

THE DYNAMICS OF A COLONIAL PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF UKRAINE (1648-1730) AND BULOZI (1864-1911)

by

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This being a dissertation submitted in
partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts in
History, University of Zambia.

March 1982

To Mutumbula, my son, who spent many hours of loneliness.
He is part of this thesis.

I, Choolwe Beyani do solemnly declare that this
dissertation has never before been submitted for a
degree at any University.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Choolwe Beyani', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Signed

This dissertation of GHOLWE BEYANI is approved as
fulfilling the part of the requirements for the award of
the Degree of Master of Arts in History at the University
of Zambia.

Signed

Signed

Signed

Date

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Notes on Spelling and Glossary

Due to the different ways of spelling Lozi and Ukrainian words, I have attempted to be consistent in the spelling of the words. For Bulozzi, I have spelt the words as they are used by the natives of the country. Due to the author's unfamiliarity with Ukrainian spelling, especially the confusion with the Russian spelling, spellings might differ but an attempt at consistency has been made.

The following words have been used in the text.

Bulozzi

- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| <u>Induna</u> | - government official |
| <u>Kuomboka</u> | - the annual migration across the flood plain to the edge of the valley |
| <u>Kuta</u> | - government council |
| <u>Litunga</u> | - king or ruler of Bulozzi |
| <u>Makalaka</u> | - inferior person (usually non-Lozi and slaves) |
| <u>Makolo</u> | - military and civil institution |
| <u>Mulena Mokwae</u> | - queen mother (co-ruler at Nalolo) |
| <u>Nalikwanda</u> | - the royal barge |
| <u>Ngambela</u> | - prime minister |

Ukraine

- | | |
|------------------------------|--|
| <u>Hetman (ataman)</u> | - Cossack leader or ruler |
| <u>Kollegiia</u> | - the Little Russian Board - administrative organ in Ukraine from 1922 |
| <u>Malorossiiskii Prikaz</u> | - Russian administrative organ in Ukraine up to 1717 |

<u>Rada</u>	- Cossack ruling council
<u>Ruina</u>	- ruin
<u>Zemsky Sobor</u>	- Russian feudal parliament
<u>Sitch</u>	- Cossack military establishment below the Dnieper rapids
<u>Starshyna</u>	- Ukrainian nobility
<u>Szlachta</u>	- Polish gentry class
<u>Voyevoda</u>	- Russian military official

Abbreviations

BNP	- Barotse Native Police
BSACo.	- British South Africa Company
BSAP.	- British South Africa Police
DC.	- District Commissioner
NC.	- Native Commissioner
P.R.O.	- Public Record Office

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ABSTRACT

Colonialism is a historical process that had demonstrated unique but similar features in the different epochs of human history. The different processes of colonialism have been objects of study for a long time. Taking the cases of Ukraine and Bulozhi, this dissertation compares the colonial processes in these two different countries as they occurred under different times and conditions. The colonial process in each of the two countries was set in motion by internal and external contradictions affecting both the colonisers and the colonised. But emphasizing on the colonised countries themselves, the study shows that the internal contradictions in the colonies that led to revolutions to overthrow alien rule set forth a series of crises that led to internal political instability. This instability was a result of serious dynastic rivalries within the ranks of the ruling classes. The looming external threat posed by the ambitions of rival imperialist powers complimented the internal crises thus compelling Ukraine and Lozi rulers to each seek protection of a stronger ally among the imperialist powers. And this led to a signing of treaties of protection in 1654 in Ukraine and 1890 in Bulozhi with Russia and Britain respectively.

The signing of the treaties of protection became the basis for the establishment of the relations of co-operation between the colonies and the colonisers. This relationship was marked

by a large measure of mutual co-operation as this was a period in which colonial interests could not be immediately realised. The policy of co-operation was perpetuated in both cases by political and administrative weaknesses of the colonial powers, and the fears of possible internal revolts should undue colonial pressure be applied.


The transformation of the relations of co-operation (1654-1709 in Ukraine, and 1889-1900 in Bulozzi) was the product of determined colonial policy and the unequal power relations between the colonisers and the colonised. Other contributing factors were: the dynastic factionalism of the local ruling classes which gave room for policies of divide and rule, imperialist rivalries that worked to the detriment of the colonised, and deliberate economic and political pressure that undermined the independent statehood of Ukraine and Bulozzi. These factors contributed to the transformation. Treaty conditions were changed to suit colonial interests, while internal factional splits militated against organised resistance, and also led to corruption and buying of large sections of the local aristocracies by the colonial powers.

Between 1709 and 1730 in Ukraine, and 1900 and 1911 in Bulozzi, the process of colonial domination had become established. This was achieved by the strengthening of the colonised state apparatus so as to weaken the power of Ukraine and Lozi ruling classes. A vicious economic policy

was embarked upon in each country to exploit and dominate the resources of these countries. This took the form of tax and labour demands upon the local populations, and also the control and domination of the means of production and exchange.

The collapse of Lozi and Ukrainian economic and political independence inevitably led to loss of the independence of the ideological state apparatus. The ideological institutions of these colonies, namely religion and education, were either subjugated or replaced, thus allowing the colonial ideologies to be dominant. By the end of the period under study, Ukraine and bulozi had lost independent statehood. The ruling classes and their countries became appendages of the wider colonial empires.

THE USSR: UKRAINE INSERT



ZAMBIA : BULOZI INSERT

(ZAIRE)
CONGO

ANGOLA

•Balovale

Mashasha

•Ledlui

•Mongu

Kalabo

•LUSAKA

Kafue

MOZAMBIQUE



(ZIMBABWE)
SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Kazungula

Livingstone

Linyati

CAPRIV STRIP



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM

Following the out break of the First World War, some middle class elements in Ukraine, many of them descendants of the old Ukrainian nobility or starshyna, attempted to secede from the Russian state. Taking advantage of the war that had dislocated the old Russian imperial state, and the revolution that became dominated by the Bolsheviks, they staged an uprising and set up a ruling council called the Central Rada.¹ The initiative to do so could have arisen from a declaration by the new Soviet government setting its nationalities policy. A declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia 'gave full equality to all the nationalities of Russia and guaranteed their right to self-determination up to secession.'² The Central Rada was short-lived due to the international situation and the polarisation of forces within the country. The right-wing Rada government which allied itself with western powers was challenged almost immediately by Ukrainian Soviets who formed a rival Ukrainian communist government. Civil war broke out and the Ukrainian communists in alliance with the Soviet government in Moscow drove out the Central Rada. But war continued until the final defeat of Germany, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic remained part of the communist system on a federal basis with Russia, which had become the Soviet Union.

A somewhat similar situation developed in 1964 following Zambia's attainment of independence though on a scale and intensity less severe than that in Ukraine. Remnants of the old Lozi dynasty in league with separatist middle class elements that had Lozi dynastic ties called for the secession of Bulozhi (Western Province) from Zambia.³

Petitions were sent to the British Government protesting against the inclusion of Western Province in the newly independent republic on the grounds that it had never been part of the colonial territory of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). Though no civil war broke out on the Ukrainian pattern, the issue caused considerable anxiety among the leaders of the new Zambian Republic, and embarrassment to the British government.

Lozi anti-separatist activists with members of the ruling party - the United National Independence Party (UNIP) campaigned vigorously against the separatist threat. The issue was ultimately resolved when the UNIP leadership made a special agreement with the Litunga and his Councillors. This assured them that their special privileges and rights which they had enjoyed under colonial rule would be respected in return for keeping Bulozhi part of Zambia.⁴

The similarity of these two otherwise separate incidents, is no mere historical accident. The significance of the two events can be traced back to the colonial histories of Ukraine and Bulozhi. The analogy drawn here simply emphasizes the similarity of their colonial processes as well as the historically discernable differences. The

present study concerns itself with a comparison of the colonial process in Ukraine and Bulozhi, countries which were colonised by Russia and Britain respectively. It is a study of the methods by which an alien power comes to extend its political, economic and ideological weight over a weaker state, and thus completely colonise it. Having established this, general assertions or conclusions will be drawn about the colonial process as it related to the two countries concerned.

The problem of the study can be best outlined by posing a series of questions which the study intends to answer. How were these two countries colonised and why? How was it possible that a small number of colonial officials in Ukraine and Bulozhi could ultimately transform these countries into colonial dependencies? Finally and most crucial to this study, how is it that two apparently different societies that experienced colonialism at different times in history can be subjected to the comparative study?

The study attempts to answer these questions by making a number of assertions and generalisations about the colonial process. These are derived from the basic fact that whenever colonialism takes place, it does not serve the interests of the colonised but those of the colonisers. In this respect the process is initially defined by relations of co-operation which in the case of Ukraine and Bulozhi were characterised by treaties of cooperation

and friendship. But owing to unequal power relations, these relations were subverted and transformed to establish those of colonial domination, and thus the realisation of colonial interests.

Rationale

It would perhaps, at this stage be useful to explain why the two case studies have been chosen. Ukraine and Bulozí have been chosen for a variety of reasons. But the initial attention to these areas was somewhat arbitrary. During the course of proposing a research topic that was geared to introduce the author to areas of East European history, a suggestion was made to discuss boundary problems in Eastern Europe and Central Africa. In the course of research, it was discovered that a dissertation on boundary problems was somewhat too wide and complex for a master's study. There also arose a difficulty in discussing boundaries in isolation of the general colonial process. But this helped the author to 'stumble' upon Ukraine as a viable comparable case.

Both countries had a well defined sense of territoriality, and a measure of national consciousness which their ruling classes sought to defend and protect however narrow they might appear to a modern observer. They both had well developed and conspicuous ruling classes whose state system were historically suited to the conditions of the time. The nature of their state systems and their responses to colonial advances offers reasonably good grounds for comparing them.

There are several grounds upon which this thesis is justifiable. The first one lies with my dissatisfaction with the attention research of this kind has received. While empirical studies of early colonial expansions such as that of the Roman empire have been made, theoretical studies of imperialism have been confined to the late nineteenth century perspective. This is of course, understandable in view of the massive colonial acquisition of the non-European world by the major capitalist powers of Europe, which in itself marked a milestone in the development of capitalism. While not totally breaking with the tradition, this study compares the old imperial expansion that took place in Ukraine and the modern one as it occurred in Bulozhi. The present study hopes to demonstrate that despite their marked differences, the processes of colonial expansion are largely similar and hence comparable.

Ukraine and Bulozhi, and also the two colonial powers may demonstrate many differences, but in this maze of differences lies one basic historical phenomenon that opens the problem to a comparative possibility - colonialism. As a specific historical process, it involves activities of men entering certain relationships with one another, relationships which inevitably develop a series of contradictions which are often characterised by anti-colonial struggles. The complex but specific character of colonialism allows, therefore, a comparative study to be made irrespective of the different epochs in which colonialism takes place.

The second justification is based upon the grounds of an extended and deeper interpretation of colonialism. Many works on colonialism have been limited to specific cases of how and why colonialism took place but do not draw general and theoretical conclusions which the present study attempts to do. It is hoped that this study will help to fill the gap, and in that way contribute to the historiography of colonial expansions.

The third justification is based upon the unique character of the study which is lacking in current historiography. The fact that two apparently different societies can be subjected to a comparative method should be of considerable interest to scholars of European and African history. What is probably most striking is the absence of such studies on aspects of European and African history. This has tended to give an impression of an exaggerated historical dissimilarity thus obscuring certain possible comparable aspects or categories. It is therefore, hoped that this study will, while offering an interesting historiographical insight to aspects of European and African histories, also stimulate research into historical studies of this nature.

The Method

The thesis does not attempt to bring forward new information or data concerning the histories of Bulozhi or Ukraine, neither is its main purpose to give a detailed and narrative account. As a comparative study,

the substantial volume of existing works are the main sources and relatively little recourse has been made to primary and unpublished materials. The existing accounts of Ukrainian and Bulozhi histories are therefore not necessary to reproduce, but are used to interpret the historical phenomenon of colonialism. The narrative accounts which have been provided are purely for the purpose of keeping the reader within a meaningful historical perspective, and to avoid confusing the order of historical events.

The nature of the study has led to adoption of a methodology that generally covers three broad themes. These themes are general guidelines which offer a viable comparative framework for countries as diverse as these under discussion.

The first theme is that of the historical setting which offered the pre-conditions for establishing the initial stage of colonial contact between Russia and Ukraine on the one hand, and Britain and Bulozhi on the other. At the core of the theme are the crises that beset both countries following the out break of revolutions⁵ to overthrow alien rule. Both countries were previously dominated by alien aristocracies which were Polish in Ukraine, and Kololo in Bulozhi. Upon the out break of revolutions, new

ruling classes came to power which were largely national, and began the task of recreating a new state. A protracted internal crisis broke out in each of the two countries which became complemented by an external one. Ruling class rivalry intensified, aggravating political instability. The theme further illustrated how the threat posed by factional dynastic rivalries compelled the ruling classes of Ukraine and Bulozhi each to seek the protection of a powerful ally. This led to the signing of treaties of protection with their respective colonial powers.

The second theme, which operated throughout the period under study but which applied particularly to the earlier phase of co-operation is that of imperialist rivalry and competition that broke out sporadically over Ukraine and Bulozhi. This rivalry was fanned not only by the ambitions of the imperialist powers, but also by internal groups in the colonies. Just as much as the outside powers sought internal allies, so did some internal groups seek external allies, though this case is more demonstrable in the case of Ukraine than Bulozhi. The threat to the security and political independence of the two countries posed by external forces was one of the factors that compelled the ruling classes of these countries to seek external allies, and in that way to establish relations of co-operation. By taking the initiative, the ruling classes of Ukraine and Bulozhi hoped to avoid the tragedy of facing a possible military attack that would have spelt disaster to their independent existence. So, the quest for co-operation was dictated by internal and

external threats. Ukraine signed a treaty with Russia in 1654 and Bulozhi with Britain through the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1890.

The imperialist rivalry did not however end with the signing of the treaties of protection, but continued throughout the colonial epoch. It is for this reason that this is a recurring theme throughout the dissertation. The main antagonists in the struggle over the control of Ukraine were Russia and Poland. Others included Turkey and Sweden, all of whom were Ukraine's neighbours. In Bulozhi, these were chiefly Britain and Portugal, and to some extent Germany. All these had colonial territories bordering Bulozhi. Another foreign force though substantially different was the Ndebele, who quickly disappeared from the scene as they were rapidly subdued by British military conquest, but who prior to the conquest proved a menace to the Lozi state by their murderous raids.

The intensity of colonial rivalry especially after the signing of treaties that established the relations of co-operation was itself the product of the latter. This therefore, tended to make the colonial authorities more careful and discreet in their dealings with the colonies so as to avoid the possibility of a sudden change of alliances coupled by an internal anti-colonial revolt.

The relations of co-operation which marked the beginning of the colonial process tended, therefore, to emphasise co-operation and not colonial domination, often tinted

by diplomatic niceties between coloniser and colonised. There were also other reasons for the pursuance of the co-operative principle. In Ukraine, it was largely the stoic resistance of the Cossacks coupled by the administrative and military weakness of the Russian colonial state that forestalled immediate transformation to relations of domination. In Bulozhi where there was no overt resistance, it was the colonial administrative weakness that contributed to pursuance of the relations of co-operation. There was also a genuine desire on the part of the BSACo. not to force the Lozi into rebellion especially after the experiences of the Ndebele and Shona anti-colonial uprisings in Southern Rhodesia.⁶ In both of these colonial territories, the colonialists adopted a system of indirect rule in which the local ruling classes were given limited powers to run the affairs of their countries on behalf of their colonial overlords. This was part of the compromise colonialists made with the Ukrainian and Bulozhi aristocracies so as to get them under colonial control. Through such compromises, and other means, colonial rule was strengthened. Other means did not exclude duplicity, for example by unilaterally changing the terms of the treaty to suit the colonialists. Owing to the absence of strong colonial administrative machinery, this first phase of colonial expansion was therefore characterised by some form of mutual co-operation and understanding. But conflicts between the two sides arose frequently and in Ukraine sometimes led to war. The resistance of the colonised was

itself an indication of their desire for independence. This desire lessened somewhat as the colonial machinery increased its grip, and was only manifested in short bursts of opposition which often remained at the diplomatic level of petitions.

Imperial rivalry was itself a product of certain specific interests which were being pursued in Ukraine and Bulozhi. Thus, imperialist interests which were economic and political are also investigated and assessed. The resources of Ukraine and Bulozhi were needed by the imperialist powers. Russia wanted specifically to control production and trade in Ukrainian wheat so as to solve her own food problems. The BSACo. wanted minerals in Bulozhi, especially gold and diamonds. Having realised tremendous profits from the gold and diamond fields of South Africa, the mining magnates, encouraged by Britain, hoped to find a second Rand in Bulozhi. Their failure to find the resources led to exploitation of other resources. To keep their interests secure from foreign competitors, Russia and Britain sought to protect them by establishing political relations with the rulers of Ukraine and Bulozhi respectively.

The relations established by the treaties soon had disastrous consequences for the colonised. Ukraine and Bulozhi became victims of the situation popularly described as 'when elephants fight, the grass suffers.'

Russia and Poland frequently went to war over the Hetmanate, and often fought on Ukrainian soil. When

ignored or subjugated the interests of the Hetmanate. Similarly, the British and the Portuguese engaged in diplomatic clash over the Bulozhi - Angola border so severe as to threaten war. Though war was avoided through gentleman's agreements, the consequences were detrimental to the Lozi. For this reason, both Ukraine and Bulozhi lost parts of their provinces or territories, and also their political independence.

The third and final theme concerns the changing relationship between the colonial powers and the colonised after the establishment of the relations of co-operation. The contention of the dissertation is that having established these relations, the colonial powers sought ways and means of transforming and subverting them to establish relations of colonial domination. Hence, we assess the dynamics of colonial rule and the process through which the Ukrainian and Lozi aristocracies⁷ were politically, economically and ideologically undermined and reduced to colonial puppets. The colonial powers began to institute policies that reduced Ukraine and Bulozhi to typical colonies. The policies were largely similar though they differed in some respects. Military forces were established in the colonies and came to enforce colonial policies and laws. Tax was imposed, to realise profits and administrative expenses. Administrative reforms were introduced that either abolished or subordinated local institutions to those of the colonial regimes. Local ideological institutions such as school systems and religion were either suppressed or subordinated resulting in colonial ideological oppression.

The local autonomy of the ruling classes in both Ukraine and Bulozhi was severely restricted, and colonialists came to interfere directly with their political structures, to the extent that they even began to impose successors to the thrones of these countries. By this time, the states of these territories had become moribund though the institutions of the Litunga and Hetman continued to operate.

As can be seen, this study is thematically divided, and the themes that have been outlined above are broad and general to take into account meaningful comparative variables. Because colonialism is itself a continuing process, the themes do not always fit into specific periods, except the first theme of the historical setting. The periods chosen are however, essentially characterised by relations of co-operation and domination respectively. The themes that have been explained above run through these two periods of the colonial process. The years 1648-1730 for Ukraine, and 1864-1911 for Bulozhi are the periods in which the main processes of colonial domination were achieved.

Three main dimensions of colonial domination that come under comparative scrutiny are the political, economic and ideological spheres. Political domination must be seen as the process of control and domination of the political institutions - the state, and the ruling classes of the colonised people. Economic domination refers to the domination and control of the economic

resources of the colonised by colonial powers. These involve the means of production and the social relations. The means of production are taken to mean the major means by which people work to reproduce their livelihood. In Ukraine and Buluzi, these included land, the seed and the tools used. The social relations basically refer to labour organisation for production, and the institutions that arise for the control and mobilisation of the labour process. Their domination and control to serve colonial interests increasingly weakened the Ukrainian and Buluzi states while strengthening the hand of colonialism. This further accelerated the loss of legitimacy of the local ruling classes as they became part of the colonial state apparatus. This consequently led to the ideological oppression of the colonised, manifested in the attempted reorientation of the Ukrainian and Buluzi ruling classes to the ideological norms of colonialism. This also involved the domination and/or replacement of their ideological institutions.

The Theoretical Framework

Having laid out the scope of the study in its broadest terms, attention is now turned to the establishment of a theoretical framework for the study of imperialism and colonialism. This also involves a historiographical assessment of the theories related to imperialism as well as their relevance to the present study. An attempt is also made on a historiographical review of some of the comparative studies that have been undertaken to date.

