SUPPLEMENTARY READING XIV

MODERNISATION

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SOCIAL ASPECTS

Modernisation is the current term for an old process - the process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed societies. The process is activated by international or intersocietal, communication. As Karl Marx noted over a century ago in the preface to Das Kapital: "The country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed, the image of its own future."

We need a new name for the old process because the characteristics associated with more developed and less developed societies and the modes of communication between them have become in our day very different from what they used to be. During the era of imperialism, "images" or pictures, of the future were transmitted mainly to colonial peoples by their colonizers. Accordingly, one spoke of India as Anglicised and of Indochina as Gallicized. As the long generations of colonization made evident certain important similarities among imperialist regimes, regardless of national origins, these parochial terms were abandoned and one spoke of Europeanization World War II which witnessed the constriction of European empires and the diffusion of American presence, again enlarged the vocabulary, and one spoke, often resentfully, of the Americanization of Europe. But when one spoke of the rest of the world, the term was "Westernization".

The postwar years soon made plain, however, that even this broader term was too parochial to comprehend the communication mode that had spread regularly patterned social change so swiftly and so widely as to require a global referent. In response to this need, the new term "modernisation" evolved. It enabled one to speak concisely of those similarities of achievement in all modernized societies - whether Western as in Europe and North America, or non-Western, as in the Soviet Union and Japan - as well as of those similarities of aspiration observed in all modernizing societies regardless of their location and traditions.

The hard core of observed similarities was economic. It was along the continuum of economic performance that societies could most readily and unambiguously be aligned, compared and rated. An important step was taken when development economists reached the consensus that their subject matter was, in the words of W. Arthur Lewis, "the growth of output per head of population" (1955.p.9). This simple operational definition specified simultaneously the aspirational continuum of economic development and the comparative measure of achievement levels along this continuum. In so doing, it focused the analysis of economic development and anchored the more comprehensive analysis of modernisation as a societal process.

Modernization, therefore, is the process of social change in which development is the economic component. Modernisation produces the societal environment in which rising output per head is effectively incorporated. For effective incorporation,

the heads that produce (and consume) rising output must understand and accept the new rules of the game deeply enough to improve their own productive behaviour and to diffuse it throughout their society. As Harold D. Lasswell (1965) has forcefully reminded us, this transformation in perceiving and achieving wealth-oriented behaviour entails nothing less than the ultimate reshaping and resharing of all social values, such as power, respect, rectitude, affection, well-being, skill and enlightenment. This view of continuous and increasing interaction between economic and non-economic factors in development produced a second step forward, namely, systematic efforts to conceptualise modernisation as the contemporary mode of social change that is both general in validity and global in scope.

CRITERIA OF MODERNITY.

Although no single theoretical formulation as yet commands consensus among social scientists, there has been steady convergence among scholars on certain key points concerning modernization. There appears to be general agreement, for example, that economic decisions on investment criteria and resource allocation must take close account of such non-economic factors as population growth, urbanisation rates, family structure, the socialisation of youth, education, and the mass media. Indeed, the contemporary association of modernization with comprehensive social planning has obliged scholars to seek some consensus on the common characteristics of modern societies.

There appears to be a large area of agreement, despite conceptual and terminological differences of more or less importance, that among the salient characteristics (operational values) of modernity are (1) a degree of self-sustaining growth in the economy - or at least growth sufficient to increase both production and consumption regularly, (2) a measure of public participation in the polity - or at least democratic representation in defining and choosing policy alternatives (3) a diffusion of secular-rational norms in the culture - understood approximately in Weberian-Parsonian terms, (4) an increment of mobility in the society - understood as personal freedom of physical, social, and psychic movement; and (5) a corresponding transformation in the modal personality that equips individuals to function effectively in a social order that operates according to the foregoing characteristics - the personality transformation involving as a minimum an increment of self-things seeking termed "striving" by Cantril (1966) and "need-achievement" by McClelland(1961), and an increment of self-others seeking, termed "other direction" by Riesman (1950) and 'empathy' by Lerner (1958a).

PICTURES OF THE FUTURE

Every nation that regards itself asmore developed now transmits pictures of itself to those less developed societies that figure in its own policy planning. All the once-imperial nations of western Europe are involved - Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and even Portugal. Modernisation has spread beyond the obsolete confines of

Europe's once-imperial nations to the Soviet Union and Communist China, to Japan, and even to Israel. The United States, which Andre Siegried (1927) judged to be presiding at a general reorganisation of ways of living throughout the world, has for many years been spending between three and four billion dollars of its national income on modernisation abroad.

