

**EFFECTS OF REWARD SYSTEM ON TEACHER PERFORMANCE: A  
CASE OF THREE SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN KASAMA DISTRICT,  
ZAMBIA**

**CHITIMWANGO MOSES**

**(714802945)**


**A RESEARCH DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA  
AND ZIMBABWE OPEN UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF  
EDUCATION IN EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT**

**2016**

**LUSAKA**

## DECLARATION

I, **CHITIMWANGO MOSES**, do declare that the work herein is presented in its original form and has not been presented to any other university or institution for any academic award whatsoever.

Sign.....

CHITIMWANGO MOSES

Date.....19/08/16.....

## **APPROVAL**

This Dissertation entitled “Effects of Reward system on Teachers Performance in the Case of Three Secondary Schools of Kasama District” has been submitted to the Graduate School with the approval of the undersigned as the University supervisor.

Supervisor..... Date: .....

Supervisor..... Date: .....

Supervisor..... Date: .....

## **DEDICATION**

There are those close to my heart and home who contributed a lot to the completion of this work by putting the researcher in a position to start, sustain and finish this dissertation. For this reason plus many others, I wish to dedicate this work to my wife, MUKUNTA CHITIMWANGO, who gave me advice, material support and offered me constant encouragement to reach the finishing line, my children who missed my constant parental attention especially at the time of doing their homework and missed my company because of my tight academic schedule. I also dedicate this work to all my good FRIENDS whom I consulted from time to time, discussed with, supported and encouraged me to reach this far. I also dedicate this work to the TEACHERS as well, that this dissertation brings a change in the rewarding systems in the schools that they happen to serve. Last but not least I dedicate this work to my late dad, ABRAHAM SAVIER CHITIMWANGO who persistently encouraged me to start this programme but did not live to see me finish this degree. May HIS SOUL REST IN PEACE.

## ABSTRACT

This study was about reward systems and their effects on the performance of teachers in secondary schools of Kasama district. The theory underpinning the study was premised on Adam Stacy's Equity theory of motivation which states that employees expect fairness when being rewarded. This implies that if employees are rewarded according to their in-put without any interference, such would motivate employees to work hard due to that fairness. The main objective of this study was to assess the effect of rewards system on the performance of teachers in secondary schools in Kasama district; while the specific objectives were: to identify the types of reward system used in Secondary schools and to establish the effect of reward system on the performance of teachers in those schools.

The study was based mainly on primary data in form of questionnaires, interviews and document reviews of the selected literature. The study employed both qualitative and quantitative techniques of data collection and data was analysed using descriptive analysis. In terms of preferred types of reward system, the study revealed that, monetary incentive that is performance-based ranked the highest (51%), followed by monetary monthly incentive (32%) and social care 15%. The study further revealed that none of the teacher respondents felt that promotion as a reward had no effect on their performance. This was in contrast to headteachers perception of promotion being the major reward that motivate teacher performance.

It was also established that reward system had a positive impact on the performance of management and teachers in the following areas: less supervision by school managers, reduced absenteeism and completion of syllabi in good time. Other effects included self-motivation, enforcement of remedial work for slow learners, adherence to lesson plan preparation and general improvement in work culture demonstrated through teachers' passion to teach.

Despite the aforementioned positive effect of reward system, the study also revealed that inconsistencies in the implementation of reward systems in some secondary schools resulted in non-achievement of the intended effects of reward system on teacher performance. Therefore, this study recommends that reward system be based on performance considerations after a fair and accurate evaluation of its effects on the beneficiary. Furthermore, the nature of reward systems in schools should be based on the essence of ensuring that teachers are looked at as the prime components in the success of any school administratively and academically.

There is indeed need to train administrators and sensitize them on the value of reward systems that is done fairly and also be made aware that of all the rewards, monetary incentive that is based on performance motivates teachers to perform at their best.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis would not have been possible without the help, support, guidance and encouragement from a number of people. Throughout this year there have been a number of challenges and all of these people have assisted me in maintaining a strong focus and shown exceptional understanding.

I wish to acknowledge all those persons who in one way or the other assisted me in the completion of this study. The list is long to be individually acknowledged. However, I cannot wholly refrain from mentioning a few individuals, without whose support and input this study would never have been accomplished. My special appreciation goes to my supervisors, Mr Chris Kukano and Dr. P.C. Manchishi for their personal commitment and effort to speedily read and comment on my drafts plus all my other lecturers on Masters of Education in Educational Management.

My gratitude is also extended to Dr. Masaiti, Dr. Tommy Ndjlovu, Ms Sunshine, Mr Kwenge, Mr Elvis Besa and Mr Nkandu Channel for their professional advice and support. Special thanks are extended to my course mates with whom I undertook this course, for their support, encouragement and academic ideas. Their input during our interactions, discussions and friendship contributed greatly to the completion of this piece of work. However, nothing substantial could have been achieved without the understanding and encouragement of my entire family, especially my wife, Mrs Chitimwango Mukunta and my children, who made me feel at home and drove me into continued search for excellence. Finally, for those not mentioned here, thank you very much for your contribution.

MAY GOD BLESS YOU ALL.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL .....	ii
DEDICATION.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....	vi
CHAPTER ONE .....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.0 Overview .....	1
1.1 Background of the study .....	1
1.2. Statement of the problem .....	3
1.3 Purpose of the study .....	3
1.4 Research objectives.....	3
1.5 Research questions .....	4
1.6 Significance of the study .....	4
1.7 Theoretical framework .....	4
1.8 Conceptual framework .....	5
1.9 Scope of the study .....	7
1.10 Delimitations of the Study.....	7
1.11 Limitations .....	7
1.12 Operational definitions of terms.....	8
1.13 Ethical considerations .....	8
CHAPTER TWO .....	9
LITERATURE REVIEW .....	9
2.0 Overview .....	9
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives of Performance of Teachers .....	9
2.2 Types of Reward systems.....	11
2.3 Effects of Reward System .....	12
2.4 Perception of Teachers on Reward System.....	15
2.4.1 Arguments Supporting Performance-Based Rewards .....	15
2.4.2 Arguments Opposing Performance-Based Rewards .....	17

2.5 Challenges in implementation of Performance-Based Rewards .....	19
CHAPTER THREE.....	22
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	22
3.0 Overview .....	22
3.1 Research Design .....	22
3.2 Study Area.....	23
3.3 Study Population.....	23
3.4 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques .....	23
3.5 Research Instruments .....	24
Self-administered Questionnaire .....	24
Interviews.....	25
3.4.3 Focus Group Discussion.....	25
3.5 Data Collection Procedure.....	25
3.6 Data Processing and Management .....	26
3.6.1 Qualitative Data .....	26
3.6.2 Quantitative Data .....	26
3.7 Data quality control.....	26
3.7.1 Validity .....	27
3.7.2 Reliability .....	27
3.8 Ethical issues .....	27
Summary.....	27
CHAPTER FOUR .....	28
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS.....	28
4.0 Overview .....	28
4.1 Demographic characteristics of Respondents.....	28
4.2 What reward systems are used in Secondary Schools of Kasama District in.....	31
Northern Province? .....	31
4.3 What is the effect of school based reward system on teachers' performance in.....	33
Secondary Schools?.....	33
4.4 How do teachers perceive reward system obtaining in Secondary Schools of.....	37
Kasama District? .....	37
Teacher Preference to Reward System .....	39

5.0 Overview .....43

5.1 To assess the reward systems used in Secondary Schools of Kasama District.....43

5.2 To establish the effect of reward system on the performance of Secondary School.....45  
 teachers in Kasama District.....45

5.3 To assess the perceptions of teachers on reward system and its effects on .....50  
 teachers performance. ....50

CHAPTER SIX .....53

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....53

6.0 Overview .....53

6.1 Conclusion.....53

6.2 To assess the reward systems used in Secondary Schools of Kasama District.....54

6.3 To establish the effect of reward system on the performance of Secondary .....54  
 School teachers in Kasama District. ....54

6.4 Perception of teachers on the effectiveness of performance-based rewards .....54  
 towards teacher performance.....54

6.5 Recommendations .....55

REFERENCES.....56

APPENDIX A: Questionnaire for Teachers.....61

APPENDIX B: Interview Schedule for The Head of Departments and The Headteacher .....71

APPENDIX C: LETTER OF PERMISSION REQUEST FROM THE DEBS.....78

APPENDIX D: PERMISSION FROM THE DEBS .....79

APPENDIX E: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION FROM UNZA-ZOU .....81

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Sample size description.....	24
Table 4.1 Sex Distributions of Respondents .....	30
Table 4.2 Respondents by Age .....	31
Table 4.3 Respondents by work experience .....	32
Table 4.4 Respondents by Level of Education .....	33
Table 4.5 Rewards Available at Secondary School A .....	34
Table 4.6 Rewards Available at Secondary School B .....	34
Table 4.7 Rewards Available at Secondary School C .....	35
Table 4.8 Perception on the effectiveness of reward system obtaining at Secondary School A .....	39
Table 4.9 Perception on the effectiveness of reward system obtaining at Secondary School B .....	39
Table 5.0 Perception on the effectiveness of reward system obtaining at Secondary School C .....	40
Table 5.1 Heads of Department and Teacher preference to the Reward System at Secondary School A .....	41
Table 5.2 Heads of Department and Teacher preference to the Reward System at Secondary School B .....	41
Table 5.3 Heads of Department and Teacher preference to the Reward System at Secondary School C .....	42
Table 5.4 Head Teacher's Order of Preference towards Reward System .....	43

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Conceptual Framework.....	6
Figure 2 Result Analysis for Grade 12s at Secondary School A ( Mission School).....	36
Figure 3 Result Analysis for Grade 12s at Secondary School B (Public School).....	37
Figure 4 Result Analysis for Grade 12s at Secondary School C (Private School).....	38

## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

APPA: Australia Primary Principals Association

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development

PBR: Performance Based Rewards.

TAP: Teacher Advanced Team

AFT: American Federation of Teachers

C.V.I: Content validity index

SPSS: Statistical Package for Social Scientists

# **CHAPTER ONE**

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **1.0 Overview**

This chapter presents the background, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, research objectives and research questions, significance of the study, theoretical framework and conceptual framework, scope of the study, limitations and delimitations of the study, operational definitions of terms and ethical considerations.

### **1.1 Background of the study**

Interest in improving public education is growing not only in developed nations but worldwide. One reason for the heightened public attention is the key role played by education in determining both individual earnings and broader economic growth. Another is widespread dissatisfaction with the education sector's performance of late: substantial increases in spending on public schools have failed to bring corresponding increases in student achievement while the main criteria used to determine a teachers' pay is years of experience and education level (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). These two variables are seen to be weakly correlated, at best, with student outcomes (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2004). Nevertheless, employers have maintained the two as basis for determining ones salary. In the interest to improve pupil performance educational reform discussions around the globe regularly include the idea of paying teachers based on how they perform in advancing their students' educational achievement (Guthrie & Springer, 2006). From a theoretical viewpoint, Guthrie and Springer (2006) affirm that performance-related pay may elicit both incentive effects – raising motivation and effort of current teachers who strive to increase their pay – and sorting effects – attracting graduates into the teaching profession who expect to do well under performance-based compensation schemes. According to observation of Nadeem, Rana, Lone, Maqbool, Naz and Ali (2011), poor salary, lack of motivation, excessive workload, poor infrastructure, lack of library facility, lack of teaching and learning material, teacher's morale, working relations with staff and head teacher and working environment are the factors which affect teachers' performance negatively. Other factors include political

interference, responsibilities at home, distance of residing area, stress, status of teacher and respect in society. Mohanty (2000) indicates poor pay, low status and morale as the key causes of poor performance and corrupt behavior in the public sector. Further, Institute for International Economic Policy (2004) noted that teachers also complain about the lack of role differentiation in their careers, the limited incentives for them to improve their practice and develop as professionals, and the limited linkages between their performance, teacher compensation and teacher development.

Given recent evidence that teacher quality is very important for student achievement but unrelated to most observable teacher characteristics. Motivating teachers to perform well and attracting a pool of high-performing teachers are promising policies to improve student outcomes. The quest to improve public education has led policymakers and researchers to focus on how to increase teachers' effectiveness. Most studies as observed by Bryson, Freeman, Lucifora, Pellizzari and Perotin (2011) suggest that when firms have good performance measures, the employees will be motivated since pay is associated with improved terms and condition of service which result in higher productivity and better quality of the worker firm match. The impetus for this report is twofold. First, while there has been a lot of research done in recent years on the economic effects of incentive schemes, little is known about the patterns of performance related pay both within and across countries. A new wave of studies have used company-specific data to investigate the effects of the introduction of performance related schemes on some measure of employees' or establishments' performance shedding light on the "causal" effects of incentives on performance (Bryson et al, 2011).

One obvious means taken is compensation. According to Bett, Maria, Onyango and Bantu (2013), the traditional basis for teacher pay - years of service and education level - provides little incentive for excellence. To make teachers more effective, these critics argue that pay should be tied to performance. Teachers are likely to have an increased commitment towards their work (Bett et al, 2013). This study sought to demonstrate that effective use of reward system on teachers enhances teacher performance.

