British Imperialism in South Africa

British Imperialism in South Africa: An Historiographi Study of the Transvaal 1886-1910.

by

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I hereby declare that this dissertation represents my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for any degree at this or any other University.

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To my old mother, Egeret Nyangulu and late father Jube Phiri.

ABSTRACT

Studies on the history of the Transvaal (1886-1910) have traditionally been classified as either imperial, liberal or radical. This categorization of scholars assumed that whatever interpretation of the history of the Transvaal was put forward by one school of thought was significantly different from interpretations put forward by other schools.

However, this approach in this author's view produced problems when it became apparent that there are as many similarities between the various schools as there are differences. Historical studies by some scholars did not neatly fit the traditional descriptions, thereby calling for a different approach in classifying the historians of South Africa. The terms imperial, liberal and radical tended to conceal a good deal of similarity in interpretation.

As an alternative to the traditional approach, this study proposes that the historiography of the Transvaal can best be studied if historians are classified as either political determinists, economic determinists or political-economic determinists. This classification, it is further argued, cuts across the accepted classification and therefore casts new light on the nature of the historiographical controversy.

The study proposes that the historiographical controversy over the interpretation of Transvaal history can be explained by the complex nature of South African

historical development as well as by sectionalism among the historians. The controversy which centres around the Jameson Raid, the Anglo-Boer War and the Reconstruction period, it is argued, has been influenced by the premises upon which historians based their interpretation of the evidence.

This study proposes that the works which give primacy to economic factors as explanations of British imperialism in the Transvaal are more convincing than those works which give primacy to political circumstances.

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INTRODUCTION

The Imperial factor in South Africa can be traced back to 1795 when Britain forcibly occupied the Cape in order to safeguard her interests in the East.[1] This occupation was temporary because following the peace of Amiens the Cape Colony was handed back to Holland, the original occupant. However, due to imperial rivalries in Europe during the Napoleonic wars, and largely for strategic reasons, Britain once more took over the Cape Colony. This second occupation was ratified at the Congress of Vienna in 1814 at which Cape Colony became a British Crown Colony. British imperialism gained prominence in the 1870-1914 period in that it was during this period that the diamond and gold discoveries at Kimberley (1868) and on the Witwatersrand (1886) respectively:

> inaugurated an industrial revolution whose socio-economic and political repercussions constitute the major themes of Southern African twentieth century history.2

Among the notable repercussions of these mineral discoveries are the Jameson Raid at the end of 1895, the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War, and the Act of Union in 1910. These episodes, as they are commonly known in the historiography of South Africa, have been the centres of much historical enquiry by historians of various backgrounds and with different ideological convictions.

Thus, going through the historiography of South Africa on the 1886-1910 period, one is immediately struck by the variety of interpretations of Transvaal history. There is the

'settler' interpretation of South African history, represented most prominently in the works of G.M. Theal in which the Afrikaner is defended against British imperialism.[3] However, Theal's works are mostly on the period before 1886. He did not write much on the period under discussion. Then there is the imperial point of view, essentially concerned with the fate of the empire, its creation, development and collapse. Thirdly, there is the Afrikaner interpretation whereby Afrikaners from the 1930s began to reinterpret the history of the Transvaal from their own point of view. Fourthly, there is the liberal school of thought whose roots are to be found in the liberal anti-imperialist attitude to empire. Fifthly, there is the radical school of thought whose roots:

> lie deep in the nineteenth century, in this case with Marx and his contemporary radical attacks on the European exploitation of colonial areas.4

It ought to be pointed out here that this dissertation is not an attempt to write another history of the Transvaal. Rather, it is an attempt to analyse the various trends in interpretation, and to extract from them an understanding of the history of the Transvaal from 1886-1910.

In fact, a closer examination of the historiography of South Africa, reveals that cutting across the above classification is another classification of economic determinists, political determinists, and political-economic determinists who combine and give equal weight to political and economic factors in their interpretations. It is in

this respect that one finds that the divisions between liberal and radical accounts, and between economic and political determinists, are cross-cutting categories. The classification of individual historians into any one of these categories cannot therefore be watertight. There are aspects of interpretation common to different scholars in their approaches to the study of South African history.

Thus for the purpose of this study, historians of South African history (1886-1910) will be classified as either political determinists, economic determinists, or political-economic determinists. Political determinists are those scholars who either write political history of the Transvaal, or those scholars who study economic events but believe that political factors were the real source of change in South Africa. In this respect, works by apologists who saw British imperialism as a progressive and humane force[5] and Afrikaner historians constitute the category which wrote essentially political history of the Transvaal. A. Mawby and R.V. Kubicek on the other hand are among those scholars who studied economic events but are essentially political determinists.[6]

Economic determinists are those scholars who hold the view that imperialism was largely based on economic forces rather than on political factors. This category includes such scholars as J.A. Hobson, Donald Denoon and Geoffrey

Blainey who are all of the view that economic factors were the real source of change in South Africa.[7] The third category of political-economic determinists includes two major groups of historians. One category is that of scholars who give equal weight to political and economic factors as liberals. The notable scholars in this case are W.M. Macmillan, C.W. de Kiewiet and L.M. Thompson.[8] The other category is that of scholars who give equal weight to political and economic factors as Marxists or radicals.[9]

The chapters in the dissertation have been arranged on the basis of the above described classification. The first chapter is on economic determinists. The second chapter is on political determinists and chapter three is on political-economic determinists. The fourth chapter is a summary and a synthesis of the preceding three chapters.

This being an historiographical study of the way in which scholars have approached and interpreted South African history, especially that of the Transvaal, the research involved the use of secondary sources. This is not to imply that archival and primary sources are irrelevant for a historiographical study. On the contrary, the author recognizes the importance of these sources. However, for reasons of expediency and practicability, the author based the study on published sources on the Transvaal. The works were identified and then classified into the different categories already

referred to above. The nature of the historiography has been examined in relation to the influence of British imperialism on the episodes of Transvaal history.

It was with this in mind that the Jameson Raid, the Anglo-Boer War, the Reconstruction period and the Act of Union were isolated as points of reference in dealing with the different points of view. Just as the mineral discovery on the Witwatersrand revolutionized the socio-political and economic life of the Transvaal, the Jameson Raid and the Anglo-Boer War gave historians of South Africa further substance upon which to examine British imperialism in the subcontinent. Since the study involved a review and discussion of specific issues, it was placed within the realm of the current historiographical controversy over the interpretation of Transvaal history.

NOTES

1. D.W. Kruger, "The British Imperial Factor in South Africa from 1870 to 1910," in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, Vol. 1 Cambridge University Press, London: 1969; 325.

P. Warwick, The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902, Longmans, London: 1980.

2. S. Marks and S. Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State," History Workshop 8 (Autumn 1979); 52; Similar sentiments are expressed by

S.H. Frankel, The Economic Impact on Under-developed Societies, Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 1953; 111-113.

3. G.M. Theal, History of South Africa, 11 Volumes, London: 1888-1919. George Allen and Unwin.

4. H.M. Wright, The Burden of the Present: Liberal-Radical Controversy Over Southern African History, David Philip, Cape Town: 1977; 14.

5. W.B. Worsfold, South Africa, a Study in Colonial Administration and Development, Methuen and Co., London: 1895.

L.S. Amery, The Times History of the War in South Africa, 7 volumes, Sampson Low, Marston and Company, London: 1900-09.

6. A.A. Mawby, "Capital, Government and Politics in the Transvaal 1900-1907: A Review and a Reversion," The Historical Journal 17, 2 (June 1974); 387-416.

R.V. Kubicek, "The Randlords in 1895: A Reassessment," Journal of British Studies 11 (1972); 84-103.

7. J.A. Hobson, Imperialism a Study, George Allen and Unwin, London: 1961.

G. Blainey, "Lost causes of the Jameson Raid," The Economic History Review 2nd Series, 18, (August 1965); 350-366.

D.J.N. Denoon, "'Capitalist Influence' and the Transvaal Government During the Crown Colony Period 1900-1906," The Historical Journal 11, 2 (1968): 301-331. Denoon's analysis of capital in

the Transvaal has under-gone much rethinking as shown in his "Capital and Capitalists in the Transvaal in 1890s and 1900s," The Historical Journal 23, 1 (March 1980): 111-132.

8. W.M. Macmillan, Complex South Africa: an Economic Foot-note to History, Faber and Faber, London: 1930.

C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa: Social and Economic, O U P, London: 1941.

L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa 1902-1910, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1960.

9. J.J. Van-Helten, "British Capital, the British State and Economic Investment in South Africa 1886-1914," The Societies of Southern Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 9 (1978): 1-17.

S. Marks and S. Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State," History Workshop 8 (1979): 50-80.

CHAPTER ONE

ECONOMIC DETERMINISM AND TRANSVAAL HISTORY 1886-1910

Economic determinism in South African studies is as old as political determinism. Exponents of this point of view are essentially economic determinists and see British imperialism in the Transvaal to have been based on economic factors rather than on political factors. The historians who constitute this category are hardly radicals in the sense in which the term is used in South African historiography. They, however, prefer an economic interpretation of Transvaal history. It is also important to note that studies done by the economic determinists reflect a lot of individual diversity in approach to the South African past. Thus one finds a kind of controversy among historians in this category over the way in which Transvaal history can be best interpreted.

The economic determinists see British imperialism, represented by Sir Alfred Milner and Joseph Chamberlain, as susceptible to economic demands rather than to political forces. As such most studies in this category start with the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand and end with the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 or at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Within this period the studies revolve around the Jameson Raid, the Anglo-Boer War, the reconstruction of the Transvaal after the war, and the Act of Union. Despite the individual approaches to these issues, the role of capital and the characteristics of the state (both local and imperial)

and the role and the characteristics of the gold mining industry are crucial in the studies by these economic determinists.

