

**“A WINNING FORMULA IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: THE CASE OF THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT IN WUSAKILE WARD OF WUSAKILE CONSTITUENCY OF
KITWE CITY- ZAMBIA”**

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DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation, which is submitted for the degree of Master of Communication for Development (MCD), has not been submitted for a degree in this or any other University and that it is a result of my own work.

Full Name: Smart Sakala

Signature: _____

Date: _____

Supervisor: Mr. F. Muzyamba

Signature.....

Date.....

DEDICATION

To Mum and Dad, who gave me chance to experience the wonders of education. To my elder brother, Stephen, you continue to be an inspiration of how to make sense of a seemingly dead end.

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ABSTRACT

This study demonstrated that the Patriotic Front's (P.F) prominent campaign message to the electorate of redemption from poverty, corruption, lack of opportunities and employment, heavy taxes ,very high cost of living *and change in ninety days* were critical in securing their victory. It seems the P.F understood the mood for change in the nation very well and therefore devised a message that could easily capture people's hearts and souls.

Further, this study demonstrate respondents in Wusakile ward believe that the "***don't kubeba***" slogan played a significant role in the 2011 elections historic victory by the Patriotic Front (PF). It encouraged a policy of defiant cooperation. The slogan was not only meant to counter suspected Movement for Multi-party Democracy's (MMD) electoral fraud but also to dislodge the party from power and it seem to have worked.

From the respondents' answers, the P.F's message of hope to the voters and president Sata's consistent articulation of this campaign message was their winning formula in the 2011 presidential elections. The "***don't kubeba***" slogan was the icing of the cake. It gave life to P.F's campaign promises.

ACRONYMS

AVAP	:	Anti-voter apathy project
ECZ	:	The Electoral Commission of Zambia
EFZ	:	Evangelical Fellowship In Zambia
EUEOM	:	European Union Election Observer Mission
FODEP	:	Foundation for Democratic Process
H.E	:	His Excellency
ICTs	:	Information Communication Technologies
MMD	:	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
NGO	:	Non Governmental Organisation
P.F.	:	The Patriotic Front
PPF	:	People’s Pact Forum
UNIP	:	The United National Independence Party
UPND	:	The United Party for National Development
SOAS	:	School of Oriental and African Studies
SPSS	:	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
ZNBC	:	Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.0 Introduction

This chapter sets the background of our study and begins by discussing Michael Sata and the formation of the Patriotic Front (P.F.). Sata's background, his earlier engagements in Zambia and abroad together with the factors surrounding the formation of the P.F. are explored. It then explains the 2011 election campaign and environment. The statement of problem, the significance of the study and its limitations follow thereafter. The media and election section points out that the state-owned media were pro MMD while the private media especially *The Post* were pro P.F.

1.1 Michael Sata and the formation of the Patriotic Front (P.F.)

According to the Patriotic Front's magazine entitled "*P.F. Today*", Michael Chilufya Sata, Zambia's fifth Republican president, was born in 1937 in Mpika district of Northern Province (*P.F. Today, 2011*). Mpika, from November 2011, became part of the new Muchinga Province. As a veteran politician, Sata is popularly known in Zambian politics as "**King Cobra**" because of his political tact and fortitude. He is very good at grassroots politics and has the ability to read the mood in the country (SANF; 2008). Further, the P.F. magazine observed that Sata worked as Police Officer, railway man and trade unionist during Zambia's colonial days. He also worked as a Porter at Victoria railway station in London. In Northern Rhodesia, he began to actively participate in politics in 1963(*P.F. Today* July issue; 2011: 6).

Furthermore, Sata worked his way up the ranks and file of Zambia's first independent ruling party (UNIP) to Municipal councillor in 1981 and Governorship of Lusaka in 1985. As Governor of Lusaka, he made his mark as man of action. He cleaned up the streets, patched roadways and built bridges in the City. Mr Sata had also been instrumental in the implementation of various projects and policies around the country. He is credited with most of infrastructural development that still stands in Lusaka (Thorn Park Fly-over Bridge along Great East Road) and other remote areas of the country such as Kamuchanga Hospital mortuary in Mufulira District (*P.F. Today* June; 2011:5).

Later, Sata became a Member of Parliament for Kabwata constituency in Lusaka. Although he was once close to Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, President Sata became disillusioned by Kaunda's dictatorial style of leadership and he thus left UNIP in 1991 to join the Movement for Multi-party democracy (MMD) during the campaigns for plural politics (*P.F.Today*; 2011). In the same year, the late Frederick J Chiluba of the MMD defeated Kaunda and thus became Zambia's second Republican President. During Chiluba's tenure, Sata served as minister for Local Government, Labour, and Health and also as minister without portfolio. He also became MMD's chief executive (Party National Secretary) in 1995. However when Chiluba nominated Levy Patrick Mwanawasa as MMD candidate in 2001 Presidential elections, Sata left the MMD and set up his own political party, the Patriotic Front (P.F.).

Others explain that the P.F. was born out of the partial disintegration of the MMD in 2001, when then President Frederick Chiluba delayed choosing a successor as part of his "*third term*" bid. Whatever the case, it seems Sata was not happy with the state of affairs in the party (MMD) and therefore decided to form his own with Guy Scott. After forming the party, Sata and the P.F. contested the 2001 election with a slogan of "*lower taxes, more jobs and more money in your pockets*" but did not do well. His party only won one seat in parliament (Lamer and Fraser; 2007).

Further, Sishuwa observed that during the 2006 Presidential elections, Sata and the P.F. also contested as populist by championing the causes of the poor in the face of Mwanawasa's economic reform policies. President Sata and the P.F. lost to Mwanawasa of the MMD. He conceded defeat but continued with his campaign fight. Undoubtedly, many questioned the

motive of his campaign trails soon after elections as they perceived it as a move to destabilise and frustrate Mwanawasa's government. However, this was not the case. It was one way of keeping the "P.F. fire" burning among the electorate (Sishuwa; 2012). In August, of 2008, President Mwanawasa suffered a stroke while attending a summit in Egypt. He was hospitalised in France where he later died. Therefore, a presidential by-election had to be held after the seat had been declared vacant. This took place on October 30th, 2008. During these by-elections, Sata was chosen as the presidential candidate to compete against Rupiah Banda who was acting-President after the death of Mwanawasa and who also was nominated as MMD's Presidential candidate(Mwewa C: 2012).

During the 2008 Presidential bye-election, Sata and the P.F. lost to Rupiah Banda of the MMD. Sata, subsequently stated that he had not been defeated and accused Banda of fraud. During the 2011 Presidential elections, held on 20th September, Sata of the P.F. emerged winner and was dully sworn in on 23rd September as Zambia's fifth Republican President by Ernest Sakala, the then Chief Justice(Mwewa: 2012). He has been Republican President since then and Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia's first Republican President, has been very happy with the current president's development agenda for the country. He has thus called on all Zambians on many occasions to give president Sata support.

1.2 The Election campaign environment and voter participation

The European Union Election Observer Mission (EUEOM) to Zambia observed that the elections held on 20th September 2011 for Presidential Office, Parliamentary seats in 148 constituencies and local government were the fifth general elections in Zambia following the re-introduction of a multiparty system in 1991. The Mission also noted that these elections were competitive with 10 candidates contesting for presidential office (EUEOM; 2011). Furthermore, Neo Simutanyi pointed out that though voter participation in the 2011 election was higher than 2008, it was much lower than 2006. According to him, the 2011 turnout of 54.0 percent was higher than the 45.0 percent of 2008, but much lower than the 2006 turnout of 71 percent. He adds that despite having 1,225,925 new voters added to the voters roll, only 2,789,340 people voted in the 2011 elections compared to 2,789,114 in 2006 representing an increase of only 226 (Zambia Analysis; November 2011). He attributes

the low turnout to the electorates' lack of confidence in the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) and also lack of satisfaction with the candidates on offer.

The 2011 leading Presidential candidates included then incumbent president, Rupiah Banda of MMD and Michael Sata of the P.F. Another significant challenge to the incumbent was Hakainde Hichilema (H.H.) of the United Party for National Development (UPND) who was staging a “*real change*” campaign. Seriously speaking, HH was not so much of a challenge to the incumbent president because he was seen working together with the MMD, a move which many people saw as a ploy to prevent Sata from winning the elections (Sishuwa; 2012). It would seem that HH's major objective after the demise of the UPND-P.F. pact was to make it impossible for Sata and the P.F. to form government. This was seen and implied in his newly acquired friendship with Rupiah of the MMD, whom he had previously labelled as corrupt during his campaigns. Sishuwa acknowledged this in his article titled “*The rise of Hakainde Hichilema, the fall of UPND?*”(The Post; 19th June 2012).

Furthermore, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) set the campaign period from 29th July to 18th September 2011 at which time a 48 hour moratorium came into force. During this moratorium, campaigning, election rallies and the publication of campaign advertisements were prohibited by the “*Electoral code of Conduct*’ ’but opinion polls and any election news stories could still be published or aired. The extent of the ban was only set in a press release by ECZ and not clarified in any legal instrument. This led to a lack of clarity as to its full scope and provisions. In addition, the code of conduct set out broad freedoms to campaign and outlawed violent or inflammatory language or conduct. False statements about opponents during campaigns were also not allowed (ECZ Electoral Act; 2011).

The 2011 election campaign environment was highly competitive with candidates of MMD and P.F. and to a lesser extent, UPND, travelling to various provinces to attend organised rallies. The parties also conducted large scale door-to-door canvassing of voters and lobbied traditional leaders in an attempt to increase votes. Most rallies were peaceful with a festival-like atmosphere. Whilst the campaign environment was generally calm, some

inflammatory and negative campaigning and personalised insults had been observed at a number of P.F. and MMD rallies (EU EOM; 2011).

1.3 The media and elections

Many political observers and Media practitioners noted that “*Freedom of speech*” in the media was respected throughout the 2011 election campaign period with few reported incidents involving infringements to journalists to report on the campaigns of political parties and candidates. However, state-owned and private newspapers’ content demonstrated similar trends with state-owned broadcasters with entrenched editorial lines and highly selective news coverage favouring either MMD in the case of the state-owned titles the “*Daily mail*” and “*Times of Zambia*” or Patriotic Front (P.F.) in respect to the private title, *The Post*(EU EOM;2011).

Furthermore, Makhetha(2011) in his pre-election analysis of the Media, pointed out that state-owned media presented the then ruling MMD as a mature, prudent and democratic party together with its leader while the P.F. and its leader as politically immature, undemocratic and violent. The P.F. was further presented as being ill-prepared for elections because they questioned President Rupiah Banda’s parentage and the award of a contract to Universal Print Group (UPG), a South African company they accused of being corrupt, to print ballot papers. On the other hand, the private media was pro opposition P.F. This was implied in their critical stance against the then ruling party, MMD. Overall, the “*good MMD*”---“*bad P.F.*” dichotomy informed much of reportage in the media, especially the public media.

1.4 Statement of problem

In 2001, Michael Chilufya Sata formed the Patriotic Front (P.F.) and he took part in the Presidential elections which saw Levy Mwanawasa of the MMD emerge victorious with 28.69 percent of votes cast to become Zambia’s third Republican President. Sata and his P.F. came out number seven at National level with 3.35 percent of total votes cast(ECZ; Presidential results: 2001).

During 2006 Presidential elections, Sata and the P.F. came out second with 29.37 percent of votes cast. Mwanawasa of MMD emerged winner again with 42.93 percent. In 2008 during the Presidential bye-elections held after the death of Mwanawasa, Rupiah Banda of the MMD emerged winner after defeating Sata of the P.F. Banda got 40.09 percent while Sata got 38.13 percent of total votes cast. (ECZ; presidential results: 2008). During the 2011 Presidential elections, Sata of the P.F. emerged winner with about 43 percent while Banda scored 35.42 percent of votes cast (ECZ results; 2011).

The Patriotic Front's (P.F.) resilience and winning formula in political communication is not yet documented. Furthermore the precise nature of strategies and tactics of the P.F. in their historic election victory had not been studied up to now. This study therefore documents various communication strategies and key political messages conveyed by the P.F. to the electorate to win the September 2011 Presidential elections. The role of the *"Don't Kubeba"* slogan (song) in the P.F.'s historic victory is explained. The study further delved into the role of the then ruling MMD's election strategies such as airing ZNBC's *"Stand up for Zambia"* Television documentary.

1.5 Significance of the study

This study is an important endeavour to promote good political communication practices and strategies. The study is also important in that it shows that framing issues and problems in terms of news or fictional content largely determines what is discussed and what solutions are considered in our communities. Such knowledge is necessary for survival of any political organisation. This study will also serve as a basis for future studies in Political Communication strategies and Political science on the importance of a communication strategy in any political organisation. Moreover, this research will provide recommendations on how to win an election and maintain the good will of the electorate.

1.6 Objectives of the study

1.6.1 The **main objectives** of the study were to determine perceptions of the electorate and selected leaders regarding the Patriotic Front's winning formula in political communication

during the 2011 Presidential elections and investigating the influence of the Patriotic Front's campaign promises on the electorate.

1.6.2 Specific objectives

- 1.** To identify key political messages conveyed to the electorate in Wusakile Constituency by the Patriotic Front.
- 2.** To find out the P.F.'s major challenges in communicating messages to the electorate during its campaigns.
- 3.** To determine the opinions of the electorate regarding the influence of the "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan (song) on voters in Wusakile Constituency.
- 4.** To determine the influence of and ZNBC's '***Stand up for Zambia***' documentary on the electorate in Wusakile.
- 5.** To determine audience perceptions of the P.F.'s 2011 election campaign.

2.0 CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the methodology used in this study. Combinations of quantitative and qualitative methods were used in order to get an in-depth understanding of study questions. The instruments used were questionnaires, in-depth interviews, participant observation and document analysis. The study focussed on the following research questions:

2.2 Research questions

1. What key political messages was the Patriotic Front (P.F.) disseminating to the electorate in Wusakile Constituency?
2. What major communication challenges did the Patriotic Front (P.F.) face during its 2011 election campaigns?
3. What was the perceived role of the *“Don’t Kubeba”* slogan (song) in the Patriotic Front’s historic victory?
4. How did ZNBC’s *“Stand up for Zambia”* documentary impact the Patriotic Front (P.F.) in Wusakile Constituency?
5. What were the audience’s perceptions of the Patriotic Front’s 2011 election campaign?

2.3 Data collection methods

The following methods were employed in this research:

2.3.1 Quantitative survey

The quantitative survey method was used with a sample of 115 respondents drawn from Wusakile Constituency, using convenience sampling procedure. This survey helped to determine and examine the electorate's attitudes, beliefs and perceptions about the P.F.'s winning formula and the campaign environment during the 2011 Presidential elections.

2.3.2 In-depth interviews

In-depth interviews were carried out with key informants from the Patriotic Front (P.F.); the United Party for National Development (UPND); the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ) and the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP). Mrs B. Atanga, the deputy Secretary General, represented the P.F.; Mr. D. Simusamba, the deputy chairperson for Finance and Economics, came from the UPND; Rev P. Mwanza, Executive director, represented EFZ; Mr. M. Chipenzi and Ms H. Mubanga, Executive Director and Programmes Manager respectively came from FODEP. These interviews were semi-structured and the researcher (student) used a question guide (on Appendix).

Furthermore, Dr Okiror Oumo of Apogo Consultants and Dr David K. Kaunda were also interviewed to give their insights. All the informants for the in-depth interviews were purposively selected on the basis of their deep and rich insights about political and socio-economic issues in the country.

2.3.3 Document review

Documentary examination is useful because it provides confirmatory evidence and strengthens the credibility of results from interviews and observations. During the attachment, various documents were examined to identify the channels, strategies and key messages in the communication process of the Patriotic Front during the election campaigns. These included the Party Manifesto, Newspaper and Journal articles, reports, correspondences, posters and other relevant literature.

