

CHAPTER III:

THE NWP AS AN IMPERIAL BACKDOOR

The missionary carried the Bible; the soldier carried the gun; the administrator and the settler carried the coin. Christianity, Commerce, Civilization; the Bible, the Coin, the Gun: Holy Trinity.

Ngugi wa Thiong'o
Petals of Blood{1}

Tropical Empire was based on power.

D. K. Fieldhouse
Colonial Empires{2}

In the late nineteenth century Europe assumed direct control of Africa by using a creation of modern technology, "the [Maxim] Gun." On it, Europe's success ultimately rested. After the initial show of force the Europeans generally kept it sheathed, but they did keep it visible and available. It became the symbol of European power. Thus weapons laid the foundation for building the colonial societies of Northern Rhodesia, Angola and the Belgian Congo. Yet the almost omnipotent power generated by "the Gun" was only as effective as the self-confident men who

{1} Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Petals of Blood, 1977, quoted in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, "The Thin White Line: The Size of the British Colonial Service in Africa," African Affairs 79 (Jan. 1980): p. 25.

{2} D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century (New York: Delacorte Press, 1967), p. 397.

either used it directly or acquiesced in its use. {3}

As the Kenyan novelist, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, observed, these men included representatives of western business and government (soldiers, administrators, and settlers who included farmers, miners, and traders) and religious humanitarians (Christian missionaries). While some were solely motivated by the thought of using the gun's power to acquire personal or national glory, most were inspired by "the Coin" and "the Bible," or some combination of "God, Gold, Glory." Though from all areas and social strata of Europe, they shared the attitudes, assumptions, and objectives of their age. For example though they disliked and distrusted each other, they all considered themselves superior to 'heathen' and 'uncivilized' Africans. They also believed that Africa and its people needed to be changed in some fundamental manner. These Europeans formed a built-in elite in the new colonial societies. As such, they not only continued to possess the different powers they enjoyed in Europe; they also expanded them through their domination of the African people. {4}


{3}Fieldhouse in Colonial Empires maintains that "the Maxim gun was the symbol of the second phase of the partition as the diplomats' cartography had been of the first." p. 222.

{4}In the introduction to his readings, British Imperialism: Gold, God, and Glory, Robin Winks states, "The old judgement that the Spanish conquistadores came to the New World in search of Glory, God, and Gold . . . continues to have meaning." (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 3.

Thus Africans rapidly became a homogeneous mass at the base of the new societies, and their powerlessness became as significant as European power. Any equality between Europeans and Africans that had existed prior to this time faded. Even Lewanika, the strongest ruler, found his power in Barotseland eroding after several decades of successful collaboration with Europeans. Accordingly, Africa's own history, together with its current politics, economies, and societies lost value and underwent a complete metamorphosis. Both conscious and unconscious changes made the lives of individuals and the structures of whole societies more compatible with the colonial society's new norms. In the process the NWP became an area that lay like a closed backdoor between the Congo, Angola, and Northern Rhodesia. {5}

{5}As the most recent scholarly work on the Lozi by Gwyn Prins makes clear, Lewanika did not initially lose his power, and in fact, immediately benefitted from his association with the British: See The Hidden Hippopotamus: Reappraisal in African History: The Early Colonial Experience in Western Zambia, 1876-96 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Lewanika was, however, an unusual exception in much of Central and East Africa. Other important works on Lewanika and his Lozi Kingdom, include: Gervas Clay, To My Friend . . . Lewanika: The Life and Times of Lubosi Lewanika, Litunga of Barotseland, 1842 to 1916 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1968); Mutumba Mainga, Bulozi Under the Luyana Kings: Political Evolution and State Formation in Pre-Colonial Zambia (London: Longmans, 1973), pp. 128-206; Gerald L. Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969: A Political History of Zambia's Western Province (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1970); and William Gervase Clarence-Smith, "Slaves, Commoners and Landlords in Bulozhi c. 1875-1906," Journal of African History XI, 2 (1979), pp. 219-34. For the futile struggles of Yeta, Lewanika's successor, see Macpherson, Anatomy, pp. 220-2 and Caplan, pp. 124-41.

The NWP AND THE NEW COLONIAL SOCIETIES



The Birth of Three Colonial Societies

As Ngugi wa Thiong'o cynically implied in his comment on the "Holy Trinity," an extremely diverse collection of actors performed in the late nineteenth century drama called the European 'Scramble for Africa'. The NWP was no exception. In fact, the actors in this local drama formed one of the more bizarre collections. Intentional actions by Cecil Rhodes and King Leopold of Belgium, two of the world's richest men, combined with the unintentional actions of Frederick Stanley Arnot, a conservative evangelical missionary, to create the NWP's colonial society. Others like Alfred Sharpe and Captain Stairs, local representatives of European business and government interests; Charles Swan, a colleague of Arnot; and Lewanika, Msidi, and Nyakatolo, all African rulers of coveted regions, also contributed to the plot.

Referring especially to the late nineteenth century, Guy Hunter in The New Societies of Tropical Africa describes and comments upon the situation that brought such men together.

Save for China, Tropical Africa was the last great land area which, in the mid-nineteenth century had not been penetrated by Western civilization. . . . It is important . . . that it was not the older, Catholic Europe which finally took hold of the heart of Africa, but the self-assured, Protestant, capitalist, industrial, scientific spirit, bred particularly in Europe's West and North--in France, Germany, the Netherlands, England. . . . Although there was the will to conquer, or to use [before this time] there was not the will to change. It needed the spirit of the missionary journeys of St. Paul, the expansive spirit of

Protestant capitalism, the imperial spirit of the nineteenth century European states and the growing power of their economies to give both the moral impetus and the physical strength to grasp, to hold and to change. It was not the trader alone, nor the missionary alone, nor the government alone, but the three together, and the settler in their train, who were strong enough; and these four, with their different yet interwoven interests, will figure again in the story. [6]

Here Hunter develops three significant points about European imperialism in Africa and the birth of colonial societies. First, Africa was the last region of the world to be "penetrated." Prior to this time Europe had no reason to enter Africa, not finding it especially desirable. But by this time, the divisions of this last large section of the earth "probably were inevitable." As a result, not just Europe but particular powers of western Europe contested for a part of Africa that they did not need and which did not have any intrinsic value for them. Second, different segments of European society that normally disagreed about the treatment of Africans agreed on or acquiesced in Europe taking charge of Africa. In this context, Rhodes and Leopold, who personified naked and aggressive political and economic power, became the bedfellows of Arnot, who personified ultra-pious, nonviolent humanitarianism. Third, Europe not only grasped and held on to Africa, but in doing so, changed it dramatically. Hunter's three points become repetitious themes in the NWP's story. [7]

[6] Hunter, New Societies, pp. 3-4.

[7] For the short quotation, see Fieldhouse, Colonial Empires, p. 373.

The most significant aspect of that story is that only one of the European 'powers' involved in the scramble for this part of Africa--namely Portugal--was a national government. The others were large international companies led by Leopold and Rhodes. The BSAC became Britain's proxy when "the government in London became fascinated with the cut price imperialism which Rhodes proffered millions made possible." The relationship between Leopold's Congo Independent State and Belgium was even more ambiguous. Technically, the Congo was independent, and hence not responsible to any European government. Belgium did not assume control until 1908. {8}

Quite clearly, these companies were more than simple business enterprises. Rhodes and Leopold, who rivalled each other in cunning, deviously manipulated the complex interacting and overlapping powers inherent in late nineteenth century economic capitalism and political nationalism. In addition, wealthy stockholders with both hidden and open political powers supported them. Thus business and government, or the economic and political spheres, acquired and sustained a relationship of extraordinary power. In relation to Rhodes and Leopold, Portugal remained an

{8} For the quotation, see Trevor A. Coombe, "Origins of Secondary Education in Zambia: A Study in Colonial Policy Making," (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), p. 2. Many historians regard Bismarck and Germany as the catalyst for the Scramble. In this area of the savanna, however, neither Germany nor France, the main competitors with Britain for territory, were involved. See also the next footnote.

inferior rival.

