

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WNLA CLOSURE ON BULOZI, 1966-1986.

by

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DECLARATION

I, MBELELA MULOBELA do hereby declare that this ed as  
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Signed: ..... *mulobela* .....

Date: ..... *03-08-89* .....

EXAMINERS

1. *Bobaim Ayaka* ..... *1st August 1989* .....

2. *Obm Lumbwe* ..... *1st August 1989* .....

3. ....

4. ....

5. ....

ABSTRACT APPROVAL

This dissertation of Mbelela Mulobela is approved as fulfilling part of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Arts in History at the University of Zambia.

EXAMINERS

- 1. *Boyan Ayeko* 1<sup>st</sup> August 1989
- 2. *Chim Lumbwe* 1<sup>st</sup> August 1989
- 3. ....
- 4. ....

As a result of this dependence on contract labour, both the Lozi Royal Establishment, especially after Lewanika (1842-1916) and the successive colonial administrations to 1964 took very little interest in creating an economic base within Bulozhi. The only industry, timber, was exploited for export purposes only, while no further efforts were made to probe other resources for industrial development in the province. Successive colonial government reports showed that Bulozhi was not capable of economic transformation because of her geographical location from markets

## ABSTRACT

This dissertation studies the consequences of the WNLA closure on Bulozhi. It focuses on the negative and positive consequences that have emerged in the province between 1966 and 1986. The study begins by examining generally the factors that stimulated labour migration in the province before and during the colonial period. It explores the process under which the Lozi were transformed from village cultivators and fishermen to labour migrants who by 1932 had become tenaciously incorporated into migratory labour and Western cash economy. Thus the study attempts to show how the colonial administrators took advantage of the precarious ecological situation in Bulozhi to reduce the province perpetually to a mere source of cheap labour for the mines of South Africa and farms of Southern Rhodesia throughout the colonial period.

As a result of this dependence on contract labour, both the Lozi Royal Establishment, especially after Lewanika (1842-1916) and the successive colonial administrations to 1964 took very little interest in creating an economic base within Bulozhi. The only industry, timber, was exploited for export purposes only, while no further efforts were made to probe other resources for industrial development in the province. Successive colonial government reports showed that Bulozhi was not capable of economic transformation because of her geographical location from markets,

ecological constraints and poor transport system. The Lozi people in the long run got conditioned to the view that their area of regional economic specialisation mainly lay in providing manpower to the already developed areas along the line of rail within Northern Rhodesia, in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and elsewhere. Those who finished school at the BNS left for the line of rail as Bulozhi had no industries to absorb them. Those who did not go to school similarly became 'birds of passage' to Southern Rhodesia through the RNLB and other recruitment organisations to 1932 and by the WNLA to South Africa from 1936 to 1966. Hence from an early stage, the Lozi adopted migratory labour as their way of life and looked down upon other methods of earning cash locally such as through agriculture and fishing.

The closure of the WNLA by the UNIP government in 1966 which ended Lozi dependence on contract labour caught many participants in the system unaware and therefore led to panic and desperation all over Bulozhi. In reality, the WNLA had not created durable wealth within Western Province. Its end, therefore, meant that the 'prosperity' of consumer goods such as suits, blankets etc came to an end and the economic condition of the people had by the middle of 1968 deteriorated. The central focus of this dissertation is to consider the Lozi people's perceptions of and responses to the consequences of the WNLA closure. A general feeling

of an antagonism which was cultivated and articulated by the UP first and subsequently by the ANC against UNIP developed in the areas of the province where the WNLA had been popular as economic hardships increased. In the General Elections of December, 1968 the Lozi in Kalabo, Mongu, Senanga and Sesheke retaliated by voting against UNIP apparently hoping to replace it with a more amenable political party that would restore the WNLA, UNIP gained the Lukulu, Kaoma and Luampa seats where the WNLA had been less popular.

In studying the consequences of the closure, this dissertation examines both the colonial and UNIP policies regarding economic development in Buluzi. In the analysis, the study demonstrates how the policies of the two perpetuated dependence on migratory labour from the province to the detriment of developing a local economic infrastructure. In the colonial period, all the development plans only emphasized the exploitation of timber for export and migratory labour as the province's only source of revenue. The UNIP government, throughout the 1970s, notwithstanding its unprecedented provision of social services in the province, echoed the colonial viewpoint. The employment schemes the government devised to assist the ex-WNLAs and school drop outs of 1972 encouraged permanent migration from the villages and the province as a whole. As a matter of fact, until the 1980s the UNIP government had no clear-cut agricultural policy for Buluzi. Hence the schemes that encouraged migration from the province.

The exodus to Bomas where there were improvements in the provision of social services and the towns where incomes

were higher as compared to the deteriorating villages gave rise to a chain reaction of problems. The villages lost their able-bodied men and women to work on the land and to replace the ageing groups. At the Bomas, a new sociological problem of squatter compounds inhabited by unemployed people emerged. Many of those who were recruited to Nakambala and were dissatisfied with the poor conditions of service there settled in fishing camps on the Kafue. Similarly, those who were employed on temporary construction projects such as at Itezhyi-tezhyi Dam at Namwala and at other projects declined to return home and opted to settle in squatter compounds and fishing camps. Their major bone of contention for not returning to the Western Province was that there were poor economic prospects and that the prices of commodities such as fish and beef were too low to economically sustain vendors.

From 1973, when copper prices began to decline, a gradual change emerged in the province. Government approach to the growing of rice and maize and to the rearing of cattle and the introduction of cashew nuts in the province gave impetus to a gradual switch to agriculture and to improvements in stockrearing. Improvements in producer prices, traditional land tenure, marketing arrangements and improvements in extension services has encouraged more villagers to grow food and to rear cattle not only for subsistence but also for earning cash. And gradually

the myth created by the colonialists that Bulozhi was only suitable for supplying cheap labour for the developed areas along the line of rail was slowly showing signs of disintegration. Many people in the province were beginning to see by 1978 that farming was more rewarding than wage labour. In 1986, government and the nation as a whole recognised the fact that Lozi soils were not all that useless as they were portrayed to be. There were cash crops such as cashew nuts which could grow better in Bulozhi than elsewhere in Zambia. The improvements in agriculture since the beginning of the 1980s suggest that there would have been more improvements if agriculture had been encouraged not through slogans of 'Go Back To The Land' only but also through pragmatic action soon after the UNLA closure or soon after independence. In the production of rice during 1986, Bulozhi came second to Northern Province, another province which had been previously condemned to the status of a labour reservoir.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I have received advice and support from various sources. However, any defects and weaknesses that may be found in this work are purely of my own creation.

## DEDICATION

To my late father Ntsu Morope Mulobela Siabwizu  
Salabani Mosokotvani and my late mother Ma-Moruthi  
Mtelo Ka Dumo who sacrificed the little they had all  
their lives for what I am today and benefited very  
little from me as their last born son, and to all the  
struggling villagers of Zambia.

## ABBREVIATIONS

AMCO:	Amalgamated Mining Construction Company
A.N.C.:	African National Congress
B.N.C.:	Barotse National Council
B.N.G.:	Barotse Native Government
B.N.S.:	Barotse National School
B.N.T.:	Barotse Native Treasury
B.S.A.C.:	British South African Company
B.T.F.:	Barotse Trust Fund
C.O.Z.:	Credit Organisation of Zambia
C.Z.F.:	Central Zambezi Floodplain
D.G.:	District Governor
G.R.Z.:	Government of the Republic of Zambia
I.L.O.:	International Labour Organisation
M.A.W.D.:	Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development
M.C.C.:	Member of the Central Committee
N.A.Z.:	National Archives of Zambia
N.C.D.P.:	National Commission for Development Planning
N.S.E.:	Nakambala Sugar Estate
P.P.S.:	Provincial Political Secretary
R.N.L.B.:	Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau
T.E.B.A.:	Tropical Employment Bureau Association
U.N.:	United Nations
U.N.I.P.:	United National Independence Party
W.N.L.A.:	Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
W.P.C.M.U.:	Western Province Cooperative and Marketing Uni
W/WI:	World War I
Z.F.E.:	Zambia Federation of Employers
Z.I.S.:	Zambia Information Services

CHANGED NAMES

<u>Old</u>	<u>New</u>
Balovale .....	Zambezi
Barortse Province .....	Western Province
Western Province .....	Copperbelt Province
Broken Hill .....	Kabwe
Bancroft .....	Chililabombwe
Bancroft Mine .....	Konkola Division
Congo .....	Zaire
Mankoya .....	Kaoma
Northern Rhodesia .....	Zambia
Nyasaland .....	Malawi
Southern Rhodesia .....	Zimbabwe
WNLA .....	TEBA

CHANGED CURRENCY

<u>Old</u>	<u>New</u>
Onepenny (1d) .....	One Ngwee (1n)
Six Pence (6d) .....	Five Ngwee (5n)
Twelve pence or one shilling .....	Ten Ngwee (10n)
Two Shillings and six pence (2s 6d) .....	Twenty-five Ngwee (25n)
Ten shillings (10s) .....	One Kwacha (K1)
One pound (£1) .....	Two Kwacha (K2)
Five Pounds (£5) .....	Ten Kwacha (K10)

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MAP 1: Location of Western Province in Zambia

MAP 2: WENELA stations in Barotseland and the rivers  
that served as part of the transport system.

## INTRODUCTION

### GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

Geographically, Bulozi, our area of study, is that province of the Republic of Zambia which is situated between the  $22^{\circ}$  and the  $25^{\circ} 30' 1''$  lines of longitude and the  $130^{\circ} 45' 1''$  and the  $17^{\circ} 45' 1''$  lines of latitude.<sup>1</sup> It lies in the western part of Zambia where it shares boundaries with: Central Province in the east, Southern Province in the south and the North Western Province in the north west. Besides, the province shares boundaries with Angola in the west and with Namibia in the south west. The province covers an area of 126,386 sq.km representing 16.8% of Zambia's total land area.

The Zambezi river, interspersed and regenerated by a network of tributaries which include the Lungwebungu, the Kabompo, the Luambimba, the Luena and the Luanginga in the northern part of the province; the Luyi, the Njoko and the Kwandu rivers in the south, runs through the province from the north to the south. This network of rivers and marshes provides Bulozi with a natural riverine economic infrastructure for transport, agriculture, fishing, hunting and herding.<sup>2</sup>

Furthermore, there are two major natural human habitats in Bulozi. These are the **Central Zambezi Floodplain** and the forest areas locally identified as luulya in the west and as makanda in the east. Both these hinge on the western and eastern edges of the **Central Zambezi Floodplain** respectively.<sup>3</sup>


In the east live the Kwengwa, Nbowe, Totela, Toka, Nkoya,

Old Mbunda, Kuandi and Subiya while the Kuenyi, Mashi, Imilangu, Nyengo, Nakoma, Liuwa, Mishulundu, some Ukoya, Mbunda, Shanjo, Fwe, Jimaa and Luvale live in the west. In the Central Zambezi Floodplain live the Lozi from whom the name Sulozi derives who during the floods between March and June move to dry forest areas on the edges of the Central Zambezi Floodplain under a transhumance system called Kuomboka. In modern times the inhabitants of the province are all identified as Lozis.<sup>4</sup>

Topographically, Sulozi is covered by the Kalahari sands. Maclean identifies six categories of soils in Sulozi. These are the western plains region, the floodplain, the central loose sands, the upland sands region, the southern sands region and the seepage soils of the Kalahari sand margins.<sup>5</sup>

The people who live on the makanda and luulya grow bulrush millet, locally known as mauza or maangu, sweet potatoes or ngulu, Livingstone potato or sikuswani, taro or malumba, cassava or mwanja, rice, sugar-cane or mushwati, mangoes, oranges, guavas, lemons and sorghum or mabele. They also fish and hunt in the tributaries of the Zambezi, in the plains and forests adjoining the central plain as well as rearing cattle.<sup>6</sup>

The Lozi, the dominant ethnic group of the region in terms of political and economic control, make their homes on termite mounds, mazulu (singular-lizulu) in the central plain and these are also utilized as fields for growing



maize, mbonyi, sweet potatoes, sweet stalks or nswe, rice, sorghum, fruit and vegetables. During dry seasons Lozi cattle graze in the central plain but are moved to the dry forest areas during the floods.<sup>7</sup>

Administratively, Bulozhi at present has six administrative centres, namely: Mونغu the provincial headquarters, Kalabo, Senanga, Sesheke, Kaoma and Lukulu which assumed a district status in the post-independence era.

Traditionally, each district is administered by a traditional chief appointed by the Litunga, the Lozi Paramount Chief, from among the members of the royal family. The Litunga is based at Lealui (lya-luyi-of the luyi) near Mونغu.

Bulozhi or Western Province is linked to the rest of Zambia by two all weather roads: Lusaka-Mونغu-Senanga Road and the Nekatindi Road which links Livingstone to Sesheke. Kalabo and Lukulu have no direct road links with their provincial headquarters, let alone with the rest of the country. There are no air services to Kalabo, Sesheke, Senanga and Lukulu.

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The present Lozi traditional socio-political system was established in the Central Barotse Plain in the 17th century by a Siluyana-speaking people supposedly believed to have originated from the Lunda side of the Luba-Lunda Kingdom. Two traditions exist among the Lozi people regarding their

origin while a third one which was popularised by members of the royal family to 'mystify their origin or to justify their rule by divine right' has of late been disowned. The first one holds that the Lozi originated from the Karanga-Rozwi Kingdom while the second holds that the Lozi originated from the Luba-Lunda Kingdom and <sup>the</sup> third one held that the first Luyi was a result of sexual union between Huembwa and God (Nysambe).<sup>8</sup>

Be these as they may, the Luba-Lunda tradition appears to have assumed a firmer ground in recent years because recent studies have brought to light 'common linguistic affinities (Lexicostatistics) cliches, place names such as Nemayula and Imuba, and similarities in the instruments of authority and regalia of kingship between the Luyi and the Lunda than is the case with the Shona, the present descendants of the Karanga-Rozwi Kingdom'.<sup>9</sup> For instance, mukubele, a popular royal drum in Buluzi, is also found among the Lunda chiefs and is known by the same name.

In establishing, consolidating and entrenching their grip on the population and terrain they had subdued and captured, and the kingdom they founded, the Luyi (Lozi) set up a complex socio-political system in the central flood plain whose hierarchical structure centred on mound ownership, agriculture, fishing, herding and trading.<sup>10</sup> Also, their control spread to other ethnic groups such as the Subiya, Mashu, Totela, Toka, Mbukushu, Ila and Tonga while breakaway groups such as those of Nuanambinyi, Munge the originator of the Kwangwe, Imenda the originator of the Nbowe and Kabingo

the originator of the Makoma spread Luyi hegemony farther afield.<sup>11</sup> Conversely, it should be noted that trade and marriage alliances, besides military conquests, contributed a great deal to the spread of Luyi influence over surrounding populations. Mutumba Mwinga (Sull) states that the Nashi started exchanging otter skins and ostrich egg shells and feathers with the Luyi (Lozi) for maize and ultimately they came under Luyi control and started paying tribute to the Litunga while N.N. Sakubita mentions Mwenyi, Nyengo and Makoma women who married Luyi princes as far back as the time of Nboo the first Luyi Litunga, and traces their genealogies to some present popular kings, princes and aristocrats.<sup>12</sup> For instance, Inonge, Lewanika's mother had Nyengo blood, the late Sir Mwanawina III had a Nkoya mother while the late Yata's mother was Subiya and Ilute Yata's mother was Mbowe. Evidence is there also which shows that the Nyengo, Totela, Imilangu, Nkoya and several other groups such as the Sala of Central Province came under Luyi control as a result of trade.<sup>13</sup>

Furthermore, evidence of interaction between the Luyi and other neighbouring population other than through military conquest can be seen in linguistic and musical similarities. For instance, the Nyengo, Makoma, Mwenyi, Liuwa, Nashi, Kwangwa, Mbukushu, Kwandi, Mbowe, Nkoya and to a certain extent Totela, Subiya and Shenjo speak dialects of Siluyana, the language of the Luyi before they were overrun by the Makololo, which most people who live in the flood plain today and claim to be "pure Lozi" cannot speak.<sup>14</sup>

Another example of interaction between the Luyi and the surrounding ethnic groups other than through military conquest

can be seen in the way the music and dances of the so-called "subject tribes" influenced the royal court. For instance, most of the drummers and musicians at the royal court at Lealui and the xylophone, silimba (plural - lilimba) are Nkoya and most songs are sung in Nkoya while Itai (a hereditary title for the chief drummer) is of Nkoya origin. Another example of interaction with neighbouring ethnic groups other than through military conquest is evidenced by the fact that Namushi Konde who introduced the growing of maize in the Kongu area and after whom the small town Namushokande near Kongu is named was a Makoma from Kalebo. The Makoma are among the ethnic groups which were regarded as "subject tribes" which were militarily defeated by the Luyi under Nboo.<sup>15</sup> The examples above have been cited to show that it was not only the so-called "subject Tribes" who were on the receiving end but also that they too influenced the Luyi in many spheres. Therefore, one can justifiably argue that the so-called "subject tribes" conquered the Luyi through their women, music, dances and trade and extended their influence on them.

In terms of labour mobilization, the Luyi utilized slave and tribute labour in all their economic activities.<sup>16</sup> Canals were dug in areas as far afield as Nengu in Makoma, Namitoma in Kongu using slave and tribute labour during the reigns of Lulembua and his grandson Lubosi Leuanika.<sup>17</sup> The Luyi made use of public utilities such as canals to drain more land for cultivation and also to reduce the level of floods.<sup>18</sup>

Furthermore, embankments, a form of man made mounds, were made through slave and tribute labour.

For instance, Nanikelako where Lewanika was buried in 1916 is an example of an embankment established in 1905 through slave and tribute labour from all over Bulozhi. Here, we see that slave and tribute labour played a significant role in Luyi economy in terms of the maintenance of major public utilities which serviced both the members of the ruling groups as well as the general public.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, slave and tribute labour were expended on the herding of cattle, the cultivation of royal fields bo simukau (simukau-singular) which were found in every silalo (the proceeds from the royal fields catered for the royalty as well as for the public who were victims of natural disasters such as floods, locusts and droughts), collecting birds from reedstands along rivers locally known as ku loba sitaka, tanning hides and other animal skins for skirts, loins, blankets and clothes and portering.<sup>20</sup> This in brief was the fabric of Luyi society which was first interrupted by the Kololo interregnum and later on by the **advent** of British colonialism.

The treaties which Lubosi Lewanika signed with Harry Ware in 1869, with Elliot Lochner in 1890 and with the British South Africa Company in 1900 and 1907 brought Bulozhi and subsequently Zambia as a whole under British colonialism first under British South Africa Company from 1890 to 1924, then as a Crown Colony or Protectorate from

1924 to 1964 when Zambia attained political independence under Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party.<sup>21</sup> Lewanika signed all the treaties above under the "tutelage" of Francois Coillard, a French Huguenot who was based at Sefula Mission near Lealui.<sup>22</sup>

According to Kapaale, the British South Africa Company during the early years of colonization had studied the Lozi socio-economic base and found that it hinged on slave and tribute labour. Coincidentally, this was the time white farms and mines in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa needed cheap African labour. Therefore, to entice the Lozi to wage labour, several measures were taken by the B.S.A.C. Firstly, slavery was abolished in Buluzi and simultaneously tax was introduced in the same year. In 1925 tribute labour was abolished but no alternative was devised to replace slave and tribute labour.<sup>23</sup>

We have seen above that public utilities in Buluzi before the coming of the British were serviced and maintained by slave and tribute labour; so with their abolition, the conditions of some canals had begun to deteriorate to such an extent that by the 1920s the ecological effects of this neglect could be seen in the increase in the level of floods whose impacts were felt in areas as far afield as Nyengo and Makoma. **Kapaale** further observes that 'by 1926, the canal at Lealui was becoming dangerously dirty while others elsewhere were silted a great deal.'<sup>24</sup> This then ushered in a spate of famines.

Furthermore, another issue occurred in Bulozhi which further shattered the economy - the outbreak of bovine pleuro-pneumonia on Lozi cattle in 1915. The Lozi people who after British colonial policy had dislocated their traditional economy depended on selling cattle to Gusman Brothers, N.F. Sutherlands and Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau to enable them pay tax, buy food and clothes because they were now part of money economy, were further curtailed economically by the outbreak which was locally known as mupanda.<sup>25</sup> As a result of the outbreak, cattle sales in Bulozhi were banned in 1916 and this completely deprived the Lozi of any local source of income. Also, large numbers of tax defaulters were reported in Kalabo, Jenonga and Sesheke from 1917 onwards.<sup>26</sup> The death of cattle in such large numbers meant that even items like hides for making blankets, loin-skirts and sandals, masangu, were in short supply. Hence, the only answer was wage labour which could only be attained by migrating to either the line of rail or to the south. Therefore, many labour recruitment organisations and individuals set up business in Bulozhi to recruit the Lozi to Southern Rhodesia, the Congo, South Africa and even to Portuguese West Africa under a contract system locally known as Sipalo sa Mbumbu.

### THE PROBLEM.

The signing by President Kaunda on 17th October, 1966 of Statutory Instrument No. 369 of 1966 to bring into operation on 14th October, 1966 Employment Act, 1965 Chapter 512 of the Laws of Zambia, terminated labour recruitment by the UNLA in Bulalozi.<sup>27</sup> As a result, Munkayumbwa Sipalo, then Minister of Labour toured all the districts of the then Barotsa Province to explain to the Lozi people why the government had decided to prohibit UNLA contract labour.