2.3.4 Direct observation

The researcher took active interest in the September 2011 elections by keenly observing the electorate's political behaviour. He watched and listened to the P.F.'s campaign rally at City Square in Kitwe where many P.F. cadres demanded to shake hands with Mr Michael Sata to assure him of their support. The P.F. website was also visited to get updates on the party's campaign activities. Further, the researcher also travelled from Lusaka to Kitwe to cast his vote on polling day. While at **FODEP** the researcher listened to P.F.'s campaign songs to identify the strategies and messages conveyed. ZNBC's "*Stand up for Zambia*" documentary was also watched.

2.4 Sampling procedure for quantitative survey

Wusakile Constituency has 38,766 registered voters and 25,506 of these took part in the September 2011 general elections (ECZ: 2011 Election results). The researcher administered questionnaires in Wusakile ward. The Constituency has five wards (Limaposa, Luangwa, Chamboli, Chibote and Wusakile) with 17,467 households. Further, it has 95,261 males and females aged 18 years and above (CSO: 2010 Census). In the constituency, our survey unit and target was individual voters in Wusakile ward, near Wusakile Mine Hospital. The ward has 4,696 households and it has 12,352 males and females aged 18 years and above according to CSO report of 2010. The starting point was purposively chosen at this central point of the ward, and every next household sampled till the sample size was reached.

Constrained by inadequate financial resources and time within which the research was to be done, the researcher prepared 120 questionnaires. These were administered to individual voters in various households of Wusakile ward using convenience sampling since the main concern was individual participation in the September 2011 elections. From 120 questionnaires, only 115 were answered while 5 were not. It should also be noted that respondents' participation in this research was determined by their availability and willingness.

Wusakile Constituency was chosen because it recorded the highest votes for the Patriotic Front on the Copperbelt at 81.42 percent (20,768) of votes casted. Its percentage poll was

also highest at 65.79 percent (ECZ; Presidential results; 2011). Furthermore, the people of Wusakile are also politically conscious due to high urbanisation. The constituency was also easily accessible to the researcher.

2.5 Sample size

The sample size for the questionnaire was 115. During the survey the type of sampling used was convenience sampling, with the main concern being the respondent's participation in September 2011 elections and willingness to respond.

2.6 Data analysis and interpretation

Data was collected, organised, examined and analysed using both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Data from the quantitative design has been coded and entered into the computer using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). It has been analysed according to demographic characteristics, communication channels and strategies; and campaign messages in terms of percentages, frequencies and other characteristics. Further, data has also been put into graphs in the form of bars and tables for illustrations.

Qualitative data from in-depth interviews, direct observation and document analysis was analysed according to the following thematic areas: political education, campaign strategies, information and publicity, communication strategies, and campaign messages.

2.7 Limitations of the study

Though this study made a comprehensive and detailed review and assessment of determinants of the Patriotic Front's (P.F.) victory in the September 2011 presidential elections, the scope for research had some limitations. Firstly, there was an association of the study with the party under study, the Patriotic Front. Secondly, the time available was too short to comprehensively determine the impact of some factors such as the "Don't

Kubeba” slogan and failure of the P.F.-UPND pact on the outcome of election campaigns and results. Thirdly, literacy levels of some respondents were very low. However research assistants were always at hand to help them understand difficult questions. Finally, there were financial challenges to extend the study to a larger sample.

On the whole, the above stated limitations had no real effect on the study’s conclusions about the P.F.’s winning formula in political communication.

3.0 CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This Chapter describes the key concepts which were used in this research and the theoretical framework within which the study was located.

3.1 Conceptual and operational definitions

In order to understand the key terms used in this study, the definitions of these terms is given below.

3.1.1 Communication: This can be defined as the giving, receiving or exchange of information, opinions or ideas by writing, speech or visual means or any combination of the three so that the material communicated is completely understood by everyone concerned(Sillars;2007:1). From the above we can deduce that communication is a transactional process and about sharing meaning with others.

3.1.2 Communication channels: These are the means by which a message travels both vertically and horizontally from a source to a receiver (Nyambe; 2004:21).

3.1.3 Communication strategy: This is *the what, who, why, when, how and where of conveying a message*. Communication strategies help organisations to propagate information in a structured and controlled manner. An ideal communication strategy details the structure of information flow, the message, the correct audience to address, potential vehicles to carry the message, resources required to fulfil and feedback mechanisms to learn from the whole exercise (Muzyamba: 2007).

3.1.4 Democracy: This is a system of government with the following characteristics: a political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections; the active participation of the people as citizens in politics and civic life; protection of human rights of all citizens and the rule of law in which the laws and procedures apply to all citizens (Nakazwe; 2004).

3.1.5 Diffusion: This is a process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system. It is thus a special type of communication concerned with the spread of messages that are perceived as new ideas.

3.1.6 “Donchi Kubeba”: This is a 2011 campaign song for the Patriotic Front. It was done by Wesley Chirambo popularly known as Dandy Crazy. The song bemoans how some Zambians are living well while others are suffering amidst the copper boom. Throughout the song Dandy urges miners, nurses, doctors, teachers and others not to tell them (the people in political office) that they would not vote for them and also to stop crying. It is a very catchy and danceable song. A very popular song indeed (Zuma. E; 2011).

3.1.7 “Don’t Kubeba”: This means “don’t tell them”. The Electorate were encouraged to receive bribes from the MMD without telling them that they would not vote for them during elections held on the 20th September. It was coined by Dr Guy Scott (Zambia’s first white Vice President) as a campaign slogan for the Patriotic Front (Kapumpe; 2011).

3.1.8 Election: This is the democratic method used by citizens to choose Political leaders. In Zambia, political Leaders are chosen at ward, constituency and Presidential level.

3.1.9 Electorate: An electorate is a registered voter who is eighteen years and above and participates in voting during polling day. In Zambia, the Electoral Commission of Zambia conducts voter registration before pooling day.

3.1.10 Innovation: Rodgers (1995) defines an **innovation** as an idea, practice or object that is perceived to be new by an audience or unit of adoption. The characteristics of an innovation as perceived by the members of a social system determine its rate of adoption.

Such characteristics or features include Relative advantage, Trialability, Observability, Compatibility and Complexity.

3.1.11 Interpersonal communication: This is also known as dyadic communication or communication between two individuals. Types of interpersonal communication vary from verbal to non verbal and from situation to situation (Handbook on communication skills for public managers; 2011:7).

3.1.12 Mass communication: This occurs when a small group of people send messages to a large anonymous and usually heterogeneous audience using specialised communication media. It represents the creation and sending of a homogeneous audience through the media (Handbook on communication skills for public managers; 2011:8).

3.1.13 Political apathy: This is the unwillingness of citizens to take part in public and national affairs such as voting during an election.

3.1.14 Political communication: This is the transmission, exchange and flow of political information by politicians through the press, face to face, pamphlets and books (Nyambe; 2004: 21). In other words it is communication at mass, interpersonal, group, public and organisational levels with political undertones.

3.1.15 Political pact: This is an agreement between two political parties. Such parties seek to collaborate on various national issues as it was the case with the Patriotic Front and the United Party for National Development (Kuwema; 2011).

3.1.16 Political party: This is a voluntary association of people who share common interests and wish to form government. Nyambe (2004) defines it as a coalition of people who join together to gain power by winning elections.

3.1.17 Selective exposure: This implies people's predisposition to expose themselves to those mass communication which are in accord with their attitudes and interests (Mumba E; 2009).

3.1.18 Selective perception and retention: This is a tendency by people to perceive and retain communication messages which are in accord with their already existing views. This is a very common phenomenon or practice among people.

3.2.0 Theoretical Framework

This study was informed by seven theories. These are agenda setting; knowledge gap; two step flows, multi step flow, four mass media theories, the diffusion of innovations and Selective Exposure Selective perception and shared interest.

3.2.1 The Agenda setting theory

Agenda setting is the creation of public awareness and concern of salient issues by the news media. According to Miller (2005), this theory puts forth the ability of the media to influence the significance of events in the public's mind. In this regard, the media sets the agenda for the audience's discussion and mentally order and organise their world. The basic assumptions which underlie this theory are that the press and media do not reflect reality but shape it. The other is the one which says media concentration on a few issues and subjects leads to the public to perceive those issues as more important than others(Nyambe;2004). The above is reinforced by the following quotation below:

“The press may not be successful in telling its readers what to think but it is stunning successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Benard Cohen: 1963).

Clearly it can be said that the agenda setting function of the media causes the correlation between the media and public ordering of priorities.

This theory is appropriate to this study in that it enabled the researcher to understand the significance of the Media in order to make recommendations to the party under study. This

is because the media can be a very powerful tool to put the party's programmes and vision on the priority list of topics which the electorate discuss.

Furthermore, the agenda setting theory is relevant to this study because it enabled the researcher determine the extent to which the electorate were influenced to vote for President Sata and the Patriotic Front since the media plays a vital role in the dissemination of political information. This is in conformity with the argument that information carried in the media has great impact on people in that people discuss what they see and hear on television and they also talk about the latest news they read in the newspapers.

3.2.2 The knowledge gap theory

This theory was first proposed by Tichenor Donhue and Olien at the University of Minnesota in the 1970s. The theory states that the increase of information in society is not evenly acquired by every member of society. People with higher socioeconomic status tend to have greater ability to acquire information than the poor. Therefore, the knowledge gap can result into an increased gulf between people of lower and higher economic status (Weng; 2000). For this reason, the attempt to improve people's life with information through the mass media, might not always work the way it is planned. This is because the media might increase the difference in the gap between members of social classes.

In addition, proponents of the knowledge gap theory present five reasons for justifying the knowledge gap. These are that people of higher socioeconomic status: have better communication skills, education, and reading, comprehending and remembering information; and store information more easily or remember the topic from background knowledge; might have a more relevant social context; are better in selective exposure, acceptance and retention. The last point is that the nature of the mass media itself is geared towards persons of higher socioeconomic status.

This theory was thus be used to help the researcher make recommendations to the Patriotic Front to establish communication systems that reach out to the people of low socioeconomic status. This is because people at the grass root are normally left behind on current issues due to high levels of illiteracy, lack of television sets and radios among other

things. People at the grass roots can help make contributions as far as the popularity of the party is concerned.

3.2.3 The two step flow theory

In the early 1940s, before the invention of television, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Goudet conducted an American Survey on mass campaigns. The study revealed that informal social relationships (Interpersonal Communication) had played a major role in modifying the manner in which individuals selected content from the media campaign.

Furthermore, the study indicated that ideas often flowed from the radio and newspapers to opinion leaders and from them to the less active sections of society. Thus informal social groups have a high degree of influence on people and mould the way they select media content and act on it. This view from the two-step flow emphasises the importance of opinion leaders in communication (Nyambe; 2004:28).

In a political system, political agencies such as parties contribute to this communication network at various levels. Political parties are influential and their member's personal influence play a significant role in persuading people make up their minds in a way that closely conform to the party's preferences. On this score political leaders and members serve as opinion leaders and thus help disseminate political information contained in the media (Nyambe; 29). Evidently this theory is relevant to this study in that it enabled the researcher to recommend to the party under study to use opinion leaders in their dissemination of political information as a communication strategy to win support from voters.

3.2.4 The Multi-Step Flow theory

In quoting Bataille (1998), Nyambe explains that the process of information dissemination from the media can have more than just two step flow—thus giving way to the multi-step flow theory of mass communication which states that there are many steps in the flow of information and communication. The process of influence is said to be more complex than a single group of opinion leaders listening to the mass media and then feeding their opinions

to a group of passive followers (p.29). Nyambe argues that research has shown that the ultimate number of relays between the media and final receivers is variable.

While political parties may receive and disseminate information from the media, some of the electorate may get the same information directly from the media or from other sources. In this regard, political information may pass on the electorate through various steps. This theory therefore has direct application to this study in that it enabled the researcher make recommendations to the Patriotic Front on using a variety of communication channels to reach the electorate.

3.2.5 The diffusion of innovation theory

This theory was proposed by Everret Rogers, the father of development communication. The theory relies upon well-established theories in sociology, psychology and mass communication to develop a concise and easily understood approach to consumer acceptance of new technologies. According to Rogers, this theory is a definitive source for learning strategies aimed at gaining adoption of complex and controversial technologies- thus the theory enables us to understand the spread of ideas and actions within social systems. Examples include the dissemination of ideas in nations, crowds, a group of farmers, physicians adopting a new drug or evidence-based medical practice, public health officers adopting a new policy, and organizations adopting new administrative practices.

A basic notion of diffusion theory is that a new idea is adopted very slowly during the early stages of its diffusion process. Then, if the innovation is perceived as relatively advantageous by its early adopters, its rate of adoption takes off as the early adopters share their favourable experiences regarding the innovation with potential adopters. According to Rogers, three main factors influence the successful dissemination of an intervention and these are; people's perceptions of the innovation; inherent characteristics of individuals among whom the innovation might occur and contextual factors, especially involving communication, incentives, leadership, and management.

This theory is relevant to our study in that it enabled the researcher and the party under this study, to understand how ideas, practices and actions spread within a social system. This understanding should certainly enable the party leadership to make use of the dynamics of innovation diffusion in their packaging and dissemination of their political messages to both existing and potential party members. Through this theory, it would also come to the attention of the party under study that good ideas, programmes and election candidates do not sell themselves.

3.2.6 Selective exposure, Selective perception and Selected retention

Mumba(2009), (in quoting Klapper 1960 and McQuail 1994) explains that mass communication does not ordinarily serve as a necessary or sufficient cause of audience effects but rather functions through a nexus of mediating factors. Put simply, it is not that the media does not have effects but that it operates within a pre-existing structure of social relationships and a particular social and cultural context (p. 43). The mediating factors are selective exposure and selective perception and retention.

These also play a role in shaping people's perception of reality. Thus mass media is not the only influence on people's perception. In this regard, McQuail observed that mass media are more likely to reinforce existing attitudes than change them or create new ones. Furthermore, it was observed that mass media can have greater influence, when they explore issues that have not been talked about because in such circumstances, there are no pre-existing values or beliefs in the audience. This usually happens before other sources of influence in society become aware of the issue.

The theory is significant to this study in that it enabled the researcher determine whether or not ZNBC's "*Stand up for Zambia's*" documentary prevented the electorate from voting for President Sata and the Patriotic Front during the 2011 general elections.

3.2.7 The Four theories of the press

According to Siebert, Fred; Peterson, Theodore; and Schramm, Wilbur, wrote that there are four theories of the press explaining what the media do, or should be, and these are:

Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist. Although the USSR had collapsed at the time of writing, there still existed vestiges of the soviet system. African state-owned and operated mass media, particularly those in Zambia, have tended to be authoritarian, and hence the importance of this theory in this study (Rahman; 1991).

4.0 CHAPTER FOUR : LITERATURE REVIEW

4.1 Influence of the media on the electorate

Most literature about world politics shows that the media are often regarded as major sources of political information and determinants of political behaviour. This has been proven true in some cases and otherwise in other cases. For instance MQuail, (in Nyambe; 2004:36), argued that the conduct of both democratic and undemocratic politics depend more and more on the use of the mass media. The mass media was and is still used by politicians to transmit information across time and space in order to coordinate collective political behaviour just like Mussolini and Hitler did during their time. She/he gave an example of a study that was done in Germany where it was discovered that the higher the exposure of the electorate to media information, the higher the stability of vote decisions between elections.

Furthermore, Nyambe also pointed out that despite the role played by the media in disseminating information which influenced the electorates' political behaviour, Carver's (2002) study in Britain showed that the media did not have the influence they were believed to possess. The study revealed that between one quarter and one third of television viewers switched channels when a party election broadcast started. It was also found out that while the largest circulation newspaper, the Sun, supported the conservative party, its readership

supported the labour party. Deelen's study in Ukraine in 2001 also revealed the same pattern of electoral behaviour. The Electorate were sceptical towards the media which they accused of not being free. Nyambe also shows that even in Zimbabwe during a referendum and elections of 2000, the majority of voters favoured the opposition which was given minimal access to the media.