## **1.2. Statement of the problem**

Most school managers (headteachers) place very heavy demands on teachers to perform, sometimes employing unpleasant measures such as threats of transfer, non-recommendation for promotion, charge letters or job loss to bully teachers towards this end. Other measures taken include monetary incentives such as salary increment, rural and remote allowances, lunch and night out allowances when on duty, acting allowance together with responsibility allowances for teachers in leadership. Despite these measures teacher performance has still remained poor and most schools continue to wallow in an unpleasant atmosphere of academic obscurity, year in, year out. At national level the pass rate for Grade 12s remains below 55% (MESVTEE, 2015), this trend has become a major source of concern to the government and other stakeholders. Northern Province, being rural suffers most from poor performance of teachers exhibited through being consistently ranked among the least performing provinces (MoE, 2014). The province has persistently taken positions 9 and 10 out of the 10 provinces in Zambia. As Yamoah (2013) points out, Headteachers' quality of interaction with their staff provides a great amount of success, hence, Headteachers need to find more acceptable and orthodox measures of boosting their schools' performance. The problem was that we do not know the effects of reward system on teacher performance in Kasama district of Northern Province, Zambia.

## **1.3 Purpose of the study**

The present study sought to establish the effects of reward system towards enhancement of teacher's performance which is finally translated into good pupil performance.

## **1.4 Research objectives**

The general objective of the study is to evaluate the effect of reward system on the performance of teachers in Secondary Schools of Kasama District in Northern Province

- To assess the reward systems used in Secondary Schools of Kasama District.
- To establish the effect of reward system on the performance of Secondary School teachers in Kasama District.

- To assess the perceptions of teachers on reward system and its effects on teachers performance.

## **1.5 Research questions**

The study was guided by the following research questions:

- What reward systems are used in Secondary Schools of Kasama District in Northern Province.
- What is the effect of school based reward system on teachers' performance in Secondary Schools?
- How do teachers perceive reward system obtaining in Secondary Schools of Kasama District?

## **1.6 Significance of the study**

The study bears great importance to the school management bodies of secondary schools to realize the vitality of establishing sound reward system in their school so as to enhance effective teacher performance for realization of good results for their students. The study is also significant to the Headteachers and Parent Teachers Committee, to know the best way to motivate their teachers thus enhancing teacher performance. Lastly, the findings of study may also help employers (Ministry of Education) and policy makers to come up with informed policies or decisions on how reward system should be awarded.

## **1.7 Theoretical framework**

This study was based on Adam Stacy's Equity Theory of motivation and Victor Vroom's Expectancy Theory. The Equity Theory states that employees expect fairness when being rewarded for the work done. The theory was developed from the Hertzberg's job satisfaction theory and linked to the reward system by Adam Stacy. An important factor in employer's motivation is whether individuals perceive the reward structure as being fair. The Equity theory essentially refers to an employee's subjective judgment about the fairness of the reward she/he

got in comparison with the inputs (efforts, time, education, and experience) when compared with others in the organization. The Equity theory of motivation concerns on the people's perception and feelings on how they are treated as compared with others (Armstrong, 2004). The argument is that people work well in accordance to what they regard as fair. Employees consider whether management has treated them fairly, when they look at what they receive for the effort they have made. Maicibi (2003) agrees with this that employees expect rewards or outcomes to be broadly proportional to their effort. In this regard, Boddy (2008) give the formula below to illustrate the comparison.


$$\begin{aligned} \text{Input (A)} &= \text{Input (B)} \\ \text{Reward (A)} &= \text{Reward (B)} \end{aligned}$$

Employee A compares the ratio of his/her input to his/her reward to that of employee B. If he/she feels the ratios are similar, he/she is bound to be satisfied with the treatment received. If he/she feels inadequately treated, he or she is bound to be dissatisfied. This dissatisfaction is likely to breed tension and frustration in such employees and their consequent performance may be negatively affected and this may perhaps further lower rewards (Boddy, 2008). Much as Employees must be rewarded, employers' perception towards performance-based rewards can depend on many factors such as politically rewarding someone because of his/her political affiliation, circumstantial instances like one being in the right place at the right time and be rewarded with a high office position, it can be gender sensitivity, strategic, just because someone teaches well mathematics so it is assumed that he can equally teach physics, it can be ethical, personal, such as one being rewarded because of the relationship he/she has with the head teacher. The factors can even be policy based in that some schools are led and not managed but stagnant because there is a management blockage or poor management. The reasons can vary or be a combination of all the above and many more (Maicibi, 2003).

## **1.8 Conceptual framework**

Conceptual framework summarizes the relationship between the independent variable, which is reward systems, and the dependent variable that is, teacher performance.

**Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework showing the possible effect of reward systems on teacher performance**



**Source:** Based on Herzberg's (1966) two factor theory

Figure 2.1 above has independent variables being qualifications, experience, promotion, incentives and merit based awards while the dependent variable is teacher performance. The framework given above looks at the factors that enhance teacher performance. The traditional reward systems that exist in organisations include qualifications, experience, promotion, incentives and occasionally the merit based awards. It is expected that effective application of motivational factors would definitely enhance teacher performance. Many of these factors have been implemented in the education system but still performance of teacher is quite poor (MoE, 2014). This research study was undertaken to assess the reward systems applied in the education system in Zambia and assess their effects on the performance secondary schools teachers.

## **1.9 Scope of the study**

The study covered the period between 2010 - 2015. This period was chosen by the researcher because it was the period when incentives became the talk of the day as a way of enhancing teacher performance in Zambia. The research to be conducted was on the effectiveness of school based reward system on the performance of teachers in Secondary Schools, in Kasama district of Northern Province. In total the study covered 102 respondents; these included: 84 teachers, 3 headteachers and 15 Heads of Department.

## **1.10 Delimitations of the Study**

The study was delimited to the secondary schools in Kasama district of Northern Province. Only secondary schools were selected because the study was interested in finding out how some rural secondary schools had proved to be successful through the use of performance-based reward system compared to other secondary schools. The sampled schools were confined to one province so as to avoid sample differences resulting from differences in administrative and selection policies among Provinces.

## **1.11 Limitations**

Conducting a research at one private school under study that seemingly had lower salaries, posed a problem when it came to focus group discussion, respondents tried not to disclose information but through research techniques and observation it was curbed. Secondly, due to financial and time constraints the sample used was quite small; however it enhanced the deeper understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. It is less wonder, Snider (2010) rightly noted that though numbers were impressive, they unfortunately, concealed a lot more than they revealed.

While it is most unlikely that the results of the study could be representative of all Zambian secondary schools, considering the scale and population of this study, useful insights about school improvement which could be applied elsewhere have been generated.

## 1.12 Operational definitions of terms

Key terms used in this study had the following meanings:

**Challenge** - Constraints or hardships schools face in their effort to secure high achievement for all pupils.

**Implementation** - This refers to execution or operationalisation of a strategic plan so that it guides the day-to-day activities of the school. It also involves monitoring and evaluation to determine the extent to which objectives are being met.

**Motivation** - is a set of courses concerned with a kind of strength that boosts performance and directs towards towards accomplishing some definite targets (Khan, Farooq & Ullah, 2010).

**Performance** - refers to the results of activities of an organization or investment over a period of Time (Slotnick & Smith, 2004).

**Reward** – refer to any contingently that may deliver a consequence such as an activity, event, or any object that may be associated with an increase in the future likelihood of a defined behaviour in a similar situation (Horner, 2009).

**School effectiveness** - The degree to which a school manages to meet its expected goal of ensuring the achievement of all its pupils in national examinations, regardless of its internal organisation or contextual position.

## 1.13 Ethical considerations

Regarding issues of ethical nature, confidentiality was maintained by keeping the names of respondents anonymous. Consent was too obtained from the participants before allowing them to participate in the study or taking their photos. Secondly, a clearance from the Ethical Committee under the University of Zambia was sourced. Permission to carry out the study was also sourced from the Institute of Distance Education, University of Zambia. The aspect of confidentiality communicated to all respondents and their response was taken note of using numbers instead of their names.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.0 Overview**

This chapter, reviews different literature of different scholars, about reward system. The literature reviews gives a brief discussion on the importance of motivation in form of reward system on teacher performance to give the readers the study focus.

#### **2.1 Theoretical Perspectives of Performance of Teachers**

Teacher's job performance is a concern of everybody in the society. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines performance as —the act or process of carrying out something or execution of an action or a repetitive act or fulfillment or implementation (Hornby, 2000). The influence of teachers teaching effectiveness on the learning outcome of students as measured by students' academic performance has been the subject of several studies (Adediwura & Tayo, 2007).

Reward system usually involves some objective assessment of schools' or teachers' efforts or success or some measure of their students' performance. Reward system pay schemes have many variable features. They can compensate teachers only for their own performance or they can be structured as a team incentive program, with group performance determining the total incentive payment, which is then divided among team members regardless of individual performance. The group can include all of the school's teachers or a subgroup, such as the teachers of a given grade or a specific subject. Reward system pay schemes can, but need not, involve sanctions for below-threshold performance. Lavy (2007) observes that though monetary rewards are the most common incentive in performance-related pay, other incentives can include reduced teaching load, promotion, and public recognition of outstanding teachers. The reward can be just a one-time event or it can be ongoing, leading to a permanent salary increase. It can be based on a relative criterion (for example, the average test score gain of a teacher's class relative to the classes of other teachers) or on an absolute criterion (such as the class average test score being

higher than a predetermined threshold). The reward may be a fixed sum that is equal for all winners, or it can vary and increase with the winner's level of achievement. The total amount of awards may be predetermined (for example, only a certain number of teachers can win an award) or it may be open (Lavy, 2007).

The influence of teachers teaching effectiveness on the learning outcome of students as measured by students' academic performance has been the subject of several studies (Susan, 2012). The above studies suggest that effective teaching is a significant predictor of students' academic achievement. Therefore, effective teachers should produce students of higher academic performance. Poor academic performance of students in Zambia has been linked to poor teachers' performance in terms of accomplishing the teaching task, negative attitude to work, low salaries and poor teaching habits, which have been attributed to poor motivation (ECZ, 2014). It has also been observed that conditions that would make effective teaching such as resources available to teachers, general conditions of infrastructure as well as instructional materials in secondary schools are poor in most Zambian public secondary schools (Mwanza, 2004). These prevailing conditions would definitely show a negative influence on the instructional quality in schools both private and public schools, which may translate to poor academic performance, attitude and values of secondary school teachers.

These prevailing conditions would definitely show a negative influence on the instructional quality in private and government schools, which may translate to poor academic performance, attitude and values of secondary school teachers (Starr, 2002). Although teachers' strong effect would significantly influence students' academic achievement, other factors such as socio-economic background, family support, intellectual aptitude of student, personality of student, self- confidence, and previous instructional quality have been found to also influence students' examination score either positively or negatively. To this end, Blankstein (1996) had stated that students' grades and test scores are not good indicators of the quality of teachers' instruction. In support of this view, a study carried out in Nigeria by Joshua et al. (2006) showed that Nigerian teachers condemn the use of student achievement scores as indicators of teachers' competence, performance or effectiveness.

Since students' academic scores are not the only predictors of teachers' effectiveness, researchers have sought other fairer ways of evaluating teachers' effectiveness. Students, administrators, colleagues and the teachers' self-evaluation have been used to evaluate teachers'

effectiveness. Students' competence in the evaluation of the effectiveness of their teachers has been of great concern to researchers in education. However, studies have shown that students' ratings are valuable indicators of teachers' effectiveness (Barnett et al. 2003). Despite the fact that there are research reports in support of students' rating of their teachers' effectiveness, Nuhfer (2004) warned that students rating should be one of a comprehensive evaluation system and should never be the only measure of teachers' effectiveness.

In theory, Lavy (2007) observes that reward system based on output has two advantages over input-based pay in terms of efficiency (that is, producing "more" education for the same cost). The first, most frequently noted efficiency advantage has to do with incentives. For example, a teacher might fail to assign homework even though she knows its value for her students because correcting and grading assignments involves more work for herself or himself. Individual Reward system provides some incentive for the teacher to do the "right thing." The second efficiency advantage of out put based pay, mainly relevant for the merit pay model, involves sorting and selection. Assuming that the compensation system accurately identifies productivity, basing pay on performance, will attract and retain the most productive teachers.

## **2.2 Types of Reward systems**

In the DEST Research Paper (2007) about Performance-based rewards for teachers, there were mainly three main types of performance-based reward systems identified and they included:

In knowledge and skill-based compensation schemes, teachers are compensated for the acquisition of specific knowledge and skills required to meet higher expectations for performance. This might be in the form of formal certification or undertaking specific professional development units. Another example might be taking on additional work such as mentoring or curriculum development. The second type of reward is Merit Pay, "Pay for performance" or "Performance pay", adjusts salaries upward or provides compensation for higher levels of performance. A standard for individual performance is set, such as increased student achievement. If a teacher meets or exceeds this standard, they receive a bonus or a salary increase (Alam, 2011)). The main argument in favor of merit pay is that it can foster individual motivation by recognizing effort, achievement and rewarding it in a concrete way.

Adeyemi (2010) also acknowledge that team-based performance rewards is another reward system that is applied but is less common, and is normally associated with completing a particular task or project, or achieving a prescribed performance target. Conflicts and lack of best in-put from individuals was observed.

It must be emphasized that individual performance-related pay schemes can either base the whole of the individual’s pay on one’s performance, or affect only a performance-related bonus in addition to a fixed wage or salary. Kirimi, Gikunda, Obara, and Kibett (2013) concurs with the current educational reform discussions around the globe which regularly include the idea of paying teachers based on how they perform in advancing their students’ educational achievement. From a theoretical viewpoint, performance-related pay may elicit both incentive effects – raising motivation and effort of current teachers who strive to increase their pay – and sorting effects – attracting graduates into the teaching profession who expect to do well under performance-based compensation schemes (Kirimi et al, 2013).