By the 1880s, the leaders of these three powers and their representatives in Africa vigorously attempted to out-manuever each other to acquire the south-central savanna. Although they regarded it as one of the least desirable parts of the continent, all three needed it to round out their territorial claims. Portuguese agents wanted to push old claims inland and across the continent to connect Mocambique and Angola. Rhodes and his cohorts dreamed of stretching the British Empire from Cape Town to Cairo. Leopold desired to make all of the Congo River basin a personal fiefdom. In addition, each man hoped that the area would contain valuable minerals. [9]

To make the stratagem successful, each power tried both to assert an internationally recognized territorial claim and to secure actual control. At the end of 1884, the eve of the Congress of Berlin, Portuguese representatives moved into the upper Zambezi Valley; BSAC agents pushed north across the Zambezi and west from Nyasaland; and

[9] Unlike Leopold's inherited wealth and title, Rhodes was a self-made millionaire. He became governor of the Cape Province. Several useful biographies have been written on Rhodes. I used J. G. Lockhart and C. M. Woodhouse, Rhodes (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963). The best work on King Leopold today is still probably Ruth M. Slade, King Leopold's Congo: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Congo Independent State (New York: OUP, 1962). Also, its sequel by Roger Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo Under Belgian Rule, 1908-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 1-36. For a recent study, which reflects their conservative philosophy, see Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 1884-1914, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 1-163.

Leopold's men headed south into the upper Congo region.

When this extraordinary amalgam of power enveloped the south-central savanna in the mid-1880s, the outside world neither knew much about the area nor possessed a curiosity to learn more. The NWP still remained a segment of the "Heart of Darkest Africa" even though famous world travelers such as David Livingstone had passed through. Now very suddenly, the situation changed. For a few short years, many of Europe's powerbrokers carefully and eagerly noted details concerning the region and its people, including their past and present customs. They also stimulated an increasing public interest in Europe. {10}

Since the Congo Independent State, Portugal, and the BSAC all desired more general information on the region, the missionary-explorer Frederick Stanley Arnot received attention when he literally walked into the picture. Arnot was uncooperative and could not be influenced, let alone controlled. He was unconcerned about his significance to them. These imperialists, however, saw more in the stories of his experiences and observations than religious fortitude and faith. From his writings they could extrapolate materials concerning, and possible claims for, the frontier areas between them. They especially noted Arnot's geographic observations of Barotseland, the upper Zambezi Valley generally, and the region that stretched east from

{10} For David Livingstone's descriptions of this part of the savanna, see: Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1858), pp. 205-381.

the slave entrepot at Nana Kandundu (ruled by the Luvale chieftainness Nyakatolo), just north of the Congo/Zambezi watershed, into the present Shaba Province of Zaire. Consequently, the threads of the complex European power struggle that related to the NWP quickly involved Arnot and his travels. His missionary work could not be accomplished in a vacuum, and the European powers exploited this fact in the course of gaining control over this part of Africa. {11}

Even a novelist would have difficulty conjuring a more unusual, unlikely, unknowing, and unwilling participant in the colonial and capitalist division of Africa. Arnot had played with David Livingstone's children and, possibly more than any other individual, was Livingstone's spiritual successor. While in his teens, Arnot felt God's call to Central Africa. In 1881 at the age of 23, he left England for South Africa with almost no money, but lots of faith and promises of support from several Brethren assemblies in the United Kingdom. He had a tough constitution and began trekking into many isolated places that had not been explored by any European since Livingstone. His sole wish was to have the 'privilege' of preaching the Word of God in a new part of Africa. {12}

{11} See the following four footnotes for references to Arnot's travels and observations.

{12} See Chap. V for a more detailed explanation of the role of the Brethren in the history of the region and Appendix A for a self-description of their missionary philosophy. For the best account of his early years, see

Between 1881 and the end of 1884--the Congress of Berlin was meeting during the latter time--Arnot traversed the Barotse kingdom from south to north and Angola from east to west. He spent much of this time at the Lozi court, opening the first school in what later became Northern Rhodesia. As Livingstone before him, he tried to work peaceably and amiably with all people around him. Arnot's personal relationships remained untainted by the European influences that soon infested the region. In 1884 when civil war in Barotseland seemed to threaten his world, Arnot retraced Livingstone's footsteps to Angola's west coast. [13]

While he completed this final trek, Arnot's supporters published the first brief travels of his life in Barotseland. They brought him instant fame in Britain. The imperialist agitators, a vocal and influential minority throughout Europe, especially took interest. Thus when Arnot arrived in areas under the firm control of the Portuguese, he heard that the colony's governor had ordered officials to give him full cooperation. After he reached the coast, an American official asked him to come aboard ship and preach to the seamen, and a representative from a

his official biography by Ernest Baker, The Life and Explorations of Frederick Stanley Arnot (London: Seeley, Service and Co., 1923), pp. 17-119.

[13] For an analysis of African-European relationships in the nineteenth century before they became tainted by Europe's new power, see H. Alan C. Cairns, Clash of Cultures: Early Race Relations in Central Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

German man-of-war politely questioned him. In addition, the captain of an English battleship offered to give him the supplies he needed and to convey him to Loanda for Christmas with the Portuguese Governor and the British Consul. [14]

Arnot largely ignored everyone. He wanted only rest, supplies, and his supporters' approval of his plan to proceed inland to the court of Msidi. Messengers had brought a letter that "contained an earnest appeal that men might come to Garenganze." Although Msidi sought traders rather than missionaries, Arnot considered this God's Call. In June 1885 he left the coast and followed the old slave route east to Msidi's kingdom. Here he lived as simply as he had in Barotseland. Only in August 1888, when Charles A. Swan and W. L. Faulkner replaced him, did Arnot return to Europe. He had achieved his personal goal of preaching the Word in a new corner of the world. [15]

[14] Arnot's first publication was a pamphlet, consisting of some letters and parts of his diary: From Natal to the Upper Zambesi (London: James E. Hawkins, n.d.). This pamphlet was followed by two others, also undated, produced by the same editors and publisher. They were: The First Year Among the Barotse on the Zambesi in Continuation of From Natal to the Upper Zambesi; and From the Zambesi to Benguela. For his experiences with the representatives of the colonial powers, see especially Baker, Arnot, pp. 120-42, and the book that was published when he first returned to England, Garenganze: Or, Seven Years' Pioneer Mission Work in Central Africa (London: James E. Hawkins, 1889; reprint ed., London: Frank Cass and Co., 1969), pp. 97-126. For a later autobiographical summary of events up to his reaching the coast, see Missionary Travels in Central Africa (Bath: Office of the "Echoes of Service," 1914), pp. 1-53.

[15] For the quotation, see Baker, Arnot, p. 119.

Agents of Rhodes and Leopold utilized such geographical data as Arnot's in their final maneuvering for control of the region. In Berlin, Britain had agreed in principle that Leopold was to control the Congo Basin. But a determined Rhodes and his BSAC refused to give up the area. In 1888 just after Arnot had left for Europe, representatives of the BSAC focused their attention on Msidi's kingdom. Thus within a few months of each other, Alfred Sharpe, the BSAC agent, and Captain Stairs, the Congo agent, arrived at Msidi's court. [16]

There, significant events occurred in quick succession. Charles Swan, as Arnot's replacement at the court, tried to remain neutral. This annoyed Sharpe, who expected cooperation from a fellow Englishman. Even Swan's simple lifestyle angered him. Sharpe bitterly reported:

The missionaries treat Msidi as a great king; do nothing without first asking his permission, are at his beck and call, almost his slaves. . . . They live like natives, . . . It seemed to me a humiliating thing to see white people taking up such a position . . . and a great mistake too. [17]

For Arnot's journeys to and from Garenganze and his life at Msidi's court, see *ibid.*, pp. 142-230; Arnot, Garenganze, pp. 127-250; Arnot, Missionary Travels, pp. 54-104.

