SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN COLONIAL ZAMBIA

by

Lennard Nkhata

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DECLARATION

I declare, in accordance with regulations governing the degree of master in the University of Zambia, that this dissertation has not previously been submitted for a degree in this or in any other university.

Date 30/6/79 Signature L. NKHATA

Abstract

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A conflict approach is used in this study for refuting/accepting race as a base for social stratification in colonial Zambia; for identifying the main form of social stratification in the colonial society and for identifying causal relations among 'racial', class, and status forms of social stratification in the society.

The main findings are that race was not a base for social stratification, rather it was a status symbol; that the main form of social stratification was status; and that this form gave rise to class stratifications in the mining industry.

The study as a whole indicates that when a group of people assumes a concentration of political power through a struggle with another group, a status stratification emerges. This, in turn, gives rise to status-based political struggles.

The study being of only one case, it is finally suggested that this inference be tested with empirical material from many different societies.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The present study is about the nature of social stratification in colonial Zambia. It attempts, on the basis of a conflict approach, to identify the various forms of the stratification, assessing their relative dominance in conditioning the life chances of people in the society; and to evaluate the role of skin colour in social relations in the cclonial period (1890-1964). Thus the significance of the study mainly lies in clarifying a particular social existence and in providing, thereby, comparative material for students of social stratification.

A. MAIN CONCEPTS OF THE STUDY

The term social stratification comes from the simpler term stratum, a term which denotes a layer of some sort. In geography the term denotes a layer of rock. In sociology it denotes a layer of people. In this case the layer is not descernible

by the eye as a layer of rock is. Rather it is identified by some kind of hierarchical scale made up of characteristics such as income or prestige. A stratification is, therefore, a structure which when examined is seen to consist of two or more layers arranged hierarchically.

The term 'social' refers to some form of cooperation between two or more individuals. To use Karl Marx's words, "By social we understand the cooperation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end" (in Bendix R and Lipset S.M, 1974 , p 8). Hence the compound term social stratification refers to a hierarchical structure made up of layers of people in cooperation. When social groups (Giner S, 1972, pp 56 and 57) make up a hierarchy, a form of social stratification exists. So is the case when categories of people in cooperation make up a hierarchy, categories such as those cooperating about personal social status. The presence or absence of group consciousness is thus not significant in defining the term social stratification. However, group consciousness becomes significant in studies where a researcher is interested in hierachies made up of social groups, at the exclusion of those made up of categories of people. In

the present study, for example, where we are interested in stratified social groups, the presence of group consciousness is significant.

In our view, what people are cooperating about distinguishes basic forms of social stratification. When people are cooperating about economic gain, their hierarchy is a class stratification. When they are cooperating about social status, the hierarchy is a status stratification.

Cooperation is the backbone of each form of social stratification. For a hierarchy characterised by economic gain to exist, all groups or categories of people must cooperate forcibly or otherwise to maintain the necessary social relations or connections among the people. There can be no class stratification without economic social relations.

These relations are characterised by unequal market chances. For example taking the two basic categories that make up a class stratification (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M. (eds), 1974a, p 22), the propertied and the propertyless; the propertied have, in most cases, more chance for economic gain in relation to be propertyless. In bargains with the propertyless who have nothing to sell but their labour power and who,

above all, are compelled to sell the labour power in order barely to subsist; the propertied have the higher chance and so gain more in the sell and purchase of the labour power. The fact that they are less compelled in the transaction than the propertyless is what gives them more chance.

Within these basic categories, the differential market chances necessary for the existence of a class stratification go, on the one hand, with the kind of property that is used for economic gain and, on the other hand, with the kind of labour services offered in the market. To use Weber's terms "ownership of domestic buildings; productive establishments; warehouses; stores; agriculturally usable land, large and small holdings - quantitative differences with possibly qualitative cnsequences -; ownership of mines; cattle; men (slaves); disposition over mobile instruments of production, or capital goods of all sorts, especially money or objects that can be exchanged for money ~~or objects that can be exchanged for money~~ easily and at any time; disposition over products of one's own labour or of other's labour differing according to their various distances from consumability; disposition over transferable monopolies of any kind - all these distinctions differentiate the class situations of the propertied just as does the 'meaning' which they can and do give to the

utilization of property, especially to property which has money equivalence" (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds),1974a, p 22).

The propertyless are differentiated just as much according to the kinds of labour services that they offer in the market. But always a class stratification is essentially a distribution of market chances.

Categories of people with more of these gain more and enjoy distinct standards of living and personal life experiences than those with less. There is thus a causal connection between market chances and material conditions of living and personal life experiences.

However, in pointing out the essence of class stratification, we also indicate the essence of a class. In our view, a class is essentially a number of people with a distinct market chance. A category or group of people with the chance or probability of 0.1 in the labour market, for example, is a separate class from that with the probability of 0.3. This, in turn, is a separate class from that with the probability of 0.6. The chances go with the kinds of the labour services offered for earning the total income in the market, and this consideration applies in the commodity market.

A class, therefore, is in no way defined by amount of income earned. Income may be an empirical indicator of class, but it is not a determinant in itself. Rather the determinant is what is offered in the market for earning that income, and the sessence is always the chance for sharing in the total income available in the entire market.

In the illustration, however, the class stratification would consist of people with the 0.6 at the top, those with 0.3 at the middle, and those with 0.1 at the bottom; and their material living conditions and personal life experiences would differ accordingly. A class stratification is a hierarchical arrangement of classes.

The emphasis on market chances, though expressed in different terms, is Weber's. Here is his definition of class: "We may speak of a 'class' when 1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, in so far as 2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and 3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets". He then stressed that "But always this is the generic connotation of the concept of class; that the kind of chance in the market is the decisive moment which represents a common condition for the

individual's fate". (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974a, pp 21 and 22).

Mathematically, chance or probability stretches from zero to one. The latter denotes the condition in which there is 100 per cent chance of success, the condition in which the entity or people concerned have all the chances of success. In this mathematical continuum, zero if of special interest to us. It leads us to pose the question: is a category or group of people with zero chance in the market a class?

People who have nothing to sell for earning income, and hence have no market chance, are not a class; for a class is a category or group of people with a distinct share in the total income earned in the market. Those who do not share the total income, that is those with zero probability, do not constitute a class.

We thus concur with the Weberian idea expressed in the following terms: "Those men whose fate is not determined by the chance of using goods or services for themselves on the market, e.g slaves, are not, however, a 'class' in the technical sense of the term. They are,

rather, a 'status group'" (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974a, p 22).

This brings us to a consideration of status stratification. If for a class stratification to exist, people must cooperate forcibly or otherwise to maintain the necessary social relations, the same goes with a status stratification. There can be no status stratification without respectiful social relations.

These are basically superior/inferior relations sustaining differences in social status, differences which may be connected to a differential distribution of political power, to market classes, or to any other quality shared by a plurality. Just as market chances are significant in defining a class stratification, so are differences in social status in defining ~~a defining~~ a status stratification; and just as market chances give rise to distinct standards of living and personal life experiences in a class stratification, ~~as~~ so is the case with social status in a status stratification. There, similarly, people of a higher status consequently enjoy better life chances than those with a lower.

On the relation between classes and status groups, Weber pointed out that members of both the propertied and

the propertyless can and do belong to the same status group (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974a, p 24). This means that a class of labourers can belong to the same status group that a class of employers of the labourers belongs. A status group is not always made up of people of the same class position. What matters is that the people of different classes should have the same social respect in society.

This is particularly possible, we hypothesise, where the basis of the social respect is political power. In that case, when a group of people has a concentration of political power, inspite of comprising members of the propertied and the propertyless, the group can enjoy a distinct amount of social respect and hence constitute a status group separate from that with less political power in the society.

We may add that while Weber looked at the relation between classes and status groups, he did not concern himself with the relative dominance of coexisting forms of social stratification. This is an area left for other thinkers, and so is worth investigating in the present study.

Weber, however, noted that "For all practical purposes, stratification by status goes hand in hand

with a monopolization of ideal and material goods or opportunities, in a manner we have come to know as typical. Besides the specific status honor, which always rests upon distance and exclusiveness, we find all sorts of material monopolies" (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974a p 25). This means that enjoying a certain amount of social respect makes the individuals concerned look down upon these who have less and hence confine social intercourse such as friendships and marriages to people of equal social status. In this way they tend to monopolise potential brides, bridegrooms and relevant ideal opportunities. In the realm of material goods too, relevance to social status tends to effect status monopolisation of the goods and of opportunities for earning these. In particular, non-manual employment opportunities fall under the monopolisation, for "Quite generally, among previleged status groups there is a status disqualification that operates against the performance of common physical labour" (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974a, p 26).

Struggles for economic opportunites then, are not always class struggles. Sometimes they are status struggles, taking plcase between status groups in disagreement over status monopolisation.

Similarly, political struggles are not always class struggles. They are sometimes status struggles. Weber elaborated thus: "In any individual case, parties may represent interests determined through 'class situation' or 'status situation', and they may recruit their following respectively from one or the other. But they need be neither purely 'class' nor purely 'status' parties. In most cases they are partly class parties and partly status parties, but sometimes they are neither. They may represent ephemeral or enduring structures" (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds) 1974a, p 27)

Altogether, the foregoing gives social stratification, class and status as the main concepts of the present study. By social stratification we mean a hierarchy of social groups or of categories of people. But in this study we limit ourselves to a consideration of hierarchies made up of social groups.

One of the characteristics of our classes, therefore, is group consciousness. In the study we look at classes possessing group consciousness. Hence the concept of class stratification here denotes a hierarchy made up of classes with respective group consciousness.

The other significant characteristic of the classes is market chance attached to kind of property sold in the commodity market or to kind of labour service sold in the labour market. Each class has a distinct market chance of this sort.

The study also concentrates on status groups, at the exclusion of what may be termed status categories. Hence the concept of status stratification here denotes a hierarchy made up of status groups, each of the groups having a distinct amount of social honour. A corollary characteristic of status stratification is status monopolisation of ideal or material goods and opportunities.

A methodological assumption of this conceptual model is that the fate or, what is but the same thing, the life chances of individuals in society are determined by market chances and/or social status.

It is, however, pertinent to justify the use of this version of the Weberian model in the present study. Why not use the Marxian, the Veblenian, the functional model of Davis and Moore, or even some other model? The answer is simply that the Weberian is suitable for

analysing empirical situations with coexisting class and status stratifications. The Marxian is about class stratification only, so are the Veblenian and the functional.

According to Marx, "Freeman and slave, partician and plebian, lord and serf, guild - master and journeyman, in a word, appressor and oppressed" (Marx K and Engles F, 1973, p 41) are some of the antagonistic classes that have existed in different historical periods. Such classes exist in hierarchies wherein the oppressor class owes its position to the ownership and control of means of production; and the oppressed class to the non-ownership and lack of control. This ownership and control or otherwise determines the respective life chances of individuals making up the different classes. Hence the chance for accumulating wealth, for enjoying more political power, social prestige and other things of this nature is assumed to be determined by the control and ownership; while living in "misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation" (in Bendix R and Lipset S.M 1974, p 10) and the like is taken to be determined by the lack of control and non-ownership.

The Marxian model does not recognise the existence of any other form of social stratification. The differential social status found in society is considered as a characteristic of class stratification; and not as an independent variable capable of giving rise to a form of social stratification and, thereby, of determining people's life chances.

Recorded history, however, shows that there have been cases of people in the same class position, but receiving different incomes. Hall, for example, when writing on colonial Zambia, noted that "By 1940, lorries were being driven on one mine by Africans, on another by Europeans. The difference was that in one case the pay was £30" (Hall R, 1976, p 78). It is because of such facts that the existence of another form of social stratification becomes credible, and the Marxian model appears inappropriate for analysing social stratification in societies like colonial Zambia.

Looking at the Veblenian model, we find that it considers only a class stratification comprising the working class and the leisure class. It does not acknowledge the existence of status stratification. Besides, it holds that the basis of social honour is wealth and that it sis this connection

that is the main incentive to the accumulation of wealth in society. Veblen himself wrote that "The possession of wealth confers honor; it is an invidious distinction. Nothing equally cogent can be said for the consumption of goods, nor for any other conceivable incentive to acquisition, and especially not for any incentive to the accumulation of wealth" (Veblen T, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974, p 37). This means that the model does not permit testing our hypothesis that a concentration of political power in a group of people produces a status stratification. So the flexibility of the Weberian model, in that it accepts that status honor can be attached to any quality shared by a plurality (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974a, p 24); adds to the relative advantage of using the Weberian in the present study.

In the case of the functional model of Davis and Moore, we find that it treats social honour merely as one of the rewards for individuals occupying occupational positions in society. It shows that because some occupational positions require special talent or training and others are functionally more important, some kinds of differential rewards are used

for inducing individuals to fill the positions and actually perform the duties required of them once in the positions. Main kinds of the rewards are assumed to be three: things that contribute to sustenance and comfort; things that contribute to humour and diversion; and things that contribute to self respect and ego expansion. The kinds are differentially 'built into' the positions, rendering social inequality 'an unconsciously evolved device by which societies insure that the most important positions are consciously filled by the most qualified persons!! As to what determines the hierarchy of the postions, the model shows that "In general those positions convey the best reqard, and hence have the highest rank which a) have the greatest importance for the society and b) require the greatest training or talent" (Davis K and Moore W.E, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974, p 48). As is the case with the Marxian, it is because this model does not recognise the existence of status stratification in its own right that we choose to use the Weberian model.

B. MAJOR AIMS OF THE STUDY

We said that what people are cooperating about

distinguishes basic forms of social stratification. This does not mean that there are numerous basic forms. As far as we are aware basic forms are only two: class stratification and status stratification. All other forms are basically either one of these. A caste stratification, for example, is basically a status stratification; for a caste is a closed status group, in the sense that nobody can enter or leave the group, other than by birth or death, respectively. A caste stratification is a status stratification with characteristics in the extreme (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974b, p 32). The monopolisation of brides and bridegrooms, of employment opportunities, and for other ideal and material opportunites are all in the extreme. Social distance too is in the extreme. There it is not only guaranteed by conventions and laws, but also by religious rituals. Any physical contact between members of different castes is considered to be polluting and to be something worth expiating by a religious ritual. (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974a, p 25).

Writing on social stratification in south Central Africa, that is in colonial Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia, J.C. Mitchell showed that military actions and treaties

between European whites and indigenous blacks established a racial stratification as a form of social stratification (Mitchell J.C, in Tuden A and Plotnicov L (eds), 1970, pp 311 and 314). It is therefore worth asking whether a racial stratification is another basic form. De people cooperate about race in the way that they cooperate about economic gain and about social honour?

Well, apparently nobody knows what race is. Here is an extract from a book by B.J. Marais: "Most people think that scientists are bound to know what they mean by the word race', and they leave the matter at that. After all superficially one would think that there are enough external differences in colour, hair, form of the skull, etc, to denote different races. But the truth of the matter is that science itself does not know what it means by the term 'race'. There is a veritable confusion of tongues among scientists as to the full meaning of this term. In this connection Hogben remarks: 'Geneticists believe that anthropologists have decided what race is. Ethnologists assume that their classifications embody principles which genetic science has proved correct. Politicians believe that their prejudices have the sanction of genetic laws and that the findings of physical anthropology

sustain them'. Actually the term race has become, for scientists, more and more a word without any definite content" (Marais B.J., 1952, pp 28 and 29). It is therefore doubtful that people cooperate about race.

It is hence equally doubtful that the military actions and treaties gave rise to a racial stratification in colonial Zambia. What might have happened is that the actions gave rise to a status stratification, as was the case in Rwanda. Ancestors of the Tutsi stratum in Rwanda were invaders. They invaded the Hutu and dominated them in social esteem. (Maquet J, in Tuden A and Plotnicov L (eds), 1970, pp 106 and 107).

If we arbitrarily define race as a range of skin colours, that whitish, yellowish, brownish and blackish skin colours are races; it still remains doubtful that the actions and treaties made people cooperate about race. What is credible is that the actions and treaties gave whites a concentration of political power which, in turn, gave them higher social respect, thus producing a status stratification in the society, and that the coexistence of the diffrential political power with the skin colours made the colours status symbols.

One of the major aims of the present study, therefore, is to refute/accept race as a base for social stratification in colonial Zambia.

Mitchell, in the same article, argues that the racial groups were also 'status groups in the Weberian sense, since, apart from the physical features that identified them, they were seen to enjoy different levels of consumption, to follow distinct styles of life, and to confine social intercourse to themselves'; that the 'status groups at the same time were largely coincident with social classes in that they showed common interest in the command over the possession of goods and the opportunities for income.... or alternatively in the lack of them; and that the groups 'were also political interest groups or parties in Weber's sense'.

This coexistence of race, status and class raises the question of relative dominance. When there is such a coexistence, which form of social stratification determines most material benefits and personal life experience of groups of people in society, is it the 'racial', the class, or the status? We explore this problem in the present study.

Connected with this, is the problem of causal relations among forms of social stratification. It is

possible that these do not emerge at exactly the same time. One form is likely to emerge first, followed by another. In that case, are the different forms causally related? This too, is explored in the present study.

In sum, the study has three major aims:

1. To refute/accept race as a base for social stratification in colonial Zambia.
2. To identify the main form of social stratification in colonial Zambia.
3. To identify causal relations among 'racial' class and status forms of social stratification in the society.