### **2.3 Effects of Reward System**

The first international example of an individual- based program is an experiment, begun in fifty high schools in Israel in December 2000, that offered teachers a bonus based on student achievement. The experiment included all English, Hebrew, Arabic, and mathematics teachers who taught tenth- to twelfth-grade classes in preparation for matriculation examinations in these subjects in June 2001. Each teacher was ranked separately on the basis of the mean performance of each class she taught. All students on these lists were included in the class mean outcomes. Students who dropped out or did not take the exams, regardless of the reason, were imputed a score of zero to neutralize any incentive for teachers to keep poorly performing students out of the tests. All teachers who performed better than predicted in both passing rate and average score were ranked from first to fourth place and awarded points according to ranking. The awards, based on total points, ranged from 6 to 25 percent of the average annual income of high school teachers. A teacher could win several awards if she prepared more than one class for a matriculation examination (MoE, 2000). Of the 629 teachers in the program, 302 won awards.

According to Lavy, (2004) analysis, the program found that it significantly improved matriculation examination participation rates as well as the passing rate and average test scores among those who took the test. These gains accounted for about half of the improved outcomes among all students. They appear to have resulted from changes in teaching methods, afterschool teaching, and increased responsiveness to students' needs, not from artificial inflation or manipulation of test scores.

Besides that, there is some evidence that financial incentives matters to teachers. The intrinsic rewards of helping students reach their potential are important, but teachers' career decisions can be tied to financial incentives. This is clearly true upon entry to the profession. Jennifer Steele of the RAND Corporation and co-authors Richard Murnane and John Willett, both of Harvard University, found that a California program offering a \$20,000 incentive for academically talented novice teachers to work in low-performing schools for at least four years increased their probability of them taking such a position by 23 percentage points (Steele, Murnane & Willett, 2009).

In addition, when departing teachers were asked what schools could do to encourage teachers to remain in the profession, 69.9 percent of teachers in high-poverty urban schools and 64.8 percent of teachers in high-poverty rural schools suggested increasing salaries (Ingersoll, 2004). So it seems that while difficult working conditions may lead to dissatisfaction, teachers believe that higher salaries can help to compensate for some of these challenges. It is further observed that remuneration rewards are the most significant factors influencing people not to choose teaching as a career, and to leave the profession, OECD, Paris, (2005). So this implies that performance based rewards play a significant role on the performance of teachers in secondary schools. Reward system seems to be a plausible way both to motivate teachers to direct effort at performance goals and to attract and retain teachers who are high performers.

The other evidence on the effects of teacher performance pay stems from a set of recent experimental studies performed in Israel, Kenya, and India. We find that students in countries that adjust teacher salaries for outstanding performance in teaching perform about 25 percent of a standard deviation higher on the international math test than students in countries without teacher performance pay, after controlling extensively for student, school, and country measures (Lazear (2003).

A study by Bennell (2004) in Sub Saharan Africa noted that incentives for schools and teachers in the public education system to perform well are frequently weak due to ineffective incentives and sanctions. This was particularly the case when teachers could not be effectively disciplined for unacceptable behaviour (absenteeism, lateness, poor teaching, abusive behaviour towards pupils) by school managements and not all promotions were related to a teacher's actual performance. This situation was also revealed by Carron (1996) who also observed that where teacher pay was very low, there was normally de facto recognition that the labour process in schools had to be organized in such a way that it gave teachers the autonomy to generate additional income. Generally most managers also engage in these survival activities. The usual trend has been that you get what you pay for, which is not very much when pay does not meet minimum livelihood needs.

From the above discussion it can be noted clearly that reward system is meant to solve the two fold problem of motivating high teacher performance while attracting and retaining good teachers under conditions where their effort or ability is not readily measured or observed. In Zambia teachers are subjected to appraisals by their immediate supervisors for a salary increase. This method has proved a failure because almost everyone gets notched. There is a lot of subjectivity (nepotism, favouritism and corruption to mention a few) in the appraisals done by their supervisors leading to frustration of many performing teachers. To curb the problem of poor performance, effective implementation of reward system based on consistent production of quality results, will be the only authentic method that honour deserving teachers. Critics of traditional pay like Kituyi, Musau and Thinguri (2014) argue that schemes which reward experience and formal qualifications instead of performance argue that such schemes are unfair to highly motivated, effective, and efficient teachers whose extra efforts are not rewarded. Finally, reward system may increase support for public education from politicians and members of the public who are convinced that the reform will reverse the education sector's poor reputation and perceived inefficient use of resources (Kituyi, 2014).

The DEST Research Paper report (2007) does however suggest that the lack of financial recognition of teaching performance is a likely contributor to teachers leaving the profession especially those with attractive job prospects elsewhere. This in the end leads to teachers behaving unethically.

On contrary, DEST Research Paper (2007) quoted Harvey-Beavis (2003) noting some reasons against performance based rewards. The following are typical of the issues raised in opposition to performance pay: Reward system may be seen as a means of containing salary costs by reducing automatic progression through salary levels, Reward system requires investment in terms of both time and money. Time is required to plan, introduce and run the scheme (e.g. undertaking staff appraisals and training managers in its operation). The financial costs of reward system are often underestimated, thus undermining its effective implementation. Reward system encourage competition rather than collaboration among teachers. Many would argue that the concept of individual merit is at odds with the collegiate approach of effective schools, stifling collaboration and creating conflict and tension in the school environment.

## **2.4 Perception of Teachers on Reward System**

The idea of reward system and its influence on teacher performance has been understood differently. Some see it a viable programme to enhance teacher performance while others see it to promote individualism other than cooperation. The following are the perceptions of teachers for and against the effectiveness of reward system.

### **2.4.1 Arguments Supporting Performance-Based Rewards**

Under most current systems of a salary scale, teachers are rewarded for the number of years spent teaching and the number of tertiary degrees, rather than their performance (Odden, 2000a). For this reason, many analysts believe the salary scale system determines teacher compensation on incomplete criteria. For example, Lavy (2009) argues that any non-merit-based system is unfair for exceptional teachers because they are judged on an inefficient criterion. This will cause, it is argued, talented teachers to leave the education system because excellence is not fairly rewarded (Odden, 2001). Only when performance is rewarded and teachers command salaries equal to the private sector without having to progress up an arbitrary salary scale, will the best talent be attracted and retained.

Another good example is from the case of Israel. Lavy (2002a) finds that an Israeli program providing teachers individual cash prizes for increases in student test scores on a high-school matriculation exam increased high school matriculation exam rates from 42% to 45.3%. At 60% to 300% of the average monthly salary, the prizes given in this case were much larger than those in most teacher incentive programs in the U.S. Koretz (2002) also discovered that a teacher incentives program in Kentucky had significant positive impacts (0.5 to 0.6 standard deviations) on the test used to determine rewards for teachers but much smaller effects (0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations) on another test that was not tied to the rewards.

According to Armstrong (2009), money as a reward incentive is out rightly a powerful motivating force due to its direct or indirect link to the satisfaction of many needs. Some of the reasons given for the preference of monetary tokens by teachers for example were the harsh economic times that made welcome any additional cent. Teachers also mentioned that they enjoyed the freedom to use the money as they acquired what they pleased from a place of their own choice. Armstrong (2009) for instance, observed that money in itself may have no intrinsic meaning to an individual but it acquires significant motivating power because of the so many intangible goals it may symbolize.

One of the largest benefits reported by proponents of performance-based rewards is an increase in the motivation of teachers. It is argued that reward system increases teacher motivation by adequately rewarding productivity gains. This perspective links the attitude of teachers to student outcomes, by arguing that motivation and skill of the teacher determine salaries, teacher quality will be improved. A reward system that focuses on mutual respect, Lindbald (2008) for instance observes, increases employee retention, performance productivity and morale. A good reward system therefore, that is mutually agreed upon between the staff and the school principal, fulfills this need as teachers feel that their efforts are appreciated, recognized and respected. According to Horner (2009), high performing employees add value to the company, hence the need to recognize their efforts, worth and contributions through rewarding them appropriately. Highly motivated teachers for instance, who are also passionate about quality output from their schools are a huge treasure to any school and hence, everything should be done to retain them including putting in place an attractive school based reward system.

In summary, the main arguments in favor of performance-based rewards are: the current system is unfair and rewards experience instead of performance; school administration would improve, especially when school-based compensation programmes are implemented; teacher motivation would improve, with an emphasis on knowledge and skill and school-based reward models in the literature; teacher co-operation would improve, which is presented as an argument in support of school based reward programmes.

#### **2.4.2 Arguments Opposing Performance-Based Rewards**

A wide body of literature criticizes the evaluation procedures of performance-based rewards. In this literature it is argued that goals are hard or impossible to establish in teaching because key education outcomes have not been identified, and this necessarily reduces goal clarity (Chaudhary, 2014). One problem evident, it is argued, is the complexity of designing a programme that balances clarity of goals and diverse evaluation criteria, since clear criteria are required to measure productivity gains. Rather, it is argued, teacher commitment and knowledge is often a better guide for good instruction than observing and assessing their performance.

Some analysts argue that the performance of a student is beyond the control of a teacher. Rather than viewing the teacher as a single actor, the vital roles played by the school, the principal, and the family should be acknowledged. This means the 'cause' of educational achievement is difficult to establish, and includes numerous actors, not simply teachers (Evans, 2001). Confounding this problem, it is argued that, the best teachers are often given classes that perform lowest academically, and may therefore be punished under a performance-based payment system (Evans, 2001). Even the recent efforts to establish 'value-added' evaluation criteria are considered problematic because they are in the embryonic stages of development, and there are clear socio-economic and racial biases in these systems (Clotfelter et al, 2008).

It is argued that proper employee evaluation requires an equal participation and relationship between the key participants. When pay is linked to performance, any equality is undermined because there is inevitably a judgmental aspect that makes this equal relationship obsolete (Cutler & Waine, 2000). Teachers, on one hand, use evaluation as a formative process, allowing

them to see how they are performing, and how they can improve. Administrators, on the other hand, use evaluation for summation, which considers evaluation as a process used to gauge teachers worth. This is supported by Murnane and Cohen (1986) who argued that principals in the 1980s United States school system were found to prefer giving better evaluations than the teachers actually deserved to build trust between the administrators and the teaching staff, and also as a form of formative evaluation. Thus, it is argued that a functioning professional relationship between the principal and the teachers would be undermined by the use of performance-based rewards.

It is also argued by the American Federation for Teachers (2001) that, morale can be reduced because merit pay creates unfair competition between teachers. Teachers who have not been rewarded can question the fairness of evaluation, as there are frequently no transparent criteria. Even if the evaluation process is completed accurately and fairly, teachers may still feel aggrieved if they are not considered competent (Woessmann, 2010) and new hierarchies can be evident in administrators who now have power over teachers and the curriculum).

A large body of literature argues that reward systems have a negative effect on teacher collegiality. For example, Chamberlin, et al. (2002) argues that competition amongst teachers, in a profession where co-operation is essential, undermines any attempt to introduce performance-based rewards. The American Federation of Teachers (AFT, 2001), a United States teacher union, argues that previous programmes created divisions between teachers, as they were classified as either 'winners' or 'losers' (see also, Storey, 2000). It is argued that even when a school-based system is used, collegiality is adversely affected, sometimes because limited funding means the average reward is often so small it is meaningless (Malen, 1999), sometimes because of the 'free rider' problem. The 'free rider' problem occurs when some teachers who are not contributing to the outcomes of students are rewarded because of others' actions (Cutler & Waine, 2000).

The other concern is that poorly performing students may suffer under a performance-based reward system because they may require significant tuition to improve. Teachers would focus a disproportionately large amount of their time on the students most likely to gain from their tuition to maximize the benefit derived, generally argued to be the middle band of students (Murnane & Cohen, 1986). Evans (2001) questions how this would affect schools in low socio-

economic areas, since the time needed for improved student outcomes may be substantial. While a school-based reward strategy provides an incentive for the most poorly performing students to be encouraged and improved, teachers may still concentrate their efforts on those students who are most likely to cross a threshold. The highest and lowest performing students may be neglected because they do not represent a quality investment of teachers' time (Chamberlin, et al., 2002). In the same manner, if poorly performing schools are underfunded, a school-based strategy will not work until additional funds and expertise are provided (Malen, 1999).

In summary, the main arguments in opposition to performance-based rewards are: objective evaluation of teachers is difficult, it would create hierarchies within school administration which would detrimentally affect student outcomes, which is particularly the case for individual forms of performance-based rewards; the incentive system would not motivate teachers; there would be reduced co-operation between teachers, which is presented as an argument primarily in opposition to merit-pay; and a range of unwanted and perverse outcomes would be promoted, which is presented as an argument against using student outcomes as a measure of teacher performance.

It would be an expensive programme, which is presented as an argument against all systems of Performance-based rewards that offer a significant financial reward; and the market is an inadequate model for the public sector, which is used as an argument against any model of performance-based rewards. In general, merit-pay is the most contentious system of performance-based rewards, but there is also concern with skill and knowledge and school based models.