For purposes of clarity and chronological development of an economic interpretation of British imperialism vis-a-vis the history of the Transvaal, the study of this point of view will first consider the influence upon it of early scholars. An interpretation of South African history with economic overtones began to be pursued as far back as 1900 with the publication of J.A. Hobson's The War in South Africa.[1] Two years later, his famous Imperialism: a Study (1902) was published. The theory of economic imperialism was for the first time systematically put forward. He, among other things, pointed out that British activities in South Africa and the Transvaal in particular were largely based on economic considerations. He argued that the most important factor in imperialism was the need to export capital by advanced industrial nations and then to invest it in areas outside their own political regions.[2] Although Hobson stressed the importance of surplus capital, he defined imperialism with the push effect of trade in mind and observed that:

> Imperialism is the endeavour of the great controllers of industry to broaden the channel for the flow of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign investments to take off the goods and capital they can not sell or use at home.3

Hobson's analysis and contribution to the theory of imperialism also features a wide range of non-economic drives

to imperialism such as strategic, military, and phil - antharopic. These forces, noted Hobson, were also behind British expansion into Africa.[4]

In The War in South Africa (1900) Hobson argued that the war was caused by capitalist profiteers and that it was a terrible disaster for everyone else both in England and South Africa. The only beneficiaries, he argued, were the mine-owners to whom the successful overthrow of the Transvaal government meant an opportunity to increase profits.[5] The mine-owners anticipated a more economic working of the mines in the post-war period in that the obstacles experienced in the Kruger regime could be removed. Aware of the non-economic factors, Hobson argued that the combination of finance and the patriotic forces generated by soldiers, politicians and traders led to imperialism.[6] The Hobsonian view of British imperialism in South Africa was based on the fact that in the Transvaal economic and political factors were closely connected.

Although Hobson did not consider the Jameson Raid in detail, his observation was to the effect that the same conspiracy of 1895 was again at work in 1899. He argued that during the years preceeding the Anglo-Boer War the imperial government showed its willingness to proceed to extreme measures on behalf of the Uitlanders. The gold magnates had also made up their minds to behave as though they were imperialists rather than the secret conspirators of 1895.[7] He observed that all the active members of the Uitlander Council, established in June 1898, were closely

connected with the mining industry at different levels. These members became the mouth-piece of the great capitalists whose interests in the Transvaal were at stake. The most visible instrument of agitation in the Transvaal was the South African League. The League, Hobson argued, resolved to support British supremacy in South Africa and to oppose strenously any attempts that were likely to weaken or destroy that supremacy.[8]

On the Anglo-Boer War, Hobson argued that it was made by the press. He argued that press was under the control of a body of capitalists who used Newspapers to appeal for public opinion both in England and South Africa. These capitalists, he observed, deliberately misrepresented issues in order to stimulate British action. Thus, he argued that a 'small confederacy of international financiers' working through a kept press were responsible for bringing about the war.[9] While the Afrikaners did everything possible to arrive at a peaceful settlement, the Rhodesite press and the average British jingo never concealed their distrust of any Afrikaner concessions and promises. A group of powerful business politicians rallied behind the imperial forces not for the benefit of the imperial factor, but for their own benefit. It is in this respect that Hobson saw economic considerations to have been of great importance in South African political changes.

Hobson's Imperialism influenced a number of scholars, including Rosa Luxemburg and V.I. Lenin.[10] In her The Accumulation of Capital (1913) Luxemburg demonstrated how

capitalism affected the pure peasant economy which prevailed in Cape Colony and the Afrikaner republics before the mineral revolution. The Afrikaner expansion into the interior, she argued, did not have as profound an impact as did the mining revolution of the 1870s and the 1880s. The Afrikaners were generally farmers and their livelihood depended on land and livestock as did the Africans they found in the interior. The only significant change was that the Afrikaners built their peasant economy like parasites--they largely depended on African slave labour. It was therefore the desire or the pretext to emancipate Africans which provided the excuse for the English conflict with the Afrikaner Republics. Luxemburg argued that:

> In fact, peasant economy and great capitalist colonial policy were here competing for the Hottentots and Kaffirs, that is to say for their land and their labour power.11

Although the British government appeared as protector of Africans, its ultimate aim was to rob Africans of their land. In fact, argued Luxemburg, British capital showed its true intentions after the mineral revolution when capitalists did everything possible to replace the small peasant republics by a great modern state.[12] The Anglo-Boer War led to the triumph of capital over the peasant economy whereby capital officially took over the reins of the new South African Union.[13] Thus for Luxemburg it was capitalist influence which was the real source of political change in the Transvaal and the rest of South Africa.

In 1916 V.I. Lenin's Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism was published. In this publication Lenin discussed, among other things, the nature of imperialism as a special stage of capitalism. He briefly referred to the Anglo-Boer War and analysed the role of Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain. He noted that these two were imperial heroes of the last years of the nineteenth century who openly advocated imperialism. They applied the imperial policy in the most cynical manner.[14] He augued that these British politicians saw the connection between the purely economic and socio-political roots of imperialism. As such, argued Lenin, they advocated imperialism as 'a true, wise and economical policy'. Imperialism to them was a matter of survival--a question of bread and butter. It was this consideration which led them to be actively involved in precipitating the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War.

Lenin's explanation of imperialism is similar to Hobson's in that he too observed that:

> The non-economic super-structure which grows on the basis of finance capital, its politics and its ideology, stimulates the striving for colonial conquest.15

Both are essentially economic determinists although they were prompted by different situations which in turn help to spell the differences between their analyses. Hobson's contribution to the theory of imperialism was in line with terms appropriate to the tradition of liberial opposition to British colonization of foreign lands. In fact, the

Anglo-Boer War shaped Hobson's understanding of Britain's domestic economy. Lenin's contribution on the other hand was inspired by his analysis of the position of the working class in the western world. His views were shaped by the First World War which, as Kubicek noted, 'heralded for Lenin the end of advanced capitalism in western Europe'.[16] In fact, as Eric Stokes pointed out, Lenin was not putting forward the same model of imperialism as Hobson.[17] The two differed on the question of chronology: for Hobson 'surplus capital' emerged as a compelling impetus to overseas annexation, while for Lenin, 'monopoly finance capitalism' did not coincide with the scramble for colonies between 1870 and 1900. It came after this period.[18] The debate on imperialism was carried on during and after the first World War by scholars who were essentially economic determinists.

In the 1960s attention was focused on the role of capital and capitalists in the events of the Transvaal. In 1965 Geoffrey Blainey's "Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid" appeared.[19] In this lone article Blainey made the assertion that the Jameson Raid and the Johannesburg plot were the responsibility of a certain sector of the mining magnates. He seriously challenged the political interpretation of the origins of the raid then prevailing.[20] Blainey observed that those historians who preferred a political interpretation had done so because they had wrongly assumed that all mine-owners had similar economic

interests. They therefore wondered why some magnates supported the plans for the rebellion while others ignored such plans.[21] Blainey ascertained that there were valid reasons to believe that the grievances of the Rand mining industry were stronger than historians had realized. These grievances, he argued, were more severe for the deep level mines than for the outcrop mines.[22] The outcrop mines and the deep level mines are said to have experienced different operational problems due to different operating conditions and costs. Because the deep level mines required more expensive machinery and larger amounts of capital than did the outcrop mines, the former were likely to suffer under Kruger's government. Blainey argued that the chief plotters of the raid were members of the two big deep level mining companies --the Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa and the Rand Mines Limited.

Blainey argued that Cecil Rhodes who was a joint Managing Director of the Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa and the largest shareholder took the strongest initiative to rescue his company from the dangers of Krugerdom. Blainey's analysis in proposing a dichotomy between deep level and outcrop mines rested on the special burden state policy placed on the working costs of the deep levels. Although Blainey's interpretation has been disputed on various points by other historians,[23] it was, however, endorsed by Richard Mendelsohn.[24] The distinction between deep level and outcrop mining houses

is said to have been untenable because Eckstein's and the Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa were simply the first mining houses to diversify their operations into deep level mining.[25] They still maintained their outcrop mining ventures and it is argued the distinction which Blainey emphasized disappears as soon as one realizes this fact.

Despite these criticisms, Blainey acquired followers, the most prolific of whom is Donald Denoon. He has written several articles and one book on Transvaal history. Most of these are on the Anglo-Boer War and the post-war period. In his "'Capitalist Influence' and the Transvaal Government", Denoon examined the 'supposedly monolithic' influence of capitalists in the Transvaal during the reconstruction period.[26] Denoon observed that while writers after J.A. Hobson rejected almost everything written by Hobson, they endorsed his interpretation that the hostility between the small mining companies and the big mining companies did not affect the monolithic nature of international capitalism in the Transvaal.[27] Adopting Blainey's information and ideas on pre-war politics in the Transvaal and applying Blainey's type of analysis, Denoon concluded that capital was influential in the Rand during the Crown Colony period. In his view capital seized political power when the deep level magnates gained the upper hand in the Chamber of Mines.[28]

Denoon was also interested in the failure of imperial policy in South Africa. He advanced a number of reasons and argued that one direct cause for the failure of Milnerism was the failure on the part of the Progressives to carry the whole of the English speaking white Transvaal electorate in the 1907 elections.[29] He observed that Milner's government was unable to placate all the necessary magnates because the Chamber of Mines was itself divided. This division posed a serious local obstacle to the accomplishment of the imperial project--supremacy of imperial influence in the Transvaal. Denoon gave an economic explanation to the failure of Milnerism in place of the political interpretation then prevailing.

Although Denoon's analysis was strongly challenged by Mawby, the significance of his work is that he was one of the first two historians to seriously consider gold mining financiers in their studies.[30] Denoon's analysis was therefore more economic than Mawby's which used economic evidence to advance a political interpretation of Transvaal history. The controversy between their analyses should be seen as one involving historians belonging to different camps. The works so far considered were concerned with the way in which capitalist development influenced local politics in the Transvaal. Various mining magnates participated in local politics for varied reasons, some to enhance their mining business, while British imperialists used the mining industry to foster imperial connections in the subcontinent.