Every nation that is less developed, but regards itself as developing, receives the pictures transmitted by these more developed societies and decides, as a matter of high priority for its own policy planning, which of them constitutes the preferred picture of its own future. This decision is the crucial turn in the direction of modernization; whatever its particular configuration, it spells the passing of traditional society and defines the policy planning of social change.

The decision is rarely clear-cut. Hence, the ensuing policy often is ambivalent, and the planning often works at cross purposes. Nevertheless, much of the world is now engaged in an unprecedented process of social change that seeks to govern itself by rational policy planning. The less developed societies want to achieve in years the modernisation that more developed societies attained over centuries of haphazard, or at least unplanned, development. But we do not have available the evaluated experience needed to provide rational guidance for such unprecedented efforts to induce comprehensive social change. This is why modernization - the twentieth Century's distinctive mode of accelerating social change by rational planning - presents to social scientists so great a challenge and so important an opportunity.

For modernization, as we have seen, presents a very complex matrix of experience to be evaluated. It is one thing to summarise the common characteristics of modern societies. It is quite another thing to plan the rational transfer of these "items" from more developed to less developed societies - for each such transfer from the sender involves a deep transformation in the receiver. There exists no rational formula for the transfer of institutions. - Modernization operates rather through a transformation of institutions (Lerner 1964) that can only be accomplished by the transformation of individuals - the painfully complex process which W.H. Auden epitomized as "a change of heart."

COMPLEXITIES OF MODERNIZATION

The complexities of modernization puzzle social scientists who are indispensable for rational planning, because such complexities bring together varieties of institutional and individual behaviour that have in the past been studied in very different ways under the specialised division of labour in the social sciences. The variation in the level of knowledge and the "state of the art" in the different social sciences has been so large that a major effort of reintegration is required to deal with the model of social change presented by the matrix of modernization. This "boomerang effect" upon the social sciences produced by their efforts to deal with modernization is relevant in two ways.

First, in seeking to account for variations in the responses of less developed societies to the picture of their own future presented by more developed societies, scholars have felt obliged to restudy the modernization paths of the more developed societies. Thus, W. Arthur Lewis (1955), building upon prior work on the conditions of economic progress by Colin Clark (1940) and others, has produced a theory of economic growth that measures less developed as well as more developed societies on the same continuum of aspiration and metric of achievement. David C. McClelland (1961), building upon prior work in the pscyhology of "achievement-aspiration ratios" - since William James, has produced a synthetic construct of the achievement motive applicable to all recorded history. Seymour M. Lipset (1963) building upon prior work in sociology on the processes of social change since Karl Marx and Max Weber, has re-written the history of the United States as "the first new nation." Walt W. Rostow (1960), reviving the latterly quiescent but newly relevant disciplines of economic history and political economy, has formulated a general theory of modernization that ranges all societies of the world along the states of a single continuum of "self-sustaining growth."

These important efforts to conceptualise modernization have become, inevitably, objects of controversy in the modernized world of specialised scholars. However, the critique and correction of detailed relationships in these synthetic models which is the proper business of scholarship, does not seem to have impaired either their conceptual validity or their policy utility. They have already enabled contemporary thinkers to recognize that economic development is a high priority objective of every modernizing society - the prime mover, when indeed it is not the only motivation, for modernization. Moreover, andthis is the crux of the matter, the attainment of "self-sustaining growth" involves far more than purely economic processes of production and consumption. It involves the institutional disposition of the full resources of a society' in particular, its human resources. For an economy to sustain growth by its own autonomous operation, it must be effectively geared to the skills and values of the people who make it work. On this view, a society capable of operating an economy of "self-sustaining growth" is ipso facto a modernized society (Hagen 1962).

The apparent circularity of this statement is eliminated when one specifies the minimum conditions required to make a society capable of operating an economy of self-sustaining growth. Although non consensus has yet been reached on the full matrix of modernization, which requires explicit specification of interrelations and sequences among the components, a fair measure of agreement has been achieved on the identification and conceptualisation of the components themselves. This has been the second large gain to accrue from recent attempts by social scientists to reintegrate their specialized ideas and tools in order to deal effectively with a general model of modernisation (Millikan and Blackmer 1961).