Apart from providing a rationale on the scholarly necessity and possibility of this kind of study, this offers an insight into the different interpretations of imperialism. It must however be emphasised that this is not a comprehensive study of the theories of imperialism, but a rather brief outline of the main lines of argument among the different schools of thought on imperialism. And the main concern of this study is only that aspect of the debate that deals with the main factors that lie behind imperial expansion. This is followed by a discussion of some comparative studies.

The debate on imperialism involves basically three schools of thought, each with internal variants - the colonial school, the liberal school and the marxist school. The colonial school justifies colonialism as having been a necessary and humanitarian force. Fieldhouse, Faber and Robinson are representative of this school.⁸ The school rejects the ~~Marxist~~ interpretation of imperialism as economically determined. Instead, imperialism is seen to have been propelled by many factors such as political and strategic consideration, population expansion and humanitarian views. Faber goes on to explain the humanitarian cause of imperialism as the desire to end tribal warfare which was supposedly endemic in the non-European world. The fact that tension and wars were a perpetual feature of Europe does not appear to concern him. A more crucial factor that they appear to ignore is the fact that many wars that broke out in the countries where colonialism took place were

themselves due to an incipient imperialism that was beginning to create hostility, power rivalry and imbalance. In many parts where so-called tribal warfare broke out, this was the effect of imperialism in its infancy, and this was used as a pretext for colonial expansion which in fact had already been set in motion.

The authors that represent this school are not unanimously in agreement however, owing to differences in areas of emphasis. While the majority take factors explained above as having equal weight in explaining the imperialist expansion, Fieldhouse takes all the factors as having played a role, but his main emphasis is on the political factors. He argues that political factors were fundamental, and economic motives were either absent or insignificant. He says that the new imperialism (of the late nineteenth century) was specifically a political phenomenon in origin, which was an outcome of fears and rivalries within Europe.⁹ He explains these rivalries but fails to comprehend their economic basis be it trade or market considerations. While Faber emphasizes the role of public opinion in crystallising imperialism, Robinson argues in a similar view but with what he calls 'official mind of imperialism.' He sees the imperial idea as having been the actual motive force of imperialism. By looking through the spectacles of British imperialist officials, he becomes a victim of their expressed thoughts or ideas. This sterile approach leaves room therefore,

for representing ignorant and even false statements or opinions of the officials as reflecting reality. The situation is made worse when an imperial official who is ignorant of the economic forces behind imperialism makes a statement discrediting imperialism as economically wasteful and such an opinion is taken as 'the official mind' of imperialism. Even if it was, the reality of imperialism eluded him.

Within the above school are those writers that have looked at colonialism from their actual colonial experience. Such are Crocker and Lugard, the latter being at one time a British colonial official who saw colonialism as having a civilising mission. Though he admitted to the role of competition among European powers as a primary factor, he nevertheless argued in a decidedly racist colonial fashion that native warfare and plunder led to the intervention of civilisation from Europe.¹⁰

The liberal school of thought is represented by Hobson.¹¹ This school does not essentially justify colonialism but sees it as an attempt to gain surpluses. It therefore accepts the economic motives as having been paramount but argues that the colonial venture was in fact wasteful and uneconomic. Hobson was one of the first liberal historians to recognise the economic motives of imperialism, but he went on to claim that this did not bring the expected material benefits, and was

hence a burden to the tax payer in Europe. He accused the European ruling classes of selfish interests (assuming these were economic) while at the same time asserting that trade did not 'follow the flag', it remained precarious and unprogressive.¹² He was expressing anger at colonial expenditures rather than assessing the objective long-term value of colonialism to the imperialist countries, regardless of temporary setbacks.

Robinson and Gallagher hold similar views on the uneconomic nature of imperialism. Using a deliberately distorted selection of sources, they reach a decidedly anti-Leninist interpretation. They argue that imperialism could not have been dictated by economic interests because capital exports were directed not to the African colonies but to develop dependencies like Canada and Australia. It is for this reason that they view the colonial adventure as expensive, and hence find comfort in subjugating economic motives as the cause of imperialist expansion.¹³ But they attribute the main factor that accounted for colonial and imperial expansion to strategic interests. They give two examples of this strategic interest - one in Egypt where the British needed Egypt as the route to India, and the other in South Africa. The crises that broke out in both countries are believed by the two authors to have created the need for strategic security. They also as a result advance the thesis that such activities in the colonies led to the emergence of collaborators who were instrumental in the realisation of imperial expansion.¹⁴

Three observations can be made on the Robinson-Gallagher thesis. Firstly, the export of capital to the developed dependencies, rather than to the African colonies does not harm Lenin's argument at all. Capital looks for sources of raw materials, not simply in areas where sources are well established but even in areas they are believed to exist. Hence, the carving up of the world could not immediately result in capital exports, and certainly would not have been preceded by them but capital exports had to await exploration. But because every part of the world was potentially a source of cheap raw materials, competition for their colonisation was high. That was why spheres of influence or protectorates were declared as acts of monopoly control, thus eliminating other contenders.

Secondly, the so-called strategic security considerations should be seen as having been basically economic. Robinson and Gallagher were either strangely unaware of or chose to ignore the basic economic interests in Egypt and diamond rich South Africa. The crises that broke out there were simply responses to an advancing imperialist crisis as local interests attempted to resist imperialist encroachment.

Thirdly, the so-called local collaborators could not have collaborated without the arrival of

imperialism on their door step. Neither does this explain causes of imperial expansion because the process of collaboration was itself the product of the presence of imperialist forces.

It is no accident, therefore, that both schools of thought are decidedly anti-Leninist, and therefore, anti-Marxist. While the liberal school may accept some elements of Leninist interpretations, especially the economic basis of imperialism, it still rejects the view that colonisation benefited the colonising powers. The colonial school rejects entirely the ~~Marxist-Leninist~~ approach. Both colonial and liberal schools however, ignore the class basis of imperialism and tend to lump it into purely national categories.

Lenin in his exposition of imperialism looked at production where social classes were organised in the process of production. He therefore, saw imperialism in its late stage as having been the product of capitalist laws of production¹⁵ and of the contradictions inherent in capitalism.

Lenin's thesis pointed to five major developments within the bourgeois capitalist system. The growth of competition led to the growth and domination of monopolies in all branches of production.¹⁶ This also led to the merging of finance capital with industrial capital which hitherto had been separate

branches of capital. As the domestic market could not accommodate the entire capitalist produce, as well as the rise in the organic composition of constant capital, this led to periodic crises which necessitated the establishment of external sources of raw materials and markets. This also meant export of capital to areas where labour was cheap, and constant capital composition in production would be low. The inevitable consequence of this was the division of the world among the large corporations, which in the case of Central Africa was the British South Africa Company. Because of increasing insecurity of cartel competition in the colonies, the colonial markets had to be defended by a process of formal acquisition. Hence, the division of the world among the great capitalist powers of the world.

Lenin and his ideological successors see imperialism as the monopoly stage of capitalism. Despite various trends in Marxism after the second world war, the analysis of causes of imperialism has been largely unaltered since Lenin's time.¹⁷ What has been an issue of debate is the post-Lenin era of imperialism and the fate of Lenin's predictions which certain scholars contest, but this is outside the theme of this study.

Radical class analysis which falls in the marxist vein is adopted in this study. Lenin was simply

writing a sketchy outline which was inhibited by conditions of exile as well as purpose and hence did not take account of class relations in the colony which the present study hopes to illuminate. Writing during the throes of World War I, Lenin aimed at explaining the causes of the predatory imperialist war with the intention of galvanising the European working class into a revolutionary uprising against their capitalist exploiters, and did not concern himself with pre-19th century imperialisms.

While the first two schools highlight other areas of imperialism that the marxist tradition ignores, the author finds their basis for explaining imperialism defective and wrong. They are useful to scholars who would be interested in other aspects of imperialism (e.g. ideology) but cannot be effective in explaining imperialist expansion.

The above historiography (of the three schools of thought) is itself defective in the sense that while it offers tools of analysis, it does not offer a comparative framework. Its major concern is with the imperialism of the nineteenth century.

Some studies have been conducted which though not really comparative, come close to the purpose of this study. These have been attempts to study the processes of colonial expansion throughout documented

Colonisation¹⁸ traces the development of colonial expansion throughout the ages of Europe and sees the earlier expansions as landed agriculture imperialism. He argues that the nature of colonial expansion changed with changes in technological innovation. It is this type of expansion that is applicable to Ukraine during the period of Polish rule, especially following the introduction of the deep plough. Verlinden further states that the imperial expansion of Europe into other areas of the world following the industrial revolution was in itself unique as it was in pursuit of surplus. The latter is an unfortunate flaw because colonial expansions in earlier ages also sought some forms of surplus. It would have been better to say that the 19th century search for surplus was itself unique as it was demanded by a capitalist mode of production at its monopoly stage. Several writers have undertaken similar studies such as R. Betts, Europe Overseas,¹⁹ which traces the origins of European colonial expansion from the early ages to the nineteenth century. Betts defines imperialism as 'that consciously undertaken state activity in which force, intrigue or even negotiation are employed to secure the long range political and economic domination by the state of foreign territory or foreign peoples it wishes for some reason to control'.²⁰ This definition is appropriate to this study for it

is general enough to incorporate elements of the late nineteenth century and of the old such as those imperial expansion in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

More controlled comparative studies have been made by Furnival, Crocker and Niculescu.²¹ Furnival discusses the differences and similarities that exist in the colonial policies and sees the historical epochs in which colonisation takes place as crucial in formulating colonial policies. He further argues that whatever time this happens, economic consideration is often paramount, a factor he uses as the frame of reference in the comparison. Crocker, a colonial apologist, takes institutional reforms and changes as an area of comparison. Niculescu takes colonial planning in areas such as agriculture and capital investment as comparative possibilities.

The above historiography offers good grounds for formulating areas of comparison in historical studies. These studies however, are quite general in approach and do not discuss in detail the specific changes or transformations that take place in the internal structures of the colonised.

Other equally challenging studies have been undertaken on societies that are different but offering interesting similarities. J. Bryce, The

Ancient Roman Empire and the British Empire in India²²

is a study of this nature, though his main concern is the diffusion of English and Roman law throughout the world.

Comparative studies have also been made in fields outside the theme of colonialism. A brief review of such historiography which appears unrelated to the topic, is useful to emphasise the necessity as well as possibility of a competently handled comparative study. The review also offers a much more thorough bibliographic rationale for this dissertation.

In the realm of revolutions, comparative studies have been competently handled precisely because of identifiable areas of commonality. Crane Brinton's Anatomy of Revolution compares American, English, French and Chinese revolutions and finds a common cause in the material and ideological conditions of these societies.²³ Similarly, Barrington Moore has studied French, Chinese and Russian revolutions²⁴ - three different historical phenomena but which he competently handles.

Comparative studies have also been handled on such a daunting topic as modernisation involving equally different societies. M. Craig's Japan, A Comparative View²⁵ is collective of comparative studies of Japan,

America and Korea in their development aspects. The author views inter alia institutional structures of these societies as the basis of comparison in spite of the alien cultural influences that affected their development. Another work edited by Cyril Black, The Modernisation of Japan and Russia²⁶ views the two countries as latecomers to modernisation. But he finds them comparable in chronology, cultural tradition and exposure to Western challenge.²⁷ He argues that these societies show 'surprising areas of commonality in those earlier stages of their development that underlie the vast differences between them, differences that have generally commanded attention'.²⁸

On the African scene, Edward Steinhart, Conflict and Collaboration²⁹ has made a very controlled comparative study of the Kingdoms of Ankole, Toro and Bunyoro in their responses to the imposition of British colonialism. He calls the process by which external forces were accommodated to the domestic political scene by the leaders of the African polity as collaboration - an active policy of co-operation and compromise.³⁰

Steinharts' approach is by its nature and purpose very close to this study though the areas of study apparently have much more in common than Ukraine and Bulozzi. While this study shares Steinhart's interest in uncovering the political process of collaboration, it goes beyond to discuss the economic and ideological consequences of colonialism within the comparative framework.

This dissertation might attract more attention to the differences that exist between the two case studies than the similarities. It is however hoped that by concentrating more on the colonial process under comparative scrutiny than other interrelated issues, this problem will be avoided, and a more meaningful understanding of the study will be arrived at. The historiographical outline provides adequate grounds for justification of a thesis of this nature. This has indicated that differences in the historical and cultural conditions of countries or societies are no hindrance to the use of the comparative method. This historiographical insight adopted by this study offers challenging research possibilities to scholars of European and African history who might otherwise have been confined in their own regional historiographies.

Organisation


The framework of analysis has led to the present structural organisation of the remainder of the dissertation, which is divided into three chapters. The second chapter deals with the relations of co-operation that were established in Ukraine and Bulozhi, first describing them separately and then comparing them. Chapter three deals with the relations of domination, again, as two separate case studies and then comparatively. The final chapter is a conclusion which assesses the major achievements of the comparative study.


Notes to Chapter 1


1. Progress Publishers, History of the USSR, Part Two, (Moscow: Progress, 1977), 53.
2. Academy of Sciences of the USSR Institute of History, A Short History of the USSR, Part II, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), 41.
3. See G. Caplan, 'Barotseland: The Secessionist Challenge to Zambia,' Journal of Modern African Studies (October, 1968), 343-360; T.O. Ranger, 'Nationality and Nationalism: The Case of Barotseland,' Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, vol. 4, No. 2, (1968) 227-246.
4. Northern Rhodesia, The Barotseland Agreement, London: H.M.S.O., 1964.
5. Revolution means a complete political change of a ruling class to be replaced by another through popular but violent means. Palace coups are sometimes referred to as revolutions where this involved change of leadership but strictly at the political level.
6. T.O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7, A Study in African Resistance, (London: Heinemann 1967).
7. Aristocracy means a ruling class with hereditary claims to its social, political and economic dominance in society. Lozi and Ukrainian aristocracies began to reform themselves after the revolutions to hold absolute political and economic power by hereditary right, real or imagined.
8. D. Fieldhouse, The Theory of Capitalist Imperialism, (London: Longmans, 1967); Economics and Empire, 1830-1914, (London: Faber and Faber, 1966); R. Robinson, Africa and the Victorians, (London: Macmillan, 1961); R. Faber, The Vision and the Need, (London: Faber, 1966). For other works that followed this line of thought see F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922); W.R. Crocker, On Governing Colonies, (London: George and Unwin, 1947); L. Gann and P. Duignan, The Burden of Empire, (London: Pall Mall, 1968).
9. Fieldhouse, The Theory, xv. See also W. Crocker, On Governing Colonies.
10. F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate, 5.

11. J.A. Hobson, Imperialism, A Study, (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1938).
12. Ibid, 38.
13. R. Robinson, Africa and the Victorians (London: Macmillan, 1961), 25.
14. See W. Louis, Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy, (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), 3-10. For an interpretation that simply takes economic, religious and glory seeking factors see R. Winks, British Imperialism: Gold, God, Glory (New York, Holt: Reinhart and Winston, 1963).
15. V.I. Lenin, 'Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism', in Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress, 1970).
16. Ibid, 679-689.
17. See V. Lichtheim, Imperialism, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971); M. Barrat-Brown, The Economics of Imperialism, (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1974); A. Owen and S. Satchcliffe, Studies in the Theories of Imperialism, (London: Longman, 1972).
18. C. Verlinden, The Beginning of Modern Colonisation (Ithaca, New York: Cornell, 1970).
19. Betts, Raymond, Europe Overseas: Phases of Imperialism, (New York: Basic Books, 1968); Also see J.H. Perry, Europe and A Wider World, 1475-1715, (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1949).
20. Betts, Europe Overseas, 5.
21. J.S. Furnival, Colonial Policy and Practice, A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India, (New York: New York University Press, 1956); W.R. Crocker, On Governing Colonies; B. Niculescu, Colonial Planning, a Comparative Study, (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1958).

22. J. Bryce, The Ancient Roman Empire and the British Empire in India: The Diffusion of Roman and English Law throughout the World, (London: Oxford University Press, 1914).
23. C. Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, (New York: Random House, 1965).
24. B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, (London: Penguin Books, 1974); See also R.R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic revolution, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966).
25. M. Craig, ed., Japan, A Comparative View, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979).
26. C.E. Black ed., The Modernisation of Japan and Russia: A Comparative Study, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1975).
27. Ibid, 2.
28. Ibid.
29. E. I. Steinhart, Conflict and Collaboration, The Kingdoms of Western Uganda, 1890-1907, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977).
30. Ibid, vii.







CHAPTER 2

RELATIONS OF CO-OPERATION

UKRAINE: 1648-1709

The newly-born Ukrainian state or the Hetmanate established relations of co-operation with Russia in 1654 following the signing of the Pereyaslav treaty. This marked the beginning of the Russian colonial process, and the entire period between 1654 and 1709 was characterised by a protracted struggle by the Cossacks to maintain the independence of their state from the centralising effects of Russian colonial policy. Their success in maintaining this independence arose from several interrelated factors. The initial weakness of the Russian colonial administration coupled by staunch Cossack resistance made it difficult to institute policies that would have effectively reduced Ukraine to a colonial status. The unsettled conditions in Ukraine following years of civil strife and war with Poland, a declining colonial power, created an extremely restive population which could not be quickly and easily harnessed to the colonial yoke. Under such conditions, Russia was forced to adopt a cautious diplomatic policy of co-operation, and little internal interference.

But several factors also worked against the Hetmanate. The factional and intriguing character

of the Cossack aristocracy, constant warfare, and the contentions of rival imperial powers militated against the unity and strength of the Hetmanate. This allowed the Russian state to penetrate some of the institutions of the state, and prepare the ground for the defeat of the Hetmanate in 1709, and hence bring an end to its independence.

This chapter investigates, therefore, this process of co-operation and accommodation, from the time of the signing of the 1654 treaty. The interests of the parties to this treaty will be discussed, and it will be explained why the clash of interests was to surface later, and the treaty undermined. The process of assimilation of the upper sections of the Ukrainian ruling class to the Russian ideological system will also be investigated.

The process of the establishment of the relations of co-operation is placed in a historical setting, the period prior to this process. The historical setting puts in perspective the conditions and events that led to the establishment of the relations of co-operation. Following the establishment of the Hetman state or Hetmanate in 1648 through a Cossack-led national revolution against Polish rule in Ukraine, a series of crises set in. At the centre of the crises was the failure of

Poland to recognise the changed political situation in Ukraine and her attempts to reconquer the country. This crisis compelled the Cossacks to seek accommodation with Russia if they were to survive at all.

Historical Setting

The historical setting covers the period 1648-1654. This was the period in which a revolution broke out against Polish rule in Ukraine. This section covers therefore, the problems of the Hetmanate ruling class. A continuing political crisis haunted the Ukrainian ruling class especially the continuing war with Poland whose immediate end was not in sight. It was this particular problem that led to accommodation with Russia in 1654.

Before 1648

Ukraine had fallen under the yoke of Polish landlords following the downfall of Kievan-Rus in the fourteenth century under the might of the Turkish - Mongolian empire, popularly known as the Golden Horde. Even after its collapse, remnants of the Golden Horde, taking the form of Crimean Tatars, who had become the vassals of the Mongols continued to plunder Ukraine for slaves and booty right into the seventeenth century.

The collapse of the Golden Horde also led to a power vacuum in Ukraine, as Ukraine increasingly became

a border zone between Islam and Christianity. Because of constant warfare on the border region of the southern steppes, no settled life could be encouraged. Economic conditions were hard and austere, based on hunting and fishing, while nomadic frontiers-men engaged in murderous raids with Tatar hordes.

In the northern regions of Ukraine, the Poles moved in and colonised,¹ especially the region around Kiev. Attracted by the country's rich black soil, Polish colonists came to own vast estates. Agriculture became more developed especially with the introduction of the deep plough in the sixteenth century which was able to turn the thick and deep-rooted grassland, intractable to the traditional plough.² Polish feudalism became entrenched, and its climax was the 1569 Lublin Union which united Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland into a commonwealth.³ That act sought to establish a federation under one king (a Pole) and a feudal parliament, though in practical terms, the union never materialised and remained only on paper.