In his recent article, "Capital and Capitalists in the Transvaal in the 1890s and 1900s", Denoon reviewed recent analyses and sought a new synthesis of published evidence.[31] He observed that:

> The debate in South African historiography has, of course, moved on: it is no longer an argument about the economic motives of individuals and their relevance to political processes; but whether or not Southern African history is characterized by class struggles.32

Having reviewed the critics of Blainey's analysis, Denoon made the observation that few scholars realize how much of Blainey's analysis has survived the attacks upon it. Denoon reviewed Kubicek's criticisms of Blainey and came to the conclusion that Blainey's thesis stands in as far as it deals with Rhodes.[33] Denoon, however, acknowledges the value of Kubicek's analysis of the financial structures of the groups of mining companies as demonstrated in his Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice.[34]

Important in Denoon's reworking of the role of capital and capitalists in the Transvaal is his observation that:

> the character and behaviour of capital and capitalists has extensive implications for the analysis of the war in South Africa in 1899: but much detailed research remains to be published on that subject.35

Denoon argues that in 1902 capitalism was no longer confined to the mining enclave. Capitalist relations of production and indeed the availability of wage labour on the Witwatersrand modified relations between land-owners and tenants in the country side. He argues that the accumulation of capital was the over-riding factor in

Milner's policy during the reconstruction period.[36] Although Denoon did a lot of reworking in his analysis of Transvaal history, he did not completely abandon his earlier observations. He maintained that the local representatives of the deep level mining companies who in 1895 conspired to overthrow Kruger's government were prominent in the agitation which led to the outbreak of war and after the war were prominent in the counsels of the Colonial State.[37] Denoon has strengthened his earlier analysis by using new material and has benefited from his critics. The economic determinism considered in this chapter has contributed a lot towards the understanding of South African history and indeed, economic imperialism in the Transvaal.

A further overview of this stance in the interpretation of Transvaal history has been left for the last chapter where different trends in interpretation will be compared and contrasted in detail. The economic interpretation of Transvaal history considered in this chapter points to the fact that in the Transvaal the economic factor was the source of change in that society.

NOTES

1. J.A. Hobson, The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects, James Nisbet and Company,London: 1900.

2. J.A. Hobson, Imperialism A Study, George Allen and Unwin, London: 1938; 51.

3. Hobson, Imperialism A Study, 85.

4. This observation was made by R.V. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: the Case of South African Gold Mining Finance 1886-1914, Duke University Press, Durham: N.C. 1979; 6.

5. Hobson, The War in South Africa, 21.

6. Hobson, Imperialism A Study, 59.

7. Hobson, The War in South Africa, 23.

8. Hobson, The War in South Africa, 199.

9. Hobson, Imperialism A Study, 345.
He argued that "The same conspiracy of powerful speculators, manufacturing interests and philanthropy of missions and the lust for adventure, may plot the subversion of honest, self-developing democracy, in order to establish class rule, for their own political and commercial ends".

10. Though Luxemburg's and Lenin's analyses are in this chapter, they are essentially Marxist in approach as are the works in chapter three.

11. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London: 1951; 412.

12. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, 416.

13. This view is shared by the Simons, but they differ with Luxemburg on the necessity and inevitability of war. H.J. and R.E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa 1850-1950, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 1969; 60-61.

14. V.I. Lenin Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Progress Publishers, Moscow; 1978, 74.

15. Quoted in E. Stokes, "Late Nineteenth Century Colonial Expansion and the Attack on the Theory of Economic Imperialism: a Case of Mistaken Identity?" The Historical Journal 12, (1969); 292.

16. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism, 8.

17. E. Stokes, "Late Nineteenth Century Colonial Expansion", 298.

18. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism, 8.
Stokes, "Late Nineteenth Century Colonial Expantion", 298.

19. G. Blainey, "Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid", The Economic History Review 18, 2 (1965); 350-366.

20. R. Mendelsohn, "Blainey and the Jameson Raid: The Debate Renewed", Journal of Southern African Studies 6 (1980); 157.

21. Blainey, "Lost Causes", 351.

22. The grievances referred to here include the dynamite monopoly, tariff system, chronic shortage of cheap labour, and Kruger's Concessions policy.

23. Among the outspoken critics of Blainey's thesis are: A.H. Jeeves, "The Rand Capitalists and the Coming of the South African War 1896-1899", Canadian Historical Association Papars (1973); R.V. Kubicek, "The Randlords in 1895: A Reassessment", Journal of British Studies. 11 (1972).

24. Mendelsohn, "Blainey and the Jameson Raid".

25. A.A. Mawby, "Capital, Government and Politics in the Transvaal, 1900-1907: A Revision and a Reversion", The Historical Journal 17, 2 (June 1974); 392.

26. D.J.N. Denoon, "'Capitalist Influence' and the Transvaal Government During the Crown Colony Period, 1900-1906", The Historical Journal 11 (1968); 301-331.

27. Denoon, "'Capitalist Influence'", 301.

28. Denoon, "'Capitalist Influence'", 310; Denoon, A Grand Illusion: the Failure of Imperial Policy in the Transvaal During the Period of Reconstruction 1900-1905, Longmans, London: 1973, 26.

29. Denoon, "'Capitalist Influence'", 317. The 'Progressives' were those opposed to Kruger before the war, while the conservatives were supporters of Kruger. The progressive Party in the Cape was opposed to the Bond. Denoon is discussing these Progressives.

30. This observation was made by R.V. Kubicek, "The Randlords in 1895: A Reassessment", Journal of British Studies 11 (1972): 84.

31. Denoon, "Capital and Capitalists in the Transvaal in the 1890s and 1900s", The Historical Journal 23, 1 (March 1980): 111-132.

32. Denoon, "Capital and Capitalists", 112. Denoon observed that H. Wolpe's "Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: from segregation to Apartheid", Economy and Society 1, 4 (1972); and M. Legassick's "South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence", Economy and Society 3, 3 (1974); were based on new ideas which made it possible for them, and himself, to construct a better synthesis than was possible in the 1960s.

33. Denoon, "Capital and Capitalists", 114.

34. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism. This is a more detailed study of the gold mining financiers by Kubicek than his two articles.

35. Denoon, "Capital and Capitalists" 118-9. Denoon was here referring to the doctoral thesis by Jeeves which was not yet published.

36. Denoon, "Capital and Capitalists", 122.

37. Denoon, "Capital and Capitalists", 132.

CHAPTER TWO

POLITICAL DETERMINISM AND TRANSVAAL HISTORY 1886-1910

In the preceding chapter we were looking at how economic determinists have treated and analysed events in the history of the Transvaal. In this chapter we shall concentrate on political determinism and the way in which it has been adopted in the interpretation of Transvaal socio-political and economic developments. The extent to which historians have demonstrated that it is possible to treat political and economic history as substantially independent of each other has varied from historian to historian, and from one school of thought to another. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the nature of political history in South Africa reflects the interests of historians and the times they wrote their works. This chapter has been divided into two sections.

The first section looks at political history of the Transvaal as represented in the works of imperial historians like Worsfold and Amery. In this section, the author will also briefly deal with Afrikaans historiography though there were not enough Afrikaans works in English at his disposal to allow proper discussion of this school.

The second section looks at those historians who study economic events but believe that political factors were the real source of change in the socio-political

and economic development in South Africa. However, it ought to be pointed out that although these two views are discussed in the same chapter, they are not the same in sentiments. The common aspect between them is that both consider political considerations to have been more important than economic considerations.

i. Apologists For British Imperialism in the Transvaal

One trend which is quite evident in the historiography of the Transvaal is the imperial point of view. Its central theme was British expansion in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The scholars who held these views were largely concerned with the fate of the British empire, its establishment, growth and collapse. Early exponents of the imperial point of view rested their studies on ideological bases which aimed at conveying the concepts of civilization, progress and humanitarianism to the ends of the world.[1] The works which came to constitute this point of view originally appeared in the 1890s when writers of this period censured G.M. Theal.[2] Theal was censured because he was critical of the Imperial Government, but sympathetically disposed towards Afrikaners.

The imperial interpretation of Transvaal history gained impetus with the publications of works by W.B. Worsfold,[3] L.S. Amery,[4] A. Conan Doyle,[5] and L. Creswicke[6] and their analyses of the Anglo-Boer War and its aftermath. In the 1960s L.H. Gann and P. Duignan gave yet further impetus to the political interpretation of British imperialism in South Africa.[7] The dominant view in these works is that

the Transvaal Republic under the Kruger regime was an obstacle to imperial supremacy in the subcontinent. In fact the imperial point of view accepts the British imperial factor to have been the dominant force in the subcontinent, and therefore maintains that political factors were the most important in the socio-political and economic changes in the Transvaal.[8] Worsfold and Amery, writing what are essentially political histories of the Transvaal, justfied British imperialism in South Africa from the 1790s to the days of the Anglo-Boer War. Worsfold argued that the English occupation of the Cape in 1806 rested on two factors. Firstly, that England was a conquering power; secondly, that the English position was legitimized in 1814 by the Convention of London.[9] Britain was in a position to exercise her control over the otherwise independent Afrikaner republics.

Although these scholars were essentially writing political history of the Transvaal, they recognized a number of other issues which contributed to the Imperial Government's participation in the partition of Africa. They acknowledged the influence of social, political, economic and humanitarian reasons as driving factors in the partition of Africa. However, they put emphasis on political aspects of imperialism which they saw as more important than economic issues.[10] Imperial historians are familiar with the impact of the mineral revolution upon South African society, and on the

imperial factor itself, but still maintain that political factors were more decisive. This interpretation is illuminated in their analysis of the background to the Jameson Raid where they consider relations between Afrikaner and Uitlander communities in the Transvaal.

The English element in the Transvaal, argued L.S. Amery, was not a product of the mineral revolution. He pointed out that it was present in the Transvaal as far back as the times of the Great Trek. The advent of gold mining merely increased their numbers.[11] The early British inhabitants of the Transvaal are said to have included the English hunters of big game as well as traders, whose children became completely absorbed in the Afrikaner population. With the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand and the subsequent development of the mining industry after 1886, the foreign element in the Transvaal swelled with such rapidity that the Transvaal government became increasingly concerned. As various scholars have argued, the Afrikaners were almost entirely engaged in agriculture and the raising of livestock. Their ideals were those of the seventeenth century and not those of the nineteenth century.[12] This situation demanded profound changes in both the political and the economic life of the Transvaal.

As things proved, in the Transvaal, the mining industry fell under the control of foreign capital and capitalists. J.A. Hobson described most of the foreign capital as Jewish.[13] Thus, the Transvaal government was faced with the serious problem of how to control the

mining industry with its new demands upon the government which had no experience in dealing with capitalist institutions.

