

to crush a peasant revolt aimed against the Bantu Authorities system. The Transkei still remains under emergency regulations after this revolt; chiefs are still attacked and occasionally killed. In fifty years, conflict had changed radically from its early beginnings when town mayors opened ANC conferences and protest was respectfully articulated in terms of petition.

The power of this coercive mechanism and government willingness to use it as fully as necessary, maintain strong brakes on the scale of civil strife, though they do not obviate the conflict itself. The institutions of the state form an organic part of the structure of privilege. Army, police and bureaucracy are geared to the perpetuation of privilege. A system of laws ensures that virtually every aspect of African life, in "white" South Africa, at least, is regulated. This system, wedded to the coercive power of the state, predetermines the manner of operation of conflict. The controls imposed on leaders make movement, speech, and hence organization on a national scale difficult. Patterns of political protest become stereotyped. Where violence breaks out, its mass nature is spontaneous; often it is non-realistic, seeking tension release rather than redress.⁶⁷ Mass violence is not only spontaneous, but conforms to stereotypes of action: buses are stoned, bricks are hurled, police are rushed in.⁶⁸ Government and municipal property is destroyed. Whites are not affected because they are far from the segregated ghettos in which violence occurs. The weapons, the targets, and the eventual adversaries - the police - are all that is allowed by the system, "the situation is so controlled and so structured that the possibilities of action are severely restricted".⁶⁹ Thus the self-perpetuating

conflict system imposes controls on the pattern and scale of strife such that the coercive mechanism is usually able to cope comfortably. Facilitation of civil strife is hence extremely low. It is made lower by the cultural nature of white domination: where the regime is prepared to answer protest by a full use of the coercive machinery, even co-opting civilian aid and where the suppression of such protest is seen not as a signal of disharmony but as a sign of success in defending privileges, the short-term potential of strife for change is extremely weak.

Coercive potential, however, can contain conflict, but cannot obviate it in the long run. The rigid defence of the system of social relationships based on exploitation place increasing emphasis on coercion and increasingly limit the functional alternatives for conflict resolution. The stereotyping of strife action also stereotypes official response and makes coercion an unstable mechanism for controlling strife.

"Presumably over the long period of contact, well-tested techniques for the handling of Africans have crystallized into traditions and rituals of domination, to which the single-minded application of the doctrine of apartheid lends a sacred rigidity ... An unconventional gambit, the march of 30,000 African demonstrators on a central police station in Cape Town at the end of March 1960, almost transformed the pattern of South African race relations".(70)

Given the nature of deprivation in South Africa, events would tend to indicate that the intensification of repressive techniques and laws tends to escalate conflict. The harsh nature of Nationalist rule did not quell African demands; rather they were intensified and conflict actions escalated. This in turn led to increased use of the coercive mechanism. By 1964, internal dissension had largely been silenced, though external preparation

for guerrilla warfare was underway. Internally, the cost of sanctions had proved too high, and the cost of compliance too low for conflict to continue. But the cost of this was that the regime was now almost totally dependent on the coercive mechanism for the maintenance of order.

An "armed peace" is an extremely unstable method of control. It depends not only on the maintenance of a precarious organizational or institutional capability, but also on a stability in the objective social conditions of the conflict participants. This makes it an extremely unstable mechanism for conflict resolution in the long term. The South African government was forced, during the forties and fifties, as conflict escalated and coercive techniques increased in vigour, to seek some other mechanism of conflict resolution.

CONFLICT EXTERNALIZATION

The claims put forward from within the common society were strongly resisted by the government. To accept the common society meant to abandon privilege. The extension of citizenship rights to black South Africans would erode and destroy the pattern of exploitative social relationships which had been created by the whites over three centuries. To maintain privilege, segregation, the denial of the common society, had to be defended at all costs. The basic principle was expressed and established by the Stallard Commission of 1922 which held that the African "should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the

white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister"⁷¹. This view was incorporated in the Hertzog Acts of 1936. But the African who came to minister remained to minister. He and his family became part of the urban environment and it of him. The vast influx during the war, with its accompanying proliferation of shanty towns on the edge of the white cities, aroused genuine alarm among whites that there was a "swart gevaar" and a danger of "swamping". The word "apartheid" was coined in 1943 as a principle for the survival of white hegemony.

The Smuts government appointed the Fagan Commission to re-examine the segregation principle in the light of the vast urban African population. The Fagan Report in fact denied the validity of the Stallard dictum. In so doing, it essentially declared the policy of keeping Africans confined to reserves to be no longer founded in reality or possibility.⁷²

The Nationalist Party rejected the Fagan findings. The report was never implemented because, in the same year, 1948, Malan became premier of an administration pledging a still undefined policy of "apartheid".

The first decade of the apartheid policy revealed that little more was conceived of it than as a more rigid and intolerant version of the traditional segregation policy. But the viciousness of the new application and its intolerance of opposition increased the intensity of conflict far beyond the level known in the Smuts' days, as we have seen. The escalation of conflict increasingly left the government with fewer and fewer functional alternatives for conflict resolution; finally only coercion remained. In sum

"South Africa's malaise stems from the impact of an advanced industrialism on an obsolete, degenerate colonial order. Stress and conflict are symptoms of an inner disharmony. Contradictions or antagonisms occur between the society's structure and super-structure, between the dynamic potential of a multi-racial labour force and the strait-jacket of racially segregated institutions; between the dominant collective role of Africans in the economy and their exclusion from the centres of power.... Some four million whites combine the privileges of a colonial autocracy with the technology and amenities of the machine age and employ coercive measures to keep fifteen million Africans, Coloured and Indians in permanent subordination".(73)

The policy which suggested itself to the Nationalist government in South Africa, such as to retain the pattern of privilege enjoyed by the whites, while diverting African political demands, was the Bantustan strategy. By setting up the reserves as future independent homelands for the Africans, the intention was to shift their political aspirations from the common society to the fragmented tribal environment. The major aspect of the strategy is the expulsion of economic and political demands from the centres of white affluence. It is a strategy of conflict externalization.

The policy was articulated by the Nationalist Party throughout the fifties. But it remained largely undefined. Definition came concomitantly with the escalation of conflict internally and the increasing external attention which vociferous anti-colonial sentiments gave to the repressive aspects of apartheid. By promising a distant independence in "homelands" (a revamped version of the Reserves) which were claimed to be the historically determined areas of original black presence in South Africa⁷⁴ it was hoped that black political aspirations would be directed away from the cities, and that Western opinion would be satisfied that the system rests

on a moral basis which envisages more for the African than naked exploitation.

In 1948, Dr. Malan denied that apartheid would ever mean the total "return" of all urban Africans to the reserves; this was a caricature of the policy.⁷⁵ When Strijdom succeeded as Premier, he stated that total territorial separation was an ideal but one that would not be achieved since whites required African labour.⁷⁶ This remains the basis of Nationalist policy today. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M. C. Botha, said in 1968, that the future of all the black and white "nations" of South Africa lay in

"interdependence - mutual dependence of one nation upon another. This pattern of interdependence upon one another is the only pattern which can ensure a peaceful coexistence in South Africa for the entire constellation of nations.... We, as whites, admit that we are dependent on the non-white nations... for their labour, and they are in turn dependent upon us for all kinds of labour requiring more expertise".(77)

The basic nature of labour exploitation is thus to be retained.

Politically, the system seeks to return power over Africans to the traditional sector which, by definition, does not seek equality in the common society. The traditional sphere of African life is now restored in the face of eighty years of integration. South Africa, we are told, is a pluralist society, in which

"the various Bantu peoples are in fact separate and distinctly different ethnic units which have temporarily and partially become enmeshed with the white South African community, but which should be allowed to evolve into separate nations within the confines of their own geo-politically demarcated homelands"(78)

There is absolutely no possibility, said Mr. Botha, of considering these

separate nations as able to become equal, and hence no opportunities for this should be created.⁷⁹

The evolution of the Bantustan or separate development policy is seen as stemming from the dangers of economic integration, the subsequent "emerging political consciousness of the Bantu", and the "determination of the whites not to allow the political development of the Bantu to take place at the cost of their own survival".⁸⁰ Rhoodie distinguishes several "motives" for separate development. There are political and constitutional motives, which derive from the fear of whites that their interests will be destroyed by black domination, and the need to cater for "the political upliftment and emancipation" of the African.⁸¹ There is the need to prevent economic integration, which is seen as the basis of the present political conflict.⁸² This verbose rationalization of the conflict of interests in South Africa is depicted as a compromise, through separate development, between two nationalisms which are conceived of as socio-cultural and racial in content.

The strategy for the preservation of white domination is thus dignified as a moral quest to preserve different and distinct cultures and allow them full scope for self-fulfilment, within the confines of economic interdependence. Unlike the whites, it would seem Africans must be divided into eight separate nations. As conflict has escalated, so too has the sense of moral purpose become more sharply defined. In 1951, during the debate on the Bantu Authorities Act, which shifted power to the chiefs in rural local government, Dr. Verwoerd denounced opposition claims that he would hand over independence to the homelands: The United Party, he said had

tried to create the impression that

"I had announced the forming of an independent Native State ... a sort of Bantustan with its own leader ... that is not the policy of the party. It has never been that, and no leader has ever said it, and most certainly I have not. "The Senator wants to know whether the series of self-governing areas will be sovereign. The answer is obvious. How could small scattered states arise? We cannot mean that we intend by that to cut large slices out of South Africa and turn them into independent states".(83)

By 1959, during the debate on the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill, Verwoerd was speaking of the moral necessity of African self-government as an alternative to a voice in the central government from where they would challenge white interests.⁸⁴ In 1961, Verwoerd told Parliament that the Bantustans could develop into independent black states:

"This is not what we would have preferred to see. This is a form of fragmentation which we would rather not have had if it was within our control to avoid it... In the light of the Forces to which South Africa is being subjected, there is, however, no doubt as to what must be done in the course of time".(85)

In 1962, in the wake of the 1960 revolt in the Transkei and the Sharpeville crisis, and at the height of the sabotage campaigns, Verwoerd announced the grant of self-government to the Transkei:

"... the full franchise ... although separated from that of the whites" was to be given to Transkei Africans. He declared that "Bantu agitators" and their organizations, the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress, "who ask for one man, one vote and for black domination" would not be satisfied; but he felt that the government's policy would enable the Western nations to reply to the Afro-Asians: "No. Here we have a method which does not violate international Morality and international demands".(86)

It seems conclusive that the full implementation of separate develop-

ment has been responsive mainly to internal conflict and external pressure. Morality has followed conflict.

The colonial nature of the society has required decolonization. But in South Africa, colony and metropolis coincide territorially. To dismantle the colony would mean dismantling the metropolitan centre.⁸⁷

A set of domestic colonies has had to be created and are to be progressively "liberated" as they become "ready". At the same time the exploitative relationship between the races, in which labour skills are to be "exchanged", is to be retained through "interdependence". Migratory labour and financial control will form the neo-colonial arms of white policy.

The strategy is based on the fact that South Africa is still a society in transition. Different social structures coexist within her borders. The urban, industrial society which occupies forty per cent of the population is the centre of the conflict system. It is a society in which black and white hold similar values but in which white privilege denies equality to Africans. A subsistence economy, (found in the overcrowded, badly eroded Reserves, which house another third of the population) is the basis of the separate development strategy. It is a society conspicuous for the absence of young men who form the labour force in the urban areas; it is overstocked, peopled by the aged, the very young and women, devoid of any meaningful resources or infrastructure. The subsistence sector is also virtually devoid of racial interaction; whites thus do not feel threatened by it.

It is the middle class on which the greatest pressure has up to date been placed to leave the towns; businessmen are losing their trade licences, lawyers are being endorsed out, and political prisoners are exiled to the reserves when their sentences expire. By forcing the African middle class out of the urban areas and into the reserves, the policy hopes that conflict will be diverted from its racial pattern to one inside black society. And if white-black friction continues, the claim from within the common society can be legally terminated, by the granting of an economically meaningless independence allowing recalcitrants to be banished to a remote rural "state".⁸⁸

The chiefs are to become the buffer class between white and black. Somehow (although the process has not been clarified) they are to operate in a reconstructed society incorporating the black bourgeoisie, a proletariat commuting to work in industries on the borders of the reserves, and an increasingly landless peasantry. The "white areas" are to lose their black bourgeoisie and retain only the African labourer, more or less skilled, always separated in terms of job categories from his white counterparts, and forced to live an urban life of artificial bachelorhood.

Bantustans form the most dramatic element in the policy of apartheid or separate development. But they are a part of an intricate web of strategies, all of which are organically essential for the implementation of the policy. The pillars on which apartheid rests can be artificially demarcated for analytical purposes. They include:

i) The Repressive Mechanism.

A structure of legislation regulating all aspects of contact between the races, from economic to sexual, and most aspects of African life in the "white areas" including the right to be physically present there at all and the right to enjoy a family life. We have already examined the role of coercion in the pattern of conflict; it must merely be added that this mechanism extends to the Transkei as well, with the opposition harrassed by the powers which Proclamations 400 and 413 vest in the chiefs and police. (See Appendix I).

ii) The Exploitation of Labour.

The African urban population of South Africa was 1.8 million in 1946; despite influx control it is some 4.0 million today and is estimated to be a minimum of 6 million by 2000.⁸⁹ It is this urban worker who provides the cheap manpower needed for white affluence and poses the major threat to that privilege. Since the policy of apartheid cannot keep Africans out of the towns, it seeks to exploit them by making them foreigners earning low wages.

"African productivity in the mining industry has practically doubled with the use of migrant labour force whose cash wages have not increased for half a century. It is the government's belief that similar results can be achieved in the sphere of industry".(90)

This claim has been officially substantiated by Mr. Sampie Froneman, then Deputy Minister for Bantu Administration:

"We are trying to introduce the migratory labour pattern as far as possible in every sphere, that is in fact the entire basis of our policy as far as the white economy is concerned ..."(91)

The Minister, Mr. M. C. Botha, elaborated this:

"We know that those Bantu present in the white areas are, in terms of our policy, present here for a limited, clearly defined, statutorily laid down purpose - those restrictions imposed upon them here ... are imposed just for one reason and that is because we regard them as being present in another man's country".(92)

If the mine policy of recruiting foreign Africans is to be applied to the indigenous population (there were more than a million foreigners in 1962⁹³) apartheid becomes a psychological, legal and political exercise, rather than an economic one. We must thus seek to understand its motives not in terms of economic feasibility but of political manipulation. The economy is not to suffer strains greater than those of "decentralization"; indeed, it is to perpetuate labour exploitation. Mr. Botha has said:

"Bantu persons can be in the white areas solely for their labour ... There is a wall, a roof, and one cannot get past that ... Nor do we wish to conceal it. The Bantu cannot strive to the top on an equal footing with the whites ... In their homelands there are measureless and limitless opportunities for them, and there you, ... and I, as whites, are in our turn restricted. That is the morality of our policy ..."(94)

To this end an array of legislation seeks to make the African an alien in the white owned parts of the country. The Bantu (urban areas) Act forbids an African to stay in an urban area more than 72 hours unless he fulfils certain conditions to prove that he is employed. An amendment in 1969 ended the right of Africans to acquire the prescriptive tenure of the Act. Legislation is pending to remove all such rights from all Africans.

The Bantu Laws Amendment Act allows a labour bureau to refuse to grant or renew or to cancel any labour contract involving Africans, and to remove unemployed, "idle or undesirable" Africans from any area. And the Physical Planning And Utilization of Resources Act of 1967, aimed at re-locating industry, can refuse to sanction any new factory or extension of a factory in 32 magisterial districts, if these involve additional African labour. These districts cover all established centres and have been an increasingly important weapon in moving industry to the border areas.

Labour remains extremely cheap, Africans earning an average in Pretoria of between R32.10 and R52.95 per month for men, and R18.39 for women.⁹⁵ The mean monthly income of households is R61 as against an estimated poverty datum line need of R65.

"The establishment of Bantustans whatever the degree of independence, therefore, will not interfere with the availability of African labour in white South Africa. In fact, Bantustans turn out on examination to be no more than a device for perpetuating the supply of African labour on the cheapest and safest possible terms to white South Africa".(96)

iii) The Border Industries.

The heavy concentration of South Africa's industrial growth in four main areas of the country creates certain economies of location. But it also makes the political vulnerability of the whites more sharply focused, intensifying the interaction of the races within a common economy. Accordingly, a major aspect of the policy of separation entails the decentralization of industry. But this is being done in a specific manner - on the borders of the Reserves. The proportion of Africans in the border

industries will be allowed to increase greatly while that of the urban areas will be rigidly decreased. And Africans will be housed within the Reserves, commuting as citizens of "other countries" to work each day. Economic integration is thus to be perpetuated in geographic areas where political separation is possible.⁹⁷ The rapid expansion of the economy in the last five years has placed great strains on the white ability to provide the skilled workers which are their monopoly. In the border industries, Africans will be allowed into more skilled jobs, provided that there is no mixing within any job category and whites are not employed in jobs which have African superiors or supervisors. Apartheid will thus allow Africans to rise to higher job categories provided they never operate at equal levels with whites; economic growth, for many the ultimate answer to apartheid, will thus not be allowed to redefine the status relations between the races and whites will remain a labour aristocracy. Indeed, economic growth provides the resources and means to perpetuate white hegemony.⁹⁸

The scheme requires large injections of government investment to create a necessary infrastructure for industry. But its ultimate success depends on the willingness of white entrepreneurs to locate their new factories in these border areas. This readiness has not been forthcoming and the government has resorted to carrot-and-stick measures to induce the move to the borders. A tariff of border area concessions has been created. Business in the border areas is offered state provision of basic services, assistance in the acquisition of land and in building and "wage differentiation" allowing them to pay Africans still less than in the urban areas.⁹⁹

At the end of 1969, other lures were added.¹⁰⁰

As this set of concessions has not created sufficient enthusiasm, the government has used the stick through the powers granted the Ministry of Planning under the Planning Act. Coloureds and Indians living on the Bantustan borders, in their "own Group Areas", have also been asked to establish border industries using black labour and their own skills, provided no whites were employed.¹⁰¹ In addition, in 1969 that "agents" canvassed businessmen in the Reef areas to move to the borders.¹⁰² The agents, Border Areas Consultants, announced that 50 factories would probably move to the borders.¹⁰³

The net result of all this has been an increasingly significant shift of firms to such regions. An early example (1967) was a new pulp-mill for Anglo-American on the Transkei border with Natal. Subsequent migrations have shown less correlation with economies of location; they include 65 enterprises moving in 1969 and the announcement that hundreds more would follow in 1970.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, the high cost of creating an infrastructure, the fact that the policy has only long term significance, and the fact that in the meantime the shortage of skilled workers (which Africans are generally debarred from becoming) creates severe difficulties for urban industrialists while imposing heavy inflationary pressures on the economy as a whole, has made numerous industrialists attack the policy, for manipulating market forces in a dangerous way.¹⁰⁵ These attacks have tended to obscure the exploitative nature of border industry development.

Africans will be forced to subsidise the venture through low wages and longer working hours. Based on the rationalization that the African will be living at home, and hence his native standard of living will operate, he is to be paid less than 75% of his urban wage.¹⁰⁶

The border development makes attempts to develop the homelands through invested African earnings (one of the Verwoerd claims in over-ruling the Tomlinson recommendations against the scheme) still more improbable. Since the Reserves are economically unattractive, it would be difficult enough to attract white capital there; but the creation of an industrial infrastructure on their borders makes the idea seem even more remote.¹⁰⁷

The policy thus makes no attempt to restructure the social relationships between the races; it is founded on the perpetuation of the exploitation of land and labour by the whites.

iv) Influx Control and Resettlement.

In the late sixties, the Africans became the new settlers of South Africa, by government order. They are being uprooted from the towns and from rural areas deemed to be white, and dumped into "resettlement townships" in the Reserves. The exact dimensions of the operation are difficult to determine because government pronouncements vary so greatly. Probably some 200,000 Africans have been removed from the towns since 1964.¹⁰⁸

Who is affected? The Bantu (Urban Areas) act allows for removals of people deemed "idle" (including the unemployed) and "undesirable". Mr. Froneman has said that of the six million Africans in the "white areas" in 1968, only two million are actually employed; the rest will have to leave.¹⁰⁹ A departmental circular to all officials, circulated in December 1967, states

that

"... the resettlement in the homelands of thousands of superfluous Bantu families ... must enjoy the highest priority".⁽¹¹⁰⁾

The circular defined the "unproductive" as

"the aged, the unfit, widows, women with dependent children, and families who did not qualify for family accommodation in the urban areas"

even if they were "productive". In November 1967, Mr. Blaar Coetzee, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration at the time, affirmed that African businessmen, industrialists, lawyers, doctors and other professional men were also to be "repatriated" once opportunities were available for them.¹¹¹ Any woman deserted by her husband or suddenly widowed, becomes eligible for resettlement.¹¹² Africans convicted under laws directed against strikers, demonstrations, assemblies, passive resistance, membership of political organizations and sabotage, are resettled on the expiry of their sentences. Families must go with them and some have even been removed when sentence was passed.¹¹³

While widows and children form the bulk of the victims of the policy, they are increasingly being joined by the African middle class. In particular, African businessmen are being forced to leave the townships and begin shopkeeping in the Reserves.¹¹⁴

So eager is the government to remove those people whom they deem to be surplus to labour needs, that transit camps have been created outside the towns, to which people are moved until a resettlement area is made available to them. The Prisons Department has acquired farm prisons for use as transit camps on the borders of the reserves.¹¹⁵

On the resettlement camps themselves, a great deal of press and other documentation is available.¹¹⁶ It is sufficient to say that most constitute merely barren tracts of land devoid of social services and buildings, and are sometimes incapable of supporting life. Reports of deaths through starvation, gastro-enteritis and tuberculosis have emerged from several, especially (and most authoritatively substantiated) from Limehill and Morsgat camps.

The brutality of the enterprise is perhaps not surprising when one notes the terminology employed to describe the victims of resettlement. Mr. L. C. Koch, director of Bantu Affairs in the Eastern Cape, speaks of removing

"people who are no longer productive - like old people, incapacitated people - who can no longer contribute to the labour market";

Mr. Botha speaks of "labour units"; and Mr. Froneman of "superfluous appendages". The policy is best summarised by its grossest advocate, Mr. Froneman:

"We resettle elderly people. If they do nothing in the white homeland, they may just as well do nothing in the Bantu homeland ... There are many Bantu children who do nothing. They simply stay with their mother or with their grandmother or whoever it may be, They do no work at all. Then they may as well go and stay in their homelands and do nothing ..."(117)

The policy shows that there is no attempt to divest white South Africa of its labour force. Resettlement is for every African who does not work for a white man. Those who are prepared to give their labour are still being recruited. Indeed, figures indicate that Africans are recruited in the Reserves on labour contracts by government labour bureaux and private recruiting organizations, at an ever increasing rate. The figure for the

Transkei in 1964 was 92,288, but rose to 109,000 in 1965 and 120,000 in 1967.¹¹⁸ The difference is that now the worker must leave the town when his contract expires and re-register when he returns to the Reserves. The fact that Africans are kept to low skilled positions makes the cost of retraining not much higher than it ever was. Skilled positions will be confined to the settled, commuter populations serving the border industries. African workers have been placed on a carousel, travelling backwards and forwards between town and Reserve. The entire operation is an exercise in creating insecurity to destroy African urban vested interests.

v) Bantu Education.

By differentiating African education from that of whites and other races, in the 1954 Bantu Education Act, Dr. Verwoerd made no attempt to conceal that Africans would be taught "from childhood to realise that equality with Europeans is not for them ..." and that they had no place within the common society "above the level of certain forms of labour ..."¹¹⁹ "The school must equip him to meet the demands which the economic life of South Africa will impose on him ..."¹²⁰ Not only does South Africa differentiate education racially, but the teaching of vernacular through the mother-tongue principle (English and/or Afrikaans only enter the educational curriculum at secondary level and as second languages) ensures that Africans remain, or rather become, tribally segmented. Bantu Education thus is at the heart of the attempt to return Africans to the state of tribal division which they suffered during the period of colonization, and has come to symbolise the status of deprivation in which they live.

In taking education out of the hands of the mission system, the government claims that it has vastly extended educational facilities for Africans, and that 80% of children of school-going age are now at school, compared with only 67% in Ghana, 52% in Kenya and 56% in Swaziland.¹²¹ They hold that school-children have increased as a percentage of the total African population from 10% in 1954 to 15% in 1965 and that the number of teachers has increased by 50% in that period.¹²²

But an examination of the figures, viewed from the aspect of African needs and white educational facilities, reveals another side to this picture. African schools are overcrowded; 97% of their pupils are in primary classes; teachers are mostly unqualified; 50% of pupils never go beyond Standard II; the secondary school population actually fell from 3.47% in 1954 to 3.02% in 1963; and only 0.5% of the Sub A enrolment in 1951 reached Standard 10 in 1963.¹²³ The number of pupils completing University degrees has fallen.¹²⁴ An average figure of 25,000 white students matriculated annually in the mid sixties, compared with some 850 blacks, representing 15.39% of the total white population at school, as against 0.13% for the blacks. The annual expenditure on white school-children per annum was some R150 as against R14 for Africans.¹²⁵

vi) The Bantustans themselves.

The Tomlinson Commission Report, from which a government White Paper was published in 1956, is the theoretical blueprint of the Bantustan policy. Its recommendations are to be found in virtually every contemporary study of the Republic and have been summarised.¹²⁶ The Commission was basically mandated

to refute the Fagan Report and propose a blue print for apartheid. It recommended the spending of R208 million over the ten years to 1966. It advocated the use of white capital to develop the reserves to make them viable, the removal of people from the land to fill a new urban economy in these areas, the creation of freehold title for property and the creation of 50,000 new Bantustan jobs a year over the next 25 years to 1981. There has been detailed criticism of the government's failure to implement these proposals and its decision to spend only a third of the proposed amount. Fewer than 50,000 jobs in all have been created in 12 years.

This failure has led to accusations of dishonesty on the part of the government and the Tomlinson Report has become the basis of arguments that the Bantustans are not feasible.¹²⁷ It is here contended that it was never the intention to implement the report. Assuming that its recommendations would have made the Bantustans viable economically (which they would not since Tomlinson underestimated the future black population of South Africa by some 10 million¹²⁸) the entire pattern of white privilege which the policy aims to preserve, would have disintegrated with the absence of cheap labour. It is significant that the very proposals in the report which aimed at economic viability for the Reserves (white capital investment and massive job creation through government spending) were rejected by Dr. Verwoerd (on the grounds that they would perpetuate white exploitation). The proposals accepted, (border industries and agrarian reform) perpetuate both the economic stagnation of the reserves and the white monopoly of wealth. Indeed agrarian reform, by removing people from the land, frees a larger

proportion of the population for proletarian duty. Since border industries pay less for higher skills, the white control of wealth and cheap labour resources is refined and intensified. The significance of the Tomlinson Report does not lie so much in the divergence between government spending and its recommendations, as in the nature of the policies rejected and accepted. Apartheid aims to retain white control of land, resources and cheap indigenous labour; it is the conflict (actual and, more especially, potential) that it seeks to expel, not the African. Impoverished Bantustans (and population pressures will ensure their poverty regardless of the level of investment the government can inject) acting as labour reservoirs, border industries retaining white control of industry and depressing African wages while exploiting their labour aptitude still further, and the "influx carousel" increasing African insecurity by destroying their urban vested interests and family life while confining aspirations, by force, to the homelands, is the basis and hope of the policy.

"Direct externally initiated military intervention excluded, the economic integration of the Bantu forms probably the only rock on which the policy of separate development can founder.

"Government spokesmen contend that the 'presence' of Bantu workers in white South Africa does not amount to economic integration as the utilisation of Bantu labour is meticulously restricted and defined, and systematically regulated and determined by white interests".(129)

Hence the urban African is being forcibly fitted to the controls implied by the Stallard dictum. The Nationalist government sees the policy as the "only hope" for "white survival" and the prevention of an integration already well advanced. What political aspirations the black man seeks to express

must be formulated in the context of the Bantustans.

Presiding over this massive exercise in control and reorientation is the Ministry of Bantu Administration and Development. Its continually expanding jurisdiction over African society is possibly the clearest indicator of the colonial nature of the society and of the policy. The Ministry controls African education, welfare, labour recruitment, housing, welfare, community development, agriculture, physical mobility and job opportunities. Since the beginning of 1970, African health has also been appropriated. The financial management and development of the Bantustans, their administration and local courts and their chiefs are also the province of this Ministry. The Cabinet portfolios such as health, welfare, labour and social services, confine their activities largely to whites. The majority of the population are the responsibility of one Minister. The major ideologues of the policy of separate development - Eiselen, Verwoerd, De Wet Nel, Froneman, Koornhof and Botha - are products of this Ministry. It is also served by ancillary or complementary administrative departments. The police enforce the pass regulations, magistrates serve as Native (now Bantu) Commissioners, and the powerful Ministry of Planning pressurises white business to conform with the needs of conflict externalization and the preservation of the exploitative pattern of social relations.

Governments, by definition, are committed to the preservation of the status quo which maintains them in power or presents them with an opportunity for power. They do not indulge in structural changes, unless such changes will entrench their power. In seeking to preserve "white integrity",

South Africa's government is committed to the preservation of its social structure. To criticise it for failing to make Bantustans economically viable, is to condemn it for failing to precipitate the structural social and economic changes which would destroy the colonial pattern of caste privileges on which its power rests. Die Burger comments:

"The Bantu people are no exception to the rule that a people, sooner or later, want to be completely free. Either they become progressively free in the homelands, or they will try to become it in the whole of South Africa, which will mean never-ending racial strife.

"The white man will not surrender his own freedom. He will not permit any erosion of his self-determination. Political parties which refuse to recognise this, which are helping to direct black ambitions to Pretoria and Cape Town, and think they can contain them by means of veto powers and constitutional guarantees, are sowing the dragons teeth of a race war".(130)

The policy of arbitrarily fashioning colonies to be divorced from the metropolis, has many pitfalls - not least the physical survival of a vast African urban proletariat. Whether or not the forcible reduction of this population to a condition of permanent migrancy can succeed, is an essay in guesswork and beyond our scope. But another hazard presents itself: if Bantustans can be created with growing African acceptance of political separatism as a goal, conflict can still only be "externalised" if the basic ends of Pretoria and the Bantustans dovetail. If black apartheid articulates demands inimical to the preservation of white exploitation, new lines of conflict will emerge. And if, in addition, these demands become involved with conditions within urban, or metropolitan, South Africa, the old conflict lines will persist, complicated by the new ones. It is with

these questions that we are now concerned in the attempt to establish our third hypothesis that new patterns and symbols of conflict are emerging in the Transkei, as a result of the dualism existing between the attempt to externalise conflict on the one hand, and to retain white privilege, on the other.

The new patterns of conflict will be examined through attitudes expressed in the Transkei. Only if they appear to show that conflict articulation is confined to (i) non-realistic conflict (seeking tension release rather than the achievement of desired African ends) and (ii) demands which do not challenge white privilege, will we be able to say that externalization may succeed.

CHAPTER II

THE ISSUES EMERGE - THE POLITICAL DEBATE

IN THE TRANSKEI: 1963 - 1968

The life of the first Transkei Legislative Assembly during the five years which followed the creation of the Transkei "homeland", under the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963, was characterised by the gradual emergence and definition of a political debate between the Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP) supporting apartheid, and the Transkei Democratic Party (DP), espousing multi-racial equality in a unified South Africa, aimed at resolving the ambiguities inherent in the operation of a separate political entity within an economically and culturally integrative social situation. Understandably, this debate began somewhat tentatively, concerning itself with the future role of various African social classes within the Transkeian framework and with a rather general discussion of the efficiency of separate development as a policy. Africans in the Transkei Legislative Assembly, in the wake of the government's liquidation of the national organizations of opposition, were forced to return to a debate on the nature of African objectives in the racial conflict in South Africa, on the relative merits of integration and separation - in fact to a debate which had lost much of its meaning during the years of industrialization and the forging

of the common society in which many Transkeians had shared, through migration.

As if, however, to illustrate that the common society would no longer allow a return to the tribal exclusivism of the nineteenth century, this tentative argument rapidly extended itself, during these five years, to include major elements of the apartheid edifice. Thus a range of policies applied at the national level by the white government forced their way into TLA debates; in the case of two of these, tactics rather than ideology divided the advocates of separatism from those of integration. The integrated nature of the economy made it difficult for TLA members to ignore issues which affected their own constituents in the white owned areas of the country. Increasingly, the issues between Africans were translated into an articulation of grievances against the white government in Pretoria. Externalization appeared decreasingly viable as a strategy of conflict resolution. The Transkei had never found it easy to remain aloof from events affecting the country as a whole, even though successive South African governments had always applied a slightly separate form of local administration to it. After its annexation in 1894, the Transkeian Territories General Council had been created for the four districts of Butterworth, Idutywa, Nqamakwe and Tsomo. In 1931, the TTGC had expanded into a United Transkeian Territories General Council (called the Bunga) incorporating the whole Transkei. The Bunga had comprised the 26 white magistrates who administered the 26 magisterial districts of the Transkei, three African councillors from each district and the four Paramount Chiefs.

It had enjoyed purely advisory powers on minor local matters and had not been permitted to discuss national affairs. Nonetheless, the Bunga had refused, during its life from 1931 to 1956, to confine itself to matters relating to cattle dipping, minor roads and markets. It had stubbornly condemned the Hertzog Acts, which deprived Cape Africans of the qualified common role franchise, and had continued to press for an extension of the franchise for Africans until 1952. It had also made intermittent requests for Africans in the Transkei to be accorded the same privileges as whites in the area, including an abolition of the pass laws. Members had also concerned themselves with the composition of the Natives Representative Council, arguing that it degraded the position of chiefs to sit on that body and be forced into debate with commoners. Members had pressed for the preservation of the traditional role of the chiefs while the magistrates resisted demands that the judicial role under customary law be restored. The consistency of the Bunga's opposition to the removal of the common role franchise and to the devaluation of the status of chieftainship was illustrated by the Bunga's refusal to adopt a resolution regretting the abolition of the NRC in 1949. But, despite this concern, the Bunga remained largely oblivious of urban based political movements. It hardly ever mentioned the ANC and, indeed, only two major references to political organizations are found in its records: a general condemnation of a messianic movement in 1925, and the failure of the African councillors to respond to a call by the Chief Magistrate, in 1941, to check the formation of semi-political societies in the Transkei.¹

It is in fact surprising that there was not a greater interest in the national scene evidenced in the debates of the Bunga. While the ANC had not been a major presence in the area, Kadalie had succeeded in forming a fairly active ICU branch there for a time, while the Communist Party's Sidney Bunting had contested the Tembuland constituency under the qualified franchise in 1929². The passive nature of politics in the Transkei can perhaps be attributed to a combination of magisterial control over debates in the Bunga, the conservatism of the Transkeian elite, both traditional and mission-educated modern, and the efficiency of the coercive mechanism which Bunting had experienced.

In 1951, the Nationalist government passed the Bantu Authorities Act. The administration of the Transkei shifted from the direct rule of the magistrates to an indirect administration in which chiefs implemented government policy at the district level. Nevertheless, the Bunga refused to accept the change, preventing the implementation of a Territorial Authority (the basic unit of Bantustan creation) until 1956. However, by 1955, the Bunga was prepared to agree with Chief D. D. P. Ndamase of Nyanda, that the Territorial Authority should be accepted as a form of local self-government which might eventually lead to direct representation in the central Parliament.³ Bantu Authorities were accepted by the Bunga as "a limited opportunity for self-help"⁴, and in 1956 the Transkei Territorial Authority replaced the Bunga, with Chief Kaiser Matanzima, a government supporter, as its presiding officer.

The Bantu Authorities system restored to the chiefs certain customary

powers of administration; but it also gave them a new role as local bureaucrats undertaking government business. Many of these new powers centred on the implementation of land and stock improvement policies, as recommended by the Eiselen and Tomlinson Commissions. In an already overpopulated rural slum, policies aimed at fencing scarce land and destocking scarce cattle, are always likely to meet a violent response from the peasantry. That it was implemented by a traditional aristocracy flexing its new muscles, extorting fines in local courts, manipulating land allocation for personal advantage, imposing government land rehabilitation and generally distorting traditional economic and social relations in the name of traditional autocracy, made such violence inevitable. The first warnings of impending violence came with peasant jacqueries, in Zeerust and Sekhukhuneland, and in Zululand. The delay in implementing Bantu Authorities in the Transkei until 1956, delayed the outburst there until 1959. By 1960, a full scale mass revolt was however underway in Eastern Pondoland.⁵ The Paramount Chief in the area, Botha Sigcau, one of the most corrupt members of the Transkeian traditional aristocracy, was forced to flee; collaborators, a few chiefs and some headmen were killed. The people spontaneously organised themselves under district committees hidden in the mountains and thus known as the Mountain Committees. Units of the South African army and police were ordered in to quell the revolt as the unrest spread to the south and west of the Transkei. By 1961, the military, armed with emergency powers, had largely silenced the protest, and the Pondoland chiefs had begun a reign of terror in reprisal.⁶

The revolt coincided with the peak of the urban protest. The flight of capital from South Africa, international condemnation, and the difficulty experienced in coping with conflict diverging from normal stereotypes of mass action, forced the government to speed up the somewhat vague plans for conflict externalization which were embodied in the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 and which the TTA had accepted. The government was joined in its haste by the chiefs in the Transkei, still contending with sporadic sabotage, assassination and destruction of public property:

"On November 10, 1961, Chief Tutor Ndamase, son of Paramount Chief Victor Poto of Western Pondoland, said publicly to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, 'We want self-government for the Transkei by the end of 1963, and complete independence as soon as possible after that'. He did not make this statement, he said, because of letters from white agitators urging independence as the Minister had suggested; the only letters he had seen were from Pondos threatening him with death if he continued to collaborate".(7)

In January 1962, a Recess Committee of the TTA, which had been set up nine months earlier but had never met, sat down to examine the "implications" of self-government. Its chairman, Matanzima, drafted a constitution which rejected multi-racialism and gave the chiefs a predominant role in legislative power.⁸ After much angry debate over the role chiefs would play in the legislature, with Matanzima opposed by two Paramount Chiefs, Sabata Dalindyebo and Victor Poto, over the number of commoners to sit in the TLA, and over the racial complexion of the Transkei, and after several interventions by Verwoerd and De Wet Nel, the Transkei Constitution Act was passed in 1963, giving the Transkei severely limited jurisdiction over

largely local matters, retaining meaningful powers in the hands of the Republican government, and allocating 64 ex officio seats in the TLA to the chiefs and Paramount Chiefs, and 45 for election by universal suffrage. (See Appendix II on traditional and political personalities in the Transkei). The 1963 Transkei general election has been fully documented elsewhere and we need go no further than a few pertinent observations.⁹ Of the registered voters, some 78.4% of those living in the Transkei voted, while only 47.4% of those living outside the area who registered, went to the polls. It is estimated that some 54% of all those eligible to register did so, the comparable figure for those living outside the Transkei being only 26%.¹⁰ Africans living outside the Transkei are believed to have avoided registration in case this should endanger their rights to remain in the urban areas. The voting figures indicate that there were no major divergences between voting patterns inside and outside the Transkei,¹¹ but one must add that those who voted in the towns are most likely to have the freshest links with the Transkei, while those abstaining would be most likely to have little knowledge or recollection of the area and to regard the elections as personally irrelevant. Further, the influence of the chiefs, who pressed people to vote, would be weakest in the urban areas, both physically and symbolically.

There was little electioneering, the area being still under close police control and fear being a major feature of the campaign. What campaigning there was, polarised around the contrasting personalities of Chief Kaiser Matanzima of Emigrant Tembuland and Paramount Chief Victor Poto of Nyanda.