In his closing remarks, Sipalo explained that 'the independent state of Zambia could not tolerate the continuance of a system which subjected its nationals to misery, indignity and poverty.'<sup>28</sup> Every where Sipalo addressed a meeting in Mongu, Kolobo, Senanga and Sesheke, crowds retorted, Niwana u felile mo i felazi Sinala, "You are also finished politically as you have finished the UNLA."<sup>29</sup>

As E.H. Allen has observed, 'since it is not given to mortals either to plan with perfect foresight or to act with unerring judgement, the fulfilment of a design almost invariably gives rise to unexpected situations...'<sup>30</sup> Similarly the decision to end the UNLA recruitment in Bulalozi not only severed the longstanding economic, social and psychological ties between Bulalozi and South Africa but also ushered in a series of unexpected repercussions which affected the lives of the Lozi people who had been tied to labour migration since 1901 or even earlier than that as we shall see later. This study seeks to investigate and analyse the major economic, social and political events that have emerged since 1966 when UNLA

recruitment ended in Bulozzi to 1986. It does this by tracing out those outstanding events within and outside Bulozzi which have affected and altered the **lives** of the Lozi people from 1966 to 1986.

#### METHODOLOGY AND PROBLEMS FACED DURING THE RESEARCH

In the collection of data, this study made use of two types of sources, namely written and oral sources. Under written sources, I made use of the University of Zambia Library books, magazines, newspapers, Government Reports, Hansards or Daily Parliamentary Debates, Government Gazettes, Statutory Instruments, Acts and Bills of Parliament, colonial reports, unpublished dissertations and journals.

Very limited use was made of the National Archives, especially for the **period** 1966 to 1986 as this falls under the "closed period." Another problem was that most key files, especially those which touched on early labour recruitment in Bulozzi were carried away by the colonial administrators at independence. However, despite the absence of the above documents, I still feel the data I have gathered is adequate to be the basis of this dissertation.

Initially, I attempted to use structured questionnaires and a tape recorder to obtain information from oral sources. However, these arrangements proved rather unsuccessful, for in the former I only retrieved two questionnaires out of the twenty I had distributed while in the **latter**, most informants in Bulozzi declined to be taped for fear of being lured into

criticising the government and ending up in gaol. Eventually, I compromised by making use of unstructured interviews which most informants accepted.

The interviews covered all the districts of Bulozhi. And since one of the major objectives of the study was to investigate the perceptions of the Lozi people of the UNLA closure, the interviews covered those who participated inside and outside Bulozhi, those who benefited from the UNLA, even though they did not go to the Rand lines themselves such as housewives, children and dependants of ex-migrants, politicians and other government officials who participated in the closure; politicians who took advantage of the UNLA closure to sway the Lozi away from UNIP and many other Zambians who demonstrated interest and competence to contribute to the study. I also interviewed ex-UNLAs who had worked at Nakambala Sugar Estate as seasonal workers, Nkandabwe coal mine, Itzhyi-tezhyi Dam, Kafue Gorge, Nampundwe mine and also those who live at the fishing camps as well as those who are or have been farm labourers at Numbwa and Lusaka.

Much as I attempted to gather a balanced representative view, my effort had some limitations. There are gaps in the statistics of recruitment. Secondly, while there are written sources for the period 1936 to 1965 there are gaps and also very little coordinated written sources for the period 1974 to 1979. This period appears to lack a regular supply of government reports, especially with regard to the Western Province. Thirdly, the study may suffer from problems relating to the authenticity of the data and exaggerations. Some

informants were still nursing the "wounds" of the closure and so their information may have been blown out of proportions or since it involved passing judgment on the government of the day, some information may have been contracted or distorted. Despite all these, I still feel the material gathered is valuable because some of these have been countered through the use of other sources of data. Furthermore, the documents I have examined in the course of this study have provided useful information to supplement the oral data for the dissertation.

#### NEED FOR THE STUDY

Most scholars who have written on the history of Southern Africa in general and Zambia in particular have tended to focus their studies on the colonial period. Very little, if any, has been done to review the performance of the Zambian Government since the 1960s. This study by focusing on the independence period is intended to make history as a discipline a little more relevant to contemporary society.

Secondly, a lot has been written about the positive and negative effects of labour migration in Southern Africa. However, very few studies have been carried out to show what was the outcome of abolishing it. For instance, within Southern Africa Malawi abolished migratory labour to South Africa after the Francistown disaster in 1974 only to reintroduce it in 1977. Mozambique, Botswana and Lesotho, in spite of being outstanding members of the Frontline States opposed to apartheid have continued to rely on migratory labour to

South Africa. This study therefore ventures to plug the gap by opening a debate on the positive and negative consequences of abolition. In other words, the consequences arising from the ULLA closure in Buluzi can be extended to other areas in Southern Africa where labour migration has been equally extensive.

Thirdly, the study is justified in its own right in that it is intended to be a contribution to the assessment of the effectiveness of Zambia's rural development policies. Buluzi being one of Zambia's leading undeveloped rural provinces, the study seeks to identify some of the constraints or obstacles which have held up development in the province during the past 20 years despite the fact that foreign labour recruitment was abolished there twenty years ago.

Fourthly, many studies have been carried out on the history of Buluzi and among these are those conducted by Gluckman, Clay, Gutumbo Wainga (Gull), Caplan, Turner, Swyn Prins and Sumbwa. However, nearly all these have tended to concentrate on either the politics of the ruling groups or on narrow ethnic issues which compartmentalize the people of Buluzi as separate unrelated entities. For instance Gluckman concentrates on the flood plain people only, Clay on the life of Lewanika and even isolates him from the Nyanga people among whom he was born in 1842, Wainga on the history of the ruling group, Caplan, Turner and Prins on the political history of the ruling groups while Sumbwa concentrates on the history of the Nanyengo or Luyana as he prefers to call them. Furthermore, A. Kopenle has conducted his 'Survey of the Senela in

Bulozi' and so far the only known study on the UNLA in Bulozi, but the 'survey' does not go beyond 1966; hence as I have shown above he does not address the subject of consequences of the UNLA closure adequately but rather emphasizes the operations only. Secondly, his conclusion though elaborate, appears to underrate the pecuniary advantages that the Lozi people derived from the UNLA, let alone the responses of the Lozi people to UNLA closure.

Furthermore, the study departs from the divisive nature of the above named scholars by addressing the subject of consequences of the UNLA closure on all the inhabitants of Bulozi irrespective of social or economic status. For instance the royalty, the commoners and all the ethnic groups of Bulozi were affected in one way or another by the closure. For the first time, all the people of Bulozi are brought under one title of history - Toka, Mashi, Totela, Mwenyi, Kwangwa, Mbunda, Mkoza, Subiya etc as congenial participants - because it touches on labour which is mankind's foremost endowment.

Also, the study is a humble contribution by someone who himself actively participated by going to South Africa as a UNLA recruit in 1965. Hence it is the first study in Zambia on the UNLA by an ex-UNLA recruit.

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This study, which is an investigation of the consequences of the UNLA closure on Bulozi, is organized in three chapters. Following the introduction, the first chapter deals with

foreign labour recruitment in Bulozhi to 1966. It addresses the major factors surrounding early labour migration in Bulozhi to 1932 and the **advent**, growth and development of the UNLA in Bulozhi to 1966.

The second chapter attempts to assess the political and psychological responses and interpretations of the closure by the Lozi people. It attempts to establish whether the Lozi people perceived the closure as an isolated grievance or as part of a series of grievances. The chapter further tries to establish whether the UNLA closure played any role in winning the Lozi to the United Party side and subsequently to the UE.

The third chapter, which is the central part of the study, examines the consequences of the UNLA closure which ended Lozi dependence on migratory wage labour to the south for over 70 years. It examines the positive and negative social and economic consequences of terminating migratory labour and how the people adjusted themselves to the new situation without the cash from UNLA.

Further, the study concludes with a summary of the major argument of the dissertation which is that the measures taken by the government represented another form of labour migration and therefore did not provide a lasting solution to the people's plight.

Finally the study is not based on any single theoretical framework, for theories are good, but if worshipped may limit one to a narrow single viewpoint about the world. This one is, therefore, an empirical study that borrows from the theori

only as they become relevant to the study. Its major concern is to present how the Lozi community in Zambia have perceived and responded to the UNLW closure and how this has affected its relations with the government and other Zambians.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### FOREIGN LABOUR RECRUITMENT IN BULOZI TO 1966

The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief descriptive background of, and an insight into, foreign labour recruitment in Bulozhi and the circumstances which enabled it to firmly establish its roots in the area to 1966. The chapter focuses on the two phases of labour recruitment in Bulozhi. The first part is a general discussion of labour recruitment. It examines the major factors which stimulated and influenced foreign labour recruitment in Bulozhi to 1932. The second part considers the major issues within and outside Bulozhi which influenced and stimulated the **advent**, growth and development of LRLA recruitment to 1966. Furthermore, the chapter serves as a framework for the understanding and appreciation of the major ensuing debate in chapters two and three.

#### a) BACKGROUND TO EARLY FOREIGN LABOUR RECRUITMENT IN BULOZI TO 1932

With the imposition of British colonial rule on Bulozhi in particular and Northern Rhodesia in general from the 1890s, and the subsequent integration of the Lozi and other Africans to Western money economy the Lozi were ushered into an era of desperate dependence on migratory wage labour.<sup>1</sup> A number of factors surrounded this early dependence on migratory wage labour and the high demand for Western material goods. In this part I propose to assess these factors which surrounded and accelerated this early dependence.

The first factor most scholars have identified to have influenced labour migration in colonial Africa is taxation. This school of thought views the introduction of tax to have been responsible for forcing Africans to leave their villages for the 'white areas' in search of wage labour to enable them pay tax.<sup>2</sup> For instance, in the case of Buluzi where there were no industries to provide employment locally, people were forced to leave their province for other areas. The argument further goes on that the 'introduction of tax in Buluzi proper in 1906 and the enforcement of paying it in cash only by 1909, further pushed the Lozi into wage labour'<sup>3</sup> for fear of being imprisoned, chained or flogged or having their huts burnt by the colonial authorities.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, the role played by taxation is reflected by the fact that all the districts of Buluzi at that time namely Kalabo (Lukona), Senanga (Malolo) Sesheke and Keoma (Mankoya) were established mainly 'for the purposes of administration and tax collection.'<sup>5</sup> Most of these 'were established between 1906 when tax was introduced and 1909 when it became compulsory to pay tax in cash only.'<sup>6</sup>

However, even though the argument above sounds plausible, there are obvious limitations to the tax view when we assess the situation in Buluzi. Hermitte and others have convincingly demonstrated that foreign labour recruitment started in Buluzi before tax was introduced. According to Hermitte, Acout and Crewé recruited 3500 Lozi for Southern Rhodesia in 1901-2 and several other individuals recruited other Lozi to farms in

Southern Rhodesia. Here we are clearly shown that the Lozi started taking up wage labour long before tax was introduced in the whole of Northern Rhodesia. Hermitte describes this as 'the irresistible movement to go to the mines and farms of Bulawayo and South Africa.'<sup>7</sup> This, therefore, suggests that while the tax view cannot be ruled out completely, there were probably other factors which might have forced the Lozi into wage labour at such an early period of British colonization. While it is true that large numbers of recruits began to emerge after 1906, we should also recognise that there were other factors which combined with tax to push the Lozi into wage labour. According to Gann, the Lozi had started to travel on their own to the south for work as early as 1891<sup>8</sup> and L. Hermitte adds that Coillard in 1897 heard of Lozis who were going in large numbers to the south.<sup>9</sup> This suggests that factors other than tax may have influenced these early movements to work in the south.

First, the Tswana with whom the Lozi are known to have been in close touch, are recorded to have been regular migrants to the diamond and gold fields of the Cape Province and the Transvaal before 1885 when Bechuanaland was declared a British Protectorate. The Tswana are said to have brought back with them clothes, gin, guns and many other western material goods. Louis Schepers talks of a Tswana chief who sent some of his people to go and work for guns at the mines which the tribe later came to use in fighting another tribe. Therefore, owing to the regular contact and good relations that existed between the two groups, the Lozi should have

known about the South African mines through the Tswana.<sup>10</sup> As a result, the Lexi knew where to turn to during times of crises which threatened their existence in their locality as will be shown later in this discussion.

Secondly, available evidence shows that there had been regular occurrences of alternating natural disasters of droughts, locusts, floods then livestock diseases in Buluzi since 1878 and this trend continued to 1978.<sup>11</sup> For instance, all years ending with '-8' (i.e. 1878, 1888, 1908, 1918, 1928, 1938, 1948, 1958, 1968, 1978) have been years of floods followed by famines. Furthermore, there was a flood in the period 1901-2 during which water was reported to have entered the Ngundu, the Litunga's house at Lealui.<sup>12</sup> It is also during this same period that we see the largest number of Lexis being recruited for work in the south. In addition, the schedule of RWLS recruitment in Kalaba District from 1911 to 1932 shows that recruitment usually increased during years of natural disasters.<sup>14</sup>

Therefore the floods of 1899, 1901-2, 1908, 1918-19 coupled with the influenza, 1926, 1928-29, the droughts and locusts of 1905-7, 1916 and 1930-31 and the cattle diseases of 1914-15 which occurred in the 1930s contributed to the decline in Lexi agriculture and livestock.<sup>15</sup> As a result, the Lexi who had won a reputation of selling pounded mealie-meal, vegetables and fruit to mission stations and Somas and later on to the RWLS and the Zambezi Sawmills were no longer able to do so effectively during the 1920s and 1930s because these natural disasters were a menace to

ANLS RECRUITMENT IN MALABU FROM 1912-1932

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NO. RECRUITED</u>
1912/13	304
1913/14	405
1914/15	579
1915/16	793
1916/17	774
1917/18	1 232
1918/19	1 104
1919/20	593 No. reduced due to influenza epidemic
1920/21	575
1921/22	742
1923/24	634
1924/25	1 396
1925/26	1 301
1926	1 752
1927	1 604
1928	1 525
1931	500
1932	464

Source: MSN 2/1 MALABU DISTRICT RETURN VOL II P50.

their agriculture and livestock. Hence, more people started going out in search for wage labour as working on the land became tedious because of the ravages done by the natural disasters.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, in 1936 when tax was introduced and the RNLS and others established recruitment offices in the area in 1938, it became 'irresistible' for most Lozi who either had already heard about work in the south or had already been there to enroll themselves for work outside. In other words, tax became an additional stimulus to wage labour. Since the colonial rulers showed no interest in establishing industries in Sulozi to generate employment and also used force to make tax defaulters pay, this increased the number of people who enrolled for foreign labour recruitment.<sup>17</sup>

Another factor which **reduced** Sulozi's major source of income was the outbreak of pleuro-pneumonia in 1915. The disease, which was reported to have started in the Kalabo district in 1914 and had spread to other parts of the area in 1915, added more to the area's scourge of natural disasters. The disease deprived Sulozi of its lucrative trade in cattle. According to Gann, A.F. Letherlands and Lusena, both businessmen of Jewish origin, bought cattle and hides from Sulozi which they sold in Southern Rhodesia from as early as 1897.<sup>18</sup> Their headquarters was in Livingstone and it was estimated that not less than 4000 cattle were exported from Sulozi in 1901 and King Levanika alone was reported to have sold cattle valued at £1 500 in 1905. Also Sulozi supplied not less than

10 477 cattle to Katanga and settler farmers within Northern Rhodesia.<sup>15</sup> These early large sales of cattle suggest that the Lozi were already becoming accustomed to the use of money long before taxation and the abolition of slave and tribute labour were put into effect; for they would not have exchanged cattle for money if it was not a popular medium of exchange among them. Therefore, the outbreak of the disease obviously deprived Bulozi of this valuable trade and the authorities responded by restricting sales of Lozi cattle outside the province. It was not until the 1940s that the colonial administration took steps to try and **combat** the disease which had become 'endemic' in the province.

The outcome of the 1915 cattle disease and other natural disasters was that the number of people who enrolled themselves for wage labour outside Bulozi trebled. For instance, in Kolabo district alone, recruitment by the NLLs went as follows: 1911-12 two hundred and five people enrolled, 1912-13 three hundred and four people were recruited, 1913-14 four hundred and five people were recruited, 1914-15 the number dropped to three hundred and seventy-nine mainly because of the outbreak of the first world war which required many African carriers, but during 1917-18 and 1918-19 the figures rose to one thousand two hundred and thirty-two and one thousand one hundred and four respectively. These two increases may justifiably be attributed to the famine arising from the droughts and floods of the 1910-12 era and from the shortage of cash which was the result of the disruption in cattle trade.<sup>20</sup>

Furthermore, the British attitude towards the economic development of Northern Rhodesia as a whole was questionable. As Andrew Roberts points out, the B.S.N.C did very little with Northern Rhodesia during its rule from 1899-1924 especially when compared with Southern Rhodesia.<sup>21</sup> In the case of Bulolozi which was regularly prone to natural disasters, had no mines, and was geographically located far away from the line of rail, this neglect became more obvious. The area had no local industries to generate employment for its people who had become accustomed to wage labour as a result of a combination of natural and man-made factors. Secondly, even though the area had cattle hides and crocodile skins in abundance, these were bought for the factories established in Southern Rhodesia, thus depriving the area of the opportunity to develop economically.

As a result, the only sources of employment available locally were the Barotsi Native Government, the B.S.N.C administration centres and mission stations where small numbers of people were employed as peddlers of barges (befuluhi ba lisape) to transport officials and property for the B.S.N.C administration and missionaries and as porters (bo simuzampula) who carried luggage for white officials during tours.<sup>22</sup> These sources of employment proved inadequate as the number of job seekers increased as a result of the famines emanating from the regular occurrences of natural disasters and the intensification of tax collection campaigns. Moreover, as Mashimani has convincingly **pointed out**, fishing and skin tanning which would have served as possible industries in the area and as sources

of employment were deliberately ignored by both the colonial rulers and the Barotsse Royal Establishment who after 1906 received 50% of the tax collected in Gulozi. Furthermore, apart from financing the building of the Barotsse National School which opened up in 1937, the Lozi Royal Establishment spent their share of the tax and dividends from mineral royalties on the maintenance of 'all the members of the Royal Family and on the luxury of the Litunga and his Indunas at Lealui.'<sup>23</sup> The remainder was 'kept like clothes whereby it was put in the sun to dry and was later re-placed in the boxes unutilised.'<sup>24</sup> The system of keeping money as a royal prestige remained in force until 1965 when the Litunga's jurisdiction over the Barotsse Native Treasury was abolished by the Local Government Act of 1965.<sup>25</sup> These may sound irrelevant details but they are an attempt to show how the Lozi Royal Establishment partly contributed to the economic backwardness of the area.

The Lozi commoners' dissatisfaction with the lack of economic development in their area is best summed up by the following quotation:

Since the Beuan Government succeeded the Chartered Company, we have seen no improvement worth mentioning. We hear no one speak of a railway to Barotseland or of cheaper transport. We have seen no work undertaken for the benefit of the country or to help the people to earn money without going far away from their homes. What is our good trying to improve or increase the produce of our gardens? Transport is so expensive that it does not pay to send anything to Livingstone for sale. Why should the government not help to transport our produce to Livingstone? 26 (Kaplan quoting Jalle)

In the statement above, we see the Lozi commoners registering their dissatisfaction over the pace of economic development

in the area. It would appear that by 1927 when Jalla observed this resentment among the Lozi commoners, neither the Crown nor the Lozi Royal Establishment were prepared to take the initiative in trying to develop the area.<sup>27</sup> For instance, while Lawanika (1842-1916) took the initiative to spend part of the Barotse Native Trust Fund on the digging of canals such as Heritome near Wangu, Mushuma and Wangu in Kalaba in 1898, and the construction of the Barotse National School,<sup>28</sup> Yata (1871-1951) spent more on the luxury of the Royal establishment. In 1935 alone, he is said to have spent more than £1 500 on luxury while his subjects starved and had to leave the province in large numbers in search for employment elsewhere.<sup>29</sup> He insisted that the development of the area was the legitimate responsibility of the government in accordance with the 1933 concession.<sup>30</sup>

The effects of this foreign labour recruitment were many and varied. Scholars such as Kapelle, Gluckman, Deplan, Harmitte, Van Horn and others have identified many. However, in this study, I only discuss those I consider to be of relevance to the understanding of the main thesis of the study. The first effect was that identified by Max Gluckman in 1940. He stated:

I saw this fall in production as being probably **due to** the effects of an increasing labour migration rate. I argued that the withdrawal of more and more workers would affect deleteriously a complex economy in which several scattered productive activities had to be performed simultaneously much more than it would affect a simple economy where absentees could be compensated for harder work on the part of those left behind. 31

Gluckman's explanation has been disputed by L.L. Hermitte who conversely points out that there had been a marked increase in Lozi agriculture between 1900 and 1940 and further contends that Lozi agriculture could not be severely crippled by the absence of male labour because their agriculture largely depended on female labour.<sup>32</sup> Whatever Hermitte based his contention upon, while this may be true for forms of agriculture like preparing earth mounds for sweet potatoes and cassava and small sitaga fields of maize, this may not be true for forms of agriculture like matama (forest gardens) where big trees **needed to** be cut or uprooted or matanga (singular- litanga) which could only give substantial yields after being fertilized with cattle dung. Women in Buluzi do not herd cattle and the role of cutting trees is for men under a system locally known as kutulisa or ku kumulisa. (In addition, other public services such as the digging of canals to drain marshes for cultivation which constituted the main framework of Lozi economy were a masculine affair.<sup>33</sup> Hence, like in the abolition of slavery and tribute labour, the massive recruitment of male labour out of Buluzi by the NILE and other small recruitment organizations to 1938 and by the M.L. after 1938 compositely contributed to the economic backwardness of the area.<sup>34</sup>

Furthermore, both the D.S.C and the Crown policies contributed to the economic backwardness of the area. While the area had become a battle ground of natural disasters, the colonial administration in collusion with Yeta and his Indunas took no meaningful measures to correct the situation in the

area.<sup>35</sup> Instead, the colonial rulers concentrated on those issues which pleased their collaborator, Vata, at the expense of the development of the area as a whole. While a lot of money 'poured' into Buluzi out of cattle sales before 1915 and out of **capitation** fees from the NLU and other recruitment organizations as well as from the B.S. share from tax and dividends from mineral royalties, the Lozi Royal Establishment, Vata in particular, spent the money on feeding unproductive members of the Royal Family all over Buluzi at the expense of the tax payer who had contributed to the accumulation of this money.<sup>36</sup>

In effect, this neglect increased the trend of labour migration and the dependence on western material goods which manifested itself in sartorial garbs like suits, trousers, cotton shirts, shoes and in the transition from skin and bark wear as well as in the abandoning of local crafts like pottery and woodwork as people became 'birds of passage shuttling between Buluzi and Southern Rhodesia, the Congo and South Africa.'<sup>37</sup> Therefore, when the depression set in during the 1930s and western economies declined, Buluzi was mainly the only rural province in Northern Rhodesia where rural Africans were reported to have been severely affected by the depression. This therefore clearly shows that by 1932 Buluzi had become sufficiently tied to wage labour and any disturbance in the western economic system or in the system of wage labour in Southern Africa affected them very severely too. This manifested itself when the NLU closed down in 1932 as we shall see in the second part.