C. METHOD OF THE STUDY

When discussing the Weberian model of social stratification we saw that struggles for economic opportunities are not always class struggles, sometimes they are status struggles, taking place between status groups in disagreement over status monopolisation; and that, similarly, political struggles are not always class struggles. So, in view of the aims of the present study, it is appropriate to use a conflict approach focussing on struggles that took place during the colonial era (1890-1964).

History books, particularly those by Gann and Rotberg, help us identify the struggles. Once identified, relevent documents, including reports of various commissions of inquiry which furnished the colonial government with facts, are sought and examined in the light of the aims of the study.

Refutation/acceptance of race as a base for social stratification depends on whether evidence about the conflicts indicates that cooperation about race was an issue at stake. The main form of social stratification is indicated by what people mostly struggles about. Specifically, the decision rules are that if people mostly struggled about market opportunites, the main form was class stratification; if about social respect, the main form was status stratification; if about race, the ~~amin~~ main form was racial stratification. Causal relations between forms of social stratification are identified by examining the rise of conflict groups, that is political parties and trade unions.

The government reports kept in the Zambia National Archives in Lusaka are valuable sources of data. Others include the micro-filmed early newspapers available in the special collection section of the University of Zambia Library. A bibliography of sources specifically mentioned in the study is attached.

D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

We are aware that many studies have been done on colonial Zambia, most of which have been published under the former Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, what is now known as the University of Zambia Institute for African Studies. These have focussed on such ~~theses~~ themes as the social and economic life of African urban workers, on the trade union and political activities among the workers, on the problem of African advancement in industry, on the government attempts to control and regulate African urbanisation, on the question of whether African urban workers became proletarians, and on many other issues. But so far there has been little attention given to social stratification as a topic in its own right.

The significance of the present study, therefore, mainly lies in clarifying the nature of the social stratification that existed in colonial Zambia and in providing, thereby, comparative material for students of social stratification.

E. PLAN OF THE STUDY

The study opens with a chapter giving a brief

background of the nature of social stratification in the days just before the creation of colonial Zambia. This is then followed by discussions of how this nature was transformed at the entry of the BSA Company rule, the significance of struggles over economic opportunities and of the advent of the Federation, and the role of skin colour in the colonial social stratification. The last chapter summarises the findings and considers their theoretical implications.

Chapter 2

PRE-COLONIAL SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

In the second half of the 19th century, before the establishment of the British colonial rule through the BSA Company, the present territory of Zambia comprised many politically autonomous groupings or societies. There was the Barotse (Lozi) society in the south-west, the Ngoni in the south-east, the Bemba in the north-east, and the Ndembu confederacy in the north-west. There was also a stateless society of the Tonga around the present Mazabuka township. And many more existed.

A. THE LOZI SOCIETY

Social stratification in the Lozi society was based on social esteem. High esteem went to members of the royal extended family. These were the Linabi (Luyi-royals) or Bana Bamulena (Kololo-children of the King). Husbands of princess (boishee) and commoner relatives of the royal family (likwanabi) were also accorded reflected respect. Low esteem went to Lozi freemen and their bondsmen. The latter were assimilated into kinship relations and were mostly referred to by

their respective masters as 'my children'.

In terms of material standards of living, however, master and bondsman were about the same and this applied to the King. Gluckman noted that "Not even the King could use the wealth that came from his own land and waters, from tribute, and later from trading-caravans, to improve his own standard markedly above that of his subjects. The people emphasize most in chiefs the quality of generosity, and their tales and anecdotes of the past, and even of today, constantly recount the distribution of goods and food by the King among his people. The subject peoples were drawn into this distribution. After European trade-goods entered the country this continued; and missionaries have described how King Lewanika, after the arrival of a trading-caravan, shared out the cloth among all the people present until every man flounted a half-yard of cloth" (Gluckman M, in Colson E and Gluckman M (eds), 1968, p 14). But although wealth may hence be said not to have been unevenly distributed by the differential social esteeem, personal life experiences nevertheless were; for the entire society was permeated with the idea of bulena (Kingship, Chieftainship, rank, overlordship) and of the proper and appropriate behaviour between persons

of different ranks. In fact likute (politeness, respect, appropriateness, good taste) was constantly emphasized in Lozi converation, public address, and writings. (Gluckman M, in Colson E and Gluckman M (eds), 1968, p 42).

The society had no class stratification. This is because, inspite of the presence of some economic specialisation[1] among tribes, exchange was based on tribute and gifts. The King organised the internal economy by collecting the tribute and by redistributing it as gifts. (Gann L.H, 1968, p 5). An internal market that could give rise to a class stratification did not exist.

Not even a labour market existed. All Lozi land and its resources belonged to the entire nation through the King. No piece of land or amount of natural resources belonged to a group of people. Every adult person had right to use the resources and even the King could bot withdraw that right. When the King wanted a particular piece of land for some purpose, the person currently using the peice had to be given an alternative before the King could make use of it. Land ownership was communal and the labour power

needed to work it was not sold. (Gluckman M, in Colson E and Gluckman M (eds), 1968).

8. NGONI SOCIETY

Like the Lozi society, that of the Ngoni was also stratified on the basis of social esteem and, again, the strata were two: the ruling group and the subject group. In this case war captives were assimilated into the subject group.

Political struggles in the Ngoni society were essentially not struggles to control wealth but to enjoy the support of followers and the main source of followers was raiding (Barnes J.A, 1954, p 30). In general all captives belonged to the Paramount Chief who could allocate them as he wished, usually to the warriors who had captured them. A specific privilege was accorded to regional governors in that these kept their own captives. The followers were valued as source of high esteem.

Just before the Ngoni were defeated by black troops of the British Central Africa Protectorate in 1898, there were 4 royal villages; one belonged to a brother of Mpezeni (the Paramount Chief); the other three were controlled by groups of Mpezeni's queens and

their sons. Associated with each of these, were regional governors responsible for the well-being of a group of lesser villages; Each regional governor resided in a village of his own and each of the lesser or commoner villages was directly under a village headman.

Each chief, regional governor and headman was assisted by lieutenants, ranked in order of the creation of their posts by their principal. Mpezeni himself had two kind of lieutenants; those charged with specific functions of the state as a whole and those known as lieutenants of such-and-such a royal village, appointed by Mpezeni to look after the queens of the village and to be responsible for the internal ordering of the village. Also each chief, regional governor and headman had a deputy. This was a patrilineal Kinsman of the same generation selected by the principal himself. His duties were to act for the principal and to serve as intermediary between the principal and his lieutenants.

All these were members of the ruling group and enjoyed greater social esteem than the commoners or subject group.

C. BEMBA SOCIETY

The Bemba society was also stratified on the basis of social esteem. The main strata were the ruling group at the top, the subject group at the middle, and the slave group at the bottom. Unlike the Ngoni, the Bemba did not incorporate war captives into their tribe, but sold them to Arab slave traders for muskets (Gann L.H, 1968, p 7).

Members of the ruling group were the royal extended family, hereditary ritual officers (bakabilo), advisers (bafilolo), and village headmen. Territorial chiefs and the Paramount Chief were all part of the royal family. (Richards A.J, in Fortes M and Evans-Pritchard E.E (eds), 1940).

The Bemba society, too, had communal landownership. All land was communal property and each freeman[2] had right of use. Tribute and gifts again militated against the rise of a class stratification within the society. Needy areas were provided for by the Chief or village headman and this explains why the headman earned the reputation for 'feeding his people' and the chief, for generosity (Richards A.J, in Fortes M and Evans-pritchard E.E (eds), 1940. pp 104 and 105).

D. NDEMBU SOCIETY

The Ndembu society, just before the coming of the BSA Company, was politically fragmented and could be described as a confederacy of chiefs. The paramountancy of Chief Kanongesha was mostly in name. Each chief or village headmen was in charge of an autonomous community. (Turner V.W, 1972, p 6).

The fragmentation reached its heights daring the slave-trading and slave-raiding in the second half of the nineteenth century. At that time the Ovimbundu slave -traders made trade pacts with Kanongesha and important senior headmen such as Ikelenge in north-west Mwinilunga, and these leaders, with the aid of their warriors, raided their own tribesmen and sold them into slavery in return for guns and cloth.

This gave rise to two kinds of slavery in the entire society: village slavery and commercial slavery. Turner observed that "Village slaves were paid as fines to terminate blood feuds, to settle debts, to compensate for homicide, to pay a chief or senior headman whose poison-oracle had cleared a person accused of sorcery, and to discharge fines for a number of other offences" (Turner V.W, 1972, p 189). The village slaves were attached to households and were made to assist in the household chores.

Commercial slaves were captured in raids and were destined for sale.

A striking feature of the Ndembu society was 'elaborate conventions enjoining formal respect in the matter of greeting and in behaviour at a chief's court'. Greetings between village headmen expressed their relative status in terms of criteria based on traditional history, rather than in terms of their current circumstances.

We thus see that the Ndembu society was status conscious and had three main status strata: that of the ruling group at the top, that of freemen in the middle, and that of slaves at the bottom.

More, too, tribute and gifts were not conducive to the rise of a class stratification. A certain amount of specialisation existed in that women dominated agricultural production and men hunting. But the hunters and cultivators exchanged their produce through gifts. A hunter, for example, reserved certain portions of the game as tribute for his senior headman or chief; a back leg was given to his brother or mother's brother or several brothers; a front leg was divided among his sisters; the saddle was given to his wives; the

breast to his father; and any small pieces that remained went to boys too old to live in their parents' huts. In a large village containing many matrilineages, the hunter usually allocated to the senior man of each lineage for subdivision among married men in the lineage. (Turner V.W, 1972, p 31).

E. TONGA SOCIETY

As regards the Tonga society, E. Colson observed that "On the whole the Tonga might be defined as culturally a have-not group. They have never had an organised state. They were unwarlike and had neither regimental organisations nor armies. They were and are equally lacking in an age-grade set-up, secret societies, and social stratification of all kinds" (Colson E, 1970, p 84). The absence of social stratification and of a political organisation rendered the society unique in pre-colonial Zambia.

The Tonga with whom we are concerned were those not part of the Lozi kingdom, the Tonga of Mazabuka District. These were constantly raided in the 19th century by the Kololo, the Lozi, and the Ndebele. But the raids were usually for slaves and cattle and never for gaining land or for establishing political domination. (Colson E, in Colson E and Gluckman M (eds), 1968, p100).

It was the 'southern Tonga' who were incorporated into the Lozi Kingdom.

Just before the coming of the BSA Company the Tonga of Mazabuka lived in small villages, each headed by a person whose status was not markedly above his followers. The loyalties of the followers to the village headman were tenuous, based perhaps on gratitude for favours received, or on kinship, or on ties which bound a slave to his master. A man was free in the society to settle where he would, with his matrilineal kin, with his father's matrilineal group, with his wife's relatives, with a non-related fellow clansman, with a stranger, or by himself. The only exception was a slave. If his master was a village headman, the slave was forced to stay in the headman's village.

Apart from the tenuous royalties, the status of the village headman was not markedly above his followers because the Tonga believed that each matrilineal group was an undifferentiated whole, that all of its members wherever they lived and however related to each other had the same status in the group.

The term slave is perhaps a misnomer in the case of the Tonga society. This was because no person

was regarded as property. Each person was well intergrated into a matrilineal group and even in terms of work there was no category of people conspicously set apart as inferior beings. When a person was captured or bought he was soon designated a kinship term and henceforth regarded as a kin. He could even become a village headman within the kin group.

It follows that although we could analytically say that there were slaves, freemen, and village headmen in the Tonga society, these categories did not consitite classes or status groups. The society was without class and status stratifications. It was a society of equals.

As to how this egalitarian and stateless society managed to maintain social order, Colson observed and recorded the following: "Tonga society, despite its lack of political organization and political unity, is a well-intergrated entity, knit together by the spread of kinship ties within any one locality. It obtains its intergration and its power to control its members and the different groups in which they are aligned, by the intergration of each individual into a number of different systems of relationships which overlap. When a man seeks to act in terms of his

obligation to one set of relationships, he is faced by the counterclaims upon him of other groups with which he must also interact. This entanglement of claims leads to attempts to seek an equitable settlement in the interests of public peace which alone enables the groups to perform their obligations one to another and a Tonga to live as a full member of his society" (Colson E, 1970, p 120). However, when an offence was committed, an offended person communicated to members of his kin group and these acted together in Vengeance.

F. THE TERRITORY AS A WHOLE

The foregoing survey shows that the present territory of Zambia had no intra-society class statifications. Communal ownership of natural resources, in the sense that each adult member of society had right of use, and the organisation of internal exchange on the basis of tribute and gifts militated against the rise of a class stratification. What the territory had, in most cases, were status stratifications in which political power was honorific. The Ngoni even used war captives as followers because of this.

In many societies in the territory slave labour was used. But this does not mean that a class stratification

existed, for Weber explained that "Those men whose fate is not determined by the chance of using goods or services for themselves on the market, e.g. slaves, are not, however, a 'class' in the technical sense of the term. They are, rather, a 'status group'" (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974a, p 22).

NOTES

1. The specialisation is reflected in a report of the BSA Company as follows: "Tribute is paid annually to the King; this takes the form of the particular product with the manufacture of which each tribe has become associated; thus the Matotela are iron workers and pay their tribute in hoes, spear-heads, and axes; the Monkoya and Masubáa are canoe-makers and ~~the~~ net-makers; from the Mambunda come mats, wooden utensils, and trade goods purchased from Portuguese traders with rubber; the Batoka, Balovale, and Baishi pay chiefly in skins of wild animals" (The BSA Company Reports on the Administration of Rhodesia: 1898 - 1900, p 94)

2. Since in the Weberian sense slaves constitute a status group, the slaves in the Bemba society did not form a 'class' of non-owners of the means of production.

CHAPTER 3

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION DURING THE BSA COMPANY RULE

In the last chapter we found that the present territory of Zambia had status stratifications only, and that people used to give high respect to holders of political power. As to whether the latter condition remained significant during the BSA Company rule, will be analysed in the present chapter. This analysis will include the role of the company bureaucracy in the rise of the colonial status stratification and a stratificatary effect of a correlation between political power and degree of lightness of skin colour.

Another issue to be examined is the rise and significance of a class stratification during the company rule.

A. STRUGGLE FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE PRESENCE

Cicil Rhodes, the founder of the company, was primarily interested in spreading British political power over much of Africa so as to avoid a civil war. "My cherished idea",he said, "is a solution to the social problem, i.e in order to save 40,000,000 inhabitants of

the United Kingdom from bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must provide new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The empire.... is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war you must become imperialists" (in Heisler H, 1974, p 2). In this respect, the company was conceived as his major tool and was founded by petitioning for a royal charter in Britain.

Specifically, the objectives of the company were described in letters addressed to the British Government on 30th April, 1889 as follows:

"(i) To extend northwards the railway and telegraph system in the direction of the Zambezi.

(ii) To encourage emigration and colonisation.

(iii) To promote trade and commerce.

(iv) To develop and work mineral and other concessions under the management of one powerful organisation, thereby obviating conflicts and complications between the various interests that have been acquired within those regions, and securing

> to the native Chiefs and their rights reserved to them under the several concessions" (BSA Company reports on the Administration of Rhodesia 1889-1892, p 2).

These were accepted by the British Government and on 29th October the same year a charter was granted.

To implement the objectices, a start in what later became Northern Rhodesia was made in 1890 when Frank Lochner was sent to make a treaty with King Lewanika, and Alfred Sharpe and Joseph Thompson were sent into the territory east of the Kafue to make treaties with tribal chiefs. Sharpe first called on Mpezeni whom he failed to impress with the protection of the British Government. In disappointment, he crossed the Luangwa and took it upon himself to declare the whole of the country to the west to be 'under British protection'. Then he went north-west making treaties. Unlike Mpezeni, Chief Nsama accepted the protection and gave mineral rights to the BSA Company. An analogous agreement was reached with Chief Kazembe. (Hall R, 1976, p 29).

Thompson took a different route. He passed through the Lala country and reached that of the Lamba. In all he made more than a dozen treaties.

With regard to social stratification, it is worth noting that nearly all of the treaties were made with militarily weak chiefs who were constantly raided by powerful Kingdoms. An offer of protection by a powerful ruler to them, therefore, was acceptable. Mpezeni on the contrary, was strong and it was for this reason that he refused to accept a menial position.

As for Kazembe, who was also strong, the position was that he did not clearly understand the terms of the treaty that he signed; for later he steadily opposed the company's actual spread of political power over him and his people. Here is a report by M. Gelfand; "There still remained Kazembe, another powerful chief, who opposed the advent of the white man. It was anticipated that sooner or later settlement would have to be made with this chief, who lived on the south-east side of Lake Mweru. Several times he had attacked tribes living near Kalungwesi and refused to allow Dr. Blair Watson into his domain to discuss the question of submission to the administration. It was known, too, that he harboured Arabs in his territory..... Accordingly, in October 1899, a contingent of European officers and Sikhs, with a seven-pounder gun, only to find the village deserted

and the Arabs fled. The whole affair was over and no further trouble occurred in the Mweru district" (in Hall R, 1976, pp 29 and 30). Kazembe and his subjects had fled into the neighbouring Belgian Territory. He returned in December - to surrender and make his peace with the company officials.

