

**THE SYNTAX, SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS OF CONDITIONAL
CLAUSES IN TONGA AND ENGLISH:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

BY

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DECLARATION

I, Handili Jimaima, declare that this dissertation:

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APPROVAL

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ABSTRACT

This study comparatively analyses the syntax, semantics and pragmatic functions of conditional clauses in Tonga and English. It also establishes whether there are differences and similarities in the syntax, semantics and pragmatic functions of conditional clauses of both languages. The analysis done in this dissertation is on the (4) types of conditional sentences in the languages under study. The study analysed both secondary and primary data upon which it based its conclusions. In the analysis, the study has used the Speech Act Theory and the Cognitive Linguistic Approach. Analyses have shown that there are some similarities and differences in the syntax of conditionals in the two languages under study. However, similarities also do exist in the syntax, semantics and pragmatic functions of the conditionals. Just as English has several conditional markers including *if*, (which the study focused on). The study has shown that Tonga has several conditional markers (*such as: kuti, naa, wa, noo, ni, ba, twa*) equivalent to the English *If*. Other differences include the use of (in Tonga conditionals as opposed to English counterparts) a whole sentence represented either by subject and verb or by a verb plus an enclitic.

It is evident from the findings that conditional clauses account largely for tools mostly used in conversation in both Tonga and English, in oral and written discourse, though the written discourse is not discussed here. When used in conversation, initialised if-clauses can be used to give directives, speak humorously and sarcastically and offer apologies, commands, advice and instructions (Celce-Murcia & Larsen Freeman, 1999). The study has also shown that, as opposed to Tonga speakers, English speakers, in certain instances prefer to introduce strong arguments (e.g. I will visit you soon if I buy a car) and indeed interesting topics in the main clause, which necessitate final position for the subordinate conditional clause as well as those that are long and involved. The analysis has in addition shown factors that determine the position of the if-clause. Such factors as Topic continuity, parallelism and qualification apart from the principle of end-focus have been seen as determining the position of the if-clause.

Under the semantic analysis, it has been learnt that in the Tonga Zero conditional, there is the prominence of *when* than the *kuti* (if). As for the second conditional, the expression in the main clause refers much to the present than the future. Interpretations of conditionals in this paper are based on a number of form meaning correlations such as their verb forms and compatibility between the protasis and the apodosis.

The analysis of conditionals in this study is in line with (Maye's 1994), and has shown, that conditionals help us explore the relationship between language and the human mind. In this case, conditionals are seen as reflecting the psychological thoughts and the state of speaker (sorrow, regret). These aspects are shown in the use of predictive and future temporal conditionals by both Tonga and English speakers.

The study on the whole has contrasted conditional clauses in Tonga and English at syntactic, semantic and pragmatic levels. The study recommends further studies on conducting a comparative analysis of the Tonga conditionals and other Zambian or Bantu languages.

DEDICATION

To my wife: Lungowe Imasiku Jimaima and my son Mulala Handili Jimaima.

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| | |
|---|-----------|
| Declaration | |
| Copyright | |
| Approval | iv |
| Abstract | v |
| Dedication | vi |
| Acknowledgements | vii |
| Table of contents | viii |
| CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| 1.0 General..... | 1 |
| 1.1 Background | 1 |
| 1.2 Statement of the Problem | 7 |
| 1.3 Rationale | 7 |
| 1.4 Aim and Objectives of the study..... | 9 |
| 1.5 Research Questions | 9 |
| 1.6 Theoretical framework | 10 |
| 1.7 Operational Definitions | 15 |
| 1.7.1 Mood..... | 16 |
| 1.7.2 Protasis..... | 16 |
| 1.7.3 Apodosis..... | 16 |
| 1.7.4 Clitic | 17 |
| 1.7.5 Proclitic | 17 |
| 1.7.6 Enclitic | 17 |
| 1.7.7 Topic | 17 |
| 1.7.8 Focus | 17 |
| 1.7.9 Optative | 18 |
| 1.10 Scope of Study | 18 |
| 1.11 Structure of Dissertation..... | 19 |
| 1.12 Summary..... | 20 |
| CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW | 21 |
| 2.0 General..... | 21 |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| 2.1 English Conditional Clauses Overview and Definition..... | 21 |
| 2.2 Conditionals in the Speech Act Theory | 30 |
| 2.3 Conditionals in the Cognitive linguistic Framework..... | 31 |
| 2.4 Tonga Conditional Clauses..... | 32 |
| 2.5 Conclusion | 32 |
| 2.6 Summary | 33 |
| CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN..... | 34 |
| 3.0 General..... | 34 |
| 3.1 Research Methodology | 34 |
| 3.2 Research Design | 35 |
| 3.2.1 Area of Study..... | 35 |
| 3.2.2 Population | 35 |
| 3.2.3 Sampling Method | 35 |
| 3.2.3.1 Purposeful Sampling Method | 36 |
| 3.2.3.2 Research Sample | 36 |
| 3.3 Data Collection Procedures | 36 |
| 3.3.1 Data Collection Instruments | 37 |
| 3.3.1.1 Unstructured Interviews | 38 |
| 3.4 Desk Research | 39 |
| 3.5 Introspection | 39 |
| 3.6 Ethical Considerations | 40 |
| 3.7 Data Analysis | 40 |
| 3.8 Conclusion | 41 |
| CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION | 42 |
| 4.0 General..... | 42 |
| 4.1. Types of Conditionals | 42 |
| 4.1.1 English Conditional | 49 |
| 4.1.1.1 The Zero Conditional | 49 |
| 4.1.1.2 The First Conditional | 51 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 4.1.1.3 The Second Conditional | 52 |
| 4.1.1.4 The Third Conditional | 53 |
| 4.2 Tonga Conditionals | 54 |
| 4.2.1 Simple Conditions..... | 54 |
| 4.2.2 Modified Conditions..... | 56 |
| 4.3 The Syntax of Conditional Clauses..... | 57 |
| 4.3.1 The English If and its Tonga Equivalents | 58 |
| 4.3.2 The Position of the If-Clause | 63 |
| 4.3.3 Topic Continuity | 66 |
| 4.3.4 Parallelism | 68 |
| 4.3.5 Qualification | 69 |
| 4.3.6 Verbless Conditional Clauses | 71 |
| 4.3.7 Deletion of the if Conjunction | 73 |
| 4.4 The Semantics of Conditional Clauses | 74 |
| 4.4.1 The Semantics of the Zero Conditional..... | 80 |
| 4.4.2 The Semantics of the First Conditional | 82 |
| 4.4.3 The Semantics of the Second Conditional..... | 85 |
| 4.4.4 The Semantics of the Third Conditional..... | 86 |
| 4.5 The Pragmatic Functions of Conditionals | 88 |
| 4.5.1 Rebuke | 92 |
| 4.5.1.1 Lamentation | 94 |
| 4.5.1.2 Arguing..... | 95 |
| 4.5.1.3 Request | 97 |
| 4.5.1.4 Assertion | 98 |
| 4.5.1.5 Manipulation..... | 100 |
| 4.5.1.6 Exhortation..... | 101 |
| 4.5.1.7 Mocking..... | 103 |
| 4.6 Summary | 104 |

| | |
|---|------------|
| CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS | 105 |
| 5.0 General..... | 105 |
| 5.1 Conclusion..... | 106 |
| 5.2 Recommendations | 108 |
| 5.3 Recommendations for further Research..... | 108 |
| 5.4. Summary..... | 97 |
| REFERENCES..... | 110 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Table 1: Progressively weakened result from will to might..... | 47 |
| Table 2: The Zero Conditional with the same Tense in both clauses..... | 50 |
| Table 3: The First Conditional..... | 51 |
| Table 4: The Second Conditional..... | 52 |
| Table 5: The Third Conditional..... | 53 |
| Table 6: Simple Conditionals..... | 54 |
| Table 7: Modified Conditionals..... | 56 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Figure 1: Types of Conditionals..... | 44 |
| Figure 2: Proclitics and enclitics in Tonga Conditionals..... | 72 |

APPENDICES

| | |
|---|-------------|
| APPENDIX A: DATA | XII |
| APPENDIX B: UNSTRUCUTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE..... | XXI |
| APPENDIX C: ABBREVIATIONS | XXII |

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 General

This chapter is the introduction to the study by providing the background information to the investigation, stating the actual problem under study and explaining the rationale for the study. The chapter also spells out the aim and specific objectives of the study, and the theoretical framework adopted for this study. The chapter concludes with an outline of the scope of the dissertation and provides the summary of issues discussed in the chapter.

1.1 Background

Human beings were created with the ability for abstract thought. Through language humans reflect such skills as making logical connections as part of his reasoning capabilities, posing questions and expressing hypothetical possibilities. Among the syntactical tools that accomplish these are conditional clauses. These clauses usually consist of two clauses, one stating a hypothesis and the other giving a conclusion, (Elliott 1981). The foregoing argument supports the notion that language is multifaceted to the extent that human activity is various, each of which has its own language and cultural setting. Walks of life may therefore be divided into two categories; those that are familiar to everybody and those that are concerned with specialised topics familiar only to a few.

The study has comparatively explored the syntax, semantics and the pragmatic functions of conditional clauses in Tonga and English. The term *comparatively* as used here does not necessarily refer to the use of the comparative method in a general sense, which seeks to discover whether the languages have a common ancestor, or

indeed one concerned chiefly with establishing language families and reconstructing languages using the comparative method. Conversely, the term *comparatively* has been used in a narrow sense to compare and contrast Tonga and English (unrelated languages) simply to establish similarities and differences in the syntax, semantics and pragmatic functions of their conditional clauses as a result of cultural contact between them. By 'conditional', the study primarily means the sentences so labelled by grammarians rather than logicians. For example, Conditions like: *If all men are mortal, then Socrates is mortal*. The study has looked at the syntax, semantics and pragmatic functions of conditional clauses. At the syntactic level, the study investigated the structure of the conditional clauses, the meaning at the semantic level and function or role of these conditional clauses at the pragmatic level.

Tonga, the language under study, is a Bantu language classified as M.64 by (Guthrie 1948). It is predominantly spoken in the Southern Province of Zambia and to a limited extent in Kabwe and Mumbwa districts of the Central Province of Zambia. Tonga is one of the seven indigenous languages used in both the public media and in educational domains besides English. The language is also taught as a school subject at primary and secondary level in Southern Province of Zambia. The total number of Tonga speakers, according to *the Zambia 2010 Census of population and housing* is estimated at 11.4% of the total population of 11, 126, 922 people. The total number of Tonga speakers in Zambia is 1, 268, 469. Out of the 6,586,183 people in rural areas, 15.9% speak Tonga while only 4.9% of the 4, 540, 739 urban population speak Tonga. Although the exact number of clusters and the details within each cluster is not known, there are two major ones identified (Nkolola 1997). The two identified are Valley Tonga and Plateau Tonga. Valley Tonga is spoken in the Zambezi valley and

such other places as Siavonga, Gweembe and Sinazongwe. On the other hand, Plateau Tonga is spoken on the plateau which include places like Choma, Kalomo, Monze, Pemba and Mazabuka.

Tonga is an agglutinative language as opposed to English language, which is generally synthetic. In agglutinative languages like Tonga, instead of morphological modifications with internal changes of the root of the word, or changes in stress or tone, each affix is a bound morpheme for one unit of meaning (such as “diminutive” *ka- kasako*, to mean; small stick “plural” *ba- basimbi*, to mean; girls and so on). In an agglutinative language, the truth is that stems do not change, affixes do not fuse with other affixes do not change form conditioned by affixes (Stocking, 1995). In linguistic typology, Agglutinative languages have words containing several morphemes that are always clearly differentiable from one another in that each morpheme represents only one grammatical meaning and the boundaries between those morphemes are easily demarcated; that is, the bound morphemes affixes, and may be individually identified. Furthermore, Agglutinative languages tend to have a high number of morphemes per word, and their morphology is usually highly regular.

English language on the other hand is an Indo-European language classified as analytic in linguistic typology. An analytic language is a language that conveys grammatical relationships without using inflectional morphemes. A grammatical construction can similarly be called analytic if it uses unbound morphemes, which are separate words, and word order. The term *analytic* is commonly used in a relative rather than an absolute sense.

English has lost much of the inflectional morphology of proto-Indo-European over centuries and has not gained any new inflectional morphemes in the meantime making it more analytic than most Indo-European languages. In analytic languages, the syntax and meaning are shaped more by use of particles and word order rather than by inflection (Li and Thompson, 1981). Furthermore, these languages have stricter and more elaborate syntactic rules and often express abstract concepts using independent words. And since words are not marked by morphology showing their role in sentences, word order tends to carry a lot of importance. For example, word order is used to show subject-object relationship. In addition, analytic languages tend to rely heavily on context and pragmatic considerations for the interpretation of sentences since they do not specify as much as synthetic languages in terms of agreement and cross-reference between different parts of the sentence.

Conditional sentences are multi-fold structures. They directly reflect the language user's ability to reason about alternatives, uncertainties and unrealized contingencies, (Traugott, et al 2009). It is further argued that an understanding of the conceptual and behavioural organization involved in the construction and interpretation of these kinds of sentences, supplies deep-seated insights into the inferential strategies and cognitive and the linguistic processes of human beings.

The canonical form of a conditional, is a two-part sentence consisting of the condition or an "antecedent" (also: "premise", "protasis") marked with *if* and a "consequent" ("apodosis") sometimes marked with *then*, (Fintel 2009). For example: *If it rains [condition], the picnic will be cancelled [consequence]*. The terms *apodosis* and *protasis* have been defined under operational definitions.

Among many other writers on conditionals, (Yu-Shan, Ke 2005) has argued that conditionals are used to express the cause-and-effect or temporal sequences of two events. The typical surface structure of conditionals is a bi-clause consisting of an antecedent clause and a consequent clause, that is, the protasis and apodosis Yu-Shan, (2005). Smith in (Fintel 2012) explains a condition as a supposition on which a statement is based. He argues that the protasis is the subordinate clause expressing supposed or assumed case (*if*). As for the apodosis, Smith in (Fintel 2012) explains that it is the conclusion, or principal clause, expressing what follows if the condition is realized. He further states that the truth or fulfilment of the conclusion depends on the truth or fulfilment of the conditional clause.

This investigation was partly prompted by the assertion that English conditionals pose a number of problems owing to their complexity. Firstly, their logical structure has been a puzzle to philosophers since Aristotle. They have been used as a testing ground for some of the most influential theories in the philosophy of language, such as, the theory of implicature (Dancygier, 1998). Conditionals are characterised by an imposing variety of forms, and furthermore, an overwhelming variety of interpretations. They are indeed a part of language use where the interface of basic structure, meaning and context is exceptionally complex. The interest in this study, as (Dancygier, 1998) points out, was an attempt to describe how various aspects of the form of conditionals map onto their interpretation. What was at the core of the investigation as alluded to in the objectives of the study was to identify various types of conditional clauses in Tonga and English, and to contrastively establish their grammatical construction, establish how their semantics is motivated compositionally

and finally analyse their pragmatic functions. In so doing, it was necessary to establish whether Tonga conditionals were as complex as their English counterparts and further examined their similarities and their differences.

Indeed conditional clauses are widely known to be a weighty topic, the fact that they are confusing, first from an abstract point of view, they are, or at least seem to be non-truth-functional (Stalnaker 1990). Additionally, the number of formal patterns of conditionals is limited, but their applications involving interpretations with speaker's intentions become multitudinous. Owing to this, the subtle distinctions with regard to semantics and pragmatics bring in great difficulties (Yu-shan, Ke 2005). Tangential to this is the fact that grammarians face a major description problem with English conditional clauses owing to the complex system of compatibility between the two parts of a conditional sentence. Available literature has revealed however, that the protasis and the apodosis relation seems to be a particularly important aspect of conditional interpretation.

The linguistic features that have been investigated in the study include the syntax, semantics and the pragmatic functions of conditional clauses. The syntax deals with the structure or grammatical construction of conditional clauses, the semantics deals with the meaning of conditional clauses based on the construction and the tense of the verb. Pragmatics has to do with the social functions or application of conditional clauses. In other words, this has to do with how the conditions are used in social discourse by speakers to achieve their intended goals.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The linguistic form of conditionals has been a puzzle and has seemingly escaped the uniform descriptions and interpretations, (Dancygier 1998). Because of this, conditionals have been an object of study in fields such as syntax, semantics and pragmatics. It is evident however, that most of these studies have been on English conditional clauses and not necessarily on Tonga. Most studies on Tonga have concentrated on phonology rather than other aspects of linguistic analysis. Of course, Nkolola (1997) analysed the Morphology, Syntax, Semantics and Phonology of applied, causative and passive verb extension. Nkolola looked at how the verbal extension can be derived from the lexicon. Sibajene (2013) carried out a dialectological study where he contrasted two Tonga dialects at various levels of linguistic analysis. Another study on Tonga was done by (Jimaima, 2008). In his study, Jimaima contrastively analysed Modification and Determination in English and Tonga. While there are all these studies on Tonga, and literature has shown some studies even on conditionals in both Tonga and English, there is hardly any study that has comparatively analysed the syntax, semantics and pragmatic functions of conditionals in Tonga and English, and there is hardly any study to date that has been done to examine how particular meanings are assigned to different types of Tonga conditionals. This particular research, therefore, was set out to investigate whether there is any relationship between Tonga and English conditional clauses with regard to their syntax, semantics and pragmatic functions.

1.3 Rationale

This study was motivated by the notion that conditional sentences are multi-fold structures (Traugott, et al 2009). Their grammar has long been controversial in that

they manifest subtle differences in mood, tense and areas of syntax, which have themselves been a subject of debate. It has hence proved difficult to assign particular meanings to the different types of these conditional clauses (Armitage, 2007). The importance and value of the study, therefore, might be self-justified. It goes without saying that this study would contribute in a broad sense to comparative linguistics and translation studies. The increasingly global and multicultural world in which we live has rendered translation more and more important both as an actual material practice and as cultural phenomenon to be critically analysed. This would be dully linked to the relative increase in human contact across linguistic-cultural boundaries that have occurred in the recent years, in turn, an increased need for communication across the boundaries. Furthermore, translation studies are now emerging as a significant and useful aspect of comparative literature and of humanities in general. Comparatively, the study would shed light on areas of similarity and difference between Tonga and English with regard to conditionals. To the best knowledge of the researcher, and although literature is available on each of the languages, no work has been done on conditional clauses from a comparative point of view with reference to the two languages in question. Since publications on Tonga conditionals are not an in-depth analysis, and no attention has been paid to how these conditionals operate comparatively with their counterparts in English, it is hoped therefore, that this study has endeavoured to carry out an in-depth analysis of Tonga conditionals as has been done in the English language to make a significant contribution to the body of knowledge, especially to the understanding of Tonga conditional clauses. It was also conceived that the study would be found useful and meaningful by the relevant policy makers, the ministry of education as well as useful to practitioners such as teachers within the ministry. Teachers, having read on Tonga conditional clauses in this study

in comparison with those in English, would gain insight and be able to explain them better to learners.