THE ADVENT OF THE ULLA IN BULOZI, ITS GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT  
TO 1966

The ULLA or Umla, a South African labour recruitment association which from the 1970s assumed the new name Tropical Employment Bureau Limited (TEBL) replaced the original Native Labour Supply Association of 1896. It was established by the Transvaal Chamber of Mines on 14th March, 1902 'for the purposes of engaging, distributing and regulating African labour in order to reduce costs and competition for African labour among the gold mines of South Africa.'<sup>39</sup> In Bulozhi, the ULLA officially started its recruitment operations in 1936 and many reasons have been advanced by scholars for the association's delay in coming to Bulozhi. This chapter will focus on those reasons which bear relevance to the main thesis of this study in **chapters two and three.**

Several developments took place in Bulozhi, in South Africa and indeed in the world economy during the period 1930-1936 which gave rise to the ULLA's official commencement of labour recruitment in Bulozhi. Various sources have mentioned cases of secret recruitment and "boating" at borders. The 'Zambazi boys' mentioned by Denn had started travelling to the south from as early as 1891, but official recruitment only started in 1936 or thereabout.<sup>40</sup> Below, I discuss the circumstances that led the ULLA to officially begin recruiting labour from Bulozhi and the circumstances that facilitated and accelerated its growth and development in the area to 1966.

In South Africa, the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 disturbed mining operations. Thus until after peace was restored, there was very little demand for labour in the mines. However, after 1902, mining revived and the demand for black labour climaxed in the formation of the M.L.A. which in 1903 had started recruiting labour from Nyasaland and Mozambique. However, the outbreak of pneumonia which killed 60 out of every one thousand recruits from Nyasaland between 1903 and 1907 led the South African Government to ban the recruitment of labour by the M.L.A. from areas north of latitude 22° S.<sup>41</sup> The ban was specified thus:

As a result of the exceedingly high rate of mortality amongst natives recruited from tropical areas, it was decided in December **last** upon the authority of His Majesty's Government and by arrangement with the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association to suspend all recruiting operations north of latitude 22° S in the territories of British Central Africa, Zululand, Mozambique and Portuguese Nyasaland.<sup>42</sup>

Officially, the ban remained in force until 1933 when the South African Institute of Medical Research established by the M.L.A. in 1919 discovered the Lister anti-pneumococcal vaccine. This discovery became part of the M.L.A.'s bargaining grounds with the South African Government in requesting it to lift the ban on recruiting labour from areas north of latitude 22° S.<sup>43</sup>

The second issue was that between 1931 and 1940 over 500 mines were opened up in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. This situation was brought about by South Africa's departure from the gold standard which was followed by a high demand for South African gold after 1933. The opening

up of more mines and the high demand for South African gold on the world market increased the demand for black labour which was becoming scarce in South Africa during the 1930s owing to a 'stiffer competition' and better conditions of service (including higher wages) offered in the industrial and commercial sectors of the South African economy. A 1935-36 report showed a rise in employment from 188 122 in December 1935 to 200 273 in December 1936 in sectors other than mining and agriculture.<sup>44</sup> This competition forced the WNLA to look elsewhere for cheaper labour. As a result, labour agreements were signed with Mozambique, Nyasaland and the two Rhodesias in 1935 and 1936.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, the shortage of black labour in South Africa is reflected in the high degree of poaching labour from the borders at Kazungula which a source described as "labour war" with South Africa and threatened 'to abrogate the 1936 agreement if the trend of labour poaching continued.'<sup>46</sup> Hence, labour shortage in South Africa played a role in the introduction of WNLA labour recruitment in Bulozhi.

Furthermore, a series of natural disasters set in between 1930 and 1937 to destroy all the remnants of Lozi traditional economy that had survived the onslaught of BSAC and Crown office policies of 1906 and 1925 respectively. During this period, it was reported that a succession of alternating floods, droughts, cattle diseases and locusts devastated crops and livestock in Bulozhi.<sup>47</sup> These disasters deprived the Lozi of all the chances of earning income through traditional

agriculture and cattle sales. Longere**miniscent** of the terror**wrought** by locusts during this period are still heard among old Lozi and one of them went as follows:

Se yaya Nzi! Se yaya Nzi! Hane lu sa i nata nzie (twice)  
Haba Nanyima! Nzie woo, nzie hane lu sa i nata nzie.  
Haba Nsanda! Nzie woo, nzie hane lu sa i nata nzie.  
Haba Imbua! Nzie woo, nzie hane lu sa i nata nzie.  
Haba Kulubela! Nzie woo, nzie hane lu sa i nata nzie. 48

The song may be translated in English thus:

Oh the menacing locusts! We kept fighting them under-  
trying conditions of hunger and despair at:  
Induna Nsanda's area (in Sasheke)  
Induna Nanyima's area (in Kulaba)  
Induna Imbua's area (there were imbuas in Kulaba,  
Sasheke and Mangu)  
Induna Kulubela (in Mangu; not related to the author).

The mention of Induna areas from nearly all the districts of the province suggests that the locusts affected Buluzi as a whole and that the suffering was usually widespread.<sup>49</sup>

Even though some written sources have indicated that cassava was not affected by the locusts and therefore served as the main staple crop in Buluzi,<sup>50</sup> other sources disputed this view. Firstly, cassava is not immune from the ravages of floods and long draughts; with the former causing the roots of the plant to rot and the latter retarding their growth and development. Secondly, older informants in Buluzi who witnessed the locusts were of the view that the locusts devoured cassava leaves and parts of the stalk. Where this happened 'either the roots got rotten or none was produced at all.' The sources further stated that people during this time mainly lived on wild plants locally known as mashela or manzana with fish or meat and that cassava was scarcely seen.<sup>51</sup>

As a result, prior to 1932, villages all over the province heavily depended on the NLLS and other recruitment organizations for money to buy food and to pay tax.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, the setting in of the depression in 1932 which ended NLLS recruitment also severely curtailed the government's capacity to finance anti-locust and famine relief campaigns.<sup>53</sup> Hence the Lozi dilemma or predicament of the 1930s which Caplan has cogently described thus:

Between 1930 and about 1936-7, paid employment both in Bechuanaland and abroad became increasingly scarce - the recruiting agencies shut their doors in 1932 - while floods, droughts and locusts destroyed four successive crops, and pleuro-pneumonia, anthrax and foot and mouth disease terminated the remnants of the cattle trade, and the small export trade in skins. Famine, unemployment and imprisonment or compulsory menial labour for non-payment of poll-tax characterized the life of the average inhabitant of Bechuanaland during most of the decade.<sup>54</sup>

Therefore, in 1936 when news of the official opening of NLLS recruitment in Zulazi reached the villages, it was received with a sigh of relief. The first despatch of 1 500 recruits which sources described as experimental reached Johannesburg towards the end of 1936. The recruits were gathered from all over Zulazi in barges to Mutima-Mulilo near Jeshaka. There they were transported to Francistown in Bechuanaland via the NLLS depot at Rozengula in Lorrise. From Francistown the recruits caught trains to Johannesburg (Rua Nzilikazi) where they were allocated to mines after undergoing strict medical examinations to detect pneumonia and other diseases.<sup>55</sup>

Back in Zulazi, following the 1936 agreement signed in Salisbury by the Labour Commissioners of the two Rhodesias


and Nyasaland on the one hand, and General the General Manager of the UDLA on the other, the UDLA was authorised to establish recruitment depots at and send representatives to every district of Zulazi.<sup>56</sup> As a result, the Natima-Nulilo and the Mangu Depots were established in 1936-37 respectively while the Kalabo Depot firmly took root in 1940. By 1946 after the Second World War, the UDLA had covered Zulazi and had spread to the Angolan border. Thus recruitment depots were established at Sikongo in Kalabo, Liselebele, Shangombo and Kaunga-Nashi in Senanga West, Lalafuta in Namoa, Luatambo in Mangu rural and at Lukulu.<sup>57</sup> There were several other reasons why the UDLA became so widely accepted in Zulazi apart from those already advanced above.

First, unlike the A.L.E whose recruits walked long distances from Mangu to Livingstone in the famous Lihula road, the UDLA transported its recruits in motor barges and lorries. For instance, the UDLA were the first to introduce a motor vehicle in Kalabo, Senanga West and Western Sesheke by the 1940s. In areas like Kalabo, Senanga West and Sesheke the UDLA from 1946 to 1959 constructed and maintained the Kalabo-Natima-Nulilo road which served as the only transport infrastructure in the three districts. The Sikongo road in Kalabo District was also constructed by the UDLA. The UDLA transport system further attracted more people when in 1954 the **association's** air services which had been started in 1951 were extended to Zulazi.<sup>58</sup>

Secondly, the long period the Lozi had been associated with wage labour enabled them to compare the conditions of service offered by employers in the two Rhodesias and the Rand. For instance, one informant who worked as a builder's helper during the construction of the Kitima-Kulilo Depot in 1935-36 stated that other employers of black labour in the area such as Gushen who hired hardemen and Kukwenya and Larroo who employed paddlers and farm workers complained that the higher monthly wages of £10 the U.S.A. was offering its African employees was causing them problems in finding and retaining African labourers, for most of these workers escaped to the U.S.A.<sup>59</sup>

The Lids-Browne Report of 1938 stated that 'the far higher wages offered at a distance which Northern Rhodesia could not afford for all its inhabitants rendered migration to the south the only means to advancement.' Though the £10 mentioned above as monthly payment for a builder's helper in 1935 might be an exaggeration, written sources show clearly that a monthly salary of 62 shillings 4d on the Rand in 1936 was by far higher than that of: a miner who earned 18 shillings, a casual labourer at the Cammills who earned 12s 6d and an unskilled town labourer who earned 10 shillings per month in Northern Rhodesia then.<sup>60</sup>

Another centre of attraction to the U.S.A. was food. Unlike the U.S.A. and from 1946 the Southern Rhodesia Government Transport system, Ulere, whose recruits were reported to have sometimes gone without food for days or were expected to provide their own food, sikafu se ndota or carried their own



SHOWING WENELA STATIONS IN BAROTSELAND AND THE STATIONS THAT SERVED AS PART OF THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM.

food mufaho on their long journeys to the working places, the U.M.A. provided free nshima, meat, beer and sweet beer, maheu, all the way from the recruitment depots to the Wand and back.<sup>61</sup> Hence the saying that on the Wand 'teeth get finished in people's mouths but meat does not' (Ku pula a mazinyo e nyama **kaipeli.**)<sup>62</sup>

Furthermore, recruits were, on departure from Mangu the provincial headquarters, each given a blanket (kubo ya Dipalo) (the second blanket was issued in Johannesburg), a pair of khaki trousers, a brown overcoat locally known as kamunjunga for keeping recruits warm, a green skipper marked 'U.M.A.' on the chest, a dish, a mug, a piece of bar soap and a bottle of vaseline. Medical attention and accommodation too were among the best.<sup>63</sup>

These conditions clearly did not attract the Lozi only. Available records show that over 1 200 non-Lozi had checked in at the Luscke Hostel (the only available hotel accommodation for Africans in Luscke then) in 1946 on their way home from work in Johannesburg and these expressed a strong desire to return to Johannesburg after a short rest at their villages. Furthermore, while there were 4 721 Lozi working in South Africa in 1946, Eastern Province had 4 075 people working in the same area and each of the remaining provinces of Northern Rhodesia had no fewer than 100 people working there during the same year. Only Sulozi had legal recruitment obligations to south Africa.<sup>64</sup> The impression created by the view that 'the Lozi were bemused with the superficial prosperity of such

things as money, clothes, radios etc... the area was turned into a dumping ground for South African goods' is questionable.<sup>65</sup> Firstly, the use of the word 'bemused' gives the impression that the Lozi accepted labour migration without reservations. It has been proved within this chapter that in 1927 the Lozi refused to cooperate with Hall because they were tired of having to leave their homes for employment outside their province. Secondly, the Lozi registered **dissatisfaction** with the lack of economic development in their area since the Chartered Company and subsequently the Crown office. As a result, the Lozi took to labour migration not because they were 'bemused' with South African goods but because a combination of factors beyond their control, as we have seen in this chapter, forced them to do so. Thirdly, dismissing the MLLA completely as having been of no use to Sulozi is unfair. People from Sulozi who are today prominent in the Party and its Government and even the University of Zambia were educated out of money earned from MLLA. In this way money earned from the MLLA served as a long term investment in education.<sup>66</sup> Fourthly, those who were thrifty enough bought cattle and built stores which have helped them and their posterity. After all, not all workers even in modern independent states become wealthy at the end of their working lives. The majority of workers content themselves with feeding and educating their children - a goal most MLLA' goers fulfilled.

Furthermore, migration also contributed to the broadening of the migrants' minds. Pettman has argued that 'people who

travel have broad minds.<sup>67</sup> Evidence is there which shows that while most elderly Lozi who had never been out of Sulozi tenaciously held to tradition and conservatively supported Sir Mungwana's bid to oppose the nationalists, most ex-B.L.A.s opposed him and sided with the nationalists to bring down the Federation. Many ex-B.L.A.s and those Lozis who had been to Southern Rhodesia and the Northern Rhodesia line of rail actively participated in the struggle for independence in this country. It would seem they gained new ideas for change and experience about exploitation and oppression by whites during their stint outside Sulozi. For instance, at a meeting in 1963, representatives sent by the Litunga, the late Sir Mungwana, sought the opinion of the people of Kalaba whether they preferred tradition and colonial rule on the one hand and the nationalists on the other. At this meeting, all the old men voted in favour of the Litunga while all the B.L.A. repatriates, teachers and school pupils at that time doing standards 5 and 6 shouted 'Kwacha Kwacha' in favour of UNIP. In this way the Litunga was defeated in his bid to side with Sir Roy Kalusky's United Federal Party.<sup>68</sup>

Culturally, the B.L.A. contributed to the growth of Koyowe a dance which is today prominent on Zambia's Cultural Dance Troupe. Concurrently, Koyowe and B.L.A. started in 1936 in Sulozi. This dance was started by Malangisi Makuise who was later renamed Mungomba for his good Koyowe songs. While Mungomba popularised the dance through songs, Nanjako Mupwilo popularised it through dancing. During Koyowe,

repatriated with their wives and other relatives exhibited the gorgeous clothes brought from South Africa. Furthermore, those who wanted to marry used the occasion to demonstrate their potential for being good husbands by the clothes they wore. Moreover, it was a difficult thing for one to find a future wife in some parts of Zuluzi than if he was a stay-at-home.<sup>69</sup>

Another point is that the UNLA migrant unlike his counterpart on the Sappanbelt never lost contact with his village. The deferred pay system and the Family Remittance Scheme obliged every UNLA recruit to look after his family at home. Secondly, the contract system which did not allow recruits to exceed 10 months on the road led a good number of recruits to return home. There were cases of those who used to return to the land without **reaching** their villages but these were about 1 out of every 20 repatriates. This contact with the village meant that the UNLA recruits had houses and wives to look after at home. Also, part of their earnings were used to finance the fertilizing of their fields.<sup>70</sup>

As have been above that **some** policies and schemes that the British colonial administrators undertook in Zuluzi, primarily benefited the Lozi Royal Establishment at the expense of the commoners. In the same way, the Litunga received a capitulation fee of 11s 6d per recruit following the advent of UNLA recruitment in Zuluzi. Besides, he received capitulation fees over all the Angolans who were recruited at depots in

Sulazi. According to M. Labour, 2 330 were recruited at depots in Sulazi during the year 1959 and a sum of 1193 4s accrued to the Litunga in this respect. In 1964, the Litunga requested an increase in the capitulation fee which the UNL raised to 24shillings per recruit.<sup>71</sup> This, however, was shortlived as it was overtaken by the closure of 1966 shortly after being implemented.

The benefits some of which have been outlined in this chapter obscured the evils of exploitation that were entailed in underground employment. The onerous tasks of rock breaking, shovelling and tramping rock underground, mechanical sweeping and the propping of loose rock underground in working places coupled with the cruelty of some of the white supervisors who could insult and flog their black subordinates **it will** make work on the Rand Lines a dehumanizing experience. In the compounds, even though food was satisfactory, people were housed in barracks-type of accommodation without privacy. Free movement outside the compounds was limited and severely suppressed. The few who were allowed out had to carry with them their wristlets which bore their identity numbers. Those who did not have wristlet numbers were easily picked up as loiterers or rogue vagabonds by the South African Police.<sup>72</sup>

In summing up this chapter, I wish to state that I have tried to show that labour migration in Sulazi was not a deliberate preference by the Lozi. Rather, migration was caused by a combination of factors. Some factors were natural while others were man made. The natural disasters allocated

Zulu's capacity to sustain its inhabitants agriculturally. The attitude of the colonial rulers coupled with their desire to obtain cheap labour for the south rendered them to make no attempt to introduce any industries and modern technology to provide jobs to Zulu locally. The apathy of the Lozi aristocracy, especially Vata and Mwanawina, caused them to make no attempt to sacrifice luxury to clear up some ponds which were getting silted. As a result, labour migration became the only answer to the people's plight. **Most / did not** like it as we have seen in this chapter but all the same they had no alternative way in which to survive by putting soul and body together. Thus, for 60 years or so, the Lozi tied themselves to foreign labour recruitment shuttling between Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia or South Africa. Hence ending the contract labour system so suddenly as did the Zambian Government on 14th October, 1966, meant ending a people's existence and psychological attachment to foreign labour recruitment. Therefore, the next two chapters survey the Lozi people's perception of and response to and the consequences of the termination of this long existence and attachment.

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Interview: Thomas Chibande 24 November, 1986.  
Interview: Sitimale Mukenda 24 November, 1986.  
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CHAPTER TWO

LOZI REACTIONS TO THE CLOSURE OF THE UMLA IN JUNE  
1972

a) Background

The period from October, 1966 to December, 1972 was marked by suspicions and misunderstandings between the Zambian government on the one hand and a large section of the Lozi community in Zambia on the other. Government charged after the December, 1968 General Elections that the Lozi wanted to secede from an independent Zambia, while a large section of the Lozi community felt that the government was responsible for the socio-economic hardships that afflicted them. The Lozi argument centred on the government's decision to ban the UMLA in Zuluzi which had recruited labour in the province since 1936 and had since 1960 been recruiting not less than 6 000 Lozi annually for the gold mines of South Africa.

This chapter is, therefore, an attempt to examine the Lozi response to and interpretations of the UMLA closure. It further assesses the impact of suddenly ending more than 70 years of Lozi dependence on migratory wage labour. The chapter also examines some of the government's actions to contain the discontent which emanated from the closure and the extent of its success to 1972.

The discussion in this chapter ends in December, 1972. This was the year when the Second Republic was signalled by an act of Parliament and the UMLA's pursuit to integrate the

Lozi into an independent tribe like any other ethnic group was completed.

b) Lozi Perception and Responses, and Government Actions To 1972

Kina Nunukayumbwa Sipalo. Hi tiloa felisa sipalo oa bonele ner Huluyi-Longa-Bulozi. (I am Nunukayumbwa Sipalo. I am here to announce the end of MIA contract labour in Bulozi) and "sipalo" translated literally from Bulozi, the local language widely spoken in Bulozi, means "contract labour." In these few words, Sipalo broke the news that signalled the suspension of his active participation in politics for fifteen years from December, 1956 until 1972 when the Lozi pardoned him and he was elected Member of Parliament for Longa. 1

In an attempt to allay fears in the ex-MIA and others whose employment and commercial prospects were put at stake by the closure, Sipalo in his capacity as Minister in charge of Labour promised, 'the government in collaboration with employers in the private sector will **endeavour** to alleviate and minimize the social and economic consequences of this decision and all the demobilized labourers will be drafted to development projects and other sources of employment within the province or elsewhere in Zambia. The LFI and the mining companies have expressed willingness to assist in absorbing the demobilized labour.'<sup>2</sup> Sipalo made these promises while touring all the districts of the Western Province in 1956 to explain the government move to the people.