But the unification of the Polish Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, creating the Uniate Church led to Polonisation of large sections of the Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy. The Uniate Church began to deal severe blows to Orthodoxy, and

thus became the main medium of Polish cultural and ideological influence. A schism developed among the Ukrainian people and clergy as resistance against the Uniates developed. The conflict was manifested in the 1648 revolution when Hetmans dismantled the Uniate Church.

By the end of the first half of the seventeenth century, Ukraine had developed a socio-economic system along Polish feudal lines. The Polish colonists composed of the szlachta and their Polonised Ukrainian colleagues dominated the densely populated regions of Kiev and Poltava.⁴ Peasants faced direct exploitation owning little or no land. They were virtually owned by their masters as perpetual labourers on the lords' lands. It was this situation that led to a massive combined Cossack - peasant revolt against Poland in 1648 which led to the establishment of the independent state of the Hetmanate.

This was not the general scene all over Ukraine, however. There were still many pockets of free peasants who owned land communally especially towards the steppe frontier zones. These appropriated products of their own labour, a factor that encouraged revolts when this freedom later became curtailed by the advancing tide of serfdom.

Far out into the steppe frontier up to the Black sea were settled pockets of Cossack rebels and freebooters.

These were runaways from either Polish or Russian serfdom who sought a free roving life in the wild steppe of Eurasia. Their ranks were periodically swelled by large numbers of runaway serfs, who saw in this Cossack life a freedom from the tax and labour burdens of serfdom. They roamed the empty steppe, hunting and fishing, often pillaging and plundering Tatar hordes and Polish estates. It was this class of wild frontiersmen who were later in the 17th century to dominate the history of Ukraine.

Though the Cossacks roamed and pillaged the steppes, they nevertheless settled in more inaccessible forest regions like south-east Ukraine where for defensive reasons, they set up military fortresses.⁵ The strongest of these military fortresses was the Zaporozhian Sitch, meaning below the rapids as it was situated below the Dnieper rapids, and almost impossible to approach by a stranger owing to the natural barriers.⁶ This was to become the seat of revolutionary agitation and war at the close of the first half of the seventeenth century.

In these military settlements, which played the role of a military and naval academy, a sort of camaraderie was developed which encouraged equal membership for all regardless of one's social background. The Sitch especially, became the haven for dissaffected peasants, and all anti-feudal

elements and other malcontents. Primitive institutions like the army were developed which revolved around basic requirements of survival and warfare. The Cossack's common ideological unity was Orthodoxy. But very little concern was given for religion, and not until the seventeenth century did Cossacks combine social issues with religion fighting on the side of Orthodox masses.

Their leader was called Ataman or Hetman who was publicly elected by the Cossack assembly or Rada. Their primitive democratic passions were nurtured by the hard conditions of bare existence which did not leave much room for a well established state hierarchy. An Ataman demonstrated his qualities in warfare and acts of brigandage. Because of this physical requirement, he was not allowed to grow old, for he would be immediately replaced, and more often killed. In essence, small embryonic states had begun to be established but strictly on military lines. It was indeed their sudden appearance in history coupled by their obscure growth that the Cossacks became the object of romanticism and idealism as expressed in Ukrainian folklore and ballad.⁷

Because of its association with serfdom, settled agricultural life was loathed by the Cossacks. Only aged members went to settle down for agricultural work due to their physical disability to continue

the life of a rebel and fighter. The rest preferred to plunder rich estates, trade wagons and Tatar trade settlements, and bartering their goods for food during the cold winter months around the cities.

The dual character of Cossack life, that of peasant and also Cossack rebel, can also be explained by the understanding of Hobsbawm's concept of the social bandit who rebels against the state but attempts not to antagonise the relations with his own kinsmen and the ordinary people upon whom he depends for food and security. This way, he is idealised by the peasant masses who see in him the symbol of a rebel fighting against state injustice.⁸ The Cossacks would probably fit in this category. They fought state tyranny though lacked organisational ideology, and in the process maintained good relations with the peasants who after all faced similar state injustices and were also potential Cossacks.

Realising the military capacity of the Cossacks, European powers sought to enlist them as mercenaries in their armies for keeping internal order, and conquests abroad.⁹ The Russian state recruited thousands of them for this purpose, and so did the Polish state. They fought for the highest bidder, commanded by their own officers. For Poland, the enlisting of the Cossack army was largely due to the internal political problem they posed. From the 1590s to the 1630s, the Cossacks rose in armed insurrections which were costly to pacify. The

problem was compounded by some sections of the Polish gentry who began to find a stake in Ukraine and to resist the encroaching centralising tendencies of the Polish state. These could easily defect as some later did, and cause serious trouble in a region already turbulent.

Cossacks were put on an official register, and organised along the lines of the Polish army but under their own commanders. Hence started a process which further stratified the Cossacks between an elite military class, most of which was Polonised, enjoying the privileges of an aristocracy, and the ordinary Cossack soldiers. By the first quarter of the seventeenth century, six thousand Cossacks were registered out of an estimated population of between thirty and forty thousand.¹⁰ The rest faced enslavement under the mercy of local magnates. Many fled to the Zaporozhian Sitch, which by this time was teeming with all sorts of malcontents, and aggrieved peasant masses who resorted to Cossacking. This was an expression of resistance to antagonistic social relations in the unfolding class struggle. Polish magnates and Polonised Ukrainian gentry were objects of this hostility.

Because of strict measures to strengthen serfdom and limit the register, a series of rebellions broke out in 1630, 1637 and 1638 but were all crushed.¹¹ Between 1638 and 1648 was a period of the 'golden peace' in which Cossacks were reduced on the register,

and no war in Europe took place. Landlords rejoiced in Poland, but were unaware of the storm that was to come.

Revolution and War, 1648-1654

In 1648, a massive social revolution broke out in Ukraine starting from the tumultuous Cossack assembly in the Sitch led by Hetman Khmelnytsky, spreading to the entire breadth of Ukraine, and even spilling into Poland itself. The massive social character of the uprising is demonstrated by Rudnytsky who writes that 'all strata of the Ukrainian-population, excepting the magnates and their retainers, participated in the uprising, an indication of how deep was resentment against the Polish regime in Ukraine.'¹² At the battle of Korsun, the forces of the Hetman destroyed the entire Polish army, capturing its major commanders, Potocki and Kalinowski.¹³

The Cossack-led revolution showed its contradictions almost immediately. This was due to the composition of the class forces in the revolution. The top leadership of the Cossacks led by the Hetman belonged to the increasingly aristocratised class, especially those who defected en masse from the Cossack registered regiments. These provided the backbone of the insurrection, and hence came to dominate state power. Their strong ties with the Polish szlachta, of which Khmelnytsky was a typical case having been a petty-noble¹⁴

was manifested by their ambivalence towards Poland. Despite having risen against Poland, the latter remained a model for their state reconstruction combined with their own Cossack institutions. The alliance between Cossacks and peasants proved to be a marriage of convenience which broke down as the post-revolutionary era sharpened class distinctions.

Hetman Khmelnytsky was not even clear about what he intended to do. He would have probably settled for the redressing of physical injustice done to him by Polish authorities had it not been for the popular character of the revolution.¹⁵ It was the Ukrainian theological scholars of the Kievan Academy, and the effect of the warm welcome given to him by European ambassadors at his entrance in Kiev, that changed his vision. He then decided to call himself the 'Prince of Rus' with Kiev as the capital.¹⁶

While the Cossack aristocracy was suing for peace under the evident glamour of noble pretensions, the revolution spread beyond their comprehension. Peasants revolted and whole towns fell into rebel hands. In the words of Doroshenko, 'by the end of the summer of 1648 the region had been cleared of Polish administration. . . . In the first months, not a single Polish soldier, nor landowner nor Roman Catholic priest, nor Jew was left alive between Chihirin in the south to

Chornopil on the extreme northern limit of the forest district in the north.¹⁷

It was this revolution in the countryside which the Ukrainian leaders failed to comprehend probably overwhelmed by their unexpected rise to power. The problem was also largely due to ignorance of peasant interests and a lack of an alternative to a feudal socio-economic system. It was quite clear that peasants were not so interested in the lofty ideas of Ukrainian sovereignty and freedom, as in the abolition of serfdom. Their main concern was to own land and live a life free of landlords. Illiterate and impoverished as they were, political power struggles and the establishment of an independent state were not related to their immediate grievances, and of entirely no relevance to them. It is quite obvious that the interests of the Cossack aristocracy and the peasants were worlds apart, not to mention the increasing distance between common Cossack soldiers and their aristocracy. It was the literate Cossack elite and the orthodox priests and clerics including patriotic though Polonised ones who conceived ideas of Ukrainian independence. They represented the new ruling class. Despite the varying trends in their political orientation they were united in the intention to achieve this independence either by peaceful or violent means. Their different social, political and ideological orientations were to emerge

later, a factor that encouraged factional tendencies and hence made difficult the process of maintaining the independence and autonomy of the Hetmanate.

There were many other internal problems that beset the Hetmanate as a result of the war of national liberation. The war had dislocated the society and undermined production leading to economic chaos. Tatars were also never good allies due to their ravageous tendencies that ruined entire southern Ukrainian populations.

Following the treaty of Bila Serkva in 1648 between Poland and Ukraine, a treaty which guaranteed Ukrainian independence, but also allowed Polish landlords to return, peasants revolted. This further plunged the Hetmanate into endless internal chaos and political instability. Neither were the Cossack rank and file happy with the terms of the treaty which restricted the Cossack register, while the revolution had created tens of thousands of Cossacks.

Even the reformation of the Cossack state demonstrated contradictions which further alienated the aristocracy from the people, while its stability was threatened by growing factional tendencies within the ruling class. The Hetmanate was created and refashioned under war conditions. Having no ruling class traditions of their own, they improvised, imposing Cossack institutions on the whole country. They also borrowed whatever elements of the Polish model they could. The whole

country headed by the Hetman was reformed and divided into sixteen military zones or regiments, each administered by a colonel. There were initially nine on the Right Bank and seven on the Left Bank of the river Dnieper but were later increased.¹⁸ All the staff had military ranks and carried out both judicial and administrative functions. The Zaporozhian army became the administrative as well as military apparatus of the state.

The ~~weakness~~ and inexperience of the new ruling class was probably influential in the return of Polish nobles who were able to swear allegiance to the new leaders.¹⁹ Their literacy and experience were found useful to the state, though this also meant giving them back their estates, enserfing peasants in the process. By 1658, a well established landed aristocracy had emerged, a combination of the top Cossack military class, patriotic Ukrainian and Polish gentry and higher sections of the Orthodox monasteries.²⁰

The economic growth and potential of the Hetmanate made this class development possible. The advance in agriculture (through the estate system) enabled the society to sustain a non-labouring class of the nobility. The aristocracy, their appetites whetted, contrived to accumulate personal wealth in the form of estates.

The internal contradictions affected the ordinary people. Peasants began to run away to the forest regions to escape bondage and war.²¹ The popularity of the Hetman was waning. Externally, the Cossack aristocracy failed to find security as Poland stubbornly sought to reconquer Ukraine.

Despite the initial successes against Poland, the Cossacks failed to achieve complete military victory, and neither could Poland. Between 1648 and 1651, three treaties had been signed but did not hold because of the antagonistic objectives of the two.²² The treaties proved to be simple breathing spells between continued fighting. In many parts of the country, the Hetmanate troops were facing reverses. The Crimean Khan, overlord of the Tatars, had been called to assist Ukrainian forces but had abandoned them three times at points when Cossacks were on the verge of victory.²³ A crisis of perpetual warfare therefore created the need for an external ally.

The combination of internal and external crises thus compelled the Rada to seek external aid. Several possible options existed. There was the Crimean Khan, but he was disqualified by his previous unreliability. Moldavia, Wallachia and Sweden were potentially good allies but were not regarded as strong enough against the Polish army. The Tsar of the Grand Duchy of Moscovy was potentially the most viable ally of the moment.

The Russo-Ukrainian Alliance

The early years of the 1650s were crucial in the formulation of Ukrainian as well as Russian policies toward one another. Moscow was all along interested in Ukraine for both political and economic reasons. Expansion into Ukraine would open the gates to the Baltic region which was the centre of Christian controlled commerce.²⁴ Besides, Ukraine, then popularly known as the 'bread basket' of Europe due to its surplus wheat output was an obvious object of Russian colonial interest. With a long history of periodic famines which sometimes created such social stress as to pose a political threat, Russia saw in the Hetmanate a solution to her grain requirements.

There was also a very important political consideration. Control of Ukraine would strengthen the Russian grip on the southern border areas which often had proved a political nuisance as they were hotbeds of intrigue and revolution against the Russian regime.²⁵

There were also certain ideological interests specifically in the sphere of religion. The Patriarch of Moscow was interested in the unification or co-operation of the Russian and Ukrainian branches of Orthodoxy and advised the Tsar to accelerate the process.

Moscow was however cautious in her policy to Ukraine by reason of her fear of the Polish state after the experiences of the 'time of troubles' when Polish

forces had actually occupied Moscow itself before being driven out. Russia had also been pre-occupied with the suppression of urban revolts throughout 1648-1650 when Khmelnytsky had been trying to court Russian protection.²⁶ But with Poland now considerably weakened by Cossack blows, the prospects had never looked brighter.

Certain factors were perceived by both sides to be advantageous. Both shared a common slavic language. They culturally followed a common religion - Orthodoxy. Finally in 1653, the Zemsky Sobor agreed to 'take the Ukraine under his (the Tsar's) high protection out of pity for the Orthodox and the holy churches of God.'²⁷ And hence was signed the famous Pereyaslav treaty in 1654.

The treaty confirmed the independent status of the Hetmanate, and for a time appeared to have more advantages than disadvantages. The Cossack register was put at 60,000 and the landlords and the clergy had their property rights confirmed. Cossacks were free to elect a Hetman of their choice, though to be confirmed in office by the Tsar. The Hetmanate was to exercise independence in foreign affairs except with Poland and Turkey.²⁸ The other conditions were direct Tsarist administration of the cities, provisions for the Tsar's taxation, and lastly Russia gave assurance of military aid against Poland.²⁹ The latter was followed with stationing of a voyevoda in Kiev with 3,000 soldiers.³⁰

The Pereyaslav treaty created a controversy that has dominated scholarship to date. Soviet scholars view the treaty as a union of two branches of Slavic peoples.³¹ Western scholars, and exiled Ukrainians especially, view it as an act of incorporation by an aggressive power, and further emphasize the historical and cultural separation of the Russians and Ukrainians.³² It is not the intention of this study to continue this debate because it is not absolutely necessary in the context of this study. The major issue here is not to make a judgement on the debate but to identify the Russian and Ukraine leaders' conceptions of the treaty, and the opposing uses each side tried to put it to, and the consequences that followed.

The signing of the treaty was not without contradictions. In the first place, sections of the Cossack aristocracy did not want a simple change of masters. The Cossack Rada would have made the pro-Russian orientation more difficult had it not been for the peasant and Cossack masses who compelled it to do likewise. This was largely due to Orthodox identity with Russia, and the latter was also seen as a liberator from Polish oppression.

It also became obvious that the interests of the signatories to the treaty were not identical. A clash during the swearing ceremony almost marred the treaty. Khemelnysky ordered the Tsar's envoy Buturlin to swear in the name of the Tsar that

privileges of the Cossack state would be maintained, to which Buturlin replied: 'There is no such tradition that the Tsar should make pledges to his subjects.'³³ Upon Cossack persistence, he replied firmly, 'It cannot be done . . . the Tsar gives no oath to his subjects . . . he is an autocrat and his word stands firm.'³⁴ This attitude enraged Khmelnytsky and his council so much that they stormed out of the meeting, and only returned after 'entreaties and assurances by the Tsarist envoy.'³⁵ This only demonstrated the conflict that was to arise later.

It was evident that while Russia wanted colonial domination of the Ukraine through the Pereyaslav treaty the Cossack ruling class was only interested at that point in military alliance against Poland, and chose to ignore all other considerations. In the end both parties pretended to do what they did not wish to do (respecting the treaty) so as not to jeopardize the treaty. Kohut points out that 'Cossacks probably never understood the implications of exchanging theoretical pledges for military assistance.'³⁶ In practice, the Hetmanate functioned as an independent republic, seeing no contradiction at all in getting Swedish protection at a time the latter were foes with Russia.

Consequences of the Treaty

The establishment of the relations of co-operation between Russia and Ukraine brought war to Ukraine.

Poland refused to give up claims to Ukraine and also refused to recognise the Pereyaslav treaty. This had several consequences. The wars of colonial conquest damaged and ruined the Ukrainian economy, subverted and corrupted many sections of the starshyna thus hastening the process of undermining the relations of co-operation as treaty terms were changed to suit colonial interests.³⁷ Imperial rivalry weakened the Hetmanate such that by the 1660s, parts of her territory were divided by contending powers.

The process of changing the treaty terms was undertaken so as to define the relations of vassalage more explicitly. Because there were no established rules about the manner in which the Pereyaslav treaty was to be confirmed, much depended on the personal relations between the Tsar and the Hetman.³⁸ Confirmation of the treaty was required each time a Hetman died (but not a Tsar). This created a situation where Hetmans looked for other allies each time they felt that their powers were being undermined as Vyhovsky demonstrated later.

The war between Russo-Ukrainian forces and Poland turned into a stalemate leading to the signing of a truce in 1656. Cossacks were not consulted, a factor that embittered Khmelnytsky so much that he rejected it. Without abrogating the treaty of 1654, he changed course making diplomatic intrigues with Sweden, Turkey and Transylvania and acted as if no treaty existed with Moscow.³⁹ The agreement was that Sweden was to attack

Poland⁴⁰ and Ukraine was to get Belorussia and Galicia as a reward for aiding Swedish forces. Much to the embarrassment of the Tsar, the Ukrainian Cossacks with Transylvania⁴¹ joined Swedish forces in 1656 and overwhelmed the Poles in Warsaw forcing the king to flee.⁴² The Tsar was totally distrustful of Khmelnytsky, particularly because of his refusal to hand over towns seized from Poland and his introduction of the Cossack administration in conquered Polish areas.⁴³ Fearful of the emergence of Sweden as the new dominant power, the Tsar made a hasty peace with Poland and attacked Sweden.

The intervention of the Tsar on Ukrainian political ambitions thus shattered the Hetman's plans, giving a clear indication that the Hetmanate would have to remain within the Russian imperial domain. Khmelnytsky's death in 1657 following a sudden stroke spelt no easy path to freedom for Ukraine. Baturlin, the Russian envoy went so far as to reproach the Hetman on his death bed for his co-operation with the Swedes. He defiantly replied that he had been with the Swedes six years before his allegiance to the Tsar, decried Moscow's pro-Polish policy and complained of the ruin of Ukraine.⁴⁴ He died at the most crucial time in Ukraine's history, and was buried at his old home where seven years later, vengeful Poles had his bones dug up and thrown to the dogs.⁴⁵

His death also probably meant the death of the legal value of the 1654 treaty, at least in the sense that it became open to manipulation by the Tsarist government.⁴⁶ In honour of his statesmanship, his son Yuri was elected by the Cossacks to rule the Hetmanate, but a General Council later decided in 1657 he was too young and instead chose Ivan Vyhovsky, the close associate of the late Hetman.

It is at this point that Moscovite policy towards Ukraine changed markedly. They attempted but largely failed to convert the relations of co-operation to that of domination. The Ukrainian state was so personified in the Hetman that the independence of the Hetmanate depended to a large measure on the independence of the Hetman from the Tsar, and the personal relationship established between the two.

Moscow's unreliability became evident as the new Hetman was turned down. Vyhovsky represented the pro-Polish Cossack faction. Following the advancement of new articles by Moscow which restricted the autonomy of the starshyna, he rejected the treaty terms. Incensed by Russian propaganda which agitated the southern regiments of the Hetmanate, he broke with Moscow and sided with Poland. After effecting a tremendous defeat of Russian forces at Konotop⁴⁷ in 1668 with the aid of Tatars, he signed the ill fated Hadiach treaty with Poland the same year.⁴⁸ Certain developments in the Hetmanate class structure made this treaty possible.