1.4 Aim and Objectives of the study

The aim of the study was to comparatively analyse the grammar of conditional clauses in Tonga and English and the following were the specific objectives.

- i. To identify various types of conditional clauses in Tonga and English.
- ii. To establish the syntax of various types of Tonga and English conditional clauses.
- iii. To investigate how the semantics of Tonga and English conditional clauses is motivated compositionally.
- iv. To analyse the pragmatic functions of Tonga and English conditional clauses.

1.5 Research Questions

In trying to achieve the aim and the set objectives, the study tried to answer the following general questions.

- i. What are the various types of conditional clauses that exist in Tonga and English?
- ii. How do Tonga and English speakers construct conditional clauses?
- iii. How are the Tonga and English conditional clauses arranged to convey the intended meaning?
- iv. How is the semantics of Tonga and English conditional clauses motivated compositionally?

- v. What kind of linguistic expressions initiate the use of conditional clauses among the Tonga?
- vi. What are the pragmatic functions of conditional clauses in Tonga and English.

1.6 Theoretical framework

The syntax, semantics and pragmatics of conditional clauses in this study were explored with the help of the Speech Act Theory and the Cognitive linguistic approach, in spite of the many competing theories on conditional clauses. Undoubtedly, human language has a system whose complexity is furnished within all linguistic levels of description and analysis. One plausible interpretation of this complexity might be the fact that language itself is used to enormous functions and express highly complicated meanings and abstract ideas conjoined in various conditions and situations, (Yasser 2008). The basic thesis of the speech act theory according to (J. L Austin and Searle, J. R, 1962) is that people actually perform acts by using speech patterns. Austin (1962) begins by saying that most of the utterances are not reports about reality hence they are not subject to being true or false. Instead, these utterances are actions (e.g., “I pronounce you husband and wife”). By making the utterance, the speaker is actually performing the action. Such use of language is termed “performative”. Thus, Austin theorizes, language may be used either to say something about reality (constative utterance) or to do something (performative utterance).

Austin (1962) describes the Speech Acts theory as an approach that explains the specific functions of utterances in shaping the attitudes of participants in interpersonal

communication. According to Austin, Speech acts reveal the intentions of speakers and the effects the speaker's utterances and expressions have on hearers. The implication of speech acts is that every utterance has a purpose that ensues from a particular context. Observations are that language use is dependent on contextual factors such as physical conditions, attitudes, abilities, beliefs and relationship between the speaker and the listener.

Austin (1962) emphasises three distinct levels of interaction between the speaker and the listener using speech acts. The three levels are the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Locutionary acts are those observed as the process of producing grammatical and meaningful utterances, which can be recognised by the hearer. Illocutionary acts are said to be the force behind the utterances. Indeed the speaker performs these acts to achieve the purpose of communication as a statement, a question, a command, an invitation, a threat, a request, an apology, and so on. It is possible for instance to, use a sentence that has the structure of a statement for the purpose of a warning. For example, *You will lose all your benefits.* (from the employer to an employee). This sentence may be a warning or a piece of advice. Therefore, it is possible to use similar utterances for different expressions on the intentions of the speakers and context. Perlocutionary acts on the other hand are effects of the speaker's utterance on the behaviour of the hearer. They are the acts performed by the hearer as a result of the effect of the speaker's utterances. It is assumed for example, that the hearer will respond to a question of the speaker in a specific way, or behave in accordance with the demands of the context. It ought to be noted that the illocutionary force is the intended effect of the utterance on the hearer from the point of view of the speaker. The perlocutionary effect is the actual effect of

the speaker's utterance on the action, behaviour, attitude or belief of the hearer. Maximum communication is only achieved when there is illocutionary *uptake*, a situation which arises when the listener understands the intended effect of the speaker.

Often the performative will be marked in the surface structure by a definite formula: the first person singular pronoun, the present tense, and the performative verb, such as promise, warn thank, or apologise, as afore said. Other times the performative will not be overtly marked in the surface structure, e.g. "Can you pass the salt?" would be the implicit of "I request that you pass me the salt." Thus, there are two categories of performatives: explicit performatives (marked in the surface structure by standard formula) and implicit performatives (not marked in the surface structure by standard formula).

In conformity with (Young, 1989), the speech act model views all conditionals as implicit performatives which are used to do something in addition to stating a condition; that is to persuade the listener to make a strong assertion, to manipulate the listener, to give an exhortation, to express a respectful rebuke, to ask something in a polite way, and to mock someone, or to convey a lament, (Young 1989: 39). It is argued further that the speech act theory categorises utterances according to function rather than form. Examples of the use of conditionals are as can be seen in (1) - (8).

(1) If you had studied, you not have failed the exam. (*softened rebuke*)

(2) If your father loves you, you must also love one another.
(*exhortation*)

(3) If you love me, build me a house in the city. (*manipulate/persuade*)

- (4) If my husband were here, I would not suffer like this. (*lament*)
- (5) If you are going to Monze today, buy me some salt. (*polite request*)
- (6) If the teacher bought a car, then the head is a fool. (*assertion*)
- (7) If I get the car fixed, then I will to see you. (*argument*)

The Speech Act Theory was used in that it attempts to explain how speakers use languages to accomplish intended actions and how hearers infer intended meaning from what is said. The theory was chosen on grounds that it is able to shed more light on these conditionals in a manner that is convincing especially on the objectives of the study. And according to (Young 1989), the theory also, when applied to conditionals, yields more meaningful results than traditional approaches. The use of this theory does not mean theories like the traditional grammar cannot be used. The traditional approach to conditionals is adequate for classifying their surface structure. It is however inadequate or indeed has some deficiencies for describing the semantic range of conditional sentences. The main interpretation problem with traditional approach emanates from a simplistic view of semantics. There is an overemphasis on one-to-one correspondence between form and meaning, which does not fully recognize the semantic range of a particular conditional type, or that one type of condition may be represented by various surface structure forms. As has been observed, conditional clauses are classified according to surface structure phenomena (mood and tense) and then meaning is attached to each class (Young, 1989).

The assumption that there is one-to-one correspondence between form and meaning is often violated in actual usage. Lexical forms as well as grammatical constructions often have multiple meanings. Any attempt to uncover the meaning of conditionals

therefore, must be based on a more productive theory of semantics. Furthermore, the traditional approach fails to recognize the role of situational context in the communication act. One fallacy that grammarians are prone to make is to interpret the meaning of language purely on the basis of its linguistic features without paying attention to situational context. Situational context influences the meaning of an utterance in two ways. Firstly, speakers allow the context to communicate part of their message for them. Young (1989) argues that, as in most forms of human behaviour, there is a principle of least effort. People just say enough to be understood in light of the situation. They allow the audience to compare what was said with the context and draw the proper inference. Secondly, the speaker may be influenced by pragmatic concerns and modify how he says something. Sometimes a conditional construction is used as a politeness marker when requesting a superior to do something: “If you wouldn’t mind...” This interaction between linguistic form and situation context implies that the linguistic form cannot be adequately explained apart from considering the communication situation. Thus, since meaning is conveyed through both the linguistic activity and the situational context, it follows that there is more communicated than what is said.

Coupled with the speech act model is the Cognitive Linguistic Framework advocated by (Fillmore, 1977, Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, Langacker, 1987, Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor, 1988). In this framework, it is argued that every aspect of structure and wording of a given utterance is considered to make a contribution to its overall interpretation. Cognitive linguistic approach sees conditional constructions as playing a very important role in interpretation. In other words, conditional constructions in both Tonga and English are associated with interpretation. The belief in the cognitive

linguistic approach is that meaning of a sentence is derived from meanings of words in it, and their relations to one another. This approach also has thus been adopted to complement the semantic and pragmatic interpretations of conditionals.

In Cognitive approach, it is not possible to speak of grammar in isolation from meaning. On the contrary, grammar is meaningful and essentially symbolic in nature. In Langacker's Cognitive Grammar, for example, Lexicon, Morphology and Syntax form a continuum of symbolic units serving to structure conceptual content for expressive purposes. Each grammatical construction, be it lexical or syntactic has a semantic and or pragmatic interpretation as part of its description. In this work, therefore, an attempt has been made to describe how various aspects of the form of conditionals (including the choice of verb morphology and clause order) map unto various aspects of their interpretations. The cognitive approach has tried to describe conditionals from the point of view of the form used. The approach has tried to identify the aspects of the form of conditional sentences that contribute to interpretation and specify the aspects of interpretation each formal distinction is connected with. The description has thus covered the role of the component clauses and has also considered the significance of these exponents in context (which has been taken care of by the Speech Act theory).

1.7 Operational Definitions

The study has made use of certain terms which, if not defined may be misunderstood or indeed misapplied and there by rendering the study hard to understand. This section of the report therefore, introduces and discusses some of the terms investigated in the study.

1.7.1 Mood

Mood is a group of verb forms expressing a particular attitude. It might also be defined as a grammatical category in specific languages. English, for example, the indicative mood, expressing factual statements, the imperative mood, expressing commands and the subjunctive mood, expressing possibilities and wishes (Encarta Dictionaries, 2009). The said aspects are shown in examples in (1)- (5).

- (1) If Lungowe plays tomorrow, we will lose the base ballgame.
(indicative/expressing possibility)
- (2) If Lungowe played tomorrow, we would lose the base ball game.
(subjunctive)
- (3) If you have washed the dishes, you can now mop the floor. *(imperative)*
- (4) If she had studied hard, she would have passed the exam. *(wish)*
- (5) If you hit the water to 100°C, it boils. *(factual)*

1.7.2 Protasis

In the context of this study, the word protasis has been used to refer to the hypothetical clause which states the condition (William, 1981). (“If this...”) for example: *If he asks* in “If he asks, I will tell him.”

1.7.3 Apodosis

Apodosis is the main clause explaining the consequence conditional statement. It is sometimes referred to as the conclusion, or the principal clause, expressing what follows if the condition is realized (William, 1981). *I will tell him* in *If he asks, I will tell him*, is the apodosis.

1.7.4 Clitic

A clitic is a morpheme that has syntactic characteristics of a word, but depends phonologically on another word or phrase. It can also be a word or part of a word that is structurally dependent on a neighbouring word (its host) and cannot stand on its own (Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia). The term clitic is derived from the Greek for “leaning.” E.g the root *boola* can have clitics attached to it at the beginning or at the end as shown;

Ko *boola* to mean
You come. Or
Ba *kali* *boole de* to mean
They had come

Where *ko*, *ba* and *de* are clitics. *Ko* and *ba* being proclitics and *de* being enclitic.

1.7.5 Proclitic

A proclitic is a type of clitic which is prefixed to a root, especially verbs to denote number and subject (Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia). This is as shown in 1.7.4

1.7.6 Enclitic

An enclitic is a type of a clitic which is attached to the end of the word to denote aspect of verb (Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia). Example as shown in 1.7.4

1.7.7 Topic

Topic of a sentence in linguistics is what is being talked about. Sometimes topic is referred to as theme. Topic can also be defined as the phrase in a clause that the rest

of the clause is understood to be about. It is used to describe the information structure, or pragmatic structure of a clause and how it coheres with other clauses. In some languages, word order and other syntactic phenomena are largely determined by topic-comment structure. For example, in the conditional sentence *You will not get the job if you fail the interview*, the topic is about getting the job, which is continued by the if-clause that lies at the end of the sentence.

1.7.8 Focus

Focus is a grammatical category that determines which part of the sentence contributes new, non-derivable or contrastive information. The information placed at the end of a sentence will facilitate the listener's task in focusing on what is considered interesting or noteworthy. For example, in the sentence; *If you fail the interview, you won't get the job*, the information noteworthy is about getting the job.

1.7.9 Optative

An optative clause or a sentence is the one containing a verb expressing a wish or desire and in a subjunctive or optative mood. For example in the sentence; *If my husband were still alive, I would be happy*. The verb *were* in the example is the optative mood expressing a wish.

1.10 Scope of Study

The scope of the study was within the confines of the comparative analysis of conditional clauses in Tonga and English. The study was basically restricted to the syntax, semantics and pragmatic functions of conditionals in English, and the plateau Tonga of Monze. Owing to this, the findings of this study may not be interpreted

outside the context of the objectives and the use and the underlying meaning of plateau Tonga. There could be aspects that may appear to have been left out or indeed not captured in the study. This is so because those aspects were not part of the purpose for which this study aimed at investigating.

1.11 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the study by providing the background information to the investigation. The chapter not only provides the background information to the study but also states the actual problem under study and points out the rationale for the study. The chapter also spells out the main aim and specific objectives of the study, the theoretical framework within which the data have been analysed. The chapter concludes by outlining the scope of the study and the structure of the dissertation and provides a summary of issues discussed in the chapter.

The second chapter presents a literature review which provides information about previous investigations related to the present study. This chapter has three parts. The first part gives an overview of conditionals in English, in relation to the objectives of the study. The second part shades light on how conditionals have been analysed by various scholars and the last part presents Tonga conditionals and how they have been dealt with.

Chapter three presents the Research design and Methodology used in the data collection and analysis. Included in the chapter are the study area, sampling

procedures, population, data collection procedures, unstructured interviews and the chapter concludes with ethical considerations.

Chapter four of the dissertation presents the findings and discussion of the findings, arranged in accordance with objectives of the study that are sub-themes of the dissertation. The chapter discusses the findings on the syntax, semantics and the pragmatics of conditionals in Tonga and English. The findings of each of the aspects under investigation: the syntax, semantics and pragmatics of conditionals, have been dealt with in the light of the research objectives and the theoretical framework. Under syntax, the findings discussed have to do with the grammatical construction of Tonga and English conditionals. Under semantics, the findings have been discussed about how the meaning or the semantics of conditionals are realised in relation with their constituents and verb mood. Under pragmatics, the findings discussed relate to the use or the application of conditionals contextually. Discussed also are the types of conditionals and the significant differences that exist between them. The fifth and final Chapter of the dissertation is the conclusion of the study and recommendations that may necessitate further studies.

1.12 Summary

This chapter has introduced the study by providing the background information, stating the problem under investigation, the rationale for the study and the theoretical framework. The chapter has also stated the aim of the study, the specific objectives, the research design, and the scope of the study as well as the structure of the study. The following chapter presents literature review which focuses on information related to the subject under study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 General

The preceding chapter introduced the study by providing the background information to the investigation, stating the actual problem under study, the theoretical framework adopted for analysis, the aim and the objectives of the study.

The present chapter reviews literature, which is related to the present study. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section discusses the English conditional clauses in general whereas the second section looks at the speech act theory. The third section deals with the cognitive linguistic approach and how it is used in the understanding of conditionals, and the fourth section deals with the Tonga conditional clauses and then presents the conclusion respectively. The fifth section is the conclusion and the sixth section summarises of the chapter.

The chapter concludes by outlining the gaps noticed in the literature reviewed. It has been noticed in the literature that there is nothing documented on the comparative analysis of conditional clauses in Tonga and English.

2.1 English Conditional Clauses Overview and Definition

Biber, Johansson, Leech, Conrad and Finegan (1999) argue that, as a linguistic and cognitive complex structure, the conditional sentence expresses a myriad of meanings and functions via various manifestations. The conditional is considered complex since its realization is dependent upon the occurrence of another event. Conditionals are said to have the ability to express logical arguments, especially in academic debates to introduce or develop an argument (Biber et al, 1999). This is as has been shown in

1(a). Not only that, literature has shown that they also express cognitive reasoning, semantic nuances through factual, nonfactual or hypothetical events as in 1 (b). In addition to the said afore, conditional sentences can also be used to mitigate the force of suggestion or command, making it the hearer's choice as in 1 (c).

1. (a) If breaking the rule of law is a crime, why then do we see law breakers walking the streets freely? (*Introducing an argument*)
- (b) If you expose a candle to excessive heat, it will melt. (*Factual*)
- (c) Well, you can join us if you don't mind. (*Suggestion*)

There is a large body of literature on English conditional clauses. Most modern grammarians that have worked on conditionals follow Robertson's classification of conditional clauses (William, 1981). Robertson fundamentally follows the system of Gildersleeve and Winner in identifying four classes of conditionals based on the surface structure phenomena of mood and tense, and then follows the assignment of meaning to each class. William (1981) further argues that these four classes of conditionals are as identified in the subsequent chapter under findings. According to the literature reviewed, in terms of definition, (William 1981), defines a conditional sentence as a two-clause sentence in which the first clause states a supposition or hypothesis and the second states the results if that condition is met. For example; *If it rains, [condition] the picnic will be cancelled [result/consequence]*. The hypothetical clause which states the condition ("If this...") is termed the protasis and the conclusion clause is called the apodosis ("...then this.").

Literature has also shown that a condition is a supposition on which a statement is based. This implies that it consists of two clauses, the protasis and the apodosis. The protasis is the conditional, or subordinate clause expressing supposed or assumed case (if) while the apodosis is the conclusion, or principal clause, expressing what follows if the condition is realized.

Different scholars have actually written on Conditionals. Evidence has so far shown that their interpretations were based on the syntax or the form of conditionals. Fintel (2012), for instance, discusses subjunctive conditionals and argues that conditional sentences, canonically of the form “If p , q ” (p , being the condition (protasis/antecedent) and q , being the main clause (apodosis/consequent)) whisk us away to a scenario described by their antecedent and then make a claim about their consequent. Fintel (2012) claims there are two main kinds of conditionals, as illustrated in the well-known Oswald/Kennedy minimal pair (Adams 1970):

(3) If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, someone else did.

(4) If Oswald hadn't killed Kennedy, someone else would have.

Fintel (1912)'s argument is that clearly, the two conditionals differ in meaning. The conditional in (3) signals that it is an open possibility that Oswald didn't kill Kennedy and will be judged true by anyone who knows that Kennedy was in fact assassinated. The conditional in (4), in contrast, signals that it is taken for granted that Oswald did in fact kill Kennedy and makes the somewhat dubious claim that Kennedy's assassination was inevitable.

The same difference in meaning, Fintel argues, can still be illustrated with a similar pair (due to Bennett or Stalnaker), where it is even harder to hear the second conditional as making a plausible claim. This is as exemplified in 6 and 7.

(5) If Shakespeare didn't write *Hamlet*, someone else did.

(6) If Shakespeare hadn't written *Hamlet*, someone else would have.

In his argument, (Fintel 2009) states that conditionals of the first kind are usually called “indicative” conditionals while conditionals of the second kind are called “subjunctive” or counterfactual conditionals. In his analysis of the two kinds of conditionals, Fintel suggests that the indicative Vs subjunctive terminology suggests that the distinction is based in the grammatical mood, while the term counterfactual suggests that the second kind deals with a contrary-to-fact assumption. It is clear that the difference between conditionals of the two kinds lies in their tense/mood/aspect syntax.