Ball(1983), in his book, "*Modern politics and Government*", argued that the most effective means of influencing public opinion is not through the mass media but the level of personal contact and through local opinion leaders. This means that the mass media should not be seen as the only means of political communication in a political system. It is but one of the means. Rahman (1991) wrote a paper entitled; *Political Communications: Press and Politics in Nigeria's Second Republic*. This paper examined mass media bias in Nigerian political communications. It argued that ownership of the mass media in Nigeria determined how they are used for political communications in the country. Other factors, such as ethnicity, religion, literacy, language of communication, legal limitations, political and socio-economic conditions, were also considered. The paper maintained, however, that the fact of ownership was not only the key which determines how the mass media were used for moulding the citizen's perception of political reality in the country, but that it was also a more precise means of understanding and investigating the role of the press in political stability or instability, national integration or disintegration. This article helped the researcher to determine the role of the mass media in the Patriotic Front's Victory. It also helped in identifying the media that was mostly used by the party under study when disseminating its vision for Zambia.

4.2 Winning an election

Furthermore, the election of Barack Obama as the forty fourth (44th) President of the United States of America was a significant event for Americans and the world at large. This could be seen in the way the world watched and keenly followed events leading to his election as President. Deborah white (2009) in her article "*Five reasons why Obama won the 2008 Elections*" explains that one of his top strategies was his empathy and genuine help for the suffering middle class Americans. She emphatically asserts that Obama won the Presidential

race largely because voters correctly perceived that he, and not John McCain, cared about and would address the struggles and inequities of the middle class. This article is important to our study in that it helped the researcher to make recommendations to the party under study that they should be seen or perceived to care about the suffering of the electorate if they are to remain in political office for a long period.

In addition, Todd and Gawiser (2009) in their book, *“How Barack Obama won: A state by state guide to the historic 2008 Presidential Elections”*, put the 2008 presidential election in political and demographic perspectives. Votes or results in each state are also broken down by percentage according to various categories as perceived important in each state. This book provides a very insightful examination of the 2008 presidential campaigns and it is significant to this study in that it enabled us make recommendations to the party under study that to win an election, you need to understand important needs of people in various regions of the country and promise to meet such needs.

Sishuwa in his article: *“Defying the incumbency theory: Explaining Sata’s victory in the 2011 Zambian Elections”*, argued that one of the reasons for Sata’s victory over Rupiah Banda, was his ability to capture the mood and aspirations of the electorate as opposed to other contestants in the September 2011 elections who appeared or seemed detached from the ordinary citizens (Post; December 2011). This was acknowledged by General Miyanda, leader of the Heritage Party (HP) just before the elections when he said that he wished he was like Sata who had managed to sell himself so well to the electorate. It appears as if Sata easily connected with the grassroots. In fact one can argue that they (Electorate) took him (Sata) as one among them.

In addition, Larmer and Fraser in their article *“Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist politics and Zambia’s 2006 Election”* argued that the most important outcome of the campaign was the successful articulation of a new populist politics by Michael Sata’s Patriotic Front (P.F.), which won a significant majority in urban areas. Sata’s attacks on foreign investors (particularly from China) for their abuse of the workforce and their supposedly corrupt relationship with the MMD resonated with urban Zambians, already angered by the negative impact of economic liberalization. P.F.’s campaign injected popular social demands

into what had become a moribund political debate. The article also describes the campaign and its outcomes, contrasting the political discourse of the MMD and P.F. and analysing the differences in voting behaviour between rural and urban Zambians. It argues that relief of 92.0 percent of Zambia's international debt, along with the renewed profitability of the copper mining industry, had created conditions for the re-emergence of a nationalist-developmental political framework (2007). This article was important to this study in that it helped the researcher understand PF's growing popularity among the poor, unemployed and urban dwellers. Such knowledge enabled the researcher make sound recommendations to party under study and future political players.

Dr. F. Chigunta (2011) in his article, *"What went wrong with the MMD?"* explained that the MMD defeat came as a shock to the party leadership, members and supporters. But to a discerning eye, the loss was not so shocking. He further argues that the loss says more about MMD's campaign weaknesses than the strengths of the P.F. This article is very important to our current study because it enabled the researcher draw sound recommendations regarding the development of a campaign team and message. On more or similar basis, Neo Simutanyi (2011), in his article *"Zambia votes for Change"* explained that president Sata's victory in the 2011 elections was not surprising because the MMD's performance in the last three elections was consistently poor, winning less than 45 percent of the national vote each time. Furthermore, Sata only lost the 2008 presidential election by 35,208 votes and it was always possible that a higher turnout in regions where he commanded support would be enough to hand him victory. His strategy of concentrating on his strongholds and urging his supporters to turn up in large numbers even if they were assured to win locally appears to have worked. The Patriotic Front Manifesto also identified Zambia's socio-economic problems and promised to fix them. The Manifesto puts social justice at the core of the P.F.'s local and foreign policy.

Walker's (2004) *"Sidewalk strategies: seven winning steps for candidates, causes and communities"*, provides effective, ethical and successful political strategy to individuals and organisations committed to improving the communities they serve. The study offers candidates advice for political success and inspires individuals to pursue causes they believe in. This study was important to our current research work in that it was a resource base for

drawing recommendations to the Patriotic Front as far as defining their commitments, overcoming their fears and maintaining their sincerity is concerned.

Paul and Pedro (2010) in their book, *Violence, Bribery and Fraud: The Political Economy of Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*, explains that Post-Soviet African democratization has introduced elections into contexts that often lack restraints upon the behaviour of candidates, resulting in the emergence of voter intimidation, vote-buying, and ballot fraud. They propose a model of electoral competition where, although some voters oppose violence, it is effective in intimidating swing voters. They show that in equilibrium a weak challenger will use violence. Similarly, a nationally weak incumbent will use repression. However, a stronger incumbent facing local competition will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud. They discuss the applicability of the model to several African elections. This article was important to this study in that it enabled the researcher discover whether the party under study used the suggested model to win Presidential elections or not. It also helped the researcher in making recommendations to the party concerning The Post election consequences of using such methods.

4.3 Communication channels and strategies

Windeck Frank (2010), in his article, *Political communication in Sub-Saharan Africa and the role of new media*, argues that at present despite the growing importance of new media, political communication in Sub-Saharan Africa generally takes place via the traditional media channels. Therefore, those wishing to successfully communicate politically in the future will have to master these new instruments and to integrate new media as an important component in their communication strategy. This article was important to this study in that it helped the researcher in assessing the extent to which the Patriotic Front used new media when communicating to both its members and the electorate.

According to Banda (1997), in Zambia, the main media are concentrated along the line of rail, leaving the majority of potential voters without information. As a solution to this knowledge deficiency, Banda suggested that political actors should serve as opinion leaders since they have access to the media and hence they have political information which people in rural areas need.

4.4 Political ignorance and participation

Furthermore, Literature on political information and communication in Zambia reveals that there is a high level of political ignorance among the electorate. This is characterised by political apathy and a poor democratic civic culture shown by low levels of voter turnout during elections at all levels (ECZ Presidential results; 1991; 1996; 2001; 2006; 2008; 2011).

Political apathy has been explained differently by different scholars and civic organisations operating in Zambia. The Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) and the Anti-voter apathy Project (AVAP) attribute it to failure by politicians to honour their election (Campaign) promises when they assume power. Others attribute it to poor political communication among the electorate. Such views are important to this study in that the party under study will learn how best to motivate the electorate to participate in political activities.

Mwanza G (1995) conducted a study entitled *“Apathy, legitimation and democracy.”* In his work he argued that apathy ought not to be a political behaviour since conditions that create it undermine democracy. This study was important to our current research in that it informed the researcher on different ways of encouraging the electorate to take part in political and public affairs of national interests thereby enhancing democracy.

In addition, Nyambe (2004) undertook a study about political development in Zambia. Her focus was on the communication strategies used by the MMD to disseminate political information to the electorate. She found out that the party was not communicating political information to the public on a regular basis. This resulted into an ignorant electorate who ended up making wrong electoral practices. Nyambe’s work was important to this study in that it helped the researcher to make recommendations to the party under study to learn from the mistakes of their counterparts. Nakazwe (2004) also did a similar study on inter-party communication during the Mwanawasa regime. The study revealed that different political parties lack trust for each other and thus inter-party communication has broken down. This state of affairs is not winning the faith of the electorate.

On a similar premise, Nyambe in quoting Saasa (2003) in his paper presentation to the SADC-Parliamentary Committee, entitled *“Political Parties in Parliament: Collaboration Challenges and agenda issues in Zambia,”* explained that the failure to dialogue between the opposition and ruling parties in Africa is the degree of disharmony and distaste against each other. He suggested that there was need for a shift in the framework within which politics is conducted including the need to educate the electorate in ways of thinking and acting conducive to opposition thinking.

Nyambe further explains that Bratton and Liatto-Katundu (1993) did a study in which twelve focus groups were conducted in four districts and nine provinces of Zambia. Particular attention was paid to citizen’s knowledge of and attachment to democratic values.

The focus group revealed notable short comings in political knowledge attributed partly to limited formal education and to misinformation disseminated by political authorities. In addition the majority of citizens thought that political participation began and ended with voting. Nyambe also quotes Ollawa(1979) who conducted a survey in Lusaka, Feira, Mazabuka, Mongu, Kitwe and Kasama on political participation. The study revealed low-level political consciousness among the electorate. The study also showed that the rural districts relied more heavily on informal face to face communication process for their political information than their urban counterpart. This led to low levels of political information and participation among the electorate.

The aim of this study was to determine the P.F.’s winning formula and analyse the communication strategies and channels used by the Patriotic front (P.F.) to win the 2011 Presidential elections. The study also investigated the impact of the *“Don’t Kubeba”* slogan and the *“Donchi Kubeba”* song. The research findings will make a significant contribution both to Citizens’ and Politicians’ understanding of how political information is communicated to the electorate in order to win their support.

CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

1.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the study for both the Quantitative and qualitative designs. The presentation of the findings is in two parts. The first part is a presentation of the quantitative survey results for one hundred and fifteen (115) respondents. This part is in three subsections. Subsection one looks at socio-demographic factors of the respondents. Communication channels and strategies are discussed in the second subsection. The third section presents people's feelings and perceptions about the P.F.'s campaign messages. The second part shows findings from the six in-depth interviews conducted by the researcher with EFZ, FODEP, UPND, PF, and Dr. Kenneth Kaunda and Dr. Oumo Okiror. Then a conclusion for the research findings follows at the end of this chapter.

1.1 Quantitative survey:

1.1.1 Socio-demographic characteristics

As can be observed in **Table 1** below, out of 115 respondents, 46 were females representing 40 percent while 69 were males representing 60 percent of all the respondents or informants. This was not by design. The selection of respondents was premised on an

individuals' availability and willingness to participate in our research. Therefore, the 2:3 ratio of females to males is a function of people's willingness or lack of it to take part. In this regard one would argue that the females were less willing to participate as compared to males. Reasons for this ranged from mere apathy to uncertainty regarding the use of the research findings though the purpose of the study was clearly stated.

5.1.1 Sex of respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Female	46	40.0	40.0	40.0
Male	69	60.0	60.0	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 1: Source: Field Data (2012)

1.1.2 Age range of respondents

As can be seen below, the age range for respondents of this questionnaire was between 18 and 50 years. Results indicate that the higher percentage is that of those between 18 and 35 years representing 51.3 percent (59 out of 115 respondents). Those between 36 and 49 years were at 36.5 percent while those who were 50 years and above were at 12.2 percent.

Table: 2: Age range of respondents


	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 18 to 35 years	59	51.3	51.3	51.3
36 to 49 years	42	36.5	36.5	87.8
50 years and above	14	12.2	12.2	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Data (2012)

5.1.3 Level of educational attainment

Figure 1 shows the highest level of education attained by each respondent. 7.0 percent of the respondents had gone up to primary education; 35.7 percent were secondary school and college graduates. 21.7 percent were University graduates. This is shown on the next page.

Figure: 1: Level of education attainment



Source: Field data (2012)

Furthermore, the study shows that 60 percent (69 out of 115) of the respondents were in formal employment; 40 percent (46 out of 115) were either self employed or not working. It seems the employed wanted better conditions of service while the unemployed wanted jobs to better their lives and standard of living and hence their voting for Sata.

5.1.3 Respondents in formal employment

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	69	60.0	60.0	60.0
No	46	40.0	40.0	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 3: Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.0 Communication channels and strategies

5.2.1 Respondent's choice of presidential candidate

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Michael Sata	74	64.3	64.3	64.3
Hakainde Hichilema	2	1.7	1.7	66.1
Rupiah Banda	11	9.6	9.6	75.7
Can't tell / did not vote	25	21.7	21.7	97.4
Others(Charles Milupi, Edith Nawakwi, Elias Chipimo, Godfrey Miyanda, Ng'andu Magande)	3	2.6	2.6	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 4: Source: Field data (2012)


Table 4 above shows that 64.3 percent (74 out of 115) of the respondents in *Wusakile* voted for President Michael Sata; 1.7 percent voted for Hakainde Hichilema; 9.6 percent for Rupiah Banda; 21.7 percent could not reveal who they voted for (these could have voted for the P.F.. They seem to have been disciples of the *Donchii Kubeba slogan*) and 2.6 percent voted for others (Charles Milupi, Edith Nawakwi, Elias Chipimo and Ng'andu Magande).

5.2.2 Respondents' perceptions regarding the quality of political information disseminated by the P.F.

According to Figure 2, 14.8 percent of the respondents said the quality of political information disseminated by the P.F. was poor while 85.2 percent felt it was well done. This could be the reason for the popularity of the P.F. among the grassroots and other

supporters. This also points to a good communication strategy developed by the Patriotic Front party in preparation for the September 2011 elections.

Figure: 2: Respondents' opinions regarding quality of information disseminated by the P.F.



Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.3 Respondents on media and P.F. activities

Regarding various media through which the electorate came to learn about the P.F.'s campaign activities and programmes, the Radio and Print Media combination was the most popular channel. It was at 23.5 percent. Radio was mainly Icengelo in Kitwe while Print Media was The Post Newspaper in the main. It also seems campaign vans were very prominent during the campaigns. Internet was not accessed by many respondents, it seems.

5.2.4 Respondents on door to door campaigns




Figure 3: Source: Field data (2012)

As shown in Figure 3, most of the respondents were not of the view that the P.F. used the door to door campaign strategy to communicate its vision to the electorate in order to win their support. 32.2 percent supported the idea while 39.1 percent disagreed that the P.F. used the strategy to win support from voters. 28.7 percent was for those who were not sure whether the strategy was used or not. Though not fully used by the P.F. in wusakile constituency, the door to door campaign strategy is very effective when it comes to mobilising support.

5.2.5 Respondents on the use of “Mass rallies”

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
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Valid	Strongly agree	70	60.9	60.9	60.9
	Agree	35	30.4	30.4	91.3
	Not sure	7	6.1	6.1	97.4
	Disagree	2	1.7	1.7	99.1
	strongly disagree	1	.9	.9	100.0
	Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 5: Source: Field data (2012)

Table 5 above demonstrates that about 91.3 percent (105 out of 115) of the respondents were of the view that the P.F. used mass rallies to communicate their vision of a better Zambia for all to win their support. 6.1 percent were not sure as whether the P.F. used the strategy. 2.6 percent were not agreeable that the P.F. used mass rallies to win support. It seems mass rallies really helped the P.F. to rally support behind them during the 2011 presidential elections just like it had done during the 2006 and 2008 elections.

5.2.6. Respondents on the use of “Opinion leaders”

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	12	10.4	10.4
	Agree	29	25.2	35.7
	Not sure	57	49.6	85.2

Disagree	14	12.2	12.2	97.4
Strongly disagree	3	2.6	2.6	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	


Table 6: Source: Field data (2012)

The table above indicates that 49.6 percent of the respondents were not sure whether the P.F. used opinion leaders or not. This could be attributed to the fact that some respondents did not seem to know who an opinion leader is. However, 35.7 were of the view that the P.F. used opinion makers to win support from the electorate. Such individuals included Panji Kaunda, Catholic priests and others. 14.8 percent were not agreeable that the P.F. used opinion makers to win the support of voters during the 2011 presidential elections.

