

July 10th. On this day President Kaunda broke his silence with a statement made from State House. The Mail opened for the third successive day with a headline relating to the incidents of July 7th., "Gun Fired in Demo" and the Times - "'Leave things to me,' KK warns students". The actual press release included the following remarks.

I fully recognise the deep feelings the Zambian people share with me, the Party and Government in our opposition to the sale of arms by some Powers, France included, to South Africa.

The country will, however, remember that on my return from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Singapore early this year I told the nation that I wanted the problems between Zambia, the minority regimes that surround us and the big powers which back them by such acts as sale of arms or commissions for arms manufacture under nefarious permits, left to me to handle in the best interests of the Republic.³²

He said this at the same time as confirming that a firearm had been used against the students.

The incidents of this week have left a black mark on the record of the Republic which must not be allowed to re-occur.³³

The statement proved to be the turning point in relations between students and the government. The students were now piqued because, unlike all the other politicians and the mass media, the President made no attempt to congratulate the students or even condemn the police, only regretting the events of the last week. Secondly, as the statement was portrayed in the Times of Zambia it appeared that the command 'leave things to me' was directed at the students, and was widely interpreted as a faint criticism of the action taken by the students in protesting against the French. Thus it appeared that whereas all sections of Zambian society had applauded the students and deplored the police behaviour, the President by contrast

But the protest was peaceful and relaxed. After approximately an hour the Vice-Chancellor himself made an appearance and he was cheered as he moved through the crowd onto the roof of a landrover which had been turned into a speaker's platform. It seemed as though he had been called by some one in government to remove 'his students' from the Secretariat. He told the gathering that he had been assured that they were only going to attend the proceedings at the law courts and was surprised to find them at the Secretariat, clamouring for the Minister of Home Affairs. He suggested that they consider carefully before they take any action and that action taken on impulse was not always in their best interests. He further urged them to draw up a petition, to work through their executive, and to return to campus for lunch. The students began shouting at him to stand down which he was eventually forced to do and an annoyed student - Mundia Sikatana - rose to address the students. He thanked Professor Goma for obtaining the release of the detained students the previous evening (great applause) and also for his advice.

We all understand your position and recognise that you as our Vice-Chancellor have earned your position through merit. But this is a very serious issue which cannot be left unresolved. At the same time we must pledge to Professor Goma that we are here on peaceful grounds that this is a non-violent meeting. We must also thank the press; the Times because it always reports the truth, the Mail because as a government paper its condemnation of its own police suggests how brutal they must have been. We must all stick around here until someone comes out and is prepared to talk to us. We have been preparing a petition on your behalf....30

The petition, after condemning the violence perpetrated by the police the previous day, particularly the use of a firearm, included the following points: that the government make

crystal clear its stand on arms sales to South Africa, that the Officer Commanding Lusaka police, Chadwick Magai, be removed from his position, that the whole police force be disciplined and the students on police bond be released unconditionally. Changufu received the petition but said he could not comment until he had received a report from the police and the hospital superintendent concerning the injured student. With this the meeting had reached an anti-climax, but the students had made their position clear and returned to the campus. The demonstration chant had moved on from "Pompidou down" to "Hang Magai High".

July 9th. Headlines in the Times read "Students turn wrath on police" in the Mail, "Police Action under Fire". The Mail editorial again reviewed the police behaviour on the Wednesday and welcomed the proposed investigation into the incident. It reiterated its support for the students,

....we hope something will also be done by the Ministry of Home Affairs to give the police political education so that they know who are the friends of Zambia and who are not. ...If the actions of a stupid government in Europe threaten their future security in Zambia, the people of Zambia including the police should congratulate these youngsters when they take action which exposes the evil intentions of such a stupid government. They should not instead be treated like common criminals. They should be treated like responsible future leaders of this nation.³¹

At this stage, adulation from press, from politicians (even those who might normally resent the students), from commentators on radio such as Vernon Mwaanga (Zambia's representative at the United Nations) had reached its peak. Only the President remained silent.

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It is a common and accepted principle that every nation must identify its friends and its enemies, and to isolate and have no dealings with its enemies. Your activities so far with the racists South of the Zambezi are not consistent with this principle. We believe there that the people of Zambia should be given the opportunity to make their sentiments felt on this issue, rather than leave it to you alone. The lives of the four and half million Zambians and other peace-loving people in this part of the world are in great danger.

Your Excellency by indirectly condemning the students' demonstration you are also condemning all the people of Zambia on whose behalf we were demonstrating, especially UNIP, the Trade Union Movements and the Press media who have openly expressed support. Sir we were demonstrating in favour of Government policy, but now it appears there is no Government policy in this particular direction.

Sir, you have in the past communicated with the enemy. Does it not occur to you therefore that you are asking too much of us and the Zambian nation as a whole by saying "leave things to me"?

Our role in this nation cannot be overemphasised. Our convictions and feelings ought to be communicated to the rest of the nation; and this we shall perform according to the best accepted manner.

The University of Zambia students demonstration on Wednesday, the 7th of July, 1971 served to point out our convictions on the issue at hand.

It is proper and fitting that in the light of the above, your Excellency be called upon to explain in detail to the nation why you deem it fit that the nation leaves everything in your hands.²⁴

The letter was signed by the ten members of the UNZASU executive. The student body only became aware of its existence the following day.

There can be no simplistic reason why the letter was written and sent. The most common explanation is that the students, riding on a wave of popularity, were outraged by the President's failure to pay a tribute to their 'valour.' But this ignores the context and background of the student

executive and student politics. First, a feeling of resentment towards the President and the party had been building up since the beginning of the year as can be seen by proliferation of attacks on government in the pages of UZ. Apart from the failure to pursue a vigorous policy either towards external enemies or foreign owned enterprises, the increasing militancy and violence in the country perpetrated by party supporters was a source of bitter discontent.

The composition of the executive also provides insight into the possible influences conducing to an open expression of opposition. The previous student government - the first to survive a full year in office - had been successful in building a more respectable and powerful image of the student union. The new executive had a greater sense of their own potency as a result of their enhanced image both within the university and outside: this was particularly so after the successful demonstration outside the French Embassy. Since 1967, student executives had been led by non Zambian Presidents who were likely to avoid confrontations with government. However the 1971 executive was all Zambian and its feeling of alienation and exclusion from the national political arena must have been keenly felt, as was the case with previous Zambian Presidents. (Chikamba had been removed by the students for his close connections with government, while Chanda had been removed by government for his belligerence towards the government.) The oppositional sentiments within the executive were possibly compounded by the high proportion of Bemba-speaking members. Of the ten members who signed the letter, only one had no links with Bemba-speaking population. And this was at a time when a new political party - the United

Progressive Party - with predominantly Bemba-speaking support was about to be formed. Though there is no evidence that any of these students were supporters of the UPP faction within UNIP at that time, nevertheless it is highly likely that they sympathised with those of their own sectional group who bore a grudge against what they perceived to be the practices discriminating against Bemba-speaking politicians. Yet, the members of the executive could hardly be regarded as 'radical' in any sense of the word - though they were radicalised by the subsequent events. By comparison, the previous executive contained students who were very much more 'politicised' and 'radical'.

Internal politics must have contributed further influence impinging on the executive. The record of the Chola administration in its first two months of office had done much to tarnish its image. First there had been the confrontation between himself and Matakala, the President of NUZS, ostensibly over UNZASU contributions to NUZS. Since Chola and the majority of his colleagues on the union executive were of Bemba-speaking background, they had fewer qualms about making a stand against Matakala whose support was mainly from the Lozi students. However, there was resentment in many quarters of the community towards the dominance by the Bemba-speaking students in the union executive. When it was discovered that K17,000 appeared to be missing from UNZASU funds and that this money must have disappeared the previous year while Chola was Vice-President there was a move to suspend Chola from office until a commission of inquiry had cleared him of 'corruption' charges. It was urged that the Vice-President - a Tumbuka from Eastern Province - take Chola's place in the meantime.

The student body was deeply angered by the alleged misappropriation of funds and Chola's implicit association with their disappearance. Their anger was compounded when two members of the new executive were also suspected of misusing union funds since they had assumed office in April. At a meeting of the Council of Representatives convened to discuss the evidence, the Social and Cultural Secretary was dismissed and the Treasurer suspended from office. At the time of the demonstration, the popularity of the Chola administration was at a low ebb and conceivably it was partly with a view to restoring its reputation that the demonstration was staged. But the executive did not play a prominent role in the demonstration. Chola and the Vice-President only appeared later in the morning when the students had scattered and the majority of arrests had been made. In fact the demonstration had been largely led by members of the previous year's executive and other influentials within the student community. Of the seven students charged with riot only one - a committee member - was from the executive. It could be argued that the union executive had not made much political capital out of the successful demonstration and in writing the letter to the President they hoped to gain the initiative and improve their standing amongst the rank and file.

July 12th. The newspapers had little to say on the demonstration and the events which had followed. There was an interesting report in the Daily Mail that Changufu, the Minister of Home Affairs, had accused it - the Mail - of failing to tell the truth about the student-police clash. Of particular significance was his complaint that the statement issued by the

the letter went to the press.

July 13th. While the Mail made no mention of the letter, the Times of Zambia devoted two front page columns to the content of the letter and an editorial which set the tone for the onslaught to come.

It is time the students at the University of Zambia took a long hard look at their role in this country.

Their petulant outburst yesterday, accusing the President of 'inconsistency' towards issues in Southern Africa, is symptomatic of the confusion and occasionally deliberate double-think which our favoured sons and daughters at the nation's premier seat of higher learning specialise in....

We sympathised with the students when they were harassed with excessive vigour by the police during last Wednesday's demonstration against French arms sales to the Nazis of the seventies.

But consider how the issue has been deflected since then. The righteous indignation felt by students at the latest example of French hypocrisy turned into a verbal onslaught, narrow in scope, on the police. Now it has become an ill-informed, malicious attack on the integrity of a leader chosen by our elected representatives....

The sheer arrogance of their words should sound an alarm-bell in the minds of responsible people. While we defend free speech in our open society, and shrink from advocating murderous repression of student opinion as practiced elsewhere, harsh charges must be backed up with facts. 36

The atmosphere on campus was a mixture of expectancy and uncertainty. The day began quietly enough. But events began to follow one another in rapid succession. The union executive was summoned to Freedom House - headquarters of UNIP - by Fines Bulawayo, Secretary for Publicity and a prominent UNIP politician. They were issued with an ultimatum to make an appearance before 5 p.m. The students refused to go, fearing, probably quite rightly, that they would be molested by UNIP supporters. They preferred to remain on campus where

they were relatively safe. As the Secretary General of UNZASU retorted, "If they want to meet us they should come over to the university and meet us here."³⁷ Chola had asked Bulawayo over the telephone if the venue of the meeting could be changed and Bulawayo, after first refusing, then himself 'phoned up to say that he would be prepared to meet the executive at the Secretariat. They were all prepared to go in the middle of the afternoon when a mob of students collected in the car park and, after much argument, dissuaded their leader from departing. The students argued that the matter could not now be handled by the executive but had reached such proportions that every student was affected and any move by the leadership must be endorsed by the entire student body. A general meeting previously arranged for 10 p.m. was now brought forward to 7.30 p.m. Until then there would be no dialogue with UNIP or Freedom House. Failing to meet the appointed deadline of 5 o'clock, Bulawayo had no hesitation in mobilising the entire UNIP propaganda machine against the students. He called for nation wide demonstrations to begin the following day.

We shall stop at nothing. The ten students must be made to understand that the party is supreme in this country and it cannot therefore tolerate insolent behaviour against its Secretary General from a handful of misguided, ill-informed students from the university.³⁸

Though it is conceivable that on reading the letter the previous day, some students would have wished to dissociate themselves from its contents, as the reaction from Freedom House became increasingly uncompromising so the student body closed its ranks behind its executive. UNIP leaders had unleashed hostility not specifically at 'ten irresponsible

leaders' but at 'those arrogant students.' The call for nation wide demonstrations against the students only served to entrench their defiance and solidarity. Finally the responsiveness of the executive to rank and file advice during the day erected a bond of common destiny between the leaders and the led.

Tension mounted on the campus as the students watched the 7 o'clock nation news on five communal televisions situated in the halls of residence. It was clear that the students had unleashed the wrath of the party. After the news approximately eight hundred students packed into the largest lecture theatre to attend the mass meeting convened to review the latest developments and discuss 'the next step'. If there was any opposition to the action taken so far, the nature of the meeting was such that it would not be able to express itself. The assembled students gave Chola's introductory speech and resumé of events to date an ovationous applause and unanimously endorsed his action. Prominent students rose to support Chola and his executive, to criticise the government and attack the President. At no time either before or since had the students felt so free to speak out their resentment of the party and the political élite. "It was time some of these politicians went," said one. Another spoke in condemnation of the President, "He is not omnipotent, the nation had matured politically and now was the time when other bodies could be consulted freely over such issues as foreign affairs." "We are not the 'favoured sons and daughters', none of us are favoured. We got here on merit. If Bulawayo wants he too can join us by sitting for the mature age examinations." (Roar of laughter and applause. Bulawayo is considered on campus

to be a typical UNIP politician, 'unenlightened' and poorly educated.) Most of the meeting was devoted to a consideration of what to do next, but there seemed only one conceivable course of action - to defend themselves against the promised march by UNIP to the campus. It was widely feared that UNIP Youth or the Zambia Youth might, egged on by zealous politicians, use the opportunity to make a violent assault on the students. The meeting closed at about 9.30 p.m. and about one hundred students were asked to work out the defence of the campus. Chemistry students were hard at work all night manufacturing petrol bombs in the laboratories; piles of stones were collected in the residences and on the roofs, and hose pipes were held in readiness. Most students never slept that night, not knowing what to expect, while others working through the night prepared for the confrontation of the next day. There seemed no doubt in students' minds that UNIP would invade the campus. If there were students who opposed these moves then it was inconceivable that they should voice their misgivings.

The state of seige had not reached the proportions of the barricades in the Latin Quarter of May 1968, but the preparations, implements, tactics, etc. bore a remarkable resemblance.³⁹ The euphoric relief that now, at last, there was to be a showdown with the symbols of oppression - the Parisian 'Flics' (police) and the violent vigilantes of UNIP. The atmosphere of liberation and excitement, which overwhelmed the students of Paris behind their barricades, had its parallel that night on the UNZA campus. The student body had merged into a spiritual oneness.

July 14th. The front page headlines of the Times read, 'Massive Protest Called Against Students' and the Mail wrote, 'UNIP - Student Showdown Today'. The Mail published an editorial from which the following extracts have been taken.

There has never been any individual (apart from John Vorster, who had his own wicked motives), including the leaders and officials of opposition parties, who has gone so far as making such uncalled for insulting remarks against the President as these students....

But the support for the cause of their demonstration and the sympathy over the rough treatment they got from the police did not give them the mandate to insult a Head of State who, more than any other person, has not only done a lot for the country, but has also put his own popularity at stake by allowing his government to spend lavishly on those young men and women when their own brothers and sisters are starving in the villages and going without respectable dress.

Their insults, which have been given great publicity overseas, have only had the effect of giving fuel to the enemies of Zambia who are now looking at the university as their main target for operations, against the State of Zambia, if they have not yet made their way there already through a handful of mealy-mouthed students....

It should be impressed upon the university students that there is always a limit to what society and a nation can tolerate. And in a democratic society, it is important that people disagree without being insulting. When those without even the means to stand on their own start hurling out insults freely to even those who feed them, this is not only biting the finger that feeds, but it is downright base ingratitude.⁴⁰

At the same time both newspapers published extracts from a statement made by Aaron Milner, Secretary General to Government, on the previous night. He makes the distinction between constructive criticism and 'unconstructive criticisms and distorted information which could only be identified with a group of irresponsible individuals seeking cheap publicity.'⁴¹ After endorsing the President's consistent efforts in making

a clear stand on Southern African issue as witnessed by the Non-Aligned Nations Summit, his leadership of an OAU delegation on the issue of arms sales to South Africa and his renown in this regard throughout the world, he is quoted as saying

It is important to observe in this regard that last week's student demonstrations, although reflecting a popular sentiment, were illegal in that no permits were obtained from the competent Government authorities.

Mr. Milner has further said that while Government appreciates the need for students to take a fuller part in the political life of this country, it cannot, nevertheless, allow a small group of irresponsible and intellectually arrogant young people to be writing highly insulting letters to the Head of State ...it will be more unfortunate for the people of Zambia to begin questioning the relevance of producing an élite which will be out of touch with national realities....42

This is the first reference to the illegality of the demonstration of July 7th, and marked the beginning of attempts by the government to justify its action by reference to the law.

Everyone had risen early and the dining room was crowded at the unprecedented hour of 7 a.m. All exits and entrances to the university were blocked and barricaded. Students stood guard only allowing staff and the one or two hundred students from Evelyn Home College who had arrived in solidarity, to enter. The students had taken over every building on the campus. Others had gone to town in overalls to mingle with the UNIP demonstrators gathering in the centre of Lusaka outside Freedom House. The marchers set off from Freedom House to walk to the university. There were about six hundred people involved, of which a great number were women; some even carrying children on their backs. This was certainly not a UNIP Youth brigade as the students had been anticipating. Students mingling with the crowd, came away with the impression that the

majority of participants were unclear as to why they were demonstrating. With the exception of the leaders, Fines Bulawayo and the Minister of State at Freedom House, Ali Simbule and possibly a few regional officials, there seemed to be little anger amongst those marching. A few banners and posters bore the inscriptions 'University is not Parliament', and 'We shall not allow a state within a state'. During the morning a number of Ministers attempted to reach the Vice-Chancellor but the students refused them permission to enter the university grounds.

When it became apparent that were the demonstrators to enter the university there would almost certainly be bloodshed, the Minister of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, Sikota Wina, arrived with a message for the demonstrators from the President. They were to hold their gathering at Mulungushi Hall half a mile away from the University and there they would be addressed by their leaders and hand over a petition to the Vice-Chancellor. The UNIP petition, which is reproduced in full in the Appendix,

PLEGGED UNIP's unqualified support for President Kaunda and his Government.

REFUSED a "student government."

DEMANDED the closure of the university forthwith.

DEMANDED the expulsion of the entire student executive and that they should not be re-admitted.

DEMANDED that future students should make a pledge not to engage in activities detrimental to the welfare of the nation. 43

Earlier, during the morning, three circulars - What are we doing? (No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3) - produced by two PCE's and another European outside the university were distributed amongst students.⁴⁴ The first advised the students to rethink their political role outside the university, to understand

their responsibility and to predict the consequences of any such activity. The second suggested that 'we' haven't thought about the needs of the country, that 'we' should study 'other student political thinking' before committing 'ourselves to a situation which will increase the distance which has to be travelled when trying to communicate between people whose experiences and expectations are very different'.⁴⁵ The circular questioned the advisability of attacking people angered by 'our woolly statements' rather than committing 'ourselves ...[to] achieving a democratic and egalitarian society in Zambia'.⁴⁶ The third circular suggested that by 'fighting our Zambian government...This is exactly what Vorster wants... we have played into his little trap'.⁴⁷ In other words the students were now indirectly giving support to Vorster. The ideas behind the circulars, perhaps consonant with the liberal backgrounds of students operating in a society where student protest is an accepted practice, were at variance with the assumptions of the political culture of the Zambian student community. At the time of their distribution, they were largely ignored, their patronising style was unlikely to have struck a sympathetic note. However, Manase Phiri - a student broadcaster for Radio Zambia - read them out at lunch time over the air in a weekly programme devoted to the university, indicating, so he said, that the open letter to the President did not have the support of the entire student body. The students on campus were, however, furious at this betrayal of student solidarity. As far as they were concerned, this was just what the government was waiting for, namely signs of a rift in the community between the leaders and the led. Until that moment there had been no suggestion that the executive's

action did not have the backing of the entire student body. When he returned to the campus at 2 p.m. Manase Phiri was brought before a gathering attending a meeting on the lawns in front of the library. Before he was allowed to justify his action, he was set upon and savagely beaten up by the crowd. Fortunately he was not too badly hurt and was soon rescued by the university security officials. The PCE's responsible for writing the circulars had made themselves scarce sometime ago. These were the lengths to which the students were prepared to go to present an unbroken solidarity in defiance of the government and party.

Earlier the UNIP demonstrators who had presented the Vice-Chancellor with the petition turned back to town after being addressed by a number of politicians. The campus began to return to normal; students came down from the barricades and the rooftops. There was a sense of anti-climax as though nothing had been really settled between the party and the students. No one had any cause to believe that the events had come to an end, but no one anticipated what would be the next move. No students guarded the campus that Wednesday night, indeed most were very weary from the activities of the previous night.

July 15th. At 4 a.m. students were awoken by a din resonating through the halls of residence. Police in full riot kit of helmets, shields and batons were pouring into the student residences hammering on doors with their truncheons. Still half asleep those who dared to venture out of their rooms were terrified at the spectacle, particularly as only a week previously the same police had violently assaulted them in the streets of Lusaka. It became clear that despite their ominous

apparel they were not there to precipitate a blood bath but simply to get students out of their rooms and onto the lawns outside the library. Once there they were herded into a group and surrounded by police armed with rifles, quite clearly ready to use them at the slightest provocation. But the students were not in a provocative mood. Hundreds of armed paramilitary troops had encircled the campus to make quite sure no student managed to escape. The shocked community listened in silence to Mundia Sikatana, one of the most respected students on campus, sound words of warning that the armed forces were quite prepared to use the weapons at their disposal. He read out the government press statement which he had been handed by the police.

The University of Zambia has been closed. Students have been dismissed and no teaching functions will take place until the beginning of the second semester on 30th August, 1971.

Announcing the closure this morning, a Government spokesman has said that Government has taken this painful action after receiving and considering disturbing reports of indiscipline and lawlessness among students at the University Campus of the University of Zambia.

The arrogant and highly insulting letter sent to His Excellency the President, the breakdown of order in which the life of the University has been seriously and adversely affected and widespread intimidation of the majority of students loyal to the Government have made it abundantly clear that the deteriorating situation should not be allowed to continue.

The spokesman said that the ten members of the Executive Committee of the University of Zambia Students Union who signed the letter dated 11th July, 1971 to His Excellency the President will not be re-admitted when the University re-opens on the 30th August, 1971....

The rest of the students will be required to apply for re-admission to the University. Re-admission will not be automatic. Each application will be considered strictly on its merit.

On being re-admitted each student will be required to sign a pledge to devote all his or her time and

energies to the pursuit of his or her studies and not to engage in any acts calculated to undermine either the University authority or the Government.

Students wishing to be re-admitted to the University of Zambia should, as soon as possible, get into contact with the appropriate University authorities so that application forms can be sent to them without delay.

The spokesman appealed to the students, in their own interests, to disperse peacefully and in a decent manner befitting the society of which they are members. No student should create any trouble for the majority who value this national institution.

He also appealed to the public to remain calm and maintain absolute discipline. Under no circumstances should any student be molested following the closure of the University. He emphasised that the majority of the students have been genuinely mis-guided and should be given a chance.⁴⁸

Students were then asked to return to their residences to pack their bags. Initially this was done under police supervision but when it became obvious that students were in no mood to resist, the police relaxed their surveillance. It is hard to imagine what else the students could have done against armed police and para military troops, but the cumbersome manner of the take-over through military intervention provides an insight into government thinking and perceptions of the students.

The newspapers of that morning were printed too late to carry the story of the closure of the university and focused their reportage on what the Times referred to in its front page headline as 'The Day of the Demos'. Under another headline, 'Country goes on march for KK', the Times reported on the nation wide demonstrations staged by UNIP supporters in Kitwe, Mufulira, Luanshya, Chingola, Livingstone, Gwembe, Choma, Monze and Mazabuka. A new element had now entered the attacks on the students and the university, namely the reference to

'subversive foreign influences'. Thus at Mufulira, the District Governor, was reported as telling the gathering of '2,000' UNIP supporters

that the actions of the students' union had been masterminded by foreign influences at the campus.⁴⁹

At Gwembe the District Governor was reported as suggesting

that foreign lecturers should be dismissed from the University of Zambia and replaced by UNIP lecturers.⁵⁰

As regards the demonstration in Lusaka, the Times reported that 4,000 had marched to Mulungushi Hall whereas a more accurate figure would have been six hundred. The Mail carried the front page headline, 'Close UNZA, demands UNIP', and like the Times gave prominence to a number of pictures of the Lusaka demonstration with the caption, 'Marching in Silent Anger'. In its middle pages, the Mail carried more photograph of the Lusaka demonstration this time with the caption, 'We rule, you learn'.

The editorials of the two papers also approached student defiance from a new angle. The Times referred to the majority of students as 'gutless wonders' puppeteered by student demagogues.

And while they [the majority of the student body] are about it, they might ask whether the job of student leaders is to organise campus activities, or is it to publicly express, unasked, opinions on behalf of the majority? Are these leaders, in fact, de facto MP's? And if they're not, why is it that they did not fully study the claims of Vorster and the White Paper issued by Mr Wina, and then put the issue to the student body for decision?

What manner of adolescents are these - the ones we're paying for?

Why did a majority of students sit there like a bunch of gutless wonders while a few puppeteers, for motives of their own, pull the strings.

Whose decision was it to rush about smashing property? Could it be an immature emulation of the sort of thing that has happened overseas?....

Too much of the students' letter is drivel, and misses the most important point of all. It is that there are powerful financial interests (this is not the place to name them) who are doing their best to force Zambia and Tanzania, into a grotesque capitulation of their independence. Is that what the students want? 51

The charge against the student leaders is ignorance and irresponsibility, while the editorial accuses the rank and file of failing to dictate terms to its leadership. In practice the opposite was nearer the truth: once the letter had been delivered it was the majority which dictated the pace and direction of events. The executive became redundant as mass participation emerged as the driving force behind the behaviour of the student body. The editorial, in absolving the majority of the students, was attempting to drive a wedge between them and the leadership, albeit unsuccessfully. The editorial in the Mail was propaganda of a more vicious nature. Its tenor is represented in the following extracts.

With all this generosity from the government and the members of the public, one would have expected that these young men and women would have spent more time on preparing themselves to give more to the country and less on composing badly-written statements insulting those who provide for them.

Last year, the campus was a place of embarrassment to the government and members of the public when reports were received and substantiated, that a handful of local students, egged on by foreign students, had established a hippieland at the campus in which young men and women indulged in sex orgies which went on into the daily [sic] hours of the morning as the participants drugged themselves with marijuana and danced naked on the campus roof tops....

Although the pocket money they now get is by far more than the salary of the farm and

factory workers;* they have been asking for more because their present allowance is not enough for their unending rounds of drinking sessions....