This problem was further compounded by the sudden influx of foreigners into the Transvaal, the majority of whom are said to have originated from other parts of the British empire or were British. Soon a number of these Uitlanders began to acquire land to the extent that by 1890 a considerable amount of land was under British control.[14] It is this factor which Amery used as proof that Uitlanders were permanent residents of the Transvaal republic. Since they had taken permanent residence, they were entitled to political rights. Denying them these rights, especially the franchise, meant that the republic was unfairly treating the Uitlanders. Amery and those who hold similar views to his saw the grievances which led to the Jameson Raid to have been first and foremost political. It was therefore justifiable, in their view, for Uitlanders to appeal for imperial government intervention in the affairs of the Transvaal republic.

A. Conan Doyle argued that one could not deny that Uitlanders had real and pressing grievances against the Transvaal government. He added that:

> there was not a wrong which had driven the Boer from Cape Colony which he did not now practise himself upon others.15

Doyle accepts that Afrikaners were wronged in Cape Colony, but argues that a wrong could be excused in 1835 but not

in 1895. These considerations and the Transvaal government attitude towards the Uitlanders made it necessary for the latter to call upon the imperial government to intervene on their behalf.

The 1895 raid was a case whereby Britain was performing her role as the superior power in South Africa. In fact, Gann and Duignan have argued that the Imperial government was merely trying to re-establish its supremacy indirectly in 1895.[16] The failure of the raid meant the reopening of the crisis of imperial supremacy which had been of great concern to British statesmen since the Transvaal rebellion in 1880.

Imperial historians argue that by 1895 Johannesburg was in a state of suppressed insurrection. Capitalists began to look to political ways of redressing their grievances and turned to Cecil Rhodes who 'had good reason to dislike president Kruger'.[17] Rhodes immediately began to get actively involved in the inception of the plot to overthrow the Transvaal government. Amery argued that although the responsibility of the raid rested with Rhodes, the author of the scheme was Dr Leander Starr Jameson. The latter was the real originator and prime mover of the raid.

The raid is said to have been put down with much brutality which resulted in the suffering of many British people.[18] The raid was a disaster. It increased Afrikaner suspicion of the British government. The grievances which brought the raid lingered on and in some cases they were

worsened.[19] Going through imperial historiography on the years following the raid, one gets the impression that the raid became one of the issues upon which Britain based her need to re-establish its supremacy in the Transvaal. The raid had far-reaching political consequences. It deepened the cleavages between Afrikaners and the British, and also contributed to the race towards a military confrontation that culminated in the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War. Afrikaners seized the military initiative in the race towards a military confrontation as a reply to imperial pressures rather than concede a small installment of reform.[20]

The war which broke out in October 1899 is, they argue, to be seen as the means by which Britain was to re-establish her supremacy in the republic. Imperial scholars see the war to have been made inevitable so that the imperial government could determine the principle of equal citizenship in the Afrikaner republics.[21] However, the inevitability of war is questionable especially when one examines reasons advanced by imperial scholars closely. They describe the situation in the Transvaal as humiliating because an 'ignorant and corrupt Boer oligarchy' armed to the teeth on British profits was in power. One wonders whether these historians realized that the changes Kruger had made since the mineral revolution were directly connected with his awareness of the impact and effects of the industry upon his people.

Gann and Duignan strengthened the political interpretation when they argued that the 'financial interpretation' of imperialism advanced by Hobson hardly squared with political facts.[22] They argued that Hobson misinterpreted the Anglo-Boer War. Britain, they argued, did not fight to acquire new gold mines, nor did British victory change the property relations on the Rand. The Randlords made good money under Kruger and thus remained politically divided in their allegiance during the Anglo-Boer confrontation. However, these political determinists do not probe the issue further, as do economic determinists, to find the real cause of the dichotomy.[23]

On the reconstruction period Amery emphasized the 'conclusiveness' of Lord Milner's policies. He argued that:

> the re-annexation of the Boer Republics to the British Empire was an inevitable consequence of the success of the imperial forces.24

The achievements of the imperial administration were conclusive in that they showed that a new country had been created from the old. The Transvaal of 1905 was different from the Transvaal of 1899, he argued.[25] When Milner left South Africa the British flag was flying unchallenged from Cape Town to the Zambezi. The Afrikaner republics were replaced by two 'progressive' British colonies with the requisites of modern civilization.[26] For Amery, political change was responsible for the industrial and agricultural expansion in the Afrikaner republics.

However, the crop failure of 1903 is considered by Amery to have had serious political and economic consequences. Politically, the crop failure became a source of political agitation in the Afrikaner camp. Afrikaner leaders took it as an opportunity to strengthen their influence, as a political opposition, by blaming British authorities responsible for repatriation and relief. Afrikaner leaders deliberately mis-represented issues, and accused British officials of dishonesty and embezzlement of funds meant for relief.[27] This situation meant that the work of reconstruction was made hard. Economically, the drought precipitated an economic depression which was worsened by lack of rapid expansion in industrial prosperity. In fact Amery observed that it was the failure to successfully mobilize African labour for the mines which threatened to impose a permanent check on the development of South Africa.[28] To this effect he argued that the situation was likely to:

> upset for good all the calculations of capitalists and investors, and to frustrate irretrievably the expectation on which the whole of Milner's policy was based.29

The labour question was seen as the key to imperial success during the reconstruction period without which there could have been no rapid expansion of the mining industry. The capitalists looked at the labour question in terms of profit and loss, Milner looked at it as a question of success or failure of imperial policy in South Africa. Thus, the importation of Chinese labour

was seen as the only solution to many of the economic problems South Africa was facing soon after the Anglo-Boer War. The Chinese indentured labour fulfilled the primary purpose of meeting the stress of an abnormal situation. Milnerism, it is argued, succeded due to the use of Chinese labour during the Crown Colony period.

Amery observed that by the process of economic substitution, the Chinese in the mines made it possible for the public works, the railways and roads to be reconstructed and worked on unhampered.[30] Thus, the much needed labour force in these areas was not diverted to the mines since the Chinese had taken up jobs which would have required the unskilled labourers. Their presence on the mines enabled the mines to be organized on the same basis of a large number of low-paid non-Europeans at a time when the industry was seriously threatened with a shortage of such labour. However, Amery, who was writing during the time of the crisis, did not have the opportunity to use the evidence used by later historians. He therefore did not explain the continued availability of low-paid non-European labour after the Chinese had left in 1907. This was largely due to the collapse of the post-war boom. In fact as S.T. van der Horst explains, when the post-war boom collapsed there was a corresponding fall in demand for African labour in other occupations so that Africans had not much alternative but to move to the mines in increased numbers.[31] Thus it would be wrong to base the success of Milnerism on Chinese labour without

stating the circumstances in which they operated.

Politically determinist history of South Africa is manifest in Afrikaner historiography of the Transvaal.[32] Although Afrikaner historiography is essentially ethnic, it falls in line with the political determinism being considered here. Afrikaner historiography is anti-imperialist. As F.A. van Jaarsveld has pointed out, the Afrikaner historians are of recent time. They are largely a product of four Afrikaans Universities in South Africa.[33] The basis of Afrikaner historiography was laid at the University of Stellenbosch. The development of an Afrikaner intellectual class with great concern over the way in which the history of the Transvaal was being written by English speaking historians gave impetus to this school. The emphasis is on political history at the expense of other themes.[34] Like imperial historians, they recognized economic causes of the Anglo-Boer conflicts, but maintained that political issues were more important and decisive in the history of the Transvaal.

ii. Political-economic History of the Transvaal

Scholars in this category are essentially political determinists, but do seriously study economic events of Transvaal history. A. Mawby, R.V. Kubicek, J.S. Marais and G.H.L. Le May fit quite well in this classification. Also included in this classification are scholars like Robinson and Gallagher, and A.N. Porter, who reckon imperialism to have been essentially a strategic matter.[35] These scholars and those listed earlier share one common

approach in their interpretation of South African history. They look to the economic events as well as other forces that led to imperialism and conclude that political circumstances were more decisive in the history of the Transvaal.

J.S. Marais writing in the 1960s explained how the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand led to the Jameson Raid and the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War.[36] The Government of the Transvaal is discussed in relation to the problems posed by the opening of the mines. The Afrikaners were caught almost unawares by the development of mining amidst them. And because successful mining required large amounts of capital, the 'backward' Afrikaners lost to a small number of foreign companies controlled by big capitalists.[37]

Marais pointed out that only a small proportion of the wealth from the Rand went to the Afrikaners. The Afrikaners failed to benefit from the increased demand for pastoral and agricultural produce because much of the demand was fulfilled by supplies from outside the republic. The Uitlanders monopolized the market gardening and dairy farming which developed in the vicinity of Johannesburg. This development left many Afrikaners impoverished especially when free land became increasingly scarce.[38]

Uitlander pressure on the Transvaal government appeared as early as 1887.[39] By 1892 a more powerful Uitlander organization had been formed --the Transvaal

National Union. Its main objective was to obtain equal rights for all citizens of the republic and to redress Uitlander grievances. Marais argues that by 1895 Rhodes and his Consolidated Gold Fields company was giving the movement its greatest impetus. Rhodes, he argues:

> had become impatient to get rid of Kruger, who continued to obstruct his aim of achieving the federation of South Africa.40

Rhodes therefore got in touch with disaffected capitalists, argued Marais, to have them participate in the plot to overthrow the Transvaal government. The significance of this argument is that Marais saw the 'capitalist' involvement in the raid as a response to Rhodes, who himself was representing imperial influence in South Africa.

In fact, Chamberlain's handling of the investigations into the raid, in Marais' view, points to the idea that capitalists were responding to imperial influence. Marais is thoroughly aware of the economic causes of the raid but maintains that imperial influence was more important than economic forces. He argues that the Colonial Secretary was as guilty as the men on the spot. The Committee that investigated the raid exonerated those involved by letting off witnesses lightly as was the case with Flora Shaw, Colonial Correspondent-in-Chief of The Times.[41] Her evidence was not properly probed so as to get more information from her. After detailed examination of the post-raid years, Marais came to the conclusion that by 1899 Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner between them gave the South African Republic no choice except surrender or war.

