

THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

ETHNIC GROUPS' INTERESTS AND ZAMBIA'S POLICY ON THE
DECOLONIZATION OF ANGOLA,
1965 - 1980

BY

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DECLARATION

This dissertation was written and submitted in accordance with the rules and regulations governing the award of the Master of Arts Degree of the University of Zambia. I further declare that the dissertation has, neither in part nor in whole, been presented as a substance for award of any degree neither to this or to any other University. Where other people's work has been drawn upon, acknowledgement has been made.

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DEDICATION

Dedicated to my wife Kasmia Chongo Musonda, to my children and to the memory of my father, Dismas Kalunga (Kababe) Sampa, and my mother Ndelefina Mulenga Kalema (Chisoka) Mutale - Mukulu.

APPROVAL

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ABSTRACT

The main objective of the study is to explain Zambia's policy on the decolonisation of Angola by examining the role played by members of ethnic groups living along the country's border with Angola in policy making. The study will analyse relationships between Zambia and Angola's liberation movements during the struggle for independence, and its position on the Angolan conflict from 1965 to 1980.

The concentration is mainly on three policy issues. These are: (one), the issue of a government of national unity in Angola; (two), preference for West-oriented liberation movements and (three), the problem of foreign intervention in the Angola civil war.

The study is guided by the hypothesis that: the pursuit of interests of the ethnic groups living along Zambia/Angola border, by members of these groups involved in policy making bodies of the party and its government, contributed to tilting Zambia's policy towards Angolan liberation movements away from the policy of evenhandedness to one of preference for UNITA and the FNLA.

Accordingly, it determined the extent to which the ethnic groups sympathised with liberation movements in Angola. Out of a sample of 100 people from these groups, sixty were interviewed. These were chosen from, village headmen, provincial and district party officials, leaders of church organisations, businessmen and ordinary people. These people were asked to identify the

liberation movements they supported in Angola and to give the reasons for their support.

These interviews focussed mainly on three reasons for such support. These are: security - such as fear of harassment by movements active in Angola near border areas; economic - like the risk of losing economic benefits; and lastly social - such as family ties with people across the border.

To analyse the ethnic group's influence on Zambia's policy with respect to the above mentioned policy issues, two main approaches were followed: Firstly, interviews were conducted with members of these groups who were on the following policy making bodies of the party and government; the House of Chiefs, village committees; ward committees; provincial development committees; sub-committees of the National Council and of the party congress; the Legal and Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of the Central Committee; Zambia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its African Affairs Political Desk; Parliament; the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Cabinet and State House. Secondly, collection of data by examining records of the proceedings of these institutions regarding Zambia's policy were also done.

Other sources of information included were: Records of Zambia/Angola historical events from newspapers and periodicals. Records in the United National Independence Party (UNIP) political Museum; Ministry of Foreign Affairs communique and press releases; texts of speeches delivered by the President of Zambia on

the decolonisation of Angola for the periods under study; commu-
niques released by liberation movements; the Party Congress of
the National Council and by the Chairman of the Political, Legal
and Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of the Central Committee;
refugee committee documents of the Refugee Committee under Cabi-
net Office, OAU liberation committee documents and National
Assembly Hansards.

The study shows that the policy of evenhandedness was not
consistently followed over the period under review. In practice
Zambia's policy covertly continued to prefer UNITA and the FNLA.
This basically put her on the same side as the United States of
America and to less extent, the Republic of South Africa.

The study further shows that in general Zambian ethnic
groups in areas along the border with Angola perceived that
supporting UNITA and the FNLA was consistent with their inter-
ests. Therefore, they made attempts through opposition parties
and through people from their areas who were on the policy making
bodies of the ruling UNIP and the Government, among other media,
to make Zambia adopt a policy showing preference for the two
movements. It is therefore, concluded that it is likely that
ethnic group pressure was among the factors that made Zambia not
to follow the policy of evenhandedness consistently and to cov-
ertly show preference for UNITA and to less extent, for the FNLA.

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However, full responsibility for any short-coming of this study, that may be noted by the reader is mine.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.01 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Zambia gained her independence in 1964 without resorting to armed struggle. However, in close collaboration with Tanzania, she became, involved in supporting the liberation movements of Angola, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Mozambique and Namibia. Although in each of these countries all the movements were involved in the armed struggle against colonial governments and against white minority rule, as the case may be, there were important differences among them. In Angola the Movimento Popula de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) followed a Marxist - oriented ideology and was committed to socialist transformation of the society. In contrast, the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) and the Frente National de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) were pro-West in their ideological orientation.

In supporting the liberation movements in Angola, Zambia faced two problems, among others. These were: (one) which movement to support, given their ideological and other differences, and (two) supporting the liberation movements entailed the risk of military retaliation by the Portuguese colonial regime. With respect to the first problem, Zambia chose a policy of evenhandedness in principle. She also chose to remain steadfast

in supporting the liberation struggle in spite of the security risks this entailed.

The policy of evenhandedness was particularly put to test just before and during the civil war that preceded Angola's independence. In this period, South Africa was colluding with the FNLA and UNITA against the MPLA. On May 31st, 1975 Daniel Chipenda of the FNLA, who had deserted the MPLA, consulted for three days with the Director of the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) Hendrick Van Den Bergh¹.

In July the same year Holden Roberto, also of the FNLA, met with South African officials in Kinshasa, while Dr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA travelled to South Africa. Soon after these visits South Africa began to establish military training facilities in Southern Angola for UNITA and the FNLA. Arms, financial aid and equipment were also supplied by the South Africans to the two movements. This exercise was supported by the United States and her allies. In the late fall of 1975, the United States at last dragged herself into the conflict when she condemned Cuba's military involvement in Angola, while at the same time remaining silent on the activities of South Africans. She was tacitly supported by Tanzania, Botswana, and Zambia, all of which also favoured the policy of detente with South Africa. Zaire, Senegal and the Ivory Coast supported the position of the United States of America openly. Together with these independent African states, UNITA, and the FNLA formed a tacit alliance against the MPLA².

On one hand, the main objective of this alliance was the formation of a pro-West government in Angola from which the MPLA would be excluded. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, and the MPLA were working toward the formation of a Marxist-oriented MPLA government excluding other movements.

Subsequently, Zambia delayed recognition of the new government formed by the MPLA at the time of Angola's independence. However, some countries which had been in the same camp with her, for example, the Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Botswana recognised the new Government before she did.

1.02 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Therefore, in practice, Zambia did not follow the policy of evenhandedness during the war in Angola. The question to be asked is: What factors influenced her policy on the decolonisation of Angola? The problem of this study is therefore, to explain why the principle of evenhandedness was not followed in practice in Zambia's relationships with Angola's liberation movements. The period to be covered is from 1965 to 1980. This period is chosen for study, because it is when the important events that affected Zambia's policy of evenhandedness towards Angola liberation movements which included the breakout of the civil war occurred. The different Angolan liberation movements which took part in the civil war drew their main support from different ethnic groups.

The Zambia/Angola border cuts across some of these ethnic groups. Mass support for the MPLA came mainly from Mestico (People of Euro-African ancestry), the urban Mbundu and other ethnic groups. Before the civil war, the movement was strongest around the capital Luanda, Nova Redondo, Porto Amboim, Santo de Zaire, and in the Cabinda Enclave. Most of these places are along the Atlantic coast of Angola. For UNITA, mass support came mainly from Ovimbundu, Lwena, Chokwe, Lunda, Luvale, Mbunda and Luchazi. These were primarily rural ethnic groups which were concentrated in Luanda, Zaire, Uige, Cuanza Norte, Moxico and Cuando Cubango (on the border with Zambia), Bie, Benguela, Huambo, Cunene and Mocamedes (border with Namibia). The FNLA's popular support came mainly from one major ethnic group the Bakongo of Bakongo Province which is on the border with Zaire.³

It is clear that, only in the case of UNITA where we have the Zambia/Angola border cutting across many ethnic groups supporting it. The problem is: to what extent did members of such ethnic groups on the Zambian side of the border sympathise with UNITA? How far and in what ways did they try to influence Zambia's policy so that she could favour UNITA?

1.03 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of the study are:

To contribute towards explaining Zambia's policy on the decolonisation of Angola, with reference to three policy issues. These are: (1) the issue of a government of national unity in Angola; (2) preference for west-oriented liberation movements; (3) the problem of foreign intervention in the Angola civil war.

To discuss how the ethnic groups living along Zambia-Angola border influenced Zambia's policy.

To analyse the nature of the relationships that existed between Zambia and different liberation groups in Angola and the extent to which this was affected by the interests of Zambian ethnic groups living along the border with Angola.

1.04 REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

Among the texts dealing with interpretation of Zambia's policy towards the decolonisation of Angola are those of D.G. Anglin and Shaw⁴, A.J. Klighoffer⁵, the IISS⁶ and I. Kaplan⁷.

Anglin and Shaw explain that Zambia's policy towards the decolonisation of Angola was influenced by presidentialism and the ideology of humanism, both of which are rooted in the principles of Christianity, Pan-Africanism, representative government and in non-alignment. They suggest that Zambia wanted a

government of national unity in Angola because a military victory by any of the movements was not possible. This meant that none of the three movements, UNITA, MPLA or FNLA, would rule Angola on its own.

Early in 1975 a broad consensus on power sharing as a means of facilitating peaceful change of government from Portuguese colonial rule to independence in Angola existed in the Western and Eastern world alike, among Angolan liberation movements, as well as OAU member states. Similarly, there was consensus about the recognition of the three liberation movements as legitimate representatives of the Angolan people.

The idea of power sharing or a government of national unity held a special appeal for Zambia. Anglin and Shaw say that not only did it offer the prospect of a common front of Angolan nationalist movements, but it also held an historical parallel in Zambia's decolonisation process and post colonial political history⁸. On Zambia's support for UNITA, Anglin and Shaw suggest that this was aimed at ensuring equality in bargaining power and position among the rival movements in view of the advanced military aid the MPLA was receiving from the USSR, Cuba, East Germany, Guinea and Poland⁹. In contrast Shaw and Mugomba suggest that Zambia was undecided in the Angola liberation struggle because she and South Africa wanted a liberal government in Angola. They further suggest that Zambia feared that if a radical regime came to power in Angola, Zambia's collaboration with international capitalism was likely to be challenged¹⁰.

Anglin, Shaw and Molteno argue that there was a coincidence of interests between Zambia and South Africa on the problem of the decolonisation of Angola¹¹. However, according to them, this did not mean that Zambia had changed her policy and recognised the legitimacy of racist South Africa before majority rule was established there. South Africa wanted to be accepted by black states, including an independent Angola; and later become a member of OAU, without demolishing apartheid and without withdrawing from Namibia which it illegally occupies¹².

Shaw and Mugomba¹³ and Ericksen¹⁴ argue that there was a close correspondence of interest between Zambia's "political class" and international corporations on the decolonisation of Angola. They also suggest that a major imperative behind Zambia's diplomacy was the interest of its "ruling class" in maintaining its international trade links and continuing to exploit its regional economic potential. They also argue that formal understanding appeared to have been reached by South Africa and Zambia on supporting the emergence of "moderate" regimes in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. They further suggest that Zambia's diplomacy in Southern Africa also reflected the interest of its new "ruling class" in the maintaining its own affluence and political power.

Tordoff disagrees with the view that Zambia was ambivalent towards the decolonisation of Southern Africa, Angola included, because of the existence of a ruling class that worked to maintain its links with international capitalist interest. He states

that such arguments overlook the intense nationalism of the Zambian leadership and the country's record in the liberation struggle¹⁵.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Klinghoffer, state that Zambia's unofficial preference for UNITA during the liberation struggle and the Angolan civil war seriously affected the country's political and economic position. The vital Benguela-Lobito railway line ran through the territories controlled by UNITA and MPLA during the 1975 Angolan civil war. Therefore, in the event of a partition of Angola, to be able to use the Benguela-Lobito railway line, Zambia would have depended not only on UNITA, but on MPLA goodwill as well. However, if the MPLA won recognition as the legitimate government of Angola and secured towns along the railway line, (even if it did not hold the country side around it), then Zambia's support for UNITA would almost certainly antagonise the MPLA to the point that it would deny her access to the port of Lobito. The IISS suggests further that, Zambia also faced additional political and economical pressure because her outlets to Dar-es-Salaam and Mombasa via the Tazara railway and to Nacala via Malawi, were controlled by Tanzania and Mozambique both of which were at that time (1975) fully committed to the cause of the MPLA. Using the only alternative railway through Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) would have been politically embarrassing for Zambia. Zambia's credibility among independent African states had already been hurt because of her role in dialogue with South Africa¹⁶.

The other assertion by the IISS is that Zambia's tendency to favour the UNITA/FNLA alliance had arisen partially from the MPLA's close association with the Soviet Union. This was because although Zambia was anxious about full foreign intervention in Angola, she feared especially the spread of Soviet influence in that country. However, according to the IISS, further overt or covert support for UNITA would have probably been counter-productive in that it would have increased MPLA dependence on the Soviet Union, and could also have encouraged, a victorious MPLA to make life difficult for Zambia. The IISS points out that this could have as well strengthened Sino-Soviet competition¹⁷.

Dobert, states that in June 1967 the President of Zambia asked Savimbi to close his Lusaka office because of UNITA attack on Teixeira de Sousa in December, 1966 and for another attack in March 1967 that cut the Benguela railway. He adds that Zambia found itself in a difficult and ambiguous position, which gave it little room for manoeuvre with respect to Angola. He also points out that Zambia's dependence on the Benguela railway and her ideological orientation was closer to Savimbi's than to Neto's. This in addition caused Zambia in the early 1970's to support UNITA, which controlled some of the territory traversed by Benguela railway. Dobert further suggests that this explains why the MPLA which had an office in Lusaka since 1965, moved to Brazzaville in 1968¹⁸.

The interpretations advanced by Anglin and Shaw, Shaw and Mugomba, the IISS, Klinghoffer, Dobert and others, give only a partial explanation of Zambia's policy on the decolonization of Angola. Similarly, literature reviewed above focuses mainly on geographical, military and economic determinants of Zambia's foreign policy. The question that needs to be answered is, what other factors influenced Zambia's policy on the decolonization of Angola?

The work of Mackay and Saxena suggests that the influence of ethnic groups could be another determinant of Zambia's policy. McKay concludes that foreign policy is largely a projection of domestic policies influenced by ethnic groups, or political parties¹⁹. This shows that the study of foreign policies of African countries towards their neighbours requires a much greater understanding of domestic determinants.

Saxena argues that, the domestic settings as stated above, among others, include internal political pressure exerted by various groups. Included in these groups are, influential tribal or ethnic ones, living along the borders of such countries, which no formulator of African policy cannot afford to disregard. It is the influence of such groups on Zambia's policy that this thesis will examine²⁰.

1.05 HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis of this study is that, the pursuit of interests of the ethnic groups living along the Zambia/Angola border contributed to tilting Zambia's policy towards Angolan liberation movements away from the policy of evenhandedness to one of preference for UNITA and the FNLA.

1.06 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study will be guided by Saxena's theory according to which another important determinant of the foreign policies of African States is the pressure exercised by various ethnic groups living along their countries border²¹. Saxena adds that African states do not have organised political lobbies as they exist in West European countries. Nevertheless there are some very important pressure groups in these states which exercise significant influence upon their foreign policies and among them are ethnic pressure groups which according to him, are the military, the youth leaders, influential tribal or ethnic groups and leaders of trade union organisations. He therefore further suggest that none of these states can completely ignore the interests of ethnic groups living in other areas when formulating its policies toward neighbouring countries.

Saxena adds that the ethnic groups influence the foreign policies of African countries through the decisions made by their members belonging to the military group, youth leaders within the ruling party and those in trade union organisations, among others. He also adds that the military as a pressure group influences foreign policy through direct professional participation in national policy formulation.

The theory outlined above is appropriate to be used as a theoretical framework for the analysis of the influence of the ethnic groups in border areas of Zambia's policy towards neighbouring countries. The United National Independence Party (UNIP)

and its government's policy of ensuring regional representation and ethnic group balancing in making appointments to public policy making bodies, gives representatives of these groups, potential to have an impact on policy outcomes.

1.07 DEFINITION OF TERMS

The following definitions, unless otherwise stated apply:-

Foreign Policy: While the term foreign policy is used with different meanings by different people, in this study it will mean a country's national interests used to economically and politically, influence other states in order to induce them to exercise their law making powers in a manner desired by the state concerned, Northedge²².

Influence: Will be considered as the capacity to affect the decisions of others. Power and influence are inextricably related. Power becomes important in conflictual situations, whereas influence is central both in circumstances of conflict and in cooperative relationships. Power in this case will be used to identify all influence, whether coercive or non-coercive, Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff Jr²³.