And when they are forced to cease haunting the town bars because their funds have run down, a great deal of their time is spent in listening to arm-chair politicians and fifth columnists who have found their way at the University, not to teach what they are paid for, but to preach subversion.

The events of the last week, involving insults to the leadership of the nation should give the government a golden opportunity to move fast and rid the campus of those foreign forces of destruction which have been moving into one African University after another, leaving in its wake from Ghana to Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and now in Zambia, a load of trouble.⁵²

*The writer of the editorial is under the mistaken impression that students receive K425 pocket money each year when in fact the actual amount is K95, which compares with a figure, used by Sikota Wina on another occasion, of a national per capita income of K186.⁵³

There is no evidence that the accusations against the students have any validity - they merely replicate the type of criticism over which students became so annoyed before the eruption of the Chanda Affair in 1967. The reference to foreign subversion represents a development which was to be hotly pursued in the following days. It was to be another tactic to absolve the 'favoured sons and daughters' from guilt and to explain away a genuine confrontation, with structural origins, between two sections of the Zambian society, undermining the national goal of unity of purpose and action.

The Mail also reported that two Rhodesian students, purporting to represent foreign students at the campus, had handed in a note the previous day dissociating themselves from the letter written by the executive. When this was found in the Mail these same two students were brought before the gathering amassed outside the library, and subjected to a

torrent of abuse for their betrayal of the student body - all the more acrimonious because of their alien status. Were it not for the menacing presence of hundreds of armed police and troops, there is little doubt that they too would have been assaulted and beaten up. The students knew that any crack in their solidarity behind their leadership would be exploited out of all proportion by the government to show that the action taken was masterminded by a small minority who imposed their will on the majority.

As the morning advanced so the police guard relaxed its surveillance and students were no longer being herded into the police lorries and carried off into town. After a series of deputations to the Vice-Chancellor, who had now arrived on the scene, and discussions with the Minister of Education, it was agreed that students should each receive K30 to finance their return home and that foreign students be allowed to reside during the extended holiday at the Ridgeway Campus. The atmosphere earlier in the morning beset with tension and anxiety was now noticeably easing and even giving way to joviality. Students were to be seen chatting to their somewhat embarrassed 'cousins' or 'old school friends' now in the uniform of police officers, assembled to carry out the evacuation of the campus. Rumours were circulating, still widely accepted, that the cabinet had been bitterly divided over the closure of the university and that at least three ministers, Kapwepwe, Nyirenda, Kwanakatwe and possibly a fourth Mudenda had opposed the majority decision of the Cabinet.⁵⁴

UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIA AND THE SOCIAL ORDER.

The divergence (escalation) or convergence (diminution) of the confrontation between two competing groups engaged in open conflict will depend on three variables. They are: first, the tension existing in the societal social structure in general and between the two groups in particular; second, the nature of the initial violation and counter-violation of the social order precipitating confrontation, and third, the stabilising elements tending to return the system to an equilibrium where tension and unimpeded role articulation can coexist. In this section, the events leading to the closure of the university will be examined within the framework of this paradigm with a view to a comparison with the Chanda Affair.

Tension in the Social Structure.

In an earlier chapter attention was accorded to the nature of the political system, the legitimacy of conflict and the expression of opposition. The tensions within society were contained through an authoritarian political system dominated by the political party. Tension inevitably increases in the social structure when strong opposition groups threaten to break out of the social order. At such times overt opposition becomes less legitimate. Coinciding with the series of confrontations between students and government just described, was the threatened appearance of a new party led by the popular leader amongst the Bemba-speaking population Simon Kapwepwe. Tension surrounding the possibility of a new Bemba dominated party had been rising ever since that sectional group had lost

its previous dominance in the Central Committee of the Party and the formulation of a constitution expressly designed to avoid a repeat of the Mulungushi Conference of 1967.⁵⁵ Already there were two ex ministers, Chimba and Chisata, from the Bemba-speaking population axed by President Kaunda waiting in the wings to return to national politics. Though the country had to wait another month after the closure of the university before the UPP was formed, many knew of the party before the students demonstrated at the beginning of July.

Thus when students were airing their opposition to the government and party, tension had already risen above its normal level.

The tension which exists between students and the government or party has been considered in chapters two and three.

But there is evidence that the tension between the university and the government had also been on the increase for some time.

Only a month before the disturbances on the occasion of the third graduation ceremony the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Goma, speaking of the pressures confronting universities in contemporary Africa made the following prophetic remarks concerning

'the unripe, uncongenial and sometimes risky environment'.

The proper growth and development of a new university and its efforts to be responsive to the real needs of its nation can be seriously impeded by mistaken or negative activism; but growth of a politics of intimidation and confrontation; an atmosphere charged with prejudice and distrust; ignorance of what a university is about and how it functions; outside interference; and instability in the nation. It is, therefore, important in evaluating the progress and performance of the university, to be aware of the intensity, presence or absence of these constraints

....

....students and university administrators have come under fire for allowing members of opposition parties to address meetings at the campus. And yet such opportunities can help to show the emptiness of some or all of the claims made by those who oppose ruling parties. Students and their teachers will not easily be fooled by the political buffoon of

whatever following. Where the public or ruling party is against such "invasions" of the campus by those with dissimilar beliefs, several questions arise. Does society want to encourage conformity, regimentation and passivity? Are students to be encouraged to model themselves on their present leaders, some of whom have failed miserably to solve the problems of their country, or are they to be given opportunities to grow and to mature, to decide for themselves what beliefs they will hold, what traditions they will respect and what they will discard?⁵⁶

The number of politicians, in some way opposed to UNIP, had recently addressed meetings on campus, usually at the invitation of the Sociological Association. From the beginning of the academic year, 1970, until July, three leading politicians from ANC, one ex-minister and opponent of the present government, five different government ministers including three appearances from Kapwepwe, had addressed meetings on campus. Those addressed by the opposition spokesmen tended to be better attended and were given publicity in the national press. Naturally the ovations welcomes and freedom awarded to opposition politicians at the university campus rankled with the UNIP politicians. The students for their part were possibly inspired by the oratory of the opposition spokesmen who ridiculed the government and spoke of the trends towards 'Messianism'.⁵⁷ But they were also genuinely disturbed about the nation's developing policy towards South Africa, and the uncovering of what appeared back door dealings with Rhodesia, as in the maize fiasco, and the revelation that Kaunda had been in correspondence with Vorster unbeknown to the Zambian population.⁵⁸ Whatever the contents of the letters, as far as they were concerned there was room for suspicion. In 1970 Zambia had staged, at great cost to itself, the Third Summit of the Non-Aligned Nations. The construction of an entirely new conference hall

and palatial residences for the visiting heads of states was greeted with unrestrained cynicism from the student body who could see no advantage to be gained from the event except as a publicity stunt for the President. His later trip to Europe and America where he was unceremoniously cold-shouldered by Heath and Nixon was greeted with indignation on the campus compounded by the President's passive response to the insults levelled at him and his people. Students were dissatisfied by the general lack of vigour in his dealings with other nations. Movements towards the one party state, always a possibility, were in the air and UNIP was as active as ever in deploying its coercive machinery to compel deviants to conform to UNIP rule.

That students were acutely conscious of the arbitrary powers of African governments is no better illustrated than by their reaction to the steps taken by President Mobutu against Congolese students commemorating their six colleagues shot dead a year before. Significantly the only UZ editorial in its three years of production to be devoted to events in another country not directly influencing Zambia was a hard hitting attack on the Mobutu regime.

And so President Mobutu once again has resorted to dirty dictatorial tactics of closing Lovanium 'Varsity' and ordering the students to enrol into the army. Like a colossus the mad Mobutu, murderer of that Congolese patriot and African hero Lumumba, went ahead to sentence 16 students who refused to be drafted into labour camps to 10 yrs. imprisonment. What bullshit! Those trumped-up charges of students plotting to kill him are outbursts of a frightened tyranny. We feel it is time African students condemned the wanton murders committed by the Mobutu gangsters. Must our brothers and sisters die in cold-blood with us gloating over their pool of blood? No fellow students. The time has come when students in droves and drabs, with ranks closed go ahead and castrate reactionaries like Mobutu and the globe-trotting Emperor Haile

Selassie who are constantly urinating on student progressive plans. The time for complacency is over and such leaders who are willing tools of imperialism must be made mince-meat of once and for all. 59

Ironically, this appeared just one month before similar events were to overtake the University of Zambia. Then, Zambian students would have even greater justification for joining the Congolese students in a bond of solidarity, but even at the time of writing students at UNZA were conscious of the oppress and insecure political atmosphere of their own country.

At any time the tensions within the social structures and between students and the party impose severe limitations on legitimate opposition, but in July 1971 there were indications that tensions were unusually high and relations particularly strained. What might have been legitimate at another time would now be considered illegitimate by government, and the reaction to oppositional sentiments, publicly expressed, was likely to be more severe.

Stabilising Forces.

In the previous chapter the various associations and ties which link the student to the wider society were considered for their potential to contain and resolve tension. It was found that their role in this connection was minimal; links to the government and party where they existed at all were tenuous and offered little scope for restraint of student or government behaviour. However, a body with strong connections both with government and the students would provide an apparatus of countervailing forces which might help restore equilibrium to the relations between conflicting groups. One such

intermediary body and probably the only one is the university administration and academic staff. In this section an attempt will be made to assess the impact of the academic staff and administration to articulate a brokerage role in the dispute between students and government after the students had been dismissed and the university closed.

Whatever pressure was exerted behind the scenes, there was no public statement from either the administration, senate, university council or academic staff until the 21st July, one week after the closure of the university and two days after a deportation order served on two lecturers. Indeed until the deportation order, the events and initiative was entirely in the hands of the students and party. Officially, at least, the government did not consult the Vice-Chancellor over the closure of the university, the expulsion of the students or the signing of the pledge. This appeared to be a case of direct and unimpeded interference by the government in the running of the university and clear cut example of the violation of what is referred to as 'university autonomy' as enshrined in the University Act.⁶⁰ Though the university senate met after the government intervention and before, its decisions and discussions have never been made public. It appears that the university council, the supreme governing body which in any case meets very rarely only began its deliberations after the deportation order on July 24th. At no time did either the academic staff or the administration attempt to influence student behaviour except on the occasion the Vice-Chancellor attempted to persuade the students to leave the Secretariat on July 8th. Nor would the students have taken much notice of what a member of staff or administrator had to say. It has

been the policy of the university authorities and staff to respect student autonomy and only as a last resort do they make any efforts to influence student behaviour. Thus as an intermediary group between student and government the university administration and staff had little bargaining power with the students.

Its bargaining power vis-à-vis the government was, if anything, even less, as is illustrated in the events following the deportation orders served on the two lecturers. The academic staff could not believe, as could not the students, that Etherton and Horne, perhaps the two lecturers who had contributed most to the university, who had been a major guiding hand behind the success of UNZA dramatics, were to be deported. Many who knew them, both students and staff, were incensed. Though they were two of the few lecturers who had known students outside the lecture room in extra curricular activities, there is no shred of evidence that they influenced the students in any way at any time since July 7th. Indeed when it came to political matters not only would the student totally ignore anything any expatriate had to say, but Etherton and Horne were likely to be so pro-government that their views would be rejected out of hand. In practice, of course, there was no conceivable opportunity for their influence to be exercised. Yet these were the lecturers served with deportation orders, presumably for the role they played in the events leading to the closure of the university.⁶¹

Following the announcement of the deportation order on July 19th an academic staff meeting was convened and in the afternoon a senate meeting also sat to discuss the closure and now the deportation orders. As a result of the senate meeting

the Vice-Chancellor telephoned the President who was then touring Northern Province to arrange a meeting. The two met the following day in Mbala, unbeknown to the press. On July 21st the Vice-Chancellor reported to a meeting of the entire academic staff on his meeting with President Kaunda. At this meeting Professor Goma said the President had agreed to request the Minister of Home Affairs to extend the deportation order by a period of seven days. He also said that the President would meet a delegation of academic staff on Saturday, July 24th and address all the members of the academic staff on Sunday morning. Following this meeting between the Vice-Chancellor and the entire academic staff a statement was released to the press reflecting the views of those assembled on the closure, expulsions and deportations. Whatever the actual text of the press release, it did not receive a very happy interpretation in the press the following day. Headlines in the Times were, 'UNZA threatened. Now the staff have their say' and in the Mail 'Lecturers issue warning...UNZA's Future in Danger'. The Mail editorial, however, made the views of the party admirably clear.

It is most regrettable that when the lecturers and professors at the University decided to break their silence on the University issue yesterday, their statement was far from reassuring the nation that they would help bring the situation back to normal at the campus.

What was the nation given instead? A feeling of disquiet among the academic staff about the expulsion of a group of students who had insulted the President; disquiet about the requirement that those returning sign a pledge stating that they would concentrate on activities for which the taxpayer pays for during their stay at the University, and disquiet about the deportation orders issued on two members of the academic staff....

Whether those deported are University lecturers, medical doctors, engineers or surveyors is immaterial. It is government's prerogative to keep in

the country only those she wants to keep. We do not think it is fair for other busybodies to tell us how to run the country.

We feel it ill-behoves intellectuals and academics to toss around veiled threats, which are tantamount to blackmail, with naive statements that the University hangs in the balance. Who is intended to be kidded? This University will go on and will be run as those who finance it want it to be run in the interest of the nation as a whole. This is an indisputable fact and one of which those who want to blackmail us into believing otherwise should take full note.⁶²

These views sum up the bargaining strength of the university community, as subsequent events bear out.

A delegation from the academic staff did meet the President on Saturday, July 24th and this was followed by a meeting between the President, accompanied by the Minister of Education, Mr. Nyirenda, and the Chairman of the University Council, Mr. Phiri, and the entire academic staff. The press was deliberately barred from the meeting. Nevertheless, both newspapers carried front page stories the following morning on the meeting: the Mail under the headline 'Staff talk it over with KK'⁶³ and the Times under the headline 'No comment - but UNZA smiles'.⁶⁴ In fact the President had given the academic staff considerable grounds for optimism. He said he would look into the deportation orders, while postponing them for a further seven days. As far as the expelled students were concerned, 'it was up to them', which was widely interpreted as meaning that following a public apology he might be prepared to lighten their punishment.

For four days silence reigned but at midnight on Thursday (July 29th) the President summoned the Vice-Chancellor to State House and informed him that there would be no concessions from government. On the contrary the two lecturers were to

leave the country by July 31st which was three days before the President's extended deadline. They eventually left on August 1st. The newspapers' publication of the possibility of concessions to the academic staff may have so irked party politicians that they forced the President to reverse any goodwill he may have felt towards the academic staff. Between the conflicting demands of the party and the university there is no doubt which is the more decisive.

The propaganda disseminated by government in justification of the closure of the university is an equally potent example of the weakness of the university before the essentially government controlled press agencies, and the virtual monopoly over information related to government action. In a lengthy speech to parliament, five days after the closure, Milner, Secretary General to Government referred the House to a number of factors concerning the closure of the university.⁶⁵ He stressed that the original demonstration outside the French Embassy was illegal and that it broke into a riot before the students reached the Embassy. (The latter point is of doubtful validity.) As regards the atmosphere on the university campus on the day previous to the closure Milner says,

The stubbornness and parochialism of the student leaders was not received with acclamation from all quarters of the student body. The majority of students felt embarrassed...On Wednesday July the 14th, terror had gripped the Campus. The majority of students had been completely subdued by a small noisy and lawless group...The real problem was what was happening on Campus itself. Student leaders had completely lost control of the situation. Ugly incidents of violence against fellow students were increasing. Two of them were badly beaten up for holding opposing views. Intimidation was rife and a reign of terror was the order of the day....⁶⁶

At another point in his speech he makes the comment

Information had been received that the students on the 14th July had planned to march on the Administration.⁶⁷

Towards the end he makes veiled references to outside influences which presumably account for the deportation of the two lecturers.

If in this matter student leaders, or some of them had fallen prey to influences from outside, let me say this: Our students, indeed all Zambians, should desist from taking advice on crucial issues, from people or groups of people who in the final analysis will not be answerable. When the dire consequences of shortsighted actions and attitudes come, as they always will, such advisers and friends will not suffer with us. Indeed, the students of the University of Zambia, more than anyone else, should be able to appreciate the seriousness of this wisdom.⁶⁸

All these factors, which Milner presents as contributing to the closure of the university, in a direct or indirect manner, have an air of spuriousness. On the following day the Mail front page headlines were 'Students Planned to Take Over'.

University of Zambia students planned to take over government offices on the day the university was closed, Secretary-General Mr Aaron Milner told the Mail yesterday. But, he said, he never believed they would have overthrown the government, or achieved anything.⁶⁹

Such a statement was nowhere included in Milner's address to parliament and cannot be regarded as having any more validity than some of the other statements made by Milner and the story of the balloons which was included in President Kaunda's letter to the Vice-Chancellor. According to the Times the letter said

that students had released balloons filled with explosive gas. Two people were injured when the balloons exploded.

Sources at the university campus said the closure, and subsequent actions, stemmed from the balloon incidents.⁷⁰

The 'ideological counter attack' assumed two forms. First a direct attack on the students (following an equally and biased outspoken assault on the police) as arrogant and ungrateful parasites. After the closure the government, concealing the existence of a genuine breach of confidence between students and government, attributed student defiance to a set of irresponsible, privately motivated and externally influenced leaders who incited and intimidated the majority of innocent students into an expression of anti-party sentiment. The source of the confrontation lies more in the subversive activities of expatriate lecturers and not in the structural tension between students and government. Thus the reason for the closure is not the letter signed by the ten member executive, nor the determination of the students to make a stand against the party but an apparently purely technical matter; the (supposed) breakdown of law and order on the university campus.⁷¹ The university was powerless to counter the propaganda created to justify the closure, the expulsions and the deportations. Just as the academic staff and administration had no influence over student behaviour they had equally little influence over governmental behaviour. As a stabilising factor tending to restore equilibrium its effect is slight.

The Powerless University.

In explaining the tense relations between universities and the state in Africa, Ashby writes,

What is sometimes overlooked in Africa is that in Europe - even in Britain - and in America it is the conventions, not the constitutions, of university government which provide the real safeguards for academic freedom...When universities are exported, these conventions are unlikely to be exported with them; and this has been the cause of some difficulties in the universities of tropical Africa.⁷²

Why have the conventions not taken root in Africa? What ensures adherence to them in countries where they have taken root? The answer in both cases revolves around the more fundamental element of the power of the university. There are good reasons to believe that the university is more influential and has greater sanctions at its command in England, for example, than it has in Zambia.

There are a number of factors which contribute to the university's weakness. First, the academic staff are nearly all non-Zambian and white; their contacts with the government are tenuous if they exist at all, while their links with the party politicians who are the most hostile towards students are virtually non-existent. There is no opportunity for either side to attempt to reach an understanding of one another's position. Given the isolation of the academic staff and indeed the students, when faced with an attack they have no contacts upon which to draw to mount a 'resistance movement'. The Vice-Chancellor of the University, though he is a Zambian, has spent much of his time in universities abroad, and is possibly more a scientist than a politician. He brings with him the traditions of the liberal university as his valiant defence of the university revealed. However, his long absence from the country and his scientific interests have diminished his chances of establishing support for himself and his institution in political circles.

The lack of sympathy between the members of the university and the political élite is compounded by the low levels of education amongst members of the latter group. In Britain the members of the university student body, teaching staff and administration are often no better educated than the political

élite and indeed were often colleagues together in the same institutions. Consequently their common background makes for a mutual understanding of one another's problems. The relations in Zambia between the university and the society outside is thwart with misunderstanding and antipathy. The situation is not ameliorated by the existence of disparate channels of mobility into the various élites. Leaders in the military, administrative, governmental, economic and party élites have all moved through different avenues of recruitment, unlike other countries where they nearly all pass through universities. Thus for the majority of the members of the ruling class the University of Zambia has no particular significance except possibly as a threat to their own incumbency. Certainly there is no core of university graduates within each of the élites which, acting as 'an old boy network', might exert influence on behalf of the university. The few graduates which are to be found in the ruling class are from universities outside Zambia and have little or no connection with the University of Zambia.

Bargaining power of a section of Zambian society outside the ruling class is largely dependent on their indispensability to the smooth running of the state. In this respect the mineworkers, for example, are very much more powerful than the students, and the government would be very wary of dealing with the miners in a reckless manner.⁷³ This is because the mineworkers control the nation's economy. The students, on the other hand, have no such sanctioning power. As the centre for the training of skilled manpower to diminish the nation's reliance on expatriate manpower, it is conceivable that the university has some bargaining power. In practice, however,

the government is not so unhappy with the status quo where expatriates perform crucial roles without assuming any political influence. The young graduate is not likely to accept a politically impotent role in his new job. He is likely to provide a threat to Zambians in supervisory and administrative positions where the expatriate employed on short term contracts is more interested in the pecuniary benefits of his job. As Professor Goma has said,

Many of Africa's key men are surrounded by foreign advisers, some of them being the same old colonial civil servants now under a different guise. The great majority of the academic staff in African universities is still made up of expatriates. Among these are those who are still dominated by colonial attitudes. Their role at these universities, besides being paternalistic, is to try and influence and guide things and students for purposes not always in the best interest of the African country concerned...Then there are some Africans in our universities, schools, the civil service, industry, and other sectors of our societies, who are worse in their attitudes than some of the worst expatriates. Their main interest is to preserve their prestige, to earn their income and hence preserve the status quo.74

Not only are their vested interests in government which show some reluctance to allow the graduate to progress as fast as he would like, but there is also an unwillingness to take advantage of the teaching personnel at the university as 'experts' in their respective fields.

In the matter of expert advice, the African governments and countries do not make full use of the expertise concentrated in their universities and colleges. The reasons for this...would seem to be insufficient decolonisation of the mind and the consequent uncritical adulation of foreign experts and know-how. The work of local specialists is often not seriously appreciated or demanded by Government and the various sectors of the national economy. Instead specialists are brought in (from abroad) at very great expense to produce, in a few days, reports that are often worth next-to-nothing. In some cases, the advice that the visiting so-called experts give today may be identical with what the local expert has been saying for years, but has never been listened to.75

The attitude which the Vice-Chancellor refers to as 'insufficient decolonisation of the mind' is a particular example of provincialism, and has wider applicability than merely ex-colonial territories. The consequences, however, are clear. The university becomes more isolated and even less able to apply pressure or mobilise countervailing forces when it faces an assault from the party.

The University Council, the supreme governing body of the university, appears also to have relatively little influence as a countervailing force as against the pressures brought to bear by the party. The members of the council tend to be representatives of the world of education rather than the political sphere. The Chairman for example, Mr. David Phiri, is a graduate from Oxford University and a Director of Anglo American. Like the Vice-Chancellor his background leads him to sympathise with the ethos behind the liberal university and the preservation of university autonomy. He has probably little sympathy for and receives little from the majority of party leaders.

Such are the inevitable problems of an isolated, dispensable institution structurally discontinuous with the total society. When its members violate the precarious segregation of institutionally prescribed roles and wider civic roles, on which equilibrium rests, the university can do little to restore the system to normalcy.

Violation and Reprisal.

A state of social equilibrium between students and government presupposes the segregation of university and civic roles into their respective social structures. A violation of the

role discontinuity by enacting a university role in the civic sphere or by imposing a civic role in the university sphere leads to a chain reaction of reprisal and counter violation.

The first demonstration outside the French Embassy, though it was a violent assault on the unprotected building, was heralded both within the university and outside as a heroic act, well within the bounds of legitimate student behaviour. Situated at the intersection of university and civic roles it served as a ritualistic cementation of solidarity between students and government. The reprisals of the police, in many ways understandable but nevertheless unrestrained and disorganised, became the subject of public consternation. A certain amount of 'student bashing' on such occasions has become an established ritual, but the use of a firearm signalled the first move outside the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. The tributes showered on the students in the mass media forged a heightened student solidarity and triggered off a spontaneous demonstration of protest, this time against 'police brutality'. Student action was already moving out towards the boundaries of legitimate behaviour, now extended by a wave of public support. The government was to grant no concession to the student demands, on the contrary the President in failing to congratulate the students on the courage of their demonstration indirectly questioned its legitimacy.

At this point student spontaneity reached a climax. Unbeknown to the majority of students but nevertheless in sympathy with their sentiments the ten member student executive wrote an open letter to the President attacking the manner in which he was governing the country. The first reaction was shock at the 'temerity' of the student leaders compounded by

realisation of their seriousness when, in the face of pressure from the Minister of Education, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Vice-Chancellor, they unhesitatingly refused to retract the letter or make any apologetic gesture. To publicly criticise the President of Zambia is to discredit the most sacred national symbol, the embodiment of Zambia and the United National Independence Party - an unprecedented event in the history of the nation. Retribution could only be damnation. Reprisal from the party was to be unrestrained.


Essentially there were two modal responses from the student body to the action taken by their leadership. Either they could have dissociated themselves from it through the insurrection of a counter leadership from the plentiful supply of informal 'influentials' within the student community, or they could endorse the sentiments in the letter by mobilising support behind the executive. After the initial impact, and discussion the informal leaders and the rank and file spontaneously absorbed the executive into its midst and stood as one. This was the second shock which UNIP had to countenance, epitomised by the refusal of the student executive to meet UNIP politicians.

Reprisals from Freedom House were swift. The students and not just the student leaders were the enemy of the nation. This put the final touches on the consolidation of student solidarity. Dissent within the student body would, from now on, be stifled, if necessary through intimidation. Minority interest would have to bow to majority rule. The escalation of the confrontation was inevitable as both sides were recalcitrant in their opposition. The precarious division between civic and university roles had been shattered. Students had

launched into the civic sphere in the unbridled capacity of their university role. The party equally had reacted by threatening to use coercion to force the civic role on the students now that they had entered the national political arena, while others threatened to compel them to retreat into their isolated university existence. The matter was resolved in favour of the government by the non violent closure of the university, after a ritual condemnation of the students through country wide demonstrations and the ritual reaffirmation of the public's faith in the nation's most sacred symbol of unity and integrity.

The events are diagrammatically represented in figure one. Student protest becomes significant as a catalyst for change when it enjoins, supports, resonates or detonates contemporaneous unrest and dissatisfaction in the wider society. If the student executive, moved by the public tributes to their 'valour' outside the French Embassy, felt it had widespread support in the nation then it underestimated the authority of the party and the widespread resentment that underlies attitudes towards students in many influential circles. Though possibly trade unionists may have been in sympathy with the sentiments expressed by the students, they were not in a position to give any support to the students nor capitalise on their defiant stand. The most they could be expected to do, was to refrain from condemnation of the students. Certainly the series of nodal points of student oppositional action were sufficient to allow any other oppositional group to make its appearance. The student body by itself can never bring about social or political change without support from outside; it can however detonate support from other groups at the nodal

FIG. 1 - ESCALATING CONFRONTATION - JULY, 1971.




points of its own defiance of the state. Thus the workers of France exploited the determination of university students to overthrow the Gaullist regime, for their own ends and the prosecution of the 'May Revolution of 1968'.⁷⁶

Comparison with the 'Chanda Affair'.