He observed that:

> as British policy gradually unfolded during the succeeding months, the republican leaders came to the conclusion that Britain was aiming a mortal blow at their independence. Once they reached that conclusion they decided to fight.42

Le May in British Supremacy in South Africa also examined the impact of the mineral revolution on Transvaal politics. Although he was aware of the way in which the mining industry had transformed the socio-political and economic life of the Transvaal, he saw the Jameson Raid and the Anglo-Boer War to have been caused by imperialist agitation. He argued that Chamberlain and Rhodes had all along worked towards a federation of South African States and the colonies into a British controlled Union of South Africa. The Transvaal was their obstacle and it therefore became the target of imperial conspiracy.[43] The desire to get rid of Kruger led to the raid and subsequently to the Anglo-Boer War in 1899 when Kruger failed to implement certain reforms to ease the hardships suffered by Uitlanders.

Arthur A. Mawby put across a political interpretation of the events in the Transvaal when he strongly challenged Denoon's economic interpretation of the Randlords and the mining industry.[44] Mawby disagreed with Denoon's adoption and application of Blainey's analysis to the post-war period.[45] Mawby sought to demonstrate the weakness of Denoon's arguments and suggested that the dichotomy between deep levellers and outcroppers was irrelevant and incorrect.[46] He maintained that the mining houses of Eckstein and Conso-

lidated Gold Fields were simply outcroppers who had diversified their operations into deep level mining. For Mawby therefore, the causes of the conflict between Afrikaners and the British were not essentially economic. Political influence in his view seems to be more important.[47]

R.V. Kubicek in "The Randlords in 1895" observed that apart from Blainey and Denoon, historians of 1886-1910 Transvaal neglected gold mining financiers in their studies.[48] He therefore set for himself the task of thoroughly scrutinizing the South African gold mining financiers --a task he accomplished in his Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice.[49] In "The Randlords in 1895" Kubicek studied the working relations of Randlords and concluded that they did not in any way forge a united monolithic front though they dabbled in conspiracy. Kubicek, in a bid to strengthen political interpretation of the raid, reduced the role of Rhodes and his company and argued that Rhodes was a director of the company in name only.[50] Rhodes' lack of involvement in the affairs of the company is maintained on the basis of his failure to attend a single annual meeting of the Consolidated Gold Fields during the 15 years he was associated with it.[51] Kubicek and Alan Jeeves see Rhodes' non-attendance at meetings as an indication that he was more involved in politics than in the mining industry. This version of Rhodes' relationship with the company is uns atisfactory.

As Mendelsohn argued, Johannesburg was critically important for Rhodes financially. He in fact took full part in strategic decisions.[52] Although Kubicek's earlier publications were essentially politically determinist, his book is a good example of the treatment of political and economic history of 1886-1910 Transvaal as substantially independent of each other. It is in this respect that he concluded his detailed book with the observation that in the Transvaal:

> International capitalism, British imperialism and Afrikaner nationalism did to some extent coexist. But these forces,...were fundamentally at cross purposes. South African developments, consequently, should be seen basically as a function of clashing priorities and the inability of any one or combination of these forces to achieve supremacy.[53]

Afrikaner historians, as we have already shown, opted for a similar approach and attached more weight to cultural and political circumstances. Kubicek on the other hand seems to attach more weight to economic circumstances, at least in his Economic Imperialism, although he is aware of the interaction of political and economic circumstances in influencing change in South Africa.

Robinson and Gallagher, in a different approach to British imperialism, suggested that the causes of imperial expansion in southern Africa were different from those which caused British expansion in the rest of Africa. Their approach to the study of British imperialism has been described by Kubicek as a 'peripheral approach.'[54]

They argued that imperial expansion in South Africa arose from internal conflicts among the colonists rather than from rivalries among European powers. They noted that by 1896 economic growth had released the Transvaal from the strangle-hold of British colonies and ended the supremacy of the Cape. The assault on the Transvaal, argued Robinson and Gallagher, was inspired by the fear that the political ties which were binding South Africa to the empire were snapping.[55] British ministers believed that imperial supremacy was at stake since the Transvaal was politically and commercially replacing the Cape Colony. The Transvaal was absorbed because the British ministers feared that their influence in the Transvaal would be lost.[56] Thus, the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War was fought because the British government was trying to make a mid-Victorian system of supreme influence work after it had broken down.[57] Robinson and Gallagher argued that:

> The motive behind intervention was therefore not the contriving of commercial success. Rather it was commercial success which raised up republicanism and undermined British influence. And the late-Victorians' imperial instincts, their determination to secure the long route to the East and fear of losing their British allies in South Africa, brought them to restore their supremacy and shape a loyal dominion.58

South Africa, argued Robinson and Gallagher, represented a case of economic development raising the enemies of imperial connection to political dominance. They thus see imperial influence in South Africa, which was

initially strategic, become intertwined with the economic development of the Transvaal after 1886. The Cape Colony was an important link in the British Empire, both politically and economically.

A.N. Porter saw imperial influence in South Africa to have been initially strategic. South Africa, he noted, was an area which contained one of the principal life-lines of the empire in the Cape Sea route to India.[59] In his analysis of British imperial policy in South Africa Porter, like Robinson and Gallagher, drew his conclusions after observing the economic circumstances and how such circumstances shaped imperial policy in the subcontinent.

CONCLUSION

Political determinism as observed in the historiography of the Transvaal is a product of a varied category of historians. In the first place, we noted the way in which imperial scholars and Afrikaner historians adopted this approach. Secondly we observed yet another category of scholars who ppted for this approach, but seriously considered economic development in their analyses. The latter category produced economic evidence in their politically determinist interpretation of Transvaal history. They argued that political circumstances were in fact the real source of change. The extent to which they put these arguments varied from one scholar to another.

The diversity in approach is a common aspect on the historiography of the Transvaal. However, in the works considered in this chapter, the scholars emphasized the importance of political issues in the understanding of South African history. It is in this respect that their works have been classified as politically deterministic.

NOTES

1. F.A. van Jaarsveld, Ou En Nuwe Wee in Die Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedskrywing (Old and New Trends in South African Historiography), Pretoria: 1961, 55.

2. van Jaarsveld, Old and New Trends, 55. In this work he cites A. Wilmot, The Story of the Expansion of Southern Africa 1894, History of Our Times, 3 volumes 1897-1899, and J. Cappon, Britain's Title in South Africa, 1902; to be among early historians who held the imperial point of view.

3. W.B. Worsfold, South Africa, a Study in Colonial Administration and Development, Methuen and Company, London: 1895.

4. L.S. Amery, ed., The Times History of the War in South Africa, 7 volumes, Sampson Low, Marston and Company, London: 1900-1909.

5. A. Conan Doyle, The Great Boer War, Smith Elder and Company, London: 1901.

6. L. Creswicke, South Africa and the Transvaal War, 7 volumes, The Caxton Publishing Company, London: 1900-1902.

7. L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, Burden of Empire, Paul Mall London: 1967.

   L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914, volume 1, Cambridge University Press, London; 1969.

   The apparent gap between 1910 and 1960 in imperial historiography is largely due to a toning down of the note of acerbity when the Union of South Africa came in 1910. This was because of the idea of unity between the white races. The constitutional achievement was viewed with self-satisfaction. See van Jaarsveld, Old and New Trends, 56. A good example is F.R. Cana, South Africa From the Great Trek to the Union, Negro University Press, New York: (1909), 1969.

8. Worsfold, South Africa, 26
   Amery, The Times History, volume 1,2.

9. Worsfold, South Africa, 26.

10. Gann and Duignan, Burden of Empire, 36.

11. Amery, The Times History, vol. 1, 107.

12. Cana, South Africa From The Great Trek, 5, Similar sentiments were expressed by R. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, 415, Luxemburg was concerned with the way in which the mineral discoveries influenced change in the Transvaal.

13. J.A. Hobson, The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects, James Nisbet and Company, London: 1900; 11.

14. Amery, The Times History, vol. 1, 109.
J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1961; 5.

15. Doyle, The Great Boer War, 27.

16. Gann and Duignan, Burden of Empire, 36.

17. Amery, The Times History, vol. 1, 152.

18. Creswicke, South Africa and the Transvaal War, vol. 1, 157-163. He quoted a number of Uitlanders to prove his case of Afrikaner brutality against the Uitlanders.

19. Doyle, The Great Boer War, 38.
Gann and Duignan, Burden of Empire, 36.

20. Gann and Duignan, Burden of Empire, 36.
Amery, The Times History, 1, 376.

21. Worsfold, South Africa, 168.
Amery, The Times History, vol. 1, 377.

22. Gann and Duignan, Burden of Empire, 42.
Gann and Duignan, Colonialism in Africa vol. 1, 107.

23. Refer to Chapter one for a full discussion on this perspective.

24. Amery, The Times History, vol. 6, 1.

25. Amery, The Times History, vol. 6, 149.

26. Amery, The Times History, vol. 6, 101.

27. Amery, The Times History, vol. 6, 100.

28. Amery, The Times History, vol. 6, 101.

29. Amery, The Times History, vol. 6, 101.

30. Amery, The Times History, vol. 6, 127.

31. S.T. van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa; Frank Cass and Company, London: 1971; 172.

32. This school will be discussed briefly due to language handicap on the part of the author. Most Afrikaner history is in Afrikaans.

33. van Jaarsveld, "Afrikaner Historiography", The Proceedings of the 11th Annual Conference of Canadian Association of African Studies, 1 (1981); 237.

34. van Jaarsveld, Old and New Trends, 56.

35. It ought to be noted that the strategic issue can be interpreted in two ways. It can be either for economic reasons or for political considerations. This should be borne in mind while going through the analyses by these scholars.

36. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic.

37. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, 3.

38. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, 4-5.

39. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, 56.

40. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, 63.

41. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, 75.

42. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, 331.

43. Le May, British Supremacy in South Africa 1899-1907, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1965:2.

44. Denoon's work has already been considered in chapter one.

45. Refer to chapter one on economic determinism.

46. A.A. Mawby, "Capital, Government and Politics in the Transvaal 1900-1907: A Review and a Reversion", The Historical Journal 17, 2 (June 1974); 415.

47. Although Mawby's criticism of Denoon's analysis were correct, he did not himself offer a new and better analysis of the situation. It is in this respect that Denoon sees him as belonging to the "I do not know" group of scholars. (Personal communication with Denoon).

48. R.V. Kubicek, "The Randlords in 1895: A Reassessment", Journal of British Studies, 11(1972); 84.

49. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: the Case of South African Gold Mining Finance 1886-1914, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. 1979.