[16] The BSAC's clear intent to annex Msidi's kingdom and the assumption that Arnot and these other Brethren would help were stated in a letter from Shippard to Coillard, 1 Sept. 1889, CO 5/5/1, cited by Gervas Clay, Lewanika, p. 62.

[17] Sharpe to Johnston, 8 Sept. 1890, to 27 Jan. 1891, encl. in Johnston to Salisbury, 6 May 1891, F.O. 84/2114, quoted by Cairns, Clash, p. 47.

Swan's earnest attempts at neutrality proved significant. Since Swan refused to influence Msidi one way or the other, the ruler did not sign a treaty with Sharpe. After Sharpe left, Stairs arrived and quarrelled with Msidi. Amid the ensuing confusion, the king was shot. Stairs claimed the kingdom for the Congo Independent State. As a result of Stairs' incident, the European powers believed that Leopold's representatives had outfoxed Rhodes's men. {18}

For Europe's elite, such tactical maneuvers resembled a large-scale chess game that gentlemen and their subordinates played. But for Africans and for the region, such events had long-term consequences. This particular confrontation at Msidi's court determined part of the new

{18} The BSAC's failure to annex Msidi's kingdom meant that Katanga's copperfields went to Leopold's Congo. This created one of the more interesting "if" questions of Central African colonial history. The details of these events in Katanga that involved Msidi, and also Kazebe in the Luapula region to the east, have been described by Ruth M. Slade, Congo; and Robert I. Rotberg, Christian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia: 1880-1924 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 67-71 and "Plymouth Brethren and the Occupation of Katanga, 1886-1907", Journal of African History, 5 (1964): 285-97. Many Brethren resent some of Rotberg's implications regarding their missionaries. For descriptions of these events from their viewpoint, and some rebuttals, see the following two works: Frederick Roy Coad, A History of the Brethren Movement: Its Origins, its Worldwide Development, and Significance for the Present Day, 2nd ed., (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1976), pp. 204-7; Echoes of Service, Turning the World Upside Down (Bath: Echoes of Service, 1972), pp. 388-9. See also the following by Arnot's son: R. S. Arnot, Northern Rhodesia Journal, III (no. 5, 1958): pp. 428-34. Macpherson, Anatomy, gives these Msidi/Arnot/European powers an interesting new perspective, pp. 43-5.

rigid boundaries between the British and Belgian empires in south-central Africa. More specifically, it fixed the Zambezi/Congo watershed as the NWP's northern boundary with the Belgian Congo. For the African peoples living in the region, it meant that Musokantanda's people in the west and the Lamba and Kaonde peoples in the east were split into two separate territories and empires. [19]

Meanwhile to the west, the Northern Rhodesian/Angolan boundary areas that Arnot had explored became the focus of equally complex negotiations. Britain, through the BSAC, took Barotseland under its protection and created North Western Rhodesia. In 1891, both Britain and Portugal agreed that the latter's colony of Angola would begin where Lozi rule in Barotseland ended--somewhere in the upper Zambezi Valley. Until a final agreement could be reached, the Kabompo/Zambezi confluence served as a boundary. Portugal wanted to retain this boundary by proving that the upper Zambezi peoples had been independent, especially Nyakatolo at Nana Kandundu. Britain on the other hand, wished to extend the Barotseland boundary north to the Congo/Zambezi watershed, and west to include much if not all of the upper Zambezi Basin. Thus the BSAC became advocates for the Lozi and sought to prove that in 1891 Lewanika, the

[19] For the final Congo/Northern Rhodesia boundary agreement between Great Britain and King Leopold's Congo Independent State on 12 May 1894, see Sir Edward Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, revised ed. (London: H. M. S. O., 1909), vol. II, pp. 578-80 and map facing p. 580.

Lozi king (Litunga), had a very large kingdom. {20}

These Barotseland/Angolan boundary negotiations became part of wider wrangles between Portugal and Britain over African territory. By the time King Emmanuel of Italy arbitrated a settlement in 1905, it had become one "of the last outstanding boundary questions between European powers in Africa." When he attempted to identify the boundaries of the Lozi, King Emmanuel correctly recognized that no fixed line had ever existed. Consequently, he compromised by creating a geometric boundary halfway between the two claims. Thus the Chokwe peoples become part of Angola, and the Lunda and Luvale peoples were each divided and placed into Angola, the Congo, and Northern Rhodesia. {21}

{20} For a brief contemporary account of the final boundary negotiations and settlement, see "Barotse Boundary Award", Geographical Journal, 26 (1905): 201-4. For the relevant international exchanges, between Great Britain and Portugal, see Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, Vol. III, pp. 1016-21, 1026-9, 1072-6 and attached map. In their accounts of extended journeys in disputed areas, Major A. St H. Gibbons and Col. Colin Harding seemed to have stretched their observations considerably to support British and BSAC claims: Gibbons, Africa from South to North through Barotseland, (New York: John Lane, 1904), 2 vols. and Harding, In Remotest Barotseland: Being an Account of a Journey of Over 8,000 Miles through the Wildest and Remotest Parts of Lewanika's Empire (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1905). For a debunking of these two accounts, see C. M. N. White, "The Ethno-History of the Upper Zambezi," African Studies, 21 (1962): 21-5. For the Lozi reactions to these British activities and the 1905 arbitration, see Clay, Lewanika, especially pp. 137-40. See also, fn. 5.

{21} "Barotse Boundary Award," p. 201. For some later implications of this award in the upper Zambezi Valley, see Papstein, who refers to other relevant studies, pp. 30-9. For an example of one of the wider wrangles, see Alan K. Smith, "The Angola-Portuguese Conflict Over the

This geometric division of the upper Zambezi Valley, created by a disinterested European king, resulted in major long-term consequences for Africa and symbolizes the basic fact that European power and African powerlessness rapidly became absolutes. Equality between Europeans and Africans ended. The traditional subject/ruler respect that Arnot and Swan showed to Msidi largely ceased to exist when the ruler was an African. European attitudes, assumptions and perspectives became all-powerful. Europe could create a new social order in the region and it did so as the new colonial societies came into being.

The Growth of The Colonial Societies

Rhodes and Arnot only met once, in 1894. Each had reached his peak of fame: Rhodes as the wealthy entrepreneur-politican who built empires and Arnot as the humble missionary-explorer who followed in Livingstone's footsteps. By this time, Europe's paper division of Africa was rapidly becoming history. A new stage had been reached

Shire Highlands, 1875-91," in From Nyasaland to Malawi: Studies in Colonial History, ed. Roderick J. Macdonald (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1975), pp. 44-64. Macpherson, (Anatomy, pp. 45-6) also gives these new NWP boundaries a wider perspective. He notes for example that by the end of 1891 the boundaries of Northern Rhodesia were complete but that "the weakest links in the chains of the fence were those dividing what is now Zambia's north-western province from Angola and, to a lesser extent, from the Congo Free State" (p. 45).

and new activities were being initiated. Rhodes's BSAC representatives were moving north both to establish their suzerainty and to install an administration in their newly recognized regions. In a very different manner, the missionary work initiated by Arnot was also expanding. A new string of mission stations stretched east from the Atlantic to the Luapula River and Lake Mweru along the old slave--and future railway--route and across the newly designated territories of Angola, the Belgian Congo, and Northern Rhodesia. {22}

Arnot described their meeting in Durban, South Africa.