Matanzima had been closely associated with the AAC during his studies at Fort Hare University College, but had never been a member. A Methodist Lay Preacher, he had married three wives by customary law, and then married by Christian rites, ceremoniously divorcing each in turn. Although the first two wives were thus no longer legally married to him, they were described as "more or less around". This strangely syncretic mixture was also reflected in his views: a fervent profession of separation as the only viable policy for South Africa, was linked to a fierce insistence that it was the right and duty of the chiefs to rule their subjects which earned him the support of most chiefs. But this insistence was based only on the most superficial traditionalism, demanding as it did the modern theatre of a legislative assembly, and a Transkeian state, for its fulfilment. Poto, who had been a member of the NRC, on the other hand, maintained the old Bunga argument that the dignity of the chiefs could only be preserved in the symbolic presence of an Upper House while commoners ruled. Poto also supported a multi-racial society, expressing the hope that the Transkei would remain part of South Africa where rights would be extended to all citizens. For this reason he had the support of most educated commoners. The debate about the nature of African aspirations was thus joined at the Transkei's inception, but while Matanzima treated Poto with a large measure of respect, the full impact of the ideological division was felt in the personal hatred between Matanzima and Poto's main ally, Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo of Tembuland. The animosity between these cousins, based on life styles, personal attitudes to the role of chieftaincy, and a dispute regarding the jurisdiction of the

Dalindyebo royal house over Matanzima's Emigrant Tembuland, was increased by Sabata's demands for an elected majority in the TLA and by his denunciations of Matanzima as a government stooge. The debate over Matanzima's true motives continues still among South African politicians and journalists; he has variously been called a stooge, an opportunist, and an African nationalist seeking a new method of escaping white exploitation. During the 1963 election, it could be said that he emerged as a confirmed racialist, a harsh ruler of his people, and a believer in the revival of the chief's role as leader of his people.

While political debate, such as it was, revolved around these personalities, no political parties existed. In fact, during the campaign one party actually was formed in Pondoland, but the police detained its leader and it ceased to function almost immediately. Nevertheless, rudimentary organisations supporting Poto or Matanzima appeared, canvassing lists of candidates pledged to support their respective policies. Despite police harrassment of a number of anti-apartheid candidates and a number of others campaigning independently on policies closely related to the issues of the 1960 Pondoland rebellion, the election passed quietly, with the largely illiterate voters handing the lists of candidates they preferred to electoral officers who filled in the ballots for them. Although it was difficult accurately to define the loyalties of the successful candidates, the election result showed an overwhelming defeat for the pro-Matanzima men. This was confirmed when Matanzima narrowly won the election for the Chief Minister by 54 votes to Poto's 49; only 12 elected members supported

Matanzima to 33 for Poto and it was the chiefs who ensured Matanzima's victory. Even so, there is evidence that the government took an undue interest in the election, with bribes being offered to several chiefs to support Matanzima.¹²

The election result was widely seen by observers in South Africa as a rejection by Africans of the Bantustan policy, of Kaiser Matanzima's position as its representative, and of the chiefs as a ruling group. It seems likely that the bitterness of the 1960 rebellion had not ended and therefore anyone seen as the ally of the white government would be unpopular. Apartheid had become the focus of African hatred in the reserves through the Bantu Authorities system as the 1960 revolt had shown. But one feels that it is less certain that the election displayed a rejection of the new role marked out for the chiefs by the government, than that it merely expressed disapproval of the chiefs actions during 1960. Certainly Professor Hammond-Tooke held that the erosion of traditional legitimacy had been the main factor expressed in the results.¹³ Noting that Bantu Authorities had changed the nature of administration from indirect to direct rule, and that the policy had placed powers in the hands of the chiefs which had traditionally been the province of the headmen, Hammond-Tooke claimed that the chieftainship, while remaining "a vital institution among South African Bantu tribal groups", had been suffering from the ambiguities of the mixture of modern and traditional roles which the Bantu Authorities system imposed upon it.¹⁴ The result was that

"magistrates are complaining that the system is not working, that authority meetings are badly attended, that there is opposition from the people, and that the traditional system of moots and courts is operating side by side with the new structure, instead of being integrated with it".(15)

Hammond-Tooke pointed to bribery demanded by the chiefs, especially in land allocation matters, to political schisms within groups and clans, to hatred of the Bantu Authorities system, debasement of the position of the headman, inter-tribal rivalries, the exclusion of the middle class from power, and the despotic (hence non-traditional) powers which the chiefs had been given, and used, as causes and symptoms of the breakdown.¹⁶ The result was, he suggested, to throw doubts on the institution of chieftainship as a basis for Transkeian local and central government, and to suggest

"that in four or five years time the institution of chieftainship will be anathema to the Bantu of the Transkei, at least as an organ of government, and already this is beginning to take place".(17)

Philip Mayer¹⁸ took a somewhat less pessimistic view. Noting that South Africa had evolved a modern elite of impressive size and sophistication, he found that in the Transkei, at least, this development had not "deglamourized the old-style tribal leaders" entirely.¹⁹ This was largely because the chiefs became a source of traditional pride after the white governments took over the appointment of headmen in 1894, because rural people continued to frown on urban values which challenged their traditional conservatism, and because the chiefs suffered official discouragement during the 60 years of indirect magisterial rule.²⁰ They thus retained a residue of respect when the government turned to them in 1951. Mayer agreed with Hammond-Tooke that the Bantustan system created a

paradoxical role for chiefs to play. On the one hand, they were and are seen by the peasants as able to satisfy the peasant desire for autonomy from the whites; on the other, the peasants feared that the system would turn the chiefs into "the yes-men of the European" and they would thus become despised.²¹ He quoted a schoolteacher as saying

"Traditionally the chiefs got cattle and other things from their own people. But now, since they are to receive salaries, they are too independent of us, so they will be the government's most active servants in oppressing us. A dog like its master".(22)

Nevertheless, despite resultant violence from the peasantry and Poqo against the traditional elite, Mayer saw the position of the chieftaincy as more fluid than did Hammond-Tooke. The 1963 election campaign was fought, said Mayer, on the images of good and bad chiefs. Bantu Authorities and the 1960 revolt thus proved a more valid factor than any blanket rejection of the chiefs per se. The older elite gathered around Matanzima as the advocate of a strong chieftainship and a dominant role for them in the Transkei government. The younger, modern rural elite (the modern urban elite, as we have seen, largely treated the election as irrelevant) gathered round Poto, "the good chief", the advocate of commoner government and a symbolic role for the chiefs.²³

The vast mass of voters certainly seem to have retained a strong allegiance to the preference of their chiefs, where the latter were regarded as "good" or where they were strong, and only seem to have strayed from the traditional preference where the chiefs had ceased to occupy strong elite status, or where they professed a neutralist position, or where they had incurred deep resentment during 1960. This is demon-

strated in the election of the Chief Minister in the TLA after the election; elected members from Nyanda (Poto's area) and Dalindyebo (Sabata's area) voted solidly for Poto, while those from Emigrant Tembuland (Matanzima's area) remained solidly in the camp of their chief. In the backward Gcaleka area, Mayer found that there was an easy victory for the powerful "palace group". In Qakeni, Botha Sigcau, the focus of most mass hostility during the 1960 revolt, refused to commit himself until after the election, and the elected commoners divided evenly. In Fingoland and Emboland, where the chiefs had ceased to occupy an elite status as chiefs, Mayer found that the elites split along age lines with the younger pro-Poto elements electing their candidates against the urging of the pro-Matanzima chiefs.²⁴ The divisions reflected those between the chiefs, and where a single region was divided, allegiance to the most popular chiefs was the general rule. Only where the chiefs had lost both power and status, as in Fingoland, was there a strong vote for their opponents. The vast majority of the educated members sat on the Poto benches, while the chiefs supporting Poto tended to be better educated than those supporting Matanzima, though none had the University background of the Matanzima brothers.²⁵ Ultimately the election appeared to have endorsed popular chiefs and protested against corrupt ones.

This conclusion is confirmed by a regional breakdown of party affiliation after the Poto faction had formed the Democratic Party in February 1964²⁶ and the Matanzima group had become the Transkei National Independence Party in April.²⁷ All the elected members in Dalindyebo followed their Paramount Chief and Mr. Knowledge Guzana (the "brains" behind the Poto

group) into the DP; the same pattern occurred in Poto's Nyanda region. This despite the defection of several lesser chiefs in these regions to Matanzima. The elected members in Matanzima's Emigrant Tembuland, and in Umzimkulu, followed their chiefs into the TNIP. In Fingoland, the weak chiefs divided two to one for the TNIP, but the elected members all joined the DP, while in Emboland, where the chiefs suffered from the same lack of status as in Fingoland, their fairly equal division between the parties was paralleled by the division between elected members. In Gcaleka, the senior Xhosa Paramount Chief, Zwelidumile Sigcau, joined the TNIP with all his chiefs, but was followed by only three of the eight elected members. This is explained by the fact that Sigcau had made little attempt to influence the result in his area and was, in any case, regarded as a usurper placed on the throne by the government. In Qakeni, only one elected member followed Botha Sigcau and his chiefs into the TNIP, but this region is, as we have seen, a special case, having been the centre of anger against the chiefs in 1960. Only in Maluti, did the chiefs and elected commoners diverge inexplicably, and even here a Poto supporter, Sinaba, crossed to the TNIP and became a member of the party executive and Matanzima's Chief Whip. The more educated the elected member, the more likely he was to act independently (though the influence such men had in the DP made them unlikely to move to the TNIP) and the more urbanised he was, the less the control exercised by the chiefs (which may explain Maluti where three of the four elected members were urban dwellers).²⁸

The 1963 election was thus a rebuff for the chiefs. But it rejected

the role they had played in certain areas in implementing Bantu Authorities, rather than their legitimacy as a leadership group. Unlike Hammond-Tooke, Mayer did not find this paradox irreconcilable. Matanzima, he felt, could unite tribal and modern rural elites and restore mass faith in the chiefs, on condition that

"he manages to project an image of autonomy. Power attracts, but not if it looks like a by-product of puppet dependence on whites. If Matanzima should manage to present himself as a man so strong that the pressure of the whites behind him can be overlooked, then he may in time reverse the trend whereby governing chiefs could not be prestige chiefs at the same time".(29)

The role of the chiefs was, therefore, not surprisingly, a constant element in the debates in the TLA after the election. On the one hand the TNIP, espoused separate development and projecting the chiefs as the natural leaders of this separatist revival. On the other hand the DP, reiterated the claims of the common society: the unity of the whole country, its multi-racial nature, and the demand for racial equality.

SEPARATION OR INTEGRATION?

We shall now consider the political issues which emerged in the Transkei, especially in the TLA, after the 1963 election up until the dissolution of the First Assembly in 1968. Despite the importance of the problem of chieftaincy, it was the acceptance or rejection of apartheid which dominated Transkeian politics to 1968.

Almost immediately after his election as Chief Minister, Matanzima stated his total support of the policy of separate development. Integration, he said, would result in domination of one race by another, as three

centuries of South African history showed. Different cultures inevitably led to conflict in the single society; "to avoid trouble you must live apart and then come together as friends".³⁰

The Democratic Party had issued a statement of its objectives in February 1964 when the party was formed. The first point of this manifesto clearly delineated the challenge which the DP would make both to Matanzima and to the apartheid policy. The party aimed at ensuring "harmonious and cordial relationships among the races which constitute the inhabitants of the Transkei ..." Elsewhere, the document proposed the protection "of minorities" through constitutional safeguards, the continued retention of the Transkei as an integral part of South Africa, its economic development as such, and the "development of non-racial loyalty to the government of the Transkei and of the Republic".³¹ The document strongly reflected the Christian liberal views of Guzana and Paramount Chief Poto and the deeply-felt multi-racialism of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo.

Guzana elaborated this theme during the no-confidence debate which began the following session of the TLA in 1964. "We want South Africanism for all", he said, and when chiefs raised the spectre of racial inter-marriage: "This side of the house needs no immorality act to respect the identity of races".³²

In reply Matanzima laid down the tenets of his policy.

"We wholeheartedly endorse the policy of separate development as being the only policy whereby the different races can live side by side ... and will in terms of the constitution ask from time to time that greater powers and more comprehensive duties ... be handed over to us so that we can develop towards

full autonomy in the Transkei ... We confirm our policy of friendship towards the whites of the Transkei and acknowledge our indebtedness towards the European administrators, traders and missionaries, but we also unequivocally stand for the gradual withdrawal of the whites from the Transkei so that this territory can become our own exclusive homeland".(33)

Whereas the DP sought close links with Western countries, Matanzima talked only of "intimate friendship with our mother country". Both groups saw development accompanied by the values of Western "civilization and democracy", but Matanzima stressed that this would be used to "fructify" the traditional cultural heritage.

Matanzima carried the theme of complete separation and the removal of whites from the Transkei further, when he defended Verwoerd's insistence on the exclusion of white capital investment from the Transkei:

"We are quite aware of what has taken place in the past ... The white people of these territories wanted to have the monopoly of business to the exclusion of the African. That is why you still find so few traders today. We do not want to create a similar situation ... There are many black people who are capable of forming companies to exploit industrialism in the Transkei ... this side of the House will not allow it (a white takeover of the Transkei) ... The Transkei has never been a white man's country. It is a black man's country".(34)

Until 1968 the DP persistently linked their rejection of apartheid to Matanzima's position as a creature of the government who had been rejected by the people at the polls. They accused Matanzima of deception, of presenting apartheid as something meaningful, when it was "only a sham", in the words of C. N. Nogcantsi.³⁵ Matanzima was accused of selling his people to the white man, and of foisting onto them "this fanagalo parliament".³⁶ The opposition pointed to the lack of development in the area; to

the fact that almost any government project in the white areas (such as the Orange River scheme) received more funds than all the Bantustans together, and to the fact that Africans continued to travel to the towns because local employment did not exist, thus placing them at the mercy of the influx control machinery.³⁷ The Reverend Rajuili concluded that the white officials in the Transkei did the planning, that the government "is doing the learning" and that even its dearest concern, "the industry of expropriating the whites out of the Transkei", was not remotely in danger of matching the Chief Minister's promises.³⁸

Matanzima's initial response to these accusations was extremely uncertain. He was unable to throw off the accusation of being a stooge. He could only reiterate his acceptance of separate development, launch constant attacks upon independent African states for a lack of planning and order, and accuse them of being Communists (Ghana, in particular, was a target).³⁹ He attempted to justify his position in terms of expediency, claiming repeatedly that the opposition, were it in power, could not have extracted the funds he had from Pretoria. When they responded that aid would come from England and America, he retreated to his accusations of Communism, holding that Pretoria would not aid or finance "a revolutionary government".⁴⁰ The order and stability which "gradualism" would create in the Transkei, he said, would be the envy of the African states which had suffered "bitter enmity, internal strife, bloodshed and chaos".⁴¹ The DP claim that his government represented no one but himself, particularly angered Matanzima, who rejoined that "the people belong to the chiefs".⁴²

For the moral aspects of the debate, Matanzima could only argue that integration brought conflict. He had no reply to Guzana's fear that

"... the consequent outcome of the application of separate development is hatred and I do not think that the alleged basis of separate development is an all-surrounding moat to isolate the policy from the contamination of race superiority, race pride and race hatred ..." (43)

Equally, there was no TNIP response of any kind when Dr. H. P. Bala, (who had never belonged to any political organization) in words strongly reminiscent of urban African attitudes, said that

"... the policy of segregation, is based on the hatred of the black man because of his colour and because of his immense numbers ... it robs us of our birthright in the land of our birth. It deprives us of our human rights; it deprives us of our land rights. Even in this Transkei we are still squatters. It deprives us of the immense wealth of the Republic ... On purely moral grounds the policy is indefensible". (44)

To all this Matanzima could only repeat that integration brought conflict. The willingness of the DP to question the very basis of the Transkei experiment, and to reject it openly, using their position in the TLA to voice criticisms for which ANC leaders had been jailed and banned, made the first three years of Matanzima's rule extremely uncertain in tone.

By 1967, however, Matanzima had become more effective in his defence of apartheid. He appealed to the exclusivist sentiments in the policy, propounding it as a virtual "negative" of the South African government's version. When Guzana noted that despite talk of separation, there had been a constant and necessary flow of white officials to the area, Matanzima replied that this showed the need for the Transkei to have a policy of influx control.⁴⁵

This new confidence was fully apparent in the 1968 session of the TLA. He accused Guzana of being a "white agent" during the no-confidence debate, pointing to the fate of the Negroes in America as an example of where, he claimed, the DP's policy of integration would lead the African. The DP should be indicted for treason, he said, as they stood against the ideals of the Transkei as a separate nation without racial domination by the whites.⁴⁶

This no-confidence debate proved one of the most heated during the five years of the TLA. Dr. Bala called apartheid a "gigantic fraud" and the Transkei "a Bastille, the symbol of oppression", while Mr. O. O. Mpondo accused Matanzima of following a policy of those who were "oppressing millions of black people in this country" and asserted that Africans wanted "the tree of freedom planted not in the cramped, corroded and decaying native reserves ... but in the Republican cities".⁴⁷ Matanzima's reply (far more effective than in 1964 or 1965) was to assert that the Africans had lost all rights during the years after Union; apartheid was their opportunity to overcome this lack of citizenship.⁴⁸

THE POSITION OF THE CHIEFS

If the TLA members could not agree on the efficacy and morality of the Transkei venture, they were nevertheless forced to debate the internal political structure it would acquire - in particular the respective roles of chiefs and commoners in government. The TNIP, with its majority dependent on the support of all but a few chiefs, strongly maintained the right of chiefs, not only to participate in the TLA, but to actively lead Transkeian

politics. The DP, on the other hand, adhered to the attitudes that Poto and Sabata had long expressed, namely, that the status and respect the chiefs enjoyed was undermined by their participation in the political life of the Africans. This, they held, was moving the chieftainship out of its traditional relationship with the tribe, destroying its symbolic (and hence unifying) role, and turning chiefs from democratic leaders responsive to the tribe, into autocrats despised by the people.

In many ways, although Poto had expressed these views during his term as a member of the NRC, the DP attitude reflected the popular sentiments expressed during the 1960 revolt. Poto and Sabata regarded the Bantu Authorities system of indirect rule, as debasing the traditional role, status and respect for the institution of chieftaincy, Poto's nephew, Chief Douglas Ndamase, had strongly defended the chiefs as the natural leaders of the people while he had been a member of the Bunga. In the wake of the revolt, he found himself on the opposition benches in 1963 alongside Mr. Gordon Dana, who had proposed the Poto view of chiefs in the Bunga in 1943 and had then been sharply criticised by Ndamase.⁴⁹

Ironically, Poto and Sabata, confirmed believers in the common society, and supported by a majority of the elected members, urged the Transkei to restore the traditional position of the chiefs. Kaiser Matanzima, the advocate of separate development, of tribally defined exclusivism, with the support of the chiefs (including most of Sabata's juniors) proposed a modernised, activist, political role for the traditional aristocracy. Both sides, therefore, strongly defended chieftainship as an institution;

they differed on its role in a separate Transkei.

In 1964, the DP, with an elected member, Mr. Bubu, dominating the discussion, urged the TNIP to increase the salaries of chiefs and headmen; to ensure that they were promptly paid each month; and that they received payments which enabled them to educate their children.⁵⁰ DP speakers admitted that they hoped prompt and sufficient payments would end many of the abuses which had made the chiefs unpopular. It is also likely that they sought to woo TNIP supporters among the chiefs to their side (some did indeed cross the floor) by establishing themselves as a party friendly to the traditional elite (which Matanzima had accused them of not being) but it is unlikely that the sentiments expressed were any less genuine for that.

In 1965, the DP again found itself defending the traditional status of the aristocracy, in the face of that group's support for Matanzima's personal ambitions. Matanzima had long aspired to become a Paramount Chief. Traditionally Emigrant Tembuland was an off-shoot of the Tembu tribe and Matanzima thus owed fealty to Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo. The creation of the position would thus assert the autonomy of Emigrant Tembuland and provide a personal victory for Matanzima over the cousin he hated personally and politically. Guzana strongly defended the paramountcy of his chief, moving that the matter be referred to the Paramount Chief of the Tembu (Sabata) and that African law and custom be followed.

"Can this house seek to create a paramount chief by casting a vote? ... Is constitutional procedure going to negate the very essence of a nation which still recognises its custom ..?(51)

It would seem that it was. The chiefs were prepared to support Matanzima,

perhaps as an assertion of their right to rule, and even chiefs from Sabata's Dalindyebo region voted for the creation of a new paramountcy. Another possible reason for their support was that Matanzima was quite prepared to support in turn the creation of new chiefs, to satisfy discontented claimants and to entrench his administrative control at the local level. The Pretoria government was certainly responsive to his paramountcy claims and to the creation of more chieftaincies. In 1966, an amendment to the Transkei Constitution was made to enable chiefs to elect by secret ballot their representatives for the ex officio seats in their areas, as the number of chiefs now exceeded the 64 seats allotted to them.⁵²

But the height of the controversy over the traditional elite came in 1967 with a DP motion expressing Poto's views on the need to preserve the traditional role of the chiefs. This was embodied in a motion seeking to create an Upper House for the chiefs so that the TLA would become a totally elected body. Moving the request to the South African government, Mr. Jafta (DP) claimed that the DP was in this way trying to maintain respect for chiefs while the TNIP was lowering it by insisting that chiefs debate policy with commoners.⁵³ The Opposition argued that the South African government's insistence on the chiefs as leaders was an attempt perpetually to enslave the people in a colony in which "the chiefs have assumed power that does not belong to them".⁵⁴ Paramount Chief Poto, supporting the motion, said that he had always fought for the traditional dignity of the chieftainship and felt that they should not fear going into an upper house to

review the laws enacted by the people.⁵⁵

The motion produced vituperative replies from Matanzima and Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau of Eastern Pondoland but the elected members on the TNIP benches proved strangely indecisive in their support of the government. Mr. Sihele (TNIP) held that the chiefs were necessary in the TLA because they believed in independence for the Transkei and would not forsake this for multi-racialism. The people wanted to become independent of Pretoria and hence they needed the chiefs, implying that the present system was somewhat of an interim measure, and had been foisted on the Transkei by Verwoerd.⁵⁶

The TNIP chiefs were united in their total opposition to the amendment. They expressed fears that all their powers would be revoked under such a system, that the opposition coveted their salaries, that multi-racialism would result and the Transkei would lose its opportunity to achieve complete independence, and that the elected members would alienate them from their people.⁵⁷ They defeated the motion by 62 votes to 41, the vote indicating the polarization of chiefs and commoners.

LAND REHABILITATION

The causes of the 1960 Pondoland revolt had not disappeared from the Transkei; land rehabilitation persisted as the most unpopular feature of Bantu Authorities and the cause of a great deal of insecurity among the chiefs. The policy, so dear to officials of the South African government's Ministry of Bantu Administration, became even more unpopular when the

Transkei suffered a succession of droughts and consequent crop failures after 1964. By 1969, for example, the position had deteriorated so sharply that plans had to be made to lend farmers R1 million, to provide fodder for 50,000 cattle, to move another 90,000 and to provide supplementary feeding for 250,000 school-children. In addition, the South African government had to relax its influx control measures to allow an extra 35,000 workers into the towns, while providing "relief employment" for another 15,000 inside the territory. From the start of the TLA in 1964, Mpondo moved a motion for the suspension of land rehabilitation schemes in the Transkei. DP spokesmen protested the lack of industrial development which made land rehabilitation an even greater burden for the people, the substitution of rural locations without labour for meaningful development, and consequent hunger and starvation.⁵⁸ Mpondo asserted that 85% of the people detested "this stinking thing"; they wanted more land not rehabilitation, which would never solve their problems of poverty. The policy was the result of the whites determination to retain control of most of the land, but the "only solution is the fair distribution of land".⁵⁹

The deepest anger was expressed by Mr. Nogcantsi (DP). The people were tired of the promise of "Utopia or the Moon", he said. "Even the separate development apostles ... usually shelve this question of rehabilitation"; even the Minister of Agriculture had not applied it to his own kraal. The result, he said, was the killing of chiefs by the impoverished people. Those who accepted rehabilitation did so out of fear, the fear of a conquered people.⁶⁰

Mr. Zibi (DP) referred to rehabilitation as designed to perpetuate the supply of cheap labour for the whites, by creating "these zoological gardens" in which the limitations of land and stock forced them to sell their labour at the lowest prices.⁶¹

The TNIP chose to oppose the DP motion, claiming that the policy remained voluntary. But the TNIP amendment was defeated by 45 votes to 44, with a number of chiefs voting with the opposition - particularly those in Eastern Pondoland which had been the scene of the 1960 disturbances over the policy. This proved to be Matanzima's only defeat during the five year period. But the DP, in a self-defeating protest, walked out, and lost the vote on the substantive motion.⁶²

Nevertheless, the TNIP was forced to make a gesture to the peasantry in 1966, creating government machinery to aid co-operatives. The DP supported the motion despite reservations about the political leverage which would be applied by Matanzima.⁶³ The measure proved predictably inadequate and, after a particularly severe drought, 1967 saw the spontaneous emergence of a large agricultural co-operative enterprise. Originating in Fingoland, the Fingo Agricultural Co-operative Company Ltd. doubled its membership during the year and was still growing. It announced in July that it was seeking loans of R1 million.⁶⁴ Co-operative movements may yet become a major political factor in the Transkei if the present increase in pressure on the land is maintained.

Thus far we have examined the issues which would appear best to confirm the Nationalist Party's hopes of externalizing conflict. Africans in

the Transkei were forced into a lengthy debate on the merits and demerits of the apartheid policy they had rejected outright since 1948. They were made to challenge or defend the idea that their future and human rights lay not in the country as a whole, but in a small rural segment in which they might hope to evolve to some vague form of political independence while remaining economically dependent on the whites. Further, instead of continuing the urban struggle, many of the members of the TLA were forced to seek a definition of the relationship between commoners and the traditional aristocracy in a political future most did not accept. Men like Mpondo, Guzana, Poto, Nogcantsi and Nkosiyane (all of the DP) were forced to recommend the creation of an Upper House for chiefs as the most practical method of structuring a government they considered to be fraud in the first place.

It would seem then that to some extent externalization had succeeded. Matanzima became a buffer between the privileged white minority and African aspirations. All the elements of non-realistic conflict, in which functional alternatives as to ends are replaced merely by functional alternatives as to tension release, appeared to exist. Africans debated the futility of the Transkei rather than the means of ending apartheid in South Africa as a whole. The chiefs, as the land rehabilitation debate demonstrated, had become the enemies of the people, the cyphers of a now remote oppressor.

Yet such a conclusion, though it goes far, is not entirely acceptable. The debate on apartheid did give Africans a public opportunity to protest their inferior social position - a platform which had really ceased to exist from the time of the Congress of the People in 1956. Members of the

opposition were able to restate liberal aspects of African aspirations such as human rights, equality, an end to exploitation, and full citizenship. They were able to attack the government's exploitation of cheap labour and denial of land rights to Africans. Nor were these criticisms always confined to the perspective of the Transkei since, inevitably, the wider perspective was needed to illustrate local grievances. While the policy had created a situation in which the modern, industrial man was forced to face his archaic traditional elite and argue over the future of his society, it was also true that the chiefs did not oppose modernisation as such, but only a modernisation which excluded them. Indeed, it was Matanzima who used traditionalism in a manner which his opponents found "untraditional". And in response to persistent pressure from the DP, Matanzima moved rapidly to a conception of apartheid, not as a system of survival for the chieftaincy under the protective weapons of the whites, but as a method of escaping white rule forever. Matanzima rejected, in fact, the notion that apartheid alone was the enemy and replaced it with 300 years of white oppression. The integrated society, as he saw it, had resulted in exploitation of the black man; the only way out was total rejection of the exploiter and, if the government gave him even the Transkei as a way out, he intended to use it. "The whites have been lice in our hair for 300 years", he said frequently.

If the whites had succeeded in dumping a large number of the Xhosa elite in a rural slum to argue among themselves, it is also true that in rejecting land rehabilitation, that elite did protest one of the main

techniques of controlling the rural masses, of creating cheap labour, and of dividing the people from their chiefs. The rejection of land rehabilitation did, in essence, remove a major element of nonrealistic conflict from the Transkei. Though the motion did not succeed in the end, the evidence indicates that land rehabilitation is a policy practised more in the breach than in the observance in the Transkei; few chiefs have employed the policy since 1960, and Matanzima's Great Place at Qamata, predictably, boasts no "betterment" scheme - though there is a major (and meaningful) irrigation scheme there.

The close links with the urban world which characterises the South African African perhaps makes such qualification of the externalization policy inevitable. The integrated society does not permit political manipulation to obviate the realities of a common exploitation. And if this emerges in the argument over the issues presented so far, the qualification becomes even stronger when we examine other major issues which emerged during the five year period under review.

INFLUX CONTROL

Probably no element of apartheid affects the African so harshly as influx control. Job reservation prevents the African worker from occupying certain types of occupation and the labour colour bar confines him to the lowest work positions on the ladder. But ultimately any job is better than none, or than starvation in the overpopulated reserves. South Africa has unemployment, yet the influx control regulations force Africans out of the towns while importing indentured labour from neighbouring countries to

ensure a compliant work force. This is justified by the mineowners' propoganda as necessitated by a backward bending supply curve of indigenous labour; in fact indentured labour ensures a work force excluded from local political organization and willing to accept wages which have remained static for more than three decades. The present application of influx control has been extended beyond the original attempt to force the unemployed out of the towns. Now all Africans are put onto a contract basis. They face severe penalties for breaking contract, but the agreement can be unilaterally revoked by white South Africa at any time. People removed are dumped in resettlement camps in the reserves; the application takes particularly heavy toll of women, children, the aged, and "political agitators". Influx control thus provides the mechanism through which all African grievances coalesce - lack of political power, economic deprivation of a persistent nature, and the destruction of family and social life. Even during the 1963 election, influx control was an issue causing widespread dissatisfaction. It bound peasants to workers, elite to masses; few people did not at least have a relative who had either been dumped back in the region or had been forced onto the labour carousel which endorsing out and recontracting at a labour bureau creates.

Scholars studying the election, found such dissatisfaction widespread. One (educated) interviewee linked the policy to land rehabilitation and said that the two facets had featured in the grievances expressed during 1960, in the creation of "a more militant spirit against the white man", and even in the killing of chiefs. The young people, said the respondent, had been and

still were influenced by the bitterness of those endorsed out of the towns and by political "agitators" returning from Cape Town (the main area of influx control application) while many between the ages of 16 and 35 had themselves been affected.⁶⁵

The recurrence of drought placed still greater pressure on the Transkei's meagre resources. The lack of food and the death of stock had caused widespread hunger and resulted in long queues of men outside the labour bureaux; in August 1967, Mr. M. C. Botha estimated that some 90,000 Africans were being endorsed out of the nine main urban centres each year.⁶⁶ This despite the assertion by Dr. Moolman (United Party) that there were usually four or five more applicants for jobs than jobs available.⁶⁷

In 1964 Nkosiyane (DP) moved that "immediate steps be taken by the proper authorities for the repeal of the Influx Control Regulations" including the pass laws. It was obvious that even dogs were better treated than Africans, he said, since dogs were not allowed to starve. Innocent people were jailed for pass offences while Europeans were able to visit the country without passes. The pass meant that Africans carried their own warrant of arrest. The regulations broke up homes and families; "even in Russia", he asserted, people were allowed to live with their families.⁶⁸ The TNIP agreed with the opposition to the regulations but expressed the fear that the wording would anger Pretoria and nothing would be achieved. George Matanzima, brother of Kaiser Matanzima, proposed that the word "relaxed" replace "repealed" and the motion was carried.⁶⁹

In 1965, Matanzima took the lead, arguing that citizens of the Transkei

should not be regarded as foreigners in South Africa and should retain South African citizenship until the Transkei was no longer "an integral part" of the Republic. He agreed with the opposition that a select committee be appointed to make recommendations to the government in Pretoria on the matter, and welcome DP representation on it.⁷⁰

Nevertheless, the opposition continued to accuse Matanzima of weakness in the matter, claiming that his support for apartheid meant condoning influx control. The accusations were apparently to good effect, for Matanzima declared openly in East London that people tended to refer to influx control as the "Matanzima Act". This was not true:

"I do not agree with the Urban Areas Act. We want our people to work in towns because we have no work in the Transkei. I never made the influx control regulations. I do not agree with them".(71)

But Sabata, for one, was not satisfied. Speaking in East London he stated that influx control was slavery, under which starving people were locked up in the primitive and drought stricken Transkei, whose TLA was a stooge body in which certain people slavishly followed the policy which aimed at disuniting them.⁷² At the same meeting, Chief Joyi accused Matanzima of neglecting popular needs because he was not a ruler but a "boss boy" enjoying more privileges than the "other government boys"; thus visiting delegates from Malawi were able to sleep at Umtata's best hotel which Matanzima was not allowed to enter.⁷³

Matanzima went to great pains to dissociate himself from the label of stooge, and on no issue more so than influx control. Speaking at his party's annual congress in April 1968, he protested against the policy,

stating that there were no jobs in the Transkei and that Africans had to remain in the towns.⁷⁴ He repeated the theme during a visit to Pretoria, telling Xhosas there

"... I do not want you in the Transkei at the moment. What I want you to do is work hard in the urban areas and save money and go to the Transkei only when you have enough to invest there".(75)

The problem of influx control was linked not only with land rehabilitation but also with the problem of economic development and employment within the Transkei. In 1967 only 32,700 Africans were listed as being "gainfully employed" in the area: 28% were domestic servants dependent on the whites in the Transkei, 17% were in commerce and industry and 46% worked for government. More than 250,000 were in the towns, especially the Western Cape.⁷⁶

Matanzima travelled to Cape Town in 1966 to urge the South African government to relax influx control and was able to obtain temporary agreement to give Transkeians preference over other Africans.

In addition, dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of hospitals, the shortage of doctors, and the general lack of amenities was frequently expressed. The situation also resulted in demands for Africanisation from TNIP backbenchers. A 1965 motion calling for the Africanisation of post office positions, alleging that the whites discriminated against Africans and that many competent people were available for the positions, was carried unanimously. Rev. Rajuili (DP) stated that the one department which Africans could man entirely was Education, yet white officials persisted when there were better African graduates available. Matanzima urged moderation in the Africanisation policy, contending that the Transkei's needs had

to be satisfied before the whites could be asked to leave. In this he was joined by Guzana who was opposed to racial exclusiveness and hoped that the influx of whites would force multi-racialism on the area.⁷⁷

DIGNITY AND POWER.

Members of both parties in the TLA showed increasing impatience and frustration at the manner in which the treatment of Africans in the Transkei by whites had remained the same since 1963, despite "self-government"; and at the total unwillingness of the South African government to broaden the powers of the Transkei government. Here it was the TNIP which showed the deepest frustration, especially as time increased the taunts of the DP.

As early as 1964, a TNIP backbencher moved that the health portfolio be transferred to the Transkei. The extremely high incidence of T.B., gastro-enteritis and malnutrition, and the totally inadequate facilities existing in the area, made this a logical choice to initiate demands for more power. Matanzima supporting the motion, stated that he was sure that funds could be found.⁷⁸

Similar demands were made without any apparent response from the Ministry of Bantu Administration. In 1967, with Matanzima no longer moderating his language during similar debates, Vorster announced that the Transkei was receiving "sympathetic consideration" in terms of its requests for the health, information, transport and police portfolios.⁷⁹

Another source of frustration was the Bantu Investment Corporation, which was mandated to buy out white businesses and create new industries, but had produced minimal results. Here the allegations of "stooges" was

again flung at the TNIP, with Mr. Cromwell Diko (TPFP) labelling the organization the "Broederbond Investment Corporation" and alleging that it merely enabled Afrikaners to replace Englishmen in the economic life of the Transkei.⁸⁰

Matanzima proved vulnerable to charges that the political and economic inertia which characterised the Transkei proved the apartheid policy a hoax. In 1968 TNIP demands became stronger. Mr. Chemane (TNIP) expressed his disappointment at the "delay" from Pretoria⁸¹ and the government supported a DP attack against the treatment Africans received from white bus conductors which ended in a demand that such personnel be removed from the Transkei as "they are unfit to deal with Africans".⁸² Matanzima then reopened a pet issue which he had treasured since his days in the TTA - a "Bantu Battalion" which would "defend the Transkei against the communists". This time there was a prompt reply from Pretoria - refusal.⁸³

The sense of frustration was perhaps best expressed when the TLA, in complete silence (in contrast to its usual practice of heckling speakers), listened to an impassioned denunciation of the South African government from Dr. Bala (DP):

"The darkie is a citizen of South Africa. We know no other fatherland. But the nigger is not wanted in South Africa, or in America or, it would seem, in Britain". Misery had increased in the Transkei in the past five years and 90% of the Transkeians lived below the breadline and earned the lowest wage of any African state. "I have been called a communist, an atheist, a witch-doctor. I am none of these. You claim to be civilised - then I am proud to be a savage ... I am an extremist ... An extremist of life".(84)

But if the TNIP was sufficiently disappointed to give even Dr. Bala a respectful hearing, it was in September that it made its major demonstration.

The Transkei Constitution Act states that the Ministry of Bantu Administration and Development will consult the Transkei over the appointment of all white seconded officials. This is merely a formal procedure designed to create a little face for the Transkei government. In August, the Ministry appointed a Mr. Stone as Transkei Secretary of Education, the most senior civil service post in the Department. The Transkei Cabinet refused to recognise the appointment because it had not been consulted beforehand. Unable to remove Stone, George Matanzima declared he would have to investigate the matter, and in the meantime declined to recognise the appointment. The Ministry hastily contacted the Transkei Cabinet which remained adamant in its rejection of Mr. Stone. After several weeks in his office, during which time he was totally ignored by George Matanzima and denied access to all information, Stone announced his resignation. The Transkei made it known that no personal animosity to Stone was felt. And African civil servants publicly stated their approval of the Transkei reaction, claiming that this was the moment to promote Africans not bring in outsiders.⁸⁵

POLICE AND EMERGENCY POWERS

If the South African government aimed to remove conflict from the urban areas by means of the Transkei, it seemed determined to leave little to chance in ensuring that Matanzima was able to establish himself in power, even without popular support. Proclamations 400 and 413, which had placed the Transkei under a state of emergency in 1960, remained and, indeed, are still, in force. The activity of the police and Special Branch has also been maintained. Detentions without trial have persisted and

over a thousand people are believed to have been imprisoned under Proclamation 400 and various other laws (such as 90-day detention).

Soon after the 1963 election, Security Branch searches of DP members' homes began. Magisterial delays were also experienced by the DP when permission to hold meetings was applied for - a feature of the 1963 election campaign as well. Government legislation was passed eventually in Cape Town to prevent white political parties from "interfering" in the Transkei.⁸⁶ In addition, agents provocateurs were employed to contact various militant members of the DP. Having a broader base than the TNIP, the DP included traditionalists like Poto, liberals like Guzana, militants like Bala, Mpondo and Sabata, and a radical element led by Nkosiyané and Nogcantsi. The latter two were approached by at least one white agent who befriended them. It was claimed that at a meeting there was talk of killing Matanzima; Nkosiyané and Nogcantsi were tried and jailed for seven years each. Nkosiyané went on to win acquittal on appeal and to stand as an independent in the 1968 election. The hatred felt for Matanzima among many Africans is still further illustrated by two trials in which people were accused of attempting to murder him.⁸⁷ In 1968, 12 people were accused in court of taking part in military training and terrorism from June 1965; it was claimed they were variously members of the Communist Party, Umkhonto, and ANC. In the Transkei, violence among school-children led to the stoning of a white-owned shop in Tsomo and rioting at a school in Engcobo, during the first half of 1968.⁸⁸ Even in 1968, eight years after the Pondo-land revolt, chiefs were still occasionally attacked; three chiefs moved

everywhere surrounded by personal bodyguards.⁸⁹

In the TLA, the DP demanded the end of the application of Proclamation 400, which also gives chiefs powers to disallow public meetings and to banish people from different areas. Matanzima used this proviso to deport one of Sabata's headmen to another part of the Transkei. DP spokesmen saw the emergency regulations as oppressive to them, hampering their attempts to organise democratically, and perpetuating the tense situation in the region through the creation of widespread resentment.

In 1964, Rajuili (DP) moved the revocation of the proclamation, arguing that the Ministry of Justice and the police could deal with offenders without the aid of the South African Government. The TNIP responded that the measure had saved the Transkei from Communism; figures were furnished to show that 13 people had been killed in Engcobo since 1959. Rajuili argued that the measure was open to abuse by certain chiefs and Nogcantsi made it clear that Matanzima was employing it as a weapon of intimidation.⁹⁰ The opposition accused the TNIP of using the measure to set up the Transkei without consulting the people, claiming that the specific reason for its promulgation had ended, that it undermined the security of the people of the Transkei by making them vulnerable to the whim of a displeased chief and that it had not ended the killing of chiefs anyway. Dr. Bala concluded that "there is armed peace in this country".⁹¹ But, apart from Paramount Chief Poto's objection to the measure, the chiefs defended the Proclamation with an intensity greater than they exhibited on any other issue during the five years.