50. Kubicek, "The Randlords in 1895", 94.
Kubicek, Economic Imperialism, 86-106.

51. Kubicek, "The Randlords in 1895", 89.
A.H. Jeeves, "Rand Capitalists and the Coming of the South African War 1896-99", Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers, (1973); 146.

52. R. Mendelsohn, "Blainey and the Jameson Raid: The Debate Renewed", Journal of Southern African Studies, 6 (April 1980); 165-166.

53. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism, 204.

54. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism, 6.

55. R. Robinson and J. Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians, The official mind of Imperialism, Macmillan and Company, London: 1961; 411.

56. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 410.

57. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 461.

58. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 461.

59. A.N. Porter, "British Imperial Policy and South Africa 1895-1899" in The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902, ed. P. Warwick, Longman, London: 1980; 56.

CHAPTER THREE

LIBERAL - RADICAL HISTORY OF THE TRANSVAAL 1886-1910

In the preceding chapters we looked at historians who either gave primacy to economic factors or political factors in their interpretation of South African history. In this chapter the author addresses himself to a third possible stance in the interpretation of the history of the Transvaal. There is a category of historians in the historiography of the 1886-1910 Transvaal who give equal weight to political and economic factors in their analyses. This approach is characteristic of the liberal and radical historians of South African history. Thus the combining of political and economic factors in the interpretation of Transvaal history will be discussed in two sections.

The first section will be devoted to liberal analyses based on this approach. The second section will be devoted to Marxist analyses of Transvaal history which to a large extent combine political and economic factors. It ought to be pointed out however, that within this trend of approach one sees certain scholars giving primacy to economic circumstances and others giving primacy to political circumstances. If this trend is shared by both liberal scholars and Marxists (or Radicals as they are commonly known in South African historiography), then there is need to know the distinction between them. Liberal works are generally concerned with relations

between races. To summarise their version crudely, they hope that the workings of the economy will, through a natural process, lead to general prosperity and equality for the races. The radical scholars, on the other hand, are generally concerned with classes and conflict between classes. They are thoroughly aware of racial conflict in South Africa, but maintain that class conflict is more important in the understanding of South Africa history.

i. Liberal Historiography

A liberal interpretation of South African history was initiated after the First World War.[1] Early liberal scholars were generally preoccuped with attacks on the 'settler' interpretation which was prominently represented by G.M. Theal.[2] The liberal point of view was essentially concerned with the non-European problem, which in the view of liberal scholars was the paramount issue in South Africa. As van Jaarsveld has noted:

> Race relations, in which the Bantu view point was emphasized, were at the core of this new interpretation and it embodied a polemic with those historians who approached the past purely from the white man's point of view.3

With passage of time liberal scholars 'battled' against what they considered as the growing dominance of illiberal history and illiberal politics in South Africa.[4] Liberal analyses of the episodes of Transvaal history are placed within this perspective. Liberal scholars, as Kubicek noted, are thoroughly familiar

with the mining magnates' involvement in South African politics.[5] However, they are not as informed as radicals about capitalists' financial operations. This is why they emphasize non-economic priorities of government officials and contribution of imperial policy to the growth of racism in Southern Africa.[6]

W.M. Macmillan's Complex South Africa (1930), marking a departure from the traditional interpretation, was loaded with controversial detail in order to clear the ground for fresh contemplation of the South Africa of his day.[7] He was preoccupied with the non-European problem and the Poor White problem, which was of great concern to the South African leaders in the Union of South Africa. Although Macmillan was largely concerned with these two issues during the days of the Union, he gave consideration to their economic origins and argued that the root of South African ills in the 1930s could be traced directly to the disregard of the place of Africans in the community. He pointed out, too, that the mineral revolution in the High Veld gave impetus to general African development and intensified the competition between White and Black.[8] New demands were created and land became too valuable for the haphazard agriculture which Afrikaners and Africans had all along been engaged in. Thus, those who could not use the land well were replaced by commercial farmers, some of whom bought land for speculative reasons. He argued that these changes

originated from the mining industry. However, we should note that Macmillan's work is to a large extent on the period outside the scope of this dissertation. He wrote the book with:

> the conviction that only a better understanding of the past and more certain knowledge of the present can bring the country's affairs to a happier issue.9

C.W. de Kiewiet, as Denoon pointed out, was however, the first South African liberal historian to allow Australian experience to illuminate Southern African evidence while bringing economic expertise to bear upon his material.[10] The next historian to use Australian experience in explaining a similar phenomenon was G. Blainey in his account of the Jameson Raid.[11] C.W. de Kiewiet distinguished between economic and political history. He therefore noted that:

> South Africa has advanced politically by disasters and economically by windfalls. Diamonds, much helped by wool, were the windfall which undertook for South Africa what wool was doing for Australia.12

He devoted more than half of his book to tracing social and political effects of the mining industry on the development of South Africa. He also shared the view that the conflicts between Afrikaners and the British were basically 'a quarrel between a backward subsistence economy and a cash economy.'[13] The conflicts, argued de Kiewiet, were later manifested in the Jameson Raid and the Anglo-Boer War when the impact of the mining industry had completely transformed the Transvaal.

The consequences of the mining industry prove the assertion that in the Transvaal the Anglo-Boer conflict was one between a backward economy and a cash economy. The Afrikaners could not cope with the development of the mining industry and soon conflicts arose. President Kruger adopted the policy of racial patriotism in order to safeguard Afrikaners against the Uitlanders.[14] The only way Kruger could successfully protect Afrikaners from the Uitlander community was to deny the latter the franchise because by 1895 there were at least seven Uitlanders for every three burghers.[15] Giving them the franchise was tantamount to handing over the Transvaal to them. De Kiewiet argued that the Uitlander grievances were greatly exaggerated by British Blue Books on South African affairs. It is in this respect that he argued that what was important before and after the raid in 1895 was not the grievances, but 'the relationship between a rural republic and the world industry in its midst.'[16] The principal cause of the raid, he argued, was the realization in 1895 that the Rand mines were geared for a long life. Mining magnates had to hold on to the Rand longer than most people had anticipated.[17]

Another liberal scholar who gives primacy to economic circumstances as does de Kiewiet is S.T. van der Horst who considered the impact of capitalism on Africans in South Africa. She has shown how the development of the mines led to the demand for African labour and instituted

far-reaching changes in the South African economy. Since the success of profitable mining depended on a large number of poorly paid labourers, it was apparent that Africans had to be coerced into the mines. This is where the government was brought in to institute 'labour taxes' for Africans in the reserves to force them to go out to work.[18]

The 1899-1902 war disrupted the growing inter-dependence of different parts of South Africa and in a bid to ensure continuation of the mining industry, Milner started a process of reconstruction long before the war was over. Milner's policy depended on the prosperity and rapid development of the mines during the reconstruction period. Thus, when labour was not forthcoming within South Africa, Milner worked out a modus vivendi with the Portuguese authorities in Portuguese East Africa to ensure a continuation of labour supply. The shortage of labour seriously threatened the post-war boom.[19] The labour shortage was a serious blow to all who had plans for rapid development of South Africa. This state of affairs was worsened by a severe drought in the 1902-03 season.

Since van der Horst was largely concerned with the importance of African labour in the economic development of South Africa, she emphasized the effects of African labour shortage on the mines and other sectors of South African economy. In fact the majority report of the July 1903 Transvaal Labour Commission concluded

that the demand for labour was far in excess of the supply. This was confirmed by the 1903-5 Native Affairs Commission which argued that labour was lacking in South Africa.[20] This was why the Chamber of Mines began a campaign to import Chinese labour. Van der Horst's arguments take into account political and economic factors while giving primacy to economic circumstances.

While de Kiewiet's and van der Horst's analyses are open to both political and economic evidence and are essentially liberal works, they give primacy to economic factors. They are unlike the works by other liberal scholars who give primacy to political factors. This is largely due to diversity in approach to the complex South African past.

Eric Walker put forward the argu ment that the idea of a raid on the Transvaal was suggested by Sir Henry Loch, the High Commissioner before Lord Milner.[21] Walker argued that Sir Henry Loch, a staunch unionist, was convinced that war against the Transvaal was imminent. Thus, anticipating war, Sir Henry Loch mobilized the Bechuanaland Police on the western border. Although he was aware of the impact of the mining industry, he maintained that the raid was caused by conflicts between the two white races long before the discovery of gold on the Rand.

Leo Marquard assumes essentially this stance. The Jameson Raid and the Anglo-Boer War, he argued, resulted from a repetition of Lord Carnarvon's mistake of trying

to federate South Africa from above. Marquard, like Walker, was aware of the mining magnates' involvement in the raid, but did not see it as caused by economic grievances capitalists had against the Transvaal government. Capitalists are said to have acted in response to imperial influence.[22]

Elizabeth Pakenham, writing in the 1960s, was interested in discovering those who knew about the plot to overthrow Kruger. She too gave primacy to political circumstances and as such devoted much of her book to studying the political aspirations of Joseph Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes who is seen to be the principal figure in the raid. Elizabeth Pakenham argued that Chamberlain was supposed to have been officially ignorant of the conspiracy.[23] The implication is that the imperial government was aware of the plans to overthrow the Transvaal government and gave unofficial approval to the conspiracy.

Elizabeth Pakenham argued that by 1895 Rhodes had succeeded where others had failed. Rhodes had managed to persuade a number of leading Rand capitalists to join the Uitlander National Reform Union, an association which organized agitation against the Transvaal government. The National Union did not represent any particular class, since memberships was open to all Uitlanders. Capitalists, on the other hand, had for a long time been meagrely represented.[24] The National Union was more vocal but less influential than the Chamber of Mines. It was

principally concerned with agitating for redress of Uitlander grievances.

W.K. Hancock's Smuts (1962) has shown in detail how J.C. Smuts as State Attorney (from June 1898) of the South African Republic fought hard to prevent the Anglo-Boer War.[25] Hancock argued that Smuts was aware of the problems the Afrikaner republic was facing--the sudden rise of a super-modern capitalist industry in the midst of a simple and slow moving country folk.[26] Smuts was aware, too, that the immigrant population had genuine economic grievances and in his efforts to prevent war he tried to come to terms with the mining industry to remove the causes of conflicts. However, his efforts went to waste and he realized the British were bent on war.[27] Hancock's account points to the idea that in the Transvaal there was an alliance between the mining industry and Lord Milner to get rid of Kruger. What does not come out clearly is the question of which force was more influential in the agitation. The Uitlander demand for the franchise favoured Milner's stand towards the Transvaal. Hancock argues that the Anglo-Boer War was caused by a combination of economic and political circumstances which prevailed in the post-raid period.

