11/2004
Nalishiwa B. C., Director HRA (Agriculture), Lusaka	-	04/05/2005
Namoya M. H., Director of Administration, Choma Council	-	18/11/2004
Namukola G. M., Choma Councillor – Batoka Ward	-	26/11/2004
Ngulube P., Lusaka marketer	-	15/04/2005
Ng’ambi C., Treasurer – Luwingu Council	-	04/10/2004
Ng’wane P. N., Director of Administration, Lusaka Council	-	05/04/2005
Nkoma H., Director, Community Development, Lusaka	-	03/05/2005
Njovu W., Director of Public Health – Lusaka Council	-	18/05/2005
Nyanga G., Choma Mayor	-	26/11/2004
Nyangu N., Director of Planning (Education), Lusaka	-	05/05/2005
Nyonda C. A., Internal Auditor – Luwingu Council	-	06/10/2004
Phiri D., Accountant- Family 24 Limited, Lusaka	-	10/05/2005
Phiri G., District Agriculture Coordinating Officer, Luwingu	-	05/10/2004
Phiri N., Acting Chief Administrative Officer, Choma Council	-	11/11/2004
Phiri R. C., Lusaka Councillor – Kalingalinga Ward	-	04/04/2005
Sakwiya A., Director, Decentralisation Secretariat, Lusaka	-	14/12/2005
Shawa J., Deputy Director Planning (Agriculture), Lusaka	-	10/05/2005
Shawa S., Chief Administration Officer – Luwingu Council	-	04/10/2004
Satish N., Manager –Choma Garage, Choma	-	08/11/2004
Siamunyanga L. Finance Director, Southern Water and Sewerage	-	09/11/2004
Sichala I., Member, Tobacco Association, Choma	-	12/11/2004
Sichintu F., Choma Councillor – Kasiya Ward	-	22/11/2004

Sikaulu N., Programme Officer, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Lusaka	-	02/05/2005
Sikufweba S., Choma Councillor – Sikalundu Ward	-	22/11/2004
Silenga C., Programme Officer, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Lusaka	-	02/05/2005
Silungwe B., Choma resident	-	25/11/2004
Simusokwe C. C., Planning Officer – Luwingu Council	-	05/10/2004
Sindamu C., Town Clerk, Choma Council	-	22/11/2004
Singani, a Choma chief	-	15/11/2004
Siwakwi A., Lusaka resident	-	12/04/2005
Skjaeveland S., Counselor, Norwegian Embassy, Lusaka	-	14/12/2004
Stevenson B., Managing Director of Toyota Zambia, Lusaka	-	17/12/2004
Takada M., Project Formulation Advisor (Japan International Cooperation Agency), for a project aimed at capacity building for local government including the offices of Provincial Local Government Officers (PLGO).	-	04/04/2005
Tembo B., Executive Director, Anti-Voter Apathy Project, Lusaka	-	25/04/2005
Tembo C., Lusaka resident	-	14/04/2005
Tompwe E., Continuing Education Officer, Luwingu	-	05/10/2004
Tungati, a Luwingu chief	-	12/10/2004
Veiga C. P. Lusaka Deputy Mayor – Lubwa Ward	-	11/04/2005
Wakumelo W. R., Head, Fisheries Department, Choma	-	17/11/2004
Walaza M., Head, Immigration Department, Choma	-	17/11/2004
Yombwe G., Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia, Luwingu	-	04/10/2004
Zulu L. G., Director of Planning, Choma Council	-	18/11/2004
Zulu Z., Surveyor – Lusaka Council	-	06/04/2005