If Kazembe accepted a lowly position for himself and his subjects in this way, other strong chiefs and their subjects in the area visited by Sharpe and Thompson succumbed in the same way. In February, 1889, 'native troops of the British Central Africa Protectorate' (what later became Nyasaland) faced Mpezeni. He was defeated and a large number of his Kingdom's cattle were captured. Singu, his son, was tried by court - matial and shot dead.

Meanwhile, the power and authority of the Paramount Chief of the Bemba, Chitimukulu, were absorbed by Chief Mwamba. This was done by accumulating a large number of slaves whom Mwamba exchanged for guns and gun-powder in 'Unyamwezi Country'. The actual suzeraintly passed into his hands when Chitimukulu died. Henceforth Mwamba felt himself supreme, accountable to nobody.

Mwamba had heard of the might of the BSA Company. So his great desire was to avoid coming into conflict with it. But this was not possible for long and a report on what happened reads that "having allied himself very closely with the Arab slaves, he was induced at

their instigation to attack the village of Chuali a friendly Chief in the Chambezi District whom Mr. Young, an Official of the Company's Administration happened to be visiting at the time (septembr, 1879). Mr. Young kept the raiders in check for five days until reinforcements arrived from the Headquarters of the District and the Awemba and Coast-men were utterly rooted. Arab influence was utterly destroyed, and the Awemba taught to respect European authority" (BSA Company Reports on the Administration of Rhodesia 1898-1900, pp 66 and 67).

To mark the respect for 'European authority', the chiefs in the area began giving tribute to the BSA Company. This is confirmed by a report of the company in the following words:: "The revenue for the year ending 31st March, 1898, amounted to £2,065, of which £388 11s 6d was derived from licences and stamps, and the remainder from export duties on ivory and the sale of the ground tusks which are paid by native chiefs in recognition of the sovereignty of the Chartered Company. The revenue from the same sources for the half year ending 30th September, 1898, is estimated at £1,200" (BSA Company Reports on the Administration of Rhodesia 1887-1888 p 14). In fact, the tribute continued to dominate the company's revenue for some time.

TABLE 3-1: North -Eastern Rhodesia Summary of Revenue

	Year ending 31st March 1899	% of total	year ending 31st March 1900	% of total
1. Postal	£565 12 6	25	301 17 0	8
2. Licences	70 8 8	3	572 6 9	15
3. Duty on Ivory	137 19 9	6	465 13 9	12
4. Sale of Ground Tusk and Ivory received as tribute from native Chiefs	963 11 0	42	1,094 13 1	29
5. Sale of Land			185 0 0	5
6. Miscellaneous8	536 7 0	24	1,211 13 8	31
	£2,275 18 3	100	3,831 4 3	100

SOURCE: The BSA Company, reports on the Administration of Rhodesia, 1898-1900, p 78. The percentage columns have been added into facilitate comparison.

We therefore see that the assumption of political power over the blacks through the treaties and the military conquests, made the company administration some kind of supreme ruler to whom respect had to be expressed by the tribute. White administrators thus acquired high social status.

Before the establishment of the company administration, however, white missionaries had considerable power over local political affairs. They used it against slave raids and for keeping peace between contending chiefs and factions on many occassions. The Mambwe and Lungu people in particular are reported to owe their existence to the missionaries for protection against Arab and Bemba raids. (BSA Company reports on the Administration of Rhodesia 1898-1900, p 74). From the beginning the tribes accepted missionaries as their protectors. At the establishment of Fwambo mission station in 1887 for example, local Mambwe and Lungu welcomed the missionaries on the condition that they would not listen to sermons or work for the mission until a stockade was built around the station and the mission had demostrated its ability to protect them from the Bemba and Arab raids. Indeed, as long as these conditions were not met the station suffered a scarcity of labour and the mission school and church remained empty. But when the conditions were met, a drastic change took place. (Meebelo H.S, 1971, p 27).

At the establishment of the company administration, therefore, both the missionaries and the company administrators had acquired high social status. Hence, with their distinct culture (Mitchell J.C, in Tuden A and Plotnicov L (eds), 1970, p 314) and their group consciousness, they

were a status group. Numerically the missionaries and administrators were only about 50 in the area east of the Kafue (what became North-Eastern Rhodesia): "According to a census taken on 30th September, 1899, the number of Europeans residing and travelling in North-Eastern Rhodesia at that date was 129 persons, comprising Agents of the British South African Company'S Administration 19; Agents of the African Transcontinental Telegraph Company 11, London Missionary Society 10, French Catholic Mission 16, Dutch Reformed Church Mission 2, Traders and Agents of Commercial Companies 31, Garenganze Mission 3, Roving Traders 28, and Travellers ." (BSA Company Reports on the Administation of Rhodesia 1898-1900, p 73).

Although the administrative presence of the B.S.A Company was well established by 1898 in the area that Sharpe and Thompson visited, it was on 29th January, 1900 that the British Government acknowledged its administrative powers. This was done by passing the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council 1900, Clause 7 of which stated that "The Company shall have and may exercise the general administration of affairs within the limits of this Order, in accordance with the terms of the Charter and the

provisions of this Order" (Appendix to BSA Company Reports on the Administration of Rhodesia 1898-1900, p 84). The name North-Eastern Rhodesia was also officially approved for the area by the order.

In the case of the area that Lochner visited, the company's administrative powers were regularised by passing the Barotseland - North- Western Rhodesia Order in Council 1899. Clause 6 of the order stated that "The High Commissioner may appoint an Administrator for Barotziland - North Western Rhodesia, and so many judges Magistrates, or other officers as he may from time to time think necessary for the administration of the affairs of Barotziland - North-Western Rhodesia, and may define from time to time the districts within which officers shall respectively discharge their functions" (Appendix to BSA Company Reports on the Administration of Rhodesia 1898-1900, Op 98)

Before this, Lewanika, King of the Lozi, was dethroned by Tatila Akufuna and had fled for refuge in Bechuanaland where King Khama, his friend, ruled. He went back to face Akufuna in 1885. Akufuna was defeated and Lewanika once more became King. But he remained uncertain about

the security of the Kingship and so sought the reputed protection of the British Governmnt. In January 1889, he asked F.Coillard, a missionary who had already settled in his Kingdom, to solicit the protection through Sir Sidney Shippard, the then Administrator of Bechuanaland. The letter was written on 8th January the same year and it began thus: "I am urgently requested by Lewanika, the king of the Barotse, to write to Your Excellency, and through you to Her Majesty the Queen's Government. The King Lewanika is anxious to solicit that the Protection of the British Government should soon be extended to him and his people. For reasons of prudence suggested by our local circumstances, I thought it advisable not to yield too easily to his desire, in order as well to test his sincerity as to make sure of the disposition of his headmen. But the King's persistence removed all motives for further delay. I therefore lay before you his urgent request" (in Mainga M, 1973, p 173)

It follows that when Lochner visited him, Lewanika was willing to grant mineral and trading rights for an assurance of the British protection; and on 27th June, 1890 a treaty was signed to that effect. At that time Lewanika also ratified the purchase by the BSA Company of the concession that Lewanika had granted to Harry Ware.

Apart from Coillard's position, however, another fact demonstrating the high social status which white missionaries had acquired in the Lozi society concerns the rise of the Ethopian Church of Barotseland under the leadership of Willie J. Mokalapa. Mokalapa was once Coillard's assistant within the Paris Missionary Society. He broke away together with other blacks because white missionaries were treating them as social inferiors. This was the main discontent that gave rise to the Ethiopian Church and dominated its early surmon's so much that Coryndon, the Administrator for North-Western Rhodesia, officially noted that "among the more pernicious doctrines being spread ... (were) the equality of the white and black races" (in Rotberg R.J, 1972 p 59).

But if white missionaries and white administrators in both the North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia acquired high social status, was this the case with other whites?

B. TAX COLLECTION & LAW ENFORCEMENT

As a commercial venture, the BSA Company was expected to show profits for its shareholders. So, to argument its current revenue, it began collecting taxes from blacks in North-Eastern Rhodesia in 1900 and in North-Western Rhodesia in 1904. In the latter it was first

collected in the Victoria Falls and Tonga country, spreading to the 'Hook of the Kafue', and finally to the regions in the north. By 1913 even the Lunda in the extreme north were taxed. (Gann L.H, 1968, pp 76 -91).

The tax was mainly monetary and was levied on each adult male and on each wife except the first. In North-Western Rhodesia it ranged between 5s and 10s depending on the district. This existed up to 1914 when it was unified at 10s for the whole of Northern Rhodesia (in 1911 North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia were amalgamated to form Northern Rhodesia). Initially, tax in kind was acceptable, but as from 1905 it was only cash tax that was collected. Between 1910 and 1911 this earned the company an income of £57,000 out of a total of £95,000 for the entire country.

The only indigenous ruler with a stake in the tax was Lewanika. This was because of the treaties signed between him and the company. "At the insistence of the Colonial Office (the Lozi administration) received 10 per cent of the tax collected in the area which the Barotse King... claimed to be under his suzerainty" (Gann L.H, 1968, p 81). All other chiefs received no share.

On tax collection, I Henderson's report says that with few company officials available, the tax was also collected by white employers and the police. (Henderson I, 1972). So in this respect, the company officials, the employers, and the police were the same, and these were not more than 850 in the entire country in 1904 (Kay G, 1971, p 26).

The different categories of whites were also indistinguishable with regard to maintenance of 'law and order'. In the same report Henderson points out that 'Officials, labour recruiters, police and settlers all helped impose law and order, mostly in circumstances which were illegal under both English and African customary law'....

The position for other whites in the country, therefore, was the same as that for missionaries and administrators. All whites were of high status and belonged to the same status group.

C. STATUS GROUPS, RACE, AND CLASSES

Inspite of this, there were cleavages among whites. In the first place there were 'settlers' (Kay G, p 30) and non-settlers (Kay G, 1971, p 30) and non-settlers, distignuishable by their basic interests. Most settlers

were primarily interested in bettering themselves financially. They entered the territory mainly for this reason. On the contrary, most 'non-settlers' the missionaries and B.S.A Company officials, were primarily interested in carrying out their assigned tasks. The missionaries were chiefly assigned the task of spreading christianity, while the company officials were assigned duties safe-guarding the interests of the company.

Then there were divisions among settlers, according to economic means for bettering themselves. There were miners, farmers, railway workers, and traders. These divisions constituted classes in that they were distinct market positions. Their relevance to social stratification will now be examined.

A number of copper discoveries were made in the 'Hook of the Kafue' between 1895 and 1899. These included the following ancient mines of the indigenous people:

Silver King	Blue Jacket	Wonder Rocks	Crystal Jacket
Maurice Gifford	Sugar Loaf	True Blue	North Star
Sable Antelop	Lou-Lou	Bee Hive	Leashimbeaka

In 1899 an additional disused copper mine was discovered at Kansashi by means of information from local Blacks.

(BSA Company Information as to Mining in Rhodesia 1902, pp 267 and 403). Other discoveries were copper at Nkana, Bwana Mkumbwa, and Roan; lead, zinc and silver at Broken Hill; and gold at Sasare in the east of Luangwa river. Most of the copper deposits were oxides and the copper content ranged between 3 to 5 pef cent. Similar deposits discovered in the Congo had on average 15 per cent copper. As a result most and larger copper mining operations took place there. Only few and small-scale operations took place, in Northern Rhodesia. These were in the 'Hook of the Kafue' where copper deposits were exceptionally rich, but fraught with water seepage and foul air problems for mining; and at Kansashi and Bwana Mkubwa. The lead, zinc and silver mine at Kabwe and the Sasare gold mine also went into small-scale production. (Kay G, 1971, p 30).

TABLE 3-2: Samples of Copper Ore in the 'Hook of the Kafue'

		copper	silver	Gold
No.1 Maurice Gifford	30 feet	42.00%	5 16 0	Traces
" 2 " "	30 "	41.75%	5 16 0	"
" 3 Sable Antelop (No. 1)	34 "	29.10%	0 17 0	"
" 4 " (No 2)	30 "	21.95%	0 13 0	"
" 5 Silver King (No.1)	100 "	57.10%	29 0 0	"
" 6 " " (no.2)	75 "	38.75%	2 9 0	"

source: The BSA Company, Information as to Mining in Rhodesia, supplied to the BSA Company 1902, p 270

In the mining centres of this time there was no white labourer. The closest to a labourer was a foreman in charge of supervising large numbers of Blacks. Such men often used corporal punishment in their supervision and thereby made mining unpopular among blacks. For their cash tax, many blacks resorted to selling grain. (Gann L.H., 1968, pp122 and 124).

Just as there was no white labourer, there was no black man occupying a position identical to that of a white man. All blacks served under white supervision, and this included the so-called 'boss boys'. The latter were in every case blacks with delegated authority over gangs of black labourers. There was no white 'boss boy'. The menial connotation of the term was exclusively designed for black adult supervisors.

This connotation signifies the dominance of status consciousness in the mining centres. There, in fact, class consciousness was almost absent. "There were at least a few dozen Europeans, some of them in charge of 'outstations', working under the manager's orders. These men were seperated from their African hands by a rigid bar of colour, skin and standard of living. They did not regard themselves as 'workers', but as fellow officers bound to the manager by ties of camaraderie..." (Gann L.H, 1968, p 123). Whites trade unionism was thus non-existent, and hence class

consciousness was almost absent.

If white miners were mainly a status group, so were white railway workers. It is tempting to argue that the white railway workers union that spread from Southern Rhodesia engaged in a class struggle vis-a-vis blacks, on the basis that the latter were being prevented from competing with the former in skilled jobs. Upon closer examination, however, it is clear that the skilled whites were not struggling with unskilled blacks, that is with people occupying a different class position. Rather they struggled with their fellow class members.

Specific skills in railway work were taught to blacks by white workers themselves. What used to happen is that because many white workers valued taking things easy, they coached their black helpers so that when these had mastered the techniques, the work assigned to whites would be done by the blacks. This was observed by early railway trade unionists, some of whom complained that the practice was the main cause of potential competition for skilled jobs. (Gann L.H, 1968, pp 131 and 132).

The struggle between skilled blacks and skilled whites however, was essentially about social status, in that the white group wanted to monopolise skilled posts for fear

that otherwise they would lose their distinct standard of living. Specifically, the fear was that being of low status honour, skilled blacks could not be engaged on a salary as high as that given to equally skilled whites, and consequently the employer would tend to engage more and more skilled black workers and replace whites who could not accept the wage level set for the blacks. In that way whites would lose their high standard of living and hence their social status. (Gray R, 1960, pp 98 to 102) A convenient defence for them was the monopolisation of skilled employment positions.

The fact that the cause of the struggle was that equally skilled blacks were paid lower wages than whites meant that blacks stood in a different position from that in which whites stood. But these positions were in no way class positions, for what determines a class position is not income. Income may be used as an empirical indicator of class; not a determinant in itself. What determines a class position is what is offered in the market to earn that income. Rather the positions were status. The differential remuneration was for providing whites with a distinct standard of living, suitable for their status in th society.

White railway workers too, therefore, were mainly a status group and this applied to white farmers. In the

case of the latter it is pertinent to show their stand by referring to a brief historical background of southern Africa whence most came.

In 1652 a refereshing station for Asia-bound ships of the Dutch East India Company was set up at the Cape of Good Hope. Local people there were Hottentot pastoralists and Bushmen hunters and gathers. The early whites thus came to live among these and treated them as social equals once they had accepted the white man's religion. (Van Den Berghe P.L, 1967,pp96-111).

This initial situation was changed within a generation after slaves had been introduced into the area. The first shipload of slaves arrived in 1658 in repomse to the white settlers' request for servile labour. The slave population began to grow. In 1700 there were 838 slaves as against 1308 whites; by 1805 this had grown to 29, 545 slaves as against 25,757 whites and an estimated 28,000 Hottentots. Mostly, the slaves came from eastern Africa, Madagascar and to a lesser extent from the Dutch East Indies. But long before slavery was abolished in 1834, 'color or race had supplanted religion as a criterion of membership in the dominant group'.

With the largely black slaves labouring for whites, the whites came to associate manual work with the slave menial position. They came to see such work as degrading and fit only for the slaves and their fellow black Hottentots. To use van den Berghe's words, 'The division of labour was clearly along racial lines, being regarded as degrading by whites and engaged in almost soley by slaves and Hottentots'. In or view, race thus became a symbol of status and hence a criterion of membership in the dominant group.

White craftsmen, therefore, tried to avoid labouring and began assumming the role of supervisor, supervising black labourers; and status monopolisation emerged. Hottentots, although nominally free, were consequently reduced to serfdom by losing both their pasture land and their cattle to whites. All free blacks were quickly subjected 'to vagrancy laws and master- and - servant laws which greatly restricted their mobility and reduced them to a state of symbiotic dependence on the Dutch settlers that differred little from slavery'.

Then a period of northward expansion began, spear-headed by trek-boers ('travelling peasants') in search of new pasture lands and cattle to 'trade or steal' from the Hottentots and later from the Bantu blacks further north. Originally the boers carried out genocide

against Bushmen, 'whom they hunted down in organized commandors and whom they exterminted in the present area of South Africa'. The Hottentots, who had something to offer, their cattle and their skills as headsmen, were not wiped out. Instead they became herdsmen and sevants to the boers, after they had been deprived of their pastures and cattle. (Van den Berghe P.L. 1967).

