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135. W. Chapman, A pathfinder in South-Central Africa, (London: W. A. Hammond, 1909), 29.
136. T. Lewanika, 'History of Education in the Western Province of Zambia', Mimeographed, Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1979, 13.
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146. The Ndebele had just raided Batoka areas and military protection against such incursions appear to have been high on the agenda of the king.
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151. Baxter, The Concessions, 6-7.
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159. In 1895, fort Moseku who established, 1896, Kakengi and Nyakatoro, and Kameya in 1897. See Ibid, Actions of Portugal under modus vivendi.
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CHAPTER 3

RELATIONS OF DOMINATION

UKRAINE: 1700 - 1780

Establishment of the Colonial State

The defeat of Herman Strogon and his Swedish allies led to a rapid transformation of the relationship between Russia and Ukraine, culminating in the establishment of the relations of domination. The war situation enabled the Tsar (Peter I) to move military forces en masse into the Hetmanate, thus laying the foundations of coercive colonial state institutions which were crucial in the transformation of the relations of co-operation to domination. The Russian policies were thereafter, aimed at weakening the power of the ruling class and thus destroying the independent statehood of the Hetmanate, and making Ukraine part of the Russian imperial system.¹

The process of incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian state was a product of the expansionist and modernising programmes of Tsar Peter the Great. They were aimed at strengthening Russia both economically and politically. The success in the establishment of an absolute feudal monarchy in the last century had to be complimented by strengthening of the empire's economy which had begun to come under the influence of mercantilism. This involved harnessing the country's resources for the expansion of local industry and an all-Russian market. Borderlands like Ukraine had to be incorporated into the empire to ensure a more meaningful exploitation of their resources.

Using administrative pressure of the colonial state, Ukraine's independence was subverted and violated. Russia managed for the

first time to extract surplus in the form of tax and labour. The starshyna played no small role in this process of colonial domination. With the Hetmanate directly coming under the control of Russia, they lost political will and succumbed to close collaboration with the Russian nobility vying with them for ennoblement and high office. Hetmans became puppets who could be removed at will, or have the institution actually abolished by Russia as was the case in 1722.²

The process of the establishment of the relations of domination is best demonstrated by examining the nature of Russian colonial policy up to 1730. Following Mazepa's defection, ten Russian dragoon regiments in addition to town garrisons were stationed permanently in Ukraine, and quartered among the Cossack rural population.³ Under the pretext of searching out sedition and treason, their commanders were given the unprecedented right to interfere in local affairs and bypass Cossack authorities.⁴

Soon after Poltava, a Russian minister was assigned to the Hetman, accompanied by a small staff, and occasionally with two dragon regiments.⁵ He was given orders that established the format of the relations with the Hetman. He was to observe the Hetman's external relations, and read his correspondence.⁶ There was also a set of secret instructions that allowed the minister free use of Russian dragoon regiments, and to observe any treasonable elements among the starshyna.⁷ By 1710 the Tsar had increased the number of representatives in Kiev to two.⁸

Regimental commanders of Russian forces almost immediately initiated a campaign of terror against Mazepists, real and imagined. Executions, property confiscation, interrogation and exile was the fate of anyone associated with Mazepa. Ukrainian society was so effectively terrorised into submission that no Hetman and his starshyna would ever dare to oppose the Tsar again. The ruling class had also become so weakened that it could not resist if it wanted to.

The process of pacification was itself meaningless unless it was backed by administrative policies that would realise Russia's colonial goals. Initially, dual rule was encouraged in which the Hetmanate operated semi-independently side by side with the Russian officials.

All elections of colonels and regimental officers were abolished by 1715.⁹ The Hetman together with the Russian Resident were to appoint them. Cossack regiments received Russian colonels instead of their own officers, and this ensured the loyalty of the troops to Moscow. Many general and civic administrators were granted land in Ukraine as a reward for office and loyalty. Some of these generals were of foreign largely German origin,¹⁰ who treated Ukraine as conquered territory and disregarded local Cossack authorities.

Russia did not attempt to thoroughly subjugate the Hetmanate immediately because of the continuous wars of imperial expansion. She needed energies and resources for the wars, especially the participation of the Cossack troops. But in 1722, the Peace of

Nyastadt was signed with Sweden, and the weight of Russian colonialism fell on Ukraine. A 1722 Ukase established the Little Russian Board or College (Kollegiia) replacing the Malorosiiskii Prikaz to administer the Hetmanate.¹¹ This was done on the pretext of removing the injustice of the starshyna against the population, and to put order in the management of the Ukrainian finances.¹² Hetman Skoropadsky tried to petition against the allegations but to no avail, and died the same year (1722).

The Board was composed of six Russian officials, who were officers selected from the dragoon regiments, one of whom was appointed president.¹³ The Kollegiia was established at the Hetman's court, but soon came to bypass the Ukrainian authorities and intervene at all levels of local administration. This is because its powers were so general that almost every aspect of Ukrainian administration could be claimed to fall under its jurisdiction. No order could be issued by the Hetman without going through the Kollegiia for approval. Amongst the college staff were ten who were sent into the field to supervise the collection of tax.¹⁴ The number of Russian officials in Ukraine rose in 1722 to ninety men¹⁵ from less than a dozen. The Kollegiia also acted as the highest court of appeal, and could if need arose overturn the decision of the Hetman. To a large extent, the Kollegiia and not the Hetman ruled Ukraine.

The Kollegiia's position in the Russian bureaucracy was such that it became the administrative organ of Ukraine. It was subordinate to the Senate, a body which dealt with internal affairs. It was clear that the Russian government treated Ukraine as part of the Russian imperial state.

Domination of Ukrainian institutions spread also to the judicial system. Russian law came to replace the old Magdeburg laws of the Hetmanate, a factor which in itself encouraged the Russification of Ukrainian institutions. It may not be easy of course, to say precisely the extent of the operation of Russian laws during this period as data appears to be wanting. Ukrainian law was definitely being replaced with Russian law since the Kollegiia was made the 'Supreme Court' following the 1722 Ukase. While this may have affected the Ukrainian towns and the Hetman's court, it is questionable whether lower sections of the Ukrainian people like those in villages, especially the independent peasant communal villages were affected. The only influence colonial policy may have had was at the level of meeting tax obligations of the colonial state.

All these administrative changes were designed not only to politically subjugate and dominate the Hetmanate, but were also aimed at enabling the economic exploitation of the country. This way, direct colonial interests were going to be realised. It was the enforcement of internal control that would have made possible the exploitation of resources from Ukraine.

Economic Control and Exploitation

The domination and exploitation of the Ukrainian economy was undertaken in three major areas which deserve particular attention here. The first is the process by which Russia came to dominate and control the means of production and the social relations that arose from them. In this case, it was land ownership that was crucial in transforming the economic relations. The

second is how the surplus extraction process was undertaken and achieved. Surplus extraction was expressed in three forms: Troop exactions upon the local population, labour demands for war and construction works and tax obligations imposed on the people. The third, which was a form of surplus extraction but is treated separately here due to its special character was the domination and control of Ukrainian trade. This was a major means by which Ukrainian wheat was channelled to Moscow.

The process of controlling the means of production was characterised by using Russian settlers to own land in Ukraine. These were settled en masse, a factor that accelerated the development of big estates which rapidly ate away whatever traces of free peasant holdings that existed.¹⁶ This was achieved and accelerated by the equally property-hungry Starshyna who sought favours from Russia. Private landholding spread faster than any other time under Hetman Skoropadsky. Russian nobles began to swallow up large tracts of land. In 1704 for example, A. Menshikov controlled 1,261 peasants in the Hetmanate. In 1709, the figure was 28,035 and by 1725, it was 55,176.¹⁷ Many Serbs, Moldavians, Montenegrins and Greeks who settled in Ukraine also came to own vast estates¹⁸ and their loyalty lay with the Tsar and not the Hetman.

This development was also in line with the Tsar's centralisation and modernisation schemes. They were aimed at achieving greater control of the empire's resources in the provinces like Ukraine. The modernisation of Russia by Peter occupies one of the darkest pages in the history of Russian

relations. The roots of capitalism at the merchant stage were being viciously implanted. Manufacturers were being developed in Russia, and the borderland territories were used as suppliers of raw materials for the capitalist factories. Whole populations were subjected to an oppressive tax burden, while tramps, beggars, prostitutes and soldiers were, forcibly hauled into the factories as a cheap source of labour.¹⁹ This vicious modernisation programme also needed efficient centralised administrative organisation of the entire empire for the resources to be tapped thoroughly. In 1721, a decree allowed merchants to buy whole villages so long these were tied to industry.²⁰

For the Tsar to realise many of his grandiose schemes, he needed money. The Hetmanate which constituted twelve percent of the Russian State's subjects contributed virtually nothing to the Tsarist treasury. Between 1709 and 1722, the Russian authorities embarked on policies to extract revenue from Ukraine to redress the situation. The Ukrainians were ordered to support the newly arrived regiments because in the words of one official, 'they must consider the troops their own'.²¹ The annual cost of maintaining these regiments was estimated at 147,000 rubbles.²² The population had to provide food, cattle and horses for the Russian army.

Labour extraction was also imposed upon the Cossacks which had the effect of lowering the combat readiness of the Cossack armies, and also sharply decreasing their numbers through deaths. Thousands of Cossacks were recruited to do construction works in various

parts of the Russian empire. In 1716, 10,000 Cossacks were sent to work on the Don-Volga canal.²³ Two years later, roughly the same number was sent to the Caucasus. And in 1721 and 1722, thousands more were sent to work on the Ladoga Canal north of St. Peterburg where many perished due to hard conditions.²⁴ The sufferings of the Cossacks were preserved in the heart rending songs that became part of popular folklore.²⁵

War was another means of extracting the Ukraine's labour resources. In 1721, Tsar Peter started war with Persia and thousands of Cossacks were sent to the front. Between 1724 and 1725, 12,000 were conscripted for the war effort.²⁶ Hard climatic conditions and the war are believed to have killed nearly half the number. In 1725, there were 6,800 Cossacks at the war front, and according to a St. Petersburg official report, 5,200 perished on the spot, 1,000 dismissed as invalids and 600 reported to be in good health.²⁷ Regardless of the casualty figures, Moscow was not moved, sending 20,000 Cossacks and 10,000 Ukrainian peasants to build fortifications along the shores of the sea of Azov,²⁸ which Russian had captured from the Tatars.²⁹ This perpetual drain on the Cossack labour¹ resources had the consequences of further weakening the Hetmanate's internal autonomy and extending the growing impotence of the Cossack leaders. The Tsar was interested in harnessing the entire populations of the empire to the state.³⁰

But the biggest financial exaction on Ukraine came with the introduction of the Kollegiia, which imposed direct taxation. The process was not an easy one as the Kollegiia faced passive

resistence (through non-co-operation) of the Starshyna. Velianov, the Russian President of the Kollegiia resorted to random collection where ever he could. For this reason, the collection was uneven in different regiments of Ukraine, and no data could be used as to the taxable populations. Substently shows that 'in 1724, the Boldan Company of the Starodub regiment paid even seven rubles in taxes while the Korop Company of the Chernigov regiment, roughly equal in size, paid 227 rubles. Even more striking was the disparity between the eight rubles which the Poltava Company of the Bitava regiment paid and the 2,276 rubles taken from the Kremenets Company of the Myrhorod regiment.'³¹

The Kollegiia was however determined to realise a higher surplus from Ukraine. The starshyna and higher clergy were put on the tax paying list as they were the wealthy classes in the Hetmanate. The chances are that they did not really feel the weight of the tax directly as they could have transferred the burden to the peasants.