In 1967 the DP made another major attempt to remove this legislation, describing it as contrary to the declaration of human rights. Madikizela, one of the grosser TNIP members, angrily maintained that as long as "subversives like Nogcantsi and Nkosiyanane" remained, the law was needed. Sihele (TNIP) further slandered Nkosiyanane, calling him a murderer, and George Matanzima embellished this unseemly debate with a story which a Special Branch agent called Dunne had produced, to the effect that he (Dunne) had discussed killing the Matanzimas with Nkosiyanane and Sabata; Diko, Raziya, Chief D. D. P. Ndamase and even Poto were brought into the accusation, the chairman overruling their protests.⁹²

In 1964, Nogcantsi asked the Transkei government to allow political fugitives from apartheid to enter the Transkei without fear of prosecution. It was defeated 50 - 35.⁹³ Nogcantsi produced another motion in 1965 calling for the release of Transkeians who were political prisoners of the Republican government, naming among others, Nelson Mandela. George Matanzima replied by expressing his appreciation to Pretoria for taking steps "against communist infiltration".⁹⁴ Kaiser Matanzima was hardly likely to have supported such sentiments in the best of times, but with tension still strong he had another problem: political prisoners ending terms on Robben Island were being deported back to the Transkei where they were confined to a magisterial district. The large size of such districts gives the prisoners plenty of access to the people. The TNIP was thus determined to cling to Proclamation 400 and the protection of the Security Police.

Nevertheless, that there was a great deal of sympathy for many of the sentiments expressed by Nogcantsi was apparent when the funeral of Mandela's mother took place in October 1968. A huge crowd attended including Kaiser Matanzima. Mrs. Winnie Mandela studiously ignored her father, C. K. Madikizela, the Transkei Minister of Agriculture, and Matanzima, her husband's cousin - an indication of the strong emotions raised by Matanzima's support for apartheid. Mandela had not been permitted to attend the funeral, but a telegram was read out to noticeable effect, despite the vast array of Special Branch present. Sabata referred to Mandela as "a true national leader ... and not a puppet like other so-called leaders".⁹⁵

BANTU EDUCATION.

If the TNIP resisted popular attempts to remove the arbitrary powers vested in the police and the chiefs by Proclamation 400, all groups united solidly in rejecting one of the major edifices of apartheid - Bantu Education. Armed with the education portfolio, the Transkei could do more than merely make appeals to the Minister, and it lost no time in acting on this major symbol of black deprivation.

A select committee on education was set up by the TLA during its first session and its interim report was considered in June 1964. The report unanimously recommended that the vernacular be replaced by either English or Afrikaans in the fifth school year. It also argued for a reversion, with certain modifications, to the Cape Syllabus, under which Africans had been taught before the introduction of Bantu Education. The final report, tabled June 19th, was unanimously accepted by the TLA. Vernacular teaching

was rejected, as was the aim professed by Verwoerd when introducing the Bantu Education Act - that a system of education had to be devised for Africans which would ensure that they knew that equality with the European was "not for them".⁹⁶

Speaking to the report, the Transkei Minister of Education, B. B. Mdledle, stated that his aim was to adopt the Cape Syllabus, with certain suitable adjustments. These "suitable adjustments" in effect meant combining certain elements of Bantu Education with the Cape syllabus. This angered the Opposition who wanted all elements of the former removed.⁹⁷

They saw a TNIP retreat in the face of anger from Pretoria; Mr. Bubu (DP) summarised their position:

"... the Journal (Bantu Education, Produced by the Ministry) gave expression to its undisguised displeasure at the changes which this Assembly had decided to make in the system, as well as the content, of education. That department bitterly regretted the fact that the Assembly had unanimously decided to reject the system ... They went on to exhort the governments of future Bantustans not to follow the example of the Transkei which had decided to reject the legacy of Bantu Education ... I submit that ... the Ministry of Education (Transkei) have fallen prey to the nefarious influences from Pretoria".(98)

The debate is interesting for the revelations it throws on the South African government's methods of attempting to dissuade the TNIP from removing Bantu Education. It avoided an open confrontation, seeking to apply pressure through veiled threats contained in critical articles in "Bantu Education" and by discreet pressure on Matanzima. It also applied pressure on the TLA through the seconded white Secretaries serving in the Transkei. During the debate, the Mdledle admitted that he had been pressurised by his Secretary, and implied that the "modifications" had largely come through the advice

of seconded officials. Naturally, he defended these changes as practicable, and was supported by his colleague, Madikizela, who assured the House that the syllabus was "much better than the Cape and much better than Bantu Education itself".⁹⁹

The opposition was not assured. It seized on the admissions by the Minister to ask whether the Africans ran their ministries or whether the real bosses were the Secretaries. Zibi (DP) maintained that

"There is no point in appointing committees which were dictated to ... by departmental authorities ... The decisions of this House have been contemptuously flaunted by the department ... If the Secretary is the head of the department, then where can we look? ... we would like to have an African Secretary for this particular department".(100)

The Africanisation of the Education department became a persistent theme; even the DP abandoned its multi-racialism on this point. Opposition members repeatedly expressed fears about the influence which Pretoria exercised through the seconded secretary.¹⁰¹ This feeling was shared by African civil servants, as we have seen in their reaction to George Matanzima's removal of Stone.

When the report was unanimously passed by the House, the South African government simply refused the Presidential assent needed to make it law. Nevertheless, it would seem that the Transkei government proceeded to implement the report in practice, introducing teaching in English or Afrikaans in primary school (invariably it was English) and it would also seem that white officials did their best to hinder this implementation.

The DP maintained a watchdog vigilance on the implementation of the

report throughout the life of the First Assembly. It constantly accused the TNIP of claiming to have ended Bantu Education when it had merely changed the label while leaving the contents intact.¹⁰²

When George Matanzima replaced the largely incompetent Mdledle in 1967, the Education department improved in efficiency and the early teaching of English and Afrikaans was implemented more vigorously. Indeed Matanzima's appointment of his brother was seen as a provocative action by several observers in Pretoria. Nevertheless, the DP took strong exception to the increased tuition in Afrikaans which "special officers" were undertaking, demanding equal attention to the other two languages. The TNIP justified the emphasis in terms of "the policy of the state" and the needs of students going to University.¹⁰³ Even so, Afrikaans tended to remain very much a third language in schools, largely due to the unavailability of teachers. This was reflected in George Matanzima's report that only 53 of the 6,499 teaching posts were occupied by seconded personnel (African teachers were unlikely to be fluent in Afrikaans) while only two of the nine head office personnel were whites (the two most senior). In all, only 58 seconded officials were now involved in education in the Transkei, and he hoped to remove these quickly.¹⁰⁴

The DP did not allow the government any rest in this department. When H. H. Nolutshungu, a senior TNIP member, moved that Fort Hare be completely Africanised, they accused him of attempting to restore Bantu Education by increasing apartheid. Claiming to oppose anything which had a "tinge of apartheid about it, Mpondo extended his remarks to an attack on Verwoerd who,

with his lieutenant, Dr. Eiselen

"... were the architects of the ungodly policy of apartheid, which has made our beloved country, South Africa, stink in the nostrils of the world. They will go down in history as leaders of the minority which has made our country the polecat of the world. Because of their belief in the inherent inferiority of any human whose skin is not white, they decided that Africans should not get the same education as whites ... they said the kaffir must be kept in his place to develop along his own lines".(105)

Throughout the five years, the DP was able to attack apartheid through Bantu Education with greater TNIP tolerance than in the case of any other aspect of the policy. Though prepared to defend separate development as the hope of black salvation, and capable of the most insensitive behaviour in preserving the emergency powers in the Transkei, the TNIP did not feel able or wish to apologise for Bantu Education. In fact, it went further by attempting to remove the system, first in law and, when this failed, in practice.

LAND AND TOWNS

Matanzima was able to seize the initiative from the DP on two issues which the Opposition, by the very nature of its aims, regarded as irrelevant to African problems in South Africa. These were the questions of the land allotted to the Transkei and of its eventual independence.

The total area of the Transkei is 16,330 square miles, of which only 14,250 square miles was set aside for Africans under the Transkei Constitution Act. Excluded were the white farmlands of Matatiele, the whole of Mount Currie (the 27th district) and the town of Port St. Johns, the only

natural harbour on the Transkei coast. Also excluded were 26 white owned township areas, including the capital, Umtata. These towns were completely surrounded by black areas and were intended for eventual handover to the Transkei through what was officially termed "zoning" (forcing whites to sell as their businesses became less and less profitable). The zoning process was designed to take over the towns piecemeal and over a sufficiently long period so as not to arouse anxiety among the white electorate.

In 1964, Chief Moshesh, the Transkei Minister of the Interior, stated that the re-zoning of the towns would allow for the "repatriation" of Transkei "citizens", especially "those who are returning from the Republic". The DP angrily accused the TNIP of aiding the intensification of influx control by encouraging the whites to leave.¹⁰⁶ This approach to the question of zoning was dropped by the government benches as a result; they concentrated instead on the need to remove whites from the Transkei.

Pretoria, however, did not move with the speed which Moshesh's speech had hopefully implied that it would. In 1965, Proclamation 336 classified nine towns in the Transkei as either completely reserved for Africans and 13 partially so (Umtata and Butterworth being excluded from both lists). Anyone not a Transkei citizen could not acquire land in the Transkei except by donation or inheritance; there was no compulsion to sell but transfer by sale could only be made to a Transkei citizen, the S. A. Bantu Trust or the Bantu Investment Corporation. Some R3.04 million were spent by Pretoria compensating or buying out whites in 1966-7, while a further R3 million was earmarked for 1967-8.¹⁰⁷

The ponderous nature of this handover frustrated even the majority of chiefs and angered Matanzima. He began an annual public demand that the towns be zoned black and that the white traders leave. His favourite call became for a speed up in the removal of whites: "We want Umtata. We want all the towns and businesses in the Transkei".¹⁰⁸ The government's response in 1968 was to amend the Transkei Constitution Act¹⁰⁹ specifying that the white areas of Matatiele and Port St. Johns were outside the jurisdiction of the Transkei government. Mount Currie was declared to be a permanently white district.

The move seemed to infuriate Matanzima. His demands became less and less couched in conciliatory language as the opposition's derision mounted. In April 1968, with an election approaching, A. N. Raziya (DP) noted that Matanzima had made promises for five years during which time nothing had happened. He concluded that the demand for land was no more than a number of "Voting-catching bluffs". But Matanzima would not "hoodwink" the electorate which had tired of his unfulfilled promises, he predicted.¹¹⁰

Opening his party's annual Congress the same day, Matanzima called for the incorporation of all the "white spots" into the Transkei. If Africans were to be repatriated there, these "must be given back". He specified not only Mount Currie, Matatiele and Port St. Johns, but extended the definition of white spots to include Elliot and Maclear in East Griqualand; the Transkei would "not rest" until these were given back he said. Brandishing an old map of Kaffraria, he stated:

"Kaffraria means our land. It includes all the lands we are going to claim from the Republican government. We will never rest until this is done ... Where are these people (repatriated Transkeians) going to be settled when Whites are still occupying our land?"⁽¹¹¹⁾

Matanzima, by introducing the geographic concept of Kaffraria into his land claims, took the argument far beyond the mere zoning of towns. His vision of the Transkei restored the old frontiers between Xhosa and Boer which had existed in the eighteenth century. It also asserted a claim to the unification of the Transkei and Ciskei, a long term Matanzima goal.

As early as 1964, De Wet Nel had stated that these two reserves would eventually be merged, but not until the Ciskei was "as politically responsible" as the Transkei.¹¹² This became a major ambition of Matanzima's and he found some support among Africans in the Ciskei. In any event, after the TLA had voted for amalgamation of the two areas with the incorporation of the white areas between them (despite DP protests that this would further impoverish the Transkei)¹¹³ M. C. Botha told the Cape Nationalist Party Congress in September that the two would never be one territory and there would always be a strip of white land between them.¹¹⁴

The same response greeted the TNIP's enthusiastic endorsement of Matanzima's Kaffraria speech. The party gave him a mandate to seek the incorporation of Elliot, Maclear, Mataiele and Mount Currie into the Transkei, but Vorster told Parliament in Cape Town that these areas would definitely remain white.¹¹⁵

If Matanzima encountered cold hostility from Pretoria on his greater claims, on the question of town zoning, he found an unexpected ally in

Hans Abraham, Commissioner-General of the Xhosa National Unit. Addressing the (white) Transkeian Territories Civic Association, Abraham called on them to apply to have their towns zoned black. This, he claimed, was in their own interests as they were experiencing difficulties in transacting property. He thus recommended immediate reclassification to enable them to sell out rapidly.¹¹⁶ His proposal received a positive response from the whites in the smaller townships and a negative answer from those in the larger towns.¹¹⁷

Despite the fact that the DP continued to jeer, Matanzima doggedly persisted in his claim for more land. Throughout 1968 the TNIP repeatedly introduced the land issue into their political dialogue. In the TLA, H. H. Nolutshungu for instance, called for the handover of Mataiele, Maclear, Umzimkulu, Port St. Johns, Mount Currie and Elliot.¹¹⁸ And J. Sineke (TNIP) called for the immediate "return" of the white spots within the Transkei.¹¹⁹

Mr. Guzana was not impressed. He referred to the "hallucinations" of the Chief Minister, which had persisted despite Matanzima being "rapped over the knuckles and told to return to his own constitution which he endorsed and accepted". Since the Transkei was part of the Republic, he said, this could only be understood as part of Matanzima's "insatiable greediness" for land.¹²⁰

Thus, on the land issue, by refusing to call for the expropriation of white-owned land, the DP rapidly became less of a challenge to white privilege than the TNIP - a tactical error which Matanzima was not slow to exploit. Since land and independence were the issues which dominated Transkeian politics in 1968, and since on both issues the DP resisted the

challenge Matanzima had directed against the South African government, the political initiative which earlier issues had given the opposition was skilfully shifted to the TNIP by the Chief Minister.

INDEPENDENCE FOR THE TRANSKEI.

Although Nationalist party politicians used the terms "self-government" and "independence" synonymously (when they used the latter at all) in their references to the Bantustans, as if to indicate that they considered the Transkei Constitution Act to confer as much autonomy on Africans as they needed, Matanzima indicated from the start of the TLA proceedings in 1963 that he regarded the grant of "self-government" to be an initial step on the road to complete independence.

Replying to De Wet Nel's speech opening the TLA in 1963, Matanzima referred to the Transkei as a "conquered territory" regaining its independence. He then quietly insisted on leaving with the Minister ahead of the other white officials.¹²¹ In the 1964 session, he denied that he wanted the Transkei to be a "colony":

"A colony is a place which is physically removed from the parent country but is controlled by the parent country through its citizens. That would be the case under a multi-racial society. We want to be independent. That is our objective. We want to withdraw the colonists from the Transkei and give power to the aborigenees of the land".(122)

He went still further by referring to a possible future "commonwealth" of Bantustans which he hoped would occur when all the other Africans were in the same position as the Transkei: When members of the Opposition, referring to the Transkei's poverty, stated that its lack of development indicated that

there would never be independence, Matanzima replied that Basutoland and the other High Commission territories were at that time moving to independence though they were no richer.¹²³ But if he felt that independence could come without economic wealth, Matanzima was not prepared to ignore the economy altogether. He repeatedly stated that the aim of his party was eventual independence. Immediate independence would result in the instability found elsewhere in Africa, he claimed. Only by creating a legacy of political stability in the area, and by developing agriculture and new industries, could the Transkei attain a stable independence; for this reason, he held, they must not act precipitately.

The DP replied that this indicated that Matanzima did not wish to annoy his "bosses" in Pretoria. In any event, they regarded independence as unwelcome, calling on members to support the idea of the Transkei as a province of a South Africa in which all races had full equality. In 1966, Poto and Guzana repeated the call, stating that it was necessary to counter the "selfish and exclusive mentality" which they could see arising round them as a result of Bantustans.¹²⁴

Until 1966 the debate about independence in the TLA remained a sterile one, evidencing little strong feeling. Matanzima could repeat that he wanted freedom eventually while the DP could reiterate that only a common society would succeed, without any clarification of either's policy being forthcoming. The whole problem took a back seat to the discussion on apartheid; the matter seemed light years away anyway. But the TNIP contained members who did feel strongly about the need to escape white domination.

In 1966, the TNIP's chief whip, Shadrack Sinaba, left the party in protest against what he saw as Matanzima's lack of commitment to independence and "delaying tactics". He created the Transkei People's Freedom Party in May 1966, dedicated to "immediate independence" for the Transkei, with friendly relations with South Africa, but, failing such relations, aid to be sought from "some other country".¹²⁵ Like Matanzima, he stood for rights for Africans only in the Transkei. Sinaba was joined in the TLA by Cromwell Diko, a renegade from the DP, who felt that even an independent Transkei was better than continued suffering in South Africa.

In 1965, while still a member of the TNIP, Sinaba had introduced a motion calling for the granting of immediate independence to the Transkei. George Matanzima had proposed an amendment that "the Transkei is not ripe for independence at this stage" and the DP had presented a further amendment stating that independence would result in a diminution of the citizenship rights of Transkeians.

The Transkei government had largely ignored the DP argument in its concern over Sinaba's motion. Stating that it too wanted independence, it had reiterated that it did not want to "do things haphazardly" and finish with the state in chaos. Sinaba, seconded ironically by Nogcantsi, had asked when Africans would be considered ready for independence by whites and had reminded the TNIP of the word "Independence" in the name of the party. He had rejected the fear, expressed by TNIP frontbenchers, that immediate independence would result in a loss of South African aid. Pretoria would continue aid in the event of financial difficulties, out

of fear that such assistance would come from "other countries", he had said. Independence was not tied to economic viability but to the acquisition of "basic human rights".¹²⁶ But the TNIP ranks had held firm: Guzana's motion was rejected by 50 votes (including Sinaba) to 21, while Sinaba lost by 49 votes to 1, the Opposition abstaining.

The emergence of a third party putting pressure on Matanzima from the "right", made the independence issue the scene of stormy debates during 1967 and 1968. In 1967, the TFPF proposed immediate independence in May 1967 or as soon after that as possible. Matanzima reiterated his earlier reasons for gradualism and added that independence could only come when the people were prepared to pay income tax "up to our necks". The vituperation which Sinaba and Diko showered on the TNIP appeared to affect Matanzima in a way that the DP had never managed to do. Instead of being able to dismiss arrogantly all protests as he had done in the past, Matanzima found the two-man TFPF challenging him in his own constituency. It rapidly emerged that he felt the whole future of his party threatened if he could not convince the people that he offered them something new and significant in the form of a Transkeian independent state. If he could not remove the whites, what purpose did he serve? Certainly, in 1968, Matanzima laid greater stress on rapid development to independence than on "gradualism". He made the issue one of the main planks of his party for the forthcoming 1968 election. His own manifesto, published long before the campaign began, showed his concern over the slow pace of South Africa's implementation of the policy, and challenged the government to make this policy more meaningful.¹²⁷

In the TLA, the new TNIP Chief Whip, M. H. Canca, tried to head off the TPFPP attack by calling on the South African government to do all in its power to prepare the Transkei for independence in the shortest possible time. The motion criticised the failure of the government to hand over the portfolios of health, posts and telegraphs, transport and information. The DP responded with its traditional motion that the Transkei be permanently retained "as an integral part of the Republic", while the TPFPP called for independence to be granted, first retrospectively, and then during 1968.¹²⁸

Mr. Canca denied that the TNIP wanted to set a date for independence; he agreed with Matanzima that employment for the people had to come first, but he wanted immediate negotiations with Pretoria to speed up the process. Mr. Diko (TPFPP) replied that independence had to come immediately because the existing situation made the TLA a dummy body to enslave the African. He urged the chiefs to "liberate their people". He referred to events in other Bantustans, saying that it appeared that Pretoria was reluctant to grant them even what it had given the Transkei; there was a growing realization that the black man was intelligent and could change the future of South Africa. The consequence was a slowdown in the pace in the Bantustans, he claimed, and thus it was necessary to win independence quickly.¹²⁹

The debate grew increasingly heated, with only Guzana and Matanzima seemingly immune from confusion. The TNIP attacked the DP for rejecting independence ("any person who denies independence has the mentality of a slave") and the TPFPP for wild irresponsibility. Sinaba demanded that the Transkei "take independence" which Diko embellished by adding "by force if

necessary". The TNIP decried them as "fanatics".¹³⁰ The emotions generated by the issue were great. Sinaba also raised the matter during the debate on agriculture, shouted for the resignation of the TNIP, accused the Minister of making "this stinky statement", and stating that "for five years we have listened to this rubbish while many people are suffering untold miseries"; he was removed from the Assembly.¹³¹ Later, speaking in East London, Sinaba stated that if returned at the election, he would "test the validity" of the Transkei Constitution Act in the courts.

Pretoria's reply to Canca's motion came during the parliamentary session in Cape Town when M. C. Botha stated that the road to independence was "a long and difficult one", requiring considerable administrative experience, a "deep rooted reliability in all actions", particularly financial, public integrity, responsibility and a "democratic way of life", control of all administration by one's own citizens, economic development and the ability to provide jobs for one's own people, and "a firm desire for peaceful coexistence" displayed by a desire to live in peace with others, especially one's neighbours.¹³² The rebuff was underlined by Blaar Coetzee's statement in the Senate that the Transkei would not get independence merely by asking; "this Parliament will decide when they are to receive that independence, and no one else ..."¹³³

The curt and indirect rejection of Canca's motion seemed to goad Matanzima in publicising the independence issue still more. He told public meetings in the Transkei that Africans would not tolerate being told to take "second place", that any whites still believing in baasskap would not

be tolerated by Africans, and that the Afrikaners were an object lesson from whom Africans could learn about the fight to achieve "nationhood". But he also was emphatic that jobs and development had to precede independence.¹³⁴

It would be rash to draw conclusions from the political debate in the Transkei during the first five years of the TLA. Africans had seen their national organizations of resistance destroyed by an efficient, powerful coercive mechanism and had been abruptly deposited in a powerless legislature in a rural backwater. The issues which had prompted the Defiance Campaign, the 1961 stay-at-home, and Sharpeville remained fresh, and were even intensified while they, at the same time, were forced to assume a pattern of debate and articulation determined for them by the government they opposed.

Nevertheless, some factors did emerge as tendencies for the future. The first was that the integrated nature of society in South Africa ensured that debate could not be confined entirely to the Transkei. Increasingly the TLA came to concern itself with matters of apartheid policy such as influx control, police and Bantu Education. The problem of land rehabilitation, although superficially affecting only the rural population, took on a national dimension when local suffering was exacerbated by population pressures resulting not only from drought but, also, from influx control policies. The nature of the society established that even local policies implemented by Pretoria could not operate in isolation from the general level of apartheid. Equally, if Pretoria was to push land rehabilitation, removing people from the land to serve the border industries, and influx

control, the Transkei would need more land. The zoning of towns as black and the "return" of conquered territories became issues directed against the South African government by their own black supporters in the reserves. The close association which exists between all the issues raised in the TLA is very real, a reflection of the whole society's integrated nature; it is our own delineation, for purposes of analysis, which is artificial.

Externalization implies two factors. Firstly, for externalization to succeed, non-realistic (in the sense of tension release) should replace realistic (in the sense of seeking satisfaction of interests) conflict. Here the strategy would appear to have succeeded to a certain extent. Africans in the Transkei now debated apartheid among themselves instead of taking their rejection of it for granted. Furthermore, they disagreed strongly on the nature of the coercive mechanism in the area, despite the fact that the police had long symbolised and implemented their deprivation. And finally, they were forced to redefine the relationship between the old and new elite in the leadership of opposition to white hegemony.

But secondly, externalization also requires that Africans do not make demands which threaten to diminish white privilege. In South Africa, where white privilege is so great and the erosion of even a minimal aspect of it is seen as a threat to the security of the state, any demand which seeks to compromise this monopoly of power will be resisted. Such resistance by the white government occurred when demands were made to end Bantu Education, to relax influx control, to remove whites from the Transkei, and

to hand over the remaining lands of what had been Kaffraria and was now wealthy white farmland. And, in each case, the resistance created growing anger in the Transkei and led to an increasing harshness in the tone of such demands by the Africans.

The demand for independence forms a category of its own. While it is true that apartheid ideology does make provision for independence, it is also true that whites see it as something reserved for the very distant future, something to be granted as a last resort. That two men were able to force the TNIP into making demands for a speed up of the entire process, and that the Minister's curt refusal in Parliament only resulted in increased agitation by Matanzima, is an indication that the Transkei will not easily fall into line with Pretoria's wishes where these are seen as detrimental to her own interests.

It is also an indication that the 45 elected members, while they cannot control the proceedings of the TLA, can place extremely heavy pressures on Matanzima. Given the existence of an elected element at all, the people have the ability to express their disapproval of the performance of the chiefs, as they did in 1963. And the chiefs, if they wish to rule by an authority stronger and more stable than the South African police, must respond to these signals. That is the major lesson of the 1963-1968 session of the TLA.

To some extent, then, the TLA defused the situation which had existed in 1960, to a large extent replacing violence with discussion. But externalization did not appear to have succeeded in the main. The TLA provided

a platform, as Sabata has pointed out, for the articulation of grievances for which others had been imprisoned before 1963. It also forced the chiefs to make demands in an attempt to regain their former stature and legitimise themselves as leaders within the context of a modern political system. Most important, debates tended to indicate that, if for no other reason than that 250,000 Transkeians worked in the white owned areas and local poverty was great, it was difficult and often impossible to divorce local demands from the overall political situation in the country.

The Transkei went to the polls in 1968 to choose between an opposition demanding equality in the common society, and a government committed officially to apartheid, but increasingly demanding that whites honour the propoganda as well as the purpose of the strategy. The tentative lines drawn in the first five years would take more definite shape during and after the election.

CHAPTER III

THE 1968 ELECTION AND AFTER.

The Transkei's second elections for the 45 elected seats in the TLA took place on October 23rd, 1968. The debate over the issues which had dominated the proceedings of the First Assembly had become increasingly heated and party positions increasingly uncompromising during that body's 1968 session. The DP had continued to oppose the implementation of separate development in the Transkei, and had emphatically opposed the separation of the area from the rest of South Africa. They had demanded equality within the common society, and rejected any form of independence outside it. The TNIP, or rather Matanzima, under pressure from opposition charges that he was a stooge, TFPF attacks on his reluctance to press for immediate independence, and several TNIP elected members, who wanted a faster pace of development and separation, had moved increasingly towards expressions of black exclusivism and an anti-white racism. The election year saw a polarisation within the Transkei of the two traditions of African resistance to white supremacy. Increasingly, demands made by both sides became inimical to the comfortable management of conflict externalization by Pretoria. While non-realistic conflict articulation had not disappeared (the very powerlessness of the Transkei made this impossible) African demands had rapidly assumed more realistic perspectives in that they challenged

white privilege by demanding substantive rights for Africans, albeit in two very different ways.

The 1968 election was to hasten this progression of African attitudes in the Transkei and create a political environment in which definite expressions of antipathy to the whites of South Africa was decreasingly hidden behind a smokescreen of platitudes about gratitude to the Nationalist government.

When the 1968 session of the TLA ended, the DP commanded the support of 27 elected members and 11 chiefs. The TNIP had the support of 15 elected members and 53 chiefs. Two members were TFPF representatives and one sat as an independent. The DP thus had suffered a loss of 14 supporters during the first five years of Transkeian "self-government". Three chiefs had abandoned the party to the TNIP. One elected member, Cromwell Diko, had joined the TFPF, another nine had crossed to Matanzima, and one, Dr. Bala, had resigned from the party, in anger at what he considered Guzana's moderation. Bala regarded the whole Transkei venture as a fraud, and resented the manner in which the DP appeared to "play the game" and decided to sit as an independent, delivering impassioned speeches against the immorality of apartheid. The DP also lost one seat in a bye-election in Qakeni, where Nogcantsi's seat fell vacant after his imprisonment and was won by the TNIP, after a rebel DP candidate split the opposition vote. Nogcantsi was replaced by Sobahle, who rapidly became a major TNIP voice in the demands for a faster pace towards independence. While a few chiefs

had crossed to the DP shortly after parties were formed, Matanzima's only permanent loss of support was the defection of Sinaba over the independence issue. At dissolution, then, Matanzima controlled the support of 68 members of the TLA and commanded an absolute majority of 27.

The DP needed to win 42 of the 45 elected seats in the 1968 election and to hold the support of 13 chiefs in order to command a majority. Since this seemed completely unlikely, Matanzima was almost certainly assured a majority, even if he suffered the same defeat in the elections as he had in 1963. In fact, the DP appeared more likely to be able to woo several chiefs to join its ranks, than to sweep the elections. The party had proved unable to control rebels from standing in bye-elections and had lost one seat on a split vote. On the other hand, there were several chiefs who were believed willing to join the opposition because they felt they had alienated the loyalty of their people by supporting Matanzima. Evidence indicated that some of these had approached Guzana about the matter but had been advised to remain with the TNIP until they commanded a solid block of votes which could alter the balance of power.¹ As we shall see, this proved to be a grave error on the part of Guzana. The possibility of a change of government in the Transkei was largely academic; interest in the election lay in the indications it would provide of popular attitudes to apartheid (or rather to black exclusivism) and the possible reaction of the chiefs to another mass rejection of their policies.

The 1968 election cannot be accurately compared with that of 1963. In 1963, the election had revolved around personalities; people voted for the

"good" chiefs, led by Poto, and rejected the government's "stooge", Matanzima. They expressed dissatisfaction over the part which the traditional aristocracy had played in the implementation of Bantu Authorities and land rehabilitation policies which had led to popular revolt in 1960. In 1968, Transkeians voted for parties for the first time. Further, they now had to choose between a party led by traditional leaders, and one led by an educated commoner (Poto had resigned as leader of the DP, to express his support for the idea of an upper house for chiefs, and the party had been led for most of the first five years by Knowledge Guzana). Most important, the technical machinery of election had been substantially altered. In 1963, voters had expressed a multiple choice in nine constituencies, which were the nine tribal regions of the Transkei. The system had proved extremely unwieldy. In 1967, the constituencies had been altered to comprise the 26 magisterial districts of the Transkei and the 45 seats were now divided among these areas.² Detailed comparisons of the two elections thus cannot be made.

The total number of registered voters for 1968 was 907,778, an increase of only 28,000 over 1963. The registration of voters in the urban areas showed no increase over 1963, comprising just over a quarter of a million of the total. As this was thought to represent only 50% of eligible urban residents, urban interest in the concept of a "separate homeland" had obviously not increased.

Nomination of candidates closed on 26th August. The TNIP put up a candidate for every seat, while the DP contested 42 of the 45 places. The

two TNIP candidates in St. Marks and the one in Butterworth, were returned unopposed. In Butterworth, the DP front-bencher, O. O. Mpondo, was refused nomination because he was unable to produce his pass book; Mpondo, the DP's Chief Whip in the TLA, was unable to collect the document before nominations closed, giving the TNIP candidate, N. P. Bulube, a seat the latter had seemed certain to lose. Thus, from the start, one of the DP's major figures was eliminated. Butterworth had been the area of Dr. Bala's support, but he had refused to stand out of contempt for the TLA and the Bantustan policy.³

The TPFPP nominated six candidates in four districts. The two major parties suffered a rash of defections after party nominations were decided upon. The result was a proliferation of independent candidates, finally totalling 52 in all, though a large number of these were people uncommitted to the main political parties. In all, 145 people declared themselves for the 45 seats, the largest single block being independents, an indication of the weak hold which parties had on their members and the importance of local loyalties and issues. All but nine of the districts remained multiple seat constituencies, but no district required the voter to cast more than three votes to fill three seats. Fifteen districts returned two members each, while two, Engcobo and Lusikisiki, returned three representatives each. Generally, DP strongholds tended to be more strongly affected by independent candidates: Engcobo had 15 people contesting its three seats, Umtata six for two seats, Mount Fletcher eight for two seats. Nevertheless, rebel candidates from both parties were the norm rather than the exception

in all but Matanzima's own Emigrant Tembuland. Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau's region, Qakeni, the scene of several post-1960 attacks on chiefs, and the main centre of rural unrest in the Transkei, predictably showed a large number of rebels from both parties in its constituencies: Mount Frere was contested by eight aspirants, Tabankulu by seven. In Dalindyebo, five men who were not nominated by the party left the DP to stand as rebels after a misunderstanding over nominations, compounded by indecisive leadership from Paramount Chief Sabata. The TNIP expelled, in all, 20 people who stood as independents in defiance of party orders.⁴ The party rebels were expected to aid TFPF candidates, where these stood, by splitting the vote of the two main parties.

The TNIP campaign was dominated by the two Matanzimas. Kaiser had withstood a challenge to his leadership from P. M. Sobahle, a former chairman of the Transkei Public Service Commission, during the 1968 TNIP Congress; Sobahle had been expelled and now stood as an independent in Tabankulu. Matanzima made a strong effort to win votes, indicating that while he could continue without popular support, the Chiefs felt that such an endorsement was considered extremely necessary. He campaigned on his past achievements, claiming to have steered the area through a "difficult period". He demanded a faster pace towards independence, Africanization of the civil service, the removal of the whites and the takeover of "white spots". At least one observer felt that his attacks on the South African Government's lethargy in developing the Transkei, made a strong impact on Transkeians.⁵

The TNIP Manifesto called for a rapid handover of more departments of

government to the Transkei and, in due course, independence from South Africa. The Manifesto attacked the opposition indirectly, first as "leftist political rabble rousers" supported by the "European-owned and edited Press". Apart from the word "European" instead of "English", the TNIP Manifesto closely paralleled, in its rhetoric, the language of the Nationalist Party. But it did make an appeal on a broad anti-white basis which Pretoria was unlikely to approve. It also echoed the Nationalists in its attack on the DP for a lack of "patriotism", describing the party as "people devoid of all national sentiment".⁶ To this was added demands for whites to leave the Transkei. This subject evoked such enthusiasm from TNIP activists that a pamphlet appeared in which, in Matanzima's language, whites were described, in general, as "lice feeding on the blood of the black man". Matanzima denied all knowledge of the pamphlet, but at no stage repudiated it!⁷

In his efforts to win the election, Matanzima sought to "popularise" the traditional aristocracy by persuading them to offer themselves as candidates for election, instead of claiming ex officio seats. In this, his only success was his brother George, who was returned unopposed at St. Marks, although a large number of members of royal houses, who were not chiefs, did run for election. Matanzima even approached the Xhosa Queen Mother, Nozizwe Sigcau, in an unsuccessful bid to persuade her to stand, but TNIP candidates abounded with names like Mtirara and Sigcau.⁸

Matanzima also made an effort to recruit educated people to his cause. The general level of incompetence which his party had manifested in the First

Assembly had placed great strains on himself and his brother during all debates. In addition, his cabinet had performed so poorly that white officials had quite openly stated that they had a free hand in running their departments⁹ and the TNIP had remained open to constant charges of being stooges and of being corrupt.¹⁰ Matanzima succeeded in gaining several educated supporters, including three University graduates. Three of these recruits were particularly noteworthy. N. P. Bulube, returned unopposed in Butterworth, held a diploma in agriculture and became the Minister of Agriculture after the election. Miss Stella Sigcau, a member of the traditional elite and a Fort Hare University graduate, had appeal to a large section of the population. The most impressive, however, was Curnick Ndamse, a former teacher at Fort Hare. He had been one of the few faculty members of Fort Hare to accept Bantu Education. This he did, he told students, because he felt that there had to be a way out of the African's dilemma in South Africa and that separation might be that way. If Bantustans were a fraud, he wanted to expose them "from within" as such; if not, they might prove to be the only way Africans could be rid of white exploitation. In 1965, however, Ndamse attacked the Ministry of Bantu Administration for unfair application of Bantu Education, including discrimination against African women teachers. He was removed from Fort Hare and banned.¹¹ In 1967 Matanzima travelled to Cape Town, persuaded the government to modify the banning order, and appointed Ndamse to a senior bureaucratic post in the Transkei Ministry of Education. The

banning order was finally lifted to allow Ndamse to stand for the TNIP.

Ndamse became a third TNIP force during the campaign. With white newspapers obviously interested in him, he was given wide publicity in his attacks on whites as a group:

"I am sick and tired of the white man's nonsense and hypocrisy ... In practical terms, segregation (the Nationalist Party) segregation with justice (United Party) and the granting of a qualified franchise (Progressive Party) are synonymous ... Separate development has given the white man all the good things in life. Our pledge and vow is that the black man has his turn. We shall make mistakes, but they are our mistakes. We would rather rule in hell than sweep the streets in heaven... (I) abhor domination".(12)

Ndamse's perspective, linking apartheid to the demand for independence and the end of exploitation, formed the basis of Matanzima's appeal to the electorate. M. C. Botha's rejection of Canca's independence motion¹³ encountered indirect attack from TNIP speakers who increasingly pressed for a rapid advance to independence in their campaign speeches. Matanzima was able to counter opposition charges that he was a stooge and a personal power seeker by proposing his peculiar brand of African nationalism, justified by Ndamse's argument that even the Transkei was better than continued permanent subordination to the white boss - an appeal used successfully earlier against Federation by Dr. Banda in Malawi.

"Matanzima, the creature of the Nationalists, was able to pose as the apostle of African nationalism by pledging to strive for independence from South Africa".(14)

The personal contrast between the aggressive, vocal Matanzima and the cool, reasoned, highly moralistic Guzana, is expressed also in the different tone of the DP campaign. Guzana, the rural lawyer, a convinced

multi-racialist and a highly articulate man, fought his campaign on premises which can perhaps best be described as Christian liberalism. Although he had entered the TLA without any political background, he had been that body's outstanding figure. He fought this campaign in the face of great animosity from most of the chiefs who feared that, if he won, he might persuade the South African Government to banish them to an Upper House. Under Guzana, the DP condemned restrictions on labour mobility in South Africa and demanded the right of the African to enjoy a family life wherever he worked. Asserting the need for white skills in the Transkei, the DP condemned the policy of moving the whites out, and proposed a policy of racial goodwill and understanding among the races who "must live together in South Africa to eternity". The party also asserted the integrated nature of the country and held that economic growth assured the African of "upliftment", whereas a closed Transkei economy was "neither feasible nor realistic". The party further stated that the African was as great a South African patriot as anyone else and called for free elections under universal suffrage so that he could "pledge his patriotism".¹⁵

But if the demands made by the DP were, in ^{the} South African context, radical, the manner of expression was not. The party condemned "subversion" in any form. It also soon became clear that Matanzima was able to depict it to the voters as a party of reaction and conservatism, seeking to preserve the white yoke on the Africans by retaining the Transkei as "an integral part of South Africa".¹⁶ It is an irony that apartheid creates a pattern of perspectives which enable the party advocating what are radical changes

in the whole society, to be perceived as a group of conservatives seeking to preserve the existing system; the irony is no doubt attributable to the great success of the repressive mechanism and the consequent hopeless situation in the common society in which the African sees himself.