All models of modernization that aim at generality have dealt in some way with the economic development variables that affect rising output per head directly and visibly, such as industrialisation, urbanisation, national income, and per capita income. In their quest for a model sufficiently general to subsume the move from "rising output per head" to self-sustaining growth," sociologists have added to these variables an enlightenment variable measured in terms of schooling, literacy, and media exposure: political scientist have added a power variable measured in terms of participation party membership, and voting: psychologists have added a cross-cutting variable of personality (usually postulated as an explanatory variable for which other variables serve as behavioural indices) measured in terms of authoritarianism, empathy, and need achievement. Anthropologists have enriched the general model by obliging it to account for local-temporal variants - those "diverse cultures" which, Kluckhohn's words (1959) shape the behavioural variations underlying our "common humanity".

THE WESTERN MODEL RECONSIDERED

The convergence of disciplined perspectives upon a general model of modernization has diffused among scholars the recognition that, in our time, social change has become the distincitve component of virtually every social system. There remain in the world today few "traditional"social systems that operate with low rates of change over long time periods. Most societies are in some phase of transition. These are social systems operating with high (and usually decreasing) periods of time. It is this phenomenon which in our time documents the "accelerationof history" that for previous generations was merely an interesting speculation by philosophers of history. Acceleration, now an essential component that must be incorporated in the research designs of all empirical students of social change, has obliged us to reconsider as well the operational mode of social systems that are already "modern" on current indices of modernization.

This reconsideration of modern Western Societies has occasioned considerable reorganization of their societal theories and policies. Such reconsideration, having modified the evaluation of theoretical paths from the past to the present, now shapes new ways of estimated policy paths from the present to the future. There exists few theoretical constructions of future states of the world that are based on present changes in social systems. Lasswell (1965) has outlined the dangers of a "garrison-prison State" that attend policies designed to make any nation more powerful than all others; Rostow (1960) has sketched the attraction s of a "mass-consumption society" for peoples who now demand more comfort and fun than peoples dared to dream of in all previous history. These theoretical constructions are strong becuase they account for the ambivalent behaviour of all "transitional" societies and the vigorous behaviour of most "modern" societies.

These theoretical constructions are as well because they show that modern societies are better able to cope with perceived needs for change than less developed, transitional societies.

The obvious examples are their concern with the population explosion and the expanding metropolis. These are the demographic and ecological variables that index fundamental mechanisms for the Want Get ratios, which govern "dynamic equilibrium" in any society. Modern Western societies have brought these two variables under policy control more rapidly and efficiently than any transitional society has been able to do. The reason is that modern societies restudy and reappraise themselves continuously with an eye to their future. Hence, it is no accident that contraceptives came into wide=spread use in modern Western societies a full century ago to prevent an unmanageable population explosion. Nor is it accidental that "the pill", invented in the Western societies, is still more widely used by Westerners than by the traditional peoples to whom it has been offered, virtually free of charge, since the 1950s. Modern societies, founding their social policies on data-based estimations of the future, are readier to perceive the dangers of overpopulation and to take steps to prevent them (Spengler and Duncan 1956).

So it has been also with the dangers of over-urbanisation. The acceleration of history has produced everywhere, as a major manifestation, an accelerated movement of people from the village to the city (California, University of ... 1959). The outcome has been the spread of slums in every modernising society. But almost from the moment these slums appeared, social scientists in the Western World began to study them in empirical and policy terms. Over a century ago, Frederic Le Play (1855) described the situation of the urban poor in France and elsewhere in Europe; Charles Booth (Booth et al. 1889 - 1891) and Jane Addams (Hull House ... 1895) did the same for England and the United States , respectively Their studies led to social diagnosis, social legislation, and finally, social programs aimed at improvement. The institutionalisation of urban policy in modern society is now visible in American "urban renewal." British "new towns" and French "amenagement du territoire." Few such programs have been made effectively operative in the modernizing societies of the transitional world today (Hoselitz 1960).

TRANSFORMATION, NOT TRANSFER

The widespread failure of transitional societies to incorporate modernizing institutions of sufficient amplitude and durability has occasioned reconsideration of the theory and practice of social change under conditions of extreme acceleration. Among the conclusions that have emerged (many of them reminders of lessons brought by anthropologists from their early encounters with traditional societies a century or more ago) is this reciprocal proposition: Traditional societies can respond effectively to internally generated demands for institutional change articulated over a relatively long period, but they are typically incapable of rapid institutional changes to meet externally induced demands.