Whereas the events leading to the closure of the university represent a divergent or escalating confrontation, the 'Chanda Affair' represents a convergent or diminishing confrontation. The points of difference are worth considering. The initial demonstration over the letters published in the Mail did not receive any approval from the wider society or mass media, on the contrary the media showed much disgust for the student action. Thus, Chanda's letter, which followed, not only embittered an already hostile public opinion, but also failed to attract the support of either the remainder of the student executive or the student body as a whole. The hostility expressed by the press and the Presidential demand for an apology was therefore focused not at the student body but at its leader Henry Chanda. Though he may well have expressed the oppositional sentiments in his letter the students were not prepared to confront the government over this issue. Instead the student executive deliberately betrayed their President in dissociating themselves from his action and apologising to Milner for any embarrassment he may have been caused. Rather than launching out into the civic arena, the students recoiled back into the university arena reasserting their conformity to the established norms of student behaviour. In this way, only Chanda himself suffered from the temporary violation of the discontinuity between university and civic roles. The events are portrayed diagrammatically in figure two.

FIG. 2 - DIMINISHING CONFRONTATION - OCTOBER, 1967.



The Dynamics of Unstable Equilibria.

The equilibrium in which the university system normally rests is unstable for three reasons. First the structural conditions for equilibrium are rigidly defined and impose severe constraints on legitimate student behaviour. These constraints are analytically described by the discontinuity between civic and university roles and the small arena of social action over which these two roles intersect. In societies where university and civic roles intersect over wider arenas of social action, student behaviour in public and university spheres is less restricted and equilibria more stable. Second, tension in the social structure is such that any violation of equilibrium conditions is sensitively recorded. The social structure responds to the slightest 'aberration' by propagating a series of 'perturbations' through the system of interactions between different groups. These perturbations may converge or diverge according to the nature of the initial and subsequent aberrations and the countervailing pressures brought into play. Third, the social forces tending to dampen perturbations and restore the system to equilibrium are weak. Following a violation of equilibrium conditions a chain reaction develops throughout the system whose destabilising tendencies are difficult to contain with only weak countervailing forces. The university system is not enmeshed in a set of cross cutting ties and associations which lock it into a position in the social structure and from which it may deviate only slightly. On the contrary it is a disconnected and relatively powerless institution tenuously integrated into the wider social system. Thus the unstable equilibrium is described by the sensitivity of the social structure to departures from equilibrium conditions, the precise and confining definition of those conditions, combined with an absence of strong stabilising forces tending to restore the system to equilibrium.

Short of permanently closing the university, the onus was now on the Zambian government to re-establish a working relationship with the university under conditions which would nurture peaceful co-existence. It was to be on the government's initiative, possibly in consultation with representatives of the university, that these new conditions would be defined. In the next chapter, the discussion will turn to the response of interested parties to the events of July just described. The analysis will first dwell on the response of the students, and then it will revert to a consideration of the response of the government in the light of steps taken by other governments faced with a similar set of problems.

NOTES.

1. This is what Gluckman in another context might have referred to as a ritual of protest. Gluckman, M., Custom and Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), Chapter V, pp.109-36.
2. Image of UNZASU (Mid Year General Report of the University of Zambia Student Union, 1 October 1970).
3. Times of Zambia, 1 May 1966.
4. In this sense the police the world over are similar in behaving like the Zulu women who once a year are encouraged to reject their submissive role and take on the role of the man. This is an accepted and legitimate practice, just as police brutality so long as it does not overstep certain limits is similarly encouraged by the society at large.
5. Gluckman, op.cit., p.116.
6. Ibid., p.134.
7. Times of Zambia, 4 October 1967.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Times of Zambia, 5 October 1967.
12. Times of Zambia, 6 October 1967.
13. Zambia Mail, 6 October 1967.
14. Times of Zambia, 6 October 1967.
15. Ibid.
16. Zambia Mail, 15 September 1967.
17. The films shown every Friday at the campus are usually of the cheaper American variety, and are very popular amongst students.
18. Times of Zambia, Mid October, 1967.
19. Ibid.
20. Skinner Affair. See Times of Zambia and Zambia Mail, 16-19 July 1969.
21. This was revealed in court at the trial of seven students charged with riot on July 7th, 1971.
22. It is interesting to note that students have never demonstrated with UNIP Youth or any other UNIP organisation even over issues in which their interests are apparently identical.
23. This was revealed in court at the trial of the seven students charged with riot.
24. Sunday Times, 11 July 1971.
25. Times of Zambia, 8 July 1971.
26. Ibid.
27. Daily Mail, 8 July 1971.
28. Ibid.
29. Undisclosed source.
30. Recollections of the writer soon after the speech.
31. Daily Mail, 9 July 1971.
32. Zambia Information Services, Press Release No. 92/71, 12 July 1971.
33. Ibid.
34. Where are We Going? A Letter to President Kaunda (Circular distributed 12 July 1971).

35. The only evidence of annoyance was the tearing up of a number of the circulars on which the open letter had been reproduced.
36. Times of Zambia, 13 July 1971.
37. Times of Zambia, 14 July 1971.
38. Daily Mail, 14 July 1971.
39. Scale, P. and McConville, M., French Revolution 1968 (Penguin Books, 1968), Chapter Four, pp.71-93.
40. Daily Mail, 14 July 1971.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Times of Zambia, 15 July 1971.
44. They represent an interesting difference of opinion as between the liberal student from England and the Zambian student.
45. What are we doing? No. 2 (Circular distributed 14 July 1971).
46. Ibid.
47. What are we doing? No. 3 (Circular distributed 14 July 1971).
48. Zambia Information Services, Closure of the University of Zambia (Distributed to students 15 July 1971).
49. Times of Zambia, 15 July 1971.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Daily Mail, 15 July 1971.
53. Wina, S., The University and our National Interests (An address to the University Sociological Association, 6 May 1970; Zambia Information Services, Background No. 41/70.).
54. This is a rumour which is still so widely believed that it might bear some approximation to the truth. It is certainly the case that the Minister of Education never made any speech condemning the student, yet as Minister of Education this should have been his responsibility. Kapwepwe was known to have had sympathy for the students and his subsequent recruitment of students from the university campus for his new party suggests that he too was probably opposed to the closure. Mwanakatwe as a previous Minister of Education and Mudenda as a product of the University of Cambridge may be regarded as having sympathies for the students.
55. The writer was aware of the probability of the formation of the new party some two months previous to the July events.
56. Goma, L. K. H., The Pressures on a Developing University in Contemporary Africa (Address by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zambia on the occasion of the third graduation ceremony, 5 June 1971).
57. Sipalo, M., Democracy in Theory and in Practice in Independent Africa (Address to the University Sociological Association, 13 October 1970). It was Sipalo who coined the phrase 'messianism.'

The appeal is no longer to the reason of the citizen, but to his gullibility. A more recent phenomenon in Africa has been the emergence of what Max Weber has called the "charismatic leader" - the era of Messianism has arrived in Africa. He is the expression of the general will. He is the be-all and end-all of everything.

- Sipalo's address was so widely acclaimed that the student union was compelled to reproduce 500 copies of his speech. Sipalo was Minister of Agriculture in the UNIP government until he lost his seat in the 1968 election.
58. For details of the exchanges between Vorster and Kaunda see, Republic of Zambia, Dear Mr. Vorster,... (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, April 1971).
 59. UZ, 14 July 1971.
 60. See the Government of Zambia, University of Zambia Act (Act No. 66 of 1965). All powers as regards the administration and government of the university are constitutionally in the hands of the University Council or the Senate.
 61. The only indication that the lecturers were being deported for their supposed involvement came in a paragraph from Aaron Milner's statement to parliament on the closure of the University of Zambia.

....if in this matter student leaders, or some of them, had fallen prey to influences from outside, let me say this: Our students, indeed all Zambians, should desist from taking advice on crucial issues from people or groups of people who in the final analysis will not be answerable....
 62. Hansard, 20 July 1971, column 137.
 63. Daily Mail, 22 July 1971.
 64. Daily Mail, 26 July 1971.
 65. Times of Zambia, 26 July 1971.
 66. Hansard, 20 July 1971, columns 129-144.
 67. Ibid., columns 133-5.
 68. Ibid., column 135.
 69. Ibid., column 137.
 70. Daily Mail, 21 July 1971.
 71. Times of Zambia, 2 August 1971.
 72. One does not have to look far for a similar analysis of student opposition. For example the protest demonstration by South African students, see The Guardian (U.K.) 12 and 13 June 1972. For an analysis of American students which attributes American student 'radicalism' to professors who 'teach alienation' and to a few malcontents see Hayakawa, S. I., "Alienation is being Taught by Professors," reproduced in Wallerstein, I. and Starr, P. (eds.), Confrontation and Counterattack (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp.439-41. This statement by the President of San Francisco State College bears a remarkable resemblance to the suspicion voiced by party leaders towards expatriate lecturers.
 73. Ashby, E., African Universities and Western Tradition (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p.71.
 74. Though in 1971 a handful of leaders, who were instigating strike action, were put under restriction, the government has generally feared the power and organisational strength of the mineworkers and the party has failed to gain control of the mineworkers' union. See Bates, R., Unions, Parties and Political Development (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), especially Chapter Seven and passim.
 75. Address by the Vice-Chancellor at the Occasion of the Second Graduation Ceremony of the University of Zambia, 6 June 1970.
 76. Ibid.
 77. See Seale and McConville, op.cit.

CHAPTER SIX

THREE MODAL RESPONSES TO TENSION.

The principles of interaction and legitimate articulation of the student's university and civic roles have been discussed in previous chapters. Prior to the events of July an unwritten concordat, acknowledged by both government and students, delineated the norms of behaviour in different situations. The conventions enshrined in the concordat were temporarily abridged by the government intervention and closure of the university. This chapter will be concerned to examine the nature of the concordat which was established following the reopening of the university. What changes were wrought in the balance between civic and university roles and in the areas of their respective arenas of action? What alternatives were open to the government in defining the relations between civic and university roles?

STUDENT RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION.

The chapter begins with a recapitulation of the principles of role articulation within the university social structure and the uncertainty concerning the relative importance to be accorded to different roles following the reopening of the university.

Limitations on the Civic Role.

What Gluckman wrote of the Zambian mineworker may be equally applied to the Zambian student.

....An African townsman is a townsman, an African miner is a miner. We may anticipate that as soon as Africans assemble in towns and engage in industrial work, they will begin to form social relationships appropriate to their new situation: they will try to combine to better their conditions in trade unions, and associations of law-

breakers will emerge as well as friendly and burial societies, and so forth. Of course, these Africans continue to be influenced by many factors arising outside of the urban situation; the rapid growth of towns and their own inexperience of towns, the constant move of African labourers between tribe and town and between towns and the tribal culture and life from which they come, as well as customary linkages and hostilities between different tribes. But even these tribal influences operate now in an urban milieu, and not in a rural milieu. The urbanized African is outside the tribe, but not beyond the influence of the tribe. Correspondingly, when a man returns from the towns into the political area of his tribe he is tribalized again - de-urbanized - though not beyond the influence of the towns.¹

Replacing townsman by student, urban system by university system etc., and extending tribal linkages to include a much wider range of externally derived roles, the above passage adequately summarises the previous chapter. Put another way, within the university system, the civic role will be activated only where university and civic roles are compatible. When the civic role is activated in a situation where it is incompatible with the university social structure or interests of the student community then severe sanctions are applied to the 'deviant' individuals to ensure conformity to established norms. This was apparent in the accusations of political partisanship, close links with government, 'spying' etc., which so abound any election contest. In a closed, small scale, community sanctions are inescapable; students are easily subjected to embarrassment and if necessary ostracised for their failure to conform to the norms of the student community. In extreme cases when the student is not prepared to relinquish overriding commitment to a civic role in the context of the university social structure then he will sever relations with the student community, amputating his university role. When student interests are ambiguous for one reason or another,

'deviance' is less well-defined and behaviour, which under normal circumstances would be penalised, is now considered legitimate.

Limitations on the University Role.

The discontinuity between university and civic roles is dependent on the insulation of the university social system from the wider social system. Where the two systems overlap and intersect incompatible demands on student behaviour are resolved in favour of the system which is both able and desires to impose the severest sanctions.²

The boundaries of the urban and rural systems of relations are not always clear but reveal themselves as sharply defined in a specifically industrial setting. When strike action is called for, the tribal representatives are openly rejected in favour of a strike committee.³ Different circumstances pertain in the case of the university system which, in accordance with the 'Western tradition', retains a well-defined boundary insulating its activities from the outside world. The third chapter illustrated the extent of the insulation of the university system by virtue of its geographical isolation, the detachment of the university from wider societal problems, the inability of the world outside to appreciate the problems of the academic, the propagation of the ideology of academic freedom and university autonomy and the disparate and conflicting interests of the academic community vis-à-vis the wider society. The nature of the university system therefore strengthens the discontinuity between university and civic roles.

So long as oppositional attitudes were confined to

internal channels of communication, that is to the student press consumed internally, to applause for campus speeches of opposition politicians, to angry replies to visiting government ministers, to circulars distributed at meal times and to informal debate and discussion, so the role discontinuity was not violated and neither government nor party intervened. However, when the result of the articulation of the university role is deliberately propagated out of the university system into the wider system, as in the case of the open letters sent by Chanda and the 1971 UNZASU executive, the university role may be "over extended." The difference between the hostile political commentaries in the columns of U2 and the public expression of opposition in an open letter to the President by student leaders is clear. But the legitimacy and consequences of the expression of opposition in the area spanning these two extremes is less obvious and open to dispute. The section next turns to competition within the community arising out of the ambiguity of the consequences of the extension of the university role.

Competing Role Allegiances.

During the period between the closure of the university on July 15th and its reopening on August 30th, the United Progressive Party was formed. UNIP was now presented with a challenge to its supremacy and the country faced the possibility of a political schism. In those areas where the UPP was anticipated to have support, UNIP's activities tended to be particularly militant. In the event, UPP never managed to achieve the following some had anticipated but UNIP nevertheless perceived it as an 'enemy' not to be trifled with. When

the university reopened it was still not clear how much support the new party had, since widespread intimidation disinclined its followers and sympathisers to reveal themselves. The challenge of the UPP, the known oppositionalism to government coupled with the apparent popularity of Kapwepwe on the campus and the resolute defiance of the government leading to the closure of the university were all good reasons for party politicians to encourage the development of a UNIP cell amongst the students. Staunch supporters of UNIP, either out of motives of opportunism or idealism, greeted the new circumstances as requiring the consolidation and mobilisation of support amongst their fellow students.

The closure of the university and the memories of the spirit of community and liberation during those few 'glorious' days when the students had become deeply embroiled in the national political arena, and had defied the strength of the party had a lasting impact. They returned disenchanted with what had happened, expecting a stricter surveillance of their activities and a drastic curtailment of their freedom of expression. In his welcoming address to the students the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Goma, stressed the importance that university life should return to normality. Though the editor of UZ was initially doubtful whether the publication of the paper would be resumed (he had earlier received a note from the Registrar to the effect that student publications would all be banned) nonetheless it was not long before it reappeared. But, there was no commentary on the events which had come to pass since the last issue.

A number of students had become intensely politicized, though many more wanted nothing more than to be allowed to get

on with their studies and prepare for their examinations unhindered by politics. The community had become more polarised into "politicized" and "anti-political" students.

One further circumstance lent itself to the intrusion of externally derived roles into campus life, namely the leadership vacuum left by the expulsion of the ten member UNZASU executive. After initial uncertainty it was decided that the Presidents of Hall Councils (elected in a two stage electoral process by the students living in each hall of residence) would be called upon as an 'Ad Hoc Committee', to perform the functions of the union executive. They accepted this new role and from amongst themselves elected a chairman to act as President. Since they were appointed to their new positions and had not offered themselves as candidates in an election, they felt justified in pursuing a very moderate and conciliatory approach towards the government and university authorities. They were not there to make a political stand but to simply take care of the day-to-day running of UNZASU affairs.

Five analytically distinct groups emerged against this background, a UNIP cell composed mainly of students from Eastern Province, a UPP cell composed mainly of Bemba-speaking students, a group of strong independents who, though disaffected, refused to be intimidated by the government, the party or any other extraneous 'power', a group of 'unionists' whose concern was the narrow prosecution of student interests and the return to peaceful relations with government, epitomised by the Ad Hoc Committee, and finally the majority who wished to be left alone to get on with their studies and successfully complete their degrees.

The UNIP campaign was led by Kamoyo from Eastern Province.

As Social and Cultural Secretary in the Bushe administration, he was continually at the centre of controversy. At that time he had been one of the most prominent opponents of a UNIP branch on the campus, asserting that loyalty to UNIP was compatible with opposition to a campus branch of the party. It was widely reported, when the students reassembled after the reopening of the university, that Kamoyo had been in close contact with State House, and some went so far as to accuse him of divulging the names of prominent leaders during the July events. How true this is, is not clear but amongst students it was widely believed. As a result Kamoyo yet again became the centre of controversy and suffered a spate of vituperative abuse. It was not long, however, before he was campaigning for student participation within UNIP, gathering around him a group of fellow UNIP followers almost entirely recruited from Eastern Province. Meetings were arranged with politicians off the campus and large UNIP posters, printed in response to the creation of UPP - 'UNIP IS POWER' - were distributed to students. Kamoyo, now in his fourth year, was not eligible for office in NUZS but at the Eighth National Congress held between 1st October and 3rd October, 1971 Kamoyo and his supporters secured a large following and of the five UNZA students elected to the executive three were known UNIP stalwarts, one was a supporter of UPP (the President) and one was an 'independent'. There is no way of accurately estimating UNIP's support on the campus but it could not have been large, particularly as the cell was confined to students from Eastern Province

While Kamoyo was campaigning on behalf of UNIP, a number of students were actively supporting UPP. UPP cards were being sold freely but not too openly on the campus. There was

little doubt that the party received considerable support from the Bemba-speaking students. After the first round of detentions, nine students gave up their studies to fill some of the vacant posts. Of these nine, seven were Bemba-speaking, one from Southern Province and one from North Western Province. Cosmos Chola, the expelled President of UNZASU, led the group and the two non-Bembas had been colleagues of his when he was Vice-President in the Bushe administration. These same two (one had been Secretary General and the other Publicity Secretary) were known for their idealism and 'radicalism' towards national and student politics. Both had been particularly disenchanted with the government's response to their sincerely felt hostility towards the French. On the day before their departure these same two students were comparing the Zambian government unfavourably with the apartheid regime of South Africa. Their joining the UPP was an expression of extreme distaste for the way the government had handled the students. Their departure did not stimulate any particular reaction from the students, but inevitably brought them yet again into the limelight of the national political arena. It was further cause for UNIP politicians to begin another assault on the students, but by now the students were inured to such attacks.

A third group - the 'unionists' - wished merely to preserve the student body intact and protect it against a repeat of the incidents of July. They disapproved of the use of the campus as a recruiting ground for UNIP and UPP. The Ad Hoc Committee, entrusted with the role of UNZASU executive, attempted to steer a diplomatic course seeking assistance and advice from the administration and academic staff. They, for example, gave one lecturer - Robert Molteno - a platform to

address students on the restructuring of the university proposing such changes as the dispersal of students and staff among the community, bicycles for students, loans instead of grants, community service, and university self help scheme. Molteno was given a rough handling by the assembled students who were not impressed by his suggestions. Nevertheless the report was widely distributed by the Ad Hoc Committee both within and outside the University. This was part of their conciliatory public relations role.

The fourth group comprised the strong independents who felt that party politics had no role to play on the campus and that students should not be intimidated by government or pressures, but retain their self respect through freedom of thought and expression. Thus some students were eager to invite Milner and Bulawayo to address the student body, whereas the Ad Hoc Committee and other 'unionists' expressed the fear that such a meeting might have the unfortunate consequence of attracting more wrath from the party. In fact the Sociological Association invited both, but failed to receive a reply from Bulawayo while Milner, keen to come, was too busy at the time. It was an opinion poll which most clearly revealed the divergence of opinion on campus and the ambiguity of the situation the students now found themselves in.

The Politics of Withdrawal versus the Politics of Confrontation.

With the opening of the University the Daily Mail discontinued its assault on the student body until the nine students joined the United Progressive Party on September 23rd. This was the occasion for further abuse to be thrown at the students, particularly by the head of the government news agency (ZANA),

who was frequently called upon to assault the "enemies of the nation" on radio or television. The press was less concerned about the students and more concerned to highlight the opportunism and unscrupulousness of Kapwepwe. However, the Mail did write in its editorial,

Now he has attracted students who have been accused of hurling worse insults on the leadership in the country...If these are the people that he now elevates in his party, does it ever occur to him that the bulk of the decent people that really matter in this country are beginning to ask what type of a leader Mr. Kapwepwe is that he appears to attract only the scum of society.⁴

UNIP officials began to suspect that the university campus had been 'subverted by UPP'. Thus on the next day the Daily Mail reported the Chililabombwe district governor as having thrown out a challenge to the students that,

....they should come out into the open and make their stands known. And speaking of the students who have already declared their support for UPP, he said: "If they think they can withstand the force of UNIP, let them come, we are ready for them."⁵

The press report was followed by a story that proved to have significance in the events to be recounted below.

Yesterday a five-man delegation representing students loyal to UNIP called on the district governor for Lusaka Urban, Mr Justin Kabwe, and assured him that the actions of the students who resigned on Thursday were not in any way representative of the views of the majority of students at the campus.⁶

The two factions representing the two parties had now committed themselves to their political allegiances and were each being reported in the press as representing the students in general. At the same time students had also taken sides in yet another national political debate, that of the legality of the detention of the UPP leaders. On the 28th September, the

University Law Society Chairman, Mundia Sikatana, was reported 'as coming out in open support for the Law Society of Zambia' in their wrangle with the Attorney General.

Mr Sikatana made a scorching attack on the Attorney General and accused President Kaunda's legal advisers of being misleading and causing ridicule to the Head of State. He exonerated the country's Law Society, to which the university branch is affiliated, and said they were correct in demanding that United Progressive Party detainees should be brought before a court of law to prove their guilt.⁷

It was against this background, and the inevitable distortions and conclusions which the press drew that two students, Buraway (a white) and Phiri, decided with encouragement from many of the student leaders who remained on campus to run an opinion poll to make unambiguously clear where 'the students stood'. The questionnaire which was distributed on Tuesday, 28th September contained questions relating to the UPP detentions, popularity of UNIP in the country, national support for the government's closure of the university, the objectivity of the press, the deportations of the two lecturers, relations with South Africa etc.⁸ Everyone on campus knew the response would indicate an extreme disaffection and was therefore opposed by certain groups, particularly the 'unionists' and the UNIP cell. The strong independents and the UPP supporters had a vested interest in the revelation of just what was the prevailing student opinion.

The issue was simple and clear. Following the closure the students could adopt one of two stands. On the one hand they could submit to the power of the party either by imposing a voluntary censorship on strongly held views (unionists) or by making positive efforts to link up with UNIP and work through the party organisation. On the other hand they could

continue to oppose the government by either joining and campaigning for UPP or ANC or they could remain committed to their university role in making pronouncements in areas bordering on the national political arena. This real issue was clouded in the wrangle that followed the distribution of the opinion poll.

The organisers of the poll anticipating militant opposition and reprisals from within the student body, placed the polling box in the library next to the security guard and distributed the questionnaire to each room. Hours after the distribution both students received threatening notes pushed under their doors. Burawoy for example received the following

No whites should take part in the affairs of either UNZA or Zambia. Don't you ever learn from the deportation orders served to those who over-indulge? Keep out! Keep quiet! Isn't it enough just allowing you to stay in Zambia? Be warned. For all we know you could be a racist agent sent over here to create unrest.9

Phiri received similar notes accusing him of being a "stooge." Kamoyo came round personally to remonstrate with him to cancel the opinion poll. It was already clear at this early stage that the campus was seriously split. At lunch time on the following day (Wednesday) a circular was distributed.

The opinion poll published by Messers Burawoy and Phiri makes a lot of us wonder as to what the intention of the questionnaire is. These two gentlemen have taken it upon themselves to assess the student feeling on National matters. What upsets us is that while we would like to accept Mr. Burawoy's intention as genuine curiosity, we are of the opinion that such information could be very disastrous to Zambia if it got into the wrong hands.

The opinion of the UNZA students means such a lot on the Zambian political scene that it would be very unpatriotic of us to allow these two gentlemen to assess it.

We have observed with increasing interest that some foreign students have made it their

business to pilot the feelings of the UNZA student. This is reminiscent of the circular published by certain P.C.E. students just before the closure of the University in June. One student got clobbered for reading it over the radio as the opinion of the students.

Our advice to you Mr. Burawoy is don't go around doing Moltano Reports. You will only make yourself very unpopular. Leave us to deal with our domestic affairs the Zambian way. When and where we need foreign advisors we have never failed to say.

Cancel the Opinion Poll.¹⁰

In casting doubt on the intentions and integrity of Masuatso Phiri, the writers of the circular were courting the opposition of many students. This is probably why the circular went unsigned. For Phiri, a fourth year student of English was both popular and respected on the campus. His intellectual eminence was unquestioned and he had made many contributions to Zambian writing. Though he had never been active in internal student politics, he had always figured prominently in student demonstrations over Southern African issues. In 1970 he was severely beaten up by the police and at the time of the opinion poll he was still on trial, along with six other students, charged with riot. Phiri was particularly well-known on campus for his activities off the campus in producing plays together with other citizens of Lusaka - not just students - which were then taken on tour of the provinces. Unlike the UNZA dramatic society which was centred around the university, Phiri believed in taking drama to the people and in forging links between different sections of Zambian society through the re-enactment of cultural activities. Though he had been a strong supporter of UNIP, he now pursued the independent line of a 'socialist' intellectual. The accusation that Phiri was a stooge or that he was deliberately trying to undermine the

student interest had very little credibility amongst those who knew him.

Burawoy, too, had been active in student life. He was known as the chairman of the Sociological Association which had been responsible for inviting a variety of politicians to the campus, and for the conduct of opinion polls. None of these opinion polls had been disruptive and there was no overt reason for questioning the motives behind the present one. His legitimacy amongst the student body had been enhanced by involvement in the events leading to the closure of the university and he, too, was still on trial together with Phiri for riot outside the French Embassy. He was a regular contributor to the columns of UZ, and none of his articles had caused any controversy. However, he was a white student and this always gave room for suspicion in the minds of many. Students had to decide whether Burawoy was to be regarded primarily as a student or primarily as a white. In any event, mobilising support through appeals to the racial prejudices of the student community was a potentially powerful tactic. Racial prejudices were stronger amongst potential UNIP supporters and unionists than amongst the independents. It was natural for those opposed to the opinion poll to exploit the racial status of one of the conductors.