So effective was Matanzima's early campaign that visiting journalists predicted a massive election victory for him. This seemed to spur Matanzima to still stronger demands. He renewed his call for more land, for new portfolios (to which list Police was added) and took up the most controversial sentence in the party manifesto. This promised to assist Transkeians "in the fight against all laws passed before 1963 that do not appeal to the Transkeian people".¹⁷ Nevertheless, the DP appeared to rally support in the last fortnight of the campaign - particularly after Sabata returned to campaign after a long illness. With a week left to the election, journalists were no longer predicting a TNIP landslide. Roger Omond of the "Daily Dispatch" felt that the DP would retain the majority of elected seats though the TNIP seemed likely to make several gains.¹⁸

The TNIP campaign, particularly its anti-white aspects, is known to have given white officials there some anxiety. Early in the year, when Matanzima's demands were becoming louder under TPFPP pressure, this anxiety became manifest. Welcoming Vorster to Umtata, Matanzima referred to "this territory which is developing to independence" and was answered icily by Vorster: "It sounds strange that I should be welcomed to my own country".¹⁹ During this period, DP relations with seconded officials from Pretoria improved markedly. They were increasingly called on to sit in on

most conferences involving discussions between Umtata and Pretoria, and Guzana was given a salary as leader of the opposition of R1,800 a year.²⁰ While this was seen by many observers as intended to prepare for the possibility of a DP government in the Transkei, it would seem also to indicate growing sympathy for the DP in the light of its avowed opposition to independence for the Transkei and its concern with friendship between the races.²¹ Certainly, during the election, Matanzima, on one occasion, accused the white officials in the Transkei of aiding the DP in its campaign and even of writing speeches for the Opposition. The charge is unlikely to be true, but it does indicate increasingly strained relations between the TNIP and the South African government. The whole election placed Vorster in an embarrassing position. A DP victory would again be seen as a popular rejection of apartheid, while a Matanzima win might encourage him to make demands for Transkeian autonomy, which the white electorate were not ready to contemplate.²²

Of the TFPF campaign, very little has been reported. The party appeared to make little impact on voters despite its militant policy. Its manifesto called for immediate and total independence for the Transkei. It also demanded the abolition of all "discriminatory legislation", equal pay for equal work, the introduction of adult education, industrialization of the Transkei, and increased food production.²³ Totally lacking resources, opposed by both the old and the new elites, and able to present few candidates, it seemed a collection of individuals rather than a party. Apart from the often repeated threat by Sinaba to test the Transkei

Constitution Act in the courts after the election, because of the lack of tangible progress, little was heard of the party.²⁴

Of the independents, only two offered the voters more than their own desire to sit in the TLA for five years. Many were obviously seeking the opportunity their own party had denied them of a fairly comfortable position in an impoverished Transkei. But Sobahle represented dissatisfaction with Matanzima's leadership though not with his aims. And, in Guzana's district of Mqanduli, Nkosiyanane offered the militant opposition to white South Africa which had characterised his speeches in the TLA. Like Nogcantsi, he had been arrested on a charge of plotting Matanzima's murder and, though freed on appeal, had lost his seat in the TLA through non-attendance. The DP refused to nominate him again, possibly because it did not approve of his views, and he stood as an independent supporting the party.

The election, in which the TNIP needed to win no seats (as it had an absolute majority comprising 54 chiefs and three unopposed candidates) took place quietly in rain. Despite appeals from the Transkei Secretary of the Interior, bars and bottle stores owned by whites (and thus not subject to Transkei legislation) remained open, but there were no incidents.²⁵ South African police had been brought in earlier to ensure that no trouble occurred, but were not needed. In the urban areas, despite appeals from Vorster himself to employers to drive their employees to the polls, there was little activity and a great deal of apathy.²⁶ Voters voted for as many candidates as there were seats returned by their district. Where a voter was illiterate, he instructed an official in the presence of two witnesses,

to mark his ballot paper according to his wishes.²⁷

Both parties expressed confidence of victory. The DP were, however, expected to win at least 20 seats and the TNIP 13. The DP was considered secure in Willowvale, Umtata, Engcobo, Tsomo, Qumbu, Mqanduli, Libode and Flagstaff. It also appeared likely to pick up seats in divided districts like Tsolo, Ngeleni, Matatiele, Mount Frere, Bizana and Lusikisiki. The TNIP had already won St. Marks and Butterworth, and was expected to pick up further seats in Port St. John, Umzimkulu, Xalanga, Lusikisiki, Mount Ayliff, Tsolo, Ngeleni, Mount Frere and Bizana. Idutywa was also expected to divide between the parties, but was considered marginal along with Mount Fletcher, Ngamakwe, Elliotdale, and Kentani in which the DP was favoured to win narrowly.²⁸

In the event, the TNIP won the election most handsomely and surprisingly, gaining 28 seats to the DP's 14. (See Appendix III) Three independents were returned, of whom two supported the DP and one the TNIP. The TFPF was completely eliminated, although Sinaba and Diko had been expected to retain their seats. Diko was the only Freedom Party candidate to do well at the polls; Sinaba was placed seventh in the vote at Matatiele, while most of his followers lost their deposit.²⁹ The TFPF managed only 18,324 votes or 2.25% of the total cast. None of the independents who were not party rebels was elected. In all they polled just over one-sixth of the vote (17.52%) or just under half the votes recorded for the Democratic Party. Three party rebels were returned, the most notable being Nkosiyane, who received twice as many votes as the DP's S. Bacela, although he was well

behind the total for Guzana, in Mqanduli. But another prominent DP rebel, Miss L. Twetwa, came a poor fifth in Qumbu, while the former TNIP front-bencher, Sobahle, only ran fourth in Tabankulu where he was expected to win. Nevertheless, the large total vote for independent candidates was an indication of weak party loyalty among the Transkeian peasants, and strong attachments to local district issues and personalities.

While the two parties finally obtained between them just over 80% of the votes cast, the figures indicate that many voters did not vote a straight party ticket. This split ticket voting is another indicator of a weak identification with the parties. In multiple seat constituencies candidates from the same party never obtained equal votes and in most cases disparities between the votes for candidates of the same party were great. The DP voting recorded fairly strong party stability only in Engcobo, Ngeleni, and Qumbu among the regions where the party won, and in Idutywa, Kentani, Matatiele, Mount Frere, Tabankulu and Tsolo, where it lost.

TNIP votes showed party stability which was fairly strong in Idutywa, Kentani, Lusikisiki, Matatiele, Mount Frere, Tabankulu and Umzimkulu among the districts won by the party, and in Engcobo, Ngeleni, Qumbu and Umtata where it lost. Yet for the most part, such stability for both parties was weakly established. In some constituencies it would appear that voters from both parties combined to cast their second ballot for an independent (as in Bizana). In others, voters supported one of the official party candidates and deserted the other in favour of a rebel from the same party. Thus in Mqanduli, Guzana's vote was roughly the same as the combined votes

of Nkosiyanane and Bacela, while in Tsolo, the combined vote of the victorious TNIP rebel and the defeated TNIP candidate was roughly the same as that of the victorious TNIP's Mabandla. And in multiple member constituencies where no independents stood, such as Nqeleni, it would appear that many voters withheld their second vote.

Stability of party loyalty would appear to have been slightly stronger for TNIP voters than for DP voters. TNIP candidates received similar votes more often than did DP members. This probably helps to account for the TNIP success for, in constituencies won by narrow margins, the TNIP tended to perform more consistently well, win or lose. More important, the TNIP vote was more evenly spread than that of the DP, which tended to be concentrated in its strongholds and weak in marginal constituencies. Thus the TNIP won almost two-thirds of the seats on 43.95% of the votes cast, while the DP won just over one-third of the seats (including successful rebels) on 36.28% of the votes. To a large extent, the uneven distribution of seats among the electorate, caused by the determination to use district boundaries (instead of a sounder delineation which would have required a census) worked for the TNIP. Engcobo returned three DP members for 80,000 voters compared with Lusikisiki returning three TNIP members for 60,000 voters, while in Xalanga 11,000 voters elected one member and in Port St. Johns one member was returned by 10,000 electors. Nevertheless, this point can be overstressed. In Nqamakwe, a TNIP stronghold, only one member was returned by 20,000 voters. The TNIP won, in the end, because in marginal constituencies like Matatiele and Idutywa, it was able to obtain stronger

party loyalty than the DP, which tended to be beset by indecision among its leaders. For this Paramount Chief Sabata was partly to blame for his insistence on supporting (or being indecisive about rejecting) party rebels. Whereas Matanzima had no hesitation in expelling rebel candidates, the DP's attitude to them was less clearly defined. Often remonstrations were the only disciplinary action taken. Where DP rebels left the party, it was usually on their own initiative rather than that of the party executive.³⁰

Nevertheless, party rebels appear to have harmed the DP by making the leadership indecisive and uncertain in the campaign, rather than by costing them many seats in the TLA. Most of the identifiable DP rebels stood in DP strongholds like Dalindyebo and Nyanda regions, where the party won anyway, though with a far lower vote than it would otherwise have received. The two successful rebels rejoined the party immediately they were elected. On the other hand, a TNIP rebel definitely lost Port St. Johns for Matanzima, giving the DP a majority of 144 votes in what was considered a safe TNIP seat. With or without rebels, the DP was secure in Engcobo, Umtata, Libode, Mqanduli, Ngeleni, Qumbu and Tsomo for a total of 11 seats. The redistribution of Independent votes might have given the party another seat in Bizana, Idutywa, Mount Fletcher and Willowvale but would definitely have lost it Port St. Johns. Thus, at best the DP could have finished with 19 seats (instead of 16) to Matanzima's 26 (instead of 29) and even this is unlikely as Willowvale could just as easily have gone to the TNIP from such a redistribution.

Why then did the TNIP win so dramatically? The concentration of DP

voters in two regions is partly the answer, but does not go far enough. The increased voting turnout (79% as against 69% in 1963) may have been occasioned by a turnout of "red blanket" voters who would support the chiefs and hence the TNIP, but who had stayed home in 1963 to express their disapproval of co-operation with apartheid. Certainly the urban polling demonstrated no greater enthusiasm for the Transkei than it had in 1963, and this would mean a loss of potential DP votes. An increase of rural votes would tend to help the TNIP; an increase of urban votes the DP. The first occurred while the second did not.

But the most important determinant of the result was undoubtedly the influence of the traditional aristocracy. Where a strong chieftaincy remained in the Transkei, voters tended to support the party to which their chiefs belonged. Every seat in Paramount Chief Sabata's Dalindyebo and Paramount Chief Poto's Nyanda regions went to the DP or to a DP rebel. Similarly, Emigrant Tembuland (Matanzima) and Qakeni (Botha Sigcau) Regions returned only TNIP members. These four regions accounted for 11 DP seats and 12 TNIP seats. The nucleus of support for both parties therefore came from four regions whose Paramount Chiefs were prominent leaders of the two parties. In Gcaleka, the pattern is less clear. The TNIP took all but one seat reflecting the loyalties of its Paramount Chief. While independents drew votes away from the DP in Idutywa to give Matanzima victory there, party rebels did not influence the victory of the TNIP in Elliotdale, where both sides suffered from rebels and where the TNIP scored a surprise victory. Only in Willowvale were the seats shared by the two parties. Gcaleka is

presided over by the Transkei's senior Paramount Chief, Zwelidumile Sigcau, but voting loyalties were probably weaker than in the other four regions because Sigcau was put on the throne by the South African government in preference to his anti-government nephew who was considered the legitimate successor. Since he is widely regarded as a usurper in the region, Zwelidumile's influence was probably much weaker than that of the other four Paramount Chiefs and this was reflected in a less definite adherence to the wishes of the chiefs. Nevertheless, Gcaleka is the region which is probably least affected by the modern rural elite and it is significant that the two successful candidates in Willowvale, while representing different parties, both bore names of the traditional aristocracy - Sigcau (TNIP) and Dumalisile (DP). While Guzana averred, throughout the campaign, that the chiefs seemed to be interfering less in politics than they had done in 1963,³¹ Matanzima retained great faith in the chieftaincy as a politically powerful group, putting up a number of people who would have qualified for ex officio seats as TNIP candidates.³² Matanzima's confidence in the value of traditional support was thus justified, while Guzana's decision to make potential supporters among the chiefs remain on the TNIP benches, probably cost him thousands of votes.

In regions without Paramount Chiefs, a less definite pattern of party support can be seen. In Emboland, the chiefs were divided between the parties. The TNIP, with majority support from the chieftaincy, won Mount Frere and Tsolo comfortably, while the DP easily retained Qumbu, from where their frontbencher, Chief S. S. Majeke, came. Similarly, in Umzimkulu, the

pro-TNIP chiefs were led by Chief Petros Jozana, the chairman of the TLA (the equivalent of Speaker) and the TNIP retained their seats there quite easily. Fingoland on the other hand, had been, in 1963, the scene of an electoral battle between the young elite and the unpopular, weak chieftaincy. The DP had won easily there and was expected to do so again. The 1968 results would indicate that the chiefs were now more influential as the TNIP won easily in Kentani and overwhelmingly in Nqamakwe. Still, the DP held Tsomo, despite the candidature of a rebel, and would almost certainly have won Butterworth had Mpondo's nomination succeeded (Butterworth is the home of Dr. Bala and the disenchanted young elite is concentrated there). The Fingoland pattern would indicate that the more rooted in traditional values an area was, the more likely it was to follow the chiefs in the swing to the TNIP. Elsewhere, the indications are that where the chiefs remained popular, or were regarded as the legitimate local leaders, the people tended to vote along the lines they recommended.

To a lesser extent, personalities were also important in the Transkei election. Although Guzana was a commoner, his high education gave him high status and earned him respect in the area. Similarly, Dr. Bala, though he did not stand, was accorded respect on the infrequent occasions that he made public statements - most notably an angry exchange in Butterworth with Bulube (TNIP) whom he accused of unfairly attempting to influence voters at a polling booth.³³ Curnick Ndamse's election victory was in part due to his status as an academic and in part to the support of the local chiefs,³⁴ despite the fact that he was a stranger in the area. Nkosiyane's

victory over the official DP candidate in a DP stronghold was due to his popularity as an outspoken enemy of apartheid. And Miss Stella Sigcau won easily because of her status as a member of the royal house and a graduate. Indeed, only three women were elected and two of these were related to the traditional aristocracy. But personality did not save other candidates who stood in districts where the chiefs strongly opposed them. The DP frontbencher, H. H. Bubu, Cromwell Diko, C. S. Mda (another prominent DP spokesman) Miss Twetwa, and Sobahle, all lost their seats.

The fact that only just over 30% of Transkeians are literate, and that most of these are away at work in the towns, means that the chiefs have inordinate influence on their followers, who constitute a local electorate in which over 80% are probably illiterate. People tend to vote for a candidate pointed out by the chief. The result is that many voters who believe in escaping from the whites vote DP, while others who want whites to remain in the Transkei vote TNIP. Where the chiefs are not in disfavour, they have strong influence in deciding voting preferences in a situation in which the party machinery is primitive and reaches far fewer people than do the chiefs.³⁵

The weakness of party resources compounds the influence of the traditional elite. Throughout the campaign, the DP was crippled by a lack of funds, with nominees being forced to pay their deposits out of their own pockets and sponsor electoral organisations from their own resources and in their spare time. In contrast the TNIP machine, while still extremely amateur, was relatively efficient and, more important, seemed to have ample

funds, free publicity on Radio Bantu, and the free and effective organisation which the chiefs provided.³⁶ The DP was thus less able to reach the voters in this election than the TNIP.

The power of the chiefs robs the election of much of its democratic potential. Their influence is strengthened by the parochial loyalties of the electorate which remains behind in the Transkei, after its labour force has migrated to the towns. Voters interviewed at a polling station generally expressed a desire to elect representatives from their own villages and districts, who could "seize power in the Transkei". Where such voters came from Dalindyebo or Nyanda Regions, they often added a hope that in this way they might "kick out Matanzima and his men".³⁷ The power of the chiefs also created a strong element of coercion in the election. Many villagers expressed the fear that if they did not vote as they had been ordered to do in their village, they would be in serious trouble, and some refused to believe that the ballot was secret.³⁸ This fear was increased by the voting procedure: illiterate voters were not catered for by party symbols on separate boxes. Instead, they had to whisper their choice to an electoral official who marked the ballot paper in the presence of two witnesses (all of whom were appointed by the government and over whom the white Bantu Commissioners presided) thus strengthening the "Matanzima will know how we vote" feeling of the people.³⁹ This system of voting led to allegations of poll rigging by the Opposition. A test case involving two districts was believed to be in progress in 1969, but its results have not been available. Chief D. D. P. Ndamase is known,

however, to have referred to the positioning of the polling booth at the headquarters of the Mcebani Tribal Authority in Ngeleni, where the T.A. Chairman, Curnick Ndamse, was a candidate, as "very irregular". He also made similar references to the stationing of a polling booth in Port St. Johns, in a kraal whose headman was an independent candidate there.⁴⁰

The element of coercion was still more noticeable in the application of Proclamation R400. The emergency powers which it gave to the chiefs allowed them to vet all meetings held in their area and to banish people to other districts. The DP found great difficulty in obtaining permission from hostile chiefs for the holding of election meetings. This capability was supported by police action. Where chiefs did not banish a local recalcitrant, the police could always detain him without trial under other offences listed in Proclamation R400. In October, five men were detained under these police powers. They included Chief Joyi⁴¹ and two other officials of the Transkei General Workers Union, one of whom had previously been jailed in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act.⁴² A week later, four more men, from Engcobo, were similarly detained.⁴³ Such actions, when linked to the belief that chiefs know how one votes, are obviously not an encouragement to people to support the DP. And as if to stress the benefits accruing from support for the TNIP, Matanzima was able to demonstrate his ability to influence Pretoria, first over the banning of Ndamse and, second, when the banning order confining Mr. T. M. Ntlongana, a university honours graduate, to Idutywa, was lifted two months before the election.⁴⁴

While the predominant role of the chiefs in the political process of

the Transkei must be seen as the major factor in Matanzima's victory⁴⁵ we are still forced to conclude that Matanzima's ability to project apartheid as a means of removing white domination, to picture his party as struggling to free the Transkei from white control, and to use his position of power to his party's advantage, did attract a large number of voters and contributed greatly to his election victory. Otherwise, the disparity between the 1963 and 1968 results cannot be fully explained. Matanzima's position of power gave him resources which the opposition lacked. In October, Matanzima announced the immediate increase in wages and salaries of 1,200 Transkei government officers and 15,000 government labourers. Although the increases were small, he described them as being "in line with" salary increases recently made by the South African government.⁴⁶ This move further enhanced his popularity among the new African civil servants who were known to support his attitude to Africanization, and had earlier publicly expressed support for the treatment accorded to Mr. Stone by the Transkei government.⁴⁷ Matanzima's ability to attract educated people to his policy was reflected by the surprisingly good showing the TNIP made in Umtata in the election.

"An elite group capable of taking full personal advantage of possible immediate profits in the Transkei has emerged as allies to Matanzima. The candidates put forward by the Transkei National Independence Party were young, aggressive and well educated. The cabinet (after the 1968 election) itself consists of lawyers and university graduates".(48)

Whereas Matanzima's pledge to remove white domination and white traders from the Transkei carried strong appeal for the mass of illiterate

voters in an impoverished rural area, the DP's plea for racial tolerance, equality, and the preservation of a single South African state, appeared strangely conservative and out of touch with local attitudes. Experience, particularly of twenty years of Nationalist Party rule, did not appear to justify the opposition policy as realistic. Matanzima's alternative, of possible total independence, seemed to many voters to be a more hopeful one, or, at least, better than anything offered previously by the whites.⁴⁹ In addition, as early as 1964, scholars had found only a dim understanding of the concept of "multi-racialism" in the Transkei even among members of the educated rural group who professed support for it.⁵⁰ Further, the DP was likely to receive strongest support from the very group of Transkeians, both rural and urban, who were least likely to vote: an interviewer found strong disaffection for the whole idea of an independent Transkei from the young, militant intellectuals who regarded the Transkei venture as a cynical attempt to replace control by English whites with control by Afrikaners.⁵¹ The illiterate rural Transkeians, who formed the bulk of the Transkei electorate, had the weakest links with essentially urban concepts such as the DP's multi-racialism and equality: In fact, as if to illustrate the dislike of things urban, the five candidates in the election who lived in the urban areas, including Sinaba (TPFF) and Rev. Rajuili (DP), all lost the election.⁵²

The voting patterns of the 1968 Transkei election would indicate the validity of certain propositions which we employed earlier to elaborate the nature of conflict in South African society. The persistence of depri-

vation would appear to ensure the persistence of conflict. Given the poverty of the Transkei, Matanzima did not fight the election as a stooge of the South African government. In fact, he went to great lengths to dissociate himself from apartheid legislation like influx control. Further, he posited a version of apartheid which aimed at removing white supremacy through the rapid development of the Transkei, the progressive acquisition of more meaningful political power by Africans, and the eventual achievement of independence (without white participation) for the area. The TNIP appeal to the electorate was made in terms of the need for meaningful economic and political policies for the Transkei through which Africans could escape white hegemony. Matanzima pointed out that the common society had resulted in white domination; he advocated separatism as a means of achieving African dignity and employed the concept of a separate territorial entity to couch such an end in nationalistic terms. In rejecting the TPFPP demand for independence before economic development, Matanzima sought not only to placate the white government, but also a future for the Transkei as something more than a politically independent labour reservoir for white South Africa. This demand, added to the claims for more land, changed the concept of apartheid - as seen by its African exponents - from one of tame acquiescence in the plans of the Ministry of Bantu Administration, to one of aggressive challenge to white privilege. Thus, while the institutional mechanisms of South African society, in particular its coercive potential, had lowered the level of facilitation of strife to the point where open conflict articulation by Africans in the urban areas had become impossible,

the persistent nature of deprivation had ensured the continuation of grievance articulation, even from within the apartheid system. Given the nature of African aspirations, consequent perceptions of deprivation, and the social immobility of the system, it would appear that conflict is not only inevitable, but that where old forms of articulation are destroyed, new ones will be found and utilised by African leaders.

The formal institutional structure of the Transkei provided the basis from which this new form of conflict articulation developed. Since the Africans to whom the values of the common society are most meaningful, work in the urban areas and have very little interest in the proceedings of the TLA, they are for all practical purposes, disenfranchised in the Transkei and forcibly controlled in the towns. The effect of this is to confine political participation in the Transkei to the rural element of the African population to whom it is most meaningful. The concept of a separate tribal nation is thus allowed to develop under the leadership of chiefs, while interference from the rival values of the common society is minimised.

Nevertheless, this process must be heavily qualified, by the fact that the DP remained a meaningful political force. It obtained more than a third of the total votes cast, and, had there been no independent candidates, would probably have received well over 40% of the vote. The very fact that certain members of the traditional elite and of the modern rural elite espouse the values of the common society, makes such values politically meaningful in the Transkei. The 1968 election in the Transkei did not mark

the end of urban, industrial values as a political force among Africans in South Africa. Rather, it marked a new willingness to try an alternative method of escaping from white domination, a hope that the Transkei Bantustan might provide Africans with the redress which they had been unable to achieve in the towns. Even those observers who did not regard the new conflict articulation as meaningful, saw it as a new form of opportunism:

"Nationalists are making much of Chief Matanzima's gains in the recent Transkei elections, which are being interpreted as an indication that Africans are coming to support apartheid ... Africans do not support apartheid. They may accept it as an unpleasant fact which they are powerless to change, and make what adjustments they can the better to live with it. But they do not support it; ... This inclination to adapt as best one can to a grim but unchangeable situation is, we suspect, now fairly widespread among Africans in this country. It is, moreover, the raison d'etre of the TNIP: Chief Matanzima's philosophy has always been, in effect, if you can't beat them, join them and get what you can out of them that way ... Transkei election results ... reflect a movement towards this amalgam of cynicism, hopelessness and opportunism".(53)

The emergence of this new institutionalized form of grievance articulation was reflected in the surprisingly weak showing of the DP at the polls. Although it received only 7.5% fewer voters than the TNIP, it suffered a substantial loss of support when compared with the victory of the pro-Poto group in 1963. As we have noted, the conservatism which an appeal to multi-racialism appeared to imply (in the context of the Transkei) made the DP leadership indecisive and uncertain. Rebels were not disciplined (and, indeed, many had the support of Paramount Chief Sabata) and the cautious nature of Guzana's politics alienated intellectuals like Dr. Bala and militants like Nkosiya⁵⁴. By the 1968 election, the DP resembled less the urban values which had been expressed by the ANC during the fifties, than

it did some cautious, mission school-type of Christian liberalism.

To the extent that the externalization strategy had yielded a popular vote for ethnic separatism, and to the extent that it had moved the Transkei Opposition to a position resembling the early nationalism of 1912 rather than 1952, it had seemingly succeeded in buying time for whites in South Africa. Yet Matanzima's campaign, predicated on demands which would entail real sacrifice from the white government, made the success of the strategy far less certain.

This was reflected in the uncertainty of white reactions to the election. The Nationalist Party naturally saw the victory as an occasion for celebration. Separate development had been vindicated, they held, by a black electorate. The opposition United Party was not as pleased; its leader, Graaff, spoke of "black nationalism out of control" and stressed the nationalistic, exclusivist aspects of the TNIP campaign.⁵⁵ And the Progressive Party newspaper, the Rand Daily Mail, saw the result as an expression of a new African cynicism and opportunism, as we have noted. Most English language newspapers in South Africa saw the result as giving Matanzima a mandate to increase his demands and put new pressure on Pretoria.⁵⁶ A Nationalist Party journal felt that

" ... while the victory of the TNIP is a triumph for the pure ideology of separate development, it is not necessarily a victory for the National Party government of South Africa ... Kaiser Matanzima has shown himself to be too much of a non-stooge for that. Thus while Matanzima praised separate development in a victory speech ... there are uncomfortable memories of the claims he has made on white territory ... of the blasts he has directed at Pretoria for the endorsement of Transkeians out of the white urban areas, of his pressure for quicker

"Transkeian progress to independence. The expectation of even bigger doses of this type of officially sanctioned black nationalism being administered to South Africa, probably tempered even National Party satisfaction about the outcome of the election".(57)

Stanley Uys took a still gloomier view of the conflict potential inherent in the Transkei Bantustan. In an article entitled "Bantustans a sure way to conflict"⁵⁸ he noted that Matanzima was under great pressure in the Transkei to "deliver some kind of goods to his own people". He could thus only increase the intensity of his demands, said Uys. At the same time, Vorster was under equal pressure from right wing members of his own party who objected to white financing of the Bantustans and to promises of eventual independence. The South African government was thus likely to come under increasing pressure while the demands of the Transkei were likely to increase as the pace of development remained static, he felt. Uys also foresaw the Transkei's demands centring on the need for more land, the need for internal industrial development, an end to the dumping of Africans endorsed out of the towns in the Transkei, greater powers for the Transkei government, and a speed up of the pace towards independence.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, another observer⁶⁰ felt that Matanzima's victory would defuse the conflict potential which existed between the Transkei and the South African government, since the pressure for independence from the TPFPP had now ended and since Matanzima could no longer demand concessions from the government to help him defeat the DP. A month after his earlier predictions, Uys, himself, reported that Matanzima had assured Vorster that he would not embarrass the government by making "premature and ill-

conceived demands for independence".⁶¹

Given the poverty of the Transkei, the need for its labour to migrate to the urban areas, and the nature of the promises made by the TNIP during the election, it remained for future events to show whether or not Matanzima was capable of fulfilling such an assurance. One observer⁶² noted that Matanzima was himself "a complex person" whose motives could not be understood. Given the ease with which Pretoria could be embarrassed by adverse publicity (indicated by its need for an assurance from Matanzima) there was also a new political factor in Transkeian politics in the form of the new, educated TNIP members of the TLA, who were unlikely to allow Matanzima to dictate his party's policies as he had done in the past.

This new element was strongly represented in the Transkei executive elected after the 1968 election. Matanzima remained Chief Minister and Minister of Finance, although nine members of his own party abstained from voting for him.⁶³ Of the four former members of his Cabinet, Matanzima dropped the weakest two - Z. M. Mabandla and C. K. Madikizela. George Matanzima retained the Education portfolio, while Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, the only minister in the First Assembly (apart from the Matanzimas) to have shown any noticeable degree of competence, became Minister of Justice. The three newcomers to the Transkei Cabinet all represented the new intelligentsia in the TNIP. Miss Stella Sigcau, a Fort Hare graduate and daughter of Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau of Qakeni, became Minister of Roads and Works. N. P. Bulube, holding a diploma in agriculture, became Minister of Agriculture. And Curnick Ndamse, who had been so prominent in the election

campaign, became Minister of the Interior. While Miss Sigcau and Bulube were not politically prominent figures, Ndamse's enormous ability was undoubted. A victim of South African government, he had made no secret of his dislike for whites and of his desire to free Africans of white domination. His appointment was in itself an indication that Matanzima did not intend to allow the issues raised during the election campaign to die. The new Transkei Cabinet contained four University graduates (the Matanzimas were both Fort Hare law graduates) of whom three were devoted to the ideology of black exclusivism. More important, the Matanzima brothers had flirted with the ANC and Unity Movements during their student days, Ndamse had been politically active at Fort Hare, and Stella Sigcau had been a member of the ANC Youth League while at the university. In addition, there was a newly elected TNIP frontbencher in the TLA: he was T. E. Tshunungwa, who had been returned unopposed for the TNIP in St. Marks, and had been an accused during the early stages of the Treason Trial in 1956.

The TNIP after 1968 had thus far closer links with the urban political experience than it had had before. This new look was accentuated in 1969 when Matanzima's son, Chief Mteto Matanzima succeeded to a chieftaincy and became an ex officio member of the TLA: he had been a PAC supporter at Fort Hare. Thus, if Matanzima relied heavily on the chiefs, the political leadership of the TNIP after 1968 election moved markedly away from the traditional elite towards people associated with the more traditional forms of African nationalism in South Africa. Even Matanzima himself, though a

stern advocate of the right of chiefs to lead, reflected a new style of chieftaincy: he saw its political role in a parliamentary-type institution rather than in the traditional form of local leadership. And he surrounded himself with people capable of administering a modern system of government, a reflection of his own status as a university graduate. Perhaps such a development was inevitable, in terms of the fact that the TLA institutionalized the ability of the masses to exert pressure on their chiefs through the elected minority in the Assembly; the peasantry could express dissatisfaction with the chieftaincy through the ballot box rather than through revolt. In this way, the chiefs were required to seek popular approval of their position in a way never required of them under the Bantu Authorities system. The result was, if the 1968 election result was any indication, that the chiefs were forced to ally with commoners who emphasised the nationalistic elements inherent in the policy of separatism and who, by virtue of their education and political skills, rapidly assumed a prominence in the TNIP which was denied to less educated chiefs. The TNIP thus appeared to become an alliance between the traditional elite and a new African nationalist who sought escape from white South Africa through separation.

Matanzima himself appeared to be fully aware of this, as indicated in a post-election speech in which he underlined the complex relationship between the chieftaincy and popular feelings of nationalism - a relationship which he, as a member of both the traditional elite and the modern educated elite, could perhaps more fully appreciate than other members of

the TLA. Attacking the DP as a party of "deceivers and pretenders" who propounded a policy of integration which had failed throughout the world, and who had no sense of national identity or wish for independence, Matanzima said:

"Today the voters have expressed themselves in no uncertain terms that they are no party to the policy of integration of white and black races ... Even those who managed to scrape through the polls under the banner of a multi-racial policy, know in their hearts they succeeded because of the support of the two Paramount Chiefs (Poto and Sabata) on the Opposition benches among their subjects. This answers the question of how powerful chieftainship is in the socio-political life of the African people ... (but) ... These two chiefs are trying to work against the strong forces of nationalism and, if they persist, they will find themselves losing the allegiance of their loyal subjects".(64)

Given the syncretistic nature of the TNIP, in which traditional and modern elites allied on the goal of separatist independence for the Transkei, and given the peculiar interdependence of chiefs and their people, in which chiefs were at once politically powerful and yet dependent on mass approval of their use of power and on educated expertise in the administration of power on the one hand, and mass loyalty to the chiefs as long as they reflected popular sentiments against white control, on the other hand, it would appear that Matanzima would find it difficult to meet his assurance to the South African government, that he would not "embarrass" it. An indication of the problems Matanzima would face should he attempt to revert to the policy and attitude favoured by the Ministry of Bantu Administration, was given by the reaction a reporter found among elected TNIP members after the election. "Nothing can stop us now", was the general feeling expressed

among these elected members when referring to the TNIP drive for more land and a more rapid pace to independence.⁶⁵

The attitudes so tentatively formed and expressed during the five year life of the First Assembly would appear, therefore, to have been crystallised during and by the 1968 election in the Transkei. An examination of the attitudes expressed during 1969 and the first part of 1970, both in the Second Assembly and elsewhere in the Transkei, would appear to indicate that, far from Matanzima's victory dissipating the intensity of demands expressed by Africans in the Transkei, the conflict potential and articulation of grievances actually increased during these months. Further, tension release became a less frequent motive for conflict expression and the demands made by Africans became more openly directed towards the amelioration of real grievances and the satisfaction of economic and political aspirations. While most of the issues which dominated the First Assembly's debates remained important to Transkeian politicians, the problem of economic development assumed a new importance. We can now consider these issues in turn, as we did in the previous chapter.

SEPARATION AND INTEGRATION.

The DP resumed its criticism of separate development almost immediately after the 1968 election. At the party's annual congress in April, 1969, Guzana linked the policy to the poverty of the Transkei. He doubted that any meaningful development would occur in the area as white capital was only permitted to enter the Transkei on an agency basis through the Bantu

Investment Corporation and its subsidiaries and was limited to a 25 year tenure period by the South African government. Separate development, he said, was misleading urban Africans into moving to the Transkei where there were no business opportunities for them. His conclusion was that, despite all that Matanzima claimed for the policy, multi-racialism would eventually persist as the only alternative to the mythical nature of the government's policy.⁶⁶ This attack on apartheid showed a significant change of emphasis when compared with the DP criticisms levelled before the election. The moralistic elements of the DP critique had become muted; in their place was a stronger appeal to economic rationality, reminiscent of the critiques levelled against Verwoerd's policies by liberal or laissez faire economists in the late 1950's and early 1960's.⁶⁷ This new emphasis was echoed by other speakers at the congress, particularly by members of the modern elite, with a Qumbu lawyer attacking the racially discriminatory salary and wage structures set up by the South African government in the Transkei.⁶⁸

Guzana repeated this theme when moving the motion of no-confidence which opened the 1969 session of the TLA. Without social and economic integration of the races, there could be no development or progress, he stated. The DP, when it came to power, would fight for a single legislature for all races in South Africa, he said. Guzana pointed to population estimates which indicated that by 1980 the Transkei could not hope to accommodate its potential population, whatever the level of development, and to the growing number of jobs previously reserved for whites and now

being given to Africans to overcome manpower shortages in South Africa, as indicators that apartheid had already failed. But he changed his argument in terms of the agency principle which allowed white capital into the Transkei. Guzana now argued that the system would perpetuate white control of capital and would make the development of the Bantustans meaningless; he noted that Matanzima had opposed such a suggestion in the TLA in 1964 but was now accepting it, even though it made his policy meaningless.⁶⁹

The no-confidence debate became so heated that one DP member, L. L. Mgudlwa of Engcobo, who had referred to the TNIP as corrupt, power drunk and composed of "bigoted opportunists", had stated that one of its members had been convicted of theft of public funds, and had referred to separate development as a myth serving the interests of the TNIP, was assaulted by a TNIP member outside the TLA.⁷⁰ Guzana later continued his attack by jeering at TNIP claims that apartheid was a "springboard to independence", holding instead that it was a "bandwagon with no destination". The motion was lost by 68 votes to 24; but it had been one of the most protracted debates in the TLA.⁷¹ The vote indicated, however, that the TNIP no longer had much to fear in terms of a DP challenge to its policies and that, while separate development would continue to be a major issue among Africans in the Transkei, it was unlikely to remain at the centre of the political process, at least until the next election in 1973.

THE CHIEFTAINCY AND TRADITIONALISM.

In May 1969, Guzana proposed that the number of elected members of the

TLA be increased to 64, the same number as the chiefs. During the debate which followed, he repeated his now annual call for the creation of an Upper House of Chiefs so that laws created in the Transkei could be made by people responsible to the electorate. The present system, he claimed, allowed the chiefs to "steamroller" whatever they wanted through the Assembly; the result was the decline of their traditional "aura" and "dignity". The TNIP, of course, opposed the move, but its elected members again tended to defend the present position of the chiefs in the TLA in terms of expediency rather than in terms of any "natural right". The former Minister of Agriculture of the Transkei, C. Madikizela (TNIP, Bizana) previously one of the most outspoken advocates of government by chiefs, now merely stated that the chiefs were necessary at present to "maintain the policy of separate development".⁷² Although the motion was easily defeated by the TNIP, the 1969 session was to show a new attitude to chiefs on the part of the TNIP - a reflection of the new status and influence of elected members in the party.

Before the TNIP victory at the polls, TLA debates were characterised by the ability of chiefs constantly to heckle and misbehave without incurring any disciplinary action from the chair. Now, a stronger insistence on correct parliamentary behaviour was required from TNIP members. The Chairman, Mr. Canca, applied the rules of discipline equally to both parties, instead of solely against DP militants. The result was that a number of chiefs were frequently removed from the Assembly during the 1969 session. One of these was Chief Makhosonke Sigcau (TNIP, Bizana) who

persistently heckled speakers in April and May and was at least twice removed from the Assembly at spearpoint by order of Mr. Canca. He was also expelled from a health conference by a white doctor, with the apparent approval of Curnick Ndamse, when he attempted to interrupt a speaker.⁷³ In May, Chief M. H. Sigidi (TNIP, Idutywa) was ordered out of the Assembly by Canca and when, in defiance of the chair, he then proceeded to shake hands with Opposition chiefs, was forcibly removed from the chamber.⁷⁴

Throughout the 1969 session, the "new look" TNIP appeared to favour the tribal idiom far less than it had done during the debates of the First Assembly. After a speech by Miss Sigcau, the new Minister of Roads and Works, a Pondo chief, Madlanya Tansi (TNIP) declared that it was not traditional to listen to women of royal blood in silence; he then proceeded to dance and sing and was immediately ejected from the TLA. The chair warned members to behave according to the dignity of the house, and Matanzima was reported to have been greatly annoyed by Tantsi.⁷⁵ In July, during a debate on a proposed change of name for the Chief Minister's position (the TNIP wanted him to be called Prime Minister) Chief Tutor Ndamase (DP) referred to the debate as "a tribal kitchen dance" without disagreement from the TNIP benches. Although these incidents are slight, they tend to indicate that while the chiefs remained politically powerful, the nature of the TLA and the new TNIP composition, required them to work increasingly within a modern idiom. Just as the TLA allowed the chief-taincy to retain a powerful control of politics in the Transkei, so too did

it require them to adapt to new methods of conduct in order to exert such control. Increasingly, the chiefs who represented a syncretic mixture of traditional and modern skills (as in the case of Matanzima himself) remained prominent in both parties, while those who could not provide more than traditional skills tended to become little more than a source of votes.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

Whatever African views were about other aspects of apartheid, the squalid poverty in which Transkeian Africans live remained the most important problem for the mass of people. It was a constant indicator of the deprived position of the African and was aggravated by the dumping of people from the urban areas into the Reserves and by the fact that the Transkei suffered a series of droughts which reduced many areas to famine. In 1969, the economic arguments against apartheid, which had been made periodically by DP speakers in the First Assembly, were superseded by a less theoretical debate on the nature of poverty in the Transkei and the role which the South African government was perceived to be playing in the persistence of this poverty. The Transkei Department of the Interior estimated the Transkei population in 1969 to be 1,579,000 people (excluding those who were "eligible" for Transkeian citizenship but were permanently domiciled in the urban areas). Of this figure, only 41,626 were employed in the Transkei cash economy - 46% of these by the Transkei government.⁷⁶ This meant that the vast majority of the adult male labour force formed a pool of migrant labourers from which the urban areas drew.

The level of poverty was reflected in the high incidence of disease (7,000 people in the Tsolo area were being treated for tuberculosis by one hospital alone.) Hospitals all admitted that they were able to treat only a fraction of the kwashiorkor cases in the country, and it was reported that in the Qumbu, Tsolo, Mount Frere, Mount Fletcher and Libode districts, at least, 40% of children died of malnutrition before the age of 10.⁷⁷ The effect of the drought contributed greatly to this poverty. The Transkei was forced, in 1969, to divert R250,000 to the emergency provision of fodder for cattle, though it was admitted that this sum would help "only a limited number".⁷⁸ In addition to this, George Matanzima noted that the South African government had "spent a great deal of money in loans to hire tractors to plough for the Transkei people"; this had been necessitated by the death of cattle in the previous drought, which had left the Transkei with insufficient plough oxen. George Matanzima also stated that there was no possibility of the Transkei reaping any crop as a result of the 1968-9 drought.⁷⁹

The hardship caused by drought was reflected in the 1969-70 Transkei Budget, presented to the TLA by Kaiser Matanzima in April, 1969. The Department of Agriculture was voted a record R5,665,000 of which R2 million was to be spent on planning agricultural services and development; and the Department of the Interior received R5,018,000 of which R3 million was allocated to pensions, "ex-gratia assistance" and a further R1 million was set aside for "the relief of distress".⁸⁰ But the very fact that the budget, which had risen by R3.5 million, amounted to a mere R23,570,000 was the

surest indication of the inadequacy of development to cater for the basic human needs of the Transkei. The fact that R15,017,000 of the figure was raised through a grant from the South African government, underlined the lack of any meaningful economic structure in the Transkei, and made conflict articulation inevitable.