Mr. Rhodes had many questions to ask about the Garenganze country, and hoped that the brethren there would be willing to train young men as telegraphy clerks, etc., so that they might earn good wages and be useful to the large commercial companies and European governments. It was not very easy for me to explain to him that we were rather hoping to find ways and means of teaching the native boys trades that would keep them at home. The African native cannot be employed on trading stations and Government posts without developing a strong inclination to pick up the white man's vices; and even when congregated in mining compounds, or on plantations under the best control, they are still exposed to what might be called 'barrack life' temptations. The natives can weave and work in metals, as well as farm, all of course in a rough way. Our ambitions, therefore, I explained to Mr. Rhodes, lay

{22} Baker says that "whilst waiting at Capetown for a steamer to Durban, the late Cecil Rhodes sent Arnot an invitation to meet him." ARNOT, p. 256. Arnot was making his third voyage to Africa against his doctor's orders and hoped to "ascertain the possibilities of the East Coast route and its possible advantages over the West Coast." Ibid., p. 255.

rather in the line of stimulating these industries, and in preserving African village life. {23}

Both men tacitly assumed that Africa's old social order had passed. A new order, based on European control and guidance, had dawned.

This assumption notwithstanding, Arnot focused on the major differences dividing Rhodes and himself, especially on how to remold Africa and Africans. He clearly did not agree with Rhodes's vision of the new order's structure. Rhodes envisioned missionaries training Africans for relocation to towns where they could assume low level jobs in government and industry. Rhodes assumed, of course, that such towns would quickly spring up. He knew that at such places as Lovedale and Fort Hare in South Africa and Livingstonia in Nyasaland missions already trained Africans. Probably thinking of the same missions and South African cities, Arnot recoiled from the thought that the same fate awaited his isolated Brethren, who were just establishing their missions in the new hinterland. Rather he prayed for and dreamed of a new rural utopia where life would be improved in a very simple manner while Africans were being converted to Christianity.

Since Rhodes represented the enormous political and economic power instituting the new order, Arnot's polite objections had little effect on the new pattern of events throughout the region. His objections indicate, however,

{23} Ibid., p. 256.

how future Brethren policies would clash with those espoused by men like Rhodes. Following Arnot's example, most Brethren quietly resisted providing the educational programs that Rhodes desired. Objecting in principle, they believed that such programs, if necessary, should be provided by secular authorities. However, these missionaries only rarely attempted to apply Arnot's vague ideal. And when they did so, their efforts were feeble and rested solely on government sufferance in rural areas like the NWP. In a few isolated areas though, this ideal occasionally had meaning. Later chapters on the NWP's educational system will illustrate these instances. {24}

In this ambiguous setting, the new colonial societies of Portuguese Angola, the Belgian Congo, and British Northern Rhodesia came into being. The combined power of European big business and government molded these societies. While the power of Europe gave these societies a similar base in the world economic system and empowered a European elite to organize and rule them, the strong counter-force of nationalism increasingly differentiated them. Consequently each began to embody the national differences of its European homeland. These apparently contradictory crosscurrents often complemented one another and in the process splintered many homogeneous African peoples. This made African resistance harder. In turn, the

{24} For a detailed analysis of later Brethren work, especially in the NWP, see Chap. V.

colonizers often deflected severe discontent by allowing Africans to move into neighboring territories and by permitting the flow of labor to other regions. European internationalism and European nationalism became two sides of one phenomenon.

Since the dividing line between the economic and political spheres was so blurred during this period, early officials often represented both currents of power. Often ex-military officers, independent adventurers, explorers, or big game hunters, these men frequently had only vague national loyalties. In addition they shared an enormous self-confidence, bolstered by 'the gun' they carried on behalf of their new imperial masters. From the original nuclei on the Atlantic coast (Portugal), the lower Congo River (Congo Independent State) and the middle Zambezi (BSAC), these representatives moved inland not only to create the modern boundaries of Angola, Congo, and Northern Rhodesia, but also to establish their authority and then to organize the region's resources for exploitation. {25}

{25} For Northern Rhodesia, see: L. H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953 (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 94-8 and The Birth of a Plural Society: The Development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company: 1894-1914, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), pp. 44-59; Hall, Zambia (Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 87-96; and Macpherson, Anatomy. For the Congo, see: Gann and Duigan, Belgian Africa, pp. 52-79 and Slade, Congo, pp. 16-140. For Angola, see: Lawrence W. Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 95-116; James Duffy, Portuguese Africa, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 197-8, 226-30, 247-50; Douglas L. Wheeler and Rene

Humanitarian rhetoric masked cynical avarice as these representatives of the BSAC and the Congo Independent State proclaimed to be 'stamping out slavery and tribal war', 'civilizing savages', and 'teaching them to work'. And while they placated humanitarians in Europe by stamping out all disorders, they also benefited international company-rulers. Disorder cost money through the loss of African labor and the waste of administrators' time. Through such activity, they also quickly established control over a district and its people. When a simple display of arms did not clarify their position, minor overt action--such as killing a few resisters or burning 'huts'--did. One or two well-armed Europeans and a few African retainers generally could handle the task. Yet the European powers frowned on district administrators who precipitated costly military campaigns. Even King Leopold discovered that widespread atrocities brought down the wrath of Europe's humanitarians. {26}

Pelissier, Angola (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 58-62. For the most vivid sketches--but laudatory in a way that seems strange today--of the most outstanding or unusual men in Northern Rhodesia, see W. V. Brelsford, Generation of Men: The European Pioneers of Northern Rhodesia (Salisbury: William Manning Ltd., 1965).

{26} See the previous footnote. Slade on the Congo and Macpherson on Northern Rhodesia especially make this pattern clear throughout their books. For King Leopold and the humanitarians, see especially Slade, Congo, pp. 178-214. For an outdated but still useful work on Leopold and the Congo, see Arthur Berriedale Keith, The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919; reprint: Westport, CT: Negro University Press, 1970), especially pp. 42-174.

Having subdued an area and established their authority in the name of western civilization, the representatives set up a rudimentary administration. Theoretically this job assured peace and justice for a district. In practice it organized and mobilized the population as a labor pool. Although the Portuguese used forced labor on a large scale, the resulting humanitarian outcry indicated that taxation was more efficient. Consequently, the administrators quickly and often forcibly instituted it in most of the region. {27}

The administrators, though a diverse group, had a lot in common because of their similar problems and tasks. Despite their different nationalities, these representatives felt a fraternity as 'civilized' whites in a 'savage' black sea. In the most isolated outposts, such as those near the juncture of these territories in the NWP or the contiguous parts of the Congo or Angola, they acquired the greatest powers. Distance from the territorial nuclei allowed a few individuals to assert almost unlimited, dictatorial power

{27} For Northern Rhodesia, see Macpherson, Anatomy, pp. 105-90; the topics musonke (taxation) and chibale (labor migration) are the key parts of his book. Also, Macpherson attempts to show how these administrators perceived their own cruelties in relation to those in other imperial powers' central and south-central African territories, pp. 192-4. For the Congo, see Slade, Congo, pp. 16-140 and Gann and Duignan, Belgian Africa, especially pp. 116-40. For Angola, see Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 153-68; Henderson, Angola, pp. 114-6, 119-24; and Wheeler and Pelissier, Angola, pp. 62-4, 109-15, 138-41. For Angolan details by a Brethren missionary early in the century, see Charles Swan, Slavery of Today, or, The Present Position of the Open Sore of Africa (Glasgow: Pickering [introduction 1909]).

over the African populace. Sometimes, their imperial masters directly or indirectly encouraged them to abuse their subjects. The Congo Independent State incessantly demanded rubber. The Portuguese tried to supply forced labor to Sao Tome plantations. The BSAC drafted carriers in World War I. At the same time, some took their tasks seriously and served their districts conscientiously as benevolent dictators. Until World War I or even much later, however, not even the best administrators in any of the territories provided social services. Thus, voluntary European mission agencies assumed tasks that European businesses and governments refused to undertake. [28]