Even though the decision to close the MIA was from the outset received with mixed feelings and suspicion by the Lozi, the period between November, 1956 and the end of 1957 was largely unincidental.<sup>3</sup> There were several reasons for this lack of a quick response. The first one

was that a good number of the recruits were still in South Africa working while those the announcement of the closure found at home still had enough money and clothes from WNLA which enabled them to subsist to the end of 1967.<sup>4</sup> Other sources stated that the Lozi waited patiently to give the government time to fulfill its promises of 'alleviating the economic and social consequences of the WNLA closure.' These views may sound tenable because between October, 1966 and the end of 1967, the tension that was there was between the Royal Establishment and the new nationalist leaders but in all, this in no way affected most commoners who had voted for UNIP in the 1962 and 1964 elections and were now anxiously waiting to see it 'deliver the goods.'<sup>5</sup> One of the reasons the majority commoners had voted for UNIP was because they were disenchanted with the 'selfish members of the Royal Establishment who heaped all the privileges on themselves' while the majority commoners straddled in poverty. The term "Lozi commoners" include those Lozis who lost employment following the closure, home-store owners and other stay-at-homes who lost a source of income, ex-WNLAs and other Lozi workers on the line of rail who had jobs but were forced to look after large numbers of unemployed relatives. The closure, therefore, had a differential impact on these sections of Lozi society as we shall see in the course of this study. Thus, to most commoners, the moves taken by UNIP to break and abolish some of these privileges were initially welcome.<sup>6</sup>

Another reason for the absence of an immediate reaction was that government, between November 1966 and March 1967 took measures which convinced people that it was concerned with the welfare of the demobilised labourers. First, this was the boom period of the Transitional Development Plan of 1964-1966 when a substantial construction work took place in

the country. The Mankwee-Joel line in Southern Province which was opened in 1966, the constructions at Itexhyi-toxhyi Hydro-Electric Dam, Kafue dams, Hariba North Bank and the Mangu-Lusaka Road, all combined to absorb a considerably large number of ex-MLAs and much of the work at these places which involved drilling, detecting and lashing called for labour with mining experience and the ex-MLAs became the ideal choice for this.<sup>7</sup> Thus the Labour Exchange which was set up at Mangu in 1966 became a hive of activities as people flocked there to register for jobs in the construction companies. Furthermore, another step was taken by the government in April, 1967 when over 300 ex-MLAs and some standard 6 (Grade 6) drop outs were flown to the Copperbelt from Mangu under the Lusaka Scheme to be deployed at Mchanga, Sincroft and Mshinga mine. This convinced people in Zulazi that government was doing everything possible to contain the unemployment situation in the province and for some time very little discontent was openly expressed about the MLAs closure.<sup>8</sup> Also, the 275 former employees of the MLAs inside Zulazi who opted not to retire were absorbed in the Rural Councils and the Civil Service.<sup>9</sup> These measures, though ephemeral, it would appear, contained the unemployment situation in Zulazi to the end of 1967 or thereabout. A trend of events, however, set in from 1968 which altered the situation in the country in general and Zulazi in particular.

First, Kapala who had been the **leader** of the small sphere of absorbing the ex-MLAs into jobs locally was

defeated at the 1967 Zulungushi General Conference elections to the UNIP Central Committee. According to the UNIP constitution then, he had to move from the Ministry of Labour to any other less influential Cabinet post and in this case he was transferred to Agriculture to replace Elijah Ndlovu who moved to Finance. The new Minister of Labour, Louis Chagufu, who replaced Dipole on 11th September, 1967 simply took unemployment as a country-wide problem not to be used to create priorities for certain regions of the country.<sup>10</sup>

The second problem was that towards the end of 1963 most of the construction companies mentioned above were not taking on new employees while those who were in employment were gradually being laid off because most construction projects were nearing completion.<sup>11</sup> The next problem was that by the middle of 1963 nearly all the 3412 reported by Dipole in 1963 to have still been working on the Road Lines of South Africa were repatriated home. These, it would seem, increased the number of job seekers within and outside Zulazi. Those who flocked to the line of rail found a labour market that was already strained. As a government source stated thus about the unemployment situation:

...The continued influx of work seekers from rural areas into urban centres attracted by 'bright lights' and the hope of finding employment has posed the government a major problem. Despite repeated appeals for 'go back to the land' this influx does not appear to have been arrested. The year under review witnessed a drop ... in employment due partly to ... the completion of projects under the Development Plans ...<sup>12</sup>

Besides the problems stated above, a flood destroyed crops in all the districts of the province. This ushered in an era of famine which forced many people 'to live on wild plants, fish and poached game meat only.' The Times of Arabia reported thus about the flood:

Thousands of people in the Saratse Province face starvation in a matter of weeks because of an early flood in the Zambezi plains. The water has already reached the roots of the immature crops on which most of the province depends and threatens to destroy them. The affected areas cover Longu, Kalaba, Lenanga, Washaka and parts of Koose. The crops to be destroyed are sorghum, maize, bulrush millet and sweet potatoes. The flood is feared to be the worst for 20 years. This week I (Times reporter) watched as Longu gardeners canceled on an area that less than a month ago was dry land. Floods occurred in 1948-49 and 1958-59. 13

During the U.L.A. days, famines of this kind stimulated able-bodied men to leave their villages to go and work far away to purchase food. Since by 1958 there was no more U.L.A. recruitment in the province, large numbers of people straggled to the line of rail in search for employment which was no longer readily available. Within Buloba, these men sought jobs at councils and some could not all be taken on because earnings were limited. The few jobs that were available at these district centres involved cleaning, garden, unloading barges carrying rice meal and other commodities from one district to another, and transporting government officials who were on transfer within the province and these took on a limited number of job-seekers. 14

The Mechanical Services Branch and the Public Works Department, largely employed skilled workers like mechanics

drivers, accountants, bricklayers and others of the 275 former UMLA employees within Buluzi. The "ex-UMLA Johannesburg recruits" who "chanced" jobs at district centres other than those referred to above, largely became office orderlies, firewood gatherers, hospital scrubbers etc.<sup>15</sup> (At this time Councils and Towns operated separately, unlike the case since 1980 when the two have been merged into one to form District Councils). Thus the outcome of the unemployment following the closure and the famine resulting from the floods was that large numbers of ex-UMLAs flocked to towns, particularly to the Sapporhelt. Various sources have pointed out that by the end of 1958, it was common to find more than 5 unemployed ex-UMLAs living as dependents of one employed relative or friend on the Sapporhelt, Lueska, Kabee or Livingstone where employment was expected to be found.<sup>16</sup> As a result relatives and friends of these jobseekers who were in employment along the line of rail suffered the burden of having to shoulder the responsibility of looking after gangs of jobseekers. "Before the UMLA closure, most Lozis never used to hang around towns for years looking for work. If they went to the Sapporhelt and other Namibian towns and failed to find employment in a few months, they quickly returned home to enrol with the UMLA where employment was readily available. 'Quick employment' was one of the reasons for the popularity of the UMLA in Buluzi. Thus the new development of having to hang around towns for years on end looking for jobs which could not be found proved strange and therefore disenchanted many Lozis."<sup>17</sup>

On the Copperbelt, the Lusanda Scheme under which the government had hoped to deploy all the demobilised ex-SALAs into the Copperbelt mines was discontinued after the first recruitment because other ethnic groups who dominated the Copperbelt then, strongly resisted it. They persuasively argued that unemployment was a nation wide problem. Thus, it would be unfair for the government to give priority to one province at the expense of all the others. One informant told me that a delegation of leading UAW men on the Copperbelt and in Luaka protested to Heunde that he and Dipolo were encouraging the reintroduction of 'special privileges' for the Lozi as did the colonial rulers to the Litunga.<sup>10</sup> In this way silently ended the 'Lusanda Recruitment Scheme' and thence ex-SALAs who sought employment on the Copperbelt had to compete with other jobseekers from elsewhere in the country. To the ex-SALAs as to many other unskilled Lubian jobseekers, the competition became stiffer because by 1968 the mines had begun a 'six plus employment system' whereby only those with grade 7 and/or standard 8 education and above were employable. Furthermore, the okushola system of recruitment where jobseekers queued with their national registration cards and other references in hand while recruitment officials went round selecting those they preferred to employ was discontinued. By 1968 all jobseekers were required to write their application letters in English, stating their educational qualifications and the kind of

jobs they wanted.<sup>19</sup> This angered many uneducated job seekers, not only the ex-MLAs but others also who considered it absurd to require one to have education in order to 'push a tram-car underground, to shovel rock or to handle a jackhammer drilling machine underground.' However, the government encouraged the 'six plus employment system' in the mine partly because the number of unemployed Grade 7 and Form II drop outs in the country was gradually leading to alarming proportions. By 1966.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, even though mining construction companies such as Sinker and WCC preferred the ex-MLAs on account of their mining experience and dedication to duty, pressure from UZIP officials on the Copperbelt then prevented these construction companies from taking on ex-MLAs in large numbers, especially from January, 1966.<sup>21</sup> In the meantime, the UP was gaining an upthrust among the ex-MLAs. William Muzala Chipanga, the UP National Organising Secretary and a former UZIP Mayor of Livingstone was frequently spotted in Sinker and WCC compounds and in homes of Lozi miners in the mine townships especially at exchange in Chingola. This increased suspicion among UZIP officials that the UP was penetrating the Copperbelt through the ex-MLAs.<sup>22</sup>

A number of promises were made by the UP in order to win the support of most of the ex-MLAs who constituted a **large section** of Lozi-speaking people on the Copperbelt. To these the UP pledged to reintroduce the MLAs in order to lighten the unemployment problem which the UP interpre-

ted as having largely affected the Bezi people following the MLAs closure. In the same vein, the unemployed ex-MLAs were promised to be relieved of the burden of looking after gangs of unemployed youths in their tiny mine houses at their low salaries. These promises made many ex-MLAs receive the UP with exaggerated enthusiasm. A point worth noting here is that most of the ex-MLAs on the Copperbelt at that time were employed through the initiative of the UNIP government. Hence by switching to the UP which had no prospects of winning a large country-wide following, the ex-MLAs put their employment prospects on the Copperbelt at stake as things later turned out to be.<sup>83</sup>

From 10th to 13th August 1983 the Copperbelt was rocked by a series of inter-party clashes between UNIP and UP. During these clashes, Alfred Mvula, a UNIP constituency chairman at Shillibumbwe's Konkola Mine Township was killed on 11th August allegedly by UP supporters. Two days later, a team of UNIP youths and other officials led by three Assistant Ministers of state Albert Kalyeti, **Matthew Nkolomo** and Fines Sulubayo were dispatched to Shillibumbwe to visit the site of the murder. Immediately the team which was walking approached the site, a gang of men armed with pangas, knobkerries and axes sprung from the bush and attacked. Timothy Lukuka, UNIP Youth Regional Secretary for Malulushi near Kitwe was killed. Albert Kalyeti and Nkolomo were hurt

while Finca Bulwaga escaped unhurt by jumping across a very wide and deep mine pludge trench. This was the official version of the Chililabombos riots. On the other hand, the defendants who were arrested by a combination of UNIP youths and policemen in the MDC and Linker compounds testified in court that they 'were arrested after failing to produce UNIP cards and were threatened with violence for being UP supporters.' The UP membership was determined by the Liloxi the defendants spoke. The trial registrars cautioned the arresting officers that the law of the land did not provide for the "tribes" of the accused to be included on their dockets. The defendants who were all Loxi-speaking ex-MDCs were acquitted by a High Court judge in January 1969.<sup>24</sup>

Other riots took place in Kitale, Chingole and Malulushi. The riots confirmed a prior suspicion by UNIP officials that UP was conducting the Sapperhalt through the ex-MDCs who dominated the Linker and MDC compounds all over the province. UNIP took the riots and murders on the Sapperhalt as a serious threat to its dominance. According to Macdonald the increase in the UP's political activity coincided with the sharpening of divisions within UNIP. Many UNIP militants were looking for an alternative to UNIP.<sup>25</sup> The severity with which the UP was suppressed confirms this **view**. Lukuku was a Youth Regional Secretary for Malulushi. He would have made his leave his station, Malulushi, and find himself involved in

scuffles at Shililebambue? It would seem Kukuku was part of a U.I.P. 'combat group' sent to Shililebambue to go and **avenge Mvula's** murder in the Sinkwa and MBO compounds. Thus when the UP supporters proved too strong and better organized, U.I.P. used the coercive techniques used by dominant parties elsewhere in Africa by banning the UP on the evening of 14th August, 1968.<sup>26</sup> However, the riots continued to 15th August.

The behaviour exhibited by the ex-S.I.L.S. on the Copperbelt clearly demonstrated how widespread unemployment coupled by a feeling of insecurity could cause chaos in a country. The UN official remarked regarding the effects of widespread unemployment in a country:

We are aware of the urgency to create jobs; the feeling of insecurity owing to unemployment if widespread, can lead to unrest, to a loss of social responsibility for individuals and to political instability at the national level. In some countries the level of unemployment could determine whether a government should remain in power or not. 27

The sharp reactions that the Copperbelt riots drew from a cross-section of the Zambian political leadership in the main portrayed more of ethnic than inter-party considerations. Peter Chanda, who was the Minister of State responsible for the Copperbelt then, charged "Luzia to blame" and his remarks in turn sparked off sharp reactions from all the Lexi U.I.P. Ministers then: Dr Lwansa, Silvio, Arthur Mwa and from Sikata who most Lexi had nicknamed "Chi-Chulya" for allegedly being extremely pro-U.I.P., a party which cast Luzia on the Copperbelt then believed

are for Lozi speaking people.<sup>28</sup> The Lozi Ministers argued that Shanda's remarks could lead to divisions in the country, for they were a wholesale condemnation of all the Lozi-speaking people including those who were in the UNIP cabinet. They argued further that the tribal remarks were not expected to come from the mouth of the President's representative on the Copperbelt who was expected to be a custodian of unity and justice. Perhaps Shanda would have sounded nationalistic if he said, 'Lozi-MLAs to Shanda' to avoid ethnic generalizations.

Thus, Shanda's remarks might have been over-reactive but the reprisals which followed the riots and murders of the UNIP officials assumed an ethnic dimension. A spate of harassment of Lozi-speaking people became widespread. At the climax of the harassment many Lozi-speaking people were fleeing from the Copperbelt. Laywell Mumba, the UNIP Regional Secretary for North Urban appealed to his fellow UNIP members 'to stop the indiscriminate harassment of Lozis on the Copperbelt.'<sup>29</sup> In Chililabombwe a Lozi housewife, Mrs Namkuba with her three children were petrol-bombed in their house while her husband was at work in a night shift. Likewise, Lozis organised in groups to attack any lone Bemba speaker they found at night. In Chingola, a female Bemba speaker was found with her breast chopped off while a Bemba speaking miner in a night shift was stabbed to death by a gang of Lozi speakers. No evidence connects any of the slain with being active in organising either the UP or UNIP.<sup>31</sup> The victims were largely singled out on account of the languages they spoke. At that time on the Copperbelt, the Lozi association

UNIP with the Lelebe while the Lelebe associated UP with the Lezi and the LWA with the Tonga. Surprisingly, the leadership of the parties **comprised** people from other ethnic groups. For instance Henry Mhlova the UP Vice President, **Saindani Phiri** the UP Divisional President for Lunshya as well as Adamson Mubhele, Chipanga and Mulondwe Muzungu were not Lezi. In UNIP there were still many Lezi-speaking people who held posts from the section or village to cabinet minister level. It would seem, therefore, that the branding of the UP as a Lezi party was largely determined by the degree of **its** following. There were more Lezi who followed the UP than any other ethnic group. Similarly, there were more Lelebe speaking people at that time who held leading positions in UNIP on the Copperbelt and elsewhere in the country.<sup>32</sup>

As reports about the harassment of Lezi-speaking people by UNIP on the Copperbelt spread, antagonism against UNIP in LuLozi grew. A song composed by the late David Mucule in LuLozi mentioned 'widespread unemployment and Portuguese bombings which decimated people in LuLozi while stones were finishing the same people along the line of rail.' Mucule was then a resident of Lunshya, and some senior UNIP officials were by 1962 threatening to eliminate all the **members** of the opposition from the Copperbelt.<sup>33</sup>

After the riots which culminated in the banning of the UP, over 100 ex-mines, employed and unemployed, were despatched from the Copperbelt to Nabua Mine and Kapunda. Those who remained were distributed into the mine townships from the "historical" areas and linked communities. Secondly, the ex-mines

and other leaders who were involved in cases which were connected to the riots forfeited their jobs and were further forced to leave the Copperbelt for either the Eastern, Central or Southern Provinces.<sup>24</sup> As the evictions and harassment of the ex-UMC intensified, the late N. Mkhumbula, President of the MOC which the ex-UP members had joined, complained that UANC youths were employing hitlerite Gestapo tactics to eliminate his members from the Copperbelt. Before the MOC-UP merger which came after the UP was banned, MOC following was mainly concentrated in Lufulira and at Shingola's Kasungu camp.<sup>25</sup>

In the Eastern Province itself, antagonism against UANC grew as economic problems arising from widespread unemployment intensified. Businesses collapsed due to poor communications with Lusaka and also due to little money flowing in the province. Before the closure, the UANC provided 35% of the province's income in maintenance. The absence of reliable communications between the province and the entire country rendered most traders in the province remote from the whole country. In June 1968 area traders in Keleso, Senanga and Lechale were reported to be still receiving the old currency of pounds, shillings and pence. Radio reception too was very poor and the few villagers and workers who owned radio tuned radio South Africa and Angola. Regarding falling businesses, the Times of Zambia in January, 1961 quoted the Chairman of Zambian African Traders' Association S.M. Mukalike to have complained in Nyanja:

Traders in the Great Lakes Province will be compelled to close their shops if they cannot afford to keep tailors and shop assistants at the monthly salaries of 240-450 instructed by the government. The profits of traders in the province were limited because of transport problems, the little money in circulation and the sole reliance on subsistence farmers as the major customers. Loans for traders are unheard of in the province. No one has received one yet, although access have applied... in one case, the Minister of State for the province... was requested to intervene because the number of applications for loans being turned down was too large and the reasons for their rejection were not given. 26

The report was disclosed by the Minister of State in charge of the province without providing statistics of traders who had been allocated loans. However, various sources have shown that leading African traders who had prospered during the 1950s in the province such as Lubinda Moyi and Samuel Nyonya Trading, Mukumbuta and other leading traders in Kongu, Ntunga, Ntunga and some who owned shops in Pongu, Malwa, Mungwa, Mumbwa and many others were on the brink of collapse towards the end of 1960 largely because they had no goods to sell.<sup>27</sup> Alternatively whenever commodities were found, there were not enough customers to buy them out quickly 'as the case used to be during the UAL days.'<sup>28</sup> For instance, Ntunga who lost his chain of shops and was forced to earn a living as a lorry driver with Malwa Rural Council became a bitter opponent of UNIP. He was a leading UP and afterwards an ANS activist until 1972 when he was imprisoned at Kongu for sedition against the President.<sup>29</sup> Economic hardships drew more people to the side of the opposition in the province. As the Times of Zambia reported about the swing from UNIP to UP in the province:

The United Party is gaining ground in the Orange Province. The officials of UNIP which dominated the area before UP moved in are living in fear. A UNIP regional official who did not want his name to be disclosed for fear of being victimised by members of the rival party said there had been confrontations between members of the two rival parties. The coming to UP has coincided with widespread discontent by businessmen and civil servants over lack of development in the area. The educated feel very much out of touch with current affairs because newspapers arrive several days late... they also complain bitterly about poor roads and undeveloped areas... 40

Before the Longu-Lusaka Road was completed in 1970, it used to take the days to travel by public transport between Longu and Lusaka. The two major clearing stations were Namwe and Nambar. Newspapers carried by bus to Longu were thus read there three to four days later.<sup>41</sup>

At this stage it should be pointed out that the government did not sit idle callously spectating the deteriorating economic situation in Zambia as implied by critics. First, the problem of communications was tackled by the construction of the Lusaka-Longu and Livingstone-Bachema Roads which were completed in 1970 and 1972 respectively. The two roads partially ended the province's total isolation from the whole country in terms of transport. Secondly, the two roads served as stimuli for development and as tools for social comfort. On the other hand, critics have argued that the two roads were constructed out of political expediency as their economic benefit to the province have not been substantial. Be this as it may, the two roads have proved to be of both economic and social benefit to the province in the long run.<sup>42</sup>

In 1961, government hired Greek consultants, Dexinides Associates, to carry out feasibility studies in the establishment of projects worth K40 500 000 in Zulazi. The results of the feasibility studies included the income will be large, housing schemes in all the districts of the province, schools and hospitals. Furthermore, the feasibility studies paved the way for the establishment of Wandu-kisa research station, Lambazi animal breeding scheme and several cattle development schemes in agricultural road stop stations in each district of the province. Plans were also made to extend electricity to places like M lake which at that time depended on an old electric generator inherited from the colonial administrators.