## **2.5 Challenges in implementation of Performance-Based Rewards**

The literature consistently argues that one of the major difficulties in the implementation of performance-based reward systems has been the existence of teacher unions who have been strong opponents of these programmes (McCullum, 2001). Schools are typically highly unionized workplaces, and teacher unions have traditionally rejected movements towards merit pay (AFT, 2003). Wage differentiations on the basis of subject taught, and any sort of subjective evaluation of teachers for rewards has been rejected outright, possibly because of existing collective bargaining strategies (Ballou & Podgursky, 2001). Typically, unions employ a range

of arguments to reject attempts to introduce reward systems, particularly focusing on doubts about accurate evaluation of teachers. Hassel (2002) also observes that by lobbying legislatures against merit pay, unions have frequently changed the shape of systems or reduced the number and frequency of performance-based reward programmes. This clearly indicates that teacher unions can exert strong influences on school reform. This means radical reforms can be difficult to implement where union presence exists.

Contemporary efforts to introduce performance-based rewards therefore have to consider unions before implementation. However, this has been possible, as there are a group of teacher unions in the United States who now support the Consortium for Research and Policy in Education's (CRPE) efforts to introduce knowledge and skills based pay (Odden, 2000b).

Another reported reason for the failure of performance-based reward system is the apparent opposition of teachers. Ballou and Podgursky (1993) argue teachers have been opponents of reward system. Explanations for this opposition vary widely, with some attributing this opposition to the reduction of autonomy of teachers because of constraints on their teaching style and outputs. When teachers' autonomy is threatened, they are likely to respond negatively which may impact on student outcomes (Lorna et al, 2010).

Furthermore, Malen (1999) argues there is a fundamental tension between the policy makers and the public, and teachers, since the most attractive component of performance-based pay with policy makers and the public has been the individual and differentiated selection criteria, whereas teachers often have deep-seated concern about the fairness of individual evaluation. This is also one of the most common concerns cited within the literature, which suggests that there is a conflict between past programmes of individual performance-based rewards, and teacher motivation (Lorna et al, 2010).

There is however some concern that the evaluation process could be seen as unfair or inadequate. This means performance-based rewards system is considered to be difficult to administer objectively and fairly (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). Unsurprisingly, performance-based rewards are reported to be more popular when it is viewed as supplementing, rather than replacing, other forms of salary (Hassel, 2002).

Implementation can be difficult because any one of the implementing bodies can discontinue programmes. For example, Ballou (2001) argues legislators, school superintendents and school boards all have the power to discontinue performance-based reward programmes in the United

States. As supporting legislators leave office, the political will to continue what can be a costly enterprise can disappear, particularly in times of economic recession (McCollum, 2001). As UNESCO (2006) argues, in times of economic recession it can be difficult to implement new performance-based strategies, and existing programmes come under political attack. One possible explanation is the dollar costs of these programmes are more easily measured than the more vague benefits in student outcomes, so a cost-benefit analysis cannot be completed easily by policymakers (Chamberlin, et al., 2002).

However, it has also been argued that previous financial bonuses have been comparatively small, which undermine the motivational value of the programmes. A great deal of literature has noted that the rewards offered have not been enough of an incentive to change teacher behavior (Malen, 1999). The money rewarded has been limited and this has meant that arbitrary quotas were often established which provided only small incentives to a majority of practitioners (Chamberlin, et al., 2002). Further problems can occur when there is a belief that teachers will not get rewards even for increased performance. This problem has been highlighted in several studies, including the Kentucky and Charlotte-Mecklenburg programmes, with skepticism about future reward bonuses evident in even well-established Programmes (Kelley, Heneman and Milanowski, 2002).

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Overview**

This chapter describes the frame work within which the research was conducted. The chapter presents the research design, study population, sample size and sampling techniques, data collection instruments, validity and reliability of research instruments, procedure and data analysis.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

The study used a cross-sectional survey design adopting qualitative methodology to a smaller extent and quantitative method. The researcher chose this research design because of its advantages in obtaining data; it is also the simplest and least cost alternative compared to longitudinal (Neumann, 2003). According to Fowler, Floyd and Cosenza (2008), cross-sectional research can be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory. Babbie (2007) shares the same views by stating that there are three purposes of social research, exploration, description and explanation each of them with different purposes for the research design. The study was both qualitative and quantitative.

According to Creswell et al. (2009), qualitative research helps in getting an in-depth analysis of the problem under investigation and qualitative research was applied in order to describe current conditions or to investigate relationships, including effects relationships. The study will use both qualitative in form off interviews and quantitative method in form of questionnaire. The qualitative method will be used in order to verify and further probe quantitative data provided by the respondents in the questionnaires to authenticate the findings. The researcher will also use both primary and secondary data. Primary data would be obtained using questionnaires while secondary data will be obtained from the internet, reports, articles, journals, dissertations, thesis, books and newspapers.

### **3.2 Study Area**

The study area was Kasama District with 15 secondary schools of which two (2) are grant mission aided schools, thirteen (13) government (public) schools and one (1) private school (Data from the District Education Office). The study area was considered appropriate because of the low performance of teachers despite the strict supervisory measures instituted by district and school administrators.

### **3.3 Study Population**

The population under study focused on secondary school teachers, heads of department and Headteachers. This population was chosen because it was assumed to have adequate knowledge of the subject matter under investigation and the research variables under investigation.

### **3.4 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques**

The sample size was 102 participants of which 84 were teachers, 15 Heads of Department and 3 Headteachers. Three secondary schools were used in the study, these included a government school, one mission grant aided school and lastly one private school. The purposive sampling technique was used to select head teachers in order to get in depth information about the problem under study. In addition, stratified random was used to select teachers and Heads of Departments since this category of respondents comprised of a big number. According to Aday and Llewellyn (2006), purposive sampling is a sampling technique where the researcher consciously decides who to include in the sample. The technique is used to collect focused information. The technique was chosen because it saves time and money.

**Table 1: Sample size description**

<b>Category of Participants</b>	<b>Sample size</b>
Head teachers (Key informants)	3
Heads of Department (Purposive sampling)	15
Teachers (Random sampling)	84
<b>Total</b>	<b>102</b>

**3.5 Research Instruments**

The research used primary data which was collected using self-administered questionnaires to get information from teachers and guiding questions (interview guide) were designed for focus group discussions with heads of departments and Headteachers. For the purpose of this research, and in order to achieve the objectives, data was collected using both primary and secondary data. The secondary data which - include dissertations, journals, articles, books and magazines - contributed towards the formation of background information, needed by both the researcher in order to build constructively the project and for the reader to comprehend more thoroughly the survey outcome. Primary data, which is the actual information derived from the respondents, was collected using a questionnaire and interviews.

**Self-administered Questionnaire**

This researcher used self-administered questionnaires for the respondents. These were distributed among the teachers in their respective schools. The justification for using this instrument is that

questionnaires are easy to quantify and analyze. In addition, the questionnaire was used because the study focused on opinions, attitudes, feelings and perceptions of teachers.

## **Interviews**

An interview guide consisting of structured questions was designed and administered to the head teachers. Information solicited by this instrument helped the researcher enhance responses from the self-administered questionnaires and made it possible for the researcher to cross examine some key issues in the research. The choice of this instrument was made because it was considered a good method for producing data which dealt with the topic in depth. Interviewing was also a good method for producing data based on informants' priorities, opinions and ideas. Informants had the opportunities to expand their ideas, explain their views and identify what they regard as the crucial factors.

### **3.4.3 Focus Group Discussion**

One focus group discussion composed of 5 heads of department was organized at each of the three secondary schools under study to capture views of supervisors regarding the effects of reward system on teacher performance. A focus group discussion checklist was used to guide the discussion. A sample focus group discussion checklist is attached to this study as appendix B.

## **3.5 Data Collection Procedure**

The collection of data was from April to May, 2016. Upon obtaining written permission from the District Education Board Secretary (DEBS), of Kasama district, the researcher proceeded with administering questionnaires and obtaining data from the selected schools. This was done headteachers with the assurance that the data collected from their schools through sampled teachers, heads of department and the headteachers would purely be for academic purposes and that information given in the questionnaires would be strictly confidential.

### **3.6 Data Processing and Management**

This section looks at the manner in which the qualitative and quantitative data collected was processed to get good meaning out of it.

#### **3.6.1 Qualitative Data**

All the qualitative data collected from key informants was edited on a continuous basis to ensure completeness. Data collected with the use of interview schedules was put into meaningful and exhaustive categories. Content analysis was the main method of analyzing the data collected. Data collected was categorized according to emerging variables from each question in the interview guide. The percentage number of respondents according to variables such as; sex, age, type of reward and so on were computed and presented using tables. The effect of reward system on the performance of teachers was established using Pearson Product Moment statistical method.

#### **3.6.2 Quantitative Data**

Data collected at the end of each day, was checked to ensure regularity and accuracy; this was useful in ensuring that the objectives of the study were being addressed. Analysis was done according to the objectives of the study, data generated by questionnaires was cleaned, edited and coded before analysis was done; then analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) program. Summary statistics in form of qualitative and quantitative measures, frequencies and percentages were run and interpretations were made. Finally, conclusions and recommendations were derived as presented in Chapter 5. Triangulation of these methods was correlated to improve on the validity and richness of the information gathered.

### **3.7 Data quality control**

Validity and reliability of the research instrument was measured as follows:

### **3.7.1 Validity**

Copies of the questionnaire consisting the objectives of the study were given to two research supervisors to find out whether the instruments measured what it was meant to measure and also check on the phrasing, understandability and wording of the statements. Content validity index (C.V.I) was used to establish whether the questionnaire measured what it was to measure.

### **3.7.2 Reliability**

Reliability is the extent to which the measuring instruments will produce consistent scores when the same groups of individuals are repeatedly measured under the same conditions (Amin, 2005). The study administered one type of questionnaire to teachers and using Cronbach reliability test, Alpha values of 0.752 were attained implying that the tool was suitable for assessing the effect of performance-based reward system on teacher performance in secondary schools of Kasama District.

### **3.8 Ethical issues**

At the onset of data collection, the researcher sought permission of the District Education Board Secretary (Appendix III) who introduced the researcher to the head teachers. The head teachers also introduced the researcher to the teachers. In addition, each questionnaire contained an opening introductory letter requesting for the respondents cooperation in providing the required information for the study. The respondents were further assured of confidentiality of the information provided and that the study findings were to be used for academic purposes only. Respondents were further assured of their personal protection and that they had authority to refuse or accept to be interviewed.

### **Summary**

The next chapter discusses the findings of the study. The presentation and analysis of data was therefore based on the effective sample of 102 respondents. The sample is composed of 15 heads of department, 3 head teachers as well as 84 teachers and the documentary evidence the researcher got access to.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

#### 4.0 Overview

This chapter reviews the findings from the study about the effects of reward system on the performance of teachers in the secondary schools of Kasama districts. The study intended to establish the types of reward systems used and their effects on the performance of teachers in secondary schools of Kasama district. The research questions of the study were to identify the types of reward systems used in secondary schools of Kasama district and to establish the effect of the reward systems on the performance of teachers. In this section the results of empirical analysis are presented.

#### 4.1 Demographic characteristics of Respondents

The study put into account the sex of the respondents and their academic qualification which were considered relevant to this study. Table 4.1 presents the background information of respondents.

**Table 4.1: Sex Distributions of Respondents**

		<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Valid	Male	64	62.5
	Female	38	37.5
	Total	<b>102</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 4.1 is about the sex distributions of the respondents. It is evident from this gender frequency distribution table that the majority of respondents were males at (62.5%) while

(37.5%) were females. This tentatively implies that secondary schools in Kasama district have mainly more male teachers than female teachers.

**Table 4.2: Respondents by Age**

Age range of teachers	Frequency	Percent (%)
26 - 30 Years	10	10
31 - 35 Years	15	15
36 - 40 Years	18	17
Above 41 Years	59	58
<b><u>Total</u></b>	<b><u>102</u></b>	<b><u>100</u></b>

Table 4.2 shows respondents by age in years. Out of the 102 respondents, only 10% of the teachers were in the age group of 26 – 30 years, 15% of the respondents were in the age range of 31 – 35 years, respondents within the age group of 36 – 40 years were 17% and lastly the majority of the respondents, 58%, belonged to the group that was above 41 years. Since the majority of the respondents were above 41 years it made the study more reliable because they were the ones that experienced and understand the effect of reward system on their performance.

**Table 4.3 Respondents by work experience**

<b>Work Experience (Years)</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
0 – 4 years	15	15
5 – 10 years	23	22
11 – 15 years	26	25
16 – 20 years	20	20
21 – 25 years	5	5
Above 26 years	13	13
	<b>102</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 4.3 shows the respondent's work experience in the school. The results indicated that the majority were in the category of 11-15 years represented by 25% of the total respondents followed by category 5 – 10 with 22%. The third category is 16 – 20 years with 20%. Fourth category is 0 – 4 years with 15% and category 21 - 25 years with 5% taking fifth place. The last category that with above 26 years, had 13%. The majority of the respondents were between 11 - 15 years of teaching experience, hence, had enough very valuable information with regard the influence of reward system on teacher performance. The category of teachers with above 26 years of teaching experience came mostly from the private school. This was necessitated by the low salaries that could not attract the middle age group, except retirees who took the offer as part-time job to keep themselves occupied.

**Table 4.4 Respondents by Levels of Education**

		<u>Name of the school</u>			<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
		<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>		
<u>What is your highest teaching qualification?</u>	Certificate	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>
	Diploma	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>30</u>
	Degree	<u>26</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>60</u>
	Masters Degree	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
<b>Total</b>		<b><u>32</u></b>	<b><u>52</u></b>	<b><u>18</u></b>	<b><u>102</u></b>	<b><u>100</u></b>

Results in Table 4.4 revealed that the majority of the respondents (60%) from government and grant aided secondary schools had University Bachelor's degrees followed by Diploma holders with 30%. Certificate holders were at 8%, such were found at the private school (C). Percentage for Masters degree holders was at 2%. Only one teacher (a headteacher) had a masters degree.