5.2.7. Respondents on use of press conferences

The figure on the next page demonstrates that 39.1 percent of the respondents in Wusakile constituency were not sure whether the P.F. used press conferences or not to win support from voters. Again it seems some respondents did not understand the term “Press conferences”. However, 36.5 percent of the respondents were of the view that Press conferences were used by the P.F. to communicate their vision to voters of a “*better Zambia for all*”. 24.4 percent of the respondents were not agreeable that the Party under study used Press conferences. The truth of the matter is that press conferences were held by the party secretary general on many occasions to state party position on various issues.

Figure: 4: Respondents on the use of press conferences




Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.8 Respondents on publishing party manifesto in newspapers

The figure on the next page indicates that 59.1 percent of the respondents were of the view that the P.F. used to publish its manifesto in the newspapers such as The Post in order to communicate their vision for Zambia. It seems this strategy helped the party to gain support among the educated. Furthermore, 27.0 percent of respondents were not sure whether the P.F. used this strategy. Only 13.9 percent were not agreeable that the Party under study used to publish its manifesto in The Post newspaper to communicate its vision of a "better Zambia for all" in order to woo support from the electorate.

Figure: 5: Respondents' views on publishing party manifesto in newspapers



Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.9 Respondents on the use of the “Don’t Kubeba” slogan

97.4 percent (112 out of 115) of the respondents were of the opinion that the “Don’t Kubeba” slogan was instrumental in the P.F.’s historic victory as it gave life to the P.F.’s campaign promises. Jack Hogan, a PhD student at University of Kent, but present during the 2011 elections, pointed out that as a way of upholding the secrecy of the ballot, and running a campaign against an opponent with resources far in excess of your own, the slogan was a risky but clever strategy as it paid off. Furthermore only 2.6 percent of the respondents were not sure about the role of the above strategy. It seems the strategy infused people to vote for the P.F. and President Sata.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
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Valid	Strongly agree	97	84.3	84.3	84.3
	Agree	15	13.0	13.0	97.4
	Not sure	3	2.6	2.6	100.0
	Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 7: Source: field data (2012)

5.2.10 Respondents on use of Radio and TV adverts

The Table below shows that 58.3 percent of the respondents felt that the P.F. used Radio and TV to communicate their plans for Zambia to the electorates. However 15.6 percent were of the view that TV and Radio were not used by the P.F. 26.1 percent were not sure as to whether the P.F. used them (TV and Radio) or not. The Public media could hardly be used by the P.F. The public media portrayed Sata and the P.F. as enemies of a peaceful and democratic Zambia.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	19	16.5	16.5
	Agree	48	41.7	58.3
	Not sure	30	26.1	84.3
	Disagree	13	11.3	95.7
	Strongly disagree	5	4.3	100.0
	Total	115	100.0	

Table 8: Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.11 Respondents on the use of Intimidation against competitors

The figure below is an illustration of how the respondents felt regarding the use of intimidation against competitors by the P.F. during the campaigns. 27.0 percent of the respondents were of the view that intimidation was used by the P.F. against its competitors. 29.6 percent were not sure as to whether the Party under study used to intimidate its opponents during election campaigns. 43.5 percent of the respondents were not agreeable that the P.F. used intimidation against its opponents during the 2011 elections. These could be P.F. supporters or members who did not want their party to be viewed as violent.




Figure 6: Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.12 Respondents on using billboards

47.8 percent of the respondents were of the view that the party (P.F.) used billboards while 23.5 percent were not agreeable. 28.7 percent were not sure as to whether the P.F. used billboards or not. However, billboards were mainly used by the MMD.




Figure 7: Source: Field work (2011)

5.2.13: Respondents on use of posters

The figure below is an illustration of how the respondents felt regarding the use of posters by the P.F. during the campaigns. 86.1 percent were of the opinion that Posters were widely used by the P.F. during its campaigns. 11.3 percent were not sure whether the P.F. used Posters or not. Only 2.6 percent of the respondents were not agreeable that the P.F. used Posters during its 2011 election campaigns. Posters were very common during campaigns.




Figure 8: Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.14: Respondents on the use of internet

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly agree	8	7.0	7.0	7.0
Agree	16	13.9	13.9	20.9
Not Sure	74	64.3	64.3	85.2
Disagree	9	7.8	7.8	93.0
Strongly disagree	8	7.0	7.0	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 9: Source: Field data (2012)

20.9 percent of the respondents were of the acknowledged that the P.F. used internet during its campaigns to communicate to the electorate its plan of a “better Zambia for all”. 64.3 percent were not sure whether the P.F. used internet. 14.8 percent were not agreeable that the P.F. used the internet to market their plan for Zambia to the voters. The use of ICTs is still a challenge in Zambian political communication though steady progress is being made in recent times. Most of the voters still lack access to the internet.

5.2.15: Respondents’ views on the use of campaign vans

75.7 percent of the respondents were of the view that Campaign vans were widely used by the P.F. during its campaigns. 16.5 percent of the respondents were not sure about the use of campaign vans. Only 7.8 percent were not agreeable that the P.F. used these Campaign vans. It seems campaign vans were very effective at drawing people to P.F. rallies. The foregoing is shown in figure 9:




Figure 9: Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.16: The Patriotic Front's information dissemination to the electorate in comparison with other political parties...

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid As good as others	39	33.9	33.9	33.9
Better than others	70	60.9	60.9	94.8
Worse than others	6	5.2	5.2	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 10: Source: Field data (2012)

In response to the above question, 60.9 percent of the respondents acknowledged that the P.F.'s information dissemination to the electorate was better than others. This could explain the Party's popularity among the grassroots. 33.9 percent were of the view that the Party was as good as other political parties. Only 5.2 percent said the P.F. was worse than other parties. It seems the P.F. had a better communication strategy than other political parties.

5.2.17: Respondents' familiarity with the Patriotic Front's party manifesto

As can be observed below, 64.3 percent (74 out of 115) of the respondents were familiar with the P.F. manifesto. Whether they understood the contents of the manifesto is not clear.

35.7 percent were not familiar with the P.F. manifesto. More work needs to be done by the P.F. for more people to be familiar with the party manifesto especially now that they are in Government.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	74	64.3	64.3	64.3
No	41	35.7	35.7	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 11: Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.18: Respondents' views on "Stand up for Zambia" documentary

The Figure (10) on the next page demonstrates that 62.6 percent (72 out of 115) of the respondents did not believe the messages disseminated on ZNBC's "*stand up for Zambia*" documentary about president Sata because they felt that it was malicious. The majority of these were college graduates at 38.9 percent. 16.5 percent of the respondents believed the messages. These argued that the programme was factual. People saw President Sata in the documentaries. However 20.9 percent of the respondents were neutral. These did not know whether to believe it or not.




Figure 10: Source: Field data (2012)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Was malicious	73	63.5	63.5	63.5
	It was factual	15	13.0	13.0	76.5
	Did not know what to believe	27	23.5	23.5	100.0
	Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 12: Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.19: Respondents' Perceptions on the influence of the "Donchi Kubeba" song on voters

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Yes	67	58.3	58.3	58.3
Not sure	11	9.6	9.6	67.8
No	37	32.2	32.2	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 13: Source: Field data (2012)

As shown in the table above, 58.3 percent of the respondents acknowledged that the "*Donchi kubeba*" song influenced people to vote for the Patriotic Front (P.F.) and President Michael Sata. 9.6 percent were not sure as to whether the song influenced voters to support the party under study. 32.2 percent were not agreeable that the song influenced people to vote for President Sata.

5.2.20: Respondents explanations regarding the influence of the “Donchi Kubeba” song

The 58.3 percent of the respondents who felt that Dandy crazy’s “*Donchi kubeba*” song influenced people to vote for President Sata and the P.F. explained that the song reinvigorated (gave life to or a boost to) P.F. campaign themes. 28.7 percent were of the opinion that the song did not influence electorates to vote for President Sata. People just wanted change. 9.6 percent said that it was difficult to tell the influence of the song on the electorate while 3.5 percent of the respondents were of the view that people voted for President Sata because of the promises that he made during his campaigns.

Respondent’s perceptions regarding the influence of the “Donchi Kubeba” song

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Reinvigorated P.F. themes	67	58.3	58.3	58.3
People wanted change	33	28.7	28.7	87.0
Difficult to tell	11	9.6	9.6	96.5
Promises he made to people during campaigns	4	3.5	3.5	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 14: Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.21: Respondents' views on the influence of the "Dont Kubeba" slogan on voters

60.9 percent of the respondents' opinion was that the "*Don't Kubeba*" slogan influenced people to vote for the P.F. and President Sata. 11.3 percent were not sure of the influence of the slogan on the electorate while 27.8 percent were of the view that the slogan did not influence people to vote for the P.F. and President Sata.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	70	60.9	60.9	60.9
Not sure	13	11.3	11.3	72.2
No	32	27.8	27.8	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 15: Source: Field data (2012)

60.9 percent of the respondents were of the view that the slogan influenced people to vote for President Sata and the P.F. They explained that the slogan reinvigorated the P.F.'s campaign themes. 11.3 percent were not sure of the influence of the slogan on the electorate. These argued that it was difficult to tell or to measure the influence. 27.8 percent of the respondents were not agreeable that the slogan influenced the electorate in favour of the P.F. These explained that People wanted change and also that the promises which President Sata made during his campaigns played a significant role in the P.F.'s historic victory.

Respondent's perceptions regarding the influence of the "Don't Kubeba" slogan




Figure 11: Source: Field data (2012)

5.2.22: Respondent’s opinions regarding the most believable source of campaign information about the P.F.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Radio Icengelo	50	43.5	43.5	43.5
Radio Phoenix	2	1.7	1.7	45.2
ZNBC TV	1	.9	.9	46.1
ZNBC radio two	4	3.5	3.5	49.6
<i>Times of Zambia</i>	1	.9	.9	50.4
Daily mail	1	.9	.9	51.3
Post Newspaper	47	40.9	40.9	92.2
Campaign Vans	4	3.5	3.5	95.7
Other specify	5	4.3	4.3	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 16: Source: Field data (2012)

Table 16 above demonstrates that the respondents’ most believable source of campaign information about the P.F. was Radio Icengelo at 43.5 percent. It was followed by The Post Newspapers limited at 40.9 percent. ZNBC TV, *Times of Zambia* and the Daily mail were at 0.9 percent each. ZNBC’s Radio two and Campaign Vans were at 3.5 percent. Radio Phoenix was at 1.7 percent.

5.2.23: Respondents perceptions regarding major challenges faced by the P.F.

According to the respondents, the major challenge which the P.F. experienced during their campaigns was lack of access to the public media. 43.5 percent of the respondents acknowledged it. Other challenges include resource mobilisation; Government intimidation and abuse; the Homosexuality tag and explaining manifesto to the electorate.

The tribalism tag was not seen to be a problem in the P.F.. as only 0.9 percent of respondents acknowledged its existence in the party.

Major challenges faced by the P.F. according to respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Media coverage	50	43.5	43.5	43.5
Resource mobilisation	14	12.2	12.2	55.7
Government-intimidation and abuse	15	13.0	13.0	68.7
Not sure/ Can't tell	31	27.0	27.0	95.7
The Homosexuality tag	2	1.7	1.7	97.4
Explaining Manifesto to Voters	2	1.7	1.7	99.1
Tribalism	1	.9	.9	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 17: Source: Field data (2012)

5.3. Campaign messages:

5.3.1: Respondent's views on the promise for free education and health services

59.1 percent of the respondents were of the view that the P.F. won elections because they promised the electorate free educational and health services once they assumed political office. 18.3 percent were not sure as to whether this promise made the people vote for the P.F.. 22.6 percent of the respondents were not agreeable with the opinion that the Patriotic Front (P.F.) won presidential elections because they promised free education and health services for all.

5.3.1: Respondent's views on promise for free education and health services




Figure 12: Source: Field data (2012)

5.3.2: Respondent's views on the promise to fight against corruption

73.0 percent of the respondents felt that the P.F. won because they promised a rigorous fight against corruption upon assuming political office. 17.4 percent were not sure of the role of this promise in the P.F.'s historic victory. 9.5 percent were not agreeable that the party under study won because they promised to intensify the fight against corruption.




Figure 13: Source: Field data (2012)

5.3.3: Respondent's opinions on the P.F.'s communication strategy

The figure below shows that 67.8 percent of the respondents acknowledged that the P.F. won presidential elections because they had an effective communication strategy to reach out to people. 18.3 percent were not sure of the impact of the communication strategy on the outcome of the elections. 13.9 percent were not agreeable that the party under study

won presidential elections because they had an effective communication strategy to reach out to the electorate. Figure 14 is shown below.

5.3.3: Respondent's opinions on the P.F.'s communication strategy




Figure 14: Source: Field data (2012)

5.3.4: Respondent's opinions regarding the P.F.'s promise to come up with Constitution that reflects the will of the people

68.7 percent of the respondents responded in the affirmative that the P.F. won because they promised to come up with a constitution that would stand the test of time once they assumed political office. This was promised to be achieved within the first ninety (90) days of being in office. Though not yet achieved, the constitution making process is underway. 20.9 percent of the respondents were not sure as to whether the promise to come up with a good constitution made people vote for the P.F.. 10.4 percent of the informants did not

believe that electorate voted for the P.F. and president Sata because of the Constitution promise.

5.3.4: On a Constitution that reflects the will of the People




Figure 15: Source: Field data (2012)

5.3.5: Respondent's views on low taxes and more money in people's pockets

A resounding 93.9 percent of the respondents were of the view that people were persuaded to vote for the P.F. because of the promise to lower taxes and put more money in their pockets. This worked well among the employees who had been exploited for a long time. 4.3 percent of the respondents were not sure regarding the impact of the more money in your pockets promise on voters. 1.7 percent was not agreeable that the P.F. won presidential elections because they promise people low taxes and more money in their pockets.

5.3.5: Respondent's views on low taxes and more money in your pockets




Figure 16: Source: Field data (2012)

5.3.6: Respondent's views on the 90 days promise

The table below demonstrates that 78.3 percent of the respondents were of the opinion that the P.F. won presidential elections because they promised a supersonic turnaround for all ordinary citizens within the first 90 days of being in power. Undoubtedly, this promise appealed and drew many voters to the P.F.. as it easily found its way among the grassroots and the masses. 12.2 percent were not sure as to whether the promise made people vote for the P.F. or not. 9.6 percent was disagreeable as shown in table 35.

Table: 18: Respondent’s opinions on the 90 days promise

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly agree	54	47.0	47.0	47.0
Agree	36	31.3	31.3	78.3
Not sure	14	12.2	12.2	90.4
Disagree	10	8.7	8.7	99.1
Strongly disagree	1	.9	.9	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field data (2012)

5.3.7: Respondent’s opinions regarding President Sata identifying with the needs of the people

78.3 percent of the respondents felt that the P.F. won because President Sata identified with the needs of the people. Tendai (2011) acknowledged this fact when he said although Banda's favourable investment policies meant foreigners had brought modern changes to Zambia's infrastructure, feelings of disenfranchisement, labour exploitation and exclusion run deep within many Zambians. And Sata knew this. 15.7 percent were not sure if people voted for the P.F. because president Sata identified with their needs. 6.0 percent were not agreeable that people voted for the P.F. because Sata appeared to have known their problems and solutions.

5.3.7: Respondents' opinions on President Sata identifying with the needs of the people

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly agree	47	40.9	40.9	40.9
Agree	43	37.4	37.4	78.3
Not sure	18	15.7	15.7	93.9
Disagree	5	4.3	4.3	98.3
Strongly disagree	2	1.7	1.7	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 19: Source: Field data (2012)

5.3.8: Respondent's views on "People wanted change"

94.8 percent of the informants responded in the affirmative that the P.F. won because people wanted change. This is because people were fading up of MMD's 20 year rule which did not in large measure translate into noticeable upward mobility of many people. This strong desire for change was synonymous with what happened in 1991 when the MMD removed UNIP from political office. Thus, the P.F. rode on the good will of the people. However this does not mean that their campaign message had no significant role whatsoever. 4.3 percent were not sure about this. 0.9 percent of the respondents were not agreeable that the P.F. won because people wanted change.