Fintel (2009) further argues that it is quite apparent that in English at least, the indicative/subjunctive dichotomy of conditionals is marked by tense and aspect morphology:

(7) If Mulala played her drums, Lungowe played her flute.

(8) If Mulala had played her drums, Lungowe would have played her flute.

Fintel's analysis of conditionals is in conformity with earliest works taking the role of tense and aspect in the semantics of conditionals, especially works by (Dudman

1983). Fintel (2009) observes that what is commonly known as subjunctive in subjunctive conditionals is an additional layer of past tense morphology, no matter whether the referred to state of affairs is temporally located in the past, present, or future: (9) (a) - (c) shows these arguments.

- (9) (a) If Mulala comes to the party tomorrow, it will be a grand success.
- (b) If Mulala came to the party tomorrow, it would be a grand success.
- (c) If Mulala had to come to the party tomorrow, it would have been a grand success.

Writing on Conditionals, (Dancygier 1989) states that their meaning is determined by a number of form-meaning correlations that are construction specific. For example, their verb forms signal important aspects of interpretation, but they do so in ways that affect the whole construction, rather than one clause, and which are specific to conditionals. Thus, properties of the entire conditional sentence are primarily determined by the properties of the protasis (condition), its tense, and degree of factualness. The study of conditionals done by (Fillmore, 1990) analyses the verb forms in conditional sentences as indicative of two aspects of their interpretation: temporal reference and epistemic stance. Predictive and counterfactual conditionals generally have objective values but not necessarily true values in the usual sense. Epistemic conditionals on the other hand have truth conditions, which may however fail to produce values in certain cases. Thus, (10) (a) - (c) show how these are realised.

- (10) (a) If you ate the food, you were satisfied. (epistemic)
- (b) If you eat the food, you will be satisfied. (predictive)

- (c) If you had eaten the food, you would have been satisfied.
(counterfactual)

Studies carried out by (Comrie 1986), indicate that some description has to address the way in which various aspects of interpretation arise in the construction. Thus, in Comrie's analysis of conditionals, some aspects of constructional meaning traditionally associated with the form of the conditional are claimed to arise through implicature. Kaufmann (1985) in the study of Conditionals argues that the interpretation of conditionals is determined and constrained by the temporal and modal expressions in their constituents. The main claim is that the tenses in both the antecedent and the consequent of an indicative conditional are interpreted in the same way as in isolation.

Other studies on conditionals as reviewed by literature include studies of such scholars as E. A. Sonnenschein and Chambers, both cited in (Fintel, 2012), who classify conditionals basing on the criterion of form of the conditional sentence. Of course, other grammarians such as (Dancygier 1989) followed this approach. Sonnenschein argues that to him, the ordinary forms of conditional sentences, whether in Latin, Greek or in a modern language; present themselves into different classes, the distinction between which is marked by certain well-defined differences both of meaning and linguistic form.

Form, for Sonnenschein and Chambers cited in (Fintel, 2012), helps determine the meaning of a conditional, for in his classification there is a coincidence between distinctions of form and distinctions of meaning. Chambers, cited in (Fintel 2012)

supports this principle, noting that it is axiomatic that the division by form, and not by sense, is the truly scientific one, because like forms must have like meanings, but like meanings need not have like forms.

Agreeing with Sonnenschein, Gildersleeve, in common with most grammarians, divides the conditional sentences into four classes, for which he claims he has been in the habit of using the designations 'Logic,' 'Anticipatory,' 'Ideal,' and 'Unreal.' And Robertson in his system of analysis basically follows that of Gildersleeve in classical Greek by identifying four types of conditions, each determined by mood of the protasis. Robertson cited in (William, 1981) summarizes the importance of mood in conditionals as follows: The indicative mood in the condition always makes a clear-cut assertion one way or the other [fulfilled or unfulfilled]. If the subjunctive or the optative is used in the condition (protasis), a doubtful statement is made whatever may be the actual fact or truth in the case. By these modes of doubtful statement the condition puts it as doubtful or undetermined (not put it in a clear-cut way). If the subjunctive is used, there is less doubt than if the optative is used, precisely the difference between these two modes of doubtful statement.

This distinction in mood (indicative=fulfilled or unfulfilled, subjunctive=doubt, optative=more doubt) leads to the natural conclusion that there are four types of conditional sentences:

- (a) First Class: Determined as fulfilled with any tense of the indicative in condition. Any tense of the indicative in the conclusion. This is as shown in the sentence *If Lulu plays tomorrow, we will lose the base ball game.*

- (b) Second Class: Determined as unfulfilled only past tenses of the indicative in condition. Only past tenses in the conclusion as in the sentence *If I were to have the money, I would travel to America.* (future)
- (c) Third Class: Determined with prospect of Determination with the subjunctive in the condition, usually future or present indicative or imperative in the conclusion, much variety in the form of the conclusion. For example in the sentence *If our ex-president were in the office, the country wouldn't face such crisis.* (present counterfactual)
- (d) Fourth Class: Undetermined with Remote prospect Determination with the optative in the condition, and the optative in the conclusion as in the sentence *If my husband were here, I would not be suffering like this.* (counterfactual)

Chamberlain (1952), accepting Robertson's terminology, affirms that in the first class conditions, "The protasis has to do with the way the statement is made, and not with the truth or falsity of it." In the second class, Chamberlain, like Robertson, identifies the tenses used as past tenses: It is possible to have different tenses in the protasis and apodosis, the entire sentence is still a second class condition. Chamberlain identifies the third class conditions as those which are stated in a matter of doubt, with some prospect of fulfilment. The fourth class is even more doubtful than the third class.

Moule (1968) in his analysis of conditionals neither follows Robertson nor Goodwin in his analysis of conditional sentences. Moule presents a unique system of both construction and application, setting aside many of the chief dicta of other grammarians. He summarizes the various conditionals under three headings:

1. Past or present conditions, possible or actual.
2. Recurrent or future conditions, whether real or hypothetical.
3. Past or present conditions, only hypothetical.

Moule cited in (Fintel, 2012) outlines his system as follows:

1. Past or present conditions, possible or actual.

Protasis: with indicative in the appropriate tense.

Apodosis: another indicative or its equivalent [an imperative or conceivably a participle] in the appropriate tense.

2. Recurrent or future conditions, whether real or hypothetical.

Protasis: with the subjunctive in the appropriate tense.

Apodosis: indicative or its equivalent [an imperative or participle] in the appropriate tense.

3. Past or present conditions, only hypothetical.

Protasis: with a past tense of indicative.

Apodosis: a past (but not necessarily the same) tense of the indicative.

Moule, (1968) sums up his concept of conditional sentences by stating:

Thus the form of a conditional sentence is largely determined by two main factors- time (past, present, future) and the degree of reality (impossible, improbable, possible, probable, and actual).

Specific factors which help determine the mood of conditional sentences, as (Moule, 1968) argues include:

- (a) Any past condition introduced by if must, in the nature of the case, be hypothetical, if not definitely Unreal: otherwise there would be nothing

conditional about the sentence. Therefore there appears to be no need to vary the mood, and it is regularly indicative.

- (b) But present, future or recurrent conditions may vary widely in their degree or actuality: hence (perhaps) the variations in moods.

In general, the indicative represents certainty, while the subjunctive represents something more hypothetical or uncertain.

Noted also in the literature were studies on conditional sentences done by (Muhammad, 1999). In his analysis of Persian and in English Conditionals, he argues citing (Celce-Murcia and Freeman, 1999) that conditionals consists of two clauses; (*if* and *result* clauses) which can switch places. Muhammad further talks about verbless conditional clauses as well as the deletion of the *if* conjunction in the condition of a conditional sentence, in certain circumstances. This, according to Muhammad can be achieved through the use of the auxiliary verb *should* as has been shown in the examples below.

(11) If he should join us, we can start the game.

(12) Should he join us, we can start the game. (if conjunction deleted).

2.2 Conditionals in the Speech Act Theory

Literature indicates that in the speech act (theory) model, all conditions are seen as implicit performatives which are used to do something in addition to stating a condition. The model states that the meaning of any utterance cannot be understood apart from the speaker's intent, the situational linguistic context as well as the

linguistic form. Young (1989) suggests that viewing conditionals under the speech act model is like viewing a problem from different angles which usually results in a clearer understanding. This can be likened to taking pictures of different sides of the building, for a picture of the front of the building may be an accurate representation but it cannot provide the viewer with an understanding of the whole building. Hence, the use of the Speech Act theory makes the understanding of conditionals clearer in the present study.

2.3 Conditionals in the Cognitive linguistic Framework

As alluded to earlier, in the theoretical, in chapter one, Fillmore et al cited in (Dancygier, 1989), points out that it is not possible to speak of grammar in isolation from meaning, on the contrary, grammar is meaningful and essentially symbolic in nature. In Langacker's cognitive grammar, for instance, lexicon, morphology, and syntax form "a continuum of symbolic units serving to structure conceptual content for expressive purposes." (Langacker, 1977:35). Furthermore, in construction grammar by (Fillmore 1998, Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988, Fillmore and Kay 1994), it is stated that each grammatical construction (be it lexical or syntactic) has a semantic and or pragmatic interpretation as part of its description. And so, in cognitive approaches every aspect of structure and wording of a given sentence is thus considered to make a contribution to its overall interpretation in ways that are governed by linguistic convention. In this work therefore, an attempt has been made to describe conditionals not only through the speech act model but also by describing how various aspects of form of conditionals map onto various aspects of their interpretation through cognitive approaches.

2.4 Tonga Conditional Clauses

Literature has shown that not much has been documented on Tonga conditional clauses. However, (Collins, 1984) documents Tonga conditional sentences and argues that conditionals in Tonga are divided into two kinds. The two kinds are the *Simple* and the *Modified* conditionals. Collins defines the *Simple* Conditionals as not implying unfulfilment or (in future) its likelihood. As for the *Modified* conditionals, Collins explains them as implying unfulfilment or (in future) its likelihood with would or should in English. The writings of Collins do not seem to have dealt with the conditional sentences in the same manner they have been dealt with in the English language. Hence, the aim of this study was to comparatively analyse the Tonga and the English conditionals. The rationale behind this is to see similarities and differences in the structure, the meaning and the pragmatic functions of Tonga conditionals against their English counterparts.

2.5 Conclusion

The literature reviewed therefore, shows that conditional clauses in Tonga and English have not been studied equitably. Many scholars as reviewed in the literature attempted to analyse Conditionals basing on their form. This means that their interpretations were based on their construction. To a large extent conditional clauses have been studied in English within various theories, but their Tonga counterparts have not been studied in as much detail. Furthermore, there is no documentation to date showing a study that has comparatively analysed conditional clauses in Tonga and English. Although Tonga conditional clauses have been studied, there is no explanation of how this was done or the theory that might have been used for analysis

is not stated. Literature does not seem to show how the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects of Tonga conditional clauses are realised. Of course, Collins only briefly attempts to do this. The present study however, considers theories with which conditionals have been analysed.

2.6 Summary

This chapter has presented views as regards to conditional clauses in general, how they are understood from the point of view of cognitive approaches and the speech act theory. The chapter has also alluded to the absence of documentation of any study that has compared conditionals in Tonga and English. Not only that, the chapter has also expressed failure of application of any theory in the previous studies and analysis of Tonga conditional clauses. The next chapter presents the research methodology and design used in the study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

3.0 General

The aim of this study was to comparatively analyse the syntax, semantics and pragmatics of conditional clauses in Tonga and English. This chapter presents research methodology, research design, study area, population, sampling method, purposeful sampling method, research sample, data collection procedure, data collection instruments, interviews and ethical considerations.

3.1 Research Methodology

The qualitative and quantitative research approaches are the two paradigms that guide the direction of a research paper from the initial stage to the time of writing the final report. In this particular study, the researcher used the qualitative approach owing to its suitability in social research and the fact that it can be applied in the subjects' natural environment (De Vos, 2001). In addition, the rationale behind the choice of the qualitative approach is centred in its strengths. It is flexible and emphasises people's lived experiences, their perceptions, their assumptions and their presuppositions as connected the world around them (Neumann, 2006). In qualitative research, the researcher collects data right from the participants. In this study, the researcher collected data from native Tonga speakers, who also had proficiency of the English language.

This qualitative research aimed at unearthing detailed information on Tonga conditional clauses, how they formed syntactically as well as linguistic factors that

initiate their use in social discourses. The selection of native Tonga speakers with English proficiency was to enable the researcher good understanding of the Tonga conditional clauses.

3.2 Research Design

This section considers in detail the research design adopted and used in both data collection and data analysis. A research design is a guideline within which a choice of an approach to be used in data collection methods is made. This study was restricted to the use of the qualitative method in both data collection and data analysis. The qualitative approach used focused on the description of conditional clauses, syntactically, semantically as well as pragmatically.

3.2.1 Area of Study

The study was conducted in Monze district of the Southern province of Zambia.

3.2.2 Population

The population of this study consisted of 35 participants whom the researcher regarded as the relevant group from whom information could be drawn. The characteristics of the participants had similar economic strengths. Generally, they were teachers in high schools either from universities or colleges. In addition, they were within the age group of 25-49.

3.2.3 Sampling Method

The sample was drawn from the population of Tonga speaking people of Monze district and included both males and females. A sample is an element of the

population considered for actual inclusion in the study or subject of measurements drawn from a population we are interested in. A sample can also be defined as a small group of the total set of objects, events or persons, which together comprise the subject of study (Seaberg, 1988). To rationalise the collection of data, the researcher chose in an appropriate manner the restricted set of persons, objects and events from which the actual information would be drawn. The researcher employed a non-probability sampling technique, particularly the purposeful sampling method, which assisted him to choose in an appropriate manner, the restricted set of participants (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000).

3.2.3.1 Purposeful Sampling Method

The purposeful method was chosen because the researcher was concerned with the relevance of the sample in the sense that only those who were native speakers of Tonga and also had proficiency of the English language were chosen.

3.2.3.2 Research Sample

In this study, the research sample constituted 35 participants. There were 19 males and 16 females from among teachers in high schools. 20 of these hold university degrees while 15 of them hold diplomas from colleges.

3.3 Data Collection Procedures

The procedure for collecting data involved gaining access to participants by presentation of oneself and becoming acquainted with research subjects. Sampled participants were consulted individually by the researcher at their respective places of work or homes for their permission and agreed on the time of their choice.

Getting acquainted:

The researcher each time he met with participants had to create a relaxed atmosphere. The explanation of the research purpose was done and participants were informed that their participation was voluntary and the information collected would be strictly confidential. The researcher informed them that the aim was to comparatively analyse the syntax, semantics and pragmatics of conditional clauses in Tonga and English. The data collection exercise was undertaken over a period of three months. In terms of specific procedure, the researcher carried out unstructured face-to-face interviews with indigenous Tonga speakers. Later, the researcher spent time to read a number of selected publications on conditionals. This was done to ensure authenticity of the research.

3.3.1 Data Collection Instruments

Individual face-to-face unstructured interviews were used because the researcher wanted the respondents to bring out information on the types of conditional clauses in Tonga, grammatical construction, the semantics and the pragmatic function of conditionals. Not only that, but also maximise the flow of valid, reliable information while reducing the distortions in the interviewee's recollection of events. Unstructured interviews enabled the interviewer to obtain an inside view of the Tonga conditional clauses in the social context. To ensure that the research was authentic, both primary and secondary data were collected. Primary data were collected from Monze, the study area, whereas secondary data were collected through desk research from the University of Zambia library, where selected publications on conditionals were read.

3.3.1.1 Unstructured Interviews

In order to collect data and ascertain the comparative nature of conditionals in Tonga and English, simple unstructured interviews were conducted with 35 informants who were purposively selected. The selected informants were either University graduates or students from University colleges. The selection was based on grounds that these were native speakers of the standard dialect and that they had competence of the English language. The following were some of the interview questions were used for all participants.

- Can you speak Tonga very well?
- How often do you speak Tonga in your conversation?
- Do you sometimes use conditionals clauses in your social discourses? Or
- Do you think Tonga speakers use conditional clauses in their daily social discourses?
- What kind of conditional clauses do they use?
- What are the social contexts that instigate the use of conditional clauses?

Informants were educated on what exactly the study was about and the specific information that was required of them. Secondly, types of conditionals in English and Tonga were sometimes provided and informants were to translate and interpret into Tonga and into English respectively. In other circumstances, informants were asked to provide conditional clauses of their own and asked to provide their counterparts in either English or Tonga, depending on what language they had provided first. In the process informants were made to evaluate the conditionals provided before these could be accepted as appropriate and meaningful.

3.4 Desk Research

The University of Zambia Great East Road campus' main library provided source of information for the desk research, particularly dissertations on conditionals by different scholars from the internet. The researcher collected data related to the conditional clauses in both Tonga and English. The desk research exercise supplied the implications of the Speech Act Theory and the Cognitive linguistic Theory on conditionals. The exercise was an in-depth survey of conditionals as analysed by other scholars. The survey revealed various controversies among scholars on the understanding of conditionals. These controversies have been reflected in the literature review as well as the findings and discussion.

3.5 Introspection

Introspection was another method employed in data collection. The rationale behind recourse to introspection was that the researcher was aware of the composition of the conditional clauses in both Tonga and English. Under introspection, the researcher was able to identify structures that had conditional clauses. As proposed by (Chomsky, 2006), the native speaker's intuition cannot be underestimated. Moreover, supporting Chomsky's assertion, (Radford 1997:24), in the minimalist framework states that: "A grammar of a language is a model of the grammatical competence of the fluent native speaker of the language, and that competence is reflected in the native speakers' intuitions about grammaticality and interpretation." Thus, based on Radford, and on Chomsky's argument on native speaker's linguistic competence and linguistic performance, the researcher was able formulate generalisations about how words, phrases and conditional clauses are formed in both Tonga and English.

Therefore, in the study of Tonga, the researcher's mother tongue, the researcher did engage himself in judging the formulation, acceptability and other utterances using his own intuitions. Such judgements as; what determines the meaning of conditionals are their syntactic structures, their tense and the context in which they applied. All these conclusions were supported by the researcher's intuition.

3.6 Ethical Considerations

Issues of ethical confidentiality and privacy of personal rights of participants had to be protected. Since participation in the study was voluntary, some identified participants could not be accessed easily due to their busy schedules, so they were replaced. Consent was sought and the objective of the study explained verbally and participants were assured the information would be kept confidential.