The northward expansion later brought the boers (later known as Afrikaners) into conflict with British imperialists who also wanted to control the Kimberley diamond field discovered in 1869 and the Witwatersrand gold deposits opened in 1886. The upshop was the second Anglo-Boer war of 1899 to 1902 which 'ended in British victory and led in 1910 to the formation of the Union of South Africa as a politically autonomous state under the joint control of local English and Afrikaner settlers'.

The mutual war agreement facilitated the trek-boers to finally settle in the British -controlled North-Western Rhodesia in 1910. Prior to ther arrival, the BSA Company officials had cleared away indigenous blacks so that the boers could get the land at 3d per acre (Carpernter F, in Palmer R (eds), September 1973, p 2). They were to pay no taxes as was the case with other whites. At that time

only blacks paid taxes at no less than 5s per adult male and additionally per each wife save the first.

The favoured position did not make it necessary to struggle with local blacks. But be this as it was, it is clear from historical background that the boers were status conscious and looked down upon blacks. This is further demostrated by the fact that they raised no black man to a position of 'bywoner'.

'Bywoners' were often needy relatives of theboer land-owner for whom they worked either as foremen supervising black labourers or, in cases where no blacks were employed by the land-owner, as sharecroppers. They lived in mud-huts at a conspicuously lower standard of living than that at which their masters, who owned brick houses, lived.

A point worth noting here, however, is that class membership and status group membership did not coincide. Sharecroppers, being different from slaves, were technically a labouring class. So were blacks employed on some boer farms. White sharecroppers and black labourers stood in the same class position, but belonged to different status groups.

Another point is that inspite of the labouring, the sharecropper felt himself the social equal of the rich farmers (Gann L.H, 1968, p 143). This was because white skin colour, as a status symbol, was a common factor between the sharecropper and the rich farmers. In fact it was his only basis for claiming social equality with them.

The boers, however, were not the only white farmers in Northern Rhodesia at that time. They merely constituted the dominant ethnic group. (Carpenter F, in Palmer R(ed), September 1973, p 3). Others included retired BSA Company officials and absentee-landlords like the Duke if Westminister, Lord Winterton and Lord Wolverton. (Gann L.H, 1968,pp139 and 140). The latter category stayed in England and farmed the Northern Rhodesia land through paid white managers.

With regard to traders, the dominance of status consciousness over class consciousness did not exist during the BSA Company rule. Instead, it was class consciousness that was dominant.

In North-Western Rhodesia the largest category of traders was made up of East European jews who left their

home country both for economic reasons and to escape religious persecution. By 1902 many of these had trade links with the Lozi. They used to barter cattle in exchange for cloth, move the cattle on foot all the way down to Bulawayo for sale. In this way many became wealthy enough to open up stores in North-Western Rhodesia. (Gann L.H, 1968, pp151 &to 153).

By 1907 a struggle emerged among white traders themselves. This was between 'small traders' and 'old established firms'. The real nature of the struggle was brought out in an interview between Susman, a trader in Sesheke and head of the firm of Susman Brothers, and the staff of the Livingstone Mail, a newspaper based at Livingstone. A report of the interview began as follows: "Mr, Susman asserts that the indiscriminate granting of licenses_____ all restrictions against which are to be removed after Jan. 1st 08_____ has already resulted in such keen competion, more particularly by the small traders with little capital, that the old established firms in the Barotse valley are threatened with extinction. Traders who have been there for years, have built large camps and substantial stores, carry heavy stocks of trading goods, etc, are handicapped by the expenses of maintaining their establishments. The small traders, often supported by speculative firms in

Bulawayo but having little capital of their own, live and trade mostly in their own wagons, making no attempt to build permanent stores, to live and behave as befits white men, and assume none of the responsibilites of legitimate traders" (The Livingstone Mail, November 2nd 1907). The report added that the small traders were satisfied with a lower rate of profit than would enable the established trader to live comfortably. Thus, the established traders were engaged in a class struggle and in contrast to the status struggle in which the railway union engaged, the opponents in this struggle occupied different class positions, determined by their respective capital; not incomes.

The established traders emmerged victorious out of the struggle and a class stratification of the two groups of traders emerged. The political power that they gained lay with the BSA Company administration, as is evidenced by the following observation: "The Administration encouraged the weather store keeper, as against the small hawkers, in order to protect the Africans against known bad characters, to prevent European prestige from being lowered by poor men becoming too familiar with the Africans, and to avoid cut-throat competion" (Gann L.H, 1968, p 153). Control was exercised through the issue of compulsory trade licenses and seems to have been fairly effective.

Blacks, as customers, did not come under similar control. The trader kept on persuading them to enter his shop and buy the stock. The class stratification did not extend to them.

Besides, status considerations did not attain much significance between white traders and black customers, a fact that prompted The Livingstone Mail to speak of 'caste-degrading practices' between the traders and the suctomers.

Apart from the small white traders, the established traders had to contend with Asian Traders who entered the country in 1905 through Fort Jameson. There the company administration welcomed them. It is even reported through interviews with Indians that the first contigent of the traders, the Khamisa brothers and their retainers, were escorted into the town of Fort Jameson upon their arrival by a brass band sent out by the administration. (Dotson F, and Dotson L.O. 1968 p 50).

Soon they proved to be good at trade and many white traders, large and small, became uneasy and began protesting. The administration ingnored and the struggle was futile. No class stratification affecting the Asians emerged in North-Eastern Rhodesia at that time.

Competition for customers, particularly black customers, remained free and none of the groups dominated the other.

This position applied to North-Western Rhodesia where emotional attacks continued after the creation of Northern Rhodesia (Northern Rhodesia came into being in 1911), an example of which was in The Livingstone Mail of 24th April, 1914 and began thus: "Sir, as a newcomer to Livingstone may I express my surprise at the support given to Indians here, especially to the fruit hawkers. A long stay in Southern Rhodesia made me acquinted with the fact that Indians are most insanitary, herding together in the most filthy and abominable conditions. In Bulawayo it was not unusual to find four or five sleeping on the floor in the same room and spread out on dirty sacks the unsold fruit, to be handled next morning with dirty unwashed paws, and sometimes bananas under the blankets to hasten on the ripening process. Again, these interlopers do no good to a country. They scrape all they can together spend nothing, and then clear out, paying no rent for shops, lights, etc., taking up no licences and missing the other taxes with which white traders people are saddled". But the attacks fell on deaf ears, as regards the administraion.

Although it is clear that the Asians at that time did not become part of a class stratification, it is necessary to inquire into the nature of the struggle, since that would be a background to what happened after the end of the BSA Company rule.

A cursory glance might give one the impression that skin colour gave rise to the struggle, that because they looked different, small and big white traders teamed together for a united attack on the Asians. The fact is that race was not at issue; it was skill. In the example of the attack, no argument was built on race. The argument centred on the idea that the Asians were 'interlopers(. Well, an economic interloper is a competitor, one who thrusts himself into others' economic life and upsets that life. This is what the Asians were. They were good at trade, skilled enough to attract a considerable proportion of customers.

Long before their entry into Fort Jameson, the Asians had already proved themselves to the world that they were no mean competitors. In 1873 Sir Bartle Frere pointed out that along 'some 6,000 miles of sea coast in Africa and its Islands' the Asian trader had become the most influential in commerce. Frere further doubted whether along the whole coast from Dalgoa Bay

to Kurrachee there were half a dozen ports known to commerce but at which the Asian traders were not, as a body, better able to buy or sell a cargo. He went on to explain, in the following words, their trade aptitude: "Hardly a loan can be negotiated, or mortage effected, or a Bill cashed without Indian agency; not an important cargo can be distributed, nor an export cargo collected which ... does not go through Indian hands. The European or American, the Arab or Sowaheli may trade and profit but only as an occasional link in the chain between producer and consumer, of which the Indian trader is the one invariable and most important link of all" (in Mangat J.S, 1969, p 12). As to how they managed to become that dominant, Burton explained that "they work all day, rerely enjoying the siesta unless rich enough to afford such luxury" (In Mangat J.S, 1969. p14).

By the time they entered Fort Jameson, many whites had already experienced the Asian's strong competition in trade and in many other economic branches. A spokesman of white settlers in Kenya at the begining of this century illuminated this point as follows; "In all countries, the backbone of the country is the small man, the white colonist with small means, but there is no place for him in a country when once the Asiatic is there.I have some years experience myself with the newest

of the colonies in Africa and I know from personal observation and knowledge that every two or three Indians in the country means the loss of a white colonist. There is no place for the small white man arising in the country. All the vegetable - growing for the towns is done by Indians, all the butchers with one or two exceptions are Indians, all the small country stores are kept by Indians, and most of the town shops, all the lower grade clerks are Indians, nearly all the carpentry and building is done by Indians. They thus fill all the occupations and trades which would give employment to the poor white colonists, especially those arriving new in the country. That is what Indian immigration means in the early days of a new country in Africa. IT means that if open competion is allowed, the small white colonist must go to the wall" in Dotson F and DotsonL.O 1968, p 31). Hence many whites feared Asian competition.

Having thus seen that what was at issue was not skin colour but skill, it becomes easier to see that the Asians in Northern Rhodesia were definitely a class. Their class position was determined by the quality of their skill.

Status honour too, was not at issue. It would have been so if use of income, as opposed to use of trading skills, underlay the conflict. This means that by the end of the BSA Company rule Asians were not even part of the black/white st,tus stratification.

On the whole, however, the foregoing examination shows that although classes did exist, class stratification was insignificant. What dominated the colonial society was the black/white status stratification. This being the case, an analysis of status disqualification is appropriate for a deeper understanding of the nature of the colonial social stratification.

D. STATUS DISQUALIFICATION

The 'bywoners', as we have already seen, were indigent. Because of this, they were unable to acquire farms of their own and their labouring was necessitated by the poverty. But still the fact remained: they were connected to a white status disqualification, labouring; It is for this reason that the BSA Company administration disliked them and made attempts to keep them out of the country. Had there been adequate legal grounds for doing so, the administration would have been successful. Only the inddequacy of a legal base saved the bywoners from expulsion. (Gann L.H, 1968, p 143).

The status disqualification, therefore, encouraged the administration to effect status monopolisation of non-manual jobs, where possible. There were not many whites or Asians (who had not been relegated to a

to a subordinate postion) to fill all supervisory and skilled posts throughout the country. To a considerable extent the administration had to make use of blacks. Hence it was only able to effect the monopolisation where there were enough whites. This is indicated in The Livingstone Mail of 10th September, 1910 in the following words: "In the course of an interview granted by His honour the Administrator we were informed that there was no intention of discontinuing the employment of natives as typists, telegraphists, compositors, etc., and we gathered that as the country developed they would be employed on an increasing scale. ~~Friction would be employed on an increasing scale.~~ Friction would be avoided as much as possible _____ it has been decided not to employ native bricklayers and carpenters in local building operations _____ but the principle we have advocated, Viz., the employment of native labour for manual work only, and of white wherever it can be utilised in preference to native labour finds no sympathy with the Administrator and will not be adopted." The phrase 'local building operations' referred to areas with white population concentrations.

TABLE 3-3: Europeans, Asians, and Africans in Northern Rhodesia, 1911 and 1921

Year	No.of Europeans	No. of Asians	Ration (Asians per 100 Europeans)	estimated African population
1911	1,407	39	2.6	820,000
1921	3,634	56	1.5	1,000,000

SOURCES: Dotson F. and Dotson L.O, The Indian Minority in Zambia, Rhodesia, and Malawi, (New Haven and London: Yale Univeristy Press), 1968, p 51)

Hanna A.J, The Story of the Rhodesians and Nyasaland, (London: Faber and Faber), 1960,pp 161 and 219).

Kay G, A Social Geography of Zambia, (London: University of London Press Ltd.,) 1971, p 26.

A skilled job presupooses training. So, in the light of the status monopolisation, the administation fostered intellectual poverty among blacks. The only black school controlled by the administration was the Barotse National School which was founded in 1907 and financed from the share of tax on blacks, paid to the Lozi King and his administration. Instead the company administration concentrated on developing education for whites. In the days before 1920 it even used the services of visiting

inspectors from Salisbury; and from 1920 to beyond the end of the company rule, there was an inspector of schools exclusively for Northern Rhodesia who, besides his educational work, arranged for medical and dental inspection of white school children. The latter were 337 actually at school at the end of 1924. (Pim Report 1938, pp 274, and 278). As to monetary expenditure available statistics show that in 1923 there was zero expenditure on education for blacks, but £7,835 on education for all non-blacks. (Gray R, 1960, p 133).

Blacks had to rely on mission schools, initially designed to teach how to read the bible and to train evangelists. Incidental industrial training only became available when an increasing need for school-buildings, mission houses, and churches was experienced.

Another status disqualification was violation of social distance. This is evident from the complaint about 'caste-degrading practices' of white traders. These traders were, as an economic necessity, becoming friendlier to their black customers. The expected social distance was becoming shorter and other whites saw this trend as a danger for the white man's prestige. Hence the complaints in The Livingstone Mail.

It is also evident from complaints about intermarriage. There were always very few fellow whites to marry. Males were too many for the available white women. Consequently, some white men began courting black women and even stayed together as husband and wife, but to the annoyance of other whites.

TABLE 3-4: Age and Sex Structure of the Europear Population, 1911 and 1921

Year	Males as % of total population	Women(over 20 yrs) per 100 men	Men aged 25-44 yrs as % of total population	Children under 15 yrs as % of total population
1911	74.5	17.5	49.0	15.5
1921	62.5	48.0	30.0	25.0

Source: Kay G, A Social Geopgraphy of Zambia, (London University of London Press Ltd.,) 1971, p 27.

During labour recruiting and tax collection campaigns many officials of the BSA Company engaged in brutal acts. In Gwembe District in 1907 about 100 Tribesmen took to hills to resist tax. The native Commissioner there, Patrick Macnamara, defeated them in a skirmish and subsquently forced many others of the valley Tonga through floggings and threats to go back to work in

Southern Rhodesia; in Lunda District, the senior company official there, McGregor, 'systematically flogged both tax defaulters and his own messengers and bearers, ordered his police to shoot deserters, killing at least three and probably more, he never held a trial or judicial proceedings of any kind, and is still remembered as the scourage of the district;' and in Kaunga District in 1905, because the local blacks had no money for tax, McGregor, then an Assistant Native Commissioner advanced with a party, burned down 620 huts and destroyed many gardens. Such acts were illegal under both English and African customary law'. Yet none of the company official was dismissed for the brutality. Instead, dismissal appeared appropriate in the case of a cohabitation of a company official and a black woman. Macnamara, for all the violence merely received a warning from his superior officers, but was dismissed in 1910 when it was revealed that he had been living with a black woman. (Henderson I, 1972).

Maintenance of social distance was so much valued by whites that they even gave it a physical expression in the structure of early urban settlements. In the settlements whites and blacks had separate geographical

areas set aside for residential purposes. (Kay G, 1971 p 133). The parts reserved for whites were provided with streets that formed a grid-iron pattern and had houses built in brick. Those for blacks were labour camps. They were not considered permanent and so had neither roads nor housing structures in long-lasting building materials. To these areas, blacks were expected to confine their social intercourse. The expectation took a legal form in the case of Ligingstone after the settlement had become the capital for Northern Rhodesia. The BSA Company, as the Government, issued a notice in 1914 to the effect that no black was allowed to live outside the Labour Camp in the settlement. (Heisler H, 1974, p 101).

E. SUMMARY

In sum, the rise of the status stratification that dominated the colonial society during the BSA Company rule was brought about by three categories of whites: white administrators, white missionaries and white 'settlers'. The administrators acquired high social status through the treaties and military conquests which made the company administration some kind of supreme ruler to whom respect had to be expressed; the missionaries did so through their role as protectors of

militarily weak tribes or as politcal advisors to some Local Chiefs, and the 'settlers', through participation in the company's bureaucratic role of tax collection and maintenance of law and order.

The co-existence of white skin colour with the political and bureaucratic power and hence with high social status made race a symbol of status, and in particular, explains why the 'bywoner' sharecropper despite his indigence and labouring felt himself the social equal of the rich farmers.

The class stratification that existed during the company rule affected a small section of the society, namely, the small and big white traders, and in no way did it significantly affect the life chances of the vast majority of the country's population. In this respect, it was the status stratification that dominated.

The class stratification emerged out of the free market competition which made the big traders sense their imminent extinction and so encouraged them to solicit political backing. The backing was given by the company

administration which held ultimate political power and consequently the small traders were relegated to a position of domination, giving rise to the class stratification.

The Asian traders, as a class, did not become part of this stratification. They were saved by the reluctance of the company officials to include them in a discriminatory political backing.

Finally, it may be noted that status group membership and class membership did not coincide, for although white sharecroppers and black labourers stood in the same class position, they belonged to different status groups.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION DURING COLONIAL RULE

In what follows we examine struggles for political power and economic opportunities in order to determine, inter alia, the main form of social stratification during the colonial office rule.

A. STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER

The first settler to take an active interest in politics was Leopold Moore. In 1915-16, he refused to accept the proposal of the BSA Company to amalgamate Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia for administrative economy. A year later, in 1917, he preached the end of the company rule in favour of what he called 'self-determination'. As early as that he told his supporters that it was "best to carry on a guerrilla warfare..... keeping always in view the ultimate object to be attained ——— getting rid of the Chartered Company" (in Rotberg R.I, 1972, P 95). Later he took a stronger position and declared that "The people of this country desired to build up a self-governing state..... within the empire, which..... seems to be possible only if Crown Colonial government is established first" (in Rotberg R.I, 1972, P 96).

In 1924 this demand was largely fulfilled: the company rule ended and a Legislative Council with a majority of government officials and a minority of elected settlers was set up.

The Council was headed by the Governor of Norhtern Rhodesia and its task was to enact local laws.

Another branch of the new government was the Executive Council, which comprised solely of the Governor and government officials.

The connection with the colonial office in England lay with the Governor in that he was responsible to the office.

The settlers' opposition to the amalgamation, however, changed when the British Government indicated that it was for paramountcy of 'native interests'. Lord Passfield, as colonial secretary in England, issued a Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa in 1930 to the effect that interests for black Africans should be paramount where there was any clash with the interests of whites. This was in reference to East Africa. But Moore and his colleagues in Northern Rhodesia scented danger. They strongly objected to that policy, arguing that "To subordinate the interests of civilized Britons to the development of alien races, whose capability of substantial further advancement has not been demonstrated appears to be contrary to natural law.... (Thus) faced with the declared determination of the Imperial Government to prefer the interests of barbarous races to those of their own, (we) may seek and find sympathy and aid..... from

neighbouring colonies enjoying freer institutions and more equitable opportunities" (in Rotberg R.I, 1972, P 26. Among the 'neighbouring colonies', Moore and his colleagues particularly preferred Southern Rhodesia and their new demand was now for amalgamation with that country.

But Lord Passfield made it clear that "Her Majesty's Government..... are not prepared to agree to the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia..... They consider that a substantially greater advance should be made in the development of Northern Rhodesia before any final opinion can be formed as to its future.... The European population is small and scattered... while problems of native development are in a stage which makes it inevitable that Her Majesty's Government should hesitate to let them pass even partially out of their responsibility" (in Rotberg R.I, 1972 P 20). This merely made Moore and his colleagues to make more protests.

The protests led to the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, a facilitating factor being that in 1951 the Conservative Party, then in power in England, became convinced that the "federal form of amalgamation would benefit the British balance of payments, its world-wide strategic posture, the financial interests of the City of London, the British-backed copper companies of Northern Rhodesia, and the tobacco firms in Southern Rhodesia"

(Rotberg R.I, 1972, P 237).

About the cause of the protests, an indication is provided by G. Chad Norris, an unofficial member of the Legislative Council. "The white man", he said, "simply cannot contemplate the possibility of the black man being allowed to buy a stand beside him in his township or elsewhere, to build thereon a house and to rear therein a family. The origin of this aversion it may be said is race prejudice. It may be. The outcome is nevertheless a fact" (in Davidson J.W, 1947, P 71). The aversion was, therefore, the cause of the protests.

But Norris, as he himself indicated, was not clear about the origin of the aversion. For that, we need to look at political struggles of the blacks.

Around 1930 the blacks formed native welfare associations along the railway line running from Livingstone to the Copperbelt. What prompted their rise was pointed out in a meeting of the Livingstone Native Welfare Association held in April 1930. The vice-chairman, J.E.C. Mattako made the point in these terms: "Some people think that since we are Africans with black skins we are only inferior creatures and that we shall never escape from that inferiority. No, that is a mistake ———— just let us behave ourselves like human beings and respect ourselves by co-operating with one another, and we shall see a great change, and we will enjoy freedom

black though we are, and even the powers that be will respect us as human beings..... this day the association has been formed as a rope to pull the canoe of freedom little by little" (in Hall R, 1976, P 64). It is thus clear that law status honour was what prompted the rise, not skin colour. Black though they were they still expected to achieve more respect.

Not only that, the status honour was the main-stay of the associations. The association at Livingstone met on several occassions protesting against the consequent status discrimination, practised by whites in their capacity as the superior status group. By 1930, blacks were forbidden by law to walk on pavements in all towns of Northern Rhodesia. In fact in Livingstone in one month there were 43 arrests for the offence. As the association's treasure, Gideon Mumana, pointed out, it was not even possible for a black man to look in a shop-window without being picked up by the police for standing on the pavement. Often such picking up was rough. At a meeting of the Livingstone Native Welfare Association, Nelson Nalumango described how he had been kicked and beaten up in Broken Hill by a black police constable who had caught him standing on a pavement. (Hall R, 1976, P 64). To the pavement question, the Livingstone association complained.

On these reports as a whole, matters reached a crisis when Sam Mwase, as chairman of the association, sent a memorandum to the Government of Northern Rhodesia, pointing

out that blacks were more severely dealt with in court than the whites. The Governor looked at it, but merely said that the way to treat the association was to ridicule it. Accordingly, the Secretary for Native Affairs, Moffat Thompson, was instructed to talk to the committee with "the attitude of a schoolmaster towards a stupid boy in the third form" (inHall R, 1976, P 65).

In one of the meetings held by association at Lusaka, I. Clement Katongo Muwamba and Henry Mashwa Sangandu, chairman and secretary respectively, voiced out that the local white butcher refused to sell decent meat to blacks. The butcher either threw the meat on the floor or refused to allow blacks to see what they were buying before paying for pre-wrapped items. Sangandu particularly mentioned that the butcher treated blacks "as though the native was a dog whereas a human being the natives know what is good to eat" (in Rotberg R.I, 1972, P 129).

The same type of discrimination was echoed by members of Mazabuka Native Welfare Association in that they complained about being allowed to buy only intestines and other offal which the staff of the municipal abttoir had tramped on. Indeed blacks throughout Northern Rhodesia were discriminated against by white butchers up until 1956. (Rotberg R.I, 1972, P 129).

In 1932, the native welfare associations at Lusaka and Luanshya had a concerted attack on discriminatory legislation to which blacks throughout the country were subjected. Members of the associations in particular wanted blacks to be permitted to carry guns just as whites were; to be as unencumbered with identification certificates as whites were; and to be equally unencumbered by passes which they had to possess if they had to leave their urban residential areas to visit other parts of the town during the dark hours of the day: "Why only Africans need to carry passes in their own country", they asked. (Rotberg R.I., 1972, P 130).

The whites' aversion that Norris was not clear about, therefore, was that between two different status groups. It was caused by the difference in social status. So, the demand for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia and the political protests were basically status struggles. Whites wanted to secure, through increased political power, their status in society. In 1933, however, the native welfare association, after their separate initial protest against the amalgamation, decided to come together and the United African Welfare Association was formed. White authorities were alarmed and flatly refused to give it legal recognition But this did not deter blacks in their struggle for equality and justice. They soon took advantage of the council system that the white authorities had accepted.

These were local advisory councils set up to keep district commissioners in touch with blacks' opinion and to advise on blacks' welfare. Later provincial councils were set up, embracing both urban and rural areas. Local advisory councils began sending their members to the provincial councils who ultimately nominated representatives for the country-wide African Representative Council.

The whole system of councils was used in practice for listing grievancies about status descrimination: lack of educational apportunities, white proprietors' refusal of permitting blacks to enter stores, whites' use of the term 'boy' to describe a native black, and many others. It was in this respect that in 1944, Isaac Potphara, of Ndola, summed up the feelings of many fellow councilors throughout Northern Rhodesia thus: "We have seen that there is only one great thing ~~out~~ and that is the colour bar" (in Rotberg, R.I, 1972, P 202). At that time skin colour was being used for identifying the status groups and hence those to discriminate against.

Unable to attain appreciable attention to their grievances through the councils, blacks revived the welfare associations. Once again the recurrent theme of status discrimination was raised. In 1943, for example, the revived Lusaka African Welfare Association accused the compound manager there, a man named Nichols, of mistreating

blacks in the town beer-hall, and they asked for service from butcher, banks, the local mill, and the railway, without reference to colour. (Rotberg R.I, 1972, P 203).

The separate associations came together in 1946 and formed the Federation of Welfare Societies. When the whites' federal form of amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia became imminent, the Federation of Welfare Societies was renamed the Northern Rhodesia African Congress in September 1948 at Munali School in Lusaka. (Hall R, 1976, PP 71 and 72). The re-named political party struggled against the federal idea, albeit unsuccessfully; for in 1953 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland came into existence.

The congress struggled because it feared that in the Federation the blacks' status would deteriorate to that of slaves. This was expressed in a confidential memorandum of the congress, dated 28th December, 1948, in the following words: "Some people may think that the African does not see clearly the meaning of the Federation. We see its meaning and it means to enslave the African" (in Rotberg R.I, 1972, P 214).

This review of political struggles then, suggests that during the colonial office rule the status form of social stratification dominated the society. For more evidence we now proceed to analyse struggles over economic

opportunities.

3. STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

A herbinger of the first large-scale strike by blacks in Northern Rhodesia was a notice posted up at Nkana on 4th April 1935 calling for a strike on the 29th of April of the same year. It was written in Bemba and a translation of it is in the Russel Report (Russel A, 1935, P 13) in the following terms:

> "Listen to this all you who live in the country, think well how they treat us and ask for a land. Do we live in good treatment, no; therefore let us ask one another and remember this treatment. Because we wish on the day of 29th April every person not to go to work, he who will go to work, and if we see him it will be a serious case. Know how they cause us to suffer, they cheat us for money, they arrest us for loafing, they prosecute and put us in goal for tax. What reason have we done? Secondly, do you wish to hear these words, well listen, this year of 1935, if they will not increase us more money stop paying tax, do you think they can kill you, no. Let us encourage surely you will see, that God will be with us. See how we suffer with the work and how we are continually reviled and beaten underground. Many brothers of us die for 22s 6d, is this money that we should lose our lives for. He who cannot read should tell his companion that on 29th April not to go to work These words do not come from here, they come from the wisers who are far away and unable to encourage us.
>
> That all. Hear well if it is right let us do so.
>
> We are all of Nkana.
> Africans ———— Men and Women.
>
> I am glad,
> G. Lovewey".

Here, it may be noted that the writer began with the theme of 'treatment'. According to him, the strike was called on because of the treatment.

The strike, however, did not take place on the 29th of April. Instead, it took place in May and began at Mufulira instead. But the connection between tax payment and strike action manifested itself nevertheless. In 1934 the Government of Northern Rhodesia reconsidered tax rates with a view to lightening the burden of taxation for the majority of impecunious blacks and to further reduction of arrears in tax payment. The outcome was a reduction in rates in areas outside centres of large wage employment and a rise in rates within the centres.

TABLE 4-1: Tax rates for Blacks in 1935

Old rate		New rate		Area
s	d	s	d	
10	0	7	6	Plateau Province, all districts
12	6	7	6	Barotse Province, all districts
10	0	7	6	Lundazi District
10	0	7	6	Petauke District
12	6	7	6	Mumbwa excluding fice areas
12	6	7	6	Namwala, excluding nine areas
12	6	7	6	Guimbi Area

Old rate		New rate		Area
s	d	s	d	
12	6	7	6	Mwinilunga District
12	6	7	6	Solwezi District
12	6	7	6	Mkushi District
10	0	10	0	Fort Jameson District
12	6	10	0	Lusaka District
12	6	10	0	Mazabuka District, excluding Guimbi
12	6	10	0	Kalomo District, excluding Guimbi
12	6	10	0	Five areas Mumbwa
12	6	10	0	Nine areas Namwala
12	6	12	6	Livingstone town and district
12	6	12	6	Broken Hill town and district
12	6	12	6	Ndola town and district
12	6	15	0	Mufulira
12	6	15	0	Nkana
12	6	15	0	Luanshya

Source: Russel A, Northern Rhodesia Disturbances Commission (Russel 1935): report, despatch and evidence, 1935, PP 5 and 6 of the report section

On the 22nd of May the strike at Mufulira began as a result of a sudden bawling out by the mine police there that the tax rate was increased to 15s.

The police made no mention of the reductions in other areas of the country, and a misconception of the change in tax rate was thus created. Blacks thought of how whites treated them, including how they were being boxed on the ears by their compound manager and came to the conclusion that the new tax rate was another injustice. Hence, they demanded lower taxes and higher wages.

The boxing was described in the following words by the commission of inquiry appointed to examine the 1935strikes on the Copperbelt: "It appeared that the compound manager was in the habit of punishing the natives under his control by boxing their ears. This boxing of the ears was by no menas a casual cuff on the side of the head, but was a deliberate punishment. The offending native was made to stand and hold his head sideways in a stiff position, and then blows with the open hand on the side of the head were administered. Dr. Dunlop, who is in charge of the native hospital, stated that since his arrival on the mine in April, 1935, two natives had been admitted to the hospital suffering from damage to the ear. The first occassion was after he had been there a few days. The ear was discharging and the native said he had been struck. The result was that his hearing would be affected. On the 15th April, Dr. Dunlop protested to the compound manager, who said he would look into the matter and see that it did not occur again.

About a week later another native came in to be treated by Dr. Dunlop. The boy said he had been struck on the ear; there was a little blood and the drum was raptured. The effect of that would be that he would never be able to hear as well with that ear afterwards" (Russel A, 1935, P 12). No white worker on the mines was treated in this way.

With the cause of the strike at Mufulira thus being the misinterpretation of the new tax rate, because of taking into account the status discrimination, the disturbance spread to Nkana through communication. A demand for higher wages and lower tax was heard and a strike started on May the 27th.

Then the strike spread to Luanshya too, because of a false message that the strikers at Nkana had won a wage increase. This menat that if the Luanshya blacks had to achieve the same they had to go on strike also, and they did on May the 29th. Consequently, white district officers and the compound manager at Luanshya addressed them. Asked what the trouble was, the new strikers "let out a big shout of 'tax' and 'more money'" (in Rotberg R.I, 1972, P 165).

In all the three strike centres then, low tax rate and more wages were the central issue. Tax was primary and wages secondary: without the new tax rate the strikers would not have taken place, at least at the times that they did. In this light, the strikes were not against employers as a class; rather they were aimed at the Northern Rhodesia Government.

It follows that the series of strikers were not class struggles. The fact that they were aimed at the government for apparently furthering the status discrimination by imposing the new tax rate on blacks only, means that they were about social status.

It was, therefore, because of an oversight, with respect to the status discrimination in view of which the tax rate was misinterpreted by blacks, that the Russel Commission failed to see wages as an existing part of the discrimination, brought to the fore because it was out of which the new tax would be paid. Instead, the Commission thought the tax rate and wages were unrelated and that the latter were not even an irritant to blacks. Here is what they wrote in their report: "The Commission find that the wages on the mines compare favourably with the wages paid in other forms of employment in Northern Rhodesia and with the wages on the mines in adjoining territories. That the wages are considered to be good is shown by the number of natives who are ready to accept employment on the mines" (Russel A, 1935, P 35).

Going back to 1936, we see that another struggle over economic opportunities began. This time there was a low world price for maize and the local demand was inelastic. So, the Northern Rhodesia Government passed the Maize Control Act upon advice by the Agricultural Advisory Board, to protect white maize growers from competition with blacks growers:

The two groups of growers were then allocated quotas: whites ¾ of the local market demands; blacks ¼. At one time the Director of Agriculture declared that this protection was necessary for otherwise 'one by one the European growers (would) drop out' (Davidson J.W, 1948, PP 63 and 64).

In practice the Maize Control Board, formed to exercise the powers of the Act, outlived the lean years, but still maintained its discrimination. The following excepts indicate this:

> "The cost of maize production in the Territory in respect of 1949 was calculated by the Board's auditors, based on the report dated 20th October, 1948, which was submitted by the committee appointed by the Government to investigate the cost of maize production in the territory. As a result of the auditor's findings, Government approved a pay-out to the European producer of 27s per 200 lb of naked maize, exclusive the cost of the bag, for delivery during the 1949-50 Pool year" (1948-49 Maize Control Board Annual Report, P 3).

> "Until the recent appointment of a Government Agricultural Economist, it had been the function of the Board's Auditors to calculate the cost of maize production in the Territory but, upon appointment, this officer undertook the work. As a result of his findings, Government approved an initial payment to the European producer of 30s 2d per 200 lb of naked maize, during the 1950-51 Pool Year" (1950-51 maize Control Board Annual Report, P 4).

No consideration was given to revising the price of maize from black producers.

That the lean years were over by this time is indicated in a speach delivered by the chairman of the board during the opening ceremony of the Lusaka Grain Silo in 1953: ''It (the board) was created to secure to the European growers of maize a proportion of the internal market at a time when over-production was threatened and the export price was very little more than 3s a bag. The local price was 7s 9d and yearly consumption ran at about 190 000 bags. How different is the present situation with consumption nearly six times as big and the internal price multiplied by 5½" (1952-53 Maize Control Board Annual Report, p3).

The discrimination, however, was not produced by class competition, since, by definition, both groups of farmers belonged to the same class position. Rather, it was produced by status monopolisation. White farmers, as members of the white status group, needed to monopolise maize marketing for maintaining the requisite standard of living.