A motley group of individuals directly or indirectly supported the work of the administrators. Before their arrival, a small number of Portuguese and many more half-caste Portuguese-Africans traded for ivory, rubber, and slaves with the region's last independent African trader-rulers. At the same time the administrators began their work, mining prospectors searched for mineral wealth, especially gold and diamonds, and dreamed of another Witswatersrand gold field or another Kimberley diamond strike. Many of these early prospectors explored for concessionary companies that were connected through business

[28] For BSAC abuse during World War I in the NWP, see Chaps. IV and VI; and for Northern Rhodesia as a whole, see Macpherson, Anatomy, pp. 167-71. For the CFS, see Slade, Congo, pp. 171-8. For the forced labor to Sao Tome, see Duffy, Portuguese Angola, pp. 157-65 and Henderson, Angola, pp. 114-6.

agreements to Rhodes's and Leopold's companies. For example, George Grey, who Europe credited with discovering both Kansanshi and some of the large Katangese mines, represented Sir Robert Williams's Tanganyika Concessions Ltd.. Grey and many of the companies's leaders belonged to the British nobility and/or were independently wealthy. Prospectors also came solely on their own, often as destitutes or outlaws. In Appendix E Pirouet vividly describes one of them, old man Severts. [29]

These isolated administrators, traders, and mineral prospectors comprised but one part of grandiose imperial dreams. As Arnot's quotation implied, Rhodes and his BSAC ultimately dreamed of towns and cities, mines and industries--all the products of rapid and widespread economic development in an enormously rich British Empire. Although Leopold's initial dreams of the Congo more closely resembled a medieval fiefdom, he acquired similar economic dreams, at least for the southern Katanga (Shaba) region. In contrast, proud but poor Portugal was still to dream of industrial development for herself as well as for her

[29] For useful references to Grey or Williams, consult the following: Joseph Austen Bancroft, Mining in Northern Rhodesia: A Chronicle of Mineral Exploration and Mining Development (BSAC, 1961), pp. 49-52, 105-7; H. Francis Varian, Some African Milestones (Oxford: George Ronald, 1953), pp. 148-215; Gann, Plural Society, pp. 119-20 and Northern Rhodesia, pp. 121-3; E. A. Copeman, "George Grey," Northern Rhodesia Journal, Vol. II (no 3, 1954): 23-5. In the latter, the attached photograph of Grey's first 1899 expedition indicates its military orientation. Brelsford, Men, pp. 78-86, with the photograph of Grey between pp. 136-7.

Angolan colony. {30}

The BSAC's north-south railway line became the most concrete manifestation of new economic dreams. It symbolized a modern communication and transportation system. Not only in the prospect of great wealth, but also as an act of faith in a glorious imperial destiny, Rhodes and the BSAC pushed the line northwards across the African savanna, even when the British Government refused to help. Initially they maximized the rail line's economic potentialities by routing it north from Bulawayo through the Wankie coal fields. Meanwhile, early discoveries of copper, lead, and zinc vindicated this northward expansion. In 1905 the line crossed the Zambezi River just below the Victoria Falls. It then continued through the fertile farmlands of the Tonga Plateau and Lusaka toward the lead and zinc deposits of Broken Hill (Kabwe). BSAC officials chose this route instead of a more westerly and northerly route toward the small copper mines opening in the Kafue Hook and Kansanshi. They could lay the track most easily through these plateau lands and the Kabwe minerals appeared to be more immediately exploitable. Then, in 1908 the railway reached Ndola and

{30} For a good economic overview of these events, see J. Forbes Munro, Africa and the International Economy 1800-1960: An Introduction to the Modern Economic History of Africa South of the Sahara (London: J. N. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1976), especially see pp. 86-113. For the Portuguese poverty and economic problems in relation to Africa, see: Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 221-4 and R. J. Hammond, Portugal and Africa, 1815-1910: A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 1-35.

its Bwana Mkubwa mine a few kilometers from the Congolese border. {31}

Meanwhile, other international railways moved across the south-central savanna. Under the Congo Free State, a new transportation and communication system spread across the inhospitable Congo Basin. Rail lines supplemented navigable portions of the Congo River and inland lakes. The high concentrates of copper in the Congo sector of the Northern Rhodesian/Congolese copperbelt also became a major focus for this system. This copperbelt excited international big business, dominated by English-speaking concessionaires like Williams and his Tanganyika Company which had interests on both sides of the border. {32}

In 1909 the Southern Congo's railroad connected with the BSAC's north-south line. Then before the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, other new Belgian rail and water ties linked the southern Congolese mines with both Atlantic ports to the west and Indian Ocean ports to the east. These newer routes, however, remained less convenient than the initial South African connection. Finally, in 1931 the Lobito (Benguela) Railway crossed Angola from west to east and connected the three territo-

{31} For the laying of the railroad, especially consult Varian, Milestones, pp. 95-140, 202-15; and Gann, Northern Rhodesia, pp. 125-7.

{32} Varian, Milestones, pp. 148-215; Ansley, Legacy, pp. 102-5; Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 247-8; Henderson, Angola, pp. 126-32.

ries. It provided the most international and direct route between the Northern Rhodesian/Congolese copperbelt and the oceans. An international Western European business consortium led by Williams rather than the Portuguese completed this final railway. {33}

The initial north-south line not only moved the Southern African mining frontier north, but also permanently linked the copperbelt to the modern world economy and laid the foundation for further economic development. Additional extensions, however, depended on the profitable exploitation of mineral reserves. Though ample enough to keep hopes alive, these reserves did not appear to justify immediate expansion of the initial line. This fact explains why the Benquella Railway took three decades to open. It also explains why the economic development of the region was so unequal and patchy. {34}

When the BSAC sited the railway along the Tonga Plateau to Kafue, and then to Lusaka, Kabwe, and Ndola, the NWP became destined for nondevelopment. Modern mining depended on cheap transport. In the absence of navigable rivers, a railway became essential. But building a feeder line to the Kafue Hook or to Kansanshi or even to the northeast toward Mbala (Abercorn) and Tanganyika cost large sums of money. Since international business and imperial

{33} See the works cited in the previous footnote.

{34} Munro, International Economy, pp. 90-95, 107-13, 133-7.

governments never felt sure that the soils and minerals of these areas were worth exploiting, they slowly abandoned most plans for extensions. And as a result, the Kafue Hook mines, with impressive names like 'Silver King', slowly shut down. Likewise, the large copper lode at Kansanshi was worked only spasmodically. {35}

By the 1930s European nationalism accentuated the process of nondevelopment in the NWP by increasing the significance of the Northern Rhodesian/Congolese boundaries. After its completion in the 1930s, the Benguela Railway's close proximity might have ended the NWP's increasing isolation. Mineral deposits in Solwezi and Mwinilunga Districts lay just south of the new rail line, and relatively short branch lines could have been laid. But the NWP's mineral potential not only remained unproven, but also the boundary kept new lines from being laid. Thus, while the southern Congo's economy rapidly expanded, the whole of the NWP and contiguous areas of eastern Angola ignobly languished. Although the NWP reflected new economic, and also political and social changes, it did so only weakly or marginally.

The NWP became more peripheral to the new Northern

{35} Francis L. Coleman, The Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt 1899-1962: Technological Development Up to the End of the Central African Federation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971), pp. 6-23; Bancroft, Mining, pp. 57-106; Varian, Milestones, p. 209; also see, Chap. IV. After 1914, Kansanshi Mine was reopened from 1927 to 1933 and 1952 to 1957. More recently, it reopened in the mid-1970s and, as of the end of 1982, still operated.