Ethnic Group: Will refer to a tribal group of people corresponding to some logical geographical or linguistic unit; in which family and tribal loyalties support each other harmoniously. It has loyalty to a government of its own in some cases, Flinkle and Gable²⁴.

A sample of 100 people from these groups were chosen from village headmen, provincial and district party officials, leaders of church organisations, businessmen and ordinary people. But since people interviewed kept on repeating the same information which was provided by others, it was decided to reduce the number of interviewees to sixty. Of these interviewed, 20 people accepted to be cited by name. The other wanted to remain anonymous. These people were asked to identify the liberation movements they supported in Angola and to give the reasons for their support.

These interviewees focussed mainly on three categories of reasons for such support. These were: Security reasons - such as fear of harassment by movements active in Angola near to the border area; economic reasons - like the risk of losing economic benefits; and on social reasons - such as family ties with people across the border.

To analyse the influence of the ethnic groups on Zambia's policy with respect to the issues areas identified, two main approaches were followed. First, interviews were conducted with people from the ethnic groups that have been named who were members of the following policy making bodies of the party and its government: the House of Chiefs, Village Committees, Ward Committees; Provincial Development Committee, Sub-Committees of the National Council and of the Party Congress and the Political, Legal and Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of the Central Committee. Similarly, people from Zambia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

its Africa Affairs Political Desk, Parliament, the Parliamentary Committee, on Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet and State House were interviewed. Second, collection of data by examining records of the proceedings of these institutions regarding Zambia's policy was also done.

Other sources of information included records of Zambia/Angola historical events from newspapers and periodicals: the papers of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) political museum; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Communique and press releases; texts of speeches delivered by the President of Zambia on the decolonization of Angola for the period under study; the communiques released by liberation movements, the Party Congress, the National Council and by the Chairman of the Political, Foreign and Legal Affairs Sub-Committee of the Central Committee. OAU Liberation Committee documents and National Assembly hansards were also consulted.

1.09 THESIS OUTLINE

The study is presented in six chapters. Chapter one serves as an introduction to the thesis. Chapter two analyses Angola's liberation movements covering their historical development and their role in the struggle against colonialism from the time they were established upto 1980. The bases of support for these movements in terms of ethnic groups and geographical areas in Angola and in Zambia are also discussed. Chapter three discusses how and the extent to which the interests of the ethnic groups

contributed towards Zambia's policy of preferring western oriented liberation movements, in general, and UNITA in particular. Chapter four deals with Zambia's policy on the government of national unity and how this was influenced by the ethnic groups living along the country's border with Angola. Chapter five discusses Zambia's position on foreign intervention in Angola and analyses the ways in which this affected the interests of the ethnic groups and why. Finally, Chapter six contains the summary and conclusion of the study.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA

2.01 INTRODUCTION

Angola's main liberation movements started at different times and places with different leaders and were backed by different ethnic groups. They had one principle aim in common, namely: the independence of their country and formation of a government that would be for all ethnic groups in Angola. It is against this background that these movements will be viewed. This would be done, among other things by analysing the relations that each movement had with Zambia, with ethnic groups living along Zambia/Angola border and with foreign powers. The chapter will seek to answer the following questions among others: What were the major differences among these movements? What were their bases of support? What regions did each one of these movements control before and during the civil war? How effective were the leaders of these movements and how well were they organised? Why was cooperation among the movements difficult? What policy difficulties did Zambia go through during the liberation struggle in Angola?

2.02 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Like most African states, the early history of Angola is scarcely known. This is because the interests of European historians concentrated on the colonial period. However, original inhabitants of today's Angola are thought to have been nomads who migrated from the southern parts of Africa. They belonged to the Khoi people. About 500 AD, new Bantu people migrated to Angola from the Southern Kongo delta. As a result of assimilation among the various peoples, a new Bantu culture emerged. Its people settled and lived in various places, rearing cattle and other domestic animals. The population of these people increased rapidly and spread across the country, creating different Bantu societies, each with stable social culture. They were either chiefdoms or kingdoms, which frequently based their relations on spiritual powers¹.

Gradually, two different types of kingdoms developed. In the 14th century trade in Western Angola between the different chiefdoms increased. This led to the formation of powerful empires. Among them were the Kongo, Luango and the Kimbundu. The Kimbundu King's title was Ngola, from which the name Angola was later derived. Within these kingdoms there was quite strong popular control of power, because the king was always elected and there was no succession by inheritance.² As we shall see later, the issue of elections is very significant in Angolan politics.

However, as a result of wars in about 1500, the most powerful empire, that of the Lunda people, came to exercise a form of

indirect rule over some of the kingships and chiefdoms in Angola. These kingships and chiefdoms, included those of the Kongo, the Luango and the Kimbundu. The Lunda empire covered the eastern part of Angola and present day western Zambia and Zaire. It carried on trade successfully across the whole continent of Africa. In the South-Eastern part of the present Angola, there existed a number of small chiefdoms which had no ties to the Lunda empire. These included, the Cussu, the Liyuma, Mashi and the Mbukushu.³

During the time of Salazar's iron fist fascist rule in Portugal, there was no opportunity for reformist opposition politics in Angola. Instead the few African intellectuals who might have been reformists in different political climates, became leaders of the African revolt in the 1940's. These new Angolan political groups which were formed in the 1940's and 1950's rejected the idea that Portuguese colonialism had a civilising mission. They upheld African civilisation rather than Europeanisation.

In 1956, a number of the resistance groups joined together to form the FNLA and the MPLA which had as their goal the organisation of the whole oppressed population against the whole colonial system. The founders of these liberation movements were aware that the struggle for national independence would have to be waged by the mass of the farmers, forced labourers and workers in the cities.

On the 4th of February, 1961, after the Movimento pour la

Liberatocao de' Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC) had been formed in Cabinda, a groups of MPLA supporters attacked the central prison in Luanda in an attempt to free political prisoners. The attack failed, but the event initiated the armed struggle in Angola. In March of the same year, the African workers on coffee plantations in northern Luanda revolted, and within a few days the revolt spread to several districts in the north.⁴ The Union of the Angolan People (UPA), the predecessor of the FNLA, was also involved in the revolt.

2.03 THE FNLA

The Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA), was an outgrowth of Bakongo political movements originating in the north-west region of Angola and among Bakongo emigres across the border in Zaire. Its Bakongo leader Holden Roberto, was born in Mbanza Congo in the Sao Salvado Province of Angola. FNLA was created out of the Uniao Populacoes de Angola (UPA).

The UPA had succeeded in broadening its ethnic representation in 1961 when a Swiss educated Ochimbundu political scientist, Jonas Savimbi, joined it. He rose to the position of foreign minister of the organisation's government in exile. However he left it, denouncing the Bakongo dominance of the UPA and criticising the admission of the breakaway MPLA faction of Viriato da Cruz, which was an outgrowth of the Union de Populacoes de Norte de Angola (UPNA). Many of the Bakongo emigres were members of the organisation and French speaking, which tended to

isolate them from the Portuguese-speaking members of the UPNA. The UPNA was founded in March 1957 by Holden Roberto while he was in exile to protest the installation by the Portuguese of an illiterate puppet, Dom Antonio III, as King of the Kongo. Most of the initial members of the organisation were French speaking emigres. Its objective was the creation of a separate Bakongo state. In December, the following year, Roberto, as the UPNA's delegate to the first All - African People's Conference at Accra, Ghana, found little sympathy for regionalism and separatism, the word Norte was dropped from the movement's name and it was changed to Union of Angolan People, Uniao da Populacoas de Angola (UPA). The organisation from then onward supported the liberation of all Angolan People. In 1962 Roberto formed the Frente Nacional de Liberatacoa de Angola (FNLA).

The membership of FNLA was less intellectual and less urban than that of the MPLA. However, it was more race - conscious and more traditionalist. However, it lacked coherent ideology but it was strongly anti-Marxist. It labelled the MPLA as a group of "Bourgeois, Marxist mesticos". The FNLA had its headquarters in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), Zaire, and had also military training facilities in that country. It enjoyed the support of successive Zairean governments, but did suffer a set back during the period of Moise Tshombe's Premiership from 1964 to 1965.⁵ In April 1962, the FNLA established a government in exile, Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio (GRAE).

The FNLA had more men as its base than the MPLA and UNITA combined and it had the most convenient base of operations in areas adjoining Zaire. However, it lacked experienced administrators and it was weak in the capital Luanda, in Lunda Province and its support within the organisation of African Unity (OAU) was decreasing. It had an overly strong identity with Bakongo interests. One of the Lunda, a Boma messenger, I interviewed at Mwinilunga, commented that the FNLA's problem was to find a way by which it would win the support of a large number of ethnic groups in Angola which was not the case with UNITA.

However, most of the Bakongo in Zaire provided the base for the FNLA. One of the reasons for this was because Roberto's policies for the most part were similar to those of President Mobutu Sese Seko. President Mobutu came to power in 1965, but the FNLA had began to count on Zaire's help even earlier. Joseph Kasavubu, Zaire's President from 1961 to 1964, curtailed FNLA activities because his own support came from the Portuguese in Angola and from white settlers in Zaire. But when Mobutu came to power the Zairean army took on organising and training FNLA fighters. Zaire also supplied arms to the FNLA. The then newly founded OAU recognised the GREA in July 1963 and provided it with funds. This recognition was withdrawn in June 1971 because the movement was not effective militarily and because it was still primarily supported by the Bakongo people. Only Zaire and Zambia continued to recognise it. Covert support in the form of funds was provided by the United States Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) beginning in 1962. From 1973 onwards there was also some help from the People's Republic of China (PRC) which sent advisers and equipment. Romania sent arms. This happened at the time when Mobutu established ties with the PRC.⁶

Roberto ran a one man show. He personally collected all the information and personally distributed all the funds he received. He dominated the running of the movement and did not account for the funds he collected. He eliminated potential rivals from leadership positions. He remained in his secure Zairean base, living in a comfortable villa in Kinshasa with his Zairian wife (Mobutu's sister in-law). Roberto was guarded by Zairean soldiers, and never went across the border into Angola. This caused the FNLA National Council not to meet for several years.

However, selfish as he was, Roberto concentrated on building military strength, using some of the funds he was collecting. By 1974 there were about 2,000 FNLA guerrillas inside Angola and another 10,000 to 12,000 making forays from the Kunkuzu military base in Zaire near the Angolan border. This was the largest fighting force of the three main Angolan liberation movements. However he virtually disappeared from the scene⁷.

2.04 THE MPLA

The MPLA originated as a movement of those Angolans who were most exposed to Portuguese education and were mostly influenced by Portuguese culture. Many of these people were assimiladoes⁸. Under Portuguese colonial policy people from the colonies who had

adopted Portuguese culture were accepted and treated as Portuguese citizens. These were the assimiladoes. Its nucleus consisted of intellectuals with degrees from Portuguese universities. It had membership of civil servants in the Angolan capital Luanda and in other large cities. However, the MPLA was adamantly opposed to Portuguese colonial tutelage. It therefore shared the perspective of Portuguese leftists opposed to the authoritarian rule of Portuguese President Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and Marcello Caetano who succeeded him⁹. Close ties developed between the MPLA and the Portuguese socialist and communist movements. The MPLA's ties with the Portuguese communists was one of the main areas of difference of opinion among the ethnic groups which were supporting each one of the three liberation movements, according to Mr. Bulaya a member of the Lunda ethnic group, of Chief Kanongesha whom I interviewed¹⁰.

The MPLA leadership emphasised the class more than the ethnic structures of Angolan Society. This contrasted with UNITA's and FNLA's views. The MPLA was prepared to work with Portuguese Marxists and sought to eliminate the decisive political force of tribalism. As pointed out by John Marcum, the MPLA's lack of ethnocentrism was engendered by the integrating effect of the Portuguese language and culture. In addition he points out that many mesticos (mulattoes) were attracted to the MPLA because of their lack of ethnic identity with black Angolans. Marcum maintains that the marxist stress on class, rather than race, helped to resolve the ambivalence of mesticos in the

rural areas who had problems of identifying themselves.

Most of the black assimiladoes who supported the MPLA were members of the Vimbundu ethnic group in the urban areas. The mesticos were also heavily concentrated in urban areas (mainly Luanda). They constituted a very narrow stream in Angolan society - about one and half percent of the population. However, their political impact far exceeded their numbers. The Portuguese favoured them because of the education and employment they monopolised. Many early MPLA leaders, such as Mario de Andrade, Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, Urpiato da Cruz, the Secretary General and Neriques Tales (Iko) Carrera were mesticoes. Among the active black assimilado members were Agostino Neto and Alves Machando. Both were Mbundu and came from Luanda. They originally came from the north central section of Angola. The dominance of assimiladoes in the MPLA was used by Savimbi and Roberto to justify their claim that the MPLA was not a movement of Angolan people.

The Mbundu ethnic group where most of the rank and file members of the MPLA came from, is the second largest ethnic group in Angola. The Mbundu constituted almost eighteen percent of the population. They had the greatest exposure to Portuguese influence among all ethnic groups in Angola. This was because much of their region was urbanised, and most of its population participated in the second world war.

2.05 THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Soon after the war, the Portuguese Communist Party, Partido Comunista Portuguese (PCP), started organising an affiliate in Angola and was associated with assimiladoes and white communists residing in the country. The PCP was founded in October, 1955 and it quickly moved to broaden its base of support in Portugal, Angola and other Portuguese colonies in Africa. It collaborated with other leftist movements in Portugal in the formation of the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA). It then merged with the MPLA after the latter was created in December 1965. Right from its inception, the MPLA had cordial relations with the members of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). After Machando, the MPLA President was arrested by the Portuguese authorities, and later went into exile after his release from prison, Mario de Andrade acted as President of MPLA until Machando returned from exile. The MPLA's honorary president was Agustino Neto. Neto escaped from a Portuguese prison in 1962 and made his way to Leopoldville (Kinshasa) in the former Belgian Congo (Zaire) in December 1962. He was later elected President of the MPLA.¹¹

Neto was born on September 17, 1922, in Bengo, a village near Catete, south west of Luanda. He was trained as a gynaecologist in Portugal. He married a white Portuguese woman. An accomplished poet, Neto was arrested a number of times for his anti-Portuguese nationalist activities. Neto's imprisonment prevented him from participating in most of the MPLA's activities

between 1956 and 1962. These included the first MPLA Congress of 1956. After becoming president of the MPLA, he was consistently the most important MPLA leader until his death in Moscow in 1979.¹²

It was the MPLA which started the armed struggle by launching an attack on the central prison in Luanda on 4th February 1961. In October 1961 the MPLA established its headquarters in Leopoldville (Congo) Zaire. Its military operations were also directed from there. Launching raids from Zaire against urban centres in Angola was a disadvantage because of the long distance involved except when they raided Cabinda in 1963. The restrictions imposed by the Leopoldville authorities were partly responsible for difficulties the MPLA faced during this period. For the Luanda revolt the MPLA attracted recruits within the sizable Angolan refugee community in Zaire. Most of the refugees were Bakongo and supported the FNLA. In 1963, the MPLA opened an office in Brazzaville, capital of Congo-Brazzaville, which became its headquarters after they were expelled from Leopoldville in November of that year. This new base of operations facilitated forays into Cabinda in 1964, although land access to the rest of Angola was lacking because the Zairean government and the FNLA prohibited MPLA movements from there through Zairean territory. However, the MPLA did manage to infiltrate a military column into Angola in 1966 and in 1967 through Zaire. While stationed in Brazzaville, from 1964 the MPLA maintained an office in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.¹³

Soon after Zambia's independence, the MPLA started to operate from the western part of Zambia which consequently improved its future. However, this was unfamiliar territory for the movement in terms of popular support. This was because it had to seek support from the Lunda and Chokwe peoples of the eastern grasslands including those ethnic groups living along Zambia-Angola border. Therefore, the MPLA was compelled by the necessity of armed struggle to extend its base of support to include these new rural elements.

Nevertheless, in 1973, Daniel Chipenda of Ovimbundu ethnic group origin and military commander of the MPLA's Zambia based eastern forces complained of mestico's domination and too close ideological affiliation with Soviet Union at the expense of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Chipenda considered mestico domination to be the basis of the personality cult of Neto.

Chipenda had great military autonomy. He operated from Zambia, west of Lusaka, rather than Brazzaville where MPLA's headquarters was. He personally had the support of Lunda, Chokwe and Ovimbundu ethnic groups living along Zambia-Angola border.¹⁴ Furthermore, he had the support of the majority of the MPLA members in the eastern part. He however, lacked international connection with leftist political movements and governments which Neto had. Nevertheless, Chipenda managed to develop his own links with PRC and members of his ethnic group.