Turning back to the history of industrial conflict, we find that the next stage was based on status considerations. This time a number of blacks were in somewhat skilled occupations on mines, occupations such as carpentry and bricklaying. But the principle of equal pay for equal work

was not practised: status discrimination was the norm. Members of the superior status group got more pay for the same work that members of the lower status group got less. With the economic depression of the 1930s mines therefore began substituting the expensive whites with cheap blacks.

The whites became defensive and embarked on a monopolisation of the skilled jobs. Their catalyst was Charles Harris of the South African Mine Workers' Union who visited the Copperbelt in 1936. There he considered that blacks had invaded the preserve of white occupations. Quickly a branch of the South African Mine Workers' Union was set up and supported by the Railway Workers' Union which had already been extended into Northern Rhodesia from Southern Rhodesia. The branch's aim was to make Northern Rhodesia a 'white workers' country'. However, since the constitution of the South African Mine Workers' Union did not allow extentions into other countries, the branch, in the same year 1936, became the autonomous Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union. The following year it gained recognition by the mine companies and in 1938 made the so-called 'gentleman's agreement' with the companies to the effect that there would be no further substitution of blacks for whites for a period of another two years. (Quinn K, in Elliott C, 1971, pp 62 and 63).

By March 1940, the Union differed with the mine managements on the following matters:

a) Basic wage to be raised by 2s a shift where it did not at the time exceed 28s; and a war bonus of 5 per cent on the new basic rate to meet the increased cost of living.

b) Overtime pay to be at the rate of time-and-a half and double time on Sundays.

c) Revision of Agreement signed in 1937 to the effect that managements recognise the union and that neither party would countenance a strike or lock out until conciliation measures had been tried.

d) Establishment of a 'closed shop' principle whose essence was to bar blacks from advancing into skilled positions however qualified they might be.

f) Investigation into silicosis potentialities.

On the 17th of March whites at Mufulira withdrew their labour. Those at Nkana followed on the 21st of the same month. But white workers at Nchanga and Luanshya did not. (Forster J, 1940, pp 10 to 13).

The outcome of the strikes were a gain of the 5 per cent war bonus and an increased rate for overtime, but not the 2s addition to basic wage. This was left for subsequent arbitration.

A point to note here is that although the barring of blacks appeared on the agenda leading to the strikes, a fact which could be interpreted as status discrimination, the white workers were mainly struggling with their employers for better conditions of service in their labour market. This means that the strikes were mainly class struggles and that a class stratification of comparatively limited extent did exist at that time in the status stratified society of Northern Rhodesia. It comprised the white workers and their employers, the white mine managements.

Another step in the history of industrial conflict was an incident that took place at Nchanga on March the 22nd. There, as in all other mining centres on the Copperbelt, black mine workers were provided with food items. A miner's wife went to get her share of the rations at a grain store where a black superviser was in charge. Somehow a quarrel errupted, in the course of which the superviser assaulted the woman and then reported her to the white assistant compound manager. The latter handcuffed her and flogged her. When the woman's husband arrived he too was handcuffed and flogged. Eye witnesses reported thus: "Which cause us to be angry is this: we come here to work from home with our wives with us.... Now we saw that the feeding store capitae was beating a woman and took her to the compound manager's office, the capitae then made a statement to

the European who listened to him, but the woman was never asked to make a statement, but she was merely being beaten without her statement (and) she was handcuffed. The husband came and was instantly handcuffed, then the compound manager.. started beating them with a sjambok without reasons. He made both the husband and wife lay down, this made us very angry because he said 'come here you all and see what we are doing to your friends'. Seeing this, we were very, very angry. We said these people despise us and also our wives, then see these Europeans, the meal they give us.... does not fill our stomach, yet they make us suffer for it" (in Retberg R. I, 1972, pp 169 and 170).

Here again we see the framework of status discrimination and its use in the interpretation of the flogging incident, indicating the significance of the status stratification in the lives of mine workers at Nchanga.

In fact, the matter did not end there. Blacks went on strike at the mine and urged the District Commissioner to flog a white man and a white woman: "Now before we go to work, a European must handcuff his wife anf be beaten, both the European lady and her husband together. If you refuse to do this, then do to us things you like. We have finished. We are all Africans" (in Retberg R, I, 1972, p 170). Later the miners ended the strike on an assurance

that the assistant compound manager would be prosecuted, and he was indeed prosecuted, so was the black supervisor. A report of the Forster Commission reads that "Both Nyambe and Pettit were summarily dismissed; both were convicted of assault and sentenced, the former to 7 days' imprisonment and the latter to 14 days', and they have not been re-employed on the mines" (Forster J, 1940, p 13).

The strike ended on March the 25th, before the whites' strikes at Mufulira and Nkana had ended. The latter strikes ended on March the 27th, but before they did, they had given rise to a new desire for strike action among blacks. On 24th March the same year 1940, the desire was expressed, inter alia, in the following notices posted at Nkana:

> "My friends--- listen to me my fellow workers. I say to you--- are our grievances many in number? In what respect do we differ from the police because we are working men and the police are very overbearing towards us. This annoys me greatly and I say--- all who feel like me should attack the police.
>
> Moreover this fact embitters my mind--- the Europeans left their work without any trouble falling upon them. Cannot a slave, too, speak to his master?
>
> Also--- let no one say, 'I have no food' or 'I have left my work with only 2s 6d'. We will all help each other to find food.

And when you read this letter keep calm and add your own thoughts as to whether this shall be done. That is all. I entreat you strongly my friends that we should not differ about leaving our work and that we should come to an understanding with each other so that the thing should be done. Good-bye

I am

KATWISHI" (in Forster J, 1940, p 63).

"All my fellow workers who work on the Mine—— I have something to discuss with you because you hav- seen how the Europeans left their work for the sake of an increase in pay. What do you say?

Bear in mind too that in the year 1935 we had some trouble and guns were heard and some amongst us died thereby. Yet although people died nothing was done for us to compare with the deaths of our friends.

Observe now how their own people refused to work but no guns have been heard. And when you see them begin their work again what do you think?

As for me I say that if they have been given an increase in pay then we should work for one weak and if we too do not recieve an increase in pay then, so be it, let us leave our work. Let there be no

fighting or argument--- let us just go to our homes.

That is all,
I am,
'I DON'T KNOW' "(in Forster J, 1940, p 63).

"My friends, young men of the Mine, I have words to tell you. You know how the Europeans left their work on a matter of increased wages. I ask you, therefore, what will you do if the Europeans receive an increase in wages? I ask you--- will you see them resuming their work unless they receive an increase? Certainly not, Sir.

I am very angry about this. See what we did in 1935 without any result. Also at Luanshya some of our friends died and nothing was done for us because in fact we are their slaves. So if the Europeans receive an increase by leaving their work then we should cease working too. We should not fight or cause disturbances because, if we do, they will bring many machine guns and aeroplanes. In this matter we are in Gods care--- He really loves us. Look at the police--- they are like Europeans here at Nkana. We should beat them. We are like slaves because of the police. If you fail in this you are only women. You have defiled your mothers. If you think they will kill you--- not at all. They are only human beings

like ourselves.

Indeed it would be a good thing if they gave us an increase. All would be well.

I am,

KATWISHI CHOWA" (in Forster J, 1940, p 64).

These notices may be summarised in three words: police, slave and strike. Two points about the police were that black constables were essentially members of the black group though in behaviour they did not seem so, and that blacks werelike slaves because of the black policemen. Hence both points were about the status stratification and thus constituted a separate theme. The other theme in the notices was about strike action and was specifically summoning all black mine workers to go on strike in immitation of the whites. Our next step then is to find out whether it was a class stratification or the status stratification that mainly conditioned people's life chances in the mining centres at that time.

The strike began at Nkana and spread to Mufulira. Luanshya and other mining centres were not involved. However, through the notices and other channels the Government of Northern Rhodesia learned of the imminent strikes and so

advised the managements to consider some concession to black workers. Consequently the mine managements late on the 27th March, the day when the Whites' strikes ended, gave notice of their intention to pay black workers a bonus of 2s 6d on each 30-shift ticket 'so long as the war lasted and prices remained high'. This was the second world war.

At Nkana and Mindolo the bonus was announced at meetings with 'boss boys' (black sub-supervisors), for here there was no 'Elder' system at the time. But the meeting broke up inconclusively and the following day on March the 28th all blacks at Mindolo except 369 withdrew their labour. The latter followed on the 29th and the strike spread to Nkana and Kitwe compounds and to Mufulira. The Nkana strike culminated on the 3rd of April in the death of 17 blacks and in 63 wounded. These were gunned by the police. By the 8th of April all workers returned to work. In the case of Mufulira, it was 'Elders' who were informed of the bonuses on the 27th of March. These communicated to their fellow black workers, only to return to the compound office the following day with a mandate to refuse the bonus offer and to demand 5s a day as terms for calling off the strike. At this time the blacks showed themselves to be sensitive to taunts and insults from whites. In particular they disliked being called 'monkeys' by white workers on the

mines. One of the mine workers expressed that "Even though the African is educated (he) is....like a monkey to the Europeans. All the Africans who are at work at (the) mines are treated like this: when an African is carrying a very heavy load, (and) a European is coming behind him without the notice of an African, the European kicks him. When the African says 'What's the matter Bwana?' now the Bwana says, 'shut up, get away', and gives the African a very hard blow. When an African wants to know the reason why he is beaten, the Bwana takes (his) number.... so an African will have to be fined....for nothing" (in Rotberg R. I, 1972, p 160). Apart from taunts and insults, the blacks complained, through a committee of 17 which they formed upon the advice of and for the convinience of the District Commissioner, that they did all the work for which whites were paid, and suggested to be tested by one shift being worked by whites and one by blacks in order to find out which shift would achieve the greater output.

The Mufulira strike died out two days after the District Commissioner had announced of the return to work of most workers at Nkana. Areport of the Forster Commission says that on the 6th of April "the District Commissioner gave due publicity to the return to work of the majority of strikers at Nkana, but this was received with some detachment and suspicion. The 17 were induced to undertake that

intimidation should cease, and again ~~confined~~ confirmed this the following day, which also passed quietly. A large crowd came to the office to get their tickets back. On the 8th April there was a general turnout to work, but the Africans were depressed and suspicious of ridicule by Europeans and the District Commissioner found it advisable to warn as many of the latter as possible against laughing at them" (Forster J, 1940, p22).

Looking back on the facts that black workers were engaged in a conflict with their employers over a wage rise, as particularly indicated by the Mufulira final demand of 5s a day and by the cause of the strikes being the apparent succes of the class of white workers, we see that another class stratification of limited extent came into existence on the mines. This time it comprised the black workers and the mine managements.

But the reference to ridicule, and the taunts and insults cast at blacks, show that the status stratification determined the life chances in the mining centres far more than the class stratifications did. Not even remuneration was mainly determined by the latter, since the challenge about one shift being worked by blacks while the other is worked by whites meant that remuneration was largely determined

by status discrimination.

This deminance remained un changed, with respect to the rest of the period of colonial effice rule and to the country as a whole. Before the end of the rule in 1953, a number of organisations came into being. In 1941 senior white workers organised themselves into a Staff Association as a separate bargaining group from the whites union; at the end of 1947 blacks working in shops formed the first blacks' trade union, the Shop Assistants' Trade Union; and in 1949 the African Mine Workers' Union was formed. But these did not grow much in strength during the period, as to change the relative dominance of the status stratification. (O'Byrne B.R de R, 1956; Forster J, 1954; Rotberg R. I, 1972, pp 254 and 255).

On the geegraphical extent of the status stratification, let us turn to a report by I. Henderson. Henderson, examing the history of the Northern Rhodesia civil service, found that by 1933 a pattern had been established of prefering whites even for suberdinate posts such as those for postal assistants and clerks. Only at bomas, that is administrative centres, outside areas of white population concentration were the posts allowed for blacks. The reason

was that there whites to fill the posts were simply not available. (Henderson I, 1972).

Not only this, he also found that there was clear resistance to blacks advancing into higher occupational positions. In fact a clash on this issue came in 1933 when the colonial office requested the Governor of Northern Rhodesia formally to initiate a 'replacement' policy in the civil service, whereby cheap blacks would take the place of expensive whites in the lowest grades of the service, thus saving money diring the world economic depression. At that time the Governor told the colonial office that 'it must be remembered that the European settler not unreasonably demands opportunities for his children to enter the lower grades of the civil service'.

The status discrimination applied to remuneration too. For example, there were black graduates, S. A. Mudenda and J. Mwanakatwe, who were denied the equal pay for equal work principle. In justification the following words were raised: 'The remuneration of a non-European should, in our opinion, be such as to mark the status of an officer as a professional man and to enable him to uphold his position with dignity. On the other hand, in determining his salary, account need not be taken of the additional expenditure

to which the expatriate officer is put, whereas account should be taken of the ruling income levels in those classes of the community from which he comes. The latter consideration will become progressively more important as more Africans find their way into the higher ranges of the services. The disadvantage of so remunerating any class of Africans is to create a Mandarin caste, divorced in income and interest from their fellows would not be confined to the economic fieled'.

The fact that this kind of civil service covered the entire country, shows that the geographical extent of the status stratification was country-wide. So, on a geographical dimention too, the class stratifications were comparatively of limited extents during the colonial office rule, a fact which indicates the relative dominance of the status stratification then.

C. RACE AS A STATUS SYMBOL

We may now focus on the quastion of race. When demonstrating the dominance of the status stratification, we have accepted the presence of class stratifications in limited areas of the society but denied the existence of racial stratification. Race, we have assumed, was a symbol of status. That it was really so will now be seen

from the creation of a social position for coloureds.

Coloureds were originally born of black women and white or Asian men, and not the other way round. A 'representative' black man once pointed out that "Coloured children are born of our women, they eat our food and are treated with our medicine" (in Kreft H. H. G, 1950, pp 3 and 4).

Once born, a problem arose and may be stated in the following question: how are these products of members of different status groups to be socially considered? At first most people in Northern Rhodesia were of the opinion that the children should not be allowed to become a separate social group. "Some held that the children should be absorbed into the racial group to which their fathers belonged; others that they should adopt the tribal customs of their ~~fathers belonged;~~ mothers. The latter point of view was the one that largely predominated" (Kreft H. H. G, 1950, pp 3 and 4). However, the lack of concensus ultimately lead to the appointment of the Kreft Committee of Inquiry and to the consequent report produced in 1950.

By that time, according to the report, 'the greatest body of opinion was that Coloured people must be regarded and accepted as a separate group within the community'. Seeing this the committee recommended to the Govrnment

of Northern Rhodesia that "recognition be accorded to the Coloured people as a separate group within the community and that such recognition be kept constantly in mind in the normal course of administration and planning" (Kreft H.H.C, 1950, p 8).

At the time there was a total of 1 240 coloured persons in the entire country, 836 of whom were reported to be living after the manner of whites and 404 after that of blacks. Big concentrations were at Fort Jameson (252), Lusaka (163), Ndola (161) and Livingstone (124). Many of these had been born out of unions between coloured men and coloured women.

At Lusaka most lived in houses separate from blacks in a part of the location known as Marripodi's Compound. The houses were build of poles and dagga, and their ownership was usually exchanged at a price ranging from L10 to L25 per house.

At Ndola the municipality had especially constructed 4 houses in burnt brick and iron roof at a cost of about L400 each. These were rented at L2 per month and were situated in the whites' residential area in 3rd Street.

In general, there was a tendency to physical segragation. The Kreft Committee noted this and inquired about it.

Here is what it found: "At all places visited, evidence and opinion was almost unanimous that a portion of the township or, if township land is not available as at Ndola, a suitable area adjoining the township be set aside where it will be possible for Coloured people with their limited incomes to build, rent or acquire houses on hire-purchase. The area should provide space for a school, social centre, sports ground and children's playground" (Kreft H. H. C, 1950, p12). The Committee accepted this and recommended to the government accordingly.

To a large extent and unlike blacks, coloureds liked the position thus allocated to them in the society. All along they had shown a dislike for being considered members of the black group. They prefered to be accepted into the white goup. For example, the Kreft Committee found that coloureds on the whole prefered the practice whereby in hospitals their separate wards were attached to the whites' hospital as against the occassional practice which attached the wards to the blacks' hospital. Hence the medium position was accepted as a not-too-bad solution.

That the social position was really medium with reference to blacks and whites is clear from the avenues of employment which coloureds were allowed to occupy by

some whites. In practice about half of these were already occupied by coloureds at the time of the Kreft Committee.