Since the influx control regulations provided the primary focus of African grievances in the Transkei, both TNIP and DP speakers did not hesitate to advise Xhosas in the urban areas to avoid migrating back until there was a more meaningful economic situation there.⁸¹ In January 1969, the Transkei Cabinet travelled to three provinces in South Africa to urge white industrialists to open up employment for Transkeians so that the effects of the drought could be eased. They also asked government and municipal authorities to ease the influx control regulations for the Transkei. They found government more responsive than industry, which was hampered by the Planning Act.⁸²

The issue of economic development emerged as the most fruitful avenue of attack available to the DP in its criticisms of Matanzima. At the DP Congress, as we have seen, speakers (like Chief D.D.P. Ndamase) were able to attack the TNIP for "upholding White supremacy" by tolerating the perpetuation of racial discrimination in pay scales in the Transkei. The DP demanded that capital investment be allowed into the Transkei without limitations as to the race of the investor or the length of tenure of the investment.⁸³

While the TNIP showed great sensitivity over the matter of economic

development, with Matanzima calling for the rapid establishment of industries in the Transkei, the party also showed that it was not prepared to deviate officially from the agency basis for investment which Vorster had announced. This agency system allowed white investors to invest their money in the Transkei through the agency of the Xhosa Development Corporation (a subsidiary of the Bantu Investment Corporation) and receive profits for 25 years (50 years in the case of mining) before the enterprise became the property of the Transkei. The DP attacked this plan as unattractive to investors and unlikely to succeed. But Matanzima, who had rejected such a scheme five years earlier, showed himself, at this stage anyway, to be unwilling to annoy the South African government which controlled the purse strings.⁸⁴

The sensitive nature of the issue led Matanzima to grant widespread tax relief to Transkeian peasants in May, and successfully to persuade the South African government to exempt Transkeians from all Republican and provincial tax as from March 1970.⁸⁵ Matanzima also announced the lowering of basic tax immediately and the increase of pensions and civil service bonuses; tax collection had met with strong mass resistance and the average Transkeian taxpayer was five years in arrears with his tax, he said.⁸⁶ In making these concessions, Matanzima showed himself responsive not only to mass grievances, but also to the aspirations of the new Transkei bourgeoisie which was emerging (mainly in the form of civil servants). Before the 1968 election, he had raised civil service salaries. Now he was granting them bonuses in the midst of severe mass hardship. In addition certain agricul-

tural development schemes, especially the Qamata dam irrigation project in Matanzima's own district, created a class of small landed farmers economically privileged in relation to other agrarian peasants in the Transkei. Such land reform also threw more families onto the labour market. Further, to the extent that businesses were being made available to African businessmen, this too tended to create a small privileged elite in the Transkei. The general nature of development in the Transkei tended to maximise inequality and produce a small new elite.⁸⁷

This development was increasingly used by the DP in its criticisms of economic development in the Transkei. Guzana offered to give up a month's salary for the poor if Matanzima would do the same,⁸⁸ DP speakers referred to corruption among the police and in the selection of female teachers in schools,⁸⁹ and the Opposition contended that the whites who remained in the Transkei lived like overlords and made a farce of the zoning of towns as black - Guzana citing a Mr. Hempel, who was "acting as a dictator over the African people" of Tsomo by virtue of his ownership of most property in the town.⁹⁰ The problem of inequality, poverty and corruption became cause for even more heated debate in 1970, when a luxury "Africans-only" hotel was opened in Umtata at a cost of R308,000. At the same time as the hotel was opened, the white-run Umtata town council forbade African women from selling vegetables except in a market which the council refused to build. B. S. Mnyani (DP) spoke angrily of both events, noting that the police were victimizing the women and that the hotel, which stood empty, had swallowed funds which could have provided a factory as an alternative. He described

both the hotel and the Umtata Town Council decision as "a mockery of the Xhosa people".⁹¹ Earlier, Mnyani had criticised the decision of the South African government not to allow African ratepayers to vote for municipal elections, despite the fact that in most Transkei towns, African ratepayers now outvoted whites. The Matanzima brothers were conspicuously unavailable for comment on this decisions⁹² but it was part of a series of grievances which the DP raised in protest against economic exploitation of Africans. Later, George Matanzima avoided reference to the ratepayers' grievance, but defended the hotel as a place from which Africans could exclude whites for the first time in three hundred years.⁹³ TNIP speakers were more forthright about Guzana's reference to Hempel in Tsomo, calling for his removal from the Transkei.⁹⁴

The issue of economic development and African poverty appeared to be the last on which the DP could seriously challenge the Transkei government. Matanzima made clear his dissatisfaction over the virtual lack of any meaningful development in the region, as did most members of his party. But he was placed in a difficult situation because to criticise too strongly would require him to take the risk that South Africa might refuse more money or even cut off funds. Finance and naked force remained the two sanctions South Africa could effectively wield against the Transkei; understandably, Matanzima remained reluctant to criticise Pretoria's attitude on economic development too strongly. Thus despite Opposition anger over the failure to build any meaningful economy in the Transkei, the TNIP could do little more than merely announce new development projects, such as a tea factory,⁹⁵

and make periodic demands for more rapid Africanization of government and municipal posts in the Transkei.⁹⁶ In one instance, the TLA passed a resolution calling for a rail link with the rest of South Africa⁹⁷ and was informed by the South African Minister of Transport, Ben Scoeman, that such a link, if it ever were achieved, would remain permanently the property of South African Railways, under its labour conditions of service, or it would not be built.

If Matanzima was not prepared to deviate from official South African ideology on economic development while speaking in the TLA, he showed, in August 1969, that he was dissatisfied both with the agency system of attempting to attract private capital and with the lack of spending for development. Speaking at a Symposium on the Economic Development of the Transkei at Fort Hare in August, Professor Hobart Houghton said that industrialization required vast injections of private white capital, but that the Transkei had little to offer as an investment area. Matanzima in reply, disagreed sharply. He felt that if all restrictions on the inflow of private white capital were lifted by the South African government, white enterprise would play a significant role in industrializing the Transkei. In this way, he said, Hobart Houghton's point that agriculture could improve rapidly with relatively small capital injections could come into play as unproductive peasants moved to industry. Not only did Matanzima thus reject all the apartheid tenets of Bantustan development (by calling for the free entry of white capital) but he also couched his description of his own plans in the language of economic nationalism. He called for

Transkeian government ownership of 51% of the shares of ventures established and operated by whites, with a gradual Africanization of personnel, so that a "position such as the sudden nationalisation of the copper mines in Zambia should never arise". In return, he assured delegates, the Transkei aimed to create a favourable political climate, stability, and a citizenry geared to social change; economic, political and human development were all closely related. The Transkei's problem was to attract its graduates sufficiently for them to remain in the region, and to create a "community spirit" aimed at development. In an obvious reference to the level of development in the Transkei, Matanzima said: "We must educate and activate in the shortest possible time and without undue regard to cost"⁹⁸.

Matanzima's speech shows a radical divergence from the South African official line. It is an indication that his goal of independence for the Transkei as quickly as possible is in conflict with the stagnant pace of development undertaken by the South African government. His implied desire for a direct relationship between the Transkei and the white investor, cutting out the agency of the BIC and XDC, directly challenges the apartheid thesis of "political independence with economic interdependence" and hence the continued economic control of the Bantustans by the South African government. For South Africa to concede such power to the Transkei would imply that Matanzima could seek investment from foreign sources as well. Economic development thus becomes an issue of great conflict potential. Matanzima is likely to find it difficult to appease both his internal critics and the South African government at the same time.

Given the backwardness of the area, popular demands for development are likely to outstrip South African willingness to provide it. Matanzima's speech at the Symposium would indicate that his ability (and possibly his desire) to please the white government by accepting its economic policy, is severely limited.

LAND.

Despite the rejection of the Transkei's demands for more land by the Minister of Bantu Administration, the TNIP persisted with its public demands. After the 1968 election, the Minister, M. C. Botha, took a more conciliatory position on one aspect of these land demands - the amalgamation of the Ciskei and Transkei. Addressing the newly formed Ciskei Territorial Authority, he said that the door was not closed to such amalgamation although it was necessary for the Ciskei to first achieve the same level of political development as the Transkei. Although the speech was a contradiction of earlier assurances given to white farmers in the corridor between the two reserves, it was sufficiently evasive in tone to indicate that the Minister intended to shelve the question for the foreseeable future with the proviso that the possibility of amalgamation was not finally excluded.⁹⁹

In 1969, Matanzima reopened his demands for more land, stating that claims would be made to the South African government in terms of the policy of separate development. Matanzima linked such claims to "the spirit of nationalism" which the TNIP was seeking to create in the Transkei.¹⁰⁰ The

South African government response came quickly. In May, twenty plots in Port St. Johns were sold to whites, on auction, for R345,000¹⁰¹ and ten days later a letter to the Transkei government, stating that continued demands for Elliot, Maclear, Mount Currie and the white areas of Mataiele and Port St. Johns, would "only tend to disturb good relations between the Republic and the Transkei" was read to the TLA.¹⁰² Only in the case of the town of Umzimkulu did the letter agree to the acquisition of more land by the Transkei. The letter held that the demands were made without consideration of the "historical creation" of white and black land occupation. At the end of May, the South African government indicated that it was prepared, however, to speed up the handover of towns within the Transkei to Africans. A Pretoria official was appointed to investigate the zoning of nine towns, including Umtata and Butterworth, as black.¹⁰³ In February 1970, the South African government announced the zoning of 10 towns as reserved solely for blacks, bringing the number thus zoned to 21. This left five towns still unaffected - Umtata, Butterworth, Idutywa, Umzimkulu and Engcobo.¹⁰⁴ In the town of Umzimkulu, Matanzima was able to announce that rezoning would soon begin.

Although the Transkei appeared to have been able to achieve little in its demands for more land, the issue seemed unlikely to lose its importance in TNIP eyes. Although the problems of economic development and independence seemed likely to eclipse land in dramatic content,

"Africans cannot accept that their right to South Africa ends with 13% of the area of this country. Even Chief Matanzima does not accept that ..."(105)

Population pressures caused by natural increase and influx control are likely to intensify demands for more land, particularly if development remains as slow as it has been and people thus remain dependent on the land. The need for more land, closely linked as an issue to the problems of independence, economic development and Matanzima's attempts to create an African nationalism in the Transkei, would seem to be a potential source of breakdown in the co-operation between black and white in the Transkei.

INDEPENDENCE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF A "TRIBAL NATIONALISM".

The defeat of the TPFPP at the polls in 1968, seemed likely to de-escalate the independence issue as a point of conflict between the TNIP and the South African government. It certainly appeared to be the wish of the white administration that this should happen. Mr. A. Vosloo, then Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, indicated as much in a speech opening the interim session of the TLA after the election. Vosloo urged the Transkei to build up a political system gradually and patiently, avoiding "overhasty decisions which might lead to confusion and chaos", before seeking the "ultimate goal" of independence.¹⁰⁶

If the South African government did, in fact, hope that Matanzima's election victory would still his demands for rapid independence, it was to be rapidly disappointed. Matanzima, supported by his new educated elite, extended his call for independence beyond the boundaries of the Transkei. Speaking in Sharpeville in March 1969, Matanzima stated that the Africans constituted one nation like the whites. He developed this theme during a

tour of the urban locations, stating that this concept of a single nation meant that Africans would have to come together through the Bantustans to form a federal government which would unite all the tribal governments; "at that point the African will be respected by the white man, for we shall meet them as equals".¹⁰⁷

The call for independence by the TNIP was now openly linked with a desire to create African nationalism in the Transkei. But it was a nationalism in tune with the TNIP's ideology of separatism and rejection of the white man as a political partner. T. E. Tshunungwa (TNIP, St. Marks) described Matanzima as "a Moses" who would lead his people to freedom. He linked this freedom with the call for more land to accommodate the Xhosa people and attacked the DP for failing to respond to any of the nationalist feelings and needs of the people.¹⁰⁸

Ironically, it was Guzana who was now forced to attack the TNIP for "fanning the flames of African nationalism". The party, he claimed, had visions of Matanzima wielding the "big sjambok and beating the whites into the sea". The DP had been forced into the position of more than ever opposing the demands for more land and greater freedom. The TNIP was able to capitalise on this by picturing Guzana as a time-server for certain white interests, whose policies would perpetuate white domination and delay independence for the Transkei.¹⁰⁹ Certain members tried to introduce an element of personality cult into this ethnic nationalism, calling for a public holiday in the Transkei called Matanzima Day.¹¹⁰ It is possible that such attempts (as well as Tshunungwa's talk of a "Moses") were aimed at

forcing Matanzima to the forefront of the demands for independence and forestalling any attempt by the Chief Minister to moderate the language of the independence demands.

While Matanzima still insisted that economic development had to precede independence¹¹¹ and that his demands aimed at speeding the pace, the tone of TNIP demands caused genuine alarm among white politicians in Cape Town, especially the Opposition United Party whose leader, among others, spoke of the danger of creating hostile black states on the borders of South Africa and referred frequently to Matanzima's call for one "large black nation talking to white South Africa on equal terms".¹¹² Only apartheid ideologues and intellectuals who favoured a genuine independence for the Bantustans appeared able to accommodate the TNIP demands.¹¹³ Despite repeated demands from Opposition spokesmen in Parliament, the South African government refused to reply to questions seeking clarification on the independence issue.¹¹⁴

In the meantime, TNIP discussion of genuine independence from South Africa continued, with a new and unexpected voice adding to the intensity of the language used. Matanzima's son, Chief Mteto Matanzima, in his maiden speech in the TLA, attacking the DP for its failure to support the demand for independence and more land, stated that the demand for land would "always" be made by the TNIP, and that independence was inevitable: "no one will take it away from us".¹¹⁵

Faced with such calls for a genuine commitment to independence from the TNIP, the South African government was finally forced to offer a dead-

line for independence. Predictably it decided to place this deadline in the distant future. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M. C. Botha, stated that such independence would come "in our lifetime" but that it would be a gradual and pragmatic process to avoid the chaos of the Congo.¹¹⁶ This was the only elaboration he would make on an earlier response to Opposition questions in which he said that Africans would receive independence by the year 2000, a declaration which Mr. Vorster also made to the New York Times. The reply produced anger from many white South Africans. The leader of the Progressive Party, Dr. Steytler, said that Africans now faced 30 years of frustration and domination to be replaced by a meaningless independence in their old age. Sir de Villiers Graaf reiterated that the scheme would surround South Africa with hostile states while ruining the white economy. And certain Afrikaner intellectuals accused the government of dishonesty and timidity.¹¹⁷ Matanzima was reported to be privately displeased and under pressure from many members of his party who wanted independence soon rather than in 2000.¹¹⁸

The indefinite deadline for independence also appeared to give the DP new vitality. It reopened its charges that the entire venture was a fraud, that independence was a meaningless "bandwagon" cry, that it masked the true nature of the Transkei as a rural slum which served the integrated economy as a labour reservoir by failing to provide its inhabitants with a living off the land or in industry. Guzana repeated his charges that the system of polling in the election had been "undesirable" and, by implication, fraudulent. Guzana felt that the Transkei contained a discontented

mass of unemployed whose anger was conveyed by the rising crime rate; Matanzima, he felt sure, was worried by the political instability this would create. Above all, the Transkei could not afford the "price of independence" because it had no meaningful economy, said Guzana, and demands for independence were meaningless to the people.¹¹⁹

Nevertheless, the authoritative Financial Mail was not prepared to agree with Guzana. Noting that the Transkei was more viable economically than Lesotho, the paper stated that Guzana "should know better" than to tie political independence to economic viability and, while such an event seemed far off, it was not beyond the possibility that South Africa would be balkanized eventually.¹²⁰ The DP criticisms, in fact, appeared to prompt the TNIP into renewing their independence claims and expressing them increasingly in an idiom of African nationalism.

This nationalist expression was mostly strongly apparent in the speeches of Curnick Ndamse. Ndamse pre-empted Matanzima's position as the leading oracle of black separatism and independence in the Transkei and, by mid 1969, had become its leading spokesman. In May 1969 he declared that what the white man had given the Transkei could never be taken away, regardless of what certain white politicians said. The Transkei had become meaningful to Africans; it no longer merely served white interests, he claimed:

"Go and tell everybody that we are not following Dr. Verwoerd's policy. He gave us a springboard from which to spring to other pastures ... We will accept no second hand position ... We are going to get whatever the black man desires without a single shot being fired in the whole of South Africa".(121)

In September, Ndamse was invited to speak to students at the University of the Witwatersrand. His speech, which included praise for prominent white liberal academics and for the former Native Representative in Parliament, Mrs. Margaret Ballinger, laid down the basis of black aspirations for an independent Transkei. It was a speech which could have come from any African nationalist on the continent and is worth reporting in some detail:

"The requirements of the white man are a secure future in South Africa ... free from the fear that a future black majority will jeopardise this stability. The requirements of the black man are a stake in his land, self-determination and an end to serfdom, indignity, poverty and political voicelessness ... What the white man is prepared to sacrifice is territory - the African homelands. What the black man is prepared to sacrifice is territory - the rest of South Africa ... In accepting the government's good faith, we accept also that Transkei self-government is but the first down-payment on the policy of separate development. We have been promised more land and we accept that the government will keep its word ... Africa is shaking off the shackles of centuries of enslavement. She is kicking off the chains of bondage, struggling to free herself from the thralldom of European domination. The Transkei enables us to express the determination that the black man can regain his rightful place in his own land without ... any form of violence whatsoever. And now a word about certain extremist politicians among our white fellow countrymen who believe that the Transkei is getting too much and who state dramatically that Africans would swim in a pool of white blood before entering the Republican Parliament. These lovers of secluded privileges, the small frightened men, ... should save their breath. We have no ambition to go to Cape Town any more - and if we did it would have to be ... along the road that goes via Umtata. In other words, we reject with contempt any suggestion that we should ever be represented by whites in the Republican government. There is no room for hate in South Africa, nor is there room for domination of one group by another. The bright lights and imposing buildings of the white cities we have helped to build have less appeal for us than the barren land that gives us a sense of belonging, that gives us the opportunity to manage our own affairs - or even to mismanage them. I take liberty and freedom from any hand as a hungry man would snatch a piece of bread".(122)

Ndamse typified the African nationalist who had decided to work within the apartheid system (Tshunungwa was another) because it seemed the only way to wring concessions from the government. Privately, many were willing to agree with Guzana that "the Transkei will remain part of South Africa until doomsday"¹²³ and that South Africa "wants to extend its power not reduce it", but they were nevertheless, determined to gain as much as possible for Africans through the Transkei. Ndamse felt that the waste of brilliant minds like Mandela who now languished on Robben Island, had achieved nothing. By steadily winning concessions, they hoped to achieve the same as the ANC had done; as long as concessions were made they would avoid points of conflict, but Ndamse was adamant that demands would not be stilled by South African government intransigence.¹²⁴ The strength of Ndamse's appeal within the Transkei was recognised by Matanzima, who promoted him from Minister of the Interior to Education over his brother George. The promotion was itself considered provocative by South African whites - the second man in the Transkei was now a man more interested in Pan-Africanism than in tribal self-government.¹²⁵

The TNIP maintained a steady concern for independence and rapid economic development throughout the 1970 session of the TLA. TNIP speakers also demanded that Africans be armed "to fight Communists" and that passes be removed in favour of identity cards such as those carried by other races in South Africa. Both of these demands struck at the base of racial domination in South Africa and were hastily stilled by a frightened Matanzima.

But the independence issue itself could not be so easily disposed of. In April 1970, the white electorate in South Africa went to the polls against the background of a divided Nationalist Party, whose right wing had split off in protest against Vorster's racial and ideological "liberalism". The election was fought just after the abortive election in Lesotho which had resulted in a coup led by white police officers. The United Party attacked the idea of independence for the Bantustans, using Lesotho as "proof" of the political instability South Africa would be creating on its borders. This led to Nationalist speakers playing down the issue of independence for the Transkei during the elections. Blaar Coetzee expressed doubts that the Africans would "have it in them" to achieve independence and said he had no intention of forcing it "down their throats".¹²⁶ Senator Danie Potgieter (NP) assured one election audience that none of them would live to see the Transkei independent¹²⁷ and a Nationalist candidate in Zululand claimed that the Minister of Defence had assured him that "Communist activity" in the Bantustans, even if they became independent, would result in armed intervention by South Africa.

These developments moved the TNIP to even stronger assertions of their right to independence. George Matanzima rejected the United Party plan of white representation of Africans in Parliament in Cape Town¹²⁸ and Kaiser Matanzima, opening the TNIP Congress in Umtata, stated unequivocally that "Independence is not far off and nothing will stop us from getting it".¹²⁹ With international attention focused on the election in the Republic, Matanzima's speech, for the first time, attracted world publicity (the story

reached the front page of one British paper) and gave the debate between Umtata and Pretoria a new dimension.¹³⁰

Nevertheless, there were also indications that Matanzima was worried that he had lost control over his party. This was particularly noticeable in the way Ndamse appeared to have taken the initiative in articulating the Nationalist elements of the TNIP demands. South African newspapers (particularly the Financial Mail) seemed to interview only Ndamse and ignore Matanzima altogether during 1970. In addition, there were reports from the Transkei¹³¹ that several prominent members of the TNIP were dissatisfied with Matanzima. These people claimed that he was failing to use the very real weapons which they felt the constitutional machinery of the Transkei gave him, to put greater pressure on South Africa for meaningful concessions. There was talk of replacing him with a more militant leader. Such talk was intensified by the decision of the South African government to transfer the portfolio of African health to the Ministry of Bantu Administration, rather than to the Transkei, as Matanzima had demanded. Whatever the case, in July Matanzima demoted Ndamse from Education to the Ministry of Roads and Works, whose minister, Stella Sigcau, in turn became the new Minister of Education. It is possible that internal squabbles within the TNIP will emerge to the detriment of the demands being made of the South African government.

SECURITY AND THE POPULIST RE-EMERGENCE

The tensions emerging within the TNIP undoubtedly reflected Matanzima's fear that he would lose control of the party and of the pace of demands

made on South Africa, to the new militants. It is also likely that the growing problem of order within the Transkei made him reluctant to alienate the white administration. As we have noted, the first five years of the TLA took place against a background of sporadic and isolated outbursts against persons in positions of authority within the Transkei; there were no incidents reminiscent of the 1960 rebellion, but certain chiefs still required bodyguards, while several people were detained by the police under security regulations. This problem of order intensified in the first eighteen months after the 1968 election.

From the start of the 1969 session of the TLA, Matanzima opposed the DP's demands that he remove Proclamation R400 from operation, claiming that a number of people convicted under the Terrorism Act in a recent trial in Natal were Transkeians.¹³² The DP, said Matanzima, was equally protected under the security regulations, even though some of its members had been responsible for unrest in the Transkei in the past. As before, the chiefs were not prepared to sanction the suspension of the regulations and the DP motion failed.

The TNIP fears had been strengthened by several events which followed the 1968 election. In November 1968, students (predominantly Xhosa) at the University College of Fort Hare had gone on strike after a long period of unrest (sparked off by the refusal of the University of Cape Town to appoint an African graduate to its staff). Some 400 students had initially been suspended from Fort Hare and, finally, seven "ringleaders" were arrested by the police.¹³³ Despite the new participation in the TNIP of men like

Ndamse and Tshunungwa, the young educated elements in African society had shown a strong affinity to the values of the urban African struggle.

The Fort Hare disturbances had been followed, in December, by the distribution of pamphlets, signed by Umkhonto we Sizwe, in Umtata.¹³⁴ Despite police attempts to recover the publications, the distribution was reported to have been widespread in the town. More important, it indicated that the ANC organization still functioned effectively in the area. And in February 1969, concern had been expressed in Parliament in Cape Town about light signals exchanged between a ship at sea and some huts on the Transkei coast. A newspaper commented:

"The disclosure in Parliament that signalling had been observed at night between a ship and some huts on the Transkeian coast adds point to long persistent rumours about this sort of thing ... the Wild Coast is a lonely coast where much mischief can be done undetected. Strange stories about things seen or heard along that coast have filtered through, on and off, for the past five years at least. There have been stories of boats coming ashore with groups of men brought to these waters by submarine, and of men being taken away by the same means. There have been reports of lights out at sea in odd circumstances. And there was the Port St. Johns African seen sporting a type of headgear not commonly encountered outside Russia".(135)

The newspaper went on to state that the primitive communications system along the coast made surveillance very difficult. Such reports were unlikely to imbue Matanzima with any sense of equanimity, given the other developments in the Transkei.

The problem of order had become more severe with a riot by schoolboys at Mfundisweni Mission School in Flagstaff, during which windows had been smashed and the warden's car damaged. The students had all been sent home.¹³⁶ The students had also besieged the store of an elderly white trader,

Mr. G. B. Stuart, who had suffered facial injuries when hit by stones.¹³⁷ At the same time, two factions in Flagstaff district had fought a battle with axes for several hours, during which five people were killed. Although the battle had been attributed to an old faction feud, there were indications that it might have resulted from anger over a land rehabilitation scheme in the area, which had caused trouble a week earlier.¹³⁸ The Flagstaff district boasted South Africa's first African magistrate, Mr. L.H.D. Mbuli, who had been appointed a year earlier. Five hundred African tribesmen had petitioned him to stop the rehabilitation scheme and, when he failed to act, the trouble described broke out - including a threat to the life of the local chief.¹³⁹ Involved in the disturbance was the TNIP elected member for Flagstaff, Mr. Babini Langa. Langa had won comfortably in the 1968 election, despite predictions of a DP victory, on a platform of support for Matanzima, strongly qualified by an anti-rehabilitation posture. During the disturbance in Flagstaff, Langa led a group of commoners and headmen in cutting fences and generally attacking rehabilitation projects. He was detained, along with several other tribesmen, by the police, although the latter refused to admit this officially.¹⁴⁰

Langa's detention caused him to miss the session of the TLA and thus to lose his seat, which necessitated a bye-election in Flagstaff. Although Langa was by then out of detention, Matanzima refused to allow him to stand again for his old seat because his protests had endangered the safety of the local TNIP chief and because it had angered the South African government. Langa therefore decided to contest the bye-election as an independent. The

TNIP nominated Mr. G. Ntanta to contest the seat and the DP put up its national secretary, Mr. H. H. Bubu, who had been a surprise casualty of the 1968 election. Langa's popularity was expected to split the TNIP vote, despite the support given Ntanta by Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau and Curnick Ndamse, who was popular in the district. In addition, Bubu had a strong following in the Qakeni region and was thus expected to be the benefactor of this split.¹⁴¹ At the same time, the death of the DP frontbencher, Mr. A. M. Raziya of Umtata, necessitated another bye-election there. The TNIP nominated Mr. L. Madubela, with George Matanzima leading the party campaign, and the DP put up a popular chief, Luvuoy Mtirara, in what was an Opposition stronghold. Both parties suffered from rebels in Umtata, with the brother of Matanzima's first wife, C. Sangoni, standing in defiance of his brother-in-law, and M. Mqgweto defying Guzana to stand as an independent supporting the DP.¹⁴²

Once again, the leaders of the parties reacted to rebel candidates in strongly contrasting ways. Matanzima expelled Sangoni, Langa and Godlwana (another TNIP rebel standing in Flagstaff and expected to further aid Bubu's election there) from the TNIP.¹⁴³ On the other hand, Guzana did not expel his rebel, Mqgweto, who claimed to have the support of Paramount Chief Sabata. In the event, Sabata did not commit himself and Guzana was reduced to alleging that the Paramount Chief had privately expressed his support for the official candidate, Chief Mtirara.¹⁴⁴

The Bye-election took place in April 1970. In Umtata, the rebel

candidate split the DP vote sufficiently for Madubela to be elected in the heart of Sabata's region. TNIP voters again showed marked party loyalty in refusing to vote for their party rebel, while DP voters again showed weak party identification, allowing their party to lose control of a safe DP seat.

More important was the Flagstaff result. Here Langa easily defeated the strong candidates of the TNIP and DP, whose secretary, Bubu was unable to win despite the split in the TNIP vote. The magnitude of Langa's victory (figures were unavailable but reports indicated a landslide win) demonstrated that an uncompromising opponent of apartheid policies would gain popular support despite the intervention of the traditional aristocracy and the regular party machinery.

Langa, once elected did not still his antagonism towards land rehabilitation and other local manifestations of apartheid. His criticisms of TNIP ministers in the 1970 session of the TLA were reminiscent, in their effectiveness, of the challenge of the TPFPP in 1967 and 1968. With popular bitterness increasing in Qakeni, Langa emerged as something of a populist hero - the first, since the 1960 rebellion, to function openly in Transkeian politics. His attacks on the TNIP angered Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau (whose authority had remained precarious ever since the attempts on his life in 1960). In July, Sigcau visited Langa at the latter's home in Flagstaff and, in the presence of a large crowd, called Langa a communist and stated that the Transkei government would not be "happy" while he was alive. Soon afterwards, an attempt was made (unsuccessfully) to assassinate

Langa, three shots being fired at him and one hitting him in the cheek. Although police stated their inability to find the perpetrators of the incident, reports indicated that a nephew of Sigcau's might have been involved. At the time of writing, no arrests had been made and Qakeni was reported to be "seething" with popular anger and gossip.¹⁴⁵

* * *

The events following the 1968 Transkei election would seem to indicate the evolution of conflict patterns unlikely to please either Matanzima or the South African government. On the one hand, the TNIP has become a party in which the traditional aristocracy coexists with elected commoners dedicated to a new form of African nationalism. Matanzima, as a chief and a graduate represents a fusion of the two elements. As such he is vulnerable to the conservatism of the chiefs and the militancy of men like Ndamse, Tshunungwa and Canca. It is possible that the strains on the Chief Minister will increase as both groups seek to assert their influence over him. In this, the militants are strong because they possess the skills needed to work the constitutional machinery created in the Transkei, but weak because they have no enduring links with the population. If the TNIP fails to win meaningful concessions from the South African government, they will have little hope of maintaining popular support. The chiefs are strong because they command the political support of the people and serve as an enduring focus of traditional ties and loyalties, but they cannot alienate their subjects by repeating the blind obedience to the government which resulted in the 1960 rebellion, and they

need the skills of the educated elite. Matanzima is not only a leader of both groups, he is also the prisoner of the weaknesses of both groups. Given the poverty of the Transkei, it is likely that lasting political support from the people will only be earned by winning concessions from Pretoria and by employing all the symbols of black resentment against whites which the TNIP used so successfully in the 1968 election. These symbols, as we have seen, have involved the TLA in debates in which the issues have grown increasingly broadly based and are likely to continue to do so as long as the Transkei's demands remain unanswered by the white administration. On the other hand there is the popular unrest arising from Transkeian poverty and unpopular rehabilitation schemes - a disaffection symbolized by Langa.

The TNIP is thus vulnerable to popular disaffection and militant aspirations on the one hand, and to the power of the South African government on the other. The post-1968 election process in the Transkei has shown both these conflict tendencies. The TNIP has become increasingly militant in its demands of the white administration. At the same time, symptoms of a very real unrest within the Transkei have become manifest more clearly than at any time since the 1960 rebellion. Matanzima's position in 1970 seems more complex than it did in 1968. He must either continue to intensify his demands against Pretoria, in the hope that this will win him popular support locally. Or he must abandon the new educated militants in his party (and also popular support) in the hope of surviving through the coercive support for the chiefs of Pretoria. But he is not

guaranteed that the masses will support him if his stand against Pretoria is unavailing, nor that the white administration would continue to support him against a more popular opponent.

For the moment, Matanzima appears to be attempting to seek popular support by taking a nationalist stance on matters relating to the South African government, while ensuring that a tight South African police grip remains on the area through Proclamation R400. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Matanzima's desire for an independent Transkei or his attempts to build an exclusivist, Transkeian nationalism.¹⁴⁶ His demotion of Ndamse appears to be more the result of a desire to retain firm personal control of the TNIP and a fear that the escalation of protest against the South African government will move out of control, than a reluctance to displease the white government.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to see anything but an increase in the conflict themes at present emerging in the Transkei. The TNIP is committed to "the creation of African nationalism" in the Transkei. This nationalism will only intensify if the South African government continues to pay lip service to the propoganda of apartheid - which propoganda is precisely the point of the policy on which the TNIP rests its case. And, at the same time, a lack of development will increase popular pressures on the Transkei government, forcing it either to increase its demands on the white government or to abandon popular support and face mass anger with the aid of the South African police.

Whatever the case, conflict is not being externalised. The issues

proposed by the TNIP increasingly demand that white South Africa makes sacrifices - both economic and political - to honour its own policy. Whites are asked to give up more land, pass on meaningful political power to Africans, and create a viable economic structure within the Transkei. They are also being challenged on aspects of apartheid which are essential for urban control over Africans being maintained - influx control, the pass laws, and income differentials. In addition, the populist sentiments which Langa represents, demand an end to land policies in the reserves which destroy traditional patterns of agriculture in a situation of land hunger and joblessness. And, while the politics of the Transkei after the election indicate that the DP has a declining role to play locally, this decline is largely the result of inept leadership pushing issues which have little relevance to the local population; the rectification of this organizational breakdown, or the failure of the Matanzima approach, could make it a powerful force again - and one capable of linking Transkeian politics with those of the urban areas. It is thus unlikely that conflict patterns presently emerging will subside. In fact, they are likely to intensify and, if they do, the range of issues raised is likely to grow. The process of conflict escalation, governed by the reality of economic underdevelopment and the emergence of a new racially exclusive, black nationalism, is likely to make externalization increasingly unlikely to succeed. The Transkei could well represent a new conflict outlet rather than an expulsion of conflict from the areas of white privilege. The events of 1968-70 would indicate that persistent deprivation is likely to result in persistent conflict articula-

tion, and that the policy of conflict externalization in an integrated society is founded on wrong premises.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The study of expressed attitudes of political leaders in the Transkei reveals the emergence of issues on which Africans hold positions in conflict with the preservation of white privilege to which the South African government is committed. What is more significant is that such positions are held not only by the Opposition, in its adherence to the aspirations for a common society which the ANC has espoused for nearly 60 years, but also by those Africans who claim to support the policy of separate development and to seek co-operation with the white administration in Pretoria. The Democratic Party, protected by the constitutional machinery which the Nationalist Party government created in the Transkei, is able to put forward openly African demands for equality and multi-racialism (the demands for which ANC leaders were banned, harrassed and imprisoned even when they advocated non-violence). The fact that nearly forty per cent of a predominantly tribal and illiterate electorate supported such policies in 1968 would indicate that, even in the rural backwater which is the Transkei, the values of the common society are strongly relevant. More interestingly, the TNIP, officially committed to the separate development policy, has inverted the tenets of the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism to propound a militant, racially exclusive black nationalism. Amid protestations of faith in the white government as liberators of the Africans of South Africa, Matanzima and his supporters have come increasingly to attack several bases

of apartheid and to make serious demands of it on behalf of the Transkei.

It is this development of an ethnic or separatist nationalism (the ethnic aspects of the Transkei seem decreasingly relevant to the TNIP judging by its public statements) rather than the reaffirmation of the urban ethnic by the DP, which is particularly significant. The emotional debates between the two Transkeian parties, so characteristic of the life of the First Assembly, has been largely replaced by a conflict dialogue between the TNIP and the South African government since the 1968 election. Having won the 1968 election, the TNIP, dominated by a chieftaincy commonly regarded as conservative and obsequious to white official policy, has not become the buffer between the Transkeian masses and the Pretoria government which had been the role envisaged for, and performed by, the chiefs under the Bantu Authorities Act.

Given the nature of politics in the Transkei, the TNIP could successfully depict the Opposition as a party of reaction seeking to perpetuate white domination. But it did not merely juggle political symbols. It went further. The debates we have analysed show that the demands of the TNIP are not easily manageable ones; in terms of the strategy of conflict externalization. Conflict externalization envisages "political independence with economic interdependence"; in other words, a constitutional arrangement in which African grievances will be channeled into the rural areas of South Africa while white control of land and indigenous labour will be preserved. In fact, the TNIP platform conforms only superficially with such requirements or hopes: the Transkei has challenged the white control of 87% of South

Africa's land by demanding substantial areas of the Eastern Cape; it has opposed the attempt to keep the Bantustans a meaningless constitutional arrangement by demanding a rapid transfer of power to the area and a speed up of the pace to independence; and it has linked the demand for independence to one of rapid economic development within the Transkei to prepare the area for such independence.¹ Further, by demanding an easing of the influx control regulations, publicly opposing the dumping of Africans in the reserves, and removing Bantu Education, the Transkei has in fact attacked two of the edifices on which rest the repression of Africans in South Africa as a whole.

The fact that urban Africans showed no great willingness to participate in the 1968 Transkei elections than they did in those of 1963, indicates that, for them at least, the Bantustans do not form a viable alternative political future in place of the common society. Hence in the urban areas, where, despite influx control, the number of African workers increases steadily, the South African government is still dependent on coercion as a means of conflict resolution.² The demands emanating from the Transkei thus would seem to indicate that the Bantustans provide an additional platform for grievance articulation rather than an alternative one able to replace urban aspirations. The strategy of conflict externalization thus would appear to be, potentially, one of conflict extension instead. To a certain extent, of course, externalization has succeeded. African leaders are sitting in the TLA making verbal demands of the system, rather than resorting to mass protest or violence; in this sense,

at least, the clock has been turned back to the first three decades of the century and the potential for mass action such as that which characterised the fifties has been weakened. But, on the other hand, the TLA has institutionalized an African ability publicly to criticise the government and make demands of it (an ability which ceased to exist after 1956).

That such an evolution of the conflict themes we have described in the Transkei should be at all surprising, in the light of three centuries of racial conflict in South Africa, is an indication of the (largely ideological) misconceptions which have attended press reports and more serious studies of the Transkei. Nationalist Party ideologues and propagandists have persistently romanticised the civilising mission which they claim to have undertaken; liberal and leftist sources have consistently dismissed the strategy as a "fraud", a "bluff" and a deception staffed by black "stooges", of whom Matanzima has been depicted as the main stooge.³ South African government propoganda has been countered by valied arguments about the Transkei's lack of economic viability, which, it is claimed, precludes the Transkei from attaining independence. What has been neglected, as a result of this euphoria of false morality on the one hand, and moral outrage on the other, has been the very real political process which is unfolding in the Transkei. The emerging conflict articulation, the fact that much of this is being voiced by the very group which purports to accept separate development, and the fact that such demands are increasingly being voiced in the language of African nationalism (akin to that heard earlier in other parts of Africa) has, in consequence, been overlooked.⁴

CHIEFS, PEASANTS AND BOURGEOISIE.

When the Nationalist Party began the implementation of the Bantustan policy with Bantu Authorities, power was vested in the chiefs and not in the educated elite which had spearheaded urban opposition to white domination. This was done in order to use the traditional elite as a buffer class against the modern elite. As other colonial administrations had done, it was reasoned that industrialization had eroded the traditional power of the chiefs and that they would be responsive to policies which restored their powers. Opponents of apartheid reasoned, in turn, that the traditional role of the chiefs had been eroded by urbanisation, that such attempts to create a ruling elite out of this class in the 1960's was not only unworkable but would further undermine their declining legitimacy. The response of the traditional aristocracy to Bantu Authorities (authoritarianism, arrogance and extortion) was, as we have seen, to flex the new muscles the government had given them. It appeared to confirm the apartheid thesis that this class formed a natural ally of white privilege. The 1960 peasant revolt, in turn, illustrated the opposing argument that such powers in the hands of the chiefs would only diminish their traditional legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects and thus would be unworkable. The 1963 election results in the Transkei appeared to confirm this further and, in the view of Professor Hammond-Tooke, as we have seen, indicated an irreversible trend which belied the notion that chiefs formed a class able to govern a modern political system. This interpretation was not shared by Philip Mayer, who argued that the chiefs

could redeem themselves in the eyes of their subjects if they abandoned the application of unpopular policies and espoused anti-government platforms.⁵ As we have seen, this is precisely what happened. Most chiefs did not rigorously apply land rehabilitation policies, while Matanzima campaigned in 1968 as the apostle of anti-white exclusivism. The chiefs survived as rulers in a modern political system, and became the backbone of a party espousing an end to white domination on any terms. This political survival was not a survival of the chiefs on purely traditional terms, however, and the clue to their growing reluctance to act as the local cyphers of the Ministry of Bantu Administration and Development lies in the fact that the political machinery created by the white administration in the Transkei not only entrenches the power of the chiefs in Transkei politics, as was intended, but also changes the nature of their political role. The chief is no longer merely the symbol of traditional loyalties, he is also a government administrator at the local level (the Bantu Authorities system, in common with earlier British colonial policy in Africa, ensures that) and, even more important, a politician at the central level in the Transkei. As such he not only represents the archaic, conservative, tribal values, but must also undertake the political role of legislating and dealing with his people's political aspirations. The traditional role of the chief made him not only a ruler of his people, but also a person responsive to their needs. This complex relationship is reinforced now by the need of the chief to maintain a political responsiveness to his subject who, in the Transkei, can exert traditional pressures on him, or rebel as he did in 1960, or express

his dissatisfaction as in 1963, with the performance of his chief through the ballot box.