The first research question was -

#### **4.2 What reward systems are used in Secondary Schools of Kasama District in Northern Province?**

This section gives the answers to the first research question that sought to find out the types of reward systems used in Secondary Schools of Kasama District in Northern Province. Below are the responses from all the participants concerning the reward systems that prevailed at the three secondary schools under study.

**Table 4.5 Rewards Available at Secondary School A**

<b>Types of Reward System</b>	<b>Number of Participants</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Certificate of Merit	2	<u>6%</u>
Social Care in material form	21	<u>64%</u>
Promotion	4	<u>12%</u>
Monetary reward based on performance	33	<u>100%</u>

Participants in the study as indicated in table 4.5 show that there were four reward systems namely: Certificate of merit, Social care in material form, Promotion and Monetary reward based on performance. The most prevalent type of reward used at secondary school A was Monetary reward based on performance (100%), followed by social care (64%), while promotion as a reward system was as low as 12% and lastly certificate of merit was at 6%.

Below is the table showing the rewards available at secondary school B.

**Table 4.6 Rewards Available at Secondary School B**

<b>Types of Reward System</b>	<b>Number of Participants</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Certificate of Merit	8	<u>15%</u>
Social Care in material form	6	<u>11%</u>
Promotion	5	<u>9%</u>
Monetary reward based on performance	32	<u>59%</u>

Table 4.6 reveals that at secondary school B there were four forms of rewards used to motivate teacher performance. These were Certificate of Merit, Social Care, Promotion and the Monetary Reward based on performance. The most dominant reward was monetary reward based on performance (59%), followed by certificate of merit (15%). Social care was at 11% while promotion, noted to be the most unpopular reward, was at 8%.

Secondary school C had only two forms of reward system as shown in the table below.

**Table 4.7 Rewards Available at Secondary School C**

<b>Types of Reward System</b>	<b>Number of Participants</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Contract Renewal	15	<u>100</u>
Salary Increment	15	<u>100</u>


Secondary school C had only two forms of rewards, as shown in table 4.7, given to deserving teachers that produced good results that were above 75% pass. These were salary increment (100%) and contract renewal (100%).

The second research question was -

### **4.3 What is the effect of school based reward system on teachers' performance in Secondary Schools?**

The second research question was on effects of reward system on teacher performance. The following were the findings from the respondents in the three secondary schools under study. It must be noted that performance-based reward system was introduced at Secondary School A in 2010. Evidence supporting the effects of reward system on teacher performance can be observed from the school results records as tabulated below.

**Figure 2 Result Analysis for Grade 12s at Secondary School A (Grant Aided Mission School)**



The results shown from figure 2 above give something very unique about their results. The pass rate moved from 95% in 2010 to 97% in 2011 and thereafter maintained a 100% pass rate through and consistently for four years up to 2015. Respondents at secondary school A, when asked if reward system enhanced teacher performance, all the 33 participants (100%) - teachers, Heads of department and the Headteacher - strongly agreed of its positive impact on teacher performance as experienced at their school. At School A individual performance-based reward system was introduced in 2010 but was removed in 2013.

At secondary school B, 85% of the participants strongly agreed that performance-based reward system could positively enhance performance of teachers. This was supported by the Grade 12 result analysis for a period of 6 years as indicated from their school record for the Grade 12 national exams given below. Note that performance-based reward system was introduced in 2010 at secondary school B and was removed as an incentive in 2013.

**Figure 3 Grade 12 Result Analysis for Grade 12s at Secondary School B (Public School)**





Figure 3 shows Grade 12 results that appear to have a pattern of up and down scenario. Results for the Grade 12s improved by shifting from 67.9% in 2010 to 80.4% in 2011 through up to 2013 with 82.4% pass rate. There was some consistency in production of better results for only three years - 2011 to 2013. This improvement was however short lived. There however was a drastic fall in the pass rate from 82.4% in 2013 to 52.4% in 2014 and only 58% in 2015. About 39 teachers (81%), 5 heads of department (100%) and 1 headteacher of the secondary school B agreed that there was a high correlation between their school based reward system and individual teacher performance.

One teacher complained stating that

“Why did they remove the monthly incentive in 2013? It’s a pity this school is suffering from poor Grade 12 results because teachers are demoralized by such an act from the Provincial Educational Officer who enjoys a lot of duty allowances when teachers have almost none?”

At secondary school C all the 15 respondents (100%) strongly indicated that performance-based reward system had a positive effect on teacher performance. At school C, it must be noted that performance-based reward system had been in existence for more than 8 years. Below are the Grade 12 results that show a rather better and consistent range of performance.

**Figure 4 Grade 12 Result Analysis for Grade 12s at Secondary School C (Private School)**



Grade 12 results for secondary school C indicate consistency in production of relatively good results. It can be seen clearly that performance of teachers, expressed through pupils performance, was constantly at 90% or above 90% as shown in figure 4. Both teachers and management (Headteacher and Heads of Departments) strongly agreed to the fact that there was a high correlation between school based reward system and teacher performance at their school. To support the results given, one teacher attributed such performance to the reward systems put in place by stating that

“Since renewal of contract is performance-based, we simply put in our level best to remain on board. This method is fair to all the teachers”.

The third research question was -

#### **4.4 How do teachers perceive reward system obtaining in Secondary Schools of Kasama District?**

Respondents gave various answers to the third research question which sought teachers' perception on reward systems obtaining in the three secondary schools under study and their effect on teacher performance? The following responses were given as shown in the tables below:

**Table 4.8 Perception on the effectiveness of reward system obtaining at Secondary School A**

	<b>Number of Participants</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Teachers	27	100%
Heads of Department	5	100%
Head teacher	1	100%

The findings from the figures given in table 4.8 indicate that all the respondents at secondary school A valued the school based reward system practiced at their school. The rewards offered to teachers included monetary performance-based reward and social care in form of material goods. One long serving teacher and a head of department at secondary school A commented to say

“ this school remained stagnant at 95% pass rate with average results where only one pupil could get a single digit from a population of 100 grade 12 pupils.. This trend came to an end the moment monthly incentive was increased from 80 Zambian Kwacha to 300 Zambian Kwacha and through the introduction of performance-based rewards for examination classes simultaneously. That gesture humbled us as teachers, forcing literally everyone to work hard. Today our school produces up to 45 pupils with single digits at Grade 12 from a population of 100 pupils (Grade 12s).”

### Teacher Preference to Reward System

This section looks at the descending order of preference with regard to Performance-Based Reward systems. The table below gives the preference of the rewards that matter to teachers for the performance to be boosted.

**Table 5.1 Heads of Department and Teacher preference to the Reward System at Secondary School A**

Awards	Number of Participants	Percentage
Monetary performance-based reward	33	100
Monetary Monthly incentive	33	100
Social care	25	76
Certificate of Merit	5	15
Promotion	1	3

Results from table 5.1 indicate that the most preferred reward system, in the descending order, to both heads of department and teachers was monetary individual performance-based reward and social care. Certificate of merit and promotion appear to be un popular with very low value in motivating them.

**Table 5.2 Heads of Department and Teacher preference to the Reward System at Secondary School B**

<b>Awards</b>	<b>Number of Participants</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Monetary performance-based reward	43	81
Monetary Monthly incentive	53	100
Social care	25	76
Certificate of Merit	11	21
Promotion	9	15

Table 5.2 shows that the most preferred reward, in the descending order, at secondary school B was monthly monetary incentive followed by monetary performance-based reward. Social care came third while the least preferred were certificate of merit and promotion. In support of the monetary performance-based reward and the monthly incentive, one teacher stated that

“As teachers we prefer money form of reward because it gives us freedom to attend to various pressing matters in our homes. In addition very few teachers get duty allowances because we are glued to our classes. Besides we are too many for all to have such a privilege in schools that have erratic funding from the government”

**Table 5.3 Heads of Department and Teacher preference to the Reward System at Secondary School C**

<b>Awards</b>	<b>Number of Participants</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Monetary performance-based reward	12	86
Performance-Based Contract Renewal	14	100
Social care	10	71
Certificate of Merit	2	14
Promotion	1	7

Table 5.3 shows that the most preferred reward, in the descending order, at secondary school C was monthly monetary incentive followed by monetary performance-based reward. Social care came third in importance while the least preferred were certificate of merit and promotion.

**Table 5.4 Head Teacher’s Order of Preference towards Reward System**

Type of Reward	Number of Participants	Percentage (%)
Monetary performance-based reward	3	100
Promotion	3	100
Certificate of Merit	3	100
Social Care	2	67

Table 5.4 gives the descending order of headteacher’s preference towards the reward system implemented in their secondary schools. The first preferred reward system was Monetary performance-based reward (100%) followed by Promotions (100%), then Certificate of merit (100%) and lastly Social care at 67%. The head teacher at secondary school A passed on this comment for the best results the school is enjoying –

“ as a school the policy of performance-based reward plus the social care is our medicine for the best results we are enjoying. I make sure these two incentives that teachers love most are in place no matter the financial crisis. I prioritise that because it has made our lives as administrators comfortable by having self motivated teachers”. As an administrator I respect what is making my school be number one in the Province and one of the best schools in the Nation.”

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **DISCUSSION**

#### **5.0 Overview**

Chapter four has presented the research findings. This chapter discusses the findings of the study. All the research objectives have been addressed in this chapter, these include, assessing the reward systems used, establishing the effect of reward system on teacher performance and lastly assess the perceptions of teachers on reward system and its effects on teachers performance in the three secondary schools of Kasama district under study. The results of the study collected were interpreted by referring to the relevant literature and principal data sources such as questionnaires.

The first objective was -

#### **5.1 To assess the reward systems used in Secondary Schools of Kasama District.**

The findings of the study established that the most common types of rewards used in secondary schools were promotions, social care, certificate of merit and monetary reward based on performance. The study revealed however that, certificate of merit and promotion were so common due to the fact that they had no or little financial implications on the secondary schools. The phenomena was corroborated by Chait (2008) who indicated that traditionally there were a variety of models for recognizing employees on the basis of the quality of their performance. Among the models included paying employees, wholly or partially, on the basis of the quality of their performance. Noting the fact that public secondary schools receive inadequate funding from the government while private schools in Zambia are mostly aimed at profit making hence they ensure high level minimization of costs. So they cannot afford financial rewards to the performing teachers.

Odden and Kelley (2002) observe that most current systems of a salary scale are rewarded to teachers basing on the number of years spent teaching and the number of tertiary degrees, rather

than their performance. This is contrary to the Zambian context where promotions could be given according to the, one's relationship with the head teacher, District Education Officers or Provincial Education officer.

Social care was another incentive given to teachers once in a while in form of presents or packages. It was revealed that they had a cheaper financial implication to the school yet yielded high satisfaction to the performer. Such included giving out home utensils, clothes, Christmas gifts, organizing performance parties, giving uniforms to performing students and books and financial assistance to teachers furthering their studies. Such gifts were financially cheaper and did not strain the school budget.

As earlier on noted from the respondents social care, particularly, at Secondary School A were quite pronounced. Social care reward came in full force when monthly incentives were removed from the system through the Provincial Education Officer. Such gestures according to the teachers make them feel valued, treasured and needed by the institution. That creates a sense of belonging and ownership among the teachers. It is a simple and humble gesture but sends out a lot of love and togetherness in an educational institution like a school. By so doing teachers become more focused on attaining the vision and goals of the school. It takes a good administrator to realize that such gestures go a long way in energizing teachers to become more committed toward their work (Boddy, 2008).

Social care from the private secondary school was quite marginal. This is because they are oriented towards rewards that are pupil result based while at the same time ensured profit making from the venture. It came out from the respondents that private schools rarely support teachers in their academic advancement. If one happened to go for further studies their contracts were instantly terminated. At the private school under study, for instance, had the headteacher with a Primary school certificate qualification. Normally private schools have poorly qualified school managers who do not value teacher academic advancement due to fear of being replaced with a very highly qualified teacher. In addition private school do not have enough money to pay very qualified teachers in high positions (DEST Research Paper (2007).

Monetary performance based pay as observed from the findings was more pronounced at the mission secondary school compared to the government and the private secondary schools. According to the respondents, the idea of performance based reward done at the end of each year was only for exam classes and terms and conditions for one to get an award were collectively

made between the administrators and the teachers. Since the introduction of such a reward based on production of quality results reaching or exceeding the target of 75% in a particular class, performance of teachers increased tremendously compared to the time when monthly incentives (currently banned by the Provincial Education Officer) were introduced to all teachers across the board. Results for this mission school have tremendously gone up competing with the best schools in the country as observed from the results given.

As revealed by the respondents, reward system that focuses on mutual respect, Lindbald (2008) for instance observes, increases in employee retention, performance productivity and morale. A good reward system therefore, that is mutually agreed upon between the staff and the school principal, fulfills this need as teachers feel that their efforts are appreciated, recognized and respected. According to Horner (2009), high performing employees add value to the company, hence the need to recognize their efforts, worth and contributions through rewarding them appropriately. Highly motivated teachers for instance, who are also passionate about quality output from their schools are a huge treasure to any school and hence, everything should be done to retain them including putting in place an attractive school based reward system.