TABLE 4-2: **Avenues of Employment for Coloured Men**

GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

Agricultural Department

* Demonstrators

Education

* Teachers
* Groundsmen
* Caretakers

Forestry Department

** Foreser's Assistants

Game and Tsetse

* Under Rangers

Information Department

* Cinema Operators (Mobile)

Post Office

* Telegraphists
* Telephonists
* Sorters
* Postmen

Public Works Department

* Road Overseers
* Labour Overseers
* Launch and Ferry Operators

Veterinary Department

* Cordon Supervisors

NON-GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS

Agriculture

* Farm Managers

Local Government

* Sanitary Overseers

* Labour Overseers

* Sanitary Inspectors

Industry and Commerce

* Sawyers

* Cabinetmakers

** Tailors

* Storekeepers & Yardsmen

** Book-keepers

** Clerks

Motor Industry & Transport

* Mechanics

** Panel Beaters

** Coachbuilders

* Conductors (bus)

* Drivers (bus)

Railway

* Platelayers

COMMON TO GOVERNMENT & NON-GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS

* Fitters' Mates

* Electricians' mates

** Welders' Mates

* Carpenters

* Bricklayers

* Plasterers

* Plumbers

* Heavy Plant Operators

* Tractor Drivers

* Drivers (motors)

* Machine Operators

* Machine Minders

* Fire Fighters

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* Avenues recommended to the Kreft Committee by whites (most also quoted by coloureds)

** Avenues recommended to the Kreft Committee By coloureds

source: Kreft H. H. G, Report of the Committee to Inquire into the Status and Welfare of Coloured Persons in Northern Rhodesia, 1950, pp 15 and 16

TABLE 4-3: Avenues of Employment for Coloured Women

* Teachers	** Book-keepers
** Hospital Nurses	** Clerks
** Assistant Nurses	* Dressmakers
** Ward Attendants	* Needlewomen
** Matrons (Coloured School Hostels)	
** Shorthand Typists	* Children's Nurses
	* Domestic Helpers

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* Avenues recommended to the Kreft Committee by white (most also quoted by coloureds)

** Avenues recommended to the Kreft Committee by coloureds

Source: Kreft H. H. G, Report of the Committee to Inquire into the Status and Welfare of Coloured Persons in Northern Rhodesia, 1950, p17

Having thus demonstrated that coloureds were basically a status group, we need to say a word about Asians. We have seen before that when Asians first entred the country from Eat Africa they entered into a class conflict with

whites. That conflict remained unsupported discriminatorily by the then political machinery and hence no class stratification emerged. The market competition for customers remained free.

In the period now under study, we find that the able competition of the Asians drove most whites out of the trade with blacks. In particular they did so thruogh undercutting. Here is what an Indian pioneer remembers of the competition: "There was nothing but Jew-boys in business here then, and they had no competition. But we soon saw to it that they got some. They were selling blankets which cost them five shillings for a pound; we sold them for ten. They wanted a sixpence for one of these(holding up a soda bottle). We sold'em for four-and-a-ha'-penny" (in Dotson F and Dotson L. O, 1968, p231). Asians thus monopolised the black customers. The process was facilitated by the opening up of the copperbelt mines between 1927 an d 1930, for that attracted a large number of white miners and the white population grew considerably. These became the main customers for white traders. (Dotson F and Dotson L. O, 1968, p231)

This situation meant that the white traders were not relegated to a low class position by the competition with the Asians and so no class stratification emrged. But

TABLE 4-4: European Population, 1925 to 1954

Year	Population
1925	4 620
1927	7 540
1930	14 000
1931	13 846
1932	10 550
1934	11 460
1935	12 000
1940	15 190
1946	21 907
1951	37 079
1954	53 000

source: Kay G, A Social Geography of Zambia, (London: University of London Press Ltd), 1971, p 26.

what happened was that the derogatory remarks about Asians that rose as a result of the competition (see Chapter 3) painted an unpleasant image of the Asians. For example, many people came to believe that Asians were 'economic parasites'(Dotson F and Dotson L. O, 1968, p 230) and dirty and hence lower in status than whites in general. Thus the Asians came to occupy a position between whites and coloureds in the status stratification and their racial appearance came to be a 'uniform' for their relative status; it became an identification mark, a symbol for their status.

9. SOCIAL MOBILITY & THE CONCEPT OF CASTE

With racial appearances as status symbols (black for the lowest status group, coloured for the next in the hierarchy, Asian for yet the next, and white for the highest), there was no social mobility, in the sense of rising up to become members of a higher status group or falling down to become members of a lower status group, at this time when whites were struggling for the Federation as a means for securing their previleged position. Even the few blacks who were graduates, as we have already seen, were not accepted as members of a group other than the black status group.

This closed nature of the groups does not mean that the stratification was caste, since the social distance was not regulated by the concept of polution and there was no occupational specialisation in practice. In the civil service, as we have seen too, areas outside these with white concentrations had blacks in clerical and higher posts, that is occupations which whites, coloureds and indeed Asians filled wherever they were available. On the mines blacks actually drove locomotives, tapped smelter furnaces, ran casting machines, fitted pipes, blasted underground, and did other similar jobs. (Wetberg R. I, 1972, p 177). Moreover, Hall noted that "By 1940, lorries were being driven on one mine by Africans, on another by Europeans. The (only) difference was that in one case the pay was £3 a month, and in the other £30" (Hall R, 1976, p78).

In a caste stratification social distance is regulated by the idea of pollution. Any physical contact with a member of a lower caste group is expiated by a religious ritual under which the idea of pollution is covered. In Northern Rhodesia during the era of the colonial office rule there were no pollution expiation ceremonies related to the social stratification.

For these two reasons, we are unable to call the stratification caste. Rather we call it status stratification.

E. SUMMARY

To find out if the status form of social stratification continued to be dominant during the colonial office rule, in this chapter we have examined the settlers' struggle on amalgamating Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, the circustances leading to the 1935 disturbance on the Copperbelt, the rise and activities of the Maize Control Board, the rise of the white workers' union, and the flogging incident at Nchanga. To discover if there was a causal connection between the status stratification and the rise of the class stratifications on the mines, we have examined the 1940 strike by white workers and the consequent strikes by black workers. And to identify the role of skin colour in the colonial social stratification during the period, we have looked at how coloureds and Asians attained their respective hierarchical positions.

During the BSA Company rule, the settlers turned down the company's proposal to amalgamate the two Rhodesias

for administrative convinience. But when the British Government advocated 'paramountancy of native interest', the settlers changed their feeling. Instead, they strongly demanded what they had previously turned down. This was because the amalgamation was then seen as a possible way of attaining increased political power necessary for securing their status in society. Corollary, blacks strongly opposed the amalgamation for fear that if realised it would actually reduce their status to that of slaves. In this light, the struggles were mainly about social status.

The 1935 disturbance, in the eyes of the blacks, was primarily a reaction against ill treatment by the colonial masters, the white status group. Its immediate cause was an increase in the tax rate for blacks on the Copperbelt, an increase which was misinterpreted as a furtherance of the status discrimination that was then in existence.

In the area of agricultural marketing, the discrimination was institutionally put into effect by the Maize Control Board, created to protect white farmers from competition with black farmers. The board was thus a tool for affording white farmers of all sizes a standard of living appropriate for members of the white status group.

On the rise of the white workers' trade union, basic facts are that it arose because of status discrimination in remunerating equally skilled black and white mine workers and because of the consequent mine managements' tendency, necessitated by the economic depression of the 1930s, to replace the expensive whites with cheap blacks; that Charles Harris expressed concern about blacks having invaded the preserve of white occupations; and that the original aim of the branch of the South African Mine Workers' Union was to make Northern Rhodesia a 'white workers' country'. Altogether these facts show that the effort to establish the union was mainly about social status.

So, the political struggles on amalgamation, together with the struggles in the economic field, including the flogging incident at Nchanga, show that during the colonial office rule (1924 - 1953) people mostly struggled about social status, and this dominance of the status stratification is confirmed by the relatively small number of class struggles which actually took place: the 1940 strikes by white and black workers.

Since these strikes, however, were possible because of the prior existence of the whites' union and since the union was formed because of the prior existence of the

status stratification, there was a causal connection between the status stratification and the class stratifications that emmerged through the strikes.

Finally, the role of skin colour in the forms of social stratification during the period of colonial office rule remained that of a status symbol. The social position that the Kreft Committee regularised for coloureds was a status position : Coloureds became accepted as a separate social group eligible to occupy certain jobs and to be treated in a special way in the course of public administration and planning. Their skin colour then became a means for identifying who, in the colonial society, belonged to the coloured status group and deserved to be treated in that special way. Thus the colour became a symbol of their status. In the case of Asians, skin colour became such through the derogatory remarks made by competing white traders.

Chapter 5

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION DURING THE FEDERATION

In the last chapter we saw that the struggle over political power was essentially a status struggle. The position was that the group with more political power also had higher social status. The white status group wanted to consolidate that position through amalgamation with other whites, particularly those who lived in Southern Rhodesia, and the form of amalgamation that consequently emerged was the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The black status group strongly opposed the establishment of the Federation, on the fear that the Federation would pass more political power into the hands of local whites and a decline in the blacks' status would follow. We now proceed to analyse the development of this situation during the Federation.

A. POLITICAL STRUGGLE

When the Federal Assembly met in Salisbury in 1953, Mauti Yamba, one of the two indirectly elected black representatives from Northern Rhodesia, moved 'that equal treatment be accorded immediately to all races in all public places within the Federation and that such action be enforced

by (Federal) legislation'. To this, Yamba received sarcarstic interruptions from white members and ridicule from the federal Prime Minister. The Prime Minister clearly refused to allow blacks to use whites' entrances to post offices or to expect certain services on the railways, both federally controlled. In particular, he said that "If this motion were carried out....it would create so much ill-feeling and so much resentment in the Europeans that we should put back the clock of advancement and cooperation and partnership by at least ten years. It is a very mischievous motion.... You cannot expect the European to form up in a queue with dirty people, possibly an old mfazi (African woman) with an infant on her back, mewling and puking and making a mess...." (in Rotberg R. I, 1972, pp 254 and 255).

At the start of the Federation then, status considerations were significant in relations between whites and blacks. This continued up to the mid 1950s. By that time blacks were not allowed to enter whites' theatres or cinemas in Northern Rhodesia; they were not allowed to eat in an airport restaurant, even though they were waiting to board a plane; they could not go to churches in the whites' areas without being the object of angry glances from white worshippers; hotels and cafes were closed to them and in gro-

ceries they had to wait their turn untill all whites were served. (Hall R, 1976, p 115).

G. Keith provides a vivid account of the shopping situation. She points out that because blacks were not expected to shop over the counter, there were alleyways with signs reading 'Messengers', 'Boys', and even 'Natives'. Somewhere in the alley there was a small hatch in the side or back wall of a shop. This small hole in the wall was through which blacks were served. Any black man, woman, or youngster who ventured into a shop instead, was informed of the 'mistake' in no uncertain terms: 'Get out you! Hamba la pa side'—— meaning go to the other side. There at the 'side' the chased-out black would have to wait patiently until there was no more white in side the shop to be served. Keith adds that: "Privileged white customers, shopping leisurely and comfortably at the counter were often afforded a ring-side view of the mass of waving black arms stretching stretched through the hatch; hot fingers clutching sixpences or kalatas (letters) from employers and behind those supplicating arms, the jostling sea of black faces, chanting ~~'Plees Missus~~ 'Plees dona', 'Me next dona plees'. 'Missus! Missus! Plees Missus'. Every now and again a louder more belligent voice would be heard, from someone whose patience had began to crack, whereupon the harassed assistant would turn round on them all in a fury with a 'Shut up man! Can't

you see I'M busy. And none of your cheek or I'll call the manager'. She would then turn similingly back to her better-class clientele, with a smooth 'Yes Madam, can I help you?'" (Keith G, 1966, p 84).

All this was because blacks and whites differed in status as represented by their styles of life. The Prime Minister's reference to dirt and way of carrying infants indicates this. Hence the discrimination was in no way caused by differences in skin colour, or race. Race was merely a status symbol.

For further evidence that race was not the issue at stake, it is necessary to examine a report of the O' Byrne Committee which was appointed by the Northern Rhodesia Government to investigate the extent to which 'racial' discrimination was practised in shops and in other similar business premisses. The committee found that bakeries had separate entrances, counters or hatches through which blacks were expected to buy 'a pig in a poke', a parcel whose contents they did not know until they unwrapped it outside the shop--- "Not infrequently any remonstrance by an African customer who (found) he (had) been sold what he did not ask for (lead) to a refusal to exchange the meat, followed by a threat to call the police" (O' Byrne B. F. de M, 1956, p4).

that cafe and milk bar owners feared that if they admited blacks, coloureds, and Asians they would lose most or even all their white customers and thereby make losses in their business; that chemists too, had separate entrances, hatches or doorways though which blacks were served by often rude white shop assistants; that blacks were precluded from entering many dairies; that this applied to delicatessen shops; and that in department stores one of the things which adult blacks did not like was the use by whites of the word 'boy' when addressing them. A striking thing is that in all the findings of the committee there is no indication that race was the issue at stake. Rather the fear of losing white customers and the use of the term 'boy' indicate that what was at stake was status honour. Whites did not want to mix with people of low status.

There is one point that needs clarifying though. The O' Byrne Committee's report reads at some place that "European customers are almost invariably served before African customers. This may be and often is a form of racial discrimination but it is not necessarily so and in many cases it is based on the fact that in general the individual European is a more valuable customer than is the individual non-European" (O' Byrne B. P de R, 1956, p 11). We accept this to some extent, particularly in view of the following

report: "Most hotelkeepers contend that they would lose much European custom if they admitted non-Europeans and submit that there is not yet a sufficient number of such people who could afford to replace European custom which would be lost to them"(O' Byrne B. P de K, 1956, p9). But it is pertinent to notice that this is a superficial explanation. The fundamental point is that the society at that time was dominated by status consciousness. Hence white customers would withdraw their custom if the low status blacks attempted to mix with them and it was that possible withdrawal which the businessmen feared, for these were convinced that if the withdrawal took place, they would inevitably face business losses. The discrimination was thus not basically economic.

The dominance of status consciousness in general, however, was particularly brought out in a memorandum submitted by a white to the committee, in the following words: "The fearthe European of low intelligence and ability has of slipping down in the social scale is a very real one. The more so because a European settling in Central Africa often finds himself a notch or two higher in the social scale and something recently won is always more bitterly defended. One of our biggest educational problems is what to do with children who in Europe, would dig ditches, hew wood and draw water. This type of European knows that his white skin is his

biggest asset, and doesn't want it to mean any less than it does now. He has a vested interest in racial discrimination" (O' Byrne B. P de R, 1956, p 6). Moreover in here too, we find that skin colour was no more than an identification mark, something by which to know the status group to which one belonged so that appropriate interpersonal behaviour could be manifested. That was the sense in which white skin was the 'biggest asset'.

That skin colour was merely a status symbol is further supported by an incident involving Sir Francis Ibiam, a Nigerian black High Court Judge and Privy Councilor. Travelling by car from Congo to catch a plane at Ndola, the judge stopped at a cafe in Chingola to refresh himself with a cup of tea. As soon as he entered, hewas asked to leave the cafe immediately, 'for no other reason than that his face was black'. Latter the incident burst into world headlines and was followed up by 'overwhelming apologies' from the federal Prime Minister, the Northern Rhodesia Government, and from the Chingola Town Council. (Keith C, 1966, p 101).

Those apologies took place simply because, black though he was, the judge was a dignitary; he was a man of high status honour. Skin colour had given him a mistaken identity.

The mere symbolic significance of skin colour is also supported by an incident involving the present head of State in Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda. In 1957 he, together with Harry Nkumbula, visited Kitwe in an area where there was no eating house for blacks. They drove to a cafe, after having been told that that particular cafe would sell them whatever they wanted. So they went into the cafe, to the counter, and asked for some sandwiches. In reply a girl of about 17 years old told Kaunda that 'boys' were not served at the counter. To this Kaunda replied that he was not a 'boy'. She then turned to an elderly white woman who was apparantly in charge. The woman repeated to Kaunda that 'boys' were not served at the counter. Kaunda repeated, in turn, that he was not a 'boy'. At that point he was dragged out of the cafe by his clothes by a white man who had already dragged Nkumbula outside the cafe. The white man hit Nkumbula and called him a cheap, spoiled nigger. Five other white men joined him in attacking the two black men . Then other white and black men nearby joined in the fight.

Latter at a police station Nkumbula and Kaunda were asked to make a statement. Nkumbula began by saying that the girl at the counter refused to serve them. But before

he could finish his sentence, the white police superintendent who had stopped the fight said, "You cannot call a white lady a 'girl' or a 'woman'". Nkumbula ignored and went on to say that "after that an elderly woman came...." but again the superintendent cut in: "I say, you cheeky nigger, you cannot call a European lady a woman". Then the superintendent called Nkumbula to a room and closed the door and began giving him a beating. (Kaunda K, 1967, pp 33 and 34).

Here then, we again see that status honour was the issue at stake, not skin colour. Skin colour was merely something for identifying who was of a low status and who was not.

The status discrimination was so widespread that it even covered the urban structure and texture throughout Northern Rhodesia. H. Powdermaker, when studying Luanshya, for example, observed that it had two townships: a municipal and a mine, each with its white and black people's sections. Between the municipal and the mine townships, there was a Second Class Trading Area with Indian-owned shops, catering almost exclusively for black customers. The Indians lived in substantial bungalows not far from the shops.

The First Class Trading Area was elsewhere and mainly cattered for whites. The black people's section of the mine township, colloquially known as the 'compound', stood in a separate place, with houses laid out on a gridiron road pattern; only the inevitable ant hills broke the uniformity of the housing layout. "At the time of my study", Powdermaker added, "the average house, made of sun-dried brick, plastered and lime washed outside and inside, with concreate floor and corrugated iron roof, had two rooms.... The orderly rows of white houses and the lack of trees and flowers seemed to me to lack a pleasing esthetic quality". She contrasted this with the Whites' section of the mine township: "The fifteen hundred or so European employees of the mine had their own residential area outside the compound. Its tree-shaded streets were lined with one-story bungalows set in garderns. When the rains came, this part of the community was vivid with colour from poinsettias and roses and from the blossoming Rhodesian flame trees and the purple bougainvillea, the hibiscus, jacarandas, and frangipani. The large ant hills, some with small trees growing out of them, were part of the landscape in summer or winter, rainy or dry season". (Powdermaker H, 1965, p 5 and p 8). The discrimination, therefore, spread out to cover even the horticultural treatment of public streets an and open spaces in the two sections of the mine township. The section for people of higher status received closer attention horticulturally.