The second volume of The Oxford History of South Africa, edited by Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson was published in 1971, the first volume having been published in 1969. The Oxford History was inspired by the authors' belief that:

> the central theme of South African history is interaction between people of diverse origins, languages, technologies, ideologies, and social systems, meeting on South African soil.28

The Oxford History is a landmark of liberal historiography. Thompson argued that Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner as Colonial Secretary and High Commissioner respectively had strong imperialist conviction. He observed that these two used their offices to safeguard British interests in South Africa for the future generations and made British imperial policy appear positively co-ordinated, and impelled by a grandiose imperialist vision.[29] He pointed out that the mineral revolution in the Transvaal strengthened economic arguments for British territorial supremacy in South Africa.

Thompson further argued that Rhodes was not interested in wealth for its own sake. Rhodes used his financial position to achieve his political ambitions. Rhodes wanted to replace the Kruger regime with one which would co-operate with Britian and the British South African colonies.[30] However, this argument that Rhodes was not interested in wealth for its own sake has been strongly refuted by Mendelsohn.[31] Mendelsohn pointed out that critics of the economic interpretation minimized the possible financial implications of the leadership of the conspiracy in order to restore a political interpretation.[32] Thompson is therefore among those scholars who give primacy to political circumstances.

The Anglo-Boer War was fought because Chamberlain and Milner wanted to establish British supremacy in South Africa by force. This led to the failure of imperial policy in the post-war years, argued Thompson. This is a similar position to the one taken by Le May and Marquard. South Africa was important to the empire both economically and politically. The loss of South Africa meant the loss of other parts of the empire. The failure of imperial policy was due to opposition from the British in the Transvaal. The Afrikaners were too occupied with needs for personal survival to have had time to spare for politics. This explanation of the failure of Milnerism holds, especially when one realizes that the Uitlanders tended to think that the war was fought exclusively for their benefit. They therefore formed two rival political associations--the Transvaal Responsible Government Association and the Transvaal Progressive Association.[33] By 1905, Milnerism was already showing signs of failure. The Transvaal had not been transformed into an outpost of England and Afrikaners had not been cowed or persuaded into accepting the empire. In fact:

> Milner had failed to create political solidarity among British South Africans. They belonged to different religious denominations, they pursued different occupations.34

However, it ought to be pointed out here that this failure is true on the political scene only. The war created in South Africa a situation whereby capitalist activities

were being carried out unhampered.[35] Thus, Thompson's interpretation of the reconstruction period cannot be accepted without queries. He and other liberal scholars arrive at this conclusion because they do not probe capitalist working relations in the Transvaal any deeper than is necessary to explain the failure of Milnerism in the political integration of South Africa.

Thomas Pakenham gave further impetus to the liberal perspective on South African history. In his massive and detailed account of the Anglo-Boer War, Pakenham argued that the Rand millionaires who controlled the richest mines in the world were directly concerned with the making of war. He saw an informal alliance between Sir Alfred Milner and the firm of Wernher-Beit, the dominant Rand mining house. Pakenham argues that it was this secret alliance which gave Milner the strength to precipitate the war.[36] He further argues that:

> the gold-bugs, contrary to the accepted view of later historians, were thus active partners with Milner in the making of the war.37

While this alliance was on between Milner and some mining magnates, the Colonial Secretary was not given a hint. Pakenham's contribution is not different from de Kiewiet's. Both give equal consideration to political and economic factors. The difference is, perhaps, that Pakenham had more evidence at his disposal than de Kiewiet and other early scholars.

Pakenham bemoans the injustices suffered by Africans and the failure of Milnerism. He observed that Milner's desire to build 'Greater Britain on the veld' was cut short when Milner allowed the flogging of Chinese labourers. This was a political blunder Milner should not have committed. However, the failure of Milnerism cannot be wholly blamed on the Chinese factor because, as Pakenham rightly points out, the experiement was already doomed, Chinese or no Chinese. The demographical facts did not support Milner's desires. Afrikaners remained in the majority and by 1907, with the winning of elections by Afrikaner dominated parties, the seal on Milner's failure was firmly set.[38] In the final analysis Milner's desire to destroy the Afrikaner republics led to the loss on the part of the empire of two old colonies. In fact, the priceless liberal legacy of the no-colour-bar tradition of the Cape was cast away.[39]

The foregoing account has demonstrated an aspect of interpretation shared by various schools on South African history. These historians treat political and economic factors as having equal potential validity in explaining South African history though they finally come down on one side or the other.

ii. Marxist or Radical Historiography

As was the case with scholars discussed above, Marxist analyses of Transvaal history reflect a good deal of diversity in approach. Since most

of such analyses give primacy to economic circumstances they usually start with the growth of gold mining on the Rand and end with the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 or at the outbreak of the First Wolrd War in 1914. They see imperial influence in the Transvaal to have been susceptible to economic demands. This is similar to the stance taken by those scholars who are essentially economic determinists, with whom they share a common origin.[40] The difference between the views is that scholars discussed in chapter one were to a large extent concerned with economic issues, while scholars in this case give an equal consideration to political and economic issues in their analyses.

Rosa Luxemburg, who we have already considered in chapter one, and H.J. and R.E. Simons share a common view of British imperialism in South Africa. They argue that although the British government appeared as a protector of Africans, its ultimate aim was to rob Africans of their land. In fact, they argue, British capital showed its true intentions after the mineral revolution when capitalists did everything possible to replace the small peasant republics by a great modern state.[41] They, however, differed on the inevitability of the war in 1899 as a means of achieving economic development in the Transvaal. The Simons argue that the British Fabians and Luxemburg saw the 1899-1902 war as necessary because of the 'assumption that the republics could not change their ways to meet the needs

of an industrial economy .'[42] The Simons argued that this was a 'false and dishonest' argument because the agrarian societies of the Transvaal were richly endowed and well equipped for an industrial revolution. They base this argument on the presence, within the Transvaal, of educated and professional Hollanders. The Transvaal was also beginning to produce its own specialists to meet the needs of an industrialized economy. It is with this observation in mind that they argue that war was neither necessary nor inevitable for the modernization of the Transvaal. The war was prompted by imperialist aggression backed by capitalist greed.[43] Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido have similar views to the Simons although they differ in approach to and analysis of Transvaal history.[44]

In their detailed critique of liberal analyses of uth African history they argue that the Anglo-Boer War to the creation of a state system south of the Limpopo t provided the foundations for the capitalist develop- of South Africa.[45] This view is shared by Luxemburg. s and Trapido argue that Milnerism can be seen to have eeded if one realized that Milner and his Kindergarten the foundation of a state which reflected and ful- d the demands of twentieth century British imperialism. point out, too, that British imperial policy had always determined by the interests of imperial ends:

> in the case of Southern Africa, there was no intention to change the property relations already existing in the region.[46]

They therefore do not regard the winning of elections by Afrikaner parties in the ex-republics as indicating the failure of Milnerism.

Peter Richardson and Jean Jacques Van-Helten fit quite well in this category of historians. Commenting on the impact of the mineral revolution in the Transvaal, they argue that:

> the massive development of the gold mines effectively ensured that the Transvaal underwent an economic revolution, creating a society dominated by the demands of industrial capitalism,...the gold mining industry transformed the economic and political complexion of the subcontinent.47

They further suggest that economic development is the key to understanding the politics of the pre-war decade in the Transvaal. As they correctly point out, the impact of the mineral revolution was reflected in competitive railway building, and customs policies, which embittered the relations between the British colonies and their Afrikaner neighbours.[48] Richardson and Van-Helten give primacy to economic circumstances. They suggest, for example, that the policies of neglect pursued by the Transvaal government manifested in the government's lack of concern for the mining industry's demands, such as clear policy on the acquisition of African labour, contributed to the mining magnates' hostility towards the Transvaal government.[49] That was precisely the reason behind the magnates' participation in the precipatation of the war. They wanted the Kruger regime to be replaced by a government which would be

sympathetic to the cause of the mining industry.

Further Marxist analyses on the history of South Africa can be found in the works by F.A. Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold (1976) and Martin Legassick, whose works include "Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry in South Africa, 1885-1970", and "South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence".[50] These works are to a large extent concerned with the way in which the development of the mining industry and commercial agriculture contributed to the creation of apartheid in South Africa. Legassick and indeed Johnstone have argued that South African capitalism is characterized by extreme extra-economic coercion of the majority of the labour force.[51] As Legassick points out:

> British imperial power and metropolitan capital was used not simply to annex territory, but to assist in the transformation of social relationships.[52]

The centre of gravity of South Africa, economic and political, shifted from the Cape to the Transvaal and the new circumstances, argues Legassick, required new institutions. The Anglo-Boer War led to the assumption of British hegemony over South Africa and created a unified South African state which allowed the formulation of new policies required for the mobilization and control of black labour.[53] These policies, he noted, led to segregation of the races in South Africa.

Though much of the analyses by Legassick and Johnstone are outside the scope of this dissertation, they represent

the basic Radical analyses of South African history. Johnstone looked at the origins of racial discrimination in the mining industry and argues that racial discrimination is:

> a product of the system of production of which it formed a part, and as determined in its specific forms, functions and nature by this system.54

Johnstone's work is in fact a critique of the way in which race relations in South Africa and South African history have been studied by liberal shcolars. He offers a new approach which he calls the 'Marxist structuralist approach.' It is also worth noting that both Johnstone and Legassick draw their conclusions from the economic circumstances which prevailed in the Transvaal after the discovery of gold. It is in this respect that they give primacy to economic factors.

CONCLUSION

The assessment of the Liberal-Radical historiography of the Transvaal has revealed that the categorization of scholars into these two schools of thought are cross-cutting categories. Analyses by both liberal and radical scholars take into account political and economic factors. The analyses we have considered in this chapter indicate that political and economic factors have equal potential validity as explanations of the socio-political and economic development of the Transvaal. Some liberal scholars gave primacy to economic factors, while other gave primacy to

political factors. Radical scholars, on the other hand, give primacy to economic circumstances although they consider political and economic factors to have equal potential validity as explnations of the event in the Transvaal.