The second research objective was -

**5.2 To establish the effect of reward system on the performance of Secondary School teachers in Kasama District.**

As noted from the findings, performance-based rewards in all the three secondary schools under study were considered important due to the fact that they motivate teachers, promote good performance, improve on administrator/teacher relations, demonstrate a fair and equal treatment and contribute to individual records. It was also discovered that performance-based rewards demonstrate fair and equal treatment to teachers. Of all the schools under study teachers from the private school were the least paid. Salaries for public and mission secondary schools were average. As a supplement on the salary, rewards play a big role to cover up the gap. Head teachers disclosed that rewards acted as reinforcements to teachers' performance.

These results are similar to the works of James and McCallion (2001) who assert that interest in performance-based pay for teachers rose, in part, from a basic dissatisfaction with the traditional

salary schedule can therefore be approved. James and McCallion (2001) further maintain that many policy makers believed that the traditional salary schedule provided no incentive for teachers to demonstrate subject matter competence, improve teaching, or increase academic performance by students. The same applies to monthly incentives given across the board (to all teachers whether a performer or not), little if not no improvement in teacher performance was noted, hence such were banned in Northern Province.

This is also highlighted by Lavy (2007) who identified benefits of individual performance-based rewards as; improved productivity; that if rewards are based on student performance, they provide teachers with powerful signals about what is valued and what is not. Improved efficiency is another benefit Levy identified with reward system; he urged that individual performance-based pay schemes improve efficiency because they provide some incentive for teachers to 'do the right thing'. That is, they encourage teachers to find ways to enhance student performance; encourage individual teacher professional development; and discourage teachers who are unable to lift performance to continue in the profession.

From the turn of events in secondary school it is clearly observed that group performance base pay in form of monthly incentive is associated to the traditional salaries that are given to all teacher with the view of improving teacher performance. Since it was given to all performers and non-performers not much benefit was derived from it. The moment it became individualistic much effort was observed and results were produced as per expectation. OECD Paris, (2005) further indicate that while people who have chosen teaching as a career are chiefly motivated by 'intrinsic' rewards (such as wanting to make a difference), extrinsic factors such as remuneration are the most significant factors influencing people not to choose teaching as a career, and to leave the profession. It thus means that performance-based rewards play a significant role in the performance of teachers in secondary schools. So, performance-based pay seems to be a plausible way both to motivate teachers to direct effort at performance goals and to attract and retain teachers who are high performers.

It is worth noting that the awards were offered on merit hence the most performing teachers had the most awards forming the grounds for stiff competition among teachers which ultimately improved the general school performance. According to Horner (2009) for instance, rewards are an important tool for encouraging appropriate behavior as well as preventing the encouragement of a behavior that is not appropriate. Most schools reported various categories of monetary gains

which are listed here: Grade tokens – Most schools reported awarding a certain amount for pupil grades in each subject ranging from a score of merit and above, others rewarded any teacher that managed to score 100% pass for his or her class. The amounts differed from school to school with some reporting as little as 350 Zambian Kwacha while others could get as much as 500 Zambian Kwacha. Some teachers could get awards from two or three different classes that beat the quality target agreed upon as a school policy.

Generally, according to the document reviews, the highest paying schools seemed more established and posted very high mean scores indicating that monetary tokens were one of the highly motivating factors for the excellent performance.

Mean score tokens– Some respondents reported setting targets for subject mean scores. For example secondary school A had a mean score target of 75% pass rate with merit and distinction grades for each subject which if arrived at or exceeded, the teacher would be rewarded. On the other hand, to improve results for mathematics, secondary school A awarded any 10% positive improvement in the mean scores as compared to the performance in the previous years' National Examination set by the Examination Council of Zambia. This policy was maintained at this secondary school for 3 years leading to improved mathematics results for the Grade 12s. Each time a subject teacher made a 10% increase in the national examination, an award was given to the teacher. Within a space of 2 years, results for the grade 12 rose from the stagnant 75% to 100%. This remarkable positive result was attained not through monthly incentive but through individual performance based reward system.

Miscellaneous tokens included free tea break to keep teachers in school and reduce on late reporting for lessons especially after break; parties to celebrate good results; tours to exotic tourist points within the country, presents for Christmas and Easter Feasts. These tokens, according to most respondents, were put in place at their school to ensure every teacher present on the school compound then, whether on teaching practice, contract or permanent will all have some token to take home with. This according to most respondents created a sense of ownership of the school results and removed any sense of a feeling of alienation among those teachers who did not handle the previous candidate class.

Monetary reward system as observed from the respondents is the best motivator. This discovery is highly supported by Armstrong (2009) who argues that money is outrightly a powerful

motivating force due to its direct or indirect link to the satisfaction of many needs. Some of the reasons given for the preference of monetary tokens by teachers for example were the harsh economic times that made welcome any additional cent. Teachers also mentioned that they enjoyed the freedom to use the money as they acquired what they pleased from a place of their own choice. Armstrong (2009) for instance, observed that money in itself may have no intrinsic meaning to an individual but it acquires significant motivating power because of the so many intangible goals it may symbolize.

To emphasize the effect of performance-based rewards, DEST Research Paper (2007) quoted Harvey-Beavis (2003) identifying a range of responses in favor of performance-based rewards such as, School administration would improve, especially when school-based reward system are implemented. An emphasis on knowledge and skill and school-based reward system models would improve teacher motivation and increase collegiality. Student outcomes would improve. Proponents of pay-for-performance programs believe they will attract and retain better teachers if they are able to offer increased salaries to the best teachers. They argue that paying teachers poorly in the same way as those who work longer hours, engage more effectively with their students and consistently produce improved academic outcomes, is unfair, inequitable and does little to improve the overall quality of teaching.

Heads of department and the Headteacher at Secondary School A revealed that, they put in minimal supervision on their teachers because the fair school reward system had already energized them with a sense of commitment that pushed them to conduct remedial work and attend to their classes without being pushed. The reason given was that they had a target of producing qualitative results for them to qualify for the reward at the end of the year.

From the findings under secondary school B it could be noted that performance of teachers had improved tremendously upon the introduction of monthly monetary incentives to teachers. Results for grade 12 pupils greatly improved from 60.9% in 2010 to 80.4% in 2011. Better performance at this school remained constant for the three years when monetary monthly incentives were in operation. Results dropped drastically from the year monthly incentive was scrapped off. The findings show that ever since the ban on monthly incentive was declared towards the end of 2013, results for grade 12s dropped drastically in the successive years of 2014

(52.4%) and 2015 (58) respectively from a pass rate of 80.4% in 2013. This clearly shows a high correlation between rewards and teacher performance.

Though rewards that are performance based are seen to be producing results, other proponents argue that performance-based compensation programs encourage competition rather than collaboration among teachers (Harvey-Beavis, 2003). Many would argue that the concept of individual merit is at odds with the collegiate approach of effective schools, stifling collaboration and creating conflict and tension in the school environment. Nevertheless, Harvey-Beavis (2003) argument contradicts with the findings of Solomon and Podgursky (2001) who realized that performance-based reward systems can increase collegiality by rewarding cooperation between teachers especially through administering group-based rewards, also, (McCollum, 2001) proved it.

From the private school it can also be noted that the driving force for the wonderful results was not a result of good salaries but the rewards in form of contract renewal and salary increment. Salary increment was a reward used only at Secondary school C (private school). Respondents indicated that any teacher that managed to reach the agreed target of 95% pass rate for the Grade 12 national results was automatically awarded a salary increment. In addition since teachers were on contract, renewal of contract was based on teacher performance. The private school under study had few teachers employed due to insufficient funds. It is for this reason that one teacher could teach more than one subject adding to 40 periods per week. Since the majority of the teachers were retirees, performance-based contract renewal became a source of motivation for them to be retained through their hard work. This explains the reason why teachers have maintained a higher (90% or above) pupil performance for Grade 12 results.

This is indeed another typical proof of how small rewards as they may appear do the magic of enhancing teachers' performance. Low morale at the government school came as a result of disappointment by teachers to realize that their efforts were not appreciated when in the actual fact monthly incentive was given to them by the Parents, through the Parents Teachers' Association, that had seen the necessity to motivate teachers for them to be effective.

Lastly other opponents of pay-for-performance, on the other hand, argue that it is almost impossible to evaluate and measure teachers' performance fairly. They point to the many

variables involved in student academic outcomes, such as family support, socio-economic status, ethnicity, natural ability, location, and ask how can teacher performance be measured fairly?

It can be clearly pointed out that a lot of stakeholders fight the idea of motivating teachers financially. Little do they know that there are many organizations that get bonuses at the end of the for their excellent production. Appreciation pays and motivates a person from their inner spirit. This is because it borders on a sense of belonging and a feeling of being valued to be important in the processing and production of the desired results that determine people's future.

The third research objectives was -

### **5.3 To assess the perceptions of teachers on reward system and its effects on teachers performance.**

The findings from all the participants under study indicate that they all valued reward system and were very much aware of their positive results towards teacher performance. From the study participants indicated that of all the reward systems - monetary performance-based reward was the most preferred reward. This is in line with Armstrong (2009) who affirmed that money as a reward incentive is out rightly a powerful motivating force due to its direct or indirect link to the satisfaction of many needs This reward was favoured mostly by teachers and heads of departments because of its fairness. Respondents indicated that it was one method that was not subject to issues such as favouritism, corruption and nepotism to mention a few. Besides that eachers further indicated that they felt good to be appreciated for their effort. Lastly it being nonetary helped to sort out some domestic issues in their homes.

Performance-based rewards are very pronounced in all the secondary schools under study. The reason being that head teachers are tasked by the employer to produce quality results, hence have realized that performance-based rewards would easily enhance teachers morale to be more committed and productive in their performance. It was however pointed out by head teachers that insufficient funds in schools at times posed a challenge to award a huge number of teachers leading to low monetary rewards. Nevertheless, teachers appreciated the little effort put in by the administrators.

From the findings monthly incentive was their second best form of reward preferred by teachers and heads of department. They indicated that teaching career is such a one that attracts less allowance compared to other professions. The monetary aspect gave them empowerment to handle most of their domestic needs thereby encouraging them to work hard creating in them a sense of responsibility. Unfortunately that form of reward was banned after seeing no change in pupils' results at grade 12. The other problem was that it was so low to make any difference. Respondents revealed that monthly monetary incentive was quite low due to insufficient funds from the grants received from the government. And so the only source of funding was school fees from the pupils which apparently was not enough to give a handsome monetary monthly allowance to teachers. .

Social care incentive was perceived to be their third best form of reward. This incentive according to the respondents was in form of an allowance towards teacher's furthering their studies and also in form of material during bereavement and sickness. Teachers indicated that gifts in form of foodstuffs, microwave, mattresses, kitchen utensils to mention a few were used under social care.

The findings also indicated that in moments when schools had insufficient funds, they resorted to material form of reward. That was because such had a cheaper financial implication to the school yet yield high satisfaction to the performer. The head teacher commented that, ".....Packages, presents and gifts such as home utensils, clothes, Christmas gifts, organizing performance parties, giving uniforms to performing students and books. Such gifts were financially cheaper not to constrain the school....."

Promotion, as a reward, was one among other rewards given to teachers to boost their performance but was not popular to teachers at all. The study established that teachers did not like this form of reward because there were very few positions available. One respondent remarked, "when a teacher is appointed on promotion it takes years for one to be confirmed so as to enjoy the salary increase. At times "Promotions are given according to one's relationship with the headteacher" leaving out performing teachers in the cold. Teachers in all the schools under study saw no need for them to work for their promotion. The negative attitude towards it was based on the understanding that usually promotions were not based on teacher performance but other connections such as corruption, nepotism, tribalism with either the headteacher, district or provincial education officers. They too indicated that there were just too few positions for all of

the teaching to fight for and perhaps only get them when near to retirement. Certificate of merit was one last form of rewards available in schools but was unpopular to many teachers.

Heads of Departments indicated that a lot of commitment had been instilled so much that there was less supervision on the part of HODs. The main aim of a school manager is to promote teacher commitment for effective teacher performance in class. Furthermore the study revealed that rewards in form of certificates were much needed by teachers for record purposes; to add onto the Curriculum Vitae. One teacher stated; "it is useless to appreciate me in public without giving me anything for my records. I need papers for my future". To the head teachers however, issuing of commendable certificates was mainly to minimise on rewards that were in monetary form.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **6.0 Overview**

This research set out to investigate the effects of reward system on teacher performance: a case of three secondary schools in Kasama district. This chapter concludes the study and also makes recommendations based on the major findings of the study.

#### **6.1 Conclusion**

This study examined the effects of reward system on teacher performance from a purposive sample of three secondary schools of Kasama district. Data for the study was collected from 102 respondents of which 3 were headteachers, 15 head of department and 84 teachers. With varying education levels, the majority of the respondents had been working for over 5 years in the schools studied. This implies that teachers were already conversant with the reward systems in their respective schools and were therefore expected to assess how such motivational factors had affected their performance at work. Consequently, some of the study findings agree with the conceptual framework that was developed to guide the study while others do not. In all, however, the study found that rewards that were performance-based were necessary for high performance of teachers although in most cases teachers were poorly motivated.

Below, conclusions of the study have been presented in line with the specific objectives of the study

A) To assess the perceptions of teachers on reward system and its effects on teachers performance.