That these elements applied to other urban settlements is pointed out in a government policy statement issued in 1968, four years after the end of the colonial era: "You are aware that all our towns still bear the ugly imprint of colonial ~~'segregation~~ 'segragated' housing. Low density housing in garden setting contrast unhappily with the monotonous rows of high density housing. People in the former areas enjoy public facilities and services of a very high standard, while those in the latter make do with the minimum range of poor facilities and services. The disparity in the quality of physical environment is evident to anyone, emphasizing the segragation" (Minister of Local Government, 1968, p 1).

It was in the context of the widespread status discrimination that the blacks' political struggles took place during the Federation. By 1956, the blacks' then only political party, the African National Congress, had organised a campaign against the discrimination. In the case of shops the campaign culminated in the 1956 boycot of certain Asian and whites' stores trading almost exclusively with black customers. Many store-keepers thus came to a brink of ruin and a storm of protest broke over the Northern Rhodesia Government. As a result the government went into action. At Mufulira several members of the congress, including

the president and deputy president on the Copperbelt, were arrested on the grounds that they had engaged in a malicious conspiracy against the traders. However, when the matter reached court, a magistrate discharged them, stating that he had no hesitation in saying that the boycotters had sufficient justification for their action. The evidence showed that the aim of the boycot was to redress customers' grievances, not to force recognition of the political party. (Clegg E, 1960, pp 189 to 191).

But through the struggle, the Northern Rhodeia Government was finally forced to legislate. It passed a law in 1960, forbidding the discrimination in hotel dining rooms, restaurants, cafes, movie houses and in other business and public places. Many whites became disappointed and angry: "According to reports from Northen Rhodesian papers, as well as from foreign correspondents stationed there, some groups of angry white men attacted the Africans who took advantage of this law on the first week end it was in effect. In one town on the Copperbelt white men ran through the streets, shrieking curses and obscenities" (Powdermaker H, 1965, p 85). But that was all in vain; the law was there to stay.

Other parts of the status discrimination remained unaffected and so blacks continued struggling. The target

was the political power on which the discrimination finally rested. They had to acquire the political power if their status had to change for the better. "We must have self-government and a democratic Constitution now in Northern Rhodesia. We must get it before 1960 or face the prospect of Dominion status, and that means pertual subjugation to the British", said Sipalo, a black politician. (Rotberg R. I, 1972, p 293).

By that time, white settlers, particularly Welensky, had threatened to entrench their position by demanding dominion status for the Federation. Blacks retaliated by stepping up their opposition to the Federation, and in this respect the newly formed Zambia African National Congress was in the forefront.

Kaunda now headed the new party, after becoming unhappy with Nkumbula's leadership in the African National Congress. He was supported by many former members of the latter party. Together they became a serious threat to the whites' position, and consequently the white government banned the new party and imprisoned its leadership.

This was in 1959. In 1960 Kaunda emerged from prison and began afresh to lead the struggle for self-government and universal franchise. He and his colleagues started building up a new party, the United National Independence

Party, for achieving the objectives. The party gained mass support and was able to stand the numerous riots with police units and with members of the African National Congress.

1960 saw schools, bridges, and hospials go up in flames, especially during the months of July, August, and September. The British Government in England thus gained a glimpse of the deepening blacks' resistance to the Federation. With the help of the Monkton report that was released in October 1960, the Federation consequently received a death sentence (Hall R, 1976, p 143)and died out in 1963. Ayear latter, the independent republic of Zambia was born, with Kaunda as its first president.

We have therefore seen that during the Federation, the driving force of African nationalism was everywhere provided by status discrimination and that blacks' political control was the only alternative to the humiliation. Next we try to find out whether the status stratification had a place in the struggle for 'African Advancement'.

B. STRUGGLE FOR 'AFRICAN ADVANCEMENT'

In February 1954, in response to an approach by mining companies, the whites' trade union suggested to include the blacks' union and the whites' staff association, formed in 1941, in their long-standing discussions about what

was then known as 'African Advancement'. The consequent quadripartite talks ground to a deadlock on 24th July 1954. Then the Northern Rhodesia Government appointed a board of inquiry to look into the matter and, once more, to be headed by John Forster who had headed the 1940 commission.

In 1940, the Forster Commission had raised the issue of African Advancement by recommending that the 'mine managements should consider with representatives of the Government and the (whites') Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers Union to what positions not (then) open to him the African worker should be encouraged to advance'. By July 1954 the recommendation had been accepted in principle by both the companies and the Whites' union. But a difference of opinion lay on how it had to be implemented. The companies suggested to do so by letting blacks advance into jobs which were then done on some mines by blacks while on others by whites; by fragmenting or breaking down into components certain jobs then done exclusively by whites and letting blacks advance into the components at lower rates of pay and conditions of service than those that would apply to whites; and by creating some 'intermediate' jobs for blacks, that is new and substantially advanced posts not impinging on the preserve of whites'jobs. To this three-pronged su-

ggestion, whites objected, for they saw the possibility of the companies replacing them with cheap blacks. From their point of view, the objection was in no way racial. All they feared was that the differential rates and conditions of service would leave the whites at a disadvantage; that the companies would be enabled to displace white labour with black labour at cheaper rates; that the opportunities for employment of white workers and members of their families would be reduced; and that the whites' standard of living would deteriorate. They saw that their own protection lay in allowing blacks to undertake the whole job and re ceive the full rates and conditions to which whites were entitled. (Forster J, 1954, pp 19 and 20).

But the companies did not want blacks to be accorded the same rates of pay and conditions of service as those enjoyed by whites. The view of the companies was that the whites' rates of pay and conditions of service had little current relevance in determining the wage scales and conditions of service for black workers. The Forster Board summarised the view as follows: "Untill the later were better assimilated to European traditions their remuneration should properly be related to, though always measurably in advance of, the standards and needs of their own traditional society. Adequate assistance, training and encouragement should be made available to increase African pro-

ductivity and improve African standards and as a result African wage scales might be expected, as time advanced, to approximate more closely to European rates. Gradual evolution on these lines would enable the social economy of the rural communities, inevitably more backward and slower to advance, to progress without undue dislocation. Any excessive and hasty widening of the gap in social and economic status between African mine employees and the rural communities from which they sprang should, in the view of the Companies, be avoided, as tending to create an unhealthy and dangerous state of unbalance in the social economy both of the Territory and of the Federation" (Forster J, 1954, p 21).

This concern with traditions shows that the status stratification was being taken advantage of by the mining companies in their goal of profit maximisation. They did it during the economic depression of the 1930s, when, thereby, they unintentionally gave rise to the whites' trade union; they were still doing it by paying blacks less than they were paying whites doing the same jobs on the mines; and they were threatening to extend the advantage by proposing the more widespread differential payments.

Besides, the status stratification was helping the mine companies by legitimising their dominant bargaining

position on remunerating black workers. It was making it possible for the mining companies, as a class, to exploit the black workers more than they would otherwise have done.

The 1954 Forster Board of Inquiry favoured this situation by sympathising with the companies on both job fragmentation and differential rates of pay. So did the subsequent agreements between the companies and the whites' union that authorised these two principles. In fact, by 1960 many jobs had been withdrawn from Schedule 'A' (the list of jobs originally represented solely by the whites' union) and given to blacks on rates of pay unrelated to the whites', and fragmented to the satisfaction of the mining companies.

The black workers reacted by asking for a 'Unified Wage Structure' in the entire industry. Their union wanted a scale of wages in which various wage levels were interrelated and which had as its criterion the comparative value of the jobs performed. To achieve such a non-status based wage structure, the union suggested that:

"(1) The new jobs (sometimes referred to as intermediate jobs) created as a result of the second Advancement Agreement should be remunerated at a level of wages related to the Schedule 'A' scale.

(2) There should be a general increase in the level of wages for the ticket-paid workers, the great majority of whom were unaffected by the Advancement Agreement, so as to reduce the vast gap

> which existed between the lowest paid worker and the top of the Schedule 'A' scale" (Brown R, 1966, p 18).

The latter suggestion was strongly opposed by the companies and so a strike ballot was held among members of the blacks' union, resulting in 95.4 per cent vote in favour of a strike action.

At that time the Northern Rhodesia Government stepped in by appointing the 1962 Morrison Commission. This accepted the general wage rise, without specifying a numerical value for the rise. The numerical value was settled between the companies and the blacks' union later, on the 31st of July 1962.

So, when black politicians were taking over political power, the use of the status stratification for maintaining the position of economic gain by the mining companies was also dying out and a non-status based wage structure began to emerge through the general wage rise. This shows the anchorage of the status stratification on the political power.

C. CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE MINING INDUSTRY

It is necessary at this point to give a closer atte-

ntion to the relative deminance of class and status stratifications during the Federation, for the foregoing discussion of the use of the status stratification for economic gain suggests that industrial conflicts on the mines at that time were essentially class struggles.

At the start of the Federation in 1953, the Rhokana African Staff Association came into being. It was to be a union for black clerks, interpreters, and for other blacks occupying senior posts. The name of the association later changed to Mines' African Staff Association. By 1954 this had extended to other mining centres. There were branches at Nchanga, Mufulira, Roan Antelope and at Bancroft.

Justification, as expressed by the staff association, for the formation of the additional organisation for blacks was summed up by the Forster Board of 1954 in the following terms:

"(i) Although they are all Africans, they do not belong to one class and they do not work under the same conditions. Therefore they are not on the same level.

(ii) No single industrial association or union could be capable enough to serve a supervisor and a man working under him, especially when there is a conflict between the two.

(iii) For fear of being disloyal to his union, once the supervisor and the men working under him

> belong to one union, it becomes very difficult for him to exercise properly his powers over his gang. This state of affairs may cause him to ignore their mistakes and therefore lead him to negligence of duty" (Forster J, 1954, p 26).

This means that blacks in supervisory posts saw themselves as a class, as a group of people with distinct economic interests over which they had to cooperate.

The mining companies ' recognition of the association was withheld up until at the end of 1955. At that time the companies reached a new agreement with the blacks' union, by which a revised schedule of jobs to be represented by the union was made. Those withdrawn had to be represented by the association.

This only aggravated the discontent of the trade union. From the start the union did not like the rise of the association. It saw that as a weakening of its bargaining position.

In the same year 1955 another aggravating factor was the first advancement agreement that raised a total of 75 jobs from the jurisdiction of the whites' union. The majority of these went to the staff association, 2 went to the

Mines African Police Association. The blacks trade union was left with only 11.

The upshot was a series of the 1956 strikes which included what came to be known as the relling strikes. Thefirst strikes were "Nchanga, 23-24 May; Nkana, 18June; General Strike of 25 000 workers, 20-24 June; Rhokana, 2-8 July; Mufulira, 3-5 July"(Quinn K, 1971 p67). Then the relling strikes of two-to three-day duration occurred between 30th JUly and 23rd August. These followed a set order, "starting with the big mines, followed by the small mines and then the big mines again"(Mwendapole M. R, 1977, p 28). In addition there were several assaults by members of the Blacks' union on those of the staff association. The situation only came to an end when the Government of Northern Rhodesia, on 11th September 1956, imposed a State of emergence on the Copperbelt.

We have therefore seen that although the status stratification was dominant in the society as a whole, in the mining centres it was the class stratifications that dominated.

D. SUMMARY

The entire discussion, however, has again shown that the struggle for political power was essentially a status struggle. Blacks were convinced that the only sure way out of the subjugation was to wrestle political power from whites. The Federation had to go , and it did go, giving place to the independent Republic of Zambia that came into existence on 24th October 1964.

It is with regard to the mining industry that a different picture has emerged. During the Federation, mining companies used the country-wide status stratification for farthering their economic interests; the whites' union struggled to secure the economic position of its members by letting black workers advance, unencumbered by their status in society, into positions previously reserved for whites; and the blacks' union struggled to maintain its bargaining strength by obstructing the establishment and growth of the staff association. Thus, life in the mining centres came to be dominated by class struggles instead.

Chapter 6
CONCLUSION

We began this study with three major aims:

1. To refute/accept race as a base for social stratification in colonial Zambia.
2. To identify the main form of social stratification in colonial Zambia.
3. To identify causal relations among 'racial', class, and status forms of social stratification in the society.

After using the conflict approach focussing on struggles that took place during the colonial era (1890 - 1964), we are now in a position to summarise and discuss the findings.

A. THE MAIN FORM OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

In the first place, the main form of social stratification that existed in colonial Zambia was status stratification. It was so during the BSA Company rule, the colonial office rule, and during the Federation.

The blacks with whom the early white missioneries, administrators, and traders met had a different life-style. In those days there were no westernised blacks with whom friendships could easily be formed with the whites. The two groups came to exist separately. Each had its own style of life and confined social intercourse to its members.

At the time of contact, what prevented mutual respect or mutual ethnocentricism was the establishment of white political power, particularly through show of the military strength that resulted in actual conquest of blacks in some places and in treaties seeking the whites' protection in others. In this way, whites gained a higher social status and a status stratification emerged.

Weber once wrote that "For all practical purposes, stratification by status goes hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal and material goods or opportunities in a manner we have come to know as typical" (Weber M, in Bendix R and Lipset S.M (eds), 1974, p25). Indeed we saw that after it was established, the white status group embarked on a monopolisation of employment opportunities, of pavements or sidewalks, of shopping facilities, and of many other goods and services. The monopolisation, and its consequent discrimination, were largely maintained by their political power, either through legislation or through illegal use of the police force. Nkumbula, for example, was illegally beaten up by the police for calling a white girl a 'girl' and a white woman a 'woman'.

Blacks did not like that and so struggled to take over political power. Their political struggles were essentially status struggles. They wanted to get out of the subjugation by taking over the political power. That they did and on the 24th of October, 1964, the independent Republic of Zambia was born, with Kaunda as its first president.

On the whole then, the concentration of political power in the whites produced a status stratification. This, in turn, produced a status monopolisation which made blacks react through political conflicts that brought about Independence.

B. RACE AS A STATUS SYMBOL

Secondly, throughout the study, we have seen that race, that is skin colour, was nothing but a status symbol. The allocation of a social position to coloureds and the incident involving a black judge, Sir Francis Ibiam, were particularly revealing.

Of interest in this respect, is what M. Fraenkel wrote about black ex-slaves, locally known as Americo-Liberians, who came to settle in Liberia. He wrote that "In fact, the colour of their skins made it more important for them to

stress the social distance between themselves and the local Africans. The fact that they were not obviously physially different accentuated the fear - shared by other colonial communities - of being submerged in what was to them a barbarous and heathen society.. Thus, to distinguish themselves in appearance from the tribes-people, they adopted a formal, Western style of dress, inappropriate to tropical climates... " (Fraenkel M, 1965, pp13 and 14). This sort of situation was not necessary in colonial Zambia. There, skin colour was enough for achieving the requisite social visibility.

C. STATUS AND CLASS RELATIONS

Lastly, the status stratification brought about the class stratification in the mining industry through the differential remuneration of white and black workers, and through the willingness of the white workers to monopolise for themselves and for their future generations and white immigrants certain employment opportunities on the mines.

During the economic deppression, the mining companies sought ways of cutting down production costs, and so began replacing the expensive whites with cheap blacks. The whites reacted, in the light of the status stratification, by forming a trade union exlusively for themselves. But later this union began fighting for purely class interest and in imitation blacks also formed their own trade union. Thus, the class stratifications came into being.

Besides this casual relation in the rise of the class stratification, the status stratification, by legitimissing the differential remuneration, also made it possible for the mining companies to exploit black workers more than they would otherwise have done. The companies bargaining position vis-a-vis black workers was thus strengthened by the status stratification.

D. THEORETICAL HYPOTHESES

One theoretical hypothesis suggested by the entire study is that when a group of people assumes a concentration of political power through a struggle with another group, a status stratification comes into being. In fact, apart from colonial Zambia, this is what happened in India.

In the early phase of the rise of the caste stratification in India a struggle for power was in process. At that time Brahmans (or priests) wanted to be supreme arbiters of social policy and to subordinate the Kshatriyas (or warriors) who so far ruled the country. This struggle for power ended with the victory of the priests. The warriors thus formed a stratum lower in social status than the stratum comprising the priests. Then other occupational groups in the society became castes below the warriors, on the basis of a philosophy provided by the priests. (Cox O.C, 1959, p116).

The purpose of indicating this support is to encourage further research. The support shows that the hypothesis is worth undergoing a thorough investigation.

Another theoretical issue which needs thorough study is that in a society with a co-existence of class and status stratifications, the latter is dominant and skin colour is used as a status symbol. Connected with this is the idea that in such a society skin colour is not the cause of the discrimination; the differential status honour is.

Yet another such issue is that status monopolisations bring about political struggles aimed at changing the existing status stratification.

What we now need is a research design for testing these issues.

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