3.7 Data Analysis

Data were descriptively analysed and presented. This was started during the data collection exercise by thematically arranging notes according to questions and in relation to objectives. The analysis was done in light of the Speech Act Theory, and the Cognitive Linguistic Approach. The speech act theory is a model through which conditionals are seen as implicit performatives that are used to do something in addition to stating a condition. For example, *if you have finished doing the dishes, mop the floor*. As for the Cognitive Linguistic Approach, it is an approach where every aspect of the structure and wording of a given sentence is considered to make a contribution to its overall interpretation. This analysis incorporated the syntax, semantics and the pragmatic functions of conditionals as stated in the objectives.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the research methodology of the study. The chapter has shed light on the research design, the study area, population, sampling method, purposeful sampling, data collection procedures, data collection instruments, unstructured interviews and ethical considerations.

The next chapter presents the findings and discussion of the study. The discussion and presentation have been done in conformity with the objectives of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 General

The previous chapter has presented the research methodology and design. It has shed light on the actual approach adopted in this study and the rationale behind the choice of the qualitative approach. Presented also in the chapter are: the area of study, population, sampling method, data collection procedures, data collection instruments, data analysis and ethical considerations.

In this chapter, the findings of the study have been discussed in light of the research objectives and the theoretical framework of the study. The chapter sets out by providing an argument on the existence of conditional sentences in Tonga. The chapter then proceeds to discuss various types of conditional sentences that exist in Tonga and English, the syntax of conditional types, the differences that exist between different types of conditionals, how the semantics of Tonga and English clauses are motivated compositionally and finally, the analysis of the pragmatic functions of Tonga and English clauses.

4.1 Types of Conditionals

This section deals with various types of conditionals and addresses the first objective, which has to do with the identification of various types of Conditional clauses that exist in Tonga and English. The mood of the verb is the key element in identifying the type of condition, certain constructions are fairly standard. The verb forms are a salient feature in the description of conditionals and later the classification. The classification of the types of conditionals identified as shown subsequently is

dependent on the various verb forms used in both the protasis (antecedent) and the apodosis (consequent). The identification, classification and discussion done in this study is in conformity with most grammarians on conditionals such as (Young, 1989), Goodwin cited in (Fintel, 2012), and whose classification of conditional sentences is based on the verb in the protasis, Robertson also cited in (Fintel, 2012) whose classification basically follows that of Gildersleeve in classical Greek by identifying four types of conditionals, each determined by the mood of the protasis.

Here presented are the various types of conditional sentences as identified in both English and Tonga. Depending on which book of grammar one consults, one will find three, four or more English conditional sentence types referred to (and with slightly different names for each), but generally, one can say that there are four that are most recognized. These are the zero conditional, the first conditional, the second and the third conditional. Note worthy is the understanding that English conditional sentences can be divided into two broad classes of factual (predictive) and hypothetical (counterfactual), depending on the form of the verb in the protasis (condition clause). In factual constructions the protasis expresses a condition the truth of which is unverified and the verb is in the past tense. The verb in the apodosis (result) however, can be in the past, present or future tense, (Palmer, 1986). In counterfactual constructions, the protasis expresses a condition that is known to be false, or presented as unlikely. The result of counterfactual constructions as opposed to factual ones contains a conditional verb form consisting of would, (or could, should, might) plus a main verb in the base form (infinitive without *to*) as in *If I were rich, I would buy you anything you wanted.*

Arguably, it can be said that the meaning of conditionals can vary from structure to structure. It can convey the sense of possibility, wish or regret, and volition. Generally, conditionals can express three types of semantic relationships: the Factual, Future and the Imaginative conditional sentences (Mohammad, 1999). Murcia and Freeman (1983) agree to this assertion and argue that, some grammar text books divide the conditional sentences into three types: Factual conditional sentences, Future or Predictive conditional and Imaginative conditional sentences (Murcia and Freeman, 1983). Figure 1 shows how these sentences are described.




Figure 1 Types of Conditionals.

Copied as given by Murcia and Freeman, 1983.

The subsequent three main types of conditionals are based on figure 1. These conditional types have been explained in detail with examples.

1. Factual conditional sentences

Factual conditional sentences are used in everyday speaking and writing. Grammarians say that factual conditionals are divided into timeless and time-bound.

Timeless conditional sentences are further divided into generic and habitual factual conditional sentences whereas time-bound factual conditional sentences are divided into implicit inference and explicit inference (Murcia and Freeman 1983). It is important to point out that general factual conditional sentences express the true and unchanging relationships and use the Simple Present tense in both clauses. They are often used in scientific writing or to relate with absolute relationships as in the example below.

(13) If you heat water to 100 degrees Celsius, it boils.

Other timeless conditionals are the habitual factual conditional sentences, which are basically the same with general factual conditional sentences; they express the relationship in habit and not restricted or bounded in time. This type in fact, is on many occasions used in informal conversation. When these conditionals express habit, both clauses like the general factual conditionals use Simple present time. This is shown in (14).

(15) If Grace cleans the dishes, her sister mops the floor.

Kuti Grace wasanzya mitiba, mucizyi wakwe ulakolopa.

However, when the sentence expresses past habit, both clauses take Simple Past time as in the example shown in (16).

(16) If I baked the scones, my wife prepared the tea.

Nindakalikupanga tunkwa, mukaintu wangu wikalikupanga tiyi.

Time-bound factual conditional sentences as earlier alluded to can be divided into implicit inference and explicit inference. Implicit inference is used for specific and time-bound relationships and conditions. It is different from factual, and it has a wide range of tense forms and uses certain modal auxiliaries on the one hand. See the examples in (17) and (18).

(17) If you will pass your examinations, I will buy you a present.

Kuti ukapase musunko, diyakukuulila cipego.

(18) If you will come late again, I will severely punish you.

Kuti ukamuke kuboola alimwi, ndiya kukupanisa kapati.

On the other hand, the implicit inference conditional has similar characteristics with generic and habitual factual; this is in having the same tense or same modal auxiliary in both clauses. The explicit inference conditional sentences are the only type where tense; aspect and modal are not parallel in both clauses. The result clause in this case takes modals such as ‘must’ or ‘should’. Like implicit inference conditionals, however, explicit inference conditionals can refer to past as well as present time. This is as exemplified in (19).

(19) (a) If someone works for you, you must pay them. (Present)

Naa muntu wakubelekela, ulelede kumubbadala.

(b) If some worked for you, you needed to pay them. (Past)

Naa muntu wakalikubelekedede, wakelede kumubbadala.

2. Future or predictive conditional sentences

The future or predictive conditional sentences express future plans or contingencies. Future conditionals are divided into two types, the first one being the strong condition and result and the second is degrees of weakened condition or result. The common pattern of this type of conditionals comprises an if-clause in the Simple Present tense and a result-clause with 'will' to express future time. See example (20).

(20) If he returns my bicycle, I will lend him the wheelbarrow.

Kuti waijosya ncinga, ndiya kumupa wilibbala.

It must be noted however that sometimes, in the result clause the future time not only expresses 'will' or 'be going to' but also expresses a weaker modal of prediction such as 'may' or 'should'. This is as shown in example (21).

(21) If he returns my bicycle, I may lend him the wheelbarrow.

Kuti waijosya ncinga, nga ndamupa wilibbala.

The prediction scale in table (1) shows how it applies to the result clause of the future conditional sentences:

Table 1: (Progressively weakened result from will to might)

| | |
|--------------------|-------------------------|
| Will / be going to | Certain (strong result) |
| Should | probable |
| May | Possible (strong) |
| Might | Possible (weak) |

To express weakened prediction in the if-clause of future conditional sentences the modals 'should' or the verb 'happen' or both of them are used together as shown in the sentences (22) (a) - (c). This argument is in conformity with (Murcia and Freeman, 1983).

- (22) (a) If it should rain, I will stay at home.
(b) If it happens to rain, I will stay at home.
(c) If it should happen to rain, I will stay at home.
Na ilawa, ndilakkala aṅanda.

3. Imaginative conditional sentences

There are two types of imaginative conditionals: Hypothetical and Counterfactual. While Hypothetical conditionals refer to events unlikely and possible to happen, counterfactual express impossible events which are stated in the if-clause. Counterfactual conditionals can refer to the present as well as the past. Note in the sentences in (23) and (24) respectively;

- (23) If I had the time, I would have come to your house. (Hypothetical)
Nindakalijisi ciindi, nindakaboola kunṅanda kwako.
(24) If I had had the time, I would have come to your house. (counterfactual)
Nindakalijisi ciindi, nindalaboola kunṅanda kwako.

Based on the types proposed by (Murcia and Freeman 1983), First conditional sentences (type 1); refer to future conditionals which express what are said to be strong condition and result; and those expressing degrees of weakened condition and

result. Second Conditional sentences (type 2), attribute to imaginative conditionals which express present hypothetical condition and those that express present counterfactual condition. Finally, Third conditional sentences (type 3), relate to imaginative conditionals which express past counterfactual condition, (Murcia and Freeman, 1983). The subsequent section of the dissertation outlines the formula of the Zero, First, Second and the Third conditional.

Identified as earlier alluded to, were the four types of conditionals in English and these included the Zero Conditional, the First Conditional, the Second and the Third Conditional. These findings are in conformity with such scholars as Gildersleeve cited in (Fintel, 2012), (Robertson, 1908) and (Sonnenschein, 1995). It was also unearthed that Tonga conditionals would also be classified as the four English conditional types though Collins categorises them into two, the simple and the modified.

4.1.1 English Conditionals

4.1.1.1 The Zero Conditional

The zero conditional is a structure that expresses that something is (or was) always true, that one action is (or was) always followed by another. It is also used to talk about scientific facts - things which always happen under certain conditions. It is worth pointing out that most zero conditional sentences will mean the same thing if “when” is used instead of the “if”. In the zero conditional therefore, the Present Simple Tense or the past is used in both clauses. The Zero conditional is called Zero because it is not about what might, or will, happen in the future, or about hypothetical or unreal situations, but about things that always happen when something else is done.

The result or the consequence is always true or certainty. (Kuti ndamuka kuncito, bantu balanyema- If I am late for work, people get angry).

Table 2: The Zero conditional with the same tense in both clauses.

| Form | | | | Semantic Function | |
|-----------|-----------------------|--|-------------------------|--|----------------------|
| If-clause | Time ref of If-clause | Main-clause | Time ref of Main-clause | Hypotheticality | Temporality |
| If+ [pre] | Now/always | [Present] | Now/always | Real, possible | Time-less generic |
| If+ [pre] | Present | [pre cont] | Present | | |
| If+ [pas] | Past | [past] | past | | |
| If | | you expose a candle to excessive heat, Mulala is cursing, Lungowe was sad, | | it melts. it means that he is very angry. she just stared into the distance. | |

Type 0: if + present tense + present tense or
 if + past tense + past tense

Examples:

(25) (a) If you expose a candle to excessive heat, it melts.

Kuti wa bika nkendulo kusaala, ilasungunika

(b) If Lungowe was sad, she just stared into the distance.

Naa Lungowe wakalinyemedede, wakalikwiile kulanaga kulaale.

(c) If/When Mulala is cursing, it means that he is very angry.

Kuti Mulala kasinganya, caamba kuti ulinyemedede kapati.

4.1.1.2 The First Conditional

The first conditional (also called conditional type 1) is a structure used for talking about possibilities in the present or in the future. In other words, it is possible and also very likely that the condition will be fulfilled. Table (3) describes how this is realised.

Table 3: The First conditional (also called type 1).

| Form | | | | Semantic Function | |
|-----------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| If-clause | Time ref of If-clause | Main clause | Time ref of Main clause | Hypotheticality | Temporality |
| If+ [pre] | Pres/future | [Pre modal] Will/must/ can/may | Pre/ future | Real, possible & probable | Pre/future time-bound: explicit |
| If | | it rains | | I will stay at home | |

Type 1: if + present + will Simple form.

Examples:

(26) (a) If I have money, I will buy this car.

Kuti ndabaamali, ndiyakuula mota ooyu.

(b) If it is sunny, we will go to the river.

Naalilabala, tulaunka ku mulonga.

Noted was the fact that among other variations, the structure;

If + present + present, is also possible.

It is used when the results are habitual or automatic as shown in (27).

(27) If a commodity is in short supply, prices tend to rise.

4.1.1.3 The Second Conditional

The Second Conditional (also called type 2) is a structure used to talk about unreal situations in the present or in the future. It is used to talk about *impossible* situations.

Table (4) shows how this type of conditional is realised.

Table 4: The Second conditional (also called type 2).

| Form | | | | Semantic Function | |
|------------|-----------------------|--|-------------------------|---|----------------|
| If-clause | Time ref of If-clause | Main clause | Time ref of Main clause | Hypotheticality | Temporality |
| If+ [past] | Now or any time | [Past, modal] would/should/could might | Now or any time | Unreal, hypothetical conditional with probable [past, modal] would/should/could/result unreal (counterfactual, hypothetical) | Present |
| If+ [were] | Non past | would/should/could | Non past | | Present future |
| If | | I won the lottery | I would buy a car | | |

Type 2: if + past + conditional

Examples:

(28) (a) If I had the money, I would buy this car.

Nindali amali, nindauula mootu ooyu.

(b) If I were you, I would drive more carefully in the rain.

Nindalinduwe, nindali kwenzya kabotu kabotu mumvula.

It is worth noting that the action in the second conditional is characterized by unreality, as in the example in (29):

(29) If pigs had wings, they would be able to fly.

Ni zyakali amabbaba ngulube, nizyakali kucikonzya kuuluka.

3.1.1.4 The Third Conditional

The Third Conditional (also called type 3) is a structure used for talking about unreal situations in the past. In other words, it is used to talk about things which DID NOT HAPPEN in the past. The action in the third conditional is characterized by impossibility

Table 5: The Third conditional (also called type 3).

| Form | | | | Semantic Function | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|---|-----------------------------|--|-------------|
| If-clause | Time ref of the If-clause | Main clause | Time ref of the Main clause | Hypotheticality | Temporality |
| If+ [pas, perfect] | past | [pas, modal, perfect] would/should/ could/might <i>have + en</i> | past | Counterfactual, unreal conditional & unreal probable past result | past |
| If | | I had won a lottery | | I would have bought a car | |

Type 3: if + past perfect + perfect conditional

This is realised as shown in (30) (a), (b) and (c).

(30) (a) If I had had the money, I would have bought this car.

Nindakalijisi mali, nindakauula moota ooyu.

(b) If you had driven more carefully, you would not have had an accident.

Nookalienzyede kabotukabotu, na-utakaba antenda.

(c) If the driver had fastened his seat belt, he would probably have survived the accident.

Kuti namutekenya wakalisamide lutambo lu-a-ci-uno, nakafutuka muntenda.

It is worth noting that while the first conditional and second conditional focus on the present or future, time in the third conditional is the past and signifies a completed action in the past. The condition, therefore cannot be fulfilled because the action in the *if-clause* did not happen.

4.2 Tonga Conditionals

Findings on Tonga conditional sentences seem to suggest that not much indeed has been done on this subject. Collins (1984) argues that Conditional sentences in Tonga are divided into (i) Simple and (ii) Modified conditions.

4.2.1 Simple Conditions

Collins (1984) refers to what he calls Simple conditionals as; ‘not implying unfulfilment or (in future time) its likelihood’. He shows the pattern as in table (6).

Table 6: Simple conditions (Tonga). Copied as presented in Collins (1984).

| | | U | E |
|--------------|------|-----------------|--|
| (a) Present: | Kuti | + Present Subj. | + Present Subj. of -li + Pres. Indic. |
| (b) Past: | Kuti | (not used) | + Present Sub. of -li + Past. Indic. |
| (c) Future | Kuti | + Fut. Subj. | + Past indic. (or remote) + Past Indic. of ya + the infinitive. |

To explain what is in table (6), Collins exemplifies as shown in (31).

- (31) (a) U. Kuti kayanda, ulakonzya kuboola
if he wants, he can to come.
if he wants, he can come.
- U. Kuti nsetazumini, bala ndi katazya
if I do not agree, they me trouble.
if I do not agree, they trouble me.
- E. Kuti ko liusyi, uleelede kumusanina mwana
if you are the father, you should support your child.
- (b) Kuti kabali basika, kuli wabatondezya nzila
if they have arrived, someone showed them the way (path).
Kuti kazili zyazimina ŋombe, tiizyakali kweembelwa
If they have strayed, cattle not they were being herded.
If the cattle have strayed, they were not being herded.
- (c)U. Kuti mboole kumazuba, nda ku jana hena?
if I come this evening, I you find shall?
- E. Kuti nda mu uma, antela ulateelela
If I him beat, perhaps he will obey
If I beat him, perhaps he will obey.
- E. Kuti ndaa ku mu bona, nja kumwaambila
If I to him see, I him will tell.
If I see him him, I will tell him.

4.2.2 Modified Conditions

Collins refers to Modified Conditions as implying unfulfilment or (in future time) its likelihood, with ‘would’, ‘should’ in English. These are to be considered as shown in table (7).

Table 7: Modified conditions. Copied as presented in Collins (1984).

| | U | E |
|-------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| (a) Present | (kuti) na + Past tense | (kuti) na + imperf. of kunga in both |
| (b) Past | in both clauses | clauses |
| (c) Future | Kuti + past, + inga + past or present (E) | (not used) |

The contents of the table are as exemplified in (32).

(32) (a) U. (Kuti) Naali kuyanda kwiiya, naatali kuli bakaapanyina ino: if he wanted to learn, he would not be with his grandmother now.

E. (Kuti) naali kunga ulayanda kwiiya, naatali kunga uli kuli bakaapanyina ino: if he wants to learn, he would not now be with his grandmother.

(b) U. (Kuti) naakasika, nookamubona: if he had come, you would have seen him.

E. (Kuti) naali kunga wakasika, nooli kunga wakamubona:
if he had come, you would have seen him.

U. Naakafwa jilo, nitwali kulila sunu:
if he died yesterday, we would be mourning today.

(c) U. Kuti ndabona shyumbwa, inga ndatija: if I saw a lion, I would run away.

From the findings made, in Tonga Conditionals, one can actually see various kinds of expressions. Noted in the Tonga speakers’ use of conditional sentences were the uses

of Factual Conditionals, Predictive, Imaginative, Negative and Conditionals with the deleted if conjunction. These discoveries are as has been shown in the findings 4.1. The identified classes or types of conditional sentences as can be seen are based on the tense forms in the conditions (protases). It can as well be argued that this classification is in a way based on the structure of the conditionals.

4.3. The Syntax of Conditional Clauses

The previous section of the study discussed various types of conditional clauses. This part of the study deals with the syntax of conditional clauses and focuses on the second objective which sought to establish the syntactic construction of conditional sentences. As earlier alluded to in the study, the analysis of the syntactic construction of conditionals done in this section is in conformity with most grammarians on conditional sentences such as; (Yu shan, Ke 2005) who argues that the typical surface structure of conditionals is a bi-clause consisting of an antecedent clause and a consequent clause, that is the protasis and apodosis. The protasis is the subordinate clause expressing supposed or assumed case (if). Whereas the apodosis is the conclusion or principal clause, expressing what follows if the condition is realized. Others include (Elliot 1981), (Fintel, 2009), (Young, 1989) and (Dancygier, 1989).