The author, therefore, considers that the labels radical and liberal are not the best terms by which these scholars can be described. The term 'political-economic determinists' seems more appropriate. This is because scholars in the two categories draw their conclusions from both political and economic evidence. Their interpretations, in general, can not be described as either political or economic.

NOTES

1. F.A. van Jaarsveld, Ou En Nuwe Wee in Die Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedskrywing (Old and New Trends in South African Historiography), Pretoria, 1961, 57. The Local English version of South African history referred to here is what the current author has described as the imperial point of view.

2. H.M. Wright, The Burden of the Present: Liberal-Radical Controversy Over Southern African History, David Philip, Cape Town: 1977; 5.

3. van Jaarsveld, Old and New Trends, 57.

4. Wright, The Burden of the Present, 6.

5. R.V. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: the Case of South African Gold Mining Finance 1886-1914, Duke University Press, Durham N.C. 1979; 11.

6. There are exceptions to this observation: S.H. Frankel, The Economic Impact on Under Developed Societies, Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 1953.; H.M. Robertsons "150 years of Economic Contact between Black and White" The South African Jouranal of Economics, 3, 1 (March 1935); 3-25; are works by liberal economic historians and contain good understanding and analysis of the development of the mining industry.

7. W.M. Macmillan, Complex South Africa: an Economic Foot-note to History, Faber and Faber, London: 1930; 13.

8. Macmillan, Complex South Africa, 27.

9. Macmillan, Complex South Africa, 280.

10. D.J.N. Denoon, "The South African Mining Industry and Racial Discrimination: Which is the Chicken and which is the Egg? Unpublished Paper,(1982); 8.

11. G. Blainey, "Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid", The Economic History Review, 18, 2 (1965); 350-366. Refer to chapter one.

12. C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa: Social and Economic, OUP, London: 1957; 89.

13. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, 107

14. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, 122.

15. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, 132.

16. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, 133.

17. Frankel, The Economic Impact, 113. Frankel was commenting on the fears expressed by mine owners ever since the discovery of gold that the mines would close down soon. These fears were based on the experience of the relatively short-lived gold mining fields of Califonia and Australia.

18. S.T. van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, Frank Cass and Company, London: 1971; 149.

19. van der Horst, Native Labour, 163.

20. van der Horst, Native Labour, 170.

21. E.A. Walker, A History of South Africa, Longmans, London: 1942; 440-1

22. L. Marquard, The Story of South Africa, Faber and Faber, London: 1968; 196.

23. E. Pakenham, Jameson's Raid, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London: 1960; 179.

24. J.P. Fitzpatrick, The Transvaal From Within, William Heinemann, London: 1900; 94.

25. W.K. Hancock, Smuts: The Sanguine Years 1870-1919, vol. 1 Cambridge University Press, London: 1962.

26. Hancock, Smuts 1, 78.

27. Hancock, Smuts 1, 88.

28. M. Wilson and L. Thompson, The Oxford History of South Africa, vol. 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1969:v.

29. L. Thompson, "Great Britain and the Afrikaner Republics, 1899-1899", The Oxford History, vol. 2,290.

30. Thompson, "Great Britain and the Afrikaner Republics", 331.

31. R. Mendelsohn, "Blainey and the Jameson Raid: the Debate Renewed", Journal of Southern African Studies, 6 (April 1980); 166.

32. Mendelsohn, "Blainey and the Jameson Raid", 165.

33. G.H.L. May, British Supremacy in South Africa 1899-1907, O.U.P. London: 1965; 39.

34. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 39.

35. This argument is advanced by S. Marks and S. Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State", History Workshop, 8 (1979); 52.

36. T. Pakenham, The Boer War, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London: 1979; xvi-xvii.

37. Pakenham, The Boer war, 89.

38. Pakenham, The Boer War, 575.
Le May, British Supremacy, 155-191.

39. Pakenham, The Boer War, 576.

40. Refer to chapter one on the origins of the radical school and economic interpretation of South African history, 1886-1910.

41. Luxemburg, Accumulation of Capital, 416.
H.J. and R.E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa 1850-1950, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 1969; 60-61.

42. Simons, Class and Colour, 61.

43. Simons, Class and Colour, 63.

44. Marks and Trapido,"Lord Milner", 52.

45. Marks and Trapido, "Lord Milner", 52.

46. Marks and Trapido, "Lord Milner", 52.

47. P. Richardson and J.J. Van-Helten "Gold Mining Industry in the Transvaal 1886-99" in The South African war: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902, ed.P. Warwick, Longman, London: 1980; 20.

48. Richardson and Van-Helten, "Gold Mining Industry in the Transvaal", 21.

49. Richardson and Van-Helten, "Gold Mining Industry in the Transvaal", 31-34.

50. M. Legassick, "Gold,Agriculture and Secondary Industry in South Africa, 1885-1970: From Periphery to Sub-Metropole as a Forced Labour System", in The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, ed. R. Palmer and N. Parsons Heinemann, London: 1977.

M. Legassick, "South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence", Economy and Society 3 (1974); 253-291.

51. Legassick, "South Africa: Capital Accumulation", 255. F.A. Johnson, Class, Race and Gold: A Study of Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London: 1976; 20-21.

52. Legassick, "Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry", 177.

53. Legassick, "Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry", 180.

54. Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold, 2.

CHAPTER FOUR

PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSVAAL HISTORY 1886-1910 A SUMMARY

The South African experience during the 1886-1910 period 'formed an important case study in the debate about the nature of imperialism.'[1] That debate, as already demonstrated in the preceeding chapters, centred around three related episodes of Transvaal history: the Jameson Raid, the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, and the Reconstruction period after the war. This study was concerned with the way in which historians have interpreted these episodes in relation to British imperialism in the Transvaal. The complex nature of the causes of these events, and of the South African past, entails that different historians interpret the history of the Transvaal differently--hence several recognizable perspectives. Donald Denoon, in fact, observed in his paper "Synthesising South African history"[2] that:

> the study of South African history is attended by numerous difficulties, arising from the diversity of influences upon South African events, the pluralism of the Society, and the consequent sectionalism of the sources and of some of the interpreters of South African affairs.3

The historical writings on South Africa as revealed in this study reflect these difficulties.

As more material and evidence on the nature of imperial influence in the Transvaal becomes available, the more complex the understanding of South African history becomes. The historiography (in English) of South Africa has traditionally been considered as either imperial, liberal

or radical. These labels have tended to conceal similarities between interpretations. As an alternative to the traditional approach, this study proposed that the historiography of the Transvaal can best be studied if historians are classified as either political determinists, economic determinists or political-economic determinists. This classification cuts across the accepted classification and therefore casts new light on the nature of the historiographical controversy.

Most of the works analysed in this dissertation were concerned with the way in which the mineral revolution transformed the socio-political and economic life of the Transvaal, and what role British imperialism played in the transformation. However, differences between theoretical frameworks and approaches to the complex South African past led to different analyses and conclusions by scholars of South African history. Political determinists and political-economic determinists who give primacy to political factors are generally agreed that the system of racial discrimination which first appeared in the mining industry stemmed from non-material factors such as prejudice, racism and nationalism.[4] To those who give primacy to economic factors, racial domination is regarded as a product of the system of production--capitalist in the case of South Africa. These views reflect the changes taking place in the historiography of South Africa. Originally,

scholars were concerned with the question of whether or not imperial influence should triumph. From the late 1960s, however, the debate in South African historiography moved onto a new phase:

> it is no longer an argument about the economic motives of individuals and their relevance to political processes; but whether or not South African history is characterized by class struggles.5

However, it is the contention of this author that the different perspectives on Transvaal history have a lot to offer towards an understanding of that history. It has been observed that each had a part to contribute and contains elements of the evidence which other analyses overlooked. This can be exemplified by Robinson and Gallagher's observation on the diversity of imperial policy. They argued that every imperial historian was at the mercy of his own particular concept of empire. That concept, they argued, was further influenced by the historian's original hypothesis.[6] We argue, therefore, that to understand the contribution of historians' analyses of British imperialism in South Africa we should consider their working hypotheses. Anthony Atmore and Shula Marks put this clearly when they observed that:

> Perhaps one of the reasons for the confusion that clutters the concept of imperialism in the historiography of South Africa is the tendency to pick one 'cause'--or cluster of causes--from an apparently inexhaustible bin of factors.7

Having picked one such cause, or cluster of causes, the historian considers it as encompassing all other possible causes. Atmore and Marks argued that basing

the discussion of imperialism in South Africa on one causal factor was responsible for the confusion and short-comings of many studies.

This argument can be conveniently extended to the rest of the issues discussed in this dissertation. The diversity in approach to and interpretation of the episodes of Transvaal history reflects the existence of many causal factors. In fact, different interpretations of the history of the Transvaal in relation to British imperialism are likely to continue, especially of the critical 1886-1910 period which continues to arouse strong emotions.[8]

This study proposes in conclusion that the works which gave primacy to economic factors as explanations of British imperialism in the Transvaal are more convincing that those which gave primacy to political circumstances. As more material becomes available, the stronger the case for those scholars who give primacy to economic factors becomes.

NOTES

1. S. Marks, "Scrambling for South Africa," Journal of African History 23, 1 (1982); 97. This work only became available when this study was in its final stages. The first three chapters were already completed.

2. D.J.N. Denoon, "Synthesising South African History," Transafrican Journal of History 2, 1(1972 103-120.

3. Denoon, "Synthesising South African History," 103.

4. F.A. Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold: a Study of Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London: 1976; 1.

5. D.J.N. Denoon, "Capital and Capitalists in the Transvaal in the 1890s and 1900s," The Historical Journal 23, 1 (1980): 112.

6. R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," Economic History Review 2nd series, 6, 1 (1953); 1.

7. A. Atmore and S. Marks, "The Imperial Factor in South Africa in the nineteenth century: Towards a Reassessment," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 3, 1 (1974): 106.

8. C. Saunders, "Reflections on the state of South African History (In English) at the beginning of the 1980s," The Proceedings of the 11th Annual Conference of the Canadian Association of African Studies 1 (1981): 235.

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