Since Burawoy was so vulnerable to attack, he kept silent and Phiri produced the reply - "To Hell with Campus Eyes" - for distribution at dinner that evening. He was deliberately provocative, determined to make an issue out of the opinion poll.

The student body will by now be aware of the opinion poll we are conducting. The reasons for conducting the poll are

- a) Press comments as to what student opinion is and the suspicion enshrouding it.
- b) The departure of nine students to join UPP and another number reported as having visited Freedom House.

We have not claimed to be conducting an official poll - never. But we believe that the decisions made by the nine and also the twelve do not necessarily portray student opinion - hence the poll.

The accusation that we are in no position to conduct a poll is utter rubbish. Such an accusation can only be made by people who benefit from the secret meetings with D.G.'s while masquerading as champions of students. Their fear is that the poll might reveal that they are not leaders of students as they claimed, and that the assessments of student opinion they present to Freedom House is not what they say it is.

If the authors of the lunch time circular feel strongly about student opinion - why don't they come forward and help to project the true student opinion? Why should they assume the know all attitude of the ignoramus?

For their benefit the poll will go on - the number of questionnaires is steadily growing and this regardless of their unjustified comments - or is observation in reverse?

"K" and your "vicious clique" why can't you sign your names for all to see?

Masautso Phiri.11

Phiri accused Kamoyo of writing the circular, which had the required effect of bringing the dispute out into the open. There was an issue to be debated and better do so in full view rather than through notes pushed under doors. The following day at a meeting of the Council of Representatives convened to discuss the Nguni Commission findings on the misappropriation of union funds, the election of a new student executive and an additional item - the conduct of the opinion poll - was included. Neither Buraway nor Phiri attended that meeting but the participants, mainly "unionists", decided that if the poll was carried through, before publication the results should be submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee for censorship. The meeting resolved that in future any individuals wishing to run an

opinion poll should first seek permission from the student union. Kamoyo had not secured the cancellation of the poll which still continued and he therefore replied to Phiri's last circular the following evening at dinner time.

I am not the author of yesterday's circular but I strongly support the comrade who wrote it.

Unfortunately, Masautso Phiri spilt a lot of unnecessary inference to innocent people in his circular, "To Hell With Campus Eyes."

Since this unholy alliance of Masautso Phiri and Mike Burawoy is not prepared to take heed of what some of us feel about the dangers of this opinion poll, the consequences will not affect the two, but the entire University. One wonders why Masautso and Mike Burawoy want this Opinion Poll, and for whom are the results, and what are they? There seems to be some mysterious significance which they contrive to explain to the students. Masautso is just being used by Mike Burawoy. For Masautso and those who don't know Michael Burawoy: this gentleman is a Jew born somewhere in Eastern Europe during the Second World War. His parents moved and are now living in Manchester England. Where he was educated nobody knows, but all I know is that, in 1968, from June to December, he worked as a journalist in South Africa and yet he tells us that he has a first degree in Sociology. How can a sociologist work as a journalist for a South African paper? There is indeed some inconsistency in his statements. He is now twenty-three (23), doing some dubious courses for an M.A. If he is really twenty-three (23), when did he do his first degree, since he spent most of his time working in South Africa? Who is sponsoring him here? Nobody knows! He spends most of his holidays running up and down our country doing research, which results we never see. He lives in P6/11. Let's be aware!

We all know as students what our answers are to questions in the questionnaire but what has this chap with a dubious background got to do with them? Whose interests is he serving?

These two sadistic and self-styled gentlemen, instead of spending their time in the showers, have continued to incite their fanatics to denounce me daily in public, heaping pious insults upon me and charitably consigning me and my colleagues who belong to UNIP, to Freedom House and State House. We are mere UNIP followers. We know how you have tried on campus by giving us such names as 'informers', 'eyes', and all the rest. We are none of these dear Masautso. You are telling cheap lies. Who is an informer? Those who work for foreign governments, or those who belong and work for their

government and their country?

I should care very little for anything they might say were it not for their cunning in making enemies for me among men and women I respect in this University and enticing into their ranks, genuinely good people whose confidence they shake by creating hostility and suspicions on campus. You have done enough damage to my name comrades. Sit down now and find time for a shower.

All students know that your Opinion Poll will bring more trouble for this young institution. You are domestic reactionaries who want to destroy the peace that is coming on the Campus now.

I agree with yesterday's circular. Cancel the Opinion Poll. We want peace and stability in the University now!

Yours,
Kamoyo.¹²

This was not the first time that Kamoyo had instigated a smear on a political opponent; he had been responsible for making allegations against Chibala for ANC sponsorship, which cost Chibala many votes in the 1971 elections. Kamoyo had also been active in the formation of SMOLISA, publicly attacking aliens for their associations with white girls and supporting the 'no white' clause in its constitution. The anti-semitism, expressed in the circular derived from a visit he and two other students made to North Korea to attend a Youth Festival. The participants from other countries, including a number from Arab countries, influenced Kamoyo in identifying Zionism with Imperialism. There was no doubt that ever since rumours had been circulating that Kamoyo was in contact with Freedom House and State House, he had suffered much abuse and possibly lost friends. Phiri was not the only one who had attacked him as betraying the student community. In view of his opposition to party politics on campus less than a year previously, his present associations with the party signified, to most, opportunism rather than idealism. In his circular, therefore, he did not try and capture support through an

appeal for loyalty to UNIP; that was sure to alienate the majority of students in view of the prevailing disenchantment with the party and the government. Rather he appealed to the interests of the student body which was being threatened by a student with a dubious background and a subversive influence if not a spy for Zambia's enemies.

Kamoyo had issued the circular to Burawoy and Phiri earlier in the day, giving Phiri sufficient time to write a reply which appeared along with the attack at dinner time.

Thanks for coming out in the open. Perhaps we might now breath under this oppressive atmosphere. Now Mr Kamoyo, why don't you tell us why it is so important for you as an ordinary member of UNIP to go about compiling lists of who-belongs-to-what on this Campus? For whose benefit can such an exercise have?

It seems you do agree that there are some problems on this Campus and there is truth somewhere hidden in the labyrinth of this our fledgling community. And this truth has made it so important for you to compile this list, spy on your fellow Zambian students, get their sentiments and opinions and transmit them to Freedom House. Or whenever some D.G. comes to visit you pass it on - a true Humanist and revolutionary - isn't it?

You have self-styled yourself as a chief spokesman of UNIP students on this Campus and like father like son you have seen it fit to blacklist those that don't belong to UNIP or hold ideas like myself that you think are bad to the growth of a humanist nation. Congratulations!

Your charge that I am being used is utter rubbish. This is just childish racial sentiment. How many whites are in this country as advisers of one sort or another, not to me, but to ministers etc. and some of them give advice which is not in the interests of this nation? Burawoy and myself are just working together as students and in as long as your university allows anyone to join it - there will be contact between black and white. And as a UNIP member you should know that Humanism does not discriminate man because of his colour or are you telling us that the philosophy has since been abandoned for a much milder form of racialism?

Your denial that you did not write the circular is rubbish because you yourself came to my room as a spokesman of the many people who had approached you voicing their disagreement over the poll -

since this and the letter from the vicious circle (the handwriting which you recognised) are one you have taken it upon yourself to reply on their behalf.

And lastly, we have not at one time refused anyone interested in the poll and its results to come and work with us - and the truth, which you fear so much my revolutionary friend Kamoyo will then be unveiled for you and everyone else to see. And perhaps, with it, all the Campus eyes will burst open - such a revelation will go down to solving the many fears and problems that we all have.

Masautso Phiri₁₃

Phiri was recruiting support from a large section of students opposed to racialism.¹⁴ He continued to attack Kamoyo as a renegade who had committed the highest form of treachery - an informer for the party and government. He accused Kamoyo of opportunism and betraying principles for which UNIP stands, namely non-racialism. He appealed to his audience to regard Burawoy as a student and not a white. The two circulars appearing simultaneously nullified one another. But, since the opinion poll was supported by the more senior and influential statesmen of the community, Kamoyo was showered with abuse, so much so that he never distributed a further circular he had already had duplicated.

The campus was clearly divided over the issue and the balance of opinion was held by the 'unionists' whose views varied according to what they felt might be the repercussions of the release of the results of the poll. Since the university reopened at the end of August, the government had not made its attitude towards the students and the university apparent. There seemed to be two realistic alternatives: it could either recontinue its previous policy of laissez faire enforcing a discontinuity between the student's university and civic roles while upholding the isolation and exclusion of the university

from national affairs. On the other hand the government could seek to incorporate the university within the party apparatus and keep a closer surveillance of students through the party. In the latter case the loyal UNIP supporters would consolidate their position on campus with support from outside and possibly a number of the unionists would join them. In the event of the government continuing with a policy of non-intervention, previous divisions within the student community would be restored. UNIP would have support amongst a minority while common interests would unite "unionists", "independents" and supporters of opposition parties. However, so long as the government was ambiguous over its university policy, the campus was destined to remain in a state of unresolved division.

The Re-emergence of Oppositionalism on the Campus.

The exchange of circulars ceased but the poll continued and the results were eventually published the following Thursday without censorship by the Ad Hoc Committee. The analysis of the response was probably the most significant feature to emerge from the poll.

459 replies were received which represents a poll of 31%. This is 10% lower than the poll conducted earlier this year by the Sociological Association. If we assume that the 'apathetic' 59% who failed to reply to the earlier poll also failed to reply to the recent one, then we are left having to explain the 10% reduction. We believe that this comprises two groups. The first and smallest has deliberately tried to sabotage the poll. The second and larger group genuinely believes that the public expression of student opinion will result in further 'interference' from outside.

The poll for men was 33% while that for women was 19%. Whereas in previous polls first years gave the highest percentage poll, followed by second and third years with fourth years offering the lowest poll, this time the pattern was reversed.

27% of first years, 30% of second years, 33% of third years and 37% of fourth years responded. The normal tendency for B.A.'s to poll in greater numbers than the B.Sc. students was particularly pronounced. Whereas 31% of B.A.'s responded, the figure for B.Sc.'s was 18%. Medics as usual polled high at 51% followed by law students (44%), engineers (36%) and finally social work students (33%). Should anyone wish to query our analysis then they are at liberty to come and inspect the questionnaires.

We do not claim the poll is necessarily representative of the whole student body. But the low response does suggest a growing fear in our community.

Massutso Phiri
Michael Burawoy¹⁵

Just as we noted earlier fourth year students were the most cynical about Humanism, so they now appeared as the most eager to express their disenchantment with government. They are disproportionately represented in the group of "independents", suggesting their greater socialisation and commitment to the university student role.¹⁶ In chapter three emphasis was laid on the structural discontinuity between the university and the wider society. It was also suggested that students are very sensitive to this structural discontinuity, using their university role as a reference point for feelings of relative deprivation towards their civic role. The results of the fourth opinion poll highlight the discrepancy in orientation to the university and wider social systems.

The university is in need of radical reform

46% agreed, 23% were uncertain, 31% disagreed¹⁷

Our society is in need of radical reform

81% agreed, 9% were uncertain, 10% disagreed¹⁸

Response to the latter statement is a reflection of the disenchantment with the action of party and government. This

was revealed more starkly in student reaction to specific acts of "repression."

The detention of UPP leaders is justified

7% agreed, 13% were uncertain, 80% disagreed¹⁹

(This response reaffirmed the view that few strong UNIP supporters had polled.)

The deportation of the two lecturers was in the interests of the nation

4% agreed, 9% were uncertain, 87% disagreed²⁰

The majority of the population approved of the closure of the university

5% agreed, 8% were uncertain, 87% disagreed²¹

After the university had reopened there were rumours that the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Goma, was to be replaced by a 'politician' as a result of his defence of students and academic staff in their protest against government action.

The Vice-Chancellor has failed in his duties as leader of the university community

5% agreed, 11% were uncertain, 84% disagreed²²

Nor did the students think that the government was much more popular in the wider society than it was on campus.

The government represents the will of the people

13% agreed, 19% were uncertain, 68% disagreed²³

UNIP has the support of the majority of the people

18% agreed, 29% were uncertain, 53% disagreed²⁴

Not half of those who polled could say that any party had their

support, suggesting the existence of a strong independent group.

Neither UPP, ANC nor UNIP has my support.

40% agreed, 11% were uncertain, 49% disagreed²⁵

Nor were students particularly happy about the image of them projected by the government and press.

The student body did not support the actions of the ten member UNZASU executive committee which led to their expulsion

11% agreed, 8% were uncertain, 81% disagreed²⁶

The President of UPP has subverted the campus

11% agreed, 15% were uncertain, 74% disagreed²⁷

The press in its recent statements and editorials has painted a true picture of the university and student life

4% agreed, 4% were uncertain, 92% disagreed²⁸

As regards the student role in the national political arena the responses were as much in favour of participation as they were in the first opinion poll.²⁹

Students should get on with their studies and leave politics to the politicians

11% agreed, 8% were uncertain, 81% disagreed³⁰

As students we should be given more opportunities to influence political decisions at the national level

80% agreed, 9% were uncertain, 11% disagreed³¹

Students who tend to disagree with these statements, however, are also less likely to have responded to the questionnaire.

Perhaps the most interesting reversal of attitudes caused by the events of July concerns government policy towards Southern Africa. At the end of May students seemed to be against dialogue with South Africa.

Dialogue with South Africa will improve the welfare of non-whites there

25% agreed, 24% were uncertain, 51% disagreed³²

In the fourth opinion poll a somewhat different but related question was raised.

Zambia should pursue dialogue with South Africa

43% agreed, 24% were uncertain, 33% disagreed³³

On the assumption that the same students responded to the two polls and the first poll indicated opposition to dialogue, then it is fair to conclude that there was a reversal in student opinion. Another statement provides further evidence to support such a conclusion.

Students should in future refrain from demonstrating in support of declared government foreign policy even if they sympathise with that policy

56% agreed, 6% were uncertain, 38% disagreed³⁴

This contrasts vividly with the response in May to the statement,

If economic sanctions on Rhodesia are formally lifted by the British government then students should demonstrate outside the British High Commission

53% agreed, 17% were uncertain, 30% disagreed³⁵

Indeed when, in December 1971, the British Foreign Secretary appeared to have come to a compromise with Rhodesia over the

latter's status and the Pearce Commission was appointed with a view, it was felt in many circles, to ratifying the lifting of sanctions, no demonstration took place outside the British High Commission in Lusaka. Students were now not only chary of demonstrating but had no wish to make a show of solidarity with the government policy. They questioned the sincerity of the government's policy towards Southern Africa because, while engaging in an ideological offensive, it continued to trade and deal with the regimes South of the Zambezi. There was no sympathy for the government's predicament of being unable to extricate itself from economic ties with the South. The students now felt that efforts in this direction were not worth pursuing, if they did not involve a total severance of links with white supremacist regimes.³⁶

Zambia should begin to trade freely with regimes
South of the Zambezi

66% agreed, 15% were uncertain, 19% disagreed³⁷

Even if the attitudes expressed in the opinion poll did not represent all, they nevertheless represented a sizable proportion of the student population. How was the government going to respond to such expressions of oppositionalism?

RESPONSE TO TENSIONS: FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY.

Though the Sociological Association had made a formal invitation to President Kaunda many months ago, it was clearly at the express wish of the President himself that he came to talk to the student body, the day after the publication of the opinion poll. (The two events were entirely unrelated.)

The address contained two points of interest, in the context of the relations of government and university. First, the President distinguished between criticism and opposition.

However, criticism is not the same as opposition; the first is a legitimate function of the Universities, while the second can easily belong to a different world and requires different methods and instruments. 38

The distinction is very fine, easily abused, and inevitably drawn by the government and not by the students. Perhaps a more precise statement of the same idea is included in the second point.

....during the freedom struggle, we who were directly involved, were careful not to be put out of action for ever untimely. It was necessary to know just how far to go and still remain at large. This was part of an effective strategy. I should think that students can consider themselves to be in a somewhat similar position. 39

Already in the address the tenor was one of conciliation. His response to questions served to confirm beyond doubt that the government wished to re-establish relations as they existed before the July events, with the university enjoying a measure of autonomy and academic freedom so long as 'criticism' or 'oppositionalism' was kept within the university arena and not given public expression in the form of an open challenge. Kaunda pointed out that both sides had learnt from the experience and now knew much better where each stood. When the President had finished his address, the questions which he confronted were neither sympathetic nor politely worded. Students demanded to know why he had detained UPP leaders, why it was that his party was intimidating and victimising those who were suspected of supporting UPP. Why was it that the

university was closed by the government, when according to the university act this was the responsibility of the Vice-Chancellor? How could students play a constructive role in the nation's development when they are forced to sign a pledge which prevents them from engaging in any activities of a political nature? Why does he allow the press to continue to hurl untrue and scurrilous insults at the university and its student body? There were also direct accusations from the floor that the President was developing a personality cult around himself, that he only refused life presidency to enable him to say how great a democrat he was. However he felt inwardly, outwardly he showed few signs of irritation, never used threatening language and conducted the meeting with a keen sense of humour. He took a great number of insults without throwing any back. Though the students were very far from satisfied with his replies, many of which were very evasive, nevertheless their antagonism towards him and the government was not increased by the exchange. The government was not bent on imposing its will on the students; rather it sought to appease their hostility.

The invitation of the Minister of Education one week later served to cement the conciliatory approach of the President. At the time, on tour in Southern Province with the President, Nyirenda was given 'special permission' to return to Lusaka for the purpose of talking to the students, indicating his own and the President's concern for a renewal of dialogue. Asked to speak on academic freedom and university autonomy, Nyirenda delivered an address he had given to the Christian community two years previously. Always sympathetic to the interests of the students and the university, he spoke of the necessity of

upholding academic freedom so long as it was "within the bounds of the law." Confronted with a barrage of questions over government policy, related and unrelated to academic freedom, Nyirenda seemed to suggest that the cabinet had no alternative but to bow to the dictates of the party in closing the university and expelling the ten students. He verged on the apologetic when referring to the action taken by the government.

We had problems in July...A new institution such as the university is bound to have troubles with the public. This is a healthy situation. What happened in July is a blessing in disguise... What happened in July cannot now be defended in cold logic...We closed the university because we thought that if it were left open there would be more disturbances...It was difficult for people involved to make rational judgement. We meant well. We were not anti-university. We were only concerned with restoring normalcy. Those sad events are gone, we know where we belong now. They were symptoms of growth and of a new university. 40

Possibly as a gesture of goodwill, Nyirenda announced what appeared to be major concessions over the bursary issue. He said that over and above the existing student bursaries, a system of loans would be introduced and that the bonding of students to government employment would be relaxed.

Expecting a very hostile reaction in the press, students were pleasantly surprised to find that while the Daily Mail never even referred to the opinion poll, the Times of Zambia on the Monday after the President's address (the Monday before Nyirenda's address) published the results on the front page under the headline 'Nothing Pleases Students at UNZA' and in its editorial adopted a particularly conciliatory tone. Referring to the President's willingness to 'chart a new course in his relations with the students', the Times of Zambia editorial

commented,

....the now-famous "insulting" letter which precipitated the crisis between the students and the President would not have been couched in the curt language that it was had there been more communication between the two much earlier on.⁴¹

Commenting on the opinion poll, the editorial continued,

....there is absolutely no reason why their voices should not be heard. Their status should not be used to silence them....⁴²

And marking a complete reversal in opinion the editorial ended as follows.

The major stumbling block to a meaningful relation, or even a dialogue between the Government and the students, seems to be the rather dogmatic attitude of UNIP. This intolerance seems to be born out of the party's conviction that since the university was created with the "common man's" hard-earned cash, its beneficiaries have no right whatsoever to bite the hand that feeds them. To us, this is a quite paradoxical attitude. Admittedly the University of Zambia cannot expect to enjoy the same privileges as other institutions, given the different circumstances. But a more tolerant attitude by the ruling party and a lot less sabre-rattling from its more junior officials could, we believe, make for a much healthier relation between the students and the Government.⁴³

The following Sunday, the Sunday Times devoted a long and sympathetic article to the opinion poll and the issues it raised.⁴⁴

These events had their inevitable repercussions on campus. Though Kamoyo continued with his campaign for UNIP support his interests in common with the 'unionists' were becoming ever more tenuous. With the peace overtures from government, the unionists, supporters of opposition parties and independents now formed the dominant coalition. Corresponding to the government's desire to relax tension on campus, it became increasingly apparent that the UNIP cell had very little support from the party outside.⁴⁵ Nevertheless the government could

have decided to exploit the existence of enthusiastic UNIP supporters and attempted to incorporate the students into the party. In this way it could ensure for itself greater control over the political life of the students and lessen the likelihood of any further assaults on the government in public. This was action pursued by Ghana's government following a similar confrontation with the university.

RESPONSE TO TENSIONS: OLIGARCHICAL INCORPORATION.

The Zambian government has throughout its tenure of office striven to respect academic freedom and the university's autonomy. It has been able to do so because the university has not, except in the one or two instances already cited, challenged the legitimacy of the government in public. Both students and staff have upheld the norms of behaviour which ensure adherence to their university roles only within the university system. But the equilibrium thus achieved has always been a precarious one, which may inadvertently break out into open conflict if the tenets of the role discontinuity are transgressed.

Nyirenda, the Minister of Education, has on occasions valiantly defended the university's autonomy and freedom from outside influence. The President himself made clear the extent to which he and his government would be prepared to protect the university from outside interference in its affairs.

There are various ways in which the freedom of the university can be defined, but let us remember that this freedom can never be absolute. No university, for example, remains uninfluenced, or should remain uninfluenced, by its previous history and by the tradition of the country in which it lives. The universities of France and Germany

live with governments which exercise a great deal of control over the appointment of staff; such as is not the case with the universities of Commonwealth Africa. Even so, the universities of France and Germany, and those who teach in them, would insist that they have academic freedom. Oxford and Cambridge became universities open to all, without religious test, by Act of Parliament. Few would argue, these days, that Acts of Parliament which open universities to all restrict the freedom of those universities thereby. Thus, you will see that to rule out government's intervention in all situations relating to the university would be unrealistic....⁴⁶

The President then goes on to endorse the rights of the university to determine its own teaching methods, curricula, research publications, etc.

Having endorsed these freedoms without which this and other universities cannot flourish, it is equally incumbent upon the university to ensure that these freedoms are used in the service of the nation, and of humanity, because freedom in the university world implies responsibility - and heavy responsibility.⁴⁷

He continues by suggesting that the freedom of the university must not be used as a licence to irrelevancy - "everything that is taught should pass the test of relevance."⁴⁸ The freedom entails an obligation to be responsive to the needs of the society and the responsibility to pursue truth in an honourable and unbiased manner. In other words academic freedom can be subverted from within as well as from without the university. When that freedom is abused from within, as it is in the party's eyes, when the students attack ministers or the President, then the government is entitled to intervene to enforce the obligations of the academic community. But these have not been mere words, the Zambian government has been exceptional in its willingness to uphold the university's freedom to govern itself. Other African governments, faced with similar tensions,

have tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to eliminate them through the erosion of the autonomy of the university.⁴⁸ The following discussion focuses on the relations between the University and Government of Ghana under Nkrumah.

Structural Discontinuity between University and Society.

The University of Ghana was established in 1948 as the University College of the Gold Coast bound in a special relationship to the University of London which awarded graduating students with University of London degrees. Its constitution replicated, not that of the British civic university, but the Cambridge model which granted the junior academic staff greater participation in its running. Only in 1961, when the University College became a fully fledged university awarding its own degrees, did the constitution revert to the two-tier system of the civic university. Like Zambia, therefore, the constitution of the University of Ghana was inspired by the 'liberal ethos' of the British civic university which jealously guarded its academic freedom and right to self government.

In its situation and physical structure the university closely resembled its Zambian counterpart, being placed at a distance of some eight miles outside Accra and concentrated on a lavishly provided campus. In 1961 there were 700 students which rose to 1,238 in 1965.⁵⁰ Africans constituted 13 per cent of the total teaching staff in 1959 but 47 per cent in 1965.⁵¹ In this respect the University of Ghana has been less dependent on expatriates than the University of Zambia. With successive enrolments students have come from increasingly diverse backgrounds. Whereas in 1953 25% of students'

fathers were from the agricultural or fishing occupational group, the figure in 1963 was 39% and in 1966 was 42%.⁵² The corresponding figure for Zambia in 1969 was 16% and one might reasonably expect this figure to increase with the expansion of secondary school education.⁵³

Though there is little information on the organisation of internal student politics, there are suggestions that the division of the students into separate self-contained and largely independent halls of residence as in Cambridge, may have undermined the cohesion in the community and accounted for what appear to be lower levels of politicisation.⁵⁴ Nevertheless in general the university system was structurally discontinuous with the wider society, in that within the university system directives for action tend to flow up from below while in the wider society they tend to flow down from the government. Consequently a government has great difficulty in imposing its wishes on the university. In other words, its constitutional processes of government are functional to its autonomy. In the case of Zambia the government made little to no attempt to control the university and therefore the incompatible structures, for the most part, resided in peace. However, Ghana was less willing to allow the university similar freedom and adopted a series of measures which sought to bring the university under its control. Before discussing these, it will be necessary to examine the tensions prevailing in Ghana during the Nkrumah era.

Tensions between the University and Society.