Agents were posted to supervise the collection of the tax, and Ukrainians were expected to pay in cash and not in kind. Collection of the tax was undertaken in the regiments which were the military as well as administrative regions of the country. Exactly how this was done does not appear to be clear, but the figures below demonstrate the massive profits accumulated by the Russian regime.³²

<u>Year</u>	<u>Tax in Cash</u>	<u>in Kind</u>
1722	45,000	17,000
1723	86,000	27,000
1724	141,000	40,000
Total (in Rubles)	<u>272,000</u>	<u>84,000</u>

A total of 356,000 rubles was collected in space of only three years from Ukraine by Moscow, making it clear that the former had been incorporated into the latter's imperial economic system. This was further amplified by the Russian domination of the Ukrainian treasury after 1722. The Hetmanate had all along raised revenue through taxes upon the population especially on trade goods. But the state treasury was indistinguishable from the Hetman's personal wealth, a factor that encouraged corruption and patronage. With the establishment of the Kollegiia in 1722, Ukrainian finances were supervised by a General Chancellery and an accounting office based at the Hetman's court which were accountable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³³ Ukrainian control of their economic and financial affairs became severely restricted. Of the tax collected most of it went to Russia while a small percentage remained in the Ukrainian treasury. Despite the fact that the treasury maintained considerable independence as it raised its own revenue through taxes on imports and exports, this tended to be regulated by Russia. It was the resistance of the Starshyna that allowed this nominal autonomy, especially when the Kollegiia had attempted to take over total control of the administration of taxes which led to a drop in tax revenue after 1722.³⁴

The domination of the Ukrainian economy did not simply end at the level of the production and financial control but also extended to means of exchange—trading. Ukrainian trade had been free of Russian interference and the crunch did not come till 1714. Ukrainians had been free to trade with who ever they wished, and

had established extensive contacts in the Baltic region and Western Europe.³⁵ From 1714, they were ordered to shift their waggon trade routes to Russia controlled ports such as Arkhangel, Riga and finally St. Peterburg.³⁶ Export of wheat to Western Europe was banned in 1719, thus allowing the Russian government to buy it cheaply for its own use, and also sell it at a profit.³⁷

The trade was organised and owned by townsmen and local aristocracy. Having lost political dominance, they attempted to make themselves the leading class economically but under Russian domination. They hence participated in agriculture and commerce. In trading, common Cossacks and peasants were used as carriers of trade goods. The measures of Peter to control Ukrainian trade led to a decline in its commercial value. Russian ports were often far and uneconomic.³⁸ Not only did they channel trading to Russian ports, but also prohibited the buying of certain European goods. This was aimed at bolstering Russian fledging capitalist industry. To further strengthen the imperial treasury while weakening the Ukrainian one, all Ukrainian goods crossing the common border with Moscow were taxed, and the tax was shared between Ukrainian and Russian treasuries. Imported goods faced similar restrictions. Finally, Russian merchants were given preferential treatment, such that they came to dominate the trade driving many Ukrainian merchants out of business.³⁹ This helped strengthen the Russian control of the merchant capitalist business to her advantage, despite the effect of lowering the profitability of the trade.

Ideological Control and domination

The colonial domination of the Ukraine was extended to be ideological sphere. This involved the ideological re-orientation of the ruling class to Russian ideological norms by a process of Russification. This involved the Kievan Academy which came under direct pressure to force it to adopt a pro-Russian cultural and ideological orientation.

Having lost political power and independence, the Ukrainian aristocracy abandoned the struggle, and instead sought favours from the Tsar as pointed out earlier. But the process became more thorough after 1709. Peter went so far as to desire assimilation of 'Little Russia', as he called Ukraine, even by marriage. In 1728, he ordered Hetman Skoropadsky's daughter to marry a Russian.⁴⁰ The implications are clear. Through intermarriage and eventual Russification, the ideological orientation of the Cossacks was going to swing to Russian norms.

Using tactics of divide and rule, the Russian colonial state was strengthened on the pretext that Cossack authorities were unjust to their own people. This paternalism was an ideological tool of control and domination. The Russian military governor of Kiev is reported to have written 'it is essential for our security in Ukraine to foster hostility between the Hetman and the commanding officers of the Cossack regiments.'⁴¹

The Russian colonial state made its great impact in the one major Ukrainian ideological institution, the church. The Kievan Academy, owned printing presses and hence published Ukrainian

theological literature. The Academy became the centre of learning for children of the starshyna. Its anti-Russian orientation had partially been neutralised in the first stage of Russo — Ukrainian relations. But after 1709, attempts were made to totally subjugate it to Moscow, and hence swing its ideological orientation to the Russian ideological superstructure. The defenders of the Ukrainian ideological institutions did not succumb too easily however. They waged a protracted struggle against the Russian colonialism and its ideological apparatus. This can be explained to have been a nationalist resistance but rooted in the long tradition of orthodoxy in Ukraine and the intellectual superiority of the Kievan Academy over Russia. The fall of the Hetmanate in 1709 ultimately decided the fate of its ideological arm - the church. Any struggle to maintain ideological independence of the church by Kievan scholars often led to sacking of recalcitrant priests by Moscow. The capitulation of the starshyna also inevitably led to the capitulation of the Kievan Academy.

On the part of the Russian state, the Ukrainian church had to be controlled if it was to produce the social and ideological apparatus of the colonial state. Education at that time was closely intertwined with theology, an ideological tuition that conformed to feudal social relations.

A major move taken by the Tsar against the Ukrainian church was in 1720 when he issued a general Ukase 'which banned the printing of any books not in the Russian language'.⁴² A strict censorship of religious, political and historical books was undertaken,⁴³

and could only be published with the approval of the religious college in St. Petersburg. An attempt by Ukrainian printers, Yoasaf Krokowsky and Varlaam Vonastovych to resist this ban led to their imprisonment and death.⁴⁴ Gradually, the metropolitane of Kiev was reduced to an ordinary diocese under an archbishop. Russian theological books were introduced, and any Ukrainian books sent for publication were required to have a Russian edition. The Schools of the Kievan Academy were therefore required to adopt a Russian theological and academic version that was part of the Petrine reforms. The Kievan Academy began to decline from 1730 because of the strictly theological character they exhibited, and hence fall behind the European academic standards of the time.⁴⁵ The Ukrainian ruling and landed classes began to respond to a typical colonial situation as they sent their children to better schools in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The Russian state gave them unlimited opportunities to develop their skills and talents so long as they conformed to the colonial regime's ruling ideology and political reality.

The Close of an Era

By the time of Peter's death in 1725, Russia had succeeded in making Ukraine part of the Russian state. After that, it was up to the individual Tsar to decide whether to abolish the Hetman institution or revive it. Otherwise, the main aspects of colonial domination had been realised. It is for this reason that when Skoropadsky died in 1722, Tsar Peter chose to restrict further the institution of the Hetman, and simply allowed an acting Hetman, Polubotok. The latter's attempt to rush the issue of confirming the articles of the 1654 treaty met only

a harsh response, with the Tsar proclaiming that all Hetmans except for Khmelnytsky were traitors. 'I do not think it fit to trouble me any more with this question.'⁴⁶ Polubotok was immediately thrown into prison with his council, and all forthcoming Hetmans were nothing but puppets.

Politically, economically and ideologically, the Hetmanate was irrevocably incorporated into the Russian colonial and imperial state system. The Russian nobility and the starshyna had succeeded also in eliminating the peasantry from the higher cultural and political life of the country. The expectation of the 1648 revolution turned into a mere illusion for lower classes which they hopelessly nurtured in popular epic and ballad.

BULOZI: 1900 - 1911

Establishment of the Colonial State

The beginning of the 1900s saw the unfolding transformation of the relations of co-operation to domination. Having legally defined the relationship between the Company and Bulozhi, the stage was now set for the translation of these political and legal arrangements into concrete colonial domination.

The problems that had beset the Company earlier had begun to disappear, especially following the end of the South African war in 1902. The Company now turned its attention to harnessing Bulozhi and effectively bringing it under the heel of the colonial administration.

A time had also been reached within the global imperialist system where the rest of the world had been curved up and

engulfed by the European bourgeoisie. Sources of raw materials, real and imagined had become monopolised by each contending imperialist power. Now, these territories had to be made to pay if the colonial venture was to be worth it.

The process of the realisation of dominant colonial economic interests in Bulozhi initially took a political perspective. The regime of labour migration, and the tax which was imposed to achieve this purpose as well as raise funds for administrative expenses, could be not be carried out without a state machinery. The state machinery came to enforce colonial policies, while also subverting the Lozi ruling class, reducing them into managers of the colonial enterprise within the indirect rule system.

A coercive state apparatus was necessary for the extraction of surplus especially under conditions where resistance might occur due to the unwillingness of the people to accept colonialism. To this effect, the Barotse Native Police (BNP) was formed in 1900 though officially proclaimed under the control of Lt. Col. Colin Harding in 1901. The old police force established by the Lozi was incorporated into the newly established colonial one. But colonial policy was geared towards creating an alien police force, and hence recruited mostly among the Tonga in Batoka,⁴⁷ a once tributary people to the Lozi state. Later, most of the personnel in the force were Bamba and Chewa. In 1903, a plan was approved to import 25 Sikhs from India for the BNP, though whether these actually arrived does not appear to be clear.⁴⁸ The Headquarters of North-Western Rhodesia, and also the base of the police force was first established at Mongu but was later moved to Kalomo.⁴⁹ This was of considerable significance as

Kalomo was beyond effective Lozi jurisdiction.

The term police is itself misleading as the force was in fact a military one that carried arms and was drilled along British military lines. The loyalty was guaranteed by the fact that the police force was composed of a majority of alien elements and commanded by white colonial officers. The establishment of this force was, therefore, a necessary condition for transforming the relations of co-operation to domination.

The BNP activities were extended to the rest of North-Western Rhodesia which was treated as part of Bulozhi for mere administrative convenience by the Company. The police force was used in the outlying areas of Bulozhi to coerce populations into accepting colonial rule such as Mungaila's people who attempted to resist.⁵⁰ But the BNP was set up with the main objective of enforcing the impending tax obligation, which marked a definite entrenchment of the colonial process.

The force was also involved in various activities especially those linked with extraction of surplus. When tax was imposed in 1904, every tax collector was escorted by a policeman⁵¹ to ensure safety of the official as well as compel people to accept the tax. The police also enforced the recruitment of labour in Bulozhi for the Southern Rhodesian mines when the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau was formed.⁵² Labour recruitment was a regime marked by unprecedented brutality, while failure to pay tax often led to burning of peasant's homes by the police.⁵³

For a colonial process to be successful, there is often need to incorporate elements of the local aristocracy into the colonial machinery, and in the process defend them against internal opposition. The intrigues that continued in the Kuta had to be checked whenever they threatened to get out of control. The police force played this vital role. In 1905, a rival faction in the Kuta attempted a coup and failed.

Another more serious attempt took place in 1909 but failed.⁵⁴

On each of these occasions colonial troops were sent to put down the rebellions with promptness and efficiency. The colonial administration further made it publicly clear that it would back Lewanika, with force if necessary.⁵⁵ Though Lewanika had all along been edgy about the establishment of the police force, fearing, despite Harding's repeated assurances, this might weaken his powers,⁵⁶ he obviously came to appreciate its existence after these crises.

The most obvious result of the attempted palace coups was that the Litunga came to rely upon colonial authorities in order to retain his position. This further played in the hands of the colonial authorities who took advantage of such internal factional fights to strengthen the process of colonial domination. By 1905, the police force had three hundred trained troops excluding privates and reserves.⁵⁷ It had become an effective occupation force which taking the lower technological development of Lozi society, could beat any attempted combined force of armed insurrection through its superior fire power.

With the effective establishment of the instrument of oppression and coercion, a simultaneous process of administrative control and

subjugation started. This was in effect part of the process of strengthening the colonial state and its institutions so as to properly harness the resources of the country. Three basic areas of colonial interest were attended to. The first involved completing the process that had begun during the relations of co-operation — exploring the limits of the Lozi state whose ultimate result was characterised by an agreement between imperial powers. The second involved the sub-division of Bulozhi into units or districts for administrative convenience, and tax collection. The third was the imposition of colonial policies that economically and politically undermined the Lozi aristocracy. These were basically the tax and labour burdens imposed upon Bulozhi.

Colin Harding continued to collect information on the extent of the Lozi empire. His determination to get borderland peoples to accept Lozi rule was demonstrated by his use of a phonograph carrying Lewanika's recorded message. The message often threatened people who refused to accept the representatives of the 'great white Queen' with punishment.⁵⁸ Having never seen such an instrument before, people were scared, and often believed this to be the work of unconquerable witchcraft and therefore quickly submitted loyalty to Lewanika and the British government.⁵⁹

It was Lewanika and the British government's hope that such information would help them extend the Lozi state to such disputed areas as to those claimed by the Portuguese.

Arbitration was left in the hands of a supposedly neutral power — the King of Italy.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, Lewanika was ordered

not to take any action until such time that arbitration was undertaken.⁶¹

Arbitration did not take place until 1905 after Italy received the claims from both sides. The result was more or less inevitable but came as a shock to both the British and the Lozi. All that Italy did was to take the two claims and split the disputed region roughly in half as a compromise.⁶²

Lewanika was bitter, and protested vigorously calling it 'no boundary at all and a joke indeed.'⁶³ Coryndon wrote the High Commissioner that Lewanika and his Council were quite dissatisfied as they could not understand why entire subject peoples had been cut in half. Neither did the boundary follow cultural, national nor natural frontiers.⁶⁴ What exasperated the Lozi elite most was the loss of so much tribute-paying country and the King's cattle posts,⁶⁵ which represented one of the major sectors of the Lozi economy. The British government refused to review the boundary due to alleged diplomatic difficulties. In 1911, Lewanika was told that the boundary was going to be demarcated on the ground, thus closing the issue to posterity.