If government made these efforts to develop Zulazi, why then was the clamour that there was no economic development taking place in the province? And according to Prasang development allocations to provinces in Zambia have not been assigned to favour any particular region but rather to emphasize, generally, efforts in the least developed areas of the country by equalizing levels of provincial development rather than to favour areas with high representation in government. Prasang further argues that the Western and North Western Provinces, the two areas with the nearest boom, had higher per capita **expenditures**.<sup>40</sup>

To understand why there was discontent in Zulazi over lack of economic development we ought also to understand the nature of the development projects the government allocated to the province. Secondly we ought also to understand the socio-economic background of the province. To begin with

the province is predominantly rural but the colonial socio-economic history of the province tied its people more to migratory wage labour than to the proceeds from the soil as was the case with their Tonge counterparts from the 1940s. Thus from an early period of British rule, Lazi agriculture was barely subsistence while a legacy of dependence on migratory wage income proliferated. This long dependence on wage labour prompted by precarious ecological conditions meant that the Lazi could not benefit from the development plans of both the colonial administrators and the UNIP government. Projects such as the Lunke-longu Road, the setting up of schools, **hospitals**, agricultural research stations, the cattle development schemes and the installing of electricity in **rural** areas such as Molabs without corresponding industrial growth did very little to satisfy the immediate economic needs of the villagers.<sup>45</sup> Thus, from the outset, villagers in Zululani viewed the projects above as primarily designed to benefit workers and a few other people in the vicinity. The majority who lived far away from towns had very little to benefit from the electricity, abattoirs, water and housing schemes which were concentrated at towns at immense government expenditure.<sup>46</sup>

As a result, critics have viewed the government development projects in Zululani as 'eccentric' for they were not meant to create wealth within the province. The projects **were** mainly intended for consuming. Some critics have wondered why government could first invest an abattoir in a province where cattle

disorder, the so-called 'corridor' had been reported to have devastated livestock since 1959. Other sources have suggested that priority should have been given to the draining of swamps, sinking of canals and to the general reclamation of the alluvial soils on the edges of the river network of the province. To most people, lack of land use and drainage policies in the province was considered the most serious handicap to an economic take-off.<sup>47</sup>

From the foregoing we notice that discontent in Zulazi arose from the stunted and distorted nature of the projects which government allocated to Zulazi. Those who lived in villages neither obtained the employment they needed nor the economic boom that the projects were expected to create for the villagers. The discontent was therefore exploited by politicians who for one reason or another had left the ANC or UDF. Hence, unemployment and lack of economic development in Zulazi became the manifesto of the United Party and later on the ANC. An ex-UDF member of Parliament pointed out 'we told people that if we won the Government we would reopen the WLA and this was our manifesto.' For some time the WLA closure has been a major issue of debate by the ANC in the National Assembly during 1989.<sup>48</sup>

Furthermore, in the absence of corresponding productive investment to the projects established in the province, projects such as the Nongu-Lusaka Road, the Wakatindi Road etc have not benefited the village dwellers. Thus while scholars like Pransing and government statisticians look at

the figures allocated to each province per capita do not truly reflect a fair distribution of resources to the provinces, the villagers have looked at these allocations from the perspective of whether they have been of direct benefit to them. For instance if several millions were spent on the installation of the ZONE electricity to Buloba which is only there to illuminate houses for civil servants at the camp, what viable economic benefit per capita do the villagers derive from the allocation. Hence the outcry in the province especially between 1958 and 1972 that while the towns sprouted with new buildings, electricity and new cars, the villagers deteriorated. In this way, the villager threw back his mind to the days of the UAL when he could afford to buy himself things which the UAF government came to divest him of.<sup>40</sup>

Many Lezi interpreted the UAL's closure in many ways. The first one was that the UAL's closure was part of a series of vengeful retributions against the Litunga and his subjects because of the former's opposition to the integration of Zuluzi to an independent Zambia. Various sources argued that the UAF leaders demonstrated this spirit of vengeful retribution by ignoring the Litunga when they decided to ban UAL recruitment which only operated in Zuluzi. Secondly, the UAF government from 1964 to 1988 ruled by consensus and consultation - presidentialism was still at its minimal stages. Thus most Lezi were surprised to find that the people who were involved in the UAL recruitment were not consulted on the decision taken to ban the UAL in Zuluzi.

Hence the conclusion that U.I.P banned the U.L.L without consulting anybody to show the Litunga and the Lezi people that power was now in the hands of the nationalists and not the Litunga. Thus even Lezi understood the measure to close the U.L.L in Luwazi as punitive 'because government did not care to consider the consequences of closing the U.L.L so untimely.' The general consensus among the Lezi was that the system was exploitative but it should have been terminated in stages to ensure the economic well being of the human beings who participated in the system.<sup>50</sup>

The bitterness that emanated from the closure and also from the realization that the U.L.L closure was the brainchild of Lezi speaking Ministers, Sipelo, Malilungwa and even Nondin himself, soon to vote for the U.I.P which manifesto was to close the U.L.L upon winning the elections. In areas where the U.L.L was popular such as Mafela, Gwangu and Gwanetshe U.I.P lost all the seats. The U.I.P lost the Luwazi, Mankoya and Lukulu seats, the first two having not been popular U.L.L recruitment areas. Secondly, the U.L.L closure soon drew supporters to the side of the Litunga. Most Lezi, especially the educated ones, began to understand and interpret the closure as part of a series of humiliating, torture and harassment by U.I.P of the Lezi speaking community in Luwazi. The harassment on the Government by U.I.P youths already referred to above and the widespread unemployment which the Lezi people sustained from the U.L.L closure became the pedestal of Lezi antagonism against U.I.P.

As a result, the Litunga's enmity against UNIP which began 1965 had been, in the main, the concern of the members of the Royal Establishment, from the middle of 1967 onwards, a province-wide discussion. Mwenemwa who had been considered the villain in the 1950's and the early 1960's and from the middle of 1968 considered a hero and champion of Lezi rights who the majority of Lezi failed to understand as they got carried away by the promises of the UNIP nationalists in the 1960's. As economic hardships intensified as we shall see in chapter 3, most Lezi regretted having sided with the UNIP nationalists whose main objective of insisting on the incorporation of Zulazi into an independent Zambia they did not know, leaving their Litunga who had ruled them for 23 years. None of the nationalists had ruled before, so no one knew what kind of rule they would be. It was too late. Mwenemwa, son of Lubani by his wife **Aongola** escaped away at 1250hrs on 13th November, 1967 leaving the Lezi in the dilemma of widespread unemployment. It is strongly believed he was refused permission to seek medical treatment outside Zambia.<sup>51</sup>

In February 1968, the Lezi assembled in several hundreds at Mwanu asking the government to reconsider the UNIP issue. They said they were suffering because the government had failed to provide an alternative source of cash income since the UNIP was closed. The government replied by stating that it could not grant authority for the Lezi to go to the South African mines, for doing so would be tantamount to surrendering responsibility over its citizens to South

office. The Lomi 'chiefs' took to their villages dis-  
appointed. Unlike the Congres they voted for in the  
1966 elections and the ruling UNIP was in a position to  
alter the economic situation in the province. Antagonism  
against UNIP intensified but it did the province no good.<sup>58</sup>

In the referendum of June 17, 1973 which the opposi-  
tion leaders disapprovingly referred to as Lifu la Ndaba,  
(death of a neighbour), the Lomi overwhelmingly voted  
"No". Western Province with 26 034 "No" votes was only  
second to Southern Province which had 32 541 "No" votes.  
This provoked a loss of prestige to the province from UNIP.  
Sikoto Nwa, the Minister of Broadcasting, announced in 1970  
that the last house that was supposed to have been built in  
Ndaba would be transferred elsewhere where people voted for  
UNIP. Subsequently, the slogan 'It pays to belong to UNIP' was  
applied in the Western Province. Congress supporters and  
sympathizers were denied trading licences. Some Indians  
such as Ndebele of Kamboko and Kungale in Ndaba who sup-  
ported the Congress were disposed with the former being detained  
in the Western Province. Subsequently, in the economic  
reforms of 1975 the Litunga forfeited his mineral royalties  
and in 1977 the Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous  
Provisions) Act became law and the Litunga became 'just  
another chief'. Land, fishing, hunting and other rights that  
accompanied the tenure of traditional office in Ndaba were  
vested in the President and no longer in the Litunga. The  
pretext for confiscating land rights from the Litunga was  
that the traditional landowners delayed government develop-

ment development projects.<sup>53</sup> We shall return to this in chapter 5.

From **1977**, a sense of reconciliation started to evolve between the government and the people of Zululani. The appointment by President Mankwa of Joseph Dlamini as minister in charge of Zululani largely contributed to the rapprochement between Zululani and UDF. Several UDF MPs from Zululani crossed the floor in Parliament to UDF. In the local government elections of 1979 UDF won with overwhelming majority in the Moshaka and Makhanya Rural Councils. It also won seats in the Makhanya and Moshaka councils. In the by-elections of 1979, UDF won the Lukene and Makhanya seats while the ANC only captured the Moshaka seat. The Lukene seat was situated in Makhanya which was an **ANC stronghold**. By 1979 when the first republic was drawing to a end, people in the province, notwithstanding the continuing economic hardships perpetuated by floods, endemic stock diseases, searing droughts and distorted development allocations, were gradually coming to their senses that the ANC was gone never to return. Thus people began to realize that it was only by cooperating with those in power that their grievances could be listened to, no matter how faintly. The realization came mostly when people saw at work that some of the UDF MPs who had run their campaign against UDF were secretly taking up appointments in UDF without informing their electorates. Dlamini was appointed district governor while Makhanya Dlamini was appointed minister of state.<sup>54</sup>

In concluding this chapter I argue that UNIP's **defeat** in the Western Province in the general elections of 1992 was not an expression of a desire by the people there to secede but rather it was a response or reaction to a feeling of economic deprivation brought about by the government's decision to terminate UNIP recruitment without providing a viable alternative. Both the Mungwe Air Squadron (1962-1965) and Mwikite (1975-1977) had no part in UNIP's defeat. Mungwe was a flying unit in 1965. He had been equally defeated in the same manner in 1962 and 1964 but was the proponent of national economic development and not a tribal nucleus of privileges for the few and suffering for the majority. Mwikite too knew too well that he would either not be recognised or ignored by Zambia using the criteria set of 1985 if he campaigned for the U.D. Thus the defeat was an expression of disenchantment by voters disillusioned with the government's urban oriented development projects. Thus the grievances emanating from widespread unemployment and the 'economic' economic development in the province were exploited and articulated by opposition parties to dislodge UNIP from Solusi. This demonstrated itself by the fact that after the 1992 elections what the Leza demanded was not secession but rather they requested to go to M.I.P. stating very unequivocally that this was their purpose of voting for the U.D.

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2. I.I.U. 'Zambian Recruiting', p.6.

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11. Annual Labour Report, 1968, 3 items no.0

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13. 'Escaped Famine Threat,' Times of Zambia no.732, 41 January, 1968.

14. Interview: Dr Kenneth Chilala UNIP Regional Secretary and Rural Council Chairman; and District Governor for Malawi and Mwanza from 1963 to 1979. Date 20-12-86  
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16. The author himself experienced this overreaching at his cousin's hut No. 69/27 at Kobonga in Chingola after returning from South Africa towards the end of 1967. For the Lozi this overreaching was a strange development because during the 1960s those who came to seek employment on the Copperbelt and failed quickly went back to join the UNIP.

17. C.S. Zumbo, 'The Impact,' 5.

18. This information was obtained from a highly placed source in the UNIP government who is not Lozi. He requested for his identity to be withheld. He has been in the higher echelons of UNIP since its formation.

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24. Thomas Ansuman, 'Political Competition and the Party System in Zambia' in Journal of Modern African Studies, 7, No. 3 (October 1969) 413.
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UNIP opposition to further employment of ex-MILs on the Department was part of the 'coercive technique' mentioned by Ansuman which UNIP used on the Department against its supporters. See the article by Ansuman cited above on page 414.

27. Ansuman, 'Political Competition,' 414. See also Times of Zambia, No. 262, 18th August, 1968.
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35. Sikote Date The Light Without, 34 see Ndlovu's photo.

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36. The song was regularly heard on Radio Zambia during Lexi programmes to the middle of the 1970s. It has since been discouraged by the authorities.
37. Interview: Linde Shimbai Date: 23-11-80 Place of Interview: Lusaka and Company office, Lusaka Shimbai was then the Personnel Manager for UNIP based at Ndaba she was given the responsibility of **handling** the issue of ex-MILs she was evicted from Department. She worked directly with the Vice President, then the late Ngwenya.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE LAND CLOSURE IN ZULUJI TO 1985

The intention in this chapter is to examine the consequences of the land closure on Zulushi to 1985. Scholars such as Ogilby, D. Glen, Lortol, Fubben, Kwaqwen and others have made references in their studies on post-independence Zuluji to the land closure as the main source of the discontent and antagonism that existed in Zulushi in 1980 as in 1981.<sup>1</sup> However, none of these studies went further to explore in detail how and why the closure affected the socio-economic welfare of the average inhabitant of Zulushi.

The chapter examines the impact of the closure by focusing on: (1) widespread unemployment in the villages as a factor later used by the policies of the colonial and post-colonial rulers (2) migration from and the decline in the land villages (3) and (4) the gradual switch to salient agricultural and livestock raising activities by the early 1980s.

The discussion begins in the middle of 1950 and ends in 1985. 1951-1952 has been chosen because the impact of the closure started to be felt on a large scale in the province from 1951 onwards. The closure was ended in 1985. This was the year when the largest joint agricultural venture by the state through the purchase of large tracts of land in the province for growing wheat and other crops on a commercial scale. The state's state project signalled

defect for more or less of the year in the province. The  
have been a major factor in the loss of natural  
resources for economic development in the world and later.

1. THE SITUATION IN THE PROVINCE

Following the closure of the bank, unemployment with  
its effects of hunger, poverty and disease became the  
major cause of concern to villagers in the eastern  
provinces.<sup>6</sup> The villagers who contributed over 50% in  
1950 of the inhabitants of colonial had during the days of  
the independent state. Their economic problem with  
the country. They had to bring from the world market of South  
Africa. The people usually insisted to know what to do  
because, they had to buy goods for school, fuel for school go-  
ing children, clothing, court fees, and money to buy food  
during times of natural disasters.<sup>7</sup> Thus the decision to  
not to open the bank in colonial was a kind of socio-  
economic problem which the bank had to grapple with  
for a long time.

During the independent, the independent also maintained  
a regular link with the world market and their villages  
were the people who had been poor, hungry, ill, and  
diseased, the poor and other stay-at-home, ill, and  
the independent effort to help stay-at-home to look after  
their lives and to maintain their court-  
yards and houses and to participate with working and cultivate  
their fields while they (independent) were busy to South  
Africa. In many parts of the province, the independent

owned ploughs and their chains, oxen and other items which stay-at-homes used for agriculture. Thus the closure disrupted this socio-economic pattern which had evolved in the Lozi village system over a long period of time. The stay-at-homes and the ex-mineworkers, therefore, were forced to adjust themselves to a new socio-economic pattern of subsistence without cash which many former mineworkers and some stay-at-homes had forgotten.<sup>4</sup>

The closure forced the ex-WNLAs and others who had depended on the WNLA to change to a new socio-economic status of village cultivators who, largely, were to depend on subsistence economy. And since resources in the province were undeveloped, the period of adaptation produced many economic and social hardships for most people. The disappearance of the regular cash flow that the WNLA used to remit into the area deprived the province of its main source of income. In 1966, a total of 2436 000 was paid to the province in deferred pay, voluntary and compulsory remittances to dependants of migrants and others. The Royal Establishment too received 11/6 per recruit from 1940 and this was raised to 24 shillings in 1964. Hence the outcome of the closure was a chain reaction which affected the ex-mineworkers, stay-at-homes, home-store owners whose businesses had depended on the money remitted in by WNLA, and the Royal Establishment at Lealui near Mongu. Thus the closure, to borrow Kapaale's words, 'ended the prosperity that was evidently noticeable in the villages of Bulozhi during WNLA recruitment.'<sup>5</sup>

villagers owned sewing machines, ploughs and their children out of wages we earned from contract run away from public gatherings because of magumu (lack of clothes). Employment, even that of shavell-

In the initial years of the closure (1966-1968) people in the villages met their basic needs such as the purchasing of soap, **lubricants** like vaseline and uniforms for school children by selling the property they used to bring from South Africa. However, this could not sustain them for long. The over-selling of property ushered in a crippling shortage of clothes, pots and other valuables which created more hardships among many villagers. Wives **ran** away from their husbands who could not clothe them. In February, 1969, ANC MPs from Western Province told Parliament that villagers in their constituencies, 'have sold their pots, sewing machines, their last herds of cattle and other valuables as a result of banning WNLA employment.'<sup>6</sup> The outcome of selling the only clothes which could not be easily replaced was that 'people started to wear rags like lunatics in an area where people used to change clothes hourly on festivities such as Siyemboka and Kayowe during the WNLA days.'<sup>7</sup> By 1970 it was common to find homes where there was only one blanket and once decently dressed families wearing greasy **empty maize** bags, torn overalls and raincoats. The author came across several families during the research where spouses were left without blankets because the only ones they had were buried with the other deceased partners.<sup>8</sup> As many sources in Bulozhi lamented:

Before UNIP ended WNLA recruitment, even we uneducated villagers owned sewing machines, ploughs and their chains, bought cattle and other things. We educated our children out of wages we earned from contract labour. Today we are destitutes who are forced to run away from public gatherings because of **mapunu** (lack of clothes). Employment, even that of shovell-

ing rock in a mine or cutting grass at a Boma or that of a security guard calls for Form 5 education and besides one has to leave home to go and strive for it outside Buluzi, under circumstances dictated by nepotism, tribalism, provincialism and other forms of corruption. Going out of Buluzi too calls for money which most of us do not have. Those who afford the money for transport in many instances fail to find employment on the line of rail and eventually end up getting stranded there while their wives divorce them back home. 9. During the period 1978-

1981 This state of destitution may not be strange among village cultivators in other parts of rural Zambia where poor dressing and poverty in general were characteristic of village life throughout the colonial and post-colonial period. In Buluzi, desperate destitution was a new development largely experienced by able-bodied men in the province after the UNLA closure.<sup>10</sup>

Several factors accelerated and worsened the conditions of village life in the Western Province. Since 1968, a combination of alternating natural disasters destroyed crops and livestock in the province. In 1968 anthrax and pleuropneumonia destroyed thousands of cattle in the major cattle producing areas of the province while an early flood destroyed crops all over the province. In 1970, there was a country-wide drought which burnt all the forest crops while late planted crops in the plain were destroyed by floods from the rain regions of the North Western Province. Anthrax remained endemic in the province until 1979. There was another devastating flood in the 1977/78 season which is reported to have prevented the Cold Storage Board of Zambia from buying cattle in the province.<sup>11</sup>

As the following table of Family sizes and Fertility Rates of

was that starvation and mapunu afflicted many villagers and led to a further drop in their standard of living.

In areas like Imusho and Sankolonga in Sesheke, Sinjembela in Senanga West and Mambolomoka in Kalabo, inhabitants experienced untold hardships resulting from floods, droughts and outbreaks of cattle diseases. During the period 1978-1981 over 30 000 people were reported displaced by famine in the four areas. Mortality rate in these areas was reported to be 'frighteningly on the increase since 1978.'<sup>11</sup> Events of this kind in the pre-closure days used to serve as the major stimuli for people to migrate to the south in large numbers. Now that recruitment was ended, economic dislocation threatened village life.

The effects of unemployment manifested themselves in a number of ways on Lozi society. First, while population growth was reported to be on the increase in other parts of Zambia since independence, 'owing to improvements in social and economic opportunities, the situation in Buluzi changed from prosperity to misery in the villages.'<sup>12</sup> A government source has indicated that the population growth and fertility rates of the Western Province were among the lowest in the country. Poverty prompted by a combination of natural disasters and widespread unemployment contributed to the fall in hygienic and nutritional standards. Life expectancy at birth in the province since 1969 at 47.0 has been the second lowest to Luapula with 45.0. The province also had one of the lowest family sizes with 3.5 in 1969 and 4.9 in 1980.<sup>13</sup> As the following table of Family sizes and Fertility Rates of

vicinity of health institutions. And since most villages

provinces will show:- From medical facilities, the death rate should be expected to be even higher. In 1980, a

PROVINCE	1969		1980	
	TOTAL FERTILITY	FAMILY SIZE	TOTAL FERTILITY	FAMILY SIZE
CENTRAL	4.8	5.0	6.9	6.8
COPPERBELT	5.4	4.7	6.2	6.6
EASTERN	3.2	5.7	5.0	6.6
LUAPULA	5.2	5.3	5.8	7.6
LUSAKA	5.7	5.3	5.7	7.0
NORTHERN	6.1	6.3	6.0	7.2
NORTH WESTERN	3.0	3.2	4.7	4.7
SOUTHERN	5.4	4.2	5.4	7.0
WESTERN	1.9	3.5	4.1	4.7

SOURCE: 1980 Population and Housing Census of Zambia Analytical Report Volume iv, Fertility and Mortality Levels and Trends, 3.