5.3.8: Respondent's views on "People wanted change"





Figure 17: Source: Field data (2012)

5.3.9: Respondent's views on the promise to create employment opportunities

Figure 18 on the next page clearly shows that 89.6 percent of the respondents acknowledged that the P.F. won presidential elections because they promised to create employment opportunities for the youths and the unemployed. 7.8 percent were not sure whether the P.F. won because of this promise. 2.6 percent were not agreeable that the party under study won presidential elections based on the above promise of creating employment opportunities.

Figure: 18: Respondent's views on the promise to create employment opportunities



Source: Field data (2012)

5.3.10: Respondent's opinion on "self regulation" of the media

As shown in the following table, 54.8 percent of the respondents were of the opinion that the P.F. won presidential elections because they promised free regulation of the media. Journalists and other Media practitioners were impressed with this process especially that the MMD Government wanted to control the media in the country. Furthermore, 35.7 percent were not sure while 9.6 percent of the respondents were not agreeable that the P.F. won because they promised a self regulated media.

Respondent's views on Self regulation of the media

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly agree	27	23.5	23.5	23.5
Agree	36	31.3	31.3	54.8
Not sure	41	35.7	35.7	90.4
Disagree	8	7.0	7.0	97.4
Strongly disagree	3	2.6	2.6	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Figure 20: Source: Field data (2012)

5.3.11: Respondent's opinions on whether MMD stopped listening to people

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly agree	51	44.3	44.3	44.3
Agree	25	21.7	21.7	66.1
Not sure	13	11.3	11.3	77.4
Disagree	18	15.7	15.7	93.0
Strongly disagree	8	7.0	7.0	100.0
Total	115	100.0	100.0	

Table 21: Source: Field data (2012)

The table above demonstrates that 66.1 percent of the respondents were of the view that the P.F. won because the MMD had stopped listening to the people. They put their eyes off

the needs and aspirations of the people. For instance People were against the removal of the abuse of office clause in the anti-corruption Act but they went ahead and repealed it. People also opposed the sale of ZAMTEL. 11.3 percent were not sure while 22.7 percent of the respondents disagreed that the P.F. won elections because the MMD stopped listening to people.

5.3.12: Respondent's opinions on whether MMD had become too corrupt




Figure 19: Source: Field data: (2012)

As observed above, 79.1 percent of the respondents felt that the P.F. won presidential elections because the MMD had become too corrupt. These gave an example of the repeal of the abuse of office clause in the anti-corruption Act as evidence for a corrupt regime. 10.4 percent were not sure while 10.5 percent were not agreeable with the argument that the P.F. won because the MMD had become too corrupt.

5.4.0 In-depth interviews

Six in-depth interviews were conducted by the researcher. Respondents or Participants were drawn from the Patriotic Front (P.F.); United Party for National Development (UPND); Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ) and the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP). Other respondents were Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda, Zambia's first Republican President and Dr. Okiror Oumo, a political and economic consultant. All the informants were purposively selected on the basis of their positions, experience, in-depth knowledge and insight on the 2011 election campaigns. Indeed their views on these elections helped in determining the P.F.'s winning formula in political communication.

5.4.1 An Interview with the Patriotic Front Deputy Secretary General Mrs B. Atanga

At the P.F. secretariat, the researcher had an in-depth interview with Mrs B. K. Atanga, the current party Deputy Secretary General, in order to have great insights on the party's historic victory during the September 2011 elections. Mrs Atanga, at the time of the interview, had been a member of the P.F. for about nine (9) years. According to her, she joined politics in order to fight for women's rights. She was moved by the suffering of women who worked as labourers on farms in Chongwe District. She once stood as a parliamentary candidate for Chongwe Constituency though she lost. With regard to promoting political education within the party in preparation for the 2011 elections, she explained that workshops and seminars were organised for both youths and women. During such workshops, the party manifesto and constitution was explained so that members were kept abreast with the vision and values of the party.

For the voters or electorate, rallies were organised throughout the Nation. At such rallies the P.F. officials shared their vision of a better Zambia for all. The campaign message was simple and plain and thus people at the grass root found it easy to grasp it. It was about change within 90 days, low taxes and more money in people's pockets. Various campaign materials such as posters, pamphlets, fliers, brochures, campaign vans and songs carried this message. Furthermore, the electorate were charmed by the ***Donch kubeba*** slogan and song to vote for the P.F.

In addition, Mrs Atanga pointed out that the Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation's (ZNBC) "Stand up for Zambia" documentary was a blessing in disguise for the P.F. While the MMD thought that they were de-campaigning President Sata and the P.F., little did they know that their programme made people sympathise with President Sata and the P.F. She also explained that President Sata's visit to Oxford University as guest lecturer before the September 2011 tripartite elections improved his international reputation and that of the party. The international community saw him as one with genuine concern for his country (people). This is evident from what different people who attended his conference said at the end. For instance Abdul Raufu Mustapha, a lecturer in African Politics at Oxford University said Sata "seemed to be very genuine about his concern for Zambia".

Furthermore, Justin Pearce, a postdoctoral research fellow at SOAS observed that in the Academic world researchers spend a lot of time discussing and debating politics, often in quite an abstract way, "So it was most refreshing to receive a visit from Michael Sata: someone whose lengthy career has been spent in the world of Zambian politics and who was able to speak in the first person of his experiences. It was very interesting to hear his vivid account of the challenges he has faced over the last decade and how he has tried to get around them."(African Studies Centre 2011 News letter; 11).

When explaining the P.F.'s victory, Mrs Atanga acknowledged that people wanted change just like they did in 1991 when UNIP and Kaunda were removed from office by the MMD. However, she also attributed it to the campaign messages derived from the party Manifesto. For her, President Sata's consistence on campaign promises and the good will of people coupled with a good manifesto was their winning formula in the 2011 elections.

5.4.2 Interview with the United Party for National Development (UPND) Deputy Chairperson for Finance and Economics

At the UPND secretariat, the researcher interviewed Mr. D Simusamba, the deputy chairperson for finance and economics, in order to get the UPND perspective on P.F.'s historic victory during the September 2011 elections. Mr Simusamba explained that September 2011 elections were free and fair to some extent in that they reflected the will of the people. Furthermore, the elections were not completely free and fair since the media

landscape was polarised. The public media was pro-MMD. With this situation, other political parties were not covered. He further pointed out that UPND has no problem with a newspaper stating who they think is a better candidate in their editorial but had problems when news coverage is just for one particular candidate.

On the victory of the P.F. in presidential elections, he explained that it was a sweet victory. The victory instilled a sense of hard work in the P.F. and other political parties. It is a lesson that even opposition parties can win an election. In addition, the P.F. won because their strategy was right and especially that they had a simple campaign message of low taxes and more money in people's pockets. This resonated with the grassroots. Further, the promise of a supersonic turnaround of the economy and consequently people's standard of living within ninety days also played a significant role in the P.F. victory.

Regarding what the P.F. did right to win the presidential elections, Mr Simusamba felt that two factors were critical. These were the ability by the P.F. to firstly manage to maintain their urban vote, and secondly they managed to penetrate rural areas or areas where they previously did not do well. Mongu and Livingstone were given or cited as examples. On the impact of ZNBC's *"Stand up for Zambia"* documentary, he explained that it was a double edged sword. Firstly it galvanised support for the MMD and secondly it made people feel MMD was scared of President Sata and hence Sata became popular as people sympathised with him.

The *"Don't Kubeba"* slogan and song resonated with people throughout the nation. It was but an icing of the cake. People were moved to vote and support the P.F. by this slogan. In some parts of the Country, the P.F. was indeed preaching to an already converted audience especially in urban areas. However, for places like Mongu, the above cannot hold. It was their strategy or campaign messages that made the P.F. and Sata make progress. Explaining people's jubilation from the time president Sata was declared winner up to the inauguration ceremony, Mr Simusamba said that it was a reflection of people's expectations from the new Government. It also showed that people were tired of the MMD Government.

Furthermore, the impact of the failure of the UPND-P.F. pact was positive on the P.F. This is because some members of the UPND joined P.F. and consequently P.F. entered or penetrated UPND strongholds where they had no presence before the pact.

To crown it all, Mr Simusamba was of the view that President Sata's insistence on his campaign message of more money in peoples' pockets and a supersonic turnaround of the economy and consequently peoples' lives since 2001 resonated with the grassroots and explains well their victory in the 2011 elections.

5.4.3 In-Depth Interview with Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (E.F.Z) Director

The EFZ is a Christian umbrella organisation representing Christian denominations, local congregations, mission agencies and Para-church organisations working together in providing a united front for the holistic transformation of Zambia. EFZ carries out various programmes in education, health, advocacy and good governance. It is therefore for this reason that the researcher sought to have an interview with the Executive Director of EFZ in order to get the organisation's perspective on the P.F.'s historic victory during the 2011 presidential elections.

Rev. Pukuta Mwanza, the Executive Director of EFZ, pointed out that the 2011 elections were free and fair in that they reflected the wishes of the people though there were instances of campaign related violence and voter intimidation perpetrated by supporters of various political parties. Instances of violence were recorded in Kitwe and Lusaka. Voter intimidation was reported in chief Mushota and Mwata Kazembe's chiefdoms. Indunas and subjects were instructed not to support any opposition party.

Regarding the P.F.'s victory in presidential elections, Rev Mwanza was of the view that people needed change. They were tired of the MMD's twenty (20) years in power. He also attributed the victory to the P.F.'s campaign promises of more money in people's pockets and a change for the better within ninety (90) days of assuming political power. People were further hopeful of employment opportunities which would eventually improve their standard of living. The Post newspaper and Radio phoenix played a significant role in the P.F. victory.

On what the P.F. did right to win presidential elections, Rev Mwanza pointed at the party's vigorous monitoring of the electoral process and the party's ability to penetrate areas where they had no support previously. The "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan and song resonated with people throughout the nation. It was undoubtedly the icing of the cake. In this way the

slogan and song contributed to the P.F. victory. Concerning the impact of ZNBC's stand up for Zambia programme on election campaigns for the P.F., Rev Mwanza was of the view that the programme had no impact whatsoever in that people who were urged not to vote for Sata and the P.F. defied it by voting for him and the P.F.. He also explained that the P.F. was preaching its campaign message to an already converted audience since people were ready for change. The 2011 elections was a replica of the 1991 elections that ushered in MMD. People's Jubilation from the time President Sata was declared winner up to the inauguration ceremony reflected the expectations of people from the P.F. government. The failure of the UPND-P.F. pact made the P.F. more vigilante and strong. To crown it all, Rev Mwanza, explained that the P.F. owed their victory to an appropriate campaign message to the grassroots: change for the better within 90 days and more money in people's pockets.

5.4.4 In-depth Interview with the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) Executive Director and Programmes Manager.

The Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) is a Zambian civic NGO which operates in a non partisan way. The organisation was formed in 1992 with the overall objectives of consolidating and promoting democracy, peace and stability, and ensuring enhancement of democratic, free, fair and acceptable elections both at local and National elections. This is done through various activities such as civil and political rights education, voter and civic education, mediation in inter-political party conflicts and offering a forum for political dialogue. With such vast experience in the electoral process in Zambia, the researcher found it necessary to have an in-depth interview with the organisation in order to get its perspective on the P.F.'s winning formula in presidential elections.

The Executive Director (McDonald Chipenzi) and Projects Manager (Hope Mubanga) were interviewed separately. Both Hope and McDonald contended that the 2011 general elections were not free and fair though they reflected the will of the people. This is because the elections were marred with malpractices such as the media being biased and also due to the fact that the MMD had access to state resources among other things.

Regarding the P.F.'s victory in presidential elections, FODEP was of the view that it was a well deserved victory. Officials from the organisation argued that P.F. had the best message

for the people. It was about more money in people's pockets, change for the better within ninety days of assuming political office, making a constitution that would stand the test of time, restoration of the abuse of office clause in the anti-corruption Act and intensifying the fight against corruption. Coupled with this was the will of the people to change as they were tired of twenty years of MMD rule.

Furthermore, the respondents asserted that the media played a significant role in the P.F.'s victory in the 2011 elections. They explained that The Post Newspaper propagated the P.F. agenda of a better Zambia for all. It published the P.F. manifesto and also publishing the "***Don't Kubeba***" page with President Sata urging voters to "***Don't Kubeba***" politicians who wanted to bribe them. It was also observed that Catholic community radio stations dotted around the Nation propagated the P.F. agenda. In addition Sata also appeared more mature and collected during this time.

Furthermore the "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan and song alerted electorate against electoral malpractice. Regarding the role of the slogan and song in the P.F. victory, the respondents explained that it was difficult to measure it. On what the P.F. did right to win the presidential elections, Hope and McDonald pointed at two factors. The first being the fact that the P.F. partnered with the media especially The Post and secondly the party intensified its campaigns as its message appealed to many voters especially the grassroots. It is also true that Sata connected well with the grassroots.

Concerning the impact of ZNBC's "***Stand up for Zambia***" documentary on election campaigns for the P.F., FODEP contended that the programme created sympathy for Sata and the P.F. and thus President Sata became popular. It was a blessing in disguise for the P.F.. On people's jubilation from the time president Sata was declared winner up to the inauguration ceremony, the organisation was of the opinion that it was a reflection of the expectations of the people that Zambia could change for the better. Furthermore, the failure of the UPND-P.F. pact strengthened the P.F. and weakened UPND since some prominent members of UPND like Panji Kaunda left to join the P.F.

To crown it all, FODEP was of the view that the P.F.'s winning formula was their campaign message which appealed to the masses and also their seemingly genuine concern for the

needs and difficulties of the people. The “*Don’t Kubeba*” slogan simply gave life to the P.F. campaign promises.

5.4.5 Interview with Dr. Okiror Oumo, Director Of Apogo Consultants

Dr. Oumo is a former diplomat from Ghana. He claimed to have been a lecturer of international relations at the University of Zambia. He is now the director of “*Apogo*” consultants, an organisation dealing with political and economic issues. He consults with many politicians in Zambia.

On whether the September 2011 elections were free and fair, Dr Oumo was of the view that elections in both the developing and developed world are never completely free and fair. They just reflected the will of the people.

His thoughts about the P.F.’s historic victory centred around two factors and these were: the P.F.’s presidential candidate and MMD’s poor governance record. He argues that Michael Sata was the most effective political communicator that Zambia has ever seen. He managed to reach out to the masses; identified with them and their needs and also spoke their language. His language was appealing. Never lost for words, Sata's language was picturesque, discursive and entertaining. He possesses an effortless command of the illuminating and hilarious metaphor and has boundless energy which cannot permit him to sit down quietly for a long time. He was thus seen as one among the masses. This attracted the masses to him and hence they voted for him.

MMD’s poor governance record also made people look for an alternative. This is similar to Sishuwa’s observations when he wrote (*The Post, December 2011*):

...The behaviour and conduct of Rupiah himself was another factor. He antagonised the ruling party, expelled everyone who did not agree with him, alienated himself and his government from the concerns and cries of many Zambian people and behaved as though he was running a kingdom, not a democratic state. Many times many well-meaning people including The Post, the Church, civil society and other ordinary Zambians offered free advice to Rupiah on how he and his government could govern the

country better but Rupiah and his lieutenants..... Ignored such advice or dismissed the advisors as opposition surrogates.

Further, Dr. Oumo argued that the P.F. was well organised this time around. Their membership registration was tied to an individual's voting locality. They also preached a simple message of lower taxes, more jobs and more money in your pockets to the electorate. Other promises were free education for all; free medical facilities and coming up with a new constitution and intensifying the fight against corruption. The Post newspaper was also instrumental in the P.F.'s victory. It highlighted the wrongs of the MMD and presented the P.F. as a party that would advance Zambia's development agenda.