For this Neto, in turn accused Chipenda of tribalism. Both men exchanged recriminations about assassination plots against

each other. This quarrel disrupted military activities in the east. It heated up again in the summer of 1974, and once again in the following year. In the end Chipenda was expelled from the MPLA after being accused of causing the Eastern Revolt against Neto. Chipenda took with him his own faction and about 1,500 fighters. Subsequently in 1975 he joined the FNLA. In March, 1974 a small group of mestico intellectuals based in Brazzaville led by Gentil Vienna and Foaguis Pinto de Andrade also split off from the MPLA, denouncing Neto for presidentialism meaning centralizing too much power in himself.¹⁵

In 1968 the new Congolese government of Marien Nguoubi placed restrictions on MPLA activities in Brazzaville. Following this was another restriction imposed by the Zambian government on the MPLA activities. This was soon after the new government of Mobutu in Zaire began to support the FNLA exclusively.¹⁶ This complicated the MPLA's liberation struggle in Angola. However, Neto continued to organise his movement using old friends, although this move still led to further troubles within the MPLA.

Meanwhile, with the election in December, 1962, within the MPLA of Neto as the President of the MPLA, fighting within the MPLA intensified. This followed the accusation by Alves Machando who was the first President in exile, Avarito da cruz and Mario de Andrade that the mesticos had elements which exploited black Africans and that this was the reason they were inviting whites to Angola who were similarly motivated to join their cause. Later Varito da Cruz who was more associated

with Chinese communism, accused Neto of embarking on a "revisionist trend" because the latter was more closely aligned with the Soviet Union. For this reason he was removed as Secretary General of the MPLA in May 1963. This split within the movement became final in July and da Cruz decided to lead a breakaway faction which later attempted to join the FNLA.¹⁷

Mario de Andrade did not lend his support either to Neto or to da Cruz but only became inactive in party politics for two years. After the departure of da Cruz, he became the driving force which in May 1974 initiated the Revolts Activa (Active Revolt) faction of the MPLA. This faction was mestizo-dominated and opposed Neto for personalised methods of leadership. Andrade was soon joined by his brother, Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, who had just been released from serving yet another prison term. Joaquim was considered the honorary president of MPLA while in detention.¹⁸

However, the MPLA factions, namely: the Chipenda and the Joaquim Pinto de Andrade ones were temporarily reconciled in Lusaka on June 8, 1974 so that they could confront Neto in elections. Nevertheless disunity was evident in August at a meeting in Lusaka, when an effort to elect the president for the movement was made. This led to a walkout by Neto and by the Activate Revolt faction. Chipenda was then elected president of the MPLA by his own faction which remained in the congress. However, a meeting of all the MPLA factions in Brazzaville on September 3 the same year produced an agreement making Neto the president and

Chipenda and Joaquim Pinto de Andrade vice presidents. Despite the agreement unity proved impossible. Chipenda opened an office in Kinshasa in October and was expelled from the movement in December. The Active Revolt faction remained within the movement, but created a lot of discomfort for Neto. However, Neto had certain advantages over the other two nationalists which he exploited. These included the well educated leadership in his faction which had extensive ties with other African movements and support from European radical movements.

The MPLA organised affiliations of workers, women and youth. It also established economic infrastructure within the liberated area in Angola. The infrastructure included schools, medical centres and peoples stores. It conducted programmes for political education and adult literacy. However, the movement's military actions had become stalemated as a result of factionalism by the time of the Portuguese revolution of April 1974. The problem of operating from or through Zaire had never been solved either. Frequent arrests of leaders also contributed to the weakening of the MPLA's fighting capability.

2.06 UNITA MOVEMENT

After Savimbi left GRAE he travelled to a number of countries, including Algeria, where he met Ernesto Che Guevera. In July 1964 he travelled to the People's Republic of China (PRC) where he met Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-lai. He returned to Luusanne, Switzerland, where he had stayed previously. In the fall

of 1965, not wishing to join the MPLA and after a visit to Zambia, he decided to form his own movement. He felt that a genuine need existed for a third movement since the MPLA represented mostly Mbundu, mesticos and assimiladoes. The FNLA for its part was mostly dominated by the Bakongo, which left most Angolans without a voice. Savimbi was allowed to open an office in Lusaka, but his plan was to establish his movement inside Angola southwest of Luso, in the foot hills of the Bie plateau. His supporters included a few who had left GRAE with him in 1964, some students who were politically active abroad in the National Union of Angola students (Uniao Nacional dos estudantes Angolanos), rural Ovimbundu, some Portuguese whites and church groups. However, this support did not help UNITA much when the civil war broke out. The MPLA's forces with the Cubans and Soviet military assistance proved too strong for UNITA forces.

In all, Savimbi presented himself as a leader of black peasants in contrast to the mestico dominated and urban based MPLA. He was not tied to a particular ideology. Although UNITA's constitution decided on at the founding conference, proclaimed that the liberation movement would strive for a government which would represent all ethnic groups proportionally. It also put all exiles on notice that the struggle for independence had to be waged within Angola. Savimbi went to Cairo where he stayed until mid-1968 and then returned to Angola by way of Zambia. However, Savimbi from then remained in Angola. Taking a leaf from Mao, Savimbi concentrated on raising the political

consciousness of the peasants, most of them illiterate and widely dispersed. He preached self-reliance and founded cooperatives for food production and village self reliance defence unit. He set up a pyramidal structure of elected councils grouping up to sixteen villages that at least in theory made their wishes known through the political commission consisting of thirty-five of member central committee. These members were to be chosen every four years at a congress. The central committee reported to another policy making body, the nineteen-member political bureau which was chosen and chaired by Savimbi. Its decisions flowed down through the various levels by the same channel. Savimbi himself was to be reconfirmed by secret ballot by congress at its quadrennial meetings.¹⁹

From its base in Bakongo Province, in 1970 UNITA began infiltrating the major population centres of Angola slowly expanding its area of influence westwards beyond Bie Province into the central plateau. There, however, it began to clash with the MPLA which was advancing from Luanda province whose Soviet-trained political cadres had started to work among the Ovimbundu, Imbukushu, Kwangali, Ambo, Chokwe, Lweno, Luchazi and Lunda. They were exploiting potential ethnic antagonisms. These ethnic groups had began advocating an independent Republic of Moxico, in Angola, which they hoped to establish by negotiating with the Portuguese. Some of the ethnic groups also lived along the Zambia/Angola border.

On 10th November, 1975, the eve of Angola's independence,

UNITA controlled much of the rich, food-producing areas. The Central Southern Provinces were therefore able to limit food flow to the rest of the country. UNITA claimed to possess allegiance of about 40 percent of the population.

2.07 LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN CABINDA

Because of the complexity of the civil war in Angola and the manner in which the liberation movements struggled for their political independence, it is important that the effect of the liberation struggle in Cabinda, on the decolonization of the country and Cabinda in particular, is also discussed and analysed.

During the time of the liberation struggle in Angola several movements advocating a separate state of Cabinda were founded. This was as early as the 1960's. The movements based their claim on selfish interpretation of the history of the Enclave of Cabinda. The most important of these movements was the Movement pour la Liberation de Enclave de Cabinda - Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (MLEC). This movement was led by Louis Ranque Franque. It had involved out of various emigrant associations in Brazzaville. In December 1961, a faction of MLEC succeeded under Henriques Nzita Tiago to form the Action Committee for the National Union of Cabindans (Comite de Accao de Uniao Nacional de Cabinda - CUNCC). A third group was Allíama. It was led by Antonio Eduardo Sozinho. This movement represented the Mayumbe, the ethnic minority of the interior in Cabinda. After

years of faction conflicts, the three groups resolved their differences and united in 1963 under the umbrella organisation of the Front for the liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para Libertacao de Enclave de Cabinda - (FLEC).

When the MPLA began its military incursion into Cabinda in 1964, it encountered hostility from coastal members of FLEC. These members were living in and near Cabinda city itself. They had come from the Mayumbe peasants of the interior, whose region is near the Congo border. MPLA guerrillas transversed their region.²⁰

Emulating the FNLA, FLEC created a government in exile on January 10, 1967 in the border town of Tshela in Zaire. Reflecting earlier divisions, the faction headed by Tiago established at the same time the Revolutionary Cabinda Committee in the Congolese town of Pointe Noire.

However, when Gulf Oil began pumping oil in 1968, many emigrants returned to Cabinda in the anticipation of an economic boom. There was an upsurge of Cabindan Nationalism that seemed near realisation when the coup occurred in Portugal. In the mid- and late 1960's, the Tiago group continued to get help from Brazzaville, and from the Franque group in Kinshasa. Within the Franque wing, several factions had developed, including the one led by Auguste Tchioufou. He was a member of the faction since 1963, and had his own feelings about his ethnic group, the Vili, who live along the coast far north of Gabon. In 1974 Tchioufou took over and Franque became honorary President.

2.08 DECOLONISATION OF ANGOLA

On April 25, 1974 the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement overthrew the Portuguese government. The following day the revolutionary regime in Lisbon dismissed all governor-generals and civil governors in the overseas territories. In Angola, Silivino became provisional governor. The decolonization of the Portuguese overseas territories became the official policy, but there was considerable disagreement over what that term meant. This problem was not only for the leadership of the new Portuguese government but for all the interested nations of Africa.

The new Portuguese President, General Antonio de Spínola, was the first major leader to suggest publicly that colonial wars could not be won and that the country's overseas problems required political approach rather than military solution. In his book Portugal and the Future, published shortly before the revolution, envisioned a Lusitanian community. Lusitania is the classical name for Portuguese community comprising of metropolitan Portugal, the overseas provinces, and the former Portuguese colony - Brazil. All members were supposed to be autonomous while retaining specific ties for their mutual benefit. The decisions for complete decolonisation of overseas provinces was quickly made in May 1974, less than a month after the coup. Portuguese leaders began conferring with nationalist leaders from Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. In July, 1974 President Spínola officially recognized the right of the overseas provinces

to total independence.

In most of her African territories Portugal had only one liberation movement to deal with. But Angola had four separate movements, including one major movement in Cabinda, which provided a perplexing exception. Therefore, Portuguese policy was to recognise all the four liberation movements. This was intended to show neutrality in dealing with them, and to support the idea of a post independence coalition government of the FNLA, MPLA, UNITA and the FLEC. In 1963 some western observers charged, however, that Portuguese authorities in Angola actually favoured the MPLA, during the period of increasing communist influence that followed the coup.

The Portuguese coup had caught the four liberation movements by surprise. However, each one of them reacted to the new situation in a different way. FNLA intensified its preparations for a projected Angolan army of 15,000 men. PRC instructors and Zairean paratroopers started training recruits at the Kinkuzu army base in Zaire. Romania and Libya sent military supplies.²⁰ Meanwhile the Portuguese and UNITA formally ended hostilities on June 14th. At the end of July they signed a cease-fire agreement with UNITA and MPLA. Savimbi was confident that his movement would score a political victory at the polls. This expectation was very much shared by many of the ethnic groups living along the Zambia/Angola border, according to a Lunda I interviewed in Kabompo.²¹ Savimbi made statements reassuring the whites and welcoming them to stay. He also implied a break, in his

relations with SWAPO by promising non-interference in South African affairs.²² Neto who had been in Cabinda when the coup occurred opened offices in Luanda. During July and August, FNLA moved military units into northern Angola and it too signed a cease-fire agreement with the Portuguese on October 12th.²³

The three liberation movements met at Mombasa, Kenya on January 4th, 1975, and agreed to conduct negotiations with Portugal regarding the process of decolonization. Both the Chipenda faction and FLEC wanted to be included, but they were excluded from the conference that took place in Kenya and the one that was held in Portugal. The latter meeting was held at the end of January 1975. It came to be known as the Alvor Summit. It was at this meeting that the three liberation movements agreed on November 11th, 1975, as the date for Angola's independence. They also formally agreed to form a transitional government of National Unity to be headed by a Portuguese High Commissioner.²⁴ Elections were to be held before the independence date to decide which movement would form a government of independent Angola through the ballot. However, this did not happen and instead a civil war broke out and the MPLA seized power.

NOTES

1. Palmberg, Mai., ed., 1983, Liberation Struggle for Africa, Totowa, New Jersey: Zed Press, p. 141.
2. Ibid. p. 142
3. Ibid. p. 146.
4. Ibid. p. 147.
5. Ibid p. 148
6. Klinghoffer, Jay, Arthur, Op Cit. p. 13.
7. Dobert, Margarita Op. Cit. p. 124.
8. Keefe, K. Eugene, 1979, in Kaplan, Irving., ed., Op. Cit. pp. 186-187.
9. Washington Post. August 12, 1977, p. 18.
10. This view was expressed by Mr. Bulaya, a member of the Lunda ethnic group of Chief Kanongesha, whom I interviewed.
11. Dobert, Margarita, Op. Cit. p. 124. Also see Henricksen, Thoma, 1976, "People's War in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 143.
12. Ibid. p. 125
13. Ibid. p. 126.
14. Ibid. p. 128.
15. Marcum, John, 1978, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I, Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 20.
16. Dobert, Margarita, Op. Cit. p. 129.

17. Ibid. p. 131.
18. Ibid. p. 18.
19. Ibid. p. 130.
20. Ibid. p. 131.
21. This view was expressed by a Lunda whom I interviewed in Kabompo. He declined to be mentioned by name.
22. Anglin and Shaw, Op. Cit. pp. 237-264.
23. Kaunda, D. Kenneth, "The World State" in Legum, Colin, ed., 1966, Zambia: Independence and Beyond. The Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda, London Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson pp. 137-139.
24. This view was expressed by a former Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs whom I interviewed. He declined to be cited by name.

CHAPTER THREE

ZAMBIA'S POLICY OF EVENHANDEDNESS

3.01 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter it was shown how in practice Zambia failed to follow its declared policy of evenhandedness in dealing with liberation movements in Angola and how instead it favoured UNITA. This chapter analyses the influence of ethnic groups living along the border with Angola on Zambia's policy towards the movements.

3.02 POLITICS OF THE ETHNIC GROUPS

According to Dobert, the supporters of the FNLA and UNITA found in four countries, namely, Zambia, Zaire, Angola and Namibia, together outnumbered supporters of the MPLA. They hoped that their interests would be protected by the leadership from their ethnic groups and the countries which supported them.¹ Therefore, these groups influenced the policies of the countries in which they operated. The Chokwe, the Luvale, Lunda and Bunda, among other ethnic groups which mainly supported UNITA, were considered by Zambian policy makers to be important for security on the border with Angola. This factor helped these groups to influence Zambia's policy. Their interests were articulated through their members who held key positions in the party, government and in non government organisations (NGOs), including members of parliament.²

In 1964, various parliamentary candidates who stood for election in the provinces were as indicated in table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1: 1964 Parliamentary Election in Provinces

Province (Rural only)	Total No. of seats	(Local) men	"Outsiders"
Western (formally Barotse)	7	7	Nil
Eastern	10	9	1
Luapula	6	5	1
Northern	9	8	1
North-Western	5	5	Nil
Southern	8	7	1
TOTAL:	45	41	4

Source: Tordoff and Molteno (1974: 267)³

Consequently, all the five constituencies in North-Western Province and seven constituencies in Western Province (Barotse) were represented by local men. This fact made it possible for the members of parliament to articulate the interests of the local areas and ethnic groups they came from.

The ethnic groups also attempted to influence policy through opposition parties. One of these parties was the United

Party (UP). The membership of this party comprised mostly of members of the ethnic groups originating from Western and North-Western Provinces. It was modelled more or less on the lines of the African National Congress (ANC) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the model which the ethnic groups supporting the FNLA and UNITA appreciated.

However, the UP lacked the support of intellectuals. Nevertheless its President, Nalumino Mundia, an Economist and Dickson Chisulo, once a member of Parliament for Lukulu, gave UP some organisation ability. William Chipango, once a Livingstone Mayor, was the party's National Organizing Secretary and Adamson Mushala was Deputy Secretary. The complete list of office bearers, according to Prince Chanda whom I interviewed was⁴:

National President	- Nalumino Mundia (Lozi) former UNIP
Deputy President	- Henry Ndlovu (Ngoni-Nsenga) former UFP
National Secretary	- Dickson M. Chisulo (Lozi) former UFP
Deputy Secretary	- Adamson Mushala (Kaonde) former UNIP
National Treasurer	- Berrings Lombe (Bemba) former UFP
Publicity Chief	- Price Chanda (Bemba-Shona) former UFP
Deputy Publicity Chief	- Jack Menzies (Coloured) former UFP
Director of Youth	- Linda Makelele (Lubale) former UNIP
Director of Women's League	- Rachel Sianjunza (Lubale) former UFP
Administrative Secretary	- Ashton Banda (Nsenga) former UFP

The United Party, members mostly originated from the United Federal Party (UFP), was not well-represented in all the provinces of Zambia, said Prince Chanda. In his view, this was because the Party's National President, Nalumino Mundia did not command respect in Eastern, Northern, Luapula, Copperbelt and Central Provinces. Also he added that the Publicity Chief himself and Deputy Treasurer had little influence in all these provinces. However, the Party had strong support in Western and North-Western Provinces and a little more in Southern Province.