Though Ghana is very much more advanced in terms of output from the educational system than Zambia it is still short

of indigenous manpower in many fields. There is, for example, competition for high positions in the civil service, between loyal supporters of the party and well qualified graduates. The organisational conflict between channels of recruitment based on experience and loyalty and those based on expertise is severe, if not so severe as in Zambia. As Finlay et al. note,

Predictably, well-qualified university graduates often found themselves passed over for better civil service positions, which appeared to be reserved for Party stalwarts, regardless of qualification.⁵⁵

Another feature, closely resembling the pressures UNIP exerts on the Zambian government, is the ascendancy of the regional officials of the CPP, recruited through the party machine to central positions,

However, at a level somewhat below the top leadership there was in Ghana, as in other African countries - especially in some of the ex-French territories, a group who had had much less contact with the colonial rulers, either as antagonists or collaborators. Their vision was not blurred, they claimed, by friendship with the whites who were still victimizing the people of Africa. This revolutionary group percolated up through the ranks of the party. Few of its members entered Parliament and became Ministers, with the consequence that their names were little known to the outside world. Many of the Cabinet members, however, were either amiable nonentities or else moderates whose authority was being eroded behind the scenes. As the political and economic problems of independence inevitably grew in number and intensity, so the tougher party members began to seek increasingly radical solutions. The genuine problem of separate regional loyalties engendered an obsessive fear of deviance, while the continuing presence of their previous 'exploiters' aroused suspicion that the white man was behind every act of opposition. The College was a doubly obvious focus of distrust on account of its autonomy and its preponderating European influence.⁵⁶

Describing the attacks made upon the university by the Party in the press and in public speeches, Curle delineated five

main components. First, the freedom of the university was considered, "a ruse on the part of a group of selfish neo-colonialists to maintain themselves in luxury at the expense of the Ghanaian tax-payer."⁵⁷ Second, the isolation of the university from the affairs of the country made it an 'ivory tower'. Third, the vast expense of the university was being considered as ill-spent resources. Fourth, the London degree (before 1962) smacked of 'academic imperialism' in which standards were deliberately raised too high or syllabi not geared to African needs. Finally, too many students were pursuing "useless and irrelevant" arts courses.⁵⁸ All these arguments have been met earlier in connection with the university of Zambia, though they have never been officially endorsed by the government as they were by Nkrumah.

Student Oppositionalism.

The main object of resentment was the political attitude of the students. Few of these were Government supporters. They tended to be politically inactive, being exceedingly keen on their studies, but they had become too deeply imbued with attitudes of scholarly objectivity to be able to accept much of the C.P.P. propaganda; they were too liberal in outlook to tolerate the gradual erosion of civil liberty to which its anxieties had driven the Government; and like most students, they were against the 'establishment.'⁵⁹

In their attitudes towards the government and the party Zambian and Ghanaian students closely resemble one another, as indicated in Tables 20 and 21. In view of the circumstances of the fourth opinion poll, the Zambian figures should be compared with the 'non-party' figures for Ghanaian students. Similarities are to be found in attitudes towards the official ideologies, Humanism and Nkrumaism, "only 13% used affirmative

TABLE 20 - GHANAIAN AND ZAMBIAN STUDENTS'
PERCEPTIONS OF THE PARTY. 60

The CPP/UNIP has the support of
the majority of Ghanaians/Zambians.

	Agree (%)	Don't Know/ Uncertain (%)	Disagree (%)
<u>Ghanaian Students.</u>			
Party Supporters	59	20	14
Ambivalents	47	22	28
Non-Party	30	16	53
Total	43	19	34
<u>Zambian Students.</u>			
Total	18	29	53

TABLE 21 - GHANAIAN AND ZAMBIAN STUDENTS'
PERCEPTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT. 61

The Government represents the will
of the people.

	Agree (%)	Don't Know/ Uncertain (%)	Disagree (%)
<u>Ghanaian Students.</u>			
Party Supporters	49	19	32
Ambivalents	23	27	48
Non-Party	15	9	75
Total	27	17	55
<u>Zambian Students.</u>			
Total	13	19	68

terms in defining Nkrumaism, 19% were negative, and 53% were largely neutral,"⁶² while 50% of Zambian students thought that Humanism was relevant to the needs of the country, 20% were uncertain and 30% thought it was irrelevant.⁶³ Amongst Ghanaian students 80% were opposed to a one party state,⁶⁴ while the figure for Zambian students was 81%.⁶⁵ Again under Nkrumah, only 5% of students felt that the protection of civil liberties was good or excellent.⁶⁶ Correspondingly only 7% of Zambian students agreed that the detention of UPP leaders was justified.⁶⁷ As with Zambian students, the Ghanaian students showed high congruence with the government over issues of foreign policy.⁶⁸ Contrasting with the Zambian student, the Ghanaian student tended to desire withdrawal from the national political arena. Thus in 1966, after the military coup, 71% of the students "felt that they should dedicate themselves to their studies."⁶⁹ Though both student bodies were not active in national politics it appears that whereas the Ghanaian students voluntarily withdrew, the Zambian students felt excluded.⁷⁰ This may reflect the differing tactics adopted by the party towards the students and the university.

Nevertheless there have been political demonstrations by Ghanaian students. In November, 1965, virtually the entire student body protested against the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of Independence. But in the main, student activism has been directed against the CPP particularly in response to pressures exerted on students after 1962. In late 1963, students sent a note to the government protesting at the dismissal of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.⁷¹ There was no response from the government but at the beginning of January 1964, shortly before the referendum for the one-party

state, the government issued deportation orders for six expatriate staff. Students protesting against the orders were violently dispersed by the police and the government closed the university for seventeen days, officially to allow students to return home to vote in the referendum.⁷² It was widely assumed to be a measure to disperse student opposition. After the referendum the CPP supporters marched on the campus and shortly thereafter five student leaders were arrested and detained. Students again protested at government action in 1965, this time by calling for a two minute silence at a meal time in honour of the opposition leader Danquah who had died in detention.⁷³ Further student arrests were made as a result. However, before 1961 students were quiescent politically and were not prepared to suffer penalties for deviant political behaviour. But as the government and party sought to interfere increasingly with university life so the students responded with anti-party protests. In Zambia, circumstances have been slightly different. With relatively little government intervention, students have been responsible for political initiatives.

Bringing the University under Party Control.

The differences in relations existing between government and university in the two countries must be observed against the wider political systems. In Zambia, though the party is dominant in many spheres of life, it has nevertheless failed to incorporate all institutions and bodies under its wing. The mineworkers for example, always a powerful force, have successfully resisted attempts by the party to take over their trade union. There still exists an opposition party - the

African National Congress - and the political system has spawned two further parties with sectional appeal, though both were banned within a year of their formation. The large numbers of expatriates in key positions in government, business and industry have also managed to avoid any direct integration into the party structure and their activities are largely unhindered by party activists. While Zambia retains a more "pluralist" structure,⁷⁴ Ghana, from the early years of independence, has turned organisations and associations mediating between the masses and the political élite into agents of the party for the effective transmission of directives from the government.⁷⁵ The intolerance of opposition outside the party was extended to the university. Though its incorporation into the party was never achieved the CPP did devise other ways of controlling both the behaviour of the academic staff and the students.

The first attacks came in 1959 from the President himself on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the CPP. But Curle prefers to refer to these as

....skirmishes of a reconnaissance party testing defensive strength, than actual assaults. It is likely, of course, that any yielding on vital matters by the College would have been taken advantage of, but the Government was not ready at this stage to risk a head-on collision by enforcing its mandates. Instead, it planned to assemble an international commission on higher education in Ghana. This, it was hoped, would remove from the Government the odium of responsibility for reorganizing the College, and particularly for determining its character as a University. However, as might have been expected, relations deteriorated steadily. In the first place, the ingenuity of the College in dodging Government attacks caused increasing annoyance. But more importantly, as political tension developed in the country as a whole, so the College appeared as a growing threat to national unity.⁷⁶

The first act of intervention followed in May 1961 after the Commission's Report. Nkrumah in a memo to the Principal declared 'all appointments of members of the academic staff will automatically be terminated.'⁷⁷ Justifying his action by reference to the change of status from College to University, Nkrumah was able to remove those lecturers felt to be the least desirable. In the event only six appointments were actually terminated but a precedent had been created. Under a new constitution providing for two-tier system of government, Nkrumah brought the university under the direct influence of the CPP with the appointment of CPP supporters to the University Council.

In 1962 the government continued to intervene in university affairs.⁷⁸ The Cabinet informed the university that since there were more places at the university than students to fill them, separate entrance examinations for the university would be discontinued. Later Nkrumah announced the abolition of English as a compulsory subject for obtaining a West African school certificate. The government autonomously decided to lift the faculty of agriculture from the university and attach it to the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology. A further example of intervention and perhaps the most significant was the creation of 'special professorships' which turned out to be CPP professorships. The professors were not responsible to the university authorities but directly to the head of state who appointed them. In 1964 six members of the academic staff were expelled and Nkrumah instructed the Vice-Chancellor to appoint three named Ghanaians as heads of departments. This the Vice-Chancellor - Conor Cruise O'Brien - refused to do. Other instances of intervention followed, such as the creation

of a committee to inspect all publications found on campus and the 'Presidential Command' to remove the institute of education from the university forthwith. In all these matters the supreme governing body of the university, the university council, supported Nkrumah's directives. The Council in other words rather than defending the autonomy of the university became an agent of the government.

The student body was subject to surveillance and control from the party through more direct channels, namely a CPP branch on campus. Party organisers stepped up their efforts to enrol students into the CPP as the government launched its offensive against the academic staff. The students resisted the efforts of the party organisers who became hated members of the community. On the morning of 26th February, 1966 when a military coup d'etat took place jubilant students turned on the CPP activists and sacked their offices.⁷⁹

The independent student organisation, the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) condemned Nkrumah first for interference in the judiciary (dismissing the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1963) and then over the deportation of lecturers in 1964. CPP activists supported from outside pre-empted the oppositionalism of the NUGS by creating their own rival Ghana National Students' Organisation. This effectively took over from the NUGS when the leaders of the latter organisation were removed or detained.⁸⁰

In 1964 control of the student body through CPP organisations increased. As Finlay writes,

New assaults on Legon included developing Party cadres at the university, establishing CPP student publications, requiring all entering students to take a two-week "orientation" course at the Ideological Institute, announcing that

all scholarships would be reviewed annually on the basis of good performance and good conduct, and, with great fanfare, "inaugurating" (reconstituting) CPP branches in the universities...By 1965, the Party had organised an espionage system at the university using paid Party plants...A CPP university was in the offing, but on February 24, 1966 Nkrumah was ousted from power....81

In these and other ways the government sought to control the university and stifle it as a potential locus of opposition. This they had done but at the expense of the disaffection of students and staff. The students at Legon, so disenchanted with CPP activities only desired to withdraw from politics, and to remove CPP influence from the campus. In Lusaka because UNIP activity on the campus was insignificant, and because the government largely respected the independence of the university, students were more motivated to enter the national political arena and were dismayed at their exclusion.

Apart from the overall tensions in Ghanaian society and the development of the 'party of solidarity' which encompassed and brought under its control every major organisation and institution, there are at least three other reasons why the government should have taken repressive measures against the university. First, the opposition party in Ghana comprised a large number of the nation's intellectuals, while the CPP particularly in its early days comprised 'a marginal and decidedly non-intellectual sector of Ghanaian society'.⁸² Thus intellectuals, students included, were identified as members of the opposition, to be penalised accordingly. Second, the University of Ghana had been in existence for ten years prior to independence and it was therefore a colonial creation. Since independence it had shown no signs of transforming itself and was therefore viewed as a locus of

neo-colonialism. The University of Zambia was on the other hand established after independence and was therefore seen as a Zambian creation untainted by colonialism. The third reason which might explain the differing responses to their respective universities is one of chronology. The University of Zambia, being one of the last of the new universities in Africa, was able to profit from the experience of the older ones. Its constitution, course structure and admission qualifications showed significant departures from what had been previously accepted as the norm. It was also aware of the sometimes disastrous consequences that had befallen universities which had been subjected to undue intervention, and in this it was possibly influenced by the experiences of other African governments.

RESPONSE TO TENSIONS: STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION.

The tension between the university and wider society springs from the structural incompatibility of the two social systems. The existence of an institution governed from below in a form approximating to a pluralist democracy embedded in a wider society characterised by a more or less authoritarian system of government from above, cannot but lead to tension. The tension is all the more critical where the incongruence is the greater. Compared with Zambia, Ghana's political system was more authoritarian under Nkrumah while, until 1962, the university operated with a replica of the 'democratic' constitution of the University of Cambridge.

The two governments responded to the structural incompatibility in different ways; each was an attempt to manage the

tension which sprang from the university system. The Ghanaian government chose to regulate the functioning of the university by seeking to contract the arena of the university role and expand the arena of the civic role. In other words it tried to impose the civic role in an arena of social action which hitherto had been the exclusive domain of the university role. The Zambian government, on the other hand, chose to isolate the two arenas and perpetuate the structural and role discontinuities. By minimising interaction with the society outside, the two incompatible structures could thereby co-exist in relative peace. In both cases, however, the tension which sprang from the structural incongruence was not removed. Neither government attempted to break away from the concept of the liberal university. At least on paper the governments accepted the principles and thinking which typified the British civic university with its associated concepts of academic freedom and university autonomy. Above all neither government effected a restructuring of the university. The nearest approach to this, in the case of the University of Ghana, was but a superficial tampering with the system, which met with stubborn resistance from the university personnel. Yet there are alternative ways of administering, governing and organising a university more in consonance with the society outside. For an example of such a restructuring of the university, one might look at the socialist model as conceived in China.

The Chinese Model of the University.

Since the birth of communist China, Mao and other leaders have awarded the university student a role which differs from the role of the Zambian student in two respects.⁸³ First,

the students, and the youth in general, have been urged to attack and openly criticise party leaders. The following are the words of Lin Piao at the Peking rally which received teachers and students from all over China in August 1966.

The Red Guards and other revolutionary organizations of the young people have been springing up like bamboo shoots after a spring rain. They take to the streets to sweep away the "four olds" (old ideas, culture, customs and habits - Tr.). The Great Cultural Revolution has already touched on politics and on economics. The struggle (to overthrow those persons in power taking the capitalist road), the criticism and repudiation (of the bourgeois reactionary academic "authorities" and the ideology of the "bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes) and the transformation (of education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base) in the schools have been extended to the whole of society....

....Young revolutionary fighters! Chairman Mao and the Party's Central Committee warmly acclaim your proletarian revolutionary spirit of daring to think, to speak up, to act, to break through and to make revolution. You have done many good things. You have put forward many proposals. We are greatly elated, and we warmly support you! We firmly oppose any attempt that is made to suppress you! 84

Speeches of support and acclamation of youth had been made previous to the Cultural Revolution of 1966. In May 1956, for example, Mao Tsetung called on students and intellectuals to,

"Let a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend." In announcing a general relaxation of political supervision, Lu [Ting-yi] promised the intelligentsia "freedom of independent thinking, of debate, of creative work; freedom to criticize and freedom to express, maintain, and reserve one's opinions on questions of art, literature or scientific research." 85

The second distinctive feature of China's approach to youth and the students is the importance accorded to the integration of the students into the rest of society.

The majority or the vast majority of the students trained in the old schools and colleges can integrate themselves with the workers, peasants and soldiers, and some have made inventions or innovations; they must, however, be re-educated by the workers, peasants and soldiers under the guidance of the correct line, and thoroughly change their old ideology. Such intellectuals will be welcomed by the workers, peasants and soldiers.⁸⁶

How should we judge whether a youth is a revolutionary? How can we tell? There can only be one criterion, namely whether or not he is willing to integrate himself with the broad masses of workers and peasants and does so in practice.⁸⁷

Traces of these sentiments are to be found in the speeches of President Kaunda but students have never been given the opportunity to take them seriously. They have never been directly encouraged to partake in a national service and to integrate with the workers and villagers. Nor have they been encouraged to criticise the national leadership. Indeed, whenever they have done so publicly they have brought the might and wrath of the party upon their heads. Students have not been welcomed into the party, rather they have been positively excluded from the political arena.

The development of the 'hundred flowers' campaign is of significance to the Zambian situation since it illustrates the potential inherent in the student movement for playing a significant political role. The students were slow to respond to Mao's call for the denunciation of the three evils within the party: bureaucratism, sectarianism and subjectivism. When the first attacks were launched, they were against the party's treatment of intellectuals and the failure of the party to live up to its ideals. Once the movement had gained momentum the criticism knew no boundaries and the way of life of the party's leaders and the acquisition by them of special privileges became objects of reproof.

In short, the main thrust of the students' criticism was directed against the Party bureaucracy, which many felt had been transformed from a revolutionary organization into an elite club.⁸⁸

The Soviet model of education, which was current in China at that time (1956), was denounced both in terms of its institutional structure and course content. The nature of the criticism emanating from students at Peita (Peking University) was similar to the criticism already noted in Chapter Three as being typical of the Zambian student. The comment Nee makes about Chinese students could be equally applied to the Zambian student.

Though most Peita students criticized the Party from the standpoint of egalitarian ideals, they had not come to terms with their own intellectual elitism. The very same students who had criticized Party elitism opposed the work-study program which called on intellectuals to combine manual labour with mental labour.⁸⁹

It is important to note that the same attitudes towards the 'lower strata' and menial work appears to have been as present amongst Chinese students as it is amongst Zambian students. In view of the activities of the students of China ten years later this is significant.

The students' criticism was mainly reformist in character and as the purpose of the campaign had been to elicit a critique of the party, Mao agreed with its content. However, there was fierce opposition to the students from the party cadres themselves.

Though Mao, Chou, and Lu called for a new policy toward the intelligentsia, many Party cadres, feeling their positions threatened, were slow in relaxing political control.⁹⁰

In China, where intellectuals historically have had a high degree of access to political power, the student criticism of the Party can be interpreted as a bid to wrest political power from

the hands of the poorly educated party cadres, many of whom had been workers and peasants. Political power would not be transferred to the masses under such a dispensation; rather it would be returned to its "rightful holder," the lettered élite. Small wonder that middle- and lower-level cadres and even many of the high-ranking Party officials so strongly opposed Mao's policy of "blooming and contending." 91

The parallels with Zambia are obvious, as the second chapter clearly showed. Though there have been suggestions that the President and some of his ministers - those least likely to be challenged by students or intellectuals - have been eager to allow the students the freedom to criticise, in practice Kaunda has had to favour the poorly educated party loyalists. In his attacks on corruption and the development of a privileged class founded on political power, Kaunda has never utilised the oppositional sentiments and critical faculties of the students. Indeed, he was not even prepared to give an official stamp of approval to the more 'radical' students' request for the formation of a UNIP branch on the campus, despite the encouragement it was awarded by Kapwepwe who was then Vice-President. It was Kapwepwe who recognised the student's potential as a nucleus of criticism which, incorporated into the party, may help to reveal and undermine the abuses of political power within the party bureaucracy. But it appeared that the President had bowed to the power of the party loyalists at the middle and lower levels in excluding the students from the national political arena.

Having used the students to attack the entrenchment of the party bureaucrats, Mao took another step, this time attempting to eradicate the traits of student élitism. Clearly, it was of no use to replace one set of bureaucrats

by another set equally concerned to protect and further their own interests. He recognised that the bulk of the students came from bourgeois backgrounds and were unwilling to comply with the work study programs which sought to integrate mental and physical labour. Accordingly, in 1957 Mao launched the 'Great Leap Forward' which, as far as the universities were concerned, meant the democratisation of enrolment to embrace students from worker and peasant origins and a greater student participation in the wider society. Students greeted the new gestures, which gave them a significant role in national development, with enthusiasm, but the professors and administration at the universities resisted the new moves. Initially the impact was considerable, but gradually the Peita University bureaucracy managed to restore the university to its previous bourgeois practices. The university party committee came to stress professional criteria and political activity declined. The students reverted to their previous careerist orientations and neglected revolutionary enthusiasm. Students recruited from the worker and peasant classes felt intimidated and intellectually inferior. Increasingly admission criteria stressed performance in entrance examination at the expense of party record or class position. Consequently the enrolment of students from worker and peasant families fell sharply from 66.8% in 1960 to 37.7% in 1962.⁹² As in Zambia the attitudes of the students was largely determined by the orientation of those outside and the structure of the University itself. The party bureaucrats, now entrenched within the university, supported either the bourgeois concept of university education or the Soviet model which stressed the production of experts rather than revolutionaries.

Complaints about falling standards justified the creation of 'élite' schools which in turn stimulated criticism from the more 'radical' students at the university. Observing developments amongst students and the retrenchment of the party bureaucracy in the university, Mao launched the Socialist Education Campaign in 1962 which catered for student participation in the consolidation of the collective economy in the countryside. But this too failed to achieve much against resistance from officials in the party. Amongst the students, outspoken and ardent supporters of the Maoist view of education were few and weak. As 1966 approached, however, Mao gave strong moral impetus to the more 'radical' student elements. A clear confrontation emerged at the University of Peking between the administration and university party committee and the more 'left' students. Each accused the other of being anti-party and betraying the revolution. When Mao intervened on the side of the few students who had attacked the administration it was they who soon won the support of the majority. There was, according to Nee, widespread relief at the subsequent relaxation of oppression and intimidation which characterised the reign of the now deposed university party committee.

During these days, Peking University was transformed. Students who had been afraid to talk to one another began to express their deep feelings; they began to think about their education, the quality of their lives, and the forces that controlled them. A new sense of solidarity began to grow.⁹³

The students were jubilant at the success of their 'rebellion' and warmly welcomed a work team sent by the Municipal Committee of the Party. The work team, however, seemed determined to restrain the students, and protect the discredited officials of the university. To this end it held 'struggle

sessions' against the more radical students. The party bureaucracy was again trying to control and restrain the students, eliminating them as a potential threat to their interests. But in July, Mao again came out in support of the 'radical' students criticising the operations of the work teams. The work team was forced to leave and the students were once more allowed to develop their own ideas, to control their own lives and to plan for the Cultural Revolution in which they were to be awarded such a prominent role.

In the struggle between the party bureaucrats and the forces of change, Chairman Mao allied the students to the latter. Each time the students confronted the party as in the 'hundred flowers' campaign, the Great Leap Forward, the entrenchment of the party in the university followed by its overthrow and the attempted return to party control through work teams, the party was repulsed through the intervention of Mao. It was only his support that averted the strict surveillance of the students by the party. Given their oppositional character and alienation from the political processes Mao could rely on the students to attack the party bureaucracy. At the same time, they constituted a vanguard for a mass movement of criticism from workers and peasants directed at the party leadership. The students were able to articulate and canalise the grievances of the lower classes but only after they had been accepted by the workers and peasants. Integration with the soldiers, workers and peasants was bound to meet with resistance, and in an attempt to offset this Mao promulgated the concept of student re-education. It would be the lower classes who would first teach the student the elements of their existence. Only when the student was familiar with

the life, experiences, and problems of the common man, could he impart his specialist knowledge and skills for the development of the nation. Such was the theory, at least.

In so integrating with the masses, the students effectively challenged the monopoly of the party bureaucracy as the only channel through which workers might express grievances and the party leadership issue directives. By sending students into villages and factories to encourage the workers and peasants to make their views known direct to the leadership, Mao was undermining the strength of the party cadres. Instead of the party cadres threatening the leadership by virtue of its monopoly of popular support, as appears to be the case in Zambia and Ghana under Nkrumah, it was now the top leadership which was threatening the party bureaucrats. The monopoly of the latter was being undercut by the activities of the students. The Cultural Revolution provided a form of political control from below to counter the bureaucratic entrenchment of control from above. In those nations where the toleration of opposition is severely limited, the led have little power to regulate the behaviour of their leaders. The model of the Chinese Cultural Revolution indicates a possible way in which control from below can be instituted through the entry of the student into the political arena.

The accuracy of the above account may be questioned. However, its importance for this essay lies less in its accuracy than as an alternative model of the student role. While the Zambian government chose to exclude the student from the political arena, and the Ghanaian government to include him so as to control him, the Chinese leadership appears to have integrated him into the society at large. The university arena has

not been isolated or contracted but transformed and expanded into the furthest corners of society. The structure of the university has been albeit for a short period integrated into the society at large. Unlike Zambia and Ghana, the political executive in China did not regard the students as a threat, but quite the opposite; they were seen as allies in attacking the bureaucratised party machine.

Three "Ideal Types" of Control.

The three types of response which have been considered so far represent three different agents for regulating student behaviour. When students integrate into the wider community, they are subject to control from the mass of the people and from constraints the social structure imposes on the role they assume in the national arena. Such a form of societal regulation precludes any overriding control by the party. The Chinese case suggests further, that the students move outside the influence of all but the very highest levels of the party bureaucracy. The second response to tensions stems from the perception of the students as a threat. The party mobilises its coercive apparatus to weed out opposition from the student organisation implanting its 'own men' in positions of formal leadership. Severe sanctions are applied to students who deviate from the party line, and for the purposes of 'purging' deviants a party branch is set up on the campus. Rival organisations which contain the seeds of opposition are suppressed in any of a number of ways. The university itself is controlled through similar techniques of infiltration of reliable party stalwarts into the teaching staff and onto the governing body usually the university council. Such a series

of measures has the effect of eroding the autonomy of the university but without fundamentally altering the structure of the university and the methods of instruction. Ghana was not an altogether successful case of oligarchical incorporation, and a more successful example would be Castro's Cuba where similar friction between university and state resulted in governmental control of the university.⁹⁴ The third response, to be found in Zambia, is to leave the control of the students and the university largely in the hands of the university authorities. In this third case the autonomy of the university is acknowledged as legitimate and respected. The different agencies of social control are mutually exclusive in any one situation, that is 'societal' control precludes control by the party and the university, just as party control precludes societal and university control and university control largely precludes party and societal control. Each ideal type response may be associated with a particular type of education. Thus the structural integration solution tends toward a political education and the training of experts, as in the Soviet model, is de-emphasized. Oligarchical incorporation is compatible with a professional education in which the university is regarded as a technical or professional college responsible for imparting knowledge and skills. At such an institution lecturers become teachers of 'value free' (it is not here contended that some such education can actually exist) skills and the critical and research functions of the university are relegated to insignificance. In the third case of structural autonomy, the liberal conception of the university is upheld so that the university is encouraged to perform other roles apart from teaching, while ideological purity is regarded as

inimical to its effective operation. Such a response would regard the research functions, critical potentialities of an academic community, intellectual and 'cultural' development as essential tasks of the university.

THE LIBERAL UNIVERSITY IN A 'TENSE' SOCIAL SYSTEM.

The government of Zambia has imported a liberal university in the Western tradition with a 'liberal' constitution and has taken pains to respect its liberal ethos and conventions. Confronted with an environment hostile to the university, however, the government has not been able to guarantee the necessary preconditions for the successful pursuit of the goals for which the university was intended.

Tensions in the social structure do not accord legitimacy to opposition, and any emergence of opposition or criticism is regarded as a threat and therefore severely punished. The danger that free discussion and expression of critical views will elicit sanctions from the party and the ostensible powerlessness of the university community discourage that interaction and free discussion conducive to the development of a coherent intellectual outlook, to the creation of ideas and the pursuit of research. Not only do students feel constrained in their discussions and debate, but the issues within the purview of their influence are very limited. Because their civic role is so insignificant by virtue of their exclusion from the party and because the issues which arise out of their life within the student community have little relevance to events outside the university, debate of a more fundamental ideological nature is absent. Where there are no issues around

which debate may crystallize so ideological and intellectual development is stunted. Equally, the shortage of graduates in the nation and the resulting absence of competition does not warrant any consideration of the deeper significance of their role and status in society.