Bulozi's eastern boundary with North Eastern Rhodesia was put at the hook of the Kafue. Following the advance of the railway to Katanga in modern Zaire, it was extended to include the entire railway belt in 1905, though it was formally demarcated in 1911.⁶⁶

Despite the extension of Bulozhi boundary to the hook of the Kafue, Lozi power was in fact not allowed to extend that far. Bulozhi was officially demarcated into two - Bulozhi proper and Batoka. While the former remained a reserve for the Lozi ruling class, Batoka, a one time Lozi raiding ground, was opened to colonial land alienation and white settlement. It was therefore the area which saw early colonial military campaigns of pacification, and was also the first district to face the tax burden.

Internal territorial divisions were also made in Bulozhi for colonial administrative convenience as well as facilitating the collection of tax. In 1900, two districts were formed. These were Batoka, and Lealui. The former had its headquarters at Kalomo and was administered by Worthington, while the latter had its headquarters at Mongu, occasionally referred to as Lealui - Mongu, and was administered by Aitkens.⁶⁷ These boundaries were very imprecise and were continually revised.⁶⁸ In 1902, a third district, Falls, was added based at Sesheke. The administrative centre of the country was transferred from Kalomo to Livingstone in 1907.⁶⁹ The early years of colonial rule was therefore characterised by improvisation and continuous changes of the administrative units of the colonial state. This was an attempt to streamline and entrench the colonial administrative machinery. In 1907, Sesheke achieved district status but was reduced to a sub-district of Barotse district in 1911.⁷⁰ Falls district was abolished around 1906 and became part of Senkobo sub-district of enlarged Batoka district. But this was not formally defined till 1911.⁷¹

All this juggling of internal district boundaries was a manifestation of the transformation of the relations of co-operation to domination. There was an increasing and growing impotency of the Lozi ruling class. The condition of the 1900 Lewanika concessions which barred colonial interference in Lozi internal affairs had become a mere illusion on scrap paper.

In each district, a census of population was conducted. All chiefs and the people under their jurisdiction were listed by the Native and District Commissioners so as to facilitate the collection of tax. It was at this level of surplus extraction that the undermining of the Lozi social fabric was most effective. The powers of the Native and District Commissioners were so wide as to virtually supplant the powers of the local induna class.

District Commissioners were governors of districts overseeing the security of their regions as well as the execution of colonial policies. They were assisted in this task by Native Commissioners who were governors of smaller localities called sub-districts. They were given virtual political and judicial powers through general instructions they received from the Administrators of the territory.⁷² These instructions were the basis of their power. The powers were so general as to include virtually anything ranging from overseeing security, organisation of labour for public works, portage for travelling officials to monitoring the state of crops that were needed for the colonial market.⁷³ Traditional chiefs took a subsidiary role and were made functionaries in the indirect rule system.

The colonial state demonstrated the ability to collaborate with local state institutions to achieve complete domination. The Company administration incorporated elements of the ruling class. In 1905, the Lozi representative indunas were appointed to assist the colonial authorities in the administration of various people on the periphery of the Lozi state.⁷⁴ They were sent to places such as Nammala, Batoka, Kafue and Kasempa, and their main task was to facilitate peaceful collection of the tax. They were to send reports to Lewanika about their activities in their administrative capacity, but these reports were to be read first by the District and Native Commissioners and went through the established colonial mail system so as to check the intentions of the Lozi.⁷⁵ This gave a false sense of security and power to the Lozi aristocracy, though it did not last long. In 1907, possibly owing to a desire to cut off Lozi influence in areas outside Bulobi proper, the representative indunas were withdrawn by the colonial administration and sent back to Lealui. They were accused of being responsible for a rumoured uprising against colonialism in Kafue and Ila countries.⁷⁶ Lewanika investigated the issue and proved that the rumour was false, but was powerless to reverse the expulsion order, much to his annoyance. The situation also gave chance to some local chiefs outside Bulobi to reject allegiance to the Lozi state, and assert their independence, and in this process tended to connive with the local administrative officials,⁷⁷ who found it useful to weaken the Lozi state.

The colonial state did not simply confine itself to political domination of the people in Bulozhi. Laws were necessary to give sanction to this oppression, and this entailed dominating the Lozi judicial System, and making British legal norms supreme.

The Resident Magistrate's court at Mongu was the highest court of appeal. This court was aided in its work by District and Native Commissioners who worked closely with local chiefs and headmen. The commissioners were under the Native Affairs Department.⁷⁸ It was established theoretically to look after the interests of what were pejoratively termed 'native races'. The officials of this department, especially the District and Native Commissioners apart from a variety of other duties, also acted as little village courts, and were the judges. Only those cases believed to be of a criminal nature were sent to the Resident Magistrate's court at Mongu, otherwise the rest of the local cases came under the Commissioners' jurisdiction. As expected in the early years of colonial rule, most of these men had no literal knowledge of law, and judged cases purely on the basis of assumed good wisdom and hindsight.

While the Lozi internal administration and its judicial system was supposed to be left intact, except where it was believed not to conform to British ideas of justice,⁷⁹ it lost its independence in practice and increasingly acted as the arm of the colonial state. When an Administrator's and Magistrates' Courts were established in 1905, and the High Court, in 1906,⁸⁰ British common law became prevalent. Many cases taken to these courts dealt with offences related to violation of colonial

interests. Some were offences related to violation of firearms regulations,⁸¹ breaches of labour contracts and non-payment of tax, all of which were legally pronounced as criminal offences.⁸² Petty cases between villagers were left in the hands of chiefs and the District and Native Commissioners. Even then, many petty cases were being referred to white officers instead of the local chiefs.⁸³ Even the Lozi aristocracy began to lose its sense of power by submitting to the colonial regime most of their disputes especially over cattle thefts and cattle prices.⁸⁴ Some domestic cases which were legally within the powers of the Lozi judicial system were being advanced to the colonialists.⁸⁵ This was a sign of increasing impotency of the Lozi ruling class under conditions of colonial domination.

Lewanika did not however succumb too easily to the colonial machinations. He put up resistance wherever he could, even though he lost in many cases. He was particularly touchy about the interference of power in the Lozi internal affairs. He once sternly rebuked the District Commissioner, Harding, a man known for his toughness and force of character, for having attempted to arrest a Lozi transgressor: 'I told you yesterday that I am he who ought to be told by the government, and then, I will arrest the man ... anything that happens among the natives I ought to do it myself, and not be interferred with.'⁸⁶ The Secretary therefore advised that Lealui would not be governed like any other region but as the colonial administration advanced, Lewanika's influence would contract and be confined to the Zambezi valley.⁸⁷ While the

colonial government was trying to curtail the expansion and strength of the Lozi state, Lewanika appears even to have had ambitions to expand it. In 1903, a white girl was kidnapped by an Angola rebel group, and Lewanika suggested that these people be claimed by the British government and annexed to his country. Using the ideological language of colonialism, he declared, 'I can assure you that they will remain mischievous so long they are left to themselves'.⁸⁸ But the suggestion fell on deaf ears.

Apart from curtailing the influence of the Lozi aristocracy on the peripheral regions of Bulozhi, drastic measures were taken within the country to contain the movement of people, presumably for security reasons. From 1907, Indunas were barred from making journeys around the country without passes. Not even ordinary villagers would change their residence without the administrator's approval.⁸⁹

There were internal political repercussions to the growing impotence of the Lozi rulers. Many indunas and ordinary people took the advantage of the presence of the colonial regime to challenge Lozi power and authority.

The Kaonde were one such people who disclaimed Lozi rule over their country in 1905. A Kaonde chief denied Lewanika was their chief, and Kasempa himself claimed never to have sent presents to Lewanika until the whitemen arrived.⁹⁰ It is of course doubtful whether the Lozi state had effective influence among the Kaonde, but it is clear that the presence of a colonial

power gave the Kaonde stronger leverage against the Lozi. The colonial authorities therefore, ordered the Lozi indunas not to appear in Kasempa without proper credentials, though one Lozi induna was allowed to represent Lewanika.

Another induna representing the Lunda people on the periphery of the Lozi state took advantage of the presence of colonial authorities to claim the return of his people who had been seized by Lozi raiding parties in the 1880's. Lewanika at first refused knowledge of any such a case, and then began procrastinating, until the colonial administration intervened, and allowed the chief to come to Lealui to look for his long lost people.⁹¹

Within Buluzi proper itself, Lozi indunas were being challenged by colonial authorities for actions which prior to the arrival of the British would not have mattered. European traders were suing the indunas who failed to pay back on time goods bought on credit,⁹² and the indunas became increasingly powerless to stop the implementation of the colonial legal system. Though imprisonment of indunas does not appear to have been prevalent, except the payment of fines, there occurred one case in 1911 when an induna was imprisoned on suspicion of murder.⁹³ Some cases taken to court were by ordinary people who sought redress in the colonial courts, thus abandoning their own courts.

Although it can be argued that the Lozi system remained operative at the native court level, this was primarily for purposes of economy and practicability. It was also a device that was used

to flatter the ruling class. In fact, Lozi law was subordinated to the colonial law, and only those elements of Lozi law that were acceptable to British rule were allowed to co-exist. The mechanism was therefore, a manipulation to serve colonial interests, and strengthen the colonial state while undermining the power of the ruling class.

Economic Control and Exploitation

The process of political subjugation of the Lozi state by colonialism was enhanced much more rapidly by a colonial economic system which was geared to controlling and exploiting the resources of the country. This was undertaken by the colonial policy aimed at surplus extraction.

There were several main forms of surplus extraction. These were tax and labour, and were also closely intertwined. Another was buying of Lozi cattle by colonial agents, the pricing of which was determined by the colonial authorities and not the Lozi.

Cattle entered the colonial capitalist market much earlier than any other commodity in Buluzi. At the end of the nineteenth century, an outbreak of rinderpest, a cattle disease, engulfed most of South-Central Africa.⁹⁴ South Africa, which was the main supplier of beef to the Southern Rhodesia mining industry, banned the export of cattle. Buluzi did not suffer from the disease considerably apart from Sesheke area because of the natural protection of flybelts, and hence, took over the Southern Rhodesia beef market. The Boer war of 1899-1902 further strengthened the economic link between the Lozi cattle owners and Southern Rhodesian mines. The war

disrupted supply lines and communications between South Africa and Rhodesia, thus compelling the latter to buy cattle from Bulozhi, and sent an agent for the purpose.⁹⁵ Harding, the Acting Resident complained that there were not going to be enough cattle because many had already been bought by traders from Bihe with arms and calico bartered more readily than gold, and that he had no power to stop them.⁹⁶

Despite Lewanika's unwillingness to co-operate in stamping out the Bihe traders, Harding circumvented the problem by issuing trade licences for the purchase of cattle only to desirable traders. As a result, Bihe traders were excluded from the purchase of Lozi cattle. There was such open hostility to traders from Angola that they were often harrassed and deported,⁹⁷ and in some instances arrested and imprisoned, and their goods confiscated.⁹⁸

These harsh measures soon bore results, such that by 1910 trade waggons from Angola had ceased, thus preserving Bulozhi to British traders such as Susman Brothers who became a monopoly in the cattle business. But the cattle business had however, begun to decline by 1905 following the discovery of anthrax disease in Bulozhi. After the hesitations of 1905, the export of breeding stock from Bulozhi was banned in 1906.⁹⁹ By 1911, cattle was no longer a major income earner.

Tax was imposed in 1904 after protracted discussions between the Litunga and his Kuta, and the colonial administration.

The Lozi aristocracy accepted warmly the introduction of the tax

in view of the perceived monetary advantages. The aristocracy was persuaded to accept a percentage of the tax revenue in lieu of the tribute they were exacting on the people, and the outlying regions. Lewanika and his Kuta were to be paid five percent of the tax revenue which he rejected outright as too little and instead demanded half the share.¹⁰⁰ The conflict grew as the administration suggested application of stronger measures on Lewanika. Every male was required to pay that tax in respect of each house (or hut as the colonialists called it). This meant that those with more than one wife faced a greater tax burden.