Chanda said that foreign policy dominated UP policies. The Party's stand emphasised co-existence with neighbouring countries to reduce tension and accelerate internal economic development. The party also accepted the policy of supporting the oppressed people in their struggle to liberate themselves. But it strongly opposed UNIP's policy of endorsing some people in liberation movements to be the future leaders of their countries after independence. The Party's stand was that the people themselves should choose not only their leaders but the movements of their liking. Nevertheless, the UP itself supported UNITA. Reflecting the preference of the majority of its members who were from the border areas of Zambia.

The party's position on trade, according to a former member whom I interviewed, said that it was disastrous for Zambia to abandon the Benguela and Rhodesia railways in favour of Tazara railway. This was because his party advocated free trade along the border. He said people along the border should be allowed to

move freely across the Angolan border.⁵ Therefore to support this view, on 7th November, 1970 the Times of Zambia published an anonymous letter to the editor demonstrating the forces of ethnic groups and local politics saying:

"I can assure you that, you certainly cannot prove to be a national leader without sectional backing. To be a national leader you have got to start from the scratch, thus: village where you were born, district and then province up to national level. Mr. Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe's political career started from his village in Chinsali District, just like Dr. Kaunda... and Nkumbula of Namwala, not to omit Mundia: This is how politics start. Even if you can be well known here in Lusaka without organising your village you certainly stand to lose (Times of Zambia: 1970: 11: 7).⁶

The first public rally of the UP was held in 1967 in Mongu by Chipango, the National Organising Secretary. It was attended by more than a thousand people.⁵ The out-cry of the local people at that meeting was about lack of economic development in their area; having a limited number of people from their areas employed in the UNIP-run government and about UNIP not having a clear policy on UNITA, the MPLA and the FNLA. The people complained that the UNIP government had cut off a major source of their income, by stopping the South African-based migrant labour recruitment agency, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Recruitment Association (commonly known locally as WENELA) to recruit people from Zambia. The Association's labour recruits had been coming mainly from the North-Western and Western Provinces of Zambia.

At another public rally of the Party in Lusaka in April 1968 its Vice President, Dickson Chisulo, complained about the UNIP government's silence concerning the plight of victims of Portuguese bombings of villages along the Zambia/Angola border in both Western and North-Western Provinces. Chisulo deplored the failure of the UNIP government to bring to Lusaka the victims of these bombings as President Kaunda had done in case of Maina Soko who had been killed by Rhodesian troops on the bank of Zambezi river in Livingstone. All this information was provided by Linda Makelele, the UP's former Director of Youth whom I interviewed. Another UP official emerged in North-Western Province. This was Adamson Mushala. He alleged that Zambians belonging to the Luvale, Chokwe and Kaonde ethnic groups in North-Western Province, were being issued with alien national registration cards by the Zambian government. Some members of these ethnic groups had wanted to join UNITA and therefore initiate secession of their area from Zambia. This initiated the sympathy of the ethnic groups in the Western Province as well. The local people of Western Province, led by the Lozi, for their part also threatened to secede after the bill providing for the centralisation of local government was passed. The Ngambela of Western Province, Hasting Noyoo, resigned from UNIP. This was in protest against the bill. The member of Mongu Local Authority Council, Mbanga Mutimba, followed this move.

However, secession was not the official policy of the UP. In 1964 Zambia held talks with the Litunga of Barotseland who

consented reluctantly to the province remaining part of the new
Zambian state, but with a special status enshrined in the Ba-
rotseland Agreement. In October, 1964 the UNIP government abro-
gated the 1964 Barotseland Agreement and renamed Barotseland
Western Province. This act, weakened the political influence of
the Lozi, people in the country. Since under colonial rule
Barotseland was governed as a protectorate distinct from a colo-
ny. As such the area and its traditional leaders had enjoyed a
large measure of autonomy compared to other parts of Northern
Rhodesia (Zambia). Under the 1964 agreement, Barotseland re-
tained autonomy. Thus the area was allowed to maintain its own
treasury in which mineral royalties paid by the mining companies
also went. The unilateral abrogation of the agreement contribut-
ed to making ethnic groups in the province align with UNITA and
SWAPO. This is became ethnic groups living along Zambia-Angola
border had their kith and kin who were members of UNITA and SWAPO
and had social and economic interests in Barotseland in particu-
lar and in Zambia in general. This problem complicated the
interests of the ethnic groups living along Zambia/Angola border,
since ethnic groups were at the same time supporting SWAPO, UP
and the Zambian government.

To redress the demand for secession made by ethnic groups in
Barotseland and others, the ruling party, UNIP, had to give
Western Province (Barotseland) larger representation in govern-
ment employment and in the cabinet. Western Province also had at
this time strong political power because of a larger number of

highly educated population, as compared to other provinces in the country.

3.03 ETHNIC GROUPS' INTERESTS: GENERAL

After Zambia became independent, she allowed Angolan liberation movements to operate from her territory. She supported all the movements which claimed to be fighting for the liberation of their countries from colonial rule.

During this period when Zambia followed the policy of evenhandedness in practice, the FNLA, UNITA and the MPLA differed in their approach to the liberation of Angola. In April 1975 she joined hands with Tanzania and Botswana in calling for a meeting to support Savimbi as leader of the transitional government of national unity that was to be set up under the terms of the Alvor Accord. While maintaining relations with the FNLA, the MPLA and UNITA, Zambia initially followed a policy of supporting efforts to create unity among these movements. Such a policy was also in line with security interests of the ethnic groups living along the Zambia-Angola border in the sense that unity among the movements would promote peace in the border area in particular, and in Angola in general. This continued to be Zambia's policy until the liberation movements failed to form a transitional government of national unity in Luanda and MPLA seized power. Then Zambia's policy started to show some signs of change from evenhandedness to preferring the FNLA and UNITA. Later on, the policy again changed to that of supporting UNITA only when the FNLA became a

one-man movement when Roberto, its President, assumed total control and moved to Kinshasa, Zaire.

This shows clearly that Zambia's policy changed from one of evenhandedness to preference for UNITA. The question is what factors influenced the change of policy? One consideration regarding Zambia's change of policy was the security interests of the ethnic groups. The upsurge of SWAPO guerrilla attacks against Namibia presented hardships to these groups. The Shipanga faction, which by this time had broken away from SWAPO, had close ties with anti-Zambian government dissidents in Western and North-Western Provinces. The dissidents in the latter province were led by Mushala. Those in the Western Province were led by Nalumino Mundia and others. And later the latter formed the United Party (UP) which operated legally. This development, according to a member of the Lunda ethnic group whom I interviewed, made the area along the Zambia-Angola border insecure. Therefore Zambia chose to support a movement which was popular among the ethnic groups in the border area which was at the same time not associated with dissidents within her own borders. This movement was UNITA.

Before the policy of evenhandedness was abandoned in practice, Zambia's relations with the FNLA were partly guided by the manner in which the leaders of Zambia viewed freedom and independence, especially their stand on the need to liquidate colonial rule. Hence Zambia's initial support for the FNLA was founded on the fact that at that time, it was a major movement fighting

against Portuguese colonial rule.

However, later Roberto grew out of favour of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) because his movement had been unable to expand its base of support beyond the Bakongo Province. It therefore had a limited political constituency compared to UNITA and the MPLA. Nevertheless, Zambia continued to support it. Roberto tried to enlarge the base of support of his movement to include non-Bakongo ethnic group.

As it has already been pointed out, many ethnic groups living along Zambia/Angola border supported the FNLA and UNITA. These groups were: Chokwe, Lwena, Luchazi, Lunda, Mbwela, Mbukushu and the Luvales. At this point in time, the Chokwe ethnic group began advocating formation of an Independence Republic of Moxico roughly covering what is now the Moxico Province of Angola. They hoped to establish the government after negotiating separately with the colonial government in Portugal.

Following the seizure of power by the MPLA, Savimbi asked Zambia to invite Neto and Roberto for a meeting in Lusaka. Both leaders turned down the invitation. Nevertheless, Zambia subsequently succeeded in arranging for a meeting between Savimbi and Roberto. Instead Roberto used the opportunity to demand an apology from Savimbi for the latter's defection from the FNLA and exact a promise from him to join the movement. At this meeting in Lusaka FNLA viewed UNITA as an intruder in eastern Angola. When Zambia presented a proposal to the FNLA and UNITA to unite

with the MPLA, Savimbi declared that he wanted to have nothing to do with a movement dominated by mestizos and assimilados. This created a problem for Zambia, because she was attempting to promote unity among the movements at a time when none of them was ready for it. The other problem for Zambia was that in the absence of unity among the movements her policy of preferring UNITA would put her in confrontation with the MPLA which had already seized power.

Nevertheless, Zambia continued with her preference for UNITA. She condemned imperialism, including the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union which was supporting the MPLA government in Luanda. She stressed the priority of political solutions over military action and preached policies based on practical experience inside Angola.

The seizure of power by MPLA and the collapse of the UNITA-FNLA coalition created problems for Zambia's preference for UNITA and the FNLA. However, Zambia finally came to terms with the MPLA on March 16, 1976. This followed the visit to Lusaka of an Angolan delegation led by then Foreign Minister Jose Eduardo Dos Santos to discuss the normalisation of relations between the two countries. Soon after this visit Zambia finally forbade UNITA and the FNLA to use bases in Zambia. On September 22, Zambia recognised the MPLA regime. The decision to recognise the MPLA government was not supported by the majority members of the UNIP Central Committee, according to a former member of central committee I interviewed⁷.

3.03.1: FREE TRADE ACROSS THE BORDER

FNLA and UNITA had strong support from the Bakongo people in the provinces of Zaire, Uige, Lunda, Norty and Cunene. The Bakongo are great traders. They carried out trade in fish, wild meat and ivory in Malange, Lunda Sul, Moxico, Cuando Cubango and in Cunene provinces in Angola. They also crossed into Zambia, Namibia and Zaire on trade.

Other ethnic groups in border areas similarly carried out trade, but to a lesser extent. They too mainly supported FNLA and UNITA. The policies of the two movements were considered to be conducive to those groups' business interests. According to Chief Kanongesha, this was one of the major reasons why these groups wanted Zambia to support the two liberation movements and not the MPLA. According to a former member of Parliament for Mwinilunga West, they attempted to influence Zambia's policy through people who came from the area and were in policy making institutions.

Similarly Headman Kayombo of Kayombo's village in Kabompo district on the border with Angola said that trade was one of the reasons why the Lunda and Luvale people continued to request their representatives to influence Zambia's policy makers on the issue of the free movement of people across the border. Likewise, Chief Kanongesha said "we demanded that our area representatives on the Zambian government decision making institutions ask from time to time the Zambian government to support UNITA and the FNLA, rather than the MPLA. This was because this could have

made the border area peaceful and could have helped UNITA and the FNLA to form a government in Angola, which would have not changed the people's customary ways of life, unlike the MPLA could have done⁸. Chief Kanongesha continued by saying that "Zambia as well as Zaire were the main targets for this influence". Therefore, free trade along Zambia/Angola border was one of the interests of the ethnic groups living there which they wanted Zambia's policy makers to take into account when considering as to what liberation movement she was to support.

3.03.2 SECURITY ALONG THE BORDER

One of the problems posed by the conflict in Angola for Zambia, was how to ensure security along the border with that country. The area which was involved was from Kalena Hill down to the Zambia-Namibia border. This border area, among others, covers a number of ethnic groups. Some of these are: the Lunda, Nganguela, Chokwe, Lwena and Mbukushu ethnic groups.⁹ Security of this border was necessary for the ethnic groups in the area to have access to each other across the border and for them to pursue cross border trade. Nevertheless, security was a cause of concern¹⁰.

As the liberation movements began to achieve greater military success, the Portuguese, for their part, began to change their attitude toward Zambia in particular. They adopted the policy of hot-pursuit. Consequently, for example, between the end of 1966 and June 1969, Portuguese forces based in Angola and

Mozambique made no fewer than sixty military incursions into Zambia. There were nine such incursions in the Western Province, three in the Central Province, one in the Southern Province, and ten in the North-Western Province. Apart from these incursions, the Portuguese air force violated Zambian airspace seventy-five times. These military incursions and several kidnappings affected the lives of many people in these areas. This was because in addition to loss of life, economic development, communication and social life virtually came to a standstill. Also too many innocent Angolans and Zambians living along the Zambia-Angola border, including women and children, lost their lives or became refugees in Zambia or in Zaire.

The intensified attacks by the Portuguese were aimed at the Chipenda faction of the MPLA which was threatening the Benguela Railway. In contrast, UNITA basically avoided attacking the railway line - a move aimed at winning and retaining Zambia's and Zaire's support. Both countries heavily depended on the railway to export their minerals. The Portuguese were not militarily as hostile and the Portuguese had an understanding of collaboration as a result of which UNITA gave information on the movements of MPLA guerrillas to the Portuguese. This also ties in with the fact that the Portuguese regarded MPLA as the most serious threat militarily of all the movements.

Ethnic groups along the Zambia-Angola border were aware of the differential hostility of the Portuguese toward the Angolan liberation movement. Therefore, they put pressure on the Zambian

government to adopt a policy of showing preference for UNITA. A former Zambia Cabinet Minister and a former Security Officer responsible for foreign affairs in the North-Western Province I interviewed respectively, affirmed that the ethnic groups did in fact attempt to make Zambia's policy makers abandon the policy of evenhandedness.¹¹ The MPLA forces relinquished their control over vast areas along Zambia-Angola border partly because of the pressure from UNITA which was supported by ethnic groups living along Zambia-Angola border.

During the period of intense factional friction in the MPLA, Zambia also felt that the MPLA was not doing much fighting against the Portuguese. At the same time UNITA was gaining strength mainly because of the support it was receiving from the United States. Thereafter, the support the United States of America (USA) gave to FNLA and UNITA during and before the civil war in Angola, was a blessing in disguise to the ethnic groups living along the Zambia/Angola border which supported these movements.¹² This view was expressed by a trader in Mwinilunga whom I interviewed. Generally it is reasonable to conclude that the ethnic groups in the area believed that their security interests would be advanced if they supported UNITA and if the government abandoned the policy of evenhandedness and like-wise supported UNITA and not the MPLA. However, furthering their interests was not the only reason for their support for UNITA. It should also be emphasised that the government was also very concerned about the security situation of the border areas.

However, on its part, Zambia could have followed a different policy of dealing with the problem without necessarily abandoning the policy of evenhandedness. For example, at one time it had sought United Nations Security Council action on Portugal's attacks at the time it was following the policy of evenhandedness.

3.03.3: ETHNIC GROUPS AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS

It has already been assumed that in certain cases, national interests conceived and pursued by national policy makers conflict with the interests of the ethnic groups. In such instances the groups try to have such conflict of interests resolved in their favour. Also, even when there is no conflict of interests, the ethnic groups simply try to exploit national interests to further their own particular interests. This section therefore, looks into the issues relating to the economic interests of Zambia and Angola.

Ethnic groups living along Zambia, Angola, Namibia, Zaire borders benefited a great deal from these countries economic activities. Mining industries, transportation system and agricultural industries in these countries, for example, employed migrant labour from neighbouring countries. Generally immigration policies in these countries were favourable for the employment of migrant labour. Similarly, both Zambia and Angola, while the latter was still under colonial rule, were capitalist-oriented. This left room for a lot of free economic activities

by ethnic groups in border areas. The peoples' preference for capitalism was one of the many reasons for their support for UNITA and the FNLA instead of supporting the Marxist-oriented MPLA.¹³ However, in 1977 the MPLA government passed a decree providing for nationalisation of firms, big and small. The policy of nationalising even the small-scale enterprises threatened the interests of ethnic groups in border areas. A local businessman whom I interviewed explained that this made the Lunda, the Chokwe and other ethnic groups attempt to influence Zambian policy makers support the two movements excluding the MPLA. Nationalisation of firms in Angola adversely affected migrant labour, especially in transport sector, like railways. The railways of about 2,900 route kilometres comprise of three separate main lines running from the ports of Luanda, Lobito and Marcemedes to the interior. One small local line of 10,600 meter gauge ran from the Port of Amboin to the Cabel area. The Benguela Railway from Lobito transverse the country which is connected with Zaire. In 1975, international traffic on the line was as a result of the civil war, halted and it has not resumed up to the time of writing. The ninety per cent of the railways were owned by Tanganyika Concessions (TANKS), a private corporation. Until 1978 when it moved to London, TANKS was based in the Bahamas Islands. The Portuguese government held a ten percent interest in the railway which was later inherited by the new Angolan Railway. This line was owned under the terms of a concession

according to which the entire rail line, including all re-installations and equipment, were to become the property of the Angolan government on the expiration of the concession contract in year 2001.