The province's annual population growth rate dropped from 2.1% during 1963-1969 to 1.6% during 1969-1980. This drop in population growth may be attributed to a high death rate, a high rate of migration from the province or to both.<sup>14</sup>

An official at the statistics section of the Ministry of Health at Mongu estimated that 'an average of 2 to 3 adults and about 4 children died in each village in Bulozhi annually of poverty-related deaths.<sup>15</sup> He based his estimates on scattered data from villages which were in the vicinity of health institutions. And since most villages

were located. For every four medical facilities, the health care should be expected to be even higher. In 1950, a senior civil official at Mombasa made a statement which was reported by members of the press that infant mortality in Zululani was among the highest political leaders in the province. The statement was:

More than 200 children have died of diarrhoea and other children related diseases since 1970. The children who died were of the 0-5 age group reported to health centres and hospitals. The high infant mortality was caused by a combination of factors including malnutrition, poor water supply as well as social and economic underdevelopment. 18

From the foregoing, we notice that economic hardships contributed to the stunted population growth, and the low fertility rate was partly the result of the mass migration of the age-groups 15-24, 25-35 and 35-44. These age groups provided the adjustment factors for determining the level of fertility in an area.<sup>17</sup> Over 100 000 members of these age-groups migrated to the towns in search of employment between 1950 and 1960. The majority of these migrants settled in fishing camps on the Kofu when they failed to find employment in towns while others sought jobs as truck drivers and **herdsmen** on farms owned by individuals in Mombasa, Ukushu and elsewhere along the line of rail.<sup>18</sup> I shall return to the issue of low fertility when I discuss migration from and within the Loni Village system.

Factors noted in the colonial and post-colonial policies regarding economic development in Zululani contributed to the deterioration in the socio-economic pattern of village life after the 1911 closure. Neither the colonial

government up to 1964 nor the UNIP government up to the end of the 1970s succeeded in creating an economic base in the province which could provide employment to those who were forcibly disengaged from the UNLA.<sup>19</sup> The few resources which the colonial administration developed, such as timber, hides and crocodile skins were for export purposes only. Local resources such as makuku, a local plant suitable for making sacks, cattle and crocodile skins for leather, the alluvial soils for rice, wheat, vegetables and fruit were neglected. The fishing industry on the Zambezi which was the natural occupation of the Lozi was by 1979 still a neglected zone. As M. Armour observed in 1962, 'no cash crops are grown, the export of cattle has dwindled to virtually nothing... while a potentially valuable fish trade etc awaits development.'<sup>20</sup> The Northern Rhodesia Development Plan of 1961-1965 proposed 'to achieve self-sufficiency in foodstuffs in Barotseland by reclaiming the fertile alluvial soils along the edges of the flood plain by drainage, to develop cattle and timber industries for export and to set aside £200,000 for improving roads.' Apart from the timber industry which was improved for exporting railway sleepers to Rhodesia and South Africa, every other aspect of the plan was watered down. Not even the secondary industry which was expected to undergrow the timber industry was forthcoming at Zambia's independence in 1964.<sup>21</sup> The progress report on the plan in 1963 pessimistically stated:

Barotseland is a land of infertile sandy soils and poor communications offering limited known opportunities for economic development. Its prospects for economic development within the limits of the finances available are limited, because of the difficulty to establish satisfactory communications due to ecological constraints and the remoteness of Barotseland from the main markets of the territory. Hence, a third of its male population will continue to be employed outside the territory. 22

Thus at independence in 1964, the UNIP government inherited a province that had no rural economic base aside from migratory labour, subsistence agriculture and fishing. Hence when migratory labour was discontinued, the Lozi were left with no alternative but to adapt themselves to a subsistence economy no longer supplemented by the cash that used to flow in from the UNLA.<sup>23</sup> The adaptation process, as a result, proved to be a painful experience. Since independence, UNIP's record of achievements in the provision of "tools of social comfort" such as schools, hospitals, health centres and the construction of the two permanent roads linking Lusaka to Mongu-Limulunga-Senanga and the other linking Livingstone to Sesheke was unprecedented. However, Government efforts to create an economic base in Bulozhi to accommodate the surging numbers of school dropouts and the ex-UNLAs within the province failed. Both the First and Second National Development Plans (1966-1970) and (1972-1976) respectively emphasized agriculture and rural development as their highest priority to create a strong rural economy with emphasis on the

expansion of production in agriculture. **Both plans** involved capital investments to Gulzai valued at 100,000,000 and 100,000,000 respectively; but a large percentage of these funds were spent on social services.<sup>24</sup> In 1957, when the new plan administered by the UN set the stage for the provision of social services with equal pay in mind. In 1958, Vice President K. Popovic who was also responsible for development worked very hard to ensure that 'Lalori was forgotten in terms of economic development.' He pointed out that during his term of the province in 1957, he saw schools, health centres, housing and water schemes, and community centres which were established on a scale like elsewhere in the country. Popovic expressed astonishment as to what 'economic development' the critics wanted in Gulzai, for the new projects **stimulated** economic development in the province that the colonial government failed to establish these in their 73 years rule.<sup>25</sup> Thus, the projects have **stimulated** economic development but they were all based at least on the provincial centre, Saidu. The villagers who constituted 90% of the population of the province lived far away from the centre of the provincial centre. Therefore, their **benefit** from these urban based projects, if any, was minimal. Hence the complaint that 'Lalori was forgotten in terms of economic development.'<sup>26</sup>

The attitude of the villagers towards changed after the discontinuation of contract labour and the government's

therefore, approach to agriculture partly contributed to the deterioration in the socio-economic situation in Bulozhi. Since, as we have seen above, Government took the provision of social services as part of its rural development programme, agriculture was left to compete with other services for funds. Incidents of diverting funds in the province from agricultural projects were quite numerous in the 1970s. A total of K85 000 was diverted from a vegetable scheme and a land use project earmarked for the province to the politically motivated but economically abortive Western Province Task Force which closed down in 1972.<sup>27</sup> There were also instances of funds being diverted to the construction of senior staff houses at the provincial centre during the 1970s. And by 1972 there was nothing to motivate the villagers who had taken to subsistence fishing, their traditional occupational pattern, to take up agriculture seriously. Government too insisted on the use of expensive farming machinery and other inputs which most small scale and emerging farmers could not administer nor had the knowledge to use. As President Kaunda admitted at a Rural Development Seminar in 1970:

Another worrying aspect of our agricultural development is the rapidly increasing cost of production. I admit that we started off on the wrong foot when we so easily accepted the recommendations of the FAO/ECA commission in 1965. We are not in a position to... afford spending more than K100 to plough  $\frac{1}{2}$  an acre of land by tractor...<sup>28</sup> and 1972 for agriculture.

**Traditionally the Lozi, have an inbuilt fear of borrowing money and they lack the knowledge of utilising credit facilities. Th**

therefore, prevented many from getting loans of such big machines as tractors for fear of being imprisoned if they failed to pay back. And to the end of 1972 extension services in Bulozhi just like elsewhere in the country were limited and farmers were left in the main to work on their own.<sup>29</sup> Thus despite the province's potential in rice, wheat, fruit, vegetable and cattle production, no appreciable increase in production growth was observed over those of pre-independence days.<sup>30</sup> The growth that was there was minimal and of subsistence nature as the following table will show:

RICE PRODUCTION IN BULOZHI, 1968-1978 (80kg bags).

1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
583	360	1155	361	150	630	1134	1551	3568	3009	6492

Source: Z-Magazine, October/December, 1979, 3.

Judging from the production figures of rice above, their graphic rise has been fluctuating signifying that the village cultivators lacked both skill and motivation in rice growing in particular and farming in general.<sup>31</sup>

Both early and late planting were precarious. In early planting, crops were destroyed by lack of rains while in late planting crops were destroyed by floods. This, as a result, created uncertainty in many would be farmers to avail themselves of the limited credit facilities which government offered between 1966 and 1972 for agriculture. Many would be farmers especially in the Western Province in particular and Zambia as a whole in general, expected

the government first to take measures that would 'minimise the dependence of the country's agricultural system on the grace of God.'<sup>32</sup> Cattle farming too, though unevenly distributed was the traditional mainstay of local revenue earning besides contract labour, but similarly it made no significant increases during the same period as the following table will show:

CATTLE PRODUCTION IN BULOZI SINCE 1970

<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
362480	358646	372351	373582	385591	377645	382077	386351	390762

Source: Z-Magazine October/December 1979, 13.

The traditionalist attitude towards cattle rearing acted against progress and improvement. As one source has summed up Lozi attitude towards cattle ownership:

People in the Western Province look at cattle as a very prestigious property that cannot be easily disposed of. Hence cattle can only be sold when a great need for money arises. Furthermore, cattle among the Lozi is not slaughtered any how for meat except during occasions such as marriages, deaths and initiations. In many cases, cattle in Bulozhi is owned by families and under such circumstances, a decision to dispose of a cow will need to be collective. 33

Here, we notice that collective ownership has been a major constraint to the improvement of the cattle industry. For instance some members of a given family might be willing to adopt new methods while others may opt to remain conservative. Secondly, the continuous use of the same bulls under traditional methods has often resulted in retarded calves thus slowing down the rate of cattle increase both qualitatively and quantita-

tively. Hence, despite the vast sums of money government spent throughout the 1970s on projects such as the National Beef Scheme little significant results were achieved. Traditional attitude towards change coupled with Government mistakes caused the failure of most government sponsored cattle development projects. As one source summed up the failure of most government development schemes in Bulozhi: according to informants, had to

be done... farmers got scared when certain schemes undertaken in the National Beef Scheme and others failed. In one of such, cattle died in large numbers at the paddocks. At the time of the trial of the Beef Scheme it was observed that there was less care from the initiators. And unless change agents realise their mistakes, schemes after schemes will fail and lots of money will just go to the drain. 34

The other constraint to the creation of an economic base in the Western Province was the conservative attitude of the traditional aristocrats towards the ownership of natural resources including land. Throughout the colonial period all the natural resources in the Western Province and her tributaries for agriculture have met with stiff opposition from influential conservatives. project that involved the allocation of land or the use

This problem is rooted in the Lozi land tenure system. First, there was land called Nqwechi which the traditional aristocrats. Thus projects which did not benefit directly and could, therefore, allocate to his deserving subjects. The second type of land called Luy perpetual hold to power were easily blocked, no matter of what benefit these projects could be to commoners. Families. Not even the Litunga had authority to allocate. Prince mentions the Royal Establishment having blocked the the Luy land without seeking the permission of those who owned the land. If he did without permission, the owners build square houses for these were the preserves of the

Royal Establishment. Caplan mentions the £1 500 000 the Transitional Development Plan (1964-1966) earmarked for development projects in Bulozhi which the government feared would be forestalled by the conservative BNC.<sup>35</sup>

From 1969-1970 there was a land dispute at Ndanda near Mongu where the government had proposed to establish a Rice Research Station which would cater for the whole province. The project, according to informants, had to be delayed until 1971 when the land owners accepted the government terms.<sup>36</sup> In the marshes that lie between Mongu and Kalabo, a proposal to construct an all-weather road to link Kalabo to Mongu via Shuku was severely resisted by those upon whom tradition bequeathed ownership of the natural resources in the area. It was vehemently contended that the construction of embankments and bridges across the Zambezi would disturb their fishing grounds. Similarly, proposals to drain the alluvial edges of the Zambezi and her tributaries for agriculture have met with stiff opposition from influential conservatives.<sup>37</sup>

This problem is rooted in the Lozi land tenure system. First, there was land called Ngweshi which the Litunga owned directly and could, therefore, allocate to his deserving subjects. The second type of land called Luu vested in the Litunga but belonged to individuals and families. Not even the Litunga had authority to allocate the Luu land without seeking the permission of those who owned the land. If he did without permission, the owners

under local traditional law, had the right to sue the Litunga, for it was not "his" law.<sup>30</sup>

Then, even when his land was not in full use, an owner was allowed under traditional law to use it without expiring reservation from the owner. Hence, vast tracts of land and other natural resources remained unutilized, but no one could venture to develop them for fear of multiple farm owners.<sup>31</sup>

After 31 June, 1980 in Rhodesia, the Zambian government moved in by passing the 1979 Southern Province (Land and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act and abolished the rights of the traditionalists over land and other natural resources in the province and vested them in the President of the Republic. Government argued that it enacted the 1979 Act because it wanted to accelerate economic development in the area which was retarded by conservative landowners. However, according to Cartmel, the government could not afford the 1979 Act because it still needed the support and cooperation of the traditionalists in the province if the program were to succeed. Obviously, government had not the personnel in the province to explain to villagers and the traditionalists and to implement the act. Thus, notwithstanding the legislative changes, the traditionalists continued to enjoy their authority over land.<sup>32</sup> The failure to implement the 1979 act, thus the referendum, could be seen in the belated resolution passed at a ZIP Provincial conference at George in 1985. It stated:

The 1969 Referendum be made available to our traditional rulers so that they fully understand the (new) land tenure system in Zambia. This will avoid situations where traditional land owners withhold land for development as a result of being ignorant of the existing land tenure system. 41

The resolution above suggests that the land tenure system still effectively remained in the hands of the traditionalists. It was also for this same reason that villagers at Mabumbu and Mawawa were involved in a serious land dispute with senior members of the Royal Establishment for wrongfully allocating their 2 000 hectares of Luu land to the Cashew Nut Company of Zambia Ltd. without consulting them. Government failed to invoke the provisions of the 1970 Act but instead left the matter to the traditionalists. As a result several Indunas including the Ngambela, Francis Suu, lost their posts for not following the traditional procedure of allocating Luu land but the Cashew Nut Company retained its tenure over the Mabumbu and Mawawa land. 42

Above, we have seen how conservatism could hold up progressive institutions and individuals who needed land for development purposes. As a result, Lozis who retired from the civil service and other agencies and had interest in starting up agricultural projects were prevented from doing so in Bulozhi where land was the monopoly of owners who in many instances had not the capacity to utilise it. In this way, Bulozhi lost its enlightened brains who should have been induced mainly by economic opportunities rather than by

have taken back to the area new ideas, methods and knowledge of agriculture and cattle rearing. According to informants, 'at present, a large section of Lozi who retire decline to return home due partly to the restrictions imposed by the traditional land tenure system. Hence, unlike the Tonga whose educated elite normally tend to return home upon retirement to settle in agriculture, the educated Lozi opt to settle on farms outside the province except for a few who return to Kaoma.<sup>43</sup> The outcome of these constraints was that Bulozhi at the closure of the WNLA in October 1966 had not developed a reliable internal infrastructure to accommodate large numbers of job seekers. People were more poverty-stricken by 1970 than they had been in 1966. Thus unlike in Malawi where government policy initiated successfully established an agricultural base which induced migrants to return home to work on plantations and small holdings, the Lozi-ex-WNLA returned to a province where successive governments failed to create an economic base. Worse still, the disengagement from the WNLA, as we have seen in chapter 2, was not by consensus but by coercion. According to Christiansen and Kydd, Malawi's substantial disengagement from the South African labour market happened without incurring significant unemployment at home. They further pointed out that what was unusual about the reduction in international labour migration from Malawi was that it was induced mainly by economic opportunities rather than by

coercion and that Malawi was transformed during the next 10-15 years from an economic structure dominated by village cultivators at independence in 1964, into any economy which had large scale estate agriculture as its leading sector of development. The rapid growth in agriculture between 1968 and 1977 contributed substantially to the increase in the demand for workers. Hence the agricultural growth induced many Malawians to return home from abroad.<sup>44</sup> On the contrary, the Lozi ex-WNLA was forced back home to a province where neither an agricultural base was created nor prospects for employment assured. The outcome therefore was a new form of internal migration from the villages in search of wage labour which had become scarce in the whole country during the 1970s. The few schemes the government initiated outside Bulozhi to assist the ex-WNLAs and the economic hardships in the villages conjointly encouraged a new form of permanent migration from the villages. The new form of migration, as we shall see in the next section deprived the villages of the able-bodied manpower to work the land and to replenish dying out age-groups. Those who were declared redundant when the Lusaka-Mongu Road was completed in 1977. The influx continued into the 1980s.<sup>47</sup> Itzhyi-izhyi, in Namwala, had over 4 000 Lozi-speakers who opted to remain in the area as fishermen and fishmongers when the Hydro-electric dam was completed. The Zambian Government too arranged temporary

2. THE MIGRATION FROM AND DECLINE IN THE LOZI VILLAGE  
SYSTEM.

... Zambia over the first 14 years ... diverged significantly. There has been no significant productivity improvements in the subsistence sector. This has perpetuated very low incomes for the rural areas and has widened the rural-urban gap as well as accelerated the rural to urban migration. The growth of the modern sector has not created enough jobs to meet the demand of those who left the traditional sector. In fact the expansion of the modern sector has not been accompanied by similar growth in employment.<sup>45</sup>

The economic and social hardships that ensued from the WNLA closure coupled with the failure of UNIP's rural development programme to transform Bulozhi from her pristine economic backwardness, forced many Lozis out of their villages. The exodus was to Somas within Bulozhi, to towns along the line of rail, to fishing camps within and outside Bulozhi and to farms in areas like Mumbwa.<sup>46</sup> The Social Secretary for Mumbwa told me that there were over 15 000 Lozi-speakers in his district who were either working as farm hands or were fishermen in the 13 fishing camps in Chief Kaindu's area. Some of these people came to the district as early as 1970 being reinforced by those who were declared redundant when the Lusaka-Mongu Road was completed in 1977. The influx continued into the 1980s.<sup>47</sup> Itezhyi-tezhyi, in Namwala, had over 4 000 Lozi-speakers who opted to remain in the area as fishermen and fishmongers when the Hydro-electric dam was completed. The Zambian Government too arranged temporary

employment for ex-WNLAs and school drop outs to Nakambala etc from the Western Province. Gertzel estimated 70 000 Lozi jobseekers to have migrated to towns by 1969 while the 1980 census raised the figure to more than 100 000. Gertzel sums up the unemployment situation in Bulozhi and Zambia as a whole thus:

The councils did not ... have the funds for major programmes and central government activity slowed down with the completion of its post-independence building programme. In 1968, the small increases in the agriculture and mining were offset by the decline in construction which fell by half. There was a similar decline in commerce and transport and at the end of 1968 there was less wage employment in the province than there had been in 1963. 48

Thus from 1968 the exodus was to Bomas where people settled in squatter compounds either permanently or in transit to Nakambala Sugar Estate (NSE), to farms in Mumbwa or to towns. For those who were in transit, the squatter compounds became waiting places for raising transport money. However, in all, both the temporary and permanent settlers employed similar methods of raising money. Another point to note also is that Bulozhi witnessed, for the first time in history, the emerging of squatter compounds with their concomitant evils. Hence while the WNLAs had maintained a forward and backward link between the migrant and his village, the new situation encouraged permanent settlement away from the villages.

Squatter compounds emerged in all the districts of the province from the middle of 1968.<sup>49</sup> In the fishing camps within Bulozhi, people engaged in subsistence fishing

as the industry was undeveloped for large scale commercial purposes in the province. Hence, fishermen in camps on the Zambezi also had houses in the squatter compounds where they sold their fish. Some fished in order to earn money for transport to towns and other camps on the Kafue where the business was said to be better. One informant told me that he bought nets while living at Mandanga in Mongu and fished at Nanga on the Zambezi. In September, 1970 he moved to the Zambia Compound at Kaoma where he sold his fish. He used his earning as transport fare to Mumbwa where he was employed by Jukes Curtis as a security guard. He has been a permanent Mumbwa settler since October, 1970. The other fishermen he left on the Zambezi Fishery remained there until 1985 when the Litunga, Ilute Yeta banned migratory fishing in Bulozhi. 50

A number of factors facilitated the exodus from the villages. First, the Bomas were within the walking capacity of the migrants. Neither money nor transport was needed to start a journey. Hence, men, women and children who could not travel directly to the line of rail due to financial constraints were able to walk to the Bomas provided they had enough food provisions. In the case of women, they took bulrush millet with which to brew beer in the squatter compounds where there were better markets for beer sales than in the villages. In this way, lucrative opaque beer businesses developed in result, more people left the villages to go and benefit

the squatter compounds and many women beer sellers declined to return to their villages.<sup>51</sup>

The second factor was the desire by some of those who faced economic difficulties in the villages to engage in small businesses. Besides engaging in illicit brews, the settlers sold tobacco, firewoods, slaughter cattle, fish, mealie-meal and other small commodities to earn a living. Since the demand for such commodities in the villages was limited, aspiring traders were forced to move to the Bomas where there were relatively substantial concentrations of people with money to buy their commodities. Sumbwa estimated over 80% of settlers in the squatter compounds to have migrated for the purposes of trading as there were no other viable alternative sources of income elsewhere in the province. Hence people kept moving to those districts, particularly Mongu, which had a reputation for better beer sales and prospects for recruitment to Nakambala and other places and to Kaoma for better fish sales.<sup>52</sup>

The uneven distribution of development projects and social services between the village and the centre also attracted more people to the Bomas and towns. From 1964 to the end of the 1970s development projects in Buluzi were concentrated in the urban centres. The construction of schools, hospitals, and clean water supplies and the installation of electricity and other facilities were largely at Bomas while the villages stagnated. As a result, more people left the villages to go and benefit

from the 'fruits of independence at Bomas and towns.'