The tax was to begin in Batoka and then gradually extend to other areas. A struggle ensued between the colonial administration and the Lozi ruling class over the method of collection and distribution of tax. The latter wanted to collect the tax and ceremonially hand it over to the colonial authorities publicly at the Kuta.¹⁰¹ The ruling class was aware of the economic as well as symbolic significance of the tax. Failure to control the tax would undermine the economic as well as the political strength of the ruling class. The fact that they would forfeit the right to tribute and depend entirely on the colonial treasury aggravated the situation.

The colonial regime for the same reason resisted the Lozi attempts at having a strong hand in tax collection, and often gave an ideological rationale that this would increase Lozi excesses against their own people. After a protracted argument between Lewanika and the administration, a small

compromise was found which Lewanika accepted although he was not fully satisfied. The ruling class was to get ten percent of the tax revenue as was the case with the Botswana monarchy. Out of this, £1,200. was to go to Lewanika and his indunas while the rest would go to the 'welfare of the Lozi people'¹⁰² like education and public works. This fund, called the Native Trust Fund became the main Lozi treasury and the pre-colonial treasury centred on the King's court was virtually abolished. The domination of the Lozi fiscal system was made complete when the Native Trust Fund came under effective and absolute Company control. In the absence of financial assistance from the Company, the amount which was delegated to the development of Bulozhi, a country which the colonial authorities recognised to be geographically larger than France was pitifully small.¹⁰³

In an insolent and paternalistic manner, Marshall Hole wrote Lewanika that the commission he was to get would replace all the tribute he had hitherto been getting. He went to say that the Company was going to suffer the cost of collecting the tax while Lewanika and his indunas would simply receive it effortlessly. 'The Board (BSACo.) have fixed your commission, and I am not prepared to discuss the question of a higher rate. . . This is the price to pay in return for British Protection.'¹⁰⁴

It was clear that things had changed considerably and Lewanika had no choice but to concede and remain quiescent. He only managed to save Bulozhi proper from facing the tax burden right

away. He wanted to prepare the people for the tax, probably aware of the repercussions that immediate imposition might have. Tax was not imposed till 1906. Tax was also not immediately introduced in Kasempa owing to the unsettled political conditions of the country. The initial tax was ten shillings (10/-) which was to be raised later to one pound (£1). This was aimed at avoiding the initial difficulties of paying a heavy tax in a country whose cash economy had not yet grown considerably.

The tax table indicates the amount of money or profits that the colonial administration was able to accumulate from Bulozhi and the surrounding peoples.¹⁰⁵ A total of £231, 373. 12^s .3^d was collected in a period of seven years. If we are to exclude Luangwa which fell outside Bulozhi and its periphery, the figure comes to £202,073. Bulozhi valley itself raised a total of nearly £74,000, only surpassed by Batoka which raised a total of almost £84,000, regions with a population of around 70,000 and 139,000 respectively in the 1904-05 tax year.¹⁰⁶ The yearly average revenue appropriated by the North-Western Rhodesia colonial administration was £35,053. Excluding Luangwa, this came to £28,868, while Bulozhi valley contributed a yearly average of £10,571.¹⁰⁷ If one considers the fact that tax did not begin in Bulozhi until 1906, the yearly average tax contributed up to 1911 increases to nearly £12,400.

Tax evasions were of course typical of the early years of colonial rule, and tax estimations tended sometimes to reflect

a tax evading portion of the population. But nearly all tax evaders were eventually caught and required to pay all the outstanding tax, not excluding a spell in prison too. Even migrant workers away from Bulozhi were required to send their tax quotas to Bulozhi. Besides, due to the strength and rapaciousness of the Lozi aristocracy, very few people evaded tax in Bulozhi valley compared to other areas.

Even the administrative expenses in the colonial territory were not high enough to offset the tax profits. Administrators never got beyond £1,000 per annum, and the white administrative staff was itself small. The bulk of the work fell on African civil servants who were paid wages for bare existence strictly. Tax collectors were Africans, supervised by Native Commissioners, so were the members of the Barotse Native Police who escorted the collectors. I have been unable to get the exact pay of Barotse police, but an estimation can be made. If Mokwae of Nalolo, an induma of high standard used to receive forty pounds (£40) per annum, lesser indumas and African members of the police force could not have received a yearly income of over twenty pounds per annum.¹⁰⁸ The same applies to tax collectors who were all Africans and hence subjected to almost starvation wages. State expenditure was efficiently minimised by the colonial authorities by virtue of employing the Lozi and making use of Lozi institutions to achieve colonial objectives. Chiefs became instrumental in assisting the tax collectors, and because they were paid by the colonial regime and not the Lozi state, it is likely that the loyalty of some of them began to swing to the colonial

state. This further increased the political and ideological bankruptcy of the Lozi state. Bourgeois apologists of imperialism like Gann portrayed the colonial adventure in a paternalistic fashion calling it expensive and fraught with deficits.¹⁰⁹ The story in Bulozhi where no minerals or major industry were developed, and where local industry and initiative was killed tells a different story. In 1910 the entire revenue collected in Barotse District ranging from tax, licenses to fines amounted to £12,703 against a total state (administrative) expenditure in the same year of £7,041.13^s.¹¹⁰ A net profit of £5,662 was realised. The Resident Magistrate did not, however, fail to lay credit for such low administrative expenditure upon low wages given to African employees.¹¹¹

One must also remember that the tax collected was not ploughed back into the colony for the development of its peoples. In actual fact, a process of degeneration set in. With relations of production and exchange restructured to meet capitalist interests, the Lozi aristocracy found itself in increasing decadence which marked the general underdevelopment of the country.

As has been pointed out, tax and labour were closely intertwined. While tax fed the colonial capitalist treasury, it also meant that people had to find a way of raising the tax. Since capitalism recognised no territorial barriers in the colonies, Bulozhi was in effect treated as a labour reserve for capitalist industry. Following the development of capitalist mines in South

Africa and Southern Rhodesia, it was found necessary (especially for the latter) to import labour which could be effectively exploited given the primitive conditions of the origin of such labour and the vulnerability to the new conditions of production. Bulozhi henceforth, became the main supplier of labour to the south, propelled by the tax burden.

Within the country, the colonial administration had frustrated whatever kind of internal developments, which might provide a source of employment. Despite being a cattle producing country, no dairy industry was established. Lewanika who demonstrated himself to be a modernising aristocrat was frustrated. His attempts to cut the Manbova rapids to facilitate trade and communications were frustrated and taken over by the government. He got no assistance for opening up waterways in the country.¹¹² He wanted a better educational system to train skilled artisans, and help modernise the country, a good communications systems involving canal building and so forth, but all were frustrated by colonial administrative indifference. For this reason, he solicited the transfer of Bulozhi from BSACo. rule to that of the Imperial Government, believing in some naïve fashion that the Imperial Government was better than the Company. This was probably due to his royal illusions following his trip to Britain in 1902 to the coronation of Edward.¹¹³ The lavish royal treatment given to him by the British royalty probably made him assume that the BSACo. and the Imperial Government were different, and the latter would look after him with benevolence.

The issue however, is that the failure of the colonial government to introduce real development in the territory (it could not be otherwise), was part of a regional imperialist strategy to relegate Bulozhi to a supplier of cheap labour and wherever possible, raw materials.

The process of labour recruiting, as much as that of tax was violent and coercive. The initial period was characterised by individual agent recruiters who appeared in Bulozhi at the beginning of the century. They often flogged deserters,¹¹⁴ and the system was so abused that the colonial authorities decided to create a labour recruiting monopoly which would guarantee some sort of security to the labourers, at least in theory. And this took the form the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau, representing labour interests of capitalist mines and farms. The migrant labourers were often transported in cattle trucks, which under recommendation from London BSACo. Board of Directors were to be well ventilated. The absence of hygienic and mobile latrines made the Board recommend the use of such trucks on short distances.¹¹⁵ But whether such simple instructions were followed by labour hungry recruiters is open to guesswork.

Statistics for the Lozi miners recruited to work in Southern Rhodesia up to 1911 are not very good because most of the migrants were treated collectively as Northern Rhodesians. The issue is complicated by the fact that many migrants chose to ignore the recruiting agencies and made the journey to the south on their own so that they could hire their labour to the most

favourable places. In 1907-08, the Labour Bureau recruited 4,743, and this figure rose to 7,009 in the 1908-09 tax years.¹¹⁶ The deaths of the recruits rose from 178 to 238¹¹⁷ respectively, largely due to poor diet, and bad working conditions.

Mention should also be made that it cost colonial authorities almost nothing when they were on tours as villagers were given orders to give specific amounts of grain to feed the touring parties.¹¹⁸ Codrington, who became the administrator in 1907, travelled extensively around the country in the most comfortable manner possible — he ordered Africans to carry him, as well as his goods.¹¹⁹ He is reported to have had carriers pass relays of water from the streams to pour over his tent to cool it.¹²⁰ Such tours, named safaris became so extensive, pompous and flamboyant that they defied their official character.

The main interest here, however, is to discover what repercussions tax and labour had within Bulozzi. The introduction of the tax increased the burdens on the slaves, as they were required to pay the tax, while meeting labour obligations to their landlords. This led to great suffering and disaffection. A widespread slave revolt broke out in 1906, which had to be suppressed with the armed support of the Barotse Native Police.¹²¹ Colonial authorities henceforth intervened to sooth the most vicious forms of exploitation, but to their advantage. The Lozi aristocracy was compelled to agree to a 1906 decree freeing all the slaves. While religious circles in

Bulozi interpreted this as the work of Christian influence on Lewanika, the facts were apparently different. Slaves were needed to fill the ranks of migrant labourers and serve capitalism, and the only way was to free them of their domestic bondage. This also weakened the power of the landlord class as they began to lose control of social relations of production. This should not be exaggerated however, because the freeing of slaves was not complete. The aristocracy, fearful of loss of their status, resisted and actually did not allow slaves to go free. A compromise was found with the colonial authorities. Slaves were to buy their freedom for £2, and commoners were required to work in the Litunga's gardens for a limited number of days a year free of charge. Despite this, the decay in the Lozi social formation had set in. By 1911, Lewanika and his indunas were experiencing such serious labour shortages that they had to pay for the most of the work done.

Lewanika personally amassed wealth by virtue of his position, just as the tradition of redistribution of revenue became increasingly hollow in royal circles. At the same time, many indunas became increasingly impoverished by the new changes, for they lost control of economic forces. Their commission was not enough to replace the tribute they used to collect before colonialism arrived. The unpopularity of Lewanika was even noticed by the colonial authorities. Tax and labour policies were the most thorough in undermining and subverting the position of the aristocracy. Outlying areas which were sources of tribute were lost. To add insult to injury, it was not until 1909

that the Lozi realised the Subiya country was lost to German South Africa. This came to light when German authorities complained that Litia was collecting tribute from Germany territory, and demanded the return of cattle he had taken.¹²² This led to a massive migration across the border into British ruled Bulozhi under the direction of Litia, but those that hated Bulozhi rule elected to remain.¹²³

The position of the Lozi ruling class had by now reached two mutually opposed contradictory dimensions. The ruling class had become both strong and weak. It became strong in the sense that it was patronised and protected by the colonial regime against both its internal and external foes. It also acquired strong material advantages. The royal extravagance that Coillard talked about in the last century had increased with the luxuries capitalism had brought. The ruling class' living conditions were marked by better food and clothes, bigger houses and royal barges, all of which were royal monopoly.¹²⁴ The King had also become more and more remote to both indunas and ordinary people.¹²⁵ But the ruling class was also weak in the sense that it became dominated by colonialism. It lost its political and economic position and became an appendage of the colonial state apparatus. While it entertained illusions of class identity with members of the British monarchy, it nevertheless admitted its weakness and also dismay at the colonial administration. Lewanika once remarked: 'We sometimes are caused to feel as if we are a conquered nation, while we have made an agreement which was said to be alliance between our nation and the Imperial

Government.¹²⁶

Lewanika was beginning to face the hard realities of colonial domination. The relations of co-operation that he had envisaged with the British had turned into a sour illusion. Pulling back now was too late and possibly dangerous. Had the Ndebele after all not tried to resist colonialism and failed? The Litunga had also antagonised members of his class considerably. His popularity was low, and his power was increasingly dependent upon close aides, friends and relatives, a group that progressively narrowed with time.¹²⁷ This compelled the Litunga to rely more and more on the colonial state for the maintenance of his power, a factor that led to further capitulation.