The two railways running out of Luanda and Macamedes were owned by the Portuguese government and were taken over by the MPLA government after independence. Another privately-owned short rail line of a narrow gauge of 06.00 meters run between the Port of Cuio and Luacho. This line served sugar plantations owned by the Acucar company. Its employees were integrated into the government transport system after nationalisation.

All these railways employed many migrant workers from Zambia, Namibia, Zaire, Congo Brazzaville, to name a few countries. Naturally, many of the labourers came from border areas since it was easier for this category of migrant workers to seek jobs in most neighbouring countries than in far distant countries. The nationalisation of railways resulted in most of them giving up or losing their jobs and returning to their home countries. They found the Marxist working conditions introduced by the MPLA government unacceptable.

Nevertheless the Benguela Railways was not immediately nationalised by the MPLA government, instead it simply wanted to wait until the concession for the rail line expired. However, because of closure of the line as a result of the civil war, technicians and general workers, the latter included Ovimbundu, Lunda and Chokwes who were principal supporters of UNITA,

left and went back to their respective home areas. Many of these people believed that UNITA controlled the entire rail line. They expected to go back to work there after the civil war. They also believed that UNITA would come to power, hence facilitate rail transport for the Zambian cargo to the ports of Lobito and Benguela.

3.04 INFLUENCE OF ETHNIC GROUPS

The interests of the ethnic groups along Zambia/Angola border were articulated through Zambia's political, social and economic institutions by members of these groups. These institutions included: the Provincial Party Council, National General Council of UNIP, the Party's Committee of Chairman, Central Subcommittee of Legal and Foreign Affairs committee and the Cabinet. The Party institutions are provided for by its constitution. The cabinet and other government institutions came under the republican constitution.

Under the latter constitution, the President of the Republic is vested with wide executive powers including those dealing with foreign policy. However, foreign policy decisions are not made by him alone. He is advised by other people and institutions. But he is not obliged to follow their advice. As must already be clear by now, there are other party and government institutions and officials concerned with foreign policy making. The influence exerted by the institutions on the President may be seen in most of his speeches, dating back from 1964 when Zambia became

independent.

The cabinet plays an important role in policy making. Before Zambia became a one party state in 1973, the Cabinet was the supreme policy making body. Since then that status has been assumed by the Central Committee of the ruling UNIP. The cabinet is still the meeting place of some country's leading and influential politicians behind whom range strong ethnic group interests. However, the Zambian president regularly consults the cabinet on a wide range of issues including those concerned with foreign policy. The President may also seek the advice of the Central Committee of UNIP and its Sub-Committees. The Central Committee also makes foreign policy decisions. Members of these institutions may seek to initiate or support policies that are in line with the particular interests of the ethnic groups from which they came. Therefore, the composition of these institutions in terms of ethnic group affiliation of their members may give some indication of the potential to influence policy that different ethnic groups have.

During the period from 1964 to 1980 the composition of the cabinet was as shown in Table 3.2. The composition of the cabinet was assumed to favour the ethnic groups that were UNIP inclined. This was noticed with the Bemba-speaking group which is the largest ethnic group in Zambia. It covers Northern, Luapula, Copperbelt, part of the Eastern, Central and part of the North-Western Provinces. They are also found in many other spored areas of Zambia. In addition to being the largest group

supporting UNIP, its vernacular language is widely spoken. Therefore, it was worth giving this ethnic groups a larger number of :

Table 3.2 COMPOSITION OF THE CABINET IN RELATION TO ETHNIC GROUPS: 1964 - 1980

Origin to Ethnic Group	Oct. 1964	Jan. 1969	Jan. 1973	Jan. 1978	Jan. 1979	Jan. 1980
BEMBA GROUP:						
President	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vice-President	-	1	1	-	-	-
Secretary-General (Prime Minister)	-	1	1	-	-	-
Foreign Minister	1	-	-	1	1	-
Others	2	4	5	7	7	8
Total:	3	6	7	8	8	8*
NYANGA GROUP:						
President	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vice President	1	-	-	-	-	-
Secretary-General (Prime Minister)	-	-	1	1	-	-
Foreign Minister	-	1	-	1	-	1
Others	3	5	6	4	4	4
Total:	4	6	7	6	4	5
LOZI GROUP:						
President	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vice President	1	-	-	-	-	-
Secretary-General (Prime Minister)	-	-	-	1	1	1
Foreign Minister	4	2	4	2	2	3
Total:	4	2	4	3	3	4

Origin to Ethnic Group	Oct. 1964	Jan. 1969	Jan. 1973	Jan. 1978	Jan. 1979	Jan. 1980
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LUNDA-LUVALE
KAONDE GROUP:

President	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vice-President	-	-	-	-	-	-
Secretary-General (Prime Minister)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Foreign Minister	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	1	1	-	2	2	2
Total:	1	1	-	2	2	2

SOLI-LENJE TONGA

ILA-SALA GROUP:

President	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vice-President	-	-	-	-	-	-
Secretary-General (Prime Minister)	-	-	-	-	1	1
Foreign Minister	-	1	1	1	-	-
Others	3	3	4	-	2	2
Total:	3	4	5	1	3	3

COLOURED-MULATOES

ASIAN GROUP:

President	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vice-President	-	-	-	-	-	-
Secretary-General (Prime Minister)	1	1	2	1	-	-
Foreign Minister	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total:	1	1	2	1	-	Nil

Origin to Ethnic Group	Oct. 1964	Jan. 1969	Jan. 1973	Jan. 1978	Jan. 1979	Jan. 1980
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WHITE

(EUROPEAN) GROUP:

President	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vice-President	-	-	-	-	-	-
Secretary-General (Prime Minister)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Foreign Minister	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	1	-	-	-	-	-
Total:	1	-	-	-	-	-

Total Size: 1 -

Source: Zambia Gazette of 1965, 1969, 1973, 1978
1979 and of 1980 respectively.

representation in the cabinet than any other. In the cabinet both the President and the Vice-President were of different ethnic groups, Bemba and Chewa respectively. There were in all sixteen cabinet ministers from 1964 to 1966. Seventeen in December, 1968, and following the first general election in January 1969; then went up to twenty-six (when the new post of Provincial Cabinet Minister was introduced).¹⁴

The significant change in the composition of the cabinet was recorded after the December 1968 general elections. The appointment of the new members of the cabinet after the election took place in a context of ethnic group contentions over appointments to the top leadership, especially the appointment of a Vice President. At the general conference of the ruling UNIP held before the elections different ethnic groups backed different candidates for election to the post of Vice-President of the Party, knowing that the person elected could also become the Republic Vice-President. The candidates were: Arthur Wina (Lozi), Reuben Kamanga (Chewa) and Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe (Bemba). Different ethnic groups aligned themselves with each of these candidates. Arthur Wina was supported by the Lozi, Chokwe, Mbwela and Toka; Kapwepwe was supported by the Bemba, Lungu, Namwanga, tonga, Ushi and Ng'umbo.¹⁵ Kamanga was supported by all tribes from the Eastern Province and the committed supporters of President Kaunda. But because Wina was labelled, American trained capitalist whose economic policy was not in line with the UNIP economic policy; and Kamanga's unsuccessful work record when

he was Vice President, Kapwepwe won the election and became Vice-President.

However, ethnic group contention of appointments continued and must have influenced the post-election appointment of cabinet ministers. Out of nineteen cabinet ministers appointed, two were from Western Province, one of whom was Luvale and the other Lozi. The nineteen cabinet ministers included those responsible for provinces. To counteract ethnic group pressure, the President posted Provincial Cabinet Ministers to areas away from their tribal areas. However, these ministers frequently visited their home areas. The Provincial Ministers had little influence when issues affecting central government were raised, but were strong men when issues affecting their areas of origin came up.¹⁶ Ethnic group pressure contributed to frequent change of cabinet ministers and cabinet portfolios. New men were brought in the cabinet when certain existing ministers were removed. By late 1972 less than one-third of the cabinet ministers who had been in the cabinet since 1964 had been removed from Cabinet posts. This obviously reduced continuity in policy making, creating a situation where Zambia's policy on the decolonization of Angola became problematic. This situation in turn was amenable to the pursuit of ethnic interests.

As far back as 1964 the Lozi-speaking people had threatened to pull out of UNIP altogether, unless they were adequately represented in the cabinet of the newly independent Zambia. The Lozi government headed by the Ngambela (Prime Minister) of the

then Barotseland (later changed to Western Province) accepted to have that area, which had been a British Protectorate, to be part of the new Republic of Zambia on condition that it was given adequate representation in the cabinet, among other conditions. The Lozi's were supported by other ethnic groups in the area, including the Lunda, Chokwe, Bundu and the Luvala. In 1970, four cabinet posts were given to Lozi speaking people from the area. This representation on the cabinet was neither warranted by the population of the area nor by its UNIP political record. The cabinet ministers who were added to the Lozi list were: Fwanyanga Mulikita, Jethro Mutti and Josephat Siyomunji.¹⁷

The ethnic groups from North-Western Province also made demands for "adequate" representation in the cabinet. In 1977 their representation was equal to that of the Western Province. They were represented by: Humphrey Mulemba (Kaonde), Samuel Mbirishi (Luvala) and William Nkanza (Chokwe).

Ethnic groups did not seek adequate representation in the cabinet for its own sake. They looked at it as a way of influencing policy in their favour, among other things. The principle of "adequate" ethnic representation (balancing) was applied to the UNIP Central Committee as well.¹⁸

See table 3.3.

Table 3.3: MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE BY PROVINCE

Province	*1973	1976	1979	1980
Northern	5	5	4	5
Luapula	3	3	3	3
Copperbelt	2	2	3	3
North-Western	3	3	3	3
Western	3	3	2+	3
Southern	2	3	3	3
Lusaka	1	1	-	-
Central	1	1	1	1
Eastern	4	4	4	4

Source: Annual Reports for Years 1973, 74, 76, 79 and 1980 prepared by the Secretary-Generals of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) (Presented to the National Council Meeting).¹⁹

* 1973 is when the Central Committee Members became full time.

+ Sikota Wina was dropped and later replaced by Nalumino Mundia.

NOTES

1. Dobert, Margarita, Op. Cit pp. 121-131
2. Molteno, Robert, 1971, "Zambia and South Africa"; South African Outlook, February, 1971, pp. 23-24.
3. Tordoff, W., and Molteno, R., 1974, "Independent Zambia: Achievements and Prospects in Tordoff, W., ed, Politics in Zambia." Manchester: Manchester University Press pp. 363-401.
4. This view was expressed by Price Chanda a former publicity chief of the UP whom I interviewed in Lusaka.
5. This view was expressed by Kalota and Price Chanda whom I interviewed in Lusaka.
6. Anonymous letter to the editor, Times of Zambia. November, 1970.
7. This view was expressed by a member of UNIP Central Committee, who declined to be mentioned by name.
8. This information was given to me by Bulaya, a Lunda whom I interviewed in Kabompo District. He pointed out that this excuse was intended to raise the number of the province's real population. According to official censuses figures for 1973, North-Western Province was the lowest populated province in Zambia, with a population of 211,000 compared, for example, to Luapula Province which had the highest population figure of 357,000. North-Western Province also had the lowest UNIP membership in the country. Since appointments or elections to top Party and Government positions, in terms of representation of provinces, were based on population figures and party membership, the province ended up with a very low number of people in these positions, for example in the UNIP Central Committee before 1969. The Province also had a low number of Parliamentary Constituencies because delimitations was based on population quarter. Also see the United National Independence Party, National Council Minutes, 20th-25th April, 1974, Lusaka: Government Printer, pp. 1-217.

9. Kaplan, Irving., Op. Cit pp. 75-77.
10. According to a former ANC and UNIP member, this view was also supported by ANC leader Harry Nkumbula and his Deputy, Mungoni Liso, as they did not want to be "Swallowed" by UNIP. In this connection also see "The Barotseland London Agreement of 18 May 1964" Information Sheet No. 27, Lusaka: Zambia Information Service 1964.
11. This view was expressed by a former Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who declined to be cited by name.
12. This is according to Chief Kanongesha of Mwinilunga District. This was supported by a former member of Parliament for Mwinilunga Constituency. Village Headman Kayombo of Kayombo Village in Kabompo District similarly supported this view and explained that free movement of people and free trade across the border was a necessity for the people living along the Zambia/Angola border; and that it was important for ethnic groups in these areas to see that Zambia's policy makers supported this perception. Also see Kaplan, I., ed., Op. Cit. p. 77.
13. This view was expressed by a Lunda in Mwinilunga whom I interviewed. He declined to be cited by name.
14. This view was expressed by a Luvale whom I interviewed in Zambezi District and by a Lozi whom I interviewed in Sesheke. Both declined to be cited by name.
15. A Luvale I interviewed in Zambezi District expressed this view. This was supported by a number of people I interviewed in other Districts; thus: Kabompo, Mwinilunga, Sesheke, Kalabo and Mongu. All favoured what they called "free trade", which others called capitalism, rather than communism the MPLA followed.

16. Tordoff, W. and Molteno, R., Op. Cit. pp. 375-376.
17. Chitambala, M. Frank, 1984, History of UNIP: Republic of Zambia, Delhi, Nirankart Colony: Avitar, p. 110. Also see the Minutes of the 11th United National Independence Party Council Meeting of 12th-15th December, 1977, pp. 1-20, the Minutes of the 14th UNIP Council Meeting, 8th-12th October 1979, pp. 1-6; the Minutes of the 13th National Council and the 8th General Conference 8th-12th September, 1978, and the Minutes of the 15th National Council 1st-6th November 1980, pp. 1-3.
18. Tordoff, W., and Molteno, R., Op. Cit., p. 209.
19. See the UNIP Secretary General's Annual reports for 1973, 1976, 1979 and 1980.

CHAPTER FOUR

ZAMBIA'S POLICY ON A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

4.01 INTRODUCTION

In chapter one it was pointed out that the idea of a transitional government of national unity leading to independence in Angola, held a special appeal to Zambia. This was because not only was this conducive to a better political, economic and cultural ratification of the peoples of Southern Africa, but because it was also in accordance with the spirit of the OAU Charter.¹ It is against this background that this chapter will analyse Zambia's policy on the issues of a government of national unity and how the ethnic groups living along Zambia/Angola border attempted to influence the policy.

4.02 GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, the President of Portugal, died in 1969, but his brand of authoritarian rule and policy of not granting independence to Portuguese African territories were continued by his successor, Marcello Caetano. On April 25, 1974 elements of the armed forces constituted as the Movimento das Forces Armada (MFA - Armed Forces Movement) overthrew the Caetano government and installed a Military Council. The appointment of General Spínola as interim president helped establish the legitimacy of the new regime and the process of decolonisation of the Portuguese colonies was initiated. This was followed by the

talks between the Portuguese government and Angola's liberation movements at Alvor in Portugal, culminating in the signing of the independence agreement for Angola (the Alvor Accord). Among other things, the Accord provided for the establishment of a transitional government of national unity in which the FNLA, the MPLA, UNITA and Portugal would be represented, pending the holding of elections leading to independence. Accordingly the Presidential Council comprising of a representative from each of the four parties to the accord was formed as the government. Its chairmanship (Presidency) was supposed to rotate. Angola's independence was set for 11th November, 1975 by the agreement. Zambia welcomed this agreement and hoped that a government of national unity representative of the different ethnic groups and areas of Angola would also be formed after election (this is different from the transitional government of national unity in the obvious sense that it was not transitional and more-over, because it did not mean a government in which the liberation movements will participate). The three liberation movements had met earlier at Mombasa, Kenya on January 4, 1975, and Neto, Savimbi and Roberto had agreed to conduct negotiations.² In Angola the MPLA established a Military Council under the leadership of Antonio Alba Coutinho. Coutinho started serving on July 29, 1974, but was removed at the time of the Alvor Accord because he was pro-MPLA. Antonio da Silva Cardoso was named High Commissioner for Angola on January 24, 1975 and he was expected to oversee the implementation of the Alvor Accord. The MPLA

preferred Coutinho. Silva Cardoso was recalled by Lisbon on August 1, 1975, because the MPLA considered him to be pro-UNITA and pro-FNLA. He was replaced by Ernesto Ferreira de Macedo who leaned more toward the MPLA than Cardoso. However, implementation of the Alvor Accord ran into serious difficulties right from start. With Portugal's decision to grant independence to Angola, each movement became primarily concerned with winning power itself so that it would form the first government of independent Angola. This intensified power struggle among the movements. Therefore, cooperation required to sustain the transitional government was not there. Instead, civil war erupted.³

4.03 THE CIVIL WAR

On February 13th, 1975, the MPLA attacked the Luanda office of the Chipenda faction, killing between fifteen and twenty people and driving the group out of the city. Thereafter Chipenda joined the FNLA and became its Assistant Secretary General.