Poland had all along treated and regarded the Cossacks as robbers, thieves and vagabonds, irresponsible rebellious gangsters who could not be allowed to run a country. This attitude made accommodation between the two after the revolution impossible. But following the post-revolutionary process of class reconstitution, a new landed class had emerged, the starshyna. Hence, a correspondingly more civil political and administrative machinery developed, consolidating itself during the 1660s. It was this class that became acceptable to Poland and signed the Hadiach treaty.

But the treaty came too late and never materialised. Ukraine broke up into armed camps, between pro-Russian and pro-Polish factions. Vyhovsky was quickly toppled from power, and civil war raged. The civil war took several dimensions. Imperialist interests fanned the wind of civil strife with the Poles and Russians each supporting their own side. At the same time, the conflict was complicated by a class struggle between the aristocracy on one hand and the poor Cossacks on the other. Peasants either supported the poor Cossacks or simply took advantage of the anarchy to engage in independent revolts. The revolts often involved plundering the estates and property of the starshyna class. Ravaged by war and threatened with serfdom, many Cossacks and peasants alike fled to the forest region known as Slobodskaia Ukraine.

Such political turmoil did not augur well for Ukraine's independent statehood. Hetmans fell as quickly as they were elected. Ultimately, the war split the country into two along the river Dnieper - the Right and Left Banks of Ukraine. The Right Bank came under pro-Polish Hetmans and the Left Bank came under pro-Russian Hetmans. This was the period known as ruina or ruin in Ukrainian history (1660s) in which endless warfare raged, destroying and depopulating large sections of the country.⁴⁹

An imperialist conspiracy formalised the division of the Hetmanate. Weary of war, Poland and Russia sued for peace and signed the 1667 Andrussov treaty which respected each of their possessions in Ukraine. The Right Bank lost its Hetmanate institutions, and only the Left Bank continued the tortuous process of limited independence. Doroshenko temporarily managed to reunite the country by driving out both the Poles and Russians with the aid of the Tatars. But both powers united against him, and drove him out declaring him a bandit,⁵⁰ while Ukraine remained politically and economically ruined.⁵¹

Tatars also proved unworthy allies to Ukraine. They rampaged and raided for slaves. Wanting to take Ukraine for themselves, they invaded it, and razed Chihirn, the old capital to the ground. A contemporary observer wrote mournfully of the fallen capital: 'Thus fell and disappeared the beautiful Cossack Ukraine like unto

ancient Babylon, the mighty city . . . Because of their discord . . . The Cossacks fell and perished having fought one after the other.'⁵²

By the end of the 1670s, all sides to the war wanted peace. In 1678, Russia and Poland prolonged the treaty of Andrussov and in 1681, a twenty-year peace treaty was signed between Russia and the Crimea. By the latter treaty, the middle and southern parts of Kiev province were to be neutral and unsettled, thus creating a desert in the middle of the Hetmanate. Poland was also able to expel the Turks from the Right Bank and embark upon repopulating the country. The international situation led in 1686 to the signing of the treaty of 'Perpetual Peace' between Russia and Poland. Kiev which had been in Polish hands was returned to the Hetmanate under Russian jurisdiction upon a monetary payment to Poland.

By this time, Russia had considerable influence in the Hetmanate. The 1654 treaty had been considerably altered by Russia having taken advantage of the chaos caused by endless civil strife. This was especially demonstrated after the overthrow of Vyhovsky, and the period after Andrussov. Each elected Hetman had his powers curbed, and by 1688, the Cossacks had even lost the right to remove their Hetmans. But more marked transformations in the colonial process took place during the eras of Hetmans Samoilovich and Mazepa.

These were also the last independent Hetmans as relations of co-operation began to crystalize rapidly into those of colonial domination.

Samoilovich was this time the Hetman of Left Bank Ukraine. He was a rich, pompous and unpopular aristocrat, prone to corruption and selfishness. He had tried to set up a family dynasty, appointing family members to high posts in the administration and army. His children went to Moscow to attend the best schools reserved for the children of the nobility. Plots against his rule multiplied. Following the disaster of the anti-Turkish campaign with Russian troops, a group of Cossack officers, taking advantage of his unpopularity with the Tsar, but also hating his autocratic ways plotted against him.⁵³ Ivan Mazepa was then elected. But the news of Samoilovich's banishment to exile agitated other regiments who rose up in rebellion, supported by peasant masses who found the excuse to plunder the property of their new nobility. Mazepa had to suppress the revolts while at the same time offering concessions. The era of Mazepa (1686-1709) was an era of the increasing dominance of a civil administration, but with tremendous royal pretensions. An autocratic Hetmanate regime had eaten away all traces of Cossack democratic traditions. This was not a moral issue however, but rather a socio-economic development that was inescapably bound with feudalism.

In 1672, Russia increased political control over Ukraine by compelling Samoilovich to accept the new Hlukhiv articles added to the Pereyaslav treaty. These articles bound the aristocracy to the Russian nobility at least on a theoretical plane.

Mazepa who succeeded Samoilovich followed a policy of close collaboration and co-operation with Tsardom. His rebellion and defection to Swedish forces in 1709 puzzled both Tsarist officials and his friends. To exiled Ukrainians, Mazepa is regarded as a patriot as well as a man of culture and learning who used his money lavishly to pursue these goals.⁵⁴ But his extremely pro-Russian policy and his own arrogance earned him tremendous unpopularity among the starshyna who regarded him as a Moscovite tool. During his rule, Mazepa's Cossack forces participated jointly with Russian troops against Turkey in 1695, and war did not end till 1700 when the Sea of Azov was formally ceded to the Russian state. This turned Russian ambitions to the Baltic Sea. Russia was evidently becoming a power, and hence quickly rivalled Sweden which controlled the access to the Baltic Sea.⁵⁵ War broke out in 1700 and 12,000 Cossacks took part in the tragic northern campaign where thousands died and many returned home as invalids. They never forgave their Hetman for this.

Meanwhile, the Right Bank Ukraine was once again up in flames against Polish rule, led by the peasant hero

Paily. Paily invited Mazepa to join the anti-Polish uprising, but the latter declined on grounds of Russo-Polish treaties. At the same time, Mazepa demonstrated typical Cossack intrigue and treachery. On the pretext of discussing the situation on the Right Bank, Mazepa had Paily arrested and excuted, and taking advantage of the order from the Tsar to put down the Right Bank upheaval, he sent his troops to occupy the country. He held to it and actually reunified it with the Left Bank despite Russia's insistence that it be returned to Poland.

At this point, events moved quickly. The Swedes quickly subdued Poland and advanced on Ukraine, sending emmisaries to Mazepa calling him to join Swedish forces. Exasperated by Moscovite policy, and encouraged by initial Swedish victories, Mazepa decided to defect and join the Swedish forces. Events proved that Mazepa was either ignorant of his strength, or overestimated it. He was so unpopular, and regarded a Tsar's tool that no one believed his defection immediately. Besides, he had kept the negotiations with the Swedes so secret that the plot to defect was known only to his close friends, and hence did not prepare the people adequately for rebellion. When the order was made to join the Swedish forces that had by 1709 entered Ukraine, many did not even know the purpose of their trip. By the time Cossacks knew the purpose of their mission, they were out of Ukraine. Either due to their disbelief in the actions of a man regarded so loyal to Moscow, or

probably as Cresson suggests, realising that Mazepa was Polish,⁵⁶ disapproval emerged with cries of 'treason'.⁵⁷ Defections took place immediately with only two regiments, that of his personal guard, remaining loyal. His invasion of Poland became a little better than a flight from Ukraine.⁵⁸

Though the Tsar was stunned by Mazepa's defection, he concentrated his energies to winning the war. Baturlin, the capital of the Hetman was razed to the ground in a fury of anger. Cossack officers were ordered to elect another Hetman, where upon a docile Skoropadsky was elected. Mazepa was publicly denounced as a traitor and hanged in effigy. He was also exorcised from Ukrainian cultural life by a thorough ceremonial process led by the Ukrainian clergy.

The climax came in 1709 when at Poltava, the combined Swedish and Cossack forces were routed and thoroughly beaten. Mazepa and the Swedish king fled to Turkey for asylum where the former died the same year. The Zaporozhian Sitch, now a shadow of the Cossack revolutionary school of the earlier period, teeming with malcontents and irresponsible and anarchistic drunkards, also faced its fate for siding with Mazepa.⁵⁹ It was captured, its inhabitants ruthlessly murdered, and abolished in its entirety. The battle of Poltava in 1709 is of tremendous historical significance to Ukraine's struggle for independent statehood, for it determined the beginning of the end of the Hetmanate.⁶⁰

Extent of Russian influence during the Relations
of Co-operation

The defeat at Poltava sealed the fate of the Hetmanate. Before discussing the process by which the relations of co-operation were subverted and transformed into those of domination, an attempt must be made to assess the degree of Russian influence in the Hetmanate before the end of this phase in its political, economic and ideological perspectives.

Russia had its own political weakness, which was dictated by military factors. Cossacks were still very strong and their military preparedness to rebel was a factor that induced the Russian state to adopt a cautious policy of co-operation until such time that dominant colonial interests could be realised. The best that could be achieved was to encourage factions, and that way find room to change the basis of the Russo-Ukrainian relationship - the terms of the Pereyaslav Treaty.

At the practical diplomatic level, the Malorossiiskii Prikaz in the department of Foreign Affairs was the organ that maintained contact. This was part of Russian system that operated up to 1717.⁶¹ It gathered information for the Tsar about the affairs of the Cossack Rada, and vice versa. But collection of such information was difficult as the Hetmans tended to be selective about the kind of information going to Moscow. Because of this, Moscow was very often surprised by

developments in Ukraine.⁶² Moscow also lacked the power to enforce any decisions upon the Hetmanate, and could only suggest to the Hetman the wishes of the Tsar. Because Russia never quite came to understand Ukraine and its institutions until much later, she paid for this ignorance through Cossack revolts, which in many ways helped to perpetuate the independent policy of the Hetmanate.

The Russian troops stationed in Ukraine did not manage to intimidate the Cossacks, nor did they interfere successfully with Ukraine's internal affairs. Though they strengthened the Tsar's position, they could not enforce his will. Moreover, their numerical inferiority reduced them to a position of a token force. In 1654, and 1668, Cossacks managed to obliterate these troops and to expel them from the towns with relative ease.⁶³ The garrisons were subsequently reduced to five towns. The only form of penetration of Cossack institutions was by playing off various rival Cossack factions. Only after Poltava did a marked change in Ukraine take place.

The one area where the Russian state made substantial headway was in the administration of towns. Many towns were self-governing, protected by the old German Magdeburg law. After the revolution, the Hetmanate came to recognise the autonomy of these towns preserving their municipal self-government. Cossack regimental courts merely supervised these municipalities and the

latter could appeal to the Hetman. But the towns hated the Cossack government because of the Cossacks' tendency to encroach upon their liberties. Smaller towns were simply overpowered by Cossacks, with aristocratic Cossacks getting themselves elected as mayors.⁶⁴ Bigger towns like Kiev enjoyed Cossack favours, while others like Chernigov enjoyed fewer rights.⁶⁵ The position of burghers declined during the era of the Hetmanate.

Taking advantage of the parallel administrative system, Moscovite voevody openly sided with the burghers, who in turn looked to Moscow for relief. By the end of the Mazepa era, many big Ukrainian cities were pro-Russian, as the Tsar came to grant them charters, further weakening the Hetmanate's central authority.

Moscow failed to acquire immediate economic benefits from the Hetmanate largely due to the resistance of Cossack officials. The annual tribute to be paid to Moscow in recognition of protection⁶⁶ was to be collected by town representatives and Hetmans.⁶⁷ The figure was not substantial to judge by the amount collected in the 1660s (only 2,000 rubles), and was spent only in Ukraine.⁶⁸ Russia ultimately abandoned the tax because of the intractability of the Cossacks, especially after the 1668 anti-Russian uprising.⁶⁹

Following the 1648 revolution, the new Cossack and civil aristocracy had merged to form a starshyna which

owned large estates and political office. Peasants were reduced to serfs in many areas. The aristocracy actually played a positive role in the development of feudal agriculture in Ukraine, and the reigns of Samoilovich and Mazepa demonstrated pomp and splendour surrounding the court of the Hetman. Ukrainian Orthodox monasteries also played a large role in the development of feudalism. Because their manorial lands needed labour the revolution was detrimental to this as it freed serfs. The problem became so serious that Khmelnytsky and his successors ordered the binding of serfs to manorial lands.⁷⁰

With the means of production largely owned by an aristocracy, Moscow attempted to make its influence felt by making use of the most opportunistic elements of the Cossacks. The Tsar had the power to grant estates in Ukraine, which he lavishly granted to loyal Ukrainian officials and Russian landlords and officials. Two of Khmelnytsky's envoys to Moscow, Judge-General S. Bohdanovych-Zarudny and colonel of Pereyaslav requested the Tsar to grant them estates while insisting that the agreement be secret ' because if the Zaporozhian army should find out . . . they would suffer.'⁷¹ The number of such officers increased to such a point that Cossack officers in the Rada began to develop a keen interest in receiving honours. Brukhovetsky himself received a boyar title. As can be seen, political struggles were closely intertwined with

economic interests which were themselves tied to a feudal social formation. All archaic social formations like the free communes of peasants and Cossack wild steppe types had to be abolished. The starshyna achieved this, and managed to exclude the rest of the population from the control of the economic forces and state power. In so doing, they were prepared to accept noble titles from the Tsar, a condition that hastened their political demise as a ruling class. But during the colonial period characterised by relations of co-operation, the Russian government was able to influence but not dominate the Hetmanate's economic affairs.

The growing influence of the Russian colonial system in the political and economic life of Ukraine inevitably extended to ideological control. This involved subverting the ideological orientation of the ruling class toward Russian ideological norms and institutions. The Ukrainian church was the prime target of Russian control.

The Cossack elite provided the conditions for this ideological development. Having no recognised ruling class traditions upon which their power could be given an ideological rationale, the ruling class acquired estates and noble status and emulated their forebearers, the Polish aristocracy or szlachta whom they had toppled in 1648. They justified their position as the new nobility by their social position and also by acquiring

enoblement from the Tsar. They went so far as to search the Magdeburg laws to give credence to their dynastic pretentions and ambitions, and hence establish for themselves new titles of nobility and family crests.⁷² They called upon the Hetman and the Tsar to grant them ownership of entire villages of free communes. By this act, they were pre-disposing themselves to Russian ideological control.

The Kievan monastery or academy was the centre of Ukrainian cultural life, as it owned the printing presses and held a monopoly in the education of the clergy and aristocracy. Using its wealth sanctioned by the Hetmanate, it became the patron of art and culture. The academy faced various cultural influences prior to the revolution. Its cultural development was somewhat different from that of Russian Orthodoxy. This was partly because Ukrainian cultural development had followed separate trends of political developments since the fall of Kievan Rus to the Mongols in the fourteenth century. But the main cause lay in Polish Catholicism which began to have its influence in the sixteenth century following the establishment of the Uniate Church. The Polonisation of the top hierarchy of the church left the lower clergy, semi-literate priests, Cossacks and peasants in defence of the Orthodox faith. A complex situation arose where higher classes were Polonised, while the lower ones remained Orthodox. Following the revolution,

a situation developed where the top clergy were more loyal to Poland than Moscow,⁷³ while the lower groups tended to have a pro-Moscovite orientation, a situation Moscow took advantage of in the 1680s. The revolution elevated the position of the Orthodox church transforming the Kievan Academy into an ecclesiastical church and cultural centre, and the main school of the starshyna. But it continued to exhibit pro-Polish and pro-Russian orientations.

The cultural and hence ideological significance of the church was recognised by Russian authorities. It was therefore necessary to redirect the ideological orientation of Ukraine to suit Russian norms. The successive Metropolitans of Kiev were so powerful that they often vied for influence with the Hetman. Since the revolution, the Metropolitan was pro-Polish as he regarded Poland as culturally more advanced than Russia. The educated classes of the Ukrainian clergy also looked upon Russian Orthodoxy as a corrupt faith, full of superstitions and inhuman acts.⁷⁴ Attempts to insert new articles into the 1654 treaty which would subjugate the Kievan Academy to the Patriarch of Moscow were resisted by the Academy's clergy. If the Hetmanate was to be ruled by Russia, its ideological institutions would also have to be tamed.

During Samoilovich's time (1672-1686) there was an attempt to elect a pro-Russian Polish fugitive bishop supported by the Hetman. Despite the resistance of the

clergy, the election went through, and the metropolitanate was consecrated in Moscow.⁷⁵ But fearful of creating conflict, Moscow acceded to the 'demands of autonomy of the Ukrainian church, and its printing processes and literature, and not to introduce Moscovite books.'⁷⁶

But the Moscovite clergy, whom Chubaty calls 'clerical businessmen' managed to buy the Ukrainian cultural and ideological institution by giving money and gifts to the Patriarch of Constantinople so as to induce him to sign a letter subjugating Kiev to Moscow.⁷⁷ While this happened on paper, it became difficult to implement in practice. The Ukrainian ideological state apparatus fell, and adopted the Russian orientation after the 1709 defeat at Poltava. The war itself was characterised by extensive use of ideological propaganda. The churches were extensively used by both parties to the conflict. Priests through sermons spread propaganda, while wandering monks were engaged as agents for spreading news and reports, fomenting whispering campaigns, instigating revolts among the population or simply acting as spies.⁷⁸ Seditious propaganda was waged by both sides to win popular support, and the Tsar excelled all in its lavish use. It was clear that the ideological orientation of the Ukrainian church was going to depend on who won the war. The defeat of Cossack Ukraine and her Swedish allies now opened the way to suppressing the anti-Russian element in the church, and instigating a pro-Russian orientation.

BULOZI: 1864-1900

The establishment of the relations of co-operation between Bulozhi on the upper Zambezi flood plain and Britain through its agent the BSACo. was a culmination of a series of events that comprised an irreversible historical process. Forces from within and without led to the establishment of relations of co-operation with the signing in 1889 and 1890 of treaties with agents of British imperialism.

From 1864 to 1900, the period this section discusses, these co-operative relations were maintained and not immediately subverted. The British were unable to bring to bear the full weight of their colonial machinery and policies. The phraseology of the early treaties tended to emphasise this aspect of co-operation and gave the impression of two sovereigns signing a pact of mutual understanding and co-operation. But at the same time, they also expressed relations of vassalage in which a weaker Lozi monarch signed an oath of allegiance and loyalty to a stronger protective British ally.

These treaties had a historical significance to both parties involved as their consequence was to influence the course of Bulozhi history. The fate of her independence was being determined in 1889 and 1890 though the Lozi ruling class was probably oblivious of this fact at that time. It was precisely this relationship of co-operation that the colonialists

wanted so that they could find time to institute policies that would ultimately lead to the establishment of the relations of domination while avoiding direct confrontation. That way, they would harness Bulozzi to colonial interests politically, economically and ideologically. The reasons for this development will have to be assessed in the light of different interests and interpretations of the treaty. But probably more important is the need to assess and understand the power relations between the two states. This will further explain the process of the transformation of the relations of co-operation to domination.

The process of colonialism in Bulozzi, whose initial stage Prins calls the concession crises⁷⁹ is best understood by a brief look at earlier events. The historical precedent lies further back in the nineteenth century Lozi history and lays the foundation for understanding the establishment of the process of the relations of co-operation. This earlier period was marked by an intense internal crisis complicated by an external crisis. The protracted international crisis aggravated internal political instability and ultimately culminated into the concession era.

The Historical Setting

The historical setting can be divided into two phases, 1864-1885, and 1885-1890. The earlier phase was characterised by intense factionalism and palace

revolutions against successive Lozi governments. Political instability was greatest in this period. The second phase was characterised by Lewanika's attempts to put order to the Lozi state system and thus end dynastic factionalism. It was also a period in which white men posed an external threat to the Kingdom.

The historical setting looks at the process of establishment of the Lozi state following an 1864 revolution against alien Kololo rule. The revolution set in motion a protracted political crisis in which competition for power within the ruling class led to considerable political and economic crises. The crises tended to weaken the Lozi state and disrupt the coalescing of central authority and power.