The 1905 attempted palace coup against Lewanika whose cause Stokes laid on the inadequacy of the tax revenue¹²⁸ led to further capitulation by the Litunga. Following the coup attempt, he signed away land outside Bulozhi Valley giving the Company power to dispose of it as it pleased.¹²⁹ In 1909, Lewanika quickly signed away another concession with little Kuta participation. He gave all the land outside Bulozhi Valley to the Company in return for that area of the recently demarcated Anglo-Portuguese border, thus practically 'resigning his position as King outside the reserve.'¹³⁰

This treaty was a case of colonial treachery. The Lozi council had either forgotten or was not aware that this piece of land they got had already been given to them before

this treaty. The Colonial Office had already made a formal undertaking in 1901 that the 'area west of the Zambezi would be reserved for the sole use of Barotseland, its people and king in exchange for the ratification of the 1900 treaty.'¹³¹ The Company thus achieved a double bargain while Colonial Office remained conspicuously silent. The new educated Lozi class came to dispute both of these concessions later but found themselves against a brick wall.

Meanwhile, most of the land in the Batoka plateau along the line of rail was gradually signed away to European settler farmers. Retired Company officials were given special preference, and Africans on such land were evicted or became squatters. Thus a typical colonial situation came to predominate where an alien settler minority came to occupy the land of the colonised and disinherited peoples.

Ideological Control and Domination

The ideology of the Lozi state apparatus began to give way to the requirements of the capitalist mode of production. Even though the Lozi ideological institutions remained co-existent with those of the colonial state, the latter were dominant. The Lozi state had become a shadow of its former self and its ideological institutions inevitably became moribund, increasingly becoming relics of the pre-colonial epoch.

There are three areas of colonial ideological influence that this study pays attention to. The first involved the changing cultural and hence ideological orientation of the Lozi

ruling class. The second is the decay of the Lozi cultural or ideological institutions that set in, and the growing predominance of colonial ones especially in the spheres of religion and education. The third is colonial paternalism and discrimination which reinforced colonial culture, and hence, ideological oppression. Ideological conditions are indeed closely intertwined with economic conditions.

The emergence of capitalism in Buluzi led to changes in the Lozi social formation. Looking at the issue purely in terms of the ruling class, it is evident that it acquired new material benefits most of which came from the tax revenue. But because such material benefits were not enough for every member of the ruling class, conspicuous consumptions became increasingly noticeable within the royal family in power and its retainers, while many indunas were impoverished by the new changes. The wealth of the Litunga and his class were reinforced by the now easier acquisition of imported European goods especially after his visit to England in 1902.¹³²

The new material conditions led to a development of more elaborated and flamboyant royal institutions. The ceremony of Kwimboka became more formalised and ritualised. Bigger Nalikoandas were built to emphasize the occasion and the power of the Litunga. European type houses became a monopoly of the ruling class. To emphasize this cultural difference, commoners were not allowed to own houses or even goods that compared favourably with those of the royal family.¹³³

The paternalistic hold of the colonial state on the ruling class was demonstrated by Lowanika's benignant disposition to the British. He persistently tried to offer tokens or gifts to members of the British crown such as live animals, and once, an especially made Nalikwanda.¹³⁴ While some of these gifts were accepted, some were turned away on grounds of transport impracticability.

The undermining of the power of the Litunga and his class was demonstrated in the attitude of colonial officials. The respect the Litunga was accorded during the period characterised by co-operation was now rapidly eroded. He was often referred to as paramount chief or simply chief of the Barotse people or reserve. The term king was dropped from every day usage because its use would put him on equal footing with the King of England, which was considered preposterous by the colonial authorities.

Education was another area of ideological offensive which was dedicated to the production of colonial elites with half-baked education. Recognising the advantages of European-type education, the Litunga encouraged and funded the mission-run schools as much as he could. But these schools were strictly under the control of the missionaries, and had primitive academic standards.

The fact that the Company did not assist these schools helped little in improving their academic standards. Assistance to these schools came after the 1907 establishment of the Barotse National School.

This was an attempt to influence mission education so that it did not by any circumstances come to contradict colonial interests. This was especially so of the schools run by the Paris Mission whose teachers taught English, an institution that was not entirely English, a factor that occasionally aroused colonial concern.

Despite the Litunga's enthusiasm in supporting these mission schools, he was nevertheless not satisfied with their performance. Christianity was after all, foreign and not related to Lozi cultural conditions. It served the interests of capitalism, even if the mission of Coillard may have had certain differences with colonial policy. The attacks by missionaries on Lozi ancestral worship worked to undermine the ideological basis of ruling class power.

The long standing conflict between the aristocratic traditions and the subversive christian ideology, coupled with the fact that the schools never produced the kind of technical experts that Lewanika wanted for the modernisation of his country¹³⁵ led to a definite break in 1904. The aristocracy decided to invite to Bulozhi the Ethiopian church movement, whose influence was the Afro-American dominated African Methodist Episcopal church based in South Africa. This movement was welcome by the ruling class because it promised to give Bulozhi that national cultural identity¹³⁶ that colonialists were geared to obliterating. It also promised a secular based education that was in line with what the aristocracy hoped for, that was practical and

relevant education that would introduce new and necessary technological advancement,¹³⁷ and not merely endless theological daydreaming. The fact that this church was of black innovation was something that potentially promised good and fruitful results.

It was for this reason that colonialists condemned it, and paternalistically thought it to 'unsettle the native mind'. It was also declared a plot by Mokalapa, leader of the church, against the French mission. His words 'do not listen to those white missionaries. They do not love you, it's only we who love you',¹³⁸ etc, are taken as evidence of this. The church was however, so popular that there were mass defections from the mission schools, much to the frustration of Coillard.

The church ultimately collapsed in 1905 because of a financial misadventure in South Africa where Mokalapa was swindled of his money. The administration then felt strong enough to ban the movement forever, despite the protestations of Lewanika.

It was the Ethiopian experience which compelled the colonial regime to establish the Barotse National School in 1907,¹³⁹ funded by the Lozi themselves. Its treasury was controlled by the colonial administration,¹⁴⁰ so was the recruitment of teachers. These were at first whites and Sotho, but Lozi graduates of the school came to join the staff later.

The tight control by the government stopped it from growing, but its graduates came to fill civil service jobs in the

colonial administration,¹⁴¹ playing a useful role for the colonial state. Quality remained basically poor. The Industrial Branch of the school produced artisans skilled in such activities as bricklaying, sawing, gardening and carpentry. One cannot fail to see an attempt to produce graduates to occupy the most menial tasks of the colonial state, and thus perpetuate the repressive ideological conditions.

British colonial rule in Bulozhi manifested itself also through racial and ideological arrogance, that often treated African as children, and hence the continuous reference to them as boys, regardless of their age. Even the term native, which etymologically refers to belonging to that country politically and historically, began to have ideological implications as it was used with a capital N. It became a pejorative concept denoting the common inferiority of the African colonial peoples. Paternalism and racism were ideological tools of colonialism which were used to convince colonial peoples of their inferiority and that way maintain alien rule and oppression.

The ideological oppression of Bulozhi was manifested in many aspects of colonial life. Black policemen were not allowed to arrest white offenders on the grounds that this would lower the status of the Europeans.¹⁴² Even Lozi cultural life was violated with callous lawlessness. Lozi marriage laws were violated and declared illegal. The colonial court directly responsible for North Western Rhodesia was based in Bulawayo but

was subordinate to the justice of the Peace of Pretoria. The latter declared in 1910 that since British law did not uphold polygamy, hence, even the children born under such a marriage were declared illegitimate.¹⁴³ Marriages between white~~men~~ and black women were not recognised, and all black women married to whites were declared concubines. Exactly what consequences this had in Buloxi is hard to tell. But all these policies were aimed at culturally undermining Africans and reinforcing repressive cultural and ideological apparatuses of the colonial state.

Even the Lozi aristocracy through its King came to accept this colonial paternalism and oppression. Under the guise of offering protection and civilisation, the aristocracy was ordered to respect all the whites in the territory. Lewanika's capitulation to colonial culture was demonstrated by his request for guidance from the colonial authorities on how his people must salute the whites.¹⁴⁴ He was then told that the administrative officials be given the Lozi royal salute while a lesser one be given to all other whites.¹⁴⁵

In essence, colonialism was willing to incorporate those elements of Lozi culture like the royal salute which were useful in advancing the ideological and culturally domination of Buloxi.

The Close of an era

The process of colonial domination came to a close in 1911 as the most dominant aspects of colonialism were realised in Buloxi.

Politically, hegemony had become complete and the internal transformation thorough.

The institution of the Litungaship survived but simply as a shell of its former self. Direct interference in its activities came after the 1905 coup attempt reinforced by another in 1911.¹⁴⁶ The colonial authorities found it fit to appoint Lewanika's son Litia as defacto successor for fear of a backlash in case of sudden death of Lewanika. The Resident magistrate went to the now impotent Kita to inform it of government decision to back Litia, declaring: 'should any other claimant henceforth arise attempting to oppose this decision, he will be looked upon as usuper by the government and dealt with accordingly'.¹⁴⁷ The Bulozhi state had indeed become moribund.

By 1911, it was found administratively and economically expedient to unite North Western and North Eastern Rhodesia into one territory called Northern Rhodesia by a 1911 Order - In - Council. This further diminished the international and national status of Bulozhi and though some shallow semblance of autonomy remained, it increasingly came to act as a labour reserve.¹⁴⁸

A Comparative Discussion of the Relations of Domination

The relations of domination were realised in Ukraine and Bulozhi owing to the entrenchment of colonial rule. This was the stage within the colonial process when the major power centres of Ukraine and Bulozhi were harnessed and controlled.

Politically, economically and ideologically, the ruling classes of Ukraine and Bulozhi were dominated by colonialism.

The immediate circumstances that led to colonial domination were different in both countries. In Ukraine, it was the war that gave Russia the pretext or chance to dominate Ukraine. This is not to suggest that domination of Ukraine by Russia would not have taken place without the war that led to Mazepa's defeat, but rather the war gave an easy opportunity for Russia quickly to realise her colonial ambitions. In Bulozhi, where no such pretext arose, domination was achieved through administrative and political pressure that was applied to realise colonial ambitions. In both cases, the ruling classes were relegated to the role of subservient colonial puppets, who administered their countries on behalf of and with the participation of the colonial forces. Whether the process of political domination was violent or peaceful does not appear to have contradicted the basic common objectives of the colonisers.

The political and economic subjugation of Ukraine and Bulozhi reached a decisive point when the colonial state institutions were effectively imposed. This was a necessary step in the transformation of the relations of co-operation to domination. These institutions were coercive and hence played a crucial and dominant role in the realisation of colonial objectives.

The first major innovation in the Hetmanate was the introduction of Russian troops which were established in all the major cities including that of the Hetman. In Bulozhi, it was the BNP

which became the coercive arm of the colonial state. It was also established at all major centres of power in the country including the Litunga's capital, though five miles away from the palace. The administrative arm of the state followed the imposition of these military institutions. A Russian Resident was appointed to Ukraine at the Hotman's capital. The number was later raised to two. Similarly a British Resident was appointed to Bulozhi to 'advise' the Litunga and represent her Majesty's government. A chain of colonial officers followed the Resident from each of the colonising powers. These officials carried out the orders of their countries and not those of Ukraine and Bulozhi.

It is probably the nature of the occupation of these countries that determined the forms of colonial domination. Whereas Russia sent her troops to occupy Ukraine and even sponsor and direct the election of another Hotman, Britain created a police force (in fact an army) using the local personnel, but dominated by foreign African elements. There is no doubt that the conditions of the time dictated these developments. War conditions in Ukraine meant that Russia could not rely on the loyalty of the Ukrainians without the effective presence of her troops. Cossack troops were too unpredictable to take for granted, especially under seething conditions of war. Because of relatively non-violent process of colonial expansion in Bulozhi, it was not necessary to impose British troops in Bulozhi. These were after all expensive at a time the British Government and the BSACo. were interested in minimizing administrative costs as much as possible. But the loyalty of the force was secured by the use of non-Lozi personnel. Apart

from that, it was led by white officers of the BSACo. who trained and drilled it along British military lines. This ensured unquestionable loyalty to the colonial state.

While the political domination of the Hetmanate was initially by military conquest, a civil colonial administration evolved shortly after 1709 in the form of the Kollegiia. The Kollegiia fulfilled functions similar to those of the BSACo. and its Native Affairs Department. In both cases, a form of indirect rule was pursued, that is, ruling through local officials. But the colonial officials determined policy and not the local Ukrainian or Lozi officials. Where there was a possibility of colonial policy being violated whether by colonial peoples or their ruling classes, the colonial states had recourse to the threat, actual or implied, of military reprisals.