Conscious of his powerlessness, the student's disenchantment is compounded by feelings of severe deprivation on account of his estimation of the worth of his education. First he feels that his superior enlightenment entitles him to a greater participation in national affairs.⁹⁵ Secondly his position at the summit of the educational hierarchy is at variance with his relatively lowly position in the political and economic status hierarchies. Such incongruity inevitably gives rise to intense relative deprivation particularly where education is officially regarded, as it is in Zambia, as the major key to upward mobility. Such feelings of deprivation further disincline the student to participate in many of the nation's activities where his skills might be of use, particularly in the area of ideological, intellectual and 'cultural' development.

The exclusion of the students from the national political arena is part of a more fundamental alienation of the academic community from the central value system, to which the liberal university is normally intimately connected. There are a number of reasons for this estrangement each associated with the peculiar circumstances of transplantation. First the academic staff are foreigners associated with previous colonial rulers; they have not grown up with the Zambian government during the independence movement; their background, experience and consequently values are very different from those of the

political élite. The lack of empathy between the lecturers and the political élite and the distrust many of the latter have for the former combine to divorce the academic staff from the central value system. Indeed so severe is the estrangement that more confidence is accorded to 'experts' imported from the 'metropolitan' countries often with little familiarity and interest in Zambia. By virtue of the structural constraints under which they live, their background, their expectations and their feelings of deprivation and oppositionalism the students are equally divorced from the central value system. It is unusual for students to be directly linked to the generation of societal values but they are normally linked indirectly through their lecturers' proximity to such values. In Zambia, however, it is the political élite who fulfil the role of intellectuals,

infusing into the laity attachments to more general symbols and providing for that section of the population a means of participation in the central value system...They are above all concerned with its more intensive cultivation, with the elaboration and development of alternative potentialities...96

Shils makes the important point that

All these needs [satisfied by intellectuals] would exist even if there were no especially sensitive, enquiring, curious, creative minds in the society. There would be intellectuals in society even if there were no intellectuals by disposition.97

In the Zambian context the task of developing, generating, and elaborating the central value system is performed by a group which has both political and economic power but whose potentialities and background severely constrain the development of a coherent ideological core of societal values. Their failure in this direction only further estranges the student who not only feels unable to commit himself to a value system so devoid of

intellectual vigour but also considers himself better able to contribute to ideological development than the political elite. The student responds to his exclusion from direct links with the central value system by voluntarily withdrawing into a negative and uncreative oppositional mentality. The two elements of the exclusion withdrawal syndrome feed on one another to intensify alienation. Yet this is by no means inevitable. The Chinese Cultural Revolution illustrated the potentialities for students to reformulate, albeit with the assistance of a political directorate, elements in a central value system. In that case 'exclusion' gave way to 'liberation' and correspondingly withdrawal gave way to inclusion. The exclusion withdrawal syndrome was transformed into a liberation inclusion syndrome in which the twin components stimulated one another to carry the students ever nearer to and more influential over the central value system, until political forces accumulated to resist their advance. But such a discontinuous reorientation to the student, a structural transformation of the university and a redirection of its aims are unlikely to take place in a country where the student is perceived as a threat and the university enshrouded in suspicion and distrust. In such countries there are two options open to the government. Either awkward and clumsy attempts will be made to incorporate, using coercion if necessary, the university if not under the wings of the party then under its surveillance, or the university will be deliberately isolated from the national political arena, and its autonomy, under certain conditions, respected. In the latter case the liberal ethos may exist at a formal level but in the absence of a set of auxiliary conditions it will not fulfil many of the functions normally associated with the Western university.

NOTES.

1. Gluckman, M., "Anthropological Problems arising from the African Industrial Revolution," in Southall, A. (ed.), Social Change in Modern Africa, (London: International African Institute, Oxford University Press, 1961), pp.67-82.
2. It is possible that a violation of the role discontinuity will be connived at by government, as was the case when the opinion poll to be discussed later in the chapter was published.
3. See Epstein, A. L., Politics in an Urban African Community (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), particularly Chapter Four.
4. Daily Mail, 24 September 1971.
5. Daily Mail, 25 September 1971.
6. Ibid.
7. Daily Mail, 28 September 1971.
8. See Appendix Two.
9. Note received under Burawoy's door.
10. Opinion Poll (Circular distributed 29 September 1971).
11. To Hell with Campus Eyes! (Circular distributed 29 September 1971).
12. re: Opinion Poll (Circular distributed 1 October 1971).
13. Kamoyo (Circular distributed 1 October 1971).
14. See Opinion Poll Two, question 20 for an indication of the spectrum of racial prejudice. Also Opinion Poll Three question 28.
15. Burawoy, M. and Phiri, M., The Results of the Opinion Poll Conducted Between September 28th and October 2nd, 1971 (Circulated 7 October 1971).
16. Hanna discovered a similar discrepancy between the attitudes and political activities of the more senior students and of those recently arrived at the university. He concluded that the old-timers were more 'professionalised', since they were less likely to engage in partisan politics. This finding is not contradicted by the observation that the fourth year students at UNZA were more strongly independent than the newcomers. Indeed the two findings complement one another, insofar as socialisation into the university role increases commitment to the university role and diminished commitment to partisan politics. Hanna, W. J., "Students," in Coleman, J. S. and Rosberg, C. G. (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p.441.
17. Opinion Poll Four, question 7.
18. Opinion Poll Four, question 20.
19. Opinion Poll Four, question 15.
20. Opinion Poll Four, question 8.
21. Opinion Poll Four, question 6.
22. Opinion Poll Four, question 5.
23. Opinion Poll Four, question 16.
24. Opinion Poll Four, question 17.
25. Opinion Poll Four, question 18.
26. Opinion Poll Four, question 9.

27. Opinion Poll Four, Question 14.
28. Opinion Poll Four, Question 19.
29. See Opinion Poll One, Questions 12 and 13.
30. Opinion Poll Four, Question 11.
31. Opinion Poll Four, Question 12.
32. Opinion Poll Three, Question 25.
33. Opinion Poll Four, Question 22.
34. Opinion Poll Four, Question 23.
35. Opinion Poll Three, Question 18.
36. An ethic of absolute ends was being pursued as opposed to an ethic of responsibility. Few students appreciated the economic arguments for trying to steer as independent a course as possible from economic servitude to South Africa. Though there are rewards in the short term for an extension and expansion of trade links with South Africa in the long term such a course of action could be disastrous for the economic development of the country.
37. Opinion Poll Four, Question 21.
38. Kaunda, K. D., Reflections on Our Common Tasks (Speech by His Excellency the President to the Sociological Association of the University of Zambia on 8th October, 1971).
39. Ibid.
40. Nyirenda, W. P., Academic Freedom (Address by the Minister of Education to members of the Sociological Association of the University of Zambia on 14th October, 1971).
Answer to questions.
41. Times of Zambia, 11 October 1971.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Sunday Times, 17 October 1971.
45. One of the indications of the little support Kamoyo and his fellow UNIP supporters had was the continued presence of Burawoy on campus. If Kamoyo had any influence with the party the evidence he had compiled against Burawoy (together with the latter's close association with the sociological association which had been responsible for bringing opposition speakers onto campus, his sponsorship by the South African based, Zambian Anglo American and his activities in the July 7th demonstration), would have ensured his deportation.
46. Kaunda, K. D., Address by His Excellency the President on the Occasion of the First Graduation Ceremony of the University of Zambia, 17th May, 1969.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. For the description of this erosion on the continent of Africa see Ashby, E., Universities: British, Indian, African (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), Chapter Ten, pp.290-343.
50. Curle, A., "Nationalism and Higher Education in Ghana," Universities Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3, June 1962, p.230, and Finlay, D. J., "Students and Politics in Ghana," Daedalus, Winter 1968, p.53.
51. Finlay, op.cit., p.52.
52. Finlay, D. J., Koplin, R. E., and Ballard, C. A., "Ghana," in Emerson, D. K. (ed.), Students and Politics in Developing Nations (London: Fall Hall Press, 1968), p.78.
53. So long as secondary education was limited to a very tiny proportion of the student population of the relevant age, so it tended to favour those who came from particular sorts of background in which English was widely spoken.

54. Finlay, op.cit., p.54.
55. Finlay et al., op.cit., p.80.
56. Curle, op.cit., p.234.
57. Ibid., p.231.
58. Ibid., pp.231-2.
59. Ibid., p.236. It would be difficult to regard the Zambian student in quite such terms. Scholarly objectivity and liberal outlook are probably weaker in the character of the Zambian student than they were for the Ghanaian student.
60. For response to "The CPP has the support of the majority of Ghanaians" see Finlay et al., op.cit., Table 8, p.95. For response to "UNIP has the support of the majority of the people" see Opinion Poll Four, Question 17.
61. Finlay, et al., op.cit., Table 8, p.95, and Opinion Poll Four, question 16.
62. Finlay, et al., op.cit., p.81.
63. Opinion Poll Three, Question 23.
64. Finlay et al., op.cit., p.82.
65. Opinion Poll Three, Question 26.
66. Finlay, op.cit., p.64.
67. Opinion Poll Four, Question 15.
68. Finlay et al., op.cit., Table 5, p.82.
69. Finlay, op.cit., p.66.
70. The more authoritarian patterns of government of the CPP and its presence on the campus must have disinclined students to enter the national political arena and to withdraw from any association with politics. The more isolationist and alienative policies of UNIP and the absence of a branch on campus must account for the feelings of being excluded current amongst Zambian students.
71. Finlay et al., op.cit., p.73.
72. Ibid., pp.73-4.
73. Ibid., p.74.
74. "Pluralist" is used in the sense Merton's defines it - "the...conception of pluralism which holds that associations can (and in the doctrine of pluralism, should) mediate between individuals and the larger society and polity." Merton, R. K., Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), p.388.
75. See for example Apter, D. E., "Ghana," in Coleman and Rosberg, op.cit., pp.259-315.
76. Curle, op.cit., p.236.
77. Ibid., p.238.
78. Ashby, op.cit., pp.329-31.
79. Finlay et al., op.cit., pp.83-4.
80. Finlay, op.cit., pp.54 and 59.
81. Finlay, op.cit., pp.59-60.
82. Ibid., p.56.
83. For the account of Chinese students the writer has largely relied on Larkin, B. D., "China," in Emerson, op.cit., pp.146-79, Nee, V., The Cultural Revolution at Peking University (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1971) and official publications of the Chinese Foreign Language Press.
84. Lin Piao, "Speech at the Peking Rally to Receive Revolutionary Teachers and Students from all Parts of China," in Important Documents On the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1970), p.250.

85. Nee, op.cit., p.15.
86. Quotation from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, in Libao, R. and Hongqi, On the Re-education of Intellectuals (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1968), front piece.
87. Quotation from Mao Tse-tung in Take the Road of Integrating with the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1970), p.1.
88. Nee, op.cit., p.16.
89. Ibid., pp.17-8
90. Ibid., p.15.
91. Ibid., p.18.
92. Ibid., p.41.
93. Ibid., p.60.
94. Suchlicki, J., "Cuba," in Emerson, op.cit., pp.315-49.
95. A leading spokesman of the Zambian student union was reported as saying that the vote ought to be limited to those with education and who make positive contributions to the national economy. In the survey of Ghanaian students, "Sixty-one per cent felt that highly educated people were best equipped to solve political problems, and twenty-four per cent believed that illiterates should not be allowed to vote." See Finlay et al., op.cit., p.87.
96. Shils, E., "The Intellectuals and the Powers: Some Perspectives for Comparative Analysis," in Rieff, P. (ed.) On Intellectuals (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), p.31.
97. Ibid., p.29.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION.

In previous chapters two sets of 'key' variables have been identified. The first revolved around the concept of role discontinuity, and the second emanated from the idea of 'structural tension'. The following sections will attempt to outline some conclusions and broaden the application of these concepts.

ROLE DISCONTINUITIES.

Two types of role discontinuity have been considered, namely that which spans time, processual role discontinuity, and that which spans arenas of action, situational discontinuity. In the former case the discontinuity derives from the widely differing status of the student's kinsmen of the parental generation and the anticipated status of the student himself. The processual role discontinuity is associated therefore with a rapid upward mobility both in inter generational and intra generation terms. This is inevitable where the national ruling class is still reliant on expatriate manpower. Educational establishments akin to those of the former colonial power, erected to rectify the manpower shortage, have given rise to a number of unanticipated consequences reflected in the structural discontinuity between the university and the political organisation of society. The student role is segmented into two discontinuous parts; the civic role and the university role. Structural discontinuity between universities and the wider society in Western society is less pronounced because the structures of Western and Zambian societies are so different. Second, structural discontinuities are more easily tolerated in societies where structural tension is more relaxed.

Processual Role Discontinuities.

In combination these two types of role discontinuity account for many of the characteristics which distinguish the Zambian student from his counterpart in other parts of the world. In consonance with their rapid social mobility students tend to choose as positive reference groups those in positions which they anticipate filling on leaving university. At the same time the students view themselves as being in competition with present incumbents of the posts they expect to fill. Indeed it is the very awareness of such a competition which leads the student to a firmer embrace of those outward symbols of high status characterised by a typical life style and value system. Such a process of anticipatory socialisation is all the stronger because students expect resistance to their upward mobility from present incumbents of the ruling class. In the same way the orientation to the lower classes as a negative reference group reflects the continuing close connection to the lower strata of society. The assumption of a "Western", urban style life while rejecting village existence as 'primitive' and the adoption of a corresponding set of Western values and standards reflect the inescapable and irrevocable primordial ties and their attendant obligations.

The contrast with European or American students is in this context vivid. For the 'Western' student typically comes from a more middle class background and typically expects to enter the middle or professional classes. That only a minority are upwardly mobile in the inter-generational context influences the choice of positive and negative reference groups. The adoption of the lower classes as a positive reference

group in purely political terms as well as in style of life is a feature characteristic of those students with liberal professional backgrounds, who are the least likely to be upwardly mobile.² For such students the process of anticipatory socialisation has little significance and their disenchantment with the wider society inclines them towards an identification with oppressed groups. Unlike those students who are 'escaping' from their poorer backgrounds, such students have greater security and less to lose by adopting the style of life of the lower classes: despite their identification with other sections of the population they remain bourgeois. The adoption of different reference groups is reflected in the American contrast between black students and those who incarcerate themselves in an apolitical subculture. The latter reject the very goals and values which the negro strives to achieve, just as the Zambian student resents the white student who moves around in disreputable attire.

When a group is projected from the lower into the higher strata of society, friction between those moving up and those whom they threaten to replace, challenge or relegate in status is unavoidable. Even though Zambians in the ruling class were not intended to be threatened by the creation of a university, nevertheless such a consequence has been inevitable as students have appeared in positions which directly or indirectly challenge fellow nationals. Where the expatriate had been no threat to the senior Zambian administrators and political élite, now the ambitious Zambian graduate, stimulated by heightened expectations and an exaggerated view of the worth of his education, is knocking on the doors of those who are well placed but poorly qualified. Where graduates as a group are not

upwardly mobile and where senior posts are occupied by persons with as good as or better educational qualifications, expectations are in accord with actual prospects and so frustration and friction is of little significance.

Situational Role Discontinuity.

Where upward mobility for the student is rapid, there is usually a shortage of university graduates and a small indig-
 nous university. Also, where there are few students, the
 structure of the university being less bureaucratic can more
 easily afford opportunities for student participation in
 decision making. In the British model of university education
 directives tend to flow upwards from the academic staff and
 at the University of Zambia students also initiate change and
 partake in decision making processes. The student community
 itself operates on a democratic basis with strict controls over
 leadership activity and yearly elections. The governing bodies
 of the university are often more responsive to pressures from
 below rather than from above or the side. This encourages the
 view within the political élite of the university as an opposi-
 tional body. As a result the student is barred from the
 national political arena not only because he may be a threat to
 the party official whose position rests on loyalty, but also
 because his oppositional outlook would be a disruptive influence.
 Similar tendencies to resist student involvement in local party
 politics are to be observed in England but at the national
 level deliberate attempts are made to recruit prospective party
 officials from the universities. Thus at Oxford and Cambridge,
 for example, there are active Labour, Liberal and Conservative
 Political Clubs which provide a reservoir of 'talent' for

recruitment to the national parties. The different patterns of recruitment to the national political arena may account for the 'oppositional' orientation, so pervasive amongst Zambian students, but which is confined to small groups in other countries.

The student is sensitive to the discontinuity between his political role in the university system and his role in the civic arena. Whereas he is positively orientated to the university political system, he is negatively orientated to the wider political system, resulting in a withdrawal into a negative and unproductive oppositionalism. The exclusion withdrawal syndrome feeds on itself, with exclusion leading to withdrawal which in turn justifies further exclusion. The discrepancies between his civic and university roles on the one hand and between his social origins and his future prospects as a member of a ruling class on the other do not incline him towards a rejection of the 'system' which potentially has much to offer the student, but towards a rejection of the leadership which controls and profits from the 'system'.

Where discontinuities of both kinds are less pronounced students will regard structural and role continuity as being more important. In the large universities of Europe and America the bureaucratic and sometimes authoritarian administrations often controlled by sources of finance with vested interests in the status quo epitomises, in the eyes of the more sensitive students, the power structure of wider society. The university replicates a factory not merely in terms of its bureaucratic organisational structure but also in the division and conflict between students and 'governors' akin to that between workers and management. The university recreates in

a mild form the oppression to be found in the wider society. That oppression is related less to the evil disposition of those who control and profit from the system and more to the system itself which permits such oppression. As the students of Berkeley discovered in 1964 the university is no sacred institution free from external control but activities within its bounds were subject to similar regulations as those outside its boundaries. The continuity between student roles in the civic and university arenas gives rise to an attack on the structure of society rather than those who merely operate the system. Unlike the Zambian students, and to an increasingly lesser extent the British students, the American graduate has little prospect of upward mobility into the ruling class. He is, therefore, more likely to attack the system which does not provide employment commensurate with his education than the rulers who are themselves victims of the system. The Zambian student, on the other hand, questions the legitimacy of the incumbents of the ruling class because he himself intends to and expects to eventually enter that ruling class.

The role discontinuities of both kinds tend to encourage the development of a group solidarity. The differences between civic and university student roles tend to differentiate the student community from the rest of society. The development of a separate identity is further enhanced by the small numbers, and physical structure of the university. The prestige accorded to the educated among many circles of the Zambian population encourages a strong commitment to the student role over and above other roles which are less rewarding. The rapid mobility with which students are being projected into high status positions and the resentment they perceive to surround their

mobility also intensifies group solidarity and a common outlook. In America or Europe by contrast the student role is much less rewarding, and structural features combined with large numbers tend to create dissensus rather than cohesion. Commitment to the student role is frequently overridden by commitment to other roles, though their common identity is exploited in the more radical student political movements.

Kornhauser has suggested that discontinuities in social processes give rise to mass movements.³ The role discontinuities to which this essay has been directed contain the seeds of a potential 'mass movement'. Both situational and processual role discontinuities lead to a weakening of ties between the student and the wider society. There are few counter-vailing forces restraining 'extremist' behaviour. Ultimately the most powerful deterrent to deviant and disruptive behaviour is physical force, but dependence on government sponsorship is also a powerful deterrent to oppositional activities. It is largely because of the tension in the social structure that the violation of expectations by a weak group evokes a response from the political elite which other governments would regard as illegitimate.

The regulative mechanisms which sustain the cohesion and solidarity of the student community are more social than coercive. A value consensus and well defined student interest arises from a common position in the social structure and the perception of out group hostility. Deviant behaviour is easily regulated by virtue of the cross cutting ties within the community which generate conformity to community values. The structure of the community itself does not give rise to any structural forms of division; those that do exist are largely

imported from outside. Cohesion has thus a strong voluntaristic component, with the emphasis on an identity of outlook and interest, rather than compliance with externally imposed norms. On the other hand the group as a whole is held in place in the wider social structure more through coercion than social mechanisms such as cross cutting linkages. The significance of role discontinuities lies in the difficulty of moderating behaviour through social sanctions, and the resulting need to use coercion as a regulative mechanism. The concern with student oppositionalism must not blind one to the obvious interests the students have in maintaining the status quo as prospective members of the ruling class. Underlying the dissensus between students and the government there is a more fundamental consensus reflecting the privileged positions they hold in the Zambian society.

TENSION IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

The idea of structural tension has been introduced at several points in this essay as a heuristic device rather than a well defined concept. In the context of the political system it is closely related to the legitimacy of opposition. Where tension is greatest so is the inclination to suppress opposition. It is also linked to the phenomenon of succession in which the successor confronts on the one hand resistance from those displaced and on the other the unfulfilled expectations of those who helped to unseat the old regime. What emerges is a system of group tensions and an atmosphere of distrust where change and criticism, not to speak of opposition, are viewed as threats. When there is a structural

tension between groups, deviations from expected and sanctioned behaviour leads to a chain reaction of disequilibria. Whereas where there is less tension deviations are more easily absorbed and cushioned by the social structure. The violation of expectations can be dealt with under two headings, first the perception of such violations and second the presence or absence of countervailing forces.

Perception of the Violation of Expectations.⁴

Given the tensions existing in the social structure at large, and between the students and the party in particular any violation of the expectations embodied in the role discontinuity is perceived by the party as a threat to its status and power. As a result the violation is defined in such a way that questions of the legitimacy of the issues raised by the students are by-passed. This is the function of explanations which rely on generational conflict or emotional and irrational outbursts. To suggest that in voicing their views students are 'biting the hand that feeds them', is equally effective in avoiding the content of those views. Above all to see student protest in terms of power alone is tantamount to denying the students any right to voice sentiments in public that are not strictly in accord with the official sentiments of the party.

Gouldner distinguishes three different types of conceptions of the causes of tension⁵. The 'naturalistic' view regards tension as inevitable and rooted in the nature of things, epitomised by the explanation that relies on 'generational conflict'. The 'utilitarian' view sees tensions as generated accidentally due to ignorance, bad communications etc.

In the third, 'voluntaristic' conception, tensions are attributed to someone's intentional violation of expectations. Each conception gives rise to a characteristic form of reaction. The response in the first case is to allow things to run their course and to view the tension as cathartic. It is natural and healthy that students should rebel against the older generation, it is part of the process of moving from one stage of life to another. In the utilitarian view the appropriate response is re-education, the facilitation of communication and exchange of ideas. (There should be closer contact and more dialogue between students and government.) The voluntaristic conception of tension elicits an aggressive response in which the violator is held responsible for the deviation and punished accordingly.

Because the party viewed the student expression of opposition as a 'threat' it was natural for it also to see the actions of July 1971 as a deliberate challenge to its supremacy. It is only a small minority in the party who tend to view confrontations between the party and students as 'naturalistic' or 'utilitarian'. It was inevitable therefore that the oppositional sentiments of the students when expressed publicly should evoke an aggressive response from the party. In defending itself against what it perceived to be a threat to its power and status, the party decided to 'stop at nothing' in showing the students how powerless they were. This was the party's defence against an apparent threat from the students. But as Gouldner points out, 'defences against threats are...threats against defences'⁶ and an escalation of threats and defences is almost inevitable, when both parties regard the action of the other as illegitimate. During the July events, students

felt that they were morally right to defy the aggression of UNIP and what they perceived as the emergence of a presidential dictatorship. Indeed the students regarded the very extremism of the party reaction as confirmation of their own moral rectitude. If the only way the party could retaliate was through the mobilisation of its coercive apparatus, and if it was not prepared to consider the issues raised by the students then the students were encouraged to view their argument as morally, ideologically and factually sound. Convinced of the legitimacy of their criticism they refused to retract or retreat.

One way of de-escalating the confrontation, once each side was convinced of its own legitimacy and of the other's illegitimacy, was to redirect aggression against a third party. In the case of the Chanda affair this was an easy matter since it was quite clear that Chanda had taken an initiative from which the remainder of the executive was able to dissociate itself. The executive itself seemed to question the legitimacy of Chanda's action and by using Chanda as a 'scapegoat' the conflicting parties were reunited. However, in the events which precipitated the closure of the university in July 1971, the students took great pains to ensure that no scapegoat was made available to the government. No divisions appeared between leaders and led and students were prepared to use force to squash any attempt to manufacture such divisions. The academic staff and foreign students had not been involved in the events at all. The 1971 executive was unusual in that it was composed entirely of Zambians and there is no trace of any lecturer having influenced student political behaviour. So, even assuming the party wished to de-escalate the conflict, there

were few opportunities for finding a scapegoat. Eventually, of course, the government faced with restoring normalcy and reducing tension between students and the government attempted to focus the responsibility for the conflict on the UNZASU executive and two lecturers. But since the students had expressed no grievances towards either the lecturers or the executive, but on the contrary had applauded their action in the first case of leading the opposition and in the second case of supporting the students, the use of the scapegoat was not altogether effective in reducing tensions or appeasing students.

Of the three types of orientation to tension referred to earlier none perceive tension as an unintended consequence of the coexistence of incompatible social structures. If instead of viewing the students as a threat, the party had recognised the incompatibility of their own demands for a quiescent and supportive student body with the nature of the liberal university they had established, then the escalation of tension may have been avoided. But this would have required structural modifications to the university. Such action is rarely taken because the unanticipated consequences of alien institutions imported to satisfy a specific set of needs are rarely recognised. The party prefers to explain student opposition in terms of a conspiracy theory, and as a consequence the structural sources of tension remain.

As a rider to the above analysis of tension, the concept of 'student revolt' can now be examined. It is normal to regard the 'student revolt' as a specifically student phenomenon. But from the above it is readily seen that a student revolt must have two ingredients, oppositional activity from the student and a particular type of reaction from the government.

It is as much the latter as the former which defines specific forms of student behaviour as comprising a 'student revolt'. Student behaviour must be perceived as a threat by those who control power before it is defined as a 'student revolt'. The greater the perception of threat the more likely it is to be defined as a 'student revolt'. At the same time the greater the structural tension the more likely a given action will be regarded as a threat. Therefore the concept of student revolt is relative to the tension in the social structure, and forms of behaviour which would be regarded as legitimate in one society would be regarded as illegitimate and constituting a revolt in another society. Thus in South Africa an orderly and peaceful demonstration would be regarded as a severe threat, while in England it is a more or less natural occurrence and in India part of everyday university existence. A letter insulting the Queen or the Prime Minister along the lines of that written to President Kaunda would be ignored in England, while in Zambia it precipitated the closure of the university. The contrasting responses reflect the different tensions in the social structure.

Countervailing Forces.