Such externally induced demands occur whenever a less developed society receives a picture of its own future from a more developed society. Since the start of international development programs in 1949 (with the Point IV program of the United States instituted by President Truman,) we have

understood that the transmission of such pictures is likely to constitute an intrusion into the less developed, traditional society. Only more recently, by way of hard and often unrewarding experience, have we concluded that such intrusions regularly are, and usually must be, disruptive in transitional societies - these being traditional societies that manifest an urgent will-to-change but are unable to incorporate rapidly an efficacious way-to-change. The disruptive effect, which is produced by the imbalance between the will and the way to modernise, emerges as a key problem of induced and accelerated social change.

Consider again the problem of overurbanisation. The newly reviving civilisations of the East have always had more people living in their capital cities than could be productively employed. Hence, over many centuries there developed the institution (or at least the vocational jurisdiction) of begging. So ancient and venerable is this institution that its routinised practice is sanctified in the holy books of most Eastern, and particularly middle Eastern, religions. The practice of begging and the duty of charity are sanctified alike in the Mosaic code of the Jews, the Koranic verses of the Muslims, and the New Testament of the Christians. Yet, under intrusion from the antislum and antipoverty ideology of the modern West, modernizers in the Eastern world have grown ashamed of this venerable institution and have sought to transform it. Many Western travellers have witnessed at the doors of the Nile hotels in Cairo and at the gates of the Taj Mahal in Agra, the often brutal consequences of the modernising proscription of begging inflicted upon people who know no other trade. But the modernizing Eastern leaders, while speeding the obsolescence of begging have not yet incorporated an efficient institutional replacement to relieve the urban poor, whose members swell at accelerating rates from year to year (Lerner 1962).

The great cities of the transitional world often have become massive impediments to orderly social change rather than productive centres of modernization. In much of Latin America, vast lands are deserted while the people are crushed into the megalopolis - for example, half of all Cubans live in and around Havana, half of all Uruguayans live around Montevideo, and about 80 per cent of the Venezuelan population lives on the 10 per cent of the land allocated between Caracas and Maracaibo. In the transitional societies of Asia, which produce far less wealth than those of Latin America, the consequences of overurbanisation are even more disruptive. No traveller in Cairo or Calcutta will forget the fights, sounds and smells of debilitated peoples who perform no productive functions for themselves or their environment. These million so hapless people who consume (however little) without producing are the psychic displaced persons of modernisation - they have come to consider themselves useless for anything beyond survival and reproduction. Their futility is an expression of the disruptive imbalance, for their minuscule benefits are gained only at the disproportionately great costs to their society which over-urbanisation imposes upon all development efforts.

That the problem or overurbanization remains unresolved is the measure of our failure to develop a comprehensive theory and practice of modernization. This proposition is circular in one sense: since the urban explosion is systematic with the population explosion and the literacy explosion, the true resolution on any one explosion will help resolve the others. These explosions are systemic in the sense that they derive from a common source, converge on a common demand, and produce a common failure to satisfy the demand. The common source is empathy: the common demand is well-being; the common failure is poverty. These terms denote the failures that explain why we are passing from a putative "revolution of rising expectations" (Staley 19 4) which shaped the theory and practice of planned social change after World War II to an incipient "revolution of rising frustration" (Conference..... 1963 pp. 330-333) that may reshape our thinking in the future.

EMPATHY - MECHANISM OF TRANSFORMATION

Empathy is the psychic mechanism that enables a person to put himself in another person's situation - to identify himself with a role, time, or place different from his own. Among the range of psychic mechanisms that supply imagination, empathy is distinctively the one that nourishes "upward mobility." For what greater stimulus is there to imagine oneself in another persons situation if not that this situation is "better" (in some sense) than one's own? The power to imagine oneself in a better situation rests upon the psychic mechanism of empathy. The mechanism may or may not be innate, but it can certainly be trained to operate more efficiently in people with a desire to better themselves. Since World War II such training has been supplied by the mass media of print, film and radio. The Mass Media which we call the "mobility multiplier" for this reason, accelerate the training in psychic mobility that enables people to imagine themselves in situations other than their own - and hence, since the alternatives invariably represent better situations, accelerate training in upward mobility.