Also the FNLA moved heavily armed contingents of its military forces from rural areas to Luanda in January 1975. In April and March several serious armed clashes between the FNLA and the MPLA took place.⁴ UNITA formally declared war on the MPLA on August 1, 1975, and the FNLA withdrew its ministers from the transitional government in Luanda, thereby heralding full scale civil war. On August 15, Portugal assumed direct rule over Angola through Macedo and suspended the Presidential government. When the independence day came, the Portuguese High Commissioner

in Angola handed power to the people of Angola rather than to any particular movement because elections had not been held as a result of civil war.

The MPLA announced the establishment of its government in Luanda and called the territory it controlled: The People's Republic of Angola. It was recognised by seven African States of the OAU including all of Portugal's former African colonies, the Soviet Union, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Communist Nations of Eastern Europe and Brazil.⁵

The FNLA and UNITA, for their part, announced their intention to form a separate regime with headquarters in the southern city of Huambo and called their state the Democratic People's Republic of Angola. Because of continuing hostility, the two movements had difficulties in actually setting up a government and they managed only to form a council of ministers and a revolutionary council of twenty-four members in December, 1975. They made no attempt to integrate their armies. However, no state gave formal recognition to the Huambo regime.

4.04 THE OAU DECISION ON ANGOLA

The OAU was also concerned with fostering unity or cooperation, while discouraging competition and conflict among them. The OAU itself was the brainchild of ardent pan-Africanists and statesmen Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure, the first President of Ghana and Guinea respectively. Among other things, the OAU was expected to create a new African identity, to reassert a

common heritage and history over the more recent colonial experience and it was expected to contribute to the liberation of Africa. At the time of its inauguration the organisation was the only forum that promoted useful communication between Franco-phone, Anglophone African countries, excluding South Africa, as well as between these areas and the Arab states of north Africa.

One of the organs of the OAU which was assigned to deal with the decolonisation of unliberated parts of Africa, was the OAU Liberation Movement Committee (LMC). This Committee was established in 1963 and in the same year, it recognised the FNLA's government in exile (GRAE). The leader of this movement Holden Roberto declared the GRAE to be the sole authority in charge of anti-Portuguese military operations inside Angola. The following year, the MPLA was recognised and it too began to receive military and economic assistance from the committee. There were then fluctuations in the relative amount of aid given to the two movements, but both were helped continuously.⁶

UNITA started to receive assistance from the LMC in October, 1974. This strengthened its position. On January 9, 1975 UNITA received full recognition from OAU. This development put UNITA on an equal basis with the other two movements. It further made it possible for the three movements to form the transitional government soon after the coup in Portugal. These decisions of the Committee were supported by Zambia. However, while supporting equal treatment of all the movements, Zambia's policy makers still believed that UNITA would win elections leading to

Angola's independence. After the civil war broke out, the OAU and virtually all African governments pleaded for reconciliation and adherence to the Alvor Agreement. It was concerned about the lack of unity among the Angolan nationalists and it tried to counter the evident disiparous tendencies adversely affecting a reconciliation of the three movements. The Presidents of neighbouring countries including Zambia agreed also in 1974 to work toward an Angolan united political front to negotiate with the Portuguese and a summit of the heads of states of Zaire, Tanzania and the Congo was held at Bukavu, Zaire, from July 27 to 29. However, they failed in their attempt to get the three movements to reach an accommodation and the OAU then adopted an evenhanded policy toward the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA.⁷ This followed the reconciliatory meeting chaired by Jomo Kenyatta the President of Kenya held in June and July 1974 in Mombasa and Nairobi, Kenya which was attended by Roberto, Neto and Savimbi. As pointed out earlier, this effort was not successful either.

This new development led thirty-one African states to request an extra-ordinary OAU summit conference to consider the Angolan situation. This conference was held in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia in January, 1976. Like earlier attempts, at this meeting African leaders were unable to agree on an African resolution to end the civil war. The first resolution, introduced by Senegal, called for a government of national unity consisting of all three liberation movements and an immediate withdrawal from

Angola of all foreign troops which had intervened in the civil war.

The second resolution introduced by Nigeria, called for the recognition of the MPLA government as the sole legitimate government. The OAU was undecided on both resolutions. Ethiopia, the host country and Uganda, Chairman, were neutral. Twenty-two African countries voted for Senegal's resolution and twenty-two for the Nigerian resolution. Senegal's President, Leopold Senghor, stated that "to recognise one faction but not the other would be tantamount to thinking like Europeans....it is necessary rather to push the three liberation movements towards a dialogue". He even defended the FNLA and UNITA's cooperation with South Africa when he said that it was not the first time that a revolutionary movement entered into a circumstantial alliance with a reactionary party, even a racist one, in order to survive.⁸

President Senghor's views were shared by a large number of African states which supported the Senegalese resolution. Zambia supported the Senegalese resolution. She did so because she felt that the MPLA did not win the war with her effort only, but with the help of Cuba and the Soviet Union. She and other countries which supported the resolution were willing to condemn not only South African, but all forms of foreign intervention.⁹

The other four Portuguese speaking African countries, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verd, were among the non-supporters of the FNLA's and UNITA's collaboration with

South Africa and called on all African nations to rally behind the MPLA. President Machel of Mozambique condemned other rival groups for opening the doors to the South African invaders and insisted that only the Popular Movement protecting the country from foreign invasion should be supported. The supporters of the Nigerian resolution distinguished between Soviet and Cuban military assistance to the MPLA and Pretoria's military aid to FNLA and UNITA. As the United States of America congressman Charles C. Diggs, reporting on his conversation with African leaders in Addis Ababa, explained: "The Soviet Union has supported virtually every African Liberation group in contrast while South Africa remains the basis of white supremacist domination on the African continent¹⁰."

In a divided Africa, the OAU conference was unable to reach a collective resolution to end the strife in Angola. Instead it appointed a Special Conciliation Commission to deal with the problem. The Commission visited Angola. In its report it indicated that UNITA was the most popular movement followed by the FNLA and the MPLA. The failure by the OAU to find a solution to the Angolan crisis left the door open for the liberation movements to escalate the war. The MPLA's success in offensives against its rivals north and in the south of Luanda, which were conducted in late January and in February 1976 led more African countries to recognise the Luanda regime.

Finally the OAU itself recognised the MPLA government in 1976 inspite of the special conciliation Commission Report. However, the MPLA and UNITA pledged to continue guerrilla warfare in Angola. Nevertheless by the end of February more than eighty nations had recognised the MPLA regime as the official government of the Angolan people. For reasons explained earlier, Zambia did not recognise the MPLA government until September, 22nd.¹¹

4.05 ETHNIC GROUPS AND ZAMBIA'S POLICY

While the conflict in Angola was not basically between the ethnic groups, but between the movements, ethnic groups aligned behind the liberation movements did have an impact on the conflict as well as on Zambia's policy. A conciliation commission set up a few days before independence as a result of an earlier OAU meeting in Kampala, Uganda, proposed a coalition government, the demilitarisation of Luanda, the sending of an OAU peace-keeping force and the holding of elections. The proposals were rejected by the MPLA. An important reason for rejection was the fear by the MPLA that, holding of election in Angola would bring its rivals to power. This was because UNITA and the FNLA had popular support among important ethnic groups in Angola. The mesticos, urban Vimbundus the assimilados and the Portuguese Communities in Angola, the main base of support for the MPLA, were not in big numbers as compared to the ethnic groups which supported its rivals.

This was in line with Zambia's long standing policy of recognising liberation movements that were considered to have popular support of the ethnic groups in their country. The popularity of the two movements had been indicated by the OAU's special conciliation's report on Angola. The other important consideration for Zambia was the security factor. UNITA's base of support extended to the area along the Zambia-Angola border. Most of the people who supported the movement live in this area. Zambia's policy of good neighbourliness meant that it would not be faced with a hostile UNITA controlling areas along the border which were contiguous to its own territory. Given that, many Zambians in the border area were actually sympathetic to UNITA, Zambia's policy was therefore designed to ensure that these ethnic groups were not alienated. Zambia and a number of other African countries feared that if MPLA formed government for the whole of Angola, oppression of the large ethnic groups would result, just as it had been the case during the Portuguese colonial rule.

Zambia's preference for UNITA and FNLA basically continued up to the time when the MPLA forces seized the strategic port of Lobito in August 1975. This was followed by the collapse of the UNITA - FNLA coalition, forcing Zambia to come to terms with MPLA. On March 16, 1976 an Angolan delegation, led by then Foreign Minister Jose Eduardo dos Santos, arrived in Lusaka to discuss normalisation of relations between the two countries. Shortly after this visit Zambia forbade UNITA and FNLA to use

bases in the country and on September 22 she recognised the MPLA regime. Zambia argued that she had waited for so long because the MPLA owed its victory to the Soviets and Cubans, whom she compared to a tiger and its cub stalking the continent. She explained that she did not wish to see Angola become a theatre for super power rivalry. Therefore, she attacked Soviet policy of hegemony in Africa and lauded China for not seeking "to impose its will on the people of Africa" while assisting liberation movements.¹²

It has been suggested by Kaplan that what led Zambia's policy makers in early 1970's to give (covert) support to UNITA and the FNLA was that they believed that these movements controlled the territory through which the Benguela Railway passed. However, Zambian policy makers were misinformed on the issue, because there was no time that UNITA and FNLA controlled the entire Benguela Railway.

Therefore, the re-opening of the Benguela Railways which closed as a result of the civil war would have not been in Zambia's economic interests because the railway line could not have been fully controlled by either movement, but by both UNITA and MPLA. Therefore, the issue of ethnic group interests continued to play an important role on Zambia's policy on the decolonization of Angola. This facilitated Zambia's policy to aim at a solution which would guarantee peace in Angola in general and along the Zambia/Angola border in particular. The idea of a government of national unity in Angola was therefore, in line

with this objective.

Many of the Zambian ethnic groups living along Zambia/Angola border preferred UNITA and FNLA to form a new government in Angola. This was because UNITA and the FNLA had substantial support from people in Angola belonging to these ethnic groups. Chief Kanongesha of Mwinilunga informed me that UNITA respected traditional leaders. According to him, this was the reason why Chipango, MP for Mwinilunga constituency and member of opposition party and the African National Congress (ANC), constantly informed the Zambian government to support the ethnic groups preference for UNITA and FNLA government, for independent Angola. He explained that the ethnic groups in his area felt that, the MPLA was not a truly Angolan movement, but a Portuguese one. This was because it was dominated by members who were thinking like the Portuguese. This apparently referred to the preponderance of mesticos and assimilados among the MPLA supporters and leadership.

On the recognition of the MPLA government by Zambia, a former civil servant seconded to Freedom House explained in an interview with me that, the decision by Zambia was based on the fear of the military superiority that Zambia perceived to be possessed by the MPLA after 1975. Mr. Chela further said Mozambique and Tanzania had exerted pressure on Zambia to recognise the MPLA government. However, Aaron Milner, Zambia's former Secretary-General to the Government from 1970 to 1973 strongly supported by Rupia Banda Zambian Foreign Minister from 1973 to

1974, opposed Zambia's recognition of the MPLA government. Milner was MP for Chingola-West constituency. Significant number of the electorates in the constituency were Lunda, Chokwe, Kaonde and Lubale. It is therefore very probable that Milner's position reflected the interests of the electorate in his constituency. Going by his own words, Rupia Banda does not like communism and for that reason he opposed Zambia's recognition of the MPLA government. Similarly, a former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, a Kaonde from North-Western Province, argued that Zambia should not have recognised the MPLA government, but should have continued to support the FNLA and UNITA. This, in his view would have forced the MPLA to accept the holding of elections. He believed UNITA and FNLA would have won the elections. Zambia also faced pressure from ethnic groups interests in formulating her policy on the issue of the government of national unity and in deciding whether to recognise the MPLA government or not. From the ethnic groups point of view, Zambia's decision to recognise the MPLA government was therefore, against the interests of the ethnic groups living along Zambia-Angola border.

NOTES

1. Dobert, Margarita, in Kaplan ed., Op. Cit. p. 132.
2. Ibid, p. 135.
3. Gibson, Richard, 1972, African Liberation Movements, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 221.
4. Azevedo, Mario, 1977, "Zambia, Zaire and Angola crisis Reconsidered", Journal of Southern African Affairs, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 276.
5. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts No. 4, Ref. B/3, Dec., 1 1975.
6. This was the view of the former Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs whom I interviewed and declined to be cited by name.
7. Klinghoffer, I., Op. Cit., p. 65.
8. Ibid., p. 66.
9. Ibid., p. 67.
10. Legum, Colin, 1976, ed., "The Role of the Big Powers", in After Angola: The War over Southern Africa. New York: Africana, p.31.
11. Anderson, Jack and Les Whitten, Washington Post, February 17, 1976; and Castro's Speech in Luanda in Grammar Weekly Review, April 10, 1977, p. 2.
12. Klinghoffer, I., Op. Cit, pp. 67-68.

CHAPTER FIVE

FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA

5.01 INTRODUCTION

The foreign powers which intervened in the Angolan conflict were South Africa, the United States of America, Cuba and the Soviet Union, among others. This complicated Zambia's policy on supporting liberation movements in Angola. This was because Zambia's policy makers had to take into account the conflicting policies of the intervening powers. Added to this was the sympathy the Zambian ethnic groups living on the border with Angola had for UNITA and the FNLA.

This chapter will critically examine Zambia's policy on foreign intervention in Angola before and during the civil war. It will discuss and analyse the ways in which foreign intervention affected the interests of the Zambian ethnic groups living along Zambia/Angola border and how these groups attempted to defend their interests.

5.02 PORTUGAL'S COLONIAL POLICY

Much of the ground work for foreign intervention was led during the Portuguese colonial rule. Acceptance by the Portuguese of foreign investment in their African colonies created an economic interest in the colonies on the part of the countries of origin of the investors. Economic interests were backed up politically as the situation demanded. The Portuguese were the

first Europeans to discover Africa south of the Sahara. However, at the so-called Berlin Conference of 1884-85, Africa was formally divided up among the colonial powers: England, France, Germany, Belgium, King Leopold of Belgium himself, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The conference in Berlin only acknowledged the results of earlier colonial conquest. Thus the actual division of Africa had already started. France had invaded Algeria as early as 1830. The British colonialists made the Gold Coast (Ghana) a colony in 1874, and invaded Egypt in 1882. The French conquered Senegal in the 1860s and invaded Tunisia in 1883. In south Africa, the British took over after the Anglo-French war of 1793-1804, and since that time she had been in constant conflict with the Boer Settlers.¹

The three most industrialised states: Britain, France and Germany were in possession of 80 percent of the African colonies. Portugal's share in Southern Africa was out of proportion to her underdeveloped economic base, in particular, and to her power in general. However, she was dependent on Britain which used her as a pawn in the big power game. Britain for her part, let Portugal have formal authority over Angola and Mozambique as a way of denying rival possession of these territories.²

Because of its economic weakness Portugal adopted the policy of accepting investment from other western countries into her colonies. This was the opportunity that the American, Japanese, West-German and South African multinational companies had been waiting for. A number of economic concessions were sold to firms

from the world's leading imperialist countries and just as the Portuguese had calculated. their home countries got a stake in Angola's and other Portuguese African colonies' future. Consequently the Portuguese lost control over Angola's rich natural resources, but in turn they got company taxes which were used to finance the military budget and powerful allies against the liberation movements.³

The size of the investments which came flooding into Angola after 1965 indicate its economic potential. The extra active industries expanded most rapidly and among the most important ones were the oil discoveries in Cabinda where Gulf Oil, a United States based company started to pump oil in 1967. By 1973, oil overtook coffee as the country's leading export. The Portuguese retained a share of the diamond mining, along with Belgium, British, French and America interests. West-German (Krupp) and Japanese companies exploited the iron ore finds, while South African and Japanese companies mined copper.⁴

As a result of this policy, Portugal received substantial foreign exchange earnings. The companies operating in Angola were required to pay special war tax. In addition, many of them had private armies, and their workers were housed in tightly controlled compounds.⁵

The rapid increase in economic activities in Angola during the liberation war, was described by West European financial magazines as the "Angolan Wonder". They measured the "wonder" in terms of millions of dollars invested; export incomes; Gross

National Product; and GNP per capita, and concluded that Angola was fast becoming one of the richest countries in Africa.⁶ But what did this "wonder" mean for the Angolan masses?