The first objective was -

## **6.2 To assess the reward systems used in Secondary Schools of Kasama District.**

The study established that promotion, social care, monetary performance-based reward and certificate of merit were the dominant rewards given to teachers in the three secondary schools under study. Reward in form of promotion and certificate of merit were preferred to monetary form of reward by school administrators due to lack of adequate funds. Purposely, all these performance based rewards were put in place by the school administrators as measures on how to enhance teacher performance which directly led to the improvement of pupil performance in their final examinations. In short, performance-based rewards were put in place to motivate teachers, promote good performance, improve on administrator/teacher relations, demonstrate a fair and equal treatment, and contribute to individual records.

The second objective was -

## **6.3 To establish the effect of reward system on the performance of Secondary School teachers in Kasama District.**

It was established that reward systems that were performance-based highly motivated and increased the commitment and efficiency of teachers. As observed from the findings, introduction of performance-based rewards saw a consistent and dramatic increase in teacher's performance and commitment the moment leading to tremendous improvement of pupils' performance. Besides the improvement of pupils' performance, schools administrators benefited a lot through reduced supervision on teacher that became self motivated to teach and beat the target that would earn them an award and a good name at the same time.

The third objective was -

## **6.4 Perception of teachers on the effectiveness of performance-based rewards towards teacher performance**

Teachers perceived performance-based reward system to be the answer to the long standing problem of poor teacher performance that manifested itself through poor pupil performance in the Grade 12 national examinations. Teachers pointed out that the best reward system that

energised teacher performance was the monetary performance-based reward system. This method not only made teachers feel good for the individual recognition, it helped them attend to one or two of their basic needs and lastly increased their future promotion endeavours. It was also established from the findings that performance-based rewards were fair and equal in treatment. That fairness made teachers that are hardworking to put in their level best knowing that they shall get what was due to them without any other strings attached.

## **6.5 Recommendations**

- Administrators should be trained and sensitized on the value of performance-based rewarding systems. They should be made aware that monetary rewards that are performance-based motivate teachers to perform at their best. This means that to implement a performance-based scheme, administrators should not perceive the process as being expensive and time consuming, but rather, a necessity.
- To accommodate all the schools in the country, government through the Ministry of General Education should adopt the performance-based reward system in form of salary increment to teachers that manage to reach the target according to the agreed set standards. That way all teachers in the country would give no lame excuses.
- Ministry of General Education should introduce a policy that would base all promotions on authentic production of good results, to create a hard working culture and not corruption.

## **Areas for Future Research**

The results of the study have revealed that there has been strong opposition towards reward systems in Zambia as a whole, by top educational managers. The research should focus on why there is this strong opposition by top educational managers like Provincial Educational Officers when poor performance of teachers in public secondary schools remains a major national problem that they have failed to solve.

## REFERENCES

- Alam, T. M. (2011). Factors Affecting Teachers Motivation. *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, 2(1), 298-304.
- Adeyemi, B. (2010). *Teacher Related Factors as Correlates of Pupils Achievement in Social Studies in South West Nigeria*. *Electronic J. Res. Educ. Psych.* 8(1):313-332.
- Adediwura A. & Tayo, B. (2007). Perception of Teachers' Knowledge Attitude and Teaching Skills as Predictor of Academic Performance in Nigerian Secondary Schools. *Educational Research and Review*, 2(7): 165-171.
- American Federation of Teachers, (2001). *Merit Pay -15 Tan 2003* from [<http://www.aft.org/issues/muntpay/meritpat.htm/>]
- American Federation of Teachers, (2003). "Merit Pay," Working Paper, [www.aft.org/issues/meritpay/meritpay.html](http://www.aft.org/issues/meritpay/meritpay.html)
- Armstrong, M. (2004). *Reward Management. A hand book of Remuneration Strategy and Practice*. Fifth Edition, Kogan Page Limited London UK.
- Armstrong, M. (2009). *Armstrong's Hand Book of Human Resource Management Practice*.
- Babbie, E. (2007). *The Practice of Social Research*. Eleventh Edition., Thomas Higher Education, 10 Davis Drive USA.
- Ballou, D., & Podgursky, M. (1993). Teachers' attitudes toward merit pay: Examining conventional wisdom. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 47, 50–61.
- Ballou, D. & Podgursky, M.(2001). *Let the market decide*. *Education Next*, 1(1), 1-7.
- Ballou, D. (2001). "Pay for Performance in Public and Private Schools." *Economics of Education Review*, 20 (1), 51–61.
- Barnett, C.W., Matthews, H.W., & Jackson, R.A. (2003). *Comparison Between Student Rating and Faculty*.
- Bennell, P. (2004). *Teacher motivation and incentives in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia*. Knowledge and Skills for Development, Brighton.
- Bett, W.K., Onyango, M & Bantu, E.(2013). *Role of Teacher Motivation on Student's Examination Performance at Secondary School Level in Kenya* (a case study of Kericho district).
- Blankstein, A.M. (1996). Why TCM Can't Work – and a School Where it did. *The Education Digest*, 62(1): 27 – 30.

- Boddy, D. (2008). *Management: An introduction*. Fourth edition, Prentice Hall.
- Bryson, A., Freeman, R., Lucifora, C., Pellizzari, M., & Perotin, V. (2011). *Paying for Performance Incentive Pay Schemes and Employees' Financial Participation*.
- Carron, G. (1996). *The quality of primary schools in different development context*. UNESCO, Paris, International institute of educational planning.
- Chait, R. (2008). "From Qualifications to Results, Promoting Teacher Effectiveness Through Federal Policy". Washington: Center for American Progress.
- Chamberlin, R., Wragg, T., Haynes, G. & Wragg, C. (2002). *Research Papers in Education*, 17 (1), pp 31-49. 'Performance-related pay and the teaching profession: a review of the literature'
- Chaudhary, P. (2014). A Study Over Expectancy Theory Of Motivation In Small Scale Industries In Ncr. *International Journal of Research & Development in Technology and Management Science* – Kailash Volume – 21, ISSUE 1 , 978-1-63102-445-0 . <http://www.ijrdtm.com>.
- Clotfelter, Charles, Glennie, E., Ladd, H., & Vigdor, J. (2008). "Teacher Bonuses and Teacher Retention in Low Performing Schools: Evidence from the North Carolina \$1,800 Teacher Bonus Program." *Public Finance Quarterly*, 36 (1), 63–87.
- Creswell, J. W. (2009). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 3rd Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Cutler, T & Waine, B. (2000). 'Mutual Benefits or managerial control? The role of appraisal in performance related pay for teachers', *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 48 (2), pp 170-182.
- DEST Research Paper (2007). *Performance-based rewards for teachers: Surveys and Workforce Analysis Section, Skills Analysis and Quality Systems Branch*.
- Examination Council of Zambia (2014). "Highlights on the 2014 Examinations Performance": Presented During The National Performance Review Meeting Held At Pamodzi Hotel from 28<sup>th</sup> to 29<sup>th</sup> April 2015.
- Evans, D. (2001). No merit in merit pay. *American School Board Journal* 1981.
- Fowler Jr., Floyd J. & Carol Cosenza. (2008). "Writing Effective Questions." Pp. 136-60 in *International Handbook of Survey Methodology*, edited by Edith D. de Leeuw, Joop J. Hox, and Don A. Dillman. Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Guthrie, J.W. & Springer, M.G. (2006). *Teacher pay for performance: Sound and lasting policy or another education reform fad*. April 5th, p. 42.
- Hanushek, E, & Rivkin, S. (2004). "How to Improve the Supply of High-Quality Teachers." *Brookings Papers on Education Policy*, 7-25. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

Harvey-Beavis, O. (2003). *Performance-related rewards for teachers: A literature review*. Distributed at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers Conference in Athens, Greece.

Hassel, B.C. (2002). *Better pay for better teaching: Making teacher pay payoff in the age of accountability*. PPI Policy Report. Washington, DC: Progressive Policy Institute.

Hertzberg, F. (1966). *Work and the nature of man*. Cleveland: World Publishing.

Hornby, A., S. (2000). *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*. Oxford University Press.

Horner, R. (2009). *The Impact of Rewards on intrinsic motivation*.

IIEP (2004). *Teachers: A Priority*, IIEP Newsletter Vol. XXII, No. 1, January-March, Paris: IIEP.

Ingersoll, R.M. (2004). "Why Do High-Poverty Schools Have Difficulty Staffing Their Classrooms with Qualified Teachers?" Washington: Center for American Progress.

James, B. S., & McCallion, G. (2001). *Performance-Based Pay for Teachers*, paper for CRS Report for Congress

Joshua, M.T., Joshua, A.M., Kritsonis, A.W. (2006). Use of Students' Achievement Scores as Basis for Assessing Teachers' Instructional Effectiveness: Issues and Research Results. *National Forum of Teacher Education Journal*, 17(3): 1-13.

Kelley, C., Heneman, H., & Milanowski, A. (2002). Teacher motivation and school-based performance rewards. *Education Administration Quarterly*, 38 (3), 372-401.

Khan, K.U., Farooq, S.U., & Ullah, M.I. (2010). *The Relationship between Rewards and Employee Motivation in Commercial Banks of Pakistan*. Res. J. Int. Stud. 14: 37 – 52.

Kirimi, F.K., Gikunda, R.M., Obara, J & Kibett, J. (2013). Influence of Selected Motivational Factors on the Performance of Secondary School Agriculture Teachers in Imenti South District, Kenya. *International Journal of Education and Research*, Vol. 1 No. 6 June 2013.

Kituyi, I ., Musau, N. M., & Thinguri, R. (2014). An evaluation of the effectiveness of school based reward systems in enhancing teacher performance in secondary schools in Kenya. *International Journal of Education and Research*, Vol. 2 No. 4.

Koretz, D. (2002), "Limitations in the Use of Achievement Tests as Measures of Educators' Productivity," *Journal of Human Resources*, vol. 37, 4, pp. 752-778.

Lavy, V. (2002a). "Paying for Performance: The Effect of Teachers' Financial Outcomes on Students' Scholastic Outcomes," mimeo.

- Lavy, V. (2004). *Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics*. National Bureau for Economic Research Working Paper 10622. Cambridge: NBER.
- Lavy, V., (2007). Using Performance-Based Pay to Improve the Quality of Teachers, *Journal of Political Economy*, VOL. 17 / NO. 1.
- Lavy, V., (2009). "Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity, and Grading Ethics." *American Economic Review* 99 (5), 1979–2011.
- Lazear, E. P. (2003). "Teacher incentives." *Swedish Economic Policy Review* 10, no. 3: 179- 214.
- Lindbald, M. (2008). *The Importance of Motivation and Reward System in the Work Place*.
- Lorna, C.N. et al (2010). *Perceived factors influencing public secondary schools teachers job satisfaction in Busia district, Kenya*.
- Maicibi N.A., (2003). *Pertinent issues in employee's management: human resource and educational management*. Kampala. Net Media Monitor Publishers.
- Malen, B. (1999). "On Rewards, Punishments, and Possibilities: Teacher Compensation as an Instrument for Education Reform," *Journal of Personnel Evaluation in Education* 12, no. 4 pp. 387–94.
- McCollum, S. (2001). 'How merit pay improves education', *Educational Leadership*, 58 (5), pp 21-24.
- Ministry of Education (2014). "*Education For All 2015 National Review Report: Zambia*".
- Ministry of Education (2000). High School Division. *Individual Teacher Bonuses Based on Student Performance: Pilot Program* (Jerusalem; in Hebrew).
- MESVTEE (2015). "*Education For All 2015 National Review Report: Zambia*". Lusaka.
- Mohanty, J. (2000). *Current Trends in Higher Education*. New Dehli: Deep and Deep.
- Murnane, R. J., & Cohen, D. (1986). Merit pay and the evaluation problem: Why most merit pay plans fail and few survive. *Harvard Education Review*, 56, 1–17.
- Mwanza, P. (2004). *Teacher Perception of school Management Practice and their Influence on Teacher Performance in Selected High Schools*. M. Ed. Thesis University of Zambia (un published).
- Nadeem, M., Rana, S.M., Lone, H.A., Maqbool, S., Naz, K & Ali, A. (2011). Teacher's Competencies and Factors Affecting the Performance of Female Teachers in Bahawalpur (Southern Punjab) Pakistan. *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, 2(19), 486-497.

Nuhfer, E. B. (2004). *Fractals and the Value of Student Evaluators*. Centre for Teaching and Learning, Idaho State University. Retrieved October 3 2005 from [www.isu.edu/ct/facultydev/extras/meaningevalsfract\\_files/MeaningEvalsfract.htm](http://www.isu.edu/ct/facultydev/extras/meaningevalsfract_files/MeaningEvalsfract.htm)

Neuman, L. W. (2003). *Social Research Methods, Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, Fifth Edition, London.

Odden, A. (2000a). 'New and better forms of teacher compensation are possible'

Odden, A. (2000b). 'Paying Teachers for Performance', *School Business Affairs*, June, pp 28-31.29.

Odden, A (2001) 'Defining Merit', *Education Matters*, 1 (1), pp 16-24.

Odden, A., & Kelley, C. (2002). *Paying Teachers For What They Know And Do: New And Smarter OECD*, at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/47/34077553.pdf>,

OECD, (2005). *Teachers matter: Attracting, developing and retaining effective teachers*. Paris: OECD Publications.

Podgursky, M., & Springer, M. (2007). "Teacher Performance Pay: A Review." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*. 26 (4), 909–950.

Slotnick, W.J., & Smith, M.D. (2004). *Catalyst for Change: Pay for Performance in Denver Final Report* . Boston: Community Training and Assistance Center.

Starr, L. (2002). Measuring the Effects of Effective Teaching . *Education World*. Retrieved from [www.education-world.com/a\\_issues.shtml](http://www.education-world.com/a_issues.shtml).