The modern relationship between the politicised chief and his peasant subjects is thus an ambivalent one, comprising two often (but not necessarily) contradictory elements: on the one hand the chief embodies and symbolises traditional values which remain of great importance to the individual (particularly in a colonial situation where migrant labour and growing landlessness weaken social stability and, hence, individual security); on the other hand, he becomes a focal point for local grievances which result from colonial policies, which he may be perceived to represent - especially in the case of Bantu Authorities. The chief thus remains a repository for traditional ties to which people cling in a time of social change (such as that imposed by migrant labour and land hunger) and a focus of grievances resulting from the same process of change.

This paradox is not peculiar to South Africa, even though the effects of change have been felt more strongly there than in the rest of Africa. In Sierra Leone, for example, the modernisation process initiated by colonialism made the chief both an ancient and modern elite at the same time.⁶

The very fact that African governments have not felt able to abolish the institution of chieftaincy is an indication that it retains strong legitimacy and close links with ruling elites. In Tanzania, the one country in Africa where the chieftaincy was abolished (in 1963) a study found that, of 11 chiefs and 97 headmen in the Tabora district in 1963,

two chiefs and 88 headmen had continued as local leaders in government positions in the district in 1966, while another chief and two headmen had become party officials.⁷ Those chiefs who had been reduced to the level of local councillors or retired farmers were generally old men who had identified themselves with colonial rule. The study found that traditional leadership had survived through a syncretic mixture with modern political roles. The traditional leaders of Tabora retained popular support in their new positions by virtue of parochial ties of loyalty and authority.

But, as we have noted, the traditional elite survives politically in a complex and often uneasy relationship with its rural subjects. And like the chiefs, the role patterns of the rural masses are also changing. The reality of peasant life is poverty - the need to invest hard labour into low, subsistence yields. It has been called Gemeinschaft without the idyll which Toennies depicted.⁸ Peasantry is at once so conservative and at the same time capable of powerful outbreaks of violence. But such violence is usually short-lived and seeks only to restore the traditional pattern which provided a subsistence.

This analysis accords well with Transkeian mass behaviour. Even if African rural farmers, working communal land, are not peasants in the strict sense of the term, such behaviour appears common to many rural populations in varying degrees.⁹ Engels noted that growing landlessness and proletarianisation of the peasantry created a strong political consciousness among them in England and weakened patriarchal loyalties;

Petras and Zeitlin have found the same process in operation in contemporary Chile.¹⁰ In the Transkei, Bantu Authorities aggravated population pressures on the insufficient land which whites had allocated to Africans. The result was a peasant revolt in 1960 in which the chiefs were primary targets as agents of the colonial process. The peasants aimed to restore traditional agrarian patterns and, after the explosive protest had ended, they were willing to accept the supremacy of their chiefs again, once land rehabilitation schemes had been minimised in many areas and once the chiefs had emerged as supporters of the anti-white policies of the TNIP. The revolt was inclusive of all tribal institutions; but equally, the "restoration" of 1968 was inclusive of the same values. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, populist pressures generally tended to seek a restoration of the traditional order by opposing chiefs who were perceived to weaken traditional values by supporting the colonial order.¹¹

If the stability of traditional social relations was undermined by social change induced by colonialism, it was further undermined by other social classes which had emerged from the same process. In Sierra Leone, populism was encouraged after 1945 by the return of ex-servicemen to their villages, and by youths returning, politically conscious, from the urban areas.¹² In the Congo, rural protest was generated by youths expelled from Leopoldville to the surrounding Kwango-Kwilu region.¹³ In the Transkei, we have seen that the existence of an ANC organisation, the presence of young militants like Nkosiyané and Nogcantsi, and the problem of political activists being rusticated in the Transkei after completing prison sentences,

have all worried Matanzima and contributed to his insistence that Proclamation R400 remain in force. The influence of migrant workers returning from the towns has not been documented and hence no conclusions can be drawn of their effect on Transkei politics, save to suggest that Matanzima's antipathy towards influx control and endorsement out of the urban areas may express, not only the problem of local poverty and unemployment, but also the bitterness of the resettled populations.

The traditional social structure on which conflict externalization is based is thus no longer a reality. The traditional elite has been "modernised" by the Transkei's constitutional arrangements and by the changes taking place within the peasantry; the peasantry in turn is affected by the changing role of its traditional rulers and by processes of social change which are aggravated by land hunger and population pressures. Thus a person like Babini Langa can represent the party of the chiefs in 1968 and lead populist protest against the local chief of Flagstaff in 1969 over land rehabilitation schemes.

Social change is further complicated by yet another dimension - the emerging bourgeois elite of the Transkei. The existence of a small educated elite is not new to the area. The mission schools, colleges and Fort Hare University ensured from an early date that such a class would emerge. It is this group that has long represented the ideas of the common society.¹⁴ The liberal elements of this rural educated elite, represented by men like Guzana, Buba and Bala, has provided the backbone of the DP. But the Transkei bourgeoisie has been enlarged by the

Bantustan policy as well. Educated Africans have been recruited into the region's bureaucracy, while others have been endorsed out of the towns into the Transkei. Still others have a background of political activism in urban areas or modern institutions. In many cases these people have, often as a result of embittering personal experiences, espoused the policies of the TNIP as a means of escaping from white rule. This new group, of whom Ndamse and Tshunungwa are the most prominent, have largely been responsible for the increasing use of a language of African nationalism in Transkeian politics. In addition, as we have noted, the new African bureaucracy has begun to develop vested interests in the Transkeian constitutional arrangement; these vested interests are inimical to the retention of white officials in the area's civil service and, indeed, direct this group to support moves towards independence.

The class structure of the Transkei thus is changing. True, the changes are small and only in their infancy. But it is suggested that such change, in a rural, stagnant society, generally characterised by social inertia, has relatively greater impact than a similar unit of change would in a dynamic urban-industrial environment. Further, the demographic changes in social class are reinforced (and even outweighed) by the changes in respective social roles which we have delineated. The traditional aristocracy is undergoing what social scientists like to call a political "modernisation", the peasantry is being uprooted from its traditional subsistence economy by the changing values of the chiefs, by population and apartheid pressures causing landlessness, migrancy and by the problems

resulting from resettlement and rehabilitation. It is also possible, though this was not found in the evidence examined, that the politically conscious bourgeoisie, able to employ the Transkei's new political machinery, will exercise a growing influence on the masses. Certainly the influence of this last class on the chiefs has been apparent in the sensitivity of the traditional elite to DP criticism and in the influence of men like Ndamse within the TNIP after the 1968 election. The growing militancy of expression on the part of the TNIP can be seen as deriving directly from pressures created by mass dissatisfaction and educated elite ambitions and aspirations.

Nor is it likely that the conflict articulation themes presently emerging in the region will suddenly subside. Even if the South African government applies greater pressure on Matanzima, it is unlikely that he will be able to resist populist sentiments (to the strength of which Langa's popularity is testimony) and the new bourgeois ambitions which the Bantustan venture has kindled. And these feelings are unlikely to die in the face of mounting poverty and the long tradition of African resistance to white domination in South Africa.

The tremendous poverty of the Transkei is underlined by the controversy surrounding the two hotels set up exclusively for blacks in the Transkei. (See previous chapter). The investment in hotels, one of which in Umtata a reporter found completely empty when he visited it,¹⁵ was criticised not only by DP members, but also by white doctors in the Transkei, who contrasted the expenditure with the mounting incidence of malnutrition. Doctors claimed that one in five Transkeians now had tuberculosis

while malnutrition cases had increased 600% in "the last three years" (presumably 1967-9).¹⁶ This poverty is unlikely to diminish. The Transkei budget is only R23 million (1969-70) and we have already noted how much of this goes to ameliorating suffering rather than into development. Given a population of 1.5 million in the area, and an African land holding of over 14,000 square miles, we can see that the budget allows a per capita spending of about R1.54 by the Transkei government while the average population density is over 100 to the square mile. Even though the South African government also spends on its own services in the area, the budget would indicate that talk of development is rendered ludicrous by such figures. Further the population density is extremely high for Africa and particularly so for a population dependent on subsistence agriculture and resistant to agrarian reform in the face of a lack of alternative job opportunities. The need for men to become migrant workers and the problem of the Transkei as a rural labour reservoir suffering land hunger is crystallized by these simple figures.

Furthermore, population pressures on the land are likely to increase tremendously in the coming three decades. Although figures for the Transkei alone are not available, gross estimates of the population explosion for South Africa as a whole underline the enormity of the problem.¹⁷ The "verligte" Afrikaans newspaper "Die Beeld", in 1970 projected the population for 2000 at a minimum of 35 million and a probable realisation of 40 million.¹⁸ Of these some 6 million would be whites, 1.4 million probably Indians, and 8.4 million Coloureds. This meant that the African population

alone would be nearly 25 million. These population figures must be seen in terms of an allocation of only 13.7% of the land for Africans. The population explosion is likely to increase rural poverty and, at the same time, actually make the urban areas blacker than before. Again the Bantustans begin to look like a means of conflict extension rather than of conflict externalization.

In addition, the long tradition of African resistance to white rule must be regarded as a substantive factor likely to perpetuate conflict.¹⁹ To this, the Transkei is unlikely to be oblivious. The personalities of men like Ndamse, Tshunungwa, Paramount Chief Sabata, Chief Mteto Matanzima, and Nkosiyane have been shaped, to some extent at least, by the long urban political struggle.²⁰ The very fact that Mandela was related to so many royal houses in the Transkei precludes the chieftaincy from being immunised against nationalist influences.

Nevertheless, if the Transkeian leadership is not impervious to the tradition of African nationalism, it is highly significant that the TNIP is tapping the exclusivist values of African society and rejecting the multi-racial symbols of the ANC. The basic ethos underlying the liberal rejection of Bantustans was the assumption that such exclusivist values had lost their relevance under the impact of industrialization. The TNIP's 1968 election victory indicates that, in the Transkei at least, this is definitely not the case. A study of the black bourgeoisie of South Africa indicates that, even among members of this class, "black power" symbols are as valid as multi-racial ones - they constitute an

alternative culture.²¹ And two recent studies of the attitudes of Zulu intellectuals indicates that exclusivist values are gaining strength again.²² It would thus seem that Xhosa personalities like Ndamse, Canca, Tshunungwa and even Sinaba are paralleled among the African bourgeoisie of Natal at least. There is indication that the changing mood is even more widespread: the Bantu Federation of South Africa, with headquarters in Bergville, Natal, now claims 49,900 members. This organisation supports separate development but resists the tribal divisions enforced by the South African government, calling for a national African parliament to be established overriding all tribal groups.²³ Another group declares itself devoted to separatism, ethnic nationalism and "a confederation and common market for Southern Africa which will be the United States of Southern Africa". This group publishes a journal called "Africa South" which is edited by L. N. Ndaba. In 1969 it bitterly attacked Guzana for opposing the idea of a Xhosa nation, claiming that Nigeria, Zanzibar, Gambia, Lesotho and Swaziland proved the efficacy of such a notion.²⁴

Whether racial exclusivism is to be linked with ethnic separatism as this journal wants, is not yet clear from a study of political attitudes in the Transkei - but even Matanzima tends to speak of "Africans" rather than the officially prescribed "Bantu" or "Xhosa" in TLA debates. Certainly, "The World" bemoaned a growing trend to tribalism in 1969.²⁵ But, at present, by far the dominant feature of this change in African attitudes is a dislike of whites and a developing racial exclusiveness. In a

recent newspaper report on South Africa,²⁶ Anthony Sampson noted that Matanzima, within the narrow limits permitted by the Transkei structure, was manifesting a surprising degree of independence of attitude, and found that South African Africans were in the process of a steady retreat from European values. A priest was quoted by him as saying that there had been, in the past two years (1968 and 1969) "a massive withdrawal from the Christian churches" by Africans, a new interest in "Black Power" and "the Government are realising that they have unleashed a social political force which they can't control". Sampson quotes one veteran African leader as saying:

"In a country which says white is beautiful, there is bound to be this reaction: black is beautiful. The government want us to be black, but as soon as we're proud of being black, they get worried".

Sampson concludes by noting that this pride in colour and race is a way in which both conservatives and radicals can come together among the African population.²⁷

OTHER BANTUSTANS.

The economic dependence of the three former High Commission territories - Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland - on South Africa, symbolised by the fact that Botswana and Lesotho send more than half of their adult male labour force to the Republic each year as migrant workers, is in many ways the basis of Nationalist Party hopes that Bantustans can enable them to expel conflict politically while maintaining economic exploitation and privilege. In 1963, Dr. Verwoerd publicly requested that Britain hand over these territories to

South Africa instead of granting them independence directly.²⁸

In effect, the three countries have not proved willing economic prisoners of the Republic. All have publicly renounced apartheid, Botswana has sought to open transport links with Zambia to free her of dependence on the South, and has accepted refugees from South Africa. Swaziland, economically less dependent than the others, has followed an independent line in foreign policy to a large extent. The Lesotho government of Chief Jonathan, the most co-operative towards South Africa, has nevertheless asked for the "return" of certain parts of the eastern Orange Free State.²⁹ The upheavals in Lesotho underline the precarious nature of South African ability to control events in these client states.³⁰ In Lesotho, at least, mass poverty and the political aspirations of the educated elite have been translated (unsuccessfully so far) into an anti-South African political idiom.³¹

The Transkei's growing intransigence, and Lesotho's instability, appear to have prompted South Africa to omit elected representatives from the legislative bodies created in her other Bantustans. In Ovamboland, for example, Bantustan government has been confined totally to the chiefs.³² True, this has been done in response to a request by the chiefs to exclude an electoral mechanism from constitutional arrangements - but a similar request from the Transkei in 1962 was rejected as "undemocratic" at that time. The other Bantustans have not achieved the "self-government" status of the Transkei and Ovamboland yet, so the fact that government in these areas is still confined to the chiefs provides no similar guide.³³

Even so, despite the absence of elected members in the administration of these "homelands", the chiefs have shown a strong willingness to annoy the Ministry of Bantu Administration and Development. The Ciskei's Paramount Chief, Bazindlovu Sandile, is the son-in-law of Paramount Chief Victor Poto and, like the latter, is a confirmed multi-racialist.³⁴ In Zululand, the death of the pro-apartheid Paramount Chief Bhekezulu in 1968 was a serious blow to government attempts to impose a Bantustan on an otherwise reluctant chieftaincy, which supported the outspoken anti-government Chief Gatsha Buthelezi.³⁵ In 1970, Buthelezi was finally persuaded to accept the constitution of Zululand as a territorial authority. But he made it clear, in a speech as chairman of the authority and in reply to an address by Mr. M. C. Botha, at the opening of the authority, that he expected the government to fulfil its promises on the unequivocal understanding that "we cannot be expected to move towards self-determination at ox-wagon pace".³⁶

Botha's deputy received similar treatment when he visited the Tswana Territorial Authority to be told by its chairman, the allegedly pro-apartheid Chief Lucas Mangope, that he (Mangope) had considered replacing white civil servants in the area with Africans expelled from the towns, but that the lack of development in the area meant that there were too few jobs to make such a move meaningful. Mangope stated that he wanted the whites, who humiliated Africans, out of the Tswana area and that he wanted more powers for the authority.³⁷ Nor is Mangope's opponent in the area, Chief T. Pilane, likely to provide the government with much greater comfort: he has called for the combination of the Bantustans into "one great black state".³⁸

A few weeks after Buthelezi's remarks to Botha, the Zulu chief was quoted as saying that he thought a meeting with Matanzima would be "most welcome as it would be in the common interests of the African people".³⁹

THE PROBLEM OF POWER

Despite the fact that there appears to be a definite development of conflict articulation emanating from the Bantustans and, particularly, the Transkei, the question, or rather accusation remains, that the Transkei lacks any substantive power and that therefore such attitudes are devoid of any value for change in the overall South African situation. One of Verwoerd's ministers, Senator Jan de Klerk, in fact, stated openly (to a white audience) that the government had not given the Transkei "a single essential right enjoyed by a sovereign independent state" and that every department of the Transkei government was led by a white official.⁴⁰

We are not here concerned with the Transkei's potential ability to alter South African history. Nevertheless, the question of whether or not the Transkei possesses any meaningful power at all, also affects the conflict potential of the system. The superficial answer to this question is that the Transkei has virtually no power in terms of the constitutional arrangements created by South Africa. The Transkei depends on finance, police and legislative assent from the South African government, whose coercive machinery operates within the territory as much as in the rest of the country.

Nevertheless, the region does have some limited constitutional power - as it showed in eliminating Bantu Education and in the Stone affair. More

important, the Transkei has power by default: the Bantustan system was, as we have seen, intended to quieten international criticism as much as to divert internal opposition from the urban areas. The very fact that Matanzima is regarded as a stooge, or even merely as a creation of white rule, gives him a certain security in his ability to criticise his mentors. Having given him power, against the wishes of the people in 1963, South Africa could only be seen to act against her own puppet at tremendous international cost to herself.⁴¹ Actual intervention in the Transkei, by the police or army, against the TNIP (or even the DP for that matter) would incur a diplomatic price she could not easily afford.⁴² In fact, the Transkei Constitution Act does allow Africans to protest their situation from the safety of a legislative assembly created by the very government they criticise. And it allows such protest to be made in terms of the government's own propoganda. Publicity is probably the strongest shield which Matanzima has, both in terms of his ability to continue to criticise and in terms of gaining concessions which government propoganda has promised him (but which the externalization strategy requires be denied to him.) It is the lack of international publicity, based on the belief that the political process in the Transkei is meaningless, which enables the South African government to continue ignoring black demands. But such power as the Transkei has already, is more than that which urban political movements enjoyed during the fifties and especially sixties. To continue to assert that the political process in the Transkei is meaningless, because it lacks power, is to imply that all black politics in the

country are meaningless, because all Africans lack power.

CONCLUSION

The events unfolding in the Transkei since 1963, would indicate that the hope that conflict could be externalised, by "ruralising" African politics while perpetuating urban economic exploitation, is wrong. It is wrong because it is not based on social reality. While the chiefs have, indeed, emerged as a viable political leadership, they have done so only in a complex relationship with mass and educated elite aspirations. The objective conditions of poverty and the nationalist heritage of resistance to white privilege ensure that the chieftaincy must respond to these popular feelings. Separatism constitutes not a basis for whites to enjoy black labour regulated by black taskmasters, but an alternative means for Africans of responding to the bitterness created by white exploitation and police repression. It thus has the potential to unite rural and urban, conservative and radical Africans. It will only cease to pose a challenge to white privilege if the exclusivist idiom is overtaken by the tribal one. However, this is unlikely while deprivation persists (and the "labour carousel" we described ensures that perceptions of deprivation are not obviated by rural isolation). The Transkei indicates that the exclusivist idiom of African nationalism is as important to the African population as the language of the common society; this dualism results from the integrative nature of the economy on the one hand, and the bitterness which the physical control of the African population (and its condition of relative deprivation) arouses on the other. The Bantustan policy, in fact, institutionalises the

colonial pattern of social relations which have persisted throughout South Africa's history. As such, it refocuses rather than diverts, African perceptions of deprivation. This refocusing process, by government intention, emphasises the separatist element in the dual nature of the African ethos of resistance.

Matanzima has shown that the manipulation of "black power" symbols are equally relevant to the African mood. Given the indications that the Transkei conforms to our initial hypotheses that persisting deprivation has a direct relationship with conflict expression (as long as there are unsatisfied aspirations for upward social mobility) and that if one avenue of conflict articulation is closed other available avenues will be employed, the persistent tendency of the liberation movement of South Africa to dismiss the Transkei as politically meaningless, harms only itself. If it is accepted that the objective political, economic and social nature of relations between the races creates African perceptions of deprivation (and even the chiefs in the Bantustans seem to say so) then the conflict potential of the Transkei (including the TNIP) will continue to be ignored by the liberation movement to its own cost. For the Transkei appears to indicate that (presently embryonic) class changes are resulting in race conflict in South Africa being extended (geographically and demographically) rather than externalized.

APPENDIX I

THE REPRESSIVE MECHANISM

The repressive aspect of apartheid enforcement is a major part of its application. Though largely neglected by political scholars, it is nonetheless well documented.(1) Having examined its role in the structure of conflict in the country, it is only necessary to note here that the political police are now headed by a Bureau of State Security (BOSS) responsible only to the Prime Minister and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. The courts themselves have had their powers of review and control heavily circumscribed by laws which lay the onus of legality on the proof that an action was undertaken because "in the opinion of the Minister" it was necessary.(2) Courts have no access to people detained without trial. Further, the courts, despite their strangely high reputation internationally, have shown themselves to be a part of a system of repression which socializes even its judges to jail a policeman guilty of murdering an African prisoner, while sentencing an African "habitual criminal" to death.(3) Given their inability to affect police operations, the courts have been a rubber stamp, legalising a status which the political prisoner suffers under statute anyway; it could be held that the Security Police, through powers of banishment, banning, detention without trial, enabling them to imprison in "the absence of evidence which would enable you to convict them in the court of law" no longer enforce the law so much as make it. (4, 5)

Statistics show that South Africa is responsible for 47% of the world's executions of prisoners of all types,(6) that in 1965, for example, some 15,700 people received corporal punishment at an average of four strokes each,(7) that of 3,714 political prisoners convicted in the seven years to 1967, 3,500 were Africans(8) that by 1967 there was a daily average of 73,000 prisoners in South African jails (or half a million annually)(9) of whom 53% received sentences of one month or less,(10) that the figure for flogging of prisoners guilty of breaches of prison discipline was 844 for 1965(11) and that an average of over 40 warders per annum were convicted annually (1960-1963) for ill-treatment of prisoners(12). In the seven years, 1960-7 4½ million convictions were made under laws like the pass laws, 120,000 for passive resistance or strikes, while 14,000 were detained without trial for political offences(13).

The system also extends to the Transkei, where, in addition, Proclamations 400 and 413 operate. These provide chiefs with powers of banishment of recalcitrants, the right to veto all meetings in their areas, and the ability to hand anyone over to the police. The police have rights of indefinite detention without trial on grounds of suspicion that a person has information about an offence.(14) In 1965, 137 people were arrested under these Proclamations in the Transkei, 74 were released without trial,

63 eventually charged and only 32 convicted. The figures for 1966 are, respectively, 109, 72, 37 and 16; for 1967 they read 25, 21, 4 and 3. One 1966 detainee was held for 203 days before being released without trial, while another two were held for 204 days each before appearing in court.(15)

While the above figures may indicate that the police are succeeding in destroying dissent, overall figures for the two decades of Nationalist rule do not confirm this. But certainly the efficiency of the machine is increasing and is augmented by an ability to protect state witnesses or bribe them:

"In at least one case all the prosecution witnesses were in some way indebted to the Security Police. The Security Police had even provided one state witness with a house".(16)

More important is the network of informers developed, and the techniques perfected by the police to penetrate organizations and cells of dissent with paid agents. As Mr. Vorster has said:

"The fact that one does not see a uniformed policeman about does not mean that there is no policeman nearby".(17)

APPENDIX II

MAJOR PERSONALITIES IN TRANSKEIAN POLITICS

- a. Regional breakdown of traditional rulers (by the nine regions of the Transkei).
- i) Umzimkulu
- Most prominent chief is Chief Petros Jozana, a TNIP supporter and Matanzima's choice as Chairman of the Transkei Legislative Assembly from 1963 to 1968.
- ii) Maluti (Matatiele and Mount Fletcher districts).
- A weak and often divided chieftaincy (though all support Matanzima) in an area where much farmland is owned by whites. Leading personality is Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, Minister of the Interior in Matanzima's first Cabinet and then Minister of Justice. Continued in the Cabinet after the 1968 election (the only person other than the Matanzima brothers to do so) in the latter position before being moved back to the Interior portfolio.
- iii) Emboland (Mount Frere, Qumbu and Tsolo districts)
- The chieftaincy weak and divided politically between the two main parties. The most prominent and popular chief is Chief Sandy S. Majeke, a frontbencher for the opposition DP.
- iv) Qakeni (also known as Eastern Pondoland). (Mount Ayliff, Bizana, Flagstaff, Tabankulu and Lusikisiki districts).
- The leading political personality among the traditional aristocracy here is Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau. Generally regarded as a corrupt and harsh ruler, Botha's implementation of the Bantu Authorities system led to the Pondoland rebellion of 1960, during which Botha was forced to flee for his life. Reinstated by the South African police, it was claimed that he instituted a "rule of terror" against his subjects in reprisal. Nevertheless, he refused to commit himself to either side during the 1963 election and only joined the TNIP and Matanzima afterwards. His alliance with Matanzima became the core on which the TNIP rests, and this alliance was cemented in 1969 when Botha's daughter married Matanzima's son. Qakeni provides more chiefs (15) to the TIA than any other region but apart from Botha, only Chief M. Tantsi was at all prominent in the life of the First Assembly - and then only for his inability to fathom the essence of any debate he spoke in.

v) Emigrant Tembuland (Xalanga and St. Marks districts)

An offshoot of the Tembu tribe, Emigrant Tembuland for a long time sought traditional autonomy from the parent tribe. This aim was symbolised by its leading chief, Kaiser Matanzima of Qamata, and formed the basis of the bitterness between Matanzima and his cousin, Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo of Tembuland. Matanzima, a Fort Hare graduate and lawyer, is a strong believer in the right of the traditional aristocracy to rule. He is regarded as a harsh though strong chief. In 1967, the South African government agreed to make him the Transkei's fifth Paramount Chief, thus officially making Emigrant Tembuland autonomous of Sabata. Matanzima is also the leading political figure in the Transkei, espousing the government policy of apartheid and leading the TNIP in the TLA. The TNIP ruled the Transkei from 1963 to 1968, with a minority of elected members, through the strong support the chiefs gave Matanzima. After the 1968 election Matanzima gained a majority of support from both traditional and elected members.

The other major personality in this region is Matanzima's brother, Chief George Matanzima, also a Fort Hare graduate and a lawyer. George has been one of the most controversial politicians in the Transkei, being his brother's most prominent supporter when the latter was head of the Territorial Authority and then later, when Kaiser became Chief Minister of the Transkei in 1963. Removed from the bar for fraud, George became Minister of Justice in 1963 (a fact of which the Opposition made much) and then Minister of Education, a post he retained after the 1968 election until replaced by Ndamse, after which he returned to the Justice portfolio. An extremely able politician, George was the only TNIP member, other than his brother, to effectively respond to the criticisms of the DP in debate during the First Assembly. Throughout this thesis he is referred to as George Matanzima, His brother Kaiser is called either by his full name or merely Matanzima.

vi) Dalindyebo (Tembuland). (Engcobo, Umtata and Mqanduli districts).

Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo rules over this, the centre of Transkei politics and its most politically conscious region. A firm believer in multi-racialism and of the traditional dignity of the chieftaincy, Sabata has been a major figure in the Opposition DP and one of its most outspoken critics of apartheid. After an unavailing struggle to ensure that the Transkei Constitution Act would give the TLA an elected majority of commoners, he became the leading supporter of Paramount Chief Victor Poto in the DP. When Poto resigned the leadership, Sabata became deputy to the new

vi) Dalindyebo (Tembuland) Continued

leader, Guzana, one of Sabata's subjects. Sabata, due to an unfortunate tendency to support rebel DP candidates, has been a problem to the DP party organization. His conduct implies a lack of confidence in the approach of Guzana, but he remains one of the most popular men in the Transkei and indispensable to the DP as a vote-getter and as a speaker. This is shown by the fact that the DP retains Dalindyebo region as a stronghold despite the fact that most of the other chiefs in the region support the TNIP.

vii) Nyanda (Western Pondoland. (Libode, Nqeleni and Port St. Johns districts).

The elderly Paramount Chief Victor Poto is the dominant figure in this region. A member of the NRC and the Transkei TTA, he is a firm believer in moderate multi-racialism and in the right of the people to elect their own government. He formed the rallying point of anti-apartheid sentiment in the 1963 election and became the first leader of the DP after the election. Believing that the dignity of the traditional elite could only be preserved in an advisory Upper House of Chiefs, Poto resigned the DP leadership. His successor, Guzana, has not fared as well as the Chief did. Poto is probably the most respected and liked chief in the Transkei, epitomising the values of moderation and Christian liberalism; he remains free from personal abuse in political debate and even Matanzima refers to him with respect. Strongly supporting Poto's views and political commitment is his heir, Chief Tutor N. Ndamase, and the latter's cousin, Chief Douglas D. P. Ndamase, a leading DP spokesman, despite an earlier enthusiasm for Transkeian autonomy.

viii) Gcaleka (Idutywa, Elliotdale, Willowvale and Kentani districts)

Paramount Chief Zwelidumile Sigcau is the Transkei's senior chief. A firm supporter of separate development and of Matanzima, Sigcau presides over the most backward region of the Transkei, where strong tribal values prevail. Nevertheless, he exercises only the most tenuous influence over his subjects' voting preferences, preferring to play a minor role in the TLA and the TNIP. He was appointed regent when his brother, the former Paramount Chief, died, but was made Paramount Chief by the South African government when the real heir, Shadrack Sigcau, grew up and proved to hold strong anti-apartheid views. As a result, he is locally regarded as a usurper and thus lacks popularity. This has probably prompted him to remain politically quiet. The Xhosa Queen Mother, Nozizwe Sigcau, similarly remains politically uninvolved compared with the other major chiefs.

ix) Fingoland (Tsomo, Nqamakwe and Butterworth districts)

The Fingo's bore the main burden of white wars against the Xhosa and their tribal system is consequently the most fragmented, the chiefs the weakest and the educated elite the strongest, in the whole Transkei. The chiefs all support the TNIP, in the hope that they can regain their old authority and power, but the region's politically prominent figures tend to be educated commoners.

b. Breakdown of political personalities by parties.

i. The Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP)

Chief Kaiser Matanzima - Chief Minister

Chief George Matanzima -

Chief Petros Jozana - first Chairman of the TLA

B. B. Mdledle (Emigrant Tembuland) - Minister of Education in Matanzima's first Cabinet. Did not stand for re-election in the 1968 election. Politically considered a "lightweight".

Chief Jeremiah Moshesh - present Minister of the Interior in the TLA.

C. Madikizela (Qakeni) - Minister of Agriculture in the TLA throughout the life of the First Assembly. The father of Nelson Mandela's wife, Winnie, his political views have estranged him from his daughter. One of the grossest and most inept members of Matanzima's inept first Cabinet.

M. H. Canca (Emboland) - the deputy Chairman of the first TLA; became Chairman after the 1968 election. A TNIP leader who believes strongly in a speedy development to independence for the Transkei; he proposed the motion to this effect in 1968.

Z. M. Mabandla (Emboland) - Matanzima's first Minister of Roads and Works. Another of the early TNIP leaders who did not distinguish himself and relied on the seconded white civil servants provided by Pretoria. Dropped from the TNIP front bench for the 1968 election.

H. H. Nolutshungu (Umzimkulu) - One of the few elected TNIP members who in any way distinguished himself during the debates of the TLA up to 1968. Joined Canca in calling for early independence.

Miss Stella Sigcau (Qakeni) - the daughter of Botha Sigcau, she won easily in Lusikisiki in the 1968 election and became Minister of Roads and Works in Matanzima's new Cabinet. She draws support by virtue of her status as a member of a royal house and as a university graduate. Politically active at university, she is not a major force in Transkei politics, which makes her an ideal Minister for Matanzima. She became Minister of Education in July 1970 - gaining the second most important Cabinet position in the Transkei.

The Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP) Continued

T. E. Tshunungwa (Emigrant Tembuland) - A new TNIP member, returned unopposed in St. Marks in 1968. He represents the new union between African nationalism and Matanzima's separatism and the fact that Matanzima gave him such a safe seat in the election indicates the hopes the chiefs have of co-operation with men such as Tshunungwa. A former accused at the Treason Trial, Tshunungwa has decided to apply his African nationalism to the Transkei situation. During 1969 he called for arms "to oppose communists" in the Transkei, for an end to passes and the right of Africans to carry identity cards like whites, and for a speed up of economic development and independence. He also projected Matanzima as "a moses" leading his people to freedom - possibly a tactical approach designed to encourage the Chief Minister to step up his own demands.

Curnick (G.M.C.) Ndamse (Qakeni) - returned for Mount Ayliff at the 1968 election. A former lecturer at Fort Hare University College where he officially accepted Bantu Education but was said to be politically active among the students, Ndamse was banned in 1965, ostensibly for criticising the application of Bantu Education. Matanzima persuaded the government to modify the banning order and then to remove it. Ndamse became Minister of the Interior, then of Education and, in July 1970, of Roads and Works. He emerged as the major voice of nationalism in the Transkei, calling for separation as a way of escaping white domination. Newspapers paid so much attention to his speeches that his demotion to the last named Ministry probably indicates a fear by Matanzima that Ndamse may become leader of the TNIP.

B. Langa (Qakeni) - elected at Flagstaff in 1968 on an anti-rehabilitation platform, Langa was detained for his part in the Flagstaff riots of 1969 and then stood as an independent for his old seat. Although expelled from the TNIP, he won overwhelmingly in the bye election as a result of his populist beliefs. He was shot in an assassination attempt in July 1970 after a dispute with Botha Sigcau.

ii. The Democratic Party (DP)

Paramount Chief Victor Poto - first leader of the DP.
Knowledge Guzana (Dalindyebo) - succeeded Poto as DP leader but his moderation and formal co-operation with the government in the Transkei have allowed Matanzima to successfully depict his multi-racial approach as reactionary and against black interests. It has also alienated several of his more militant supporters.

The Democratic Party (DP) Continued

Knowledge Guzana Nevertheless, he remains one of the ablest men in the Transkei, a brilliant debator and speaker, and a person able to use his legal training in debates on legislation in the TLA.

Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo - deputy leader of the DP under Guzana.

J. B. Nkosiyane (Dalindyebo) - one of the party radicals. Convicted for allegedly plotting to kill Matanzima, he was released on appeal. Though Guzana refused to nominate him in 1968, Nkosiyan stood successfully as an independent and then rejoined the party after the election. Genuinely popular in the region for his anti-apartheid views.

M. A. Raziya (Dalindyebo) - prominent in debates up to 1968 and successful at the polls in the election of that year. His death in 1970 (which caused the DP to lose his Umtata seat in the bye-election because of a party rebel) was a serious blow to the depleted Opposition.

G. N. Jafta (Emboland) - although not a DP frontbencher, he was prominent in debates during the First Assembly and was easily superior to most TNIP speakers. Re-elected in 1968 for Qumbu.

Miss Lillian Twetwa (Emboland) - sat on a party front bench without particularly distinguishing herself up to 1968. She was refused DP nomination for the 1968 election and stood as an independent in Qumbu, where she was defeated.

Dr. H. Bala (Fingoland) - was the "star" of the DP attacks on apartheid up to 1968. However, after being removed from the TLA for refusing to join a display of mourning for Verwoerd, he rapidly became disillusioned with Guzana as a leader and finished the last session of the TLA's First Assembly as an embittered independent. He refused to stand in 1968 (although he would have been returned in Butterworth quite easily) because he regarded the Transkei venture as a farce. Bala was an example of a middle-class, professional African, with no previous political record, growing to hate the system under which he lived in South Africa with an almost fanatical bitterness.

O. O. Mpondo (Fingoland) - the DP's Chief Whip. One of the militant members of the party, he distinguished himself in debate, particularly in his denunciation of Bantu Education. He was the DP candidate in Butterworth, but was unable to lodge his nomination papers and the party was thus deprived, for no good reason, of one of its major voices.

The Democratic Party (DP) continued

Rev. B. S. Rajuili (Maluti) - one of the few urban Africans who agreed to take part in the Bantustan adventure. Rajuili was a fine speaker and a moderate in the Guzana mould. He lost his seat in 1968.

N. H. H. Zibi (Maluti) - another DP backbencher who figured prominently in debates in the first TLA, like Jafta. His outspoken criticism of the TNIP allowed him to top the poll in Mount Fletcher in 1968, even though the other DP candidate was defeated.

T. H. Bubu (Qakeni) - national secretary of the DP and one of its finest speakers. His defeat in Lusikisiki in 1968 was totally unexpected, as was his subsequent loss to Langa in Flagstaff in the 1970 bye election. He was a teacher by profession, but had been fired by the Ministry because of his outspoken condemnation of Bantu Education before the Transkei was granted self-government.

Gordon Dana (Qakeni) - had been a member of the Bunga, in which he had preached multi-racialism and the right of people to elect their government. This made him an enemy of Matanzima and others who believed in government by chiefs. He was not as prominent in the TLA and did not contest the 1968 election.

S. C. Mda (Qakeni) - another DP frontbencher who won in Qakeni in 1963 as a result of popular disaffection with the chiefs. He was also another casualty of the 1968 election, being defeated heavily in Bizana.

C. N. Nogcantsi (Qakeni) - probably the most radical and militant of all the DP personalities. With Nkosiyané, he attacked apartheid strongly during the early years of the First Assembly, calling for the end of Proclamation R400, political asylum for "political refugees" from the rest of South Africa, and an end to government by chiefs. He was accused of plotting to kill Matanzima on the evidence of a white police agent, and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. While Nkosiyané was released on appeal, Nogcantsi's conviction was upheld and he is still serving this sentence.

iii. The Transkei People's Freedom Party (TPFP)

Shadrack Sinaba (Maluti) - an urban African who stood in 1963 as a supporter of multi-racialism and then was persuaded to join Matanzima as the TNIP's Chief Whip. In 1967 he left the party in disgust, claiming that Matanzima was not sincere about independence for the Transkei. He formed the TPFP and, although his party lacked funds or the support of the chiefs, he was able to maintain an intense pressure on the TNIP throughout 1967 and 1968, forcing Matanzima to take a far stronger position on

iii. The Transkei People's Freedom Party (TPFP) Continued ...

Shadrack Sinaba Continued .. independence than had previously been the case. Like the other TPFP candidates, Sinaba was heavily defeated in the 1968 election and no news of his activities or those of his party has been available since then.

Cromwell Diko (Qakeni) - a prominent member of the DP, until he defected to join Sinaba in 1967 to form the highly effective TPFP duo in the TIA. He was the only TPFP candidate to come near to winning a seat in the 1968 election. The fact that the two TPFP men came from the two opposing parties led to a strong ambivalence in the new party's attitude to multi-racialism. Sinaba generally referred to a blacks only independence for the Transkei; Diko was never as clear.

APPENDIX III

THE TRANSKEI GENERAL ELECTION OF 1968 - RESULTS

A statistical breakdown by candidate and party.

(* - figure in brackets next to name of constituency denotes number of seats allocated to that constituency).