Naturally, it meant an increase in jobs, but many of the new plants were capital intensive and required qualified workers, which in most cases Angolans were not. During the uprising, prices rose fast affecting everyone involved in the monetary economy. Although forced recruitment of labour was officially prohibited in 1961, it continued in more discrete forms and land was still an occasion seized from the African farmers. In the last ten years of colonial rule, five to six times as much was spent on transport and communication as on the health and education of the six million Angolans. Thus, the Angola "wonder" scarcely touched the majority of the Angolan population.⁷

Given the strong support of its allies, which were members of NATO, the Portuguese government was capable of meeting the African challenge in the early 1960's by increasing the arms of its army to include napalm and splinter bombs. They also strengthened the repressive apparatus. In 1961, Portuguese troops were moved to the Northern part of the country where they undertook ruthless measures against the Angolan people: between 30,000 and 50,000 Africans were killed.⁸

South Africa also collaborated with Portugal even long before the civil war broke out. South African army chiefs had regular meetings with representatives of the Portuguese colonial army, and South Africa declared that its 'defence interests'

extended to the borders of Zaire, Zambia and Tanzania.⁹ This pleased the Portuguese colonial government in Angola.

At a later stage of the civil war in Angola, Portugal condemned all foreign intervention from January, 1976. On January 6, it banned the use of the Azores as a transfer point for men and supplies destined for Angola. Despite the ban, Cuba reportedly continued using the Azores for several days for the transfer of troops to Angola. And during the same period, the socialist government in Lisbon extended official recognition to the MPLA Luanda government on February 22, 1976. This decision was made after an all night cabinet meeting held in Lisbon. The socialist and communist parties supported the motion recognising the MPLA government in Angola. However, Portugal's second largest political party, the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popula Democratico (PPD), remained adamant against MPLA recognition because of the large number of refugees from Angola who were at the time residing in Portugal.¹⁰

Nevertheless this did not stop the MPLA advances for world recognition. In June Angola's application for membership at the United Nations (UN) was defeated because the United States of America vetoed it. Finally, on November 22, the UN Security Council recommended the admission of MPLA by thirteen votes to none, Portugal included.¹¹

5.03 SOUTH AFRICA

Angola was viewed as a buffer zone between independent black African states and those under white minority rule. Therefore, it was coveted by the "imperialists" in order to retard the liberation process in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. South Africa shared this perspective of imperialist countries. The United States of America was not opposed to black majority rule. However, she did not want this to be at the expense of its interests in particular and in the interests of Western countries in general. It therefore preferred peaceful change and opposed liberation movements which received assistance from the Soviet Union and other communist countries. It also favoured negotiated settlements in which it would play a major role.¹²

The South Africans envisioned an upsurge of the liberation movements in Namibia, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and South Africa. She believed that the Soviets were establishing a base of operations in Angola from which they could extend their influence over Southern Africa. The anticipated communist penetrations of the region and the formation of black governments were to be feared rather than welcome.¹³ In order to protect her national interests, South African troops frequently entered Angola during the Portuguese rule to confront the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) which was operating across the Namibian border from Angola. Such actions continued after the Portuguese revolution. On August 8, the same day that the South

African Consulate General in Luanda was closed, troops occupied the Cunene River area near the Namibian border and a further advance began on August 22. South Africa took advantage of the Angolan war seizing territory, confronting SWAPO. However, this was not the major purpose of the invasion, said Angola embassy official in Lusaka.¹⁴ As indicated earlier, that South Africa was colluding with the FNLA and UNITA against the MPLA therefore, the events of August 1975 must be viewed in this context.

It was reported that almost 1,000 South African soldiers entered Angola in the month of September. Some of these soldiers were instructors and were sent to Silva Porto, Bie Province, to advise UNITA. On October 11, a 1500-2000 man column of white mercenaries, FNLA, UNITA and some South African soldiers moved into Angola and on October 14, major offensive started.¹⁵ On October 22, regular South African army units invaded Angola. They were assisted by Portuguese mercenaries and troops from Chipenda's faction of the FNLA. The threat to Luanda therefore, stymied less than a week before independence day north of Novo Redondo, in Ngunza, in North Province. On November 15, another 1500 men were committed and another equal number in early December.¹⁶

South African interference in Angola had a decisive impact on the ethnic groups in the country. At one time they did not know what to do next, although their support for FNLA and later UNITA was well known said a member of Parliament from North-Western Province, whom I interviewed. More to this was the

impact that south African interference brought about on the Soviet Union which provided arms to the MPLA. This massive introduction of Soviet arms in the fall of 1975 was imperative if the MPLA was to halt the South African invasion initiated in August. This development caused South Africa to extend the services of army reservists from three weeks to four months. It also began to operate fighter bombers in the Cuando-Cubango, Huila and in Moxico districts.¹⁷

South African interference in Angolan affairs was conducted with the active support of the United States. State Department Africanist, Edward Mulcahy admitted that the United States regularly exchanged intelligence information with South Africa. South African Defence Minister Pieter Botha also implied that there were more channels used for coordination than the CIA's link with BOSS (the South African Bureau of State Security). Botha later discussed a direct American-South African role in the distribution of arms to anti-MPLA forces in Angola. He said that he personally saw United States planes deliver arms. They were unloaded under the supervision of the American personnel in the presence of South African troops and were later asked to help distribute them.¹⁸

During the late fall of 1975, the United States condemned Cuban interference in Angola but was silent on south African activities. Verbal attacks focussed solely on extra-continental powers clearly hinted at approval of the South African role. Several other states also encouraged South Africa, especially

those which were economically linked to her and supported the policy of dialogue or detente between black South African states and South Africa. Among these were, Zaire, Zambia, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. A tacit alliance was thus developed between these four black states, South Africa, UNITA and the FNLA and the United States.¹⁹

However, South Africa was alarmed by the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola and saw the war as a clash between communist and western interests. It claimed that it had no desire to get involved in the conflict between the three Angolan movements, but that it was necessary to counter Soviet and Cuban actions. It was claimed South Africa was responding to moves by the two communist-ruled states, as well as to request from the FNLA and UNITA for support against communist intervention. It was also said that, South Africa believed that it was the duty of western states to combat communist expansion in Angola.²⁰

Furthermore, South Africa believed that her participation in the Angolan war was encouraged by Zaire and Zambia. Therefore, she felt obligated to support the policies of these two states, which had already opted for dialogue or detente with her. Soviet-armed SWAPO movement, which was operating from bases on the Angolan side of the border. An upsurge of SWAPO activities had taken place since the Portuguese revolution as many Ovimbundus found it relatively easy to slip into Angola to join SWAPO.²¹

The legitimate defence of her economic interests in Angola, also prompted South Africa to protect the Cunene River complex,

which included the Ruacana hydroelectric station and the Caluegue dam. These facilities provided irrigating water and powers to Namibia. Once Portuguese control of the area collapsed and MPLA and UNITA forces were engaged in conflict, South Africa found it imperative to provide security for the economic projects. Soldiers were sent into Angola on August 8, 1975 and MPLA forces were dislodged in the process.²²

5.04 CUBA

The Cubans performed five basic roles in Africa. Cuba emerged as a leading spokesman for the third world and has actively attempted to display its international solidarity with "progressive" forces of Latin America, Asia and Africa said an official of the Cuban Embassy in Lusaka.²³ Her extensive revolutionary involvement in Venezuela, Bolivia and other Latin American states is beyond the scope of this study, but her military role in the Middle East is more germane. Working in an area completely divorced geographically and culturally from her traditional interests, Cuba helped train Palestinian and Dhofari guerrillas for their struggles against Israel and Oman respectively and Cuban military personnel assisted the governments of South Yemen, Syria and Traque. The Cubans' role in Africa conforms to this pattern of support for "progressive" forces and its Angolan venture should be viewed as a continuation and acceleration of an already evident trend rather than as a policy aberration of change or course. During this period, from 1975 to 1980 Cuba trained and advised revolutionary movements in Africa and members of these movements were often brought to Cuba for instructions as well. Zanzibaris who participated in the 1964 overthrow of the Sultan were trained in Cuba and Che Guevara's unsuccessful guerrilla operation against the Zairean government in 1965 is one of the many examples in Cuba's effort to spread Marxist revolution to Africa. At various times, the Cubans

assisted FRELIMO in Mozambique and PAIGE in Guinea-Bissau against the Portuguese and the Eritreans against the Ethiopia government. Support for Polisario against the Moroccans in Spanish Sahara was continuing at the time of writing. Guerrilla training centres run by Cubans operated in Algeria and Ghana during the early sixties and they were later moved to Congo (Brazzaville) and Guinea. Members of the MPLA were trained in the Congo and the PALGC in Guinea.²⁴

The other role was assisting leftist African governments, such as those in Congo (Brazzaville) and Guinea, by organising presidential security forces and training troops while the other role was the provision of combat pilots. Cuba trained Algerian pilots but was generally reluctant to send abroad such highly prized military personnel. The fourth role was the delivery of arms to guerrilla movements and states such as Congo (Brazzaville) and Guinea while the fifth role was participation of Cuban troops in combat. Approximately 300-400 Cubans joined the Algerians in the border war with Morocco in 1963, and 500-750 Cubans aided the Syrians against Israel in 1973. In both cases, the Cubans operated tanks. Actual combat troops did not fight in Guinea-Bissau on the behalf of the PAIGC but the 200 Cuban advisors did get involved in battlefield situations. The Cuban role in Angola was therefore not the first of its kind but the level of participation far exceeded all previous actions in Africa and the Middle East. Angola was soon followed by a similar Cuban combat role in Ethiopia.²⁵

At the end of 1978, Cuba had military personnel in the Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Mozambique, Sierra-Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia and of course Angola. Cubans were also training the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in Zambia and Polisario in Algeria. Approximately 40,000 members of the Cuban military were in Africa mainly in Angola and Ethiopia, and Security advisors were in Benin. Medical personnel, teachers and other Cubans, performing non-military functions were also active. Cuban military advisors were expelled from Somalia in November, 1977.²⁶

As one begins to analyse the Cuban role during the Angolan war, the basic questions to consider are: Why did Cuba commit thousands of combat troops to a war in Africa in general and in Angola in particular? How did the timing of the Cuban troops entry related to the course of the war and in particular the military actions of South Africa? What degree of coordination existed between Cuba and the MPLA?

The Cuban role in Angola in late 1975 was known as "operation Carlota". The MPLA and the Cubans had however, already collaborated closely for a decade, Cubans began training MPLA troops in Congo (Brazzaville) in 1965 and Che Guevara met Neto at the time. Neto visited Castro in Cuba the following year and ninety MPLA members were sent to Cuba for military training. Cuba support for the MPLA was therefore part of a continuum. It involved training and arming the movements "fighting in Congo

(Brazzaville); two, providing advisors within Angola; three, establishing military training centres in four Angolan provinces; four furnishing troops for incorporation into MPLA units; and five dispatching entire military units for combat alongside the MPLA.²⁷

Cuban direct participation in combat in Angola began on November 5, 1975. Cuba decided to send troops to Angola in the last week of August 1975. She started to dispatch the troops the following month by ship. Ships were sometimes routed to Pointe Note. Others came directly to Porto Amboim, Novo Redondo and Luanda. By the beginning of November 1975 about 2000 Cuban troops were in Angola and a decision was then made to greatly augment their numbers. The decision was taken in response to external intervention in the civil war on the side of the MPLA's rival movements. The South African were at that time advancing northward from Namibia up the Atlantic Coast and they had reached Benguela between them and MPLA and Cuban forces. This is the first instance cited by Cubans and their Portuguese sympathiser, Silverio Silvino Marquez (Provincial Governor in Angola) in which Cubans were engaged in combat. Castro maintained that the first Cuban casualty in Angola was suffered near Benguela on November, 3²⁸. The Cubans had actually been in combat for a month and probably suffered casualties earlier, but the salient point is the importance of the battle of Benguela in influencing Cuban policy. It is believed that the Cubans apparently concluded that the MPLA and a few thousand Cuban supporting troops could not

stop the South Africans and that a new infusion of their troops would be required to halt the advance towards Luanda. The November 11 independence date was approaching and the MPLA had to be assisted in holding the capital so that the People's Republic of Angola could be proclaimed.²⁹ A permanent Cuban presence in Angola seems to date back to May 1975. In May the same year, Neto met a Cuban delegation in Brazzaville and requested assistance. In June, 230 Cubans arrived at Benguela, Cabinda, Harique de Carralho (Saurimo) and Salazar (Dalatando) to start training MPLA fighters. The centres were operational by August. The MPLA had been receiving large quantities of Soviet weapons since March. However, because the Soviets were not willing to commit men. Cuban instructors were necessary to train MPLA fighters in the handling of the weapons.

5.05 THE SOVIET UNION

Zambia's policy on the Soviet Union intervention in Angola before and after the civil war was that of wait and see. This was because Zambia felt that Neto's government in Angola owed its victory to the Cubans supported by the Soviet Union. This was in spite of the fact that both Cuba and the Soviet Union wished the MPLA to form a government that was going to include all the liberation movements in Angola. Soviet ties with MPLA have a long history. It is estimated that in 1971 as much as seventy to eighty percent of MPLA arms came from the Soviet Union and East European satellites. They also trained military personnel and

provided civilian training for students. However, aid began to dwindle in 1972 and ceased entirely by 1973. In 1974, however, as Neto regained power, with the military coup in Portugal and with the threat of growing FNLA military strength due to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) help, the Soviets decided to resume aid to the MPLA. In October and November 1975 small arms shipments arrived again for the MPLA. However, extensive aid was given only when the struggle between the MPLA and its rivals became fiercer and when the Soviet Union began to worry seriously over the prospect of the PRC's growing influence, which it seemed to fear far more than Western influence. At that time the Sino-Soviet rift was very much real. Its perception occurred against the background of what it had viewed as increased Chinese influence in Zambia and Tanzania during the construction of the Tazara Railway from Dar-es-Salaam to Kapiri-Mposhi.

In December, 1977, Jorge Sangumba, Savimbi's right hand man, talked of recent secret meetings during which Soviet diplomats had attempted to persuade UNITA to join a coalition government with the MPLA. Reportedly UNITA would consider this proposal if Cuban troops were withdrawn. But Neto would refuse out of hand. Thus the Soviet overtures ran counter to the position of the MPLA main stream leadership. On the night of May 27, 1977, there was an attempted coup (the Nitist plot) led by Nito Alves and Jose Van Dunem³⁰. Alves had been among the guerrilla forces in the dembos forest who had started fighting in 1961 when the attack on Luanda failed. He was also a political leader of the first

region at the time of the coup in Portugal. He was the self-proclaimed spokesman of the Luanda's slum. This was the first strong-hold of the MPLA in Luanda. He was instrumental in suppressing the Angolan Communist Organisation, although in some respect their out-look was akin to his, and thus lost much of his support in the slums. In October 1976 the MPLA Central Committee condemned Alves for factionalism.³¹

Jose Van Dunem had been a political prisoner in Sao Nicolou camp during the first year of liberation struggle. He was married to a white Angolan, Cita Vales, who had been prominent in the Union of Communist Students in Portugal. Dunem and Alves were involved in distributing secret plot leaflets containing racist attacks on white Portuguese who worked as expatriates for the Angolan government. The Commission of Inquiry set-up by MPLA government revealed that, Van Dunem and Alves and their followers had purposefully caused food shortages in order to stir-up discontent. The Provincial Commission of Malenge and Benguel helped them. These Provinces were traditionally food supplier in that country. On May 21 both Alves and Van Dunem were expelled from the Central Committee of the MPLA.

The attempted coup got under-way in the early morning of May 27 with the attack on Sao Paulo prison, the radio station. Alves counted on people in the slums and Van Dunem on the army units.

sympathetic to him. Neither these came to the aid of the plotters. There was suspicion that the Soviets were actually supporting the rebels - in contrast to the Cubans who came promptly to the MPLA's rescue recapturing all what Alves and Van Dunem and his followers had seized. Following the coup attempt, leading pro-Soviet leaders of the MPLA were purged from the party and some were executed for allegedly participating in the coup attempt.³²

5.06 THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

During the period covered by this study, the People's Republic of China (PRC) had very warm relations with most of the countries of Central and Southern Africa. Some of these were: Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia. However, the PRC's relations with the MPLA government were not cordial throughout. This was because the PRC's continued siding with UNITA and the FNLA and its publicity likening the Soviet and Cuban presence to Portuguese colonialism. In 1968 Savimbi had been invited to Peking and given some small help. When Neto followed him in 1971 he received nothing because he was already getting help from the Soviets. Beginning in 1973 the FNLA became a recipient of help from the PRC which in the following year began training FNLA guerrillas at the Kikuzu base in Southern Zaire and sending military equipment³³ .