Structurally, conditional sentences in Tonga and English have similarities and differences. Similarity lies in the particular words used in sentences, while the difference is the assumption in Tonga that there are only two types of conditional sentences. But this assertion is not true basing on the findings in this research.

4.3.1 The English ‘If’ and its Tonga Equivalents

In Tonga conditionals, as the research revealed, different elements or morphemes are used for the ‘if conjunction’ in English. These are (Kuti, Naa, Noo, Ni- (balikuyanda), A-t-(aakuboola), Ndaa-(kuyanda), Nda- (yanda) A- (boola), A-(sika), Baa- (kuyanda), Ba- (yanda,)) and (Twa). These morphemes are used in different situations depending on the person (whether singular, plural, first, second or third) involved. It must also be noted here that the time being referred to at the time of the utterance is much a factor as well. It is worth pointing out that ‘*Kuti*’ and ‘*Naa*’ are widely used than these others. That is they work for whichever person, be it singular, plural, first, second or third. The analysis done here of the *if* equivalent is in conformity with (Collins, 1984), on Conditionals in his *Tonga Grammar*. The examples in (20) show how each of these morphemes are used in Tonga conditionals.

- (33) (a) Kuti kayanda, u ya ku nda ambila.
 If he wants, he will to me tell.
 If he wants, he will tell me.

The conditional in (33) (a) can also be expressed differently in Tonga by using ‘*naa*’ instead of ‘*kuti*’ in the antecedent. This has been exemplified below. In spite of the difference in the use of ‘*naa*’ and ‘*kuti*’, the meaning remains the same.

- (b) Naa ula yanda, u ya ku nda ambila.
 If he wants, he will to me tell
 If he wants, he will tell me.

The ‘*naa*’ and ‘*kuti*’ in (33) (a). and (b) have been used with third person singular, but they are also used with both the singular and plural third person as shown in (33) (c).

(c) Naa bala yanda, baya ku nda ambila. Or
 Kuti kaba yanda, bayoo nda ambila.
 If he wants, he will to me tell.
 If he wants, he will tell me.

In (33) (c), in the Tonga conditionals, the *ba* in ‘balayanda’, ‘bayakundambila’, ‘kabayanda’ and ‘bayoondambila’ is honorific, dealing with the third person singular. But the same *ba* in certain instances may denote the plural form of the third person. It can easily be understood only from the context. The English conditional however puts it very clearly and cannot be mistaken. That is the use of *he/she/it* for singular and *they* for plural. See example (34) (d) (i).

(d) (i) Ni **ba** ka boola, nee ka **ba** pa.
 If they had come, I would have them give.
 If they had come, I would have given them.

The *ba* in (d) (i) is the third person plural, which is different from the honorific third person exemplified in (c) or indeed in second instance of (e).

The research findings have also shown that the ‘*ni-*’ is also one of the commonly used morphemes in the subordinate clause of Tonga conditionals denoting first person singular and third person both singular and plural. This is shown in (d).

(d) (ii) Ni nda ka boola, naa ka ndi pa.
 If I me came, would he me give.
 If I came, he would give me.

In (34) (d) (ii), the *ninda...* (if I...) is used to refer to the first person singular. The speaker is referring to him/herself. It is different from the *ni-ba..* in (e) (1) which refers either to the third person singular, in this case honorific (if he/she...) or third person plural as in (e) (2) (if they...). The *ba* in the words ‘Nibakaboola’ and ‘neekabapa’ or ‘nindakabapa’ in one instance (e) (1) denotes honorific- referring to an elderly person whereas in the second instance, (e) (2) it refers to the third person plural.

(34) (e) (1) Ni **ba** ka boola, nee ka ba pa. (nindakabapa)
 (singular-honorific)
 If he - came, I would him/her give.
 If he came, I would give him/her.
 (e) (2) Ni **ba** ka boola, nee ka ba pa (Plural)
 If they came, I would them give.
 If they came, I would give them.

Revealed in the research also were the *noo-* and the *wa-* that are used with the second person singular as shown (34) (f) and (g).

(f) Noo kali nda mbilide, neetaka mu tanda.
 If you had me me told, I wouldn't have him chased

If you had told me, I wouldn't have chased him.

(g) Waakufwambaana ku sika, ukanduumine foni.

You if early to arrive, you give me a call'

If you arrive early, give me a call.

In expressing the negative conditional involving a third person singular 'a-t-' is used while the third person singular-honorific and third person plural, the 'ba-t-a-' is used. The negative is also expressed as in the sentence; *Kuti atakabooli, nkokuti tayandi*. The - t- denotes negation. However, in the English conditionals negation is denoted by the use of *not*. Noted is the fact that in the Tonga conditionals, only particles are used to denote negation whereas a full word is used in English to realise this. Positive conditionals of a similar expression use 'a-' for singular third person and 'ba-' for both singular-honorific and third person plural. The following examples in (h)., (i)., (j)., and (k) show how these expressions are achieved.

(h) A taa ku boola, nkokuti ta yandi

He if won't to come, then doesn't he want

If he won't come, then he doesn't want.

(i) Ba taa ku boola, nkokuti ta ba yandi.

(**Ba** in (i) denoting third person singular-honorific)

He if won't to come, then doesn't he want

If he does not come, then he doesn't want. (Both (h) and (i))

(j) Ba taa ku boola, nkokuti ta ba yandi.

(**Ba** in (j) denoting third person plural)

They if won't to come, then don't they want

If they won't come, then they don't want.

(k) Aaku yanda, ku boola, uya ku ndaambila.

He when wants to come, he will to me tell

(Should he want to come, he will tell me)

Another element used with the first person singular is *nda-* and is realised as has been shown in (l) and (m).

(l) Nda manizya cikolo, ndiyooinka ku Ndola.

If I finish school, I will go to Ndola

The conditional in (l) is equivalent to the one in which the *when* is used as shown in (m).

(m) Nda manizya cikolo, ndiyooinka ku Ndola.

When I finish school, I will go to Ndola.

(*nda-*' in (l) and (m) denotes the first person singular).

Twa- (tu-a) is another particle- proclitic used in Tonga conditions. It is usually used with *tu* to refer to the first person plural. This is realised as exemplified in the example below.

(n) **Twataboola**, nkokuti **tatuyandi**.

If we don't come then we don't want.

The first persons plural *twa-* (tu-a) (we) and *tu* (we) as shown in (n), in Tonga are also realised in English. Noticed in the analysis is the fact both *twa* and *tu* are realised in

English as *we* and can thus function as subject and object of the verb. In English, however, only *we* can function as subject and its counterpart *us* as object.

The study in this particular section has shown that whereas English conditionals generally use (only) *if* in the antecedent, and rarely of course, such other words as unless, providing/provided, and whether, Tonga conditionals have several markers of conditionals that are equivalent to *if*. This could be seen from the examples that have been given.

4.3.2 The Position of the If-Clause

Further syntactic differences noticed in the study of Tonga and English conditional sentences concern the position of the if-clause. The study has shown that both languages under study have a great number of initial if-clauses. This unequal proportion may be attributed mainly to the writing style and pragmatic characteristics of end-focus and weight. According to the English principle of end-focus, the important part of a message is usually moved to the final position of the sentence and so is the long and heavy part of a message (Greenbaum and Quirk, 2003). Concerning subordinate clauses and conditional clauses in particular, the place of the if-clause and the consequent clause is determined by the content of each. If the if-clause carries new information, it is placed in the second part of the sentence, but if the consequent clause bears the new information, it comes after the if-clause. However, the findings of (Biber et al 1999) indicate that conditional clauses have no strong preference for either position in conversation, while in written academic context; they are usually inclined for the initial position.

As for Tonga conditionals, the study has shown that there is a tendency to place the important and or new information of a sentence in the initial clause as shown in (35) (a), (b) and (c). This may partially be accountable for Tonga's higher frequency of initial if-clauses compared to those in English. In spite of the analysis illustrating that English uses initial if-clauses more than final if-clauses; in comparison, Tonga resorts to initial if-clauses not only in declarative statements, but also in giving curses and warnings and conditional imperative structures. This is probably because it is the focus of attention to the Tonga speaker unlike the English speaker putting the important part at the final position in the sentence. The if-clause in Tonga is usually at the initial position since the condition is more important to the speaker than the result. As for imperative conditionals, the speaker initialises the if-clause to indicate that condition is more cared about to the speaker than the result is. This aspect is shown in (35).

(35) (a) Nitwakaula dikiti jilo, nitwaunka sunu. (Declarative).

(Nitu-a-kaula dikiti jilo, nitu-a-unka sunu).

If we had booked the ticket yesterday, we would have gone today.

(b) Naawamanizya kulemba, kosanzya mwana. (Imperative).

If you have finished writing, bath the baby.

(c) Kuti ukafeele musunko, ndiyakukukandaula. (Warning).

If you fail the exam, I will beat you severely.

The other claim concerning conditional clauses in literature holds that whether a conditional clause is in initial or final position depends on its discourse status as being in the background or in the foreground, (Givón, 1982). If conditional clauses are

topics, then they should be invariably backgrounded and hence always be sentence-initial. This feature was also noticed in Tonga conditionals. Givón (1982) discusses patterns as shown in (35) (b).

(35b) (a) Hena uyakutyani ndakukupa mali?

Hena uyakuti-a-ni ndakukupa mali?

What will you do if I give you the money?

a1. Kuti wandipa mali, ndiya kuula mootokala.

If you give me the money, I'll buy a car.

b2. Ndiyakula motokala kuti wandipa mali.

I'll buy a car if you give me the money.

(b) Hena uyakuula buti mootokala?

What under circumstances will you buy a car?

Under what circumstances will you buy a car?

b1. Ndiyakula mootokala wakundipa mali.

I'll buy a car if you give me the money.

b2. Kuti wandipa mali, ndiyakuula mootokola.

If you give me the money, I'll buy a car.

Givón (1982) has argued that the initial position for the initial clauses is preferred when the if-clause is background material (in the case of having been present already in the question). The final position is preferred when the if-clause contains new information, when it is *foregrounded*. The answer in (35a b2) becomes acceptable where there is focus on the verb phrase [buy a car] and the if-clause is de-accented. In (35b, b2), the if-clause is the focal since it constitutes the informative part of the

answer. The argument here is that if-clauses can be focal as exemplified in Tonga conditionals in (35) (b).

Other studies such as done by (Amalia, 2010), regarding the position of the if-clause, have shown that the position of the if-clause depends, largely, on the interlocutor's purpose. In most cases, the choice between fronting or delaying the if-clause is based on pragmatic considerations. Attempted to highlight here are some pragmatic elements that tend to govern the position of the *if-clause* in conditional sentences. The discussion done in this section is in line with (Greenbaum and Quirk 2003), (Biber et al 1999) and (Amalia Ilmia 2010) in a student's report about the teaching knowledge exploration through the writing class. The first element that context reveals as determinant of the if-clause's position is the topic continuity factor.

4.3.3 Topic Continuity

Discussion of topic continuity as a governing element of the position of if-clause is approached in light of the information status of the if-clause. That is, as a carrier of new information (focus) or carrier of old information (topic). In linguistics, the topic, or theme of a sentence is what is being talked about; Topic is sometimes referred to as theme. It is the phrase in a clause that the rest of the clause is understood to be about. It is used to describe the information structure, or pragmatic structure of a clause and how it coheres with other clauses. In some languages, like Tonga and English, word order and other syntactic phenomena are determined largely by the topic-comment structure. Topic continuity has been exemplified in (36).

(36) (a) Kupaila kulakonzya kweenda kabotu kuti muntu walyaaba kuli Leza,
na kuleka zyibi zyonse, kuti wasyoma Jesu.

‘Worshiping can work well if a person devotes himself to God, or stop all sinful activities, if he believes in Jesus’

(b) Kuti muntu walyaaba kuli Leza na kuleka zyibi zyonse, kuti wasyoma muli Jesu, kupaila kulakonzya kweenda kabotu

‘If a person devotes himself to God, or stop all sinful activities, if he believes in Jesus, worship can work well.’

As can be seen, (36a) seems more befitting as a continuation of the topic and thus it is a better choice. This is to say, the last idea or concept that is ringing in the reader or hearer’s mind, once he or she finishes processing the utterance, is this ‘worshiping notion.’ The if-clause in this case is the focus. In short, in (36a) the front position is devoted to old information, whereas the final position is saved for new information. It can be concluded that the topic being continued by the if clause is ‘worship’, which appears at the beginning of the sentence or which lies in the main clause of the sentence.

If the order of the conditional clause is reversed, the main information will not receive the necessary attention, and needless to say, it would be hard to understand the conveyed message. The example in (37) (a) tries to augment this fact. However, the topic seems to be in the main clause and it would be appropriate to begin the clause with the main clause as in (37) (b).

(37) (a) Kuti kandikubbadelela mali aacikolo akukupa zyoonse ziyandikana kucikolo amane kandiboola lyoonse kukubona, ngawafeela buti musunko?

‘If I pay your school fees, and I meet all your school requirements and I often come to see you at school, why would fail an exam?’

In (37) (a), the first part, of dependent clauses, preceded by ‘if’ serves to build interest in the hearer or reader. It serves to sharpen the hearer’s interest and make him or her look forward to arriving at the final destination, which is hoped to bring the awaited information. This most wanted information in (37) (a) is reached in a moment when the hearer’s interest has reached the climax. Surely, then this piece of information will receive the utmost degree of attention. It therefore would be appropriate to begin with the main clause, which has the topic as in (37) (b).

(37) (b) Ngawafeela buti musunko kuti kandikubbadelela mali aacikolo akukupa zyonse ziyandikana kucikolo amane kandiboola lyonse kukubona?

4.3.4 Parallelism

The study has also shown that the other feature that affects the fronting or delaying process of the if-clause is parallelism. Parallelism refers to similar grammatical forms. It is achieved by ensuring that the format of the first clause is maintained in the second clause. Parallelism is the balance between two or similar words, or phrases or clauses. It is sometimes called parallel structure or parallel construction. Parallel construction prevents awkwardness, promotes clarity and improves writing style and readability. The example in (38) demonstrates this feature.

(38) Tulelede kusola. Kuti twapiluka kabotu...ncibotu. Kuti titwacikonzya,

ninzi, tatuli bakusaanguna kusweeka ameenda. Mbanji bacisweeka.

We have to take our chances. If we get back safely... all right. If we don't, why, we are not the first explorers to get lost on the sea. There are plenty to come after us.

As can be seen from the example (38), there are two conditional sentences, both of which start with a dependant clause, “If we get back safely,” and “If we don't...”

The most important piece of information is the one that comes after the conditional clause. “If we don't...” After the addressees have listened to the sentence, “If we get back safe... all right.” (kuti twapiluka kabotu...ncibotu). They themselves can muse, “How about if we don't?” (Ino kuti titwacikonzya?), which is exactly what comes next. Thus, this parallel structure creates a very smooth flow. If we attempt to reverse the order of the second conditional sentence, the whole thing will sound awkward; it will be like jumping back and forth. This analysis is in conformity with (Amalia, 2010).

4.3.5 Qualification

Qualification is the third factor that context reveals as determinant of the if-clause position. Interestingly, both languages, English and Tonga do have the aspect of qualification even in conditionals. Qualification has to do with the modification, describing, or limiting the meaning of an utterance. In this case, the if-clause modifies the statement *catch me*. The if-clause acts as the qualifier, making *catch me* less general. This aspect has been shown in (39).

Context:

Lungowe is trying to save a cat, which climbed onto a pole and could not come down. Therefore, she tells Mulala to catch her. She calls back as she begins her ascent.

(39) “Undijate kuti ndiloke, Mulala.”

“Catch me if I fall, Mulala.”

As can be seen from the example in (39), the if-clause is delayed. The delay is very natural. The utterance sounds odd with the conditional clause in the front. The question then is this: Is the if-clause in (39) the focal point? The answer is ‘No.’ In (39), the most important thing for Lungowe, given the noticeable danger she is about to go through, is *to be caught if she falls down*. The if-clause is used to qualify the fact that she might fall. Thus one can imagine her saying (*Undijate...ndamba... kuti ndiloke*). “Catch me...” “*I mean... if I fall*”, while starting the climbing and turning to Mulala, who might be standing by.

Thus “Kuti ndiloke” (if I fall) here is a qualifying statement in that it limits the meaning of *catch me* (*Undijate*). Lungowe could have just said “Catch me”, with a certain facial expression, or gesture. Thus the topic/focus issue is not applicable here, since the main thing in example (39) is “catch me”, with the conditional clause acting as a qualifier. This qualification aspect analysed here is in line with that of (Amalia, 2010), who suggests that qualification is also a factor or principle that tends to govern the position of the if-clause in conditional sentences. Amalia (2010) looked at factors that determine the position of the if-clause in Indonesia and English conditionals.

The preceding discussion has attempted to bring to light some of the factors that tend to govern the position of the if-clause in light of the contextual environment in which it occurs. Note that there are similarities in factors that determine the if-clause in both Tonga and English. From the preceding argument, it is clear that those factors that have been considered are mostly pragmatic and apply to both Tonga and English conditional clauses. This means that, the writer or speaker could base his choice of whether to front or delay the conditional clause on pragmatic reasons.

In conclusion, this section has endeavoured to use context to highlight some common principles (in the two languages under study) that seem to govern the positioning of the if-clause. The contextualised illustrations were formulated for the purpose of clarification. The analysis of data has shown that context even in Tonga conditionals is extremely significant in legitimizing the fronting or delaying of if-clause. As suggested by (Haiman, 1978), when the if-clause is in the topic position, it is not necessarily a topic. Factors such as topic continuity, parallelism, qualification, as well as some other factors not discussed here are the determinants of the position of if-clauses conditional sentences.

4.3.6 Verbless Conditional Clauses

Noted in the analysis of conditionals was the aspect of the *verbless* conditional clauses in the English language, (if necessary, if any, if so etc.) which are rare in Tonga. This is so because it is usually preferred in Tonga to make use of a whole sentence which can be represented either by subject and verb or by a verb plus an *enclitic*. An enclitic is one type of clitic, which itself is a type of morpheme without an independent application, but like affixes, it is attached to a word and unlike them

(affixes), it is not part of the word (Kalbass, 2005). This explanation is made clear in figure 2. It was noted in the analysis that Tonga uses two types of Clitics; proclitic and enclitic. Proclitic being the type which is prefixed to a root, especially verbs to denote number and subject pronoun and enclitic being the type which is attached to the end of the word to denote the aspect of the verb. As an agglutinative language, Tonga verbs as opposed to English counterparts receive proclitics to represent number and person, so it is not always necessary to insert subject pronouns again; that is to say, verbs alone can represent both. In an agglutinative language, words contain several morphemes that are clearly differentiated from one another in that each morpheme represents only one grammatical meaning and boundaries between those morphemes are easily demarcated. For example, *Ndakaunka* (I went) is composed of the verb root *unk-a* (i.e. went plus the proclitic- *Nda- I*) which can stand for the first person singular pronoun. This aspect is shown in figure 2:

Nindakaunka, naakandipa.