The Kololo had been ruling Bulozhi since the 1840s when they conquered the Lozi state during the course of their migration from the Southern Kingdom of the Sotho.⁸⁰ The seat of Lozi power had been the Bulozhi valley based at Lealui but the Kololo decided to establish their capital further south at Linyati, in the Zambezi marshes owing to fear of Ndebele raids. Their political influence in the valley was thus not very secure. They had also made use of those Lozi princes that chose to remain in the valley⁸¹ by making them chiefs of regions in an indirect rule system. This system of rule was adopted to appease the princes and unite them around the Kololo state. But in reality, an alien

ruling class ruled the Lozi. Despite the fact that this class no longer had ties with the country it had left years back, and came to look upon Bulozhi as their new home it was still looked upon by the Lozi people as a colonial power. The new institutions it established were constant reminders of the alien character of Kololo rule. Even the Sikololo language came to become the dominant language in Bulozhi though its fusion with *Siluyana* created what is now called Silozi or simply Lozi. It was a product of Luyi-Sikololo cultural fusion but with a stronger Kololo bias. Many local princes and indunas were transformed culturally and adopted Kololo culture. The court etiquette of the Lozi became quite similar to that of the Sotho, which was itself so sophisticated that Coillard compared Lozi etiquette to that of the Parisians.⁸²

Kololo rule was reaching its end by the beginning of the 1860s. Sebituane died in 1854 and his son Sekeletu took over. He immediately antagonised Lozi princes and wide sections of the aristocracy, and thus broke the power balance that Sebituane had created. Livingstone described Sekeletu as power-hungry and ruthless and 'surrounded by evil bloody minded counsellors and most of the tribe lament it'.⁸³

1864-1885

The tension that existed in the country ultimately surfaced. In August 1864, open rebellion broke out in

which Lozi exile groups, the local princes and all nationalist elements rose in a massive revolutionary uprising. The revolution was characterised by such class and national hatred that virtually all Kololo men were massacred.⁸⁴ Kololo women, children and property were distributed among the victorious Lozi nobles.

But overthrowing Kololo domination was not the same thing as ruling the country. Dynastic conflicts and rivalries broke out almost immediately creating a protracted political crisis. This had the effect of polarising the forces that weakened the state system. The turnover of Litungas was rapid and often violent. Between 1864 and 1884, three kings were toppled from power.

Sipopa did not last long and was quickly dethroned owing to his unpopularity and greed.⁸⁵ A split between the royalist and traditionist factions developed that was not to heal until the colonial process was completed. Njekwa, the hero of the royalist faction died on suspicious grounds, which incensed royalist sentiment against the king. The new king Mwanawina invited his cousin Lubosi to come to his side. But he too was quickly challenged by indunas representing different factions. His Ngambela Mamili had exasperated royal factions by his assumption of kingly pretensions when he was after all (as all ngambelas were) a non-royal. The main

accusation against the Litunga was that he had contemplated replacing old indunas from the north with young men of his age.⁸⁶ Lubosi, later better known as Lewanika took over the throne. In his attempt to pacify opposition, he executed Sipopa's children who had challenged him.⁸⁷ He once collected seven indunas and executed them upon suspicion of plotting against him.⁸⁸ Even Mbunda medicine men who had come to Bulozhi earlier in the century as refugees joined the line of victims. In the absence of physical uprising, the medicine men resorted to ideological forms of struggle and became a constant force of opposition.

In 1884, another revolt drove Lubosi into exile barely saving his skin. Mataa, the leader of the revolt sponsored a young inexperienced man to power - Akufuna. He represented the breed of young princes who had grown up in exile who neither spoke nor understood Silozi. Discontent emerged immediately. By 1885 Coillard reported discontent in the valley with people looking toward a new leader.⁸⁹

Between 1884 and 1885 occurred what is popularly known in Bulozhi history as the Barotse civil war, a war which created factions that developed deep splits in the country. Many areas of Bulozhi escaped from central control, especially the southern capital of Sesheke,⁹⁰ and the Batoka area. The latter was a Tonga

speaking country which recognised Lozi power by paying tribute to the Lozi state without facing direct conquest and occupation.

The vengeful excesses of the ngambela led to a virtual extermination of Lubosi's family. Such excesses led to Lozi indunas and commoners fleeing the valley to join the ex-king in exile. So much tension existed that the Queen mother, Mulona Mukwae of Nalolo once remarked with royal sorrow to Coillard when he visited her: 'Ours is a land of blood. Kings and Chiefs succeed one another like shadows. They are never allowed to grow old. If you come back in a few months, shall we still be in power? After all one might envy the Makalaka, revolutions do not touch them.'⁹¹ This prophetic statement was fulfilled almost immediately as civil war broke out in the valley. A strong coalition rose against Akufuna, and Lubosi sent forces from exile. During the war, Mambari traders tipped the scale to Lubosi's favour through their power. Mataa and his followers were forced to flee into exile leaving a valley that was littered with human bones for years to come.⁹² Lubosi resumed power and called himself Lewanika, meaning to join together, or unite.

A variety of problems had to be contended with if Lewanika was going to manage running the country

again without another palace revolution breaking out. These problems had led to a crisis in political order. Internally, factional fights and intrigues posed the biggest political problem. Indunas had apparently become more powerful than the Litunga such that they became (to use Mainga's term) 'king makers'. Lukwakwa exiles also posed a problem. Following the restoration of Lozi power, some Lozi exiles in Lukwakwa had not come back to Bulozhi, but continued to challenge Lozi power at Lealui. Lukwakwa also became a haven for all sorts of malcontents and according to Mainga, 'a potential source of revolution.'⁹³

Although the political and ideological orientation of the ruling class was largely derived from the prevailing instability, it also contributed to that instability. The lack of agreement on the nature of the social institutions that were to form the basis of the state apparatus had a historical significance. The Kololo had left their mark on the Lozi state in institutions and culture, and this resulted in the emergence of loyalist and traditionalist factions. The former faction consisted of princes who remained loyal to Kololo institutions, while the traditionalists were dedicated to uprooting them totally and replacing them with pre-Kololo Lozi institutions.⁹⁴

The newly reconstituted national ruling class was therefore, a combination of various anti-Kololo forces,

many of whom were descendents of the Lozi aristocracy who had been toppled by the Kololo in 1840. Some of them had fled to live in exile in Lukwakwa and Nyango among the Nyengo in the northern fringes of Bulozhi, and hence were culturally and ideologically transformed such as Akufuna, who had ruled as an exile prince.

Life in exile had not been an easy one and free of intrigues and rivalry. This was largely due to the fact that the Lozi exiles had not been able to abandon the age old system of royal succession which encouraged factional dynastic infighting, itself expressing the struggle for the control of the few rich resources of the country. The nature of Lozi royal succession was such that any male member of royal blood was a potential candidate for the throne. Hence intense conflict over royal succession was often the feature of the Lozi political system, a factor from which exiles never managed to escape and if anything, abetted and perpetuated.

The arrival in exile of a new group in the 1850s, fleeing from the tyranny of Sekeletu added another source of trouble to the already divided exiles. One cannot imagine that this new element in exile would be culturally and hence ideologically in tune with the old guard whose knowledge of pre-Kololo Lozi institutions was based upon an ideological recourse to the past through popular folklore and legends.

It became quite apparent that the Lozi unity in the 1864 revolution was one of convenience which fell apart almost immediately. The traditionalist and loyalist concept of Mainga must therefore be used cautiously. The fact that the old Lozi social institutions (assuming they could be accurately remembered) were being re-introduced under the otherwise transformed material conditions of the second half of the nineteenth century, meant that considerable improvisation had to be made to fit into the new situation. Both traditionalist and loyalist approaches to reforming Bulozhi must probably be seen as two contradictory ideological manifestations. The traditionalists were simply finding ideological rationale in the past, while the loyalists took the Kololo example as their frame of reference.

Another problem that faced the reformed national ruling class was that of legitimation in the eyes of the ordinary people. The upheavals had considerably shaken the hold on the slaves and commoners, which allowed them to live under conditions of temporary freedom. Lewanika's efforts to assert effective control over these people sometimes led to revolt.

This social chaos was in fact reflected in Bulozhi production relations. Conditions of warfare led to a drop in food production since relations of production

were weakened, and economic resources were severely impaired. While this degeneration in economic life may not be easy to quantify, certain indications do exist. Famines became almost perpetual during this period. This was evidenced by the development of bothersome petty thefts and begging by indunas and ordinary people, a situation that affected Westbeech and Coillard considerably.⁹⁵

Since slaves or Makalaka were the main productive element in Lozi society but who faced tremendous physical coercion and social abuse,⁹⁶ conditions of political instability gave them the opportunity to rebel or at least to put less effort into production. In the civil strife of the 1870s and 1880s, the slaves took advantage of this anarchy to roam the country pillaging the herds of their indunas.⁹⁷ Some slave gangs might have been responsible for throwing the royal stock of firearms into the Zambezi when Sipopa was toppled in 1876,⁹⁸ as Clarence-Smith suggests.

The weakening of social relations and the consequential economic crises that affected the Lozi social formation tended therefore, to worsen the state of internal crisis, especially political instability. While it may be an overstatement to suggest a massive slave defection from social obligations, the argument that many slaves and commoners absconded with some slaves fleeing to their original homes still stands.

Trade was also disrupted, and most of the trade goods like guns and gunpowder, and cloth had become rare. The Mambari traders from Angola came erratically. In the south, the main trading partner was Westbeeche whose trade was disrupted and his stores at Sesheke looted and destroyed.⁹⁹ Under such conditions an economic crisis developed, which deepened political dissent and instability and led to a rapid turnover of governments.

Apart from the destruction of economic resources, there was evident physical damage to buildings in Bulozhi and the decay that set in is evidence of the weakening of social relations. Coillard spoke sorrowfully of the effects of the civil war especially the ruin and desolation that happened to once clean, prosperous Lealui which 'to-day is nothing but miserable shelters half buried in luxuriant grass.'¹⁰⁰ Coillard's treasury was looted with slave participation.¹⁰¹ Even the state barge, a masterpiece of craftsmanship, was sunk.

Politically, the country was in a state of chaos and partial disintegration. Sesheke chiefs who appeared to have gloriously welcomed Akufuna were now totally confused with the return to power of Lewanika. They broke up in such armed rival camps that the capital was abandoned as they left for the bush, refusing to meet for reconciliation.¹⁰²

Some outlying areas of Bulozzi became to assert independence and had to be brought under control. Sipopa appears to have encountered this problem since in 1865, he raided the Batoka, and then the Ila in 1871.¹⁰³ The objectives of these were to achieve political hegemony, and (probably the most important) acquire some resources to inject into the war ravaged economy. The aristocracy encouraged therefore, acts of brigandage to acquire loot. In these raids they captured hundreds if not thousands of cattle and slaves. No records survive to quantify this point.

1885-1890

Upon Lewanika's return to power, he set himself the task of reconstructing and reforming the Lozi state and expanding it to great heights. These reforms were aimed at restoring order in the relations of production by tying slaves and commoners rigidly to the state. Outlying areas were also brought under some control.

This is also the period in Lozi historiography known as the restoration, a period in which Lewanika supposedly restored Lozi political and economic institutions.¹⁰⁴ This restoration is a misnomer and Lewanika's traditionalism is basically a misconception. Lewanika simply improvised under crisis conditions. He sought to recreate a Lozi state but one that corresponded to the changed material and ideological conditions of the late nineteenth century.¹⁰⁵

Taking into account the highly ritualised nature of the Lozi dynasty, the only measure of legitimation was an ideological recourse to the past. This meant veneration of ancestral spirits who were believed to be the founders of the Kingdom. It is also for this reason that various factions did not molest the royal graves, as they all respected these burial grounds as the spiritual centre of the country. The Lozi state had to have some historical ritual sanction as well as continuity by drawing upon those elements of the pre-Kololo Lozi state that the ruling class thought and found expedient. Hence, the combination of economic and ritual power concentrated in the Kingship and thus, the personification of the Divine Right.

To strengthen the position of the king above the indunas, the state had to be strengthened and opponents eliminated. The early years of Lewanika's return were characterised by vengeful purges of opponents and their families by agents sent in secret missions all over the country.¹⁰⁶ A wife of one of his opponents and her children were made to drink poison and publicly taunted with 'your fathers killed the Kings who did them much good, they killed my own children . . . the day of vengeance has come for me'.¹⁰⁷ The purge was extended to Sesheke where unsuspecting chiefs were murdered,

some in their sleep. Women and children were carried off and thrown to crocodiles.¹⁰⁸ The purges did not abate till 1889 by which time opposition had been so effectively pacified that no subsequent serious challenge was made to Lewanika's throne.

Political reforms were made in the country. A single Kuta was established at Sesheke to replace the fractious body of independent chieftains, and all indunas were permanently resident at the capital. The Kuta was similar to the ones at Lealui and Nalolo.¹⁰⁹ The Litunga's nephew was made chief at Sesheke in 1886. At Kaunga in Mashi one Kuta was established to which Lewanika's brother's son was made chief. A third Kuta was established at Kalabo (Libonda Kuta). All these were linked to Lealui and were actually replicas of the central capital.¹¹⁰ Close friends and relatives formed the core of his ruling council.

New economic reforms were made so as to strengthen the economic position of the ruling class. The periodic famines that often led to serious food shortages had to be ended, or at least moderated. This also meant that the social relations of production, loosened during the chaos of the earlier period, had to be strengthened to meet production needs.

As the king theoretically owned the major means of production - the latter being concentrated on a few

rich resources in the valley based on agriculture, grazing lands, fishing and hunting grounds, he combined political reform with economic development. He made the ruling class the dominant economic class by monopolising ownership of these resources, which in itself accounted for the high degree of political conflict. Subjects had to support the state through payment of tribute to the king.¹¹¹

To ensure policing of labour, a nobility was recreated and strengthened, being assigned duties, inter alia to oversee production. The old economic institution, makolo, was revived. Its duties ranged from organising labour for state projects to military ones which played no insignificant role in the raids for booty. They were supervised by indunas. Slaves and commoners were called to serve in these institutions, and even used to suppress slave revolts. Because the commoners tended to have kinship ties with the lords and could demand social obligations and even abandon cruel masters,¹¹² the burden of exploitation fell on the slaves. Apart from being non-Lozi, the latter enjoyed the status of being unfree.¹¹³

Lewanika's economic projects like canal building, drainage of waste lands and meadows for agricultural production involved thousands of people most of whom were slaves. This explains why the Lozi aristocracy was not interested in the international slave trade. Instead of seeing the massive labour organisation as a

sign of growing tyranny of the state to achieve ruling class goals, Prins views this as the evidence of Lewanika's power, and also implicitly, popular support.¹¹⁴ Coillard reported considerably on the burdens imposed on the people, especially tribute which was distributed only among the nobles.¹¹⁵

Royal extravagance increased unchecked. The aristocracy had become divorced from production, a situation Lewanika had attempted to check in the 1880s which partially contributed to the 1884 palace coup against him.¹¹⁶ Using the surplus derived from production, conspicuous consumption became noticeable. A rise in the productive forces had contributed to this development. Larger houses, palaces and ceremonial barges were constructed exclusively for the aristocracy.¹¹⁷ Even certain speciality goods such as certain ivory, bead ornaments, rare skins and culinary delicacies were made the monopoly of the royal family and no ordinary person was allowed to have them.¹¹⁸

Royalty and ceremony infected the ruling class to a degree as not to escape Coillard's eye . . . 'Ceremonial grows more and more complicated, and soon subjects and slaves will no longer have a place under the sun.'¹¹⁹ But the indunas thought otherwise. 'Our King is the son of divinity, a god himself . . . This is the reason people lower themselves before him and before all that belongs to him.'¹²⁰ Thus, an ideological state

apparatus also sanctioned an otherwise subtle class oppression, a factor that appears to have eluded the scholarly genius of Prins.

Class struggles occasionally broke out as a result of class oppression. They rarely reached violent proportions as they tended to be highly individualised through desertion.¹²¹ Punishment for deserting a landlord was punishable by strangulation till turned senseless. Neither was flogging excluded. But the intensified control of the social relations of production produced active resistance. A serious slave insurrection broke out in the Sesheke area in 1893 though no details survive.¹²² But a more serious and widespread one broke out in 1893¹²³ in which colonial authorities had to intervene on behalf of the aristocracy. These revolts took place during peak periods of labour mobilisation for state projects.

Lewanika's modernisation programmes were a response to economic and ecological crises in Bulozhi. Despite the abundant evidence of famines partly caused by the civil strife, and occasionally intermingled with bad harvests caused by both droughts and successive floods, Prins underrates their significance. But he strangely recognises the fact that the economic programmes were geared towards solving food problems. But to imply that they solved the economic crisis as he does is unconvincing.¹²⁴ No evidence exists to

support this contention, and one would like to adopt Hermitte's cautious view that 'production level rose (as a result of the programmes) and famines were perhaps moderated but were not stopped as such production depended on the vagaries of nature.'¹²⁵

Bulozi's internal problems can be summarised as follows: Following the 1864 anti-Kololo revolt, a series of crises followed, both political and economic. Dynastic rivalries and quick successive revolts that followed created political instability and institutional crises. The era of instability further worsened the country's economic situation and thus created a vicious circle of instability. Lewanika's return to power in 1885 was characterised by reforms that attempted to solve these problems. The fact that conflict was moderated did not remove the threat to his power, as demonstrated by continuing intrigues within the ruling class especially in the 1890s when whitemen began to represent an alien force in the Kingdom.

The internal crises became intermingled with external threats to the Lozi state. The arrival of white men spelt a new danger which had to be accommodated. These were largely traders, hunters and missionaries of European stock, though the focus of power rivalry was between British and Portuguese agents. The continuing Ndebele threat further compounded the problem. These forces had to be harnessed for the

survival of the state. As imperialism began to knock at the doors of Bulozhi, the ruling class chose to accomodate colonial forces through active co-operation instead of resistance.

Bulozhi - British Treaty: 1890-1900

The British and the Lozi established relations of co-operation in 1890 following the famous Lochner concession. But this colonial process was initiated by the external crisis that befell the Lozi state - the increasing presence of white missionaries and traders who represented colonial interests. These were either hunters of fortune or men led by religious zeal to spread the Christian gospel.¹²⁶ Livingstone was the first missionary to travel through Bulozhi in the 1850s,¹²⁷ and came to serve British colonial capitalist interests.¹²⁸ He saw no contradiction at all in his ideological as well as economic perspectives. He saw christianity and commerce (capitalism) as complimentary. He outlined his motives for the 1865 mission to central Africa as 'apart from the development of African trade . . . and civilisation . . . I hope it may result in an English colony in the healthy highlands of Central Africa . . .',¹²⁹

Livingstone's African tour encouraged enthusiasts alike, both with religious and economic objectives. In 1883, Arnot of the *Plymouth* Brethren Church went to open a school in Bulozhi at Limulunga. The Litunga allowed him to teach secular subjects but not religion because 'it is not nice'.¹³⁰ Arnot left in 1884 due to frustration and also to an awareness of the impending

palace revolution.

The Jesuits were another group but which failed to get a foothold in Bulozhi. This was largely owing to the doing of George Westbeech, a long time trader and hunter in Bulozhi and the main supplier of trade goods from South Africa. He became a confidant of the king and was even accepted as a member of the Kuta. Based at Panda Matenga near Kazungula, the gateway to Bulozhi from the south, Westbeech was given virtual powers to decide whom he was going to allow into Bulozhi. It appears that the advancing tide of European adventures into the region had created a need on the part of the Lozi ruling class to get a man to advise them on how to deal with them and also recommend to the Kuta which desirable whites were to enter the country. Using this influence, he advised against the establishment of a Jesuit station precisely because he wanted only those missionaries and other agents who were going to represent British interests. This point was scored by the Litunga when he chased the Jesuits out of the country saying: 'They are not Englishmen, and are not the same tribe as Livingstone. They are not men for my country for they have no sense.'¹³¹

Three colonial powers were already making advances on Bulozhi. These were Britain, Portugal and Germany. Britain was represented by its agents like Westbeech and Francois Coillard. Germany did not really make approaches to Bulozhi but was claiming part of it at the

border with German West Africa at the Caprivi strip. The Portuguese were beginning to advance from the west. In 1878, a Portuguese officer had arrived in Bulozhi on a diplomatic mission to open commercial relations with Angola.¹³² At this time, Mambari traders from Angola were active in Bulozhi though their trade was undermined by Westbeeck whose goods were of superior quality and cheaper.