I The voting by candidates

1 BUTTERWORTH (1)*

N. P. Bulube (TNIP) returned unopposed

2 BIZANA (2)

M. E. Dyalvane (TNIP)	6381	
C. Madikizeal (TNIP)	8252	
M. W. Madikizela (DP)	5594	
C. S. Mda (DP)	3821	
W. S. Songqishe (I)	4836	2 TNIP seats

3 ST. MARKS (2)

T. E. Tshunungwa (TNIP)	}	returned unopposed
Chief George Matanzima (TNIP)		

4 ELLIOTDALE (1)

S. Dokolwana (TNIP)	6083	
V. Gwebindlala (I)	1210	
D. Gwebindlala (I)	1522	
M. W. Kweza (DP)	3299	
T. T. Mdabaku (I)	1186	
B. Livi (I)	805	
P. Pakamile (I)	1808	1 TNIP seat

5 ENGCOBO (3)

N. H. Butshingi (I)	754	
D. D. Dalasile (I)	3185	
Z. D. Dalasile (I)	3672	
N. J. Dungulu (TNIP)	6453	
G. G. Kutu (DP)	10728	
S. H. Majija (I)	7736	
Z. L. Majija (DP)	10335	
W. G. Mblawa (TNIP)	5611	
L. L. Mgudlwa (DP)	11995	
L. E. Mtirara (TNIP)	6340	
D. S. Sandile (I)	5665	
I. M. Ntlonti (I)	1344	
B. S. Tekwana (I)	381	
M. H. Xuma (I)	6731	
A. Xundu (I)	2750	3 DP seats

6 FLAGSTAFF (1)

B. Langa (TNIP)	9748	
M. D. Nonkonyana (DP)	8710	1 TNIP seat

7 IDUTYWA (2)

J. M. Dinizulu (TNIP)	7343	
B. B. Dlabantu (DP)	4438	
T. Matsiliza (I)	1221	
G. G. Mkiva (I)	3908	
T. Moses (I)	2915	
X. C. Ndikinda (DP)	3924	
J. Ntlokondala (TNIP)	6774	
S. S. Sofute (I)	1072	2 TNIP seats

8 KENTANI (2)

J. G. Maqwashe (I)	1248	
R. E. Mapassa (TNIP)	12228	
G. Maqoma (DP)	9776	
V. N. Reve (TNIP)	11654	
N. S. Sizani (DP)	9620	2 TNIP seats

9 LIEODE (1)

S. C. Mangxa (TNIP)	1528	
C. W. S. Singatha (DP)	19396	1 DP seat

10 LUSIKISIKI (3)

H. H. Bubu (DP)	9137	
N. Dweba (DP)	6637	
M. Laquela (DP)	6626	
B. S. Mjojeli (I)	2119	
S. K. Ndzumo (TNIP)	11565	
S. L. Sigcau (TNIP)	13431	
Miss S. Sigcau (TNIP)	12449	3 TNIP seats

11 MATATIELE (2)

J. Khoapa (I)	733	
S. D. N. Lebese (I)	2238	
H. G. Ludidi (I)	2399	
K. Makhocane (TPFP)	964	
T. N. Momoza (I)	2808	
S. Moshesh (TNIP)	4594	
Z. A. Mzozoyana (TNIP)	4751	
D. J. Ndleleni (DP)	3221	
Rev. B. S. Rajuili (DP)	2882	
S. S. Rajuili (I)	3385	
M. S. Sinaba (TPFP)	2551	2 TNIP seats

12 MOUNT AYLIFF (1)

T. C. Fikeni (DP)	8141	
G. M. C. Ndamse (TNIP)	11991	1 TNIP seat

13 MOUNT FLETCHER (2)

M. O. Kathali (TNIP)	7624	
M. A. Mapheleba (I)	2561	
K. T. Mbobo (I)	3000	
B. E. Mhahlo (I)	1310	
P. G. Morai (DP)	2909	
T. Motsili (TNIP)	6102	
O. Mpetha (I)	2911	
N. H. Zibi (DP)	8129	1 DP & 1 TNIP seat

14	MOUNT FRERE (2)		
	M. H. Canca (TNIP)	12755	
	C. Dabula (TNIP)	13891	
	M. M. Maqashalala (TPFP)	3881	
	M. C. Mxotwa (DP)	2887	
	M. H. Nakani (DP)	2064	
	R. Tshengulama (TPFP)	2673	
	G. Pama (I)	936	
	M. E. Sokufudumala (I)	762	2 TNIP seats
15	MQANDULI (2)		
	S. Bacela (DP)	4537	
	X. Dengwane (TNIP)	4433	
	K. M. N. Guzana (DP)	13692	
	S. Macozoma (I)	920	
	D. J. Mapongwana (I)	296	
	K. D. Matutu (TNIP)	4494	
	N. P. Nkosiyane (I)	9756	1 DP & 1 DP rebel seat
16	NQELENI (2)		
	R. Madikizela (DP)	16262	
	H. Mafukula (DP)	14449	
	K. Ndamase (TNIP)	10503	
	G. Zono (TNIP)	9193	2 DP seats
17	NQAMAKWE (1)		
	M. Masiko (TNIP)	15057	
	L. T. Mazwi (DP)	3205	
	N. J. Mtshemla (I)	2004	1 TNIP seat
18	PORT ST. JOHNS (1)		
	D. T. Majali (I)	1278	
	V. J. Makosonke (TNIP)	4595	
	M. C. Ndamase (DP)	4739	1 DP seat
19	QUMBU (2)		
	G. N. Jafta (DP)	9700	
	S. S. Majeke (DP)	10529	
	Mrs. N. A. Ngilana (TNIP)	6172	
	M. M. Siwahla (TNIP)	6940	
	M. V. Tonjeni (TPFP)	1034	
	Miss L. Twetwa (I)	3137	2 DP seats

20 TABANKULU (2)

C. Diko (TPFP)	7221	
M. Dinwayo (TNIP)	8850	
E. S. Dumani (I)	3637	
H. S. Dumani (TNIP)	8242	
T. G. Macingwane (DP)	2965	
Z. E. Ndamase (DP)	3082	
M. P. Sobahle (I)	6777	2 TNIP seats

21 TSOLO (2)

L. Bam (DP)	1265	
J. S. Dipa (DP)	1856	
Z. M. Mabandla (TNIP)	12545	
M. I. Memka (I)	1228	
W. Mntonintshi (I)	1124	
C. N. Ranuga (I)	3663	
N. Tyali (TNIP)	6878	
T. G. Vika (I)	7477	1 TNIP & 1 TNIP rebel

22 TSOMO (1)

S. C. Mnyila (DP)	7446	
T. H. Mpunzi (TNIP)	7044	
M. Ndimba (I)	777	1 DP seat

23 UMTATA (2)

Z. W. Lufefeni (DP)	6085	
N. L. Madubela (TNIP)	5187	
W. W. Makaula (TNIP)	5598	
M. D. Makongolo (I)	1456	
B. S. Mnyani (I)	6444	
M. A. Raziya (DP)	11430	1 DP and 1 DP rebel seat

24 UMZIMKULU (2)

S. L. Baleni (TNIP)	7775	
L. I. Chemane (TNIP)	8646	
Z. Chemane (I)	3986	
L. Khaila (I)	968	
G. F. Mncadi (DP)	760	
E. Mvusi (I)	2737	
T. E. November (DP)	383	
Z. J. Pamla (I)	2286	2 TNIP seats

25	WILLOWVALE (2)		
	N. J. Busakwe (DP)	12154	
	J. M. Dumalisile (DP)	15900	
	J. Malgas (I)	3781	
	W. Mazamisa (TNIP)	12955	
	Mrs. N. A. Sigcau (TNIP)	15516	1 DP & 1 TNIP seat
26	XALANGA (CALA)		
	M. H. Mngqibisa (DP)	1109	
	R. B. Msengana (TNIP)	10139	1 TNIP seat

Elected members, by party affiliation:

TNIP	28
I (TNIP)	1
DP	14
I (DP)	<u>2</u>
	45

II The voting by parties.

		Votes cast	% of votes cast
1	BUTTERWORTH (1)	Uncontested	
2	BIZANA (2)		
	TNIP (2)*	14633	50.66
	DP (2)	9415	32.60
	I (1)	4836	16.74
	Total	28884	
3	ELLIOTDALE (1)		
	TNIP (1)	6083	38.23
	DP (1)	3299	20.73
	I (5)	6531	41.04
	Total	15913	

		Votes cast	% of votes cast
4	ENGCOBO (3)		
	TNIP (3)	18404	22.00
	DP (3)	33058	39.50
	I (9)	32218	38.50
	Total	83680	
5	FLAGSTAFF (1)		
	TNIP (1)	9748	52.84
	DP (1)	8710	47.19
	Total	18458	
6	IDUTYWA (2)		
	TNIP (2)	14117	44.68
	DP (2)	8362	26.47
	I (4)	9116	28.85
	Total	31595	
7	KENTANI (2)		
	TNIP (2)	23882	53.64
	DP (2)	19396	43.56
	I (1)	1248	2.80
	Total	44526	
8	LIBODE (1)		
	TNIP (1)	1528	7.30
	DP (1)	19396	92.70
	Total	20924	
9	LUSIKISIKI (3)		
	TNIP (3)	37445	60.43
	DP (3)	22400	36.15
	I (1)	2119	3.42
	Total	61964	
10	MATATIELE (2)		
	TNIP (2)	9345	30.61
	DP (2)	6103	20.00
	TPFP (2)	3513	11.51
	I (5)	11563	37.88
	Total	30526	

		Votes cast	% of votes cast
11	MOUNT AYLIFF (1)		
	TNIP (1)	11991	59.56
	DP (1)	8141	40.44
	Total	20132	
12	MOUNT FLETCHER (2)		
	TNIP (2)	13726	39.73
	DP (2)	11038	31.95
	I (4)	9782	28.32
	Total	34546	
13	Mount FRERE (2)		
	TNIP (2)	26646	66.87
	DP (2)	4951	12.42
	TPFP (2)	6554	16.45
	I (2)	1698	4.26
	Total	39849	
14	MQANDULI (2)		
	TNIP (2)	8927	23.41
	DP (2)	18229	47.81
	I (3)	10972	28.78
	(of which Nkosiyane polled	9756	25.59)
	Total	38128	
15	NQELENI (2)		
	TNIP (2)	19696	39.07
	DP (2)	30711	60.93
	Total	50407	
16	NQAMAKWE (1)		
	TNIP (1)	15057	74.30
	DP (1)	3205	15.81
	I (1)	2004	9.89
	Total	20266	
17	PORT ST. JOHNS (1)		
	TNIP (1)	4595	43.30
	DP (1)	4739	44.66
	I (1)	1278	12.04
	Total	10612	

		Votes cast	% of votes cast
18	QUMBU (2)		
	TNIP (2)	13112	34.95
	DP (2)	20229	53.93
	TPFP (1)	1034	2.76
	I (1)	3137	8.36
	Total	37512	
19	ST. MARKS (2)	Uncontested	
20	TABANKULU (2)		
	TNIP (2)	17092	41.92
	DP (2)	6047	14.83
	TPFP (1)	7221	17.71
	I (2)	10414	25.54
	(of which Sobahle polled	6777	16.62)
	Total	40774	
21	TSOLO		
	TNIP (2)	19423	53.90
	DP (2)	3121	8.66
	I (4)	13429	37.44
	(of which Vika polled	7477	20.75)
	Total	36036	
22	TSOMO (1)		
	TNIP (1)	7044	46.14
	DP (1)	7446	48.77
	I (1)	777	5.09
	Total	15267	
23	UMTATA (2)		
	TNIP (2)	10785	29.80
	DP (2)	17515	48.38
	I (2)	7900	21.82
	(of which Mnyani polled	6444	17.80)
	Total	36200	

		Votes cast	% of votes cast
24	UMZIMKULU (2)		
	TNIP (2)	16421	59.64
	DP (2)	1143	4.15
	I (4)	9971	36.21
	Total	27535	
25	WILLOWVALE (2)		
	TNIP (2)	28471	47.21
	DP (2)	28054	46.52
	I (1)	3781	6.27
	Total	60306	
26	XALANGA (1)		
	TNIP (1)	10139	90.14
	DP (1)	1109	9.86
	Total	11248	

III Voting Aggregates

	Total Votes Cast	% of Total
TNIP	358,310	43.95
DP	295,817	36.28
TPFP	18,324	2.25
I	142,837	17.52
TOTAL	815,288	100.00

IV Candidates

Party	Number	Successful
TNIP	45	28
DP	42	14
TPFP	6	0
I	<u>52</u>	<u>3</u>
	145	45

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This bibliography does not constitute a general guide to the literature on South Africa. It merely enumerates the sources which provided background and directly relevant material for my research. It also excludes sources which provided material which was finally not used at all. The material available in Lusaka is surprisingly rich, though large gaps do exist. The Zambian archives have much which is valuable to a study of South Africa, but, unfortunately, the majority of materials date back to the period before 1964 and thus before the Transkei Constitution Act came into full practical effect. The University of Zambia Library contains many current secondary sources and also has available many periodicals and some newspapers, but here the emphasis is on the period from 1968. The major gaps, from 1964 to about 1966 or 1967 was to some extent filled by the kindness of a number of people resident in Lusaka who made available their personal libraries and press clippings, and by my personal library, supplemented by subscription to certain journals and newspapers. Nevertheless, the material available for 1965 and 1966 remained less substantial than I would have liked.

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3. Transkei Hansard:

Republic of South Africa: Debates of the Transkei Legislative Assembly (Umtata: Transkei Legislative Assembly, annually.)

First Assembly:

- Second Session, 5 May to 19 June, 1964
- Third & Fourth Sessions, 21 April to 22 June, 1965 (in 2 volumes)
- Fifth Session, 20 April to 24 June, 1966 (in 2 volumes)
- Sixth Session, 19 April to 21 June, 1967
- Seventh Session, 24 April to 14 June, 1968

The Transkei "Hansards", referred to as the "TLA Debates" in the footnotes, form the core of my research. Once a background to South Africa and the Transkei has been gained, the debates prove coherent and most readable, especially the speeches of the most prominent members of the Assembly. My approach was to delineate topics or issues and then research through all the volumes, one topic at a time. This proved time-consuming as the volumes are extremely poorly indexed. After this, I subjected the large body of material extracted to a rudimentary content analysis, using the theme rather than the word as my basic unit of analysis. The content analysis was then tabulated on a continuum using the official South African white policy as the standard of measure. This is justified by the fact that I was seeking divergences from official policy. In this way I have been able, in my text, constantly to weigh up the attitudes in terms of the distance they indicate on the part of Africans from the officially preferred view or attitude. In all cases I considered the prevailing views of each party; exceptions were noted only when they appeared significant or constituted an alternative view within the party (this is especially so in the case of the DP, where many different attitudes were incorporated in the same organization). I covered all debates on each issue for fear that any sample would omit important changes of attitude and also because I felt it necessary to present the full "flavour" of debates which had hitherto been ignored by scholars and observers alike. Unfortunately, the TLA Debates after the 1968 election did not arrive for study of them to be possible. I had to rely on press reports. To some extent this problem was offset by the fact that South African newspapers paid far greater attention to the Transkei than they had done before, but I feel that this necessary alternative was not completely satisfactory.

NEWSPAPERS

1. South Africa

(a) Dailies:

Die Burger, Cape Town, (Afrikaans - Language).

NEWSPAPERS (Continued...)

The Cape Argus, Cape Town, evening.
The Cape Times, Cape Town.
The Daily Dispatch, East London.
The Evening Post, Port Elizabeth.
Natal Daily News, Durban.
Natal Mercury, Durban.
Pretoria News, Pretoria.
The Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg.
The Star, Johannesburg.
Die Transvaler, Johannesburg, (Afrikaans - Language)
The Friend, Bloemfontein.

(b) Weeklies:

Die Beeld, Cape Town, (Afrikaans - Language)
Financial Mail, Johannesburg.
The South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg
The Sunday Express, Johannesburg.
The Sunday Times, Johannesburg.
The Sunday Tribune, Durban.

(c) African weeklies:

Post, Johannesburg
The World, Johannesburg

The bulk of my newspaper research was confined to The Daily Dispatch (some copies 1967, most 1968 and all 1969) The Rand Daily Mail (some copies 1967, all 1968 and 1969 and most 1970 to June), the Sunday Times, Express and Tribune (all copies from July 1968 to June 1970) and Die Burger (all copies from January 1969 to June 1970). Of these, the first two are essential for research, former giving Transkei news great prominence and the latter giving accurate coverage of South African government policy statements, news reports on the application of apartheid, and some coverage of Transkei events. The Star (all copies 1969 and 1970) is also valuable, but duplicates much that is included in The Rand Daily Mail. On the other hand, the weekly Financial Mail is probably as fine a paper as South Africa produces and gives frequent attention to the economics of apartheid. The Financial Gazette is not of the same standard, but frequently provides valuable statistics relevant to separate development policy and also reflects government thinking on the economy. The other papers mentioned were not regularly available and I generally had to rely on private collections and press clippings for access to them. Nevertheless, The Friend and the Evening Post frequently feature news on Transkei politics. Post and The World (both white owned) are very much geared to the urban African's supposed wants. Both, however, proved valuable on numerous occasions when I was able to gain access to them.

THE KARIS PAPERS During the year he spent at the University of Zambia, Professor Karis very kindly made available to me his notes and records of the research undertaken by himself, Professor Carter and Mr. Stultz in the Transkei. Dating from late 1962 to early 1964, these papers comprised notes, transcribed interviews with various people in the area, and Mr. Stultz's observations of the 1963 Transkei election. Much of this material was, of course, incorporated in their authoritative book, but the interviews, in particular, proved vital as a background to the attitudes I studied in the later period. Also, where material in the book was used in an interpretative way, I often found it better to use the original papers for my own interpretative work. I have referred to quotations from this set of documents as "The Karis Papers" to avoid naming people interviewed who might still be living in South Africa.

INFORMANTS. A certain amount of information was provided orally by South Africans with a good knowledge of the Transkei. In most cases this provided no more than background information on the various personalities of the region. In one case, it provided valuable information on the relations between certain Paramount Chiefs, and in another, on the resettlement camps and Bantustan locations being set up on the borders of the Bantustans. In every case, where information was provided, I tried to check it with an independent second source, trying to ensure first that such material was unpublished and then, that the second source had not discussed the matter with the first Informant or a common third source. In all cases, I thought it safer to omit material which did not conform with this requirement, though in other instances I found my informants completely reliable. In only one case did I use (in a footnote to the Conclusion) material which I had not been able to verify with a second source — and in that case I mentioned the fact. My Informants included a number of South Africans born in the Transkei or with an intimate knowledge of life there. The majority were members of the African National Congress of South Africa (either active or strongly sympathetic) and in all these cases I avoided any questions on the ANC in the Transkei, past or present. Three sources were journalists. In addition, there were a number of graduate students working in the Republic. I have not mentioned the names of these people to ensure their personal safety. But I can say that in all cases I asked for and received only information of a factual nature; I did not record interpretation of facts. Occasionally, I invited comment on my own interpretation of these facts, but did not necessarily accept the views then expressed. The material gained from these people was either written down or taped. In all cases, I used only the information of those Informants whose reliability was total in those instances where verification was possible.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1. W. M. Macmillan - Bantu, Boer and Briton: The Making of the South African Native Problem (Oxford, the Clarendon Press, 1963).
2. The Nama and Khoi have survived in history by the derisive names which the colonists gave them - Hottentot and Bushman, respectively.
3. H.J. & R.E. Simons - Class and Colour in South Africa: 1850 - 1950 (Penguin, 1969) p.13. In 1795, after the Dutch landdrost at Graaff Reinet had attempted to curb the brutality of their treatment of labourers and slaves, the colonists revolted. They were joined by their fellows in Swellendam who declared a republic. "South Africa's first republic was born in a struggle between white settlers and an external imperial authority for the right to suppress, plunder and exploit African people".

In a society where Christian civilization and morality is deemed sacrosanct it is also interesting to note the hostility which the early colonists accorded those missionaries who were deemed too friendly to the natives. The Moravian Church, which attempted to bring the Enlightenment to a colony "economically more underdeveloped, politically more inexperienced, and culturally more backward than any of the great colonies of settlement" encountered "considerable hostility from the Boers, who had previously regarded Christianity as a white monopoly and who were, moreover, anxious for their labour supply", and were forced to retire to Cape Town after the Swellendam revolt. No missionaries ever occasioned greater hatred than the two philanthropists of the London Missionary Society, Dr. van der Kemp and Dr. John Philip, who persistently interceded with the colonial authorities against settler treatment of the slaves, Nama and Xhosa. Lewis A. Coser - The Functions of Social Conflict (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956)p.60, holds that "the main function of the mediator is seen as divesting conflict situations of nonrealistic elements of aggressiveness so as to allow the contenders to deal realistically with the divergent claims at issue". In South Africa, the mediator became himself the focus of aggression by the colonists when his role was seen as in any way limiting the white acquisition of wealth and power. This hostility to the "mediator" seen as limiting their privilege has been a constant feature of South African white behaviour. In the last two decades the same anger has been accorded the white liberal who set himself up as the bridge-builder between black and white. Far from divesting any situation of "nonrealistic elements", the "mediator" has caused totally realistic conflicts of interest to assume nonrealistic aspects by diverting hostility to himself.

4. See C.W. de Kiewet - A History of South Africa: Social and Economic, (Oxford University Press, 1957) Simons, op. cit. E. Roux - Time Longer than Rope (University of Wisconsin, 1966)
5. Leo Marquard - South Africa's Colonial Policy (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1957).

Not only did much conflict between whites hinge on the exact nature of exploitation of Africans and their land, but various white groups also manipulated Africans to their own advantage in these hostilities. This is perhaps best illustrated by the relationship between John Tengo Jabavu and the Cape Liberals. From 1853 the Cape Colony provided a qualified franchise which allowed coloured people to vote provided they passed certain qualitative educational and means tests. This was seen as a method of balancing out the numerical superiority of the Afrikaners, since non-whites tended to vote with English speakers. Jabavu, the leading African intellectual at the turn of the century, supported three prominent white liberals, Merriman, Sauer and Rose-Innes. He used his position as editor of the first weekly African newspaper, Imvo Zabantsundu, to press African voters to support the liberals, or Independents, as they were known. In 1887 a new law removed many Africans from the qualified franchise common role while making the vote automatic for all whites. The Independents opposed this because they were the chief sufferers. But by 1890 they had joined a new administration headed by Rhodes. In 1892, the Independents joined Rhodes and Hofmeyr's Afrikaner Bond in supporting a bill aimed at further disenfranchising Africans although the bill would have been defeated had they voted against it. The African vote was solicited throughout this period by the side which attracted fewest white votes. Once the liberals were part of a grand coalition under Rhodes, they no longer needed to manipulate Jabavu's followers and could abandon them. See Roux, op. cit. p.57 - 77.

6. Simons, op. cit., p.13.
7. Ibid., p.31
8. Roux, op. cit. p.87
9. Hancock, Smuts., Volume II, The Fields of Force, p.100
10. John Hobson's Imperialism was based almost entirely on his view of the Boer War as a struggle by the Boers against capitalist imperialism.
11. Simons, op. cit., p. 31 - 32
12. We are not here concerned with that aspect of the policy which has been put forward as a civilizing mission, and is regarded as a rationalization of the policy. Even if it should become a genuine part of colonial policy, it does not motivate the original imperial expansion. The argument that colonialism is largely dictated by considerations of power (See Fieldhouse, The Theory of Capitalist Imperialism, Longmans, 1967) rather than of economics, does not disprove material interest, but

12. Continued.... strengthens it. Nations do not undertake colonial adventures for prestige, which is a result, not cause.
13. Marquard - op. cit., p.12.
14. See especially Leo Kuper - Passive Resistance in South Africa (Yale University Press, 1957); Pierre Van den Berghe - South Africa: A Study in Conflict (Wesleyan University Press, 1966)
Edward Roux, op. cit. and H.J. and R.E. Simons, op. cit.
15. Simons, op. cit.
16. Among the best: C.W. De Kiewet, op. cit. Leo Marquard - The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (Oxford University Press, 1969); Leonard Thompson - The Unification of South Africa (The Clarendon Press, 1960); De Kiewet - The Imperial Factor in South Africa (Frank Cass, 1965)
W.K. Hancock - Smuts, Vol. I & II (Cambridge at the University Press, 1962 and 1968); Leonard Thompson and Monica Wilson (Eds.) - The Oxford History of South Africa - Vol. I: South Africa to 1870 (The Clarendon Press, 1969); Thomas Karis - South Africa (in Gwendolen M. Carter (ed.) - Five African States (Pall Mall Press, 1963) and Gwendolen M. Carter - The Politics of Inequality South Africa since 1948 (Thames and Hudson 1959).
17. Almost all works on South Africa are forced by the nature of the subject and its world perspective, to adopt some ethical position but there is also a vast body of journalistic literature produced by pamphleteers inside and outside the country dedicated to ethical premises of one kind or another. Many of these are qualitatively impressive and provide much of the raw factual material of any study of the country. See for instance: Die Burger (Cape Town); The Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg); The annual Survey of Race Relations (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg) compiled by Muriel Horrell; Tyranny 90 produced by the 90 - Day Protest Committee (Cape Town, May 1964); Blueprint for Blackout (The Education League, 1949, Johannesburg); Liberalism in South Africa by Leo Marquard (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1965); The T.B. Davie Memorial Lectures, (University of Cape Town, annually); and a vast number of publications and occasional papers by the S.A. Institute of Race Relations, The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS).
18. Including D. Hobart Houghton - The South African Economy (Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 1967); Ralph Horwitz - The Political Economy of South Africa (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967); W.H. Hutt - The Economics of the Colour Bar (Andre Deutsch, 1964); and Sheila T. van der Horst - Native Labour in South Africa (Oxford University Press, 1942).
19. See Edward Feit - African Opposition in South Africa: the Failure of Passive Resistance (Hoover Institution of War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford University Press, 1967) Chapter I.

20. Ibid., p.14
21. Kuper - op. cit., Part I.
22. Feit - op. cit., p.189.
23. Georg Simmel - Conflict (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1955).
24. We are here concerned only with the relations between white and black South Africans and will ignore their relations with the two racial minorities of Coloureds and Asians.
25. Lewis Coser, op. cit. p.156.
26. Among the best examples (in terms of quality) is Colin and Margaret Legum - South Africa: Crisis for the West (London, Pall Mall Press, 1964).
27. Simmel, op. cit., p.26 and Coser op. cit., p.121.
28. N.J. Rhodie - Apartheid and Racial Partnership in Southern Africa, (Academica, 1969) p.96.
29. Ibid., p.34
30. Ibid., and passim.
31. Ibid., p.34
32. Sunday Times (Johannesburg) February 1970.
33. News/Check 4.10.68
34. Observer 19.4.70
35. News/Check 4.10.68
36. Ted Gurr - A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices - American Political Science Review, (Volume 62, September 1968). Gurr's article is based on a cross sectional analysis, and a fuller confirmation of his hypotheses must await a later study which could provide the longitudinal design required. Nevertheless it contains several dynamic notions which imply a time perspective beyond the study (such as legitimacy and past levels of strife). Further, his figures indicate an ability to account for variations, at a very high level. pp. 1104 - 1124.
37. Ibid., p.1107
38. Ibid., p. 1105 - 6
39. Hobart Houghton, op. cit., p. 159
40. Feit, op. cit., p. 10 - 33
41. Hobart Houghton, op. cit., p. 164, presents this comparison of white and black expenditure in 1955 in the East London and King William's Town areas:

41. Continued....

	Income group p.a.	% of income spent on	
		food	clothing, footwear
African families	Under R200	61.7	nil
	R200 - 400	43.1	4.9
	R400 - 600	35.8	7.6
	Over R600	30.8	11.2
European families	Under R1500	30.0	11.5
	R1500 - 2000	28.6	11.9
	R2000 - 2500	24.5	12.6
	R2500 - 3000	24.0	13.8
	R3000 - 4000	19.8	11.4
	Over R4000	17.8	11.5

42. Mary Benson - South Africa: The Struggle for a Birthright (Penguin, 1966)
See also Margaret Ballinger - From Union to Apartheid: A Trek to Isolation (Juta & Company, 1969).
43. Leo Kuper - An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa (Yale University Press, 1965).
44. As illustrated by the threatened walk out of non-white doctors in Natal in 1969. They were protesting that the white doctors who worked alongside them earned far higher salaries. Although they had the support of several of their white colleagues, the doctors were first refused an increase, and later given one, along with the white doctors. Their demand for equal pay was thus refused and the salary gap maintained. Over the past two and a half years (1968 - 70) there have also been constant complaints from African clergymen who earn far less than their fellows who are white. This controversy extends into the churches long regarded internationally as "liberal", illustrating once more that the conflict and deprivation is a function of more than Afrikaner nationalism.
45. The sample is based on a list of African leaders provided as an appendix to Benson, op. cit., p. 287 - 289. Housewives have been excluded unless they held some other profession. Since a large number of the leaders worked as teachers at one time or another of their lives (for instance the one chief listed - Albert Lutuli - was also a teacher) the sample breakdown is possibly biased against this category. Where possible, occupation at the time of formal entry into politics is given. The breakdown: - Law 7, Medicine 6, Education 5, Journalism and Labour 4, Clerks and Religious Ministers 3, Commerce 1, Chiefs 1, and 3 unknown.
46. Gurr, op. cit., p. 1110 - 1112.
47. Gurr, op. cit., p. 1120.
48. For detailed accounts of the 1913 Land Act and its consequences, see Benson, op. cit., Chapter I, Roux, op. cit., p. 74-77, Simons, op. cit., p. 133 - 135, and De Kiewet op. cit., p. 205 - 207.

49. Benson, op. cit., p.30.
50. Native Representation Act, and Natives Land and Trust Act of 1936. See Benson, op. cit., Chapter 5, De Kiewet, op. cit., p.238, passim, Simons, op. cit., Chapter 21.
51. Almond and Verba - The Civic Culture (Little, Brown and Company, 1965).
52. Gurr, op. cit., p.1121
53. Ibid., p.1119
54. Ibid., p.1120
55. See Roux, op. cit., and H.J. and R.E. Simons, Op. cit.,
56. See Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes - The American Voter (John Wiley & Sons, 1964) Chapter 7, where the problem of perception is succinctly attacked in terms of the difficulties encountered by the mass electorate in turning feelings about issues into partisan attachments. The approach is based on problems of cognition, evaluation, intensity of feelings, and views of the relevance of party platforms to personal problems. Also Almond and Verba, op. cit., especially their discussion of Italian and Mexican perceptions of the political process. The disjunction between elite platforms and mass frustrations in South Africa is a more sophisticated approach to the failure of ANC activism than the crude "linked utilities".
57. L.M. Thompson - Politics in the Republic of South Africa (Little, Brown & Co., 1966). p.96.
58. Simons, op. cit., p.610.
59. Gunnar Myrdal, quoted in Coser, op. cit., p.109 (from An American Dilemma, New York, Harper Bros., 1944, p.1356).
60. Frantz Fanon - The Wretched of the Earth (Penguin Books, 1967) p.31
61. Ibid., p.29 - 30 describes the physical nature of the colonial town and makes an interesting point to contrast with the typical South African town described in Leo Marquard op. cit., p. 94 - 96 passim.
62. Hancock, op. cit., Chapter 5 on Bulhoek and Bondelzwarts.
63. Benson, op. cit., p.24.
64. Roux, op. cit., p. 208
65. Kuper - Passive Resistance in South Africa, op. cit., p.185
66. Benson, op. cit., p. 212
67. Coser, op. cit., p.156 states: "In realistic conflict, there exist functional alternatives with regard to the means of carrying out the conflict, as well as with regard to accomplishing desired results short of conflict; in nonrealistic conflict, on the other hand, there exist only functional alternatives in the choice of antagonists". Nonrealistic conflicts are occasioned "by the need of tension release ... "

68. Kuper - An African Bourgeoisie, op. cit., Chapter 2, especially p. 12-15. See also, for coercive power, A. Sachs - The Violence of Apartheid (International Defence and Aid pamphlet, 1969).
69. Kuper, op. cit., p.13
70. Kuper, op. cit., p.14
71. Report of the Transvaal Local Government (Stallard) Commission, 1922. para. 42.
72. Fagan Commission Report, p.20. Union Government 28/1948. "It would be utterly impossible to put the Native population which is already outside the Reserves, back into the Reserves, or even to keep the whole of the increase there in future".

The 1913 Land Act which froze African landownership, and the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act which removed the rights of Africans in the Cape to buy land outside the reserves and made available more reserve land, were held to be out of date and baseless as instruments of native policy. "The spearpoint of ... the problem of regulating the relation between European and Native is no longer in the Reserves: it is now in the towns".

The confinement of Africans to 13.7% of the land was no longer a possible basis of policy, said the Report.
73. Wilson and Thompson, op. cit., rebut the claim that Africans did not precede the whites into most of South Africa. See especially Preface and also Chapters II, III and IV.
74. Brian Bunting - The Rise of the South African Reich (Penguin, Revised edition 1969) p.477.
75. Ibid. p.478
76. Ibid., p.489 - 490
77. Rhodie, op. cit., p.29
78. House of Assembly Debates (Hansard) 3.2.69. Also International Defence and Aid pamphlet - "Resettlement" - The New Violence to Africans, August 1969, p.11.
79. Rhodie op. cit., p. 42 - 43.
80. Ibid., p. 79 - 87 *passim*.
81. Ibid., p. 95 - 102 *passim*, 37 - 39, 41.
82. Stanley Uys in Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 29.6.69.
83. Ibid.,
84. Bunting, op. cit., p.486

85. Carter, Karis and Stultz - South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism (Northwestern University Press, 1967) p.40. See also Hansard Debates, 23.1.62, especially column 98.
86. Marquard - South Africa's Colonial Policy, op. cit., p.1. See also a detailed analysis of the relationship between colonialism and the intensity of race conflict in H.J. Simons - Techniques of Domination: South Africa's Colonialism, (in Ronald Segal and Ruth First - South West Africa: Travesty of Trust) (Andre Deutsch, 1967).
87. Simmel, op. cit., p.14 states "conflict is designed to resolve divergent dualism; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity...".

Conflict in South Africa in this century has revolved around the African desire to resolve "divergent dualisms" and achieve the unity which the common society requires. The intimate nature of the social relationship between the races has made the conflict an intense one but this has been heightened by the white rejection of the implications for equality inherent in the common society. By crushing African opposition and setting up a new political structure outside the urban areas, it is hoped to isolate and confine the conflict to areas where it cannot threaten the patterns of privilege in South Africa. We must amend Simmel's claim that:

"The centralised form into which the party is pushed by the situation of conflict grows beyond the party itself and causes it to prefer that the opponent, too, take on this form".

In South Africa, where whites reject the challenge based on shared values, and where the challenge has increasingly unified and centralised them politically, they have preferred that their opponents remain divided (by forcing on them small, fragmented Bantustans) but have insisted that they become ideologically identical - in the sense of rejecting the common society and seeking separation. The safety-valve institutions which they seek to create are of a peculiar nature: they try not only to "drain off hostile and aggressive sentiments" but also to make such antagonisms nonrealistic - by orienting them within a newly created polity in the Reserves.

88. Resettlement - The New Violence to Africans (International Defence and Aid Fund, pamphlet, London, 1969) P.16.
89. Bunting, op. cit., p.502.
90. Resettlement etc., op. cit., p.21.
91. Rhoodie, op. cit. p.35
92. Mr. Botha even announced that special facilities might be set up to take urban workers to visit their families at "home" every now and then. This would seem to be an attempt to mollify discontent on the part of urban workers whose families have been removed from the towns. See Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 7.11.69. Also News/Check 3.8.62

93. Assembly Debates, 3.2.69. Resettlement etc., op. cit., p.11
94. Survey of Race Relations 1967 (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg) p.103 - 4.
95. Bunting op. cit., p.490
96. Rhodie, op. cit., p.100
97. Stanley Uys - The Great Myth of Apartheid Economics (New Statesman, London) 14.2.69.
98. "Colonial Border Industries" (Sechaba, op. cit.,) p.17.
99. Financial Mail 28.11.69.
100. Survey of Race Relations 1967, op. cit., p.123
101. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 1.8.69.
102. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 2.8.69.
103. Survey of Race Relations 1967, op. cit., p.119. South African Financial Gazette 22.8.69; Sunday Express 30.11.69; Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 22.2.70. The initially slow response is conveyed by the figures comparing new employment in the border areas in 1969 with that of the previous nine years:

	1968	1960-8	1969	1960-9
Additional employment	7000	69000	31500	100500
Whites, Coloureds, Asians	2000	15000	4500	19500
Africans	5000	54000	27000	81000
Total direct additional investment (Rm)	18.0	314.0	86.0	400.0

The State's expenditure on housing, water and services came to R130,782,000 up to the end of 1967. While the African employment figures only provide for some 30% of the annual potential labour force coming onto the market each year, the dramatic escalation of the move to the border areas will make this aspect of the strategy increasingly significant over the next decade.

104. See Horwitz, op. cit., especially chapters 19 and 20.
105. Survey of Race Relations 1967, op. cit., p.119. In the Hammarsdale border area (Natal) the average weekly wage for a male machinist was R10 and that for a female R7.50, or 27½% less than in the same jobs in nearby Durban. In addition, the borders worked a 45 hour week compared with 40 hours in the city, and received 14 days paid leave a year compared with 21 in the urban areas. This would tend to lower the wage still further to about one third less than in the towns. Long term profits are thus likely to be far higher in the border industries.

106. Dr. P. S. Rautenbach, chairman of the Permanent Committee for the Location of Industry; address to Institute of Race Relations Meeting Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 30.1.70.

A leading Afrikaner intellectual, Dr. P. Smit of the Africa Institute, has stated that his socio-economic study of Rosslyn border area (outside Pretoria) reveals that far from being able to take capital back to the Bantustans, Africans bought most of their food and clothing in Pretoria and invested their small savings in institutions in the city. And the location of these industries was contributing to the depopulation of "the heartland of the homeland", with Africans living on the edges of the Reserves near the industries.

This is confirmed by the location of new townships in the Reserves. Speaking in Johannesburg, the then (1968) Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr. A. Vosloo, stated that "at least seventy new towns and cities" were in an advanced state of planning in the Reserves, and that about 125 such sites had been selected. These were being built on the edge of the Reserves, near the border industries, said Mr. H.H. Harvey, chief engineer in the Ministry. He was aware that this was undesirable, but could see no alternative "until economic development would get underway within the homelands themselves".

107. (Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 18.2.70
(Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 31.1.70
(Assembly Debates 4.2.69
(Evening Post (Port Elizabeth) 16.3.70
108. Assembly Debates, 30.5.68 Resettlement, etc., op. cit., p.10.
109. Bantu Administration and Development Circular 12.12.67. Resettlement, etc., op. cit., p. 19-20.
110. Resettlement, etc., op. cit., p.19
111. Ibid., p.20
112. Ibid., p.22 While many of the rural people moved have been illiterate peasants unable to formulate complaints, two such communities refused to go, one even seeking a court interdict against removal. In the case of the Bakubung tribe ordered to leave a village they had occupied for 74 years, refusal resulted in their school being bulldozed down and fines being imposed for trespassing on state land.
113. The World, 5.2.69. A wealthy Kimberley businessman, Mr. Desmond January, was forced to sell his shop, butchery and cafe, and his two houses in Galeshewe Village, and ordered to move to the Transkei. He refused and moved instead to Swaziland.
114. Resettlement, etc., op. cit., p.26.
115. Ibid., passim. Also, e.g.: Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 2.11.69. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 18.1.70. Sash (The Black Sash Magazine) November 1969, p.12 passim. Rand Daily Mail 6.11.69. Rand Daily Mail

115. Continued.... (Johannesburg) 15.11.69. Mayibuye 24.2.68, 21.12.68, 24.1.69. Sechaba, March 1970. Cape Times 30.12.68. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 12.12.68.
116. From speeches reported in: Star 10.5.68. Evening Post (Port Elizabeth) 19.3.70. Assembly Debates 18.6.68. Resettlement, etc., op. cit., p.23.

Mr. Froneman even went to the extent of saying that the government had no duty to develop the Reserves because Africans were aliens who had only to be repatriated. The press furore led to a repudiation by his colleague, Mr. Koornhof, who stated that a human being "is not like a suitcase which you can put down anywhere and say 'Now you are there'". Froneman retracted by qualifying his remarks to include only those Africans who were non-productive in the white areas, and implying that the government thus had a duty to help those who were "productive".