School drop outs too moved to Bomas and towns to look for work as well as to benefit from the evening class opportunities offered by the newly built secondary schools. According to Sumbwa, quite a substantial number of people obtained Form 2 certificates in this way and became primary school teachers, policemen, Medical and Laboratory Assistants etc.<sup>53</sup> Those who came to work as labourers during the constructions often did not go back to the villages but either remained at the squatter compounds or proceeded to towns and fishing camps. The government too established the Labour Exchange Control at Mongu which attracted more jobseekers from all over the province. The high rate of migration from villages is evidenced by the fact that while Mongu Township had only 9 000 people in 1969 this had increased close to 13 000 in 1980.<sup>54</sup> The smaller Bomas also experienced increases while the villages experienced more and more decreases. Thus the movement was that the villages lost its people to the Bomas while the Bomas lost its people to the provincial centre and the provincial centre lost its people to the towns, Mumbwa and the fishing camps on the Kafue. As one source has convincingly observed, the 'response to the pattern of economic disparities was the wholesale exodus of persons from the more remote rural areas to the more central regions of the nation.'<sup>55</sup>

Besides the factors highlighted above, the squatters brought problems to the 'once reputedly respectable Lozi society.'<sup>56</sup> The squatters who were mostly unemployed engaged in a variety of activities 'to put soul and body together.' According to Mulala Sikota and other sources, frustrations prompted by hunger and mapunu (lack of clothes) forced settlers in squatter compounds to engage in socially unacceptable activities. The settlers brewed, sold and drank various illicit brews which were condemned by public health officials.<sup>57</sup> The female settlers engaged in prostitution which quite often touched off fights among competitors resulting in serious injuries and even murders. It was a common experience during the 1970s for women to leave their husbands in the villages to become prostitutes and illicit beer brewers in the squatter compounds. Similarly, women who were granted divorce certificates by local courts because their husbands either did not clothe them properly or stayed away for far too long moved to the squatter compounds.<sup>58</sup> According to one informant, she moved to Kalabo Boma to brew beer and to live as a prostitute after she was granted a divorce certificate by the Salunda Local Court because her husband had disappeared to the towns after misusing a COZ loan in 1969. He neither wrote her letters nor sent her money as he used to do when he was recruited by the WNLA. From Kalabo

she moved to Mongu in 1970 and lived at Kapulanga the squatter compound. From Kapulanga she moved to Kama in 1974 and subsequently to Itezhi-tezhi where she lives by exchanging kachasu with fish. She argued she could not return to Buluzi because resources for making money there were limited.<sup>59</sup>

As one source summed up the exodus from the villages:

So many people were laid off after the WNLAI and closure. These have been confined to their villages. As a result of this long confinement, most people are drifting away to the Bomas, towns etc and what they are doing there is something degrading... People have taken to beer selling and beer drinking as though that was by their staple diet. Not because they like beer but it is the only consolation they find as far as the labour problem is concerned.<sup>60</sup>

According to Prins, 'a Lozi village was a map containing statements of social affinity and reflecting the demands of the productive process. Each courtyard was a cell containing different types of labour which combined to create the subsistence economy. Thus the village was both a social and economic unit in Lozi society.'<sup>61</sup> Hence the effects of the exodus to Bomas and towns was both social and economic. First, the most active agegroups of 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34 constituted the largest groups of migrants in search of means of livelihood. The outcome was that the villages lost the most active agegroups in terms of working on the land for agriculture, and replenishing the ageing groups in terms of human reproductive fertility. Secondly, the migrant age groups were the most socially active. At most, they

needed entertainment. Thus their departure from the villages is evidenced by the decline in social entertainments such as the Kayowe Dance, Siyemboka, Lyenya, and other dances which used to be very popular in the villages during the UNLA days. These functions have, on the other hand, become more popular in the squatter compounds at Bomas, in towns along the line of rail and in fishing camps especially at Iteszhi-tezhi and the Kaindu camps. This decline in social entertainment rendered village life more boring and thus accelerated the exodus of the youth from the villages.<sup>62</sup> Hence by 1977 the impact of the exodus had become more noticeable in many parts of the province. I argue that the exodus from village Silayi near Kalabo, there were 60 men in 1966. Between 1966 and 1986 20 men approximately aged between 45 and 75 died; 30 migrated to various destinations. Of those whose destinations were known, 6 left after finishing school to look for work while 9 were in the fishing camps, Bomas and farms outside Bulozhi. The whereabouts of the remaining 15 are not known. The village had ten adult males in 1986.<sup>63</sup> Other things being equal, the village would not have declined if the 30 men maintained links with their villages as the case used to be during the UNLA; for the decline is not due to the 20 deaths that have occurred between 1966 and 1986. It is due to the 30 men who have permanently stayed away from the village. In another village, Mwandi, there were going,

seven families with 10 sons in 1966. Two of the seven aged 45 and 80 respectively died between 1967 and 1977. The others migrated to various destinations within and outside Western Province. The one aged 80 died in 1977 and was the last man to live at the village. Thenceforth the village has been left without people and only mangoes and guava trees could be seen there in 1986.<sup>64</sup> The desertion or extinction of the village was, therefore, not the result of the two deaths but it was the result of the mass exodus. This study recorded 10 villages in Sesheke and Senangat West which have been deserted and have subsequently become extinct in the same way.

In concluding this section, I argue that the exodus from the villages was caused by hardships prompted by the untimely UNLA closure and the failure of the rural development programme. Those who came to the towns failed to find employment and thus moved to the fishing camps where life was similar to that found in the squatter compounds. Subsequently, the long absences of the migrants from the villages led to shortages of manpower to work on the land and also to replace the dying out age groups. This partly affected the agricultural potential of the area because most of the young people who could easily grasp new ideas about change were absent from the villages. And for those who were living in the fishing camps and farms outside Bulozzi, they declined to return home, despite the poor conditions prevailing there, arguing, shaped by the experience of the colonial period. The govern-

'the villages offered them no bright economic and social prospects either.' Hence the permanent absence of the people from the villages contributed to the decline in the village system, the life line of Lozi society.

#### THE GRADUAL SWITCH TO MODERN AGRICULTURE, 1978-1986

Throughout the colonial period and the post-independence era to the end of the 1970s, Bulozhi was neglected in terms of agricultural development. The province was regarded as Zambia's Cinderella province which was not capable of economic transformation due to ecological constraints to agricultural growth and the province's geographical location from markets on the line of rail. For instance, in the colonial period the experimental farm set up by D.U. Peters in 1948 on the plain edge and flood plain to investigate the production of rice as a food and cash crop was abandoned in the same year when Peters died.<sup>65</sup> Other plans that were devised to create self-sufficiency in food production in the province, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, failed to achieve any positive result throughout the colonial period.

In the independence era, the new government's agricultural policy on Bulozhi to the end of the 1970s was as unclear as that of the colonial administrators. Neither agriculture nor cattle production was given priority. It seems the new government's agricultural policy on Bulozhi was influenced by the agricultural thought and opinion shaped by the experience of the colonial period. The govern-

ment still considered migratory wage labour from the province as the mainstay of Lozi economy.<sup>66</sup> For instance, after the WNLA closure, as we have seen throughout the course of this study, no effort was made to settle the demobilised labourers on the land within the province. Instead, the government initiated employment schemes on the line of rail as noted earlier which further encouraged dependence on wage labour and migration from the villages. For instance, a statement made by E.H.K. Mudenda, Minister of Agriculture, to an Agricultural show gathering at Mongu in 1966, suggests that the new government, despite the ambitious promises it made during pre-independence election campaigns was not certain of what measures to adopt in order to improve food production in Buluzi. The mere exhortation of people to 'go back to the land' unbacked by concrete action did not pay any dividends. The Minister stated, 'the cost of producing a bag of maize in the Barotse was higher than in many other parts of Zambia due to poor soils and the high cost of transporting fertilisers.'<sup>67</sup>

The Lozi people too, succumbed to the myth created by the colonial rulers by believing that 'Buluzi was unsuitable for agricultural production because of poor soils' and that 'the Lozi people's sphere of economic specialisation lay in the supply of labour to the other developed areas of Southern Africa.'<sup>68</sup> This belief was demonstrated in the wide outcry, Lukaa ipilisa cwañi ha

be la khalat' inlo ha' lona ni kister lun! "How shall we live now that they live abroad the rich, the rich of the world? What is this persecuted 'oloni?" Most people argued that they could not live through agriculture in Israel while working. <sup>68</sup> Using the Israeli **Kibbutz** system of collective farming in hilly desert soils as an example, **Klinov** stated the view that 'hard soils' can hold up agricultural production in an arid/semi-arid climate. He convincingly argued that every type of soil including rock can be suitable for agriculture provided the appropriate technology is properly utilized. In other words it is not the soil that matters but rather the technology necessary to utilize it. <sup>69</sup> In fact 1964-1977 were years of the rapid land when the Israeli Government was not known to have failed to finance an economic project due to financial limitations. <sup>70</sup> Thus that the government ought to have done, as their counterparts did in Israel was to provide the appropriate agricultural incentives in Israel to enable the people utilize the sandy and low soils there for agriculture; rather than encouraging them to migrate to the, *Itahyi-tahyi* (any, if you dare, the approach), *shapardes* and other places where many people fell into bankruptcy and social misfits when they failed to find employment. The neglect of agriculture in Israel could also be seen in the fact that the whole province was generalised without exception

as sandy, acidic and unsuitable for agriculture. Yet, places like Sananga West, Sesheke, Kaoma and Lukulu had soils which were as good as those found in reputed farming places such as Mumbwa, Mazabuka and Mkushi; but the former remained as agriculturally backward by 1974 as Kalabo and Mongu which were reputed to have the poorest soils.<sup>72</sup> As a result / by 1978 Bulozhi was still the most backward in terms of agricultural growth, besides Luapula and North Western Province. The tide, however, changed during the second half of the 1970s. A number of factors contributed to the gradual switch to agriculture. On the side of the Zambian Government, Smith's closure of the Zambian border in 1973, the dramatic rise in oil prices in the mid-1970s and the subsequent fall in copper prices and copper exports due to the recession in the world economy convinced the government of the need to diversify from copper to agriculture.<sup>73</sup> In Bulozhi a spirit of reconciliation with the government since 1977 and a mature sense of realisation combined to convince the Lozi that the UNLA was long gone never to return. Hence a prolonged alienation from the government only served to deter progress in the province. Thus, many felt, by 1974 that the only way left to combat unemployment and the economic backwardness of the province was by cooperating with the UNIP government by positively responding to the call to all Zambians to turn to agriculture. It was at

long last being gradually realised that confrontation with one who is already in authority does not pay. As the Mwenyi saying goes, Wa kangwa kwiita uta kuitele, "If you fail to conquer you succumb" and this is what has actually happened in Bulozhi since the latter half of the 1970s.<sup>74</sup>

This section makes no attempt to assess the agricultural history of Bulozhi since independence. That would require specialised research and space. However, it attempts here to assess the historical trends of agriculture as a possible substitute to internal migration to the line of rail by examining the trend of the peoples responses from 1968 to 1986. Despite the inadequate or unsuitably distributed rainfall experienced in the province in particular and Zambia in general since 1978, the gradual switch to agriculture has been encouraging. A variety of crops have been introduced into the province since the latter part of the 1970s but, I shall, here limit myself to rice, maize, cashew nuts and cattle production to show their trend of growth in the area. In 1972 the whole province only produced 150 x 80kg bags of rice. By 1978, Kalabo District alone which had been condemned as the most backward labour reserve sold 2704 x 80kg bags of rice and provincial production was close to 8 000 bags. In the case of cattle production, there was growth from 390 762 cattle in 1978 to 471 379 in 1984 despite the

setbacks posed by the outbreak of diseases in Senanga and Kalabo, the major cattle producing districts in the province. Maize production too has increased in Kaoma, Sesheke, Senanga West and Lukulu. In 1965, the estimated total maize production in the province was 300 x 90kg bags. In 1978 and 1985 the province produced 39 537 x 90kg bags and 207 400 x 90kg bags. Cashew nuts were introduced in the province during the 1973/74 season. Only 6 farmers accepted to plant the crop. By 1984 there were over 60 000 peasant farmers in the province who accepted to grow a variety of crops not only for consumption but also for sale to the Cooperative Union; and the cash crops included cashew nuts.<sup>74</sup>

Besides the growth in production figures there has also been a significant increase in the total hectareage brought under cultivation and yields per hectare since 1982. According to government sources the increases have been attributed to improvements in producer prices, improved extension and credit facilities provided by the government and the liberal attitude of the Litunga Ilute Yeta who has reigned since 1977 towards change.<sup>75</sup>

The following table may prove the gradual switch of to agriculture in Bulozhi. zero in 1968 to 60 000 in 1984.<sup>76</sup>

The following table may also help to show the trend of response to agriculture since the 1982/83 season despite the bad weather, poor roads to areas where crops are grown and low prices in the case of beef prices within the province.

CROP AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION IN BULOZI SINCE 1979

a) MAIZE (x 90 kgs bags)

YEAR	NO. OF FARMERS						YIELD	
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
	33 605	13 759	42 601	102 000	148 000	180 000	207 400	250 501
1983/84			1 712			1 502		10

b) CATTLE

YEAR	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
	390762	376216	385074	403915	444675	471379	490401	501200

YEAR	NO. OF CATTLE						YIELD	
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
	5 735	6 585	7 943	14 400	17 000	22 300	30 250	40 301

Source: Compiled from the Provincial Agricultural Officer's Annual Reports for the years 1978/79

Source: Agrseason to 1981/82 and from Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, July-September 1985 for the latter period.

In 1986 ZIMCO through the Cashew Nut Company acquired over 2 000 hectares of land for commercial cashew nut production in the province. The cashew nut project was started to encourage people in the province to grow the crop for Cooperative Union. The increase becomes more noticeable especially from 1982. Since the same year, 1982, the province has been sending 35 tons of polished rice monthly to Lusaka and the number of primary cooperatives increased from 30 in 1982 to 85 in 1986. The number of peasant farmers rose from zero in 1968 to 60 000 in 1986. The following table may also help to show the trend of response to agriculture since the 1982/83 season closure. Thus the UNLA closure would have had minimal negative consequences on Bulozhi. crops are grown and low prices in the case of beef prices within the province.

a) RICE

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NO. OF FARMERS</u>	<u>HARES CULTIVATED</u>	<u>YIELD PER HARE</u>
1982/83	832	902	8
1983/84	1 712	1 502	10
1984/85	20 018	1 664	14

b) MAIZE

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NO. OF FARMERS</u>	<u>HARES CULTIVATED</u>	<u>YIELD PER HARE</u>
1982/83	2 609	2 433	9
1983/84	2 720	2 476	11
1984/85	3 477	2 791	12

Source: Agricultural Statistics Bulletin July-September, 1985

In 1986 ZIMCO through the Cashew Nut Company acquired over 2 000 hectares of land for commercial cashew nut growing in the province. The cashew nut project was started to encourage people in the province to grow the crop for commercial purposes. The cashew nut project and the increases in rice production and other crops show that Lozi soils were/<sup>not</sup>the useless they were portrayed to be. The improvements in agriculture since the early 1980s suggest that there would have been more improvements if agriculture had been encouraged in the province soon after the WNLA closure. Thus the WNLA closure would have had minimal negative consequences on Bulozhi.

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30. Gluckman, Economy, 31. Interview: Rufaya Numbungu On the exclusion of the rural masses from participation in the economic and political decision making process due to lack of education, organised solidarity among them by the owning urban elite, see also Luhring, Rural Development Planning, 51. and also 'Liboma Warns Against Loose Talk' in Press Release No 430/68, March, 5, 1968, 3.40 p.m. He was advising people in the province that the government was not going to arrest a person just because of a loan. Liboma was the UNIP Provincial Political Assistant in Buluzi when the Referendum took place, and the 1970 Western Province (Lands and Gertzel, 'Two Case Studies,' 241. See also P. Mukata, 'The Senanga-Mongu Road Benefits,' 13. its objectives of passing the 1970 Act (to socialise
31. Mukata, 'The Senanga-Mongu Road,' 13. Gertzel, 'Western Province,' 215. The resolution was
32. On the precariousness of agriculture in Buluzi at Max Gluckman observed in 1965, 'What these floods and rainy years have done is to dishearten many people and make them feel it was hardly worth cultivating' in Economy, 1965 xi. also Interview: Maybin Sitali Mbangwete, formerly a Namboard Manager, currently an improved rice farmer at Nyengo in Rev Kalabo; Holds a diploma in Agriculture and The Business Management from N.R.D.C. Place of Interview Salunda Kuta, Kalabo. Date 23-11-86. He stated that agriculture in the province would improve greatly if irrigation was emphasized not more than the current dependence on the precarious "grace of nature." Interview Magistrate.
33. S. Sinkala, 'Cattle Industry of Western Province' in University of Zambia Geographical Association 23- Magazine, No. 1, 1980, 4. net Minister, remained
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- Caplan, Elites, 212.
36. Interview: Mufaya Mumbuna, MP of the area then and helped in resolving the land dispute. Place of Interview: Lusaka, Date 22-12-86.
37. UNIP, Proceedings of the First Western Province Party Conference at Mbanyutu, Kaoma District from 6th to 10th September, 1979, Appendix 1, Resolutions.
38. Gluckman, Economy, 31. Interview: Mufaya Mumbuna MP and the Ngambela (Prime Minister) Date 22-12-86.
- Gluckman, Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Zambia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1955, xvi.
39. Interview: Mufaya Mumbuna, Date 22-12-86.
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41. The big jump from 1969 and 1970 when the Referendum took place, and the 1970 Western Province (Lands and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act was enacted to 1986 demonstrates that the state failed to honour its objectives of passing the 1970 Act (to accelerate development in Bulozhi.' See also Gertzel, 'Western Province,' 215. The resolution was passed at the Western Province Party Conference at Mongu in 1986. One wonders the purpose of the resolution, for a law already existed on the subject which could be invoked or explained to the people.
42. D. Mubyana, 'Land Dispute: What Next?' in Times Review of Sunday Times of Zambia, March 15, 1987. The land dispute broke out in November, 1986.
43. Interview: Meebelo Kalima Place of Interview, Lusaka Date 23-12-86. Mr Kalima is a leading authority on Lozi affairs on Radio Zambia. He is a lawyer and an eminent Magistrate.
- Interview: Arthur Nutuluti Lubinda Wina, Place of Interview Namboma Holdings Offices, Lusaka, Date 23-12-86. Wina a former Cabinet Minister, remained

53. Sumbwa, 'The Impact,' 4-5. The author himself on the line of rail since he was forced out of active politics by the notorious vetting system in 1978. Currently, he is actively busy planting cashew nuts at his Namboma Village at Namitome near Mongu.
54. Zambia in Brief for the Years 1969 and 1980  
44. Christiansen and Kiddy, 'The Return of Malawian Labour' 311-326.
55. Robert Bates, Rural Responses to Industrialisation  
45. Jacob Mwanza, 'Rural-Urban Migration and Urban Employment in Zambia' in Ben Turok (ed) Development in Zambia, London: Zed Press, 1979, 26.
56. James M. Mbikusita, 'Learning to Live in Precolonial  
46. Sumbwa, 'The Impact' 4-5. Interview: Patson, Mubukwanu Nyambe, Place of Interview: Kanunga wa Loba Fishing Camp in Chief Kaindu's area near Mumbwa. Nyambe came to Mumbwa in 1972. He has two homes, one at Mumbwa's Itezhyi-tezhyi squatter compound and the other at Kanunga wa Loba Camp. Nyambe told me that he came to Mumbwa because he could not meet his economic needs in Bulozhi. Date of interview 2-12-86.
57. Interview: John Shikomema Lupindula, District Social Secretary for Mumbwa. Place of Interview: Mumbwa Boma. Date: 3-12-86. Social Secretaries under the new decentralised local administration system in small districts are also responsible for labour issues in their districts.
59. Zambia, National Assembly Debates 13 February 1969  
48. Gertzel, 'Western Province,' 212-13.
49. Kapaale, 'A Survey' 89-91.
50. Interview: Daniel Kalima Nyambe, Place of interview: Itezhyi-tezhyi Squatter Compound, Mumbwa, Date 3-12-86. Nyambe is the UNIP Branch Chairman of this Lozi-dominated squatter compound. He argued that the exodus from the villages by the  
51. Sumbwa, 'The Impact' 4-5. Interview: Mbangweta Lisulo, Place of Interview, Mumbwa Market. Date 3-12-86. She travelled from her village in Senanga to brew beer at Katuya in Senanga. From there she collected enough money for from beer sales which enabled her to follow her uncle who was living at Mumbwa. She lives as a fish monger. man of this once big village. This study found similar  
63. Interview: Lubasi Ngambwa, Place of Interview: Kalabo Boma. Date 22-11-86. Lubasi migrated to Kalabo Boma as a slaughter cattle seller during the 1970s. He now runs a big shop at the Boma.
- 52.