Figure 2 showing proclitics (subject markers) and enclitics (tense marker) in Tonga Conditionals.

The analysis showed that all Tonga conditionals unlike their English counterparts had encliticised verbs as shown in figure 2. The encliticised verbs denote on the one hand the subject pronoun and on the other the tense of the verb. The analysis on the encliticised verbs is done in conformity with the analysis by (Muhammad, 2012) in his comparative analysis of Persian and English conditional sentences.

4.3.7 Deletion of the If-Conjunction

Further analysis showed that English can have the conjunction *if* deleted and the sentence inverted in certain circumstances such as when the if-clauses have an auxiliary verb like *should* in type one, *were* in type two and *had* in type three. Examples in (40) show how this is achieved.

- (40) 1a. If she should join us, we can start the game.
1b. Should she join us, we can start the game.
2a. If she were here, I would be very happy.
2b. Were she here, I would be very happy.
3a. If the professor had explained the lesson in detail, we would have passed the test.
3b. Had the professor explained the lesson in detail, we would have passed the test. (inversion)

The analysis however showed that deletion of the conjunction *if* in Tonga conditionals is possible but the inversion of the sentence cannot be achieved. For example,

- (41) 1a. Asika, undambile. (if conjunction deleted but realised as *when* in English).
1b. Naa wasika, undambile
If he comes, tell me.

2a. Aboola, umuume. (if conjunction deleted but realised as *when* in English).

2b. Kuti aboole, umuume.

If he comes, beat him up.

What is noticed is that there is an aspect of deletion of the *if* conjunction in (41) *1a* and *2a* whereas (41) *1b* and *2b* show the presence of the conjunction. Of course, the *adverbial when aspect* is what is prominently understood in (41) (1a) and (41) (2a). the if conjunction disappears in each case and may read in English as *When he comes, you should tell me* (Asika, undambile).

4.4 The Semantics of Conditional Clauses

The previous section has discussed the syntactic construction of conditionals. This section of the dissertation deals with the semantics of conditional clauses. The section deals with issues sought by the third objective, which was to investigate how the semantics of Tonga and English Conditional clauses is motivated compositionally. That is how the composition contributes to meaning (Rothschild 2009) has argued that semantics aims at a systematic account of the meaning of sentences in terms of the meaning of their parts and how they are put together. This has typically to do with the assignment of meaning to particular words and specifying rules of semantic composition (that is rules that get you from syntactic structures with meaningful components to the meanings of the whole structure). Out of this then, meaning can be assigned to the entire sentence.

In cognitive approaches, as earlier alluded to, in the theoretical framework, every aspect of the structure and wording of a given sentence is supposed to make a

contribution to its overall interpretation in ways that are governed by linguistic convention. The assumption is that the meaning of a sentence depends on the meanings of its constituents and its syntactic structure. This includes the tense of the verb in each clause.

The analysis of conditionals attempted here therefore, focuses on providing an explanation of how aspects of conditional form give rise to a variety of meanings that conditional sentences express even as pointed out by (Dancygier, 1989). It is through this analysis that we can discover what different conditionals share in their meaning and their form and thus reveal both similarities and differences. In order to do that, the study has not only identified those aspects of form of conditional sentences that contribute to interpretation but has also tried to specify the aspects of the interpretation each formal distinction is connected with.

Thus, the conditional sentence dealt with here has been viewed also as a 'construction' in conformity with the definition and exemplification in the works of scholars as (Fillmore 1986, 1988), (Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988). In these works, a construction has been described as a conventional pattern of linguistic structure that is paired with features of interpretation. A construction may thus be specified with respect to lexical, morphological, or syntactic properties, but it will also be provided with semantic and or pragmatic features of interpretation.

The description of a construction requires an explanation of how its lexical and structural features are mapped onto aspects on interpretation in ways that are construction specific. It is argued in this study, as has been argued by (Dancygier,

1989) that conditionals can be best described within such framework. Their meaning is determined by a number of form-meaning correlations, which are construction specific. For example, their verb forms signal important aspects of interpretation, but they do so in ways that affect the whole construction, rather than one clause, and which are specific to conditionals. Furthermore, conditionals in fact, represent not a single construction but a set of related constructions involving a central category and other peripheral categories.

The number of formal patterns of conditionals is limited but their applications involving interpretations with speaker's intentions become multitudinous (Yu-shan Ke 2005). Grammarians face a major description problem in dealing with English conditional sentences owing to the complex system of compatibility relations between the two parts of a conditional sentence. However, the protasis and apodosis relation seems to be a particularly important aspect of conditional interpretations.

Scholars have revealed however that the properties of the entire conditional sentence are primarily determined by the properties of the protasis (condition), its tense, and degree of factualness. Form for Sonnenschein cited in (Fintel, 2012) helps determine the meaning, for in his classification there is a coincidence between distinctions of form and distinction of meaning. Chambers, also cited in (Fintel, 2012) supports this principle, noting that it is axiomatic that the division by form, and not sense, is the truly scientific one, because like forms must have like meanings, but like meanings need not have like forms. This is also in line with (Kaufmann, 1985), who in the study of conditionals suggests that the interpretation of conditionals is determined by the temporal and modal expressions in their constituents.

Conditionals are an area of language use where the interpretation of form, meaning, and context is exceptionally complex and fascinating. They are a case in which the misleading simple if *p*, *q* structure can receive a great number of widely divergent interpretations. There exists a longstanding tradition of describing conditionals in pedagogic grammar. These accounts are around revealing formal differences among three major types of sentences, such as shown in (42).

(42) If I catch/caught/had caught the 09:30 bus, I will/would get/would have gotten to the party on time.

The description focuses on the verb forms used in such sentences, while the analysis of meaning is reduced to an absolute minimum: grammars usually mention that different forms may mark temporal reference and reality versus unreality of the conditional. Sweetser (1990) reveals a dimension of conditional interpretation which shows that conditionals are used as wholes to conduct specific types of reasoning. That is, they cannot be viewed as logically or syntactically governed combinations of selected clauses. They are more accurately described as constructions in which the clauses are connected by specific types of relations. The nature of the relations expressed by *p* and *q* are considered: in the **context** domain causal relations hold between the described events and situations, in the epistemic domain the construction links premises and conclusions, in speech act domain, *Ps* are used as comments on the speech acts performed on *Qs*.

The study of conditionals done by (Fillmore, 1990) as shown in chapter two, analyses the verb forms in conditional sentences as indicative of two aspects of their

interpretation: temporal reference and epistemic stance. For example, the present tense form of *catch* in the sentences in (42) is indicative of neutral epistemic stance towards a future event, while *caught* signals negative epistemic stance to it. The third form, *had caught*, is here used to express negative stance towards a past event. In this regard, (Fillmore, 1986) seems to account for a great variety of conditional sentences, showing important form-function correlations. Fillmore thus treats conditionals as constructions in which the choice of a verb in one clause is related to the choice made in the other in a way which is dictated by the overall interpretation of the construction in terms of time and epistemic background, rather than by any strict rule of well formedness. For instance, the choices of the *present* and the *future* verb forms in the clauses of “*If I catch the 09:30 bus, I will get to the party on time*” are not made in isolation or indeed independently; but the dependence is not based on some formal constraint on the sequence of the verb forms. Rather the pairing itself is connected constructionally to a given variety of conditional interpretations. In Fillmore’s analysis, as in this study, the verb forms are therefore treated as contributing to the construction’s interpretation in a regular, conventionalized way.

In the works of (Fillmore and Kay, 1994), it has been argued that constructions may have a pragmatic force which does not emanate from general strategies of inference and which is conventionally associated with the morphosyntactic properties of construction. As observed, work in construction grammar has focused on the aspect of meaning, “semantic or pragmatic”, which conventionally attach to a construction. This argument, however, does not rule out the possibility that interpreting a construction involves recovering both the conventional aspects of meaning and those arising via-non linguistically motivated inference. In fact, it is claimed in this study

that conditionals are best accounted for if both aspects of their interpretation are treated as equally important.

In looking for meaning correlates of aspects of conditional form therefore, this study has relied on the constructional approach and on the inference-in-context approach in accounting for contextually determined aspects of conditional interpretations. As argued by (Comrie, 1986), some description has to address the way in which various aspects of interpretation arise in the construction. Thus, in Comrie's analysis of conditionals, some aspects of constructional meaning traditionally associated with the form of the conditional are claimed to arise through implicature. As earlier stated in this study, conditionals are complex sentences composed of two clauses; the main clause and the subordinate clause (The if P, (then) Q). The subordinate clause is also introduced with a conditional conjunction *if*. This definition seems to be most appropriate from the point of view of the task undertaken in this section; it provides a general specification of a broad formal class.

Dancygier (1989) argues that the *if p, q* covers a range including the most common conditional sentence types; it likewise shows a wide variety of interpretation, which have proven difficult for analysts to bring together. The *if p, q* formula represents the basic conditional construction in other respects. It instantiates the clause order which has been found to be the most typical (if not universal) in conditional sentences (Greenberg, 1963) and (Comrie, 1986).

Thus the relation between *p* and *q* is an important, if not essential, element of constructional meaning and other formal distinctions are related to this aspect of

interpretation. In addition, the interpretation of the relation between p and q is crucial to the interpretation of the whole construction, because in a prototypical conditional the connection between the assumptions in the two clauses is what is being asserted (in the speech act sense of the word assertion). That is, a sentence such as *If it gets colder, we will turn the heating on*, which is interpreted in the content domain, does not in any way commit the speaker to the belief that it will get colder or that the heating will be turned on. The sentence does however; communicate the belief that the change in the temperature will result in turning the heating on. In other words, what has been asserted is the causal connection between p and q , not the clauses themselves.

From the foregoing argument therefore, one would simply say an ideal classification of conditionals would correlate the sense of conditions with their structure. Thus shown below is the comparison of semantics of various types of conditional clauses. The interpretations of various types of Conditionals here done are in line with interpretations as done by other scholars such as (Comrie 1986), (Fillmore 1986, 1988), (Fillmore et al 1988), (Dancygier 1989) and (Kaufmann 1985), and (Kaufmann, 2001) and Sonneschein and Chambers both cited in (Fintel, 2012). The semantics of conditionals is based on their form or their structure.

4.4.1 The Semantics of the Zero Conditional

This kind of conditional has been known to only exist in the English language, but the present study shows that it actually does exist also in Tonga. The Zero Conditional is termed as such, because it is not about what might, or will happen in the future, or about hypothetical or unreal situations, but about things that always happen when

something else is done. In other words, the result in the Zero Conditional is always true. The grammatical construction is such that both clauses (protasis and apodosis) have the same tense as shown in (43).

If + present tense | present tense or

If + past tense | past tense

(43) (a) Kuti waumpa nkendulo, ilasungunuka.

If you heat a candle, it melts.

(b) Nindakali kwiida mbeu, Mutinta wakali kusanzya mitiba or

Nekalikwiida mbeu, Mutinta wakali kusanzya mitiba.

If (when) I watered the garden, Mutinta washed the plates.

The zero conditional expresses that something is (or was) always true or that one action is (or was) always followed by another. What is noted in the examples above is that in the Tonga past conditional, the condition does not seem to come out so clearly as in the present one.

What seems to be the case in Tonga is that there is the prominence of *when* than the *if* in the protasis (condition). The conditional marker, the *kuti* or the *na* (if) does not really seem to map out the conditionality as the *if* in the English Zero conditional. Of course, in this type of conditional, in English, *when* can be used instead of *if*. Yet only *when* seems more appropriate in Tonga. The occurrence of *when* and not *if* in the apodosis renders the conditional an adverbial of time. In spite of this lack of prominence of the *if* in the past conditional in Tonga, the same meaning is derived from the conditional sentence as is the case in the conditional in the present tense. The

same past in the zero conditional in the Tonga example, is sometimes expressed as in the sentence in (43) (c);

(c) Nekalikwiida mbeu, walo Mutinta wakali kusanzya mitiba.

If I was watering the garden, Mutinta was washing plates.

The insertion of *walo* is simply to bring out contrast or indeed to emphasise the difference in the duty performed by the speaker and the other person mentioned in the apodosis.

The interpretation of the Zero conditional here is in conformity with (Rothchild, 2009) whose analysis of conditional sentences is based on meaning of their parts. And not only with Rothchild, but also in line with Cognitive approaches where every aspect of structure and wording of a given sentence is considered to make a contribution to its overall interpretation.

4.4.2 The Semantics of the First Conditional

The first conditional or type one as often referred to, describes a probable future situation. It refers to future conditionals which express strong condition and result; and those expressing degrees of weakened condition and result. In this type of conditional sentence, if the condition is fulfilled, the action in the main clause is very likely to happen. The formula of the first conditional is as shown in (44).

If + simple present | will + simple present

(44) Kuti tutanyamukiino, cilatusiya citima.

If we don't leave now, we will miss the train.

In the example above, the explanation is that if the action in the protasis is fulfilled or happens, then action in the apodosis is likely to happen. That is, if the people 'do not leave now' then the train will leave them. Thus, '*Kuti tutanyamukiino, cilatusiya citima.*' The fulfilment of the action in the main clause is dependent on what happens in the condition (protasis).

To be noted also in this type of conditional, is the fact that the present tenses in the if-clause usually refer to future time and their use is similar to that of the tense in future time clauses. However, this is not so with the Tonga conditional. Sometimes, however, a present tense in the if-clause can refer to present time. This assertion has been exemplified in (45).

(45) Kuti kolaanzala, ulacijana cinkwa atebule.

If you are hungry, you will find some bread on the table.

The semantics in this Tonga conditional as earlier alluded to refer much to the present time than it does to the future time, it does so. The expression in (45) *ulacijana* (you will find) expresses more of a present action than the future one. The English counterpart however refers only to the present and the future.

The use of the Present Continuous tense in the English first conditional is meant to refer to a present action or a future arrangement. Similarly, this structure even in

Tonga utterances bear the same semantics or rather has the same interpretation. This has been illustrated in the examples in (46).

If + present continuous | will + simple present

(46) (a) Na uyandaula Lungowe, ulamujana mucisambila.

(Present action-continuing)

If you are looking for Lungowe, you will find her in the bathroom.

(b) Naa ulakkala kumanina nsondo, tuyakwiinka ku sinema.

(Future arrangement)

If you are staying for the weekend, we will go to the cinema.

Other similarities in the semantic interpretation in Tonga and English conditionals are realised in the use of imperatives in the first conditional. The use of the imperative is meant to give an order or a direction to the hearer and this is in conformity with (Forlin, 1982). (47) for instance, shows the aspect of an order as used in the imperative.

(47) Na wamanizya kujika nsima, ndakomba kosanzya mitiba.

If you have cooked nsima, please wash the plates.

The use of the imperatives in the first conditional is commonly used in Tonga utterances mostly by parents to order or give instructions to their children in households. The hearer in this respect is expected to carry out the directive as received from the speaker depending on the whether the other activity (the one in

protasis) has been accomplished. In other words, the fulfilment of the action in the protasis brings about the attainment of the action in the main clause.

4.4.3 The Semantics of the Second Conditional

The second (type two) conditional refers to imaginative conditionals which express present hypothetical condition and those which express present counterfactual condition. This is as argued by (Schulz, 2011). Essentially, the second conditional is used to describe an unreal situation with reference to the present. In the second conditional, we imagine a hypothetical situation, which is in contrast with reality. In the if-clause the past subjunctive form of the verb, which is identical to the past simple is used except in the case of the verb *be*. The formula for type 2 or second conditional is as illustrated in (48).

If + Past subjunctive | would + infinitive

(48) Nindalizyi bwiinguzi, nindakwaambila.

Nindalizyi bu-i-nguzi, ninda-ku-a-mbila

If I knew the answer, I would tell you.

In this conditional, as has been described, the speaker imagines a hypothetical situation. In (48), (Nindalizyi bwiinguzi) *If I knew the answer* means I do not know the answer; I'm only imagining it. The aspect of imagining in this conditional is what brings about the state of unreality. Arguably, the use of the past tense does not indicate past time. The modal verbs used in the apodosis are restricted by the unreal or hypothetical meaning of the conditional. Like English speakers, Tonga speakers are heard also speaking using this conditional to imagine what they would do if the

situation in the protasis was not an imagination. Semantically, the situations under which this conditional is used in both languages are the same.

Notable in the study was also the fact that Tonga speakers use the second conditional to express theoretically possible but unlikely future situations. Possible conditions in this conditional are embedded in the if-clause (protasis), but these conditions though possible are not likely to be fulfilled. The example in (49) shows how this is achieved.

(49) Kuti/Niyalibukide nkondo yatatu yanyika yoonse, inga caamba kumana kwamusela.

If the third world war broke out, it would mean the end of human kind.

4.4.4 The Semantics of the Third Conditional

The third conditional is used when talking about things that didn't happen in the past. In this conditional, the speaker imagines a hypothetical situation, something that did not happen. In essence, this type has two subset: the hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals. The hypothetical conditional expresses events thought unlikely yet possible by the speaker while the counterfactual expresses in the protasis events or states thought impossible by the speaker. The pattern of the third English conditional is as shown in (50).

If + Past perfect Subjunctive | would + perfective infinitive

(50) (a) Naakalisamide lutambo lwacuuno namutekenya, ndiza nakafutuka muntenda.

Naakalisamide lutambo lu-a-cuno namuteke-ni-a, ndiza nakafutuka muntenda.

If the driver had been wearing a seat belt, he would probably have survived the accident.

(b) Neekalijisi ciindi, nindaakugwasya.

If I had had time, I would have helped you.

In (50) (a), the meaning embedded in the protasis *Naakalisamide lutambo lwacuuno namutekenya*, (if the driver had been wearing a seat belt) is that the driver was not wearing the seat belt, and no wonder he did not survive the accident. The protasis in the second example *Neekalijisi ciindi*, (if I had had the time) suggests that “I wanted to help you, but I could not because I did not have enough time.”

Truly, what are being talked about in examples (50) (a) and (b) are impossible conditions, impossible because they are in the past and cannot be changed. In fact it can be said that these past situations did not happen since neither action took place. The driver in the first example did not wear the seat belt and he did not survive the accident and in the second example, the other person was not helped because there was no enough time.

In this section, the semantics for each of the conditional types has been discussed. What has been noticed is that the semantics of conditionals is based on various aspects, which include the verb tenses even as argued by Fillmore and most grammarians on conditionals. Verb tenses according to (Fillmore, 1986)’s analysis are treated as contributing to construction’s interpretations. And in light of cognitive approaches, every aspect of structure and wording of a given sentence is taken into

account to make a contribution to its overall interpretation in ways that are governed by linguistic convention.