Rhodesian territory, the British Empire, and the world economic system. By World War II, nondevelopment continued on its own since sustaining and expanding growth in developing areas became easier than starting the process afresh. The vast expanse of land and the mineral reserves of the NWP counted for little in this situation. Without economic development, the place merely remained a labor reserve, while its small population even minimized the value of this human commodity. Instead of becoming an economic link between these three territories of the three European imperial powers, the NWP became a stagnant corner of Northern Rhodesia.

European nationalism also created a new cultural dichotomy. In particular, the different languages of the three imperial powers conspicuously symbolized the forces of European cultural nationalism. Speaking English allowed NWP Africans to integrate themselves better into the new NWP society. Meanwhile their clansmen discovered the same reason for learning French in the Congo and Portuguese in Angola. In this manner, Europe's cultural diversity was slowly superimposed over African cultures. Instead of the NWP becoming a cultural meeting place at the juncture of three territories, it became an isolated outpost where Britain's culture ended. Just beyond its boundary, the

culture of Belgium or Portugal began. {36}

Of the three territories, the Belgian Congo began as and remained the most international, but became increasingly stamped with Belgium's seal. Born of Leopold's fertile mind, it was the King's venture and was initially under his absolute sovereignty. Leopold's officials were often fortune seekers and adventurers and more widely European than Belgian in their background. They reported to the King, not the Belgian nation which had neither an imperial tradition nor any initial public interest in Africa. This situation changed only after Belgium took charge of the area in 1908. Questionable British intentions toward the Katangese copper mines--which in 1926 produced 80,639 long tons, much more than Northern Rhodesia's 708 long tons--strengthened Belgian national interest in the colony. {37}

Although less repressive, Belgium largely continued Leopold's totalitarian rule. It also instituted relatively effective social services for the African population in the

{36} The increasing imprint of European nationalism on Africa eventually helped lead to something different than expected: African nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. The latter phenomenon lies beyond the scope of this work. However, see Robert Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966).

{37} Slade, Congo, p. 43. Coleman (Copperbelt, p. 21) gives comparative production figures for Katanga and Northern Rhodesia from 1908 to 1926. Belgium's fears of Britain, Northern Rhodesia, and especially white settlers, in and from the latter, and the resulting "Belgianization" are summarized well by Gann and Duignan, Belgian Africa, pp. 199-200.

new mining settlements. A predominately Catholic nation, Belgium often gave the Roman Catholic church preferential treatment. But Protestant missionaries in Katanga, generally English-speaking British or American citizens, often wrote that they received fair treatment if they learned French. The government in Belgium, at its own expense, often gave specialized tropical training to medical missionaries of all faiths. While expecting others to conform to its cultural norms, it did not discriminate against Protestants in a way that severely handicapped their work. {38}

Portuguese national pride created a different situation in Angola. Since Portugal never officially connected culture with race, mulattoes and Africans who adopted the culture were theoretically Portuguese. However, Portuguese nationalism encouraged extreme chauvinism toward all other cultures within its territory. African languages, for example, could not be learned in schools, nor could books be printed in other languages unless accompanied by a Portuguese translation on the facing page. Zealous patriotism and cultural antipathy also became associated with forced labor. With only miniscule industrial develop-

{38} Anstey, Legacy, especially pp. 23-142. For a Brethren missionary description, see J. Alexander Clarke, Links of Help (hereafter Links), Vol. XII/XIII (1923/1924), pp. 251-3, which also includes a useful map of the Brethren's Congo mission stations. This article stresses the good relationship between Belgian officers and Brethren missionaries. The article describing missionaries' medical training in Belgium has unfortunately been lost. It was also by Clarke or a colleague, Zentler.

ment in both homeland and colony and with knowledge of their weakness and poverty relative to the other European powers, Portugal seemed determined to mobilize Angola's labor. Portugal rationalized that the Africans did not possess a culture and remained in an 'idle' and 'savage' state. {39}

Questionable British intentions toward Angola's territorial integrity increased Portugal's virulent nationalism. The 'secret' understanding forged by Britain and Germany over the division of Angola if Portugal could not rule the territory became known and did not help matters. {40}

At the same time, foreign missionaries agitated against horrendous abuses perpetrated upon Africans through forced labor. Since many of these critical missionaries were English-speaking Protestants from Britain, the nation that most threatened Portuguese suzerainty, local officials tried to handicap the critics as much as to correct the abuses. In Decree Number 77 in 1921, Portuguese authorities forbade teaching in any language except Portuguese. Furthermore, the Portuguese Government developed a considerable antipathy toward foreign and Portuguese Protestants. As a result, some Protestant missions employed certified

{39} For a detailed study of race relations in Angola, see Gerald J. Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978).

{40} Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 221-4; Wheeler and Pelissier, Angola, pp. 71-83; and Henderson, Angola, pp. 110-6.

teachers from Portugal to run their schools. Throughout the whole colonial era this friction continued, particularly in rural areas where Protestants predominated. {41}

Until World War II, relatively large numbers of white settlers distinguished Northern Rhodesian society from Angolan and Congolese societies. The BSAC had created this segment of colonial society by encouraging white settlement in the territory. These settlers established privileged enclaves along the railway. Many were neither British nor Anglican. The largest non-British group consisted of poor Afrikaners; they spoke English as a second language and belonged to the Dutch Reformed Church. These colonists had only color in common, so the color bar became increasingly more rigid in Northern Rhodesia than in the Congo or Angola. Consequently by virtue of race, the poorest, most uneducated and uncouth white became superior even to traditional

{41} See references in the previous footnote. For early and rather unusual agitation by a Brethren missionary, see Swan, Slavery. For Brethren responses to the 1921 Decree Number 77, see Echoes, especially G. H. Mowat, Vol. 50 (Oct. 1921), p. 238; editors' remarks, Vol. 51 (Apr. 1922), p. 77; Vol. 52 (Sept. 1923), p. 214; 26 Sept. 1923, Edward Sanders, Vol. 53 (Jan. 1924), p. 12; editors, Vol. 54 (Apr. 1925), p. 76. Also, see the following Links: F. Broadhurst, Vol. XI (1922), p. 128 and Vol. XV (1927), p. 46. This matter greatly upset Fisher at Kalene, although he was in Northern Rhodesia, as he felt it struck a blow at the very foundation of their mission work. See Walter Fisher Papers, folios 1763-1772, NAZ.

African rulers. {42}

These settlers keenly encouraged British covetousness toward the Congo's Katangese copper mines and Angola's fertile Bihe plateau. They not only sought to protect their interests in Northern Rhodesia but simultaneously to expand them by extending the British Empire. But their territorial aggrandisement ultimately failed. The international boundaries to the NWP never changed. Had they succeeded in expanding the boundary, the settlers might have reversed the NWP's negative economic and social destiny. Had the international boundary moved west, the whole of the Zambezi Valley would have fallen into British hands. Had it moved north, the Benquella Railway would have more easily served the NWP. Instead, as explained later, these settlers accentuated the NWP's isolation and remoteness within Northern Rhodesia. {43}

{42} For a sympathetic recounting of the settlers' situation in the earliest days, see Gann, Plural Society, pp. 115-74, and his broader work, Northern Rhodesia, pp. 117-48. In the latter work, Gann describes the color bar at Kansanshi and the European rationale for it (pp. 143-5). Likewise, a sympathetic treatment is given by Brelsford in Mea, especially pp. 124-34. Such sympathetic treatments are not in vogue in Africa today. Macpherson makes continual references to settlers before 1924 although BSAC officials are more directly relevant to his study. Anstey (Legacy, pp. 210-5) describes how strong the color bar became in the Congo. Possibly the situation became as bad as in Northern Rhodesia.

{43} See Chap. IV where this discussion of the settlers is continued. They had enormous indirect and direct influence on the NWP because of their strong influence on territorial policy-making.