The global spread of empathy has thus diffused a new demand for well-being among peoples who, over all previous centuries, had never even been exposed to the idea that well-being was theirs, to demand. Wants have always been with the poor, and expectations have risen or fallen with the richness of the harvest or the goodness of the king, but demand is something new in the livesof poor peoples. It involves nothing less than a new sense of onself, that is, the transformation of one's identifications that is accomplished by empathy and accelerated by the multiplier effect of the mass media. But the newly diffused sense of demand, the articulates and aggregates the age-old wants and needs of the poor imposes a new condition upon the management of societies: that ways must be found tc satisfy demands is a society is to maintain itself in a relatively durable state of equilibrium - or, more precisely, in a tolerable state of disequilibrium.

The new condition is imposed by the systemic quality of the new demand, its widespread distribution throughout

the social system entails a comprehensive institutional response. Economic theory has taught generations of analysts in modernized societies that equilibrium can be maintained only in the measure that widespread and persistent demand is balanced by adequate supply. It is the failure of transitional societies to increase supply at a sufficient rate to balance accelerating demand that accentuates the new meaning of poverty as a key to the unsolved problems of modernization. Poverty, which was once accepted as an honorable estate (as in the Biblical theme of the "eye of the needle") is now rejected as an abject condition unworthy of human acceptance. Poverty is now seen as the self-sealing mechanism of a vicious circle that deprives people of the means to obtain enough of the good things of life. As Hans W. Singer has succinctly summarised the situation, its core is "the dominant vicious circle of low production - no surpluses for economic investment - no tools and equipment - low standards of production. An underdeveloped country is poor because it has no industry; and it has no industry because it is poor. (1949, p. 5).

Economists agree that the root problem is that poor people in poor countries do not earn enough to raise their essential consumption (wants) and still have something left over to save (that is, invest). This is attributed to the series of "explosions" - population, urbanization, literacy - that consume all gains in production as soon as they are made, and often more rapidly than they are made. It is the worsening situation of the poor as compared to the rich countries that, as Gunnar Myrdal (1956) has shown, defeats the planning of modernization of our time. Despite large outlays of funds and skills for international development, the poor lands and peoples are continuously getting poorer relative to the rich lands and peoples. The latter have incorporated the individual and institutional mechanisms that make growth self-sustaining and thereby underwrite the stability of modern societies at high and rising levels of output and income. By the same token, transitional societies, which have not been able to incorporate the mechanisms needed for self-sustaining growth tend to grow relatively poorer and less stable.

Recognition that the relative situation of transitional societies is worsening, despite their high expectations and despite substantial contributions of international aids, has stimulated new research and reflection on the mechanisms of self-sustaining growth. It has long been clear that surplus product for economic investment is necessary. What was not clear, until very recently, is that an external input of investment does not necessarily ignite the motor of modernisation and almost never suffices to keep it running. It appears to be essential that the modernizing society, if its growth is to be self-sustaining, should incorporate internal means of generating the surpluses needed for investment. This apparently simple extension of thinking about economic development entails wide and deep consequences for the social theory and practice of modernisation. For a transitional society to generate surpluses internally, it must work a profound transformation into its individual and institutional patterns of traditional behaviour (Shannon 1957).

This is why we no longer speak of a "transfer of institutions" from more developed to less developed societies. Such transfer rarely occurs in fact. When it does, as in those transitional societies that have transferred electoral institutions based on universal suffrage from more developed societies, the effects have been not only intrusive and disruptive but often positively dysfunctional for societal modernisation. The indispensable lesson taught by failures to transfer institutions is that modernization must be systemic if it is to be durable. It must involve indigenous people in behavioural transformations so manifold and profound that a new and coherent way of life comes into operation. Institutions cannot be transferred; they must be transformed. Lifeways cannot be adopted; they must be adapted.

Adaptive capacity, the most distinctive feature of societies that are genuinely modernized, is what enables them to develop more rapidly than the transitional societies they are aiding out of their own large surplus product. While such handouts alleviate hardship and encourage hope in some transitional societies, these societies do not modernize effectively until they develop an indigenous capacity for accelerating and sustaining growth. Among the requirements are indigenous surpluses that enable people to break out of the vicious circle of poverty and into the self-sustaining cycle of growth. The incorporation of an adaptive capacity of this magnitude can occur only in societies that diffuse widely among their peoples the lifeways and institutions of mobility, empathy, and participation. Mobility is the initial mechanism; people must be ready, willing and able to move from where they are and what they are.