Bulozhi rulers were aware of the crisis this advance presented and hence sought wise counsel from whites they could trust. In this case, British influence was more welcome than any other. This tallied well with Westbeeck's pro-British policy which he encouraged in the Kuta. When Emil Holub, a Czech missionary doctor went on an expedition north of the Zambezi,¹³³ Westbeeck wished he were representing British interests.¹³⁴ It was because of this keen interest in British colonialism that Westbeeck recommended Coillard of the Paris Missionary Society to the Lozi. Despite opposition from some faction within the ruling class, Coillard became established at the capital and like Westbeeck, came to be a close confidant of the king and a member of the Kuta. Because Coillard was Anglo-phile, his French mission was established and was later to become a powerful force in facilitating the colonial process. The fact that the mission was a religious one did not contradict capitalism for in the words of christian ideologist Chapman, 'we cannot think of

political and religious work as things apart, they are mutually inclusive and cannot be entirely separated.' ¹³⁵

On the part of Lewanika, he needed the missionaries and other whites to protect himself against outside and inside forces; against those he felt threatened his rule. Internal opposition had not ceased as demonstrated by heated opposition to Coillard's acceptance in the Kingdom. Lewanika would have most probably been overthrown had the British not arrived in the 1890s as he had too blatantly opposed the views of the Kuta. ¹³⁶ Coillard was also seen as a peacemaker in a country beset with tension and intrigue. This is evidenced in 1889 by a case in which following conflict in the Kuta, there developed a serious palace tension that threatened a bloodbath. When Coillard went to preach the message of peace and deplored death sentences, the message struck many. Indunas went to Coillard imploring him to repeat the message to the king and the king likewise urged him to do the same to the indunas. ¹³⁷ It is quite clear that Lewanika would have needed a stronger external ally at this time more than any other. ¹³⁸ And Coillard was to fulfil this goal but as a colonial intermediary.

Lewanika was also aware of the advantages of European education and skills. He wanted to make use of foreigners to help him with his modernisation programmes by bringing new trades, skills and goods into Bulozhi.

Despite opposition by some indunas, he was prepared to bulldoze his way in the Kuta. With the effects of the turbulent years of Lozi 'restoration' still fresh in his mind, he was eager to get European allies to safeguard his state and the ruling class he represented.

The Concession era

The treaties or concessions that were negotiated between representatives of colonial forces, and Bulozzi rulers were often protracted because of the caution and suspicion of the Lozi aristocracy. Nevertheless, within a space of eight years, the Lozi were made to sign away their independent national statehood.

Capitalism had reached its maturity at the monopoly stage as characterised by increased competition for markets as well as new sources of raw materials. South-Central Africa had begun to face the dawn of European conquests. In 1883, Germany seized South West Africa, threatening an alliance with Transvaal Boers who were trying to resist British rule. This further threatened to block British colonial advance to the north.¹³⁹ In 1885, the British annexed Bechuanaland, Khama's country, while Matabeleland was annexed in 1888.¹⁴⁰ The Portuguese were also pushing into Central Africa from the east and west occupying large areas of Mozambique and Angola. Britain had to contend with these rival powers by vigorously sending agents to sign treaties with African chiefs.

The monopoly stage of capitalism manifested itself in the process of colonial expansion. Monopolistic companies representing colonial interests or powers were used to carve up the world. For instance, the British created the North Borneo Company in 1881, the Royal Niger Company in 1886 and the Imperial British East Company in 1888.¹⁴¹ Other European powers did the same for their colonial territories or areas of influence. The use of such companies was aimed at lowering expenses of the imperial powers, leaving it to the companies to maximise profit at their own accord.¹⁴²

Colonialism in Bulozhi, and indeed most of British Central Africa was spearheaded from the Cape in South Africa, the stronghold of imperialist interests in region. Cecil Rhodes, then prime minister of the Cape, used the wealth acquired from the gold and diamond mines of South Africa to sponsor the launching of the British South Africa Company (BSA Co.). The British Salisbury government also sought to use the chartered Company as an instrument of imperial policy.¹⁴³ Shares were sold to politicians and other influential leaders as a means of providing support for the Company. The Company was granted a royal charter in 1889 and its directors were based in London.¹⁴⁴ It was this Company that spearheaded the colonial process in Bulozhi.

In Bulozhi meanwhile, a crisis was rapidly coming to a head over how to contend with colonial forces. Lewanika

sought the advice of fellow monarch Khama, who had come under British protectorate status. Khama replied that British Protection was a matter specific to each ruler to handle on his own. 'I rejoice in it but cannot advise you, you are chief and must do for yourself what you desire.'¹⁴⁵ He however, promised to put him in touch with British officials.

In October 1888, the issue of protection came up in the Lozi council. Coillard played the crucial role of explaining the advantages of such protection. But opposition was firm especially on the issue of getting foreign troops.¹⁴⁶ Confusion broke out in the Kuta. While the role of missionaries was hailed, the new proposal was thrown out on the grounds that although the indunas 'served Lewanika as their ruler, if he was going to put himself under some foreigner, the Barotse would never accept such humiliation.'¹⁴⁷ Both the king and Coillard wanted British protection but for different reasons. Lewanika was afraid of the intentions of his indunas, while Coillard feared that his mission might be ordered to shut down. Ignoring the Kuta, Lewanika instructed Coillard to write to the British Deputy High Commissioner to request protectorate status. While Lewanika as Caplan suggests, had a wider national vision than his indunas as to foresee the inevitability of colonialism which he hoped to make a better deal with by initiating the process,¹⁴⁸ problems of internal security may have bothered him most. Explaining to Coillard the reasons for protection, he declared: 'it is

to protect myself against those Barotse. You do not know them; they are plotting against my life.'¹⁴⁹

Harry Ware arrived in Bulozhi in 1889 on a mission to acquire a concession treaty, and only the gifts he brought along whetted the appetites of the indunas enough to change their minds and agree. Only a few critical details of the concession will deserve attention.¹⁵⁰ Ware was granted exclusive rights to all the minerals in the land. This included only Ila and Batoka areas but Bulozhi proper was excluded from mineral prospecting. The rights were on a twenty year duration and renewable. In turn, the Lozi king was to receive £2000 in advance and get four percent of the output in mineral royalties. The Lozi were offered foreign protection in the name of Britain. Ware was to abide by the Lozi laws of the land, and 'never prospected within five hundred yards of any native village.'¹⁵¹

The concession was itself dubious. Lozi boundaries were vaguely defined.¹⁵² It did not refer to Lozi relations with foreign powers. It was not even known whether Ware was simply an opportunistic fortune hunter, or represented a mining concession Company. Rhodes ultimately bought the concession in Kimberley to pre-empt Ware's claims and immediately sent Lochner to clinch another concession and hence rectify the above shortcomings of the 1889 one.¹⁵³

Lochner arrived in 1889 with a letter from Rhodes requesting Coillard to be the Resident Commissioner for the BSA Co. Though his religious conscience made him refuse the offer, Coillard was elated, and agreed to act in that capacity till a replacement was found.

Lochner faced opposition as the indunas did not understand why there had to be a second concession within two years. Lewanika was himself exasperated by the racist attitude of Lochner.¹⁵⁴ Three factors helped to have the concession signed. Lochner himself managed to corrupt all the Sesheke chiefs, the seat of opposition, by lavish gifts.¹⁵⁵ Coillard worked very hard to convince the indunas on the necessity of the concession. Lastly, Lewanika actually cajoled and intimidated most of the indunas into signing the concession especially through the timely appearance of a hitherto inconspicuous representative of Khama who threatened anti-concession elements with the 'wrath of Khama'.¹⁵⁶ Lochner ultimately got the concession, and filled in the missing gaps. Lewanika swore not to enter into agreement with any outside power, and in turn was given protection against outside attack.¹⁵⁷ Bulozí was excluded from mineral prospecting, and an assurance was given on the independence of Lozi internal affairs. All whites were to enter Bulozí only through Kazungula as a control measure.

The treaty had certain implications which either the Lozi were not aware of, or simply chose to ignore as

their main aim of protection was achieved. They probably hoped that they would somehow make use of it to their advantage in due course. The ruling class saw the treaty as an alliance between a weaker Lozi monarch with a humane British crown. They saw themselves as vassals but purely in political terms where a stronger British state simply extended her humane hand protection without necessarily subjugating the Lozi to her colonial interests. The Lozi did not see it as a treaty with a commercial company purely dedicated to mineral exploitation. After all, the name of the Queen was so extravagantly used by Lochner, for had he indicated he represented the Company, he would have failed to clinch the deal. Coillard also kept an uneasy silence on the matter. When the truth ultimately got through to the Lozi afterwards, they were hopelessly enraged. But the process had already been set in motion inevitably. To Rhodes and his cohorts, this was British colonial sovereignty over Bulozhi. This way, monopoly control was legally sanctioned, the most necessary pre-condition for colonial rule.

As the treaties were being signed, events on the international scene moved very fast, leading to what may variously be seen as the betrayal of Bulozhi, or the simple actualisation of historical reality. In 1890, an Anglo-German treaty was signed defining their spheres of influence in South West Africa. Because the Zambezi

had been declared an international waterway, Germany insisted on access to it from South West Africa. Hence, she was given a strip of land (the Caprivi Zipfel) not more than twenty miles jutting out, and incorporating part of Bulozhi. For many years, the Lozi did not know of the existence of this treaty which had been signed over their heads, let alone of the loss of their land.

Another imperialist conspiracy took place in the same year but this time between Britain and Portugal. An Anglo-Portuguese treaty framed a convention on August 28 to settle the border dispute on the western side of Bulozhi. But the Portuguese parliament refused to ratify the convention on the grounds that the extent of the Lozi Kingdom was not known.¹⁵⁸ It was however accepted but renewable every six months until such time that the border was delimited. The colonial powers provisionally followed the Zambezi-Kabompo watershade, and kept extending the agreement till into the next century when a joint commission was proposed.

When Lewanika heard of this arrangement, he denounced it and asked the British for quick action. By this mere act, initial acts of capitulation to the British were being endorsed. Meanwhile, the Portuguese were extending forts into the territory claimed by the Lozi, threatening conflict with the Lozi state.¹⁵⁹

The conflict developed a tripartite dimension. Britain warned Portugal not to violate the terms of the agreement

and precipitate a conflict, while Lewanika sent a protest note threatening retaliation and ordering the Portuguese commandant at Kakengi to get out, as he had no right to be there.¹⁶⁰ The conflict dragged on till 1905, while the Lozi watched the situation hopelessly.

Within Bulozhi itself, new conflict and bitterness arose over the 1890 concession. The non-arrival of a British Resident and failure by the Company to pay Lewanika according to the terms of the treaty spoilt the diplomatic atmosphere between the two. The fact that Ndebele raids continued in 1893 without apparent action from the British government worsened suspicion. The rumour that the concession was a fake one granted to a commercial company instead of the British Queen became rife, fanned by anti-concession white men like McDonald, a man who had assisted Lewanika regain the throne but who feared Company competition. The king was angry and bitter and wrote to the Queen desiring her protection and not that of a Company.¹⁶¹ He threatened to abrogate the treaty. Coillard was held responsible and feared he would be expelled from the country, and wrote passionately to the High Commissioner for action. He also washed his hands of the Company. He wrote, 'the nation accuses him of having deceived them by holding before their eyes the shadow of a protectorate . . . say there is no such thing as a Queen of England, it is a lie invented for the purpose

of taking the country . . . what can he reply to all that?'¹⁶² Worse still, in 1892 Mbunda medicine men accused the king of witchcraft and being responsible for the country's problems. He had to brutally suppress them and expel them from the court forever.

The emergence of factions strongly accusing the king of selling the country to a company alarmed the Litunga. It was probably this fear that made Lewanika establish a police force at the capital, Lealui in 1890,¹⁶³ though it also had civil duties of keeping the capital quiet and chasing people off the streets at late hours of the night.

Political problems also emerged among subject peoples of the empire. In 1892, he had to pacify the Lunda and Luvale following a war between the two, the expedition of which netted him considerable war booty.¹⁶⁴ Lewanika would probably have liked the colonial state to keep order to some of these subject peoples.

The British Resident Coryndon, did not arrive until 1897. The Litunga expressed the joy of his class by according him an elaborate royal welcome on October 26. The Kuta swore unswerving allegiance and loyalty to the British government and its Queen¹⁶⁵ at a public ceremony attended by Coryndon. The arrival of Coryndon pleased two sections of Lozi society but for different

reasons. One was the dynastic faction led by Lewanika. The other were the makalaka or slaves who thought that they were going to be freed of their bondage. There was so much excitement that Coryndon had to make it clear that it was not his mission to free them, a factor that disappointed them very much.¹⁶⁶

The indunas feared the arrival of the Resident for basically two reasons. They knew that British law did not recognise slavery, which would inevitably lead to the freeing of slaves sooner or later, and thus disrupt the social relations of production. Fearful of an eventual shortage of slaves, they had planned numerous campaigns for slaves, and also tried to accumulate slaves before the Resident arrived.¹⁶⁷ Indunas also feared that the colonial administration would strengthen the hand of the Litunga over them, and that way undermine the power they exercised in the Kuta.

Coryndon was in Bulozhi for just a year when another concession was wrung from the Lozi. The purpose of the 1898 Lawley Concession was to define specifically the relationship between the Company administration and Bulozhi. The crucial aspect lay in section 9 which granted the BSA Co. administrative rights over Bulozhi. Legal cases between whites were put outside the Lozi judicial system as were all cases of crime affecting everyone in Bulozhi.¹⁶⁸ Only petty cases between Lozis remained in the hands of the Lozi state. The annual subsidy of £4,000 for Lewanika was reduced to £850,¹⁶⁹

though it is not clear what the reaction of the Litunga was. This treaty was called 'A', but was not yet ratified by Foreign Office, neither had Lewanika signed it. Another concession or treaty was added called 'B' which inserted an article missing in treaty 'A' excluding Bulozhi valley from mineral prospecting. Both were later signed and ratified and were called 1900 Lewanika Concession.

Between 1890 and 1900, Bulozhi had legally signed away her political independence and sovereignty. This was the specific character of the initial process of colonial expansion. But once it had started, the Lozi ruling class could not reverse it. While the terms of these treaties were important on purely legalistic grounds, what was more important was the power relation between Bulozhi and the BSA Co. representing Britain. The treaties simply acted as documents of good will to underwrite the relations of co-operation. With the political and technological superiority of the British, Bulozhi would not be able to withstand the colonial onslaught, which was to come more starkly in the next century. What was perhaps legally and politically more crucial was the 1899 North-Western Rhodesia Order-In-Council which Britain subsequently passed giving absolute administrative powers to the Company.¹⁷⁰ Because this proclamation was made by the Imperial Government as the absolute authority in colonial territories, all other treaties agreed upon between Bulozhi and BSACo. agents were subordinated to it. At this point, Bulozhi began to drift rapidly into the process of colonial domination, though

actual colonial policy began to be imposed only after the 1900s.

Repercussions of the Relations of Co-operation

The phase of the relations of co-operation had certain repercussions on Bulozzi society. Politically and ideologically, there was a subordination of the Lozi aristocracy to British power. Economically, British capitalist influence began to be felt through labour migration. These influences were not yet very effective in transforming the relations of co-operation to those of domination. Certain factors accounted for the persistence of co-operation rather than domination at this stage.

In 1893, the Company was engaged in a war of colonial conquest in Rhodesia which the Ndebele had resisted. Three years later, before the Company had had enough time to recuperate, the Ndebele and Shona peoples of Southern Rhodesia rose up in a massive anti-colonial uprising. The pacification campaign was long and costly especially because of the adoption of guerrilla warfare by the African resistance forces, which annoyed even Lewanika for not having been consulted to assist in crushing the Ndebele.¹⁷¹ Just as pacification was ending, another crisis broke out, this time in the centre of the imperialist base - South Africa. In 1899, Transvaal Boers rose into armed rebellion against British rule. This war lasted three hard years and virtually sapped the energies and resources of the Company. This hindered the channelling of colonial energies to the effective

acquisition of Bulozhi. The non-availability of minerals and precious stones which were the main interest of the Company compounded the problem, and thus perpetuated for a while the Lozi state system.¹⁷² There was a genuine fear on the part of the Company officials that undue pressure on the Lozi might fuel a revolt with which, under the circumstances, the Company would not be able to cope. Hence, a policy of cautious co-operation was encouraged. Besides, the Lozi aristocracy had accepted colonial rule and were contented (at least meanwhile) with the spirit of collaboration and co-operation.

The last part of this phase of the colonial process was spent on mapping the country especially the western border with Angola.¹⁷³ A sense of territoriality had to be asserted before embarking upon policies of domination. The process tended to increase the status of the Company while diminishing that of the indunas despite the fact that indunas used the Company to enlarge their claims. Colin Harding took them along in his 1900 explorations, and this probably enhanced their status temporarily since they tended to exaggerate the extent of their kingdom in the hope that the colonial power would help establish them over such extended areas.¹⁷⁴ The British were equally guilty of such exaggeration for purposes of extending their area of control. But the fact remained the same that whatever status the indunas acquired, it was dependent purely on the Company. During one of his explorations, Gibbons once told Lewanika that he had nothing to fear

so long he was good to the English, and referred to the Matebele conquest as a good example of what the English would do to disobedient African rulers.¹⁷⁵

The first explorer was Goold Adams in 1896 whom the Litunga assisted wholeheartedly. Adams reported general acceptance of Lozi rule even in areas contested by the Portuguese.¹⁷⁶ He also reported Lewanika's excessive annoyance at the Portuguese occupation of his country and that he had problems in restraining the king from taking a possible military action.¹⁷⁷ The rejection by Portugal of this report, and the subsequent one by Gibbons led to a protracted international conflict. But the pursuance of the option of dialogue instead of direct military confrontation between the two powers demonstrated the ascendancy of imperialist interests over those of local peoples. The Lozi aristocracy was finding it increasingly difficult to determine the course of the international affairs of its state.

Bulozi managed to retain independence of her economic affairs during this time. No direct colonial influence or interference existed. Colonialism had only a limited indirect influence. Of course, the wars of plunder for loot had come to an end, the effect of which was to be evident only in the next century. By 1900, migrant labour had begun to flow to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Slaves and commoners took advantage of this to flee from the

tyranny of the landlords. But this was still embryonic and did not offer a serious challenge to the Lozi social formation, until after 1900. Only the foundation for that transition had been laid.

Just as there was little economic subjugation of Bulozhi to a colonial economy, so was there little colonial ideological influence. Despite the fact that the ruling class had accepted British rule, it still retained political and ideological independence. Apart from a clause in the 1900 treaty which discouraged witchcraft, no practical steps had been taken. Besides, Lozi ideology was difficult to identify and control. The new Christian educated elite became the ideological tools of colonial capitalism but whose influence at this time was minimal, thus further restricting colonial influence. Not until the relations of domination were established did a marked economic, political and ideological transformation take place in Bulozhi.

A Comparative Discussion of the Relations of Co-operation

The comparison begins with the periods of crisis in both Ukraine and Bulozhi which set the stage for the establishment of the relations of co-operation - the initial phase of the colonial process. The crises in both countries were both internal and external ones. The 1648 uprising against oppressive Polish landlordism culminated in Russian colonial expansion in Ukraine.

Despite the external appearance of this crisis, its source was basically internal since the Polish szlachta in Ukraine had constituted itself as an 'indigenous' class. Its external ties to Poland remained largely in an ideological context through the church. The Polish state's influence was largely conditioned by the Cossack problem. She saw Ukraine as a political stake which had to be controlled through the use of Cossack regiments by using the szlachta. The 1648 revolution shattered this goal as large sections of the szlachta sided with the new unstable state of the Hetmans. In Bulozzi, a revolution against the Kololo re-established a Lozi state, setting in motion a process that culminated in British colonial expansion.

In both situations, the new ruling class had to contend with the problem of establishing a new state, the process of which entailed legitimation of their power. Under conditions of instability caused by civil strife, this was a daunting task. The problem was compounded by uprisings which disrupted the social relations of production. Peasants, and slaves and commoners in Ukraine and Bulozzi respectively, abandoned production, breaking loose the social obligations that tied them to the land and participated in the civil wars. This led to a drop in production levels and creating economic chaos that in turn worsened political instability.