In late September, 1975 three weeks before independence, the PRC withdrew instructors from the FNLA camps in Zaire, heeding the pleas of the OAU against foreign intervention in the Angolan civil war. However, with massive infusion of Soviet and Cuban help to the MPLA, the PRC lined up firmly and openly on the opposite side. This proved to be a costly political move. In June and again in November 1976, when the question of Angola's admission to the UN came up before the Security Council, the PRC's delegate was absent. Neto contemptuously denounced the PRC as a country that allied itself with the forces of imperialism while calling itself socialist. It may be remembered that at this point in time, the PRC's domestic policy and that on Africa were experiencing great difficulties.³⁴

5.07 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American policy makers, pre-occupied with assured access to military facilities in the Azores, had been totally unprepared for the swift crumbling of the Portuguese government in Lisbon. After the Lisbon coup, Secretary of State Kissinger favoured General Antonio de Spínola's proposal for a Lusitanian community, which was discussed in chapter 2.

The build up of Soviet and Cuban military aid to the MPLA and the South African intervention put the United States of America and Zambia in a quandary. The two countries warned the Soviet Union of the danger of super power confrontation over

Angola. The United States of America after the experience of Vietnam was not eager to engage in new military ventures abroad. Therefore, it decided in July 1975 to give covert support to the FNLA and to a less extent, to UNITA. This support was stepped up in January 1976 and was sent through Zaire. The move came after the Soviet Union resumed their lift of military equipment to Angola on December 24, 1975 which it had halted on the 9th of the same month following consultation between President Ford and the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatolity Dobryain.³⁵

The United States of America, also was concerned with Cabinda where Gulf oil had began to pump oil in 1968. Under the Secretary of State's pressure Gulf oil stopped paying royalties to the MPLA regime in January 1976. But in March, after the victory of the MPLA, it resumed the payments with the consent of the Departments of State. The MPLA declared that it did not intend to nationalise Gulf oil.³⁶

The United States of America resorted to covert aid because overt assistance would have embarrassed Zambia and Zaire which were working closely with it. However, in the aftermath of the second Shaba invasion in the Spring of 1975, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was reportedly considering supplying covert aid to UNITA guerrillas still fighting in Angola against the MPLA government.³⁷

On May 25, 1976, President Carter announced that he was ruling out all covert United States of America involvement in Angola and that he would deal directly and openly with the MPLA

government. However, Donald McHenry, American Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) suggested that a peaceful solution for Angolan problem should be found. He proposed that goodwill between the two countries should be established. This was in spite of the fact that Neto indicated that he would neither abandon his option for Marxism nor be willing to meet the precondition of withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola which nevertheless, the Carter Administration demanded. In July he called on the United States to establish diplomatic relations with his Marxist oriented government.³⁸ Carter viewed this move as that which would take Neto away from the Communist Camp. But since the United States of America was aiding Savimbi his rival, there was no way by which Neto could have been in alliance with the United States.

5.08 ZAMBIA'S POLICY

During the liberation struggle in Angola, Zambia supported all foreign assistance to liberation movements in the country. When President Kaunda visited the Soviet Union in November 1974, he praised Moscow's aid to liberation movements in Southern Africa. He stated that, Soviet assistance was very important for the African people's victory over colonialism and fascism.³⁹ Therefore, Zambia welcomed Soviet assistance to the MPLA when Angola was under Portuguese rule, but later she strongly opposed

the aid extended to these movements after the Alvor Accord was signed. However, later Zambia defended her change of policy from that of evenhandedness to the policy of covertly accepting foreign intervention by countries which supported UNITA, and the FNLA, South Africa, the United States of America and the NATO allies . This policy was similar to that of Zaire, although no Zambian troops ever entered Angola to fight. Zambia also covertly supported the Chipenda faction of the MPLA in 1973 and in 1974. She also obstructed the transportation of supplies to the MPLA from Dar-es-Salaam in 1975.⁴⁰ However arms from Western European, supporters of the FNLA and UNITA reached these movements through Zambia. She also covertly encouraged South African assistance to the two movements, because she considered the result of the civil war as a "Russian-Cuban victory" and she warned the rest of Africa about the plundering tiger with its deadly cubs.⁴¹ She declared: "we see this situation: that movements which are socialist at home and liberators abroad..... Cuba and Soviet liberatorsshould leave the task of liberating Africa to Africans⁴²." Zambia, the United States and her allies shared the same view that the foreign intervention in Angolan civil war was seen as a clash between the Communists and Western interests and that it was necessary to counter Soviet and Cuban action. They claimed that south Africa was responding to moves by the Soviet Union and Cuba as well as to requests for

support from the FNLA and UNITA.⁴³ Zambia and Zaire had already opted for "dialogue" or "detente" with South Africa which was in the interest of United States.

In April 1975 Zambian officials travelled to Cuba and thereafter relations with the MPLA, the Soviet Union and Cuba began to improve. The relations between Zambia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were also cordial. This was because at that time China was aiding Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (guerrilla Organisations) and South West Africa People Organisation (SWAPO) as well as the FNLA and UNITA in Angola. Furthermore, during the period, China gave more financial assistance to liberation movements in Southern Africa than the Soviet Union did. During this period PRC provided six million US dollars to Zambia and again 279 million US dollars.⁴⁴ Most of this aid was for construction of the Tan Zam Railway. All this was in spite of the fact that the PRC relations with MPLA were widely known not to be warm. This was as far back as early sixties when PRC supported the anti MPLA Viriato da Cruz faction and facilitated its leader's acceptance by the FNLA.⁴⁵

5.09 ETHNIC GROUPS AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION

The states which intervened in the Angolan civil war can be put in two ideological categories. One, Western Capitalist states; two, the Socialist states. The former included the United States, its NATO allies and South Africa.⁴⁶ The latter included the Soviet Union and East European allies and Cuba. The point has already been made that in terms of ideological orientation ethnic groups along the Zambia/Angola border were basically capitalist. Ideological affinity was among the reasons not only for their preference for UNITA and FNLA, but also for their acceptance of external intervention by capitalist states on the side of the two liberation movements.

Bulaya, a Lunda I interviewed, pointed out that most of the people in Angola and those living along Zambia/Angola border preferred to support the FNLA and UNITA. They also preferred Zambia and Zaire's policies towards these movements. This was because these movements and states guaranteed their interests since their policies were Western oriented (capitalist).⁴⁷

The intervention in Angola by South Africa and the United States of America on the side of the FNLA and UNITA, said a Chokwe I interviewed in Kabompo, had therefore, no adverse effect on the people of Angola as a whole. This, he said, was because it made no serious change on the lives of the people in Angola and those living along Zambia/Angola border. According to him, the people of Angola were accustomed to the western way of life

which included capitalism. Free trade, freedom of worship, for example, were cherished by most of the people in Angola.⁴⁸

However, the intervention in Angola by Cuba and the Soviet Union had an adverse effect more especially on those ethnic groups which were supporting the FNLA and UNITA. This view was expressed by a former Zambian minister of Foreign Affairs whom I interviewed in Lusaka. This view was also strongly supported by a Makwangala and Nawa Liswaniso I interviewed in Shangombo village in Sesheke District.⁴⁹ The Marxist ideology advocated by the MPLA was new to most of the people in border area. They had never experienced a government which forbid its people from praying further helping themselves by trading with others across the border or in the country, said Chief Kanongesha of Mwinilunga District whom I interviewed. This view was also supported by Village Headman Kayombo of Kayombo's village in Kabompo District who further added that the Marxist ideology the Cubans and the Soviets brought with them and gave to the Angolan people through the MPLA was not in our people's interests (Lunda, Chokwe, Luavale, Ambwela, Mbukushu among others). This was because our way of life was similar to that of the Zambia and Zaire said Headman Kayombo. These views therefore encouraged most of the ethnic groups living along the border to support UNITA and the FNLA rather than the MPLA Marxist movement. Therefore, the three chiefs of Kanongesha's family found in Zambia (North-Western Province), Zaire and Angola and their subjects, supported the foreign intervention by the States which were on the side of

UNITA and the FNLA.⁵⁰

Lameck Sheki, a businessman I interviewed in Mwinilunga District, pointed out that the people in the border area worked hard in their face-to-face contacts with the officials of various government institutions to influence Zambia's policy. Similar views were also expressed by George Kapita a Lunda of chief Nyakaseya, (Chokwe), Mwinilamba (Lunda) and Senior Chief Kanashi (Lubale), whom I interviewed in the North-Western Province.⁵¹

NOTES

1. Palmberg, Mai Op.Cit., p. 15.
2. Ibid., p. 16.
3. Ibid., p. 147.
4. Ibid., p. 148.
5. Ibid., p. 103.
6. Ibid., p. 104.
7. Ibid., p. 150.
8. Ibid., p. 151.
9. Ibid., p. 152.
10. Klinghoffer, J. Arthur, Op. Cit., p. 32.
11. Dobert, Margarita, Op. Cit., p. 136.
12. Hovey, Graham, The New York Times, December 30, 1975, p. 29.
13. Barratt, John, "The Angolan Conflict", South African Institute of International Affairs, April 1976, p. 14.
14. This was expressed by an Angolan Embassy official in Lusaka I interviewed who declined to be cited by name.
15. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 October 25 Ref. B/4 1975.
16. Facts and Reports, 6 No. 1, January 14, 1976.
17. Klinghoffer, 1980, Op. Cit., p. 45.
18. Berman, Kenee, John, 1978, The Guardian, April 21, p. 1.
19. See Newsweek Interview, LXXXVII, No. 70, May, 1976.
20. Harvey, Graham, in The New York Times, Op. Cit., 1975 22, p. 3. Also see Statement by Prime Minister Vorster, The New York Times, January 31, 1976.

21. Marcum, John 1978, Op. Cit p. 266. See also Colin, Legum 1976, ed, "The role of the Big Powers", After Angola The War over Southern Africa New York: Africana.
22. Marcum, John, 1975, "The Anguish of Angola", Issue, Vol. V. No. 4.
23. The Statement that Cuba actively attempted to display its international solidarity with "progressive" forces of Latin America, Asia and Africa was expressed by the Cuban Embassy official in Lusaka whom I interviewed.
24. Facts and Reports, Vol. 6, No. 24, December 1, 1976.
25. Arlington Centre for Naval Analysis, September 1977, pp. 1 - 20.
26. Ibid, p. 37.
27. Gonzales, Edward, 1977, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy", Problems of Communism, Vol. XXVI, No. 6, pp 10-11.
28. Gamma Weekly Review, April 10, 1977
29. Ibid., June, 20 1976, p. 5.
30. Grayson, George, 1977 "Cuba's Developing Policies", Current History, 72 No. 424, pp. 50-51.
31. Charles Ebinger, 1976, "External Intervention in International War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War", Orbis, Vol. 20 No. 5, p. 697. See also The Economist, 260, No. 6935, July 31, 1976, pp. 52-53. You can also see Castro speech in Luanda, Op. Cit., p 2.
32. Dobert, Margarita, 1979, Op. Cit., pp. 138-39.
33. Ibid, p. 161.
34. Ibid, p. 162.

35. Blinder, David, 1976, The New York Times, March 5. See also Klinghoffer, Op. Cit., p. 85.
36. See Edward, Mimi, 1976, "Struggle Marks Angola's First Year", Venceremos, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 4. You can also see Wilfrid Burchett, The Guardian, March 24, 1976.
37. Stockwell, John, 1968, In Search of Enemies, New York: Norton, p. 213. See also African Contemporary Record 1974-75.
38. Dobert, Margarita, Op. Cit., pp. 163-164.
39. Gramma Weekly Review, April 27, 1975. See also The New York Times, February 15, 1976.
40. Sulzberger, C.L., The New York Times, Dec. 31 1975.
41. Facts and Reports, Vol. 6 No. 8, April 21, 1976, p. 193.
42. Azevedo, Mario, Op. Cit., p. 278. See also African Contemporary Record, 1974-75, New York; Africana, P.B. 536 You can also see Facts and Reports Vol. 5, No. 25 December 13, 1975, p. 1.
44. Legum, Colin, 1976, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 4, p. 749.
45. Uralov, K., 1976, "Angola: The Triumph of the Right Cause" International Affairs, No. 5, p. 54.
46. This version was expressed by Mr. Bulaya, a Lunda I interviewed.
47. This view was expressed by a Chokwe I interviewed in Kabompo.
48. This view was also expressed by Chief Kanongesha, whom interviewed.

49. This view was expressed by Nawa Liswaniso, a villager living near Sesheke, whom I interviewed.
50. A headman in Kabompo District expressed this view.
51. Stockwell, John, Op. Cit., p. 91.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

6.01 INTRODUCTION

This study deals with the problem of Zambia's policy on the decolonization of Angola. The period covered is from 1965 to 1980. It focussed mainly on the influence of the ethnic groups living along Zambia/Angola border on the policy. The hypothesis of the study is that the pursuit of interests of the ethnic groups living along the Zambia/Angola border contributed to tilting Zambia's policy towards Angolan liberation movements away from evenhandedness to one of preference for UNITA and the FNLA.

There were three main liberation movements in Angola - FNLA, MPLA and UNITA. Two of these, UNITA and the FNLA were basically western-oriented. The MPLA was Marxist-oriented and was supported mainly by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Zambia adopted a policy of evenhandedness whereby she endeavoured to support all the three movements. In her view, what was important was the liberation of Angola.

This study has shown that the policy of evenhandedness was not consistently followed in practice over the period under review. Zambia's conduct reveals preference for UNITA and to a lesser extent, for the FNLA. This put her on the same side as the United States and other major western countries.

Various theories and conclusions have been presented by scholars of African politics but none seems to exhaust the subject as to what influenced Zambia's policy on the decolonization of Angola in general, and her preference for west-oriented movements in particular.

Therefore, to answer this question, the study was guided by Saxena's theory, according to which another important determinant of the foreign policies of African States is the pressure exercised by various ethnic groups living along their country's borders. Following this theory the study attempted to answer the question: Why was the principle of evenhandedness of Zambia's policy not continuously put into practice?

To answer this question the study examined, among other things, Zambia's stand on the policy issues of a government of national unity for Angola and Foreign intervention. The idea of a government of national unity resulted from Angola's independence agreement - the Alvor Accord of January, 1975. Formally, in supporting the idea of a government of national unity, Zambia seemed to be pursuing her policy of evenhandedness. However, in practice she still preferred UNITA and FNLA. This was because Zambia believed UNITA would win the subsequent elections leading to Angola's independence. This assessment was shared by the United States. This was also accorded with the preferences of Zambia's major ethnic groups living along the border with Angola.

The eruption of the civil war complicated the situation. South Africa intervened militarily on the side of UNITA and the FNLA. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and Cuba stepped-up their assistance to the MPLA.

Zambia's position was to condemn all foreign intervention. Again this seemed to be in accordance with the policy of even-handedness. However, it must be pointed out that in view of Zambia's and America's assessment that UNITA was likely to win pre-independence elections, then the condemnation of foreign military intervention may be seen to be in accordance with the policy of preferring UNITA since militarisation of the situation could have lead to an MPLA victory and the formation of government.

However, as a result of the civil war, it was the MPLA which seized power and formed the first government of independent Angola.

The ethnic groups living along the Zambia/Angola border attempted to influence Zambia's policy such that it would be in line with their interests. These interests were: political, economic, security and cultural ones, among others.

This study has shown that the ethnic groups perceived that supporting UNITA and the FNLA was consistent with their interests. Consequently part of their efforts were aimed at swaying the Zambian government towards consistently supporting these movements. This they did through the lobbying of people from their groups who were in the policy making organisations of

the party and its government and through the opposition parties during the first period of multi-party state. Ethnic group interest articulation facilitated by the policy of tribal balancing in making appointments in the party and government as shown by the analysis of the composition of the UNIP Central Committee and the Cabinet, for example.

Basically therefore, the policy of evenhandedness conflicted with the preference of the ethnic groups. However, Zambia's preference for UNITA and the FNLA was in line with them.

Judging from the lobbying done by the ethnic groups on the Zambian side of the Zambia/Angola border through opposition parties and through their representatives in the Party and Government, we conclude that the interest group pressure most likely influenced Zambia's policy in favour of UNITA and the FNLA to the extent that Zambia preferred these movements. In reaching these conclusions, we have taken into account the fact that the method which has been used in the study is basically an intuitive one which cannot lead to precise conclusions. We also take into account the fact that, for example, Zambia's recognition of MPLA government was against the preference of the ethnic groups. This suggests that ethnic group pressure was not the only factor that Zambia's policy makers were taking into account.

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