Steele, J.L., Murnane, R.J. & Willett, J.B. (2009). "Do Financial Incentives Help Low-Performing Schools Attract and Keep Academically Talented Teachers? Evidence from California" (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 14780.

Susan, B. et. al (2012). Motivation and Quality of Work Life among Secondary School EFL Teachers. *Australian Journal of Teacher Education*, Vol 37, 7, 30.

UNESCO (2006). *Guidebook for Planning Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction*.i.i.e.p

Yamoah, E. E. (2013). *Reward system and Teachers performance*. Evidence from Ghana.

Woessmann, I. (2010). *Cross-Country Evidence on Teacher Performance Pay*. Munich: University of Munich and Ifo Institute.

## **APPENDIX A: Questionnaire for Teachers**

**THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA IN COLLABORATION WITH ZIMBABWE OPEN  
UNIVERSITY**

**SCHOOL OF EDUCATION**

**DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY STUDIES**

Dear Respondent,

I am a postgraduate student at the University of Zambia in Collaboration with Zimbabwe Open University (UNZA-ZOU). I am conducting a research on the influence of reward system on teacher performance: A case study of St Therese Girl's Secondary School in Kasama District. You have been randomly selected to participate in this study by way of this questionnaire. The information you give is purely for academic purposes and will be treated with complete confidentiality. Your anonymity is highly guaranteed, as you do not have to indicate your name or any other form of identification on this questionnaire. It is important that you be honest in your responses. Your input will help improve the standards of education in the secondary schools of Northern Province.

### **INSTRUCTIONS**

- B) Please put a tick in the brackets [ ] provided against your answer.
- C) Put your answers in the spaces provided

## PERSONAL DETAILS OF THE INTERVIEWEE

1. Name of the school. \_\_\_\_\_
  
2. What is your sex?
  - a) Male [ ]
  - b) Female [ ]
  
3. What is your age?
  - a) 20- 25 years [ ]
  - b) 26- 30 years [ ]
  - c) 31- 35 years [ ]
  - d) 36- 40 years [ ]
  - e) Above 41 years [ ]
  
4. What is your highest level of qualification?
  - a) Teaching Certificate [ ]
  - b) Diploma [ ]
  - c) Degree [ ]
  - d) Masters degree [ ]
  - e) PhD [ ]
  
5. How long have you been a teacher?
  - a) 0 – 4 years [ ]
  - b) 5 – 10 years [ ]
  - c) 11 – 15 years [ ]

- d) 16 – 20 years [ ]
- e) 21 – 25 years [ ]
- f) Above 26 years [ ]

6. For how long have you been in this position?

- a) 0 – 4 years [ ]
- b) 5 – 10 years [ ]
- c) 11 – 15 years [ ]
- d) 16 – 20 years [ ]
- e) 21 – 25 years [ ]
- f) Above 26 years [ ]

7. How would you rate the reputation of this school?

- a) Average [ ]
- b) Above average [ ]
- c) Excellent [ ]
- d) Below average [ ]
- e) Poor [ ]

8) Which departments has been producing quality results for the last 5 years?

- a) Languages department [ ]
- b) Social sciences department [ ]
- c) Mathematics department [ ]
- d) Home Economics department [ ]
- e) Science department [ ]
- f) Business department [ ]

g) Art department [ ]

9. Currently which department do you belong to?

a) Languages department [ ]

b) Social sciences department [ ]

c) Mathematics department [ ]

d) Home Economics department [ ]

e) Science department [ ]

f) Business department [ ]

g) Art department [ ]

10. Is there any performance based reward system obtaining at your School?

a) Yes [ ]

b) No [ ]

11. If yes tick the ones which apply at this school.

a) Grade 9 and 12 Final Performance based results award. [ ]

b) Material form [ ]

c) Social care [ ]

d) Promotion [ ]

e) Monthly incentive [ ]

12. Of the reward systems in 11) above, state only one award that makes teachers perform more?

---

13. Give the reasons for your answer in 12 above..

- 1. \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. \_\_\_\_\_

14. What brought about performance based reward system at your School?

- a) poor results [ ]
- b) average results [ ]
- c) good but not qualitative results [ ]

\_\_\_\_\_

15. How many times are your teachers awarded by the school administration in a year?

\_\_\_\_\_

16. When are teachers awarded in a year?

- i) \_\_\_\_\_
- ii) \_\_\_\_\_
- iii) \_\_\_\_\_
- iv) \_\_\_\_\_
- v) \_\_\_\_\_

17. What does the school authority do to motivate teachers that could not meet the target for an award?

- i) \_\_\_\_\_
- ii) \_\_\_\_\_

18. Have you been rewarded in the last 5 years?

a) Yes [ ]

b) No [ ]

19. If yes, what system recommended such a one for an award?

a) The Administration [ ]

b) The school policy [ ]

20. How many teachers from your department have received an award more than once for their good performance, that is, school results since 2010?

a) 2 [ ]

b) 3 [ ]

c) 4 [ ]

d) 5 [ ]

e) more than 5 [ ]

21. Which subject has recorded the highest number of awards from your department since 2010?

\_\_\_\_\_

22. What could be the contributing factor for this highest number of awards in the school?

a) \_\_\_\_\_

b) \_\_\_\_\_

c) \_\_\_\_\_

23. In the last five years, in which subjects is 100% consecutively recorded at Grade 12 level?

- a) English [ ]
- b) Mathematics [ ]
- c) Geography [ ]
- d) History [ ]
- e) Christian Religious Education [ ]
- f) Commerce [ ]
- g) Home Management [ ]
- i) Science [ ]
- j) Biology [ ]
- k) Bemba [ ]

24. Is the rewarding system fair?

- a) strongly
- b) agree
- c) not sure
- d) disagree
- e) strongly disagree

25. If YES, how fair is the rewarding system for your subjects in your department?

---



---

#### EFFECTS OF REWARD SYSTEM ON TEACHER'S PERFORMANCE

26. How often do you monitor your teachers?

- a) daily [ ]
- b) once in a week [ ]

c) twice in a week [ ]

d) for every lesson [ ]

27. Are your teachers self motivated?

---

28. Are you self motivated in performing your duties?

f) strongly

g) agree

h) not sure

i) disagree

j) strongly disagree

29. Give the reason for your answer in question 29.

---

---

30. Does the amount received as an award influence teacher performance?

a) Strongly agree

b) agree

c) not sure

d) disagree

e) strongly disagree

#### TEACHER PERCEPTION ON REWARD SYSTEM REGARDING PERFORMANCE

31. All pupils can perform better if teachers are adequately rewarded for their commitment.

i) strongly agree [ ]

- ii) agree [ ]
- iii) not sure [ ]
- iv) disagree [ ]
- v) strongly disagree [ ]

32. Reward system is a motivation to effective teacher performance.

- i) strongly agree [ ]
- ii) agree [ ]
- iii) not sure [ ]
- iv) disagree [ ]
- v) strongly disagree [ ]

33. Are there any other rewards which you feel can enhance teacher performance?

- i) Yes [ ]
- ii) No [ ]

34. If Yes in 33 above, state them.

- i) \_\_\_\_\_
- ii) \_\_\_\_\_
- iii) \_\_\_\_\_

35. Which reward systems do you think can apply to institutions that do not have the financial capability?

- i) \_\_\_\_\_
- ii) \_\_\_\_\_

iii) \_\_\_\_\_

36. Which reward systems would produce the best results for the pupils and excellent performance on the part of teachers?

i) \_\_\_\_\_

ii) \_\_\_\_\_

iii) \_\_\_\_\_

## **APPENDIX B: Interview Schedule for The Head of Departments and The Headteacher**

**THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA IN COLLABORATION WITH ZIMBABWE OPEN  
UNIVERSITY**

**SCHOOL OF EDUCATION**

**DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY STUDIES**

Dear Respondent,

I am a postgraduate student at the University of Zambia in Collaboration with Zimbabwe Open University (UNZA-ZOU). I am conducting a research on the influence of reward system on teacher performance: A case study of St Therese Girl's Secondary School in Kasama District. You have been randomly selected to participate in this study by way of this questionnaire. The information you give is purely for academic purposes and will be treated with complete confidentiality. Your anonymity is highly guaranteed, as you do not have to indicate your name or any other form of identification on this questionnaire. It is important that you be honest in your responses. Your input will help improve the standards of education in the secondary schools of Northern Province.

### **INSTRUCTIONS**

- D) Please put a tick in the brackets [ ] provided against your answer.
- E) Put your answers in the spaces provided

**PERSONAL DETAILS OF THE INTERVIEWEE**

1. Name of the school. \_\_\_\_\_

2. What is your sex?

a) Male [ ]

b) Female [ ]

3. How old are you.?

\_\_\_\_\_

4. What is your highest level of qualification?

\_\_\_\_\_

5. How long have you been a teacher?

\_\_\_\_\_

6. For how long have you been heading this school?

\_\_\_\_\_

7. How would you rate the reputation of this school compared to government schools in your district?

\_\_\_\_\_

8) Which departments in your school have been producing quality results for the last 5 years?

---

9. Currently which department are you serving?

---

10. Is there any performance based reward system obtaining at your School?

---

11. If yes which ones apply at this school.

---

12. Of the reward systems in 11 above, state only one award that makes teachers perform effectively?

---

13. Give the reasons for your answer in 12 above..

1. 

---

2. 

---

3. 

---

14. What brought about performance based reward system at your School?

---

---

---

15. How many times are your teachers awarded by the school administration in a year?

---

16. When are teachers awarded in a year?

---

17. What does the school authority do to motivate teachers that could not meet the target for an award?

) \_\_\_\_\_

i) \_\_\_\_\_

8. Have you been rewarded in the last 5 years?

---

9. If yes, what system recommended such a one for an award?

---

0. How many teachers have received an award more than once for their good performance, that is, school results since 2010?

---

1. Which subject has recorded the highest number of awards since 2010?

---

2. What could be the contributing factor for this highest number of awards in the school?

---

3. In the last five years, in which subjects is 100% consecutively recorded at Grade 12 level?

---

24. How does the amount received as an award influence teacher performance?

---

---

---

---

25. How do you ensure fairness in rewarding teachers?

---

---

---

---

EFFECTS OF REWARD SYSTEM ON TEACHER'S PERFORMANCE

26. How often do you monitor your teachers?

---

27. Are teachers self motivated?

---

28. Is there maximum monitoring on the part of Heads of Department?

---

29. Are you self motivated in performing your duties?

---

30. Give the reason for your answer in question 29.

---

---

---

HEADTEACHER'S PERCEPTION ON REWARD SYSTEM REGARDING PERFORMANCE

31. Can teachers perform better if they are adequately rewarded for their commitment.

---

---

32. Does reward system enhance effective teacher performance.

---

---

33. Are there any other rewards which you feel can enhance teacher performance?

---

---

34. If Yes in question 33 above, state them.

i) \_\_\_\_\_

ii) \_\_\_\_\_

iii) \_\_\_\_\_

35. Which reward systems do you think can apply to institutions that do not have the financial capability?

i) \_\_\_\_\_

ii) \_\_\_\_\_

iii) \_\_\_\_\_

36. Which reward systems would produce the best results for the pupils and excellent performance on the part of teachers?

i) \_\_\_\_\_

ii) \_\_\_\_\_

iii) \_\_\_\_\_

**APPENDIX C: LETTER OF PERMISSION REQUEST FROM THE DEB**

St Mary's College of Education,

P.O Box 420210,

Mbala.

18<sup>th</sup> April, 2016.

The District Education Board Secretary,

P.O Box 410175,

Kasama.

UFS The Headteacher,

Kasama Girl's Secondary School,


P. o Box 410194,,

Kasama.

*AA*

*DESO for DEBS*

*A. S. M. Headteacher*



Dear Sir,

**RE: PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT AN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AT THREE OF YOUR SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN YOUR DISTRICT.**

I write to ask for permission to carry out an educational research at the following Secondary Schools in your district: Kasama Girl's, St Therese Girl's and Lethabo.

I am a Senior Lecturer of History and Philosophy of Education at St Mary's College of Education and a post graduate student at the University of Zambia in Collaboration with Zimbabwe Open University pursuing a Master of Education Degree in Educational Management (M.Ed). The research I intend to carry out is for the fulfillment of the partial requirements for the award of the said degree.

I hope my application will meet your kindest consideration.

Yours Faithfully,

Chitimwango Moses

TS No. 804988

APPENDIX E: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION FROM UNZA-ZOU



**THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA**

**INSTITUTE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION**

Telephone: 26021-1-291777-78 Ext. 3500 0978772249  
Telegrams: UNZA LUSAKA  
Telex: UNZALU ZA 44370  
Fax: 26021-1-290719  
Your Ref:  
Our Ref:

P.O. Box 32379  
LUSAKA, ZAMBIA

29<sup>th</sup> February, 2016

**TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN**

Dear Sir/Madam,

**RE: CONFIRMATION OF STUDY - CHIMWANDA MOSES (MEd)**

Reference is made to the above subject.

This serves as a confirmation that the above mentioned STUDENT of NRC Number 307883/33/1 and computer number 714802945, is a bonafide student of the University of Zambia in collaboration with the Zimbabwe Open University (UNZA-ZOU). CHIMWANDA MOSES is pursuing a Master of EDUCATION IN EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT programme.

Any assistance rendered to him/her will be greatly appreciated.

Prof. Boniface Namangala (PhD)  
**DIRECTOR**  
**INSTITUTE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION**