The increasing social differentiation between the colonial societies of Northern Rhodesia, Angola, and the Belgian Congo kept the NWP and its people powerless. They remained spectators to events that occurred around them after the 1880s. Like much of the upper Zambezi region, the NWP lay in the isolated corners of the new empires. The European powers preferred to develop more accessible regions. {44}

Although at the juncture of three territories, the NWP became a closed backdoor between them. The local inhabitants could neither stimulate European interest nor ward off the European neglect that followed. Thus an unpleasant new reality faced the NWP. It was unimportant to, but totally dependent on, the new order. In the twentieth century, territorial, imperial, and world events had enormous impact on the NWP, but local events very rarely meant anything elsewhere.

{44} The NWP was not unique. Compare its situation with Alan Smith, "Shire Highlands," especially p. 57: "There was nothing intrinsic about the Shire Highlands' which induced him [the British Foreign Secretary] to want to add them to the British Empire." Unlike the NWP, however, the Shire Highland's economy subsequently developed.

Changing African Conceptions

Having gained control of Africa and having made Africans powerless in the new colonial territories, Europeans often lost respect for their new subjects, and the relationship between the two groups changed from one of grudging equality to one of inequality. To both Arnot's spiritual kindred and Rhodes's kin, different as they were, the indigenous African population became an undifferentiated mass. Like children, they were perceived as requiring supervision, control, guidance, and salvation. Consciously and unconsciously, Europeans evolved a vocabulary that reflected this negative attitude. In Northern Rhodesia, all Europeans officially referred to Africans as 'natives' and informally called them 'boys' and 'girls'. Racists called the Africans a 'stinking lot of kaffirs', 'niggers', and 'munts'. Likewise, all said Africans lived in 'huts' or 'kayas', instead of 'hones' or 'houses'. {45}

{45} Retaining any form of equality in such a social environment required a conscious effort on the part of a white. For a territorial figure that did this in many ways, see Gore-Browne, described by Robert Rotberg in Black Heart: Gore-Browne and the Politics of Multiracial Zambia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977.) Provincial figures prior to 1945 possibly included Frank Melland and F. V. Bruce Miller and three missionaries: George Suckling at Chitokoloki throughout the era, Herbert Pirouet in the 1920s, and Peter Letchford at the end. The letters reveal their attitudes. Each made an effort to describe individual Africans as church or traditional leaders and not just refer to Africans as some amorphous mass needing salvation. The missionaries' slang in relation

The omnipresent European power rapidly and often traumatically changed many parts of Africa's old order. At best, Africans could accept or reject a new religion and learn how to read and write. At worst, they became the slaves in A Modern Slavery. The political power that Africans had once possessed disappeared almost immediately except for rare examples. Economic changes quickly followed when all Africans were forced to pay taxes. Those living away from the new economic centers migrated to earn money as unskilled labor. In the more rapidly developing regions, individuals suffered grave injustices, often being thrust from traditional lands or being forced to work as peasants for new European owners. Either way, they found themselves in a 'no win' situation. [46]

Powerless in the face of power, stereotyped by the new vocabulary, Africans responded in ways that might change their deplorable position. Just as the European colonial powers had three different imperial faces, Africans groped in different ways to improve their situation. Nonetheless, these responses were limited because they had to be passive.

to Africans is noteworthy. As the self-acclaimed protectors of the African, they resisted the blatant and strident racism found along the line of rail and the use of pejorative terms. Many like Herbert Pirouet argued strongly that the Africans were gentlemen and certainly not savages. (See App. E.) But while most initial letters home refer to African 'men and women', those sent a year later fell into established social patterns and used 'boys and girls'.

[46] This underlined title is taken from Henry Woodd Nevinson's book, A Modern Slavery (New York: Harper Brothers, 1906). He is especially referring to the Portuguese in Angola.

And in such a negative situation, the African societies often unconsciously changed their self-conceptions and brought themselves into greater conformity with the norms of the three colonial societies. {47}

As the Africans tried to deal with the situation, they found the European elite tampering directly with their societies. British administrators did so in the NWP, where they failed to understand the elaborate, multi-functional matrilineal societies. The small localized states seemed especially degenerate and exceptionally 'primitive'. From the European viewpoint, these societies were low on the evolutionary ladder.

These Englishmen clearly admired African peoples who had more 'advanced' hierarchical kingdoms, and they certainly expected to find coherent tribes. The NWP peoples seemed a 'pathetic lot' when juxtaposed against the large Lozi kingdom. Although they may have regarded Lewanika of the Lozi as a tyrant with 'savage' or 'pagan' customs, Europeans thought they understood his hierarchical state structure. They also respected his power over other African peoples. {48}

In 1924 a new missionary wrote from Chavuma in Balovale District. She stated that "Simey, our nearest

{47} Only after 1945 did Africans successfully find a new voice in the form of nationalism, which was itself a result of these new changes. For its background, see Rotberg, Nationalism.

{48} For Lewanika, see fn. 5.

official . . . has been around Africa a good bit, and he speaks of this district as being the rawest he has ever seen." The implication was clear. The officials and the missionaries both had special tasks to raise up these lowly peoples, to help them 'improve' themselves by creating a new hierarchical tribal structure. Although their concepts of African society were often wrong, their power enabled them to remold the people in the NWP as they saw fit. Thus false European concepts often became new African truths. [49]

Accordingly, tribes appeared because Europeans believed that Africans needed them. They also determined Africans' tribal identities by using the region's languages and historical traditions for their own purposes. Government officials designated the most visible African leaders as 'chiefs' and 'headmen'. They expected these individuals to assist the government in ruling over people or at least in interceding for them. Having created tribes and chiefs, Europeans later tried to divide and distinguish each of them.

Writing about the Luvale, Robert Papstein, a new social and political historian, explains why the colonial government especially needed tribes and how it subsequently made the tribes into genuine social organisms. What he said for the Luvale applies to other peoples in the NWP.

Colonialism and neo-colonialism are political manifestations of capitalist economic relations with Africa.

[49] Ruth V. Logan, Echoes, Vol. 53 (Dec. 1924), p. 276.

In the Upper Zambezi, the tribal social formation is the ethnic expression of this relationship. Colonial peoples have always been expected to pay for their becoming a part of the capitalist system and the Upper Zambezi was no different. The tribe was the administrative mechanism through which this was accomplished. Wage labor and commercialization of agriculture provided the money.

The arrival of colonial administration meant the introduction of more centralized ethnic concepts, most importantly that of the "tribe." At the beginning of the twentieth century there was no such entity as a Luvale tribe. By the late 1950's the existence of such an ethnicity is indisputable. Between 1906 and about 1964 the Luvale social formation was radically altered from a large group of essentially independent, local polities sharing certain similarities of culture and language to a centralized, hierarchical "tribe" with a legally defined territory, a drastically limited number of government-recognized chiefs, centralized courts, and a "tribal" government. [50]

As these two passages indicate, the 'tribe'--both as a concept and as reality--became the focal point of a non-dramatic, European-initiated revolution in the NWP. Europeans did not just have general objections to stateless societies; they also needed tribes as mechanisms through which to exercise their all-encompassing political and economic power.

Just as the NWP and Northern Rhodesia became genuine political entities, so tribes eventually became genuine social organisms. This happened as Africans accepted the concept and increasingly readapted themselves in the face of European power. The tribal model gave them a way to reinterpret both past and current realities.