Once expectations are violated by a group are there any forces that can be brought into play to restore normalcy and prevent the escalation of tensions? Perhaps the most important factor to consider in this connection is the distribution of power. If it is the stronger party which violates the expectations of the weaker then conflict is unlikely to escalate, unless the weaker responds by violating the expectations of the stronger. By definition the more powerful group does not

have to fulfil the expectations of the weaker and the latter is unlikely to risk the penalties of violating the expectations of the stronger. Nevertheless the Zambian students did defy the party even though there was little to prevent the party from mobilising its coercive apparatus against the university.

In those situations where the distribution of power is perhaps slightly more equal, as can be the case between workers and management, one group may be dependent to a greater or lesser extent on the co-operation of the other group. Thus in a strike both management and workers tend to lose, though management is better placed to defer gratification and therefore appears as the stronger party. In the case of the Zambian students, the closure of the university would have an immediate impact on the students but for the government, if they were to be adversely affected at all, the impact would be delayed for a considerable time.

One of the interesting observations made by Gouldner is the change in the informal relations between management and workers in the gypsum plant he studied. In the era of stable industrial relations the supervisor-worker role relation at the plant gave way to friendly informal relations in the community. Those opposed in one structural relationship were united in another. Such cross cutting ties or what have been referred to here as role continuities were important in diminishing tension on the plant arising from the structural opposition of workers and management. With the replacement of a number of supervisors by outsiders cross cutting ties were reduced, tensions became difficult to regulate and resolve and the outbreak of a wild cat strike was inevitable. In the same way role continuities, though they did link the student to the

wider community, nevertheless were too tenuous to restrain the action of either students or party.

Under what circumstances do role continuities restrain and possibly help resolve conflict? A tentative answer might lie in those circumstances where neither the social structure nor the participants regard the role relationship which generates tension as more important than ones which evoke solidarity. The feuds amongst the Plateau Tonga are resolved because kinship relations between different tribal sections bring into play forces operating to reduce tension. Such forces rely on the equally strong commitment of members of the feuding groups to kinship relations with both groups. The structural context of the tensions does not force the incumbents to award prior commitment to one or other kinship bond.⁷ The situation is very different however when the structural context of the conflict does not recognise role continuities. While the structure of a tribal segment recognises as legitimate the kinship affiliations of its members to an antagonistic segment, the structure of industry does not formally recognise bonds of solidarity between management and worker outside the industrial arena. In the same way the structural nature of the conflict between students and government regards kinship and tribal bonds as irrelevant to the conflict. The conflict between tribal segments is defined to be between groups which are united through kinship ties, whereas participants in the conflict between students and the party do not invoke any ties of solidarity. Another variable of some significance is the distribution of power. Where it is relatively evenly distributed and a conflict might lead to the infliction of severe losses on both sides, role continuities and cross cutting ties

are likely to be invoked to offset the escalation of conflict. Where it is unevenly distributed then the stronger side would be perhaps unwilling to compromise and therefore deliberately resist the mobilisation of linkages binding the opposed groups together.

Tensions which arise between two groups out of the illegitimate breach of expectations may be healed through the intervention of a mediating third party. In the theory of pluralism it is the associations, unions and voluntary organisations mediating between the individual and the ruling class which prevent the outbreak of conflict and ameliorate tension between rulers and ruled. In the present context representatives of the university administration and academic staff were in potentially conciliatory position having both contact with government and students. However the lack of influence the administration had with either the party or the students and the vulnerability of its predominantly expatriate membership to hostility combined to make it an ineffectual mediating force. In other contexts the leadership of the group in conflict with the ruling class may be prevailed upon to perform a mediating function. Thus in industry the bureaucratisation of trade union and the co-option of union leadership into a ruling class provides conditions well suited to conciliation and the moderation of tension. However in the case of tension between Zambian students and government there was no possibility of conciliation since the executive was more responsive to the student rank and file than to the national government. So much so that it was the action of the leadership which precipitated the tension between students and the party. In Gouldner's study, the official union leadership amongst the workers did not view

the wildcat strike as legitimate and it was an alternative clique closer to the workers and more distant from management which emerged to lead the strike.⁸ Amongst the Zambian students there was no such breach in the ranks of its leadership during the July events. The solidarity of the students stems from the structure of the community and the orientation of society outside discussed in previous chapters.

A TENTATIVE MODEL OF THE ZAMBIAN RULING CLASS.

Any society, except the stateless, can be divided for analytical purposes into a ruling class and a subject class. The ruling class may in turn be divided into a number of parallel élites - status groups within the ruling class. The élites may be connected through overlapping membership, overlapping functions, common patterns and channels of recruitment, etc. Personnel may circulate between different élites and promote a common identity as part of a ruling class rather than particular élites. The élites may be integrated where the membership shares a common background which endows the ruling class with a legitimacy based on a supposed superior ability to rule. The institutions through which the élites rule - the judiciary, the government, the party, the military establishment, and the economic enterprise - may be functionally integrated into a whole, or on the other hand may be in a state of open competition and functionally autonomous. In the one case the élite may be more responsive to lateral pressures for cohesion within the ruling class, while in the other the élite may be more influenced by institutional pressures from below. Referring to a ruling class stresses the cohesion

linkages and functional integration of the different élites, while the concept of ruling élites tends to stress functional autonomy, competition and segregation of élites.

Amongst the ruling élites, there is usually a pre-eminent élite which is responsible for political initiatives and has greater control over the distribution of values. Such an élite will also function as a reference group for other élites, sub-élites and indeed the subject classes. This core of the ruling class, usually the political élite, is often distinguished by the concentration of charisma in its authority. Outside the ruling class there are what may be referred to as sub-élites whose proximity to the ruling class makes that ruling class an object of aspirations and its incumbents an object of opposition. Just as the ruling class will propagate an ideology which purports to legitimise its authority so the various sub-élites will propagate counter ideologies to justify absorption into the ruling class. Each sub-élite will direct its attention to the core of the ruling class to the extent that there exists such a core controlling access to all the élites. While sub-élites may compete for representation in the ruling class and influence within the central core, the subject classes rather than demand entry to the ruling class tend to pursue the decentralisation of power and redistribution of the values in society. Thus a distinction between Zambian students and Zambian workers lies in the former's concern to gain access to the ruling class and the latter's pursuit of the re-allocation of values away from the ruling class.

It is tentatively proposed that the Zambian ruling class is a relatively unintegrated amalgam of disparate and relatively unconnected élites. What unites them is their common

interest, of which they are conscious in varying degrees, as components of a ruling class. Such a conclusion is inferred from a superficial glance at the various élites, their background and social origins and the overt crises in which different élites are found in opposition usually to the political élite.

First representation in the core of the ruling class and in the government cabinet is drawn almost without exception from the party élite. There is very little representation from the military and from the economic directorate. Though attempts have been made, in practice there is very little exchange of personnel between the civil service and the party and therefore the civil service too has relatively little representation in the political élite. For those who are barred from access to the central core there are a number of modes of response. One is to stage a coup d'etat, which has been accomplished with surprising ease in many of the new nations. The ease may possibly reflect the functional autonomy of the military élite as well as the declining legitimacy of the political élite. A second response is to create an alternative centre of charismatic authority which will attract a greater following. Religious movements of the messianic kind have such a potential but are normally easily suppressed by the government as was the case of Lenshina and her followers. The resignation of an important political leader with acknowledged charisma and the establishment of a new party which initially must draw upon sectional support as in the case of Kapwepwe's United Progressive Party and Mundia's United Party, poses another threat to the ruling party's monopoly of charismatic authority. Withdrawal from the political arena and into an

unconstructive oppositional mentality as in the case of students and intellectuals is another possible response.⁹

The second reason for the emphasis on division and competition between élites lies in their disparate backgrounds, origins and racial composition. Thus, the economic directorate is largely white expatriate which in itself militates against trust and co-operation. Yet, one of the remarkable facets of post independence Zambia has been the recognition by both government and the mining company personnel, who hold the strings of the Zambian economy, of their common interest. Overt friction between the two has been reduced to a minimal level and the spirit of co-operation is reflected in the extremely rapid, uncontroversial and cordial manner in which the two parties agreed to the terms of the nationalisation of the mines. The contrast with, for example, Chile is vivid. In consonance with such a spirit the mining companies have invited Zambians onto their Boards of Directors and pursued a Zambianisation programme with the vigour of good public relations. Yet at bottom the distrust of one racial group for another and the feeling that the Zambians are being manipulated by outside interests beyond their control prevent the cementation of ties and exchange of personnel between the economic and political élites. Where racial composition does not interpose barriers to co-ordination, differential patterns of recruitment do. In the second chapter two patterns of recruitment into the ruling class were outlined, one resting on expertise and formal education and the other on loyalty, experience and popular support. The latter channel was through the party while the former passed through the educational system. Recruitment to the political élite has become increasingly

monopolised by party loyalists while in the civil service the tendency is to recruit 'expertise' from the university. The military recruit through yet another channel, very often involving training overseas, or in-service training for those who leave secondary school after taking their O-levels. The economic élite is recruited from a totally different background overseas. In countries such as England recruitment appears to follow disparate channels at a much later stage in the individual's career, usually after he has left university.

Heterogeneous racial composition and multifarious recruitment patterns into the ruling class encase and segregate the different élites so that there is little overlapping membership or inter élite mobility. Apart from a few 'rejects' from the political élite who entered the economic élite, and the insignificant mobility from civil service into the party élite, the ruling class is rigidly compartmentalised into its constituent status groups. Segmentation and immobility conduces to responsiveness to the institutional 'logic' or structure of the individual élite rather than to the overall interests of the ruling class. Thus where institutional pressures conflict with those of the central core of the ruling class, a particular élite group may extend priority to the former rather than the latter. The judiciary, the economic directorate, the military may be more influenced by the rule of law, the rule of profit and the rule of the army than the rule of a 'class'. Thus, judiciary crises, friction between expatriate business and the party and coup d'etats are commonplace in the new nations. The friction is all the greater when the institutions through which the various élites operate are imported from countries where institutional structures are compatible with

the wider social structure. An analysis similar to that which has been undertaken for the university in previous chapters revolving around role continuities and discontinuities may be extended to other institutions whose structure is in some way incompatible with the wider social structure.

Though the university may be regarded as an integrating institution in the sense that it draws into its fold a membership recruited from diverse origins, nevertheless it is not an integrative institution in the sense that it is not firmly anchored into the social structure through a set of role continuities and functional linkages. The segregation of élites suggests also that their associated institutions tend to be integrating rather than integrative. Leadership of such institutions under circumstances of autonomy are likely to be either far removed or close and responsive to the rank and file. Thus functional autonomy and the absence of significant cross cutting ties and linkages between different élites and institutions are both a cause and a consequence of a social structure thwart with tensions.

In conclusion three stages in the development of group tensions may be postulated. In the first stage structural incompatibilities, reflecting the unanticipated consequences of relatively autonomous institutional transplantations, lead to friction with the dominant core of the ruling class (the political élite). Tensions in the social structure give rise to perceptions of friction as intentional oppositional activity which are therefore treated as a threat. In the third stage the political élite attempts to suppress the threat. In the absence of strong countervailing forces institutional resistance leads to the escalation of confrontation.

NOTES.

1. It must be added as a note of caution that it is only to the extent that values are not determined by immediate structural constraints, that they may be regarded as formulated in response to the exigencies of village life.
2. See Lipset, S. M. and Altbach, P. G., "Student Politics and Higher Education in the United States," in Lipset, S. M. (ed.), Student Politics (New York and London: Basic Books, 1967), Chapter 7, pp.199-252. For an interesting analysis of the two forms of student dissent in American society see, Keniston, K., "The Sources of Student Dissent," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 1967, pp.108-35.
3. Kornhauser, W., Politics of Mass Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960).
4. The content of this section owes a great debt to Gouldner, A. W., Wildcat Strike (New York and London: Harper Torchbook, 1965).
5. Ibid., pp.174-5.
6. Ibid., p.177.
7. See Gluckman, M., Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), Chapter Three, pp.91-122.
8. Gouldner, op.cit., Chapter Six, pp.89-105.
9. These three types of response correspond to Merton's "rebellion," "innovation" and "retreatism." See Merton, R. K., Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp.193-211 and pp.230-48.

APPENDIX ONE.

The purpose of this appendix is to explain the fieldwork procedures, the reason for their adoption and to clarify the role of the writer in the community. The introduction suggested that one of the reasons for the unsatisfactory nature of the studies of students was the methodological approach which, as often as not, relied on surveys of student opinion and secondary source material. The survey, however useful it may be at the hypothesis testing level, has a limited capacity to stimulate new insights and develop new theoretical frameworks. The construction of a survey may be regarded as a means of data collection which presupposes some theoretical orientation.

Participant observation, on the other hand, is more fruitful at the level of generating hypotheses and identifying relevant problems. The very closeness of the research worker to his 'social reality' stimulates the marriage of theory and empirical investigation. Rather than force a theory onto his data, the participant observer allows his theory to emerge out of his data. There were a number of other reasons why the writer favoured this approach. First the student community was sufficiently small, 'visible' and closed to be explored through participation in its daily life. Second participant observation seemed to be the best, if not the only way, to overcome barriers which confront the 'stranger' in any community in the form of suspicion and the self-conscious inverted racialism present in the mind of the writer. The latter's experiences in South Africa and on the Copperbelt of Zambia, where racial stratification is reinforced by a coincident

stratification by class and authority, had given rise to a distinct unease with regard to social or informal relations with Africans. The University of Zambia afforded a unique opportunity to cultivate status equal informal and friendship relations between white and black students.

Third any other approach to the student community through surveys or secondary sources would be either sabotaged by the students themselves or remain at a distance from the social reality in which the students existed and behaved. Response to interviews and questionnaires could never be regarded at their face value, as faithful representation of student opinion, when the student was uncertain or suspicious as to the purpose of the inquiry. It was the same element of suspicion compounded by the writer's racial status which was largely responsible for his decision not to disclose the fact that he was studying the student community except to his closer friends. As a white he could integrate into the community; his status as a student permitted this. However if it were known that he was also a participant observer, doubts would have been raised about the propriety of his presence and misgivings expressed over the use to which he would put his data. A community which perceives the surrounding social environment as hostile is likely to be particularly conscious of the efforts of a white student to examine its inner recesses. Much of what the writer was able to carry out legitimately would have met with resistance had it been known that he was also using the students as a subject for his thesis.

Many sociologists would, however, agree with Frankenburg.

If the observer cannot participate with the knowledge and approval of the people to be studied he should not be there at all. The

observer has a positive duty to be open that his intentions are to observe, to report and to publish an account of what he sees in print...It is a cardinal principle of scholarship that no researcher has the right to make impossible the studies of those who will follow him.

There is no simple reply to Frankenburg, but in following such "professional ethics" one runs the danger of engaging in "academic prostitution." For the sociological inquiry can never be "value free", it must always have implications for change and the status quo. In preparing the ground for those who follow, the sociologist is inclined to support the existing 'powers'. To conceal information that has been gathered through some form of deception is not simply ethical but also becomes an ideological crutch for those who are hostile to change. Too often studies undertaken in the new nations hide unpleasant truths and flatter whoever is in power through a distortion or misrepresentation of the facts. The matter of ethics and the role of the sociologist may be unambiguous to Frankenburg in his Welsh village but cannot be dismissed so glibly in a discussion of the more complex facets of a political system in a 'tense' social structure. The sociologist, at all sensitive to his role, must spend a high proportion of his life painfully examining his motives, wondering about the propriety of his study, the use to which his results might be put and the distortions he introduces by virtue of his own ideological background, his sponsors, his career and the circumstances of the study.

As far as this study is concerned the writer was regarded by all but a close circle of friends as a participant white

1. Frankenburg, R., "Participant Observers," New Society, No. 23, 7 March, 1963, p.23.

and not a participant observer. Just as the participant observer never seeks to hide his observer status, so equally the writer never sought to absorb himself into the community as an "ordinary" student but always as a white student. Indeed his whiteness proved to be the basis of friendship and comradeship between himself and many other students. As Gouldner's team forged a bond of identity with the workers at the gypsum plant through their GI status,² so the writer was able to exploit latent hostilities toward whites to establish a joking relationship with black students. In this way he was able to bleed many of his informal relations of a tenseness and anxiety which handicaps those who try to ignore their whiteness. Which of the two statuses - "white" or "student" - was the more important depended on the situation. Behaviour that deviated from the expectations associated with his student role were attributed to his "whiteness". For example, the writer failed to attend the student demonstration outside the British High Commission in 1970 because he had to spend the day on the Copperbelt. This absence was interpreted as indicating a greater commitment to white role than student role, and his credibility declined for a short time. The next year participation in a demonstration led to his arrest and trial for riot which now attested to his pre-eminent commitment to the student role. Outside the university he was often greeted as a student by people whom he did not or only dimly recognised and who certainly would not have greeted him on the campus. Thus outside the university black students would orientate toward him in his student rather than white status. When the

2. Gouldner, A. W., Patterns of Bureaucracy (New York: Free Press, 1964), Methodological Appendix, p.255.

writer tried to over-emphasize his student role at the expense of his white role, by possibly over-identifying or over-contributing, he aroused resentment and suspicion. What were good intentions were interpreted as the opposite when he violated expectations and deviated too far from the white 'stereotype'. As one commentator noted, to integrate into a black community you have to be "a bit of racist", at least toward those who do not know you as a friend.

Participant observation (closed or open) is thwart with many other problems apart from the question of ethics. First as a means of verifying hypotheses it is necessarily weak. At best it provides a set of 'quasi statistics' from which inferences may be drawn. Second, detachment from the social processes is difficult for the participant observer who becomes immersed in the affairs of the community he is studying. While involvement may lead to a deeper understanding of behaviour, it can equally lead to an over-identification with the subjects of inquiry and the consequential adoption of the 'folk theories' current in that community.³ Thus there was always the tendency for the writer to accept at its face value the exaggerated importance students attached to their 'superior' education. He was fortunate in having access to a continual discussion with colleagues or supervisors who were less involved and more detached from the situation.

Third the sociologist's involvement in the social processes he is observing may in itself introduce an artificial modification of behaviour. This is the "uncertainty principle"

3. For an examination of the contrast between 'folk' theories and 'analytic' theories see Van Velsen, J., "The Extended Case Method and Situational Analysis," in Epstein, A. L. (ed.), The Craft of Social Anthropology (London: Tavistock Publication, 1967), pp.129-49.

in sociology, viz. the nearer the observer is to the processes of social interaction the more 'distorted' and 'unnatural' they become.⁴ Thus for example the writer's position as Chairman of the Sociological Association afforded him a unique opportunity to see how students in a society committee operated. Yet he was never sure how they would have behaved were the Chairman a Zambian, in other words how much his own colour and personality affected the behaviour of other members of the committee. But, by distancing himself from social interaction within the community, the sociologist is unable to specify precisely which principles operate to stimulate a particular social outcome. Gouldner has recognised the same 'problem' in a more general manner and concludes that the best the sociologist can do is to achieve a heightened self awareness in the pursuit of what he refers to as a 'reflexive sociology'.⁵ The 'problem' is of course ultimately insoluble, as in quantum mechanics, and must be regarded as a datum of research technique.

Frankenburg makes a virtue out of necessity when he makes the interesting point that the observer may prove to be a catalyst in bringing hitherto latent conflicts to the surface.

A further objection may be levelled that the observer by his participation may change the situation he is studying. This I think is a question of sensitizing the observer to the changes he may make. I do not think a single observer in, say, a village or a tribe is going to change custom and practice built up over years or even centuries. If he does this is something that needs analysis. What is more likely to happen is that he may prove a catalyst for changes that are already taking place.⁶

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4. For those wishing to initiate themselves in the mysteries of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, a non mathematical explanation is to be found in, for example, Whittaker, E., From Euclid to Eddington (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), pp.143-8.
 5. Gouldner, A. W., The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (London: Heinemann, 1971), Chapter 13, pp.481-512.
 6. Frankenburg, op.cit., p.23.

Thus when the writer rose to propose that the membership of SMOLISA should be open to blacks only, he was expressing the sentiments of nearly half of those assembled but which remained latent for fear of creating a serious schism amongst the participants. Being less sensitive to community pressures he was well placed to bring the issue out into the open. In the event the fact that an outsider (a white) proposed the motion did not prevent a number of students walking out when the motion was passed.

Frankenburg makes the related point that the community will deliberately force the outsider in this case the sociologist to make decisions which if made by a member of the community would be disruptive of its unity. The aggression and hostility generated by the conflict is then focussed on the outsider and the community retains its solidarity. This happened to the writer on a number of occasions. The fourth opinion poll brought to the surface a serious division of student opinion concerning the community's orientation towards the government following the closure of the university. The aggression and hostilities of rival factions were redirected against those running the poll, particularly the white outsider. In this way the community preserved its integrity. Here the sociologist had not been forced to take the initiative, but earlier experiences indicated the tendency for students to elect outsiders to executive positions in university organisations. The election of 'foreigners' as President of the Students' Union has already been alluded to and analysed. A somewhat startling experience of the writer which is worth considering was his election to the post of Chairman of the Sociological Association. Soon after arriving on campus he

attended the annual general meeting of the University of Zambia Sociological Association which was attended by fifteen people, including a lecturer, a white student (the writer) unknown to all but the lecturer and the secretary of the association. Much to his surprise (naivety) the white student, who had been silent, was nominated together with an elderly black student, equally unknown to those assembled, as candidates for chairmanship. In the voting the white student received ten votes and the black student two votes (one of which came from the white student). At that time a racial explanation of the voting seemed to be the most appealing, but on reflection the event has close parallels with Frankenburg's experiences in his Welsh village where he was similarly elected to assistant secretary of the Football Club, and often found himself in the chair.

It was always the stranger who took the initiative which brought hidden conflicts into the open. This was because they were not as immediately sensitive to informal opinion as the others. Their unpopularity was also to some extent insulated. It was not so likely to spread to other social activities in the village.⁷

As Chairman of the Sociological Association the stranger could be made the focus of aggression if the Association suffered a decline or if conflict broke out concerning its activities. The white was also above many of the factionalist intrigues that abound in any closed community and is perhaps seen to be more likely to pursue the interests of the association rather than use his position as a launching platform for the protection and prosecution of some other personal or community interest.

7. Ibid., p.23.

Yet on other occasions in equivalent circumstances, the writer was discouraged from holding office. Every week, for example, he would spend a number of hours typing out columns of UZ (since he was one of the few students who had a typewriter) and when asked he would contribute a feature article. Yet he was never offered a position on the large editorial board. This represents the obverse orientation to the outsider, that he should assist (when asked) and help to keep the community 'machinery' in good working order but he should not "interfere" (guide action and make decisions) in Zambian student affairs. Strangers must not attempt to run the affairs of the community. Such norms are reinforced by the stranger's racial status, if he is white. The two orientations to the stranger are the two sides of the same coin.

The other explanation of the orientation of the Zambian student towards the white student places greater stress on the racial factor and what has been referred to as 'the bwana complex', with its associated belief in white supremacy. The behaviour of the Zambian students in the two examples would then exemplify on the one hand the belief that the white student would make a more efficient, dedicated and responsible chairman and on the other an explicit reaction to the prevailing tendency for whites to dominate. The situation and the participants determine which of two types of explanation is more pertinent. Such situations of intimate involvement undoubtedly provided the more penetrating sociological insights, in terms of which events observed at a distance could be interpreted.

A fourth consideration is the predisposition of participant observation to generate characteristic types of

explanation and theoretical frameworks. Concerned with behaviour that is observable, the participant observer in a particular community or group tends to confine his investigation to behaviour enacted within the context of the community to the exclusion of behaviour enacted outside the community. He therefore tends to portray the community as more 'closed' and 'isolated' than it really is, simply because his technique creates the practical difficulty of exploring behaviour and its determinants external to the community. In short the study is predisposed towards a closed system analysis. The shortcoming has been recognised of late, particularly in the field of industrial sociology where external influences, hitherto ignored, have now been explicitly incorporated into the 'open systems' approach.⁸ In this essay interaction and inter-relationships of the students in the university community with the society outside have been explored through the concepts of role continuities, role discontinuities and tensions in the social structure.⁹ To do this effectively it was necessary to live with students outside the university and this was accomplished during vacations.

Because of the drawbacks associated with any particular technique of sociological investigation it is common to adopt a variety of techniques each compensating for the inadequacies of others. The writer was particularly fortunate in having access to various sources of information including student newspapers, opinion polls, surveys, spontaneously produced

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8. For an example of the open systems approach see Goldthorpe, J. H., Lockwood, D., Bechhofer, F. and Platt, J., The Affluent Workers: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
9. For a slightly different approach see the very interesting book by Mayer on migrants to town. Mayer, P., Tribesmen or Townsman (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1961).

circulars and tape recordings of meetings. But the interpretation of all these other sources was inspired by insights from participant observation.

It was through the Sociological Association and in his capacity as Chairman that the writer in collaboration with other members of the executive was able to conduct the three opinion polls with a legitimacy and success which would have been impossible were he to have attempted to have done so by himself. The opinion polls were normally thought up rapidly and spontaneously and no pretensions to scholarly objectivity will be made on their behalf. For one interested in statistical analyses, they might provide a field day. Here no attempt has been made at a complicated multivariate analysis because in the opinion of the writer the quality of the questions, and the little that is known about the sample and between the attitudes expressed and those felt do not warrant such a treatment. In such an assessment of opinion one is not only faced with a problem of statistical representativeness of the sample but also how representative the responses were of the actual opinions and attitudes of the students. In what light did the respondents treat the opinion poll? This for example is a crucial factor in the fourth opinion poll which at the time it was carried out many felt the results might bring about unfortunate consequences. The statements themselves were short and often carelessly phrased. The possible responses were limited to agreement or disagreement and therefore to a certain extent the answers received were pre-ordained. Such is an inevitable consequence of questionnaires in general, but particularly those which are pre-coded. The opinion poll can of course be easily used as a political tool for this reason.

Indeed it must be confessed that some of the statements included in the fourth opinion poll were deliberately phrased in such a manner as to elicit certain attitudes which the conductors knew to exist in the community. The significance of the fourth opinion poll lay less in the results which were 'expected' but in the conflict which revolved around its legitimacy and the attempts to suppress it.