117. Cape Argus 11.12.65. Daily Dispatch (East London) 3.6.68. Horwitz, op. cit., p.394-397.
118. Mayibuye, 17.6.68
119. Brian Bunting - Education for Serfdom in South Africa, Morning Star, 7.7.67. News/Check 31.8.62
120. Blaar Coetzee, quoted in Sechaba, p.8, October 1967.
121. South African Digest 1.3.68. (Bantu Education by L. Capstickdale).
122. Bunting, op. cit., 7.7.67 in Morning Star.
123. Ibid.,
124. Dr. W.G. McConkey - The Failure of Bantu Education in Daily Dispatch (East London), 16.3.70.
124. The drop out rate is extremely heavy. The following set of figures of enrolment will indicate the dimensions of the problem:

1963 - Sub A	443,030	1966 - Std. II	239,141
1964 - Sub B	332,290	1967 - Std. III	197,853
1965 - Std. I	300,733		

More than 50% have dropped out at this level and by the secondary school level more than 96% drop out.

Thus the government figure of more than two million Africans at school must be seen against the fact that only 13 out of every 100,000 Africans reach Standard X as against 866 whites. Dr. McConkey, the former Director of Education in Natal, states that less than 0.5% of the GNP is spent on the education of 70% of the country's youth, one-tenth of the figure for whites. Some 200,000 African children leave school annually after three or less years of this education, illiterate in three languages and semi-articulate in one.

124. Continued..... He also shows that though the 1949 Eiselen Commission recommended the establishment of 2170 vocational education centres, rising to some 6000 by 1959, only 2366 pupils are in such training today at an outlay of only R15 per annum per pupil. Not only has the proportion of children in secondary schools fallen, but the weight has shifted within the primary system to the lowest classes. Thus in 1954 some 70.94% were in the four classes up to Standard II, while 71.23% were in these classes in 1967. Only in 1969 did the proportional enrolment in secondary schools pass the number for 1954 when the system was inaugurated.

McConkey also shows that while in 1949 there was one teacher to 42 pupils, in 1969 58 pupils were similarly served. Since there are some 9,000 schools, there would seem to be an average of four teachers to a school; in the urban areas classes are so overcrowded that they often contain as many as 80 children per session. In 1965 only 1.33% of the teachers had a degree or a professional teaching qualification; 80% lacked even a matriculation. Conditions of pay are so poor that schools with private funds often hire extra teachers, but the supply in both cases is severely limited by the salaries offered.

Though government claims that 80% of children between the ages of 7 and 21 are literate, an Afrikaner official seconded to the Transkei, Mr. J.L. Boshoff, Secretary for Education there, has held that only 35% of school leavers could be said to be literate. Less than 25% of matriculation candidates qualify for University entrance, while the number of graduates at the "Bantu Universities", which are also now tribally divided, declines annually. Public Libraries are not open to Africans, and Bantu Education requirements have resulted in the decimation of old mission libraries at Adams College, Lovedale, Healdtown and St. John's College, Umtata. The net result of the system is to preclude Africans from any amenities which can qualify them in engineering, architecture, veterinary services, or nuclear science. Such technology remains firmly in white hands.

125. See Hobart Houghton, op. cit.,

126. e.g. Gilbert L. Rutman - The Transkei: An Experiment in Economic Separation in (South African Journal of Economics, March 1968)

127. Tomlinson estimated that the African population would be some 16 million by the year 2000 (but could even reach 21 million) and 11.5 million could be accommodated in the Reserves if the pattern of development proposed was followed. This left between 4.5 million and 9.5 million still in the towns and on the white farms. It is now estimated that this population will be at least 28 million and could even reach 40 million by 2000.

128. Rhodie, op. cit., p.35

129. Stanley Uys, Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 29.6.69.

130. Die Burger, September 1959.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

1. Carter, Karis, Stultz, op. cit., p.92 - 110, Ch. 5.
2. Roux, op. cit., Ch. XVIII, pp. 217 - 222
3. Carter et al, op. cit., p. 109
4. Ibid., p.110
5. See Govan Mbeki - The Peasants Revolt (Penguin, 1964).
6. New Age 24.8.61, 28.9.61, 9.11.61. Emergency Powers of indefinite detention and banishment were granted to police and chiefs respectively under Proclamations R400 and R413.
7. Carter et al, op. cit., p.29.
8. Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 113 - 124. Hill, op. cit.,
9. Ibid., p. 69 - 77. Carter et al, op. cit., p. 125 - 152. Karis Papers, interviews with Matanzima and Sabata.
10. Hill, op. cit., p. 75-77.
11. Carter et al, op. cit., p. 143 - 4
12. Karis papers.
13. D. Hammond-Tooke - Chieftainship in Transkeian Political Development (Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2 No. 4, 1964) p. 513-529.
14. Ibid., p.513
15. Ibid., p.520
16. Ibid., p.520-5
17. Ibid., p.525
18. Philip Mayer - The Tribal Elite and the Transkeian Elections of 1963 (in P.C. Lloyd (ed.) - The New Elites of Tropical Africa, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 286-308)
19. Ibid., p.287
20. Ibid., p.288-9
21. Ibid., p.290 - 1
22. Ibid., p.294-5
23. Ibid., p.298-301
24. Ibid., p.302, Carter et al, op. cit., p.148, Karis Papers, interviews with John D'Oliviera of the Star.

25. Carter et al, op. cit., p.130, Karis Papers.
26. Ibid., p.153-4
27. Ibid., p.154
28. Republic of South Africa: Debates of the Transkei Legislative Assembly (hereafter referred to as TLA debates), Fifth Session, 1966; the breakdown of party affiliation by region which follows is based on the TLA Debates. Karis Papers, Informants.
29. Mayer, op. cit., p.305
30. Karis Papers
31. Hill, op. cit., Appendix II
32. Ibid., p.110-111
33. TLA Debates, 1964, p.67
34. Ibid., p.65
35. Ibid., p.85
36. Ibid., p.86
37. Ibid., p.85, 201
38. Ibid., p.75
39. e.g., Ibid., p.75, 87, 88, 91.
40. Ibid., p. 87, 88, 91.
41. Ibid., p.120
42. Ibid., p.332
43. Ibid., p.122
44. Ibid., p.127
45. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 31.8.68
46. Daily Dispatch (East London) 27.4.68
47. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 4.5.68, 1.5.68
48. Daily Dispatch (East London) 2.5.68
49. Carter, et al, op. cit., p.107
50. TLA Debates, 1964, p.189
51. Ibid., 1965, p.240-5
52. Ibid., 1966, p. 8-10
53. Ibid., p. 224-5
54. Ibid., p. 227

55. Ibid., p.228
56. Ibid., p.229
57. Ibid., e.g. p.335
58. Ibid., 1964, p.201, 246.
59. Ibid., p.165
60. Ibid., p.246-7
61. Ibid., p.244
62. Ibid., p.178-9
63. Ibid., p.337, 1966.
64. Daily Dispatch, 3.6.67
65. Karis Papers 14.3.64
66. International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa - Information Service (April - June, 1968) p.156 Ibid., (January - June, 1967) p.19
67. Ibid.,
68. TLA Debates, 1964, p.202-3
69. Ibid., p.204
70. Ibid., 1965, p.265
71. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 16.10.67
72. Evening Post (Port Elizabeth) 3.2.68
73. Evening Post (Port Elizabeth) 30.1.68
74. Pretoria News 18.4.68
75. Resettlement, etc., op. cit., p.13
76. Survey of Race Relations, 1967 p.180
77. Defence and Aid, Information Service (April - June 1967) p.156 TLA Debates 1964, p.107, 113, 122. Ibid., 1965, p.288
78. Ibid., 1964, p.223-4, 232
79. The Star, 19.4.67
80. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 4.5.67. Mbeki, op. cit., p.87 makes a similar point, viz., that Afrikaner capitalism is seeking to use the Bantustans for its own profits. In 1968 a branch of the Volkskas Bank was opened.
81. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 26.4.68
82. Daily Dispatch (East London) 6.3.68
83. Mayibuye, October 1968
84. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 1.5.68

85. Rand Daily Mail, (Johannesburg) 25.9.68 26.9.68
86. Carter et al, op. cit., p.156-7. The legislation was termed the Prevention of Improper Interference Act.
87. Defence and Aid, Information Service (October - December 1967) p.82
88. Daily Dispatch (East London) 30.4.68
89. TLA Debates, 1968 p.233
90. Ibid., 1964, p. 53, 59.
91. Ibid., p.138-147
92. Ibid., 1967 p.330, 354-8, 375, 380, 445-6
93. Ibid., 1964 p.286
94. Ibid., 1965 p.270-1
95. Daily Dispatch (East London) 7.10.68
96. Carter et al, op. cit., p.160-1
97. TLA Debates, 1964, p.162
98. Ibid., p.163
99. Ibid., p.166
100. Ibid., p.166
101. Ibid., e.g. p.162
102. Ibid., 1966, p.223
103. Daily Dispatch (East London) 16.5.68
104. South African Digest, 24.5.68
105. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 11.6.68
106. TLA Debates, 1964, p.180.
107. Survey of Race Relations, 1967 p.145. Ibid., 1968 p.138-9
108. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 31.8.68
109. Transkei Constitution Amendment Act, No. 36 of 1965, Republic of South Africa.
110. Daily Dispatch (East London) 20.4.68.
111. Ibid.,
112. News/Check 6.11.64.
113. Survey of Race Relations, 1968 p.138
114. Daily Dispatch, (East London) 5.9.68
115. Survey of Race Relations, 1968 p.138. Assembly Debates, Hansard 13, Col. 4695, 6.5.68. News/Check 10.5.68

116. Daily Dispatch (East London) 16.5.68 Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 16.5.68.
117. The Star 5.9.68
118. Rand Daily Mail, 26.4.68
119. The Star 1.6.68
120. Daily Dispatch (East London) 27.4.68
121. Karis Papers, 11.12.63
122. TLA Debates, 1964, p.65
123. Ibid., p.79
124. News/Check 28.1.66
125. Africa Report, October 1966 p.46
126. TLA Debates, 1965, p.90-2, 111, 113, 115, 117.
127. Daily Dispatch, 16.10.68
128. Survey of Race Relations, 1968 p.140-1
129. TLA Debates, 1968 p.230-2
130. Ibid., 250-6
131. Ibid., p.189
132. Hansard 17, cols. 6656 - 61 6.4.68
133. Senate Debates 5.6.68
134. Daily Dispatch (East London) 20.4.68 e.g.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III

1. John Ryan in Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 31.8.68
2. Transkei Constitution Amendment Act, No. 101 of 1967, Republic of South Africa.
3. Bala had been ordered out of the TLA when he refused to participate in a public display of mourning over the death by assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. He clashed with DP leaders over their willingness to "play the game" in this way and then refused to stand in the 1968 TLA election because he regarded the proceedings of the TLA as farcical. (Mary Corrigan - The Transkei Democratic Party: Has it a Future? in Reality published by the South African Liberal Party, p.11)
4. Ryan in Rand Daily Mail, (Johannesburg) 31.8.68
5. News/Check 25.10.68
6. Daily Dispatch (East London) 1.10.68
7. Ryan in Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 31.8.68
8. The World 28.8.68; Christopher Saunders - The Second Transkei Election (South African Outlook, January 1969) p.4.
9. Allen Drury - A Very Strange Society (Michael Joseph, 1967) p.257
10. e.g. TLA Debates 1966, p.251, 263. Carter, Karis, Stultz, op. cit., p.157-8.
11. Varsity, student newspaper of the University of Cape Town, 28.4.65
12. Daily Dispatch (East London) 14.11.68
13. See previous chapter, p.115
14. Bunting, op. cit., p.483-4
15. Daily Dispatch (East London) 1.10.68
16. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 2.10.68
17. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 24.9.68, 28.9.68. Matanzima's highly effective campaign in the early part of the election is covered in Rand Daily Mail and Daily Dispatch during September and October.
18. Daily Dispatch (East London) 15.10.68
19. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 31.8.68
20. Ibid.,
21. News/Check 4.10.68
22. Sunday Tribune, 27.10.68

23. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 2.10.68
24. Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 23.6.68 Daily Dispatch (East London) 30.10.68
25. Daily Dispatch (East London) 24.10.68
26. Daily Dispatch (East London) 23.10.68
27. Daily Dispatch (East London) 23.10.68
28. Daily Dispatch (East London) 1.10.68
29. See Appendix III
30. News/Check 1.11.68
31. Daily Dispatch (East London) 1.10.68
32. Saunders, op. cit., p.4
33. Daily Dispatch (East London) 25.10.68
34. Die Burger, October 1968
35. Brian Howard in Daily Dispatch (East London) 13.3.69
36. Ibid.
37. Daily Dispatch (East London) 24.10.68
38. Ibid.
39. Daily Dispatch (East London) 13.3.69
40. Daily Dispatch (East London) 25.10.68
41. See previous Chapter, p.93
42. Daily Dispatch (East London) 3.10.68
43. Daily Dispatch (East London) 11.10.68
44. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 7.8.68
45. Martin Kilson ascribes the early success of the SLPP under Milton Margai in Sierra Leone in large measure to the fact that the chiefs formed the basic political organization of the party at the local level, exercised strong influence on the commoners, and were thus the most effective mechanism through which the party could reach the masses. See Martin Kilson - Political Change in a West African State: a study of the modernization process in Sierra Leone (Harvard University Press, 1966) Chapter 15.

Matanzima himself would appear to confirm this viewpoint. In an address to the TLA after the election he attacked the DP and ascribed their victory to the support of the two Paramount Chiefs on the Opposition benches and the respect of the electorate for them. "This answers the question of how powerful chieftainship is in the socio-political life of the African people", he said. (Daily Dispatch, 2.11.68)

46. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 4.10.68
47. See previous Chapter p.97
48. The African Communist (South African Communist Party, Second Quarter 1969) p.10.
49. Ibid., p.9
50. Karis Papers - interview by Newell Stultz on 14.3.64
51. Ryan in Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 31.8.68
52. Daily Dispatch (East London) 1.11.68
53. Editorial, Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 6.11.68. In contrast, Dagbreek hailed the election results as a victory of separate development significant far "beyond the border of the Transkei". (3.11.68). News/Check felt that the result was significant for South Africa's international position (8.11.68). Sapa saw it as a definite vote for separate development (South African Digest, 8.11.68) and Blaar Coetzee hailed it as one of the South African government's "greatest victories". (Cape Argus, 5.11.68).
54. Mary Corrigall, op. cit., p.11-12.
55. Saunders, op. cit., p.4
56. Editorial, Sunday Tribune 3.11.68
57. News/Check 8.11.68
58. Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 10.11.68
59. Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 3.11.68 Also Cape Times, 1.11.68, Daily Dispatch (East London) 1.11.68
60. Saunders, op. cit., p.4
61. Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 15.12.68
62. Roger Omond in Daily Dispatch (East London) 11.11.68
63. Matanzima defeated Guzana by 73 votes to 25 in the election of the Chief Minister. Since all the DP members voted for Guzana, the abstentions represented 1 DP rebel, 1 TNIP rebel and 9 members of the TNIP. Voting reported in Africa Report, February 1969, p.34
64. Daily Dispatch (East London) 23.10.68
65. Sunday Tribune 3.11.68
66. Daily Dispatch (East London) 21.4.69
67. See Horwitz, op. cit., and especially W.H. Hutt, op. cit., The agency principle seeks to uphold the Verwoerd doctrine that no private white capital would be allowed into the Bantustans to prevent new exploitation, while at the same time seeking to persuade business to alleviate some of the financial burden the government bears. Hence white capital may be

67. Continued... given to the Bantu Investment Corporation and its agencies, which will act as the agent in whose name the capital will be invested. This is the agency principle. Ownership remains with the investor, but only for a limited time, after which it cedes to the Bantustan.
68. Daily Dispatch (East London) 21.4.69
69. Daily Dispatch (East London) 25.4.69
70. Daily Dispatch (East London) 29.4.69
71. Daily Dispatch (East London) 2.5.69
72. Daily Dispatch (East London) 6.5.69
73. Daily Dispatch (East London) 30.4.69 Daily Dispatch (East London) 25.6.69.
74. Daily Dispatch (East London) 23.5.69
75. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 21.5.69.
76. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 21.7.69.
77. Sunday Tribune 13.7.69.
78. Daily Dispatch (East London) 15.5.69
79. Daily Dispatch (East London) 30.1.69
80. Daily Dispatch (East London) 29.4.69
81. The World 14.11.69
82. Daily Dispatch (East London) 30.1.69
83. Sunday Tribune 20.4.69
84. Daily Dispatch (East London) 23.4.69 26.4.69 22.4.69
85. Daily Dispatch (East London) 22.5.69
86. Daily Dispatch (East London) 2.5.69
87. Informants.
88. Daily Dispatch (East London) 25.4.69
89. Daily Dispatch (East London) 8.5.69 21.4.69
90. Daily Dispatch (East London) 6.5.69
91. Daily Dispatch (East London) 18.2.70
92. Daily Dispatch (East London) 10.2.70
93. Daily Dispatch (East London) 5.3.70
94. Daily Dispatch (East London) 6.5.69
95. Daily Dispatch (East London) 15.5.69

96. Daily Dispatch (East London) 8.5.69 16.5.69
97. Daily Dispatch (East London) 21.5.69
98. Symposium for the Economic Development of the Transkei, 14-15 August, 1969, Reported in Financial Mail 22.8.69.
99. South African Digest 22.11.68
100. Daily Dispatch (East London) 22.4.69
101. Daily Dispatch (East London) 3.5.69
102. Daily Dispatch (East London) 15.5.69
103. Daily Dispatch (East London) 23.5.69
104. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 26.2.70
105. Editorial, The World, 15.10.69.
106. South African Digest, 29.11.68
107. The World, 30.3.69 Press Digest 17.4.69
108. Daily Dispatch (East London) 30.4.69
109. Daily Dispatch (East London) 2.5.69
110. Daily Dispatch (East London) 8.5.69
111. Daily Dispatch (East London) 7.5.69
112. Daily Dispatch (East London) 23.5.69
113. Daily Dispatch (East London) 24.4.69
114. Daily Dispatch (East London) 28.5.69
115. Daily Dispatch (East London) 7.5.69 Informants
116. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 19.6.69
117. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 9.6.69 Star 7.6.69 Post 5.6.69
Press Digest 19.6.69
118. Post 15.6.69
119. Guzana, interviewed by Stanley Uys, Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 14.9.69
120. Financial Mail. 28.11.69
121. The World 2.5.69 Press Digest 15.5.69
122. Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 1.2.70
123. Financial Mail 13.3.70.
124. Ibid.
125. Sunday Times, (Johannesburg) 25.1.70.
126. The Friend 17.3.70

127. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 18.3.70.
128. Daily Dispatch (East London) 19.3.70
129. The Friend 16.4.70
130. Zambia Mail 17.4.70.
131. Informants
132. Daily Dispatch (East London) 29.5.69
133. News/Check 15.11.68
134. Daily Dispatch (East London) 17.12.68
135. Daily Dispatch (East London) Editorial, Daily Dispatch, 8.2.69.
136. Daily Dispatch (East London) 17.4.69
137. Sunday Tribune 20.4.69
138. Daily Dispatch (East London) 21.4.69
139. Sunday Tribune 27.4.69
140. Cape Argus 29.4.69 Informants
141. Daily Dispatch (East London) 3.3.70. 10.3.70. Daily News 5.2.70
142. Daily Dispatch (East London) 4.3.70. Daily News 5.2.70
143. Daily Dispatch (East London) 5.2.70.
144. Daily Dispatch (East London) 18.3.70.
145. The World 2.8.70.
146. Informants say that Matanzima spoke to ANC leaders in 1959 and told them that he suspected that Bantu Authorities and Bantustans were a fraud, but that, if so, he intended to prove this from within the system. He said that he doubted that African aspirations could be realised for South Africa as a whole and would thus try to achieve an independent Transkei with more land. He is alleged to have told the ANC leaders that the Transkeian peasants knew about the Transkei but were not concerned about Natal or the Transvaal. He is alleged to have added that he thus intended to work from the known rather than the unknown and extend the sphere of operations after independence. Although the sources from which this was learned have proved absolutely reliable in the case of other information supplied and then checked, there was no way of verifying this particular point.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

1. The Transkei has not been similarly emphatic about border area development. Instead the emphasis is, like that of the Tomlinson Commission, on internal development, which, as we noted in our discussion of the function of Bantustans, is dysfunctional to the perpetuation of white privilege. Further, by linking independence to prior economic development, the TNIP has created a structure of demands which ensure that pressure on the white government is maintained. Independence without economic development is, after all, in the interests of the conflict externalization strategy. In this sense, the TFPF policy of "independence now" is dysfunctional to African demands for more land and development - it would rigidify, constitutionally, the present pattern of exploitation.
2. As suggested by the bomb blasts used to distribute ANC pamphlets in all major cities of the Republic on 14.11.69 and on 14.8.70 (See Sunday Express, 16.8.70) and by the present trial of twenty Africans (including at least one Transkeian) under the 1967 Terrorism Act, which started on 24.8.70.
3. Nationalist Party romanticism is largely the province of its younger intellectuals and its academics. Like members of the Dutch Reformed Churches, these groups generally devote much time to debates on the methods and money needed to develop the homelands and are not averse to criticising the government for going too slowly. Related to these groups are some Ministry of Bantu Administration functionaries, like Hans Abraham, the "Commissioner-General of the Xhosa National Unit" (i.e. the colonial governor) who recently described his job as "God given" (Sunday Tribune, 16.8.70) and has alternately urged greater government spending in the Transkei and bemoaned the Xhosa "inability" to "absorb" agricultural improvement techniques. Government speakers alternate between eulogies about the moral tasks of preserving all the "national identities" in South Africa and tough talking about their determination to ensure stability in the Bantustans before any thought of "independence" will even be considered - depending on their audience. The white supremacist Opposition United Party rejects the Bantustans outright as interfering with the economy and creating potentially unstable enemies within South Africa. N.H.Rhoodie, op. cit., exemplifies the apartheid academic. Liberal and leftist circles have damned the Bantustans as a fraud, a bluff, and an immoral attempt to confine the Africans to only 13.7% of the total land area of the country. They have employed economic studies to show that the Transkei is not an economically viable unit (see Rutman, op. cit.,). Bunting, op. cit., heads his section on Bantustans, "Bantustan Bluff" (p. 476) while the ANC journal, Sechaba, op. cit., has featured articles on the Transkei and border industries entitled "Colonial Border Industries" and "South Africa's Attempt to Hoodwink the World - The Bantustan Fraud". These

3. Continued.... approaches reflect very real aspects of the Bantustan function, as we have noted, but they have tended to allow the writers to ignore the equally real political process presently taking place in the Transkei.
4. Except by a few South African journalists, especially those of the Daily Dispatch, the Rand Daily Mail, and Stanley Uys of the Sunday Times. Some notable academic exceptions include, of course, David Hammond-Tooke, op. cit., and Philip Mayer, op. cit. Also see Carter, Karis and Stultz, op. cit., which is still the only authoritative full-length study of Transkeian politics.
5. Hammond-Tooke, op. cit., Mayer, op. cit.
6. He retained his archaic symbolism but his power became essentially modern, (including the colonially revised versions of formerly archaic powers such as land allocation, customary tribute and the use of labour). The chiefs operated the colonial Native Administration because they saw this as perpetuating their old power and because it enabled them to maximise their use of modern sources of power. At the same time, they were not challenged by the modern elite, largely because their ability to ensure that their own families received the benefits of colonial education meant that many members of the new nationalist elite were closely related to them. In fact, the SLPP of Milton Margai strongly upheld the rights of chieftaincy and worked through it to raise popular support. In the Transkei this pattern is paralleled in the fact that Nelson Mandela is the cousin of both Sabata and Matanzima and that Winnie Mandela's father was the Transkei's first Minister of Education, while Stella Sigcau, a university graduate is the daughter of Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau.

Even where such relationships are not found, educated commoners like Guzana retain strong ties of friendship and respect for chiefs like Poto and Sabata. Further, in South Africa, institutions like Fort Hare have enabled chiefs like the Matanzima brothers to become University graduates, teachers colleges ensured that a Zulu chief called Albert Lutuli became a teacher and a nationalist, and institutions like the NRC socialised both Lutuli and Poto in urban political credos. In this latter respect, Nigeria is perhaps analagous to the South African case, although the traditional aristocracy of Nigeria played a far more active role in national politics than did its South African counterpart.

The material on Sierra Leone here, is drawn from Martin Kilson, op. cit., p. 60-67 and *passim*.

7. Norman N. Miller - The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 6, no. 2. 1968, pp. 183-198. The political survival of the chieftaincy brings into question the caveat that the traditional aristocracy in Africa is unable to lead the forces of African nationalism. This needs qualification. In the multi-tribal situation, the chief is by definition unable to provide a unifying force for such nationalism, since he represents the more parochial

7. Continued.... values of the tribe or language group. Hence the modern political elite emerges as symbolising the birth of the new nation-state. But where there is only one tribe within the boundaries of the aspirant state, the chief becomes peculiarly well equipped to lead such nationalist forces, since he is capable of modernising his power and role, as Kilson and Miller have shown, and because he also draws on tribal values and loyalties. Hence in Botswana, Lesotho and, especially in Swaziland, the chieftaincy has led modern political life and expression. In Buganda the Kabaka symbolised populist values (see Crawford Young - Buganda, MS. 1969 and also David Apter - The Political Kingdom of Uganda).

As such he threatened the stability of Uganda nationalism and the Uganda state, but not that of Buganda nationalism. In Nigeria, the traditional aristocracy dominated politics in the "one-party regions" of the North and West until the coups of 1966 at least. Instability arose because of the interaction between these regions - not because of the chief's inability to represent modern political sentiments within each region.

8. This condition of hard work and low yields makes peasantry a coercive system in which mores of frugality, stoicism and strong communalism are enforced as virtues. Poverty ensures that research and learning are luxuries which cannot be attained; as a result peasants lack an understanding of how their life condition operates and rely on an intuitive and imitative learning process, which is vertically oriented to imitate the father or the chief. The result is that the social environment is regarded in totality and, hence, a social order which provides a subsistence is strongly defended while factors which undermine such an equilibrium are rejected in totality. This explains why. Mehmet Bequiraj - Peasantry in Revolution (Cornell University, Centre for International Studies, 1966) p.3-9, 21027, 92-4 passim. Bequiraj's is a unique analysis of the social and educational condition of peasantry as a class.
9. Thus writers of The American Voter note that low levels of education and geographic remoteness lead to a strong parochialism which makes the partisan loyalties of American farmers extremely unstable. Further:
- "With the Civil War aside, farm unrest was the primary source of political disturbance in America throughout the nineteenth century. The farmer reacts to economic pressure with political protest: yet the response has an explosive quality - great force without duration - which is unique".

Angus, Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes - The American Voter, Chapter 13: Agrarian Political Behaviour (John Wiley & Sons, 1964) p.210, 222 - 4.

10. Friedrich Engels - The Condition of the Working Class in England (Macmillan, 1958) p. 297-303 passim. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin - Agrarian Radicalism in Chile, British Journal of Sociology, September 1968) p. 254-70.
11. Kilson, op. cit. p. 180-188
12. Ibid., p. 179-180
13. Herbert Weiss - Political Protest in the Congo (Princeton University Press, 1967) p. 291, 297-8 passim.
Members of the modern elite channelled this protest so as to form political parties like the PSA. And after independence in 1960, the Mulele revolt took the form of a rural protest aimed at achieving mass values which had not been satisfied by Congolese politicians.
14. The Liberal Party and Progressive Party were believed to have had sufficient influence among this group to move the South African government to pass the Prevention of Improper Interference Act so as to ensure that their influence among Africans would be minimised. In addition, Transkeian teachers were, for a long time, during the forties and fifties, influenced by Cape teachers' organisations and by political groups like the Marxist Non-European Unity Movement. The status and respect which education earns Africans from their fellows has ensured that this group would achieve an influence rivalling that of the chiefs.
15. Sunday Times 1.3.70.
16. Ibid. One doctor at St. Lucy's Hospital (20 miles from Umtata) said that African women were even walking 20 miles to work at the mission hospital each day to be paid in food and then returning the 20 miles home with the food; this was the only way they could feed their families, he said.
17. Die Beeld, 12.1.69 In 1956, Dr. Verwoerd based his plans for the Bantustans on a population projection of 19 million for the year 2000. In 1966, this figure was amended to 28 million. But in 1969, the "verligte" Nationalist Party newspaper, "Die Beeld", in an article entitled "Sharpeville het 'n nuwe antwoord" (Sharpeville has a new answer) stated that these projections were gross underestimates. The paper said that the African population of the Republic produced 1,000 babies each day. This meant that the homelands and border areas had to absorb 300,000 new employees each year in order to keep pace with natural increase alone. The paper deplored the emphasis on resettlement without economic development; this only created situations like Limehill, it said. In 1970, the same paper estimated the 1969 population of South Africa at over 19 million (the Verwoerd figure for 2000) of whom 13.34 million were Africans.
18. Die Beeld, 18.1.70.

19. Gurr describes the legacy of past strife as a major control variable in the facilitation of conflict. Gurr, op. cit., p.1121.
20. Even Matanzima is alleged to have held talks with leaders of the ANC in 1959 and to have told them that his aims were similar to theirs, but that he saw a tactical alternative available in the form of the Bantustan venture. Matanzima is reputed to have stated, at that meeting, that if Bantustans and Bantu Authorities were a fraud, he intended to prove them so; he added that Transkeians were interested in local issues and not in South Africa as a whole, and that he intended to start with what was known to them and only extend his claims after he had achieved independence. (This allegation was made to the writer by an informant whose testimony in other cases was always able to be substantiated by an independent, second source. In this case no independent substantiation was available and the item has only been included because the informant proved totally reliable in the case of other information).
21. Kuper - African Bourgeoisie, op. cit., contains one chapter on multi-racial influence in African thought and another on countervailing racial influences.
22. Natal Witness, 29.4.68 contains a report on a paper by Lawrence Schlemmer, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Social Research, University of Natal, in which African bitterness and discontent is discussed. The Natal Mercury, 19.2.70 contains a report on a study of Zulu intellectual attitudes in which the exclusivist ethos among this group is discussed, by Lawrence Morgan.

The earlier study maintained that the Nationalist Party had crushed the African intelligentsia before it had been able to build a really effectively mass-based organisation; the result was a present lack of organisation and superficial urban calm. But, the study found, even though no white researcher could obtain open responses from Africans, it was apparent that there was a "spirit of total bitterness" and sullen resentment against whites. If the urban African intelligentsia was not reconciled to white rule, it nevertheless appeared to be reorienting its attitudes, according to the second study.

This research found that Zulu intellectuals confessed to having reacted to Matanzima and his Transkeian aspirations with "overwhelming cynicism". But disillusionment with anti-apartheid whites, resentment against whites in general, and developments in the Transkei itself, appeared to be producing a change:

"... to us it seemed to be just another bit of clumsy window dressing. Then we saw Matanzima insisting that promises should be kept, and he almost always got what he wanted. So many of us decided that if our political advance was blocked in one direction, Matanzima's way might be worth trying".

23. Sunday Express, 12.5.68 The World, 13.5.68

24. Africa South (edited by L.N. Ndaba and not to be confused with Ronald Segal's journal of the same name). Vol. IV, No. 1, January 1969, p.2.
Guzana was denounced as "a political functionary" and a "lackey", and as one who failed to realise that only the leader of a state could "speak to the top brass in Pretoria today".
25. Editorial, The World, 18.6.69
26. Anthony Sampson, The Observer, 19.4.70.
Sampson found that the number of black separatist churches in Johannesburg had doubled in the last five years and that these were attracting mainly the poorest elements of the black urban population. Even first names showed this pattern of change - the fifties generation of Nelsons and Wellingtons being replaced by a new generation with purely African names.
27. This would certainly seem to be the case in the Transkei, where chiefs and nationalists coexist within the TNIP. The resettlement issue appears to be the catalyst for much of this anger and change. Most of the observers quoted above note its influence as an issue uniting Africans, and even members of the South African Parliament have drawn attention to growing anger in the locations of the Eastern Cape where resettlement has been felt most strongly. (Rand Daily Mail, 20.6.69 and 21.6.69). The apartheid policy, particularly as applied through resettlement, may prove the means of uniting rural and urban Africans in a way the nationalist political parties could never do, with a multi-racial ideology.
28. Dr. H.F. Verwoerd - Verwoerd offered to incorporate these territories into the Bantustan policy (Nationalist Party intellectuals were fond of observing that if the territories were included the land area available to Africans would increase from 13% to nearly 40% of the region) and exercise guardianship over them until they attained independence as racially exclusive societies.
29. Post, 19.10.69
30. Times of Zambia. In 1970 Lesotho held a general election in which the Jonathan government was defeated by the opposition BCP, which openly advocated a policy of minimum co-operation with South Africa, and which had close ties with the PAC of South Africa. The Jonathan group seized power by means of a coup officered by white policemen, whose leader publicly stated that he had acted in terms of what he saw to be South Africa's interests.
31. At the end of 1968 South Africa met with the three countries to re-negotiate the common customs union which the four share and under which the client states receive a fixed share (1.31%) of the total pool of customs and excise revenue. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland had asked for a larger share to allow their development plans greater liquidity and freedom and to offset the free entry of South African goods. South

31. Continued..... Africa agreed on condition that she was given a say "about what industries were developed in the territories". In other words, South Africa wanted a large share of control in the economic development of these neighbours. This despite a speech two years earlier by the then Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. Jan Haak, that South Africa was unfairly branded a neo-colonialist seeking to control the "economic and political destinies" of her neighbours when all she wanted was to assist them. The angry delegates of the African territories - especially Botswana and Swaziland - were believed to have leaked the story to the press where it appeared in the Financial Mail, 24.1.69, which accused South Africa of seeking to ensure that development would be racially exclusive in her neighbours so as to reduce them to the status of autonomous Bantustans. The demand was hastily dropped and South Africa agreed to raise the customs share of her neighbours without this particular string attached.

South Africa's problems of trying to control the economic and political destinies of her neighbours will certainly amount. In 1968, Lesotho's High Commissioner to London said that Lesotho was interested to see what would develop out of the Bantustan policy and whether or not it would mean finally that Lesotho could organise a transit agreement with the Transkei so as to gain access to the sea and so escape from her dependence on the Republic for access to and from the outside world. Rand Daily Mail, 18.12.68.

32. For reports on the Ovamboland Bantustan, which has even more limited constitutional powers than the Transkei, see long reports in News/Check 19.9.69 and in the Financial Mail supplement on South West Africa, 20.8.65, which deals with the Odendaal Commission Report on the creation of homelands in the territory. Also The Star, 21.3.67, Die Transvaler, 22.3.67, The Star, 15.7.67, Rand Daily Mail, 18.7.67 and 20.7.67, News/Check 17.5.68, Rand Daily Mail, 4.10.68, News/Check 11.10.68 and Namib Today, published by the South West African People's Organisation in Dar es Salaam, January - April 1968.

It is interesting to note that the Chairman of the Ovamboland Executive is a chief who is apparently illiterate - Informant.

33. Bantustan government in Ovamboland is in the hands of 7 chiefs and there is no provision for elected representatives. The other Bantustans have reached the status of Territorial Authority, which the Transkei enjoyed in 1962 before being granted "self-government". In all of them - the Venda, Tswana, Ciskei and Zululand Territorial Authority only chiefs run government functions. In the Transkei, the chiefs had wanted only a token electoral representation and had been "persuaded" by Verwoerd himself to divide the TLA between 64 chiefs and 45 elected members. See Carter, Karis and Stultz, op. cit., p.118. The same interest in democratic representation was not shown by the South African government in the case of Ovamboland.

34. Rand Daily Mail, 4.7.68.
35. Rand Daily Mail, 28.9.68
36. Post, 14.6.70. In the speech, the chief stated that unless the 3 million Zulu were given more land and the territory consolidated into a single unit, the apartheid scheme would "not make any sense". He also demanded the rapid achievement of free and compulsory education, the rate for the job for Africans so as to narrow the gap between their income and those of Europeans, and an easing of the influx control system "which has destroyed the very moral fibre of our people".
37. Chief Mangope reportedly looked at the Deputy Minister, Koornhof, throughout his speech, which attacked recent announcements that urban job reservation would be extended to clerks in hotels. He received loud cheers from the assembled Africans when he demanded the removal of whites from the Tswana area because of their racist attitudes to the local Africans, especially in post offices. At the end of his speech, Koornhof rose to say that the government would increase the pace of Bantustan economic development and that it would consider granting greater powers to the Tswana Territorial Authority. Rand Daily Mail, 13.5.70.
38. Rand Daily Mail, 30.12.66.
39. Sunday Tribune, 5.7.70. Post, 14.6.70, commented thus on Buthelez's inaugural speech:

"Chief Buthelezi's appointment makes him the third able, strong-willed African in a position of authority in South Africa. Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima, ... and Chief Lucas Mangope ... have already made their mark as men who are not prepared to be government stooges ... Faced with tough reactions from (these) two men who were put in their posts as stooges ... Mr. Vorster's government must be a little worried ... at the thought of what Chief Buthelezi may say and do. For (he) is not the government's choice ... and he has a ... record of opposition to apartheid ... Even Bantustans have their uses".
40. The African Communist, op. cit., First Quarter, 1969.
41. See John Laurence - The Seeds of Disaster for a detailed account of South African propoganda strategies in the West.
42. Nevertheless, the leader of the United Party wants Bantustans scrapped as he claims they are "a launching pad for Communism" (News/Check, 12.2.65 was the first report found of this persistent claim) while during the 1970 white elections in the Republic, the Nationalist Party candidates for Zululand, Mr. Ben Pienaar, stated that he had the assurance of the Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. Botha, that even if the Bantustans had gained independence, the Republic would send in its troops to check "Communist infiltration" in much the same way as it had

- 42 Continued..... done in Rhodesia (Daily News, 18.3.70.) Even so, the whites of this Bantustan area voted for the Opposition.
43. Perhaps the fact that the ANC stressed the values of the urban society and ignored the idiom of black power, provides a better explanation of its failure to overthrow the government in the fifties than does the notion of "linked utilities".

FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX I

1. See, inter alia, Patrick Duncan - South Africa's Rule of Violence (Methuen, 1964); A. Sachs - South Africa: The Violence of Apartheid (International Defence and Aid Fund pamphlet, 1969); and on the powers and organization of the Security Police: K. Gottschalk - The Security Police: Their Rise to Power (Radical No. 1, 1969, pp. 20-30) based entirely on published sources.
2. Gottschalk, op. cit., p.22
3. Duncan, op. cit., Ch. 4, p. 49 - 54.
4. Spoken by Mr. Vorster, then Minister of Justice, Senate Debates, 2 c.2730; 27.3.63.
5. Gottschalk, op. cit., p.26
6. Sachs, op. cit., p.3
7. Ibid., p.4
8. Ibid., p.32
9. Ibid., p.55
10. Ibid., p.57
11. Ibid., p.65
12. Ibid., p.64
13. Ibid., p.33
14. Ibid., p.24
15. Ibid., p.24
16. Daily Dispatch (East London) 30.6.67
17. Cape Times 4.6.65

A basic foundation of apartheid laws: Suppressing dissent - The Suppression of Communism Act, 1950; The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1953; The Public Safety Act, 1953; The Unlawful Organizations Act, 1960; The General Law Amendment Acts of 1961, 1962, 1963 (90 - day and Sobukwe clauses) 1965 (180 - day law); and the Terrorism Act, 1967. Imposing labour disadvantages for Africans - a vast array of enactments, amendments and proclamations under the Industrial Conciliation Act umbrella, including job reservation and abolition of the right to strike, stretching across the life-span of Union as well. Imposing racial separation - Population registration acts of 1950 and 1960; the Immorality Act of 1957; the Group Areas Act 1950; various Natives (Urban Areas) Acts; and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 1955; Placing Africans under influx control - Abolition of Passes

17. Continued..... and Consolidation of Documents Act. Segregating education racially and tribally - The Bantu Education Act, 1953; the Extension of University Education Act, 1959; and the University College of Fort Hare Act, 1959. Reorganising the rural areas to create Bantustans - The Bantu Authorities Act, 1951; the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959; and the Transkei Constitution Act, 1963. Destroying interracial political activity and making Africans aliens in 83% of the country - The Prohibition of Improper Interference Act, 1967; and the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act 1969. It is taking too narrow a view to see the legislation after 1948 as a change in direction by government. There is a pre-Nationalist precedent for much of it, substantively at least; 1948 marks the beginning of an intensification of the process, rather than the beginning of a new approach to racial affairs. It is for this reason that this chapter purposely avoids seeing apartheid as the manifestation of Afrikaner nationalism per se: Afrikaner nationalism has lent an additional intensity to the conflict, but racial exploitation is not the monopoly of the Afrikaner.