With regard to the "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan, he was of the view that it was meant to counter MMD's misuse of public resources. This strategy was very effective as it helped the P.F. to win the 2011 presidential elections. It made people focus on the P.F.'s message of hope...a "***better Zambia for all***". On ZNBC's "***Stand up for Zambia***" documentary, he felt that the documentary was a blessing in disguise for the P.F. because people became sympathetic with president Sata. He was also happy with the mature manner in which Sata handled this documentary.

Furthermore, the failure of the UPND-P.F. pact strengthened the P.F. and weakened UPND since some prominent members of UPND like Panji Kaunda left to join the P.F.. UPND destroyed the hope of the people when they moved out of the pact.

To crown it all, Dr. Oumo was of the view that the P.F.'s winning formula was their campaign message which appealed to the masses and also their seemingly genuine concern for the needs and sufferings of the people.

5.4.6 An Interview with Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda

Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda is Zambia's first republican president. He ruled Zambia from 1964 up to 1991, and is an internationally respected statesman. The researcher decided to have an interview with him on his views about the September 2011 presidential elections. His views were as follows:

Elections that are organised in a fair and transparent manner in any democracy presented opportunities for the electorate to free express their will by electing a Government of their choice. During the campaign period, political parties appealed for support by explaining their party manifesto to the general populace. They also made promises as to what they would do once elected into office in order to improve the living standards of people. President Michael Sata and the P.F.'s victory is an opportunity for Zambians to reflect and rededicate themselves to achieving prosperity under a new Government. With regard to the election of President as head of state, he was of the view that given Sata's track record over a long period of time and his abhorrence to corruption, graft and theft of public resources, he will do well for the country.

Furthermore, Dr. Kaunda sincerely believes that politics is about commitment to serve fellow citizens and should be practiced in an atmosphere of peace. He holds the view that it is important for politicians to exercise a measure of respect and understanding for one another and where possible to compromise in national interests. As a patriotic freedom fighter, he holds the view that affiliation to different political parties is a health development which should facilitate the achievement of our common objective to prosper as we serve God's children. Therefore in the honest exercise of this principle, he attended national conventions for both the MMD and P.F. to which he was dully invited. In this regard he did not endorse any presidential candidate.

The P.F. like other parties which participated in the last presidential elections did its best to sell its manifesto to the electorate. However, their loud campaign promises attracted people from different walks of life. Further, Dr Kaunda was of the view that there was great jubilation from the people in general because people believed in the sincerity of the P.F. leadership to bring about change for better according to their party manifesto. People believed that the P.F. Government would quickly implement the programmes which were so

eloquently articulated during the campaign period. It may also be a question of people wanting change because of being fed up with the 20 year rule of the MMD.

Dr. Kaunda, like any other citizen listened carefully to campaign messages of the participating political parties. He remained non partisan in his public pronouncements so as not to influence the outcome of elections in any way possible. It was his prayer and hope that the elections would be held in peace for he believed that a rigid outcome would be a recipe for chaos and the attendant divisions in the country would be at variance with our cherished motto of *"One Zambia One Nation"*.

According to Dr. Kaunda, the P.F.'s historic victory could be attributed to the following two factors: first is people's strong desire for change after 20 years of the MMD in power which did not in large measure translate into noticeable upward mobility of many people and secondly, the effective campaign messages by the P.F. to bring about a supersonic turnaround within the 90 day window. This strategy generated euphoria among many people.

Furthermore, His Excellency, Dr. Kaunda felt that the media whether under private or public ownership should be professional and disseminate information in a balanced and non partisan manner. The so called *"stand up for Zambia"* documentary which ZNBC aired for sometime during the campaign period was in bad taste and indeed unfortunate development which left a stain on the credibility of the institution as a public broadcaster. It was without doubt a campaign gimmick for the MMD and its presidential candidate against President Michael Sata. The programme might have alienated many voters who felt that it was in bad light and did not reflect the required professionalism in journalism. It was a mark of gutter journalism which showed that ZNBC had unfortunately been compromised in favour of those in power.

The failure of the UPND-P.F. pact would probably not have affected the removal of the MMD from office. Yes, the winning side would have had more votes than P.F. got on its own. The result however was a clear testimony that the electorate had already decided to try another party to run the country. Although the opposition had split the votes by this failure, the MMD was nevertheless defeated. The impact was therefore minimal.

In conclusion, Dr. Kaunda pointed out that after 48 years of independence and a culture of holding regular elections, the people of Zambia have over the years learnt valuable lessons in as far as elections are concerned. If a party in office is seen and perceived not to have kept its electoral promises or implemented development projects early as was the case with the MMD government which embarked on development projects rather hurriedly during the last months of its period in office, the electorate was wise and saw it as an attempt to hoodwink them into believing that real development was indeed taking place yet that was not the case. It was like taking people for granted that a lavish campaign would do the trick. Furthermore, cases of corruption within Government circles had also begun to surface a situation which did not augur well for the then ruling party, MMD. The party in power also used enormous financial resources based on a mistaken belief that it would be strength in its favour but it turned out to be a weakness. The advantage of incumbency was definitely strength but it was outweighed by the P.F.'s "*Don't Kubeba*" slogan.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter presented the findings of the study for both the quantitative and qualitative designs regarding the P.F.'s winning formula in political communication in Wusakile Constituency. It has been demonstrated that 97.4 percent (112 out of 115) of the respondents were of the opinion that the "*Don't Kubeba*" slogan was instrumental in the P.F.'s historic victory. It combated MMD's buying of votes from the electorate. Charles Mwewa called the "*Don't Kubeba*", a strategy of defiant cooperation (2012) which won the Patriotic Front, the presidency. The study has also demonstrated that President Sata's visit to the Oxford University improved his international reputation as many came to see him as one with genuine concern for his country.

The impact of the failure of the UPND-P.F. pact was positive on the P.F. This is because some members of the UPND joined P.F. and consequently P.F. entered or penetrated UPND strongholds where they had no presence before the pact.

Furthermore, it has been pointed out that people wanted change. This is because they were fade up with MMD's 20 years in power which in large measure did not translate into

noticeable upward mobility for many people. The preaching of low taxes and more money in people's pockets was very critical in the party's victory. Further, the promise of a supersonic turnaround of the economy and consequently an improvement in people's standard of living within ninety days also played a significant role in the P.F. victory. The P.F.'s campaign message appealed to the masses and also their seemingly genuine concern for the needs and sufferings of the people.

Regarding the most believable source of campaign information about the P.F., it has been shown that Radio Icengelo was first among electorate in Wusakile Constituency. It was followed by The Post Newspaper. It seems a combination of factors were at play to secure the P.F. victory in the 2011 presidential elections.

CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

6.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses research findings of the previous chapter. It is divided into five main sections according to the research questions; applicable theory and literature. Section one focuses on key political messages disseminated to the electorate; major communication challenges faced by the Patriotic Front (P.F.) during its 2011 election campaign is the concern of section two. Section three focuses on the perceived role of the *“Don’t kubeba”* slogan (song) in the P.F.’s historic victory; The perceived impact of ZNBC’s *“Stand up for Zambia”* documentary on the P.F in Wusakile ward is explained in section four. Section five is a discussion on the audience’s perceptions of the P.F.’s 2011 election campaign. A conclusion then follows regarding the perceived P.F.’s winning formula in political communication.

6.1 Research question 1: What key political messages was the Patriotic Front (P.F.) disseminating to the electorate in Wusakile Constituency?

During the campaign period voters in Wusakile were bombarded with MMD’s *“building tomorrow’s Zambia”* campaign; UPND’s *“real change”* campaign and the P.F.’s *“lower taxes more jobs and more money in your pockets”*. In their party Manifesto, the P.F. outlines four core programmes which were the basis of its campaign agenda. These are Educational development; Health services; Agricultural development; and Local government and housing development. Economic, social and governance sectors are also catered for in their Manifesto (P.F. Manifesto; 2011).

On educational development, the Manifesto states that the P.F. recognises that all Zambian children have a right to a free, compulsory, quality education, regardless of the wealth of their family or their place of residence (P.F. Manifesto; 7). This, they preached vigorously to the electorate during the campaign period. Free health services were also promised during the campaigns. For Agricultural development, the party promised to subsidise agriculture, especially small scale farming; review the Food Reserve Agency Act in order to rationalise its

operations and functions including its role in maintaining strategic reserves of food crops. Decentralisation of Government operations was yet another promise to the electorate.


Our research has shown that the P.F.'s campaign message resonated with the electorate and the masses. 93.9 percent of the respondents attributed the P.F.'s historic victory to its message of change in ninety days and *more jobs and more money in your pockets*. Furthermore, MMD's campaign slogan did not seem to have captured the mood of the voters. Chigunta, in his article, "*What went wrong for the MMD*" explains that with low life expectancy, African voters appear to be more interested in issues affecting their daily livelihood activities and communities than any discussions of their future. This it seems is what pulled people to the P.F.

Furthermore, the Patriotic Front (P.F.) pointed out the wrongs which the MMD had committed and how things could change for the better once they were voted into political office. The P.F. argued that MMD had mismanaged and misapplied the country's resources. They also blamed the MMD government for the country's high corruption and poverty levels. President Sata and the Patriotic Front (P.F.) promised to address and remedy the foregoing failures using locally driven social and economic initiatives through the empowerment of Zambians while recognising the important role the donor community played in complementing such initiatives.

Taking advantage of the mood for change and the good will of the people in the nation, the P.F. promised the unemployed electorate employment opportunities; better conditions of service for the employed and respect for workers' rights. 89.6 percent of the respondents attributed the P.F. victory to this promise. 73.0 percent voted for him because of the promise to fight corruption; 68 percent because of the promise to come up with new constitution and also self regulation of the media.

People also felt that the MMD had become too corrupt. Our research has shown that 79.1 percent of the respondents in Wusakile were of the above opinion. They pointed at the repeal of the abuse of office provision in the anti-corruption Act in 2010 as clear manifestation of how corrupt the MMD had become. The MMD government had shown

many at times that it was not accountable to the people of Zambia. For instance they held the failed National Constitution Conference (NCC) and sold ZAMTEL against the will of the people. This pushed voters away from the MMD to the P.F. which seemed to have genuine concern for the people.



Source: Field data (2012).

Of all the respondents that voted for President Michael Sata in Wusakile, 55.4 percent were youths. This demonstrates that the majority of the people who voted for President Sata and the P.F. were the youth. These voted for the party under study because of the “more jobs and more money” in your pockets campaign promise. This fact was acknowledged by Gavin Jackson in his article *“Zambia: Patriotic Front Victory unleashes waves of strikes”* (November 2011) when he explained that:

Standing on a populist program, promising to redistribute the gains of Zambia’s mineral wealth as well as tackling widespread corruption, Michael Sata has been carried into the presidential palace by youths who

have signed up to vote by the million, battling the police and security forces in some areas, including Kitwe and Ndola and intercepting truckloads of rigged ballot papers to ensure that their man won.

In addition, 37.8 percent of those who voted for Sata were those between 36 and 49 years old. This is the most productive group of the population and these were drawn to the P.F by its campaign promise of respecting workers rights.

39.2 percent of the respondents who voted for Sata were college graduates while University graduates were only 14.9 percent of his voters in this constituency. 37.8 percent were those who had gone up to secondary education. These graduates were attracted by the P.F's promise to create employment opportunities.

Furthermore, 54.1 percent of the informants who voted for Sata were in formal employment while 45.9 percent were not employed. These voted for improved conditions of service such as low taxes and more money in their pockets as well as new employment opportunities promised by the P.F. respectively. This explains why soon after the election of President Sata, the Zambian labour market was engulfed with waves of strikes.

The Agenda setting theory; selective exposure, selective perception and selective retention; and the Diffusion of Innovations (DOI) theory were applicable here.

Put simply, agenda setting is the creation of public awareness and concern of salient issues by the news media. Though the P.F. lacked access to the public media, the party had access to Radio Icengelo on the Copperbelt and the 'Post' Newspaper. These two media helped to set the P.F agenda and vision on the priority list of issues discussed by the electorate. In fact our study has shown that Radio Icengelo was the most believable source of P.F.'s campaign information in Wusakile Constituency. This was followed by the 'Post' newspaper.

In the midst of many political campaigns coming from the MMD, UPND and the P.F., the electorate in Wusakile were selective in exposure, perception and retention of campaign messages disseminated to them. Our study has shown that though the MMD and UPND preached that President Sata and the P.F. were immature, undemocratic and violent, the

electorate in Wusakile still voted for the P.F. and President Sata. Apparently, they ignored the negative messages, and chose from campaigns the messages to be exposed to, what to perceive, and, indeed, what to retain. This confirms that media operates within a pre-existing structure of social relationships and a particular social and cultural context. It further shows that People had already decided to vote for President Sata and the P.F.

This study has also confirmed Rogers' Diffusion of Innovation theory which states that if the innovation is perceived as relatively advantageous by its early adopters; its rate of adoption takes off as early adopters share their favourable experiences with others. The early adopters of the P.F.'s campaign message of redemption from poverty, corruption, lack of opportunities and employment, heavy taxes and a high cost of living in Wusakile, saw this as advantageous and reasonable and hence urged others to vote in favour of the P.F.

According to Larmer and Fraser (2007) who authored an article entitled "Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist politics and Zambia's 2006 elections", the most important outcome of the campaign was the successful articulation of a new populist politics of lower taxes, more jobs and more money in your pockets by the P.F. and President Sata. This campaign continued in 2008 and 2011 election campaigns and many people were drawn to the P.F.

Furthermore, Deborah white (2009) in her article on reasons for President Obama's victory during 2008 elections argued that Obama's campaign message of "**Yes we can**" resonated with electorate in the United States of America just like the P.F.'s campaign message did.

6.2 Research question 2: What major communication challenges did the Patriotic Front (P.F.) face during its 2011 election campaigns?

According to the respondents, the major challenge which the P.F experienced during their campaigns was lack of access to the public media. The ruling MMD fully exploited the advantage of incumbency, and its undemocratic control of ZNBC, the *Times of Zambia*, and *Zambia Daily Mail* compromised the Media. The Zambia Elections Media Monitoring Project (ZEMMP) acknowledged that ZNBC TV was biased towards the MMD prior to the elections. The P.F. and others were not covered at all (2012). In addition the report also observed that ZNBC radio had too much pro-MMD messages, and others meant to de-campaign the P.F.

This matter was also raised by many other observers and civil society organisations who argued that the public media was overtly partisan in favour of the then ruling party MMD. Our study has demonstrated that 43.5 percent of the respondents acknowledged this as the major hurdle.

Having been blocked from accessing the public media, the P.F. and President Sata used other channels and strategies of communicating with the electorate. They used Radio Icengelo, *The Post* newspaper, door to door campaigns, Icengelo magazine and other channels to communicate their vision of a “better Zambia for all”. Therefore, this study has confirmed the multi-step flow theory of communication which states that the ultimate number of relays between the media and final receiver is variable. Therefore the MMD’s agenda to make the public or electorate perceive them as more mature and important than the P.F. failed in Wusakile constituency.

Other challenges included resource mobilisation; Government intimidation and abuse; the Homosexuality tag as some politicians accused President Sata and the P.F of supporting same sex marriage; and explaining the manifesto to the electorate. The tribalism tag was not seen to be a major problem in the P.F. as only 0.9 percent of respondents acknowledged its existence in the party (See table 17).

As indicated earlier, the media conditions were contrary to the ideals of democratic governance, and free media. Instead of the libertarian and social responsibility ideals obtaining in many democracies, Zambians witnessed authoritarian state media denying the P.F. the oxygen of publicity.

6.3 Research question 3: What was the perceived role of the “*Don’t Kubeba*” slogan (song) in the Patriotic Front’s historic victory?

This research has demonstrated that 97.4 percent (112 out of 115) of the respondents were of the opinion that the “*Don’t Kubeba*” slogan was instrumental in the P.F’s historic victory as it gave life to the P.F’s campaign promises. Jack Hogan, a PhD student at University of Kent, but present during the 2011 elections, pointed out that as a way of upholding the secrecy of the ballot, and running a campaign against an opponent with resources far in excess of your own, the slogan was a risky but clever strategy as it paid off.