Thus, the semantics here discussed was realised through the grammatical construction of each of the conditionals. The relation between the protasis and the apodosis was also treated as an essential element of constructional semantics. Thus, differences in meaning between various types of conditionals are based on the composition or construction of the conditionals. Worth noting is that the semantics in both Tonga and English conditionals are much similar than they are different. This is so perhaps because their interpretations are based much on their form.

4.5 The Pragmatic Functions of Conditionals

The previous section of the dissertation discussed the semantics of conditionals. This section discusses the pragmatic functions of conditionals with reference to the speech act theory. This section thus attempts to address the fourth objective, which deals with the analysis of pragmatic functions of Conditional clauses. The purpose of bringing in this aspect is to provide a framework for explaining the variety of ways in which what a speaker conveys can fail to be fully determined by the (conventional) linguistic meaning of the sentence he utters: indexically, ambiguity, vagueness, semantic under determination, implicitness, implicature, nonliteralness, non-truth-conditional context and illocutionary force.

The general assumption is that there is always some pragmatic explanation for how, in any given case, sentence meaning can determine what the speaker means. For example, the assumption about the claims of ambiguity is that diverse uses of an

expression are best explained not by different pieces of linguistic information (several conventional meanings) but by one piece of linguistic information combined with extra linguistic information, (Green 1989: P. 106). The term *pragmatics* in the present study has not been used so broadly as to apply to the full range of phenomena falling under the heading of language users, including such areas as social psychology, sociolinguistics, cultural anthropology and rhetoric. The discussion is restricted to those aspects of use that are directly related to acts of communication including perlocutionary acts as argued by (Bach and Harnish, 1979).

Arguably, the notion of context is often invoked to explain how pragmatics complements semantics. It is a platitude that a sentence's linguistic meaning generally does not determine what is said in its utterance and that the gap between linguistic meaning and what is said is filled by something called *context*. The idea behind the aspect of platitude is that a speaker can mean different things even when using his words in a thoroughly literal way. The truth is that even as he speaks literally is a matter of context.

Bach and Harnish (1979) have further suggested that what one says in uttering the words can vary. Therefore, what fixes what one says cannot be facts about the words alone but must also include facts about the circumstances in which one is using them. Those facts comprise the *context of utterance*. There are basically two sorts of contextual information, one much more restricted in scope and limited in role than the other. Information that plays the limited role of combining with linguistic information to determine content is restricted to a short list of variables, such as the identity of the hearer and the time and place of an utterance. Contextual information in the broad

sense is anything that the hearer is to take into account to determine the speaker's communicative intention.

It is often argued that what a speaker means "depends on context" is "determined by context" or is "a matter of context." So when it is said "context makes it clear that..." what it means is that there are items of information that the hearer can reasonably suppose the speaker to have intended him to take into account to determine what the speaker means.

Pragmatic information concerns facts relevant to making sense of a speaker's utterance of a sentence. The hearer thus seeks to identify the speaker's intention in making the utterance. In other words, the hearer seeks to explain the fact that the speaker said what he said, in the way he said it. Because the intention is communicative, the hearer's task of identifying it is driven partly by the assumption that the speaker intends him to do this. The speaker succeeds in communicating if the hearer identifies his intention in this way, for communicative intentions are intentions whose fulfilment consists in their recognition (Bach and Harnish, 1979). Pragmatics is concerned with whatever information is relevant, over and above the linguistic properties of a sentence, to understanding its utterance.

Considering the previously mentioned, the discussion of the pragmatic functions of conditionals done here is a pragmatic approach based on the Speech Act Model. As observed from the study, Tonga speakers like English speakers do use conditional sentences in speech. In the use of conditionals, it was noted that the Tonga speakers like speakers of English do not just use them anyhow, but purposefully and according

to situations. In their interpretation therefore, it would be wrong for one to explain the meaning of a particular utterance by looking only at its form without considering the context of communication.

The Speech Act Theory categorises utterances according to function rather than form. There is therefore, a greater exegetical and homiletical value in classifying conditionals in this way, because it brings the interpreter closer to the speaker's intent. When viewed from the point of the speech act model therefore, all conditionals are seen as implicit performatives which are used to do something in addition to stating condition; that is, to persuade the listener, to make a strong assertion, to manipulate the listener, to give an exhortation, to express a gentle rebuke, to ask something in a polite way, to justify oneself, to mock someone, or to convey a lament and many others (Young, 1989). Pragmatic reasons cause a speaker to use a conditional instead of a more direct expression. In addition, so discussed below is the partial classification of conditionals based on function, even as the Tonga use them within a particular context.

The pragmatic analysis of conditionals here is in line with (Young, 1989) who classified Conditionals from the viewpoint of the Speech Act Theory. Young in his analysis does not only look at the linguistic units of the utterance but also circumstances in which the utterance is made, and the intent of the speaker. Supporting this assertion, Levinson cited in (Fintel, 2012) suggests that the principle of pragmatic modulation concerns the effects on interpretation of the linguistic context of an utterance, its social and physical situation, background knowledge, and

conventions of discourse. Factors mentioned are collectively referred to as *the context of an utterance*, and they include the participant's task in psychological experiments.

Interestingly, unearthed in the study is the application of the Indirect Speech Act in conversations in both Tonga and English. An indirect speech act is when a statement is used to perform an action such as request, permission, or apology other than its direct implication. An utterance like *You parked the car on the road* for example, could mean "go and remove the car" or "the door is open" may be an indirect request asking someone to shut the door. The indirect speech act has been exemplified as used in various situations in the subsequent section.

4.5.1 Rebuke

In many instances, it was discovered that like English speakers, the Tonga were also fond of using conditionals in rebukes, in this case, gentle rebukes. A rebuke is a reprimand or expression of criticism or disapproval. To rebuke is to criticise or reprimand somebody, usually sharply (Encarta dictionaries, 2009). It is argued that to soften a rebuke and make it more respectful, it may be cloaked in a conditional sentence or some other rhetoric device. Applied in a rebuke intended to be soft is the indirect speech act coined in a conditional sentence. Shakespeare in his play '*As You Like It*', *Act 5 scene 4, page 6* said, "Your '*if*' is the only peacemaker; much Virtue in '*if*'." A rebuke is necessitated by such conditions that the hearer performed a deed in the past (propositional condition), the speaker does not believe that the deed was in his interest (preparatory condition), the deed angered the speaker (sincerity condition), and the speaker intends his expression as a reprimand (essential condition).

Noted was also the fact that at times indirect rebukes could be made by questioning. For example, the speaker may question why the hearer did an act (“Why didn’t you get the car fixed” “Kaambonzi ncimwatakuubambya moota”), or indeed the speakers knowing an act was not in their best interest, could be heard saying (“Masimpe mwatunjizya mumapenzi” “You sure got us in trouble this time”).

Speakers could be heard combining the propositional content with what would be in their best interest. The examples in (51) show softened rebukes of a husband by his wife.

(51) (a) Kuti mwaluubambizyide moota, nitwatali patide.

Kuti mu-a-li-u-bambizyide moota, ni-tu-a-tali patide.

If you had gotten the car fixed, we wouldn’t be stranded.

(b) Nimwaluulide saladi, nitwatalya cisyu cinyina saladi.

Ni-mu-a-li-u-lide saladi, ni-tu-a-ta-li-a cisyu cinyina saladi.

If you had bought cooking oil, we wouldn’t have eaten relish without cooking oil.

In the above contexts, the husband (hearer) has performed acts as well as omitted performing acts that are not in the best interest of the wife (speaker). In this case, the expected has not been done by the hearer. The speaker, therefore, is in an emotionally charged and state that surfaces in a rebuke. In the examples, the sight of the hearer only causes the speaker’s emotions to become more agitated. The most important factor involved in the formation of the wife’s utterance is the social register between her and her husband. As expected in the Tonga traditions, the speaker (wife) is devoted to her husband, having great respect and admiration for him as her husband.

The last thing she would want to do is to offend him. Owing to that, she softens her rebuke by avoiding the illocutionary force marker and framing it in the form of a conditional sentence. The explicit form would have been, “I hereby rebuke you for not getting the car fixed, or for not buying the cooking oil.”

Noted were similarities in the use of conditional clauses in an indirect rebuke by both Tonga and English speakers. This is so because the felicity conditions for the rebuke are similar in both languages.

4.5.2 Lamentation

The study revealed that laments are also quite common in the Tonga conditionals as in their English counterparts. A lamentation is a passionate expression of grief, which is often born of regret or mourning. According to informants, the necessary conditions for a lament are that an event happened in the past, the speaker does not believe that the event was in the best interest of himself or the hearer. The speaker is grieved because of the event and he counts his utterance as expressing sorrow. Tonga speakers, just as their English counterparts are heard expressing indirect laments by stating the event they would like to have happened. In such circumstances, for example, a Tonga speaker would be heard to say; (52) (a).

(52) (a) Ndalikulombozuya kuti Beene naatakakkwela kabbasi
kasyonto;

I wish Beene had not used the minibus.

However, expressions of lamentation in conditional form are common among the Tonga speakers and are expressed as shown in (52) (a) and (b).

(b) Nibacili kupona balumi bangu, nindalikkomene kapati.

If my husband were still alive, I would be so happy.

(c) Nakalikuunga ulabala, nakalipaside musunko.

If he had been studying, he would have passed the examination.

In (52) (b) and (c), it is understood that the speaker is aware that the hearer knows about the happenings in circumstances thus expressing laments.

4.5.3 Arguing

The illocutionary acts of arguing according to informants (for example, attempts by speakers to persuade the hearers to accept their opinion) are a very common feature in Tonga conditional sentences as they occur in their English counterparts. An illocutionary act is the intention of an utterance to constitute either an act of promise, command, invitation, and agreement and so on. An argument is an illocutionary act constituting a promise. It is intended to achieve a certain response or effect like. There are two rules of inference that are involved in the use of conditionals for arguing. These rules are illustrated by the conditional statements in (53), particularly, (53) (b) and (c).

(53) (a) Kuti nduubambya moota wangu, ndiyoolola kukubona.

Kuti nda-u-ba-mbi-a moota u-a-ngu, ndiyoolola kukubona.

If I get my car fixed, then I will come to see you.

Modus ponens (method of affirming) is used to argue that the consequent is true by affirming the antecedent.

(a) Ndakaubambya moota. Aboobo ndiyoboola kukubona.

I fixed my car. Therefore, I will come to see you.

Modus tollens (method of denial) is used to argue that the antecedent is false by denying the consequent (I did not come to see you. Therefore, I did not get my car fixed). The expressions in (53) (c) and (d) show that even in Tonga conditionals the illocutionary act of arguing is used.

(53) (c) Kuti ndabaamali, diyakukulila zyxisani.

If I have money, I will buy you clothes.

(d) Kuti sindaula busu, nkokuti nyina mali.

If I don't buy mealie-meal, then I have no money, or

If I don't buy mealie-meal, it is because I have no money.

In the conditionals in (53) (c) and (d), the speaker can only reach an agreement with the hearer from the context. In this case, therefore, in order for a conditional to be used to argue a point, both parties need to agree that the if-clause is true or the then clause is false. This conclusion is in agreement with (Young, 1989) in his classification of conditionals.

4.5.4 Request

The study has shown that there are also times that a speaker in Tonga frames a request or a command in the form of a conditional sentence in order to sound polite. Tonga speakers, in fact, are known for their politeness in their conversations. As a result, they try not to offend one another in their daily social intercourse. To achieve this, they are often heard using conditionals in their utterances. As argued by (Young, 1989), the if-clause is a mitigator or politeness marker. Politeness is said to be a practical application of good manners. It is aimed at showing consideration for others. It is decided by an individual's attitude and choice. There is a polarity between being direct ("I command you to pass me the salt" or "Give me the salt") and being polite (i.e. "can you pass me the salt" or "If you wouldn't mind, I would like some salt").

The felicity conditions for a request involve the following: proposition content condition that requested act is a future act of the hearer, the preparatory precondition, which has two aspects. The first one being that the speaker believes the hearer can perform the requested act. The second one is that it is not obvious that the hearer would perform requested act without being asked. There is also the sincerity condition aspect, which is about the genuineness of the speaker wanting the hearer to perform the requested act. Finally, the essential condition about how the utterance counts as an attempt by the speaker to have the hearer to do an act. We see these felicity conditions at play when Tonga speakers as well as their English counterparts use the illocutionary act to do with a request (Austin, 1962).

In the study, speakers tended toward politeness if the situation was formal, the social status of the hearer was above that of speaker, there were others listening, the hearer

was in close proximity to the speaker or if the speaker desired the conversation to continue. The demands for politeness supersede the need for clarity. A wife, for example, would not bluntly demand anything from her husband. Rather, she would soften her request with the if-clause. And so, in (54) are some of the conditionals denoting requests.

(54) (a) Naa mulainda kumaliketiki, mundulile sautu;

If you are passing through the market, buy me some salt.

(b) Naa mulaswaangana aba muka Mweemba, mubambile bandibone;

If you meet Mrs Mweemba, tell her to see me.

The utterances in (54) (a) and (b) would be necessitated by the aspect of social status as determined by social norms in a Tonga traditional society. They show that the social status of the hearer is above that of the speaker. In this case, the husband's (hearer) social status is above that of the (speaker) wife. It is also possible to argue that there could be others listening and the wife would not want to embarrass her husband.

One line of reasoning argues that the if-clause introduces an indirect request asking whether the preparatory condition of the hearer's ability to do the requested act has efficacy. The utterance would then be after the analogy of "can you pass me some salt." A second line of reasoning understands the if-clause as an expressive, not a directive. That is, the if-clause expresses a condition necessary for the hearer to perform the requested act, but both the hearer and the speaker realize that the if-clause is impossible. According to (Young, 1989), in such a situation, the conditional makes

no logical sense, but makes perfect sense if it is understood as expressing the speaker's feelings or needs.

4.5.5 Assertion

The study also showed that in certain instances, Tonga speakers use conditionals in their conversations to make assertions. To assert is simply to state or declare positively and often forcefully or aggressively. Findings showed that necessary conditions for an assertion are the same as for an argument except that the assertion is not an attempt to convince the hearer of a proposition. Assertions are recognised in conditionals when the apodosis does not follow logically the protasis. The felicity conditions for the speech act of asserting require that the speaker have evidence to support her/his belief and actually believe that he shares the same belief with the hearer, (Searle, 1969). The speaker in an assertion therefore, does not believe that the act in the condition is actually possible. This is as shown in (55).

(55) (a) Kuti Milimo waupasa musunko, nkokuti uli amaano.

If Milimo passes an exam, then I she is intelligent.

(b) Naa bakaula moota bayi, nkokuti ba hedi bali kabotu.

If the teacher bought a car, then head is good.

In uttering assertions, as noticed from (55), the consequences are so obviously false that the sentences are in fact strong negative assertions. A milder form of assertion employs a concession or contra expectation relation between the two propositions. This could be referred to as an act of maintaining. The speaker states a contrary thesis and then maintains his position in spite of it. This would be realised as in (55) (c).

(c) Ni yali kuunga ilawa, naa li mu kati.

If it were raining, then he would be inside.

4.5.6 Manipulation

The research findings show that like their counterparts the English, Tonga speakers also use conditionals to manipulate the listener. A manipulation is to get someone to do something that he normally would not think of doing, (Young, 1989). A manipulation falls under what Austin calls Speech Acts, particularly illocutionary acts (Commissive Acts according to Searle, 1969). An illocutionary act is where speakers or writers do things with words. According to (Austin, 1962), illocutionary act is performed by a performative sentence because by virtue of its structure, a performative sentence has a conversational force like the force of pronouncing a man and a woman husband and wife or sentencing a defendant in court. Expressions in (56) show how speakers achieve this.

(56) (a) Kuti utaleki kulila, tandikookuulila nswiiti).

If you don't stop crying, I will not buy you sweets;

The performance of a manipulation is necessitated by such a condition as the hearer performing a future act. Even when the hearer is able to do the act, it is not obvious to the speaker that the hearer is willing to perform the act. The speaker wants the hearer to perform the act and the speaker counts his utterance as an attempt to persuade the hearer to perform the act. At times interlocutors do engage in indirect manipulation by questioning the hearer's ability to do an act (e.g. You can do...) or by questioning the hearer's character (e.g. Kuti koli musankwa, ngo...; If you are a man, you...). Some conditionals used for manipulation are as exemplified in (56) (b) and (c).

(56) (b) Naa ulimusankwa ncobeni, koligonka samu eeli.

If you are really a man, cut down this tree.

(c) Naa ulandiyanda, konduulila bbisiketi.

If you love me, buy me some biscuits.

What is noticed in the expressions in (56) (a), (b) and (c) is that, the hearers are being manipulated to do what they normally would not do. In (56) (b), the hearer apparently is lazy or refuses to do some work, but the speaker uses a condition to manipulate him in order that he performs the dreaded task. As for (56) (c), the speaker is sure of not being bought anything if she does not persuade the hearer to do so. So she uses a conditional to coerce the hearer to buy her some biscuits. In both instances, it is prudent to say speakers use the hearers' characters as leverages (power) to force them to do something. This is indeed a common feature in the Tonga conditionals. The utterances in (56) (b) and (c) however, could also be interpreted in quite different ways. For example, (56) (b) could be said to be a challenge or rather daring someone on the one hand. (56) (c) on the other hand could be interpreted as testing someone's sincerity. When the act is performed, the speaker will truly know that the hearer is sincere in his or her claim.

4.5.7. Exhortation

Present also in the research findings is the use of Tonga conditions for exhortation. An exhortation is an attempt to urge a hearer to do something he recognizes is proper. Of course, it differs from a manipulation in the preparatory condition that is in an exhortation, the hearer has some willingness to do the act whereas in a manipulation, this is not obvious to the speaker that the hearer is willing to do the act. In an

exhortation, it is not obvious to the speaker that the hearer would do the act without being encouraged, and it counts as an attempt to urge the hearer to perform an act. The strength of an exhortation lies in stating the reason the act should be performed.

An exhortation is a declaration, which will only be perceived as an order. The felicity condition for an order are that the speaker believes the action is necessary and should be done. The receiver, or the hearer has the ability to do the action and the speakers has the right to tell the hearer to do the action. What is understood in (57) (a) and (b) is that the stated felicity conditions apply. The interpretations done here are supported by (Young, 1989) in his study of Greek conditionals. Some examples of conditionals used for exhortations are as shown (57).

(57) (a) Naa wakugwasya mweenzinyoko, welede kumugwasya ayebo.

If your friend helps you, you need to help him also.

(b) Kuti baso kabamuyanda, anwebo muleelede kuyandana.

If your father loves you, you must also love one another.