53. Sumbwa, 'The Impact,' 4-5. The author himself an ex-WNLA obtained his Form II certificate in 1968 while living at Kashitu Squatter Compound in Kalabo. He subsequently trained as a primary school teacher.
54. GRZ, Zambia in Brief for the Years 1969 and 1980  
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56. Inonge M. Mbikusita, 'Learning to Live in Precolonial Bulozhi' Ph.D Thesis, New York University, 1979, 58-60. See also Gertzel, Western Province; 207.
57. Interview: Aggrey Mulala Sikota, PPS in the Rural Development sub committee of UNIP at Freedom House. He was the District Governor for Mongu from 1969 to 1971. He witnessed several recruitments of Lozi-speakers to NSE and Mumbwa. Place: Lusaka Date 22-12-86.
58. Interview: Sianga Namumbi Place of Interview, Chibolio Squatter Compound, Itezhyi-tezhyi, Namwala Date of Interview 4-12-86.
59. Interview: Sianga Namumbi.
60. Zambia, National Assembly Debates 13 February 1969 cols 725, 726, 727.
61. Prins, Hidden Hippopotamus, 54.
62. These views were obtained from a cross section of Lozi society. Most outstanding was: Nanjeka Kapwaila a famous Keyowe dancer since 1937. He had been to various parts of the world during the colonial days. He argued that the exodus from the villages by the Youth has led to the decline in the traditional dances because there were no more young people to learn the skills of dancing from the old ones. Place of Interview: Kalabo Boma Date: 24-11-86. Nanjeka was 90 in 1986.
63. Interview: Benson Wina Muimui Place of Interview Kalabo Boma Date 23-11-86. He is the village headman of this once big village. This study found similar experiences of declining villages in Sesheke and

Senanga West.

64. Interview: Namakando Simaloya Place of Interview: Freedom House, Lusaka Date: 22-12-86
65. MacLeans, Agricultural Stocktaking, v.
66. Interview: Nawa Lifanu, Director of the Institute of Human Relations at UNZA Place of Interview Lusaka, Date 23-12-86.
67. E.H.K. Mudenda, Minister of Agriculture, 'Agriculture in Barotse' as quoted in Nshila No 227 October 17, 1966.
68. Sumbwa, 'The Impact', 5. See also Sakubita, Kalabo, 48-52.  
  
Interviews: Maybin Mbangweta, Nawa Lifanu and Silumelume Mubukwanu.
69. Sumbwa, 'Impact,' 6. Gertzel, 'Western Province' 212-213.
70. Halevi Nadav Ruth Klinov-Malul, The Economic Development of Israel London: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers 1968, 90-100. See also A Marcus, Industry in Israel, Jerusalem: Israel Digest, 1959, 3-4.
71. C.L. Dixon, The Development of Agricultural Policy in Zambia 1964-1971, O'Dell Memorial Monograph No. 5, Department of Geography, University of Aberdeen 1977, 33.
72. Interview: Meebelo Kalima, Sitali Mbangweta. On the issue of areas in the Western Province which had better soils see also MacLeans, Agricultural Stocktaking, v, 20.
73. Anglin and Shaw, Zambia's Foreign Policy, 6-9. See also School of Education, Educational Reform Implementation Project, The Provision of Education for All: Towards The Implementation of Zambia's Educational Reforms Under Demographic and Economic Constraints, 1986-2000 Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1986, 17.
74. This view was expressed by a cross section of my informants throughout the Western Province in 1986. And it seems to suggest that the antagonism that was there between the government and the people of Bulozhi during 1968-1972 was to a large extent a result of the failure of the two parties to understand the motives of one another. Hence suspicion and prejudice

intensified the antagonism, for neither the government nor the Lozi was eager to talk to the other.

75. This information was obtained from UNIP Provincial and District Annual Reports some of which are under restricted circulation. See also GRZ Annual Agricultural Reports for the Years 1968-1982; GRZ Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, Lusaka: Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development (MAWD) July/September, 1985. NB The term "agriculture" here has been used to include livestock particularly cattle.

76. Most informants in the villages told me that they became more encouraged to grow crops like rice when government established marketing depots in their areas from the latter half of the 1970s. Before that the people had nowhere to sell their crops even if they produced them in large numbers. Secondly, increases in producer prices for crops like rice motivated more villagers to produce the crop in large amounts. In 1981 the price of an 80kg bag of rice was K28 and in 1982 it was raised to K40 and in 1986 it further rose to K73. also: Interview: Thomas Mubita, Rice farmer in Nambowata area near Mongu Place of interview, Mongu Township Date 18-10-86. Mubita aged 58 in 1986 retired from the Copperbelt. He is an ex-WNLA. also Radio Interview: Green Mwala, Chairman of the Western Province Cooperative and Marketing Union. Figures of primary cooperatives and peasants farmers and on polished rice obtained by courtesy of the chairman. I am in constant correspondence with the chairman Date 29-09-86.

attempted to show that the Lozi were not 'bewildered with the wealth of the south' as some sources have portrayed the situation, for as early as 1927 the Lozi had openly expressed dissatisfaction over lack of economic development in the area and the 'endless dependence on contract labour to plant outside Bulozhi.' This was expressed openly to Resident Magistrate, Hall, at Mongu. We have also shown that the absence of an economic base in the area led to a user dislocation when the WNLA stopped recruiting labour in the area due to the recession of the 1930s. We have also shown that the colonial administration responded by introducing another recruitment

## CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

The first chapter looked at labour migration in Bulozhi generally during the pre-colonial and colonial period to 1966. We showed that labour migration in Bulozhi was the result of a combination of factors. The salient ones were natural disasters, influence of neighbours who were rooted in labour migration by the 1870s such as the Tswana, neglect by the colonial administrators to develop the province as a ploy to turn the area into a source of cheap labour and the introduction of tax. Tswana influence in this chapter has been identified as being responsible for the pre-colonial movements to white areas from Bulozhi.

The chapter also has attributed economic stagnation in the province to the apathy of the Lozi aristocracy, especially Yeta III and Mwanawina, who declined to part with part of their luxury to develop the area. The chapter has also attempted to show that the Lozi were not 'bemused with the wealth of the south' as some sources have portrayed the situation, for as early as 1927 the Lozi had openly expressed dissatisfaction over lack of economic development in the area and the 'endless dependence on contract labour to places outside Bulozhi.' This was expressed openly to Resident Magistrate, Hall, at Hongu. We have also shown that the absence of an economic base in the area led to a near dislocation when the RNLB stopped recruiting labour in the area due to the recession of the 1930s. We have also shown that the colonial administration responded by introducing another recruitment

organisation in the area, the WNLA, to the Rand Mines of South Africa. From 1936 to 1966 labour migration to South Africa became the life line in the villages of Buluzi neglecting even subsistence agriculture and fishing as the WNLA 'poured money and consumer goods' into the province. But since the organisation created no permanent economic base within the province, its abolition in 1966 ended the cosmetic prosperity that was apparent in Buluzi since the late 1930s. This chapter has argued that the Lozi were conditioned to labour migration by circumstances beyond their control. As a result, desperation and economic dislocation set in after the WNLA closure as was the case in 1932 because there was no permanent economic base within the province to generate revenue for the people within their localities. The second chapter looked at the perceptions and responses of the Lozi people to the decision to end WNLA recruitment from 1966 to 1972. The chapter examined the suspicion and lack of mutual understanding that existed between the Lozi and the UNIP government over the closure. The Lozi felt that the government, by hastily closing the WNLA in a province where there was no economic base, was responsible for their economic and social hardships. On the other hand, the government felt that the Lozi, by supporting the opposition political parties, were plotting to secede from Zambia. This chapter has demonstrated that the Lozi voted against UNIP in the General Elections of 1980 was a humiliated dying old man by 1968 who had similarly

1968 to express their dissatisfaction with the decision to end the WNLA in an area where the government knew but it had not introduced an alternative source of income. This chapter has also demonstrated that the UP and the ANC took advantage of the WNLA closure grievance to wrestle support from UNIP in the province. The UP and the ANC used the WNLA closure as its election manifesto and won support in Kalabo, Sesheke, Senanga and Mongu where the WNLA was very popular but lost in Lukulu, Kaoma and Luampa where the WNLA was less popular. We have also shown that the Lozi used the constitutionally approved ballot paper to replace UNIP with a more amenable political party that they hoped would restore the WNLA thus their longstanding economic dependence on wage labour. This was demonstrated by the fact that after the December 1968 elections, the Lozi assembled at Mongu in February 1969 demanding to be allowed to go to WNLA because that was why they voted for the ANC. We have also shown that the Lozi resorted to no secessionist activities when the UNIP government turned down their request but rather returned to their villages where they resigned themselves to their economic hardships brought about by the closure of the WNLA and the series of natural disasters that ensued. We have also shown in this chapter that the Royal Establishment played no active role in UNIP's election defeat in the area. Mwanawina who finally passed away on 13 November was a humiliated dying old man by 1968 who had similarly

been rejected by the Lozi in the 1962 and 1964 elections on the similar grounds of sticking to conservatism thus retarding the economic transformation of the province. People in Bulozhi rejected Mwanawina's candidates because they felt that sticking to tradition which brought no economic benefit to all the inhabitants of Bulozhi was a myopic pursuit. In the same vein, the new Litunga, Mbikusita Lewanika (1905-1977), knew fully well that his Litungaship purely depended on 'Kaunda's grace' who through the provisions of the 1965 Chiefs Act reserved the right to recognise or to depose him. Mbikusita, therefore, refrained from engaging in activities that he knew could strain his relations with Kaunda. This chapter, has therefore argued that the switch to the ANC in Bulozhi was an expression of dissatisfaction arising from a feeling of economic deprivation, and not a desire to secede.

The third chapter explored the consequences of the closure from the middle of 1968 to 1986. The chapter identified the socio-economic hardships of the closure and their effects on village life in Bulozhi. These hardships have been attributed to factors rooted in the policies of the colonial and post-colonial rulers of Bulozhi. The chapter did this by comparing and contrasting the policies of the two regarding economic development in Bulozhi and found that the colonial rulers to 1964 and UNIP to 1972 had no clear cut policy regarding economic transformation in the province. The colonial rulers dismissed Bulozhi as

'unsuitable for agriculture and only fit for the supply of labour' while the UNIP government echoed this view by introducing employment schemes such as the Nakambala Sugar Estate, the shortlived Musonda Scheme, Kafue and Itetzhyi-tezhyi Dam etc for the ex-WNLAs and others which perpetuated a spirit of tenacious dependence on wage labour outside Bulozhi in the minds of the Lozi people. Thus from the middle of 1968 when most projects were nearing completion and the country was entering an era of financial crises brought about by the effects of the UDI, unemployment became a source of discontent among the Lozi who the government had coerced to disengage from the WNLAs without creating a viable alternative.

The chapter also compared the disengagement process in Malawi from migratory labour to Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa to that in Zambia. We found out that the Malawians first created an agricultural base on plantations and small holdings within rural Malawi between 1964 and 1977. This transformation needed labour and so Malawians were **induced** to return home voluntarily to work on the created agricultural infrastructure with good income. On the other hand, the Zambian disengagement process was a hasty one which did not put into cognisance the effects of the sudden closure on the lives of the people in an area where no rural economic infrastructure had been created. We have also identified the fact that even though UNIP's record of providing social services or 'tools of social 1973 following the policy of diversification from dependence

comfort' was unprecedented in the province, there was no corresponding economic growth in the villages where the socio-economic situation was continuously deteriorating throughout the 1970s.

The chapter also looked at the high rate of migration from the villages in particular and the province in general to squatter compounds and fishing camps within and outside the province. We found that the exodus from villages deprived this basic social unit in Lozi society of the most active age groups to work the land and to replace the ageing groups.

The effects of the exodus have reflected themselves in some once big villages either declining or becoming totally extinct. The exodus also resulted in abnormally reduced family sizes, stunted population growth and low fertility rates in the province. The poor income flow that turned away many people from the province was reflected in the low prices of key commodities like beef and fish. In 1986, one kilogramme of steak in places like Sesheke, Senanga and Kalabo still cost K3 while it was also common to buy meat at 20n in the villages. A kilogramme of steak along the line of rail and in places like Mumbwa cost over K15 in the same year.

The chapter also looked at the trends in agricultural growth in the province since 1968 or thereabout. It was found out that government policy regarding agriculture in the province was gradually changing for the better from 1973 following the policy of diversification from dependence

on copper. The introduction of community based schemes such as the Mangango Settlement Scheme in Kaoma, Summer Grazing Schemes in the Central Zambezi Floodplain and the Provincial Rice Development Schemes partly contributed to the switch to agriculture and growth in livestock rearing. By 1979 maize, rice and livestock production had doubled. This growth was reflected in the increases in hectarages cultivated and yields made per hectare. Improvements in producer prices, extension services and the introduction of marketing boards in each district contributed to the increase in food production in the area.

We also showed that the number of peasant farmers rose from almost zero in 1968 to 60,000 in 1986. In the same year Bulozhi despite transport constraints to major rice producing areas, came second to the Northern Province in the whole country in rice production. The Northern Province except for Mbala was another condemned labour reservoir which was regarded as being unsuitable for agriculture by the colonial administrators. This chapter has also found out that the switch to agriculture has partly been the result of the liberal and innovative attitude of the new Litunga, Ilute Yeta, towards economic development and the land tenure system and also to his cooperation with the Central Government. In 1986 the myth that 'Lozi soils were useless' was shattered when ZIMCO through its subsidiary, the Zambia Cashew Nut Company recognised the fact that Bulozhi was the most suitable area for growing 'the money spinner,' cashew

nuts and acquired over 2000 hectares of land in the province through the auspices of the Litunga.

From the foregoing, this dissertation argues that the policy of replacing labour migration to South Africa with local labour migration to Nakambala and other places outside Bulozhi delayed the process of economic transformation through agriculture in Bulozhi.<sup>26</sup> Secondly, I argue that the current trend of agricultural growth from 1979 is an indicator that an economic base could have been created without the people of Western Province having had to undergo a long period of socio-economic stress if the ex-WNLAs were motivated to settle on community based agricultural projects soon after 1964 or after the WNLA closure. As it has been observed by experts all over the world that 'agriculture is a more viable rural based source of economic transformation than labour migration.'

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iv) KSD SERIES

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KSD 5/1: Miscellaneous Report-Seretseland 1890-1963.

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vi) ZA SERIES

ZA 1/9/18/56/1: Conditions under which Recruiting of Natives have been permitted for employment outside Northern Rhodesia; Wenela.

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G. ORAL SOURCES: Interviews were conducted in an informal atmosphere and were not tape-recorded. The following information is given for each informant:

1. Name
2. Date of Interview
3. Place of Interview
4. Occupation.

NAME	DATE	PLACE	OCCUPATION
Chibande Thomas	24-11-86	Kalabo Boma	Ex-WNLA, now a successful trader.
Chikote Josiah	21-10-86	Kaoma	Ex-WNLA, now an emerging farmer.
Chiyuka Ndonji	20-10-86	Kaoma	E.C. Pastor for Mumbwa and Kaoma.
Fwanyanga Humphrey	4-12-86	Namitwi Fishing Camp	Fisherman UNIP Chairman.
Kabika Pumulo (Miss)	3-12-86	Mumbwa Market	Marketeer.
Kakula Liyoka George	25-12-86	Lusaka	UNZA Lecturer.
Kakwisa Thomas Malangisi	24-11-86	Kalabo	Ex-WNLA, now an emerging rice farmer.
Kalima Meebelo	23-12-86	Lusaka	Magistrate Class 1.
Kamuti Maingo	4-12-86	Itezhyi-tezhyi	Fish trader, died January, 1987.
Kapwaila Nanjeke	24-11-86	Kalabo	Founder dancer of <u>Kayowe</u> .
Kashewe Muleya	25-12-86	Lusaka	Senior Assistant Registrar, UNZA.
Koota Felix Nandala	21-12-86	Lusaka	Lecturer, Mongu Teacher's College.

NAME	DATE	PLACE	OCCUPATION
Kufuna Cyprian	3-12-86	Mumbwa	Officer-In-Charge Mumbwa Police Station
Lifanu Likotola Nawa	25-12-86	Lusaka	UNZA, Institute of Human Relations Director
Lifanu L.M.	26-12-86	Lusaka	Ex-WNLA, now Bank employee
Lisulo Mbangweta	3-12-86	Mumbwa Market	Marketeer
Lubasi Ngambwa	24-11-86	Kalabo Boma	Ex-WNLA, now a successful trader
Lubita Mulambwa	17-10-86	Mongu Boma	Health Statistics Officer, Mongu
Lubinda John M.	20-09-87	Lusaka	UNZA Lecturer
Lupindula John Shikomona	3-12-86	Mumbwa	District Social Secretary
Luywa D. Mushiko	24-12-86	Lusaka	Lawyer
Mainga Mutumba (Mrs Bull)	24-12-86	Lusaka	Politician, Author, Academician
Masule Mubita Benson	2-10-86	Mwandi, Sesheke	Teacher, Politician, farmer
Mate Jameson Kandala	17-10-86	Mongu	Stayed in S. Africa for 40 years died 1987
Mbaimbai Lioko	24-12-86	Lusaka	Former MP for Kalabo, Cattle farmer
Mbangweta Sitali Maybin	23-11-86	Kalabo Boma	Rice farmer at Nyengo in Kalabo
Mthelo Ma-Moruti Dumo	23-11-86	Nesheka Village	Housewife, died 14/04/87.

NAME	DATE	PLACE	OCCUPATION
Mubita Thomas	16-10-86	Mongu	Ex-WNLA, retired Copperbelt miner now farmer
Mubukwanu P. Nyambe	2-12-86	Kanunga Wa Loba, Mumbwa	Fish trader
Mubukwanu Silumelume	22-12-86	Lusaka	Ex-WNLA clerk, now a senior civil servant
Mufalali Sininika Adorns	3-10-86	Sesheke	Ex-WNLA, now a Boma Messenger
Muimui Wina Benson	23-11-86	Kalabo	Ex-WNLA, now Village Headman
Mukanda Sitimela	24-11-86	Kanjumwa, Kalabo	Village Headman since the 1930s
Mulowa Nalumino	4-11-86	Nalubanda	Fish trader from Senanga East
Mumbuna Mufaya	22-12-86	Lusaka	MP, Village Headman and is the <u>Ngambela</u>
Munalula Mary Poto	3-10-86	Sesheke	Housewife, typist
Musiwa Maxwell Silenganu	8-10-86	Senanga	cattle, Maize and Rice farmer
Mutembe Sipopa	21-10-86	Kaoma	Retired NCCM miner, now a farmer
Muyoba Benard Mufaweli	7-10-86	Senanga	District Council Employee
Mwala Green	29-09-86	Senanga	Chairman, WPCMU, Businessman
Mwambwa Ofisi Ngongola	23-11-86	Kalabo	Participated in W/WI and an ex-migrant to Southern Rhodesia

NAME	DATE	PLACE	OCCUPATION
Mwenda Muyunda	23-12-86	Lusaka	Businessman, formerly employment Officer at Nchanga
Mwinga Wilisi	24-11-86	Kalabo ...	WNLA conductor in Bulozhi to 1966
Mwiya Saiti Namangolwa	2-12-86	Mumbwa	Ex-WNLA employee at Kazungul in the 1930s, died January, 1987
Namakando Simaloya	22-12-86	Lusaka	UNIP Accounts Clerk
Namuchana Namushi	8-11-86	Lukulu	MP, District Governor,
Namumbi Sianga	4-12-86	Itezhyi-tezhyi, Namwala	Fish and Kachasu seller
Nasilele Alfred Namakando	22-12-86	Lusaka	Formerly D.G. in Bulozhi, now a teacher in Lusaka
Ndui Alfred Mwiya	17-10-86	Lipuluti village, Mongu ...	Civil Servant and an Ex-WNLA
Nyambe Kalima Ndaniele	3-12-86	Mumbwa	CPCMU worker, UNIP Chairman
Paulo Fernando	26-11-86	Mongu Mulamba Harbour	Waterworks mechanic
Sabasika Petrus	23-12-86	Lusaka	Ex-WNLA, rice farmer in Kalabo
Samui Gideon Saboi	4-12-86	Itezhyi-tezhyi, Namwala	Ex-WNLA, UNIP freedom fighter in Bulozhi now a fish trader
Sayowa Pumulo	7-11-86	Lukulu Boma ..	Ex-WNLA, now a Council employee

NAME	DATE	PLACE	OCCUPATION
Sibetta Uyi Crispin	22-12-86	Lusaka	Retired Senior Labour Officer
Sikota Aggrey Mulala	22-12-86	Lusaka, Freeman House	Politician
Simangolwa Mushiko	22-11-86	Kalabo	Ex-WNLA, Village Headman
Simate Shadrach Manjolo	1-12-86	Mupayamanzi, Mumbwa	Fisherman, ex-WNLA
Sinyani Lawrence	22-12-86	Lusaka	MP for Sesheke
Sipalo Munukayumbwa	22-12-86	Lusaka	MP for Mongu, Professional Politician
Sipopa Samson	22-11-86	Kalabo	Ex-WNLA, emerging rice grower
Sitali Christopher	21-10-86	Kaoma	Ex-WNLA, emerging maize farmer
Songiso Nelson Litongo	22-11-86	Kalabo	Ex-WNLA, retired Copperbelt miner
Subulwa Thomas	8-10-86	Senanga	Teacher
Sumbwa George Nyambe	25-12-86	Lusaka	UNZA Lecturer
Timwendila F.N.	8-11-86	Lukulu Boma	Judiciary department employee
Wamunyima Mubita	30-12-86	Mazabuka	NSE Personnel Manager
Wina Arthur Nutuluti Lubinda	23-12-86	Lusaka	Former Cabinet Minister now a prominent businessman in Lusaka

APPENDIX (1)

BLACK MINeworkERS IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM FRONTLINE STATES  
IN 1986.

Malawi .....	23 507
Mozambique .....	63 707
Swaziland .....	16 629
Botswana .....	21 686
Lesotho .....	116 147
Zambia .....	-
Zimbabwe .....	-

Source: Department of Home Affairs, Pretoria, South Africa.