Further, many political commentators and observers acknowledged that the “**Don’t Kubeba**” slogan undoubtedly helped the P.F. win the presidency. Such commentators include Sishuwa Sishuwa, Neo Simutanyi and Charles Mwewa, an author and Zambian living in Canada. The report by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) on the elections of September 2011, also acknowledged the significance of the “**Don’t Kubeba**” slogan in the P.F.’s victory. It was appropriate in mobilising support for the P.F.

Sishuwa in his article “*Defying the incumbency theory: explaining Sata’s victory*”, argues that just as important in the P.F.’s historic victory was the “**Don’t Kubeba**” strategy. He further adds that if Barack Obama won the 2008 USA elections on a platform of “**Yes we can**”, it might be said that Sata won the 2011 Zambian election using the message “**Don’t Kubeba**”. He explains that the strategy proved to be an effective and economically viable way of dealing with political competitors who could afford to comprehensively outspend the opposition like the MMD did.

Simutanyi acknowledged the impact of the “**Don’t Kubeba**” slogan on the election outcome for the P.F. in his article “*Zambia votes for change*” when he was explaining why his opinion poll was off the mark. He pointed out that the P.F.’s “**Don’t Kubeba**” campaign, which spread like bush fire, may have discouraged P.F. supporters from disclosing their real voting intentions, suggesting that the undecided and those who did not disclose were P.F. voters. Clearly, it can be said that the slogan rallied many voters behind the P.F.

For Mwewa, there is no denying that “**Donchi Kubeba**” delivered results for the P.F. He argues that it was a strategy of defiant cooperation and not a corruption appeal as suggested by Dr Katele Kalumba and others. For him, the slogan was not only meant to counter MMD’s electoral fraud but also to dislodge the party from power and it appears it worked. In explaining the rationale or philosophy behind the slogan, Mwewa quoted Temfwe in the *The Post* newspaper of **October 2011** as having said the following:

The P.F. knew the MMD had considerable financial resources they could use to entice Zambians to vote for them. The MMD knew that high poverty levels creates great vulnerability, and that many Zambians would be sympathetic to and even vote for MMD if they received gifts. The MMD also knew that no one would ask about the source of funds. The strategy

was clear; the more gifts we give now, the more votes we get on polling day.

Alas the MMD strategy never worked for them because the P.F. decided to use the MMD strategy against the MMD party itself by devising "***Don't Kubeba***", a shrewd and effective strategy encouraging the electorate to engage in defiant "cooperation" with the then rulers. The electorate was encouraged to go along and get freebies or gifts from the government (which amounted to bribery), but not vote for them in the elections. Furthermore, in recognition of the role the slogan played in rallying the masses behind the P.F., President Sata honoured Wesley Chiremba, popularly known as Dandy Crazy, during independence celebrations in 2011, for his contribution in bringing the P.F. into government through his popular song "***Donchi Kubeba***".

It has also been observed by many political commentators that in most cases, those who break the labyrinth of status quo use catchy slogans. For instance, Mwewa (2011) observed that in 2008, the Obama camp in the United States of America (USA) won the election not on one but three slogans: "***No more of the same***", "***Yes we can***" and "***Change we can believe in***". Mwewa also pointed out that the MMD won the 1991 election using, "***The hour has come***" slogan. Sishuwa (2011) argued that if Barak Obama won the 2008 USA elections on a platform of "***Yes we can***", it might be said that Sata secured the 2011 Zambian elections using the "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan.

On the strategy of "defiant" cooperation, Dr. Katele Kalumba called the P.F "Don't Kubeba" slogan "a discourse of immorality and untruthfulness. He argued that the principle of the slogan condoned corruption. Some Christians also questioned the morality of the "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan. The adoption and practice of this slogan by the electorate, and the explanations given by the P.F. that after all the money being dished out was theirs as tax payers, apparently helped resolve the cognitive imbalance, or dissonance in them as they accepted gifts knowing they would not vote for the giver. Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory proposed that people have an inner drive to hold all their attitudes and beliefs in harmony and avoid disharmony. When tension arises inside someone, they attempt to reduce it through self-persuasion or trying to persuade others (ibid.). In the case

of the ***“Don’t kubeba”*** slogan, the electorate were persuaded by the P.F. to accept bribes or gifts from suspected MMD and government officials and told this was not wrong because they were getting their own money back. It seems this explanation rationalised and justified the registered voters’ behaviour and therefore it settled the imbalance in their hearts and souls.

Catchy slogans are memorable (Mwewa; 2011), and they make it easier for mass media to carry the message and set the agenda. They thus help in agenda-setting, which takes place when media prioritization of issues gets to be adopted by the audience as their own prioritization of issues, once the agenda is set (Cohen B; 1963).

6.4 Research question 4: How did ZNBC’s *“Stand up for Zambia”* documentary impact the Patriotic Front (P.F.) in Wusakile Constituency?

Regarding ZNBC’s *“Stand up for Zambia”* documentary, which seemingly supported the presidential candidate for the then ruling party, the MMD and demonised the presidential candidate of the then leading opposition party, the P.F. , our research has shown that the documentary was a blessing in disguise for the P.F. It made people sympathise with President Sata. He thus became popular as a result of the documentary. Many came to know about him and his political experience in Zambia. In fact, most of the respondents (Voters) did not believe the messages disseminated on this programme. They argued that it was malicious. Our study has shown that 63.5 percent of the respondents did not believe messages disseminated by the *“Stand up for Zambia”* documentary. Furthermore, this is in tandem with Carver’s (2002) study in Britain on *“where people get their election information”* which showed that the media do not have the influence they are believed to possess. The study further revealed that between one quarter and one third of television viewers switched channels when a party election broadcast started. This used to happen in Wusakile each time ZNBC aired the *“Stand up for Zambia”* documentary. Some respondents even used to switch off their TV sets. In addition, it was also found out in Britain that while the largest circulation newspaper, the Sun, supported the conservative party, its readership supported the labour party.

Deelen's study in Ukraine in 2001 also revealed the same pattern of electoral behaviour. The Electorate were sceptical towards the media which they accused of not being free. Nyambe also shows that even in Zimbabwe during a referendum and elections of 2000, the majority of voters favoured the opposition which was given minimal access to the media. This was also the case during the run up to the September 2011 elections in Zambia.

Furthermore, the electorate in Wusakile were selective in exposure, perception and retention of campaign messages disseminated to them. This kind of backlash tends to happen where there are negative messages on the media. Our study has shown that though the MMD, through ZNBC's "*Stand up for Zambia*" documentary preached that President Sata and the P.F. were homosexual, immature, undemocratic and violent, the electorate in Wusakile still voted for the P.F. and President Sata. This confirms that the media operates within a pre-existing structure of social relationships and a particular social and cultural context. It further shows that People had already decided to vote for President Sata and the Patriotic Front (P.F.).

6.5 Research question 5: What were the audience's perceptions of the Patriotic Front's 2011 election campaign?

Regarding the audience's perceptions of the P.F.'s 2011 election campaign and the party's communication strategy and channels, many acknowledged that the party's information dissemination to the electorate was better than other political parties. It resonated with the masses. Respondents were of the opinion that the P.F.'s communication strategy or *the what, who, why, when, how and where of conveying a message was effective*. Thus Communication strategies helped the party to propagate campaign information in a structured and controlled manner in order to infuse and win their audience.

Furthermore, the party's ideal communication strategy detailed the structure of information flow, the message, the correct audience to address, potential vehicles to carry the message, resources required to fulfil and feedback mechanisms to learn from the whole exercise. It seems the leadership of the P.F. understood this principle so well and thus they embraced and used it during their campaigns for the 2011 presidential elections.

As shown in the previous chapter, respondents were of the opinion that the most believable channel of communication for the electorate regarding P.F. activities in Wusakile constituency was Radio Icengelo, a community radio station owned by the Catholic Church on the Copperbelt. The radio station was and is still seen by many residents as a voice for the poor and voiceless. This was followed by The Post Newspaper which enjoys the most circulation nationwide. It is also seen by many people as a paper that digs not only deeper but also stands for the good of society. In The Post newspaper P.F. adverts and press statements were placed for Zambians to understand the party's plan of action for Zambia. Furthermore, respondents felt that the party manifesto which was also published in the paper helped people understand the P.F.'s vision of a "better Zambia for all". In addition, the "**Donchi Kubeba**" page with president sata urging voters to get the bribes from suspected MMD corrupt politicians but not to tell them that they won't vote for them infused many voters.



Figure 21: 'Mr. Michael Sata holding up his forefinger to his lips in the '**Don't Kubeba**' gesture. Source: P.F. Website.

It is also important to note that a good number of respondents who took part in this research had radio Phoenix as their most believable source of campaign information about the P.F. This radio station is seen by many members of Wusakile constituency as a voice for

the voiceless and down trodden. Many cited the radio station's "*let the people talk*" show as a case in point. The P.F. also used various communication strategies to communicate its vision to the electorate in order to win their support during the 2011 presidential election campaigns. In Wusakile constituency, respondents were of the opinion that the following strategies were employed by the P.F.: door to door campaigns; Mass rallies; opinion leaders; Press conferences; publishing party manifesto in newspapers; "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan; Radio and TV adverts; campaign vans; campaign songs and Posters among others.

On campaign songs, it is worth noting that the respondents' felt that the P.F. had solidly sound songs such as Ikeni Sata ateke, meaning let Sata rule; "***Donchi Kubeba***" (don't tell them); *tulefwaya ukuchinja ubuteko* (we want to change government); *Inkoloko* (clock); *tiyeni tuvotele* (let us vote); and *Zambia bali onaula* (they have destroyed Zambia).

These songs were played on both public and private buses. They were also played in bars and taverns. People easily identified with issues raised in these songs. For instance Dandy crazy's "***Donchi Kubeba***" bemoaned how some Zambians were living well while the majority were suffering amidst the copper boom. He also talked about high unemployment levels, corruption and lack of medicines in health facilities.

Furthermore, these campaign songs also portrayed Sata as caring, responsible and an honest man of action. MMD was seen as a very destructive party. Therefore citizens were urged to vote in large numbers for Sata and the P.F. because he had the political experience to move the Nation forward. The songs also talked about low taxes, more jobs and more money in people's pockets. These songs greatly resonated with the masses and hence their vote for president Sata.

Respondents also felt that another critical factor in the P.F.'s victory was President Sata's personality and character. Many voters saw him and still see him as one among them. He is seen as a man of the people. His ability to associate, identify with them and speak their language is something so amusing and a trait that has drawn many to him. This research has shown that 78 percent of the respondents in Wusakile were of the view that the P.F. won the presidency because president Sata identified with the needs of the people.

Munshya (2011) in his article "*Falling for the cobra's charm: Sata, populism and the condition of Zambian politics*" argues that:

Sata is liked because he is seen as a practical person. Robbed of complex theoretical analyses, Sata reduces everything around him to its utility. He is a utilitarian politician par-excellence. For him education should be able to translate into practical benefit.

Furthermore, respondents also perceived that he (President Michael Sata) and not Rupiah Banda or Hakainde Hichilema, cared about and would address the struggles and inequities of the middle class. This is because a close look at President Sata's previous assignments revealed that wherever he had been, he left indelible marks. This is probably why he has earned himself the "man of action" name. This also explains why there was jubilation from the time he was declared winner up to the inauguration ceremony. For the electorate, a "*better Zambia for all*" was now possible with the man of action in the driving seat. In addition, the respondents were also of the opinion that the P.F.'s historic victory was due in part to a good communication strategy. Our research has demonstrated that 67.8 percent of the respondents were agreeable to this. It seems this strategy ensured that a simple message was communicated to potential voters among the masses in order to woo them. And it worked.

Regarding the use of the internet by the P.F. to reach out to the electorate, only 20.0 percent of the respondents were of the opinion that the Party used it. However, it seems most of the electorates in Wusakile did not have access to the internet for them to access the Manifesto; Party constitution and announcements for upcoming events. The use of this strategy was not very effective in this constituency in that internet access is still a preserve of a privileged few. This confirms Windeck Frank's (2010) argument that at present despite the growing importance of new media, political communication in Southern Africa generally takes place via the traditional media channels.

Some respondents were of the view that Intimidation and threats of violence were common between P.F. and MMD cadres. This was not only witnessed in Wusakile where 27 percent

of the respondents felt that the P.F. used intimidation and threats of violence during their campaigns in the 2011 general elections. For instance in Luapula province, Chief Mushota instructed his indunas to ban support of the P.F. In Mwansabombwe, Mwata Kazembe warned his subjects against attending P.F. rallies. There had also been a number of sporadic, localised and small-scale clashes between supporters of political parties in Lusaka and Namwala in Southern province (E.U.E.O.M; 2011). Despite all these threats, people still voted for President Sata and the P.F.

The P.F. also used opinion leaders and king makers to woo support from the electorate. This was confirmed in our research where 35.7 percent of the respondents were of the view that the P.F. used it. These opinion leaders were used in both rural and urban constituencies. Sishuwa argues that Sata's prospects in rural constituencies, which he had previously lost to MMD, were brightened by the defections to the P.F. of several kingmakers and former cabinet ministers from the MMD who helped Banda to victory in 2008 such as Mbita Chitala, Sylvia Masebo, Lameck Mangani, Mike Mulongoti and George Mpombo. Another important personality who campaigned for Sata and the P.F. was Panji Kaunda who had even formed an organisation called People's Pact Forum (P.P.F.). These influential political entrepreneurs not only improved the electoral fortunes of President Sata and the P.F. but also weakened some of the MMD's rural bases. Catholic priests also played a significant role in President Sata's victory. These openly encouraged their members in parishes to vote for the P.F. and President Sata. An extreme example is Frank Bwalya, who even got leave from pastoral duties in order to and engage in politics, and campaign for the P.F.

Furthermore, it has also been shown through this research that door to door campaigns were used by the P.F. 32.2 percent of the respondents acknowledged that the P.F. used door to door campaign strategy to woo support from the electorate. Interpersonal communication of this type is very productive. It is said to be the most effective channel for the persuasion to take place (Wood, J.T; 1997).

Mass rallies were yet another strategy employed by the P.F. to win the good will of the people regarding the vision of a better Zambia for all. Our research has shown in chapter five that 91.0 percent of the respondents felt this strategy played a significant role in the

P.F.'s historic victory. In analysing Sata's win over the MMD, many political observers like Sishuwa acknowledge that one of the key factors that explain Sata's victory was his relentless campaign in between elections to keep the P.F. political fire burning. For instance soon after the results of the 2008 elections were announced and as he had done in 2001 and 2006, President Sata commenced his presidential campaigns even before the ink had dried on the thumbs of the electorate. This had been seen by some as a ploy to destabilise the MMD. However it was not meant for that as it came to be seen later. In fact through these campaigns, he kept the MMD in check.

Campaign vans were also instrumental in that 75.7 percent of the respondents said that the P.F. used campaign vans to communicate its vision of a better Zambia for all. These vans moved from one end of Wusakile constituency to the other playing P.F. campaign songs.

94.8 percent of the informants responded in the affirmative that the P.F won because people wanted change. This is because people were fed-up of MMD's 20 year rule which did not in large measure translate into noticeable upward mobility of many people. This strong desire for change was synonymous with what happened in 1991 when the MMD removed UNIP from political office. Thus, the P.F rode on the good will of the people who were selective in exposure, perception and retention of campaign messages in Wusakile constituency. The most applicable theory here was Rogers' diffusion of innovation which acknowledges people's perceptions of an innovation as an important factor in the adoption process. Rogers argued that people are likely to adopt an innovation when they believe it will benefit their endeavours. It seems the electorate perceived that President Sata cared about them and would address their struggles and suffering. It must be mentioned here that the MMD did not seem to care about the welfare of the general citizenry and the plight of exploited employees both in public and private institutions.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed research findings of chapter five. It was divided into five main sections according to the research questions; applicable theory and literature. Section one focused on key political messages disseminated to the electorate. This part has

demonstrated that the P.F.'s prominent campaign message to the electorate of redemption from poverty, corruption, lack of opportunities and employment, heavy taxes that are unbearable and a very high cost of living *and change in ninety days* was critical in securing their victory.