As can be observed from the examples in (57) (a) and (b) of exhortation, reasons why the acts should be done have been stated in the protases of the conditional sentences; ‘Naa wakugwashya mweenzinyoko...; if your friend helps you...’ and ‘Kuti baso kabamuyanda...; if your father loves you...’ The stated reasons in the protases, set a premise upon which the exhortations are built. The understanding is that it is not obvious to the speaker that the hearer would do the act without being encouraged; hence the utterances are an attempt to urge the hearer to perform the act.

4.5.8 Mocking

Research findings also showed that conditionals in Tonga are used in daily conversations to mock someone, of course, from a certain background. Putting it in another way, there are times when a person will boast about being correct and mock or deride another for being wrong. To mock is to treat someone with a scorn or contempt. This ridicule is made even more pointed when it is constructed in the form of a conditional sentence. The necessary conditions for the performance of a mockery are that the hearer has performed a past act or made a proposition, the hearer believes the act was right or the proposition true, but the speaker believes the act was wrong or the proposition false, and the speaker counts his utterance as an attempt to ridicule the hearer. Conditionals of mockeries are as expressed in (58).

(58) (a) Naa ulimuvwubi, kobabbadelela banabako mali akucikolo;

If you are rich, pay school fees for your children.

(b) Kuti koli musankwa, komubandisya musimbi ooyu;

If you are a man, propose love to this woman (lady).

The scorner (speaker) in the two instances, (58) (a) and (b), is not trying to manipulate the hearer to do what he is proposing (he does not believe that the hearer could do). Instead, he is deriding the hearer for his “false assessment” of what he could do and asserting that he was right all along. The fact that the hearer is unable to do what he claimed would do, proves for the hearer that he is correct; the hearer is not rich (tavwubide) as he might have claimed in the past and he is not a ‘man’

(talimusankwa) as might have been the claim in the past. The speaker, therefore, wishes to treat the hearer with scorn by the utterances.

This section has demonstrated how the speech act model has called attention to function of an utterance in human communication as well as the necessity of considering both the propositional meaning and the speaker's intent when interpreting what any given communication means. The discussion has shown that the speaker's intent can be detected from surface structure and situational context into grammatical analysis at all levels. Evidence from the examples in the discussion of the pragmatic functions of conditionals has shown that context can play an important part in determining the particular proposition that a sentence expresses, and this proposition in turn determines what inferences reasoners can make from the utterance. Discussions have basically shown that the interpretation of meaning in conditionals are influenced by their context. The discussion done here is conformity with (Young, 1989) in his study of conditionals in light of the Speech Act Model.

4.6 Summary

This chapter has discussed the research findings in accordance with the objectives of the study. The chapter looked at the various types of conditionals, the syntax, the semantics and finally the pragmatic functions of conditionals. All these were examined under different sub-themes, according to the objectives of the study.

The next chapter presents the overall conclusion of the study. The chapter further presents recommendations on conditionals and areas that may require further research.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 General

The preceding chapter has discussed the research findings in line with the research objectives. The chapter examined the various types of conditionals, the syntax, the semantics and finally the pragmatic functions of conditionals.

This chapter presents the overall conclusion of the study and the recommendations. The study set out to identify types of conditional clauses in Tonga and English, to establish the syntactic construction of types of conditional clauses in Tonga and English, to investigate the semantics of conditional clauses in Tonga and English and to analyse the pragmatic functions of Tonga and English conditional clauses. The study has endeavoured to show that the types of conditionals in English are as they occur in Tonga. The study has also discussed the similarities and differences in the syntactic constructions of Tonga and English conditionals, the semantics and the pragmatic functions of the conditionals.

The analysis of conditionals has shown that both languages (English and Tonga) make use of conditional clauses. Speakers of both languages as observed from the study do not use conditionals anyhow and hearers also do not interpret them by use of their surface structure only but also by considering the context in which they are uttered. Conclusions drawn from the discussions include the reasons for which conditionals are used in conversation. Among the many reasons are that conditions ensure continuity of conversation. Not only that, but also in making assertions, mocking

manipulation and many others. Furthermore, conditionals are used to maintain relationships among interlocutors as people reserve directness and openness.

5.1 Conclusions

The study has shown that Conditionals in Tonga can also be classified in four categories like those in English. What was noted was that Tonga speakers actually do use certain moods of verbs in conditionals just like the English speakers. The four conditional (the Zero, First, Second and the Third Conditionals) in English exist in Tonga also.

It was noted in the study that the surface structure of conditionals is a bi-clause consisting of an antecedent clause (protasis) and a consequent clause (apodosis). The antecedent is the subordinate clause expressing supposed or assumed case (*if*) whereas the apodosis is the conclusion or principal clause expressing what follows if the condition is realized. Comparatively, the study also noted that there are structural differences between conditionals in Tonga and English. The differences included the position of the *if*-clause, the use of various conditional markers in Tonga as equivalents to (*if*) in English. However, there are other conditional markers in English that have other interpretations in Tonga. Tonga conditionals were seen to use clitics; proclitics and enclitics in verbs and in nouns to denote subject, aspects and number respectively. Other differences involved the inversion of the English conditionals while this was not possible in the Tonga conditionals. Other aspects explored were the determinants of the position of the *if*-clause. Included are the principle of end-focus, topic continuity, parallelism and many more.

On the semantics of conditionals, the study has shown that in the analysis of conditionals using the cognitive approaches, every aspect of the structure and wording of a given sentence is considered to make a contribution to its overall interpretation. The analysis has provided an explanation of how aspects of conditional form give rise to a variety of meaning that conditional sentences express.

Furthermore, the conditional sentence in this study has been viewed as a construction, a pattern of linguistic structure, which is paired with features of semantic and pragmatic interpretation. The analysis has also shown that part of the meaning is derived from the verb forms (mood) in the conditional sentences and that the differences in the constructions give rise to differences in the semantics of various types of conditionals. Other notable aspects discussed on the semantics of the Tonga conditionals are those found in the Zero and First conditionals. In the Tonga Zero conditional, there is the prominence of *when* than *kuti* (if) in the if-clause. In the case of the First conditional, reference is made much more to the present tense than to the future in the main clause.

Finally, on the pragmatic functions of conditionals, it has been noted in the study that context fills the gap between linguistic meaning and what has been said in an utterance. It has also been noted that the meaning of what one says in uttering words can vary, and that what fixes what one says cannot be facts about words alone but also facts about circumstances in which one is using these words.

It was noted that both Tonga and English speakers use conditionals purposefully and according to situations. Owing to this, the meaning of the conditional in the was

dependent on both the circumstances that compelled the speaker to say what they said as well as the words used. The pragmatic functions so identified and analysed were to make a strong assertion, manipulation, giving an exhortation, express a respectful rebuke, ask for something in a polite way, mock someone and lament. One interesting thing is that there are actually similarities and not differences in the pragmatic functions of conditional clauses in Tonga and English.

5.2 Recommendations

While the study showed that both Tonga and English speakers use conditionals in spoken, and that there are similarities and differences in the syntax, semantics and pragmatic functions of Conditionals, the study did not fail to observe that in order to obtain a unified and linguistically sound of Tonga conditionals, different approaches, which have different goals be used in the analysis of these (Tonga) conditionals. Tonga conditionals need to be studied in much detail as done with the English conditionals.

5.3 Recommendations for further Research

The study focused on the comparative analysis of the syntax, semantics and the pragmatic functions of conditional sentences in Tonga and English. This study however, cannot be said to have exhausted all there is to be studied on conditionals in Tonga as compared with their English counterparts in that other issues are beyond the scope of this study. It is recommended, therefore, that further studies such as the following be carried out.

- A comparative analysis of the grammar of Tonga Conditionals and other Zambian local languages.
- An analysis of the students' ability in mastering Tonga Conditional sentences.
- An investigation of mistakes commonly made by students in the use of Conditional sentence type three in Zambian schools.

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APPENDIX A:
SAMPLE DATA

Data supplied in this appendix are a mixture of both primary and secondary data. Primary data were directly sourced from respondents while secondary data were sourced from several sources, which include dissertations and some books.

Conditional Sentences in General

1 Factual Conditionals

(1) Kuti Grace wasanzya mitiba, muchizyi wakwe ulakolopa.
If Grace clean dishes sister hers mops the floor.
If Grace cleans the dishes, her sister will clean the floor

(2) Nindakali kupanga tunkwa, mukaintu wangu wakali
kupanga tii.
If I made scones wife my was
make tea.
If I baked the scones, my wife prepared some tea.

(3) Kuti ukapase musunko, ndiya kukuulila cipego.
If you will pass exam, I will you buy gift.
If you will pass the exam, I will buy you a present.

(4) Kuti ukamuke kuboola alimwi, ndiyokupa cisubulo.
If you delay to come again, I will you give punishment.
If you will come late again, I will punish you.

(5) Kuti muntu wakubelekela, welede kumubbadela.
If person he you works for, you need to him pay.
If someone works for you, you must pay him.

(6) Kuti waumpa nkendulo, ilasungunuka.

If you burn candle, it melts.

If you heat a candle, it melts.

- (7) Nindakalikwiida mbeu, Mutinta wakali kusanzya mitiba.

When I watered garden, Mutinta she was towash plates.

When I watered the garden, Mutinta washed the plates.

- (8) Nekalikwiida mbeu, Mutinta wakali kusanzya mitiba.

When I watered garden, Mutinta she was towash plates.

If/when I watered the garden, Mutinta washed the plates.

2 Predictive Conditionals

- (9) Kuti wajosya ncinga, ndilamupa wilibbala.

If he it returns bicycle, I will him give wheelbarrow.

If he returns the bicycle, I will lend him the wheelbarrow.

- (10) Kuti wajosya ncinga, ngandamupa wilibbala.

If he it returns bicycle, may I him give wheelbarrow.

If he returns the bicycle, I may lend him the wheelbarrow.

- (11) Naa ilawa, ndilakkala a njanda.

If it rain I will stay at house.

If it should rain, I will stay at home. (Expressing a weaker modal of prediction).

If it happens to rain, I will stay at home.

If it should happen to rain, I will stay at home.

- (12) Kuti ka yanda, u ya ku nda ambila. or

Naa ula yanda, u ya ku nda ambila.

If he wants, he will to me tell.

If he wants, he will tell me.

- (13) Naa/kuti bala yanda, baya ku nda ambila. (*ba* is honorific not Plural)

- If he wants, he will tell me.
If he wants, he will tell me.
- (14) Naa/kuti bala yanda, ba ya ku nda ambila. (ba here is Plural)
If they want, they will tell me.
If they want, they will tell me.
- (15) Waa kufwambaana kusika, uka nduumine fooni. Or
Kuti ukafwambaane kusika, uka nduumine fooni.
If you will arrive, you will beat me phone.
If you will arrive early, give me a call.
- (16) Kuti tu ta nyamuki ino, ci la tu siya citima.
If we don't rise now, it will leave us train.
If we don't leave now, we will miss the train.
- (17) Kuti ko laa nzala, ulacijana cinkwa atebule.
If you have hunger, you will find bread on table.
If you are hungry, you will find some bread on the table.
- (18) Naa uyandaula Lungowe, ulamujana mu cisambila.
If you are looking for Lungowe, you will find her in bathroom.
If you are looking for Lungowe, you will find her in the bathroom.
- (19) Naa ulakkala kumanina nsondo, tuyakwiinaka kusinema.
If you are staying to end of week, we will go to sinema.
If you are staying for a weekend, we will go to the cinema.
- (20) Naa/kuti wamanizya kujika nsima, ndakomba kosanzya mitiba.
If you finished to cook nsima, I plead wash plates.
If you have finished cooking nsima, please wash the plates.

3 Imaginative Conditionals

- (21) Ni ndalaaciindi, ninda boola kuṅanda kwako.
If I had time, I would come to house yours.
If I had the time, I would come to your house. (Hypothetical)
Ni ndakalaaciindi, nidakaboola kuṅanda kwako.
If I had had the time, I would have come to house yours.
If I had had the time, I would have come to your house. (Counterfactual)
- (22) Noo kali nda ambulide, nee ta ka mu tanda.
If you had me told, I would not have him chased.
If you had told me, I wouldn't have chased him/her.
- (23) Ni nda ka boola, naaka ndi pa.
If me had come, would he me give.
If I came, he would give me.
- (24) Ni ba ka boola, neeka ba pa.
(*ba* is here used to denote honorific)
If he had come, I would him give.
If he came, I would give him/her.
- (25) Ni nda lizyi bwiinguzi, ni nda kwa mbila.
If I knew answer, would I you tell.
If I knew the answer, I would tell you.
- (26) Kuti/niyalibukide nkondo yatatu yanyika yonse, ngacaamba
kumanakwamusela.
If it broke out war third for world all, it can tell
end of age.
If the third world war broke out, it would mean the end of human kind.
- (27) Naakalisamide lutambo lwacuuno namutekenya, ndiza naka
futuka mu ntenda
If he wore belt for seat driver, maybe would he.
survive in accident.
If the driver had been wearing a seat belt, he would probably have the accident.

4 Negative Conditionals

- (28) (a) Ataakuboola, nkokuti ta yandi. Or
He not to come then not want.
(b) Kuti atakabooli, nkokuti tayandi.
If won't he come then doesn't want.
If he/she won't come, then he/she doesn't want .
- (29) Bataakuboola, nkokuti ta ba yandi.
(*ba* is third person singular-honorific)
He not to come then not he want.
If he/she won't come, he/she doesn't want.
- (30) Ba taa ku boola, nkokuti ta ba yandi.
(*ba* is third person plural)
They not to come then not they want.
If they won't come, then they don't want.
- (31) Nda taa ku boola, nkokuti ta ndi yandi.
(*Nda* is first person singular)
If I don't to come then not I want.
If I won't come, then I don't want.
- (32) Tu-a ta ku boola, nkokuti ta tu yandi.
(Tu-a (*Twa*) and *tu* are first person plural)
We If don't to come then not we want.
If we won't come, then we don't want.

5 Deletion of the *if* conjunction

- (33) Naa/kuti akayande kuboola, uyakundaambila.
If he/she will want to come, he will me tell.
When he/she wants to come, he/she will tell me.
- (34) Aakuyanda kuboola, uyakundaambila. (*if* conjunction deleted)
Wakuyanda kuboola, uyakundaambila. (*if* conjunction deleted)

(aa and wa denote second person singular)

Should he want to come, he will tell me.

Should he/she want to come, he/she will tell me.

(35) Naa asike, undambile. (with *if* conjunction)

Asika, undambile. (*if* - conjunction deleted)

Should he come you tell me.

If he/she comes, tell me.

Should he/she come, tell me.

(36) Naa/kuti aboole, umuume. (with *if* - conjunction)

Aboola, umuume. (*if* - conjunction deleted but realised as when in English)

When he comes, you beat him.

If he/she comes, beat him/her up. Or

When he/she comes, beat him/her up.

6 Pragmatic Functions of Conditionals

(37) Kuti mwaluubambizyide mootaa, ni twa ta lipatide.

(Polite rebuke)

If you had fixed car, we would not be stranded.

If you had gotten the car fixed, we wouldn't be stranded.

(38) Ni mwaluulide saladi, ni twa ta lya

cisyu cinyina saladi. (Polite rebuke)

If you had bought cooking oil, we would not eat

relish without cooking oil.

If you had bought cooking oil, we wouldn't have eaten relish without cooking oil.

(39) Ni ba cili kupona balumi bangu, ni nda I

likkomene kapati. (lamentation)

If he still lived husband mine, I me be

happy big.

If my husband were still alive, I would be so happy.

- (40) Na ka likuunga u la bala, na ka li paside musunko. (lamentation)
 If he was he be reading, would he have passed examination.
 If he had been studying, he would have passed the examination.
- (41) Kuti nda baa mali, ndi la ku ulila zyisani. (argument) may also be understood as expressing a promise.
 If I have money, I will you buy clothes.
 If I have money, I will buy you clothes.
- (42) Kuti si nda ula busu nkokuti nyina mali. (argument)
 If don't I buy mealie meal, then I don't have money.
 If I don't buy mealie meal, then I have no money.
- (43) Naa mula inda ku maketi, mu ndi ulile sautu. (polite request)
 If you pass to market, you me buy salt.
 If you are passing through the market, buy me some salt.
- (44) Naa mu-a-su-a-angana aba muka Mweemba, mu baambile ba ndi bone. (polite request)
 Kuti muswaangane aba muka Mweemba, mu baambile ba ndi bone.
 If you meet with Mrs Mweemba, you her tell her me see.
 If you meet Mrs, Mweemba, tell her to see me.
- (45) Kuti Milimo wa upasa musunko, nkokuti uli jisi maano. (assertion)
 If Milimo he pass exam, then he has intelligence.
 If Milimo passes the exam, then he is intelligent.
- (46) Naa bakaula moota bayi, nkokuti ba heedi,

bali kabotu. (assertion)

If he bought car teacher, then the head
is good.

If the teacher bought a car, then the head teacher is a fool.

(47) Kuti u ta leki kulila, ta ndikoo ku ulila nswiiti.

(manipulation). May also be a warning.

If you don't stop crying, don't me/I you buy sweet.

If you don't stop crying, I will not buy you sweets.

(48) Naa u li musankwa ncobeni, ko li gonka

samu eeli.(manipulation)

If you are man/male truly, you this cut
tree this.

If you are really a man, cut down this tree.

(49) Naa ula ndi yanda, ko ndi ulila bbisiketi.

(manipulation)

If you me want/love, you me buy biscuit.

If you love me, buy me some biscuits

(50) Naa wa ku gwasya mweenzinyoko, we lede ku

mu gwasya ayebo. (exhortation)

If he you help your friend, you need to
him help also.

If your friend helps you, you need to help him/her also.

(51) Kuti ba uso ka ba mu yanda, anwebo

mwelede ku yand ana. (exhortation or request).

If your father, - he you, loves also you
need to love each other.

If your father loves you, you must also love one another.

(52) Naa uli vwubide, kobabbadelela bana bako mali

a ku cikolo. (mock)

Kuti ko vwubide, kobabbadelela bana bako mali

a ku cikolo.

If you are rich, pay for children your money
for to school.

If you are rich, pay the school fees for your children.

(53) Kuti ko li mu sankwa, ko mu bandisya
Musimbi ooyu. (mock) may also be interpreted as a challenge to someone
Naa u li mu sankwa, ko mu bandisya
musimbi ooyu.

If you be a man, you her propose
love lady this.

If you are a man, propose love to this lady.

APPENDIX B
UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE
SAMPLE QUESTIONS

1. Are you a native Tonga speaker?

2. Can you speak Tonga very well?

3. How often do you speak Tonga in your conversation?

4. Do you sometimes use conditional clauses in your social discourses?

5. Do you think Tonga speakers use conditional clause in their daily social discourses?

6. What kind of conditional clauses do they use?

7. What are social contexts that instigate the use of conditional clauses?

APPENDIX C
ABBREVIATIONS

- E-** Emphatic form
- U-** Unemphatic form