Physical and social mobility have always interacted closely in the societies now regarded as modernized. Horace Greeley's maxim "Go West, young man, go West" told aspiring Americans a century ago: If you want to move up, young man, move out! Among the millions of aspiring young men in the transitional world today, many are heeding some local variant of this advice - usually delivered by "pictures" from the mass media (Schramm 1964). Those who want to move up are, in rapidly swelling numbers, moving out. Physical mobility has become a characteristic of world society in our time. But social mobility has not kept pace. This is so in part because, as we have seen, poor lands have a built-in tendency to stay poor. This tendency is built in by the persistence of traditional lifeways among the peoples of the poor lands. When they move out, they are not adequately prepared to meet the other requirements for moving up. They are, in particular, unprepared to make efficient use of the empathic mechanism that shapes psychic mobility - the personality reagent that catalyzes the interaction between physical and social mobility. In a word, they lack a sufficient dose of empathy (Lerner 1958b).

The inadequate diffusion of empathy - psychic mobility - is a major source of failure for development programmes. People everywhere have been moving out with the expectation of moving up, and everywhere they are being disappointed. Social mobility simply does not coincide with physical mobility often enough to produce widespread satisfaction.

On the contrary, if we are facing an incipient "revolution of rising frustration," it is because the newly mobile peoples of the transitional world have not found - and, more critically, have not learned to produce from their own resources - adequate satisfactions for their accelerated expectations. The disruptive imbalance that weighs most heavily on traditional societies in our time is the imbalance between what people have been taught to want and what they have learned to get.

THE WANT GET RATIO

We refer to the disruptive imbalance, which is the global source of rising frustrations, as the Want Get Ratio. Adapting an ingenious formula of William Jones, this can be expressed as follows:

$$\text{FRUSTRATION} = \frac{\text{Want}}{\text{Get}}$$

Frustration rises in the measure that the numerator of Want exceeds the denominator of Get. In traditional societies frustration remained farily constant and at a relatively low level because wants (at least in the form of articulated demands) were relatively few and unchanging. Frustration is accelerating in transitional societies because articulated wants are increasing, diversifying, and spreading at very rapid and erratic rates.

This way of putting the matter links the process of modernisation directly to the problem of economic development. Economic development is critical because continuing and deepen-ing poverty signals the failure to meet the accelerating demand for well-being (articulated Want) generated by the erratic diffusion of empathy that has accompanied increasing mobility. The economic model is also useful because it teaches us to analyse psychosocial states more exactly by submitting them to the metrics of supply and demand. For what has disrupted transitional societies so deeply that stable governance - and rational planning for growth - cannot become self-sustaining is precisely the worsening ratio between supply and demand. Transitional peoples are accelerating their manifold demands beyond the supply capacity of their institutions and resources, including the capacity of individuals with increasing demands to adapt their personal behaviour insuch ways as to increase supplies.

PUBLIC OPINION - EMPATHY TO PARTICIPATION

A modern society depends so crucially upon its human resources because it must be, first and foremost, a participant society. This does not mean that all people must participate continuously in all societal activities, since it is unlikely that any society could survive this degree of interaction. It does mean that enough people must participate continuously in each major institution to make these institutions viable, adaptable, and durable. This optimimum level of interaction between individuals and institutions can be sustained only when it produces outcomes that are reciprocally rewarding. Institutions cannot endure persistently excessive demands upon their capacity by their individual participants; nor

will individuals continue to participate in institutions that consistently frustrate their wants. (Shannon 1958).

Perhaps the most significant and subtle instance of self-sustaining interaction between individuals and institutions in modern society is public opinion - a distinctive interaction that is not found in traditional societies (Speier 1950). The evolution of public opinion in the modern West can be traced from the eighteenth century when the institutions of free public education and inexpensive mass media (the so-called penny press, for example), began to expand in response to the direct demands of peoples who had gained a fair measure of empathy and literacy over preceding generations. This initiated a growth cycle of public enlightenment throughout the modern West, from which evolved the distinctive societal process known as public opinion - a process which, in turn, lubricates the self-sustaining mechanisms of a participant society. For the adaptive capacity of a participant society resides in its institutionalized modes for registering, regulating, and responding to individual demands as well as their articulated and aggregated expression through manifold channels of collective demand. (see Public Opinion: see also Almond and Coleman 1960, Chapter 1).