Section two focused on major communication challenges faced by the Patriotic Front (P.F.) during its 2011 election campaign. Lack of access to the public media was the major challenge faced by the P.F. Section three focused on the perceived role of the "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan (song) in the P.F.'s historic victory. This study has demonstrated that the "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan played a significant role in the P.F.'s historic victory. It was a policy of defiant cooperation. The slogan not only countered suspected MMD's electoral fraud but also dislodged the party from power.

The perceived impact of ZNBC's "***Stand up for Zambia***" documentary on the P.F. in Wusakile ward was explained in section four. Our study has shown that the documentary was a blessing in disguise for the P.F. Section five discussed the audience's perceptions of the P.F.'s 2011 election campaign. It has been shown that the P.F. understood the mood for change in the nation very well and therefore devised a message that could easily capture people's hearts and souls.

From respondent's answers, the P.F.'s message of hope to the voters and president Sata's consistent articulation of this campaign message was their winning formula in the 2011 presidential elections. The "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan was the icing of the cake. It gave life to P.F.'s campaign promises.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

7.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conclusion and recommendations that derive from the findings of the study. It is divided into two sections. Section one is a discussion of the conclusions of the study where we argue that *“lower taxes, more jobs and more money in your pockets and change in ninety days”* was the P.F.’s winning formula in political communication while the second section is a discussion of some recommendations to the party under study. An example of the recommendations made entails political leaders to always understand the needs of people in various regions of the country and finding ways of communicating about, and working to meet such needs.

7.2 Conclusion

This study has investigated the impact of P.F.’s campaign promises on the electorate; determined audience perceptions of the P.F.’s 2011 election campaign; the perceived influence of the *“Donchi Kubeba”* slogan on voters; determined the perceived impact of ZNBC’s *“Stand up for Zambia”* documentary on P.F.’s campaigns and assessed the effectiveness of communication strategies and channels used by the P.F. during the 2011 elections. The study has also shown that President Sata’s visit to Oxford University as guest lecturer before the September 2011 tripartite election improved his international reputation and that of the party. The international community saw him as one with genuine concern for his country and people (ibid.).

Furthermore, the study has demonstrated that people were influenced to vote for the P.F. because of its campaign promises. Campaign messages of hope such as lower taxes, more jobs and more money in your pockets and change within ninety days were very critical in the party’s sweet victory after being in the opposition for ten years. It seems that the P.F. understood the mood for change in the country very well and carefully rode on the good will of the people.

Furthermore, our research has demonstrated that the P.F.'s 2011 election campaign was better than other political parties. There was a campaign that resonated with the masses. In addition, 97.4 percent of the respondents in our study were of the opinion that the "***Donchi kubeba***" slogan was very instrumental in the P.F.'s victory. It rallied voters behind the P.F. The slogan was the icing of the P.F. cake of a "*better Zambia for all*".

Regarding ZNBC's "***Stand up for Zambia***" documentary, our research has shown that the documentary was a blessing in disguise for the P.F. It made people sympathise with president Sata. He thus became popular as a result of the documentary. Many came to know about him and his political experience in Zambia. In fact most of the respondents (Voters) did not believe the messages disseminated on this programme. They argued that it was malicious.

When determining P.F.'s winning formula in political communication, some people felt that the "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan was the winning formula on its own, while others were of the view that it was the campaign message and Sata's consistency in articulating this message. It is true that the slogan played a significant role in the P.F.'s historic victory. However, calling it as a winning formula is inaccurate. People wanted change during this time. Taking advantage of People's mood for change in the country, the P.F. devised a campaign message that resonated with the masses and various categories of voters.

Their message of hope to the electorate was their winning formula. The message was a "*better Zambia for all*" where there were lower taxes, more jobs and more money in peoples' pockets. The P.F. also had a good communication strategy to reach out to the electorate in Wusakile constituency. Radio Icengelo was the most believable source of campaign information for the P.F. The Post was the second most believed source. It gave more coverage to the Patriotic Front (P.F.) than other political parties. These two media played a significant role in propelling president Sata to state house.

7.3 Recommendations

In view of the findings of the study on the P.F.'s winning formula in political communication, in Wusakile Constituency, the following recommendations are presented:

7.3.1 There is need by political leaders to always understand the needs of people in various regions of the country and finding ways of communicating about, and working to meet such needs. The P.F. seems to have done exceptionally well in this regard, as they prepared for the 2011 elections.

7.3.2 Political Parties are advised that experimenting with campaign strategies should be done carefully and cautiously. If something worked in the past, it may be advisable to keep using until it stops working. The MMD's decision before the elections to change teams, and drop more experienced politicians, and bring in inexperienced ones like Boniface Kawimbe to head the 2011 national campaign team may have been the beginning of their losing. Family members of the President may feel strongly about issues, but they may not be a match for the cunning and expertise of experienced campaigners (Chigunta, 2011).

7.3.3 Political parties are reminded that the National Campaign committee is critical and should therefore be selected carefully through broad consultations from all stakeholders.

7.3.4 Campaign materials and money alone do not win elections as MMD appears to have assumed in 2011. Researched, carefully crafted and targeted messages focussed on real needs of the people, are critical to winning the hearts and souls of voters.

7.3.5 Rallies may be good for political morale, but they must be backed by an accurate assessment of the situation on the ground so that the message given resonates with the needs of voters.

7.3.6 Voters perception about a given party is more important than reality. Always deal with negative sentiments from your critics in the most transparent ways. If a political party is perceived to be tribal, they are clearly in trouble if they do not tackle the problem, and be seen to seriously do so.

7.3.7 Political Parties are advised that they should always consolidate their home base first, and then boldly seek to gain ground in other areas where they are weak.

7.3.8 Parties should properly manage their relations with the media. The media is critical in helping the party to be known by potential voters. The media should never be an enemy, as one party seemed to think, when they openly said they would never permit some sections of the media to cover them anymore. Doing so, is to deny the party some of the “oxygen of publicity” so critical to winning an election.

7.3.9 Political parties should also have registers of all their registered voters in each polling station. This will help them determine their chances of winning an election with certainty, and also make it easier to resist the potential of rigging.

7.3.10 There is need to establish communication systems that reach out to people of low socio-economic status. The P.F. showed their special nature and care, when they reached out to the poorest of the poor at the grassroots, and they were rewarded by the positive response in the vote, and the massive turnout at the President’s inauguration.

7.3.11 Using a variety of communication channels, including inter-personal communication to reach out to electorate is also very important.

7.3.12 There is also need not to antagonise opinion leaders in communities. Work with them at all costs and times.

7.3.13 There is need for political parties to engage in continuous civic and voter education well ahead of elections in order to address the high levels of voter apathy and also to acquaint people with the party programmes and the content of their manifestos.

7.3.14 Political parties, their leaders and candidates are advised to be more proactive in promoting peaceful elections, transparency, and national unity of purpose, and to condemn violence.

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APPENDIX

1 INDEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE FOR P.F. OFFICIALS

Instructions

1. Introduction
2. Explain purpose of interview
3. Get verbal consent
4. Assure respondent of confidentiality
5. Interview
6. Thanking the respondent for participation

Interview guide

1. For how long have you been in the Patriotic Front (P.F.)?
2. What made you join the P.F.?
3. What is your position in the P.F.?
4. How did the P.F. promote political education within the party in preparation for the 2011 elections?
5. How did the P.F. promote political education outside the party in preparation for 2011 elections?
6. How effective has the party been in educating the public about political issues?
7. What communication channels do you use to disseminate political information within the party?
8. What communication channels do you use to disseminate political information to the electorate?
9. What communication challenges did you face during your 2011 campaigns?
10. Were individual members of the party conversant with various programmes and policies of the party regarding the 2011 elections?
11. Was the media of help in the dissemination of political information for your party during your campaigns? If so, state the ones you used for your campaigns.
12. What kind of information is usually contained in your campaign materials?

13. What kind of campaign materials did you use for your campaigns?
14. Do you think ZNBC's "*stand up for Zambia programme*" worked to the advantage of President Sata and the P.F.?
15. As a party, do you have a clearly defined communication policy?
16. To what would you attribute the P.F.'s victory for the Presidential elections?
17. Did the failure of the *UPND-P.F.* pact affect the outcome of elections? How?
18. What role did the "*Don't Kubeba*" slogan play in P.F.'s historic victory?
19. Would you say that the "*Donchi Kubeba*" song played a role in the P.F.'s victory? Why do you think like that?
20. How do you think President Sata's *visit to Oxford University as guest lecturer before* the September Tripartite elections impact on 2011 elections?

2 INDEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE FOR DR KAUNDA

Instructions

1. Introduction
2. Explain purpose of interview
3. Get verbal consent
4. Assure respondent of confidentiality
5. Interview
6. Thanking the respondent for participation

Interview guide

1. How do you feel about President Sata and the P.F.'s victory during last years' elections?
2. Dr Kaunda, why did you attend the P.F.'s general conference in Kabwe last year? Was it a sign that you had endorsed President Sata?
3. What are your thoughts about the P.F.'s historic victory in the last Presidential elections?

4. How would you explain people's jubilation from the time President Sata was declared winner up to the inauguration ceremony?
5. What was contained in the P.F.'s campaign messages that drew you close to them?
6. Were the elections free and fair?
7. To what would you attribute the P.F.'s historic victory in the last Presidential elections?
8. Dr Kaunda, what do you think was the impact of ZNBC's "*Stand up for Zambia*" programme on election campaigns for the P.F.?
9. What do you think was the impact of the failure of the UPND-PF pact on 2011 election campaigns and results?
10. What do you think were the major weaknesses and strength of the Party in power during election campaigns?

3 INDEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE FOR OTHER STAKEHOLDERS (FODEP, UPND, EFZ and Dr. OUMO)

Instructions

1. Introduction
2. Explain purpose of interview
3. Get verbal consent
4. Assure respondent of confidentiality
5. Interview
6. Thanking the respondent for participation

Interview guide

1. Would you say that the September 20 elections were free and fair?
2. What are your thoughts about the P.F.'s victory in the Presidential elections?
3. Did you at any time think that the P.F. would win the elections?
4. To what would you attribute the P.F.'s victory in the 2011 elections?

5. What was contained in the P.F.'s campaign messages to the electorate?
6. Did the Media play any role in the P.F.'s victory in the last elections? If so, state the media that were instrumental in PF's victory.
7. What did the P.F. do right this time for them to win the Presidential elections?
8. What was the role of the "***Don't Kubeba***" slogan and "***Donchi Kubeba***" song in the P.F.'s victory?
9. What do you think was the impact of ZNBC's "***Stand up for Zambia***" programme on election campaigns for the P.F.?
10. Do you think the P.F. won the elections because they were preaching to an already converted audience?
11. Do you think the **P.F.'s** promise to change Zambia for the better within 90 days had a role in the outcome of the elections?
12. How do you explain people's jubilation from the time President Sata was declared winner up to the inauguration ceremony?
13. What do you think was the impact of the failure of the UPND-PF pact on 2011 election campaigns and results?

4 QUESTIONNAIRES FOR THE ELECTORATE IN WUSAKILE CONSTITUENCY IN KITWE

Serial NO. _____

Introduction

Dear respondent,

I am a student of Communication for Development at the University of Zambia conducting a research regarding communication strategies used by the Patriotic Front to win the September 2011 Presidential elections.

Please kindly fill in this questionnaire. Your responses will be kept highly confidential and will only be used for academic purposes.

Specific Instruction:

Tick in the appropriate box provided for you next to the answer of your choice or write in the space underlined where your opinion or comment is required.

Thank you

Smart Sakala

Section A: General information

- | | | | |
|----|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. | Sex | 1. Female | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | | 2. Male | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. | Age | 1. 18 to 35 years | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | | 2. 36 to 49 years | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | | 3. 50 years and above | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. | What Tribe are you.....? | | |

4. Level of education
- 1 Primary education
- 2 Secondary education
- 3 College graduate
- 4 University graduate
5. Are you in formal employment?
- 1 Yes
- 2 No
6. Who did you vote for in last year's presidential elections if you participated.....?

Section B: Communication channels and strategies

7. How would you rate the quality of political communication to the electorate by the Patriotic Front during the 2011 elections?

- 1 Poorly done
- 2 Very well

8. Through which media did you as an electorate hear about the Patriotic Front's activities and programmes? [tick all that applies to you]

- 1 Radio Icengelo
- 2 Radio Phoenix
- 3 ZNBC radio two
- 4 ZNBC TV
- 5 *Times of Zambia*
- 6 Daily mail
- 7 Post newspaper
- 8 Campaign Vans
- 9 Internet

To what extent would you agree or disagree that the Patriotic Front used the following communication strategies to communicate its vision to the electorates in order to win their support?

Strategy	Strongly agree (1)	Agree (2)	Not sure (3)	Disagree (4)	Strongly disagree (5)
9. Door to door campaigns.					
10. Mass rallies.					
11. Opinion leaders.					
12. Press conferences.					
13. Publishing Party manifesto in newspapers.					
14. Don't Kubeba slogan					
15. Radio and TV adverts.					
16. Intimidating Competitors.					
17 Billboards					
18. Posters					
19 Use of Internet					
20 Campaign Vans					

21. How would you rate the Patriotic Front's information dissemination to the electorates in comparison with other political parties?

- 1 As good as others
- 2 Better than others
- 3 Worse than others

22. Are you familiar with the Patriotic Front's Party manifesto?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

23. If YES to question 22 above, how did you learn about the Manifesto?(Tick all that applies to you).

- 1. Radio Icengelo
- 2. Radio Phoenix
- 3. ZNBC radio two
- 4. ZNBC TV
- 5. *Times of Zambia*
- 6. Daily mail
- 7. Post newspaper
- 8. Campaign Vans
- 9. Internet

24. Did you believe the messages disseminated on ZNBC's stand up for Zambia programme about President Sata and the Patriotic Front?

- 1 No
- 2 Yes
- 3 Neutral

25. Explain your answer to question 24 above.....

26. Do you think people were influenced to vote for the Patriotic Front and President Sata by the "Donchii Kubeba" song?

- 1 Yes
- 2 Not sure
- 3 No

27. Explain your answer to question 26 above.....

28. Do you think the "Don't Kubeba slogan" influenced people to vote for President Sata and the Patriotic Front?

- 1 Not sure
- 2 No
- 3 Yes

29. Explain your answer to question 28 above.....

.....

30. Which of the following was your most believable source of campaign information about the Patriotic Front?(Tick only one)

- 1 Radio Icengelo
- 2 Radio Phoenix
- 3 ZNBC radio two
- 4 ZNBC TV
- 5 *Times of Zambia*
- 6 Daily mail
- 7 Post newspaper
- 8 Campaign Vans
- 9 Internet

31. What do you think was the major challenge which the Patriotic Front faced during its campaigns.....

.....

Section C: Campaign messages

Cross out or tick the response that most closely describes your view point for each statement given bellow.

Statement	Strongly agree (1)	Agree (2)	Not Sure (3)	Disagree (4)	Strongly disagree (5)
32. The P.F. won Presidential elections because they promised free Health services and education for all.					
33. The P.F. won because					

they promised a rigorous fight against corruption.					
34. The P.F. won because they had an effective communication strategy to reach out to people.					
35. The P.F. won because they promised to come up with a new constitution that reflects the will and aspirations of the people.					
36. The P.F. won because they promised low taxes and more money in people's pockets.					
37. The P.F. won because it promised electorates that things would change for the better within 90 days of assuming power.					
38. The P.F. won Presidential elections because President Sata identified with the needs of the people.					
39. The P.F. won Presidential elections because people wanted change.					
40. The P.F. won because they promised to create employment opportunities.					
41. The P.F. won because they promised Press freedom					

42. The P.F. won because MMD stopped listening to people					
43. The P.F. won because MMD had become too corrupt					

Thank you for answering the questions.