Colonialism demonstrated a keen adaptation to local conditions for by doing so, it was strengthening the relations of domination. It incorporated elements of the local ruling classes and some of their institutions. This after all, was necessary if colonial rule was to implement its policies successfully, and also achieve some form of acceptability from the colonised. The Kollegiia was composed of both Ukrainian and Russian officers while the Native Affairs Department in Bulozhi had apart from white personnel, African employees like tax collectors, messengers and policemen. Just as many sections of the starshyna held positions of responsibility in the colonial administration, so did the induna class in Bulozhi.

Representative Indunas were an arm of the colonial administration while the Litunga himself played the role albeit unwillingly, of a subordinate governor of Bulozhi colonial territory, a role the Hetmans played too. Even the educated elite from the Kievan Academy in Ukraine and mission schools in Bulozhi came to occupy certain positions in the colonial administration.

Ukrainians held higher positions in the Russian colonial state than the Lozi did in the British colonial state and a number of factors account for this which are largely due to different historical epochs and cultural traditions. Ukraine was ruled by a Kollegia which was part of the Russian organs for internal affairs. In essence, it was an expansion of an imperialist Russian state of the eighteenth century. Coupled by a relatively close racial and cultural proximity, it was therefore easy to incorporate Ukrainians into the Russian State. A relatively similar feudal mode of production also complemented the historical and cultural category. Since Ukraine was not just politically but physically or geographically incorporated with Russia, a greater degree of flexibility in accommodating the starshyna was possible. Bulozhi on the other hand presented a different situation. The country was ruled by a capitalist monopoly whose interest was profit maximisation and cost minimisation. Taking into account the racial and historical difference between the Lozi and the British, there was no basis for a close relationship like that in Ukraine. The geographical distance between Britain and Bulozhi compounded the problem. While both colonies were

treated as zones for exploitation, and their peoples subjected to an inferior status, Bulozzi as a typical twentieth century colony faced greater colonial impoverishment with her peoples performing menial tasks in the colonial administration.

The process of colonial domination was also marked by efforts at greater control of the colonies' power centres. In this case, regions or provinces of the colonies were brought under the supervision of the colonial authorities. Where suitable internal divisions existed, they were incorporated into the colonial administrative system. In Ukraine, the Hetmanate's military and administrative divisions were adopted by the Kollegiia. In Bulozzi the internal territorial divisions called Makolo were made part of the colonial system. But because of their small size, they were amalgamated into large districts which were formed from 1901 in preparation for the tax. These divisions were useful in the enforcement of colonial policy in both countries.

Historically the Makolo were military divisions and could therefore, be compared to the colonelncies in the Hetmanate. These institutions became increasingly civil and by the beginning of the present century had completely lost their military aspect due to colonial interference. The new districts also began to override and assume predominance. The process of the demarcation of the new districts appears to have been completed by 1911. But with the well established provinces in the Hetmanate the need for demarcating new internal boundaries did not arise.

The entrenchment of the process of political domination had to be complemented by law. Hence, one of the facets of colonial rule lay in the subjugation of colonies' juridical state apparatus to the colonial ones. Russia and Britain instituted their own legal systems to replace those of the colonies. In Ukraine, the Kollegiia became the highest court of appeal just as the Residents' court¹⁴⁹ played a similar function in Bulozhi.

Russian laws were imposed in Ukraine through the Kollegiia. Russia took advantage of the absence of a codified Ukrainian law to impose her colonial laws. Lozi law which was part of Lozi customs and traditions was similarly undermined, and in major areas replaced by colonial law. Even though the Lozi had a well formulated juridical system, it was easier for colonial rule to replace it because it was not written. It is probably because of this factor that no legal struggle took place between the aristocracy and the Company. The former were not aware of the implications of colonial laws since they believed their laws to be intact, and not having been undermined or even dominated by colonial ones. All that the ruling class saw was the erosion of their political and economic power, and legal issues did not appear important as they did in Ukraine.

It is however, not clear how effective Russian laws were at the local level of administrative practice such as the Ukrainian village. It is highly probable that Ukrainian laws continued to be operational at this level since the colonial state could not have penetrated all levels of Ukrainian society, especially

village levels which were not usually the centres of political power and hence focus of colonial interests. Similarly in Bulozhi, the British did not totally uproot all Lozi laws. They enforced laws that were crucial to the transformation of Bulozhi into a British colony. The criminal and civil cases are evidence of this transformation. But at the local level of native administration, traditional Lozi laws remained intact so long as they did not violate British ideas of law and justice. It is quite obvious, therefore, that the colonisers found it necessary to retain some of the institutions of the colonised, so long as the basic colonial objectives and interests could be realised.

Ukrainian towns and their Magdeburg laws, and the process of their domination by Russia have no meaningful parallel in Bulozhi and cannot be reasonably compared. The Company did not have to contend with Magdeburg towns that were absent in Bulozhi. Looking at the towns from a purely political aspect, one can stretch the comparison to the tributary peoples of the Lozi state who were autonomous, and colonialists weakened the Lozi state by removing Lozi political influence from these peoples. In this case, the domination of Ukrainian towns by Russia weakened the Hetmanate in the same way that the Lozi state was weakened by the removal of subject peoples from its influence.

Imperialism took advantage of certain contradictions within the ranks of the starshyna and the indunas which gave opportunities to the colonial powers to use the tactics of divide and rule. A Hetman found it very difficult to institute

policies that could undermine colonial interests. The factional and opportunistic elements within the Rada would always use this as a pretext to denounce their leader in Moscow. Intriguing Cossack officers demonstrated this throughout Russian colonial history in Ukraine. Polubotok fell victim to this kind of conspiracy within the Cossack officer ranks. The main problem was that virtually no Hetman would rule without inviting the wrath of opposition factions within the starshyna. Under such conditions, Hetmans became increasingly powerless, and politically impotent. In Bulohi, dynastic factional outbursts against the Litunga made the latter become more and more dependent on the colonial state for the preservation of his rule. This tended to make him vulnerable to the colonialists who took advantage of the situation to make him offer more concessions. The result was capitulation to colonial forces thus weakening his power and that of the entire ruling class.¹⁵⁰ In practical terms, the Hetman was replaced, and hence lost power while the Litunga remained in his position growing in flamboyance but in fact reduced to a puppet.

The nature and form of internal contradictions in the ranks of the ruling classes of Ukraine and Bulohi differ significantly because of the divergent social conditions in which these took place. In Ukraine, Russia often backed a Hetman regarded as pro-Moscow, and would defend him against

Cossack rebels in Rada. But most of the conspirators tended to denounce a Hetman and attempt to topple him with the assistance of Moscow. So, a vicious circle operated where the colonial power at times became the centre of hatching plots against a Hetman. In Bulozhi, it was often a dynastic faction or combinations of them that revolted against Lewanika's rule due to Induna impoverishment created by colonialism. Colonial authorities therefore, became indebted to Lewanika as he was the most collaborative element of the aristocracy. Any attempt to oust him met resistance from the colonial state which had vowed to defend him anyway.

To check the internal political instability caused by factional fights within the ranks of the ruling classes, Russian and British colonial officials went so far as to interfere in the internal political system of each of their colonies. They began to directly appoint successors to the positions of Hetman and Litunga. Bulozhi differs in having been ruled by one Litunga throughout the period under discussion. This limited the probability of innovation of different policies dictated by the wishes and political orientations of different rulers. Had Bulozhi had a longer time period with many Litungas, she might have developed her own 'traitors' on the lines of the Hetmans who rebelled against Russian rule. It is for this reason that the political situation in the Hetmanate was more volatile than in Bulozhi. But this difference does not contradict the general outcome of the colonial process. Both countries were politically dominated by each of their colonial powers.

Economic Domination and Exploitation

The process of the domination of Ukrainian and Lozi economic resources was a protracted one, characterised by resistance of these colonies' ruling class. But the growing strength of the colonial state coupled by its corrupting influence on some sections of the ruling classes rendered this struggle worthless.

In Ukraine, the control of the means of production was a necessary condition for the domination of her economy by Russia. In this respect land ownership quickly came to be dominated by Russians and other alien colonists as a result of official policy. Sections of the starshyna also played a crucial role in advancing large estate-holding by seeking favours from the Tsar's officials. The result was a progressive destruction of communal villages and free peasant holdings as serf social relations became predominant. The extraction of surplus in the form of wheat was therefore accelerated for the benefit of the Russian domestic market and trade. Bulozhi proper escaped the domination of its land by colonists. But outlying areas of Bulozhi like Batoka were engulfed by white settlers, a number of whom were Company officials. The whole belt of land along the line of rail became a monopoly of white colonists. Not a single member of the Lozi aristocracy or that of peripheral Tonga/Toka peoples even came to own any land. Peasants were expropriated from land ownership and reduced to serfs, just like Ukrainian peasants were ensnared by Russian landlords in league with the starshyna.

As can be seen, the social relations of production were being transformed and harnessed to meet the interests of a colonial economy. The specific historical conditions and different modes of production dictated the difference means by which these processes developed. Russia's economic policy was dictated by a feudal mode of production with a strong element of a growing merchant capitalism. Hence, efforts to develop and modernise the empire's economy were influenced by feudal relationships in landownership and labour conditions. British policy in Bulozhi was dictated by monopoly capitalism, which was advanced by the BSACo. The peculiar nature of world capitalism under backward conditions of production led to the pursuance of a policy of bleeding Bulozhi to death. Instead of investing for production, capitalism in Bulozhi was purely extractive. Technically, the Company sowed the seeds of destruction of the Lozi economy by relegating the entire country to the status of a labour reserve for the South African and Southern Rhodesian mines where the people burdened by tax went to seek work. They died in appalling numbers due to poor working conditions.¹⁵¹ The increasing outflow of labour from Bulozhi to the south created labour shortages. The grandiose schemes of the Litunga which were meant to modernise the country reached their height in 1907, after which it became difficult to raise large numbers of labourers for public works.¹⁵²

Extraction of labour was also a policy carried out in Ukraine though for purposes different than those in Bulozhi. Ukrainian labour was needed to meet Russian war demands, and also the

construction of public works which led to thousands dying in the process. What internal repercussions the withdraw of labour from Ukraine to meet Imperial demands had is hard to tell in the absence of data. But assuming that any number of men removed from Ukraine led to reduced productive labour, one cannot fail to conclude that food production declined in many parts of the country although data supporting this view is available for the post 1730 period, but which falls outside the confines of the study.

Tax was imposed in Ukraine and Buloxi for economic reasons. It was needed to feed the colonial treasuries of Russia and Britain. In Ukraine tax could have had the consequence of making it compulsory for peasants to remain tied to their lords' land. In Buloxi however, it was imposed to serve a purpose that did not exist in Ukraine. It was designed to force labour out of the country for capitalist production, firstly, on the mines and secondly on the farms. It is possible that had Buloxi been opened to white settlement for capitalist agriculture, labour would have been conserved within Buloxi to meet labour demands of the farmers,¹⁵³ as peasant labour was retained in Ukraine to work on the land of Russian nobles and the starshyna.

In both cases however, the colonial policies achieved the objectives of dominating the economies of the colonised and transforming and incorporating them into the wider colonial and imperial economies. This accelerated the impoverishment of the local ruling classes, and thus making their states moribund.

Ideological Repercussions

The political and economic domination of Ukraine and Bulohi inevitably led to fundamental ideological changes that led to the predominance of colonial ideological institutions and norms. The ideological state apparatus of Ukraine and Bulohi were either replaced or simply dominated by colonial ones. Two areas deserve attention here. The first is the changed ideological outlook and orientation of the Ukrainian and Lozi ruling classes to serve those of colonialism. The second is domination of Ukrainian and Lozi ideological institutions by colonialism.

Having lost the political will to determine the course of the country's life, the starshyna attempted to compensate this with affluence, which meant getting favours of ennoblement from the Russian government. This led to the development of a pro-Russian ideological orientation of the starshyna. Large sections of this class became Russified especially as the Russian language became the official language of the Hetmanate. The Lozi indunas faced colonial impoverishment in general, but the royal family increased its flamboyance, and hence, the growing royal pretensions that characterised the Litunga. Lewanika and the Kuta continued with their royal arrogance and continued to regard themselves as representing a small monarchical state. Lewanika's own royal pride and personality was partially demonstrated by his taste for British royal pretensions. The Litunga's 'traditional' dress which was in fact a British admiral's uniform is a case in point. The induna class retained its basic traditional outlook and culture, but were faced with pro-

British aristocratic pretensions. While the starshyna was easily Russified in Ukraine, this was not possible in Bulozhi. Because the colonial forces were led by the English bourgeoisie and not the relics of the British feudal aristocracy, a thorough Lozi cultural and ideological transformation was almost impossible. No material base for this transformation existed and only superficial and incomplete ideological leanings would be encouraged. Besides, the paternalistic and racist policy of British colonialism alienated the Lozi from any strict pro-English ideological orientation.