Public demand is something new. Earlier societies were able to survive the sporadic expression ofindividual and collective demands, particularly during periods of affluence when their institutions were able to make relatively satisfactory responses to such demands. But no society preceding those of the nineteenth century West was able to incorporate public demand as a mechanism that continuously interacts with public policy on the shaping and sharing of all societal values - power as well as wealth, enlightenment as well as deference. Indeed, only the twentieth century West has begun to develop the crude model of a polity in which public demand - in the institutionalised form of public opinion - participates as a matter of course in the making of public policy.

Public opinion has become the institutionalised expression of individual and collective demands because it has incorporated a significant measure of self-regulation. It avoids the persistent expression of demands that cannot be satisfied by existing institutions operating upon available resources - the outbursts of excessive demand that recurrently eventuate in the riots, rebellions, and revolutions of nonparticipant societies (Johnson 1962). It is responsible and self-regulating because it is based upon public enlightenment which informs people about the current condition of public institutions and resources and thereby acts as a constraint upon their individual and collective demands. The effect of enlightenment, in this sense, is that people reconsider their felt private demands in the light of known public constraints and emerge with equilibrium (or otherwise balanced) opinions on the issues before them. It is this internal balancing of the Want-Get ratio by

individuals that, ideally, corrects disruptive imbalances in their institutions and makes their society self-sustaining.

NEXT STEPS

The ideal type of a participant society does not yet exist in the modern West and may never be realized perfectly anywhere. As public opinion polls have shown time and again, citizens are often ignorant of their past, voters are often ambivalent about their future, and consumers are often confused in making their present choices. The reliance of public opinion upon such routinized institutions of enlightenment as public schools and mass media tends to routinize its creative articulation and aggregation. Those alienated intellectuals from retrograde societies of the West who point to marginal black-marketing of austerity Britain and peripheral cheating on income taxes in the United States ignore the principal fact, which is that these skin rashes upon participant societies have not been permitted to become cancerous (Shils 1958). Public opinion in these countries, despite its putative ignorance and ambivalence, has judged that black-marketing and tax-cheating are "immoral" - that their cost to public welfare exceeds their benefits to private interests and, therefore, that adaptive institutions are needed to correct their potentially disruptive imbalance. Such institutions include public sanctions against private malfeasance.

This process is the key to the "self-sustaining: capacity of a participant society. Public opinion, despite its flaws, can be counted on to perform its system-sustaining functions in an environment that supplies satisfactions and explains frustrations of individuals and collective demands. It is this subtle and continuous reciprocity between popular demand and public supply (or nonsupply) - between what people want and what they get (or fail to get) - that animates and sustains the participant society. Since this model represents the greatest advance in recorded history toward the ages-old ideal of social democracy, we must learn to assay its gains and measure its costs (Lerner and Schramm 1966).

These are tasks that lie ahead for social scientists concerned with modernisation. Procedures for assaying gains and measuring costs must be perfected. As a precondition, our concepts of what constitutes a cost or a gain must be articulated in sufficiently explicit fashion to guide our measures. While our tasks as social scientists are important, they cannot count for much without the efforts of those social planners and decision makers who change the lifeways of transitional societies. For the modernised lands have learned to develop, however crudely, a participant society with self-sustaining growth capability. This is not yet the case in the lands that are seeking to modernise.

The modernised societies must now perfect the model for their own purpose -which include the "transfer" of the model in such fashion that it can be "transformed" by the modernising societies. The modernising societies must learn how transferred institutions may be transformed,

how adopted life-ways may be adapted. As the modernized succeed in learning their own lesson, they will be better equipped to teach the lesson to the modernizing. For the contemporary world has become interactive in the sense that all nations and peoples now are continuously exposed to each other.

Modernization, now occurring on an interactive global scale, will point the way to a future modernity in the measure that advanced and backward developed and underdeveloped societies arrive at an understanding of what they have in common. This achievement of consensus on the values of a commonwealth of human dignity will provide the ultimate motor of modernization - for those who think they are, as for those who wish to be, modern.

DANIEL LERNER.