Because political office implied economic benefits (e.g., ownership of land), this tended to sharpen conflict within the ruling class of Ukraine and Bulozhi, thus opening the way to the imperial expansions of Russia and Britain.

The ruling classes of Ukraine and Bulozhi were distinguished by their dominant economic as well as political position that set them apart from ordinary people. They both attempted to find an ideological rationale of their positions by recourse to the past. The Ukrainian ruling class emulated the Polish example by making use of Magdeburg laws, while the Lozi indunas made use of pre-Kololo Lozi traditions. The difference between them is that the Cossack rulers had only the Polish example to look to, having no ruling class traditions, while the Lozi made use of their old ruling class traditions.

The 1648 revolution in Ukraine led to the birth of a Hetmanate beset by contradictions. The primitive Cossack institutions had to be refashioned to meet the challenge of administering a country whose social formation conformed more to the European feudal traditions, especially that of the Polish gentry class. Hence, considerable innovation and improvisation had to take place complicated by continued warfare with Poland which polarised class forces. The attempt to reform the ruling class along the lines of the Polish

gentry class tended to antagonise some sections of the Cossacks who still envisaged the idealised conditions of Cossack life of the steppe. Those who, seeking political office and were for a variety of reasons not happy with the faction in power, sought any means to acquire power. Hence, the split among the Cossacks between pro-Polish and pro-Russian elements was a result of such contradictions. Considering that the basis of power was sometimes dependent upon political alliances, a pro-Russian or pro-Polish orientation of the factions of the starshyna was a means of securing political office. But the basis of factional conflicts also arose from the institutional crises that affected the Hetmanate as demonstrated to some extent by pro-Russian and pro-Polish factions, a similar situation in Bulozhi between the so-called loyalist and traditionalist factions.¹⁷⁸ The induna class faced a similar institutional crisis. Exiles combined with Lozi princes who grew up under Kololo cultural influence formed a state fraught with dynastic rivalry that expressed differing political views.

The Lozi exiles who came to form the new government after the overthrow of the Kololo could not claim any experience purely on the basis of Lozi folklore which kept alive pre-Kololo Lozi institutions. Even if one were to assume that they had a clear conception

of pre-Kololo institutions, they would still have to contend with the changed material conditions, which would demand transformed political institutions and vision. Besides, the many years of Kololo rule had left an indelible mark on Bulozzi, which created pro-Kololo and anti-Kololo factions in the tumultuous Kuta, but largely in an institutional framework.

As can be seen, both Ukraine and Bulozzi inherited a historical experience that became a source of political and ideological crisis namely, Polish and Kololo influences respectively. In the Hetmanate, any faction that took either pro-Polish or pro-Russian allegiance faced immediate challenge from the other. Poland was generally regarded as an oppressor, and the Cossacks and peasants alike saw Russia as an orthodox brother, and liberator. As a result, pro-Polish factions of the starshyna tended to be unpopular. But the nature of Cossack institutions created a complexity of contradictions. Poland had an elective monarchy which corresponded loosely with an elective Hetmanate and therefore institutionally more welcome than Russian Tsardom. Such contradictions led to considerable ambivalence in the starshyna's attitudes towards Poland and Russia. As a result, historical circumstances often led to swift changes of orientations. Such sudden changes of loyalty often led to war, a situation that did not arise in Bulozzi.

The Portuguese did not have a very visible presence in Bulozhi to stake out their claims, except on the periphery of the Lozi empire. Because they did not have much to offer the Lozi, when pro-British and anti-British factions emerged eventually, no pro-Portuguese one arose, a point of distinction from the war conditions in Ukraine. It was largely a well balanced combination of internal and external factors that compelled the Litunga to seek British protection.

It is an interesting aspect of the comparison that certain questions posed will elicit relatively similar answers to similar historical phenomena operating under different conditions, and in different societies. The ruling classes of Ukraine and Bulozhi were faced with a problem of power legitimation. This meant finding historical and traditional justification for their power. As has been pointed out already, some sections of the starshyna emulated the Polish gentry while drawing upon some of the institutions and culture developed during the height of Cossackdom. The Lozi indunas on the other hand, made up a past to emulate while failing to remove all the Kololo institutions. Sikololo remains the language of Bulozhi to date. The differences in the nature of the search for historical rationale for ruling class power lies precisely in the social conditions of the two societies. The post-revolutionary period demonstrated an increasing alienation of the ruling classes from the ordinary

people who had played a crucial role in the revolutions. The starshyna tied the peasants back to the land just as the indunas tied the slaves and commoners to their masters. The difference here is that while peasants were tied to the land in the Hetmanate, slaves and commoners were not really tied to the land but to the families of nobles that owned them, except in the case of the Litunga who tied them to his land. The ordinary people in both countries came to occupy almost the same positions as before the revolution. The rapid advance of feudal estates in Ukraine, and the strengthening of feudal institutions to advance state projects in Bulohi tended to make the burdens on the people more severe than before. It is for this reason that slaves in Bulohi and peasants in Ukraine periodically rose up in rebellions against their masters. The latter used the monopoly they had over the ownership of the means of violence to suppress the revolts.

Political instability was also worsened by the nature of the institutions of the Hetman and Litunga. There was no provision for the leaders to abdicate peacefully. Any attempt to remove a leader was therefore characterised by violent insurrections. The Cossack tradition of challenging Hetmans by force of arms became a big problem of the Hetmanate. The Rada was a very factious body which raised and toppled Hetmans almost at will.

With the war becoming a perpetual problem, the internal crisis worsened, and only the person of Khmelnytsky prevented the total disintegration of the state after 1648. Similarly, the Lozi succession system allowed too many contenders to the throne which contributed to the rapid turnover of rulers between 1864 and 1885. Only the return of Lewanika to power reversed the process of disintegration of the Lozi state especially in the peripheral regions of the state. It was the continuing internal problems that contributed to Lewanika's accommodation with British colonialism in guise of the protection.¹⁷⁹

The material and social conditions in Ukraine and Bulozhi are predominantly responsible for a variety of differences between the two. Ukraine had a history of two social formations. One was that dictated by the Polish gentry-led feudal order which involved ownership of large estates by nobles worked by peasants who were in effect their property. Another social formation was that of the Steppe-frontier, the home of Cossackdom which nurtured primitive democratic passions. This in itself created a military class that came to dominate politics and economics but with a higher propensity for armed revolt than the Lozi whose military preparedness was inferior. Bulozhi had a landlord class that owned land and all the rich resources of the country. Slaves and commoners worked on this land, and faced economic exploitation and political and ideological

oppression. But Bulozî lacked such an ideal estates system due to the nature of the economy of the flood plain and the peculiar feudal social formation suited to it. Resources of land were few and scattered, while the transhumant character of flood plain life made it difficult to develop a highly productive and well established estates system. Class rigidity also tended to be blurred somewhat because of the access to land of some slaves and commoners.

The class structure in Ukraine was more developed than that in Bulozî which still gave illusions of equality through the increasingly bankrupt redistributive system. As a result, the degree and intensity of class conflict in Ukraine was much deeper, and more severe than in Bulozî. The Cossacks were a military class with a marked propensity to solve problems by military means. Their historical pride as the Knights of Zaporozhia, and free and unfettered frontiersmen sometimes bordered on anarchy thus impeding the coalescing of state central authority, and perpetuating political instability.¹⁸⁰ Class consciousness was quite high in Ukraine, probably higher than in Bulozî if the class war can be used as a measure. Rebellions were organised more quickly and the response was often spontaneous, this being the product of social conditions that gave rise to such acute class conflict. In Bulozî the capacity to

organise popular revolts was not very great and most of the revolts that took place were in the form of palace coups with the 1864-65 civil war being the longest in Lozi history. Only the economic excesses of the aristocracy upon the people led to a slave organised revolt in 1893.¹⁸¹ The potential for an internal uprising was therefore, one of the factors that influenced the Ukrainian and Lozi rulers' quest for external alliance of protection.

The process of internal crises was also interwoven with imperial rivalry, a theme that manifested itself throughout the colonial period. Imperial powers that contested for the control of Ukraine and Bulozhi had particular economic and political motives. In Ukraine, the main protagonists in the colonial adventure were Poland and Russia. But this also involved Turkey and Sweden who had similar designs. In Bulozhi, it was Britain and Portugal basically, but this also involved Germany.

Despite the fact that colonialism was manifested in political and diplomatic agreements, this was actually a superstructural expression of economic interests. It was the dialectical nature of the colonial process that the political aspect initially took apparent precedence over economic interests, and hence a leading role in the history of colonialism.

The major economic motive for Russian expansion was the rich agricultural land of Ukraine which had a high level of grain production. Wheat was necessary for the Russian merchant capitalist market which was by now expanding considerably. This way, it was going to be useful in alleviating food shortages which were a constant plague in Russian society. Another motive lay in the desire to control the prosperous Ukrainian merchant trade centred in the Baltic region. This would go a long way in benefiting and actually expanding Russian merchantilist trade. Economic interests in Bulozhi were radically different. The capitalist mode of production in Europe was this time manifested by an intense desire for sources of cheap labour and raw materials¹⁸² - real and imagined. It was this condition that drove imperialism to the doors of Bulozhi. The prime economic necessity was gold and diamonds which became the basis of wealth for the De Beers mining conglomerate in South Africa led by Rhodes.¹⁸³ Thus, the hopes of finding a second Rand in Central Africa was the main objective of British imperialism.

The Mambari trade between Bulozhi and Angola was not an attraction to the British. It was a remnant of the nineteenth century merchant capitalism which had by now outlived its usefulness in the changed economic conditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The British were not interested in controlling this

trade but rather stamping it out as it violated British interests of monopoly control.

Despite differences in the specific character of the economic interests pursued by Russia and Britain, it is nevertheless clear that these powers were interested in harnessing, controlling and monopolising the resources of their colonies.

Political stakes were involved. Despite their being closely intertwined with economic issues, it would be useful to consider them separately so as to highlight the comparative aspects.

It is the political theme that has often received greater attention in the historiography of imperialism and colonialism.¹⁸⁴ What follows is however not a detailed discussion of political motives of imperialism but rather considers the comparative aspects of Russian and British political interests in Ukraine and Bulozhi respectively.

Both colonial powers were interested in defending their economic interests by wanting to set up political relationships with the weaker states. This would help keep out other interested powers. The fear of other powers grabbing the colonial cake earlier appears to have been stronger in Bulozhi than in Ukraine. This is so because in the vicious competition for sources

of raw materials in Central Africa, those who signed treaties of monopoly earlier than other powers stood to gain as such treaties came to be respected internationally with a minimum of challenge. The Portuguese and the Germans were a constant threat to British advance in the interior of Africa and the British fought hard to keep them out of the region through hasty protectorate treaties with local peoples. Russia faced a relatively different situation. Powers like Turkey, Poland and Sweden were of course interested in Ukraine, but Poland was physically the occupying power, which was a hindrance to Russian ambitions. But it was the weakness of Poland brought upon by Cossack blows that gave the Russians chance to emerge dominant in Ukraine.

There is also one point of departure in the political motives of the two imperial powers. The difference lies in the particular and special political problem that Ukraine presented.

Ukraine as a borderland, presented a particular political problem in the sense that she was often breeding ground of political dissidents and malcontents who had so often threatened the Russian throne in the past. Russia would therefore have found it opportune to put an end to the frontier revolts that characterised the entire belt of Central Eurasia which was the home of Cossackdom. Russian and Polish rulers had alternately competed to heap slander and abuse on Cossack rebel

forces due to their passionately rebellious tendencies. The fact that the Cossack register system was not effective in checking the revolts necessitated colonial acquisition of the borderlands, which became official Russian imperial policy especially during the time of Peter I. This was therefore, a geographical and historical factor peculiar to Ukraine and absent in Bulozí.

The appearance of imperialism at the doors of Ukraine and Bulozí created a crisis for the indigenous ruling classes. The external threat played a profound influence on the choice of strategies for combating it. The arrival of foreign powers on the scene led to an inevitable need to accomodate them with the hope of fending off the most disastrous consequences of failing to do so. Poland remained a grave international political and military problem to Ukraine. On the contrary, the Ndebele and the various European powers were rapidly contained in Bulozí and hence caused no problem of such magnitude. But external forces were perpetually present in Ukraine, a factor that worsened warfare and instability. The Hetmanate faced a continuous Tatar nuisance through periodic incursions for the loot and slaves, and who occasionally occupied the southern regions. But the Tatars did not become a grave political problem in the form of attempting to conquer Ukriane. They were predators in the south

just as the Ndebele occasionally raided Bulozhi's southern regions but never challenged Bulozhi power directly. Besides they disappeared from the scene after their conquest by the British South Africa Company troops.

The Hetmanate did not however manage to obliterate the Polish problem. The basis of the Hetmanate's accommodation with Russia was the spectre of war which had serious internal and external repercussions for the country. While the Lozi annihilated their former rulers, the Kololo, the Ukrainians failed to obliterate the problem faced by Polish aggression. The endless war with Poland was one dominant historical factor that compelled the Cossack aristocracy to take a pro-Russian orientation, a kind of colonial war that the Lozi managed to avoid. The Lozi sought British protection on assumed fear of resisting the consequences of white penetration. In this case, it was not the visible military or political might of the British that catapulted Bulozhi into the concessions era but rather their potential threat as perceived by the Lozi.

The Character of the Treaties

The treaties that Ukraine and Bulozhi signed are of special significance. They covered a whole range of political and economic relations which on the face value appeared clear and innocent. In actual fact, they were so vague and general that they could mean almost anything that the colonial powers wanted them to.

One interesting article in the treaties is of special historical significance. Both Ukriane and Bulozì were required not to sign any treaty with other powers without the knowledge of their masters. The Ukrainian treaty specifically mentioned Poland, Sweden and Turkey as countries the Hetmanate was required not to have diplomatic relations with. All other relations were to be established with the knowledge to the Tsar. Following Bohdan Khmelnytsky's death, the latter provision was actually withdrawn, thus requiring Ukraine to have relations with nobody whosoever. Though the Bulozì treaties of 1890 and 1900 did not mention any country specifically, it was clear that the British were worried about German and Portuguese threats.

In recognition of the power and assumed benevolence of Russia and Britain, Ukraine and Bulozì each swore allegiance and loyalty to the ruling classes of the former. In return, the colonial powers promised each of their colonial dependencies that they would protect them from their external enemies. The treaties were regarded binding and indissoluble. The Pereyaslav treaty was renewable or reconfirmed upon appointment of a new Hetman, a factor that itself allowed Russia to change the treaty terms so as to suit her colonial interests. The 1890 Lochner concession was different but only in the sense that it bound all descendants of the Litunga and the Kuta.

Since no Litunga died in the whole period under discussion, Bulozhi did not experience such devious treaty rearrangements as was the case in Ukraine. But neither did she escape what Ukraine went through. The colonial authorities cajoled or tricked the Lozi aristocracy to accept changes in the treaty terms especially in the 1898 treaty. This treaty reduced the royalty of the Litunga and also gave administrative powers to the Company.

These treaties, and the manner in which they were signed demonstrates the main objectives of the colonial powers, though initially appearing discreet if not obscure. Both Russia and Britain presented themselves to their territories as diplomatic allies in defence of weak partners. It is precisely for this reason that the initial period of colonialism was in each case given the semblance of two political sovereigns signing a pact of mutual co-operation. And a period of co-operation lasted until such time that the relations were opportunely subverted for the realisation of colonial domination.

Because the initial phase of the colonial process was a peaceful one and not an outright military conquest, the process of colonial domination was much more subtle and hence protracted. The treaties themselves demonstrated the complexity of the colonial process. An argument still continues in the historiography of the two countries as to whether the colonised were aware of the implications

of the treaty or were simply tricked by the more advanced and stronger ally. Exiled Ukrainian nationalist historiography sees the treaty as having been signed by Ukrainians in good faith, but the Russians violated the treaty terms to suit their own conditions, taking advantage of their power status.¹⁸⁵ Kohut attributes this treaty partially to the naivety of the Cossack leaders and failure to grasp the true intentions of Russia.¹⁸⁶ Pritsak advances a similar nationalist viewpoint when he argues that Russia took advantage of her experience in political skill and diplomacy to make the young and inexperienced Ukrainian leaders to sign the treaty of Pereyaslav.¹⁸⁷ Soviet historiography does not strictly concern itself with the consequences of Ukrainian autonomy and independence presumably because by the act of the 1654 treaty, issues of independence became irrelevant. But both of these strands of historiography recognise the war crisis as a major issue that led Cossacks to seek Russian protection.

In Bulozzi, a nationalist historiography led by Mainga sees the British as having tricked the Lozi into signing treaties whose true significance they did not really understand.¹⁸⁸ While this school alludes in one way or another to the role of internal and international crisis in having compelled the Lozi to seek British protection, Prins takes a totally contrary

view and sees the 'concession crisis' as he calls it, as having been due to an initiative by a politically strong, secure and confident aristocracy to use the British to its advantage.

Two possibilities stand out strongly about the intentions of the Cossack and Lozi ruling classes. Either they were fully aware about the implications of the treaties or they were not. One can argue that had they been aware, they would have insisted on having treaty terms that were more favourable to them. It is however worth noting that even if they were, the threats posed on their countries, as well as their positions as rulers were too serious and severe weighed against the consequences of the treaties. It is quite probable that the ruling classes hoped to find better leverage against their colonial masters once having eliminated the subjective problems that threatened their states. The fact that this period of the colonial process was marked by mutual diplomatic ties of co-operation probably enhanced the views of the ruling classes in the signing away of independent statehood as a viable option.

Consequences of the Relations of Co-operation

The establishment of the relations of co-operation had a number of consequential developments. Though

these states still maintained their independent statehood, the mere presence of vassal relations tended to narrow this independence. The oaths of allegiance and loyalty to their respective overlords meant that Ukraine and Bulozhi had to submit themselves in one way or another to the dictates of their colonial masters. Besides, whatever pretensions of diplomatic co-operation there was, it was essentially the power relations that were ultimately to determine the outcome of the relationships.

Differences are more manifested here due to the specifically different historical conditions of the two countries. In Ukraine, war ensued in endemic fashion fanned by the contending imperialist powers, and characterised by factional splits in the ranks of the starshyna. This is contrasted by the relative calm that came to Bulozhi as dynastic factional tendencies were somewhat checked by the presence of a colonial power. But this peace was lacking in Ukraine due to war. Under conditions of chaos, factional splits within the Cossack aristocracy made difficult attempts to maintain internal order and authority, a situation that Russia took advantage of by playing off the factions, and hence penetrating Cossack military regiments. The absence of such militarised units in Bulozhi made it easier for the

British to send a Resident in 1897 with little fears for his safety. This was in addition, due to the almost unanimous acceptance of the British by the ruling class, with a little and weak opposition. The fear of a Lozi revolt after the experiences of the Ndebele uprisings, and the very initial weakness of the B.S.A.Co made possible the maintenance of peaceful relations of co-operation.

But there were parallels between Bulozzi and Ukriane at this stage. Russia was not in a strong military and political position to enforce her colonial policies just as Britain was not through its agent the B.S.A.Co. Politically, both colonial territories managed to retain the autonomy of their political institutions and economic life, a factor attributed to one reason - the weakness of the colonial machines. The powers feared that undue pressure might create a resistance which they could not manage, at least meanwhile. They therefore, tried to get as much diplomatic co-operation as possible. The reasons for this situation have already been explored. They are similar in their general political nature but differ significantly in their specifics. Russia would probably have dominated the Hetmanate earlier had the Cossacks not demonstrated tremendous political and military resistance which proved costly to Russia. For Britain, it was not so much as resistance from the Lozi

that forestalled immediate colonial domination but the lack of resources by the Company, administrative weakness, exclusion of other rival powers from the scene and genuine desire on the part of the B.S.A.Co. not to immediately antagonise the Lozi aristocracy. The latter had made it already clear that they were not going to accept undue political interference, a view they enclosed in the treaties. Under such conditions, the British decided to wait a little longer for the right conditions to arise just as much as Russia decided to wait so long the relations of co-operation could be maintained.