Paternalism was another ideological aspect of colonialism which became arrogantly expressed during the period under discussion. Russian and British colonial officials used the pretext of protecting the ordinary peoples from the tyranny of their leaders to enforce colonial policy in a deliberate strategy of divide and rule. Ukrainian and Lozi rulers thus came to accept the subordinate position because of increasing powerlessness in the face of stronger and more powerful colonial masters.

Ideological oppression and subordination was also extended to the ideological institutions of Ukraine and Bulozhi. The sphere of religion was one that did not escape colonial domination. In Ukraine, this involved the subordination of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the Patriarch of Moscow. This also involved banning of the Ukrainian church's literary publications. In Bulozhi, it involved destruction or

Lewanikais children went for studies in Britain.

Whatever may be the complexity of differences between Ukraine and Bulozhi at this stage, it is quite clear that the new educational and religious orientations established in these countries increasingly alienated the new elites from their moribund state systems. They were now geared to be part and parcel of the Russian and British colonial states respectively.

The Ukrainian Academy came under Russian domination because of its historical role as a cultural and ideological centre of the country which produced new literate leaders of Ukraine. Similarly, the Barotse National School, though a colonial creation, came to play a similar function of producing colonial elites and ensuring the perpetuation of the colonial rule.

The imposition of Russian as the official language in Ukraine finds an interesting parallel in Bulozhi. English was also imposed as an official language. Although Russia was meant for the entire Ukrainian society, it in fact remained localised to the Russified aristocracy while the rest of the population remained with their own language. In Bulozhi, English was also restricted to the new elite by design and was not enforced in the rest of the society. This new elite was so effectively discriminated against that it never held any pretensions of belonging to a ruling class. It was privileged but effectively discriminated against. Its role was simply to serve in the menial tasks of the colonial administration.

In Ukraine, Russification was encouraged due to the social and cultural proximity of Russians and Ukrainians. Marriages between the Ukrainian starshyna and the Russian nobility were encouraged so as to bind 'Little Russia' more closely to the Russian state. But, a totally different situation developed in Bulozhi. Marriages between whites and blacks were actively discouraged and declared illegal. Historical and geographical factors accounted for this dissimilarity. The Lozi were racially and culturally more different from the British than were the Ukrainians from the Russians.

As the relations of domination reached their climax, Ukrainian and Lozi state institutions and entire economic life were thoroughly subverted and dominated by the British and Russian colonial regimes. The reality of colonialism had dawned.

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71. Ibid, 5.
72. See General instructions Native Department, Mankoya Sub-district, KDE/5/1, NAZ.
73. Ibid.
74. Stokes, 'Barotseland', 288; Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Livingstone, 5 June 1908, BS2/29, NAZ.
75. See Secretary for Native Affairs to District Commissioner, Barotse District, Letter from Representative induna iluya to Lewanika, Kalomo, June 1907, KDE/2/13/5, NAZ.
76. Native Unrest, Kafue District, Report of District Commissioner, Mongu, 29/8/1907, KDE/2/32/3, NAZ.

77. G. Clay, Your Friend, 143-144.
78. The Native Affairs Department was established in 1904 for the tax purpose. See Acting Administrator to Secretary (BSA Co.), Kalomo, 23 January 1904, BS2/35, NAZ.
79. L. Gann, The Birth, 92.
80. Ibid, 94.
81. The Lozi state lost automatic right to firearms ownership and only leading indunas could on application be given hunting rifles. The colonial state thus monopolised the means of violence. See Coryndon to High Commissioner, Kalomo, 8 September, 1905, BS2/299, NAZ.
82. See Judicial Reports, Barotse District, 1907-1911, KDE/1/2/1, NAZ.
83. See District Administration, BS2/299, NAZ.
84. See Report of Aitkens, D.C. Mongu-Lealui, 13/12/1906. Complaints, Lobitsi, 1906 Dec-1907 May, KDE/2/14/1, NAZ.
85. The case of a young man who beat up his wife burning his house in the process is a case in point. See Letter from Ngambela to the District Commissioner, Lealui, 18 March, 1911, KDE/3/2/6, NAZ.
86. Secretary for Native Affairs to Secretary, BSACo., Kalomo, 18 January, 1905, Barotse Native Police, BS2/101, NAZ.
87. Ibid.
88. From Lewanika to Administrator, Lealui, 28/11/1903, KDE/2/34/1, NAZ.
89. Bulozhi simply inherited the Southern Rhodesia Native Pass Ordinance (N.P.O.) of 1902, ammended in 1904. See NPO of 1902, C0879/84, P.R.O.
90. Letter from District Commissioner to Secretary of Native Affairs, Kasempa, 2 March 1905, BS2/99, NAZ.
91. He was induna Kalileli of Baluvale. See letter from Acting District Commissioner to Secretary for Native Affairs No. 36/06, Kasempa, 15 January 1908, KDE/2/36/1, NAZ.
92. See Wamulumi vs. Diamond: Criminal Cases 1906-07, Magistrate's court, Lealui, Barotse District, KDE/3/2/1-2, NAZ. Another induna was charged with contempt of court on 20 June 1907, see Ibid.

93. Rex vs. Nyambe, Manslaughter, Mongu, 16 August, 1911, KDE/3/2/6, NAZ.
94. Secretary to Lewanika, Administrator's Office, Bulawayo, 13 March 1900, BS2/155 vol. 1, NAZ.
95. Granger to Marshall Hole, Barotseland, 21 July 1900, BS2/155, NAZ.
96. Colin Harding to Secretary BSACo., Lealui, 25 June 1900, BS2/155, NAZ.
97. Letter from the Resident Magistrate to Native Commissioner at Lukona No. C83/11, Mongu, 24 July, BS2/9, NAZ.
98. See the case of the two Portuguese traders caught by BSACo., police in the disputed border area. Letter from Antonio Riberio de Bessa and Monoel Burges Saraiva to Gladson (High Commissioner), 20 August 1910, NanaKandundu, Angola, BS2/9, NAZ.
99. Proclamation by the High Commissioner No. 4 30 June 1906, BS2/3, NAZ.
100. Letter from Marshall Hole (Act, Adm.) to Jones (BSACo), Enclosure 2 in No. 159, Annexure no. 26, 19 April 1904, BS2/36, NAZ.
101. Lewanika to Coryndon, Sesheke, 8 December 1902, BS2/2, NAZ.
102. Selborne to Lewanika, Johannesburg, 27 September 1905, BS2/2, NAZ.
103. Letter from Secretary to Acting Administrator (BSACo.), London, 5 January 1907, BS2/17, NAZ.
104. Marshall Hole to Lewanika, Livingstone, 9 April 1904, CO879/84, P.R.O.
105. Report on Native Labour, 1904-1911, BS2/42, NAZ; See the tax table.
106. Ibid.
107. The averages have been calculated on the basis of tax table data.
108. The standard wage for African workers in Southern Rhodesia was not over 30/- a month (£18 per year), Bulozzi with fewer resources could not have its workers received beyond the rates in mineral rich Southern Rhodesia. Harding reported that they received $\frac{1}{3}$ of Southern Rhodesia rates, which was about 10/- a month.
109. Gann, The Birth, 77.

110. Annual Report, Resident Magistrate's Office, Mongu, 28 April 1910, BS2/148, NAZ.
111. Ibid.
112. Marshall Hole to Lewanika, Kalomo, 14 December 1904, CO 879/84, P.R.O.
113. N. Watt, 'Lewanika's visit to Edinburgh', The Rhodes Livingstone Journal, 111, 1, 1953, 3-8.
114. See the translation of a letter from Lailang to Edward Grey no. 234 (5742), London, 17 February 1910, BS2/8, NAZ.
115. J. Stevens to Sectretary (BSACo.), Bulawayo, 22 August 1908, BS2/18, NAZ.
116. Agents of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau recruited labour for Southern Rhodesian mines, Report of Secretary for Native Affairs, Livingstone, 1 July 1909, BS2/142, NAZ.
117. Ibid.
118. Secretary for Native Affairs to Resident Magistrate Livingstone, June 1909, December 1911-1912, KDE/2/4/2, NAZ.
119. W. Brelsford, Generation of Men, The European Pioneers of Northern Rhodesia (Salisbury: S. Manning, 1965), 88.
120. Ibid.
121. Clarence-Smith, 'Landlords', 231.
122. Administrator to Native Commissioner (Sesheke), Livingstone, 30 June 1909, BS2/30 Vol. II, NAZ.
123. Ibid.
124. See Clarence-Smith, 'landlords', 225.
125. Mainga, Bulozi, 140.
126. Clay, Your Friend, 142
127. This is evidenced by the decreasing number of signatures to the treaties. Due to opposition fewer and fewer indunas were allowed to sign. These were 29 in 1880, 27 in 1898, and only 10 in 1900. See M. Bull, 'Lewanika's Achievements', 464.
128. Stokes, 'Barotseland', 281.

129. 1905 Concessions (signed by Crewe, Secretary of State for Colonies), 23 June 1909, BS2/21, NAZ.
130. From Acting Administrator to High Commissioner, Livingstone, 19 March, 1910, BS2/30, NAZ.
131. Stokes, 'Barotseland', 291-2.
132. NAR, HC 1/2/5, Coryndon 22 November 1905, quoted in Clarence-Smith, 'Landlords', 225.
133. See note 124.
134. See Nalikwanda presentation, 7 December, 1907, BS2/16, NAZ.
135. T.O. Ranger, 'The Ethiopian Episode in Barotseland, 1900-1905', Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, 37, June 1965, 27.
136. Ibid, 31.
137. I. Lewanika, 'The History', 1976.
138. Report of the Secretary for Native Authority on Ethiopian Church, Kalomo, 6 April, 1904, BS2/191, NAZ.
139. See M.C. Mortimer, 'History of the Barotse National School, 1907-1957', Northern Rhodesia Journal, 3,4, 1957, 303-310.
140. Resident Magistrate responsible for the School. See Barotse National School Golden Jubilee, March 1907-March 1957, 2.
141. I. Lewanika, 'The History', 53-54.
142. Report of Harding (BSACo. Police) to Coryndon, Lealui, 15 November 1899 (Received 26 February 1900), BS2/157, NAZ.
143. Secretary to Imperial Secretary (South Africa) No. 66 Livingstone, 25 March 1911, NAZ.
144. Minutes of the proceedings of a meeting with Lewanika at Sesheke, 30 September 1907, Sesheke District Notebooks, KT03/1, NAZ.
145. Ibid.
145. From Secretary to Imperial Secretary no. 66, Livingstone, 25 May 1911, BS2/191, NAZ.
147. See Note 55.

148. On the development of the labour reserve in the post 1911 period, See R. S. Kapaale, 'A Survey of Wenela in Barotseland', R.R. Palmer ed., Zambia land and Labour Studies Vol. III, Lusaka; NAZ, 1976.
149. The Resident who represented British rule also became the Resident Magistrate.
150. The Land Concessions of 1905 and 1909 are evidence of the Litunga's capitulation to colonial forces.
151. L. Van Horn, 'The Agricultural History of Barotseland', Palmer and Parsons eds., Roots of Rural Poverty in Central Africa, (London: Heinmann, 1977), 149. Also See Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, 107.
152. Van Horn, 'Agricultural', 155. The complete collapse of the Lozi economy did not however become evident till after the end of the First World War.
153. On the railway belt settlers sought to stop labour outflow to the south because of their own labour demands on their farms. See M. Muntomba, 'A Case study of Economic change in the Kabwe Rural District', in Roots, 345-361.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Having compared the entire process of colonial expansion in Ukraine and Bulozhi from the establishment of the relations of co-operation up to the realisation of the relations of colonial domination, attention is now given to the assessment of the major achievements of the study.

This is not a controlled comparison in the spirit of Steinhart's work which examines three closely related African states facing a common challenge - British colonialism.¹ Instead, this is a comparison where two different areas which do not share any geographical, historical and even cultural proximity have been chosen for comparative scrutiny. Not even the colonial powers that came to colonise Ukraine and Bulozhi were similar, although they are not the main focus of the study. It is the dynamics of a colonial process that provides an important comparative prospect.