Nevertheless the opinion polls do help to illuminate and illustrate the opinions and attitudes comprising the student political culture. Those statements which gave rise to extreme opinion i.e. where the 'uncertain' were few and the 'strongly agree' or 'strongly disagree' were many, elicited a response which was probably a close approximation to actual feelings. Throughout the essay the results of the opinion polls have been used to exemplify divisions in the community and to elaborate and confirm observations made by the writer.¹⁰

The opinion polls also afforded the writer with that involvement in community affairs which was so necessary to really come to grips with student behaviour. For example, in conducting the second opinion poll he was able to gain a much deeper understanding of the controversy over the formation of a UNIP Branch on campus. For as it turned out the opinion poll was of considerable assistance to the union executive in legitimising its stand against the formation of party branches on campus. A similar involvement in the student newspaper UZ made it possible for the writer to gain a deeper appreciation of student opinion and attitudes. He was able to listen to

10. For a consideration of the problems involved in questionnaires see for example, Moser, C. A., Survey Methods in Social Investigation (London: Heinemann, 1967), particularly Chapter XII, pp.210-45.

and argue with other members of the editorial board over issues raised in the current production and in this way was able to assess the significance which should be attached to the reportage and articles. Being a friend of the Editor-in-Chief, the writer was also able to assess the impact of editorial policy on the content of the paper. In the main body of this essay the other newspapers produced on campus have not been cited. There are three reasons for this. First, the writer was not familiar with the editorial boards of those other papers and could not witness the selection and doctoring of articles. Second, such newspapers tended to lead an ephemeral existence, appearing irregularly whereas UZ, almost without exception, appeared every week. Third, UZ was spontaneously produced, intended for a specifically student audience and prided itself in taking a strongly independent posture vis-à-vis the UNZASU executive. Other papers were produced for external as well as internal circulation and also usually depended on union or university sponsorship for their continued appearance. They were therefore less reliable reflections of student opinion.

Perhaps the most spontaneous form of writing was to be found in the mealtime circulars which always appeared with the emergence of any controversy whose outcome might affect the students' interests. They provided a running commentary on the important political events on campus. Throughout the essay they have been continually drawn upon to illustrate the different viewpoints co-existing in the student community.

Holding a position in the UNZASA committee also enabled the writer to arrange social research projects in the vacations. It was at these times that student behaviour outside the

university could be closely observed. In the long four-month vacation of December 1970 to April 1971 a research team of four members, including the writer, lived and worked together in a single house kindly provided by Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines at Kitwe. It was at this time that the reaction of the community outside the university toward the student could be assessed at first hand.

On the assumption that the role and status of the researcher is an important influence on the results and conclusions he arrives at, this appendix should help the reader assess the significance of the observations presented in the main body of the thesis. In conjunction with the preface and the appendix which follows a complete picture should emerge in terms of which it is possible to evaluate all the data included in the work.

APPENDIX TWO.

For data on the student population at the University of Zambia, the present essay has depended on three opinion polls conducted by the University of Zambia Sociological Association, a further opinion poll conducted in collaboration with a fellow student and a survey of graduates undertaken by the writer himself. The writer was intimately involved in the framing of questions, distribution and analysis of the completed questionnaires of each inquiry.

The format of each opinion poll was similar. A letter expressing the reason and purpose of the poll served to introduce the questionnaire overleaf. The questionnaire took a very simple form. The first three questions related to sex, year of study and degree course, while the following questions were framed in the form of a statement to which respondents had to say whether they strongly agreed, agreed, were uncertain, disagreed or strongly disagreed. For each statement and question concerning the student's status in the university the respondent had to enter an appropriate number in a box provided on the left hand side of the page. The coding was simple and presented with each question or statement. The completed questionnaire was therefore pre-coded and passed straight on to the computer department for punching onto cards. The data cards were fed into the university computer with a programme specially designed by the writer for the analysis of such questionnaires. The print-out produced tabulations of the responses to each question by sex, year of study and degree course. The questionnaire would only take a few minutes to complete since it merely involved placing appropriate numbers in about twenty

five boxes. After the questionnaires had been collected it was then only a matter of two or three days before the results could be distributed to the student body.

In the following each opinion poll will be considered in terms of the circumstances of the inquiry, the statistical representativeness of the sample and the response of the entire sample to each statement. (In the original analysis variations in response by sex, year of study and degree course were considered and where significant they have been incorporated into the main body of this essay.)

Opinion Poll One.

This was the first opinion poll conducted amongst the students at the University and the President of UNZASU wrote a covering letter asking for the co-operation of the student body. It was he argued a means of assessing student opinion which would help him and his new executive in their term of office. The questionnaires together with the covering letter were distributed and addressed to each individual student on 5 May 1970 and the polling boxes placed in each hall of residence were taken away three days later. Of the 1,050 (approximately) questionnaires distributed to resident students, 649 were correctly completed and returned, which represents a response of 62%. As regards sex, year and degree course the sample was fairly representative of the student population.

TABLE 22 - RESPONSE TO OPINION POLL ONE.

<u>Category of Student</u>	<u>Percentage Response</u>
Male	64
Female	52
First Year	61
Second Year	56
Third Year	60
Fourth Year	41
B.A.	72
B.Sc.	71
Medicine	31
Law	43
Engineering	40
TOTAL	62

One of the reasons for the relatively high poll was the topicality of the questions but perhaps more important the novelty. The results are reproduced below.

Results of Opinion Poll One.*

	<u>Agree</u> %	<u>Uncertain</u> %	<u>Disagree</u> %
7. The standard of meals in the dining room is poor and should be improved.	95	2	3
8. The amount of food available at meal times is inadequate.	76	8	16
9. The official hours of visiting friends of the opposite sex should be extended.	54	15	31
10. Female students show an unwillingness to mix with male students.	58	22	20
11. Male students show an unwillingness to mix with female students.	16	23	61

* University of Zambia Sociological Association, The Results of the Opinion Poll Conducted Amongst Resident Students Between May 5th and May 7th, 1970.

	<u>Agree</u> %	<u>Uncertain</u> %	<u>Disagree</u> %
12. The student body should make public its views on national issues.	87	7	6
13. The student body should make public its views on international issues.	73	16	11
14. Student grants are so inadequate that they affect the quality of work.	80	11	9
15. Students should be given the option of receiving government loans to be repaid after leaving University.	46	16	38
16. The content of University courses is not suited to the needs of the country.	25	32	43
17. There are too many lectures.	18	18	64
18. Lecturers are not interested in their students.	36	36	28
19. The present system of assessment places too much emphasis on end of year examinations.	63	22	15
20. The University should make every effort to produce graduates of international standard even if this means failing large numbers of students.	55	12	33
21. Students receiving government grants should not be given the opportunity to choose the courses they wish to study.	8	3	89
22. The facilities for sport and recreation are inadequate.	84	10	6
23. Student leaders do not represent the wishes of the student body as a whole.	54	32	14
24. Students are an elite cut off from Zambian Society.	24	20	56
25. There is too little interaction between students and lecturers.	76	15	9
26. Students demand too much from a society to which they contribute little.	15	11	74
27. The government is entitled to allocate graduates to jobs in accordance with the manpower requirements of the country.	63	10	27

Opinion Poll Two.

The second opinion poll was conducted at the request of a student member of the Board of Studies concerned to inquire into the role of the personal tutor. The request came at a time when two controversial issues were being discussed amongst Zambians, namely the relationship between students and political parties and the formation of the Student Movement for the Liberation of Southern Africa (SMOLISA). Questions four to eleven inclusive were accordingly devoted to the issues arising out of the role of the personal tutor and have little relevance to the discussions in this essay. The last nine questions are therefore the only ones to be reproduced here.

The questionnaires were not distributed individually to the students on this occasion but were made available at the entry desk to the library and the officer on duty ensured that students took only one questionnaire. It is therefore unlikely that students would have filled in more than one questionnaire. The poll was begun on 22 October 1970 and the questionnaire finally collected one week later. The response this time was much lower with only 351 questionnaires returned. This may have been because of the method of distribution, or because the novelty had worn off or because students were busy preparing for examinations.

TABLE 23 - RESPONSE TO OPINION POLL TWO.

<u>Category of Student</u>	<u>Percentage Response</u>
Male	31
Female	40
First Year	29
Second Year	38

<u>Category of Student</u>	<u>Percentage Response</u>
Third Year	34
Fourth Year	22
B.A. + Social Work	36
B.Sc.	28
Medicine	14*
Law	50
Engineering	24
TOTAL	33

* The figure for medical students is low because the questionnaires were not distributed at the Ridgeway Campus where the medical students live.

The results of the second opinion poll are reproduced below.

Results of Opinion Poll Two.*

	<u>Agree</u> %	<u>Uncertain</u> %	<u>Disagree</u> %
12. In the interests of national development party politics must be brought onto campus.	31	9	60
13. A branch of UNIP should be established on campus for UNZA students.	19	9	72
14. The Zambian student has not yet discovered himself.	36	27	37
15. Students should be forced to participate in a national service of one year before receiving their first degree.	36	9	55
16. Students must be represented on the National Council of UNIP.	45	18	37
17. Zambians must involve themselves in the struggle to liberate Southern Africa.	49	15	36
18. Zambia will not be free until the rest of Southern Africa is liberated.	43	12	35

* University of Zambia Sociological Association, The Results of the Opinion Poll Conducted Amongst Resident Students Between 22nd and 29th October, 1970.

	<u>Agree</u> %	<u>Uncertain</u> %	<u>Disagree</u> %
19. There is no need for an UNZA student organisation with the aims of SMOLISA.	42	14	44
20. Membership of SMOLISA should be open only to black students.	31	16	53

Opinion Poll Three.

The third opinion poll was conducted in the next academic year. Again a number of topical issues were introduced. One of these revolved around the controversy that was raging at the time over culture and the wholesale adoption by certain sections of Zambian society of Western forms of dress. The girls had had to bear the brunt of the attack and in the questionnaire they were also the focus of implied criticism in that the questions concerning dress referred to them alone and omitted any reference to male attire. As a result the girls boycotted the opinion poll taking possession of the polling box placed in their hall of residence. The questionnaires distributed to each student were with a few exceptions only returned by the male students. The results therefore only reflect opinion amongst the men. In introducing the questionnaire an opinion poll committee of the University Sociological Association appealed to the student body to respond so that others, confronted with an articulated student opinion, may be forced to take student views more seriously. The questionnaires were distributed on the 26 May 1971 and collected four days later. Of the 576 responses, 545 were from male students and 31 from female students, this corresponding to a 44% poll amongst the men and an 11% poll amongst the women. The following table compares in more detail the sample and the population of students by year of study and degree course being pursued.

TABLE 24 - RESPONSE TO OPINION POLL THREE.*

Year	D E G R E E C O U R S E					Total
	B.A. & Social Work	B.Sc. & Agricultural Science	Medicine	Law	Engin- eering	
First						
Population	367	349	-	-	-	716
Sample (No.)	135	130	-	-	-	265
% of Population	37	37	-	-	-	37
Second						
Population	158	95	24	27	58	362
Sample (No.)	60	35	15	5	23	138
% of Population	38	37	62	18	40	38
Third						
Population	96	46	28	15	29	214
Sample (No.)	35	20	5	5	16	81
% of Population	37	43	18	33	55	37
Fourth						
Population	83	32	17	13	11	156
Sample (No.)	20	13	7	7	5	52
% of Population	24	41	41	54	45	33
TOTAL						
Population	704	522	69	55	98	1448
Sample (No.)	250	198	27	17	44	536
% of Population	35	38	39	31	45	37

* A few responses fall outside the scope of this table e.g. fifth year medical students, P.C.E.'s etc. Those first year students who claimed to be studying for law, medicine or engineering degrees have been placed in the B.Sc. or B.A. categories.

The results of the analysis of the male responses alone to the third opinion poll are reproduced below.

Results of Opinion Poll Three.*

4. How many brothers, sisters, relatives, etc. are you supporting financially?

53% are not supporting any, 22% are supporting 1-3, and 25% more than three.

* University of Zambia Sociological Association, The Results of the Opinion Poll Conducted Amongst Resident Students Between 26th and 30th May, 1971.

	<u>Agree</u> %	<u>Uncertain</u> %	<u>Disagree</u> %
5. The quality of food in the dining room is satisfactory.	38	8	54
6. Students should have a greater say in the running of the University.	78	11	11
7. In the third, fourth and subsequent years, students should not be redirected.	80	6	14
8. The academic wardens are necessary for solving academic problems.	48	27	25
9. Rooms should be allocated to students before they arrive on campus.	82	3	15
10. Students should stop playing music in the halls of residence after 10 p.m. Monday to Friday.	57	5	38
11. Wigs improve the looks of UNZA girls.	29	13	58
12. Mini skirts improve the looks of UNZA girls.	53	11	36
13. Skin lightening cream improves the looks of UNZA girls.	33	15	52
14. The money from the defunct medical fund should be used to finance some student project.	64	17	19
15. There should be a beauty contest for UNZA girls.	39	16	45
16. Student leaders do not represent the student body as a whole.	51	23	26
17. The President of UNZASU should be given a free academic year to concentrate on his duties as President.	24	17	59
18. If economic sanctions on Rhodesia are formally lifted by the British Government then students should demonstrate outside the British High Commission.	53	17	30
19. If student bursaries are not increased then a demonstration should be staged outside the Ministry of Education.	70	12	18
20. When students in other parts of the world are demonstrating against U.S. presence in South East Asia then we should also demonstrate.	26	14	60

	<u>Agree</u> %	<u>Uncertain</u> %	<u>Disagree</u> %
21. Zambianisation in the country is going ahead too fast.	42	21	37
22. Zambianisation is being sabotaged by expatriates.	49	24	27
23. Humanism is relevant to the needs of Zambia.	50	20	30
24. Students belong to the upper class of Zambian society.	28	14	58
25. Dialogue with South Africa will improve the welfare of non-whites there.	25	24	51
26. The time is now ripe for the declaration of a one party state.	11	8	81
27. The leaders of the nation follow the precepts of Humanism.	10	19	71
28. Intimate relations between boys and girls of different races are socially desirable.	76	12	12

Opinion Poll Four.

The fourth opinion poll was the only one not conducted under the auspices of the Sociological Association. Instead it was conducted by two individuals and the circumstances of the inquiry are elaborated in the main body of this essay and will not be repeated here. The questionnaires were distributed to each room and collected in a single polling box placed in the library. The 459 replies received represented a poll of 31% and a more detailed analysis of the statistical representativeness of response is given below. (The poll for men was 33%, while that for women was 19%.)

TABLE 25 - RESPONSE TO OPINION POLL FOUR.*

Year		D E G R E E C O U R S E					Total
		B.A. & Social Work	B.Sc. & Agricultural Science	Medicine	Law	Engin- eering	
First	Population	367	349	-	-	-	716
	Sample (No.)	109	77	-	-	-	186
	% of Population	30	22	-	-	-	26
Second	Population	158	95	24	27	58	362
	Sample (No.)	55	24	10	8	11	108
	% of Population	35	25	42	30	19	30
Third	Population	96	46	28	15	29	214
	Sample (No.)	36	18	3	8	5	70
	% of Population	38	39	11	53	17	33
Fourth	Population	83	32	17	13	11	156
	Sample (No.)	32	9	8	7	2	58
	% of Population	39	28	47	54	18	37
TOTAL	Population	704	522	69	55	98	1448
	Sample (No.)	232	128	21	23	18	422
	% of Population	33	25	30	42	18	29

* A few responses fall outside the scope of this table, e.g. fifth year medical students, P.C.E.'s etc. Those first year students who claimed to be studying for law, medicine or engineering degrees have been placed in the B.A. or B.Sc. groups.

The results of the opinion poll are reproduced below.

Results of Opinion Poll Four.

	<u>Agree</u> %	<u>Uncertain</u> %	<u>Disagree</u> %
4. The ad hoc committee should give way to a popularly elected executive.	64	10	26
5. The Vice-Chancellor has failed in his duties as leader of the university community.	5	11	84

	<u>Agree</u> %	<u>Uncertain</u> %	<u>Disagree</u> %
6. The majority of the population approved of the closure of the University.	5	8	87
7. The University is in need of radical reform.	46	23	31
8. The deportations of the two lecturers was in the interests of the nation.	4	9	87
9. The student body did not support the actions of the ten member UNZASU Executive Committee which led to their expulsion.	11	8	81
10. The student executive was right to apologise for their actions which led to their expulsion.	30	16	54
11. Students should get on with their studies and leave politics to the politicians.	11	8	81
12. As students we should be given more opportunities to influence political decisions at the national level.	80	9	11
13. Students wishing to engage in party politics during term should leave the campus.	33	14	53
14. The President of UPP has subverted the campus.	11	15	74
15. The detention of UPP leaders is justified.	7	13	80
16. The Government represents the will of the people.	13	19	68
17. UNIP has the support of the majority of the people.	18	29	53
18. Neither UPP, ANC, nor UNIP has my support.	40	11	49
19. The Press in its recent statements and editorials has painted a true picture of the University and student life.	4	4	92
20. Our society is in need of radical reform.	81	9	10
21. Zambia should begin to trade freely with regimes south of the Zambezi.	66	15	19
22. Zambia should pursue dialogue with South Africa.	43	24	33
23. Students should in future refrain from demonstrating in support of declared government foreign policy even if they sympathise with that policy.	56	6	38

Graduate Survey.

The questionnaire was sent out to graduates by post to addresses provided by the Office of the Registrar. Of the 246 graduates of the University of Zambia, 48 responded by returning the questionnaire. This represents a response of approximately 19%. However, since there are no known characteristics about these graduates which overlap with the questions contained in the questionnaire, it has not been possible to discover how representative was the sample. The response rate is low for a number of reasons. First some graduates had left no address with the university and since some of the addresses were now out of date an unknown number of graduates never received a questionnaire. Almost twenty questionnaires were actually returned to the sender because the graduate was unknown at the given address. The response was also low because this is in the nature of the postal questionnaire; the only reason for completing the form was to assist someone to complete his M.A. studies. Finally some of the questions raised may have aroused suspicions amongst the respondents even though their replies were anonymous. It has been the experience of the writer that students are often very sensitive in replying about their background and this was why such questions were automatically ruled out of the opinion polls. In the manner of response, particularly the section on the social origins of UNZA graduates, students tended to be very lax about the manner in which they completed the section and it would be foolhardy to draw any firm conclusions from an analysis of that section. The letter addressed to the graduate and the response form are reproduced below and a few of the results have been cited in the main body of this essay.

President Hall,
UNZA,
P.O. Box 2379,
LUSAKA.

7th. October, 1971

Dear Graduate,

As part of my M.A. programme in sociology at UNZA, I have chosen to try and trace the progress of UNZA graduates since they left the university and to discover what section of the community they come from. With this in mind, I am sending out a questionnaire which I am hoping you will be kind enough to complete and return in the stamped envelope.

The first part of the questionnaire deals with employment subsequent to leaving the university and your hopes for the future. Once I have collected this basic information, I may follow this up with a number of interviews in an attempt to delve more deeply into the employment problems experienced by UNZA students.

The second part deals with relatives and the relationship you have with those you know best. The third part deals with your activities while you were a student which is then followed by a fourth part concerned with social origins. In a society where not only the nuclear family but also the extended family is important, it becomes necessary to go into the background of a wide selection of relatives. Hence the reference to brothers, sisters, parents, aunts, uncles and grandparents.

The questionnaire you submit will be anonymous and I will give the Secretary of the Graduate's Association copies of my findings. I would be very grateful if you would return the questionnaire at your earliest convenience.

Hoping for your cooperation,

Yours faithfully,

(Michael Burawoy)

MAIL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR UNZA GRADUATES

1. In what year did you graduate? _____
2. What degree do you hold from UNZA?
(B.A., B.A. + Educ., B.SC., etc..) _____
3. What bursary, if any, did you hold while at UNZA? _____
4. How old are you? _____

Employment

5. What jobs have you held since leaving university?

First Employer	_____	Job	_____
Second	"	_____	Job _____
Third	"	_____	Job _____
Fourth	"	_____	Job _____
Fifth	"	_____	Job _____

6. Did the Government 'direct' you to your present employment? _____
7. Would you prefer to be employed elsewhere in another job? If so, what job and where?
- _____
- _____

8. Would you prefer to be employed in the public or private sector? Why?

9. What do you hope your occupation will be in ten years time?

10. What are your three best
- secondary school
- friends doing now?

Occupation	_____	Employer	_____
Occupation	_____	Employer	_____
Occupation	_____	Employer	_____

Kinsmen

11. Where you are now living are you the head of the household? _____

12. Who else is residing with you? (Relationship of members of household to yourself.)

13. What commitments (material, financial, etc.) to your relatives have you accepted since leaving UNZA?

14. While at UNZA which three people did you most frequently stay with in the vacations?

Relationship _____ (to person stayed with)	Occupation _____ (of person stayed with)	Place _____ (Where you stayed)
Relationship _____	Occupation _____	Place _____
Relationship _____	Occupation _____	Place _____

Student Activities

15. While at UNZA did you ever hold any position in NUZS or UNZASU Executives? _____

16. Were you in the committee of any society on campus? If so, which?

SOCIAL ORIGINS OF UNZA GRADUATES

Could you please fill in the following form stating the occupation (making this as precise as possible), educational level and approximate age of your closest kinmen as indicated. Under the column for education enter in the boxes provided the appropriate number taken from Code A and under the column for age enter the appropriate number taken from Code B, (if still alive).

APPENDIX THREE.The Petition Presented by UNIP to the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zambia on 14 July 1971

(Taken from the Daily Mail, 15 July 1971)

WE, of the United National Independence Party, do hereby submit to you, Mr Vice-Chancellor, this Petition in protest against the students of this University in general, and the Students' Union Executive in particular, for the arrogant and insulting letter sent by them to His Excellency, Dr K.D. Kaunda, Secretary-General of the Party and Head of State of the Republic of Zambia.

President Kaunda is not only a leader of the 4 million people in this country, for whom the students purported to speak; he is the father of this Nation, popularly elected to be their spokesman, and to lead and guide them at all times.

He is not only the symbol of our independence and freedom, he is the symbol of authority vested in this sovereign Republic, he is a symbol of this Nation's collective identity and a mirror through which we can see ourselves as Zambians. Therefore, an insult against him is an insult against the Nation as whole. Disrespect for him is disrespect for this Nation as a whole.

We, of the United National Independence Party, as the Party in power, regard it our duty to express our love, admiration and respect for our National Leader whom the students, constituting a minute fraction of 1% of our population, have chosen to insult with arrogance without precedent.

We are grieved by the decision of the students which is unparalleled in Africa, if not in the world and, therefore, we condemn it unreservedly.

We regard the letter as blatantly disrespectful and a deliberate insult to this Nation and its Leaders. We regard the attack on the President as an attack on authority in Zambia, on the Party and Government and the People as a whole.

We resent and take great exception to the decision of the students to express their misguided feelings in the name of UNIP and the people of Zambia. We regard their action as a blot on this Nation's character.

We are profoundly shocked by the arrogant and immature exhibitionist behaviour of the students and their readiness to fall prey to foreign influence purporting [sic] to be championing the cause of liberty and academic freedom. We regard their ill-advised action as an abuse of this freedom.

Zambian Humanism postulates respect for age and authority as a fundamental precept. This is a vital legacy bequeathed to us by our ancestors. Under the banner of the United National Independence Party and its dynamic leadership, we mean to foster and preserve this heritage for posterity. It is a vital guarantee for the maintenance of a stable and decent society in this turbulent world.

We in the United National Independence Party know that education is a debt due from us as a ruling Party, to the future generation in this Nation, some of whom are privileged to be on this Campus. We are aware of our obligation to give education to each and every Zambian child. Our determination in this connection is reflected in the educational policies of the Government. We are proud, therefore, of this University as the highest institution of learning in the land - a cherished goal for many a child.

It is to satisfy the insatiable thirst for more knowledge to prepare this generation of students for the difficult future ahead that the Party and Government have spent more than K30 million of investment in capital and recurrent expenditure since 1965 to improve this Campus.

This is a symbol of our commitment to the youth in our Nation. Education is free throughout our Republic. Every student on this Campus is on a Government bursary by the grace of the United National Independence Party. We know that at the opening of the current semester, students demonstrated against lack of adequate accommodation. This implies more expenditure on improvements and expansion. Government has an ambitious programme of expansion of this University in order to increase the intake. We are proud of all this. But improvements need money from public funds - from the supporters of the Party and Government. Students have asked for increases in allowances. We know they have asked President Kaunda and yourself, Mr Vice-Chancellor, for favourable consideration.

While all this is being done in their favour to prepare them for a better and more assured future in this Nation, the students of this University have sought to undermine the authority of the Party and Government. They have sought to "kill the goose that lays the eggs."

This is a people's University, built out of contributions from poor people in villages and many other well-intentioned people of this country and elsewhere in the world. The considerable cost in money, energy, time and manpower is justified by our belief in the goodness of education. We, believing in humanism, feel strongly that education should be firmly directed toward the development not only of the mind, but, above all, of character.

Sound character cannot be achieved if spiritual development and the importance of respect for age and authority are neglected. We do not want this University, the pride of our Nation, to turn out physical and mental giants who are spiritual and moral pygmies.

We are given to understand that the students at this Campus have expressed the desire to be more directly involved in national affairs and development. We welcome this initiative. These young people are part and parcel of us. They are members of our society, they are our children. They are not a peculiar breed; there is nothing special about being a University student.

Therefore, while we welcome their desire to play a role in this Nation, we wish to state in unequivocal terms that this will not extend to hurling gratuitous insults at National Leaders, particularly our Secretary-General and leader of this Nation.

President Kaunda, the Party and Government owe the students nothing; on the contrary, it is the students who owe our Leader, UNIP and Government a debt of gratitude for free education in a free society. There are thousands of young and loyal Zambians, eager to learn, who would have liked to achieve the highest degree of academic accomplishment at this Campus but whose places were taken by the arrogant and ungrateful minority who have insulted this Nation.

We, members of the United National Independence Party, and the Nation as a whole will not stand idly by and see the authority of the Party and Government undermined and insulted with impunity by people for whom we have made sacrifices in money and other resources. The accusations made against President Kaunda, the deliberate distortions of his statement to satisfy their foreign mentors are malicious, intolerable and more than enough to provoke a saint, more than enough to try the patience of Job. We, therefore:-

FIRST: refuse government by students;

SECOND: demand the closure of the University forthwith;

THIRD: demand that the entire Executive of the Students' Union and other ring-leaders be not re-admitted to the University;

FOURTH: demand that in future, every student admitted to this University must make a declaration not to engage in activities designed to undermine the authority upon which this Nation rests;

FIFTH: accept the students' desire to participate in national activities, but believe that complete devotion to their studies will increase their contribution more to the growth of this Nation than emulating the behaviour of students elsewhere in the world.

In submitting our Petition to you, Mr Vice-Chancellor, we are aware that the majority of students at this University are innocent and law-abiding citizens. We appeal to them not to follow sheepishly the advice of those few who wish to destroy not only this institution, but the Nation as a whole by joining the fifth column anarchists and foreign agents. We want this to remain in perpetuity a people's University and not a

centre for subversion against a people's Government.

We ask you to convey this Petition to the entire Student Body.

SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION
UNITED NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY

For and on Behalf of the Demonstrators.
July 14, 1971.
Freedom House,
LUSAKA.

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