Modern Luvale history illustrates the way NWP

[50] Papstein, "Luvale", pp. 271, 270.

peoples used the model in reinterpreting the past. Historically, the concept focuses on a permanent chief or king occupying the top of a hierarchy and having a discernable genealogy of ancestral 'begats'. During the colonial era, the chinyama traditions implied a stronger, decidedly hierarchical, state structure to prominent Luvale. These leaders looked for, located, and strengthened old ties with the mwant yaav in southern Zaire. This readaptation and accommodation appears in a new book by Mose Sangambo, a respected Luvale leader. Like others, he seemingly bolsters the Luvale's kingly traditions. By improving the Luvale's negative image, the past now comes to us most easily through the colonial filter of a tribe. {51}

This conceptual revolution also imposed new social relationships and patterns. As indicated in Chapter I, African education changed, giving individuals a new ethnic identity in a culturally complex and heterogeneous modern world. Internal social changes allowed individuals and groups to conform more fully with norms of the new colonial societies while protecting the heritage of their forefathers and maintaining their integrity. Consciously and uncon-

{51} Mose Kaputungu Sangambo, The History of the Luvale People and Their Chieftainship (Los Angeles: African Institute for Applied Research, 1979). As Arthur Hansen has pointed out, the Luvale have had an especially "bad press" ("Running," p. 105). The Lunda in the region got a good press through Shinde's hospitality to Livingstone. David Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 291-302. See also Thomas Chinyama, The Early History of the Balevale Lunda (Lusaka: Africa Literature Committee, Lumbrito Series, Number 15).

sciously, individuals and societies juggled old and new concepts, and the latter often altered or replaced many of the former. For example, Africans have endeavored to minimize colonialism's harshest realities in rural societies.

The harshest of these new realities was the maxim gun. Possibly the wisest, and not necessarily the weakest peoples in Africa realized the futility of struggling openly against it. Most NWP peoples, like others throughout the world, did not choose the resistance Terence Ranger described in Southern Rhodesia or George Shepperson examined in Nyasaland. Furthermore, numbers were generally too small for any large-scale resistance. In addition, most societies had been weakened by the devastating nineteenth century slave trade. Nonetheless, some initial resistance in Mwinilunga and minor secondary incidents in Kaseempa gave the BSAC the opportunity to force people into obedience, as described in Chapter IV. {52}

In the NWP most people searched for passive ways to avoid the most noxious demands of the colonial rulers. Some simply hid from an annoying Native Commissioner and his retinue, especially when taxation started. When this tactic failed they tried other means.

{52} For the most concise summary of the BSAC's 'squashing' the NWP peoples, see Macpherson, Anatomy, pp. 115-6, 160-6. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia (London: Heinemann, 1967); Shepperson and Thomas Price, Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1958).

Living at the junction of three territories, some NWP peoples found that fleeing across international boundaries was a feasible and passive protest against or evasion of harsh colonial realities. They became aware that the white invaders had fixed concepts of territoriality and respected the claims of the other European empires. They likewise discovered that the colonial powers did not normally stop them from leaving any territory. Nor did these powers try to hinder them from entering if they agreed to be 'obedient'. In fact after World War I, when taxation had started, each colonial administration encouraged immigrants in order to enlarge the territory's tax revenue. Although continual fleeing remained an unpalatable option as each territory wanted to tax them and as homes, crops, ancestral lands, etc., all had to be abandoned, it was a useful defense tactic.

Fleeing became intertwined with traditional migration patterns through the savanna since boundaries clashed with Africans' holistic conception of the land. After the colonial era began, individuals and matrikin often crossed these boundaries when they temporarily or permanently joined kin in other places. These included the Luvale in the vicinity of Chavuma on the Zambezi River and on the upper reaches of the Lungwebungu River, the small Kanongesha state in Mwinilunga, and the Musokatanda Lunda and the Kaonde and Lamba living on the Zambezi/Congo watershed. Discontent with land or neighbors, and/or

efforts to maximize land use, had previously provided reasons for moving. Now a noxious local colonial administration could also be an incentive. And colonial officials could distinguish between traditional migrations and fleeing only if large numbers were involved. {53}

In the NWP two notable examples of large-scale fleeing stand out: one into and one out of the province. Both are examples not only because the administrators regarded them as cases of fleeing, but also because they incorporated large numbers of people who were not matrikin. The first involved the large scale, temporary depopulation of Mwinilunga. During 1907-1909, as will be explained in the next chapter, people fled into the Congo and Angola because of a cruel administrator and did so again just before World War I because of taxation. The permanent immigration into Kabompo and Mankoya (Kaoma) illustrates the reverse situation. When Portuguese forced labor in central Angola caused large-scale revolts and repression during the 1920s and 1930s, some 250,000 people immigrated into the

{53} In the 1960s and 1970s, the 'refugees' into the NWP should be considered as part of the new fusion between traditional migration and fleeing. The colonial government and new Zambian Government tried to isolate them, but many had close relatives in the NWP. I personally observed three of these migrations: a) the aftermath of the Tshombe/Katanga emigrations in 1963, b) Angolan emigrations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and c) Zaire in the late 1970s. Hansen's dissertation ("Running") focuses on the Luvale emigres from Angola.

district. {54}

All these responses created a new meaning for rural migration. Similar groups of matrilineal clans less easily joined other matrikin or dispersed themselves among other clans. The significance of matrilineal clans also diminished as the importance of the new colonial-induced concepts of boundaries and tribes increased. As a political and social unit, the clan began to die. Individuals and small groups needed a new, wider, and more rigid identity. A tribe matched colonial concepts because it occupied a specific geographic area and thus could be legally delineated. As a result, internal and international boundaries rigidified African cultural areas.

Quarrels no longer involved small groups spread across vaguely defined frontiers: instead they encompassed large tribes on each side of slowly emerging formal boundaries. In the NWP, areas that contained two or more of the new tribes not readily divided by boundaries--as in Kabompo and Balovale--became focal points of tension, and these

{54} Macpherson (Anatomy) notes the Mwinilunga emigres and gives useful sources (especially pp. 160-4 and fn. on pp. 185-6), but does not have the events clear chronologically. Instead, see Kakoma, "Mwinilunga," pp. 35-73. For the immigration into Kabompo and Mankoya, the Pioneer for these years records a number of events; for example, see Vol. 48/9 (Mar. 1935), pp. 27-8. Several missionaries became interested in these people since they hoped to begin mission work among them. See also, E. M. Jakeman, Pioneering in Northern Rhodesia (London: Morgan and Scott, n.d.). C. M. N. White reflects on these later immigrants and their opinions of both Portuguese and British colonial overlords in the era after World War II: "Notes on the Political Organization of the Kabompo Districts [sic] and its Inhabitants," African Affairs 9 (4, 1950): 185-93.

tensions precipitated further delineations of exact boundaries. Thus by the end of the colonial era, the Northern Rhodesian administration had even fixed precise boundaries between the areas occupied by recognized chiefs, and these boundaries became the new mechanism for preventing and resolving conflicts. {55}

After 1945 all these above changes were accentuated; but by that time, colonial society had thoroughly altered the peoples' basic perceptions of their homelands. At the beginning, the Africans had almost no knowledge of the world beyond their undulating savanna, and that was confined to kin and strangers and was divided by broad frontiers that separated 'us' from 'them'. But by 1945 a new geographic entity had developed. Everyone recognized three large colonial territories with fixed boundaries, rulers, languages, and laws that were based on those of Portugal, Belgium, and Britain. Even the Africans perceived themselves in new ways. More important, the NWP had a new identity that tied it to British-ruled southern Africa. Contiguous areas of Angola and the Congo became transformed as well. Relatives of NWP peoples living in those places increasingly excluded the NWP from their new framework.

No matter what form they took, western capitalism and western imperialism/colonialism informally cooperated to

{55} See especially the map of the NWP that exactly delineated all chiefs' areas with boundaries: "Chiefs' Areas: North-Western Province" (SDT.160, 1:500,000; revised March 1959, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland).

slowly transform the peoples and the geography of south-central Africa. In the process, the region became a part of the world's new political and economic systems. The NWP in particular lay at a junction, yet both it and its society became only a provincial, rural variant of Northern Rhodesia.