Taking advantage of the power relations that operated to the disadvantage of the weaker partners in the alliance, the colonial powers sought to transform certain aspects of the political relationship. This was done through pressure, deceit and duplicity. They deliberately altered the conditions of the earlier treaties by removing undesirable clauses and adding new ones. Russia did this following the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and especially so after the ruina in the Hlukhiv articles. What the Tsarist officials did was simply to change the wording of the original treaty and add new articles, removing others especially those that dealt with the autonomy of the Rada members to remove their Hetman. The new articles imposed greater restrictions on the Political freedoms of the Rada, making the Hetman

virtually accountable to the Tsar. And one such Hetman was Mazepa, despite his later defection. The Lozi faced a similar situation, though under less crude conditions compared to those imposed by the Russian Tsar. Because of the different social conditions of the late nineteenth century, a greater deal of civility operated within the British ruling class and its agents. It was an age when legal arrangements took such a formalistic bourgeois cultural character that excessively crude political behaviour and diplomacy was discouraged. Formal agreements had to be made, at least to be justifiable in case of international conflict, and given a semblance of respect. The nature of the Russian state and indeed most of Europe at that time was such that agreements between rulers were based on personal cordial relationships. Such an agreement would be subject to almost immediate reversal or abuse in the event of one of the two parties disappearing through death, for example. This should not be exaggerated though. Legality was a major concern but still, one cannot fail to see a general trend of personal relations between feudal lords, the agreements of which rarely took the legal sanctity of the modern times.

The B.S.A.Co. officials and Foreign Office did not change the terms of the treaty by unconstitutional means. But rather, they simply tricked the Lozi into signing

new treaties with subtractions and additions. Hence, we can see that while they reduced the annual fees due to Lewanika in 1898, they also added another clause which gave the Company administrative rights to Bulozhi. This was further consummated by 1899 Barotseland-Northwestern Rhodesia Order-In-Council, which does not appear to have come to the notice or attention of the Lozi aristocracy.

In both cases therefore, there was a deliberate attempt by both powers to subvert and transform the original terms of the agreements so that they could have greater legal rights to colonise, and thus undermine the power of the local ruling classes.

Imperial rivalry and conspiracy demonstrated the degree of the weakening of the ruling aristocracies on one hand and the strengthening hand of colonialism on the other. Conflict among colonial powers often led to agreements which were detrimental to the interests of the colonised. The experiences of Ukraine and Bulozhi demonstrate this point. Following continuous war that terribly ruined Ukraine, Russia and Poland signed the treaty of Andrussov in 1667 that divided the Right and Left Banks of Ukraine along the river Dnieper. The Cossacks were never consulted, a factor which they bitterly resented. The treaty thus led to loss of a part of the Hetmanate,

and actual crumbling and disappearing of Hetmanic institutions on the Polish ruled Right Bank. The treaty of eternal peace that followed Andrussov shattered all dreams of reversing the process of colonial rule.

The Lozi equally witnessed the loss of their territory to German-South West Africa following an Anglo-German Agreement of 1889. So did they lose part of Bulozhi in the 1890 Anglo-Portuguese treaty by virtue of making a provisional modus vivendi for their common border. Bulozhi could not claim control of the disputed region and often restrained from doing so by British officials. The formal secession of that part of Bulozhi did not take place till 1905 by which time the loss to Bulozhi had become a fait accompli. The Lozi ruling class was never consulted about matters that affected the fate of their country, and many such international treaties caught them unawares. Even the border delimitation process was an imperialist affair and the Lozi simply acted as errand boys of imperialism. The ultimate course of events was determined by British colonialism.

Border delimitation is one aspect of Lozi colonial history which sharply contrasts with the Ukrainian one in the sense that Ukraine did not possess a boundary problem. The main focus of imperialist conflict was over who was to colonise Ukraine, whereas

in the case of Bulozhi, it was a conflict over contested border regions. But both cases demonstrated the effect of imperialist rivalry over the colonised peoples as has already been demonstrated.

Colonialism had its ideological impact on the colonised people even at this stage. Though both Bulozhi and Ukraine retained for a while ideological autonomy, some marked changes had taken place. It is also at this level that colonial processes demonstrated very marked differences between the two colonial territories.

The presence of an independent church institution, which was also the Hetmanate's ideological super-structure invited the wrath of the Russian state which found it necessary to have one ideological institutional structure that conformed to the needs of the Russian state. This, therefore, meant the subjugation of the Ukrainian church to the Patriarch of Moscow. But the weight of ideological oppression was to follow later. The absence of a church with the formalistic hierarchies typical of orthodox Ukraine in Bulozhi made the process of ideological subjugation more difficult. Bulozhi's ideological state apparatus, religion, was based upon the veneration of dead ancestors who were believed to be the founders of the Lozi nation, and hence treated as the living dead whose wrath if incited could spell doom to the

Kingdom. The religious and hence ritual centre of the country were the sites of royal graves, especially that of Mwanambinyi who founded the kingdom. These royal graves were enclosed and looked after by religious priests who were believed to be the medium of communication between the living and the dead. It is not clear what role the priests played when colonialism arrived to challenge their basis for social existence.

The Lozi religious priests may not have reacted strongly against colonialism and its officials for there tended to be a separation between the state and the church. It is therefore possible that they hated the mission stations which daily preached heresies against Lozi religious practise as pagan and satanic. In the absence of evidence, documentary and otherwise, there can only be a cautious deduction of the situation. One thing clear however, is that missionaries were disliked both by some sections of the Lozi aristocracy and ordinary people due to their attempts to undermine Lozi cultural institutions and norms. This partly explains the reason why Mbunda medicine men, a social and ideological institution based at the royal court once accused the king of witchcraft, and squarely blamed him for the problems of the country. This was essentially

directed at white missionary ideological influence through its alien educational system loaded with christian theology which was beginning to subvert the ideological basis of Bulozí. Besides, the white missionaries tended to be regarded as great white witches who would threaten the life of the country, since Lozi medicine men had not yet come to understand the source of their power.

It is this difference in the religious and hence ideological systems of Bulozí and the Hetmanate that makes the two colonial processes in the ideological sphere rather peculiar and different. This difference can be explained purely on different material and historical conditions of the two societies involved. The only commonality is based on the attempts by the colonial powers to challenge and control these institutions for their own colonial interests. But the most serious challenge and transformation occurred only after the relations of co-operation were transformed into those of domination.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. L. Rudnytsky, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations: The Burden of History', (Mimeographed, University of Alberta, 1977), 4.
2. W.H. McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500-1800, (London, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 4-5.
3. B. Krupnytsky, 'Ten Centuries of Ukraine: A Brief Summary of Ukrainian History,' Ukrainian Review, 2, 1955, 70. See also A. Kaminski, 'Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth and its Citizens,' (Mimeographed, Columbia University, 1977), 18.
4. P. Lyaschenko, History of the National Economy of Russia to 1917, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949), 260.
5. A. Gieysztor, A History of Poland, (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1968), 239.
6. The history of the Cossacks of Zaporozhie is well documented in George March's, The Cossacks of Zaporozhie, (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University, 1965).
7. D. Doroshenko, History of Ukraine, (Edmonton: Institute Press, 1939), 140. This romanticism is nowhere more expressed than the chronicle of Kostomarov, 'Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People', (New York: Research programme on the USSR, 1954).
8. E. J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1955), 13-28.
9. An ambassador of the Pope tried to enlist them in a military alliance against the Moslem world. See Diary of Lassota Von Steblau, The Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks, 1594, (Cambridge: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1975).
10. Gieysztor, A History of Poland, 239.
11. Ibid, 240.
12. Rudnytsky, 'The Burden', 10.
13. Doroshenko, History, 235.
14. See Ibid , 231.
15. Ukraine: A consice Encyclopaedia, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 634-635.
16. Doroshenko, History, 235.

17. Ibid., 237.
18. Doroshenko, History, 247.
19. Personal communication with Professor Pritsak, Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University, May 1980.
20. Ibid.
21. Many left for Moscovite lands east of the Dnieper. See B. O'Brien, Moscovy and the Ukraine: From the Pereyaslav Agreement to the Truce of Andrussovo, 1654-1667, (California: University of California Press, 1963), 19.
22. These treaties were Zamostiv signed in 1649, Zboriv (1649), and Bila Tserkva (1651).
23. Y. Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 247.
24. O'Brien, 'Moscovy and Ukraine,' 21.
25. This was especially evidenced during the 'time of troubles' in the first quarter of the 17th Century when pretenders to the throne threatened the state with the participation of Cossacks, and occasionally, the Polish army. See Progress Publishers, History of the USSR, (Moscow: Progress, 1977), 118-126; R. Freeborn, A Short History of Modern Russia, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1966); P. Langworthy, The Cossacks, (London: Constable, 1969); M. Prokrovsky, History of Russia, From the earliest times to the rise of Commercial Capitalism, (Bloomington, Indiana: University Prints and Reprints, 1928).
26. Academy of Sciences of the USSR Institute of History. A short History of the USSR, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), 138.
27. I. Nahayewsky. History of Ukraine, (Philadelphia: America Publishing House, 1963), 181.
28. Z. Kohut, 'The Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy (1763-1786): A case study in the Intergration of Anon-Russian Area into the Empire'. (Phd. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1976), 58.
29. Ibid.
30. S. Ivanytsky, 'Did the treaty of Pereyaslav include a Protectorate?' Ukrainian Quarterly, 10, (1954), 180
31. See Progress Publishers, History of the USSR, Vol. I, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977). 138-139.

32. See Ibid.; 'N. Czyrowski, 'Economic Aspects of the Ukrainian - Moscovite Treaty of 1654', Ukrainian Quarterly, 10 (1954), 85-92; B. Krupnytsky, 'Treaty of Pereyaslav and the Political Orientations of Bohdan Khmelnytsky', Ukrainian Quarterly, 10 (1954); N. Chubaty, 'State and church in Ukraine after 1954', Ukrainian Quarterly, 10 (1954), 60-70; N. Prychodko, 'Years of Russian dealings with Ukraine', Ukrainian Quarterly, 10 (1954), 93-99., K. Myvon, the Saga of the Ukraine: An outline History, (Chicago, Mun Enterprises, 1961); O. Ohloblyn, 'The Pereyaslav Treaty and Eastern Europe', Ukrainian Quarterly, 41-50.
33. G. Vernadsky, Bohdan: Hetman of the Ukraine, (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), 104.
34. Ibid.
35. Z. Kohut, 'Ukrainian Autonomy,' 59.
36. Ibid, 61
37. Ibid.
38. Personal Communication with O. Pritsak.
39. A. Yakovliv, 'The Jurisdical Character of the Pereyaslav Treaty', Ukrainian Quarterly, 10, (1954), 54.
40. I. Nahayewsky, History, 183.
41. P. Langworthy, The Cossacks, 120.
42. I. Nahayewsky. History, 183.
43. O'Brien, 'Moscovy and Ukraine', 38.
44. W. Allen, The Ukraine, A history, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 144.
45. P. Langworthy. The Cossacks, 121.
46. A. Yakovliv. 'The Jurisdical', 54.
47. Y. Tys-Krokhmaluk, 'Victory at Konotop', Ukrainian Review, 6, (1959).
48. See N. Chirovsky, Old Ukraine: Its Socio-economic History Prior to 1781, (New Jersey: Florham Park Press, 1963), 225.
49. Personal Communication with O. Pritsak.
50. M. Hrushevsky, A History of Ukraine, (London: Yale University Press, 1941), 337.

51. Ibid.
52. Doroshenko, History, 322.
53. Ibid., 329.
54. See O. Halecki, 'Ukraine, Poland and Sweden at the time of Ivan Mazepa', Ukrainian Quarterly, 15, (1959); B. Krupnitsky, 'The Mazeppists', Ukrainian Quarterly 4, (1948), 204-214; C. Manning, 'The World of Mazepa', Ukrainian Quarterly, 15, (1959), 260-270; J. Pauls, 'Shevchenko on Mazepa', Ukrainian Review, 15, 1968), 59-65, 'Musical Works Based on the Legend of Mazepa', Ukrainian Review, 11, (1964), 57-65; O. Oleksander, 'The year 1709', Ukrainian Review, 6, (1959), 19-30; J. Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz, 'The Battle of Poltava', Ukrainian Review, 6, (1959), 13-20.
55. Doroshenko, History, 373.
56. He was a Ukrainian Cossack of Polish noble background. See W. Cresson, The Cossacks, Their History And Country (Brenton: New York, 1919), 118.
57. Cresson, The Cossacks, 118.
58. Ibid., Mazepa was to join Swedish forces who had already defeated Poland, and were advancing on Ukraine.
59. The Zaporozhian Cossacks had seceded from the Hetmanate following the anarchy of the ruina. Because of this, they remained outside the cultural life of the Hetmanat coupled by a receding frontier that no longer allowed pre-eighteenth century conditions. They became isolated and became a backward, ragtag collection of criminal bands, a factor worsened by the increasing development of serf social relations around the sitch which impoverished many of their ranks. They lost their military prowess as well.
60. Emigre Ukrainin scholars and poet Shevchenko mournfully dramatise this year. See note 54.
61. O. Subtelny - 'Russia and the Ukraine: The Difference that Peter Made', The Russian Review 39, 1 (1980), 4.
62. Ibid., 5.
63. Ibid., 7.
64. Chirovsky, Old Ukraine, 241.
65. Ibid., 242.
66. N. Czyrowski, 'Economic Aspects of the Ukrainian Treaty of 1654', Ukrainian Quarterly, 10, (1954), 87.

67. Subtelny, 'Russia and the Ukraine', 7.
68. Ibid.
69. O'Brien, 'Moscovy and Ukraine', 113.
70. Kohut, 'Ukrainian Autonomy', 33.
71. K. Kononenko, Ukraine and Russia: A History of Economic Relation Between Ukraine and Russia (1654-1917), (Wisconsin: The Marquette University Press, 1958), 6.
72. Hrushevsky, A History, 394.
73. Doroshenko, History, 360.
74. N. Chubaty, 'Moscow and the Ukrainian Church', Ukrainian Quarterly, 10, (1954), 61.
75. Ibid, 63.
76. Ibid, from letter of Bishop Avraamy of Belgorod, 1685, Archive of S. W. Russia, Part I, Vol. 5, 55-61.
77. Chubaty, 'Moscow', 66.
78. B. Kentrschynsky, 'The Political Struggle of Mazepa and Charles XII for Ukraine's Independence', Ukrainian Quarterly, 15, (1959), 245.
79. G. Prins, The Hidden Hippopotamus, Reappraisal in African History: The Early Colonial Experience in Western Zambia. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 210.
80. The Kololo were a warrior band that broke off from the Basuto and fled South African following a revolution among the Zulu, and came to dominate the Lozi in 1840. See M. Mainga, Bulizi under the Luyana Kings, Political Evolution and state Formation in Pre-Colonial-Zambia, (London: Longman, 1973), 65; M. Gluckman, Economy of the Barotse Central Plain, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968); A. Roberts, A History of Zambia, (London: Longman, 1976); D. W. Strike, Barotseland: Eight Years Among the Barotse, (London: John Bale, Sons and Danielsson) Undated; G. Clay, Your Friend Lewanika: Litunga of Barotseland, 1842-1916, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1968); Mackintosh, Lewanika of Barotseland and Allied Tribes, 1875-1916, (Society for Christian Literature) Undated.

81. Some princes and indunas fled the valley to live in exile in Mashi and Lukwakwa among non-Lozi peoples. They established small embryonic Lozi states in exile and always looked for a chance to go back and restore Lozi power in Bulozhi.
82. F. Coillard, On the Threshold of Central Africa, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1897), 169.
83. Livingstone's Private Journals, 1851-1853, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960), 222.
84. Mainga, Bulozhi, 96.
85. He was criticised over the distribution of high offices and cattle. See Mainga, Bulozhi, 96.
86. Mainga, Bulozhi, 117.
87. Ibid, 119.
88. F. Coillard, On the Threshold of Central Africa, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1897), 343.
89. Mainga, Bulozhi, 125, *From Coillard, Sur le Haut Zambezi, (Paris: Berger-Leyraud et Cie, 1898), 207.*
90. Bulozhi was ruled from two capitals, Lealui in the north and the seat of power of the Litunga, and Sesheke in the south. The latter was a confederation of fifteen chieftains that were Lozi but for not very well established reasons resisted Lozi rule. The possibility is that Lozi power was in the process of expansion towards Sesheke, which the latter resisted. The degree of anti-Lozi resistance is described by Coillard in On the Threshold, 308.
91. Coillard, On the Threshold, 172.
92. Clay, Lewanika, 45.
93. Mainga, Bulozhi 128.
94. The debate over pre-Kololo Lozi institutions occupies the minds of historians to date. In fact there is no full proof evidence of the nature of such institutions. Information available is purely extrapolative of 20th Century conditions such as Gluckman's, Economy, 67-70.
95. Coillard, On the Threshold, 163.
96. They were called 'dogs' or 'black things of the forest'. See S. Arnot, Gareganze, Or Seven Years Pioneer Mission Work in Central Africa, (London:

Frank Cass, 1889) 73.

97. E. Hermitte, 'An Economic History of Barotseland', (Phd. Thesis, North Western University, 1973), 194.
98. Clarence-Smith, 'Landlords', 231.
99. R. Sampson, A Toothbrush in His Hat, (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1972), 23.
100. Coillard, On the Threshold, 173
101. Ibid.
102. Sampson, A Toothbrush, 100.
103. Clay, Lewanika, 15.
104. See Mainga, Bulozi, 105-143.
105. G. Caplan, 'Barotseland's Scramble for Protection', Journal of African History, 10, 2 (1969), 278.
Caplan also holds the view that new conditions in Bulozi no longer reflected the old.
106. A. Roberts. A History of Zambia, 133.
107. Coillard, On the Threshold, 285
108. Diaries of George Westbeech in E. Tabler ed., Trade and Travel in Early Barotseland, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963), 44.
109. M. Bull, 'Lewanika's achievements', Journal of African History, Vol. XII, 1-4, (1972), 469, from Coillard to Christian Friends and Helpers, Sefula, 6th April, 1891, Co. 5/2/1 (Northern Rhodesia Archives).
110. M. Bull, 'Lewanika's Achievements', 469.
111. C. Clarence-Smith, 'Landlords', 221.
112. Ibid. See also Gluckman, Economy, 29-30.
113. On Slave conditions, see Clarence-Smith, 'Landlords', 229-231.
114. Prins, The Early Colonial Experience, 68-69. M. Mainga (Bull) makes a similar point about the strength of the Lozi empire and that of the king following the innovations of Lewanika. See 'Lewanika's Achievements', 464.
115. F. Coillard, On the Threshold, 272
116. G. Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, 21. For detailed information on aristocratic leisure, see Clarence-Smith, 'Landlords', 223-225.

117. Clarence-Smith, 'Landlords', 225, from Wedell Diaries, 111, 28 January, 1886.
118. See Ibid., and Mainga, Bulozi, 140.
119. Mainga, 'Lewanika's Achievements', 470, from Coillard, Sur le Haut Zambèze (Paris, 1898), 268.
120. Coillard, On the Thresholds, 319.
121. See Clarence-Smith, 'Landlords', 231.
122. Ibid., from Journal of Arthur Baldwin, 11th October, 1893.
123. Clarence-Smith, 'Landlords', 231.
124. Prins, The Early Colonial Experience, 70. He assumes that the agricultural reforms improved production, and solved the economic crises which were nevertheless not serious.
125. Hermitte, 'An Economy', 198.
126. Christian missions in Central Africa played a big role in the facilitation of the colonial process. For a detailed discussion of their activities see R. I. Rotberg, 'The Missionary Factor in the Occupation of Trans-Zambezia', The Northern Rhodesia Journal Vol. 4, no. 4 (1964), 330-338; Christian Missions and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Africa and its Explorers; Motives, Methods and Impact, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970).
127. Livingstone's Private Journals, 1851-1853; (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960).
128. J. Hanna, The Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, (London, Faber and Faber, 1965).
129. A. Tiberondwa, 'Education, Christianity, and Imperialism: The Case of Uganda and Zambia', University of East Africa Social Sciences Conference, Dar-es-Salaam, 20-22 December, 1976, 1.
130. Arnot, Gareganze, 70.
131. Diaries of Westbeech, 80.
132. S. Pinto, How I Crossed Africa From the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, (London: Sampson Low, 1881).
133. E. Holub, Travels North of the Zambezi, 1885-1886, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975).