Colonialism has too often been epitomised as a 'big bang' event without considering the often complex and at times subtle manner of its imposition. Rapid military conquests by superior colonial forces have sometimes been assessed as the culmination of a process of colonial encroachment.² Where military conquests did not take place and the colonial process was initially characterised by treaties through mutual agreements, such agreements have been stated as the climax and the end of a process of colonial domination.³

This study has endeavoured to show the complex and intricate nature of the colonial process as it expressed itself in Ukraine and Bulozhi.

The initial development of colonialism was characterised by treaties which gave a semblance of mutual co-operation between the colonisers and the colonised. For colonial domination to be established, therefore, it was not easy, and the process was protracted and hence fraught with numerous difficulties. The nature of the treaties tended to give to the ruling classes of the two countries illusions of political sovereignty. These illusions were however not baseless, and their perpetuation was grounded on what the Ukrainians and the Lozi believed were advantages to be got from the treaties, especially the illusion that they were going to maintain the independence of their states within a vassal relationship. These illusions disappeared only when the colonial reality crystallised during the period I have conveniently described as the relations of colonial domination.

It is probably the absence of a proper historical conception of colonialism through treaties that has led scholars to over-emphasise the importance of the treaties. Ukrainian and Bulozhi nationalist historiography has for this reason tended to view the colonialists almost as tricksters, who presented treaties with clauses that were not very clear but aimed at expressing and realising dominant colonial interests, while hoodwinking unsuspecting weaker and diplomatically inexperienced partners.⁴ This is almost tantamount

to suggesting that had the Ukrainian and Lozi rulers clearly understood the implications of the treaties, they would have been more careful and hence guarded themselves against colonial encroachment.

This study has demonstrated that this was not the case. The colonial process unfolded following an internal and international crisis affecting Cossack and Lozi ruling classes. The dangers that lurked from within and without had to be harnessed for the survival of these states. A class struggle that broke out after the anti-Polish revolution, between lower Cossack and peasants on one hand, and the Cossack nobility on the other complicated by factional aristocratic rivalries threatened the power of the ruling class. The emergence of a perpetual international crisis dominated by Polish aggression presented the dominant historical condition for the signing of a treaty of co-operation between Ukraine and Russia. Similarly, the anti-Kololo revolution in Bulozhi created an internal crisis that manifested itself in endless and bloody power struggles within the new aristocracy, and also between themselves and the ruled. The international crisis presented by competing European powers, and their agents created conditions for signing a treaty of co-operation with the British.

At face value, the conditions or terms of the treaties do not in any way suggest a strict colonial relationship. They express most manifestly relations of co-operation but between stronger and weaker allies. Hence vassallage is also pronounced but purely

in terms of political superiority of Russia and Britain which gives them the advantage to extended a hand of protection to their respective weaker Ukrainian and Lozi partners. Thereafter, colonial reality began to down slowly but surely. But as the study has demonstrated, it was not the signing of the Pereyaslav and Lewanika Concessions (Lochner Concession) that determined the course of the colonial process. What was crucial in the relations were the power relations, looked at from the perspective of who held superiority in the means of violence and hence control. It is clear that the colonial powers held this superiority. It was this advantage that led to the constant changing of the treaty terms to the benefit of colonial forces and not the other way round. The treaties that were signed simply acted as the means for establishing colonial relations at a political and diplomatic level. This interpretation is not well established, or clearly stated in existing historiography.

The fact that the colonial process did not manifest itself vividly during the process of the relations of co-operation shows clearly the protracted nature of the colonial process. The study has demonstrated that the success of colonialism depended to a large extent on the careful resolution of colonial contradictions. It was for instance, not useful to force the colonised people to the wall immediately by enforcing colonial policies that might otherwise create an armed resistance with all its internal and international consequences. The Russians learnt this very well during the period of the ruina, just as the British learnt this from the Ndebele and

Shona, coupled by clearly-stated Lozi intentions to resist undue colonial pressure. Thus, the weak position of the colonial powers' administrative organs relative to those of the colonised led to the pursuance of a temporary policy of co-operation. But the power balance in favour of the colonisers was already established by virtue of the Ukrainian and Lozi rulers' allegiance to the ruling classes of Russia and Britain. Only time was needed to transform these relations of co-operation to those of domination.

Under the relations of co-operation, substantial inroads were made by colonialism in the political affairs of the colonised countries. These inroads demonstrate the character of colonialism during this period. These were largely in the political and to some extent, the ideological spheres. Colonial influence was manifested in the changes and transformations of the treaties. The Ukrainians lost some of their political rights owing to new restrictions on the freedoms of the Rada to decide the procedure of the removal of Hetmans as per the Hlukhiv articles. Similarly, the Lozi ruling class lost some of its powers and rights in the 1898 Lawley concession. But these treaties were purely legalistic and had yet to be tested. The Cossacks tested the 'meaninglessness' of these legalistic arrangements by revolting. This only goes to emphasize that the power relations had not yet been fully determined, at least not until the relations of domination had been imposed. The effect was to further protract the colonial process, and the colonial powers were content to maintain the fluid situation so long they

remained the dominant powers in their colonies. They maintained their influence by taking advantage of the factional splits within the ruling classes thus favouring those elements that supported colonial forces. Factional fights of the ruling classes of Ukraine and Bulozhi are part of one of the central themes of this study. The study has demonstrated that internal conflicts among the leaders of these two countries created a chance to strengthen the hand of colonialism, using tactics of divide and rule. It is interesting that the establishment of the relation of domination diminished the class struggle and also the internal intrigues within the ruling classes. Where these happened, they were quickly crushed and only advanced the cause of colonial encroachment as in the 1905 and 1909 attempted palace coups against Litunga Lewanika. It was the sheer presence of colonial troops in both countries that led to the reduction of internal power struggles. It is obvious that the personal position of the ruling classes was more secure by virtue of the effective presence of colonial forces that were too eager to support a Hetman or Litunga who faced internal opposition. It was therefore to the advantage of the classes in power to use the protecting hand of colonialism to remain in power and reap whatever benefits accrued to them in the process.

I have also tried to show that the initial process of colonialism was largely a political manifestation. This is not surprising in view of the crucial role politics often plays in affecting and

influencing many sectors of society. It is therefore no wonder that the subjugation of the Ukrainian and Lozi state systems during the relations of co-operation was not complete, and this occurred when economic domination of these countries was achieved, providing the necessary material and historical condition for the realization complete colonial domination.

While economics was a pre-condition for the establishment of colonial political institutions, this must however not be seen as a static historical condition, but rather a dialectical one in the sense that politics and economics tend to interchange their dominant roles in the process of historical development. It is for this reason that the specific character of colonial expansion was essentially a political manifestation until such time that the economic base came to reassert its dominant role. And this happened only during the colonial process characterised by relations of domination. For economic exploitation to take place, political factors had to be taken into account first. The two are therefore, historically complimentary.

Colonial domination could only be realised with the strengthening of the colonial state. This involved imposition of administrative institutions which represented state power. The initial colonial phase of the relations of colonial domination was characterised by the institution of military forces as the most coercive arms of the state. The first thing Russia did following the outbreak of war with Ukraine was to send troops to all major towns. In Bulozhi,

the Barotse Native Police (BNP) was created. These troops were then used to back the colonial policies. It was then that colonial administrative organs like the Kollegiia and the Native Affairs Department were established in Bulozhi and Ukraine respectively. They were the administrative as well as the judicial apparatus of the colonial state.

The establishment of the institutions of the colonial state created favoured grounds for the economic exploitation of Ukraine and Bulozhi. It became possible to dominate and control the means of production and their social relations. Land in Ukraine, and peripheral areas of Bulozhi came under colonial settler control, though for Ukraine the ownership of land was by both colonialists and the Ukrainian starshyna. Tax and labour demands were imposed on the colonies, thus under-mining further the local ruling classes, as their economies were incorporated into the wider imperial economies of the colonial powers concerned.

Imperial rivalry and conspiracy is also an inextricable part of the colonial process which had disastrous consequences for the colonised. The loss of parts of Ukraine and Bulozhi to other powers was a direct product of international conflict which led to arrangements or agreements whose process did not involve the ruling classes of the colonies but remained an imperialist affair. Bitter as the Ukrainian and Lozi ruling classes might have been at what they may have regarded as treachery, they could not pull back from the colonial relationships because they had already committed themselves. Besides,

pulling back at this time spelt ghastly consequences. The Lozi had the Ndebele experience to warn them of the danger of such attempted anti-colonial risings. The Ukrainians paid for their uprising under Mazepa by the division among themselves and the defeat that followed.

The two colonial powers were also aware of the undesirability of undue antagonism with their colonies, especially at a time that they were not ready to face a possible internal revolt. The battle of Konotop in Ukraine and the Ndebele uprising in Southern Rhodesia were constant reminders of the disastrous consequences of badly calculated colonial policy. They hence, pursued a policy of soothing the passions of Cossack and Lozi rulers by assurances and promises of protecting their interests. The Russians who were not very good at this game in Ukraine were often perplexed by sudden armed uprisings whose leaders they quickly branded traitors. But it was essentially these revolts that perpetuated for a while the relations of co-operation.

It is also noteworthy that the realisation of the relations of colonial domination lessened in large measure the extent and intensity of imperialist rivalries over the colonies concerned. This was a result of a general acceptance of the colonial reality within imperialist circles. Such agreements were not possible in the initial phase of colonial expansion because the period was fraught with wild ambitions and fierce competition.

Colonial ideological influence and domination occupies one of the central aspects of the colonial process despite the apparent dearth of literature on the topic. Ideological factors occupied a big role in the colonial process. It was probably due to the fluidity and lack of specific social shape that they were the last to be subverted under the relations of co-operation. The new christian religion and its theological school system was one of the ideological pillars that colonialism used in Bulozhi to create ideological conditions amenable to colonialism. The Ukrainian ideological institutions remained intact except for being forced to swing ideological orientation to the Moscow Patriarch. Both of these situations represented a colonial process that had not yet consolidated and hence the extent of colonial influence was minimal. Even the local ruling classes' pro-colonial ideological orientation was still lukewarm.

It was not until the establishment of the relations of domination that a determined colonial ideological offensive took place. The study has pointed out that despite the differences in the Ukrainian and Lozi ideological institutions, the basic point of debate in the comparative study has been to show that colonialism under any conditions seeks to reproduce colonial ideologies. Colonial institutions like religion, and education became predominant, replacing or subjugating the existing ones in the colonies. The demise of the Ukrainian and Lozi political and economic institutions could not take place

without a corresponding collapse of their ideological institutions. This is essentially a law of history in the process of social development. Ukraine and Lozi were not exceptions to this rule.

Colonial culture was also part of the ideological spectrum of the colonial process. The Ukrainians were called 'Little Russians', an obvious paternalist allusion to Russians as their big brothers. Despite the historical rationale for the unification of the two branches of Slavic Orthodoxy, which was itself an ideological justification for colonialism, Ukrainians could not attain complete equality with Russians. The rulers had to remain masters, and any attempt at social parity would undermine the ideological basis of colonial power superiority. The fact that the starshyna fought to win favours from their masters such as ennoblement, and thus become assimilated means that entrance to Russian nobility was restricted, and as a result, the ideological superiority of the colonisers was maintained. The Russification of sections of the starshyna did not really make them equal to the colonisers. In comparison, the Lozi were also humiliated by colonial culture. They were enphemistically called 'Natives' or 'Boys' and the terms had similar perjorative connotations with the term Bantu in present white-ruled South Africa, and Boy as used in the heydays of American slave plantations. Limited respect was given to the high members of the Lozi aristocracy though every white man had by racial category to be respected by all the Africans of any rank. Unable to reach the ranks of their colonial masters, the induna class struggled to win for favours from their colonial masters through the tax system and petty gifts. Compared

their Ukrainian counterparts, the indunas' struggles were a dismal failure.

As a climax of the colonial process, there developed direct colonial interference in the central state institutions of Ukraine and Bulozhi. The colonial powers ultimately appointed successors to the thrones of their colonies which was a direct contradiction of the historical nature of those institutions. Ukraine and Bulozhi were turned into provinces of the wider colonial empires and their state systems became moribund.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. E. Steinhart, Conflict and Collaboration.
2. It is for this reason that Ukrainians dramatise 1709, and Mazepa whose history is bound with this year. See B. Krupnitsky, 'The World of Mazepa'; O. Oleklonder, 'The Year 1709'.
3. Mainga describes the end of the independent status of Lozi on the basis of the treaties signed. See Bulozi, 203.
4. See for Bulozi, M. Mainga, Bulozi and I. Lewanika, 'History of Education'. For Ukraine see. D. Doroshenko, History; Nahayewsky, History of Ukraine; B. O'Brien, 'Moscovy and the Ukraine'.

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